[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
CLIMATE CHANGE: EXAMINING THE PROCESSES USED TO CREATE SCIENCE AND
POLICY
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
THURSDAY, MARCH 31, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-09
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. RALPH M. HALL, Texas, Chair
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
Wisconsin JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California ZOE LOFGREN, California
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland DAVID WU, Oregon
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio
PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia BEN R. LUJAN, New Mexico
SANDY ADAMS, Florida PAUL D. TONKO, New York
BENJAMIN QUAYLE, Arizona JERRY McNERNEY, California
CHARLES J. ``CHUCK'' FLEISCHMANN, JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland
Tennessee TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan
MO BROOKS, Alabama
ANDY HARRIS, Maryland
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois
CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana
DAN BENISHEK, Michigan
VACANCY
C O N T E N T S
Thursday, March 31, 2011
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Ralph M. Hall, Chairman, Committee on
Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.. 7
Written Statement............................................ 8
Statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, Ranking
Minority Member, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
U.S. House of Representatives.................................. 8
Written Statement............................................ 10
Witnesses:
Dr. J. Scott Armstrong, Professor of Marketing, the Wharton
School, University of Pennsylvania.
Oral Statement............................................... 12
Written Statement............................................ 15
Dr. Richard Muller, Professor of Physics, University of
California, Berkeley and Faculty Senior Scientist, Lawrence
Berkeley Laboratory
Oral Statement............................................... 40
Written Statement............................................ 41
Dr. John Christy, Director, Earth System Science Center,
University of Alabama in Huntsville
Oral Statement............................................... 45
Written Statement............................................ 46
Mr. Peter Glaser, Partner, Troutman Sanders, LLP
Oral Statement............................................... 83
Written Statement............................................ 84
Dr. Kerry Emanuel, Professor of Atmospheric Science,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Oral Statement............................................... 96
Written Statement............................................ 97
Dr. W. David Montgomery, Economist
Oral Statement............................................... 101
Written Statement............................................ 103
Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Dr. J. Scott Armstrong, Professor of Marketing, the Wharton
School, University of Pennsylvania............................. 154
Dr. Richard Muller, Professor of Physics, University of
California, Berkeley and Faculty Senior Scientist, Lawrence
Berkeley Laboratory............................................ 160
Dr. John Christy, Director, Earth System Science Center,
University of Alabama in Huntsville............................ 167
Mr. Peter Glaser, Partner, Troutman Sanders, LLP................. 175
Dr. Kerry Emanuel, Professor of Atmospheric Science,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.......................... 183
Dr. W. David Montgomery, Economist............................... 196
Appendix II: Additional Material for the Record
Material submitted by Representative Ralph M. Hall, Chairman,
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 202
Material submitted by Mr. Peter Glaser, Partner, Troutman
Sanders, LLP................................................... 212
Material submitted by Representative Dana Rohrabacher, Committee
on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 256
CLIMATE CHANGE: EXAMINING THE
PROCESSES USED TO CREATE SCIENCE
AND POLICY
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THURSDAY, MARCH 31, 2011
House of Representatives,
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in Room
2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ralph Hall
[Chairman of the Committee] presiding.
hearing charter
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Climate Change: Examining the Processes
Used to Create Science and Policy
thursday, march 31, 2011
10:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m.
2318 rayburn house office building
PURPOSE
On Thursday, March 31, 2011 at 10:00 a.m. the House Committee on
Science, Space, andTechnology will hold a hearing to examine processes
used to generate key climate change science and information used to
inform policy development and decision-making.
WITNESSES
Dr. J. Scott Armstrong, Professor of Marketing, the
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
Dr. Richard Muller, Professor of Physics, University of
California, Berkeley and Faculty Senior Scientist, Lawrence Berkeley
Laboratory
Dr. John Christy, Director, Earth System Science Center,
University of Alabama in Huntsville
Mr. Peter Glaser, Partner, Troutman Sanders, LLP
Dr. Kerry Emanuel, Professor of Atmospheric Science,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Dr. W. David Montgomery, Economist
BACKGROUND
All aspects of modern life operate within a known range of climate
conditions. That range of variability requires that all sectors, from
agriculture to transportation, have a measure of resiliency built into
them. Our ability to adapt to changing climate conditions is predicated
on our ability to better account for risk and prepare proportionate
responses to those risks. Advancements in climate science may reduce
uncertainty and provide a better idea about the risks we face, thus
allowing for more informed decisions to be made that impact the quality
of our lives.
Weather and Climate
Weather is defined as the state of the atmosphere with respect to
wind, temperature, cloud cover, moisture, pressure, etc. at a given
point in time. Climate is defined as the composite or generally
prevailing weather conditions of a region averaged over a period of
years or more. \1\ In addition, spatial elements such as latitude,
terrain, altitude, proximity to water and ocean currents affect the
climate. The difference between weather and climate is a measure of
time. Whereas weather consists of short-term changes in the atmosphere,
climate is determined by cycles of variability that operate within
timescales that span from millennia (i.e. ice ages) to months (i.e.
seasons).
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\1\ http://www.nws.noaa.gov/glossary/
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Scientific Process, Integrity, and Debate
Since the dawn of science, man has tried to describe and measure
the natural world. Through an iterative process of data collection,
formulation of hypotheses, and testing and refining these hypotheses, a
knowledge base of information is built that yield theories and allow
for predictive models to be built that describe them. Experiments are
conducted to test these hypotheses, theories and models. As new
observations are incorporated throughout the process, the theories must
be able to assimilate these new data or change to accommodate new
facts. Confidence in a theory grows only if it is able to survive a
rigorous testing process, it is supported by multiple and independent
lines of evidence, and competing explanations can be ruled out. The
American Physical Society statement on ethics and values states that:
``The success and credibility of science are anchored in the
willingness of scientists to:
1. Expose their ideas and results to independent testing and
replication by others. This requires the open exchange of data,
procedures and materials.
2. Abandon or modify previously accepted conclusions when
confronted with more complete or reliable experimental or observational
evidence.
Adherence to these principles provides a mechanism for self-
correction that is the foundation of the credibility of science. \2\
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\2\ http://www.aps.org.policy/statements/99_6.cfm
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The creation of government regulations is dictated by several
statutes, including the law that provides agencies the authority
regulate some chemical or action as well as the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA). While the APA provides guidelines as to what steps
should be taken by agencies when promulgating rules, the statutes that
give specific authority may also require additional measures to ensure
a fair and impartial process. Furthermore, agencies have the discretion
to allow for greater public participation, longer public comment
periods, or even a greater burden of proof depending on the level of
impact a given rule is projected to have.
Whether it is scientific method or regulatory procedure, process is
defined as a systematic series of actions that are broadly known and
well understood. Given the potential widespread impacts on the U.S.
economy, climate change policy has received a level of scrutiny and
analysis that rival some of the most important debates the U.S. has
engaged in. As such, it is vital that the processes upon which climate
change science and policy are based be widely accepted, understood, and
adhered to.
In November of 2009, thousands of emails were leaked from the
University of East Anglia's Climate Research Unit (CRU). These emails-
many of which involved world-leading scientists in positions of
influence with respect to key scientific assessments relied upon by
policymakers-revealed significant communications suggesting a lack of
adherence to basic principles of scientific conduct, openness, and
information sharing. The controversy regarding the leaked emails-dubbed
``ClimateGate'' in the media-called into question the processes used in
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) as well as the
processes used to create models and data that support claims that
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases have caused changes in the
Earth's climate that is beyond natural variability. The significance of
and concern regarding the emails has been heightened by the fact that
CRU is one of the primary institutions that provide data and
information to the IPCC, raising questions regarding the integrity of
the models, data and processes, and ultimately the key scientific
conclusions upon which climate policies are based.
Modeling Uncertainty
Increased computing capacity, a greater understanding of the
atmosphere, and access to better data has allowed weather forecasting
to evolve over the last century to become a vital part of daily life.
The ability to forecast hours and days into the future is constantly
improved as models used are validated by the observational data.
Climate models, however, are not just weather models run for longer
periods of time. Generally, climate models are more complex since they
are dealing with longer time scales, larger geographic areas, and a
greater number of complicated and interactive factors.
General circulation models (GCMs) are mathematical models of the
general circulation of a planetary atmosphere or ocean. GCMs that model
the climate as a whole are actually an amalgamation of several
different models, including atmospheric models, ocean circulation
models, land surface models, and sea ice models . \3\ Each one of these
models is built with mathematical equations that describe the physical
world as it is understood. However, not all the observable physical
processes are able to be described or explained by an equation. For
example, clouds are not well modeled in the GCM, creating a very large
question of uncertainty regarding climate sensitivities, \4\ i.e. could
higher temperatures result in more clouds that then reflect more
incoming radiation or do the clouds act as an additional warming layer
preventing radiation from escaping the Earth's atmosphere.
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\3\ U.S. Climate Change Science Program, Synthesis and Assessment
Product 3.1. Climate Models: An Assessment of Strengths and
Limitations. July 2008.
\4\ Zhang, Y., Klein, S.A., Boyle, J. and Mace, G.G. 2010.
Evaluation of tropical cloud and precipitation statistics of Community
Atmosphere Model version 3 using CloudSat and CALIPSO data. Journal of
Geophysical Research 115: doi:10.1029/2009JD012006.
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While it has been well known for years that climate change modeling
is difficult, imprecise and yielding results that are subject to
interpretation, there has been increasing evidence that these models
have not been developed and used according to accepted modeling and
forecasting processes and tenants. As mentioned above, the scientific
method requires that models be subjected to rigorous testing and
experimentation in order to validate their results. Such testing and
validation is necessary to generate confidence in the models as useful
projective tools.
Data quality
Although the U.S. government began collecting weather data as early
as 1814, the first systematic collection of data and issuance of
warnings began in 1870 after President Ulysses S. Grant signed into law
a bill that established what is now the National Weather Service.
Technology has advanced from individual measurements of temperature and
wind to the current use of satellites to measure many aspects of
Earth's climate. This continuous data record provides the ability to
observe the changes in weather patterns over time, and contributes to
efforts to better predict future changes.
In any scientific pursuit, data is the key ingredient that informs
scientists as to whether or not the hypothesis being tested is
supported or wrong. Bad quality data may demonstrate a hypothesis is
supported, when in fact, the data may obscure the fact that the
hypothesis is incorrect. High quality data, however, generates
confidence that the results of an experiment represent the truth of the
scientific inquiry. Therefore, the quality of data is paramount to
production of good science.
In recent years, there have been questions regarding not only the
quality of the data collected but also the processes used for
normalization (in order to compare ``apples to apple''). The quality of
data collected from instruments that have not been maintained or whose
placement violates government positioning procedures has not been
established. Furthermore, the process used for quality assurance has
come under question as well, prompting several data quality projects
across the country to test the quality of the data used in climate
change science.
IPCC Process
The IPCC was established by the United Nations Environment
Programme and the World Meteorological Organization to provide the
world with scientific assessments of the current state of knowledge in
climate change. Although billed as a scientific organization, the IPCC
does not conduct science; it only compiles science from existing
scientific literature.
The issuance of the third (2001) and fourth (2007) assessment
reports have been accompanied by increasing questions regarding the
process used by the IPCC. Specifically, transparency, conflicts of
interest, political interference, the characterization of uncertainty,
and the use of non-peer reviewed data and information are all areas of
the IPCC process that have caused concern among scientists, academics
and policy makers. \5\ Although there have been many recommendations as
to how to reform the process in order to restore confidence in the
assessment results, and the IPCC has stated it would adopt many of
these reforms, there has been no evidence as of yet whether or not
these reforms will sufficiently address the shortcomings in the
process.
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\5\ InterAcademy Council, Committee to Review the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Climate Change Assessments:
Review of the processes and procedures of the IPCC. October, 2010.
http://reviewipcc.interacedemycouncil.net/report/Climate %20Change
%20Assessments, %20Review%20of%20the%20Process%20&%20Procedures%20of
%20the%20IPCC.pdf
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If the IPCC assessments are to be used in the U.S. as a resource
for the U.S. Climate Change Science Program and as a justification for
changing U.S. government policies, the processes and procedures
employed by the IPCC must meet the rigorous standards for integrity,
objectivity and quality control that is imposed on other scientific
information (i.e., requirements under the Data Quality Act). The
aforementioned process issues mentioned and the questions raised about
them demonstrate a need to determine whether or not the IPCC standards
meet the necessary threshold to qualify as a resource for the U.S.
government. Questions remain as to whether or not the reforms adopted
by the IPCC will actually meet those standards.
EPA Endangerment
In December 2009, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
finalized its endangerment finding, officially declaring the emission
of greenhouse gases by mankind to be a danger to public health and
welfare. Upon making this determination, the EPA became obligated under
the Clean Air Act to regulate greenhouse gases, particularly carbon
dioxide, under other parts of the bill, namely, the Prevention of
Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Title V permitting of stationary
sources.
The process used to make the endangerment finding under section
202(a) of the Clean Air Act allows for significant agency discretion.
The scientific basis the Agency used for its determination is detailed
in the Technical Support Document (TSD). More than half of the
references in the TSD are from the IPCC or from government reports that
relied heavily on the IPCC as a resource. The concerns mentioned above
regarding the integrity of the modeling results, the quality of the
data used, and the IPCC process itself, raise questions about the
robustness of the information used to make the endangerment
determination, thus calling the finding into question.
Chairman Hall. Okay. The Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology will come to order. And I say to all of you good
morning and welcome to today's hearing entitled Climate Change:
Examining the Processes Used to Create Science and Policy. In
front of you are packets containing the written testimony,
biographies and Truth in Testimony Disclosures for today's
witnesses. I recognize myself for five minutes for an opening
statement.
I want to welcome everyone here today for this hearing on
climate change processes.
When I became Chairman of this Committee, I stated that I
wanted to bring up folks to testify on climate change science
and policy because I believe there have been a lot more
questions than answers. The current Administration has been
moving full speed ahead with regulations and policy initiatives
that it justifies based on the available science. Since these
actions have the potential to severely damage our economy,
there should be extra care in making sure they are truly
necessary and appropriate.
Science is not perfect. It is a process of trial and error.
And scientists are not infallible; they are just as human as
any of us. As policy makers, we are tasked with making
difficult decisions, sometimes when not all the answers are
known. In cases such as these, we must rely upon the processes
by which the information we do have is generated, and we must
rely upon the fact that the people generating that information
have adhered to these processes.
The leaked emails from the University of East Anglia's
Climate Research Unit in November of 2009 revealed that the
scientists most vocal about the effects humans were having on
the climate were not following accepted scientific practices.
When these emails came to light, the Administration proclaimed
that the science generated by a corrupt process was still
robust and still justified the policy measures it was taking.
For many of us here, these emails were evidence that the
trust in the underlying process was misplaced. I may not be a
scientist, but as a politician, I can tell you when someone is
trying to pull the wool over our eyes.
There is an old saying. Caesar's wife must be beyond
reproach. This is to say that even if there has been no
evidence of wrongdoing, the supposition of wrongdoing is enough
to undermine the trust in an entire enterprise.
The legitimate questions that have been raised about the
processes used to generate climate change science and policy
have thus far been cast aside. The reluctance to engage in
conversations with people who have doubts or question the
veracity of climate science is at the heart of the wrongdoing
that undermines trust in climate change science.
In a hearing last November, I stated that reasonable people
have serious questions about our knowledge of the state of the
science, the evidence, and what constitutes a proportional
response. The hearing today will explore how basic and widely
accepted scientific processes have been applied in building the
foundation of climate science that we rely upon to make
decisions. I look forward to returning the debate back to the
methodical, deliberative, balanced and transparent discussion
it ought to be.
I thank the witnesses for being here.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hall follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Ralph Hall
I want to welcome everyone here today for this hearing on climate
change processes.
When I became Chairman of this Committee, I stated that I wanted to
bring up folks to testify on climate change science and policy because
I believe there have been a lot more questions than answers. The
current Administration has been moving full speed ahead with
regulations and policy initiatives that it justifies based on the
available science. Since these actions have the potential to severely
damage our economy, there should be extra care in making sure they are
truly necessary and appropriate.
Science is not perfect. It is a process of trial and error. And
scientists are not infallible; they are just as human as any of us. As
policy makers, we are tasked with making difficult decisions, sometimes
when not all the answers are known.
In cases such as these, we must rely upon the processes by which
the information we do have is generated. And we must rely upon the fact
that the people generating that information have adhered to those
processes.
The leaked emails from the University of East Anglia's Climate
Research Unit in November of 2009 revealed that the scientists most
vocal about the effects humans were having on the climate were not
following accepted scientific practices. When these emails came to
light, the Administration proclaimed that the science generated by a
corrupt process was still robust, and still justified the policy
measures it was taking.
For many of us here, these emails were evidence that the trust in
the underlying process was misplaced. I may not be a scientist, but as
a politician, I can tell when someone is trying to pull the wool over
my eyes.
There is an old saying--Caesar's wife must be beyond reproach. That
is to say that even if there has been no evidence of wrong doing, the
supposition of wrong doing is enough to undermine the trust in an
entire enterprise.
The legitimate questions that have been raised about the processes
used to generate climate change science and policy have thus far been
cast aside. The reluctance to engage in conversations with people who
have doubts or question the veracity of climate science is at the heart
of the wrong doing that undermines trust in climate change science.
In a hearing last November, I stated that reasonable people have
serious questions about our knowledge of the state of the science, the
evidence, and what constitutes a proportional response. The hearing
today will explore how basic and widely accepted scientific processes
have been applied in building the foundation of climate science that we
rely upon to make decisions. I look forward to returning the debate
back to the methodical, deliberative, balanced and transparent
discussion it ought to be.
I thank the witnesses for being here, and I now recognize Ranking
Member Johnson for five minutes for an opening statement.
Chairman Hall. I now recognize Ranking Member Johnson for
five minutes for an opening statement. The Chair now recognizes
Ms. Johnson.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Chairman, am I to assume that these witnesses are under oath
today?
Chairman Hall. I didn't understand you.
Ms. Johnson. Are the witnesses under oath today?
Chairman Hall. They are.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you. Thank you very much. I appreciate
you holding this hearing today. Political opinions on climate
change vary greatly and nowhere more than here in the U.S.
Congress. As one who accepts the overwhelming scientific
consensus around climate change, I welcome the opportunity for
this Committee to hear a number of perspectives on climate
change.
However, I believe this hearing will fall far short of
providing a meaningful discourse on the subject. I am
disappointed in the very broad scope of this hearing which
arguably ranges beyond the jurisdiction of this Committee
without sufficient numbers of witnesses to do the topics
justice.
I believe that a subject as complex as we are attempting to
cover today warrants at the very least multiple panels, if not
multiple hearings. To hope to adequately cover everything from
basic science to regulatory policy in one 2-hour hearing
strikes me as too ambitious if not a little negligent.
Likewise I am disappointed by the makeup of the panel
today. By that I mean, no disrespect to these men or the
quality of their work. However, we Democrats have been accused
of ignoring a large subset of the climate science community
that in varying degrees does not subscribe to the conclusions
of the IPCC or otherwise does not accept the climate is
changing, and that it is largely due to human activity.
We have been told that these scientists' voices have been
squashed by a wide-ranging conspiracy and that under the new
House leadership, they would finally have a platform to dispel
the alarmists' mistruth about the science of global climate
change.
I look at this panel today and I must ask, well, where are
they? Where are the masses of legitimate expert witnesses that
will corroborate to the assertion that climate change is an
unproven theory or worse yet a hoax? I don't see them today.
Instead the witnesses before the Science, Space, and Technology
today include a business school professor of marketing, an
economist, and an energy industry lawyer. We also have three
legitimate scientists, but it is worth noting that not one of
them refutes the notion that the global climate is changing and
that humans are a factor.
The necessary oversight can be done right. For instance, in
the last Congress, Energy and Environment Subcommittee Chairman
Baird sensed that time was running out in the waning days of
the 111th Congress to have a balanced hearing on the subject
and held a 4-hour hearing with three panels covering three
separate issues within climate change and with a Republican
witness on each panel.
We could have reasonable discussions and disagree on the
monetary costs of taking action and the devastating impacts of
complacency, but science will not allow us to run from the
facts no matter how inconvenient these facts may be. To be
fair, there is a danger in saying that science is settled and
that our knowledge of climate change is conclusive. On the
contrary, with the risk of this magnitude, the job of science
will never be done. It will continue to evolve. We know that
climate is changing and that we have our hand on the
thermostat, but we must always keep looking for new answers,
replacing opinions with data and projections and observations.
We must continue to innovate in how we predict, measure,
prevent, and adapt to climate change. That is the nature of
science and of the stewardship of our planet. Congress should
acknowledge that we are not experts and that allowing partisan
politics to dictate the scientific understanding of climate
change is cynical, short-sighted, and by definition, ignorant.
I implore my colleagues to recognize the value of research
and resist efforts to defund and destroy the very scientific
community that will give us answers. We may not agree as to
where the uncertainties within climate science lie, but we can
all understand that vast and avoidable uncertainties will
remain if we stop the progress of climate science.
This may be the scientific and policy challenge of the
millennium, and we have a responsibility to the Nation and to
the world to lead.
The former Ranking Member, Republican Member of Energy and
Environment Subcommittee, Bob Inglis, eloquently conveyed his
dismay at the recklessness of climate skepticism by comparing
it to the diagnosis of a sick child. If 98 doctors prescribe
one treatment and two doctors prescribe a different treatment,
who are you going to follow?
This Committee has to decide between two choices when it
comes to global climate change. We can allow the world's
scientists to continue to conduct extensive research and
improve our knowledge of this phenomenon, or we can just wait
and watch it happen and hope for the best. Climate change is a
cancer, and we don't cure cancer by refusing to test for it,
calling the doctor a liar, and refusing to consider any
treatment. We would never stop looking for the cure.
While I look forward to today's testimony and what will
undoubtedly be a lively discussion, I must say that I sincerely
hope that this Committee is not beginning and ending its record
on climate science in the 112th Congress with this hearing. We
have so much more work to do.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ranking Member Eddie Bernice Johnson
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you holding this hearing
today. Political opinions on climate change vary greatly, and nowhere
more than here in the U.S. Congress. As one who accepts the
overwhelming scientific consensus around climate change, I welcome the
opportunity for this committee to hear a number of perspectives on
climate science. However, I believe this hearing will fall far short of
providing a meaningful discourse on the subject.
I am disappointed in the very broad scope of this hearing, which
arguably ranges beyond the jurisdiction of this Committee, without
sufficient numbers of witnesses to do the topics justice. I believe
that a subject as complex as we are attempting to cover today warrants,
at the very least, multiple panels, if not multiple hearings. To hope
to adequately cover everything from basic science to regulatory policy
in one 2-hour hearing strikes me as too ambitious, if not a little
negligent.
Likewise I am disappointed by the makeup of the panel today. By
that I mean no disrespect to these men or the quality of their work.
However, for years we, Democrats, have been accused of ignoring a large
subset of the climate science community that, in varying degrees, does
not subscribe to the conclusions of the IPCC or otherwise does not
accept that the climate in changing, and that is largely due to human
activity. We have been told that these scientists' voices have been
quashed by a wide-ranging conspiracy, and that under the new House
leadership they would finally have a platform to dispel the alarmists'
mistruths about the science of global climate change.
I look at this panel today and I must ask, "Well, where are they?"
Where are the masses of legitimate expert witness that will corroborate
the assertion that climate change is an unproven theory, or worse, a
hoax? I don't see them here today.
Instead, the witnesses before the Science, Space and Technology
Committee include a Business School professor of Marketing, an
Economist, and an energy industry Lawyer. We also have three legitimate
scientists, but it is worth noting that not one of them refutes the
notion that the global climate is changing and that humans are a
factor.
The necessary oversight can be done right. For instance, in the
last Congress, Energy and Environment Subcommittee Chairman Baird
sensed that time was running out in the waning days of the 111th
Congress to have a balanced hearing on the subject and held a 4-hour
hearing with three panels covering three separate issues within climate
change, and with a Republican witness on each panel.
We can have reasonable discussions and disagree on the monetary
costs of taking action and the devastating impacts of complacency. But
Science will not allow us to run from the facts, no matter how
inconvenient these facts may be.
To be fair, there is a danger in saying that the science is
settled, and that our knowledge of climate change is conclusive. On the
contrary, with a risk of this magnitude, the job of science will never
be done. It will continue to evolve.
We know that the climate is changing, and that we have our hand on
the thermostat. But we must always keep looking for new answers,
replacing opinions with data, and projections with observations. We
must continue to innovate in how we predict, measure, prevent and adapt
to climate change. That is the nature of science and of our stewardship
of our planet.
Congress should acknowledge that we are not the experts, and that
allowing partisan politics to dictate the scientific understanding of
climate change is cynical, short-sighted, and, by definition, ignorant.
I implore my colleagues to recognize the value of research, and resist
efforts to defund and destroy the very scientific community that will
give us answers. We may not agree as to where the uncertainties within
climate science lie, but we can all understand that vast and avoidable
uncertainties will remain if you stop the progress of climate science.
This may be the scientific and policy challenge of the millennium,
and we have a responsibility to the nation and the world to lead.
The former Ranking Republican Member of the Energy and Environment
Subcommittee, Bob Inglis, eloquently conveyed his dismay at the
recklessness of climate skepticism by comparing it to the diagnosis of
a sick child - if 98 doctors prescribe one treatment, and 2 doctors
prescribe a different treatment, who are you going to follow?
This Committee has to decide between two choices when it comes to
global climate change: we can allow the world's scientists to continue
to conduct extensive research and improve our knowledge of phenomenon,
or we can just wait to watch it happen and hope for the best. Climate
changes is a cancer, and we don't cure cancer by refusing to test for
it, calling the doctor a liar, and refusing to consider any treatment.
We never stop looking for the cure.
While I look forward to today's testimony and what will undoubtedly
be lively discussion, I must say that I sincerely hope that this
Committee is not beginning and ending its record on climate science in
the 112th Congress with this hearing. We have so much more work to do.
Chairman Hall. Okay. At this time, first, if there are
Members who wish to submit additional opening statements, your
statements will be added to the record at this point.
[The information follows:]
Chairman Hall. And I want to introduce the witnesses that
we don't consider anything but legitimate and witnesses that
haven't been here before because we have asked them to be here
before and that has been turned down.
Our first witness is Dr. J. Scott Armstrong, Professor of
Marketing at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
Dr. Armstrong is an expert in forecasting and has literally
written the book on the principles of forecasting. He is the
founder of several and currently serves as editor more than
half-a-dozen peer review journals.
Our second witness is Dr. Richard Muller, a Professor of
Physics at the University of California, Berkeley and is a
Faculty Senior Scientist at the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory.
Dr. Muller is the author of over 100 peer-reviewed publications
and views of particle physics, geophysics, applied physics and
astrophysics. He is currently chair of the Berkeley Earth
Surface Temperature Project which is attempting to create a new
global surface temperature data set.
Our third witness is Dr. John Christy, Director of the
Earth System Science Center and Distinguished Professor of
Atmospheric Science at the University of Alabama in Huntsville.
Dr. Christy is the Alabama State climatologist where he has
built his own climate data sets. Dr. Christy was the lead
author in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Third
Assessment Report in 2001 and a contributing author in 1992,
1994, 1995 and 2007.
Our fourth witness is Mr. Peter Glaser, a partner with
Troutman Sanders, LLP. He practices in the energy and
environmental law fields and is the chair of the firm's climate
change practice team. He specializes in environmental
regulation and litigation, particularly in the area of air
quality and global climate change.
Our fifth witness is Dr. Kerry Emanuel, a Professor of
Atmospheric Science in the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. Dr. Emanuel's research interests focus on tropical
meteorology and climate with a specialty in hurricane physics.
He is the author or co-author of over 100 peer-reviewed
publications and was elected to the National Academies of
Science in 2007.
Our final witness is Dr. David Montgomery, an independent
economist and consultant and formerly the co-head of the Energy
and Environment Practice at Charles River Associates. Dr.
Montgomery is an expert on economic issues associated with
climate change policy, and he was the principal lead author of
the Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change. He was also Assistant Director of the U.S.
Congressional Budget Office--Assistant Secretary for Policy in
the U.S. Department of Energy. He also taught economics at
California Institute of Technology and Stanford University.
As our witnesses should know, spoken testimony is limited
to five minutes. Do your best to stay there. You are not held
there, and if you need to go a little further, you need to cut
it a little short, that is up to you, after which the Members
of the Committee are going to have five minutes each. We will
hold ourselves to that five minutes. You have leeway of course
because we appreciate you being here. You have prepared
yourself to come here. You are here, and we want to accord you
everything that we can to get the benefit from your appearance
here, and the Members of the Committee get their chance to ask
you questions about where you come from, how you got there, and
what you have for us.
So I recognize our first witness, Dr. J. Scott Armstrong,
Professor at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
STATEMENT OF DR. J. SCOTT ARMSTRONG,
PROFESSOR OF MARKETING, THE WHARTON SCHOOL,
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
Dr. Armstrong. Thank you, Chairman Hall, and Ranking Member
Hall and Ranking Member Johnson. It is a pleasure to be here to
testify. That is odd. This worked perfectly before we started
here.
Chairman Hall. Is it not working now?
Dr. Armstrong. Not working. If everybody has a copy of it,
I can just go through while you look on your copy.
Chairman Hall. You got an expert looking over your shoulder
right now.
Dr. Armstrong. All right. Here we go again. I am back to
five minutes, am I? No, it is not working.
Chairman Hall. No, we haven't even started you yet. When I
say go, you go.
Dr. Armstrong. All right. Thank you. Thanks for talking
about my credentials. I started in 1968 when I graduated from
MIT and specialized in forecasting methods, and it wound up
recently as you mentioned with Principles of Forecasting, a
handbook I did with 39 other experts around the world. So it is
50 years of experience so far. If everybody can just get out
the slides, I will just go through from that. The slides aren't
going to be as good because I had some fly-ins here, but the
first thing is to start out with what we all agree with, and
what we agree with is that climate changes. What we aren't sure
about is what is the optimal temperature?
In conclusion, the most appropriate evidence-based forecast
is that there will be no long-term warming claim. Secondly,
even if we have a scientific forecasting approach that
supported global warming on a long-term basis, there is no
logical basis for action.
Now, I am going to tell you how I got there. To adopt
policies related to global warming, you need three things. The
first is to show the forecast that there is a substantial,
dangerous, long-term temperature change, absent with any
regulations. Second is to show that this long-term change is
going to cause harmful effects versus alternative policies such
as doing nothing. Third is that you have cost-effective
policies that will deal with any harmful effects. It is like a
three-legged stool so that if any one of these legs is missing,
then you have a problem.
The next slide, and again it would be much nicer if we
could get this system working here--no, it is not working.
Forget it. The next slide shows the support that we have for
these three elements of the leg, and I put them in that little
box. You know, it is an important problem. We have been
searching, we are trying to find what evidence we have on each
of those three legs identified, and that little box contains
all of the scientific forecasts we have been able to find. It
is an empty box.
So the warming alarm is based on faulting forecasting
method. The IPCC forecast uses judgments to develop a model.
They then run the model. They make judgments on the outcomes,
and basically they are known as scenarios. Scenarios are not an
appropriate method for forecasting. They have a role, but
forecasting is not one of them. There are stories about the
future, whether told in text or whether told by computer.
We did an audit of the 2007 IPCC forecasting procedures
using the principles from this book. There are 140 of them. We
concluded that the IPCC violated 72 of the 89 relevant
principles. Some of them were pretty serious, like using biased
procedures to collect data. You should use unbiased procedures
and to be conservative when you have uncertainty.
An example of the policy section, you know, making policy
based on global warming, we looked at the polar bear population
forecasting. Two government reports indicated there would be a
sharp decline in the population of polar bears. Our forecasting
audit revealed failure to use 87 percent of the relevant
principles. They failed to provide, for example, full
disclosure of the data. Long-term forecasts were used with only
five years of data. They want to make long-term forecasts.
The global warming forecast models have not been validated
for predictability. We couldn't find any evidence on that, so
we did it ourselves. We used the period from 1850 through 2007,
and we found that--we used a method called successive updating.
We compared the error of our method, which is that there will
be no change, with the IPCC forecast. And how large was the
IPCC forecast? Well, on average, over the 10,750 forecasts that
we checked, the IPCC forecast was 7.7 times larger. For the
long-term forecast, 91 to 100 years, it had 12.6 times larger
error than we have from assuming no change.
So forecasting global warming lacks any scientific basis.
Now, given that the critical legs of the stool cannot be
supported and that improper procedures have been used, in
particular the lack of objectivity and the lack of full
disclosure, we have concluded that this is basically an anti-
scientific political movement. Has anything happened like this
before, an anti-scientific political movement? So we started
what we call the analogous project. We are looking for alarms
over serious things that are happening that might be averted at
great cost. The analogous study, some of the alarms we got were
things like DDT and cancer, eugenics movement, population
growth and famine starting with Malthus and then moving through
computer models at MIT and global warming--it was global
cooling alarm.
Government intervention was called for in 25 of the 26
analogous situations that we identified. They called for
increased taxes, increased spending and restrictions on
individual liberties. Now how accurate were these analogous
forecasts? Well, of the 26 analogous situations, 19 of the
forecasts were categorically wrong, seven were wrong in degree
and we were yet to find an analogous situation where the
forecasts were correct.
Next thing we asked was does government intervention help?
Actually, there were 23 cases where they used government
intervention, and harm was caused in 20 of those cases, and the
policies were ineffective in three of the cases. And we found
no cases in which the policies were effective.
Summary of findings from the studies on alarming forecasts
of dangerous manmade global warming are the temperature
forecasting procedures are improper, the policy forecasting
procedures are improper, the forecast failed in a validation
study and none of the analogous alarms have been found to be
correct. The thing about these alarming forecasts, it goes way
back. It goes way back to Macaulay in 1930. Julian Simon, my
friend and colleague in 1990 talked about all these alarms,
that the manmade is going to cause the end of the civilization,
and he forecasted in the early '90s that this global warming
thing will blow over quickly. So that was one of his bad
forecasts.
The conclusion then is that the--I have to get to this last
slide.
[Slide]
Dr. Armstrong. The conclusions were again--one more.
Chairman Hall. Just move along with it. You didn't have a
fair opportunity because of the malfunction, and that is our
fault. But we let you go well over. I would hope you could
conclude.
Dr. Armstrong. Okay. Thanks. Recommendation number one is
end government funding for climate change research.
Recommendation number two is end government funding for
research associated with global warming, things like
alternative energy, CO2 reduction, habitat loss,
things like that. Recommendation number three, end government
programs and repeal regulations predicated on global warming.
Recommendation number four, end global support for
organizations that lobby or campaign predicated on global
warming.
Thank you for giving me extra time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Armstrong follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. J. Scott Armstrong, Professor of Marketing,
the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
With Kesten C. Green, University of South Australia, and Willie Soon,
Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics
Abstract
The validity of the manmade global warming alarm requires the
support of scientific forecasts of (1) a substantive long-term rise in
global mean temperatures in the absence of regulations, (2) serious net
harmful effects due to global warming, and (3) cost-effective
regulations that would produce net beneficial effects versus
alternatives policies, including doing nothing.
Without scientific forecasts for all three aspects of the alarm,
there is no scientific basis to enact regulations. In effect, the
warming alarm is like a three-legged stool: each leg needs to be
strong. Despite repeated appeals to global warming alarmists, we have
been unable to find scientific forecasts for any of the three legs.
We drew upon scientific (evidence-based) forecasting principles to
audit the forecasting procedures used to forecast global mean
temperatures by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)--
leg ``1'' of the stool. This audit found that the IPCC procedures
violated 81% of the 89 relevant forecasting principles.
We also audited forecasting procedures, used in two papers, that
were written to support regulation regarding the protection of polar
bears from global warming--leg ``3'' of the stool. On average, the
forecasting procedures violated 85% of the 90 relevant principles.
The warming alarmists have not demonstrated the predictive validity
of their procedures. Instead, their argument for predictive validity is
based on their claim that nearly all scientists agree with the
forecasts. This count of ``votes'' by scientists is not only an
incorrect tally of scientific opinion, it is also, and most
importantly, contrary to the scientific method.
