[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 112-12]
THE STATUS OF UNITED STATES STRATEGIC FORCES
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 2, 2011
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio, Chairman
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MO BROOKS, Alabama RICK LARSEN, Washington
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California
JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia BETTY SUTTON, Ohio
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
Kari Bingen, Professional Staff Member
Leonor Tomero, Professional Staff Member
Alejandra Villarreal, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2011
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, March 2, 2011, The Status of United States Strategic
Forces......................................................... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, March 2, 2011......................................... 35
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 2, 2011
THE STATUS OF UNITED STATES STRATEGIC FORCES
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Sanchez, Hon. Loretta, a Representative from California, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces....................... 3
Turner, Hon. Michael, a Representative from Ohio, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces............................... 1
WITNESSES
Kehler, Gen. C. Robert, USAF, Commander, United States Strategic
Command........................................................ 4
Miller, Hon. James N., Ph.D., Principal Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, U.S. Department of Defense................. 6
Payne, Dr. Keith B., Commissioner, Congressional Commission on
the Strategic Posture of the United States..................... 25
Perry, Dr. William J., Chairman, Congressional Commission on the
Strategic Posture of the United States......................... 24
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Kehler, Gen. C. Robert....................................... 45
Miller, Hon. James N......................................... 72
Payne, Dr. Keith B........................................... 104
Perry, Dr. William J......................................... 92
Sanchez, Hon. Loretta........................................ 42
Turner, Hon. Michael......................................... 39
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Larsen................................................... 117
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Dr. Fleming.................................................. 138
Mr. Franks................................................... 132
Mr. Heinrich................................................. 135
Ms. Sanchez.................................................. 127
Mr. Turner................................................... 121
THE STATUS OF UNITED STATES STRATEGIC FORCES
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 2, 2011.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:30 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael Turner
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
OHIO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Turner. Welcome to the first subcommittee hearing of
the 112th Congress. I would like to commend Mr. Langevin on his
leadership for the 111th Congress and congratulate Ms. Sanchez
on selection as our new ranking member.
I would also like to welcome our new members on the
subcommittee: Mo Brooks, John Fleming, John Garamendi, Scott
Rigell, Dutch Ruppersberger, Austin Scott and Betty Sutton.
Glad to have another Ohioan on the subcommittee.
Since we organized at the end of January, our subcommittee
has conducted several overview briefings on various aspects of
the strategic forces portfolio. Just yesterday, officials from
OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] Policy and U.S.
Strategic Command briefed Members on the administration's
nuclear policy and posture.
Today's hearing provides our subcommittee with the
opportunity to review the status of U.S. strategic forces.
Since last year's strategic posture hearing a number of notable
events have occurred, and several new policy documents have
been released that affect our Nation's strategic posture and
which ultimately frame the administration's fiscal year 2012
budget request.
We will hear from four distinguished witnesses. On our
first panel we are joined by General Bob Kehler, the new
Commander of U.S. Strategic Command; and Dr. Jim Miller,
Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
I believe the committee's oversight is further enhanced
through additional perspectives outside of the traditional
Department of Defense witnesses we usually hear from.
Therefore, I asked Dr. Bill Perry and Dr. Jim Schlesinger, the
Chairman and Vice Chairman of the U.S. Strategic Posture
Commission, to provide their views on our Nation's strategic
posture and the changes that have occurred in the last few
years. Dr. Schlesinger was unable to join us today. Our
thoughts are with him, and I appreciate Dr. Keith Payne filling
in for him.
I want to thank each of our witnesses for appearing today
and thank them for their service and leadership.
I will keep my comments brief to allow ample time for
Members to ask questions; however, I would like to highlight
four areas of concern, and I hope our witnesses will address
these issues here today.
First, the ink is barely dry on the New START [Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty] Treaty, and administration officials are
already discussing further nuclear force reductions. The
assumption appears to be that more arms control and deeper cuts
to U.S. forces is desirable and puts us further down the path
to a ``world free of nuclear weapons,'' a vision the President
described in his 2009 Prague speech. We must be careful here.
The President admitted in that same speech that this vision is
unlikely to be realized in our lifetimes. We should slow down,
let the treaty ink be dry, and reassess where we are. Our
security requirements should guide the feasibility and
desirability of further reductions, not the other way around.
One reason for caution is uncertainty. None of us can
predict the future. China is ``rapidly upgrading its nuclear
capacity, and is trying to reach parity with Russia and the
U.S.'' Russia would have us trade away our missile defenses,
conventional forces, and space capabilities to secure another
arms control treaty that reduces their tactical nuclear
weapons.
In the last few months, NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
Organization] has reaffirmed that nuclear deterrence is a core
element of alliance security. In the last week, a senior South
Korean official suggested the United States reintroduce
tactical nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula for deterrence
and assurance. There are long-term implications of a rush to
reduce our nuclear forces that merit thoughtful consideration.
Second, the Nuclear Posture Review and Section 1251 Report
made several promises with respect to the modernization of our
nuclear warheads, delivery systems and infrastructure. Based on
what I have seen thus far for the fiscal year 2012 budget
request, I am initially encouraged that the administration
appears ready to honor these promises for the upcoming year.
But there is much work to be done, and I remain concerned about
the long-term commitment to these investments, a responsibility
shared by both the administration and Congress. We have been
handed the bill of deferred maintenance. We must be sure that
these timelines are met and that these promises are kept.
Third, I have seen solid progress in the administration's
implementation of the Phased Adaptive Approach, PAA, for
missile defense in Europe and a significant improvement in
their engagement of Congress from where we were a year ago.
This work is commendable. I met with NATO Parliamentarians and
NATO officials just last week, and I was pleased to see how far
the missile defense discussion in Europe has advanced from just
3 years ago.
Some of us remain concerned, however, about the
Department's hedging strategy for defense of the homeland in
case the long-range threat comes earlier or technical issues
arise in the development of a new SM-3 interceptor. I came away
from our PAA hearing last December believing that the
Department's hedging strategy was hollow. I hope our witnesses
can discuss the progress being made to add detail to the
hedging strategy outlined in the Ballistic Missile Defense
Review.
Lastly, I would ask that our witnesses discuss what they
see as the key challenges and opportunities in national
security space. I am particularly concerned about the health of
our space industrial base and our export control policies, and
finding the right balance between protecting our national
security interests and strengthening our industrial capacity.
It goes without saying that these are challenging economic
times, and I am certainly committed to working with the
Department to identify efficiencies and better ways of doing
business. With that said, we are a Nation fighting two wars,
and it is our subcommittee's responsibility to ensure our
strategic forces are kept viable in both the good years and the
bad.
I want to thank you again for being with us today, and I
look forward to your testimony. And with that, let me turn to
my ranking member, Ms. Sanchez, for her opening comments.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Turner can be found in the
Appendix on page 39.]
STATEMENT OF HON. LORETTA SANCHEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you so much,
Chairman Turner. I look forward to working with you and all the
members of our subcommittee, and I know that we can accomplish
a lot this year.
I would also like to recognize and thank Mr. Langevin for
his strong and his steady leadership on this subcommittee in
the last Congress.
And I want to join Mr. Turner in welcoming our witnesses to
our first--this is our first, right?--our first strategic
forces hearing of the 112th Congress. And we look forward to
hearing from the general and from Dr. Miller to examine the
strategic posture of the United States and our strategic
forces, including our nuclear weapons programs, our missile
defense systems, and our military space programs.
I have already had an opportunity to meet with you and I am
sorry, General, that you were a little delayed today, and we
didn't get a chance to talk, but I am sure that we will get to
talk privately about some of the issues that we might have.
I would also like to thank Dr. Perry and Dr. Payne, who
provide their views in the context of the recommendations made
by the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the
U.S. And I am also sorry that the Secretary could not join us
today.
In April 2009, President Obama committed to working toward
a world free of nuclear weapons, and last year the
administration took several important steps to implement
progress toward that long-term vision and to provide guidance
with regard to our strategic forces.
First on the nuclear forces, the President announced his
Nuclear Posture Review in April last year, which outlined a
plan to reduce the role and the number of nuclear weapons,
while committing to maintaining our nuclear deterrent to
reliably defend our country and our allies. And so that
blueprint addressed the most pressing threats, I think, to U.S.
security, the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries and
to terrorists, and I know I worked quite a few years now being
on this committee in trying to move part of that forward.
But I am concerned that programs that underpin the
maintenance of our nuclear deterrent and urgent
nonproliferation efforts didn't receive the fiscal year 2011
requested level of funding in the House-passed continuing
resolution. And I know that myself and some of my fellow
Democratic colleagues submitted to Chairman Ryan a letter
talking to him about the concerns of those cuts and stressing
the importance of strengthening this country's nuclear threat
reduction efforts, especially with the work that is carried out
at Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia National
Laboratories. I think those are very important efforts in order
to bring down the risk of nuclear terrorism, and I think it
also helps us to maintain a strong deterrent.
So I am pleased that the administration, in particular,
completed and that the Senate passed the New START Treaty with
Russia. I think that was, of course, one of the most important
things that we had on our list. It has been able to reset, I
think, our relations with Russia.
You know, I have a lot more in my opening statement, Mr.
Chairman, but I do know that votes are coming up, and so I will
submit the rest of it for the record. But I had already
expressed to Dr. Miller yesterday some of my concerns and my
questions. And I hope that I will get to talk to the general,
too, and hopefully with our 5 minutes today we will get more
information out of the both of you. So thank you for being with
us. And with that I look forward to the discussion.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Sanchez can be found in the
Appendix on page 42.]
Mr. Turner. Thank you. That certainly is very kind of you.
Each of our witnesses will receive 5 minutes to give a
summary of their opening statement, and we will then proceed
for Members' questions, and then we will go to our second
panel. The committee has received your full written statements
and, without objection, those statements will be made a part of
the hearing record.
We will begin with General Kehler. The floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF GEN. C. ROBERT KEHLER, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND
General Kehler. Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Sanchez,
members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
present my views on United States Strategic Command's missions
and priorities.
I am privileged and humbled to appear today for the first
time as Commander of Strategic Command. I am also pleased to
appear with Dr. Jim Miller, a great colleague, with whom I look
forward to working in the coming years.
Today's national security landscape is marked by protracted
conflict, constant change, and enormous complexity. We are
facing a significantly different operating environment than
those we have experienced in the past--an operating environment
that is characterized by extraordinary technological advances;
rapid changes in the number and type of actors; and hybrid
combinations of strategies, tactics, and weapons.
Of the threats we face, weapons of mass destruction clearly
represent the greatest threat to the American people,
particularly when pursued or possessed by violent extremists or
state proliferators. To deal with this environment demands
faster, more comprehensive awareness; strategic thinking;
flexible planning; decentralized execution; rapid innovation;
and unprecedented information sharing.
Our mission remains clear: To detect, deter and prevent
attacks against the United States, and to join with the other
combatant commands to defend the Nation should deterrence fail.
STRATCOM's [United States Strategic Command] first priority is
to deter nuclear attack on the United States and our allies. As
we implement the New START Treaty, we are committed to
maintaining a safe, secure and ready nuclear deterrent. We are
also the strongest possible advocates in favor of the
investments that are needed to sustain and modernize the
nuclear triad and the nuclear weapons complex that underpins
it.
While nuclear deterrence is our number one priority,
STRATCOM also has broader responsibilities in the 21st century.
Ongoing operations demand our full commitment as well. So, in
partnership with the other combatant commands, our next
priority is to improve our plans, procedures, and capabilities
to address regional problems, especially where those problems
and capabilities cross regional boundaries. STRATCOM's
activities to synchronize plans and capabilities for missile
defense, ISR [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance],
electronic warfare, and combating weapons of mass destruction
are helping to bring unity of effort to regional operations and
increased effectiveness to our overall investment.
Another priority is to improve our capabilities and
operating concepts in the important civil and national security
areas of space and cyberspace. Space is increasingly contested,
congested, and competitive, and its importance to the United
States goes far beyond national security. Ensuring
uninterrupted access to space and space-based capabilities,
improving our awareness of objects and activities in space, and
enhancing the protection and resilience of our most critical
systems are all essential objectives. Achieving those
objectives demands continued investment to improve space
situational awareness and to sustain our critical space
capabilities while we also pursue increased opportunities with
allies and commercial partners.
Our greatest challenge in cyberspace is to improve our
ability to operate and defend the DOD [Department of Defense]
network at network speed, and to make our critical activities
continue even in the face of adversary attempts to deny or
disrupt them. STRATCOM and its sub-unified command, USCYBERCOM
[United States Cyber Command], are working hard to improve our
organizations and relationships, enhance network situational
awareness and protection, increase our technical capacity, and
develop the human capital we need as we look to the future.
We have much to do, but we also know today's fiscal
environment demands that we must maximize both mission
effectiveness and taxpayer value. We will continue our efforts
to identify every possible place where we can become more
efficient as we work to become even more effective.
Finally, we are committed to taking care of our warriors,
our government civilians, and our families. To this end we will
fully support the efforts of the services to properly train,
equip, support, and care for our men and women, and we will
work diligently to ensure a safe and positive work environment.
Mr. Chairman, great challenges lie ahead, but so do great
opportunities. The men and women of STRATCOM perform their
difficult mission with remarkable skill and dedication every
minute of every day. I am proud to be associated with them and
look forward to working with you and the committee as we
address the important national security issues.
Thank you again for this opportunity, and I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Kehler can be found in
the Appendix on page 45.]
Mr. Turner. General Kehler, I want to apologize to you for
all the conversation going on here, but I am trying to do the
logistics of our votes, and this is what I have come up with:
if this is acceptable hopefully to you guys, I am going to hand
the gavel to Mr. Lamborn, who is going to preside while Dr.
Miller gives his statement. Ms. Sanchez and I are going to go
vote and return. During the period of the debate on the motion
to recommit and the vote on the motion to recommit, we will ask
our questions. Anybody else on the subcommittee is certainly
welcome to return with us to hear the answers to those. We will
then go and vote for the two votes that are remaining, and then
when this subcommittee reconvenes, they will have their
opportunity to ask their questions.
With that, I will be seeing you in a moment. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES N. MILLER, PH.D., PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
Dr. Miller. Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Sanchez, as you
depart, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify this afternoon. It is a great pleasure
to join the new Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, General
Bob Kehler.
As Chairman Turner alluded to, just over a year ago, DOD
submitted to Congress the Ballistic Missile Defense Review and,
soon thereafter, the Nuclear Posture Review. And along with the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, we recently
submitted the first-ever National Security Space Strategy to
complete the congressional requirement for a space posture
review.
My prepared statement summarizes the progress that we have
made in each of these areas, and I will just touch on the
highlights in each area.
On nuclear issues, the administration has made significant
progress over the past year, including ratification and entry
into force of a New START Treaty and an updated investment plan
for nuclear modernization. A key contribution of the New START
Treaty is its verification regime. The U.S. and Russia will
exchange initial New START databases no later than March 22nd,
and this information will help us to better track the status of
Russian strategic offensive arms. The treaty, as you know,
allows each side to conduct up to 18 on-site inspections per
year. These inspections will begin after April 5th, and our
instructors are ready to go.
DOD's fiscal year 2012 budget reflects our commitment to
sustain and to modernize our strategic delivery systems, and is
the front end of an investment of some $125 billion over the
next 10 years. This includes sustaining the current Ohio-class
submarines and continuing R&D [research and development] on a
replacement submarine; sustaining the Trident II D-5 missile;
preparatory analysis for a follow-on ICBM [intercontinental
ballistic missile] capability to be fielded in the 2030 time
frame; developing a new dual-capable Long-Range Standoff
missile; upgrades to the B-2 to enhance its survivability and
capabilities; and finally, the development and fielding of a
new long-range nuclear-capable penetrating bomber, with funding
starting in fiscal year 2012.
As you know, the National Nuclear Security Administration,
part of DOE [Department of Energy], has proposed spending about
$88 billion over the next 10 years to sustain our nuclear
arsenal and to modernize infrastructure. The NPR [Nuclear
Posture Review] identified a number of NNSA [National Nuclear
Security Administration] facilities that are decades old and
must be upgraded or replaced to ensure the reliability of our
nuclear arsenal.
And as the committee is aware, and as Ranking Member
Sanchez alluded to, the House-proposed budget bill, H.R. 1,
would cut NNSA funding in fiscal year 2011 by about 10 percent
from the President's request. Proposed cuts include over $600
million from the nonproliferation program, over $300 million
from nuclear weapons activities, and over $100 million from
nuclear naval reactors. If enacted, these cuts will delay
needed investments, they will drive up program costs, they will
reduce our ability to engage in nonproliferation, and they will
set back our efforts to implement the Nuclear Posture Review.
As we look to the future, Conventional Prompt Global Strike
systems offer the possibility of being able to defeat time-
urgent regional threats with rapidly executed high-precision
attacks without having to use nuclear weapons. Such
capabilities would increase the options available to the
President.
DOD is currently focusing in particular on conventionally
armed long-range missile systems that would fly a non-ballistic
trajectory, so-called boost-glide systems. Such systems could
steer around countries to avoid overflight, and have flight
trajectories clearly distinguishable from an ICBM or SLBM
[submarine-launched ballistic missile]. Such systems would not
be considered to be ``new kinds of strategic offensive arms''
for purposes of the New START Treaty, and so would not be
accountable. DOD has proposed investing about $2 billion
between now and 2016 for research and development of these
types of systems.
Turn now to missile defenses. As you know, the U.S. is
currently protected against limited ICBM attacks, with 30
ground-based interceptors at Fort Greely, Alaska, and
Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. The President's fiscal
year 2012 request provides a substantial investment in the
defense of our homeland to ensure it remains viable over the
long term.
As Mr. Turner alluded to, the United States must also be
well-hedged against the possibility of rapid threat
developments or unexpected technical delays in U.S. missile
defenses. The Department is in the process of finalizing and
refining its hedging strategy, and I look forward to briefing
this subcommittee on results soon at a classified level.
Since the President's announcement of the European Phased
Adaptive Approach in September 2009, the administration has
made substantial progress on implementation. We are on track to
deploy all four phases of the EPAA [European Phased Adaptive
Approach] and on time. The USS Monterey, a guided-missile
cruiser equipped for ballistic missile defense, is due to
depart next week on March 6th from its home port in Norfolk,
Virginia, for a 6-month mission, and this is the start of Phase
1 of the EPAA.
I want to say just a couple of words about missile defense
cooperation with Russia. Our approach on this topic starts from
our conviction that NATO must be responsible for defense of
NATO territory, and Russia should be responsible for defense of
Russian territory. Our concept is to operate our respective
missile defense systems independently, but to cooperate by
steps such as sharing sensor data to improve the ability of
both systems to defeat missile attacks by regional actors such
as Iran. As President Obama has stated, this cooperation can
happen even as we have made clear that the system we intend to
pursue with Russia will not be a joint system, and it will not
in any way limit the United States' or NATO's missile defense
capabilities.
U.S. space capabilities allow our military to see with
clarity, communicate with certainty, navigate with accuracy,
and operate with assurance. And to meet our requirements in
space, DOD is requesting about $26 billion in fiscal year 2012.
This includes $3.7 billion for satellite communications, $1.8
billion for missile warning, $1.7 billion for a GPS [Global
Positioning System] constellation, and a number of other
investments.