We conducted a validation test of the IPCC forecasts that were
based on the assumption that there would be no regulations. The errors
for the IPCC model long-term forecasts (for 91 to 100 years in the
future) were 12.6 times larger than those from an evidence-based ``no
change'' model.
Based on our own analyses and the documented unscientific behavior
of global warming alarmists, we concluded that the global warming alarm
is the product of an anti-scientific political movement.
Having come to this conclusion, we turned to the ``structured
analogies'' method to forecast the likely outcomes of the warming
alarmist movement. In our ongoing study we have, to date, identified 26
similar historical alarmist movements. None of the forecasts behind the
analogous alarms proved correct. Twenty-five alarms involved calls for
government intervention and the government imposed regulations in 23.
None of the 23 interventions was effective and harm was caused by 20 of
them.
Our findings on the scientific evidence related to global warming
forecasts lead to the following recommendations:
1. End government funding for climate change research.
2. End government funding for research predicated on global
warming (e.g., alternative energy; CO2 reduction; habitat
loss).
3. End government programs and repeal regulations predicated
on global warming.
4. End government support for organizations that lobby or
campaign predicated on global warming.
Introduction
Knowledge of Roman vineyards in Britain and Viking diary farms in
Greenland together with plots of temperature proxy data over hundreds,
thousands, and hundreds-of-thousands of years provide evidence that the
Earth's climate varies, so the existence of climate change is not a
matter of dispute. Global warming alarmist analysis is concentrated on
the years from 1850, a period of widespread direct temperature
measurement, increasing industrialization, and increasing
concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. As with other
periods, during this period one can retrospectively identify upward
trends and downward trends, depending on the starting and ending dates
one chooses. Over the whole period that we examined, 1850 through 2007,
global annual temperature proxy series constructed for the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) show a small upward
trend of about 0.004+C per year. There is some dispute over the
veracity of the proxy temperature series (Christy, et al. 2010). For
our analyses, however, we treat the data as if they were correct. In
particular, we use the U.K. Hadley Centre's ``best estimate'' series,
HadCRUt3 \1\ as described in Brohan et al. (2006).
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\1\ Obtained from http://hadobs.metoffice.com/hadcrut3/
diagnostics/global/nh+sh/annual; notes on series at http://
www.metoffice.gov.uk/hadobs/hadcrut3/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We approach the issue of alarm over dangerous manmade global
warming as a problem of forecasting temperatures over the long term.
The global warming alarm is not based on what has happened, but on what
will happen. In other words, it is a forecasting problem. And it is a
very complex problem.
To address this forecasting problem we first describe the basis of
the scientific principles behind forecasting. We then examine the
processes that have been used to forecast the onset of dangerous
manmade global warming and the validation procedures used to
demonstrate predictive validity. We then summarize our validation
study.
We limit our discussion to forecasting. Those who are interested in
the relevant aspects of climate science can find summaries in Robinson,
Robinson and Soon (2007) and in Idso and Singer (2009).
Based on our analyses, especially with respect to the violations of
the principles regarding objectivity and full disclosure, we conclude
that the manmade global warming alarm is an anti-scientific political
movement. In an ongoing study, we identified analogous alarms and
report on the forecasts behind the alarms and outcomes.
The basis of scientific forecasting
Research on proper forecasting methods has been conducted for
roughly a century. Progress increased over the past four decades, as
researchers emphasized experiments that were designed to test the
effectiveness of alternative methods under varied conditions.
Forecasting research has led to many surprising conclusions.
To make this knowledge useful to forecasters in all domains, I,
along with an international and inter-disciplinary group of 39 co-
authors and 123 reviewers, expert in various aspects of forecasting,
summarized the evidence as a set of principles. A principle is a
conditional action, such as ``forecast conservatively in situations of
uncertainty.'' There are now 140 forecasting principles. The principles
are described and the evidence for them is fully disclosed in the
Principles of Forecasting handbook (Armstrong 2001). The principles are
also provided on the forecastingprinciples.com site (ForPrin.com), on
which we invite researchers to contribute evidence either for or
against the principles.
In practice, nearly everyone believes that their situation is
different and that the principles do not apply. I suggest to such
people that they conduct experiments for their own situation and
publish their findings, especially if they contradict the principles,
and by doing so advance the science of forecasting. There can never be
enough situation-specific evidence for some people but, given the
evidence that many common forecasting practices are invalid, it would
be in unwise to reject the principles without strong evidence for doing
so.
Conditions that apply in forecasting climate change
The global warming alarm is based on a chain of three linked
elements, each depending on the preceding element, and each element is
highly complex due to the number of variables and the types of
relationships. It is much like a three-legged stool. Each leg involves
much uncertainty (Idso and Singer 2009). The alarm requires:
1. a substantive long-term rise in global mean temperatures in
the absence of regulations,
2. serious net harmful effects due to global warming, and
3. cost-effective regulations that would produce net beneficial
effects versus alternatives such as doing nothing.
Effective policy-making requires scientific forecasts for all three
elements. Without proper forecasts, there can be no sound basis for
making policy decisions. Surprisingly, then, despite repeated appeals
to global warming alarmists, we have been unable to find scientific
forecasts for any of the three elements.
Of course, there have been many forecasts based on what we refer to
as unaided expert judgment (i.e., judgments made without the use of
evidence-based forecasting principles). For example, in 1896 the
Swedish Nobel Prize winner in chemistry, Svante Arrhenius, speculated
about the effect of increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide (C02) and
concluded that higher concentrations would cause warming. His
conclusion was drawn from an extrapolation of observational data. \2\
Arrhenius's idea attracted little attention at the time, perhaps
because he expected benefits from warming, rather than an impending
disaster.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See description on Wikipedia and original paper at
globawarmingart.com/images/1/18/Arrhenius.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As noted, the forecasting principles provide advice about how to
forecast given the conditions. Here the evidence yields a finding that
is surprising to many researchers: use simple methods when forecasting
in a complex and uncertain situation. This was a central theme in my
1978 book, Long-range Forecasting. Those involved in forecasting
dangerous manmade global warming have violated the ``simple methods''
principle.
Audit of methods used to forecast dangerous manmade global warming
Kesten Green surveyed climate experts (many of whom were IPCC
authors and editors) to find the most credible source for forecasts on
climate change. Most respondents referred to the IPCC report and some
specifically to Chapter 8, the key IPCC chapter on forecasting (Randall
et at. 2007).
Kesten Green and I examined the references to determine whether the
authors of Chapter 8 were familiar with the evidence-based literature
on forecasting. We found that none of their 788 references related to
that body of literature. We could find no references that validated
their choice of forecasting procedures. In other words, the IPCC report
contained no evidence that the forecasting procedures they used were
based on evidence of their predictive ability.
We then conducted an audit of the forecasting procedures using
Forecasting Audit Software, which is freely available on forprin.com.
Kesten Green and I independently coded the IPCC procedures against the
140 forecasting principles, and then we discussed differences in order
to reach agreement. We also invited comments and suggestions from the
authors of the IPCC report that we were able to contact in hope of
filling in missing information. None of them replied with suggestions
and one threatened to lodge a complaint if he received any further
correspondence. We described the coding procedures we used for our
audit in Green and Armstrong (2007a).
We concluded from our audit that invalid procedures were used for
forecasting global mean temperatures. Our findings, described in Green
and Armstrong (2007a), are summarized in Exhibit 1. Based on the
available information, 81% of the 89 relevant principles were violated.
There were an additional 38 relevant principles, but the IPCC chapter
provided insufficient information for coding and the IPCC authors did
not supply the information that we requested.
Much of the problem revolves around the use of computer modelers'
scenarios as a forecasting method. As stated correctly by Trenberth
(2007), a leading spokesperson for the IPCC researchers, the IPCC
provides scenarios, not forecasts. Scenarios are not a valid
forecasting method (Gregory & Duran 2001), but simply descriptions of
their authors' speculations about what might happen in the future.
Warming forecasts and polar bears
We also examined two forecasts that were developed to support
proposed policy changes. The reports assumed that there would be global
warming as predicted by the IPCC. We examined the two reports that
presented forecasts in line with the stated goal, mentioned on the
first page of the report ``to support US Fish and Wildlife Service
Polar Bear Listing decision''--which we coded as a violation of
objectivity. Our procedures were similar to those in our audit of the
IPCC forecasts except that we also obtained coding by a climate
scientist who has published papers on climate change in the Arctic. On
average, these two reports violated 85% of the 90 relevant principles.
For example, long-term forecasts were made using only five years of
selected data (Armstrong, Green & Soon 2008).
One key violation was that they did not provide full disclosure of
the data in their paper, and they refused our requests for the data.
They also refused to answer our questions about key aspects of their
procedures, which were not fully described in their papers. They
refused to provide peer review of our paper prior to publication. At
our request, the editor of the journal invited them to provide
commentary. They missed the deadline and our paper was published with
commentary by other authors and with our replies to the commentaries.
We were surprised when their commentary appeared in the journal some
months later without us having being offered an opportunity to respond.
In their commentary, the polar bear scientists claimed ``every major
point in Armstrong et al. (2008) was wrong or misleading.'' You can
read their commentary in Amstrup, et al. (2009) and form your own
opinion.
Tests of predictive validity by global warming alarmists
For important problems, it is important to test the predictive
validity of the forecasting methods used. Validation tests are normally
done by simulating the conditions involved in making actual forecasts
(called ex ante forecasts) by, for example, withholding some data and
forecasting what that data will be. Thus, if one wanted to test the
accuracy of a method for forecasting 50 years from now, one would make
a series of 50-year-ahead forecasts using the method of interest and
one or more competitive alternative methods, in order to compare the
accuracy of the forecasts from the different methods.
We were unable to find any ex ante comparisons of forecasts by the
alarmists.
In the spirit of doing a systematic evaluation of forecasts, in
2007 I invited former Vice President Gore to join with me in a test as
to the whether forecasts by manmade global warming alarmists would be
more accurate than forecasts from a no-change model. Each of us would
contribute $10,000 to go to the winner's favorite charity. The period
of the bet was to be 10 years so that I would be around to see the
outcome. Note that this is a short time period, such that the
probability of my winning is only about 70%, based on our simulations.
Had we used 100 years for the term of the bet, I would have been almost
certain to win. Mr. Gore eventually refused to take the bet (the
correspondence is provided on theclimatebet.com). So we proceeded to
track the bet on the basis of ``What if Mr. Gore had taken the bet'' by
using the IPCC 0.03+C per-year projection as his forecast and the
global average temperature in 2007 as mine. The status of this bet is
being reported on theclimatebet.com.
Claims of predictive validity by alarmists
The claim by alarmists that nearly all scientists agree with the
dangerous manmade global warming forecasts is not a scientific way to
validate forecasts. In addition, the alarmists are either
misrepresenting the facts or they are unaware of the literature.
International surveys of climate scientists from 27 countries, obtained
by Bray and von Storch in 1996 and 2003, summarized by Bast and Taylor
(2007), found that many scientists were skeptical about the predictive
validity of climate models. Of more than 1,060 respondents, 35% agreed
with the statement ``Climate models can accurately predict future
climates,'' while 47% percent disagreed. More recently, nearly 32,000
scientists have disputed the claim of ``scientific consensus'' by
signing the ``Oregon Petition.'' \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ See petitionproject.org for details.
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Perhaps in recognition that alarmist claims of predictive validity
cannot sustain scrutiny, expressions of doubt about the alarm are often
parried with an appeal to the so-called precautionary principle. The
precautionary principle is an anti-scientific principle designed to
silence people who have reached different conclusions. Alarmists, such
as James Hansen of NASA, have even suggested publicly that people who
reach different conclusions about global warming have committed crimes
against the state (reported in Revkin 2008). Such attempts to suppress
contrary evidence were ridiculed by George Orwell in his book 1984: The
Ministry of Truth building was inscribed with the motto ``Ignorance is
truth.'' For a closer examination of the precautionary principle from a
forecasting perspective, see Green and Armstrong (2009).
Experts' opinions about what will happen have repeatedly been shown
by research to be of no value in situations that are complex and
uncertain. In 1980, I surveyed the evidence on the accuracy of experts'
judgmental forecasts and found that experts were no better at
forecasting about complex and uncertain situations than were novices
(Armstrong 1980). Bemused at the resistance to this evidence, I
proposed my Seer-sucker Theory: ``No matter how much evidence exists
that seers do not exist, seers will find suckers.'' More recently,
Tetlock (2005) presented the findings of 20 years of research over the
course of which he obtained over 82,000 forecasts from 284 experts on
``commenting or offering advice on political and economic trends,''
which represented complex and uncertain problems. Consistent with
earlier research, he found that the experts' forecasts were no more
accurate than novices' and naive model forecasts.
Our validation test of IPCC forecasting model
We conducted a validation test of the IPCC forecast of 0.03+C per-
year increase in global mean temperatures. We did this starting roughly
with the date used for the start of the Industrial Revolution, 1850. As
it happens, that was also the start of the collecting of temperature
from weather stations around the world. We used the U.K. Met Office
Hadley Centre's annual average thermometer data from 1850 through 2007.
Note that the IPCC forecast had the benefit of using these data in
preparing the forecasts. Thus, it had an advantage over the no-change
model.
To simulate the forecasting situation, we needed unconditional (ex
ante) forecasts. We obtained these for the years from 1851 through
2007. The period was one of exponentially increasing atmospheric
CO2 concentrations, which are the conditions that the IPCC
modelers assumed for their ``business as usual'' model forecasts of
0.03+C per-year increase in global mean temperatures. We used the
process of ``successive updating'' to obtain a total of 10,750
forecasts for horizons from 1 to 100 years ahead starting with
forecasts for 1851 through 1950, then for 1852 through 1951, and so on.
Relative forecasting errors are provided in Exhibit 3.
Note that the errors do not differ substantially in the short term
(e.g., forecasting horizons from 1 through 10 years). As a consequence,
the chances that I will win my l0-year bet with former Vice President
Gore are not overwhelming. The IPCC model forecast errors for forecasts
91 to 100 years in the future, however, were 12.6 times larger than
those for our evidence-based ``no change'' model forecasts. \4\ In an
extension, we also examined a no-change model that used ten-year
periods (instead of annual data) to forecast subsequent ten-year
periods, updating this to make a forecast each year. The results were
quite similar to those in Exhibit 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Note that, had adjustments been made to reflect the heat
island effect, the shifting base of weather stations, unsubstantiated
revisions in historical temperature records, the error ratio of the
IPCC forecasts (relative to our no-change model) would have been much
higher.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Exhibit 3 shows relative errors, but it is also important for
policy makers to look at absolute errors. Absolute errors for the no-
change model are presented in Exhibit 4. The accuracy of forecasts from
the no-change model is such that even perfectly accurate forecasts of
global mean temperatures would not provide much help to policymakers.
For example, the mean absolute errors for 50-year-ahead no-change
forecasts averaged only 0.24+C.
The alarmists claim that validation tests cannot be done because
things have changed. Such claims are commonly, but illogically, made by
people who believe that their situation is new or so different from
other situations, and cannot be related to the past.
Conclusions from our analysis of the procedures used to forecast
alarming manmade global warming
Global warming alarmists have used improper procedures and, most
importantly, have violated the general scientific principles of
objectivity and full disclosure. They also fail to correct their errors
or to cite relevant literature that reaches unfavorable conclusions.
They also have been deleting information from Wikipedia that is
unfavorable to the alarmists' viewpoint \5\ (e.g., my entry has been
frequently revised by them). These departures from the scientific
method are apparently intentional. Some alarmists claim that there is
no need for them to follow scientific principles. For example, the late
Stanford University biology professor Stephen Schneider said, ``each of
us has to decide what is the right balance between being effective and
being honest.'' He also said, ``we have to offer up scary scenarios''
(October 1989, Discover Magazine interview). Interestingly, Schneider
had been a leader in the 1970s movement to get the government to take
action to prevent global cooling. ClimateGate also documented many
violations of objectivity and full disclosure committed by some of the
climate experts that were in one way or another associated with the
IPCC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ http://network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/fullcomment/archive/
2009/12/18/370719.aspx.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The alarmists' lack of interest in scientific forecasting
procedures \6\ and the evidence from opinion polls (Pew Research Center
2008) have led us to conclude that global warming is a political
movement in the U.S. and elsewhere (Klaus 2009). It is a product of
advocacy, rather than of the scientific testing of multiple hypotheses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/jamesdelingpole/l00017393/
climategate-the-final-nail-in-the-coffin-of-anthropogenic-global-
warming/ and http://wattsupwiththat.com/2010/lO/15/another-wikipedia-
editor-has-been-climate-topic-banned/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Forecasts of outcomes of the manmade global warming alarmist movement
Using a process known as ``structured analogies,'' we predicted the
likely outcome of the global warming movement. Our validation test of
structured analogies method was provided in Green and Armstrong
(2007b).
Global warming alarmism has the characteristics of a political
movement In an ongoing study, we have been searching for situations
that are ``alarms over predictions of serious environmental harm that
could only be averted at great cost.'' We have searched the literature,
contacted various researchers--especially those who believe in the
global warming alarm. We have also posted appeals on email lists and on
websites such as publicpolicyforecasting.com. We repeat this appeal
here.
To date, we have identified 26 analogous alarmist situations in the
past Kesten Green and I independently coded the alarms. We coded them
for:
1. Forecasting method.
2. Did the proposed action involve substantive government
intervention?
3. Accuracy of forecasts was rated on a -1 to +1 scale (-1 =
wrong direction,
0 = no, or minor, effect; +I = accurate)
4. Did substantive government intervention take place, or not?
5. Outcome of government policies to date on the value of their
net benefit on a -I to +I scale
6. Persistence of government policies, to-date, on a 0 to 2
scale (0 = reversed; I = no or little change; 2 = strengthened)
We will be preparing descriptions of the analogies that will
include the following elements and references to sources of
information:
1. Forecasts of impending catastrophe
2. Methods used to forecast the catastrophe
3. Actions called for (actions by government or by others)
4. Salient endorsements of the forecast by scientists and
politicians
5. Challenges to the forecast
6. Outcomes of each conflict over the alarming forecast and
calls for action, including forecast accuracy
We have posted full disclosure of our procedures at
publicpolicyforecasting.com, and have sent announcements to websites
and individual requests to people to comment. Thumbnail descriptions
are available for nine of the 26 situations (indicated by italics in
Exhibit 5) at publicpolicyforecasting.com.
Here are our preliminary findings. None of these alarming forecasts
were correct. Twenty-five of them called for government intervention.
In the 23 cases where interventions occurred, none were effective. The
policy changes caused harm in 20 of the cases.
The findings will change as the project progresses and as we
identify new analogies, provide more and better description of the
analogies, and obtain codings from others, especially from experts in
the various areas.
We were not surprised by the outcomes, as none of the alarms were
based on scientific forecasts. They typically began with stories and
progressed from there with appeals to scientific support. Another
reason that we were not surprised is that others had anticipated our
findings. For example, after compiling a list of analogous situations
in 1990, Julian Simon said, ``As soon as one predicted disaster doesn't
occur, the doomsayers skip to another, why don't [they] see that, in
the aggregate, things are getting better? Why do they always think
we're at a turning point--or at the end of the road?'' And considerably
earlier, in 1830, Thomas Babington Macaulay concluded, ``On what
principle is it that when we see nothing but improvement behind us, we
are to expect nothing but deterioration before us?''
As with our other publications related to climate change, we have
received no funding, so we expect this study to drag on. The good news
is that it will allow an opportunity for researchers to provide peer
review and to suggest further improvements in our study--or, better, to
conduct independent studies of analogies.
Recommendations
To help ensure objectivity, government funding should not be
provided for climate-change forecasting. Kealey (1996) summarized
evidence on the dangers of bias in government-funded research. The
government should instead rely on independent forecasters.
As we have noted, simple methods are appropriate for forecasting
for climate change. Large budgets are therefore not necessary. Private
individuals have been willing to invest much time and effort in
examining the global warming alarm without external rewards. In fact, a
number of them have engaged in research on the global warming alarm at
great personal cost. The cost has been at least in part because
governments have almost universally sponsored scientists who have
supported the manmade global warming alarm and these scientists have,
as a consequence, attained considerable power over learned societies,
journals, funding, and universities. With the power has come influence
over news media that, by nature, are attracted to stories such as
environmentalist alarms that grab the attention of audiences.
The burden rightly falls on government to obtain scientific proof
that a policy will lead to superior outcomes before increasing the
burden of laws and regulations. It is not defensible to use anti-
scientific procedures such as asking scientists or scientific
organizations to ``vote'' on policy recommendations, even when the
experts are provided with excellent information. This is especially
true, given the evidence that expert opinions are useless for complex
problems such as climate change.
Instead, government should look for strict standards of objectivity
in the evidence. Thus, we suggest that government should use
information for each of the legs on the three-legged stool that
underlies the global warming alarm: warming, effects of warming, and
outcomes of alternative proposed policy changes, including ``don't just
do something, stand there!'' The following should be included for each
leg:
1. evidence, rather than experts' opinions,
2. research from scientists with diverse views,
3. research that involves testing of multiple reasonable
hypotheses,
4. use of scientific (evidence-based) forecasting methods
5. full disclosure of data and research methods,
6. criticism, replications, and extensions, and
7. testimony from scientists who have nothing to gain from the
acceptance of their evidence.
References
Amstrup, Steven C., et al. (2009), ``Rebuttal of ``Polar bear
population forecasts: A public-policy forecasting audit'' Interfaces,
39 (4), 353-369. Amstrup, S. C., B. G. Marcot, D. C. Douglas (2007),
Forecasting the rangewide status of polar bears at selected times in
the 21st Century. Administrative Report, USGS Alaska Science Center,
Anchorage, AK. Armstrong, J. S. (1978; 1985), Long-Range Forecasting:
From Crystal Ball to Computer. New York: Wiley-Interscience.
Armstrong, J. S. (1980), ``The Seer-sucker Theory: The value of
experts in forecasting,'' Technology Review, 83 (June/July), 18-24.
Armstrong, J. S (2001), Principles of forecasting. Norwell, MA: Kluwer
Academic Publishers.
Armstrong, J. S., Green, K. C., & Soon, W. (2008), ``Polar bear
population forecasts: A public-policy forecasting audit,'' Interfaces,
38, No.5, 382--405. [Includes commentary and response]
Bray, D. & von Storch, H. (2007). Climate scientists' perceptions
of climate change science. GKSS--Forschungszentrum Geesthacht GmbH.
Brohan, P., Kennedy, J. J., Hartis, I., Tett, S.F.R & Jones, P.D.
(2006). Uncertainty estimates in regional and global observed
temperature changes: a new dataset from 1850. J. Geophys. Res, 111,
D12106, doi: 10.1 029/2005JD006548.
Christy, J. R., B. Hennan, R. Pielke, Sr., P. Klotzbach, R. T.
McNider, J. J. Hnilo, R. W. Spencer, T. Chase and D. Douglass, 2010:
What do observational datasets say about modeled tropospheric
temperature trends since 1979? Remote Sensing, 2(9), 2148-2169.
Edwards, J. Gordon (2004), ``DDT: A case study in scientific
fraud,'' Journal of American Physicians and Surgeons, 9 (3), 83-88.
Green, K. C. & Armstrong, J. S. (2007a), ``Global warming:
Forecasts by scientists versus scientific forecasts,'' Energy and
Environment, 18, No. 7+8,995-1019.
Green, K. C. & Armstrong, J. S. (2007b), ``Structured analogies for
forecasting,'' International Journal of Forecasting, 23, 365-376.
Green, K. C. & Armstrong, J. S. (2008), ``Uncertainty, the
precautionary principle and climate change,'' Available on-line at
publicpolicyforecasting.com and other web sites.
Green, K. C. & Armstrong J. S. (2011), ``Effects of the global
warming alarm: A forecasting project using the structured analogies
method,'' Working Paper. Latest version available at http://
kestencgreen.com/green&armstrong-agw-analogies.pdf.
Green, K. C., Armstrong, J. S. & Soon W. (2009), ``Validity of
Climate Change Forecasting for Public Policy Decision Making,''
International Journal of Forecasting, 25,826-832.
Gregory, W. L. & Duran, A. (2001), ``Scenarios and acceptance of
furecasts.'' In J.S. Armstrong, Principles of Forecasting. Kluwer
Academic Publishers (Springer).
Hunter, C. M., H. Caswell, M. C. Runge, S. C. Amstrup, E. V.
Regehr, I. Stirling (2007), ``Polar bears in the Southern Beaufort Sea
II: Demography and population growth in relation to sea ice
conditions.'' Administrative Report, USGS Alaska Science Center,
Anchorage, AK.
Idso, C. & Singer, S. F. (2009). Climate Change Reconsidered: The
Report of the Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change.
Chicago: The Heartland Institute.
Kealey, Terence (1996), The Economic Laws of Scientific Research.
Hampshire, UK: Macmillan Press.
Randall, D. A., et al eds. (2007). Climate Change 2007: The
Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
Revkin, A. (2008). ``Are big oil and big coal climate criminals?''
The New York Times: Dot Earth, June 23. Available from http://
dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/06/23/are-big-oil-and-big-coal-climate-
criminals/
Robinson, A. B, Robinson, N. E., and Soon, W. (2007). Environmental
effects of increased carbon dioxide. Journal of American Physicians and
Surgeons, 12, 79-90.
Schneider, S. H. (1989). As quoted in an interview in Discover
Magazine, October. Available at http://stephenscbneider.stanford.edu/
Publications/PDF_PaperslDetroitNews.pdf
Tetlock, P. E. (2005), Expert Political Judgment. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press. Trenberth, Kevin E. (2007), ``Global
warming and forecasts of climate change'', Nature.com's Climate
Feedback: the climate change blog. Available at http://
blogs.nature.com/climatefeedback/2007/07/
global_warming_and_forecasts_o.html.
Waite, Donald E. (1994). ``Myths and facts about DDT,'' in D. E.
Waite, Environmental Health Hazards, Environmental Health Consultant;
Columbus, Ohio.
Author and collaborators
J. Scott Armstrong (Ph.D., MIT, 1968), a Professor at the Wharton
School of Management, University of Pennsylvania, is the author of
Long-range Forecasting, the creator of forecastingptinciples.com, and
editor of Principles of Forecasting (Kluwer 2001), an evidence-based
summary of knowledge on forecasting methods. He is a founder of the
Journal of Forecasting, the International Journal of Forecasting, and
the International Symposium on Forecasting. He has spent 50 years doing
research and consulting on forecasting (details at http://
jscottarmstrong.com). Dr. Armstrong has also published over 30 papers
on peer review and the scientific method. He can be reached at
[email protected].
Contributions to this report were made by:
Kesten C. Green (PhD.) of the International Graduate School of
Business at the University of South Australia is a Director of the
International Institute of forecasters and is co-director with Scott
Armstrong of the Forecasting Principles public service Internet site
(ForPrin.com). He has been responsible for the development of two
forecasting methods that provide forecasts that are substantially more
accurate than commonly used methods. ([email protected])
Willie Soon (PhD.) is an astrophysicist and a geoscientist at the
Solar, Stellar, and Planetary Sciences division of the Harvard-
Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics. He is also the receiving editor in
the area of solar and stellar physics fur the journal New Astronomy. He
has 20 years of active researching and publishing in the area of
climate change and all views expressed are strictly his own.
([email protected])
Chairman Hall. Thank you, and I apologize for this
scientific organization not to have the facility that you
needed. Maybe we will do better next time.
At this time I recognize Dr. Richard Muller, Professor at
the University of California, Berkeley, and a Senior Scientist
at the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory to present your testimony.
You have five minutes, sir. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF DR. RICHARD MULLER, PROFESSOR OF
PHYSICS, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY,
AND FACULTY SENIOR SCIENTIST, LAWRENCE BERKELEY LABORATORY
Dr. Muller. Thank you Chairman Hall and Ranking Member
Johnson. In addition to those organizations, I am the founder
of the Berkeley Earth study, and my testimony today does not
represent the views of those organizations but are my personal
views.
I begin talking about my view of global warming. Prior
groups at NOAA, NASA, and in the UK estimate about a 1.2 degree
Celsius land temperature rise from the early 1900s to the
present. That 1.2 degree rise is what we call global warming.
Their work is excellent, and the Berkeley Earth project strives
to build on it.
Human caused global warming is somewhat smaller. According
to the most recent IPCC report, the human component became
apparent only after 1957, and it amounts to most of the 0.7
degree rise since then. I am not denying that there may have
been human rise before that. Let us assume that by most human-
caused global warming is about 0.6 degrees. I am not endorsing
this number, I am simply stating it as a working number. The
magnitude of this is a key scientific and public policy
concern. Just a 0.2 degree uncertainty puts the human component
between 0.4 and 0.8 degrees. It is a factor of two
uncertainties. This number needs to be improved, and Berkeley
Earth is working to improve the accuracy of it by using a more
complete set of data and looking at biases in a new way.
Let me talk about one of these potential biases, bias in
data selection. The prior groups selected for their analysis
from 12 to 22 percent of the roughly 39,000 stations available.
They believe their selection was unbiased. Outside groups have
questioned that and claimed that the choice preferred records
with large temperature increases. Such biases could be
inadvertent, for example, a result of choosing long, continuous
records. This needs to be looked at carefully. To avoid station
selection bias, Berkeley Earth has developed techniques to work
with all the available stations.
In an initial test of our software and our analysis
program, Berkeley Earth chose stations just randomly from the
complete sets. Such a selection of stations avoids station
selection bias.
In our preliminary analysis of these stations, we found a
warming trend that is shown in the figure. Berkeley Earth is
the black curve, the other three groups are in color. Our
result is very similar to that reported by the prior groups: a
rise of about 0.7 degrees Celsius since 1957.
The Berkeley Earth agreement with the prior analysis
surprised us, since our preliminary results don't yet address
many of the known biases. When they do, it is possible that
corrections could bring our current agreement into
disagreement. Why such close agreement between our uncorrected
data and their adjusted data? One possibility is that the
systematic corrections applied by the other groups turn out to
be small. We don't yet know. We will find out.
Now let me address another issue, poor quality
measurements. Many temperature stations in the United States
are located near buildings, in parking lots, or close to heat
sources. Anthony Watts and his team have shown that most of the
current stations in the U.S. Historical Climatology Network
would be ranked poor by NOAA's own standards, with error
uncertainties up to 5 degrees Celsius.
Did such poor station quality exaggerate the estimates of
global warming? Berkeley Earth has studied this issue, and we
have a preliminary answer and the answer is no. Our analysis
shows that over the past 50 years the poor stations in the U.S.
network do not show greater warming than do the good stations.
Thus, although poor station quality might affect absolute
temperature, or variance in temperature, it does not appear to
affect trends, and for global warming estimates, it is the
trend that is important.
Without the efforts of Anthony Watts and his team, we would
have only a series of anecdotal images of poor temperature
stations, and we would not be able to evaluate the integrity of
the data. This is a case in which scientists receiving no
government funding did work crucial to understanding climate
change. Similarly for the work done by Steve McIntyre. Their
``amateur'' science is not amateur in quality. It is true
science, conducted with integrity and high standards.
I was asked how legislation could advance our knowledge of
climate change. After some consideration I felt the creation of
a Climate Advanced Research Project Agency or Climate-ARPA
could help. Government policy needs to encourage work such as
that of Watts and McIntyre. Climate-ARPA could be an
organization that provides quick funding to worthwhile projects
without regard to whether they support or challenge current
understanding.
In summary, despite potential biases in the data, methods
of analysis can be used to reduce bias effects well-enough to
enable us to measure long-term Earth temperature changes. Data
integrity is adequate. Based on our initial work at Berkeley
Earth, I believe that some of the most worrisome biases are
less of a problem than I had previously thought. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Muller follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Richard Muller, Professor of Physics,
University of California, Berkeley, and Faculty Senior Scientist,
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory
Executive Summary
The Berkeley Earth Surface Temperature project was created to make
the best possible estimate of global temperature change using as
complete a record ofmeasurements as possible and by applying novel
methods for the estimation and elimination ofsystematic biases. It was
organized under the auspices of Novim, a non-profit public interest
group. Our approach builds on the prior work ofthe groups at NOAA,
NASA, and in the UK (Hadley Center--Climate Research Unit, or HadCRU).
Berkeley Earth has assembled 1.6 billion temperature measurements,
and will soon make these publicly available in a relatively easy to use
format. The difficult issues for understanding global warming are the
potential biases. These can arise from many technical issues, including
data selection, substandard temperature station quality, urban vs rural
effects, station moves, and changes in the methods and times of
measurement.
We have done an initial study of the station selection issue.
Rather than pick stations with long records (as done by the prior
groups) we picked stations randomly from the complete set. This
approach eliminates station selection bias. Our results are shown in
the Figure; we see a global warming trend that is very similar to that
previously reported by the other groups.
We have also studied station quality. Many US stations have low
quality rankings according to a study led by Anthony Watts. However, we
find that the warming seen in the ``poor'' stations is virtually
indistinguishable from that seen in the ``good'' stations.
We are developing statistical methods to address the other
potential biases.
I suggest that Congress consider the creation of a Climate-ARPA to
facilitate the study of climate issues.
Based on the preliminary work we have done, I believe that the
systematic biases that are the cause for most concern can be adequately
handled by data analysis techniques. The world temperature data has
sufficient integrity to be used to determine global temperature trends.
Testimony of Richard A. Muller
Thank you Chairman Hall and Ranking Member Johuson for this
opportunity to testify before the Committee.
I am a Professor of Physics at DC Berkeley and Faculty Senior
Scientist at the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory. I founded the Berkeley
Earth Surface Temperature project under the auspices of Novim, a non-
profit public interest group. My testimony represents my personal views
and not those of the above organizations.
[[Italic part for written statement only, not to be read aloud]]
I've published papers on climate change in Science, Nature, and other
refereed journals; I am the author of a technical book on the subject.
My papers on climate change have appeared in Nature, Science,
Paleoceanography, and the Journal of Geophysical Research. I wrote a
technical book on the Earth's past temperature changes: ``Ice Ages and
Astronomical Causes'', Springer 2000. I am the author of ``Physics for
Future Presidents'', a popular book which describes many misuses of
data in climate. I was a cited referee on the report of the NRC on the
hockey stick controversy. For two years I wrote an online column for
MIT's Technology Review. My major awards for scientific achievement
include the Alan T. Waterman Award of the National Science Foundation,
the Texas Instruments Founders Prize, a MacArthur Prize Fellowship, and
election to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and to the
California Academy of Sciences.
The Berkeley Earth Surface Temperature study has received a total of
$623,087 in financial support from:
The Lee and Juliet Folger Fund ($20,000)
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory ($188,587)
William K. Bowes, Jr. Foundation ($100,000)
Fund for Innovative Climate and Energy Research (created by Bill Gates)
($100,000)
Charles G. Koch Charitable Foundation ($150,000)
The Ann & Gordon Getty Foundation ($50,000)
We have also received funding from a number of private individuals,
totaling $14,500.
For more information on Berkeley Earth, see www.BerkeleyEarth.org. For
more information on Novim, see www.Novim.org.
I begin by talking about
Global Warming
Prior groups at NOAA, NASA, and in the UK (HadCRU) estimate about a
1.2 degree C land temperature rise from the early 1900s to the present.
This 1.2 degree rise is what we call global warming. Their work is
excellent, and the Berkeley Earth project strives to build on it.
Human caused global warming is somewhat smaller. According to the
most recent IPCC report (2007), the human component became apparent
only after 1957, and it amounts to ``most'' of the 0.7 degree rise
since then. Let's assume the human-caused warming is 0.6 degrees.
The magnitude of this temperature rise is a key scientific and
public policy concern. A 0.2 degree uncertainty puts the human
component between 0.4 and 0.8 degrees--a factor of two uncertainty.
Policy depends on this number. It needs to be improved.
Berkeley Earth is working to improve on the accuracy of this key
number by using a more complete set of data, and by looking at biases
in a new way.
The project has already merged 1.6 billion land surface temperature
measurements from 16 sources, most of them publicly available, and is
putting them in a simple format to allow easy use by scientists around
the world. By using all the data and new statistical approaches that
can handle short records, and by using novel approaches to estimation
and avoidance of systematic biases, we expect to improve on the
accuracy of the estimate of the Earth's temperature change.
I'll now talk about potential.
Bias in Data Selection
Prior groups (NOAA, NASA, HadCRU) selected for their analysis 12%
to 22% of the roughly 39,000 available stations. (The number of
stations they used varied from 4,500 to a maximum of 8,500.)
They believe their station selection was unbiased. Outside groups
have questioned that, and claimed that the selection picked records
with large temperature increases. Such bias could be inadvertent, for
example, a result of choosing long continuous records. (A long record
might mean a station that was once on the outskirts and is now within a
city.)
To avoid such station selection bias, Berkeley Earth has developed
techniques to work with all the available stations. This requires a
technique that can include short and discontinuous records.
In an initial test, Berkeley Earth chose stations randomly from the
complete set of 39,028 stations. Such a selection is free of station
selection bias.
In our preliminary analysis of these stations, we found a warming
trend that is shown in the figure. It is very similar to that reported
by the prior groups: a rise of about 0.7 degrees C since 1957. (Please
keep in mind that the Berkeley Earth curve, in black, does not include
adjustments designed to eliminate systematic bias.)
Figure: Land average temperatures from the three major programs,
compared with an initial test of the Berkeley Earth dataset and
analysis process. Approximately 2 percent of the available sites were
chosen randomly from the complete set of 39,028 sites. The Berkeley
data are marked as preliminary because they do not include treatments
for the reduction of systematic bias.
The Berkeley Earth agreement with the prior analysis surprised us,
since our preliminary results don't yet address many of the known
biases. When they do, it is possible that the corrections could bring
our current agreement into disagreement.
Why such close agreement between our uncorrected data and their
adjusted data? One possibility is that the systematic corrections
applied by the other groups are small. We don't yet know.
The main value of our preliminary result is that it demonstrates
the Berkeley Earth ability to use all records, including those that are
short or fragmented. When we apply our approach to the complete data
collection, we will largely eliminate the station selection bias, and
significantly reduce statistical uncertainties.
Let me now address the problem of
Poor Temperature Station Quality
Many temperature stations in the U.S. are located near buildings,
in parking lots, or close to heat sources. Anthony Watts and his team
has shown that most of the current stations in the U.S. Historical
Climatology Network would be ranked ``poor'' by NOAA's own standards,
with error uncertainties up to 5 degrees C.
Did such poor station quality exaggerate the estimates of global
warming? We've studied this issue, and our preliminary answer is no.
The Berkeley Earth analysis shows that over the past 50 years the
poor stations in the U.S. network do not show greater warming than do
the good stations.
Thus, although poor station quality might affect absolute
temperature, it does not appear to affect trends, and for global
warming estimates, the trend is what is important.
Our key caveat is that our results are preliminary and have not yet
been published in a peer reviewed journal. We have begun that process
of submitting a paper to the Bulletin ofthe American Meteorological
Society, and we are preparing several additional papers for publication
elsewhere.
NOAA has already published a similar conclusion--that station
quality bias did not affect estimates of global warming--based on a
smaller set of stations, and Anthony Watts and his team have a paper
submitted, which is in late stage peer review, using over 1000
stations, but it has not yet been accepted for publication and I am not
at liberty to discuss their conclusions and how they might differ. We
have looked only at average temperature changes, and additional data
needs to be studied, to look at (for example) changes in maximum and
minimum temperatures.
In fact, in our preliminary analysis the good stations report more
warming in the U.S. than the poor stations by 0.009 0.009
degrees per decade, opposite to what might be expected, but also
consistent with zero. We are currently checking these results and
performing the calculation in several different ways. But we are
consistently finding that there is no enhancement of global warming
trends due to the inclusion of the poorly ranked US stations.
Berkeley Earth hopes to complete its analysis including systematic
bias avoidance in the next few weeks. We are now studying new
approaches to reducing biases from:
1. Urban heat island effects. Some stations in cities show more rapid
warming than do stations in rural areas.
2. Time of observation bias. When the time of recording temperature is
changed, stations will typically show different mean temperatures than
they did previously. This is sometimes corrected in the processes used
by existing groups. But this cannot be done easily for remote stations
or those that do not report times of observations.
3. Station moves. If a station is relocated, this can cause a ``jump''
in its temperatures. This is typically corrected in the adjustment
process used by other groups. Is the correction introducing another
bias? The corrections are sometimes done by hand, making replication
difficult.
4. Change of instrumentation. When thermometer type is changed, there
is often an offset introduced, which must be corrected
Potential Legislation
I was asked what legislation could advance our knowledge of climate
change. After some consideration, I felt that the creation of a Climate
Advanced Research Project Agency, or Climate-ARPA, could help.
Without the efforts of Anthony Watts and his team, we would have
only a series of anecdotal images of poor temperature stations, and we
would not be able to evaluate the integrity of the data.
This is a case in which scientists receiving no government funding
did work crucial to understanding climate change. Similarly for the
work done by Steve McIntyre. Their ``amateur'' science is not amateur
in quality; it is true science, conducted with integrity and high
standards. Government policy needs to encourage such work. Climate-ARPA
could be an organization that provides quick funding to worthwhile
projects without regard to whether they support or challenge current
understanding.
In Summary
Despite potential biases in the data, methods of analysis can be
used to reduce bias effects well enough to enable us to measure long-
term Earth temperature changes. Data integrity is adequate. Based on
our initial work at Berkeley Earth, I believe that some ofthe most
worrisome biases are less of a problem than I had previously thought.
Chairman Hall. Thank you, sir. I want to say to Dr.
Armstrong that your testimony will be in the record as you
submitted it as will all the testimony. The malfunction won't
cost you there.
Dr. Armstrong. Thank you.
Chairman Hall. Thank you, Dr. Muller. Now I recognize Dr.
Christy, Director of the Earth System Science Center at the
University of Alabama in Huntsville for five minutes to present
his testimony.
STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN CHRISTY, DIRECTOR,
EARTH SYSTEM SCIENCE CENTER, UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA, HUNTSVILLE
Dr. Christy. Thank you, Chairman Hall, Ranking Member
Johnson, Committee Members and my Congressman Brooks over here
for this opportunity to be here.
I am here to address issues regarding the process by which
major climate assessments have led to problems for you, our
policymakers. I am John Christy, Alabama State Climatologist
from the University of Alabama in Huntsville.
My research deals specifically with climate science. I am
one of those few people who actually builds climate data sets
from scratch to answer questions about climate variability and
to test assertions people make about climate change. I was the
lead author of the IPCC 2001 report and a secondary author of
the others which doesn't really mean much at all when you read
my written testimony.
Climate assessments like the IPCC use a process in which
IPCC's selected lead authors are given significant control over
the text, including the authority to judge their own work
against the work of their critics. You might call this a
conflict of interest. This process has led to the propagation
of incorrect and misleading information in the assessments and
thus should lead you to question the IPCC's general support for
a catastrophic view of climate change. These reports do not
represent a full-range of scientific evidence on climate, and I
have three examples.
In the first case, I address the icon of the IPCC 2001, the
hockey stick, and show that the hockey stick's author was the
same IPCC lead author who, in my opinion, worked with a small
group of cohorts and misrepresented the temperature record of
the past 1,000 years by promoting his own result and neglecting
studies that contradicted his and allowing amputation of a
disagreeable result and the splicing of unrelated data to hide
the decline. Thus, in my view, conflicting data were eliminated
or massaged, and real uncertainties were not acknowledged.
In the second example from the recent IPCC 2007 report,
evidence was presented by Dr. Ross McKitrick and others that
indicated the popular surface temperature data sets were
affected by warming, not likely to be caused by greenhouse
gases. This has raised serious doubts about using surface
temperatures for evidence for greenhouse warming. The IPCC
authors were themselves producers of these data sets, yet as
final say authors, they sat in judgment over the controversy,
eventually denying McKitrick's evidence with what turned out to
be apparently their own fabricated claim. I discuss more about
surface temperatures in my written testimony.
In the third example, I demonstrate that in the EPA finding
which declared greenhouses gas as a dangerous threat, key
evidence regarding the evaluation of climate models and their
ability to depict the real atmosphere was misrepresented. In
IPCC-like fashion, the EPA relied on establishment scientists,
giving them authority to respond to evidence which contradicted
the EPA finding with assertions that were not based on reliable
data or methods. The evidence shows the EPA overstated the
agreement between models and observations, when in fact there
was significant disagreement.
Finally, this issue has policy implications that may
potentially raise the price of energy a lot and thus
essentially the price of everything else. As such, in my
opinion, the U.S. Congress and EPA should not rely exclusively
on the United Nations' IPCC assessments and their sister
assessments exclusively because the process by which they were
written has been shown to produce bias, false, over-confident
or misleading information about one of the most murky of
sciences, climate. As I stated in my IAC testimony last year,
climate science needs adult supervision, but Congress needs at
least one second opinion--talking about medical ideas here--one
second opinion produced by expert climate scientists but
overseen by a non-activist team which includes those with
experience in the scientific method, such as physicists, and
those who simply understand what is important for people, such
as engineers, and then those who understand the legal aspects
of admissible evidence and discovery, such as attorneys.
I refer you to my written testimony submitted here and from
the Energy and Power hearing three weeks ago where these points
were fleshed out. Thank you for your consideration. I await
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Christy follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. John R. Christy, Director, Earth System
Science Center, University of Alabama in Huntsville
One Page Summary
1. Climate assessments like the IPCC have to date been written through
a process in which IPCC-selected authors are given significant
authority over the text, including judging their own work against work
of their critics. This has led to biased information in the assessments
and thus raises questions about a catastrophic view of climate change
because the full range of evidence is not represented. Three examples
follow.
1.A. Regarding the Hockey Stick of IPCC 2001 evidence now indicates,
in my view, that an IPCC Lead Author working with a small cohort of
scientists, misrepresented the temperature record of the past 1000
years by (a) promoting his own result as the best estimate, (b)
neglecting studies that contradicted his, and (c) amputating another's
result so as to eliminate conflicting data and limit any serious
attempt to expose the real uncertainties of these data.
1.B. In the IPCC 2007 report, Dr. Ross McKitrick presented evidence
that indicated warming processes other than greenhouse gas warming
affected the popular surface temperature data sets. The IPCC authors
were themselves producers of these data sets, yet as ``final-say''
authors they sat in judgment over this controversy, eventually denying
McKitrick's evidence with what turned out be (apparently) their own
fabricated claim.
1.C. The EPA Finding misrepresented key evidence on the evaluation of
climate models against real data. In IPCC-like fashion, the EPA gave
authority to its hand-picked author team to respond to evidence which
contradicted the Finding with assertions that were not based on
reliable data or methods. The evidence shows the EPA overstated the
agreement between models and observations when in fact there was
disagreement.
2. Warming in surface temperatures is caused by many factors other
that greenhouse gases, one reason they are poor proxies to depict
greenhouse warming. Bulk atmospheric temperatures, a more direct proxy,
show much less warming that models predict.
3. Because this issue has policy implications that may potentially
raise the price of energy significantly (and thus essentially the price
of everything else), the U.S. Congress should not rely exclusively on
the U.N. assessments because the process by which they were written
includes biased, false, and/or misleading information about one of the
most murky of sciences--climate. In my opinion, the Congress needs at
least one second-opinion produced by well-credentialed climate
scientists but overseen by a non-activist team which includes those
with experience in the scientific method, the legal aspects of
``discovery,'' and who simply know what is important in answering the
questions at hand.
A House Science, Space and Technology Committee Examining the Process
concerning Climate Change Assessments
31 March 2011
John R. Christy, The University of Alabama in Huntsville
Written Testimony
I am John R. Christy, Professor of Atmospheric Science and Director
of the Earth System Science Center at the University of Alabama in
Huntsville. I am also Alabama's State Climatologist. My training and
research have been almost exclusively in the area of climate studies. I
built my first climate dataset when I was 15 in an attempt to
understand and predict the interannual variations of rainfall in the
San Joaquin Valley of California. It didn't work. Even so, climate
science has been a passion of mine for almost 50 years.
I have served as Lead Author of the Third Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (2001) and a ``Key'' or ``Contributing'' Author on
the others. I was chosen to receive a Special Award by the American
Meteorological Society and NASA's Medal Exceptional Scientific
Achievement for my work with Dr. Roy Spencer regarding the development
of satellite-based climate datasets. I was elected a Fellow of the AMS
in 2002. My main research deals with building climate datasets from
scratch to understand what the climate has been doing and to test
assertions made about the climate system.
I normally speak to congressional committees regarding the science
of climate change as I did three weeks ago to the House subcommittee on
Energy and Power. Those interested in that testimony are encouraged to
access it (8 March 2011.) The question I was asked to address today
relates to the process by which past climate change assessments were
generated and how the final products of such efforts may be
compromised. This is the same basic topic I addressed before the Inter-
Academy Council (of Sciences) or IAC in Montreal last June. Some of the
discussion below is contained in that testimony (Appendix A.)
Additionally, Dr. Ross McKitrick provided information to the same House
subcommittee three weeks ago and I wish to attach that as well
(Appendix B) since I refer to it below. Finally, one of my responses to
the EPA Endangerment Finding is discussed below and thus my full
comment to EPA is attached as Appendix C.
In the following I will provide some general remarks on the
shortcomings of the assessment process as I've experienced it, then
provide three examples of how the process led to inaccurate information
provided to policymakers, followed by a comment on temperature records
and I will close with some concluding remarks.
1. General Remarks
The first basic problem with the entire issue here is that climate
science is a murky science, not a classic, experimental science. As an
emerging science of a complex, chaotic atmospheric and oceanic system,
it is plagued by uncertainty and ambiguity in both observations and
theory. Lacking classic, laboratory results, it easily becomes hostage
to opinion, groupthink, arguments-from-authority, overstatement of
confidence, and even Hollywood movies. (For a formalized discussion of
the uncertainties and ignorance in climate science see Curry 2011.)
The most prominent assessment of climate change science is produced
through the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change or IPCC. These
U.N. reports have appeared every few years, with the main reports
coming out in 1990, 1995, 2001 and 2007. Understanding the selection
and role of the authors is important for policymakers who want to
understand the process.
In simplified terms, IPCC Lead Authors are nominated by their
countries, and down-selected by the IPCC bureaucracy with help from
others (the process is still not transparent to me--who really performs
this down-select?) The basic assumption is that the scientists so
chosen as Lead Authors (L.A.s) represent the highest level of expertise
in particular fields of climate science (or some derivative aspect such
as agricultural impacts) and so may be relied on to produce the most
up-to-date and accurate assessment of the science. When these
assessments are done, government organizations such as the U.S. EPA
often adopt the reports in total, without investigation, to guide their
agendas.
In one sense, the authors of these reports are volunteers since
they are not paid. However, they do not go without salaries. Government
scientists make up a large portion of the author teams and can be
assigned to do such work, and in effect are paid to work on the IPCC by
their governments. University scientists aren't so lucky but can
consider their IPCC effort as being so close to their normal research
activities that salary charges to the university or grants occur.
Travel expenses were paid by the IPCC for trips, in my case, to
Australia, Paris, Tanzania, New Zealand, Hawaii, and Victoria, Canada.
Perhaps it goes without saying that such treatment might give one the
impression he or she is an important authority on climate.
As these small groups of L.A.s travel the world, they tend to form
close communities which often re-enforce a view of the climate system
that can be very difficult to penetrate with alternative ideas
(sometimes called ``confirmation bias'' or ``myside bias''.) They
become an ``establishment'' as I call them. With such prominent
positions as IPCC L.A.s on this high profile topic, especially if they
support the view that climate change is an unfolding serious disaster,
they would be honored with wide exposure in the media (and other
sympathetic venues) as well as rewarded with repeated appointments to
the IPCC process. In my case, evidently, one stint as an L.A. was
enough.
The second basic problem (the first was the murkiness of our
science) with these assessments is the significant authority granted
the L.A.s. This is key to understanding the IPCC process. In essence,
the L.A.s have virtually total control over the material and, as
demonstrated below, behave in ways that can prevent full disclosure of
the information that contradicts their own pet findings and which has
serious implications for policy in the sections they author. While the
L.A.s must solicit input for several contributors and respond to
reviewer comments, they truly have the final say.
In preparing the IPCC text, L.A.s sit in judgment of material of
which they themselves are likely to be a major player. Thus they are in
the position to write the text that judges their own work as well as
the work of their critics. In typical situations, this would be called
a conflict of interest. Thus L.A.s, being human, are tempted to cite
their own work heavily and neglect or belittle contradictory evidence
(see examples below.)
In the beginning, the scientists who wrote the IPCC assessment were
generally aware of the new responsibility, the considerable
uncertainties of climate science, and that consequences of their
conclusions could generate burdensome policies. The first couple of
reports were relatively cautious and rather equivocal.
In my opinion, as further assessments were created, a climate
``establishment'' came into being, dominating not only the IPCC but
many other aspects of climate science, including peer-review of
journals. Many L.A.s became essentially permanent fixtures in the IPCC
process and rose to positions of prominence in their institutions as a
side benefit. As a result, in my view, they had a vested interest in
preserving past IPCC claims and affirming evermore confident new claims
to demonstrate that the science was progressing under their watch and
that financial support was well spent. Speaking out as I do about this
process assured my absence of significant contribution on recent and
future reports.
Political influence cannot be ignored. As time went on, nations
would tend to nominate only those authors whose climate change opinions
were in line with a national political agenda which sought perceived
advantages (i.e. political capital, economic gain, etc.) by promoting
the notion of catastrophic human-induced climate change. Scientists
with well-known alternative views would not be nominated or selected.
Indeed, it became more and more difficult for dissention and skepticism
to penetrate the process now run by this establishment. As noted in my
IAC testimony, I saw a process in which L.A.s were transformed from
serving as Brokers of science (and policy-relevant information) to
Gatekeepers of a preferred point of view.
A focus evolved in the IPCC that tended to see enhanced greenhouse
gas concentrations as the cause for whatever climate changes were being
observed, particularly in the 2001 (Third Assessment Report or TAR)
which was further solidified in 2007, (the Fourth Assessment Report or
AR4.) The IAC 2010 report on the IPCC noted this overconfidence when it
stated that portions of the AR4 contained ``many vague statements of
`high confidence' that are not supported sufficiently in the
literature, not put into perspective, or are difficult to refute.'''
(This last claim relates to the problem of generating ``unfalsifiable
hypotheses'' discussed in my recent House testimony.)
With an understanding of the power of the L.A.s in determining the
content of the IPCC and thus EPA reports, I shall describe three
situations, about which I am quite familiar, to support the claims made
above.
1.A. An Example from IPCC Third Assessment Report (TAR 2001)--the
Hockey Stick
My experience as Lead Author in the IPCC TAR, Chapter 2 ``Observed
Climate Variability and Change'', allowed me to observe how a key
section of this chapter, which produced the famous Hockey Stick icon,
was developed. My own topic was upper air temperature changes that
eventually drew little attention, even though the data clearly
indicated potentially serious inconsistencies for those who would
advocate considerable confidence in climate model projections.
First, note these key points about the IPCC process: the L.A. is
allowed (a) to have essentially complete control over the text, (b) sit
in judgment of his/her own work as well as that of his/her critics and
(c) to have the option of arbitrarily dismissing reviewer comments
since he/she is granted the position of ``authority'' (unlike peer-
review.) Add to this situation the rather unusual fact that the L.A. of
this particular section had been awarded a PhD only a few months before
his selection by the IPCC. Such a process can lead to a biased
assessment of any science. But, problems are made more likely in
climate science, because, as noted, ours is a murky field of research--
we still can't explain much of what happens in weather and climate.
The Hockey Stick curve depicts a slightly meandering Northern
Hemisphere cooling trend from 1000 A.D. through 1900, which then
suddenly swings upward in the last 80 years to temperatures warmer than
any of the millennium when smoothed. To many, this appeared to be a
``smoking gun'' of temperature change proving that the 20th century
warming was unprecedented and therefore likely to be the result of
human emissions of greenhouse gases.
I will not debate the quality of the Hockey Stick--that has been
effectively done elsewhere (and indeed there is voluminous discussion
on this issue), so, whatever one might think of the Hockey Stick, one
can readily understand that its promotion by the IPCC was problematic
given the process outlined above. Indeed, with the evidence contained
in the Climategate emails, we have a fairly clear picture of how this
part of the IPCC TAR went awry. For a more detailed account of this
incident with documentation, see http://climateaudit.org/2009/12/10/
ipcc-and-the-trick/.
We were appointed L.A.s in 1998. The Hockey Stick was prominently
featured during IPCC meetings from 1999 onward. I can assure the
committee that those not familiar with issues regarding reconstructions
of this type (and even many who should have been) were truly enamored
by its depiction of temperature and sincerely wanted to believe it was
truth. Skepticism was virtually non-existent. Indeed it was described
as a ``clear favourite'' for the overall Policy Makers Summary
(Folland, 0938031546.txt).
In our Sept. 1999 meeting (Arusha, Tanzania) we were shown a plot
containing more temperature curves than just the Hockey Stick including
one from K. Briffa that diverged significantly from the others, showing
a sharp cooling trend after 1960. It raised the obvious problem that if
tree rings were not detecting the modern warming trend, they might also
have missed comparable warming episodes in the past. In other words,
absence of the Medieval warming in the Hockey Stick graph might simply
mean tree ring proxies are unreliable, not that the climate really was
relatively cooler.
The Briffa curve created disappointment for those who wanted ``a
nice tidy story'' (Briffa 0938031546.txt). The L.A. remarked in emails
that he did not want to cast ``doubt on our ability to understand
factors that influence these estimates'' and thus, ``undermine faith in
paleoestimates'' which would provide ``fodder'' to ``skeptics'' (Mann
0938018124.txt). One may interpret this to imply that being open and
honest about uncertainties was not the purpose of this IPCC section.
Between this email (22 Sep 1999) and the next draft sent out (Nov 1999,
Fig. 2.25 Expert Review) two things happened: (a) the email referring
to a ``trick'' to ``hide the decline'' for the preparation of report by
the World Meteorological Organization was sent (Jones 0942777075.txt,
``trick'' is apparently referring to a splicing technique used by the
L.A. in which non-paleo data were merged to massage away a cooling dip
at the last decades of the original Hockey Stick) and (b) the cooling
portion of Briffa's curve had been truncated for the IPCC report (it is
unclear as to who performed the truncation.)
In retrospect, this disagreement in temperature curves was simply
an indication that such reconstructions using tree ring records contain
significant uncertainties and may be unreliable in ways we do not
currently understand or acknowledge. This should have been explained to
the readers of the IPCC TAR and specifically our chapter. Highlighting
that uncertainty would have been the proper scientific response to the
evidence before us, but the emails show that some L.A.'s worried it
would have diminished a sense of urgency about climate change (i.e.
``dilutes the message rather significantly'', Folland, 0938031546.txt.)
When we met in February 2000 in Auckland NZ, the one disagreeable
curve, as noted, was not the same anymore because it had been modified
and truncated around 1960. Not being aware of the goings-on behind the
scenes, I had apparently assumed a new published time series had
appeared and the offensive one had been superceded (I can't be certain
of my actual thoughts in Feb. 2000). Now we know, however, that the
offensive part of Briffa's curve had simply been amputated after a new
realization was created three months before. (It appears also that this
same curve was apparently a double amputee, having its first 145 years
chopped off too, see http://climateaudit.org/2011/03/23/13321/.) So, at
this point, data which contradicted the Hockey Stick, whose creator was
the L.A., had been eliminated. No one seemed to be alarmed (or in my
case aware) that this had been done.
Procedures to guard against such manipulation of evidence are
supposed to be in place whenever biases and conflicts of interest
interfere with duties to report the whole truth, especially in
assessments that have such potentially drastic policy implications.
That the IPCC allowed this episode to happen shows, in my view, that
the procedures were structurally deficient.
Even though the new temperature chart appeared to agree with the
Hockey Stick, I still expressed my skepticism in this reconstruction as
being evidence of actual temperature variations. Basically, this result
relied considerably on a type of western U.S. tree-ring not known for
its fidelity in reproducing large-scale temperatures (NRC 2006, pg.
52).
At the L.A. meetings, I indicated that there was virtually no
inter-century precision in these measurements, i.e. they were not good
enough to tell us which century might be warmer than another in the
pre-calibration period (1000 to 1850.)
In one Climategate email, a Convening L.A., who wanted to feature
the Hockey Stick at the time (though later was less enthusiastic),
mentions ``The tree ring results may still suffer from lack of
multicentury time scale variance'' and was ``probably the most
important issue to resolve in Chapter 2'' (Folland, 0938031546.txt).
This, in all likelihood, was a reference to (a) my expressed concern
(see my 2001 comments to NRC below) as well as to (b) the prominence to
which the Hockey Stick was pre-destined.
To compound this sad and deceptive situation, I had been quite
impressed with some recent results by Dahl-Jensen et al., (Science
1998), in which Greenland ice-borehole temperatures had been
deconvolved into a time series covering the past 20,000 years. This
measurement indeed presented inter-century variations. Their result
indicated a clear 500-year period of temperatures, warmer than the
present, centered about 900 A.D.--commonly referred to as the Medieval
Warm Period, a feature noticeably absent in the Hockey Stick. What is
important about this is that whenever any mid to high-latitude location
shows centuries of a particularly large temperature anomaly, the
spatial scale that such a departure represents is also large. In other
words, long time periods of warmth or coolness are equivalent to large
spatial domains of warmth or coolness, such as Greenland can represent
for the Northern Hemisphere (the domain of the Hockey Stick.)
I discussed this with the paleo-L.A. at each meeting, asking that
he include this exceptional result in the document as evidence for
temperature fluctuations different from his own. To me Dahl-Jensen et
al.'s reconstruction was a more robust estimate of past temperatures
than one produced from a certain set of western U.S. tree-ring proxies.
But as the process stood, the L.A. was not required to acknowledge my
suggestions, and I was not able to convince him otherwise. It is
perhaps a failure of mine that I did not press the issue even harder or
sought agreement from others who might have been likewise aware of the
evidence against the Hockey Stick realization.
As it turned out, this exceptional paper by Dahl-Jensen et al. was
not even mentioned in the appropriate section (TAR 2.3.2). There was a
brief mention of similar evidence indicating warmer temperatures 1000
years ago from the Sargasso Sea sediments (TAR 2.3.3), but the text
then quickly asserts, without citation, that this type of anomaly is
not important to the hemisphere as a whole.
Thus, we see a situation where a contradictory data set from
Greenland, which in terms of paleoclimate in my view was quite
important, was not offered to the readers (the policymakers) for their
consideration. In the end, the Hockey Stick appeared in Figure 1 of the
IPCC Summary for Policymakers, without any other comparisons, a
position of prominence that speaks for itself.
So, to summarize, an L.A. was given final say over a section which
included as its (and the IPCC's) featured product, his very own chart,
and which allowed him to leave out not only entire studies that
presented contrary evidence, but even to use another strategically
edited data set that had originally displayed contrary evidence. This
led to problems that have only recently been exposed. This process, in
my opinion, illustrates that the IPCC did not provide policymakers with
an unbiased evaluation of the science, whatever one thinks about the
Hockey Stick as a temperature reconstruction.
This story had a couple of postscripts regarding my involvement.
First, The National Academy of Sciences contacted me shortly after the
TAR appeared in 2001 for my views on the IPCC process. I indicated that
the process was generally a pleasant experience, but that some things
still bothered me. In my written submission to the NRC I stated that I
believed too much emphasis was placed on the Hockey Stick.
21 May 2001
To: Vaughan Turekian (NAS)
Subject: Question about IPCC
1000-year temperature record
This first concern arises from our chapter (2) for which I must
accept as much blame as anyone. We (chapter 2 authors) are
guilty of omitting information that indicated the temperature
history of the past 1000 years is not as well known as is
implied by the prominent figure in the SPM [Summary for
Policymakers] (Fig. 1) and TS [Technical Summary] (Fig.5). At
each of the Lead Authors meetings I pointed out that we should
include mention of publications which strongly suggest the
medieval warm period was warmer than the current century. In
particular I mentioned the Dahl-Jensen et al. 1998 Science
paper which I believe presents the most direct measurement of
temperature and thus should be highlighted. Broeker (2001,
SCIENCE) echoed the very concerns I had put forward in our
meetings. In the final version of the text the Dahl-Jensen
paper was not even cited in Section 2.3 -a fact I did not
realize until last week when I read the report in detail (2.3
is the section on the temperature record of the past 1000
years.) Thus, its [Greenland's temperature] information was not
carried forward in the TS or SPM. (The paper is only mentioned
in passing regarding the warming 8 kybp in the TAR [Third
Assessment Report].) I should point out that the final wording
concerning the warmth of the 1990's and 1998 as ``likely'' the
warmest of the past millennium (i.e. only 2/3 chance of being
correct) tried to account for the lack of certainty in our
knowledge of past temperatures. However, the very prominent
placement of the time series of the last 1000 years in the TS
and SPM overrules what tentativeness some of us actually
intended. This is my personal view.
John R. Christy
University of Alabama in Huntsville
Secondly, I served on the 2006 NRC panel that took another look at
the temperatures of the past 2000 years and noted several findings
about the Hockey Stick that had come to light since I wrote the above
in 2001. That report stated that it was inappropriate to use the
particular type of tree rings which dominated the early part of the
Hockey Stick (p. 52), and that a key step in its mathematical method
was so biased that even when a collection of random numbers were used
for input, hockey stick shapes were produced (p. 91.) Overall, the NAS
report concluded that methodological problems in reconstructions mean
that ``uncertainties of the published reconstructions have been
underestimated'' (p. 113.) For further critical analysis see the
``Wegman Report'' (Wegman et al. 2006). It is clear now, in my view,
that the prominence accorded the Hockey Stick was inappropriate and
that the IPCC failed to provide an accurate depiction of the state of
climate science in this area.
Finally, you may hear that certain ad-hoc panels were assembled
which examined these events and were claimed to have ``exonerated'' the
scientists from major wrong doing. Please note that these reports have
no true legal standing as the legal process was not followed, i.e.
determining admissible evidence, discovery, cross-examination of the
evidence and witnesses, the full inclusion of testimony by witnesses
denigrated by these scientists, etc. A summary of this whole
``exoneration'' affair is given by Dr. Ross McKitrick in ``response to
climategate inquiries'' at http://rossmckitrick.weebly.com/
submissionsresponses-to-govt-inquiries.html.
1.B. IPCC apparent fabrication of claims regarding surface temperature
The next two examples are well-described in the attached document
supplied by Dr. Ross McKitrick of the University of Guelph, Ontario,
sent to the House subcommittee on Energy and Power in relation to their
hearing three weeks ago (Appendix B). The first situation I describe
deals with an apparent fabrication of information regarding surface
temperatures contained in the most recent IPCC AR4 (2007) and the
subsequent usage of the information by the EPA in their endangerment
finding. This is a situation encountered by McKitrick himself (Appendix
B.1). The second incident focuses more on EPA's mishandling of
information, and I relate my own experience here (Appendix C.3.1a), but
I direct you to McKitrick's commentary in Appendix B.3 as an
independent analysis of the same issue.
In the first case, a point of contention arose between McKitrick,
an IPCC reviewer, and the IPCC L.A.s concerning evidence published by
two independent groups which documented the contamination of the
surface temperature record by industrialization and land-use change (De
Laat and Maurellis 2004, 2006, McKitrick and Michaels 2004.) Numerous
papers, including some by myself (e.g. Christy et al. 2009), have been
published in this arena, but the two groups' papers cited here
specifically found patterns of warming over land that were
statistically associated with patterns of socio-economic development, a
correlation not predicted in model simulations of greenhouse warming.
This of course would call into question the use of these surface
datasets (maintained by some of the aforementioned L.A.s) as indicators
of greenhouse warming of the planet.
After the close of peer review, the L.A.s inserted text into the
IPCC report that described the findings pointed out by McKitrick, but
then dismissed them by asserting that the correlations were due to
natural circulation patterns, not industrialization, concluding that
the ``correlation of warming with industrial and socioeconomic
development ceases to be statistically significant.'' This claim was
subsequently quoted by the EPA Finding, and thus, as demonstrated
below, tarnishes that document as well. The problem? There was no
evidence to support this claim made by the L.A.s--it was simply an
assertion (perhaps a belief?) evidently invented to dismiss the
offensive results.
McKitrick (2010) was later published which specifically tested the
IPCC claim about the role of circulation patterns as the cause of the
observed distribution of warming and found the IPCC claim to be false.
Thus, the IPCC assertion had evidently been a fabrication. The key
point here is that the IPCC process failed policymakers by not
providing the complete picture of an issue and unfortunately produced
not just misleading, but false information. Given that the IPCC L.A.
team (a) exerted almost total control over the text, (b) were sitting
in judgment of criticisms of datasets they themselves produced, and (c)
were not required to accommodate alternate views, it is not difficult
to see how such a failure could occur--a failure that can have
significance for climate change policy. This, again, is an example of
L.A.s acting as Gatekeepers, not as Brokers. Furthermore, the
Climategate emails also shed light on the behind-the-scenes attempts by
the L.A.s to squelch this important information--hardly the activity
associated with an open and transparent process (see Appendix B.1).
1.C. EPA ``Finding'' relied on an IPCC-like review process
In its Finding (Part III.C.), the EPA essentially relies on climate
model output to make claims about current and future climate changes
being potentially dangerous and being caused by increases in greenhouse
gases. The report, fundamentally, assumes that climate models are so
precise in their depiction of the real climate that they are reliable
for predictions and thus policy. In the public comment period, I was
one of several who responded to this assertion with evidence to
demonstrate that basic and fundamental features of climate model
simulations do not effectively represent the real world.
A prominent signature of global warming due to greenhouse gases in
climate models is a warming of the tropical upper atmosphere, generally
between 8 and 12 km, that is much greater than the warming which models
project for the surface. The signature in models is so prominent that
it provides a relatively easy test against observations. Several
studies have indicated that observations do not show this feature,
which in turn casts doubt on climate model theory as representing
greenhouse warming properly and on which the EPA Finding relied (e.g.
Christy et al. 2007, Douglass et al. 2007).
In the review of the EPA draft, several responders, including me,
informed the EPA that the EPA's statement about agreement between
observations and models had been improperly reported. We backed up our
claims with published information. However, in their response to us,
the EPA's ``authors'' (themselves part of the establishment) in IPCC-
like fashion claimed ``when uncertainties in models and observations
are properly accounted for, newer observational datasets are in
agreement with climate model results.'' As far as we could tell, they
did not give any serious consideration to contradictory evidence. This
was another example of authors, who were utilized by the EPA, having
the authority to ignore evidence that was clearly against their
assertions. Rather than providing the range of views in the Finding, or
at a minimum pointing out significant model uncertainty suggested by
our results, the EPA authors acted as gatekeepers and mislead the
readers (See Appendix C for my full review comments.)
In their response to our reviews, the EPA cited three papers which
purportedly offered ``new observations'' to support their model vs.
observations ``agreement'', relying mainly on Santer et al. 2008.
However, these ``new'' upper air data sets (RAOBCORE 1.3, 1.4, and
Allen and Sherwood (2005) thermal wind derivation) and two of the
``new'' surface data sets (ERSST v2 and v3) had been shown to contain
spurious trends when tested for accuracy and these versions are not
used for trend estimation any longer. Santer et al., the EPAs key
citation, had done no testing of the observations as we had done. In my
review, I went through the details of why Santer et al. 2008 had been
incorrect in both their hypothesis test (where they neglected the pre-
condition of surface trend agreement between models and observations--
see bracketed note below) and with the data they used. However, the EPA
simply allowed its own hand-picked authors to assert their conclusion.
They did not objectively assess the conclusions of these contradictory
studies or even acknowledge at a minimum that significant controversy
continued on this issue. Further studies support the original comments
of my review (e.g. Sakamoto and Christy, 2009, Klotzbach et al. 2009,
Christy et al. 2010, McKitrick et al. 2010).
[I note here some technical points. Douglass et al. tested a
hypothesis that depended on a specific condition. We addressed the
question, ``If models and observations have the same surface
temperature trend, then do the models and observations have the same
upper air trend?'' In other words, we were testing the relationship
between surface and upper air temperatures. For data 1979-2004, the
answer was no. McKitrick et al. 2010 (and Santer et al. 2008) tested a
broader question without the condition of surface agreement. Their
question was simply, ``Do upper air trends of models and observations
agree?'' (i.e. without the requirement that surface trends agree).