There are currently more than 22,000 trackable man-made
objects in space of 10 centimeters or more, and many tens or
hundreds of thousands of smaller objects, but potentially large
enough to damage a satellite, and to deal with this increasing
congestion in space, DOD is taking a number of steps. We are
expanding sharing of space situational awareness data to
increase transparency and cooperation. We are looking at how to
transform the Joint Space Operations Center at Vandenberg Air
Force Base, California, into a combined space operation center
operated with international parties, and the administration is
currently closely evaluating the European Union's proposed
International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities as a
potentially useful set of guidelines for safe activity in
space.
Finally, the United States is developing a range of
capabilities, plans, and options to deter, defend against, and,
if necessary, defeat efforts to interfere with or attack U.S.
or allied space systems. And I would like to make clear that
while U.S. responses to interference or attack on space systems
must be proportional and in accordance with the law of armed
conflict, our responses would not necessarily be limited to the
space domain.
So in conclusion, reducing strategic risks to the United
States and sustaining key U.S. strategic capabilities are long-
term challenges that will require support from a succession of
administrations and Congresses. Success will clearly require
developing and sustaining bipartisan consensus on key issues,
and I am very pleased to have the opportunity today to continue
that engagement, and I look forward to your questions. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Miller can be found in the
Appendix on page 72.]
Mr. Lamborn [presiding]. Thank you, Dr. Miller, and thank
you, General Kehler, for your testimony. We know your time is
very valuable, and so we thank you for your patience and
flexibility while we go over and vote and then come back,
because we do want to hear your responses to our questions. So
we will be in recess until Chairman Turner returns.
[Recess.]
Mr. Turner [presiding]. Well, thank you for your patience
during votes. We are hoping to keep this efficient and moving.
That is why we are doing this in shifts. And I appreciate you
gentlemen giving us your patience.
What we will do is the ranking member and myself, we will
ask our questions. I think we should have about 15 or 20
minutes. And then we will go for the next two votes and then
return with the other Members for the purpose of addressing
additional questions, and then turn to our second panel.
I obviously have questions for both of you. Dr. Miller, I
will start with you. In my opening statement I made a broad
construct of the issues that I am concerned about, and I want
to give you an opportunity to respond to those. I basically put
them into three categories for the purposes of this question.
I am very concerned, I think as are others, that the
President's concept of a world without nuclear weapons or going
to zero can be a pressure for driving policy instead of the
real threat or deterrent assessment driving policy. Now, that
is not to say that the concept of a world without nuclear
weapons or the concept of zero is not something that we all
would aspire to, and it is certainly not to say that there
isn't room for the types of reductions that we have seen in New
START or issues of trying to look to what is an appropriate
shape of our strategic posture. But ensuring that those two
things are disconnected, that we don't have the pressure of
going to zero driving these issues, is a concern, I think, that
many people have.
We had New START, and the Senate made clear that as we
looked to issues of further reductions, that we had to look to
Russia's tactical nuclear weapons. One of the points that I
made when we had our conversation is that when we have a review
of our deterrence, we have to have a concept of what we are
deterring. We cannot merely do an assessment of our posture
without the concept of what are we deterring. That means that
we have to both identify who it is that we are deterring, and
what their assets are, and what is necessary for deterring it.
I am aware, as we have discussed, that NATO is also
undertaking a deterrence review, and I have concerns there as
well that we not want a political deterrence review, but a real
policy and substantive technical review of both the needs of
NATO and the concepts of what exactly we are deterring.
I would like for you to talk about that for a moment on the
issues of what are we trying to deter, how do we relate, then,
that to our actual strategic posture, and how you see the
deterrence review in NATO unfolding.
Secondly, as I discussed in my opening statement, I am very
concerned about the concept of the hedge that was identified in
the Ballistic Missile Defense Review; that in the Phased
Adaptive Approach, there was this concept that the two-stage
would be viewed as a hedge. We had a discussion of that in
another hearing. I know you have additional thoughts on that,
and I would like to hear them today.
And I would also like your thoughts on what other
reductions currently are you looking at from a policy
perspective? As we take up this issue, as we look at what is
currently on the table, what do you see ahead of us?
Dr. Miller.
Dr. Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The President has talked in the past about the next step we
intend to take on arms control, so let me start there. And what
he has said, and what we stated in the NPR as well, was that we
would look for the next bilateral round with Russia that would
deal with both deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons, and
both strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons. As you
alluded to, there are not exactly symmetries in each of those
categories, but overall there is an approximate parity, and it
is a useful basis to think about conducting the next round of
negotiations.
In terms of the process that we will undertake prior to
starting those negotiations, step one is to do the hard look at
our guidance and at the implications of the guidance that comes
from the White House, that comes from the Secretary and the
Chairman, that goes to General Kehler, and to understand the
implications of any revisions in that guidance in terms of what
is to be deterred by whom.
As we conduct that work, in parallel, we will be thinking
about what types of verification regimes will be appropriate
for a negotiation or a future agreement that really addressed
the full range of nuclear weapons: deployed, non-deployed,
strategic, non-strategic. The implications for verification are
significant and would likely go well beyond what we have in the
New START Treaty.
Also in parallel, we need to be consulting with our allies,
and part of that discussion will be in the context of the
defense--I am sorry, the Deterrence Defense Policy Review of
NATO that you alluded to. And that conversation, I think, is
beginning, is under way, as you saw when you visited. And, from
our perspective, it is essential that we continue to stick by
the principles that have guided NATO for many decades,
including risk sharing and burden sharing, and our
understanding that as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO
should be a nuclear alliance--just as as long as nuclear
weapons exist, the United States will sustain a safe, secure,
and effective nuclear arsenal.
So these activities will be going on to some degree in
parallel, but just as was the case with the Nuclear Posture
Review, where we reached key conclusions on what we needed for
our nuclear posture and what--in terms of numbers and diversity
of the force and so on, and then took those results to give
guidance to our negotiators, we similarly will get the guidance
work done, the assessments done that I talked about for what is
required for effective deterrence, including strategic
stability, and in parallel deal with the other issues I alluded
to, including verification, consultation with allies. We will
take the time to get it right.
The timeline that was given by the Senate, as you know,
sir, was a year from the Senate ratification for us to come
back with a proposal for engaging Russia on tactical nuclear
weapons in particular.
With respect to the hedge, I paid attention at our December
hearing, and the message was well received that we had not at
that point articulated sufficiently how the hedge will work,
under what conditions it would be initiated, and what specific
responses we would have.
We have done a lot of work on it, and I have to report
today that we are not quite there, and I would like to come
back and give a detailed classified briefing. I would like to
commit to do so in the next several weeks. Some of the
potential triggers for invoking the hedge will involve
classified information, and so I prefer to do that in a
classified setting in any case.
I can talk about the elements, but you are already familiar
with those, including the Missile Field 2, the eight additional
silos that are being completed. Missile Field 1 is new for this
year. We are now going to mothball Missile Field 1 rather than,
essentially, eliminate it, which gives the opportunity for
deployment of six more interceptors in the future. And I
understand that we need to explain in more detail and on a
detailed time limit that we have the specific role of the two-
stage GBI [ground-based interceptor]. I can tell you it
continues to have a critical role in the hedge, and I would
just ask your indulgence for several more weeks to come back
and give details in a classified setting.
Mr. Turner. Before I go to General Kehler, just to restate
and give you my concern--not necessary for you to respond at
this point--but I am very concerned that as we begin the
deterrence review, or as we begin any review to look at further
reductions, that it be done in the context of, as I was
describing, the actual ``what is being deterred.'' We have
Russia, we have China, we have Iran, we have North Korea, and
any concept of reducing, especially in Europe, the U.S.
footprint or the nuclear footprint of NATO as a deterrence must
take into consideration Russia and the over 5,000 tactical
nuclear weapons that they have that are in the area, because of
course NATO is looking to deter Russia. We are looking to deter
Russia, and China, and Iran, and North Korea. And I don't think
anybody thinks that the current ratio between those tactical
nuclear weapons in Russia and what we have at present with NATO
is an appropriate ratio. They have overwhelming numbers, and I
think the Senate's direction was, ``address those numbers.''
Get Russia to make a concession with respect to the tactical
weapons. And we certainly don't want to see just unilateral
reductions on the side of the United States without addressing
what is that important issue of the threat of those tactical
nuclear weapons.
With respect to the hedge, of course, our continued concern
is that with the Phased Adaptive Approach, the coverage of
protection to the mainland United States is not to arrive until
2020. That is in the best-case scenario on the evolution of
technology. It is possible that the threat could evolve as
early, as some intelligence reports say, as 2015. That would
leave a significant gap to the United States, and so that is
why I appreciate your continued work on the issue of the hedge.
General Kehler, thank you so much for your continued
thoughts and, of course, your leadership. One item that we had
a discussion on was the--on the triad, of looking to the Navy
and the tube reductions of 20 to 16. There is continued
discussion in other hearings on the Hill today. I would like
your thoughts on the reduction of the tubes and what you see
driving that, how you see it affecting our strategic posture,
and any other thoughts you have on that.
General Kehler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, sir, let me say that, in my mind anyway, the
discussion of Trident and Ohio-class replacement is really a
discussion in the context of the need to modernize the entire
triad. So first of all, I think it is important for us to
recognize that that is one piece, an important piece, but a
piece of the decision process that we need to go through.
Second, the issue of the number of tubes is not a simple
black and white answer. So let me just comment here for a
minute. First of all, the issue, in my mind, is the overall
number of tubes we wind up with at the end, not so much the
number of tubes per submarine. And second, the issue is, of
course, we have flexibility and options with how many warheads
per missile per tube. So that is another consideration that
enters into this mixture.
Another consideration that is important to me is the
overall number of boats and the operational flexibility that we
have with the overall number of boats, given that some number
will need to be in maintenance, some number will need to be in
training, et cetera. So those and many other factors, to
include a little bit of foresight here in looking ahead to 20
years from now an anti-submarine warfare environment that the
Navy will have to operate in, all of those bear on the ultimate
size, weight, shape, configuration of the follow-on to the
Ohio.
At this point, Mr. Chairman, I am not overly troubled by
going to 16 tubes. As I look at this, given that we have that
kind of flexibility that I just laid out, given that this is an
element of the triad, and given that we have some decision
space here as we go forward to decide on the ultimate number of
submarines, nothing troubles me operationally here to the
extent that I would oppose a submarine with 16 tubes. I
understand the reasons for wanting to have 20, I understand the
arguments that were made ahead of me, but as I sit here today,
given the totality of the discussion, I am--as I say, I am not
overly troubled by 16.
Now, I don't know that the gavel has been pounded on the
other side of the river yet with a final decision, but at this
point I am not overly troubled by 16.
Mr. Turner. Twenty tubes met STRATCOM's strategic
requirements?
General Kehler. Yes, sir.
Mr. Turner. A troubling aspect that we have is if 20 met
the requirements, and now we are looking at 16, does 16 meet
the requirements? And how was it determined that 20 to 16 meets
the requirements?
General Kehler. Well, I can't comment on, sort of, the
acquisition decisions that went on in the background. I don't
know what those decisions were. But the difference between 20
and 16, there was also a different number of boats in play. And
so the overall difference, as I went back and looked at this,
was not that significant in terms of tubes.
Mr. Turner. So you are saying 16 will meet STRATCOM's
requirements?
General Kehler. Sixteen will meet STRATCOM's requirements,
given that we are sitting here 20 years in advance. It
certainly will meet our operational requirements given the size
of the tube, the performance of the D-5, the ability to upload
the weapons, because at the end of the day here, the question
is, will we be able to deliver sufficient weapons with the
platforms that are available? And this would meet our
requirements just depending on the weapon upload.
Mr. Turner. And we look forward to reviewing the analysis
that says that the difference is sufficient.
General Kehler. Yes, sir.
Mr. Turner. Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General, thank you, Doctor, for being before us.
I am going to be going to South Korea in a few weeks, and
so I am sure I am going to be asked a lot of questions. A South
Korean press report this week indicated that National Security
Council WMD [weapons of mass destruction] czar Dr. Gary Samore
left open the possibility that the U.S. might introduce
tactical nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula if South Korea
makes such a request.
The NSC [National Security Council] deputy spokesman
clarified it afterwards to say that our policy remains to
support a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula, and that there was no
plan to change that policy; that tactical weapons are not
necessary for the defense of South Korea, and that we have no
plan or intention to return them.
Would you clarify what our policy is with regard to
forward-based tactical nuclear weapons, and is the
administration planning on increasing the number of deployed
tactical nuclear weapons?
Dr. Miller. Ma'am, the policy of the administration is to
continue to have the ability to forward-deploy both tactical
nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear weapons in the form of
fighter aircraft, dual-capable aircraft, and in the form of
bombers.
With respect to Korea, the clarification of the statement
is exactly right. Our policy remains to support a non-nuclear
Korean Peninsula, and the other elements that you discussed are
exactly right as well.
What I would like to add--and this is based on past and
ongoing conversations with our South Korean allies--is that the
U.S. nuclear umbrella remains firmly over South Korea, and
neither side believes that on-peninsula deployments are
necessary to sustain that deterrent.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Doctor.
As I stated in my opening comments that New START was what
I believe is a real change and a reengagement, if you will,
with Russia. I asked you this yesterday, Doctor, but maybe for
the record, and, General, if you have any comments, where do
you see us making further progress with the Russians and--with
respect to arms reduction, and also with respect to missile
defense--considering at least in the times that I have been
over there in recent years, they have been very anxious about
our whole issue with respect to missile defense, even with the
phased approach that we have come--again, I understand that
phased approach was not because of how they viewed this. But
can you talk a little bit about this engagement in Russia, and
what are the positives, where do you see us going, and what we
could do as Congress-people who work on these subjects to
enhance that relationship?
Dr. Miller. Let me take a cut and see if General Kehler
wants to come in as well. In addition to the internal planning
that we are doing currently to think about future steps in arms
control with respect to Russia and all the elements that I
described in responding to Chairman Turner, under the auspices
of the Tauscher-Ryabkov group headed by, on our side, Under
Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher, we are initiating
discussions on the future basis of strategic stability.
Discussions are just getting under way. We don't expect them to
result in a negotiated agreement. But what we do want to engage
the Russians on is what do things look not just in the 2010s
and so on, but in the 2020s and forward, and what will be the
basis of deterrence in the future.
They clearly have expressed concerns about the future
course of our missile defense deployments, and we have, in all
venues, come back with a clear statement that we will not
accept any limitations quantitatively, qualitatively,
geographically, or otherwise. And so this is part of a
conversation about how to sustain strategic stability over the
long term, and I think it is an important conversation both
with Russia, and different qualitatively and quantitatively,
but also very important with China. We have not yet had the
same sort of positive response in terms of willingness to have
this discussion vis-a-vis China, and we continue to ask for
that.
On missile defense cooperation, as I said in my statement,
we have made clear that we don't see moving forward with a
joint system, but see moving forward with the possibility of
cooperation on separate systems. And with respect to NATO, our
concept is that NATO would defend NATO, Russia would defend
Russia, and we would look for opportunities to cooperate that
would be mutually beneficial.
The Bush administration first proposed the possible use of
radar data from two Russian radars, one in Armavir and one in
Qabala. We have looked at those and a couple of others as well,
and we think that, in fact, some early-warning data from those
radars could potentially increase the ability, improve the
ability of our Phased Adaptive Approach to intercept missiles
into Europe. It is also possible that sensors from the United
States and from our NATO allies could improve the ability of
Russia to engage a missile headed toward it from Iran.
So sharing of sensor data, I think, is the most promising
initial area. In principle, it is possible that one side could
intercept a missile that is headed for the other. If you look
at the geography of a launch from Iran, or elsewhere for that
matter, the Middle East, there are some trajectories that head
towards Europe that pass over Russia, and some, conversely,
that would pass over Europe on its way to Russia.
So we will look to engage with them on those issues, and a
foundational activity that we have proposed is to do a joint
analysis that looks at the architectures and how each side's
sensors and so forth could assist in the ability of the other
side to conduct missile defense intercepts.
Our next meeting with them I will co-chair in just a couple
of weeks, and we will look to move the ball forward on these
issues. We think it is in both the U.S. and Russian interests
to have some real cooperation in this area.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you.
General, do you have anything to add?
General Kehler. Congresswoman Sanchez, I do. I would just
add that over the years--since the end of the Cold War in
particular, but even prior to that--we have found that there is
extraordinary value in having military-to-military contact with
the Russians at all levels on lots of issues. We find that
those engagements typically lead to better understanding, they
lead to less confusion at some times and, as we look to the
future, we see a lot of opportunities here that we might be
able to engage more with the Russians at a mil-to-mil level on
a wide variety of issues.
In addition, as Dr. Miller said, there have been some
initiatives. You know, the Secretary of Defense visited China
recently and, similarly we see some value there in military-to-
military contact.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you.
Because of the time constraints, I am going to hold on to
my questions, and maybe we will allow the chance for the others
to ask, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Turner. Okay. Thank you so much.
We are going to adjourn. Before we do, I do have one issue
I want to clarify first with respect to the questions I was
asking.
It is my understanding that the NATO deterrence review
could recommend a reduction in the U.S. nuclear weapons that
are in Europe. I want to make certain I am not walking away
with a misunderstanding on that. If the gentleman at this time
would correct me if I am mistaken?
Then, coupled with that, my concern being I would expect,
and I think the Senate's direction would expect, that if that
were to occur, that it would be done in conjunction with a
concession or reduction overall in the Russian tactical nuclear
weapons. Gentlemen?
Dr. Miller. Chairman Turner, I would not want to prejudge
what the outcome of the review would be. We have views,
obviously, within the administration about its future
direction, both its focus and desired outcomes, but----
Mr. Turner. You would not disagree that it could recommend
reductions?
Dr. Miller. Yes.
Mr. Turner. And then ergo to my statement, I would hope
that would occur within the context of reductions and
concessions in tactical nuclear weapons from Russia.
Gentlemen, with that we are going to adjourn for these two
votes, and then we will be returning for questions from the
other Members. Thank you.
[Recess.]
Mr. Turner. I call the subcommittee back to order.
We will begin our round of questioning, 5 minutes, to Mr.
Lamborn.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope the questions
I am going to bring forth haven't already been asked, because I
missed some of our meeting with our truncated schedule here.
General Kehler, and hopefully this isn't going to become an
issue, but press reports suggest that some in our
administration would like to sign on to the European Union's
Code of Conduct concerning space. What are the advantages and
disadvantages of signing on to such a code, what national
security considerations should the Department take into account
as it reviews such a proposal, and would this Code of Conduct
require any changes in U.S. policy or approaches to space?
And I know you are dealing with STRATCOM right now, but you
obviously have an extensive space background when you were in
Colorado Springs, and we thank you for your service in that
capacity as well.
General Kehler. Congressman, let me just set the scene for
a second. In 1957, there was essentially one object on orbit,
and it was Sputnik. Here we are in 2011, and we catalog well
over 20,000 objects. It depends on the day whether it is 20,000
or 21,000 or 22,000, but the number is growing. There are
objects there beyond what we are able to maintain in our
catalog that NASA has estimated probably 10 times the number of
objects are there than what we actually see. So this issue of
space becoming more congested is a real issue.
There are some rules that exist today, but they are very
broad, and our view, at least at STRATCOM, is that it is time
for us to embrace this issue in some way. Now, there are
caveats that have to be added to this, of course, and there are
operational considerations that we would have to make sure that
are being taken account of as we go forward.
But my view is that it is time for us to have this
engagement. It is time for us to be on the road of looking at
what makes sense in terms of best practices. Whether we call
that a code of conduct or whether we actually embrace the EU
Code of Conduct is something we are working and making our
inputs known in the policy world. But fundamentally our view at
STRATCOM is that we should be on this road looking to put
appropriate rules of the road in place that will help us and
will actually help everyone.