Santer et al. used 1979-99, McKitrick et al. used 1979-99 and 1979-
2009. Ending in 1999 was a clever way to tilt observations upward, to
help them match the models' warming, due to the massive 1998 El Nino
whose impact fades as the time series is lengthened to 2004 and 2009.
Even on this more general question, McKitrick et al. 2010 found the
answer to be no, i.e. models and observations do not agree, and noted
the difference in methodologies in their Supplementary Note 5.]
In my comments to the EPA on this issue I knew the agency would
rely on the ``establishment'' in IPCC-like fashion to write its
response, giving their hand-picked ``authors'' control of the process.
So I included the following paragraph:
Warning: The EPA will be tempted to rely on scientists/
appointees who are well-entrenched into a particular view of
the issue of global warming to review documents such as this,
and who will (a) develop clever sounding rebuttals, and (b) are
afforded the luxury of the ``last word'' to protect the current
EPA consensus. Basic scientific inquiry should encourage EPA to
listen to those of us who actually build these datasets (from
scratch) as our message has equal if not greater credibility.
This plea to be objective and avoid an IPCC-like process (i.e.
relying on hand-picked authors to give the last word) was to no avail.
Again, this demonstrates that consensus reports like the IPCC and EPA
can be resistant to dissenting scientific information in a science that
is already murky. In this last case, not only were policymakers misled
by the EPA's consensus document, but the promised expensive regulations
that are to follow must be viewed as being based, at least in part, on
misleading or flawed information. This situation occurs when an
institution follows a process that accords authors with veto-oversight
of scientific information, who hold one type of perspective, and who
are given total control over the output in a field plagued by
uncertainty.
There are other examples of the shortcomings of the assessment
process (see for example, McKitrick's Appendix B.2 and my Appendix C.1,
C.2 and C.3b), but these above are sufficient to show the problems with
the process of generating consensus documents.
Before providing concluding remarks I will briefly address an issue
requested by the committee regarding surface temperature datasets.
2. Temperature data sets
I have built temperature data sets for climate studies from
satellite microwave sensors, balloon soundings, and traditional surface
thermometers. My research as well as my experience as State
Climatologist exposed me to problems with traditional surface
measurements and led me to establish a new network of stations in
Alabama with high quality, modernized instrumentation. However, these
older stations provide the bulk of the measurements that are the basis
of the popular surface temperature datasets today. My studies (and many
others) have shown that popular land-surface temperature measurements
are affected by many influences, most of them causing warming, which
are unrelated to greenhouse gas increases (Christy 2002, Christy et al.
2006.) This is especially true for the daily low temperature which is
utilized in the popular surface temperature datasets today (Christy et
al. 2006, 2009.) As a result, these measurements, as used, are not
adequate to detect what might be happening to the global climate as a
result of greenhouse gas increases. (This is also related to the
contamination issue raised by McKitrick described above and in my
Appendix C.3.2.)
Two of the major problems with the traditional datasets today are
determining the provenance of the raw data and reproducing the
methodology that created the processed temperature products used in
assessments. In the past, raw data were often held close to the
product-producer and so results were difficult to independently
investigate. ``Just trust me'' seemed to be the basis for acceptance by
the IPCC.
There is an effort underway to create a data bank for surface
temperatures that will be open and transparent, with the capability to
trace the data to the original sources. From a data bank that is this
comprehensive, many useful applications can be created (addressing not
just climate change) with the full traceability of the product--from
its original measurement with site photographs, to the final
adjustments. In this way, for example, methods designed to deal with
the contamination issues described above can be better studied and
addressed by the community. Much of the effort of this project is led
out of the National Climatic Data Center in Asheville NC.
Bulk atmospheric temperatures measured by satellites and balloons,
from the surface to 35,000 ft., form a more robust parameter than
surface measurements for detecting changes that might be caused by the
enhanced greenhouse effect. These temperatures are also affected by
transient events, like volcanoes, that tend to confuse the detection of
what these extra greenhouse gases are doing to the climate. As
described in my recent testimony, when these extraneous features are
removed from the global bulk atmospheric temperatures, we find a rising
temperature trend since 1979 that is significantly lower than what is
being predicted from climate models as they try to quantify the effect
of those greenhouse gases. To me, this demonstrates that the real
atmosphere is not as sensitive to greenhouse gases as the climate
models suggest.
3. Concluding remarks
While there are many examples of problems with the process of
producing climate change assessments, I am not suggesting everything in
these assessments is wrong. The point I raise here is that the process
by which these assessments were created, whether intended or not, did
not provide an expression of the full range of scientific information
(and in some cases provided incorrect information) for some key
conclusions. These conclusions were then adopted without question by
regulatory authorities such as the U.S. EPA. These suspect conclusions
include but are not limited to, (a) the notion that the popular surface
temperature datasets can serve is a detection variable of the impact of
enhanced greenhouse-gas concentrations (and that it is accurately
measured), (b) the belief that climate models have precisely replicated
natural, unforced variability (so natural variations can be ruled out
as the cause for changes that occur), and (c) an overconfident view of
how sensitive the climate is to human forcing.
With the IPCC process to date, we see Lead Authors sitting in
judgment of information regarding their very own scientific results and
those of their critics. This creates an unhealthy conflict-of-interest
situation that unfortunately shortchanges the policymakers. To make
well-informed decisions, policymakers depend on receiving the full
range of scientific thought and evidence on any issue, especially one
as contentious, murky, and as potentially expensive as climate change.
The committee should understand that the IPCC presents one version of
climate change science generated by an establishment that has evolved
to largely reflect a particular point of view. As shown above, this
point of view attempts to dismiss information that questions the belief
that greenhouse gases are the dominant cause of observed climate change
(as represented mainly by a rather poor surface temperature data set)
with little effort expended on (a) other explanations for change such
as natural, unforced variability, (b) a critical assessment of the
climate change variables utilized (including paleoclimate) or (c) a
rigorous assessment of model sensitivity and fidelity to observations.
In my IAC testimony (Appendix A), I indicated that the climate
``establishment'' is so entrenched now, that our science is in need of
``adult supervision.'' If a new and independent report is called for,
one idea is to use a leadership team composed of non-activists that
includes, (a) physicists who understand that science advances by
testing falsifiable hypotheses (and not by accepting popularized,
untestable sentiments), (b) research engineers who understand what's
important to the issue at hand and (c) attorneys who understand the
meaning of language, admissible evidence, and the legal process of
discovery (transparency). With, hopefully, such objective eyes
overseeing the process, the result may be much more humble and honest--
revealing the lack of confidence and understanding we have on most
climate issues, the lack of dramatic events attributable to humans now
occurring in the climate, and the resilience of the Earth to human
inputs.
References
Allen, R.J. and S.C. Sherwood. Warming maximum in the tropical
upper troposphere deduced from thermal winds. Nature Geoscience. 2008.
Published online 25 May 2008: doi: 10.1038/ngeo208.
Christy, J.R., B. Herman, R. Pielke, Sr., P. Klotzbach, R.T.
McNider, J.J. Hnilo, R.W. Spencer, T. Chase and D. Douglass, 2010: What
do observational datasets say about modeled tropospheric temperature
trends since 1979? Remote Sens. 2, 2138-2169. Doi:10.3390/rs2092148.
Christy, J.R., W.B. Norris and R.T. McNider, 2009: Surface
temperature variations in East Africa and possible causes. J. Clim. 22,
DOI: 10.1175/2008JCLI2726.1.
Christy, J.R., W.B. Norris, R.W. Spencer, and J.J. Hnilo, 2007:
Tropospheric temperature change since 1979 from tropical radiosonde and
satellite measurements, J. Geophys. Res., 112, D06102, doi:10.1029/
2005JD006881.
Curry, J. 2011: Reasoning about climate uncertainty. Climatic
Change, submitted. (see draft: http://judithcurry.com/2011/03/24/
reasoning-about-climate-uncertainty-draft/#more-2743).
Dahl-Jensen, D., K. Mosegaard, N. Gundestrup, G.D. Clow, S.J.
Johnsen, A.W. Hansen and N. Balling, 1998: Past temperatures directly
from the Greenland ice sheet. Science, 282, 268-271.
De Laat, A.T.J. and A.N. Maurellis, 2004: Industrial CO2 emissions
as a proxy for anthropogenic influence on lower tropospheric
temperature trends. Geophys. Res. Lett., 31, L05204, doi:1029/
2003GL019024.
De Laat, A.T.J. and A.N. Maurellis, 2006: Evidence for influence of
anthropogenic surface processes on lower tropospheric and surface
temperature trends. Int. J. Climatol., 26, 897-913.
Douglass, D.H., J.R. Christy, B.D. Pearson and S.F. Singer, 2007: A
comparison of tropical temperature trends with model predictions.
International J. Climatology, DOI: 10.1002/joc.1651.
IAC 2010: Interacademy Council Review of the IPCC. http://
reviewipcc.interacademycouncil.net/report.html.
Klotzbach, P.J., R.A. Pielke Sr., R.A. Pielke Jr., J.R. Christy,
and R.T. McNider (2009), An alternative explanation for differential
temperature trends at the surface and in the lower troposphere, J.
Geophys. Res., 114, D21102, doi:10.1029/2009JD011841.
McKitrick, R., 2011: Atmospheric oscillations do not explain the
temperature-industrialization correlation. Statistics, Politics and
Policy, Vol 1, No. 1, July 2010.
McKitrick, R.R., S. McIntyre and C. Herman, 2010: Panel and
multivariate methods for tests of trend equivalence in climate data
sets. Atmos. Sci. Lett., doi:10.1002/asl.290.
McKitrick, R.R. and P.J. Michaels, 2004: A test of corrections for
extraneous signals in gridded surface temperature data. Clim. Res.,
26(2), 15-173, Erratum, Clim. Res. 27(3), 265-268.
NRC 2006: Surface temperature reconstructions for the last 2,000
years. National Academies Press, Washington DC, www.nap.edu. 155pp.
Sakamoto, M. and J.R. Christy, 2009: The influences of TOVS
radiance assimilation on temperature and moisture tendencies in JRA-25
and ERA-40. J. Atmos. Oc. Tech., doi:10.1175/2009JTECHA1193.1.
Santer, B.D., P.W. Thorne, L. Haimberger, et al. Consistency of
modeled and observed temperature trends in the tropical troposphere.
Int. J. Climatol. 2008. DOI:1002/joc.1756.
Wegman, E.J., D.W. Scott and Y.H. Said, 2006: Ad hoc committee
report on the `Hockey Stick' global climate reconstruction.
www.uoguelph.ca/rmckitri/research/WegmanReport.pdf.
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Chairman Hall. I thank you very much, and let us assume the
testimony that has been withheld until the liberal press hadn't
reported it. I am going to be watching how they report your
testimony. I thank you very much, sir.
At this time, I recognize Dr. Peter Glaser, a partner at
Troutman Sanders for five minutes to present his testimony, and
I thank you, Dr. Christy, for staying within the five minutes.
STATEMENT OF MR. PETER GLASER, PARTNER,
TROUTMAN SANDERS, LLP
Dr. Glaser. Thank you, Chairman Hall, Ranking Member
Johnson, for the opportunity to appear today. My name is Peter
Glaser. I am not a doctor. I am a partner with the law firm of
Troutman Sanders.
Let me emphasize at the outset that I am not appearing
before this Subcommittee on behalf of any of my clients. The
views I present here are my own and do not necessarily
represent those of my clients, and I am not being compensated
by them for this testimony.
I have been asked to comment on the process EPA used to
prepare its greenhouse gas endangerment finding, and that
process suffered from a number of flaws in my opinion that
undermine confidence in the substantive conclusions reached in
that finding. These flaws are identified at more length in my
written testimony, and I will provide a brief summary here.
In the first place, EPA did not consider the societal
health and welfare benefits created by the energy sources that
produce greenhouse gas emissions. The EPA's decision to limit
its analysis in this fashion caused it to miss an obvious fact
and that is that over the last century as anthropogenic
greenhouse gas emissions have increased and in EPA's view, the
public health and welfare danger from these emissions has
accelerated, every relevant indicator of public health and
welfare has improved dramatically around the world, rather than
deteriorated.
Moreover, EPA pre-judged the principal issue on which the
public was asked to comment when EPA proposed the endangerment
finding which was whether anthropogenic greenhouse gas emitted
from new light-duty motor vehicles may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. Even before
the comment period began, EPA had already made up its mind that
it would issue the proposed finding, and indeed the President
had already agreed to the motor vehicle greenhouse gas
regulations for which the endangerment finding was the
necessary predicate.
Other process flaws include the Administrator's failure to
exercise independent judgment in determining the endangerment
question. Instead, as the Administrator conceded, she relied
almost exclusively on what she referred to as third-party
assessment literature. In particular, on the critical question
of whether anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions are causing
deleterious climate change, the Administrator relied most
heavily on the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, or the IPCC.
The failure by her to exercise her own judgment is a
violation in my view of the statutory provision under which the
endangerment finding was made.
The endangerment finding also violated various provisions
of the Information Quality Act, or the IQA and EPA's own IQA
guidelines. For instance, EPA's IQA guidelines require to
ensure the quality, integrity and transparency of information
on which EPA relies for scientific reports. Despite relying so
heavily on the IPCC, however, EPA never examined the quality,
integrity and transparency of the data and studies on which the
IPCC itself relied. EPA decided instead that it could satisfy
its IQA obligations as to the IPCC material by examining the
IPCC's own information quality standards and procedures. EPA's
rationale, however, does not pass muster on the IQA, but in any
event, that rationale was undermined by the so-called
Climategate revelations.
Climategate showed that either EPA's investigation of the
IPCC's procedures was wanting or the IPCC had departed from
those procedures. Either way, given the Climategate material,
EPA should have at least afforded the public an opportunity to
comment on whether EPA's reliance on the IPCC was justified in
light of this new information, but EPA refused to do so. And
the Climategate issue is discussed in more detail in a petition
that is attached to my written testimony and is in the public
record in the EPA docket.
My testimony addresses a number of other process flaws and
contrasts the abbreviated and expedited endangerment finding
proceeding with the measured and methodical process that EPA
uses to develop national ambient air quality standards, a
process that unlike the GHG endangerment finding process
involves numerous opportunities for public comment on
successive draft scientific and policy assessments.
I appreciate the opportunity to provide my testimony to you
today, and I look forward to questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Glaser follows:]
Prepared statement of Mr. Peter Glaser, Partner, Troutman Sanders, LLP
Analytical and Process Flaws in EPA's Greenhouse Gas Endangerment
Finding
INTRODUCTION
My testimony \1\ addresses analytical and process flaws in the
finding of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA or the Agency)
that anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) ``may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger the public health and welfare''
within the meaning of Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act (CAA). \2\
This finding is commonly referred to as the Endangerment Finding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Although I represent clients in the case now pending before
the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in which the
Endangerment Finding is on appeal, Coalition for Responsible Regulation
v. EPA, No. 09-1322, I am not appearing before this subcommittee on
behalf of those or any other clients. The views I present here are my
own and do not necessarily represent those of my clients, and I am not
being compensated by them for this testimony.
\2\ Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse
Gases under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act published at 74 Fed.
Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In my view, EPA failed to observe basic requirements set forth in
applicable law as to how a regulatory determination such as the
Endangerment Finding should be made. These flaws are not technical.
They go to the fundamental fairness and transparency of the way EPA
arrived at its Endangerment Finding and the quality of the information
on which EPA relied. The procedures EPA failed to observe are designed
to ensure the integrity both of the decision-making process and the
ultimate result an agency reaches. EPA's failure to observe these basic
requirements therefore undermines confidence in the substantive
scientific conclusions in the Endangerment Finding.
One particular analytical flaw in the Endangerment Finding stands
out, which is that EPA only examined the danger to public health and
welfare from GHGs emissions as they accumulate in the atmosphere and
did not examine the danger to public health and welfare that would
occur if society did not emit GHGs. As I discuss, EPA's one-sided
analytical approach caused the Agency to miss an obvious fact--that
over the last century, as anthropogenic greenhouse emissions have
increased, every relevant indicator of public health and welfare has
improved dramatically rather than deteriorated. A new report by the
Centers for Disease Control (CDC) finds that the U.S. death rate
(number of deaths per 100,000 population) fell for the tenth straight
year and is now at an all-time low, continuing a decade-over-decade
pattern of improved mortality rates over the 20th century. \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ CDC, Deaths: Preliminary Data for 2009 (March 16, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This relationship between increasing GHG emissions and improved
public health and welfare is not an accident. As I will discuss, the
direct cause of both the increased emissions and the improvements in
health and welfare is society's use of energy, particularly
electricity, which has inevitably produced GHGs. A complete analysis of
whether society's emissions of GHGs endanger public health and welfare,
as EPA should have conducted, would include not only whether the
accumulation of anthropogenic GHGs in the atmosphere may be causing
deleterious climate change but also whether the processes that produce
those GHGs produce countervailing public health and welfare benefits.
My testimony is divided into two sections. I first discuss EPA's
one-sided analytical approach in more depth. I then describe the
process EPA used to formulate the Endangerment Finding and discuss how
that process violated fundamental obligations EPA has under the
Administrative Procedure Act, the rulemaking provisions of the CAA, the
Information Quality Act, and other applicable authority. I further
contrast the highly expedited and abbreviated Endangerment Finding
process with the much more deliberative and open process that EPA uses
when it formulates a National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS).
DISCUSSION
I. One-Sided Analytical Approach
The question that the Endangerment Finding attempts to answer is
whether society's emission of GHGs endangers the public health or
welfare. But EPA's answer only addresses one side of that question--the
effect of the emissions on health and welfare once they enter the
atmosphere. There is another side of the question, however--the effect
on public health and welfare of the activity that produces those
emissions.
Obviously, the emission of GHGs does not occur in a vacuum. GHGs
are emitted across the economy for many reasons, the principal of which
is that various residential, commercial and industrial processes
utilize fossil fuels for energy and because C02, the most
ubiquitous GHG, is the inevitable byproduct of combusting such fuels.
These processes produce fundamental health and welfare benefits without
which modern life would be impossible. As stated above, a new report by
the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) finds that the U.S. death rate
(number of deaths per 100,000 population) fell for the ``10th straight
year'' and is now at ``a record low.'' \4\ The chief reason is a
decline in mortality rates related to heart disease, stroke, malignant
tumors, Alzheimer's disease, diabetes, pneumonia/influenza, and other
illnesses. As the CDC report and related publications clearly show,
U.S. death rates have declined, decade by decade, since 1900, even as
GHG emissions have increased.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ CDC, Deaths: Preliminary Data for 2009 at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This relationship between increasing GHG emissions and improved
public health and welfare is not an accident. The direct cause of both
the increased emissions and the improvements in health and welfare is
society's use of energy, particularly electricity, as has been shown by
a variety of publications. As the National Academy of Engineers noted
in 2000 in naming electrification as the number one engineering
achievement of the 20th century:
One hundred years ago, life was a constant struggle against
disease, pollution, deforestation, treacherous working
conditions, and enormous cultural divides unbreachable with
current communications technologies. By the end of the 20th
century, the world had become a healthier, safer, and more
productive place, primarily because of engineering
achievements. \5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ http://www .nationalacademies.org/greatachievements/
Feb22Release.PDF.
EPA's decision to limit its analysis to the perceived detrimental
impact of emissions after they enter the atmosphere--as opposed to the
positive impacts of the processes that create the emissions--is based
on EPA's overly narrow interpretation of its mandate under Section
202(a) (and in other endangerment finding provisions in other parts of
the CAA) and the intent of these provisions. Logically, when EPA
assesses whether the emission of GHGs endanger public health and
welfare, EPA must assess the dangers and benefits on both sides of the
point where the emissions occur: in the atmosphere where the emissions
lodge and, on the other side of the emitting stack or structure, in the
processes that create the emissions. Otherwise, EPA will not be able to
accurately assess whether the fact that society emits GHGs is a benefit
or a detriment.
Without belaboring EPA's legal interpretation of its
responsibilities here, I would simply note that a full analysis of the
dangers to the public health and welfare posed both by emitting GHGs
and not emitting GHGs makes sense from a policy perspective. And EPA
admitted that policy played a role in its Endangerment Finding. As EPA
stated:
[t]hroughout this Notice the judgments on endangerment and
cause or contribute are described as a finding or findings.
This is for ease of reference and is not intended to imply that
the Administrator's exercise of judgment in applying the
scientific information to the statutory criteria is solely a
factual finding; while grounded squarely in the science of
climate change, these judgments also embody policy
considerations. \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Endangerment Finding, 74 Fed. Reg. at 18,892, n.10 (emphasis
supplied).
The necessity for exercising policy judgment in acting in a
precautionary fashion reflects the fact that determining the proper
quantum of precaution in a particular case requires a balancing of
risks and benefits in a broad sense. Obviously, over-caution creates
its own health and welfare risks. As Justice Breyer stated in his
concurring opinion in Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457,
495-496 (2001) (Breyer, concurring), ``a world that is free of all
risk--[would be] an impossible and undesirable objective.'' And as the
Endangerment Finding Proposal preamble states, the purpose of such a
finding is to review ``the totality of the circumstances'' to determine
``whether the emissions `justify regulation' under the CAA.'' \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Id. at 18,892/3 (emphasis supplied).
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If, as EPA says, the basic purpose of the Endangerment Finding is
to assess all risks and benefits of emissions in order to arrive at a
policy judgment of the proper amount of precaution that justifies
regulation in a particular case, that purpose cannot be fulfilled if
EPA only looks at the atmospheric impacts of emissions, and ignores the
health and welfare reasons why the emissions occur in the first place.
Without a full view of the balance of health and welfare factors that
relate to emissions, EPA could find that society would be better off
without GHG emissions, when a balanced analysis might yield the
opposite conclusion.
The GHG regulation that EPA has already undertaken and further GHG
regulation that EPA is likely to undertake in the future provides a
particularly compelling illustration of the need for a balanced
approach in assessing possible endangerment. As the regulatory preamble
to the Endangerment Finding proposal stated, in somewhat of an
understatement, ``[t]he Administrator recognizes that the context for
this action is unique.'' \8\ As the IPCC has noted, ``[e]missions of
GHGs are associated with an extraordinary array of human activities.''
\9\ Eighty-five percent of energy in the United States is derived from
the combustion of fossil fuel. As a result, according to EPA,
``[v]irtually every sector of the U.S. economy is either directly or
indirectly a source of GHG emissions.'' \10\
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\8\ Id. at 18,890/3.
\9\ IPCC, Climate Change 2001: Mitigation (``IPCC 2001''), at 608,
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/.
\10\ Proposed Consent Decree, Clean Air Act Citizens Suit, 68 Fed.
Reg. 52,922, 52,928 (Sep. 8,2003).
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Because GHG emissions, particularly CO2 emissions, are
so closely tied with all facets of modern life, a finding that GHG
emissions endanger public health and welfare is akin to saying that
modern life endangers public health or welfare. That may be true in
some sense, but the necessary rejoinder is: compared to what? Certainly
not as compared with pre-industrial society with pre-industrial levels
ofatmospheric GHG concentrations. To again quote Justice Breyer's
concurring opinion in Am. Trucking Ass'ns, ``[p]reindustrial society
was not a very healthy society; hence a standard demanding the return
of the Stone Age would not prove `requisite to protect the public
health.''' \11\ Thus, although EPA would presumably conclude that pre-
industrial society would not pose a health and welfare danger in terms
of GHG emissions, the lack of industrial activity that causes GHG
emissions would pose other, almost certainly more serious health and
welfare consequences.
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\11\ 531 U.S. at 496.
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Finally, the broader assessment of health and welfare impacts that
I discuss here does not mean that EPA is without power to conduct a
full assessment of the health and welfare impacts caused by potential
climate change. To the contrary, such an assessment is a fundamental
part of endangerment analysis. Nor do I maintain that, on balance, EPA
could not find that GHG emissions endanger the public health or
welfare. EPA, for instance, might find that the risks of what EPA might
see as potentially catastrophic climate change outweigh the benefits
accruing from energy production and other processes that result in the
emission of GHGs. Or EPA might find that the risks to society of
unabated GHG emissions outweigh the risks to society of some level of
abated GHG emissions.
But what EPA cannot do is to ignore the public health and welfare
benefits that cause society to emit GHGs--to, in effect, pretend that a
possible scenario exists where GHGs are not emitted at all and modern
life continues. Such a scenario does not exist, and to assume that it
does is to ignore the purpose for which EPA is called on to assess
endangerment, which is to duly protect society against real-world risk.
II. Process Flaws
A. Process that Led to Endangerment Finding
Proposed Endangerment Finding
When the current Administration took office in January 2009, it
brought with it a firm conviction that a scientific consensus existed
that anthropogenic GHG emissions were the cause of significant
deleterious global climate change and that continued emissions would
make the situation far worse. A central plank of President Obama's
campaign position on energy and environmental issues was the need to
reduce GHG emissions by 80 percent by 2050. \12\ And considerable
frustration was felt over what was believed to be the Bush
Administration's failure to pursue GHG regulation under the CAA
following the Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549
U.S. 497 (2007). Indeed, Carol A. Browner, who would become director of
the White House Office of Energy and Climate Change Policy, testified
in hearings immediately following the Court decision that EPA should
begin regulating GHG emissions from motor vehicles and powerplants at
once and that ``climate change is real, it is caused by human
activities, it is rapidly getting worse, and it will transform both our
planet and humanity if action is not taken now.'' \13\
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\12\ http://my.barackobama.com/page/content/newenergy_more.
\13\ Testimony of Carol A. Browner in hearings before the Senate
Environment and Public Works Committee (Apr. 27, 2007).
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The new Administration did not wait long before taking action. In
one of her first acts, EPA Administrator Lisa P. Jackson issued a
January 23, 2009 ``Opening Memo to EPA employees'' discussing her
overall views on environmental regulation that set forth ``five
priorities that will receive my personal attention.'' Her first
priority was ``[r]educing greenhouse gas emissions,'' including through
regulation under the CAA:
The President has pledged to make responding to the threat of
climate change a high priority of his administration. He is
confident that we can transition to a low-carbon economy while
creating jobs and making the investment we need to emerge from
the current recession and create a strong foundation for future
growth. I share this vision. EPA will stand ready to help
Congress craft strong, science-based climate legislation that
fulfills the vision of the President. As Congress does its
work, we will move ahead to comply with the Supreme Court's
decision recognizing EPA's obligation to address climate change
under the Clean Air Act. \14\
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\14\ (Emphasis supplied.) The memorandum can be found at http://
blog.epa.gov/administrator/2009/01/26/opening-memo-to-epa-employees/.
Consistent with this view, EPA proposed the Endangerment Finding on
April 17, 2009, less than three months after the Administration took
office. Although the proposed Endangerment Finding was ostensibly
issued as a formal rulemaking document on which public comment was
sought on all issues, including whether the Administration should make
the Endangerment Finding at all, there was little doubt that the
Administrator had already pre-judged that issue. Apart from her
previous public statements on climate science and those of others
senior to her in the Administration, the President announced in May
2009, just one month after the proposed Endangerment Finding was
published in the Federal Register and before the comment period even
closed, that he had committed EPA to issuing motor vehicle GHG
regulations that were premised on EPA making the Endangerment Finding.
\15\ The President's announcement was based on an agreement that
resulted from private negotiations among the Administration,
automakers, environmental parties, and representatives of the State of
California, and these negotiations had commenced before EPA had even
proposed the Endangerment Finding.
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\15\ President Obama Announces New Fuel Efficiency Policy, http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the_press--office/President-Obama-Announces-
National-Fuel-Efficiency-Policy/.
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Despite the Administration's commitment to unparalleled
transparency in Agency decision-making--the Administrator had issued an
April 23, 2009 memorandum on ``Transparency in EPA's Operations'' that
promised that EPA would operate ``in a fishbowl'' and declared that
``[i]t is crucial that we apply the principles of transparency and
openness to the rulemaking process''--no public record of these
negotiations exist. Press reports, including in The New York Times,
quoted the senior California representative in the negotiations as
saying that she and Carol Browner, who coordinated the negotiations,
specifically required that no written records of the negotiations be
kept by any party. \16\
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\16\ Colin Sullivan, Vow of Silence Key to White Hause-Calif. Fuel
Economy Talks, THE NEW YORK TIMES, May 20, 2009.
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The agreement provided for imposition of GHG standards for model
year 2012 automobiles and light duty trucks. In order to provide the
automakers sufficient lead time to comply with the new standards, EPA
needed to propose and then finalize the standards by the Spring of
2010. (It was also decided to coordinate the EPA GHG standards with
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards to be issued by the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), and NHTSA is
statutorily obligated to provide certain defined advance notice of new
CAFE standards.) Given the agreement to put these new standards in
place by model year 2012, there was now no doubt that the Endangerment
Finding. without which the EPA standards could not be promulgated,
would need to be issued soon.
Final Endangerment Finding and the Administrator's Failure to
Exercise Her Own Judgment
The final Endangerment Finding was issued on December 7, 2009 and
published in the Federal Register shortly thereafter. Despite the
requirement of Section 202(a) that the Administrator exercise her own
judgment as to whether GHGs endanger public health and welfare, the
Endangerment Finding was not the product of the Administrator's or her
Agency's independent review of climate science. Instead, as the
Administrator readily conceded, the Endangerment Finding was based
almost exclusively on reports produced by third parties summarizing
their views of global climate change science, reports that the
Endangerment Finding referred to as ``assessment literature.'' \17\ As
the Endangerment Finding stated, `` . . . the Administrator is relying
on the major assessments of the USGCRP, the IPCC, and the NRC as the
primary scientific and technical basis of her endangerment decision.''
\18\ The Administrator's statement of her primary reliance on these
reports is repeated throughout the Endangerment Finding, the Technical
Support Document (TSD) (which was the detailed document prepared by EPA
in connection with the Endangerment Finding that discussed climate
science), and the document EPA prepared to respond to rulemaking
comments (the Response to Public Comments). For instance, the TSD
stated that it ``relies most heavily'' on this ``assessment
literature.'' \19\ The Response to Comments stated:
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\17\ See, e.g, Endangennent Finding, 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,498/2.
\18\ Endangerment Finding, 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,510. The USGCRP
refers to the United States Global Change Research Program. USGCRP
subsumed the work of the U.S. Climate Change Science Program (``CCSP
''), which had previously coordinated such research. As ofJanuary 16,
2009, the CCSP had produced 21 synthesis and assessment reports (``SAPs
''), and these reports, along with the IPCC reports, became the
principal basis for the June USGCRP report GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES. The IPCC is a body that was established
by the United Nations Environment Programme and the World Meteorlogical
Organization to ``provide the world with a clear scientific view on the
current state of climate change and its potential environmental and
socio-economic consequences.'' Among other things, the IPCC releases
Assessment Reports. The NRC is National Research Council.
\19\ TSD at 4.
The endangerment analysis for greenhouse gases under the CAA
requires that EPA examine the extent to which the GHGs
constitute the air pollution that may be reasonably anticipated
to endanger public health or welfare . . . The Findings discuss
in detail the information that is relevant to the determination
and how the Administrator has interpreted it in deciding
whether the air pollution is reasonably anticipated to endanger
public health or welfare. The scientific literature as
synthesized in the TSD provides exactly the kind of information
that can help inform these issues. For example, the TSD
summarizes the conclusions of the assessment reports with
respect to: 1) current emissions of GHG emissions; 2) how these
emissions are changing the composition of the atmosphere; 3)
how such changes in the atmosphere are affecting the global and
regional climate; and 4) the potential impacts of such changes
in climate on human health and welfare, for current and future
generations. In its scope and quality, the assessment
literature is relevant and appropriate for addressing the
scientific issues under the CAA. \20\
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\20\ Endangerment Finding Response to Public Comments, VoL 1 at 5
(emphasis supplied.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similarly, EPA stated that:
EPA disagrees that review of the scientific and technical
information contained in the TSD was inadequate. EPA did not
develop new science as part of this action and instead
summarized the existing peer-reviewed assessment literature.
\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Id. at 7 (emphasis supplied).
Importantly, although EPA says it relied on reports of the USGCRP,
the IPCC, and the NRC, EPA relied almost exclusively on the work of the
IPCC on the critical ``attribution'' issue: whether changes to the
climate system that EPA says are occurring and will accelerate in the
future can be attributed to anthropogenic GHG emissions and not natural
forces. Most of the TSD examines observed and projected climate and the
effect on public health and welfare. Only eight pages of the TSD are
devoted to the attribution issue. \22\ I count 67 citations in this
section, with 47 to the IPCC. All the graphics in this section are
taken from the IPCC, as is the introduction. Plainly, the principal
authority for EPA's central conclusion that anthropogenic GHG emissions
are causing deleterious climate change is the IPCC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ TSD at 47-54.
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Limited Comment Period
EPA allowed only a sixty-day comment period on the Endangerment
Finding, a period that was not sufficient to address the vast volume of
material cited in the ``assessment literature'' on which EPA was
relying--as well as the voluminous material that such literature
ignored or which had been published after the ``assessment literature''
itself was published. Nevertheless, given the time pressure to make the
Endangerment Finding that resulted from the Administration's agreement
to promulgate GHG standards for model year 2012, requests to EPA to
extend the sixty-day comment deadline were denied.
EPA's publicly-stated rationale for denying requests for more time
to comment on the proposed Endangerment Finding is interesting because
it amounts to a further admission that the Administrator did not
exercise her own judgment in making that finding and instead relied on
the ``assessment literature.'' She said that:
the major scientific assessments that the EPA relied upon in
the TSD released with the ANPR had previously each gone through
their own public review processes and have been publicly
available for some time. In other words, EPA has provided ample
time for review, particularly with regard to the technical
support for the Findings. \23\
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\23\ Endangerment Finding, 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,503.
Thus, according to EPA, the ability of the public to comment on the
``assessment literature'' during the processes in which that literature
was developed guided EPA's decision in determining how much time the
public should be given to comment on the proposed Endangerment Finding.
\24\ EPA's logic makes sense only if one accepts that the Administrator
has authority to essentially delegate her obligation to exercise her
own judgment to third party institutions and that comments to these
third party institutions as they exercise their judgment are tantamount
to comments to EPA. But Section 202(a) does not permit the
Administrator to delegate her obligation to exercise judgment to third
parties, and the public has a right to comment on her exercise of
judgment to EPA.
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\24\ In denying the extension requests, EPA also said that it had
provided a 120-day comment period in the Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (``ANPR '') regarding potential GHG regulation (Advance
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions
under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,353 (JuL 30, 2008) (ANPR). The
ANPR, however, did not contain any proposed Endangerment Finding or
indeed any meaningful discussion of conclusions that might be drawn
from the draft TSD that was included with the ANPR. Moreover, although
the TSD in the ANPR was similar to the TSD in the proposed Endangerment
Finding, there were important differences between the two.
Additionally, a number of the CCSP assessment reports on which the ANPR
TSD relied had not been through the public comment period for those
reports and were not final at the time of the ANPR comment period.
Thus, the 120-day conunent period on the ANPR did not provide an
opportunity for the public to comment on these reports to EPA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lack of Independent and Objective Peer Review
The Administrator's near-total reliance on the third-party
assessments is also shown in EPA's failure to provide for objective
peer review of the Endangerment Finding. EPA's Information Quality Act
(IQA) guidelines, \25\ which are discussed in more detail below,
incorporate a ``Peer Review Policy'' that ``provides that major
scientifically and technically based work products (including
scientific, engineering, economic, or statistical documents) related to
Agency decisions should be peer-reviewed.'' During the Endangerment
Finding comment period, a number of commenters questioned the
independence and objectivity of the personnel EPA selected to peer
review the Endangerment Finding, which is plainly a major
scientifically based work product requiring peer review under EPA's IQA
guidelines. As these comments pointed out, all of the peer reviewers
were government scientists and many had worked directly on the
``assessment literature'' on which EPA relied. 1A\26\
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\25\ The IQA was enacted as Section 515 of the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2001 (pub.L. 106-554). EPA's IQA Guidelines are
Guidelines for Ensuring and Minimizing the Quality, Objectivity,
Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by the Environmental
Protection Agency (Oct. 2002). http://epa.gov/quality/
informationguidelines/documents/EPA_InfoQualityGuidelines.pdf.