This is consistent with our new national space policy, it
is consistent with the new National Security Space Strategy,
and operationally we think it is consistent with the plans that
we have as well.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you.
Now, for either or both of you, when the White House
announced the European Phased Adaptive Approach in 2009, it
said the new approach was based upon an assumption that the
long-range missile threat was ``slower to develop.'' However,
several Defense officials, including Secretary Gates and
Admiral Mullen, have recently expressed concern about the pace
of Iran's ICBM and nuclear developments.
So my question is this: Are you concerned that Iran's
missile and nuclear programs are developing faster than the
Intelligence Community previously assessed?
Dr. Miller. Mr. Lamborn, I believe when I testified here in
December, I talked through the then intelligence assessment
portions which have been made public. I talked about the
possibility of an Iranian long-range missile capability by
2015. So, in fact, we have seen Iran continue to pursue its
missile program, including through the space launch system
Safir and others. We have seen advances in that program, and we
have seen them continue to pursue their nuclear program and at
least providing the option to go to a nuclear weapons
capability and not foreclosing that.
So, I would say if anything since the time of that
decision, concerns have been reinforced and to some degree
heightened, and that is one of the reasons that we continue to
look in detail at what the appropriate hedge should be with
respect to missile defense.
General Kehler. Sir, I would add that in the 30 days I have
been in command, the first set of questions that I started to
ask about this were, do we have the flexibility to pursue the
hedge strategy; and the answer is, yes, we are making progress
in sensors. We have made progress in sensors. In fact, the
modifications that have been made to some of our early-warning
radars are now complete. There are others now in progress to be
in a better position sensor-wise to understand and characterize
the threat if it were to emerge.
Of course, we are continuing to build GBIs, so there is
flexibility there for a decision process that would respond to
a hedge. There is work going on for the two-stage GBI. There
are other things in trail here. MDA [Missile Defense Agency] is
looking at how they would position what they call an IDT [In-
Flight Interceptor Communication System Data Terminal], or it
is a way to get information to an interceptor that helps the
interceptor if it is out of radar ranges, et cetera, et cetera.
They are looking at where they might position additional IDTs.
So I think I am comfortable from a military perspective
that the pieces are in place that give the decisionmakers an
ability to hedge if, in fact, this threat emerges sooner.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you both.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First I want to welcome our witnesses here today. Thank you
for your testimony.
Before I begin, I just wanted to mention how much I enjoyed
working with my colleague Chairman Turner on the Subcommittee
on Strategic Forces in the last Congress. I had the privilege
of chairing the subcommittee, and I want to say how grateful I
am for the opportunity to continue to serve on the subcommittee
this year with you, Mr. Chairman, and, of course, Ranking
Member Sanchez, and while also getting a chance to focus more
on our national cyber efforts as now the ranking member on the
Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee.
So, with that, let me turn to a cyber question. General
Kehler, Dr. Miller, as we all know, STRATCOM has direct
authority over the new Cyber Command that stood up last year,
as you were talking about in your opening statements, and one
of the concerns that we have had is about the proper
authorities for the military in cyberspace. We recognize right
now that of the range of threats that are facing the Nation,
cyber threats are among the most serious.
Clearly the NSA [National Security Agency] and CYBERCOM are
both very capable entities for our intelligence and military
issues, but many of the threats that we face today as a Nation
are to civilian-critical infrastructure, such as our electric
power grid or our financial system.
My question is if we were undergoing a cyber 9/11 attack,
what is the capacity of the Department to assist with the
defense of nationally critical systems, and how is the
Department's efforts to work more closely with DHS [Department
of Homeland Security] evolving?
General Kehler. Sir, let me begin by saying there has been
a lot of progress made over the last couple of years to bring
focus inside the Department for sure regarding cyber. The
stand-up of CYBERCOM, by combining other pieces from throughout
the Department, has been a big step forward. Getting it to full
operational capability, although there is certainly much more
to be done, was a significant step forward. Positioning at Fort
Meade, which is the center of gravity--center of excellence for
the country, really--for cyber-related activities, was a
positive step. So there is progress being made.
I believe that the memorandum of agreement that was signed
between the Department of Defense and the Department of
Homeland Security that begins to outline the relationship
between the two Departments in just such a scenario has been
particularly significant.
There is more work to be done. If you are asking on any
given day, what is the capacity of the Department to be
helpful, there are capabilities the Department has. How the
capabilities are wielded in terms of relationships elsewhere in
the government and sort of defense support to civil authorities
and all of the relationships we have carved out elsewhere in
our military, those steps are still, many of them, in progress.
So those are high on our to-do list to continue to work our way
forward.
Certainly the SECDEF [Secretary of Defense], Secretary
Lynn, has become a real leader in all of this area. He has been
very vocal about our need to go forward. And I would tell you,
while progress has been made, there is much more to do.
Mr. Langevin. I agree. My concern is that were there a
cyber
9/11 attack under way, that we haven't worked these things out
yet, and although we might have the ability to stop it, we
don't yet have the authorities worked out as to how that would
happen. And my concern is the left hand wouldn't know what the
right hand is doing, and we would be doing great danger,
putting the Nation at great risk, by not having those
authorities in place.
General Kehler. Sir, I would just add, my view of this is
that some of those are now in place. The MOA certainly helps us
a great deal, but they are not all in place. I think I would
describe this as still very much a work in progress.
Mr. Langevin. Let me go to another question before my time
runs out.
General Kehler, Dr. Miller, yesterday in our science and
technology posture hearing on the Emerging Threats and
Capabilities Subcommittee, Secretary Lemnios, head of the DOD
Research & Engineering, brought up some of the more promising
emerging technologies in the field of hypersonics and directed
energy, from new efforts to Prompt Global Strike, to Airborne
Laser. Both of these topics have strategic ties.
Can you comment on what work is being done to evolve these
technologies into operational concepts and systems under
USSTRATCOM, and what makes the Department view these
technologies as potential game changers?
General Kehler. I will make a comment, and then Dr. Miller
may want to say something as well.
But from a STRATCOM perspective, sir, first of all, on
directed energy, of course, some work continues in terms of
directed energy and missile defense efforts. That has been
curtailed significantly, but we have some interest in what is
residual in that activity.
Regarding hypersonics, of course, we also have development
efforts under way for what we are calling Conventional Prompt
Global Strike, and there is some promising work that has gone
on, and more to do, that would perhaps give us a real advantage
here in small numbers for specific targets to give to the
President some options to go after some kinds of targets
conventionally that we do not have that option today. So both
of those are very promising to us from those two standpoints,
sir.
Dr. Miller. If I could just add very briefly, as I
mentioned before, the Department is spending about $2 billion
over the next 5 years on the hypersonics, in particular on the
Conventional Prompt Global Strike boost-glide vehicle, and we
do see a lot of promise there from a policy and operational
perspective.
With respect to lasers, with the conclusion that the
Airborne Laser didn't have real operational utility given its
limitations, it and other activities went together into a laser
R&D program that is $100 million a year-plus, and there are a
number of promising technologies across a range of
applications, including missile defense and others.
If I could add just very quickly on the earlier question,
and I apologize for doing this, but I just wanted to add to
General Kehler's answer on cyber that, in addition to having
the authority to protect its own networks, that the Defense
Department is assigned responsibility for working with the
defense industrial base, one of the 18 critical infrastructure
categories, and we are working closely with DHS now to look at
how the capabilities of the Department can be brought to bear
to support DHS in protection of other critical infrastructure.
As you know, but I just want to have on the record, the
President does have emergency authority to direct DOD to defend
the Nation as part of the defense support to civil authorities
against a cyber or any other attack. We are in internal
conversations in the administration now about how to do that
more effectively and whether new authorities and legislation is
needed, and look forward to joining your subcommittee and the
other Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee in a
couple of weeks with General Alexander to discuss.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. Well, I am encouraged by that
answer.
Both of you, I want to thank you for your testimony, and I
look forward to following up, particularly on the directed
energy issue as well.
As I have often said, with the growing threats that the
Nation faces from ballistic missile issues, we are not
adequately going to be able to defend the Nation with kinetic
weapons alone. The game changer will really come through
directed energy, and the more we can do to support that work,
the better.
So thank you both for your testimony, your work and, with
that, I yield back.
Mr. Turner. I just want to echo what Mr. Langevin just
said. Great comments.
Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Miller, the first question is for you. You may not be
able to answer it. It may make you uncomfortable. But this gets
back to South Korea. We know the conservative politicians there
have for some time wanted to reintroduce tactical nuclear
weapons to the peninsula, so we know recent DPRK [Democratic
People's Republic of Korea] actions haven't driven that desire
out of the blue from some elements of South Korean politics.
But I guess what is shocking to me is that a White House
official both believes that we would reintroduce and encourages
such a request of tactical nuclear weapons to the peninsula.
So my question is, what was he thinking?
Dr. Miller. Obviously I can't answer that first person. I
did have a chance to talk to Gary Samore, and I can tell you
that he is fully on board with the clarification that was
issued, and he was fully on board with the fact that I
commented and intended to also say and make absolutely clear
that the U.S. nuclear umbrella continues to extend to South
Korea, and that neither side believes that that requires the
deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on the peninsula. I can
tell you he is 100 percent behind what the clarification of
this policy is.
Mr. Larsen. Did anybody tell Samore he should say less?
Because he ought to.
Back to something you might be able to answer directly,
speaking for yourself. It has to do with the Global Threat
Reduction Initiative. The 2010 appropriation was over $300
million; the fiscal year 2011 request was over $550 million.
Obviously, this increase for funding reflects the
administration's success in securing promises from former
Soviet bloc countries to remove and return highly enriched
uranium by 2012.
But we are in this continuing resolution world right now,
and I would like you, if you can, help us understand what would
happen to our efforts in Belarus, Poland, Vietnam and other
countries and their ability to follow through on these 2012
commitments, and help them follow through on these 2012
commitments if, in fact, we ended up with something less than
what the administration requested for 2011?
Dr. Miller. Mr. Larsen, we would have to make some very,
very difficult choices. What I would like to do, if I can, is
take this for the record and come back and give you specific
answers, given that we are partway through the year in
execution at a lower level than we had hoped, and I would like
to describe what have been the effects so far and then what
would be the consequences if it continued for the duration of
the year.
I can give some general comments, but I think it would be
preferable to give details on it. I would be happy to do it on
a country-by-country basis and to answer very swiftly.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 117.]
Mr. Larsen. That would be great, and I think it would be
very helpful, because it is not so much that it is this
administration's policy, it is just a generally good idea to
get to these countries and get our hands on this HEU [highly
enriched uranium], get it behind a good lock and then destroy
it. I am very concerned we are not going to be able to do that,
much less than what happens to the 2012 request as we move
forward in the appropriations process.
General Kehler, again, congratulations. It has been an
exciting 30 days for you, I am sure. But something that we have
on this committee considered over the last several years, and,
Mr. Chairman, I was going to ask the ranking member, too, we
might want to either do a hearing or do something in a
different setting on the space situational awareness. We have
been tracking that and pressing that for the last several years
for a lot of reasons.
Given what is in the budget for 2012, what are the most
important steps that you can tell us about here that you are
taking with regards to space situational awareness?
General Kehler. Congressman, there are two critical
components that are continued in this budget that is before you
today that will contribute to space situational awareness. One
is a way to better fuse the existing data from the existing
sensors, make better use of the sensors that we have, and bring
that information together out at Vandenberg in what is our
Joint Space Operations Center. At the same time as we go down
that road, I think we have a great opportunity here to look
very carefully with our allies and commercial partners and
others to see how they can continue to contribute to that pool
of data and our overall understanding of what is there.
Over the last year, or almost two now, STRATCOM has been
pursuing a program that was actually recommended by Congress
that was originally called the Commercial and Foreign Entities
Program. What that has resulted in now is a much better way to
share situational information with other entities, to include
commercial partners that have now signed up and are much more
freely providing information about their platforms. So that
frees up our sensors and our computing power to go after things
that maybe we don't know as much about.
So that is very helpful. So it is how the data is exposed,
how we make use of it. And how we include partners in all of
that, I think, is something that is critically important and
something we will need to continue to push. Some of that is
contained in this budget.
The other thing is sensors. Even with sharing other
information, and even with the better use of the sensors we
have, we will need some sensors positioned in other places, and
that is contained in the budget as well.
So those two things are in the budget. They are important,
both of those, to us. And overall, I think you are right: the
issue of situational awareness for space is very high on our
priority list. And, by the way, it is for cyberspace as well,
and it is not unlike the same issues that we are working for
space. So cyber situational awareness, I think if General
Alexander was here from CYBERCOM, he would leap up at this
point and say, same for cyberspace, because that is a high
priority for us in both of these places.
Mr. Larsen. Just quickly, I gather from your answer that,
in fact, we could have a much more complex conversation about
this perhaps in a different setting.
General Kehler. Yes, sir.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
Mr. Turner. I appreciate your comment on space situational
awareness. In fact, this subcommittee has been working on
issues of having 101 sessions, if you will, briefings that are
not in the context of committee hearings for the purposes of
really just straight education and subject matter information
for the Members.
Mr. Larsen, I am very proud to say, you get a gold star. I
think you have been probably in the best attendance of
everybody, and I appreciate that.
Mr. Larsen. If I may, Mr. Chairman, after last year's
markup, I made a commitment to you that I would.
Mr. Turner. There you go. Wonderful. Space is next Friday,
so I am certain your star will not diminish. I look forward to
that. Dr. Payne, whom we have next, and Dr. Roberts have both
presented at those, and we greatly appreciated their
participation.
Gentleman, we are going to end here, but I am going to give
you an opportunity if there is anything that you would like to
say in closing or to clarify in the discussion, I want to give
you the opportunity to add anything to your comments.
Dr. Miller. I will say three things very quickly.
First, I want to thank you for the opportunity to testify
today, and to your 101 sessions, and look forward to having our
people continue those and want to be available to answer any
additional questions that you and the subcommittee or larger
committee have as well.
Second, I look forward to coming back specifically for a
classified discussion on hedge and what our thinking is in that
regard. We had by chance bumped into the combatant commander
for Northern Command in the anteroom, and I think we are well
aligned on having the conversations--internal conversations--
closed down that we need to move forward there.
Third, I want to thank you and the subcommittee and
committee for support of both sides of President Obama's
vision, including the arms control side, and also including the
investments and, again, say that it is critical to this
administration that we get the funding necessary to support our
strategic nuclear delivery systems and, again, DOD speaking for
the DOE funding line, the funding for NNSA to continues
nonproliferation and its weapons work as well for fiscal year
2011. Thank you very much.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
General Kehler. Mr. Chairman, just let me add my thanks. We
know that the subcommittee has a lot of issues on its plate,
and we are pledged to come back at any time that you want to
continue these discussions further.
Typically combatant commanders don't say much about
investment and needs to support budgets, but I must add my
voice to Dr. Miller here. In the first 30 days, I have told my
staff that what I wanted to do was get all the way around the
nuclear weapons complex. I didn't make it. I got about half of
the way through, but I will get through the rest of it within
the next couple of weeks.
I must say that my assessment is that the investment that
is planned for them is definitely needed, and it underpins all
of our other deterrence activities. If the weapons are not safe
and effective and secure, I think we don't have a leg to stand
on. So I would encourage support for that part of the
investment as well, even though that is not directly in our
portfolio.
Mr. Turner. General, thank you for those comments. Thank
you both. Thank you for your service.
We will now go to our second panel, which will be Dr. Bill
Perry and Dr. Keith Payne.
Gentleman, while you are getting situated, let me begin my
welcome to you. I want to provide you a warm welcome to Dr.
Perry and Dr. Payne.
As I mentioned earlier, I believe that the committee's
oversight is further enhanced through additional perspectives
outside of the traditional Pentagon witnesses that we usually
hear from. Therefore, I have asked Dr. Bill Perry and Dr. Jim
Schlesinger, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the U.S.
Strategic Posture Commission, to provide their views. Dr.
Schlesinger, as I stated earlier, was unable to join us today,
and I appreciate Dr. Keith Payne filling in for him.
I greatly appreciate also your participation, as we
mentioned prior, in our 101 sessions where the committee is
doing an overview of this subject matter.
Dr. Perry, I greatly appreciate you being here and all of
your service and insight. We look forward to your statement,
and I will recognize you now.
STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM J. PERRY, CHAIRMAN, CONGRESSIONAL
COMMISSION ON THE STRATEGIC POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES
Dr. Perry. Thank you. I have a rather extensive written
testimony which I have submitted, which I would like to submit
for the record.
You know, in 2009, Congress----
Mr. Turner. Dr. Perry, they are going to turn your
microphone on here, I believe.
Dr. Perry. In 2009, the Congress appointed our bipartisan
Commission. We met for a year, and we ended up with a report.
We have reported about a year ago to the Congress on that
report. It was a bipartisan Commission and ended up with,
amazingly, a consensus report with only one exception that had
to do with the CTBT [Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty] treaty.
I reviewed the statement that I made to Congress last year,
and I stand by that statement, and my written testimony
reflects that fact with a few updates, and the updates
primarily reflect the new events and, most notably, the Nuclear
Posture Review, which was finished since then. So my oral
statement, I am only going to highlight a few of the important
points.
First, the threat has indeed changed since the Cold War
with much less risk of a nuclear exchange, but a greater risk
of nuclear terrorism. Therefore, to safeguard our security, we
must continue to support the military programs and maintain an
adequate deterrence force. At the same time, we need to support
those programs that guard us against nuclear terrorism. They
fall into two categories, basically: military programs, of
which the BMD [ballistic missile defense] program is the
primary example, and nonmilitary programs, which are
international in nature, which prevent proliferation.
Considering those two different kinds of programs, when I
was the Secretary of Defense, I referred to those as the need
to lead but hedge; lead in the international programs that
prevented proliferation, but hedging by maintaining an adequate
deterrence in case stopping proliferation failed.
The leading has been supported, really, by the last five
administrations through treaties: the START Treaty, the INF
[Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty, the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty, the Moscow Treaty and, most recently, the New
START Treaty.
The deterrence, which is the hedge part of that, was the
major subject of the report we wrote. We recommended how to
maintain the deterrence in the future. I am happy to report
that, in my judgment, the Nuclear Posture Review largely
accepted the recommendations that we made in our report.
We argued that as a matter of policy we should clarify how
we are going to use nuclear weapons. The Nuclear Posture Review
used somewhat different language than we used, but nevertheless
did have an important clarification, and it also, as we
recommended, made strong assurances to our allies.
Secondly, we argued strongly that we should maintain the
safety, security, reliability, and effectiveness of our
deterrence force; do that through maintaining a robust three
laboratories, through maintaining a Stockpile Stewardship
Program and Life Extension Program, and undertake the program
to make a transformation of our two facilities at Los Alamos
and Oak Ridge. One of them is plutonium; the other one is
uranium. All of those are in the Nuclear Posture Review, and
all of them have been funded, so I am quite pleased with the
follow-up on our treaty there.
In terms of the leading, we recommended strongly actions to
reverse proliferation in North Korea and Iran, and I am sorry
to report that nothing useful has happened in either of those
cases. They still maintain threats--I would say greater
threats--than at the time we wrote our report.
We recommended that there be a treaty, an arms treaty, with
Russia with modest reductions, and the New START Treaty
essentially was compatible with what we had recommended there.
We then also said beyond that we should consider follow-on
treaties which dealt specifically with the danger of tactical
nuclear weapons.