\26\ See comments responded to at Endangerment Finding Response to
Public Co1D.Irients, Vol. 1 at 7.
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In responding to this comment, the Administrator recognized that
she was obligated to provide for independent peer review. She
nevertheless maintained that her near complete reliance on the
``assessment literature'' meant that she was justified in selecting
peer reviewers not on the basis of their independence from EPA or the
``assessment literature'' but on the basis of their familiarity with
that literature. As she stated, ``[g]iven our approach to the
scientific literature . . . the purpose of the federal expert review
was to ensure that the TSD accurately summarized the conclusions and
associated uncertainties from the assessment reports.'' \27\ In other
words, it was not important to the Administrator that she receive an
independent critique of her own Endangerment Finding; her concern was
merely to ensure that she had accurately summarized the conclusions of
the ``assessment literature'' on which she was relying.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ 27 Id. at 7.
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Failure to Docket Information Relied On
Another example of the Administrator's near total reliance on the
``assessment literature'' in lieu of making her own judgment is EPA's
failure to include in the official Endangerment Finding record the
publications and scientific information relied on by the ``assessment
literature.'' Docketing all of the information on which the
Administrator relies is not a procedural formality. It is the key way
in which the public is informed of the basis of the Agency's decision
and therefore is a critical part of the public's ability to comment on
the action the Agency is taking. As explained in the Administrator's
April 23, 2009 ``Memo to EPA Employees'' cited above, EPA can only
ensure that the principles of transparency and openness are observed in
the rulemaking process ``if EPA clearly explains the basis for its
decisions and the information considered by the Agency appears in the
rulemaking record.'' (Emphasis supplied.)
Recognizing that she was required to include in the Endangerment
Finding record the information on which she relied, \28\ the
Administrator nevertheless maintained that since she is ``reasonably
relying on the major assessments of the USGCRP, IPCC, and NRC as the
primary scientific and technical basis of her endangerment decision,''
she is not required to docket material that these reports themselves
relied on. \29\ She took the position that ``[i]nformation regarding
the underlying data, models, and studies used by the IPCC, USGCRP,
CCSP, and NRC in developing their assessment reports can be accessed by
consulting these reports.'' \30\ Similarly, the Administrator stated
that she ``did not conduct new research or modeling in developing the
TSD, and instead relied upon the findings of the assessment literature,
including data and modeling studies presented in those reports. The
information mentioned by the Commenter can be accessed by consulting
these assessment reports and the underlying studies.'' \31\ She went on
to say that ``[o]ur comprehensive referencing of the assessment
literature ensures transparency regarding the source of the data used .
. .'' \32\
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\28\ Endangerment Finding Response to Comments, Vol. 1 at 54.
\29\ Id.
\30\ Id.
\31\ Id.
\32\ Id.
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The Administrator's rationale, however, is wrong in at least two
respects. In the first place, if (as she admitted) she relied on the
``assessment literature,'' then presumably Agency personnel read the
studies and data cited in that literature and were persuaded that the
conclusions reached by that literature are correct. If that is the
case, then those underlying studies and data must be included in EPA's
record, since ultimately it is that information that forms the basis of
the Administrator's conclusion that anthropogenic GHGs endanger public
health and welfare. Additionally, as the so-called ``climategate,''
revelations showed (see below), the data underlying the IPCC
conclusions, in fact, were not made publicly available by the IPPC or
by the authors of the IPCC reports and indeed were withheld even when
asked for under freedom of information law. Thus, the Administrator was
incorrect in saying that the information cited in the ``assessment
literature'' can be ``accessed by consulting these assessment reports
and the underlying studies.''
Refusal to Allow the Public to Comment on Climategate
Just weeks before EPA issued its Endangerment Finding, a
considerable body of email and other information from the University of
East Anglia (UEA) Climatic Research Unit (CRU) became available on the
Internet. The emails are primarily those of American and British
scientists who had critical roles in writing the IPCC reports.
The CRU information undermines a number of the central pillars on
which the Endangerment Finding rests, particularly the work of the
IPCC. The CRU information reveals that many of the principal scientists
who authored key chapters of the IPCC scientific assessments were
driven by a policy agenda that caused them to cross the line from
neutral science to advocacy. They went far beyond even what is
acceptable as advocacy, as they actively suppressed information that
was contrary to, in their words, the ``nice, tidy story'' that they
wished to present, they refused to disclose underlying data concerning
the studies in which they were involved to third parties who might use
the information to critique those studies--even when asked for that
information in freedom of information requests and even to the extent
of deleting emails--, they engaged in a wide variety of improper and
indeed unethical tactics to manipulate the type of scientific
information that appeared both in the IPCC reports and in the peer-
reviewed scientific journals upon which the IPCC largely relied, and
they relied on inaccurate and unverified information from secondary
source material that was produced by advocacy groups, information that
the authors apparently knew was unverified but included anyway to
advance the authors' advocacy agenda. A comprehensive discussion of the
climategate material can be found in the attached Petition for
Reconsideration. \33\
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\33\ Petition for Reconsideration of Peabody Energy Company (Feb.
11, 2010). I am submitting both the Petition and the Executive Summary
of the Petition for the record. If the Petition is considered too long
to be included in the record, I ask that the Executive Summary be
included instead.
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The climategate revelations (at least) created significant doubt as
to the heavy reliance the Administrator had placed in the IPCC reports.
As discussed below, the IQA obligates EPA to ensure the reliability and
transparency of the information on which it relies for important
decisions. In responding to comments on the proposed Endangerment
Finding, however, the Administrator stated that she had not made her
own expert determination as to the quality and transparency of the
information used in the ``assessment literature'' despite her relying
so much on that literature. Instead, she said that she had satisfied
her obligations to ensure the reliability and transparency of the
information underlying the ``assessment literature'' by reviewing the
procedures used by the entities that prepared the that literature to
confirm that those entities, in her view, had adequately taken steps to
ensure information quality and transparency. She stated that ``[o]ur
approach is consistent with these [EPA's IQA] guidelines because we
thoroughly reviewed and evaluated the author selection, report
preparation, expert review, public review, information quality, and
approval procedures of IPCC, USGCRP/CCSP, and NRC to ensure the
information adhered ``to a basic standard of quality, including
objectivity, utility and integrity.'' \34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ Response to Comments, Vol. 1 at 57.
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There are at least two problems with the Administrator's rationale
in this regard. In the first place, it is by no means certain that the
Administrator can satisfy her IQA obligations as to information quality
and transparency without examining the transparency and quality of the
information cited in the ``assessment literature'' given her heavy
reliance on that literature to fulfill her statutory obligations. But
even if she could satisfy her IQA obligations solely by examining the
procedures used by the authors of the ``assessment literature'' to
ensure reliability and quality, climategate undermined her conclusion
that the IPCC's procedures, in fact, had conformed with U.S. norms for
scientific objectivity, integrity, and transparency.
A number of parties asked EPA to reconsider the Endangerment
Finding in light of the climategate material and, in particular, to
take public comment on this new information since it had not been
available at the time comments were submitted on the proposed
Endangennent Finding. These reconsideration petitions maintained that
the climategate information and its implication for EPA's reliance on
the IPCC was at least important enough that EPA should allow the public
an opportunity to comment on the impact of this information on the
Endangerment Finding.
EPA, however, refused to even take public comment on climategate,
dismissing the new infonnation as essentially irrelevant to whether EPA
had properly relied on the IPCC. Oddly, however, the Agency's
decisional documents needed more than five hundred pages to reach the
conclusion that the climategate material was not important enough to
warrant input from the public. \35\
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\35\ See the Response to Petitions at http://www.epa.gov/
climatechange/ endangerment/petitions.html.
B. The Process EPA Conducted to Formulate the Endangerment Finding
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Failed to Meet Basic Requirements for Fairness and Transparency
The above discussion reveals basic process flaws in the manner in
which the Endangerment Finding was developed. American law sets forth a
number of procedural requirements that administrative agencies like EPA
must observe in rulemaking proceedings and in making scientific
determinations like the Endangennent Finding that become the basis for
regulatory policy. These include rulemaking requirements set forth in
the CAA and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), information quality
and transparency requirements set forth in the IQA, and a number of
analytical requirements set forth in various statutes and executive
orders, such as the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and Executive Order
12866 and President Obama's new Executive Order 13563 on ``Improving
Regulation and Regulatory Review.''
As stated above, these process flaws are not mere technicalities
that have no relevance to the substance of the Endangerment Finding.
The reason that the law sets forth required procedures for
administrative decision-making and scientific determinations is to
ensure the integrity of the ultimate decision made.
Some of the most important flaws are as follows: \36\
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\36\ This discussion is not intended to be a complete discussion
of the process and other flaws of the Endangerment Finding but instead
is intended to illustrate some of the flaws.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
First, the most basic flaw is the Administrator having prejudged
the Endangerment Finding, which is an obvious violation of the
Administrative Procedure Act and the rulemaking provisions of the CAA.
As discussed, even before the Endangerment Finding was proposed, the
President had already undertaken negotiations to commit EPA to
regulations that the Agency could not issue unless it made the
Endangerment Finding, and these negotiations resulted in an agreement
even before the comment period on the proposed Endangerment Finding
expired. As to the basic issue of whether or not anthropogenic GHG
emissions endanger the public health or welfare, the comment period and
indeed the rulemaking process was largely a formality.
Second, in contravention of Section 202(a), the Administrator
failed to exercise her own judgment and instead adopted the findings of
the ``assessment literature.'' I can think of no instance where, on a
matter of such overriding national importance, EPA relied so heavily
and deferred so much to the judgment of third parties.
Third, apart from the pre-judgment issue, and whether or not
limiting the comment period to sixty days is strictly a violation of
law, sixty days was wholly insufficient for public input into the
Endangerment Finding. This limited comment period contrasts
dramatically with the numerous and often lengthy comment periods that
inform EPA promulgation of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS), as will be further discussed below. Moreover, the Agency's
rationale that the public had an opportunity to submit comments during
preparation of the ``assessment literature'' lacks merit. Public
comments were not taken in preparation of the IPCC science reports, and
the public could not have been expected to know that comments on the
USGCRP reports were necessary on the theory that EPA would later decide
to use those reports as the basis for the Endangerment Finding and for
the ensuing regulation (and, indeed, in contrast to the numerous public
comments on the Endangerment Finding, relatively few public comments
were submitted on those reports). More fundamentally, the right to
comment on the Endangerment Finding is a right to comment to EPA, in
order to influence EPA action, not a right to comment to third parties.
Fourth, climategate destroyed EPA's basis for concluding that it
could rely on the IPCC's procedures for ensuring the quality, integrity
and transparency of the information on which the IPCC relied.
Climategate showed that either EPA's investigations of the IPCC
procedures were wanting or the IPCC had departed from those procedures.
Either way, given the climategate revelations, EPA should have (at a
minimum) afforded the public an opportunity to comment on whether EPA's
reliance on the IPCC was justified.
Moreover, in attempting to show that climategate did not affect the
conclusions reached in the Endangerment Finding, EPA relied on studies
prepared after the Endangerment Finding was finalized and then placed
those studies in the Endangerment Finding docket. EPA thus attempted to
shore up the rationale for the Endangerment Finding based on new
information, but did not allow the public an opportunity to comment on
such information or the conclusions EPA reached from it.
Fifth, EPA held separate rulemaking proceedings for making the
Endangerment Finding and for promulgating the motor vehicle regulations
triggered by that finding. EPA did not identify any other precedent
involving an endangerment finding in which it had bifurcated the
endangerment finding proceeding from the proceeding to issue
substantive regulations. \37\ As a result, in considering whether to
make the Endangerment Finding, EPA never considered whether the cost of
regulating outweighed the benefit. Thus, although EPA took the view
that the Endangerment Finding automatically triggered an obligation by
EPA to regulate motor vehicle GHG emissions, and that EPA regulation of
motor vehicle GHG emissions automatically triggered regulation of GHG
emissions from stationary facilities under the Prevention of
Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Title V permit programs, EPA failed
to undertake an assessment of the costs and benefits of GHG regulation
of stationary sources.
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\37\ According to EPA, ``[t]ypically, the endangerment and cause
or contribute findings have been proposed concurrently with proposed
standards under various sections of the CAA.'' Proposed Endangerment
and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 18,886, 18,888/3 (Apr. 24,
2009).
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Instead, EPA took the position during the Endangerment Finding
proceeding that it was not required to assess the costs and benefits of
the regulation that its Endangerment Finding triggered because the
Endangerment Finding itself was non-regulatory. \38\ But EPA also
refused to study the costs and benefits of regulation of stationary
source GHG emissions during the motor vehicle regulatory proceedings on
the ground that such issue was more properly addressed in further
proceedings EPA would have on GHG regulation under the PSD and Title V
programs. \39\ Yet EPA again refused to study the impacts of such
regulation even during those proceedings. \40\ To this day, EPA still
has not conducted any study of the costs and benefits of the stationary
source GHG regulation that the Endangerment Finding triggered.
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\38\ Proposed Endangerment Finding, 74 Fed. Reg. at 18,90911-2.
\39\ Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and
Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards EPA Response to Comments
Documentfor Joint Rulemaking (Apr. 2010) at 7-66--7-77.
\40\ See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V GHG
Tailoring Rule: EPA's Response to Public Comments (May 2010) at 163-65.
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Sixth, in developing the Endangerment Finding, the Administrator
did not conform to several provisions of the Agency's own IQA
guidelines and those of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) \41\
for the ``Utility'' and ``Quality'' of information. The OMB Guidelines
define ``Utility'' as ``the usefulness of the information to its
intended users, including the public. In assessing the usefulness of
information that the agency disseminates to the public, the agency
needs to consider the uses of the information not only from the
perspective of the agency but also from the perspective of the
public.'' \42\ EPA's IQA Guidelines amplify this requirement by
providing that the Agency will subject ``influential'' scientific
information to a ``rigorous standard of quality.'' \43\ ``Influential''
information is defined to include the following:
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\41\ OMB's guidelines are set forth in Guidelines for Ensuring and
Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of
Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies; Notice; Republication, 67
Fed. Reg. 8,452 (Feb. 22, 2002).
\42\ Id. at 8,459/1-2 (emphasis supplied).
\43\ EPA Information Quality Guidelines at 20.
Information disseminated in support of top Agency actions
(i.e., rules, substantive notices, policy documents, studies,
guidance) that demand the ongoing involvement of the
Administrator's Office and extensive cross-Agency involvement;
issues that have the potential to result in major cross-Agency
or cross-media policies, are highly controversial, or provide a
significant opportunity to advance the Administrator's
priorities. Top Agency actions usually have potentially great
or widespread impacts on the private sector, the public or
state, local or tribal governments. This category may also
include precedent-setting or controversial scientific or
economic issues. \44\
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\44\ Id.
Plainly, the Endangerment Finding qualifies as ``influential''
scientific information within the meaning of EPA's guidelines, since it
triggered GHG regulation of automobiles, regulation of all major
stationary sources of GHG emissions under the PSD and Title V programs,
and likely other far-reaching regulation. As a result, EPA should have,
but failed in several respects to, apply a ``rigorous standard of
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quality'' in making the Endangerment Finding:
As discussed in a number of comments in the
rulemaking process, EPA failed to discuss a large number of
peer-reviewed studies that contradict the Administrator's
conclusions. According to EPA's Guidelines, EPA must ``ensure
and maximize the quality of `Influential' scientific risk
assessment information'' by, among other things, discussing
``peer-reviewed studies known to the Administrator that
support, are directly relevant to, or fail to support any
estimate of risk and the methodology used to reconcile
inconsistencies in the scientific data.'' \45\
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\45\ Id. at 22-23 (emphasis supplied).
As also discussed in comments, EPA's discussion did
not include a proper context of other peer-reviewed studies
that conflict with EPA's conclusions. OMB's IQA Guidelines for
Objectivity, however, require information to be ``presented in
an accurate, clear, complete, and unbiased manner,'' including
presenting the material within its proper context, with
dissemination of other information ``in order to ensure an
accurate, clear, complete, and unbiased presentation.'' \46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\ OMB IQA Guidelines, 67 Fed. Reg. at 8,459/3.
As discussed above, EPA failed to provide for
independent and objective peer review of the Endangerment
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finding.
Climategate revealed that the information underlying
the IPCC reports on which EPA relied did not conform to IQA
standards for transparency. Yet, for the reasons discussed
above and in the attached Petition for Reconsideration, the
climategate material revealed that the information used in the
IPCC reports did not meet these standards regarding
transparency as to data sources, assumptions used, analytic
methods applied and statistical procedures employed. \47\
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\47\ According to EPA's IQA Guidelines, ``EPA recognizes that
influential scientific, financial, or statistical information should be
subject to a higher degree of quality (for example, transparency about
data and methods) than information that may not have a clear and
substantial impact on important public policies or private sector
decisions. A higher degree of transparency about data and methods will
facilitate the reproducibility of such information by qualified third
parties, to an acceptable degree of imprecision . . . It is important
that analytic results for influential information have a higher degree
of transparency regarding (1) the source of the data used, (2) the
various assumptions employed, (3) the analytic methods applied, and (4)
the statistical procedures employed.'' EPA IQA Guidelines at 20-21.
In sum, the process used by EPA to develop the Endangerment Finding
was flawed, and these flaws undermine confidence in the Agency's
substantive finding that GRGs may reasonably be anticipated to endanger
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public health or welfare.
C. EPA's Process for Establishing a NAAQS
The expedited and abbreviated process EPA used to make its
Endangerment Finding may be contrasted with the methodical process EPA
uses to develop NAAQS, a process that involves numerous opportunities
for public comment on successive draft scientific and policy
assessments. The example I will use is EPA's promulgation of the NAAQS
for particulate matter (PM) in September 2006. \48\
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\48\ The information below is taken from EPA's PM NAAQS website.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The key scientific documents prepared in connection with a NAAQS
review are the Criteria Document (CD) and Staff Paper. The CD is
prepared by EPA's Office of Research and Development and is a
compilation and evaluation by EPA scientific staff and other expert
authors of the latest scientific knowledge relevant to assessing the
health and welfare effects of the air pollutant. The Staff Paper is
prepared by EPA's Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards. Its
purpose is to evaluate the policy implications of the key studies and
scientific information contained in the CD and to identify the critical
elements that EPA staff believes should be considered in establishing a
NAAQS. It is intended to help ``bridge the gap'' between the scientific
review contained in the CD and the judgments required of the EPA
Administrator in determining whether it is appropriate to revise the
NAAQS. CDs and Staff Reports each run to many hundreds of pages, much
longer than the Endangerment Finding TSD.
In October 1997, EPA published its plans for the current periodic
review of the PM NAAQS. As part of the process of preparing the PM CD,
EPA's National Center for Environmental Assessment (NCEA) hosted a peer
review workshop in April 1999 on drafts of key chapters pf the CD. The
first external review draft CD was reviewed by the Clean Air Science
Advisory Committee (CASAC) and the public at a meeting held in December
1999. Based on CASAC and public comment, NCEA revised the draft CD and
released a second external review draft in March 2001 for review by
CASAC and the public at a meeting held in July 2001. A preliminary
Draft Staff Paper was released in June 2001 for public comment and for
consultation with CASAC at the same public meeting. Taking into account
CASAC and public comments, a third external review draft CD was
released in May 2002 for review at a meeting held in July 2002. EPA
released a fourth external review draft CD in June 2003, which was
reviewed by CASAC and the public at a meeting held in August 2003.
The first draft Staff Paper, based on the fourth external review
draft CD, was released at the end of August 2003, and was reviewed by
CASAC and the public at a meeting held in November 2003. EPA held
additional consultations with CASAC at public meetings held in
February, July, and September 2004, leading to publication of the final
CD in October 2004. This second draft Staff Paper, released for comment
in January 2005, was based on the final CD. The Staff Paper was
released in June 2005 and then another and final version was released
in December 2005 following further consultation with CASAC.
The proposed standard was published in the Federal Register on
January 17, 2006. \49\ A ninety-day comment period was provided for.
The final PM NAAQS was published in the Federal Register on October 27,
2006. \50\
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\49\ National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate
Matter; Proposed Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 2,620 (Jan. 17, 2006).
\50\ National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate
Matter, 71 Fed. Reg. 61,144 (Oct. 27, 2006).
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The 2006 PM NAAQS is now under review for possible revision, and
the process is equally as extensive. Without going into detail, just
since the new Administration took office, EPA has published 15 notices
in the Federal Register of meetings, comment periods and review drafts
in connection with this review process. These include: Notice of CASAC
Teleconference-August 25, 2010, Notice of Extension of Public Comment
Period for Chapter 4-Second Draft Policy Assessment, Notice of
Availability-Quantitative Health Risk Assessment (Final Report) and
Urban-Focused Visibility Assessment (Final Report), Notice of
Availability and Request for Public Comment-Second Draft Policy
Assessment, Notice of CASAC Meeting-July 26-27, 2010, Notice of CASAC
Teleconference-May 7, 2010, Notice of Extension of Public Comment
Period-First Draft Policy Assessment, Notice of CASAC Meeting March 10-
11, 2010 and Upcoming Public Teleconference(s), Notice of CASAC Ambient
Air Methods and Monitoring Subcommittee (AAMMS) Meeting-February 24-25,
2010; Public Teleconference-March 26, 2010, Notice of Availability and
Public Comment Period for Draft Documents Related to the Review of the
PM NAAQS, Notice of Availability-Integrated Science Assessment for PM
(Final Report), Notice of Extension of Public Comment Period-Second
Draft lntegrated Science Assessment, Notice of Extension of Public
Comment Period-Draft Assessment Documents, Notice of CASAC Meeting
October 5-6, 2009 and Upcoming Public Teleconference(s), Notice of
Availability and Public Comment Period for Draft Assessment Documents,
Notice of Extension of Public Comment Period-Second Draft Integrated
Science Assessment, Notice of Availability and Public Comment Period
for PM ISA-Second External Review Draft, Notice of Planning Documents
for Public Review and Comment, Notice of CASAC Meeting-April 1-2, 2009.
\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ See http://www.epa.gov/ttn/naaqs/standards/pm/
s_m_2007_fr.html.
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In sum, the process that EPA used to develop the Endangerment
Finding was considerably shorter and involved much less intensive
review and a far more limited comment period than typifies the process
for establishing a NAAQS. Yet GHG regulation is just as important, if
not more so, that PM regulation, and climate science is considerably
more complex than the science behind PM effects on health and welfare.
CONCLUSION
EPA's process for developing the Endangerment Finding was
characterized by a number of flaws that undermine confidence in the
substantive conclusions reached in that finding.
I appreciate the opportunity to provide this testimony.
Chairman Hall. Mr. Glaser, thank you very much. I recognize
now Dr. Kerry A. Emanuel, Professor of Atmospheric Science,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF DR. KERRY EMANUEL, PROFESSOR OF
ATMOSPHERIC SCIENCE, MASSACHUSETTS
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Dr. Emanuel. Thank you, Chairman Hall and Ranking Member
Johnson, for this opportunity to speak to the integrity of the
field of climate research.
The basic physics of climate were established more than 100
years ago by distinguished scientists such as Jean Baptiste
Fourier, John Tyndall, and in particular they established that
our planet is habitable thanks to gases that comprise less than
three percent of our atmosphere.
Already in 1897, the Swedish chemist Svante Arrhenius
projected that fossil fuel combustion would increase carbon
dioxide levels in the atmosphere, and estimated, by hand, that
doubling CO2 would increase surface temperatures by
between 5 and 6 degrees Centigrade.
Analysis of paleoclimate records suggest that natural
climate change is caused by variations in solar output, the
Earth's orbit around the sun, aerosols, and in greenhouse
gases. In particular, elevated greenhouse gases are the primary
suspect in explaining the very warm climates of some of the
Earth's past.
The scientific basis for the existence of significant risks
from anthropogenic climate change is solid and rests on the
principles of physics established more than a century ago as
well as on records of the Earth's climate as recorded by
instruments and in the geological record.
The conclusions of the scientific community that warming of
the climate system is unequivocal and that most of the observed
increase in global temperatures since the mid-20th century is
very likely due to the observed increase in greenhouse gas,
rests on sound scientific research. I need not review for you
the fact that virtually every major scientific organization
that deals with climate around the world has issued strong
statements warning of the risks of climate change.
Many government agencies and private enterprises are taking
the risks of climate change quite seriously. For example, our
own Defense Department has recently issued a report expressing
concern about political instability arising from water and food
shortages in several locations around the globe.
Historically, science, including climate science, have
tended to be conservative and to underestimate risk. I could
give you many examples, but a recent and tragic example is the
earthquake and tsunami in Japan caused by a magnitude 9
earthquake. The best projections before the earthquake of the
largest earthquake that that region should experience was 8.3,
many, many times lower than what was observed.
Notwithstanding anything I have just told you, there is
universal agreement among scientists that current assessments
of the risk of climate change are highly uncertain. In my view,
it is unlikely that these uncertainties will decline
appreciably over the next decade. Because of this uncertainty,
there is no scientific basis for the confidence expressed by
some that the effects of climate change will be benign. In
respect to the stolen emails, and I know something about that,
Mr. Chairman, because I served on the scientific advisory panel
put together by the Royal Society in England to investigate
such allegations. While there is general agreement that the
preparation of a particular graph by a few scientists shows
poor judgment in omitting a part of the record that was
demonstrably false, there is no evidence for an intent to
deceive. Efforts by some to leverage this into a sweeping
condemnation of a whole scholar endeavor should be seen for
what they are.
Now, all scientific endeavors entail some diversity of
views, including mavericks who challenge accepted science.
There are biomedical researchers who do not think that HIV
causes AIDS, although surprisingly, recently, there were
geologists who thought that the theory of plate tectonics is
incorrect. While usually wrong, such mavericks are
indispensible to the progress of science, forcing others to
constantly test their assumptions, evidence and results. But
politicians who make mascots out of mavericks are invariably
engaging in advocacy. They are fond of saying that science is
not done by consensus. This is true, but if policy is not
formulated on the basis of a sound scientific consensus, then
it is almost certainly based on political considerations.
Dealing with risks entailed in climate change will be
extraordinarily difficult, and reasonable people will differ on
questions of strategy. But citizens expect their
representatives to confront this issue in an open and honest
way. Making mascots of scientific mavericks or shooting the
messengers are not rational options. Nations that are first off
the mark in developing new technologies and policies that
address the risks, selling those technologies to rapidly
developing countries will prosper.
Now, let me finish by speaking to you more as a citizen
than as a scientist. We properly revere our forefathers for
making material and mortal sacrifices for our benefit. One only
hopes that our descendants will hold us in similar regard.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Emanuel follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Kerry Emanuel, Professor of Atmospheric
Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
I am Kerry Emanuel, the Breene M. Kerr Professor of Atmospheric
Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where I have been
on the faculty for almost 30 years. I have taught atmospheric science
and climate physics for nearly 33 years and am a member of the National
Academy of Sciences. I am here today to affirm my profession's
conclusion that human beings are influencing climate and that this
entails certain risks. If we have any regard for the welfare of our
descendents, it is incumbent on us to take seriously the risks that
climate change poses to their future and to confront them openly and
honestly.
By the closing decades of the 19th Century, science had firmly
established that the main constituents of our atmosphere, molecular
nitrogen and oxygen--which together comprise about 97% of the mass of
the atmosphere--are almost completely transparent to solar and
terrestrial radiation. Without the handful of trace gases that do
interact with radiation, notably water vapor, carbon dioxide, and
methane, our planet would be a snowball. Of these so-called greenhouse
gases, water vapor is the most important, but cycles through the
atmosphere on a time scale of roughly two weeks. Its concentration is
highly variable and is controlled mostly by temperature; warming the
atmosphere increases its concentration. The other important greenhouse
gases include carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide. These gases
have atmospheric lifetimes of decades to thousands of years and have
concentrations that are approximately constant over the globe. It is a
remarkable fact that these long-lived gases, though they constitute a
tiny fraction of our atmosphere, make life as we know it possible. I
reiterate that these basic facts of physics and chemistry were
established more than a century ago and are not remotely controversial
among scientists.
Already in 1897 the Swedish chemist Svante Arrhenius predicted that
industrial activity would increase carbon dioxide concentrations and
calculated (by hand) that doubling the concentration would cause global
surface temperatures to rise by 5-6 degrees centigrade. Modern science
projects somewhat lower temperature increases, but Arrhenius's estimate
is remarkably close to modern estimates considering the information and
techniques at his disposal. Today, students at MIT and elsewhere can do
hand calculations or use simple models of radiative and convective heat
transfer to explore climate physics, and they find climate
sensitivities in the same range as those reported in the first National
Academy of Sciences report on anthropogenic climate change in 1979.
Global climate models were first developed in the 1960s and have
advanced rapidly over the past few decades; they are used as tools to
help us understand and predict climate, but it is not the case that
they are the single or even most important tool for these purposes.
Even before the advent of global models, there was enough science to
warrant concern, and already in 1965 President Lyndon Johnson warned
Congress that we were changing the composition of our atmosphere at our
peril.
Understanding of climate physics was such that, by 1950 or so, we
could state with confidence that doubling carbon dioxide concentration
would increase global surface temperatures by just over 1 degree
centigrade if there were no feedbacks in the system. The most important
feedback--increasing water vapor with temperature--serves to amplify
the warming. Other feedbacks involving clouds, aerosols, ocean
currents, and many other attributes of the complex system remain
somewhat uncertain, and when codified in the form of climate models are
the principal sources of the still considerable uncertainty in climate
projections.
Highly accurate measurements of carbon dioxide began in 1958 and
show beyond doubt that concentrations have been increasing from their
pre-industrial value of around 280 parts per million to over 390 parts
per million today. Analysis of gas bubbles trapped in ice cores show
that current levels have not been experienced on our planet for at
least a million years.
It is hardly surprising the doubling the concentration of the most
important long-lived greenhouse gas will lead to noticeable climate
change. Paleoclimate studies inform us that climate change over the
history of our planet has been caused primarily by changing sunlight,
owing to changes in the sun itself and to the earth's orbit around it,
to aerosol particles injected into the atmosphere by volcanoes, and by
changing concentrations of greenhouse gases. For example, increased
levels of greenhouses gases remain the only plausible mechanism for
explaining very warm climates such as that of the Eocene around 50
million years ago, when tropical plants and animals lived near the
North Pole.
Over the past few decades, when solar output, as measured by
satellites, has been decreasing slightly, there is little doubt that
increasing global temperature is attributable to ever more rapidly
increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases. We are undertaking an
enormous experiment, and so far the response of the planet has been
pretty much along the lines predicted more than a century ago.
And yet our understanding of the climate system is far from
perfect. We do not fully understand such issues as the feedback effects
of clouds and the cooling effect that manmade aerosols have on climate.
These uncertainties are reflected in climate projections, which at
present range from benign to catastrophic.
It is in such a scientific environment that our generation
confronts the various risks associated with climate change. These risks
have been well catalogued and endlessly discussed, but let me here
focus on just one: the changing distribution of the supply of water.
One of the more robust consequences of a warming climate is the
progressive concentration of rainfall into less frequent but more
intense events. Dry areas of the world, such as the Middle East, are
expected to become drier, while flash floods should become more
frequent. We are already seeing evidence of these changes in rainfall
data. Reductions in rainfall in semi-arid regions lead to decreasing
agricultural production, which in turn leads to food shortages. The
potential for political destabilization of these regions is large and
is matter of great concern to our Department of Defense, as outlined in
their 2007 report National Security and the Threat of Climate Change.
\1\ To quote directly from that report: Unlike most conventional
security threats that involve a single entity acting in specific ways
and points in time, climate change has the potential to result in
multiple chronic conditions, occurring globally within the same time
frame. Economic and environmental conditions in already fragile areas
will further erode as food production declines, diseases increase,
clean water becomes increasingly scarce, and large populations move in
search of resources. Weakened and failing governments, with an already
thin margin for survival, foster the conditions for internal conflicts,
extremism, and movement toward increased authoritarianism and radical
ideologies. The U.S. may be drawn more frequently into these
situations, either alone or with allies, to help provide stability
before conditions worsen and are exploited by extremists. The U.S. may
also be called upon to undertake stability and reconstruction efforts
once a conflict has begun, to avert further disaster and reconstitute a
stable environment. And, The U.S. and Europe may experience mounting
pressure to accept large numbers of immigrant and refugee populations
as drought increases and food production declines in Latin America and
Africa.
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\1\ Available from the CNA Corporation, 4825 Mark Center Drive,
Alexandria, Virginia, 22311, or http://securityandclimate.cna.org/
report/
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Among the recommendations of this report is one that states that
The U.S. should commit to a stronger national and international role to
help stabilize climate change at levels that will avoid significant
disruption to global security and stability.
In assessing risk, scientists have historically been notably
conservative. It is part of the culture of science to avoid going out
on limbs, preferring to underestimate risk to provoking the charge of
alarmism from our colleagues. A good example is the recent tragic
earthquake and tsunami in Japan. Examination of seismic risk maps
prepared before that earthquake show that the seismologists had
estimated that the magnitude of the largest earthquake that one could
reasonably expect to encounter in the region was about 8.2,
substantially weaker than what actually occurred. For this reason, the
Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power plant was not designed to withstand the
magnitude of earthquake and tsunami that disabled it. In our own
country, the levees that protect New Orleans were designed for storm
surge events somewhat less severe than we now believe are likely there.
And, in the climate arena, summertime arctic sea ice has been declining
somewhat more rapidly than had been projected.
Far from being alarmist, scientists have historically erred on the
side of underestimating risk.
In recognition of the potential importance of manmade climate
change, scientists organized one of the largest efforts ever made to
communicate science to the public and to policy makers. I speak of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, developed under the auspices
of the World Meteorological Organization in 1988. It is strictly a
communications enterprise (it neither performs nor supports research)
and involves large numbers of climate scientists. In my view, the four
assessment reports it has issued so far continue the conservative
tradition in science. For example, in its second report, issued in
1995, fully seven years after climate scientist James Hansen told
Congress he was 99% certain that increasing greenhouse gas
concentrations were causing the earth to warm up, the IPCC said rather
more cautiously that ``The balance of evidence suggests a discernible
human influence on global climate.'' But by the time it issued its most
recent report, in 2007, the large amount of evidence that had
accumulated in the interim forced it to conclude that warming of the
climate system is unequivocal, and that most of the observed increase
in global average temperatures since the mid-20th century is very
likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas
concentrations. The report, which includes the input of more than 1,200
authors and 2,500 scientific expert reviewers, goes on to review the
evidence in great detail, including projections for the next century,
likely risks, and the uncertainties involved. A great many scientists
whom I know personally took time off from their research and devoted
enormous effort to this enterprise whose sole aim is to provide
information to people and their representatives.
In addition to the work of the IPCC, essentially all of the
professional societies around the world that deal in any way with
climate have issued strong statements drawing attention to the risks
associated with anthropogenic climate change.
Now I want to speak to you not only as a scientist but as a
citizen. I am appalled at the energetic campaign of disinformation
being waged in the climate arena. I have watched good, decent, hard-
working scientists savaged and whole fields of scholarship attacked
without merit. Consider as an example the issues surrounding the email
messages stolen from some climate scientists. I know something about
this as I served on a panel appointed by the Royal Society of Great
Britain, under the direction of Lord Oxburgh, to investigate
allegations of scientific misconduct by the scientists working at the
Climate Research Unit of the University of East Anglia. Neither we nor
several other investigative panels found any evidence of misconduct. To
be sure, we confirmed what was by then well known, that a handful of
scientists had exercised poor judgment in constructing a figure for a
non peer-reviewed publication. Rather than omitting the entire record
of a particularly dubious tree-ring-based proxy, the authors of the
figure only omitted that part of it that was provably false. If this
was a conspiracy to deceive, though, it was exceedingly poorly
conceived as anyone with the slightest interest in the subject could
(and did) immediately find the whole proxy record in the peer-reviewed
literature.
The true scandal here is the enormously successful attempt to
elevate this single lapse of judgment on the part of a small number of
scientists into a sweeping condemnation of a whole scholarly endeavor.
When the history of this event is written, the efforts of those seeking
to discredit climate science will be seen for what they are; why many
cannot see it now is a mystery to me.