We recommended a strong strategic dialogue with Russia and
other nuclear powers. That has gotten under way. We recommended
continuing to maintain the strength of the Threat Reduction
Program. And on the nature of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty, we had a split report on that--half of us recommending
in favor of doing it, half of us recommending against it--but
all of us recommending steps that the Senate should take to
reconsider the treaty.
Finally, we recommended the strengthening of the
International Atomic Energy Agency and adding to the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty the additional protocols to strengthen
them.
Mr. Chairman, that summarizes briefly what I thought were
the highlights of the report and how it compared to the Nuclear
Posture Review. My bottom line is that I am very pleased that
the Nuclear Posture Review was very, I think, quite compatible
with the recommendations we made, with only a few very minor
exceptions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Perry can be found in the
Appendix on page 92.]
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Dr. Perry.
Dr. Payne.
STATEMENT OF DR. KEITH B. PAYNE, COMMISSIONER, CONGRESSIONAL
COMMISSION ON THE STRATEGIC POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES
Dr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to be
here today, particularly in the company of Secretary Perry who
did such a wonderful job leading the Commission. So, thank you,
sir.
And as you noted, Mr. Chairman, I am pinch-hitting for Dr.
Schlesinger today. I know we all wish he could be here, and we
all wish him the very best.
I would like to make a brief opening remark and then submit
the article from which I drew those remarks for the record. I
will take just a moment to identify a few of the Commission's
basic recommendations and then identify the potential
challenges to the U.S. strategic nuclear force posture as I see
them.
The bipartisan Congressional Strategic Posture Commission
offered numerous recommendations to reduce what we called the
nuclear danger. For example, to reduce the nuclear danger, the
Commission recommended a conscious effort to balance diplomatic
measures to reduce the number of nuclear weapons with the
necessary measures to deter attacks and to assure allies of
their security. Despite the occasional friction between U.S.
diplomatic and deterrence efforts, Republican and Democratic
administrations for five decades have sought just such a
balance.
The Commission also emphasized that the United States must
maintain a viable nuclear arsenal for the indefinite future to
support the national goals of deterrence and assurance. The
Commission did not try to identify the minimum number of
nuclear weapons necessary for deterrence and assurance. This
omission was not a mistake; it was in recognition of the fact
that these force requirements can change rapidly because they
are driven by many fluid factors.
Rather than selecting an inherently transient right number
of nuclear weapons, the Commission highlighted the need for a
flexible and resilient force posture to support deterrence and
assurance across a shifting landscape of threats and contexts.
We noted, in particular, that the importance of flexibility
and resilience in the force posture will increase as U.S.
forces decline in numbers. This emphasis on the need for
flexibility and resilience in our force structure is the
primary reason the Commission recommended that the
administration maintain the strategic triad of bombers, ICBMs
and sea-based missiles.
Finally, in recognition of the fact that deterrence may
prove unreliable, the Commission also concluded that the United
States must design its strategic forces not only for
deterrence, but also to help defend against an attack if
deterrence fails. This defensive goal includes the requirements
for missile defense against regional aggressors and limited
long-range missile threats. We specifically urged that U.S.
defenses against long-range missiles become capable against
more complex limited threats as they mature.
In light of these Commission recommendations, my foremost
concern is that U.S. nuclear policy appears to be departing
from a balance between diplomatic and deterrence measures to
reduce the nuclear danger. Specifically, the goal of nuclear
reductions appears to have been given precedence, and the
resultant imbalance could undermine our future capabilities to
deter, to assure and to defend.
What is the basis for my concern? The 2010 Nuclear Posture
Review, a highly commendable report in many respects, for the
first time places atop the U.S. nuclear agenda international
nonproliferation efforts ``as a critical element of our effort
to move toward a world free of nuclear weapons,'' and that is
quoting from the NPR. This prioritization appears self-
consciously to depart from the carefully balanced dual tracks
of the past 50 years.
The administration assurances that the U.S. will maintain
an effective nuclear deterrent certainly are welcome, but at
the end of the day, if a top U.S. policy priority is
international nonproliferation efforts and movement toward
nuclear zero, there will be unavoidable trade-offs made at the
expense of the U.S. forces important for deterrence, assurance
and defense.
This is not an academic concern over a few policy words.
The administration links qualitative limits and numeric
reductions in U.S. nuclear forces to progress in
nonproliferation and the movement toward nuclear zero.
Qualitative limitations and further reductions in our forces,
however, can reduce their flexibility and their resilience,
undermining our national goals of deterrence and assurance.
This is the trade-off that continues to need careful balance.
The Commission specifically cautioned against pursuing
nuclear reductions at the expense of the resilience of our
forces, in part because policies that undermine credible
deterrence and assurance could actually provoke nuclear
proliferation, not prevent it.
The U.S. defensive programs may also be undermined by the
administration's self-described nuclear policy agenda. Russian
officials and some American commentators now claim that
qualitative and quantitative restraints on U.S. strategic
defenses are necessary for any further negotiated nuclear
reductions.
With international nonproliferation efforts and movement
toward nuclear zero at the top of the U.S. nuclear agenda, as
defined in the Nuclear Posture Review, the pursuit of nuclear
reductions at the expense of U.S. missile defenses could
ultimately be deemed an acceptable trade-off. That certainly is
the Russian demand.
My final related concern is the possibility that new policy
guidance could attempt to drive deep reductions in U.S. forces
by redefining deterrence in minimalist terms, thereby lowering
the force requirements deemed adequate for deterrence. For over
five decades, Republican and Democratic administrations have
consistently rejected minimum deterrence as inadequate and
dangerous. Yet many proponents of nuclear zero now again
advocate new Presidential guidance that adopts minimum
deterrence as a way to justify deep reductions in U.S. nuclear
forces.
Adopting a minimum definition of deterrence may help to
justify the elimination of the triad and U.S. nuclear
reductions down to 500 weapons, but it would do so at the
expense of flexibility and resilience and, thus, the
effectiveness of our forces for deterrence and assurance.
Again, the Commission specifically cautioned against such
nuclear reductions and emphasized that new Presidential
guidance should ``be informed by assessments of what is needed
for deterrence and assurance.'' Any new guidance that adopts
minimum deterrence could easily increase the nuclear danger by
undermining credible U.S. deterrence and by pushing friends and
allies toward nuclear proliferation.
In summary, I am concerned about the apparent imbalance in
the administration's announced nuclear agenda and the
possibility that new policy guidance may adopt long-rejected
minimum deterrence standards as a route to deep nuclear
reductions. The Commission's unanimous recommendations for (1)
a balance in priorities; (2) the maintenance of a flexible and
resilient strategic force posture; and (3) improving U.S.
strategic defensive capabilities--indeed, against missile
threats of all ranges--those recommendations, I believe, remain
useful and pertinent.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Payne can be found in the
Appendix on page 104.]
Mr. Turner. Gentlemen, thank you for your comments and for
your input. This is very helpful, as we take in consideration
the prior testimony, to get your perspective.
Dr. Perry, I want to again commend you for the Strategic
Posture Commission. Everyone looks to the report from that
Commission as a great perspective on both the policy issues
that we need to look for in decisionmaking, but also some of
the substantive guidance, I think, that you are absolutely
correct went into the NPR and then, further, into START. I
think it is a great perspective for us to continue to look to.
I have basically two questions that have a couple multiple
parts. I am going to ask you the first one with a couple of
parts to it. But the first is about overall general cuts. The
second is on the tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.
So the first question is, could you please describe in more
detail the guidance that would have to be rewritten to warrant
deeper cuts in our nuclear arsenal? What are some of the
consequences or dangers associated with downgrading our
deterrence requirements? Does this mean downgrading from a
counterforce to a countervailing strategy? Could such a move
hurt the credibility and flexibility of our deterrent? That
would be the first question. I will give you both an
opportunity to answer, and then I would like to discuss the
tactical weapons in Europe.
Dr. Perry.
Dr. Perry. You wanted to do the first question first?
Mr. Turner. If you would, yes.
Dr. Perry. My present view, Mr. Chairman, is that our cuts
for the foreseeable future should be aligned with the cuts made
by Russia, and if they are willing to go to deeper cuts, we
should be willing to go to deeper cuts as well. That will be
true up until such time as those cuts begin to approach the
level of the other nuclear powers. That is a short answer to
the question.
Mr. Turner. Excellent.
Dr. Payne.
Dr. Payne. Thank you.
According to official unclassified and declassified
reports, there are different general categories of opponents'
targets that the U.S. tries to hold at risk for deterrence
purposes. Categories are nuclear forces, leadership, other
military capabilities, and war-supporting industrial and
economic facilities, according to the unclassified official
government statements to that effect.
Over time, as the Commission noted, Presidential guidance
has adjusted U.S. emphasis on these categories, which can then
change the numbers and types of weapons the military requires
to fulfill that guidance. In theory, to get to low force
requirements, new guidance could lower the force standards
deemed adequate for deterrence. New guidance could simply
eliminate nuclear requirements to hold one or more of those
categories of targets that I identified at risk for deterrence
purposes.
We have seen something like this in the past. In the 1960s,
Secretary of Defense McNamara declared that U.S. deterrence
requirements could be met by threatening 25 percent of the
Soviet population and 50 percent of the Soviet industrial base.
That was the assured destruction capability that was deemed
adequate for deterrence. Secretary McNamara subsequently said
that one of the reasons for choosing that type of threat as a
declaratory policy was because it allowed him to hold numbers
of forces very low, because the lethality of nuclear weapons is
such that it is not a large number of nuclear weapons necessary
to hold those kinds of targets at risk, population and
industry.
So some have now suggested going back to a McNamara-type
assured destruction threat--deterrent threat--with an emphasis
on only a few industrial-type targets as the way to get numbers
of force requirements, the number of forces and the
requirements down.
For five decades, I should note that no Republican or
Democratic administration has accepted that kind of minimum
deterrence standard for U.S. forces, and for very good reasons.
The primary reason is because revising the U.S. definition of
requirements down for deterrence doesn't mean that the actual
requirements for deterrence go down. The actual deterrence
requirements are driven by what our opponents think, not by our
goal to reduce numbers.
I think Harold Brown put it best when he said for
deterrence to prevent war as effectively as possible, it is
critical that the United States can threaten what the opponents
value, wherever that leads us.
So, with that, I would note there are at least a handful of
fundamental reasons for rejecting any efforts to go back to a
minimum deterrence definition of force requirements, and each
of these reasons follows because those kinds of force
requirements, minimum deterrence force requirements, create an
inflexible straitjacket for the President.
But, one, going down to very low numbers associated with
minimum deterrence is unlikely to be credible to deter attacks
on us or our allies, at least on some occasions. Enemies may
not believe that threat on occasion, or that threat may not be
suitable to address what the opponent actually values on other
occasions, violating Harold Brown's dictum. In either case,
minimum deterrence will fail to prevent war.
Two, minimum deterrence standards will undercut our ability
to assure our allies and friends, and it will lead some of them
to seek their own independent nuclear capabilities; i.e., it is
likely to promote nuclear proliferation.
Three, these types of minimum force standards associated
with minimum deterrence will also ease the problems for
opponents who seek to counter or get around our deterrence
strategies. They are actually likely to encourage challenges to
deterrence.
Four, minimum deterrence that focuses on population and
civilians, civilian centers, are both illegal and immoral as a
targeting policy. We cannot intentionally threaten civilian
populations and targets for deterrence purposes.
Lastly, minimum deterrence standards offer little
flexibility or resilience, so that when the future unfolds in a
threatening fashion, we don't have the flexibility or the
resilience to respond as necessary to deter war and to assure
our allies.
It is basically those reasons that I have just identified,
those handful of reasons, why no Democratic or Republican
administration for five decades has accepted a minimum
deterrence approach to force sizing.
Dr. Perry. Mr. Chairman, if I may comment on that, my
recommendation was to continue to reduce numbers compatible
with those of Russia. On the question of deterrence, one has to
first ask, whom are we deterring? I would argue the answer is
Russia, because all other cases are lesser-included cases at
this time. At the present numbers and foreseeable numbers in
the future, Russia is the only one that has enough nuclear
weapons to be an issue here.
And the next question is deterring what? Russia does not
have a conventional capability today capable of threatening
either the United States or Europe. So all we can be talking
about is deterring Russia's nuclear weapons.
Therefore, that is why my answer--assuming those points, my
answer talked about making the reductions in terms of bilateral
reductions with Russia. This is the background for that point.
Mr. Turner. Turning, then, to my second question, Dr.
Perry, that is a great transition to my second question, and
what we have learned today in our discussion is that NATO is
currently undertaking a deterrence review, and in that
deterrence review they will be looking at all components of
NATO's presence, both our nuclear capability, our missile
defense capability and conventional.
It is a concern that the deterrence review proceed within
context, as you said, Dr. Perry, to what is being deterred--
that being Russia and, of course, their significant nuclear
arsenal.
There is concern that there might be a recommendation in
the deterrence review for a reduction in the U.S. nuclear force
presence in Europe without achieving concessions from Russia of
the number of tactical nuclear weapons that it currently has.
For purposes of discussion, we know that they have in excess of
3,800. Perhaps they have as many as 5,000. The U.S. has a very
minimal number in conjunction with our NATO commitment.
Do you think it would be wrong for us to do that? Because
it would seem to me that if there is going to be corresponding
reductions, that we should be seeking reductions from the
Russians, and I think that is certainly the guidance the Senate
had given in adopting New START.
I would like both of your thoughts.
Dr. Perry.
Dr. Perry. I would like to give you a two-pronged answer to
that question. First of all, I do not think we need nuclear
weapons in Europe to deter Russia from an attack, or any other
country from an attack on Europe. The nuclear weapons we have
on our submarines, for example, are perfectly adequate for
providing that deterrence.
But there is a substantial political issue involved, and
the political issue, the reason we have nuclear weapons in
Europe in the first place, is not because the rest of our
weapons are not capable of deterrence, but because, during the
cold war at least, our allies in Europe felt more assured when
we had nuclear weapons in Europe. That is why they were
deployed there in the first place.
Today the issue is a little different. The issue is the
Russians in the meantime have built a large number of nuclear
weapons, and we keep our nuclear weapons there as somewhat of a
political leverage for dealing with an ultimate treaty in which
we may get Russia and the United States to eliminate tactical
nuclear weapons. My own view is it would be desirable if both
the United States and Russia would eliminate tactical nuclear
weapons, but I see it as very difficult to arrive at that
conclusion if we were to simply eliminate all of our tactical
nuclear weapons unilaterally.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Dr. Payne.
Dr. Payne. Thank you.
The Russian position certainly is that all U.S. tactical
nuclear weapons must be returned to the United States before
they will engage in negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons. I
see some real problems with that, because if they are withdrawn
now back to U.S. territory, it is hard to imagine them ever
going back. And even if U.S. tactical nuclear weapons aren't
necessary to deter Russia now, we don't know that the future is
going to be so friendly.
So I am very concerned about the idea of deciding that our
tactical nuclear weapons serve no deterrence role now;
therefore, we can bring them back, because the future has a way
of turning out in some ways darker than we anticipate on many
occasions, and I think we need that flexibility to be able to
be prepared for future events that may be less happy than we
would otherwise expect.
The second point is that, in addition to ``we may need them
for deterrence purposes in the future,'' is that many of our
allies see our nuclear weapons there as important for their
assurance. It is what in some cases helps to keep them from
deciding they will pursue an alternative to extended nuclear
deterrence.
Therefore, this isn't just a deterrence issue. In fact, I
think it is primarily, at the present time, an issue of how do
you assure allies so they themselves remain comfortable within
the alliance and in a non-nuclear status. We know, because
before the Commission a number of the allies we had a chance to
speak with said ``these weapons in Europe are important to us
for the demonstration of extended deterrence.''
So I would be very reluctant to see the U.S. do anything
unilaterally along those lines.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
With regard to minimum deterrence, Dr. Payne, would you
include the current administration as one of those who has
rejected minimum deterrence?
Dr. Payne. Yes.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
I would also note in your testimony you talk about the
governor of Tokyo arguing at some point that Japan may look to
its own independent nuclear deterrent.
I was in Japan a few years ago on a CODEL [congressional
delegation] and having lunch with some folks from the Diet, and
this was at least 3 years ago, and they were arguing then that
they should have an independent nuclear deterrent. There are
some folks in Japan who believe they ought to have an
independent nuclear deterrent regardless of who the
administration is, and regardless of assurances that we have
about extended deterrence for Asia. So I just think that is
just some context here.
But there are some things about the NPR that I know you all
looked at, and I would like to get your views, both, on the
NPR's negative assurance policy and where the administration
did make a slight adjustment on the negative assurance policy.
I would like to, first Dr. Perry and then Dr. Payne, get
your thoughts on the advantages of this negative assurance
policy, how you see it playing out, how has it played out, has
it not played out at all and, perhaps, the disadvantages of
what the current negative assurance policy is.
Dr. Perry, can you start?
Dr. Perry. The short answer is I thought that the Nuclear
Posture Review's negative assurance policy was a positive step
forward.
Mr. Larsen. Do you have a longer answer? We are not used to
short answers around here. I am sorry. You know how it is.
Dr. Perry. I think it is important that one of the main
points of the negative assurance policy is to have the minimum
incentive for other nations to build nuclear weapons.
A negative assurance policy doesn't guarantee that, but it
is a useful step in that direction. And so that is why I would
view this as a positive step forward. So, basically, I am in
favor of that. I thought we had a pretty good negative
assurance policy before. I think this is an improvement.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Dr. Perry.
Dr. Payne.
Dr. Payne. I also supported the language that the
Commission put out with regard to negative assurance policy,
and I was glad to see that the NPR didn't vary from that very
much. The changes in the NPR with regard to the negative
assurance policies are, I think, minor. And, in fact, when
Secretary Clinton later amplified it by saying if BW
[biological weapons] is ever used against the United States,
all bets are on the table, I thought that it was a useful
elaboration. And so with that type of understanding, I thought
the changes were minimal, and I thought that was a good thing.
Mr. Larsen. Okay. With regards to--and Dr. Payne, this goes
to your point perhaps--well, one of your points in your
testimony, oral and written--is that the President stated that
the role of nuclear weapons will be reduced in U.S. national
security policy. And to that end the NPR declares that non-
nuclear elements will take on a greater share of the deterrence
burden.
Should we interpret that as a desire to substitute
conventional for nuclear capabilities in deterrence?
Dr. Payne. Well, the 2001 nuclear posture said exactly the
same thing. This wasn't a great departure from what had been
set up before.
Mr. Larsen. Sounds like it was no departure.
Dr. Payne. In that case there was no departure, sir. And I
agreed with that at the time. So I, again, didn't have any
challenge whatsoever to that kind of statement in the Nuclear
Posture Review. Where deterrence can be serviced by
conventional forces, we should certainly have the conventional
forces available to do just that.
Mr. Larsen. I guess I gathered from your written and oral
testimony that this turning down in temperature or moving away
from a nuclear deterrence was a bad thing, and it might be a
bad thing. I am just trying to square that with your testimony.
Dr. Payne. Fair enough, sir. The point I was making isn't
that moving toward conventional forces for deterrence when
possible is the wrong way to go. I think that is the right way
to go.
The point that I was making with regard to the NPR
statement was the NPR language that says moving towards
international and nonproliferation goals as a step toward
nuclear zero is now the highest priority. It is the top
priority. That is what the NPR says. Whereas in the past the
United States, every Democratic and Republican administration
has balanced those priorities.