It falls to our generation to confront a global problem of
potentially enormous implications. There are three aspects of this
problem that make it particularly difficult to deal with:
1. It is global. All countries emit greenhouse gases to varying
degrees, and it is therefore politically very difficult to
regulate such emissions.
2. The risks, while potentially large, are still very
uncertain, and in my view, the level of uncertainty is not
likely to drop anytime soon.
3. While the costs of confronting these risks will fall largely
to our generation, the primary beneficiaries of our actions
will be our children and grandchildren, not us.
In facing this highly difficult problem, reasonable people will
differ in what approaches to take. But citizens have a right to insist
that their representatives confront this complex problem in an open and
honest way. In soliciting advice, we should be highly skeptical of any
expert who claims to be certain of the outcome. I include especially
those scientists who express great confidence that the outcome will be
benign; the evidence before us simply does not warrant such confidence.
Likewise, beware those who deride predictive science in its entirety,
for they are also making a prediction: that we have nothing to worry
about. And above all, do not shoot the messenger, for this is the
coward's way out of openly and honestly confronting the problem.
Finally, let me emphasize what many others have pointed out before:
Those nations that are first to develop sensible technology and
policies to deal with climate change and pollution will likely attain
great economic advantages. The market for clean energy in China alone
is of staggering proportions. Nations that invest in energy research
and in novel ideas in such fields as carbon sequestration and that
foster enterprises that are in a position to sell such technologies to
rapidly developing countries will prosper.
In her past, the U.S. helped the world confront such global
problems as fascism and communism. As a citizen, I hope that my country
will once again rise to the challenge and assume leadership in this
arena too.
Summary of Written Statement of Dr. Kerry Emanuel, Professor of
Atmospheric Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
1. The scientific basis for the existence of significant risks from
anthropogenic climate change is solid and rests on principles
established more than a century ago, as well as on records of the
earth's climate as recorded by instruments and in the geologic record.
2. The conclusions of the scientific community that warming of the
climate system is unequivocal, and that most of the observed increase
in global average temperatures since the mid-20th century is very
likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas
rests on sound scientific research.
3. Historically, scientists have tended to underestimate risk.
4. Notwithstanding any of the above, there is universal agreement
among scientists that current assessments of climate change risk are
highly uncertain.
5. There is no scientific basis for the confidence expressed by
some that the effects of climate change will be benign.
6. In respect to the stolen emails, while there is general
agreement that the preparation of a particular graph by a few
scientists shows poor judgment, there is no evidence for intent to
deceive. Efforts by some to leverage this into a sweeping condemnation
of a whole scholarly endeavor should be seen for what they are.
7. Dealing with the risks entailed in climate change will be
extraordinarily difficult, and reasonable people will differ on
questions of strategy. Citizens will expect their representatives to
confront this issue in an open and honest way; making mascots of
scientific mavericks or shooting the messengers are not rational
options.
8. Nations that are first off the mark in developing new
technologies and policies that address the climate issue, and selling
these technologies to rapidly developing countries, will prosper.
9. We revere our forefathers for making material and mortal
sacrifices for our benefit. One hopes that our descendents will hold us
in similar regard.
Chairman Hall. Thank you. I now recognize Dr. David
Montgomery, an economist, Ph.D., from Harvard, for his
testimony.
STATEMENT OF DR. DAVID MONTGOMERY, ECONOMIST
Dr. Montgomery. Thank you, Chairman Hall, and Ranking
Member Johnson to testify before the Committee. I am not here
to question climate science. I am an economist, and instead
what I intend to discuss are failures in economic analysis that
I believe have led scientists and others to reach entirely
unjustifiable conclusions about public policy.
The economics of climate policy are in fact shaped by
several generally accepted propositions from mainstream climate
science. It is a global phenomenon, driven by global emissions,
so it does not matter where the emissions came from.
Concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere are what
matter, not emissions in a single year, and these
concentrations change very slowly. And stabilizing global
temperatures at any level ultimately requires reducing net
greenhouse gas emissions to zero.
These propositions lead to some important economic
principles. To avoid unnecessary economic harm, policy must
involve comparable efforts by all countries. Mandates for
emission reductions must not get out ahead of technology
readiness, and effective R&D policy is essential.
Now, reducing greenhouse gas emissions will have a cost.
All of the comprehensive economic models used to study past
proposals before this Congress have agreed on this point. Model
results differ about the size of these costs, but the
differences stem from the model's varied assumptions,
particularly those about future technology and about the nature
of the policies that are assumed to be employed. All models
find that the deeper the emission cuts are, the higher is the
cost of making them. Moreover, these costs are not just waiting
a few months for GDP to catch up as EPA officials are fond of
saying. Their loss is every year relative to the standard of
living that would otherwise be achieved, and those costs grow
over time.
We keep hearing that we need emission regulations to create
jobs and new industries. Green jobs claims are simply wrong and
come from studies that only tell half the story. They add up
jobs in producing green energy and ignore what happens to all
the rest of the economy that would face higher energy costs and
an eroded competitive position. This is so obvious to
economists that few have even bothered to comment. Nor will
climate regulations enable a U.S. clean energy industry to
compete more effectively in global markets. Regulations may
create a demand for low-carbon energy, but the evidence is
clear that industries producing that equipment are increasingly
being located in countries that do not bear the cost of
reducing their own emissions.
There are a number of additional ways in which the cost of
policy is intended to reduce greenhouse emissions have been
underestimated in recent studies and their benefits
exaggerated. Two points are very important. Studies that use
current policy baselines ignore the cost of greenhouse gas
policies that were put in place by past legislation, like the
Energy Security Act and the stimulus package when they look at
the cost of, say, a proposal for cap-and-trade regulations. It
is like celebrating how much cheaper a home improvement project
has become because you paid half the bill in advance. You have
to look at the whole thing, unfortunately.
Many of these studies do not model the actual policies
being proposed and instead estimate the much lower cost of
idealized optimal policies, and you are going to face a very
large problem when you hear about estimates of the cost of EPA
regulations because there is no economic model that can really
capture all the distortions that they are going to create in
the economy, and they will probably assume something much more
efficient in coming to you with cost estimates.
Now, there are other practices that underestimate costs
such as widespread use of what many of my colleagues and I call
free lunch assumptions that I cover in my written testimony.
If fears about climate change are correct, curbs on
greenhouse gas emissions will have some benefit, but the harm
to the United States that can be avoided directly by our action
is often greatly exaggerated. I discuss the topic of avoided
damages from climate regulations and how they have been
distorted in my written testimony. Right now I would like to
just make one point, that efforts to reduce our own emissions
would make almost no direct difference to global temperature,
especially if industrial production and associated emissions
are simply exported to other countries.
The Environmental Protection Agency's own modeling of
climate impacts of the Lieberman-Warner bill, using a model
developed at Pacific Northwest Laboratories in the University
of Maryland called Minicamp shows that the Lieberman-Warner
bill which would have had massively expensive economy-wide
effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions would only reduce
global concentrations of greenhouse gases by 12 parts per
million and that is against a target of 550 parts per million.
By itself, the U.S. can't make a difference, and therefore
there will be no benefits to the U.S. of unilateral action, and
there is no sign that China, India and other rapidly
industrializing countries would take actions that would
undermine their economic interests.
Unless we find a more effective approach to international
action that brings them along, U.S. emission reductions are
likely to have costs far greater than their benefits. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member Johnson.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Montgomery follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. W. David Montgomery, Economist
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I am honored by your invitation to testify today. I am an economist
by profession and training and am at this moment an independent
consultant. I will start with a brief word about my qualifications. My
work for the past 20 years has concentrated on economic issues in
climate policy. I have published many papers in peer-reviewed journals
dealing with design and economic impacts of climate policies, and I was
honored by the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists
with their 2004 award for a ``publication of enduring quality'' for my
pioneering work on emission trading. I taught environmental economics
at the California Institute of Technology and economic theory at
Caltech and Stanford University. I was a Principal Lead Author of the
IPCC Second Assessment Reports chapter that dealt with the costs of
climate change policy and until recently I led the group at Charles
River Associates that developed a pioneering set of economic models and
used them in studies of virtually every major proposal for national and
global climate policy. My testimony today will address the Committees
concerns about the economic analysis of climate policy. Needless to
say, these are my own opinions.
I. Summary
Climate change is a global phenomenon driven by global emissions.
Concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere are what matter,
not emissions in a single year, and these concentrations change very
slowly. Stabilizing global temperatures at any level requires
ultimately reducing carbon dioxide emissions from energy use to near
zero. To avoid unnecessary economic harm, policies must involve
comparable efforts by all countries, mandates for emission reductions
must not get out ahead of technology readiness, and effective R&D
policy is essential.
Reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions will have a cost. All the
comprehensive economic models used to study past proposals have agreed
on this point. Model results do differ about the size of these costs,
but the differences stem from the models' varied assumptions about
future technology and the effectiveness of a global emission trading
system. All models also find that the deeper are the emission cuts, the
higher is the cost of making them. Some recent studies that make claims
to the contrary have recently garnered undue public attention, but the
fact remains that regulatory or cap and trade policies will not lead to
a net increase in U.S. jobs, nor will they create conditions for a U.S.
clean energy industry able to compete more effectively in global
markets.
Studies that purport to show that GHG controls will produce these
outcomes make a number of common errors. To be sure, if fears about
climate change are correct, curbs on GHG emissions will have some
benefit. But the harm to the U.S. that can be avoided directly by U.S.
action is often greatly exaggerated. Most of the damage from climate
change will occur in countries without adequate public health systems
and with poor, undernourished and unempowered populations. Four points
are crucial to keep in mind. First, if the U.S. were to act without
solid assurance of comparable efforts by China, India, and other
industrialized countries, its efforts would make almost no difference
to global temperature, especially if industrial production and
associated emissions are simply exported to other countries. Second,
even global action is unlikely to yield U.S. benefits commensurate with
the costs it would incur in making steep GHG emission cuts. Third,
globally, even with moderate emission reductions, benefits would not be
much greater than costs, and, fourth, conflicting economic interests
will make international agreements on mandatory limits unstable.
II. Climate economics is driven by three features of climate change
First, climate change is a global phenomenon driven by global
emissions. A ton of carbon dioxide put in the air by China causes the
same effects on Washington DC as a ton from a power plant in
Alexandria. And China has already surpassed the U.S. as the largest
emitter of carbon dioxide, and together with other rapidly developing
countries will be responsible for the vast majority of emissions over
the next century. Their growth is so rapid that even if the U.S. and
all other industrial countries ceased all greenhouse gas emissions
tomorrow, climate models would still predict global warming to continue
unchecked, after a brief pause.
Second, concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere are
what matter, not emissions in a single year, and these concentrations
change very slowly. Emissions today are harmless to those in the
vicinity of their sources, and matter only because of the consequences
of their slow buildup that are predicted by climate models. Most of the
carbon dioxide released today will still be in the atmosphere 50 years
from now, so that the time scales on which climate policy must operate
are very long.
Third, stabilizing global temperatures at any level requires
reducing carbon dioxide emissions from energy use to near zero. The
smaller the temperature increase society feels is tolerable, the more
rapidly this must happen and the lower emissions must go. Achieving
near-zero emissions is not possible with today's technology; it
requires R&D for and deployment of technologies not known today in
every aspect of energy production and use. \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Martin I. Offer, Ken Caldeira, Gregory Benford, David R.
Criswell, Christopher Green, Howard Herzog, Atul K. Jain, Haroon S.
Kheshgi, Klaus S. Lackner, John S. Lewis, H. Douglas Lightfoot, Wallace
Manheimer, John C. Mankins, Michael E. Mauel, L. John Perkins, Michael
E. Schlesinger, Tyler Volk, and Tom M. L. Wigley (2002). ``Advanced
Technology Paths to Global Climate Stability: Energy for a Greenhouse
Planet,'' Science, 298(5595): 981-987.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These three points have very important implications for the costs
and benefits of U.S. climate policy:
1. Reductions in U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, taken by
themselves, will not noticeablely lessen the impacts of climate
change on the United States. The Energy Information
Administration projects that the U.S. will contribute about 20%
of cumulative global emissions by 2035. \2\ But even if the
U.S. were to succeed in reducing its emissions to 75% of 2007
levels by 2035, that would make only a 3% difference in
cumulative global emissions between now and 2035 and have
virtually no effect on temperature increases. The Kerry-Boxer
bill that was rejected in the last Congress set the ambitious
goals of lowering U.S. emissions to 20% below 2007 levels by
2020 and 50% below by 2035. \3\ Even these ambitious targets
would lead to only about a 7% reduction in cumulative global
emissions over that time period. It is no surprise then that
the EPA Administrator herself has admitted that EPA's proposed
GHG rule will make virtually no difference to global emissions
or impacts on the U.S. Action by the United States cannot
possibly be in U.S. national interest unless it is part of a
larger bargain in which all other major emitters make similar
efforts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ EIA, International Energy Outlook 2010, May 2010, Table A10.
\3\ http://www.nicholas.duke.edu/thegreengrok/waxmanmarkey-vs-
kerryboxer.
2. Achieving reductions in emissions at minimum cost requires
Where, When and How flexibility. Where flexibility means that
on a global and regional scale, emission reductions must occur
where they cost least. A system in which the United States
adopts costly reductions and China does nothing, in addition to
being insufficient to prevent the projected rise in
temperature, is an excessively costly way of achieving whatever
reductions do occur. When flexibility means that targets for
reducing emissions must not get ahead of the availability of
cost-effective technologies for achieving them. How flexibility
means that all sources of emissions must be included so that
all the lower cost opportunities to reduce emissions are used
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
before more costly ones.
3. Achieving near-zero emissions will require a much more
effective program of incentives for R&D into low carbon energy
sources and energy efficiency technologies than has ever been
seen in U.S. energy R&D. I convened a group of the most
distinguished scholars who have studied the economics of R&D at
Stanford two years ago. They produced a set of recommendations
for R&D policy that would focus government funding on a much
more risky program of basic and applied research and leave most
development and all demonstration and deployment to the private
sector: it would use stable and credible incentives to
stimulate private investment in development, demonstration and
deployment. It would also avoid any direct funding of the white
elephant demonstration projects that led to failure of many
past energy R&D activities. \4\ This would require the
Department of Energy to concentrate its funding on high-risk
early-stage R&D and require Congress to eschew the earmarking
and micromanagement that has produced so little result for so
much wasted money on energy technology development and
deployment of costly and immature technologies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Arrow, Kenneth J., Linda R. Cohen, Paul A. David, Robert W.
Hahn, Charles D. Kolstad, Lee L. Lane, W. David Montgomery, Richard R.
Nelson, Roger G. Noll, Anne E. Smith (2008). ``A Statement on the
Appropriate Role for Research and Development in Climate Policy,'' The
Economists' Voice, 6(1): Article 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
III. Common errors that lead to job benefits and deny the existence of
costs
I would like now to discuss a number of areas where I believe that
there are serious problems with studies of the economic costs and
benefits of climate policy. I start with the most questionable studies.
These conclude that, by mandating the premature retirement of electric
generators and increasing the cost of automobiles and most other goods
and services climate policy would create massive numbers of new jobs
and stimulate economic growth. I take as an example a series of studies
by the Political Economy Research Institute on job benefits of climate
policy and other environmental regulations. The most recent of these
was based on studies funded by Exelon Corporation and released last
month by the Center for American Progress and Ceres.
Telling only half the story about jobs
The PERI study and its like only reach their happy conclusions
about economic benefits because they leave out of their calculations
all the jobs lost in the rest of the economy because of environmental
regulations and the costs they impose. In its calculations of the net
jobs created by Clean Air Act regulations that would force retirement
of a large number of coal-fired powerplants, PERI did not even include
the loss in coal mining jobs that would be caused by lower coal demand.
And it completely ignored all the jobs affected in the rest of the
economy by higher energy costs and loss in competitive advantage of
U.S. industries.
Green jobs studies can make these errors because they do not use a
model of the U.S. economy--they simply uses numbers called multipliers
that add to the direct jobs involved in producing pollution control and
generating equipment an estimate of jobs supplying materials used in
that production. If PERI used any comprehensive model of the U.S.
economy, it would be forced to account for where the mandatory spending
on compliance with carbon limits and other environmental regulations
came from.
In previous testimony I described how I used CRAs model of the
electric power sector (that supplied the estimates of investment in
generation used by PERI), but linked it to CRA's broad model of the
entire economy, I found exactly the opposite results from PERI. PERI
calculated an increase of 1.5 million jobs from EPA's utility
regulations but it ignored what happened to investment outside power
generation. EPA's regulations would reduce, not increase, total
macroeconomic investment, by increasing the cost burden on new
investment. The reduction in investment would be about $150 billion
from 2010-2015. If these numbers were used with PERI's multipliers the
result would be net destruction of over 1 million jobs. I am not
espousing either +1.5 million or -1 million jobs as a useful number, my
point is that people would have had jobs doing something else if these
regulations were not put in place, and it would be doing something that
creates more wealth.
Even PERI's calculations of jobs directly associated with
compliance are exaggerated because they assume that 100% of the
required new equipment will be manufactured in the United States. As I
discuss later, there is clear evidence that this is not happening.
The Luddite approach to industrial policy
Studies like PERI explicitly recommend climate and other
environmental regulations because they would favor industries that
employ more employees per dollar of output and would direct investment
away from industries that employ less workers per unit of output. This
is nothing more than the Luddite program to save jobs by breaking up
productivity-enhancing machines.
More output per worker is the major indicator of technical progress
and increasing productivity in the economy. Increasing labor
productivity through capital investment and technology improvement is
what drives economic growth and undergirds our standard of living. The
overall effect of restructuring the economy toward labor intensive
industries and processes can only be to lower output per worker and to
lower average wages.
Indeed, the logic of the PERI report implies that the greater the
unproductive investment caused by a regulation, the greater its
beneficial impact on jobs. If that logic were really valid, rather than
seeking cost effective regulation we should seek out the highest cost
way to achieve environmental goals. The result is absurd because the
`logic' upon which it is based is nonsense.
Believing there is a free lunch in energy efficiency and green
energy
There is a long tradition of ``bottom-up'' studies that do not
examine macroeconomic effects or market responses, but conclude based
on simple engineering models that greater investment in energy
efficiency would produce direct monetary savings in excess of their
costs. My experience with these studies goes back to the early 90s when
a series of studies by the ACEEE, UCS and OTA produced analysis and
conclusions virtually identical to the ``McKinsey Curve'' that has
become so popular in recent years. Despite a series of detailed
criticisms by economists, these conclusions are repeated over and over
again. \5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Adam B. Jaffe and R. N. Stavins. ``Energy-Efficiency
Investments and Public-Policy.'' The Energy Journal 15. 2 (1994): 43-
65. Mark Jaccard and W. David Montgomery ``Costs of Reducing Greenhouse
Gas Emissions in the USA and Canada.'' In Energy Policy, Vol. 24, No.
10. pp. 889-898. October/November 1996.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
All the studies contradict the basic principle that `there is no
free lunch' unless specific market failures or government interventions
distort the incentives that are conveyed by market prices. Unless these
market or government failures exist, the free lunch conclusions imply
that households and businesses are consistently mistaken in a major way
in making choices about energy use that it is in their own economic
interest to get right. And the policy conclusion that energy efficiency
standards, technology mandates, or subsidies are the remedy implies
that government agencies could do a better job of making those
decisions for them.
This has come to be known as the ``conservation paradox:'' simple
engineering studies find that certain energy conservation practices and
technologies should on balance save money while observations of actual
behavior show that those practices and technologies are not adopted.
The technologists' answer is that people are in general wrong or some
hidden and unspecified market failure must exist. The economists'
answer has been that the engineering studies are missing hidden costs,
barriers, or other consequences of adopting more energy efficient
vehicles, appliances, structures, and equipment that matter to people.
Considerable research remains to be done on the conservation
paradox. Stanford's Energy Modeling Forum is conducting a workshop in
which leading bottom up and top down models, including that which I
developed at CRA, are participating. An institute at Stanford
University headed by Professor James Sweeney is conducting behavioral
research. Perhaps the most comprehensive work has been done by my co-
author in the IPCC Mark Jaccard at Simon Fraser University in Canada,
who finds that upon closer examination the claims of net cost energy
savings are almost universally false.
Any claim that a regulation or standard will on balance save money
should be regarded with a high degree of skepticism unless accompanied
by a well researched and peer reviewed demonstration that the specific
action will cure a market failure, and do so without administrative
costs great enough to wipe out the gains. As EPA and Congress move more
and more into regulating greenhouse gas emissions through traditional
command and control regulations and technology mandates and subsidies,
this becomes a critical element of sensible policymaking. And the
gutting of the agencies that provided critical review of regulatory
analysis, such as the OIRA at OMB and OPA at EPA, has just about
eliminated that review in the Executive Branch. \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Randall Lutter and Richard Belzer, EPA Pats Itself on the
Back, Regulation Vol 23, No. 3.
Claiming that climate policy will promote a new clean energy
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
industry in the U.S.
Costly greenhouse gas regulations are not likely to create
industries producing clean energy equipment for export or domestic use.
The experience of the past decade has proven that environmental
standards or clean energy mandates will not create industries in the
United States that will export clean technology to the rest of the
world. To the contrary, the cost of such mandates is borne where they
are imposed, but the equipment may well be produced by workers in other
countries. For instance, in 2008 U.S. wind turbine imports were $2.5
billion and exports were $22 million; less than half the wind turbines
installed in the U.S. in 2007 were manufactured by U.S. companies. \7\
China is becoming the world's largest manufacturer of wind equipment,
\8\ and exporting that technology to the U.S. solar manufacturers,
including some of the technologically advanced, are moving to China to
manufacture the solar arrays. \9\ German experience has been similar;
its huge subsidies for wind energy largely drew electric power from
Denmark where the generation capacity had already been installed. And
now Vestas (Denmark's largest wind producer) recently closed all or
most of its Danish manufacturing, despite the large EU demand for such
technologies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ USITC, Wind Turbines: Industry and Trade Summary, Office of
Industries, Publication ITS-02.
\8\ ``With their government-bestowed blessings, Chinese companies
have flourished and now control almost half of the $45 billion global
market for wind turbines. The biggest of those players are now taking
aim at foreign markets, particularly the United States, where General
Electric has long been the leader.'' Keith Bradsher, New York Times,
Dec 14, 2010.
\9\ Edward L. Glaeser: Why Green Energy Can't Power a Job Engine--
NYTimes.com. http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/18/why-green-
energy-cant-power-a-job-engine/?ref=business.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Economic theory and the experience in Europe and the United States
with renewable energy policies show the effect is the opposite of
stimulus to clean technology industries. Clean energy equipment will be
produced where it is least costly to do so, and domestic policies that
raise energy costs can shift that comparative advantage against the
U.S. Regulations create a demand in the U.S. for that equipment, but
leave it open to all to supply that equipment. At the same time,
environmental regulations increase the cost of doing business in the
U.S. relative to other countries. Thus domestic manufacturers of
mandated equipment and its components are put at a cost disadvantage
relative to competitors located in countries that do not incur the cost
of regulation. The result is to shift the supply chain for pollution
control and electric generation equipment offshore toward less
regulated regions where companies are better able to compete in
producing components for powerplants and pollution controls. The result
is that regulation increases demand for pollution control equipment but
reduces domestic supply.
Even if the goal of industrial policy were accepted, mandatory
reductions on greenhouse gas emissions are the wrong way to go about
it. A study by economist Michael Spence that was discussed in the
Washington Post \10\ confirms this point. Spence points out that what
he calls the tradable sector--which includes manufacturing--has grown
in output but not jobs, while the nontradable sector--principally
government and health care--has provided the job growth. He then
addresses the challenge of how to create U.S. job growth in the
tradable sector--which means policies that improve the productivity of
U.S. workers so that growth in output is not accompanied by increased
outsourcing. Modeling of greenhouse gas regulations that I will discuss
later shows that they increase costs and lower worker productivity,
thus leaving U.S. workers even more vulnerable to competition from
cheaper foreign suppliers. This is not to say that climate policy
should be abandoned, but it does imply that it must be designed
carefully and sparingly because it does make the task of spurring job
growth and income equality more difficult.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Steven Pearlstein, Good for GDP not good for workers,
Washington Post March 13, 2001, G-1.
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IV. Common errors in discussing climate benefits or avoided damages
The most fundamental error is failing to admit how little is known
about the direct causes of damage to human and economic systems that
have been attributed to climate change. Climate models predict various
geophysical consequences of increasing greenhouse gas emissions--change
in global average temperature is the fundamental outcome of interest.
Different models produce increasingly inconsistent results when they
attempt to predict the regional distribution of temperatures or of
other climatic variables such as rainfall. In order to predict effects
on agriculture, the range of disease vectors, or other land related
effects an even finer scale on which the models produce nothing of
value is required, as are many other assumptions about levels of
institutional development, public health systems, and on and on. \11\
Some changes may be beneficial, such as increased growing seasons and
carbon dioxide fertilization in high latitudes, and some are negative,
such as drought or storms in tropical areas. But the range of
possibilities and whether it adds up to a positive or a negative in any
particular region is impossible to predict with confidence. Therefore,
any economic evaluation of damages is equally uncertain.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ See paper by Robert Mendelssohn on impacts of climate change
on land-based activities and comment by David Montgomery in forthcoming
book published by the Lincoln Land Institute.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another, and more intentional distortion, is describing total
effects of climate change rather than damages avoided by actions under
consideration. Many times the argument for action starts by describing
all the potential damaging consequences of temperature increases above
today's level and the costs they would impose, and then uses this image
to support a particular action or proposed legislation that cannot
avoid more than a fraction of that damage. In analyzing any particular
policy the costs of that policy must be compared to the damage it
avoids. It is shocking how rarely this fundamental economic principle
is violated.
Benefits are also overstated by exaggerating fears of health
effects and other damages to the U.S. based on what is only likely to
happen in poor countries without adequate public health infrastructure
and with populations vulnerable due to poverty and poor diet. Concern
about greater prevalence of tropical disease in the United States is
the most egregious example, when the U.S. public health system already
eliminates that risk through vaccination and vector eradication. It is
not because of temperature that malaria stops at the US-Mexican border.
There are a number of other more technical errors that lead to
overestimation of damages. The first is ignoring how individuals and
businesses will adapt to climate change in order to avoid harm. This
error was labeled the ``dumb farmer'' approach in pioneering work by
Robert Mendelsohn of Yale who showed the large reduction in damages
when it is assumed that farmers adapt through changing farming
practices rather than continuing with practices that are more
vulnerable to changes in climate.
Another error is including avoided damages that occur in all the
rest of the world in estimates of the social benefits of greenhouse gas
reductions in the United States. This approach was adopted by the U.S.
government in its guidance for calculating the social cost of carbon
for use in cost-benefit within the U.S. government. It leads to choices
that have significantly higher costs than the benefits they provide in
the United States.
The final error that exaggerates distant benefits relative to near
term costs is the use of low discount rates derived from ethical
arguments rather than economically meaningful discount rates that
represent economic costs of displacing more productive investments with
less productive ones.
V. Common errors that lead to underestimating costs
A review of modeling studies of costs of climate regulations
reveals four common errors that lead to underestimating costs.
The first I call hiding policy interventions in the baseline. This
is particularly a problem because of the incremental approach we have
taken to adopting a climate policy. Fuel economy and renewable fuel
standards were adopted in ACES. Subsidies for renewable technologies
were expanded in the stimulus package. Fuel economy standards have been
tightened again under the Obama administration. Each time this
happened, the EIA included the new regulations in its reference case
and lowered its emission forecast. This means that each time it
analyzed the cost of a cap on greenhouse gas emissions--even when it
had exactly the same provisions as a previous year's proposal--its
costs came down. The prior regulatory programs hidden in the baseline
appeared to be providing emission reductions at no cost. It is only by
stripping out all explicit climate measures from the baseline--even
those put in place in the past--that it is possible to calculate the
full cost of committing to mandatory limits on greenhouse gas
emissions.
A second common practice is assuming more efficient policies than
are actually under consideration. This occurred in the Clinton
Administration when the official estimate of the cost of the Kyoto
Protocol assumed that all countries would participate in unrestricted
emission trading, when under the actual provisions of the Protocol only
industrial countries would do so. I observed the same thing in
estimates in the cost of the Lieberman-Warner bill, when some of EPA's
estimates assumed levels of availability of offsets that were not
possible under the provisions of the law, and when estimates by other
groups were based on earlier, less stringent legislative proposals. It
is necessary to make sure that cost estimates are actually representing
the policies on which a decision is to be made. This is going to be a
major problem in evaluating EPA's proposed greenhouse gas regulations,
because many models are incapable of incorporating the intricacies of
those regulations and will simplify them to be no different from a
carbon tax or cap and trade program.
This leads to a gross underestimate of the full cost of command and
control regulations. The reason in simple terms why command and control
regulations cost more than cap and trade is that they are designed by
bureaucrats who know next to nothing about the circumstances of
individual businesses. Therefore, their orders cannot possibly lead to
the same cost-effective solutions that managers would find for their
own businesses when facing a price on greenhouse gas emissions.
Likewise, no model can incorporate sufficient detail to capture all the
costs imposed by imposing uniform mandates or standards on a highly
diverse population of households and businesses.
Costs are also underestimated in models that assume unproven
``learning curves'' for all green technologies (and no others). EPA's
recent ``Prospective'' cost-benefit of Clean Air Act regulations is a
case in point. A substantial economics literature has arisen
questioning whether the empirical observation that costs of some
complex processes or equipment (semiconductors, airframes, for example)
to decline as cumulative output increases indicates a causal connection
that could be attributed to ``learning.'' Several alternative
explanations are equally compelling and have more support in case
studies of actual R&D processes. These include the hypothesis that cost
reduction comes from a combination of R&D to create new and less costly
processes, followed by a limited period of learning; the likelihood
that learning is specific to the worker, company or establishment and
not able to be transferred to an entire industry, and the fundamental
problem that costs may be falling because of general technology
improvement over time that cannot be accelerated by producing the item
more quickly. \12\ Yet many studies of the cost of climate policies
assume aggressive ``learning curves.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ William D. Nordhaus, The Perils of the Learning Model For
Modeling Endogenous Technological Change. Yale University December 15,
2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, some studies that reach only a single optimistic
conclusion have failed to recognize adequately the uncertainty of
future technologies. For example, the low costs found in some studies
by the EIA are based on a highly questionable premise of the growth of
nuclear generation.
VI. Findings of studies based on broadly accepted models and economic
principles
Before turning to global issues, I would like to present some
findings from broadly accepted models that have been used to estimate
the costs of climate legislation in the United States. I will base
these observations on presentations made at workshop held by the
Electric Power Research Institute in May 2007 to which authors of all
extant studies of the then-pending Lieberman-Warner bill were invited.
This included the Energy Information Administration (EIA), the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO), the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Charles River
Associates (CRA), the American Council for Capital Formation (ACCF) and
the Clean Air Task Force (CATF)
Although the graph that I have reproduced above \13\ of costs per
ton of emission reduction appears to show great diversity in estimates
of impacts, all the models found that there would be costs to adopting
emission controls, and the costs would become larger as deeper cuts are
made in emissions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Tom Wilson, Understanding Model Estimates of the Economic
Costs of Climate Policy EPRI Modeling Workshop, May 8, 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is striking that the variation within a single model due to
different assumptions is far greater than across the economic models.
Looking at 2030, CRA and MIT fall in about the same place on the cost
per ton of emission reductions, EPA spans all the results of other
models save those from ACCF, and EIA's model NEMS which was used by
EIA, ACCF, and CATF spans an even wider range than EPA.
Moreover, the Chair pointed out that ``While there are important
differences in the modeling approaches and models used, much of the
variation in the cost estimates appears to be driven by a handful of
key assumptions, several of which are highlighted here:
Reference case
Most modeling efforts rely on the Energy Information
Administration's Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) to develop their
reference case. In general, models that use an earlier
projection of the baseline (AEO2006 or AEO2007) have to find
more emission reductions to achieve the Lieberman-Warner
targets and have higher costs--everything else equal--than
those using the recent AEO2008 projection . . .
Technology Cost and Deployment
In general, scenarios that limit the use of advanced, low and
non-emitting electricity generation technologies result in
higher costs; those that let them enter freely result in lower
costs. Model results presented at this workshop show dramatic
variations in renewable, coal with CCS and nuclear capacity
additions . . .
Emission Offsets
In general, scenarios that allow for compliance using offsets
(emission reductions that are made outside of an emissions cap)
show a much lower cost than those scenarios without offsets.
Most groups do not model offsets in detail, but rather make
relatively crude assumptions about their cost and quantity.
Several teams did not include any international offsets in
their analyses based upon their interpretation of the bill.
Time Horizon
The EIA's NEMS model runs (used by several groups) extend
through 2030, but most of the other models run through 2050.
Different time horizons can affect compliance behavior (e.g.
banking of extra credits), choice of technology deployments,
and other aspects of model economics.
Discount Rates
The models use discount rates (which define the time preference
for money) ranging from 4 to 7%. This affects the time period
in which emissions reductions are viewed to be most attractive
from an economic point of view, and leads to differences in
total economic cost.'' \14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ http://my.epri.com/portal/
server.pt?open=512&objID=342&&PageID=223366&mode=2&in_hi_userid=2&cached
=true.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
VII. Common errors in dealing with global nature of climate change
I have concentrated on costs of climate policies in the U.S. to the
U.S. Let me say a few words about estimates of global costs and
benefits of climate policy. Studies that avoid the errors and biases
that I have described generally conclude that globally the benefits and
the costs of even modest temperature goals would be of roughly of the
same magnitude--if they could be achieved with perfect where, when and
how flexibility.
But these studies are also overly optimistic, because they ignore
two huge obstacles to achieving where, when and how flexibility:
They ignore the institutional realities that are likely
to prevent most countries from adopting the most cost-effective
policies to reduce missions within their borders, and
They ignore clear evidence that no global agreement on
mandatory emission reductions is likely to be in the national interest
of the countries that must participate for it to be effective.
Excessively costly national policies
Even national governments are complex institutions, and their
workings can frustrate the adoption and enforcement of comprehensive
emission limits or lead to the use of policies that are needlessly
costly. There is good evidence that this will occur in the case of
domestic GHG limits. In a recent study, a colleague and I used two
examples, the United States and China, to illustrate how the systematic
study of institutions and the political economy of choices can expand
understanding of current policy choices and likely future progress in
countries with very different kinds of political and economic
institutions. \15\ This analysis suggests several conclusions:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Lee Lane and David Montgomery (2010), ``Political
Institutions and Greenhouse Gas Controls,'' AEI Center for Regulatory
and Market Studies (Revised August 2010).
There is a strong, systematic and comprehensible
political logic that leads to choice of policies that differ widely
from the economist's ideal of a single price on all greenhouse gas
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
emissions.
In the United States, the most cost-effective approaches,
a carbon tax and cap and trade, were respectively never on the agenda
and defeated in Congress. Instead we appear to be embarking on a
piecemeal approach of command and control regulation through the Clean
Air Act and technology mandates and subsidies through legislation. This
outcome was completely predictable given the history of comprehensive
energy legislation and the nature of legislative institutions.
In China it is likely to be difficult or impossible for
the central government to enforce comprehensive and binding limits on
greenhouse gas emissions; a related finding is that the outcome of
China's adopting a comprehensive cap-and-trade policy is likely to be
very different from that predicted by economic models that assume
costless enforcement and efficient markets.
Impossibility of a single global commitment to mandatory reductions
Globally, the asymmetric distribution of costs and benefits implies
that the national interests of even the most important states that must
agree to a global climate regime are inconsistent with any agreement on
mandatory emission limits. Most studies of the distribution of damages
from climate change conclude that under the most likely scenarios the
greatest harm will occur in poor countries located in tropical regions.
The United States and Europe will suffer little direct harm in relation
to the size of their economies, at least if sensible measures for
adaptation are undertaken. Russia is very likely to benefit from warmer
temperatures. Yet the distribution of present and future emissions is
exactly the opposite. In other word, the countries that would have to
undertake the largest emission reductions gain the least benefits.
China and India are possible exceptions; they have very large emissions
and are also threatened by great potential harm, at least in some
regions.
This pattern of costs and benefits is not a formula for a
successful agreement in which industrial countries make drastic
emission reductions while also covering the cost of emission reductions
and adaptation in poor countries. Only a willingness to incur high
costs for the benefit of the poor countries of the world could motivate
the U.S. to agree to such an outcome, and our current allocation of
resources to aid gives no indication of such willingness. China and
India might well find an agreement in their national interests, but
both are hard bargainers and face their own institutional and political
obstacles to carrying out meaningful reductions in emissions. Far from
receiving compensation and adaptation assistance, poor countries would
have to make payments to the rich in order to make an agreement be in
the national interests of the wealthy countries of the world.
VIII. The net result
1. Even on a global scale, costs and avoided damages are quite
similar.
The global net benefits of even optimal GHG controls appear to be
relatively modest. One recent estimate pegged their present discounted
value at slightly more than $3 trillion over the next two hundred and
fifty years. \16\ Compared to the size of the global economy, this is
not a very big number. Also, controls are certain to be far from
optimal, \17\ and costs could easily exceed benefits. \18\ The rewards
of an agreement on controls may, then, be offer only a weak incentive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ William D. Nordhaus, A Question of Balance: Weighing the
Options on Global Warming Policies, New Haven: Yale University Press,
2008.
\17\ Lee Lane and David Montgomery (2008), ``Political
Institutions and Greenhouse Gas Controls,'' AEI Center for Regulatory
and Market Studies.
\18\ Richard S.J. Tol (2009), ``An Analysis of Mitigation as a
Response to Climate Change,'' Copenhagen Consensus on Climate.
2. No global agreement to keep temperature increase to 2 deg C or less
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
will be stable.
The most comprehensive formal analysis of the resulting outcomes
that I have seen concludes that
``Only coalitions including all large emitting regions are
found to be technically able to meet a concentration
stabilization target below 550 ppm CO2eq by 2100.
Once the free-riding incentives of non-participants are taken
into account, only a ``grand coalition'' including virtually
all regions can be successful. This grand coalition is
profitable as a whole, implying that all countries can gain
from participation provided appropriate transfers are made
across them. However, neither the grand coalition nor smaller
but still environmentally significant coalitions appear to be
stable. This is because the collective welfare surplus from
cooperation is not found to be large enough for transfers to
offset the free-riding incentives of all countries
simultaneously.'' \19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Valentina Bossetti, Carlo Carraro, Enrica De Cian, Romain
Duval, Emanuele Massetti and Massimo Tavoni, ``The Incentives To
Participate In And The Stability Of International Climate Coalitions: A
Game-Theoretic Approach Using The Witch Model, OECD Economics
Department Working Papers No.702.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chairman Hall.
I thank all of you for your testimony, and I once again
remind our Committee and the Members that I would ask you to
limit your questioning to five minutes. I will open with some
questions, and I thank all of you for your good testimony.
This is a group that I have wanted from the beginning. We
have asked for it. We asked for it in letters from the opposite
side and been turned down, and the Ranking Member said I think
in her closing statement that I hope this is not the beginning
and ending of the record on climate science in the 112th
Congress with this hearing. It won't be. We are going to have
others because we want to finally get to those who did indicate
that it was, as you have, that it was bad science and had the
right to question that science and find out those that will
question. We will have that committee at a later time here.
Let me start mine. I don't want to call you doctor if you
are not a doctor. Mr. Glaser, is that right? In your testimony
you discussed the timeline of the issuance of the endangerment
finding, and I appreciate you bringing that up. With respect to
the promulgation of standards for reducing greenhouse gas
emissions for motor vehicles worked out with the White House,
automakers, California state regulators and environmental
groups, you state that the timing of the auto rules suggest
that the endangerment finding was predetermined. Do you want to
enlarge on that a little bit? How often does the EPA change the
direction of its rule-making between the issuance of the
proposed rule and the release of the final rule?
Dr. Glaser. Yeah, I can address that. It happens. In fact,
it has happened very, very recently. One good example of EPA's
substantially changing a regulation in response to public
comments is the so-called boiler MACT rule which is a rule to
address hazardous air pollutant emissions from commercial and
industrial boilers. In that case, EPA made a proposal. They got
very, very significant comments in opposition, and in the final
rule that was just issued, EPA made very significant changes to
the rule, and they say they are going to consider further
changes still.
So the integrity of the public comment period is very
important. The process flaws that I talk about in my testimony
are not technicalities. They are meant to protect the integrity
of the ultimate decision that is reached. So when we have a
situation as we had here, when the Administration came to
office determined to regulate greenhouse gases, through the
Clean Air Act if necessary, and therefore pretty early in the
Administration committed to the motor vehicle regulations for
which the endangerment finding was the necessary predicate, it
undermines the integrity of the process. It undermines the
ability of the public to affect that process with comments and
therefore undermines the integrity of the ultimate decision
reached.
Chairman Hall. I thank you, sir. How does that
predetermination of the final rule affect the usefulness and
the legitimacy of the rule-making process?
Dr. Glaser. Yeah, well, as I said----
Chairman Hall. You touched on that, but I have a couple of
minutes left. I hope you will give us an answer on that.
Dr. Glaser. Yeah, sure. The whole purpose that we have
notice and comment rule-making which EPA undertook for the
endangerment finding is for the public to comment and to be
able to present information and studies and affect what the
ultimate decision would be. Keep in mind that the fundamental
question that EPA was asking when it put the endangerment
finding out for public comment was should we be making this
endangerment finding? Do we have a basis for making this
endangerment finding? There are lots of comments that were
submitted saying no, you should not do that, but it did not
appear to me anyway and to many others that that was an outcome
that was possible. In other words, the EPA would change its
mind and not make an endangerment finding. One way we know this
is that EPA only allowed a 60-day comment period for the
endangerment finding, 60 days to comment on this massive amount
of scientific information. It wasn't enough time. But in my
view, EPA had determined that it wanted to move very quickly on
the underlying regulations which drove the endangerment finding
process forward more quickly than it should have been and
therefore really made it difficult for companies, members of
the public, private institutions, public institutions to make
comments and ultimately to affect the process.
Chairman Hall. I thank you, sir. Dr. Montgomery, if the
United States were to drastically reduce carbon dioxide
emissions, electric utilities would have to rapidly retire
traditional and coal-fired power plants which currently make up
approximately 45 percent of America's current generation mix,
and the EIA anticipates, that is the Energy Information
Administration, anticipates that coal will remain an important
part of our electricity generation producing 43 percent of our
total generation by the year 2035. So considering the EIA
projects, that they project electricity demand will increase in
the United States by 21 percent by 2035, what would be the
repercussion from removing coal, say, from the generation mix?
Dr. Montgomery. Mr. Chairman, removing coal from the
generation mix would impose very large costs and potentially
disruptive effects on electricity markets. It all depends on
how fast it is done and the extent to which technologies such
as carbon capture and sequestration become available and make
it possible actually to continue to use coal through clean-coal
technologies which capture carbon and sequester it. But all of
those technologies are unproven, in the future, at best in an
experimental stage and are themselves subject to a number of
regulatory and environment objections.
We looked just at the retirements--when I was at Charles
River Associates, we looked just at the retirements that would
be associated with EPA's greenhouse gas regulations and
concluded that they would produce very large increases in
electricity costs, maybe something like and I am relying on
memory now, 40 to 50 percent increase in whole electricity
prices over the next ten years or so and quite large impacts on
the standard of living. I remember something on the order of
$500 to $1,000 say loss in income to the average worker.
Chairman Hall. Okay. I thank you. Recognizing that China,
Russia, Mexico, India and on and on are not going to
participate with us financially, and that is a fact, is it not?
Yes or no. Yes?
Dr. Montgomery. Yes, it is. We see very little evidence
that China----
Chairman Hall. And does it surprise you that we spend over
$30 billion just on research with no expectation of any money
from them? So somebody has got to go by the cash register. Now,
you are an economist. There is a cash register in every store
in this town, and there will be a cash register involved here.
And I think they ought to consider that. I think that is your
opinion, isn't it?
Dr. Montgomery. Yes, it is. There will be costs to what we
do.
Chairman Hall. Thank you. I yield back my time. At this
time I recognize Mrs. Johnson for five minutes.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would
like to pose this question to the three physical scientists on
the panel, Dr. Christy, Dr. Muller, and Dr. Emanuel. There
seems to be some attitudes that is an elaborate hoax
orchestrated by the scientific community on global change, and
I don't know that I have heard you argue whether or not there
is global change happening and human activity as a factor.
Instead, it is more of a disagreement over the magnitude of
warming and the degree of which human activity plays a role.
Based on your work, the three of you, do you agree that the
global temperature is rising and will continue to rise and that
greenhouse gas concentrations are at least partly to blame?
Dr. Christy. The global temperature might continue to rise,
it might not, but greenhouse, the extra greenhouse gases we are
putting into the atmosphere are indeed a warming influence. The
question is what are the other gazillion things that affect
global temperature going to do as a result. But greenhouse
gases in and of themselves do exert a warming influence on the
planet.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you.
Dr. Muller. I agree with Dr. Christy. Greenhouse gases do
exert a warming. I believe we are seeing that warming. The
issue in my mind is not whether we are seeing but what is the
degree. Is it something which, if it is at the high end, we
really do need to move very rapidly, although we do have to
engage the other countries because as Dr. Montgomery said, most
of the warming is not going to come from the United States?
Most of the carbon dioxide will come from other countries in
the world.
On the other hand, if the warming is a little bit less, the
models have the ability to account for less. There are unknowns
in the models having to do with cloud cover feedback and water
vapor feedback, and so if the warming is a little bit less than
we thought previously, then we have time to implement some more
long-term solutions that currently some people object to
because they wouldn't work within the next short period of
time.
Dr. Emanuel. I think all three of us are in pretty good
agreement on this point. The planet is warming up. The bulk of
evidence suggests that increasing carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gases have something to do with it, and we are all
in agreement that unfortunately when we try to project forward,
the risks are poorly quantified at this point. And projections
that have been made by modelers range from the benign to the
catastrophic. So the problem for all of us is how do we deal
with the risk that is so uncertainly quantified?
Ms. Johnson. Do you think we have the answers now or do we
need to continue, do the research?
Dr. Muller. I believe that continued research is essential
and should be expanded. You asked about a conspiracy earlier. I
don't believe there is a conspiracy, but I do believe that many
of the scientists who have been involved in this field are so
deeply concerned about what they found that they work as
advocates. And when they work as advocates, there is a danger
that they lose their impartiality. I fear that this is
happening. I fear that the scientists are not trusting the
public enough. They feel they have to make it clear how scared
they are, and they are advocates and no longer scientists. The
bad effect of this is that the public then loses some of its
trust in science, and that is deeply unfortunate. In Berkeley
Earth, our goal is to not have any political views, not to
become advocates, simply do the best job we can on the science.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you.
Dr. Christy. You are asking a scientist if he wants more
research? I will leave that answer there. But I would say this.
One of the things I do is I test climate model output that has
been talked about here, and what we have found is that the
climate model output does not match up to the real world. So I
would say we have many questions out there that do need to be
addressed. And so that is a foundation for more research, yes.
Dr. Emanuel. I would just chime in here that there are
regions of disagreement between observations and models, and
some of those disagreements have shown demonstrably that the
model projections have been too conservative. So once again, I
emphasize that anyone who pretends to a certainty in a benign
outcome is probably kidding himself.
Now, I think of course it is ridiculous that there was ever
a notion that thousands of scientists all over the world would
be engaged in some kind of hoax. It seems to me a hoax itself
that that kind of statement ever got made. I don't understand
that.
I want to say one thing about the IPCC because I have a
sense of widespread misperception, probably not among the panel
but perhaps among the Members. It is not a research
organization. It does not conduct research, it doesn't fund
research. It was set up I think in response to requests from
broad segments of the public as a communications exercise
between scientists and the public. One can certainly claim that
it hasn't been perfect in this regard, but that is what it is.
And so when people say you shouldn't trust IPCC research,
you are not actually speaking about that body correctly.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much. My time has expired, but
I think we can finally say that global warming is happening.
The details of it and the various ranges of concern and opinion
will rest with continual research.
Chairman Hall. The Chair at this time recognizes Mr.
Sensenbrenner, Vice Chairman of this Committee, for five
minutes.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
want to have a few questions for Dr. Emanuel, but as a
predicate, you know, let me say that I think that the
scientific community has wrapped itself too tightly around the
axel rod of the fatally flawed Kyoto Protocol which let 134
countries off the hook, and we are seeing, you know, huge
increases in emissions from countries like China and India, and
as a result with draconian increases in the cost of energy,
this is no longer an environmental debate but it is a debate on
jobs and economics and who wins and who loses in jobs and
economics.
Now, Dr. Emanuel, on December 10 of 2009 which was a couple
of weeks after the release of the emails, you were at a forum
at MIT which you kind of had very advocacy comments on that.
And about three months afterwards, you were appointed to the
Oxborough Panel which was supposed to look into the
circumstances around the emails and the release of the emails
from the Climate Research Unit at the University of East
Anglia. And you know, I question the objectivity of that panel,
but since you were a member of it, I want to ask you five
questions about seriatim, and if the answer is yes to any of
them, please let us know. If the answer is no to all of them,
let us know.
The first question is does the panel have any written terms
of reference and if so, what were those terms? Did the panel
issue a call for reference? Did they hold any public hearings?
Did the panel interview any of the critics of the Climate
Research Unit's scientific work, and were the panel interviews
with CRU staff recorded and released? Now, are any of those
questions to be answered yes?
Dr. Emanuel. I must confess, I couldn't write them down
fast enough.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Okay. Would you like me to repeat?
Dr. Emanuel. But let me say, because I was on the panel, we
did have clear terms of reference. That much I can tell you. We
did write a report whose release was public, and let me say
that the scope of that panel was very narrowly defined. As I am
sure you are aware, there were several panels----
Mr. Sensenbrenner. If I may interrupt you, the question
that I asked was not whether the report was released but were
any of the panel interviews with CRU staff recorded and
released?
Dr. Emanuel. No, I don't believe so.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Okay. Go ahead.
Dr. Emanuel. I was going to simply say that our objective
we were told was to determine whether there had been any sort
of breach of scientific integrity in this particular unit, CRU.
It wasn't a comprehensive review of the quality of the science,
anything like that. It was a very narrowly defined objective.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Okay. Well, this has called into
question the quality of the science and whether the scientific
community put the wagons in a rather tight circle, and I have a
press release from the British Parliament, and there is a Labor
Party MP named Graham Stringer who said Oxborough didn't go as
far as I expected. The Oxborough report looks more like a
whitewash. And then I go back to the fact that Lord Oxborough
is the Vice-Chairman of an environmental group called Globe
International, the CEO of carbon capture and storage and
Chairman of Falk Renewable Enterprise. All of them are advocacy
groups. Two of them have the potential of making a lot of money
if all of this is implemented. And isn't that a conflict of
interest?
Dr. Emanuel. All I can say in response to that is that as
part of this commission which involved some very gifted
scientists who have no ax to grind at all in this climate
debate, the papers we read, the interviews we conducted showed
that the entire enterprise was one of great integrity.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Well, that is not what the Labor Party
MP says, Mr. Stringer, and he is a Member of the Select
Committee on Science and Technology and has a Ph.D. in
chemistry. He said it was a whitewash, and here the chairman of
this group ends up, I think, having a very clear conflict of
interest, you know. I can tell you that if the President or the
Congress appointed somebody with those types of conflicts to
head an investigation over something that has cropped up, I
think that that chairman would get drummed out of office
because of the conflict of interest. You know, I don't know how
we can believe the report of the commission that you were on
simply because there was no real sunshine in on the process.
There wasn't any public hearings, they didn't interview any
critics of their scientific work, and the interviews with the
CR staff were neither recorded nor released. Now, you know, we
are just saying that you who have been an advocate, witness
your comments at MIT, should state that the commission that you
were on is objective. And I don't think anybody who wants to be
fair-minded of this can buy it.
My time is up and I yield it back.
Chairman Hall. Thank the gentleman. The Chair recognizes
Mr. Miller, the gentleman from North Carolina for five minutes.
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to begin
by moving into the record a paper that comes from Professor
Armstrong's website on predicting elections from politicians'
faces. It concludes that surveys of voters taken a year out
before an election are predictive of how elections will come
out based upon voters' snap judgments of the competency of the
politicians' faces. It appears to forecast that Hillary Clinton
will run away with the 2008 presidential nomination and that
the Republican nomination will be a dead heat between John
McCain and Duncan Hunter.
I would now move this into the record.
Chairman Hall. Let me ask, did my staff have an opportunity
to review it? Staff hadn't had an opportunity to review it, so
I reserve the right to object to the inclusion.--
Mr. Miller. I really don't think----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Quick question at this point about the
relevancy----
Mr. Miller. I don't have time.
Mr. Rohrabacher. --of what you have just put into the
record?
Chairman Hall. It is not in the record.
Mr. Rohrabacher. It is not? Thank you.
Mr. Miller. Mr. Glaser, your testimony is the most peculiar
testimony I have ever heard before a Congressional Committee.
You know, if you went to the Player's Retreat, a bar in
Raleigh, tonight you can find a set of lawyers who are sharing
a pitcher or two and complaining about the rulings that judges
made against him the previous week, and they would say, you
know, he didn't even listen, he had his mind made up, and on
and on. But I have never really heard testimony by a lawyer
before a Congressional Committee to that effect.
Now, you take some pains to say both in your written
testimony and in your oral testimony that you are offering your
own personal opinions in your testimony here, that you are
offering your personal opinions about the very same matters
about which you have appeared as an attorney. Now, it is
unethical for a lawyer to offer their own personal opinions in
any matter in which they represent a client? Isn't that
correct? I have heard judges admonish lawyers from the bench
when they say Your Honor, I think. The judge will say, counsel,
you are not here to tell me what you think. You are here to
tell me your clients' position. That is correct, right?
Dr. Glaser. Not in front of this body, sir.
Mr. Miller. No, it is not in front of this body, but in
front of this body you are saying now these are your personal
opinions. I don't think many clients would really like their
attorney going out and saying here is how I disagree with my
client. Is there any point on which you disagree with your
client?
Dr. Glaser. In what respect, sir?
Mr. Miller. Well, I mean, in any respect. I mean, you have
offered us as your testimony today what is clearly a lightly
edited version of a brief you wrote on behalf of your clients.
But while you are saying to a court or to the EPA in a rule-
making matter that that is your client's opinion, you are now
saying it is also your personal opinions. So is there any way
in which your personal opinion that you offer here today
differs from the opinions of your clients on facts or on law?
Dr. Glaser. You know----
Mr. Miller. I take that as no, isn't it?
Dr. Glaser. Wait. You know what? I don't know the answer to
that question because I have not reviewed the testimony in
detail with all of my clients. I can tell you I hope they
don't, sure.
Mr. Miller. Well, you have submitted to this Committee
filings that you have made with EPA and with the court.
Dr. Glaser. Yeah, I did----
Mr. Miller. As part of your testimony to us.
Dr. Glaser. I did submit an attachment that I thought would
be valuable. That of course is a public document that was
filed, and so I did submit it. The Committee of course is free
to review the record----
Mr. Miller. Okay.
Dr. Glaser. --and then----
Mr. Miller. Certainly I will have to look at it.
Chairman Hall. Don't interrupt. Just let him repeat and
answer your question, please.
Mr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, I have never heard that as the
rule. The rule has been that it is my time and that I get to
control my time. And if a witness is filibustering, I can cut
them off so that I can get answers.
Chairman Hall. All I am asking you to do is to be fair with
these people who have given a lot of time.
Mr. Miller. I will try to be fair----
Mr. Miller. I will try to be polite----
Chairman Hall. Just be fair with them is all I ask of you.
That is not asking too much, is it?
Mr. Miller. No. So----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Chairman, I would move that we give
our colleague an extra minute.
Chairman Hall. I will give him extra five minutes because
he is just getting more and more in trouble all the time.
Mr. Miller. So Mr. Glaser, you have not convinced the EPA
of the correctness of your position? You have not yet convinced
the court of the correctness of your client's position but you
have convinced yourself of the correctness of your position?
Dr. Glaser. Yes, we will be bringing this to the court. I
had been asked to come here and testify about the process under
which the endangerment finding----
Mr. Miller. Okay.
Dr. Glaser. --was prepared. I have done so, sir.
Mr. Miller. All right. And how much then have you or your
law firm been paid by your clients for appearing on their
behalf before the EPA and in litigation?
Dr. Glaser. Sir, I cannot disclose confidential
communications between myself and my client.
Mr. Miller. Including how much they paid you?
Dr. Glaser. Absolutely. I hope that you can appreciate
that, that I cannot breach attorney/client privilege.
Mr. Miller. You have said, you have told this Committee,
that obviously we should think poorly of the EPA. They really
didn't listen to your arguments. They didn't follow the law.
They violated the law, on and on. If the court doesn't hold for
you, if the court also disagrees with you, what should we think
of the court?
Dr. Glaser. I think that you should first of all wait and
see what the court says, number one, but number two, I am
offering my opinions here both on law and on proper
administrative policy. You could say for instance is it a
violation of law for EPA to have only allowed a 60-day comment
period. You could differ on that. The court might say, okay, 60
days. That is enough. Is that good policy? Is that good
administrative policy? My recommendation would be no. That is
not good administrative policy.
Mr. Miller. I mean you seem to have or it is odd that you
were asked to testify with respect to a matter pending before
the courts and to give basically a legal argument, the same
legal argument that you made before the courts, but one obvious
difference between appearing before this Committee and
appearing before the court is before the court there will be
more than one argument. There will be another lawyer there
representing the other point of view, isn't that right?
Dr. Glaser. Certainly before the court there will be
multiple points of view expressed. You do have to understand
that the cases that you are talking about in court have been
challenged. EPA's regulations have been challenged by a very
large segment of the business community. There are states' pros
and con, there is EPA on one side, there are interveners. The
court will definitely hear a variety of arguments. I can't
dispute that.
Mr. Miller. All right. And another important distinction is
before courts, you will be appearing before a neutral judge
with no interest, not before politicians who have received
large campaign contributions from your clients?
Dr. Glaser. I am going to dispute that last part, but I
would agree with you that there are definitely differences
between the legislature and the judiciary. No question.
Mr. Miller. Okay. Mr. Chairman, it appears I do not have
any time, but if I do, I will yield it back.
Chairman Hall. Thank you. The Chair at this time recognizes
Mr. Bartlett, the gentleman from Maryland, for five minutes.
Mr. Bartlett. By way of full disclosure, I would like to
note that I think the EPA frequently makes erroneous
assumptions which lead to wildly excessive regulations.
I think that it is probably not easy to increase greenhouse
gases without increasing general air pollution, and I am having
some trouble understanding why everybody wouldn't like to be
breathing cleaner air.
I gather that most of those who are opposed to the case for
global warming or climate change would simply like to continue
our aggressive exploration and use of fossil fuels. There are
three groups that have common cause and the solution that those
who are concerned about global warming or climate change have.
Of course, the solution to their problem is stop using so many
greenhouse gases that emit CO2 and start using
alternatives. There are two other groups that have common cause
in this. They have very different problems with exactly the
same solution. One of those groups is those that are concerned
about our national security. We have only two percent of the
world's oil. We use 25 percent of the world's oil. We import
about 2/3 of that and much of that from countries that don't
like us a whole lot. The solution to that problem, of course,
only one solution to it, that is either find more oil here, and
we have been producing less and less oil every year since 1970,
so that isn't going to happen in any meaningful terms here, or
to move to alternatives. So this group has exactly the same
solution to their very different problem.
The third group is a group that recognizes that fossil
fuels are finite. By the way, the first person I think to
recognize that, probably the first person to recognize that was
M. King Hubbard in 1956 who predicted that in 1970 the United
States would reach its maximum oil production. We did that
right on schedule, and in spite of drilling more oil wells than
all the rest of the world put together, today we produce half
the oil that we did in 1970. And by 1980 we knew that that had
happened because looking back in 1980 we could see we were
already over the other side of Hubbard's hypothesis.
I cannot understand how rational people could just stand by
and not conclude that if the United States reached its maximum
oil production in 1970 that someday the world was going to
reach its maximum oil production. That is a given. The only
uncertainty is when would the world reach its maximum oil
production, and that is a question that was not asked.
There is now abundant evidence that the world has reached
its maximum ability to produce oil on a daily basis at about
84, 85 million barrels a day. Obviously, the solution to that
problem is to move away from fossil fuels which just aren't
going to be there in the future and to move to alternatives.
So we have these three groups, very different problems.
Common interest, same solution. Move away from fossil fuels to
renewables. Why aren't these three groups locking arms and
marching forward? Why are we sitting here today with many of us
concerned about national security? A few of us--concerned about
peak oil. Why are we here criticizing the premise of others?
They may be dead wrong. It is irrelevant to me whether the
global warming climate change people are right or wrong because
the solution to their problem is exactly the right solution to
two other very real problems. One of those is the national
security problem. We have got to move away from fossil fuels in
our country. They just aren't there. And the other is the peak
oil people who understand that the energy just isn't going to
be there.
By the way, I led a codel of people. Nine of us went to
China just a bit over four years ago to talk about energy. They
began their discussion of energy by talking about post-oil, and
they had a five-point plan. And that fifth point in that five-
point plan was international cooperation. They knew as many of
you noted that we can't do it alone. Well, they plead for
international cooperation. They planned it as if there won't be
any.
Very little time remaining. Sir, I would like your
comments. And you know, why am I wrong?
Dr. Montgomery. Thank you, Mr. Bartlett. I remember
appearing before this Committee a couple of years ago, and I
enjoyed an interchange with you, and I am looking forward to it
again.
I think the main place that I would disagree with you is
they are not the same solutions. Climate change in the near
term, if this body decided it wanted to make a serious
reduction in U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, to be cost-
effective, that would have to be occurring as Mr. Hall
suggested by reducing the amount of coal that is used for
electricity generation. The substitute for that is likely to be
natural gas which is itself to some extent produced
domestically but is also something that we import.
A cost-effective solution for climate change has next to
nothing to do with our consumption of oil. So it is different.
Mr. Bartlett. I think I talked about fossil fuels
generally. Oil we have been following more precisely. Gas is
finite, sir. That, too, will run out. So does coal.
Dr. Montgomery. So there are three problems. The problem of
climate change needs to be addressed over a longer term period
with R&D and it really, largely involves getting off coal for
power generation. That doesn't help with the national security
part. The national security part, you are right, we need to
produce more. We need to use Canadian oil, and we need to deal
with the regulations like low carbon fuel standards that could
prevent us from using an oil deposit that is larger than Saudi
Arabia's and is sitting right north of us. We might think about
a gasoline tax to discourage consumption. But peak oil is a
problem that the market will take care of.
So the problem is there are different solutions to all
these real problems.
Mr. Bartlett. Just in closing, Mr. Chairman, the market
will not take care of peak oil. Remember I said it here.
Chairman Hall. Make a note of that. Mr. McNerney, the
gentleman from California for five minutes.
Mr. McNerney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I personally
want to thank the witnesses for coming today. It is a
contentious issue, so it is good to have this interchange.
There is going to be some moments, but I appreciate your
attendance here this morning and your testimony.
Dr. Christy, do you deny that the IPCC process is open and
transparent?
Dr. Christy. I would say the IPCC is not open and
transparent as the experience, as a lead author and what went
on behind my back as a lead author in that very chapter.
Mr. McNerney. Well, there were two major reviews, including
your comments in the 2007 report. So that doesn't agree with
what you are saying.
Dr. Christy. There is confusion here about what peer review
is and what IPCC is. The lead authors of the IPCC have what is
called review authority. They review their own material.
Mr. McNerney. So there were no outside reviews of the IPCC?
Dr. Christy. There were outside reviews, but remember,
after that, there were further edits by the lead authors.
Mr. McNerney. So in previous Congressional hearings, you
have discussed your processing codes for generating satellite
based estimates of tropospheric temperature change but when
asked if you had made your codes freely available for scrutiny
by other scientists, you said it was too complicated for other
scientists to understand. Is that still the case?
Dr. Christy. No, in fact we are releasing--we already
released some of the code to the National Climatic Data Center,
and by June they will have all the parts. There are about ten
parts, many thousands of lines of codes that they don't
understand. And so we are in the process of----
Mr. McNerney. I have been a computer modeler, computer
forecaster. I know what is involved. But it is very important
that your code be available for others to examine. And so right
now today you are saying that your code is going to be
available and freely transparent for other scientists to
examine?
Dr. Christy. Yes.
Mr. McNerney. Good. Now, you said that the data was
fraudulently included in IPCC reports. I just heard you say
that this morning. Do you still believe that?
Dr. Christy. I don't believe I said fraudulently.
Mr. McNerney. You said fraudulently. I heard you say it
this morning. Fraudulent. I wrote it down. I was shocked that
you said that.
Dr. Christy. I will have to look at my testimony. I don't
remember typing----
Mr. McNerney. It is not in your written testimony, it is in
your verbal testimony.
Dr. Christy. Right. I have that right here. Referring to
which part because I don't remember saying anything like that.
Mr. McNerney. Well, your conclusion was that there is
fraudulent data in the reports. That is what I heard you say
this morning.
Dr. Christy. What I said this morning was biased, false,
overconfident and/or misleading.
Mr. McNerney. That was one statement, and you said another
statement and you included fraudulent.
Dr. Christy. Well, okay. We can look at the tape on that
but----
Mr. McNerney. All right. I am going to----
Dr. Christy. --if you have a question----
Mr. McNerney. --move on here.
Dr. Christy. --about the particular thing I was talking
about, I would be happy to answer it.
Mr. McNerney. Well, I am going to move on. Mr. Montgomery,
or Dr. Montgomery, excuse me, you criticized studies suggesting
that forward-thinking climate policies will create jobs
suggesting that the studies are the product of a biased group.
But it is well-documented that large oil companies spent
massive amounts funding the studies that question climate
science. Now isn't it true that you served as an expert
eyewitness on behalf of Exxon Mobil and which according to one
well-known report spent $16 million funding initiatives to
spark doubt on climate science?
Dr. Montgomery. I can't quite put that together, but I have
testified as an expert witness on entirely unrelated issues
about market shares in regard to other--sorry. I have testified
as an expert witness on behalf of Exxon Mobil on entirely
unrelated cases that have absolutely nothing to do with my
opinions here, nor have I stated in, and I think I probably
should have done as Mr. Glaser pointed out, that I am appearing
today on my own behalf. I am not being compensated by anyone
for this testimony. I have my----
Mr. McNerney. Okay. Well, I----
Dr. Montgomery. --own opinions, and I don't expect to be
paid attention to here because of who I represent. I expected
to because of the logic of the arguments that I present.
Mr. McNerney. You said that there is no benefit to the U.S.
for taking action on climate change.
Dr. Montgomery. I believe that that is a conclusion that I
am----
Mr. McNerney. No----
Dr. Montgomery. --perfectly happy to discuss with you at
greater length. The point of that is that----
Mr. McNerney. My personal experience----
Dr. Montgomery. --what the U.S. will do----
Mr. McNerney. --contradicts that because I have worked in
the wind energy field. We created technology here in these
United States, and it went to Germany because they had climate
policies that encouraged local utility companies to buy those
wind turbines. We are now buying their manufactured products,
manufactured by Germans, we are buying that product in the
United States. So no, I disagree with you.
Dr. Montgomery. And you were doing exactly what I described
in my testimony. You were telling precisely half the story. You
are not looking at what the people who were producing those
wind turbines would have been doing if there were not a
renewable portfolio standard that put them to work producing
equipment that is a more expensive way of producing electricity
than the alternative. They would have been producing other
things which would have led to a higher level of GDP and no
difference in employment. That is an economic argument. I am
perfectly happy to carry it out, but it has nothing to do with
whether Exxon funds bad science. It is an argument about
economics, and it is an argument about facts and data, not
about who pays for what.
Mr. McNerney. Well, I know that research money that was
spent in these United States is now developing products, is now
manufacturing products in Germany because they had policies
that encouraged them to buy wind power and green power so----
Dr. Montgomery. Actually, what is happening is exactly what
I described in my testimony. The United States is creating a
demand for renewable energy, but actually China is producing it
because they are subsidizing their industries, and that is so
well-documented that we filed a 301(b) case against them.
Mr. McNerney. Right, and they are going to be importing
their product to us as well.
Dr. Montgomery. Yeah. They are going to be exporting it to
us, but they are going to be exporting it to us because we have
regulations that force people to use it and we have higher
costs of producing it than they do.
Mr. McNerney. Well, I guess my time is up.
Chairman Hall. Final question you want to close with.
Mr. McNerney. Mr. Chairman, I don't even know where to
begin with my next question, so----
Chairman Hall. All right. Well, thank you, Mr. McNerney.
The Chair at this time recognizes Dr. Broun, gentleman from
Georgia.
Mr. Broun. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will direct my
questions to Dr. Christy, but I am from Georgia, and if the
others on the panel want an interpreter, I am sure the
Committee will be glad to provide you an interpreter. Dr.
Christy, in your testimony you speak in great lengths about
process issues associated with climate science in general, the
processes used by some at the University of East Anglia's
Climate Research Unit and the IPCC as a whole. As a scientist
who actually builds data sets, and as someone who has witnessed
what you call ``my side bias'' or ``groupthink'', would you
trust data from individuals trying to ``hide the decline'',
refine peer review when inconvenient and destroy documents,
rather than comply with the law?
Dr. Christy. I wouldn't, but I would say that because the
process has become more open that I think those doing these
data sets now are a little bit more concerned about the fact
that they will be exposed if they do make any mistakes.
Mr. Broun. I hope so. We have seen all those e-mails, but
several relating to the state of the unlined computer code
haven't received as much attention. The desperate e-mails of a
computer programmer offer us a glimpse into the data control
issues at CRU with quotes such as, ``What the hell is supposed
to happen here? Oh, yeah? There is no 'supposed'. I can make it
up, so I have.'' Another quote, ``You can't imagine what this
has cost me, to actually allow an operator to sign false WMO
codes. Well, what else is there in such situations? Especially
when dealing with a master database of dubious prominence.''
The next quote, ``Oh''--F-bomb--that is not what it says here.
''Oh, F this. It is Sunday evening. I worked all weekend, and
just when I thought it was done, I am hitting yet another
problem that is based on the hopeless state of our databases.''
Next quote, ``This whole project is such a mess.''
In his testimony, Dr. Emanuel states that all of this is
nonsense, just as he did before any review was actually
conducted. Does any review of the Climategate issue actually
address the underlying science?
Dr. Christy. Well, I think the exoneration panels that have
occurred have not addressed the underlying science, nor the
actions of the people there. You don't have the typical things
you do in the legal proceedings, where you cross-examine the
evidence and witnesses, and anyone can be called to testify,
and so on. That has not occurred. Your description of those
computer--as a programmer myself who has written thousands and
thousands of lines of code on these very kind of station
records, and Dr. Muller probably understands this too, is that
it is a nightmare looking through data coming from different
countries in different formats, and mistakes that are made.
Fahrenheit, Centigrade, missing 100 or something like that, it
is really problematic.
Mr. Broun. So it is all a mess, obviously. Has any re-do--
review of the Climategate issue addressed the entirety of the
allegations that were raised?
Dr. Christy. Well, not in my opinion. I think much more
could be done, but hopefully the peer review literature, as we
go along, will just make that unnecessary. I hope we just get
to the point we can trust what we publish these days.
Mr. Broun. As a scientist myself, I hope so too. Do you
believe an independent review of these allegations is
warranted?
Dr. Christy. I would rather see just an independent
assessment of climate, as the IPCC has done, but without the
IPCC cadre, the establishment. I think you could have a very
reputable and credible report that would come to slight--
somewhat different conclusions than the IPCC has.
Mr. Broun. Well, as a scientist, again, I hope we do that.
To the best of your knowledge, has the IPCC adopted all of the
recommendations from the IAC review conducted last summer?
Dr. Christy. Well, obviously not, because the first thing
they recommended was that the head leave, and he is still the
head. So, starting from there, they have not.
Mr. Broun. Very good. I have just a half minute left. Dr.
Emanuel, it should be noted that MIT received 100 million from
the Cokes for Cancer Research Institute. MIT is a prestigious
organization, with a world class reputation in science, but
according to logic we are witnessing here today, its research
should be dismissed because it receives any funding from the
organization that the party dislikes. Would you agree with
that? What are you asking me?