I don't have a concern that we move toward conventional
deterrence when that fits, and when that is suitable, and when
we can get appropriate deterrent effects from conventional
forces. My concern is that the trade-offs that will have to be
made if the top priority is, in fact, toward nuclear--
international nonproliferation is moving towards nuclear zero,
because there will be trade-offs made with regard to our
assurance, our deterrence, and our defensive capabilities if
that is the operative top priority. That is my concern.
Mr. Larsen. Okay. Dr. Perry, obviously you have been
chewing on this question longer than I have certainly. Do you
have a response to Dr. Payne's comments with regards to this?
Dr. Perry. I generally agree with Dr. Payne's comments on
there. I might say that the main subject of dialogue, even
controversy, within the Commission was not whether there should
be a balance. Everybody agreed there should be a balance. It
was just how to weigh that balance. And some members favored
weighing the proliferation issues more strongly than the
deterrence issues and vice versa, and that had to do with which
they thought was the more pressing threat to the United States.
But they all agreed, I think we all agreed, on the importance
of having the balance.
Mr. Larsen. Great. Thank you. Thank you both.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Turner. I am going to end with one question that is
really asking both of you for a commercial. The Commission made
recommendations about the investment into our nuclear
infrastructure and NNSA. Some of that investment is at risk in
this discussion that we are having on budget cuts nationally.
As we look to the continuing resolution process where we have
not yet funded the government for this year, there are many
reductions that are hitting areas that they should not; for
example, our national security and national defense.
Since we have had deferred maintenance, a long period of
time where we did not put the money in that we should have, we
are now in a situation where we have to put more money in, and
some are seeing that money as huge increases that perhaps we
could find savings in. I would love just if each of you could
pause for a moment and give us some guidance, give Congress
some guidance as to how important that funding is for NNSA;
what you saw, Dr. Perry, in the Commission of our
disinvestment, and, Dr. Payne, what you see as the threat if we
don't respond. Gentlemen.
Dr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will speak for myself
first, but I really think I will be speaking for the Commission
when I say this, which is that we regarded it extremely
important to maintain a robust program at all three nuclear
laboratories, the hiring and retaining of key people, the
supporting of the Stockpile Stewardship Program, the supporting
of the Life Extension Program.
Beyond that, we believe that the plutonium facilities at
Los Alamos ought to be renewed, and that the uranium facilities
at Oak Ridge ought to be renewed. In the report, if my memory
is right, we said that those could be done sequentially, in
which case the plutonium should have the first priority, and
the uranium should be done after that, but we did argue that
both of them should be renewed.
I would defer to Dr. Payne.
Dr. Payne. This, again, is another area where the
Commission was unanimous in the support for essentially fixing
the problems that NNSA confronts. You mention the commercial.
Chairman Turner, it is like the old commercial, you can either
pay me now or pay me more later. I think our recommendation was
to do it now as opposed to having to pay more later.
I was encouraged to see the letter from the three lab
directors who said that they thought the budgets that came out
of the 1251 Report and the administration's commitment were
quite acceptable to fulfill those goals and to fix the problem.
So I would hate to see, and I am sure Secretary Perry would
hate to see, movement away from that solution that we seemed
like we almost have in hand for that problem.
The only other point I would add, and the Commission report
noted this a bit as well, is we also have industrial
infrastructure challenges in front of us. Just making sure that
the United States, for example, can produce large solid rocket
motors, I think, is a very important goal, and it is something
that is going to need attention in the near future. So there
are NNSA challenges, but there are also industrial challenges
that need to be tended to.
Mr. Turner. Gentlemen, with that I will ask if you have any
closing comments.
Dr. Perry. I do not. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Payne. I just have one, and I will make it short, and
that goes back to Congressman Larsen's question, do I believe
that this administration pursues a minimum deterrence policy,
and I said no. I don't believe this administration pursues a
minimum deterrence policy. The concern that I reflected in my
remarks is my fear that, given the priorities identified in the
NPR, we could see that coming. And I would hope that we would
pay great attention to avoid that as every past Republican and
Democratic administration has avoided it.
Mr. Turner. Dr. Payne, Dr. Perry, thank you so much. Thank
you for all your contributions. And, Dr. Perry, I must tell you
that Kari Bingen, our professional staff member, had just
commented that she could listen to you for hours. And I know we
all could, and we would learn so much. So thank you for coming
and participating, and thank you for your record. Very good.
[Whereupon, at 5:52 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 2, 2011
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
March 2, 2011
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RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN
Dr. Miller. First, because as you know the Global Threat Reduction
Initiative (GTRI) is a Department of Energy effort led by the National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), my response to your question is
based on NNSA's input. Assuming that a full-year continuing resolution
is passed in April 2011, and that the GTRI is funded at approximately
$450 million, the GTRI still would be able to remove all highly
enriched uranium (HEU) from Ukraine, Mexico, and Belarus by April 2012.
However, if Congress continues to pass shorter-term, continuing
resolutions (CR), the GTRI will not be able to complete the Belarus
shipment of 280 kilograms (enough for more than 10 nuclear weapons) on
time. Also, because of the CR, the GTRI has already been forced to
delay long-lead procurement and preparation activities for HEU
shipments from Poland, Vietnam, Uzbekistan, and Hungary due to lack of
funding, which will likely delay these shipments from Fiscal Year (FY)
2012 to FY 2013. Delays to the removal of HEU from Uzbekistan may
require extensions of NNSA's material protection, control, and
accounting efforts at two facilities, putting further financial
pressure on that program. In addition, to keep the four-year HEU
removal schedule as close to the established timeline as possible, the
GTRI has had to reduce funding significantly for converting reactors
from HEU to low-enriched uranium fuel, developing a domestic Mo-99
isotope production capability, and improving radiological security. The
GTRI will eventually need the full FY 2011 funding to avoid further
delays in shipments, conversions, and security upgrades. [See page 21.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 2, 2011
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Mr. Turner. What is your assessment of Chinese intentions in the
nuclear realm? China continues to modernize and expand its nuclear
forces while we decrease ours. How does our strategic posture account
for the uncertainty that China may further build up its forces and seek
(or exceed) parity with the U.S. and Russia?
General Kehler. China has a long-standing ``No First Use'' policy
regarding nuclear weapons. China's modernization of their nuclear
forces is in line with this policy, with their nuclear arsenal designed
to be a sufficient and effective deterrent to foreign use (specifically
the U.S. and Russia) of nuclear weapons against China. At this time,
China doesn't appear to seek to expand their nuclear arsenal beyond
what they perceive as a credible deterrent and is unlikely to attempt
to match numbers of nuclear weapons or warheads with either the U.S. or
Russia.
Mr. Turner. Does the Obama Administration have plans to review and
revise the nation's nuclear strategy and/or guidance on the roles and
missions of nuclear weapons, which was last revised nearly ten years
ago by the Bush Administration? Have your organizations been given any
direction to look at changes or the impact of changes to U.S. nuclear
strategy or guidance? Have your organizations been given any direction
to look at nuclear force reductions below New START levels?
General Kehler. USSTRATCOM's current focus is on implementing New
START. The current administration has indicated its desire to review
and revise the nation's nuclear strategy and guidance on the roles and
missions of nuclear weapons, and we expect to be a full participant in
that process. Currently, USSTRATCOM has not yet been given any
direction to look at changes to, or impacts of changes to, U.S. nuclear
strategy or guidance, nor has USSTRATCOM been given any direction to
look at nuclear force reductions below New START levels.
Mr. Turner. Were the reduced force levels agreed to in New START--
1,550 warheads and 700 deployed (800 total) strategic delivery
vehicles--the lowest levels that STRATCOM could accept while still
meeting current targeting and planning guidance? If the United States
were to consider further reductions, how would the nation's nuclear
strategy or guidance have to change?
General Kehler. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the subcommittee files.]
Mr. Turner. What conditions do you believe would need to be met in
order to permit further nuclear force reductions beyond New START
levels or to permit reductions in U.S. hedge weapons?
General Kehler. I fully support the approach outlined in the
Nuclear Posture Review. Further reductions must continue to strengthen
the deterrence of potential regional adversaries, strategic stability
vis-a-vis Russia and China, and the assurance of our allies and
partners. In addition, we must invest to ensure a safe, secure, and
effective deterrent through full implementation of the Stockpile
Stewardship Program and the nuclear infrastructure investments
recommended in the NPR, as codified in the 3113 (Stockpile Stewardship
and Management Plan) and 2151 reports.
Mr. Turner. The Navy has briefed the committee on its plans to
design the SSBN(X) submarine with only 16 ballistic missile tubes.
However, as stated in the Administration's unclassified summary of the
Section 1251 Report to Congress which accompanied the delivery of the
New START Treaty to the Senate in May 2010, ``The Secretary of Defense,
based on recommendations from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has
established a baseline nuclear force structure that fully supports U.S.
security requirements and conforms to the New START limits . . . The
United States will reduce the number of SLBM launchers (launch tubes)
from 24 to 20 per SSBN . . .'' This was reaffirmed in the
Administration's February 16, 2011 update to the Section 1251 report,
``(U) Fixing the SLBM tubes at 20 rather than 24 deployed launches per
SSBN will stabilize the number of strategic submarines to be maintained
and will facilitate Navy planning for the OHIO-class submarine
replacement.'' In your testimony on March 2, you stated, ``The issue of
the number of tubes is not a simple black and white answer,'' but then
went on to testify that, ``Sixteen will meet STRATCOM's requirements.''
Can you please clarify your remarks on how 16 missile
tubes on 12 SSBN(X) platforms meets mission requirements when the
committee was told last May and again on February 16, 2011, that the
U.S. would reduce the number of SLBM launchers (launch tubes) from 24
to 20 per SSBN. What has changed?
What specific changes in nuclear deterrence requirements,
changes in nuclear strategy, or changes in planning assumptions have
allowed STRATCOM to support a further reduction in SSBN missile tubes
from 20 to 16?
The SSBN(X) is expected to have a service life of over 60
years. The threat and strategic environment can change significantly
over the course of 60 years. What planning assumptions--both nuclear
and nonnuclear--are being made? How do they affect the number of
missile tubes per hull and what sensitivity analysis has been done?
General Kehler. The Nuclear Posture Review affirmed the unique
value of each Triad leg, and while New START sets overall limits, the
treaty does not dictate how either party balances its forces across
delivery platforms. We must consider every platform investment in terms
of its impact on the aggregate. The 1251 report specifically addresses
the current Ohio-class fleet and funding requirements through 2021. The
Ohio Replacement fleet will not begin service until approximately
2029--beyond the lifetime of New START.
The planned 12 Ohio-Replacement SSBNs with a 16 missile tube
configuration provides the operational flexibility and responsiveness
necessary across a range of scenarios. Additional tubes would provide
marginal potential benefits in a subset of possible scenarios, but
their absence will not detract from the fleet's required operational
effectiveness. Furthermore, we must remember that the total number of
launchers, size and disposition of each triad leg, stealth
capabilities, total warheads available, the number of boats we can keep
at sea at any given time, and potential to adjust acquisition programs
are all factors to be considered in shaping the future force.
USSTRATCOM does not support a reduction in Ohio-class missile tubes
from 20 to 16 in today's environment. If the strategic environment
deteriorated today, our only option to increase the number of deployed
SLBM weapons is to upload weapons, which is limited by the number of
tubes/SSBN. However, during the procurement period for the Ohio-
Replacement Program (ORP) SSBNs, we will retain the option to build
more SSBNs into the 2030s. Furthermore, at the same time the Department
is considering the ORP, the Air Force is beginning to consider
strategic bomber and ICBM replacement options--both of which could
result in programs sized differently from the current force structure.
All of these decisions lie in the years ahead, as future strategic
environment, policy, and capabilities of the Triad will ultimately
determine how many ORP SSBNs, new bombers, and new ICBMs are required.
It is not possible to know what the strategic environment will be
throughout the life of the Ohio-Replacement SSBN. While a 20 tube
configuration provides marginally greater flexibility for a subset of
targeting and hedging scenarios, 16 tubes provide sufficient
flexibility and responsiveness to meet National requirements across a
range of scenarios. The capability differences between a 16 and 20 tube
configuration would only be relevant in a significantly deteriorated
strategic environment. In that event, the inherent flexibility of the
Triad would allow us to compensate with hedging strategies over the
short term, while additional force structure (SSBNs, ICBMs, Bombers)
enhancements would be a longer term solution. Again, we also have time
to decide if additional submarines, beyond the planned 12 boats, will
be required.
Mr. Turner. By law, the STRATCOM Commander is required to review
the annual certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile prepared by
the directors of the nuclear weapons laboratories, and provide his own
annual assessment. To the extent you can provide an unclassified
discussion, please describe your current assessment of the nuclear
stockpile and our deployed nuclear forces. As we look ahead, what
concerns you most about the stockpile and weapons complex, and what
impacts could these concerns have on STRATCOM's ability to meet its
mission requirements?
General Kehler. Based on CDRUSSTRATCOM 9 Nov 2010 assessment, our
nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective.
I am concerned about our ability to maintain long term confidence
in the military effectiveness and reliability of an aging stockpile due
to shortfalls in warhead surveillance and infrastructure capabilities.
I am also concerned with the potential backlog of life extension
programs and sequencing. The resources requested in the FY2011 and 2012
budget requests are critical to ensuring a safe, secure, and effective
stockpile.
Mr. Turner. The Administration has requested $564 million in
military construction authority to support the recapitalization of the
STRATCOM Headquarters at Offutt AFB. Considering the significant
investment to construct a new headquarters, what assessment was done
regarding the possibility of moving this headquarters function to
another location?
General Kehler. While no formal assessment of alternative locations
was done, Offutt AFB meets all of our location requirements for
executing our nuclear command and control and other missions. Moving
the STRATCOM C2 facility to another military installation would incur
significant relocation costs and disrupt our uniquely trained and
experienced workforce. The USSTRATCOM MILCON requirement is for the
recapitalization of a facility for an existing mission at our current
location. The primary purpose is to provide modern command and control
across a diverse and complex mission set of national importance.
Mr. Turner. In the proposed construction of a new STRATCOM
headquarters at Offutt AFB, NE, CYBERCOM has an embedded presence to
support operations. Considering CYBERCOM remains an emerging component
of the national strategy whose final composition and organization has
yet to be determined, there is concern about incorporating the
requirements of CYBERCOM elements at Offutt AFB. The Air Force is the
force provider for STRATCOM and responsible for developing the
construction requirements for the new facility.
As the force provider for STRATCOM, what has the Air Force done to
assess the necessity to provide infrastructure at Offutt AFB for
CYBERCOM? What consideration has been given to deferring the
construction of this function until a final decision is reached on the
final disposition of CYBERCOM?
General Kehler. USSTRATCOM's Command and Control Facility
requirements are distinctly separate and independent of the CYBERCOM
Mission. While cyber planning is conducted at USSTRATCOM, executing
operations and monitoring and defending the GIG is conducted at
CYBERCOM's HQ, located in Fort Meade, MD. No additional ``cyber''
infrastructure is required or planned for the new USSTRATCOM Command
and Control facility.
USSTRATCOM has not received specific infrastructure requirements
from the Air Force for CYBERCOM, nor are we anticipating any. The IT
infrastructure in the new C2 Facility has been sized to support
maintaining cyber networks, as part of our UCP mission and integrating
this SA with our other UCP missions. Therefore, USSTRATCOM specific
CYBERCOM elements are negligible and do not impact the proposed MILCON
project of the USSTRATCOM Replacement Facility.
Mr. Turner. What is your assessment of Chinese intentions in the
nuclear realm? China continues to modernize and expand its nuclear
forces while we decrease ours. How does our strategic posture account
for the uncertainty that China may further build up its forces and seek
(or exceed) parity with the U.S. and Russia?
Dr. Miller. China's official policy toward nuclear deterrence
continues to focus on maintaining a nuclear force structure able to
survive attack and respond with sufficient strength to inflict
unacceptable damage on the enemy. China has consistently asserted that
it adheres to a ``no-first-use'' policy, stating it would use nuclear
forces only in response to a nuclear strike against China. There is
some ambiguity about the conditions under which China's no-first-use
policy would or would not apply, but there has been no indication that
national leaders plan to revise the doctrine. China will likely
continue to invest considerable resources to maintain limited nuclear
deterrence with regard to the United States, also referred to by some
PRC writers as a ``sufficient and effective'' deterrent. Since China
views nuclear deterrence as critical to its national security, it is
likely to continue to invest in technology and systems to ensure the
military can deliver a damaging retaliatory nuclear strike.
The pace and scope of China's efforts to modernize its nuclear
arsenal, both quantitatively and qualitatively, combined with the lack
of transparency, underscores the importance of ensuring strategic
stability in U.S. relations with China, as well as with the other
nuclear powers. Russia remains the only peer of the United States in
the area of nuclear weapons capabilities; China's nuclear arsenal
remains much smaller than those of Russia and the United States.
Fundamental changes in the international security environment in recent
years--including the growth of unrivaled U.S. conventional military
capabilities, major improvements in missile defenses, and the easing of
Cold War rivalries--enable us to fulfill our objectives for deterrence
and stability at significantly lower nuclear force levels and with
reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. Therefore, without jeopardizing
our traditional deterrence and reassurance goals, we are now able to
shape our nuclear weapons policies and force structure in ways that
will better enable us to meet today's most pressing security
challenges. Any future nuclear reductions must be accomplished in the
context of strengthening deterrence against potential regional
adversaries, enhancing strategic stability vis-a-vis Russia and China,
and maintaining assurance of our Allies and partners.
The United States is pursuing high-level, bilateral dialogues on
strategic stability with China aimed at fostering a more stable,
resilient, and transparent strategic relationship. During his visit to
Beijing in January 2011, Secretary Gates communicated the U.S. desire
to initiate a Strategic Security Dialogue. A U.S.-China dialogue will
improve our means of communication to help reduce risk and mistrust and
to begin building the confidence and mutual understanding necessary for
enhanced relations and stability.
Mr. Turner. Does the Obama Administration have plans to review and
revise the nation's nuclear strategy and/or guidance on the roles and
missions of nuclear weapons, which was last revised nearly ten years
ago by the Bush Administration? Have your organizations been given any
direction to look at changes or the impact of changes to U.S. nuclear
strategy or guidance? Have your organizations been given any direction
to look at nuclear force reductions below New START levels?
Dr. Miller. During 2009-2010, the Department of Defense, in
consultation with the Departments of State and Energy, conducted the
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) required by Congress pursuant to Section
1070 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008.
Under the statute, the NPR was directed to review a range of elements
that included the role of nuclear forces in U.S. military strategy,
planning, and programming; and the relationship among U.S. nuclear
deterrence policy, targeting strategy, and arms control objectives. The
2010 NPR report focuses on key objectives of nuclear weapons polices
and posture, and serves as a roadmap for implementing President Obama's
agenda for reducing nuclear dangers, while simultaneously advancing
broader U.S. security interests.
A key part of implementing the NPR, as with previous such reviews,
is the revision of detailed Presidential and Departmental guidance, and
the subsequent modification of operational plans. That effort is now
beginning. As an initial step, the Department of Defense will analyze
potential changes in targeting requirements and force postures.
Potential changes will be assessed according to how they meet key
objectives outlined in the NPR, including reducing the role of nuclear
weapons, sustaining strategic deterrence and stability, strengthening
regional deterrence, and assuring U.S. Allies and partners. The
analysis of potential revisions to guidance and planning will take
account of commitments made in the NPR. The analysis will also consider
possible changes to force structure that would be associated with
different types of reductions. And, it will consider possible changes
to nuclear deterrence strategies associated with changes in the
security environment, as well as the potential contributions of non-
nuclear strike capabilities to strategic deterrence. Presidents have
traditionally conducted such an analysis and have provided updated
planning guidance to the Department of Defense.
As stated in the NPR, the United States intends to pursue further
reductions in strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons with Russia,
including both deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons. When
complete, the analysis of targeting requirements and force postures
will support the formulation of post-New START Treaty arms control
objectives. We intend to consider future reductions in a manner that
supports the commitments to stability, deterrence, and assurance of our
Allies and partners.
Mr. Turner. What conditions do you believe would need to be met in
order to permit further nuclear force reductions beyond New START
levels or to permit reductions in U.S. hedge weapons?
Dr. Miller. As stated in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)
report, the United States intends to pursue further reductions in
strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons with Russia, including both
deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons. We intend to consider future
reductions in the numbers of deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons,
both strategic and non-strategic, and the associated changes in Russian
forces and other variables that would be required to do so in a manner
that supports the commitments to stability, deterrence, and assurance.
A number of factors, identified below, will influence the magnitude and
pace of future reductions in U.S. nuclear forces below those
established in the New START Treaty. Any plans to reduce the strategic
nuclear forces of the United States below the levels prescribed in the
New START Treaty will be reported to Congress pursuant to Section 1079
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011.
Three overarching factors will affect potential future reductions
to the Nation's nuclear arsenal. First, reductions must occur in the
context of the NPR-directed goals of strengthening deterrence against
potential regional adversaries, enhancing strategic stability vis-a-vis
Russia and China, and maintaining assurance of our Allies and partners.
This will require an updated assessment of deterrence requirements;
continued improvements in U.S., Allied, and partner non-nuclear
capabilities; focused reductions in strategic and nonstrategic weapons;
and close consultations with Allies and partners. Second,
implementation of the National Nuclear Security Administration's
Stockpile Stewardship Program and the nuclear infrastructure
investments recommended in the NPR, and summarized in the Fiscal Year
2012 Annual Update to the report pursuant to Section 1251 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, will allow the
United States to shift from retaining large numbers of non-deployed
warheads as a hedge against technical or geopolitical surprise toward a
greater reliance on infrastructure, allowing major reductions in the
nuclear stockpile. These investments are essential to facilitating any
reductions while sustaining deterrence under the New START Treaty and
beyond. Lastly, the size and composition of Russia's nuclear forces
will remain a significant factor in determining how much and how fast
the United States is prepared to reduce its forces; therefore, we will
place importance on Russia joining us as we move to lower levels.
Mr. Turner. What is your assessment of Chinese intentions in the
nuclear realm? China continues to modernize and expand its nuclear
forces while we decrease ours. How does our strategic posture account
for the uncertainty that China may further build up its forces and seek
(or exceed) parity with the U.S. and Russia?
Dr. Perry. It is difficult to assess China's intentions, as it
remains quite opaque on both its nuclear posture strategy and doctrine.
At a minimum, China undoubtedly believes it is important to maintain a
nuclear deterrent that remains credible well into the future. It
appears to be addressing the vulnerability of its older-generation
fixed silo-based ICBMs through the deployment of road-mobile ICBMs and
submarine-based ballistic missiles. It also appears to be addressing
the ability of its warheads to penetrate missile defenses through the
development of multiple warhead technology and I would imagine other
penetration aids as well. The fact that China appears to maintain its
nuclear warheads separate from its missile delivery systems suggests
that it does not put a premium on swift nuclear response, which accords
with its doctrine. I believe that greater clarity on China's part as to
its intentions, strategy, and doctrine would contribute to greater
understanding and reduce the chances for misunderstanding between the
world's two largest economies. I would note that Defense Secretary
Gates has tried several times in his service under both Presidents Bush
and Obama to encourage China to be more open on these issues, so it has
not been for lack of trying on our part that its intentions remain
uncertain.
I believe it unlikely that China would seek to attain nuclear
parity with the United States and Russia given that both we and the
Russians would detect such an attempt long before China could achieve
such status. Both Russia and especially the United States would
undoubtedly respond vigorously to such a challenge. Given Russia and
our much broader experiences and capabilities in the strategic nuclear
arena, such a Chinese gamble would run the real risk that China would
be worse off than if it had not tried. Because the United States has a
substantially larger nuclear arsenal than China, much greater strategic
nuclear technical know-how, an active production line of the most
technologically sophisticated and capable SLBMs in the world, I think
China would be very ill-advised to make such a challenge, and I believe
it is unlikely to try. We also can maintain flexibility by ensuring
that future START-type agreements are of limited duration, with the
ability to extend them if circumstances permit. This, and the ``supreme
national interests'' clause that has been a feature of SALT II, START
I, and New START, provide useful additional flexibility for the United
States that should also ``deter'' China from seriously considering a
``sprint to nuclear parity'' in the years ahead.
Mr. Turner. What conditions do you believe would need to be met in
order to permit further nuclear force reductions beyond New START
levels or to permit reductions in U.S. hedge weapons?
Dr. Perry. Any such comprehensive nuclear arms treaty (CNAT), which
by including tactical nuclear weapons would move beyond just strategic
weapons, should be consistent with U.S. national security requirements.
I believe that any reduction of U.S. hedge weapons, i.e., non-deployed
warheads, would be greatly facilitated by a successful and verifiable
resolution of the tactical nuclear weapons issue. We should also be
confident that we would not require larger numbers of weapons to
account for strategic uncertainties, such as the deployment of a
Russian or Chinese missile defense that would call into question the
credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. An additional way to hedge
would be to ensure that, as in the previous response, the United States
only consider CNAT agreements of appropriately limited duration, and
not of unlimited duration, until such time that the international order
is conducive for more enduring agreements. I believe that a ratified
and enforced CTBT would also reduce any strategic uncertainty we or the
global community might have about possible developments of strategic
warheads by any state. I believe we have an important strategic
advantage over China in strategic weapon technology that would be very
difficult for China to overcome in the presence of a CTBT.
Mr. Turner. The Strategic Posture Commission observed the nuclear
weapons infrastructure was ``decrepit'' and the intellectual
infrastructure was in trouble. Do the Administration's modernization
plans address these concerns? How would you prioritize these plans and
what remains your most significant concern?
Dr. Perry. I believed that the Administration's nuclear weapons
infrastructure plans as they existed when the SPRC released its report
in May 2009 were acceptable, although they did run some risks. With the
additional funding that the Administration has added since that time,
my remaining concerns are quite satisfied. I remained concerned about
the long-term viability of the intellectual infrastructure of the
nuclear weapons enterprise and believe we should take appropriate steps
to ensure we continue to have the necessary scientific and policy
expertise required to meet future challenges. These issues are more in
the educational policy than the technical realm, but they require our
ongoing attention. The Strategic Posture Review Commission unanimously
agreed in its report about the need for a stronger intellectual
infrastructure to support our strategic posture, and I would be
surprised if the views of the Commission members have changed on this
score--mine certainly have not.
Mr. Turner. What is your assessment of Chinese intentions in the
nuclear realm? China continues to modernize and expand its nuclear
forces while we decrease ours. How does our strategic posture account
for the uncertainty that China may further build up its forces and seek
(or exceed) parity with the U.S. and Russia?
Dr. Payne. Chinese military doctrine integrates nuclear weapons
into an overall strategy called ``active defense.'' The Chinese
declaratory policy of ``no first use'' of nuclear weapons includes
ambiguities that appear to allow first use in a future conflict.
Indeed, official, open Chinese doctrinal documents talk about
``adjusting'' the nuclear use threshold in the event of war in a manner
that would allow pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons. According to
available open sources, Chinese intentions with regard to its nuclear
forces and doctrine are twofold. First, China would like to use nuclear
weapons to help deter the United States and others from interfering
with its efforts to expand its political-military influence throughout
Asia. In short, the goal is to deter the United States and others from
responding forcefully to politico-military initiatives that China may
decide to undertake in the region. Second, China sees nuclear weapons
as potentially contributing in the event of war to the goal of
defeating U.S. force projection capabilities that otherwise could help
to defeat Chinese arms in the region. The Chinese nuclear modernization
program has been in process for decades in line with these two goals,
and shows no sign of abating. There is, in fact, little uncertainty
that China intends to continue the modernization of its nuclear and
conventional forces to meet the strategic goals as described. U.S.
efforts to gain greater transparency with regard to China's nuclear
forces or a formal agreement to limit/reduce China's forces have failed
in the past and will likely fail in the future to the extent that China
judges increased transparency or limitations to interfere with these
strategic goals. The apparent direction of the U.S. nuclear strategic
posture toward deeper nuclear reductions, reduced flexibility, fewer
options and the avoidance of missile defense capabilities vis-a-vis
China's strategic forces will help ease the difficulties for China to
meet its strategic force goals.
Mr. Turner. What conditions do you believe would need to be met in
order to permit further nuclear force reductions beyond New START
levels or to permit reductions in U.S. hedge weapons?
Dr. Payne. To be prudent, the conditions necessary for further
significant reductions in our deployed forces or hedges would be: 1)
either the establishment of a global collective security system with
authority and power capable of reliably and effectively protecting the
security of all countries; or, 2) the dramatic peaceful transformation
of the world political order to such a extent that U.S. leaders and
others can reliably conclude that the threats and prospective threats
facing the United States and allies will be limited to such an extent
that minimum U.S. deterrence capabilities will be adequate to protect
the United States and assure allies. I see no evidence to suggest that
either of these conditions is emerging.
Mr. Turner. The Strategic Posture Commission observed the nuclear
weapons infrastructure was ``decrepit'' and the intellectual
infrastructure was in trouble. Do the Administration's modernization
plans address these concerns? How would you prioritize these plans and
what remains your most significant concern?
Dr. Payne. With regard to the weapons infrastructure, I defer to
the Laboratory Directors who have stated that the level of support to
which the administration has committed in the 1251 Report update
appears adequate. Dr. Michael Anastasio, Director of the Los Alamos
National Laboratory, has testified (March 30, SASC) that he is
concerned about possible reductions below the 1251 baseline in coming
budgets. He emphasized the need to sustain focus and budgets over
several decades and that, ``a national commitment and stable funding to
go with it are essential elements'' for retaining the highly-skilled
work force necessary.
I have two related concerns. First, senior administration officials
have stated publicly and explicitly that the administration is
undertaking a review of U.S. nuclear requirements, including a
targeting review, for the specific purpose of supporting the ``next
round of nuclear reductions'' by developing ``options for further
reductions in our current nuclear stockpile.'' U.S. force requirements,
however, should not be driven by the pursuit of further numeric
reductions and arms control negotiations, per se, but by the strategic
goals those forces are intended to serve. In this case, those goals are
the deterrence of threats to the United States, the extended deterrence
of threats to allies, the assurance of allies, and the defense of the
United States and its allies. It is not difficult to rationalize lower
force requirements if the priority goal used to measure U.S. force
adequacy is movement to lower force numbers. It may, however, be much
more difficult if the priority goals of U.S. strategic forces and
requirements are deterrence, extended deterrence, assurance and
defense. Unless the metrics for judging the adequacy of U.S. forces
include these priority goals--as has been the case with every
Democratic and Republican administration for over five decades--we
should not expect U.S. forces to be adequate to support those goals.
Second, if the administration indeed places numeric reductions and
arms control negotiations as the priority goals to measure the value
and adequacy of U.S. forces and requirements, the availability of the
U.S. intellectual and industrial capabilities necessary to sustain
these forces is likely to wither further. This will simply be the
result of informed career choices by talented people who will take into
account the priorities of the U.S. agenda and the related allocation of
resources--the appearance of declining prioritization and uncertain
budgets for the U.S. nuclear infrastructure will not be a helpful basis
for recruitment.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ
Ms. Sanchez. What is the relationship between non-proliferation,
arms control and extended deterrence (particularly with respect to
Germany, Japan and Turkey)?
General Kehler. As stated in the Nuclear Posture Review, the
security relationships we maintain with our allies are critical in
deterring potential threats and also serve nonproliferation goals--
demonstrating to neighboring states that the pursuit of nuclear weapons
will undermine their goal of achieving military or political
advantages, and reassuring non-nuclear U.S. allies and partners that
their security interests can be protected without their own nuclear
deterrent capabilities. U.S. nuclear weapons have played an essential
role in extending deterrence to our allies. In Europe, the presence of
U.S. nuclear weapons, combined with NATO's unique nuclear sharing
arrangements, has contributed to Alliance cohesion and provided
reassurance to allied and partners who feel exposed to regional
threats. In Asia, the United States maintains extended deterrence
through bilateral alliances, security relationships, and through
forward military presence and security guarantees. The deterrent the
U.S. extends to its allies relies in part on the credibility of U.S.
nuclear deterrent forces and policy. The pursuit of arms control
efforts--including New START, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty, and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty strengthens our ability
to reinforce the non-proliferation regime by visibly addressing our NPT
commitments.
Ms. Sanchez. The FY12 budget begins to look at whether we should
replace the ALCM. What is the impetus behind building a new ALCM and
have you estimated the costs yet?
General Kehler. The ALCM is reaching end of life in the mid to late
2020s. The department has begun the formal process to determine the
requirement, replacement capability, and cost options. We will have
more fidelity on this issue over the coming year.
Ms. Sanchez. What assurances can you make that we are making
progress toward the goal of deploying cost-operationally effective
missile defense technology?
General Kehler. I am confident we are deploying a cost and
operationally effective system based upon real-world operations such as
Operation Burnt Frost. Theater High Altitude Area Defense testing is
providing confidence with 7 of 7 successful shoot downs. Another
element, the SM-3, a cornerstone of the Phased Adaptive Approach has
demonstrated 20 of 24 successful intercepts. We are committed to
seeking every efficiency possible. For example, the use of Aegis Ashore
demonstrates the transfer of proven missile defense technology into
different operational basing modes. With each generation of interceptor
lot buys we are seeing the benefits of production lessons learned and
best practices which is reducing the cost per interceptor.
Ms. Sanchez. Are we on track to respond as soon as we are able to
threats as they develop? Are you concerned that the threat from Iran
and North Korea are developing faster than the intelligence community
anticipated?
General Kehler. We currently have sufficient missile defense
elements protecting the homeland from a limited Iranian or North Korean
attack. I am confident our investment in missile defense research and
development provides adequate flexibility against unanticipated
threats, and the Phased Adaptive Approach provides a flexible strategy
to address these threats should they emerge. We are constantly
assessing each element in our missile defense program for options to
accelerate capability across a range of scenarios and a hedge strategy
will be completed soon.
Ms. Sanchez. What are the main challenges for the newly created
CYBERCOM, and how will these be addressed?
General Kehler. Tasked to secure the DoD's networks, U.S. Cyber
Command faces significant capacity, capability, and policy challenges.
Specifically, U.S. Cyber Command faces a shortfall of cyber force
capacity to plan, operate, and defend our networks and ensure freedom
of action and maneuver in cyberspace. While they have begun to take
advantage of significant efficiencies in designing and managing our
information technology architecture, the sheer scale of DoD networks
makes configuration management and common awareness of activities a
significant challenge. Finally, there are still a number of policy and
procedural issues to resolve to ensure we can effectively partner with
the interagency, private sector, and allies to confront cyber threats.
In order to best manage risk, ensure U.S. and allied freedom of
action, and develop integrated capabilities in cyberspace, U.S. Cyber
Command is actively implementing five strategic initiatives:
Treat cyberspace as an operational domain to organize,
train, and equip so that DoD can take full advantage of cyberspace's
potential in its military, intelligence, and business operations
Employ new defense operating concepts, including active
cyber defense, to protect DoD networks and systems
Partner closely with other U.S. government departments
and agencies and the private sector to enable a whole-of-government
strategy and a nationally integrated approach to cybersecurity
Build robust relationships with U.S. allies and
international partners to enable information sharing and strengthen
collective cyber security.
Leverage the nation's ingenuity by recruiting and
retaining an exceptional cyber workforce and enabling rapid
technological innovation
U.S. Cyber Command's synergy with National Security Agency/Central
Security Service's (NSA/CSS) infrastructure and expertise provides a
significant advantage in this task.
Ms. Sanchez. What would the benefits and drawbacks be of acceding
to the European Union proposed Code of Conduct for Space?
General Kehler. I agree in principle with the pursuit of voluntary
guidelines and international norms that promote standards, safe and
responsible operations, and a sustainable space domain. Any such
guidelines or norms of behavior should enhance the security, safety,
and sustainability of all outer space activities. USSTRATCOM is working
with the Joint Staff to conduct an Operations Assessment of the Code to
identify potential impacts or risks to military space operations now
and in the future. The assessment will be completed by 31 May.
Ms. Sanchez. What is the relationship between non-proliferation,
arms control and extended deterrence (particularly with respect to
Germany, Japan and Turkey)?
Dr. Miller. Non-proliferation, arms control, and extended
deterrence can and should be mutually reinforcing to support global
strategic stability.
Arms control relates to non-proliferation through the important
role it plays in the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.
The cornerstone of this regime, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT), is built on a basic bargain--countries with
nuclear weapons will move toward disarmament; countries without nuclear
weapons will not acquire them; and all countries can access peaceful
nuclear energy. Arms control efforts are concrete steps that nuclear
weapons States can take to fulfill the first tenet of that bargain,
captured in Article VI of the NPT, to make progress toward disarmament.
Toward that end, ratification of the New START Treaty with Russia is a
significant achievement of the world's two largest nuclear powers to
reduce their nuclear arms, build trust, promote stability, and meet
their obligations under the NPT. These actions highlight the non-
compliance of States such as Iran and North Korea and can help garner
support from the rest of the international community to condemn the
actions of non-compliant States and work toward continued strength of
the non-proliferation regime.
Extended deterrence supports non-proliferation by promoting
confidence among U.S. Allies, including Germany, Japan, and Turkey--and
especially those countries technically capable of developing and
possessing nuclear weapons--that the United States is committed to
their security and that obtaining nuclear weapons is, therefore,
unnecessary and not in their national interests. In turn, U.S. extended
deterrence commitments are reinforced by reductions in nuclear weapons.
The consultative processes of well-constructed arms control agreements
increase transparency and promote stability among participating States.
Collectively, these efforts diminish the salience of nuclear weapons in
international affairs and demonstrate U.S. progress in moving step-by-
step toward their elimination.
Extended deterrence, arms control, and non-proliferation work
synergistically to strengthen deterrence, enhance strategic stability,
and assure our Allies and partners of the U.S. commitment to their
defense and the improvement of international security broadly.
Ms. Sanchez. The FY12 budget begins to look at whether we should
replace the ALCM. What is the impetus behind building a new ALCM and
have you estimated the costs yet?
Dr. Miller. The Department of Defense is committed to continued
Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO) missile capability, which provides an
important capability for existing long-range aircraft and calls for
future long-range aircraft capability to deliver weapons, even in the
event of significant advances in air defenses by potential adversaries.
The Air Force has programmed $0.9 billion for research, development,
test, and evaluation over the next five years for the development of
the LRSO. At this time, we do not have a program cost estimate,
although we expect to have program costs defined by 4th quarter of
Fiscal Year 2013.
Ms. Sanchez. What assurances can you make that we are making
progress toward the goal of deploying cost-operationally effective
missile defense technology?
Dr. Miller. The Administration is committed to deploying
capabilities that have been proven effective under extensive testing
and assessment and are affordable over the long term.
To strengthen the testing program, a number of steps are being
taken. This commitment reflected our assessment that it is no longer
necessary to pursue a high-risk acquisition strategy that
simultaneously develops and deploys new systems. The Integrated Master
Test Plan announced in June 2009, and updated every six months since
that time, reflects the Missile Defense Agency's new approach. This
program sets out test activities over the full course of each system's
development, not just two years into the future as was the case under
the former program. These activities include a comprehensive set of
ground and flight tests designed to demonstrate operational performance
and validate models used to support an evaluation of system
effectiveness.
To ensure adequate oversight of the missile defense program, DoD
has enhanced the roles and responsibilities of the Missile Defense
Executive Board (MDEB). Established in March 2007, the MDEB provides
oversight and guidance in a collaborative mode involving all missile
defense stakeholders in DoD and some from outside DoD.
Ms. Sanchez. Are we on track to respond as soon as we are able to
threats as they develop? Are you concerned that the threat from Iran
and North Korea are developing faster than the intelligence community
anticipated?
Dr. Miller. Yes, we are on track to respond to ballistic missile
threats as they develop. Our current ballistic missile defense posture
already protects us against the potential emergence of an Iranian or
North Korean ICBM threat.
Although there is some uncertainty about when and how the ICBM
threat to the U.S. homeland will mature, the Administration is taking
several steps to maintain and improve the protection of the homeland
from the potential ICBM threat posed by Iran and North Korea. These
steps include the continued procurement of ground-based interceptors
(GBIs), the procurement and deployment of additional sensors, and
upgrades to the Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications
(C2BMC) system.
We are also taking steps to hedge against the possibility that
threats might evolve more rapidly than planned capability enhancements,
or that those capability enhancements may be delayed for technical
reasons. The Administration is completing construction of eight
additional silos at Missile Field Two in Fort Greely, Alaska, and
continuing development and testing of the two-stage GBI. Additionally,
six silos in Missile Field One at Fort Greely will be placed in a
storage mode for possible upgrade for operational use in the future.
The Administration is considering additional steps to strengthen the
U.S. hedge posture, and we will brief this subcommittee on the results
in a classified setting.
Ms. Sanchez. What are the main challenges for the newly created
CYBERCOM, and how will these be addressed?
Dr. Miller. U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), as a newly organized
sub-unified command, is working to address several challenges in order
to meet the Command's mission requirements.
A key challenge is developing a command and control structure that
balances the global operations and defense responsibilities of
USCYBERCOM with the responsibilities and requirements of the regional
combatant commanders. USCYBERCOM is working with the Joint Staff and
several regional combatant commands to explore alternative approaches,
and identify the most effective command and control structures.
In terms of capacity, USCYBERCOM is focused on building the cyber
force. This involves recruiting new talent; training, credentialing,
and certifying the cyber workforce; and retaining the right force for
the future.
In terms of capability, USCYBERCOM is focused on improving
situational awareness and security of own networks. In order to do
this, DOD must provide effective configuration management of legacy
systems and hunt effectively on our own networks, while working toward
developing a single DOD enterprise, thereby providing a more agile and
active defense for our information systems.
In the policy arena, USCYBERCOM is working with the Department's
Cyber Policy Office to address the concern that DoD's networks ride on
a global commercial infrastructure that is inherently vulnerable and
open to intrusion, denial, destruction, and exploitation. To secure DoD
systems and the information and systems of the Defense Industrial Base
more effectively, USCYBERCOM and DoD are working with our interagency
partners to improve information sharing with, and the cybersecurity of,
the private sector, our Allies/partners, and other departments and
agencies of the U.S. Government.
Ms. Sanchez. Can you give us an update on where the Administration
is with regard to export control reform and how this will affect the
space industry?
Dr. Miller. We are making significant progress toward reforming the
U.S. export control system in order to make it more effective,
efficient, and transparent. Our reform effort is being conducted in
three phases and focuses on the ``four singles'' of export control
reform: a single control list, a single licensing agency, a single
export enforcement coordination center, and a single U.S. Government-
wide electronic information technology (IT) licensing system. We have
completed important regulatory changes to encryption and dual-national
controls in Phase I, and Phase II activities are well underway. For
example, we have been making significant progress toward the creation
of a single control list. The Department of Defense has taken the lead
in rewriting the U.S. Munitions List (USML), including Category XV,
which deals with spacecraft. We will also begin revising and
``tiering'' dual-use controls in the near future so that the USML and
the Commodities Control List (CCL) can be merged into one. On the
single IT system, the Department has been designated as the Executive
Agent for the new U.S. Government-wide export licensing system that
will be based on DoD's USXPORTS system. We are working with the
Departments of Commerce and State to establish connectivity with the
USXPORTS system. The Executive Order establishing the Enforcement
Coordination Center was signed by the President in November 2010, and
efforts are underway to establish the Center.
We have not completed our rewrite of controls on spacecraft in the
USML; therefore, I cannot provide a detailed assessment at this time of
the impacts on the U.S. space industry. However, consistent with our
overall approach to export control reform, I expect that we will
propose ``higher fences around fewer items,'' and increase transparency
and predictability, so that the U.S. space industry will be able to
compete globally more efficiently. We are well aware that current U.S.
law limits the flexibility of the President in this area. I look
forward to working with Congress on any legislative changes that may be
required to implement proposed changes.
Ms. Sanchez. What would the benefits and drawbacks be of acceding
to the European Union proposed Code of Conduct for Space?
Dr. Miller. There are many potential benefits to the EU's proposed
international Code of Conduct for Space. The proposed international
Code of Conduct calls on subscribing states to refrain from activities
that create long-lived debris and to notify certain space activities,
including those that might risk creating debris. Space debris is a
growing concern for all space-faring nations.
Another benefit is that the EU's proposed international Code of
Conduct reinforces key space norms that the U.S. Government has already
endorsed, including pre-launch notifications under the Hague Code of
Conduct, UN Debris Mitigation Standards, and safety of flight practices
to share collision warning information.
Additionally, the EU's proposed international Code of Conduct
explicitly recognizes nations' inherent right of self-defense. This
preserves considerable flexibility to implement the National Security
Space Strategy, issued by the Department of Defense and the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence. The Code of Conduct would not
constrain either the development of the full range of space
capabilities, nor the ability of the United States to conduct necessary
operations in crisis or war.
Ms. Sanchez. What is the relationship between non-proliferation,
arms control and extended deterrence (particularly with respect to
Germany, Japan and Turkey)?
Dr. Perry. All three of these areas are important components of
broader U.S. strategic posture. Turkey, and especially Germany and
Japan, have the potential to become nuclear weapons powers rather
quickly were they to decide to do so. However, under extended
deterrence, U.S. security assurances, including nuclear assurances,
virtually eliminate any incentives they or our other allies and friends
may have to acquire their own nuclear weapons capabilities. Without a
policy of extended deterrence we would face a highly proliferated
nuclear world, a world that would be much more unstable than we face
today. Arms control relates to extended deterrence by reassuring our
allies and friends that the potential Russian nuclear threat is
bounded, thus fostering a climate of cooperation that these countries,
most of whom lie much closer to Russia than does the United States,
very much support, given the dangers they fear could arise if U.S.-
Russian relations grew tense and hostile.
Finally, arms control and non-proliferation are linked in several
ways. The United States and Russia are both obligated under Article VI
of the NPT to work toward nuclear disarmament, offering our allies, and
all countries the prospect of ultimate freedom from nuclear threats at
some point in the distant future. U.S. participation in the arms
control process thus gives these countries important additional
incentives to cooperate with the United States in our non-proliferation
efforts, working together to block the transfer of nuclear-related
technologies and equipment to countries seeking to acquire nuclear
capabilities. Effective non-proliferation strategies, supporting
verification agreements, and monitoring technologies, also reassure the
United States and Russia that they do not need to develop or build
additional nuclear weapons to guard against new nuclear-armed states.
As Russia and the U.S. have similar non-proliferation interests,
progress and cooperation in both arms control and non-proliferation
helps contribute to greater trust and improved relations between the
two countries, helping to set conditions for future work on tactical
and non-deployed nuclear weapons.
Ms. Sanchez. What is the relationship between non-proliferation,
arms control and extended deterrence (particularly with respect to
Germany, Japan and Turkey)?
Dr. Payne. The relationship among non-proliferation, arms control
and extended deterrence is the subject of considerable controversy.
Despite numerous confident claims with regard to this relationship,
there are few basic facts that allow for confident claims to be made
reasonably. For example, the frequent confident claim that further
bilateral or multilateral agreements to reduce nuclear weapons among
the nuclear states will contribute significantly to non-proliferation
is highly speculative. There is no convincing evidence to support the
expectation that a strengthened non-proliferation norm will emerge from
such agreements and empower more effective global non-proliferation
efforts. Despite the many confident claims of this linkage, there is
insufficient evidence to conclude that these represent reasonable
expectations. Indeed, the deep reductions in U.S. and Russian strategic
nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War seem to have had no such
positive effect and the potential reduction in the credibility of the
U.S. extended nuclear deterrent will incentivize proliferation in some
cases.
There are, however, some basic facts in this regard that can be
highlighted. First, some U.S. allies, notably those who face
significant threats, including nuclear threats, or who see the
potential for greatly increased nuclear threats in their regions, have
expressed increasing concerns about the future credibility of the U.S.
extended nuclear deterrent. They understandably see negative
implications for their security in the potential degradation of the
credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Some of these allies,
implicitly or explicitly, have indicated that they do see the U.S.
focus on nuclear force reductions and movement toward nuclear zero as
contributing to the prospective degradation of U.S. credibility, and
thus to the degradation of their own security. One option that these
allies may consider if they no longer can rely on the U.S. nuclear
deterrent for their security is the acquisition of their own
independent nuclear deterrent forces. Some Japanese and South Korean
commentators and officials have pointed to this possibility.
There are internal debates along these lines within allied
countries and baring some dramatic new threat developments, of the
countries identified in the question, my opinion is that we are
unlikely to see this concern and consequence in Germany. The prospects
are, I suspect, somewhat higher for Japan and Turkey given the threats
and emerging threats these two allies face.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS
Mr. Franks. We all recall the difficulties surrounding the
ratifying of the New START treaty, one of which was whether or not the
treaty affected our ability to deploy missile defenses in Europe. There
are media reports suggesting that Russia is apparently determined to
make any potential negotiations on tactical nuclear-weapon curbs
contingent on U.S. concessions over plans to deploy missile defenses in
Europe and note Russian warnings that it might withdraw from New START
if the U.S. increases the capability of its missile defenses. If you
were directed to deploy missile defenses in Europe today, how long will
it be before such a system were operation, and in your opinion, what
will be Russia's response regarding their commitment to New START?
General Kehler. U.S. Strategic Command is responsible for
synchronizing planning for global missile defense, in coordination with
other combatant commands and the services, but we do not serve as the
force provider of missile defense assets. The President has already
directed the deployment of missile defense assets to Europe in
coordination with our NATO allies. U.S. Strategic Command fully
supports this effort. Phase 1 of the European Phased Adaptive Approach
(PAA) should be complete by late 2011 and provide an initial defensive
capability against short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic
missiles using the Aegis BMD 3.6.1 weapon system with SM-3 IA
interceptors and forward-based AN/TPY-2 and SPY-1 radars. The United
States clearly stated on 7 April 2010 that our ``missile defense
systems are not intended to affect the strategic balance with Russia''
and that ``The United States intends to continue improving and
deploying its missile defense systems in order to defend itself against
limited attack and as part of our collaborative approach to
strengthening stability in key regions.'' I look forward to any role
USSTRATCOM may play in ongoing cooperation with our Russian partners.
Mr. Franks. When the Phased Adaptive Approach was first introduced,
deadlines for each phase were set under the impression that long-range
missile threats were ``slow to develop.'' Recently you made remarks
that suggest North Korea's ICBM and nuclear developments are proceeding
faster than expected. This raises concerns that the PAA will not be
available to defend against long-range ICBMs before North Korea
develops this capability.
In the interim, there must be a hedging strategy. Please identify
the hedging strategy you will pursue to defend our Nation's Homeland in
the event that North Korea or another rogue nation acquires ICBM
capability earlier than expected or if the new Next Generation Aegis
Missile has technical problems. Particularly, does the GMD two stage
interceptor remain a realistic and flexible hedge against these
advancing threats? Also, what is the timeline for a decision on this
strategy?
Furthermore, do you have an assessment of other nations' timeline
of achieving ICBM and nuclear capabilities able to threaten our
homeland, particularly Iran's program.
If not, what is being done to make an accurate assessment of their
developments?
General Kehler. The United States is currently protected against
limited ICBM attacks. The United States has 30 deployed ground-based
interceptors (GBIs) and is continuing improvements in the ground-based
midcourse defense (GMD) system to address potential North Korean and
Iranian long-range ballistic missile capabilities. The United States
already possesses the capability to counter the projected threat from
North Korea and Iran.
Any decision to deploy elements of the hedge will be based on a
combination of factors such as threat advancements or delays in SM-3
test progress. I am confident of the intelligence community assessments
of timelines for threat development. As an adaptive strategy, the
Phased Adaptive Approach is tailored to respond to adversary
development, and has the inherent flexibility to meet unanticipated
Iranian threats. The Department is in the process of finalizing and
refining its hedge strategy, and will return to brief this subcommittee
on the results in a classified setting in the next several weeks.
Mr. Franks. We all recall the difficulties surrounding the
ratifying of the New START treaty, one of which was whether or not the
treaty affected our ability to deploy missile defenses in Europe. There
are media reports suggesting that Russia is apparently determined to
make any potential negotiations on tactical nuclear-weapon curbs
contingent on U.S. concessions over plans to deploy missile defenses in
Europe and note Russian warnings that it might withdraw from New START
if the U.S. increases the capability of its missile defenses. If you
were directed to deploy missile defenses in Europe today, how long will
it be before such a system were operation, and in your opinion, what
will be Russia's response regarding their commitment to New START?
Dr. Miller. The USS MONTEREY, a guided missile cruiser equipped for
ballistic missile defense, will deploy in a few days to the
Mediterranean Sea for a six-month mission. This is the start of Phase 1
of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). As soon as the
MONTEREY arrives on station, it will provide initial operational
missile defense capabilities in Europe.
I do not expect any particular Russian response to the deployment
of the USS MONTEREY. Russia's stated concerns about the European Phased
Adaptive Approach (EPAA) have focused on Phases 3 and 4, planned for
2018 and 2020 respectively. Both before and after the ratification of
New START, various U.S. interlocutors have explained to their Russian
counterparts that the EPAA will not pose a threat to Russia's offensive
missile forces.
Because the EPAA does not threaten Russia's strategic deterrent, I
do not believe that Russia will have any reason to withdraw, or
threaten to withdraw, from the New START Treaty.
Mr. Franks. When the Phased Adaptive Approach was first introduced,
deadlines for each phase were set under the impression that long-range
missile threats were ``slow to develop.'' Recently you made remarks
that suggest North Korea's ICBM and nuclear developments are proceeding
faster than expected. This raises concerns that the PAA will not be
available to defend against long-range ICBMs before North Korea
develops this capability.
In the interim, there must be a hedging strategy. Please identify
the hedging strategy you will pursue to defend our Nation's Homeland in
the event that North Korea or another rogue nation acquires ICBM
capability earlier than expected or if the new Next Generation Aegis
Missile has technical problems. Particularly, does the GMD two stage
interceptor remain a realistic and flexible hedge against these
advancing threats? Also, what is the timeline for a decision on this
strategy?
Furthermore, do you have an assessment of other nations' timeline
of achieving ICBM and nuclear capabilities able to threaten our
homeland, particularly Iran's program.
If not, what is being done to make an accurate assessment of their
developments?
Dr. Miller. The United States is currently protected against
limited ICBM attacks. The United States has 30 deployed ground-based
interceptors (GBIs) and is continuing improvements in the ground-based
midcourse defense (GMD) system to address potential North Korean and
Iranian long-range ballistic missile capabilities. The United States
already possesses the capability to counter the projected threat from
North Korea and Iran. The Intelligence Community continues to assess
and evaluate Iranian and North Korean progress toward achieving ICBM
and nuclear capabilities that could threaten the U.S. homeland.
The Department is in the process of finalizing and refining its
hedge strategy, and we will be pleased to brief this subcommittee on
the results in a classified setting when it is complete.
Mr. Franks. We all recall the difficulties surrounding the
ratifying of the New START treaty, one of which was whether or not the
treaty affected our ability to deploy missile defenses in Europe. There
are media reports suggesting that Russia is apparently determined to
make any potential negotiations on tactical nuclear-weapon curbs
contingent on U.S. concessions over plans to deploy missile defenses in
Europe and note Russian warnings that it might withdraw from New START
if the U.S. increases the capability of its missile defenses. If you
were directed to deploy missile defenses in Europe today, how long will
it be before such a system were operation, and in your opinion, what
will be Russia's response regarding their commitment to New START?
Dr. Perry. The key to understanding Russia's edginess about U.S.
strategic missile defenses is to recognize that Russia is strongly
committed to maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent, just as is the
United States, especially given Russia's substantial conventional
military and technological inferiority compared to the United States
and the status that their nuclear arsenal gives them on the world
stage. Accordingly, Russia becomes uneasy in the face of external
developments that have the potential to diminish the credibility of
their nuclear deterrent. This of course does not mean that the United
States should not deploy strategic missile defenses appropriate to our
needs--I continue to support the deployment of a missile defense shield
to defend against limited threats from countries like Iran or North
Korea. The need for missile defenses in Europe is related to defending
our allies and friends in that area from ballistic missile threats and
I support the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) strategy. The PAA
timetable for deployments in Europe appears realistic to me.
Russia will likely express uneasiness about this deployment unless
we are able to negotiate a level of missile defense cooperation in PAA
development that is acceptable to both the United States and Russia,
and I believe that we should try to achieve such cooperation. However,
Russia remains strongly interested in limiting U.S. strategic offensive
forces and would be unlikely to withdraw from New START unless
convinced that U.S. missile defense deployments would pose so
substantial a threat to Russia's own deterrent force that it would need
to increase its strategic nuclear force as a counter-move.
I would also note that if the roles were reversed, and Russia--or
China, for that matter--was deploying significant levels of modern
strategic defenses, the United States would likely feel uneasy in a
similar manner about possible substantial Russian or Chinese strategic
defense deployments. Russia and the United States do not see eye-to-eye
on the subject of missile defenses, and I support the U.S. position,
but I believe it is incorrect to impute dark designs to Russia's
expressed concerns on this subject. They are determined to maintain a
credible strategic nuclear deterrent, and so are we.
Finally, I would direct anyone interested in this subject to the
language on strategic missile defense of the 2009 report of the
Strategic Posture Review Commission, which the Commission unanimously
supported and which remains as valid today as it was in 2009:
For more than a decade the development of U.S. ballistic
missile defenses has been guided by the principles of (1)
protecting against limited strikes while (2) taking into
account the legitimate concerns of Russia and China about
strategic stability. These remain sound guiding principles.
Defenses sufficient to sow doubts in Moscow or Beijing about
the viability of their deterrents could lead them to take
actions that increase the threat to the United States and its
allies and friends. Both Russia and China have expressed
concerns. Current U.S. plans for missile defense should not
call into question the viability of Russia's nuclear deterrent.
China sees its concerns as more immediate, given the much
smaller size of its nuclear force. U.S. assessments indicate
that a significant operational impact on the Chinese deterrent
would require a larger and more capable defense than the United
States has plans to construct, but China may already be
increasing the size of its ICBM force in response to its
assessment of the U.S. missile defense program.
America's Strategic Posture, Report of the
Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of
the United States, United States Institute of Peace
Press, 2009, p. 32.
The United States should absolutely deploy the missile defenses we
need, but we would run important and unnecessary risks if we deployed,
or seemed seriously interested in deploying, defenses in excess of that
needed to defend against limited threats.
Mr. Franks. We all recall the difficulties surrounding the
ratifying of the New START treaty, one of which was whether or not the
treaty affected our ability to deploy missile defenses in Europe. There
are media reports suggesting that Russia is apparently determined to
make any potential negotiations on tactical nuclear-weapon curbs
contingent on U.S. concessions over plans to deploy missile defenses in
Europe and note Russian warnings that it might withdraw from New START
if the U.S. increases the capability of its missile defenses. If you
were directed to deploy missile defenses in Europe today, how long will
it be before such a system were operation, and in your opinion, what
will be Russia's response regarding their commitment to New START?
Dr. Payne. I defer to DOD officials with the responsibility for
missile defense research, development and deployment for estimates of
the timelines involved for the deployment of the four phases of the
PAA. The linkage between U.S. missile defense deployment and the
Russian commitment to New START is open to informed comment.
Russian officials see the U.S. desire for New START implementation
and for further arms control agreements as the leverage necessary to
gain some level of control over the U.S. missile defense program. They
seek to exploit U.S. fears by threatening to withdraw from New START if
U.S. missile defense threatens their nuclear deterrent capabilities and
to exploit U.S. hopes for further nuclear reductions in order to secure
limits on U.S. missile defenses and the transfer of U.S. missile
defense technical know-how to Russia. This is why Russian officials
have linked Russian implementation of New START and the potential for
limitations on Russian tactical nuclear weapons to U.S. concessions on
U.S. missile defense programs and possible U.S. conventional strategic
weapons programs (Prompt Global Strike). Specifically, Russian
officials have warned that no further arms control progress will be
possible unless the United States agrees to a joint missile defense
system with Russia or accepts geographical, technical, and operational
restrictions on U.S. missile defense capabilities.
My expectation, however, is that Russia sees New START as greatly
in its interest. Russian leaders have now repeatedly stated that New
START demands reductions only by the United States--a point made by New
START critics in 2010. Russia apparently will require years to build up
its forces to reach New Start limits. Consequently, Russia ultimately
will not withdraw from the treaty even if the U.S. goes forward in a
measured way with all four phases of its missile defense program.
Rather, the Russian hope is that its linkage of New START and further
arms control possibilities to limits on U.S. missile defense,
complemented by the vocal repetition of this linkage by domestic
American critics of U.S. missile defense, will be sufficient to secure
its desired limits on U.S. missile defense. For Russia, the existence
of negotiations alone may serve this purpose; an agreement may be
unnecessary. Russian officials will push hard and vocally on this
linkage, but hope to achieve their goals short of being pressed to the
point of actually withdrawing from New START. In the past, Soviet
leaders engaged in this same type of highly-visible negotiating
hardball with President Reagan. They were dissatisfied with U.S.
actions regarding INF and following many similar threats, withdrew from
negotiations. But President Reagan remained firm in response and the
Soviets soon returned to negotiations.
With regard to future limitations on Russian tactical nuclear
weapons, my expectation is that Russia will not agree to any
significant limitations on its tactical nuclear forces if the U.S.
demands an associated intrusive monitoring and verification regime.
Given the state of Russia's conventional defensive capabilities and the
limited prospect for serious Russian military reform, tactical nuclear
weapons will remain the centerpiece of Russia's defensive strategies
vis-a-vis NATO, China and others. Consequently, Russian officials may
seek to trade some modest increase in transparency and nominal, largely
unverifiable, numeric limitations on its tactical nuclear weapons in
exchange for geographical, technical, and operational restrictions on
U.S. missile defense capabilities. But, if pressed for an agreement
that requires effective verification and deep reductions in Russia's
tactical nuclear forces, Russia is unlikely to agree even if the United
States is willing to concede to Russia's preferred limits on U.S.
missile defense. Russia is unlikely to accept such an agreement on
tactical nuclear weapons under virtually any plausible conditions,
which is why New START is not likely to prove to be, as was advertised,
the first step toward a verifiable, equitable agreement on tactical
nuclear weapons.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HEINRICH
Mr. Heinrich. General Kehler, in your submitted testimony you
address industrial base concerns in respect to space requirements and
explain that, ``Many suppliers struggle to remain competitive as demand
for highly specialized components and existing export controls reduce
their customers to a niche government market.''
I couldn't agree more. Our decades-old system for export controls
is largely a Cold War legacy that is preventing high tech industries
from selling less sensitive items that are readily available in other
industrialized countries.
Dr. Miller indicated there are more than 60 nations and government
consortia currently operating satellites, and the United States share
of worldwide satellite manufacturing has dropped from approximately 65
percent in 1997 to approximately 30 percent in 2008.
I also think it's important to note that many companies in Europe
and elsewhere tout their satellites and components as ``ITAR-free.''
Eliminating unnecessary controls will make us more competitive,
create jobs, and boost exports.
This committee actually worked to include a Section in the FY10
NDAA conference report that required an assessment of which
technologies may be candidates for removal from the U.S. Munitions list
as well as the implications of doing so, but this report has been
delayed by over a year.
What is the status of the 1248 report? Can you speak a little about
the urgency for reforming our outdated system in a way that both makes
sense from both a security and economic standpoint? How can we actively
promote the sale of capabilities developed by U.S. companies to partner
nations?
General Kehler. I understand that the final ``1248 Report'' or
``Risk Assessment of U.S. Space Export Control Policy'' is in
coordination between the Departments of Defense and State. The final
report was originally delayed to ensure congruence with the National
Space Policy, which has since been completed and released. USSTRATCOM
has reviewed this document and provided feedback to the Joint Staff.
One of the defining characteristics of today's national security
operating environment is the extraordinary pace of technological
change--a rate that continues to grow, increasing the level of
difficulty for U.S. companies to compete in the global marketplace. At
the same time, decreased competitiveness in the U.S. industrial base
can portend fewer advancements and greater difficulty maintaining a
competitive edge in space technology. This in turn, could have
significant, negative national security implications, if neither the
industrial base nor cutting-edge technology is available. In short,
diminishing U.S. commercial space industry leadership is a step toward
diminishing overall U.S. leadership in space--steps we can ill afford
to take, especially at today's pace of global change. Effective export
policies, as outlined in the National Space Policy, require analyses
and reforms that should begin as soon as possible. Our commercial and
security interests will be far better served by a more agile,
transparent, predictable, and efficient export control regime.
This is best addressed by the private sector or departments of the
government responsible for export promotion. However, U.S. leadership
is by far the most important means of ensuring the strength of our U.S.
commercial space industrial base. Export control reform should ease the
transfer of less-sensitive products and technologies to key allies and
partners with whom we seek interoperable solutions.
Mr. Heinrich. You highlighted the importance of funding our nuclear
weapons complex in your testimony and expressed specific concerns with
the proposed year-long House CR that would cut in half the additional
funding for Weapons Activities.
This cut deeply concerns me, as well as the significant cut to
nonproliferation-- $647M. How will these cuts impact our nuclear
weapons complex overall modernization plans and how will these cuts
affect the New START Treaty?
General Kehler. Proposed cuts will jeopardize and delay necessary
recapitalization of the nuclear weapons complex as well as negatively
impact our ability to sustain the stockpile. Although I cannot speak
for the National Nuclear Security Administration, we anticipate they
will prioritize available resources to support the reconfiguration of
our strategic forces in accordance with the New START Treaty.
Mr. Heinrich. General Kehler, in your submitted testimony you
address industrial base concerns in respect to space requirements and
explain that, ``Many suppliers struggle to remain competitive as demand
for highly specialized components and existing export controls reduce
their customers to a niche government market.''
I couldn't agree more. Our decades-old system for export controls
is largely a Cold War legacy that is preventing high tech industries
from selling less sensitive items that are readily available in other
industrialized countries.
Dr. Miller indicated there are more than 60 nations and government
consortia currently operating satellites, and the United States share
of worldwide satellite manufacturing has dropped from approximately 65
percent in 1997 to approximately 30 percent in 2008.
I also think it's important to note that many companies in Europe
and elsewhere tout their satellites and components as ``ITAR-free.''
Eliminating unnecessary controls will make us more competitive,
create jobs, and boost exports.
This committee actually worked to include a Section in the FY10
NDAA conference report that required an assessment of which
technologies may be candidates for removal from the U.S. Munitions list
as well as the implications of doing so, but this report has been
delayed by over a year.
What is the status of the 1248 report?
Dr. Miller. The report required by Section 1248 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 is currently in
coordination. It was originally delayed to ensure that it could take
account of the new National Space Policy, which was completed in June
2010, and the National Security Space Strategy, released in January
2011. In preparing the Section 1248 report, DoD has worked with the
Department of State and a broad cross section of organizations,
including the intelligence community, NASA, and the Department of
Commerce. Many DoD organizations, including those in the acquisition,
policy, and operations communities, participated in the preparation of
the report. We are working to complete coordination so that we can
provide the report to Congress as soon as possible.
Mr. Heinrich. Can you speak a little about the urgency for
reforming our outdated system in a way that both makes sense from both
a security and economic standpoint?
Dr. Miller. There are compelling security arguments for
fundamentally changing the regulations and procedures we have had in
place since the Cold War for exporting weapons and dual-use equipment
and technology. Over the years, we have made incremental changes--but
this is not enough. We need to establish new rules, organizations, and
processes that deal effectively and efficiently with 21st Century
challenges. This is the basis for the ``four singles'' of our export
control reform effort: a single control list, a single licensing
agency, a single enforcement coordination center, and a single
information technology (IT) system for export licensing. The export
control reform initiative is focused on protecting items and
technologies that are the U.S. ``crown jewels.'' By doing so, we will
be better able to monitor and enforce controls on technology transfers
with real security implications while helping to speed the provision of
equipment to Allies and partners who fight alongside us in coalition
operations. A more efficient export control system, based on revised
controls and new licensing policies and procedures, would allow U.S.
companies to compete more effectively in the world marketplace.
Mr. Heinrich. How can we actively promote the sale of capabilities
developed by U.S. companies to partner nations?
Dr. Miller. This is an area more appropriately addressed by the
private sector or U.S. Government departments and agencies with export
promotion responsibilities. However, we expect that export control
reform would result in the ease of transfers of many less-sensitive
items and technologies to U.S. Allies and partners.
Mr. Heinrich. You highlighted the importance of funding our nuclear
weapons complex in your testimony and expressed specific concerns with
the proposed year-long House CR that would cut in half the additional
funding for Weapons Activities. This cut deeply concerns me, as well as
the significant cut to nonproliferation-- $647M. How will these cuts
impact our nuclear weapons complex overall modernization plans and how
will these cuts affect the New START Treaty?
Dr. Miller. Last November, the President announced his commitment
to modernize the nuclear infrastructure, which supports our nuclear
deterrent, and our nonproliferation efforts. The President's Fiscal
Year (FY) 2011 budget request represents the first step towards that
commitment. The proposed cuts, $624M for Weapons Activities and $647M
for Nonproliferation Activities, would not have any direct effect on
the New START Treaty, but they would delay much needed investments in
our nuclear infrastructure, and reduce our ability to secure nuclear
materials and prevent proliferation globally.
Mr. Heinrich. I took particular interest in one of the
recommendations the Commission presented which was that the President
should designate the nuclear weapons laboratories as ``National
Security Laboratories.'' Can you speak a little as to why this is
important?
Dr. Perry. The National Laboratories already perform a substantial
amount of work for not just the Department of Energy, but also the
Department of Defense and Homeland Security, and the Intelligence
Community as well. This is beneficial for everyone concerned, but it in
some sense shortchanges the Labs, because these other agencies can
contract for services ``a la carte,'' without having a larger stake in
the overall health of the Laboratory complex. The Posture Commission
was quite explicit in its concerns over the health of the intellectual
infrastructure of the Labs and believed that, as your question points
out,
The President should designate the nuclear weapons
laboratories as National Security Laboratories. This would
recognize the fact that they already contribute to the missions
of the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security and the
intelligence community in addition to those of DOE. The
president should assign formal responsibility to the
Secretaries of Energy, Defense, State, and Homeland Security
and the Director of National Intelligence for the programmatic
and budgetary health of the laboratories.
America's Strategic Posture, Report of the
Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of
the United States, United States Institute of Peace
Press, 2009, p. 64.
In a related recommendation, the Posture Commission also pointed
out:
To reinforce this designation, the Commission recommends that
the President issue an Executive Order formally assigning the
Secretaries of Defense, Energy, State, and Homeland Security
and the Director of National Intelligence joint responsibility
for the health of these laboratories. The White House should
establish an interagency process to accomplish this and ensure
that work in defense, homeland security, and intelligence is
assigned to the national laboratories, building on work already
in progress.
Such a step is needed because that work already in progress
has brought home an essential lesson: elements of the federal
government outside DOE are keen to utilize the capabilities of
these laboratories but they are not keen to invest in the
underlying science and engineering that generates those
capabilities. As one expert has put it, the rest of the
government is anxious to buy wine by the glass, but no one
wishes to invest in the vineyard (Frances Fragos Townsend in
remarks at the Nuclear Deterrence Summit, December 3, 2008).
The Commission believes that this diversification of support is
the most--and perhaps the only--effective way to maintain the
excellence of the laboratories. But much more buy-in is needed
from outside DOE. What is required is not a series of small
projects but a few, large, sustained efforts that will support
capability building. To accomplish this objective would require
strong, high level support and, so far, this has been lacking.
The directors of the weapons laboratories have established the
following criteria for support from a broader range of
agencies: projects should be synergistic with the Laboratory
mission, of national importance, and done with excellence using
unique Laboratory capabilities. The Commission endorses these
criteria.
America's Strategic Posture, Report of the
Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of
the United States, United States Institute of Peace
Press, 2009, p. 54.
The revised designation for the Labs thus would reflect this
broader national security reality and strengthen the programmatic and
budgetary health of the Labs.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. FLEMING
Dr. Fleming. General, since the closure of the Barksdale Weapons
Storage Area in 2007, we have a single point of failure in the ALCM
mission, a critical vulnerability that I have serious concerns about.
As part of its Nuclear Roadmap, the Air Force reached the decision in
2009 to re-certify the Barksdale WSA, going as far to request funding
for the project in its Fiscal Year 2010 budget request. However, in
testimony before the full committee on February 17th of this year,
General Schwartz indicated that the Air Force does not intend to move
forward with this project, citing concerns over its cost. At that time
General Schwartz stated he was confident that Air Force Global Strike
Command has a ``workable'' solution in place to mitigate training and
readiness issues that result from having our nuclear bombers at
Barksdale separated from nuclear munitions. While day-to-day readiness
and proficiency are critically important, I remain more concerned about
operational impacts--specifically impacts to STRATCOM's ability to
execute Presidentially-directed OPLAN cruise missile missions.
Can you describe in-detail STRATCOM's involvement, if any, in the
initial assessment to re-certify the Barksdale WSA? If such an
assessment were performed, were any conclusions made or courses of
action recommended?
General Kehler. Our involvement with the initial assessment to re-
certify the Barksdale WSA was in response to the Air Force's Nuclear
Road Map and the reinvigoration of the nuclear enterprise effort. My
staff conducted an internal look to determine the feasibility of
reopening the Barksdale WSA. After reviewing the costs associated with
sustainment of all WSAs, and evaluating the analysis conducted under
the original 2006 PDM III study, which determined a single WSA at Minot
AFB was feasible to meet our operational requirements, we decided the
operational risk to meeting our OPLAN mission requirements was
acceptable and decided not to pursue recertification of the Barksdale
WSA.
Dr. Fleming. Did the Air Force consult with STRATCOM prior to the
Air Force making the decision not to move forward with the Barksdale
WSA recertification? If so, did STRATCOM raise any concerns or
objections regarding potential operational impacts of not recertifying
the Barksdale WSA?
General Kehler. Yes. The Air Force collaborated closely with us and
the nuclear enterprise to ensure our operational requirements were a
factor in the decision. As we worked through this decision process, we
evaluated the potential operational and support risks to execution of
our OPLAN, concluded the risk was acceptable, and did not submit any
objections to this decision.
Dr. Fleming. At any point in time did STRATCOM planners perform a
vulnerability assessment related to consolidating the ALCM mission at
Minot AFB?
General Kehler. Yes. My staff was closely involved with supporting
the 2006 Program Decision Memorandum-III (PDM-III) directed studies and
assessments. We participated on the team responsible for assessing
nuclear cruise missile force structure changes and developing missile
consolidation options and ensured STRATCOM operational requirements
were addressed throughout the process. The results of this study
verified we could meet all operational requirements and execute all
directed missions operating from a single WSA location.
Dr. Fleming. Did the Commander of JFCC-GS raise any objections or
concerns over consolidating the ALCM mission at Minot AFB?
General Kehler. The ALCM fleet was consolidated at Minot AFB prior
to the standup of Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC). Establishing
a WSA at Barksdale would be operationally beneficial; however, we have
achieved a workable solution to the USSTRATCOM mission by consolidating
the ALCM at Minot AFB. This consolidation is due to the fact that the
number of ALCMs have decreased; therefore, the initial workload since
2007 has decreased. Accordingly, given the fixed variables of
facilities, support equipment, and personnel, the current solution is
meeting mission requirements.
The ALCM mission is operationally viable today with the single WSA
at Minot AFB. Discussion with the Commander of JFCC-GS at the time of
consolidation revealed that concerns were captured as part of the risk
analysis of this OSD budget driven decision. These concerns were over
the pace and magnitude of Program Budget Directives (PBD) in terms of
how fast the personnel and supply resources were drawn down in light of
the responsibility to maintain safe and secure stewardship of the
nuclear assets.
Dr. Fleming. Did the Commander of AFGSC raise any objections or
concerns over consolidating the ALCM mission at Minot AFB?
General Kehler. The ALCM fleet was consolidated at Minot AFB prior
to the standup of Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC). Establishing
a WSA at Barksdale would be operationally beneficial; however, we have
achieved a workable solution to the USSTRATCOM mission by consolidating
the ALCM at Minot AFB. This consolidation is due to the fact that the
number of ALCMs have decreased; therefore, the initial workload since
2007 has decreased. Accordingly, given the fixed variables of
facilities, support equipment, and personnel, the current solution is
meeting mission requirements.
Dr. Fleming. Does STRATCOM concur with the Air Force's decision not
to move forward with recertifying the Barksdale WSA?
General Kehler. Yes, I concur with the Air Force's decision. While
two nuclear-certified WSAs would provide us greater operational
flexibility, several other issues throughout the nuclear enterprise
have higher priority funding shortfalls. I am confident we are able to
execute all OPLAN ALCM mission requirements using one ALCM WSA. We have
assessed the inherent vulnerabilities and risks associated with
operating a single ALCM storage at Minot and I have determined they are
manageable through force posturing, force management and planning
considerations.
Dr. Fleming. What mission impact assessments or risk assessments
has STRATCOM conducted or participated in to examine the single ALCM
location at Minot and whether any planned activities in the next few
years will impact the ability of ALCM assets at Minot to support
STRATCOM mission requirements? Please provide a summary of those
assessments at the appropriate classification level and, if mission
impacts or risks are identified, discuss how STRATCOM is mitigating
these.
General Kehler. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the subcommittee files.]