Mr. Broun. I am asking about--have you all--have you
received funding----
Dr. Emanuel. Yes. MIT has, yes. I don't, of course, do
cancer research, but I am well aware of what you are saying.
Mr. Broun. So, in other words, the--calling in question
people who have--entities that have received funding, seems
that some would call their testimony in question today, and I
just wanted to point out that you all have too. Thank you very
much. My time has expired. I will yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Hall. Thanks, Doctor. This time i recognize Mrs.
Edwards from Maryland. Recognized for five minutes.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. What a shock, I
thought I wasn't quite up yet. I just want to clarify for the
record that I have here, and we have entered these into the
record before, Mr. Chairman, seven scientific, you know,
independent reports that have evaluated this question of--and
some describe Climategate e-mails that have really exonerated
the--these individuals in question, in terms of their research
and research capacity. And I just think that we need to get off
of this and really get down to the real questions in front of
us.
I just want to be clear, and each of you can as--answer
this individually. I want to be clear whether any of you have
been paid or compensated for any of your research, analyses,
testimony or a speech in any form, at any entity, by a company
or trade association that is represented by the oil, coal or
energy industry? Dr. Armstrong? That is a yes or no.
Dr. Armstrong. Well, I received $3,000 from the State of
Alaska for a report, but that did not result in a published
paper.
Ms. Edwards. I asked about the industry, not a State
government.
Dr. Armstrong. Yeah. No, ----
Ms. Edwards. I didn't----
Dr. Armstrong. --my way down here.
Ms. Edwards. Thanks so much.
Dr. Armstrong. I have had no----
Ms. Edwards. Dr. Muller?
Dr. Muller. Yes.
Ms. Edwards. And who paid you, and how much?
Dr. Muller. I am sorry, I don't have those figures
available----
Ms. Edwards. Who paid you?
Dr. Muller. I have been a consultant for BP. I have done a
lot of work with--does the U.S. Department of Energy count?
They have given me a lot of funding.
Ms. Edwards. Company, trade association, with the industry.
With the oil, coal or energy industry.
Dr. Muller. I believe--it is really hard to pull this out
without----
Ms. Edwards. Okay. Please----
Dr. Muller. --anticipating----
Ms. Edwards. --submit for the--please submit for our record
any compensation that you have received from the oil, coal or
energy industry for the work that you do. Thanks so much----
Dr. Muller. I believe----
Ms. Edwards. --Dr.----
Dr. Muller. I believe it was only BP, and that was----
Ms. Edwards. Just submit it for the record. Dr. Christy?
Chairman Hall. Ma'am, please, let him answer, please.
Ms. Edwards. He----
Chairman Hall. Go ahead----
Ms. Edwards. He can't pull it out of his head, and I would
like it for the record. And that is true, if you can't just
remember it, I would appreciate it if you could submit it for
the record. Dr. Christy?
Dr. Christy. No.
Ms. Edwards. Mr. Glaser?
Dr. Glaser. As an attorney, I have represented and been
compensated by energy industry companies.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you.
Dr. Glaser. That is a fact.
Ms. Edwards. Dr. Emanuel?
Dr. Emanuel. No.
Ms. Edwards. Dr. Montgomery?
Dr. Montgomery. As an individual, I cannot remember ever
being compensated directly. Of course, I have made my living
for 20 years as a consultant doing a very large number of
things, and my company had as clients just about every company
in the United--in--just about every large company in the United
States, including energy----
Ms. Edwards. Great. I would appreciate if you would submit
that for our record, your compensation from representatives,
trade associations or corporations associated with the oil,
coal or energy industry. Thank you very much.
Dr. Montgomery. May I----
Ms. Edwards. Let me just----
Dr. Montgomery. --question? I believe what I said was I
have received no direct compensation. My company's record--the
company's records, I am no longer an employee there, and I have
absolutely no way of providing you with information about what
Charles River Associates received over the years, and I am sure
they would object to it in any event. But I cannot do that.
Ms. Edwards. And you haven't received any compensation as a
consultant for any of those in the industry?
Dr. Montgomery. My salary is paid by Charles River
Associates--was paid by Charles River Associates, and I have
not received direct compensation as an individual from anyone
except Charles River Associates for about 20 years.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you very much. Just as my time is
running out, I think that in any field of science there is
continual study of science. We see breakthroughs, we see
setbacks. There is an evaluation process that goes forward, and
we never stop asking questions, because that is the nature of
science, and so I think we have to be willing to change. Change
policy, change direction, continue that kind of analysis,
because you never quite get to an end--to the end to it. We
look at those things all the time here on this Committee.
I represent a district where the county that I live in is
the home to NASA Goddard and also to NOAA. They have--they play
an extreme--a really important role in the analysis and use of
climate research, and it is important to me that--and should be
important to people here that we keep this investment in the
field of climate research in our monitoring capacity and
satellite capabilities and research abilities, because
otherwise--I share the view of my colleague from Maryland, Dr.
Bartlett, that we are never going to solve these big problems
by just burying our heads in the sand. And just as I close
here, for the scientists who are on the panel, Doctors Muller,
Christy, and Emanuel, I hope that you would agree that we need
to continue investment in climate research, even though you
might quibble about whether your minority view was included in
a particular evaluation or assessment. And with that, I yield.
Chairman Hall. Gentlelady does a good job of representing
her district. She went right exactly five minutes. Dr.
Armstrong, did you get to answer her question?
Dr. Armstrong. Yes, I did. The answer is no.
Chairman Hall. You yield back, Ms. Edwards? Do you want to
follow up anything?
Ms. Edwards. No. Dr. Armstrong did answer the question.
Chairman Hall. Okay.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you.
Chairman Hall. Dr. Harris is next, recognize you for five
minutes.
Mr. Harris. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
for holding the hearing today. First, Dr. Emanuel, thank you
very much for appearing here. Your summary of written
testimony, number five, there is no scientific basis for the
confidence expressed by some that the effects of climate change
will be benign. Do you believe the converse is true too, that
there is no clear scientific basis for the confidence expressed
by some that the effects of climate change will be risky?
Dr. Emanuel. I don't tend to believe anybody who is
confident about this at all. I----
Mr. Harris. Okay. Well, then, in your--thank you. In your
statement, though, you actually say--in your very statement,
the first paragraph, you said, ``It is incumbent on us to take
seriously the risks that climate change poses.'' It doesn't say
climate change might pose, says climate changes poses. And
actually, you also say, with regards to the report by the
Department of Defense, that the U.S. should commit to a
stronger national and international role to help stabilize
climate change at levels that will avoid significant disruption
to global security and stability, clearly implying that there
will be significant disruption to global security and
stability. So are you skeptical about those statements as well,
which don't say might do it, or----
Dr. Emanuel. Well, Representative Harris, I think there is
a confusion between forecasts and an assessment of risk. If I
say that I feel that there is certain risk in my house burning
down and buying----
Mr. Harris. Right.
Dr. Emanuel. --an insurance policy, I am not forecasting
either that my house will burn down or not burn down. But I
would take seriously any actuarial information that gave me
information about the probabilities of risk. That is what----
Mr. Harris. Sure.
Dr. Emanuel. --I am referring----
Mr. Harris. Thank you very much. Mr. Glaser, you make a
great point, I think, that, you know, public health--if you
graph use of energy and use of greenhouse gases versus public
health, you would probably also see, you know, an advantage in
that. For instance, I assume that what you mean by that is
that--when we mean increased greenhouse gas, we mean use of
energy. We produce energy so that we do things like have energy
for refrigeration, which has made great public health advances
keeping food safe. We have energy to, oh, buy gas for
ambulances, or diesel for ambulances, that actually bring
people to a hospital a little quicker in an emergency. Or, you
know, we have MRIs at our hospital with these huge electric
cables going into them. I am assuming that, you know, energy
does good things, it doesn't just do bad things. Is that your
point, that these good things aren't taken into consideration?
Dr. Glaser. Yes, that is--I think that is exactly my point,
and it is not a coincidence that the 20th century witnessed an
explosion in all of the benefits that we consider to be a part
of modern life. At the same time, the greenhouse gas emissions
were increasing. The underlying cause is the same. The
underlying cause is the use of energy. 85----
Mr. Harris. Sure.
Dr. Glaser. --percent of the energy we use in the United
States comes from fossil fuel.
Mr. Harris. Sure.
Dr. Glaser. That is where the energy comes from.
Mr. Harris. Thank you. That is what I thought your point
was. Dr. Montgomery, to close with, you know, we have got this
situation in our state, and, you know, you mentioned about how
frequently the economic costs of these subsidized, you know,
creating these greenhouse jobs and these things like--you know,
we have got a situation in our state where there is a move to
put offshore wind farms, which would require an economic
subsidy. Interestingly enough, the bill that is now in front of
our legislature would cap somehow the cost of the--that you
could add to someone's electric bill when you build a windmill,
as though, you know, I guess we could pass a law that says
everybody ought to pay $10 a month for electric. I mean, I
guess that is the same economic sense.
But let me summarize what it sounds like to me what we are
doing with some of these subsidies, particularly in what we are
going to do off our coast if this passes. We are going to
borrow money from the Chinese to pay for these subsidies,
because we have no money here. We are broke. We borrow money,
China is our biggest exterior--external lender now. So we are
going to buy these funds from the Chinese, perhaps to buy
either German or Chinese windmills, because, as the Congressman
from California suggested, these really aren't made in the
United States predominantly, and then we are going to place
them in our economy, causing our electric prices to go up, then
placing us at competitive disadvantage to China.
So we borrow the money from China, we buy the windmill from
China, and then we pay more for domestic electric, putting our
homes and our businesses at competitive disadvantage. Is that
kind of what you are getting along when you say, you know, when
we create these green jobs that sound good, when you scratch a
little deeper, what you see are real problems in a global
competitive world economy?
Dr. Montgomery. Yes, Mr. Harris, I would say that that is
correct, that Congress and regulators can move around who pays
for something, but they can't make the cost disappear. And the
cost to the United States of these subsidies is basically more
expensive forms of generation that provide exactly the same
service of making MRI machines work, but that are absorbing
resources that otherwise could be used for producing something
that people will enjoy and be able to use.
Mr. Harris. That is what I thought. And how can you
imagine, you know, how can you cap the cost of an--of a, you
know, you build a windmill that costs a certain amount to
produce energy, exactly how do you cap that cost--I mean, as an
economist, this must be frustrating to you, because in the laws
of the marketplace, there must be--there is no way to cap a
cost--that your impression?
Dr. Montgomery. If you require an--a company that is under
your jurisdiction to do something and then say, you can only
charge for this less than it costs you, it is either a taking,
or you are simply saying their shareholders are going to pay
for it, and their shareholders are everybody.
Mr. Harris. Sure. That is what I thought. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman. Yield back.
Chairman Hall. All right. Chair recognizes the gentleman
from Michigan, Mr. Clarke, for five minutes.
Ms. Woolsey. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
Chairman Hall. State your inquiry.
Ms. Woolsey. Yes. There is a letter that has been presented
to the minority staff from the majority staff. It is a letter
from a Mr. Anthony Watts that he requested would be read in--
read and entered into the record of the hearing. And as I
understand it, the letter purports to try to set straight some
errors that Professor Muller made in his testimony. This is
highly unusual for the Committee to receive a correction to a
witness's testimony before the testimony has even been
delivered to the Committee.
So my question is, is it your intention to enter this
document into the record?
Chairman Hall. It is my understanding we have not yet asked
it to be in the testimony.
Ms. Woolsey. Well, okay.
Chairman Hall. Is that the basis of your inquiry?
Ms. Woolsey. We would like to know if it is--because--since
we heard his testimony without the corrections, is this going
to be entered into the record? And has Dr. Muller even seen
this document? Does he want to add comment to the record, and
how does this impact his testimony?
Dr. Muller. Is that a question addressed to me?
Ms. Woolsey. I am asking my--this is between the Chairman
and myself. The Chairman that I love very much and myself.
Chairman Hall. You are showing it.
Ms. Woolsey. Just to keep you on edge.
Chairman Hall. Well, I respect this lady very much, and she
knows it. I understand that you have seen it, and you have the
letter. Now, are you asking now to submit it into the----
Ms. Woolsey. No, we want to know if you are going to submit
it into the record, and if it is----
Chairman Hall. I don't even know what it says.
Ms. Woolsey. Well, that is the point. I mean, you--
Congressman Miller was told--his testimony--I mean, he had
something to add into the record. You hadn't seen it yet----
Chairman Hall. Yeah.
Ms. Woolsey. --so you said no, you--it couldn't go into the
record----
Chairman Hall. Yeah.
Ms. Woolsey. --until you had read it.
Chairman Hall. And Congressman Miller is a very famous
lawyer from his district, and he knows that when we say we
haven't seen it yet, that we hadn't seen it yet. He didn't
question----
Ms. Woolsey. Well, you haven't seen this yet either, so----
Chairman Hall. I haven't seen it yet, so it is not
admissible into the record.
Ms. Woolsey. Thank--that is what we want. Thank you.
Chairman Hall. Now, do you want to put it in the record?
Would you like to put it in the record?
Ms. Woolsey. No, sir.
Chairman Hall. All right. The lady withdraws her request.
Who is up--who is next? Mr. Clarke, I will recognize you for
the second time. That doesn't mean you have 10 minutes, but you
have been very patient with us, so we recognize you at this
time, sir.
Mr. Clarke. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And the reason why I am
patient, because I have firsthand have seen the pain and
suffering caused by the decline of our market share of U.S.
manufactured vehicles in the United States, a market share that
we lost to Asian imports. I represent metro Detroit. I am born
and raised in Detroit, and we knew that this threat was coming,
and that we had to be competitive. But those concerns weren't
effectively heated, and young guys like me back in the '80s
couldn't even get a job in the auto plants because there wasn't
anything available. And I am--that is why I am very grateful
that this administration did provide aid to General Motors, and
now they have seen four consecutive quarters of profitability,
and I believe that that is evidence that the taxpayers'
investment is going to pay off.
But in the same way, I am concerned right now that we could
be missing a huge opportunity to export great new green energy
technology globally. And I am concerned, because of recent
findings, that for the very first time U.S. investment in new
green energy technology has now fallen from first place
globally. Now China is in first place. Not only that, we are
not even in second place, ''Germany is. We are now in third
place.
Some of you have indicated in your testimony that you
believe that green jobs is just a pipe dream. Here is my
concern with that. You have got great companies like General
Electric, they are investing very heavily now in wind, in
solar, in energy efficiency. You have corporate CEOs, such as
the CEO of GE, stating that we are at risk of losing out to
other countries, like China. Is China wrong to invest? Is
Germany wrong? Are executives like the CEO of General Electric
working contrary to their bottom line when they say we have got
to invest in new green energy technology? I welcome any of your
feedback on this.
Dr. Montgomery. If I could start--I have spent some time in
my career looking at various forms of industrial policy. I
think where I would start is a quotation from Professor Richard
Schmalensee, who was dean of the Sloan School at MIT. ``We
can't regulate our way into prosperity.'' If we feel that--the
United States economy does not need the government to tell each
industry, or to provide industries with regulations and
subsidies in order to make them succeed. Our economy grows on
its own, and industries depend on the government to create a
market for themselves at their own risk. And this is what we
have seen consistently in the past when we have tried to create
industries, the United States or other countries, through
industrial policy.
Denmark decided to take the lead on wind industry--on wind
energy. Its wind energy industry has collapsed, and has moved
almost exclusively to China. China is a--I mean, China is an
enigma. China has clearly decided to put subsidies into one
particular industry. But I remember the fear that we were--that
our--that we were going to collapse as an economy if we didn't
fight off the Japanese effort to produce high definition TVs
back in the '80s, when I was at the Congressional Budget
Office. It was a terrible decision for Japan to make. They have
lost tons of money on it. The industry was nowhere near ready
to go on technology.
I think it is critically important for the U.S. to invest
in R&D, but I see no reason that the--that a company like
General Electric would want to--okay.
Mr. Clarke. --but I appreciate what you are saying. Back
many decades ago, after the Wright Brothers, with their great
innovation in creating flight, we lost competitiveness to
Europe, in terms of airplane technology. President Wilson
decided to respond, and we subsidized air mail routes, which
resulted in the growth of air flight technology here in the
U.S. Same with Bell Labs and their technology in
semiconductors. It was the U.S. military that was their
strongest customer. So, in light of that track record, we have
got to compete. We can't lose this opportunity. I yield back.
Chairman Hall. Chair recognizes Mr. Cravaack, gentleman
from Minnesota.
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for all
our distinguished people that are involved in this today. I
would like to start off with Dr. Christy. Dr. Christy, you seem
to be of my genre, and back when I was graduating from high
school, I remember the great global cooling. Is this great
global cooling very similar to the great global warming that is
going on today?
Dr. Christy. Well, I don't know what you mean by genre.
Anyway--I have four grandkids, but--in this sense, yes. Our
ignorance about the climate system is just enormous, and we
have much to learn and much to do.
Mr. Cravaack. Yeah. I remember the time when I was going
through high school the polar caps were going to expand, and
the whole world was going to flip upside down and everything
else. It is kind of funny how history just repeats itself,
except instead of freezing to death, we are all going to fry.
So it is amazing how this has gone through. I would also like
to talk to Dr. Montgomery, if I could. Sir, I come from
Minnesota, in the 8th District of Minnesota, which has a very
proud tradition of mining. Can you tell me how this regulation
of CO2 is going to affect mining operations within
the United States?
Dr. Montgomery. For the next decade or two, there is no way
to achieve deep cuts in greenhouse gas emissions without
substantially cutting down the use of coal for power
generation. Every ton of coal that is not burned in the power
plant is a ton of coal that is not going to be mined, so it
translates directly. Best we can see is a valley of death for
the coal industry in which, after shrinking back as gas and
other technologies replace coal in the short run, it might be
able to revive, if clean technologies, like carbon capture and
sequestration, come along in the future. That could be avoided
with a different pace of control, but in the next decade or so,
it is--coal mining is going to be where the reductions occur.
Mr. Cravaack. Okay. Thank you, sir. Dr. Christy, if I can
bounce back to you again? If everybody--if all the United
States--we go totally green, but other countries throughout
this world, they don't follow suit, can you tell me what kind
of tick that is even going to put on the CO2
emissions?
Dr. Christy. Well, I have run those scenarios for a number
of different situations, and you are looking, at most, at a
tenth of a degree after 100 years.
Mr. Cravaack. So a tenth of a degree after 100 years?
Dr. Christy. Yes. And global temperature changes by more
than that from month to month.
Mr. Cravaack. Okay. And could you be positively--could you
positively state that because of what--the United States going
totally green would actually commit to that tenth of a degree?
Dr. Christy. That is a good point. You might claim it is a
tenth of a degree, but you never could devise an experiment to
attribute it to your legislative action.
Mr. Cravaack. Okay. All right, sir. So--Dr. Montgomery,
back to you now, sir. So for that tenth of a degree, that we
are not sure actually was attributed by the United States going
totally green, can you tell me the economic impact that that
would have upon the United States if we are the only ones that
went green and the rest of the world did not?
Dr. Montgomery. Yes. I have to look back in my memory for a
study that was comparable to what Dr. Christy is talking about,
but I would say the kind of work we did last year on the
Waxman-Markey Bill would suggest costs in the range of 1,000 to
$2,000 per household, a lost of one to two percentage points of
GDP, what it would be otherwise, and perhaps a--close to a
doubling of electricity prices.
Mr. Cravaack. Could you even comment on the amount of jobs
that would be lost within the United States of America?
Dr. Montgomery. Well, I am not sure about jobs, but I can
say that the impact on compensation to workers would be really
substantial. Some industries it would happen in the form of
lower wages, keeping people at work. Other industries, where
that can't happen, people would be losing their jobs, but it
would be a couple of percentage points off the total
compensation to labor, and--figure out how much of that is job
loss in the long run, and how much of it is just you have less
money to take home in your paycheck.
Mr. Cravaack. Okay. All right, sir, I think--Mr. Chairman,
I think I have answered my questions. I yield back my 32
seconds, sir.
Chairman Hall. Thank you. And do you recollect when Dr.
Holdren was here? He is the President's advisor on sea level
rise, and his testimony was that it would rise 12 feet, you
know, when the ice all falls and melts into the ocean. And the
proper person measured it--as you know, the very next year, the
so-called gold standard of scientific consensus by global
warming advocates projected that the oceans would rise between
seven and 23 inches. So that is who is advising the President.
That is the reason we are in all the trouble we are in right
now with all this. Does that help your record any?
Mr. Cravaack. Well, we can't let a crisis go to waste, sir,
so there you go.
Chairman Hall. Thank you. Now I would recognize the
gentlelady from California for five minutes----
Ms. Woolsey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Hall. --10 minutes, whatever she wants. Ms.
Woolsey is a very valuable Member of this Committee, and gives
me an awful lot of trouble, but I respect her highly.
Ms. Woolsey. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, this morning the
Democratic caucus had the privilege of hearing from and asking
questions of Dr. Steven Chu, the Secretary of Energy, and then
I came right from there up here. I feel like I am living in a
parallel universe. I mean, it has got my head going boing,
boing, boing. It is tough.
So, my first question is based on Dr. Armstrong's
testimony, who--he said--Dr. Armstrong, you said, I believe
that EPA's decision to ban DDT was based on bad science. So I
would like to ask the rest of you, would you reintroduce DDT
into our world now, today, if you could?
Dr. Armstrong. You are not asking----
Ms. Woolsey. Yes or no?
Dr. Armstrong. You are not----
Ms. Woolsey. Oh, no, I think I got--you said no. You
thought it would--should--we should not have done what we did
in the first place. I can ask you would you reintroduce it?
Sure, I would be glad to. I just didn't want to waste your
time. Just yes or no.
Dr. Armstrong. Yes, I definitely would----
Ms. Woolsey. Would reintroduce it. Okay. Dr. Muller?
Dr. Armstrong. --DDT, yeah.
Dr. Muller. It is way beyond my credentials to answer that
professionally. I have read books on the subject--or read
articles on the subject, and I think there is--I have seen a
reasonable case that introducing it would actually save lives.
Mr. Woolsey. Dr. Christy?
Dr. Christy. I have lived in Africa, saw people die of
malaria. Absolutely, yes.
Mr. Woolsey. Mr. Glaser?
Dr. Glaser. I have no idea, and have no opinion.
Mr. Woolsey. Dr. Emanuel?
Dr. Emanuel. Far beyond my expertise.
Ms. Woolsey. Dr. Montgomery?
Dr. Montgomery. I have read a good bit on the subject.
Roger Bate, I think, is a great expert. I agree with Dr.
Christy. Millions of millions of children and poor people in
Africa are dying because of the lack of DDT to--as an effective
way of getting rid of disease vectors.
Ms. Woolsey. Well, okay, I didn't want to go too much
farther on this, except I am on the--I served on the Africa
World Health Subcommittee. We have just about, using other
technologies and other methodologies, done away with malaria,
if we provide the right preventions for African people, like we
would have had to provide DDT. So I think it has proven itself,
from my opinion.
Dr. Emanuel, I understand that you have not always--I mean,
that you didn't--you weren't born recognizing the link between
greenhouse gas emissions and climate change, so how did you get
to where you are today? How did you form your current beliefs
on climate change?
Dr. Emanuel. Well, Representative Woolsey, science is based
on evidence, and evidence is often ambiguous. It evolves with
time, it changes. Science progresses, but it doesn't progress
monotonically. It goes up and down. In the '80s, when I first
started to study the issue of climate change, back in those
days I didn't feel that the evidence was conclusive. I didn't
have the opinion that this wasn't happening or otherwise. But
in the intervening 20 years, because of the wonderful work done
in paleoclientology, to some extent because of models--my own
involvement with the physics, radiative transfer, convective
heat transfer, I and many of my colleagues came to the
conclusion that the evidence is very strong for this.
And let me take the opportunity to say that one has to
distinguish between what groups of scientists come to over a
long period of time, and what a few say that get amplified by
the press. We heard that there was no difference between the
scare of cooling in the '70s and the concern of warming. That
couldn't be further from the truth. To the best of my
knowledge, not one scientific organization back in those days
raised any alarm. It was a few scientists that expressed some
concern amplified hugely by a big cover in Time magazine. It is
not comparable to today, not at all, all right? One should not
make that mistake.
Mr. Chairman, I think you misquoted Mr. Holdren. He was
referring to what would happen if all of Greenland's ice
disappeared. That is not projected to happen, but his numbers
are correct. If it did, we would see a sea level rise of about
22 feet. Unfortunately, it is a risk. It is way out there
because we don't understand the physics of ice, but I think
that is what he was referring to.
Chairman Hall. We will add on to your time. We won't take
from you the time, but in a recent interview Dr. Holdren was
sitting right where you are there, and I told him--he stated
that the Republicans needed to be educated on the issue. In an
August of 2006 interview with the BBC News, he reportedly said
that if the current pace of change continued, the catastrophic
sea level rise of four meters, that is 13 feet, not 12 feet, I
was wrong, was within the realm of possibility, and while you
were going to the interview, how sure were you about your
prediction? And the hard cold facts were the very next year the
so-called gold standard of scientific consensus by global
warming advocates projected that the oceans would rise between
seven and 23 inches between now and 2100. How sure was the
scientific community of their prediction? That is my
recollection of it. You probably know more about it than I do.
Dr. Emanuel. I mean, I would only simply add to that, the
IPCC, in making that projection, very explicitly excluded any
calculation of the melting of land ice. They--I think they were
wise to do that, because we don't understand the physics very
well.
Chairman Hall. All I was trying to emphasize was that he
guessed at 13 feet, and he is just 12 feet wrong.
Dr. Emanuel. I don't--I think his statement that it was
within--correct.
Chairman Hall. --I am not very good at math.
Dr. Emanuel. No.
Chairman Hall. There are three things I couldn't do, and
that is add and subtract.
Dr. Emanuel. I think--but the notion that it is within the
realm of possibility is correct on his part.
Chairman Hall. Okay.
Dr. Emanuel. That is different from a projection.
Chairman Hall. All right. So you made your point. You made
a good point. You have been a good witness. I am sorry I
haven't been as good a Chairman.
Ms. Woolsey. On that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield the
remainder of my time.
Chairman Hall. Okay. Now, let us see, we have Mo Brooks
from Alabama. Gentleman from Alabama.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It has been most
entertaining seeing you folks act up on the higher row. Dr.
Christy, would it be fair to say that pretty much the one
constant about the weather is that it is always changing?
Dr. Christy. The climate is always changing.
Mr. Brooks. And in looking at Earth's climatological data,
have there been cooler periods than what we are now
experiencing?
Dr. Christy. Yes.
Mr. Brooks. And do you have any way of expressing a
judgment as to how often the world has experienced cooler
periods of what we are now incurring?
Dr. Christy. If you go back through the entire history of
the world, most of the periods have not been cooler than today.
They have been warmer.
Mr. Brooks. Well, let us get into the warmer periods. Have
there been warmer periods?
Dr. Christy. Yes, much warmer, yeah.
Mr. Brooks. And do you have any way of expressing a
judgment as to how often, during whatever period of time you
want to use, that it has been warmer than what it is today?
Dr. Christy. I cannot give you a percentage of time, but it
is--just to say most. I can't call up that graph in my brain
right now.
Mr. Brooks. And looking at the materials that you all
handed to us, this one is by Dr. Christy, I am going to read a
part of it. ``To compound this sad and deceptive situation, I
have been quite impressed with some recent results by Doll,
Jensen, et al, in which Greenland ice bore hole temperatures
had been deconvolved into a time series covering the past
20,000 years. This measurement indeed presented intercentury
variations. Their result indicated a clear 500 year period of
temperatures warmer than the present centered around 900 AD,
commonly referred to as the medieval warming period.'' When it
says ``warmer than the present'', does that mean that
consistently for that five century period of time, according to
the Greenland ice bore hole measurements, we had had a global
warming period then?
Dr. Christy. Yes, in a smooth and average period. About a
century smoothing. Each one of those centuries are considered
to be warmer than the present.
Mr. Brooks. So the temperatures that we are experiencing
right now, do you consider them to be an aberration, or just a
part of the Earth's normal warming and cooling cycle?
Dr. Christy. I think most of all they are part of the
normal ups and downs of climate.
Mr. Brooks. And do you have a judgment as to what has been
the warmest climatological year in the past two or three
decades?
Dr. Christy. That would be--in the bulk atmosphere, 1998.
Mr. Brooks. And would it be fair to say, then, that there
has been cooling of global temperatures at least over the last
13 years, compared to 1998?
Dr. Christy. Well, I can say that there certainly hasn't
been a warming of temperature since that time.
Mr. Brooks. And the last four or five years, have they been
cooler or warmer?
Dr. Christy. They have been up and down. Some have been
cold, some have been warm.
Mr. Brooks. And Congressman Cravaack kind of jumped on some
turf I wanted to hit on. It is nice to have these little cell
phones where you can pull up things, and I couldn't help but
pull up the Time magazine front page article dated April 28,
1975, where we have a penguin on the cover, and it says, ``How
to survive the coming ice age''. And those are the days back
when I was on the Grissom High School and Duke University
debate teams, back in the early '70s. Of course, this was one
of the topics that came up from time to time in extemporaneous
speaking, so I happen to recall that. For you young folks, I
envy you not having that recollection, but for us older folks,
you know, we can remember that far back. How do you compare
that global cooling claim versus today's global warming claim?
Is there any consistency or inconsistency?
Dr. Christy. Well, I think the consistency there is--like I
said before, there is a large amount of ignorance about the
climate system, and that is just the way it is. It is such a
complicated system. I think there has been too much jumping to
conclusions about seeing something happen in the climate and
saying, well, the only way that could happen is human effects.
When you look at the possibility of natural unforced
variability, you see that can cause excursions that we have
seen recently.
Mr. Brooks. Would it be fair to say, then, that within the
scientific community it literally is asking too much of them
for them to be able to tell us whether 10, 20, 30, 40, 50 years
from now Earth's temperatures are going to be warmer or cooler,
much like it is pretty unreasonable to ask a meteorologist
whether we are going to have rain in Washington just two or
three weeks from now?
Dr. Christy. Well, there are some differences in that kind
of thing, but I do yield to Dr. Emanuel over here in the sense
I agree with him that it is very risky making predictions that
far out.
Mr. Brooks. Well, if I could just make this one concluding
statement, in my judgment, based upon what I have heard and
learned over the decades, the fact of the matter is nobody
knows whether we are going to have global cooling or global
warming over the next half century or century, but we are being
asked to undermine America's economy based on this guesswork,
speculation and surmise. And we need to be very careful as a
Congress before we start eliminating jobs that people in our
nation so badly need. And with that having been said, I very
much appreciate the time each of you all have spent with us
today.
Chairman Hall. Yield back your time? Was Dr. Armstrong
trying to get his attention? Okay. Anyone else? Thank you, Mo.
Thank you for your----
Mr. Brooks. Thank you.
Chairman Hall. --good questions. Chair at this time
recognizes the very patient Mr. Sarbanes. And you won't be last
today. It is the gentleman from Maryland, five minutes.
Mr. Sarbanes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the
witnesses. Your testimony is helpful, and this is a complicated
issue. I wonder who among you would be prepared to declare that
climate change is not happening. Is there anyone at the table
who would say that? Okay.
Dr. Armstrong. Do you mean in either direction, or--I mean,
my position is it is just as likely to go up as down, so I am
sure it is going to change. It is absolutely certain it is----
Mr. Sarbanes. Okay, but you are not refuting the notion
that climate change is occurring?
Dr. Armstrong. Definitely not.
Mr. Sarbanes. And who among you would dispute that human
activity has some role to play in climate change? Okay. What is
interesting to me about the testimony is, when I look at each
of the witnesses, Dr. Christy, you clearly have concerns about
the IPCC, the process, whether they are taking into account all
the things that they should, including some of the things that
you have urged upon them and so forth. But you don't appear to
reject out of hand the possibility that human activity can be a
factor in climate change. You are not predicting it necessarily
one way or the other, but you are not rejecting that out of
hand. Is that correct?
Dr. Christy. Yeah, that is correct.
Mr. Sarbanes. Okay.
Dr. Christy. Carbon dioxide is increasing. That will----
Mr. Sarbanes. All right.
Dr. Christy. --have some effect.
Mr. Sarbanes. And then, Mr. Muller, you also had some
concerns about the IPCC, but appear to recognize climate change
is very real, as being caused or heavily driven by the
greenhouse gas emissions. I accept your point that it is fair
to worry about whether other countries are going to take steps
to meet this challenge, and whether we are sort of going to be
out there on our own if we push for it, and that is a subject
for discussion and formulation of policy. But you have clearly
acknowledged climate change and a human activity component to
that.
Dr. Muller. That is correct. I----
Mr. Sarbanes. Okay.
Dr. Muller. The degree of the human component----
Mr. Sarbanes. Fair enough.
Dr. Muller. --is, in my mind----
Mr. Sarbanes. Fair enough.
Dr. Muller. --quite uncertain.
Mr. Sarbanes. Right. And, Mr. Armstrong, you also challenge
the IPCC. Obviously that is one of the parts of the agenda here
today is to raise questions, and I am going to come back to
that. But, again, don't appear to be dismissing--as you just
indicated, not dismissing out of hand the connection of climate
change and potential human activity's influence there. Dr.
Glaser, you are a--I mean--Dr. Glaser, you are a lawyer. Well,
that--you are a doctor. But you are not really here to speak to
the science so much as raise questions about the EPA and the
Clean Air Act and all the rest of it. And Dr. Montgomery, you
are focusing on the economics, but, again, don't appear to be
issuing a major challenge to the underlying science when it
comes to climate change and the potential connection to that of
human activity.
So I think it is important for us to recognize this. It is
fair to raise questions and have a debate on the process by
which we are trying to reach some good judgment as we make
policy with respect to climate change. But the public needs to
understand that climate change is real, that human activity is
a contributing factor to that, and that that is--that it is
fair to gather up that kind of information going forward.
Now, Dr. Emanuel, I would like to ask you--what emerges to
me from these discussion of what, you know, some mistakes that
were made by some of the folks involved with the IPCC's--and,
you know, we can say that, but what I get the impression of is
that the IPCC, you know, can take it. That this is a group
that, you know, is made up of a significant number of
scientists that participate over almost 200 countries that
participate. And they recognize the importance of the work they
do, and they are going to make corrections to try to make sure
in going forward that they are an important resources.
My time is running out, but I did want you to confirm for
me that, in addition to the IPCC being a robust source of
expertise with respect to climate change, there are others that
we rely on, because the suggestion was made earlier in the
hearing that we are sort of putting all our eggs in one basket.
There is the InterAcademy Council, is there not, which has
issued some important recommendations with respect to climate
change, and there is the U.S. Global Change Research Program,
among many others, that are there as well. Can you just confirm
that there is a lot of different and independent sources of
conveying this real concern about climate change?
Dr. Emanuel. There are indeed, and let me simply remind the
Committee that the IPCC is not a research organization. It
communicates published research. You could throw away the IPCC,
throw away that one graph that some people are focused on, that
had one piece of one curve a minute. The evidence remains very
strong, very robust, and very worrying. And anyone who says
that we shouldn't be worried is just kidding himself. Is the
outcome certain? We have heard here, we all agree, it is not.
But to suggest that we are not facing a significant risk going
forward, and that we should not sacrifice immediate economic
goals in order to deal with that risk, I think is being
colossally irresponsible.
Dr. Glaser. Mr. Chairman, if I could just respond? Mr.
Sarbanes characterized his view of what I am saying here, and I
just want to be precise about this. My view on the science is
that the record that the Environmental Protection Agency
created in the endangerment finding does not provide a basis
for EPA to make that endangerment finding, and therefore to
regulate. I don't want my silence otherwise--to be construed
otherwise. Thank you.
Chairman Hall. I think your emphasis is what I believe is
Mr. Sarbanes is saying, that this hearing really is about
process. And that is what we would hope it would be about,
because that is the only honest way to approach it. And, Mr.
Sarbanes, you can add on to any question or statement you want
to make.
Mr. Sarbanes. I will yield back my time.
Chairman Hall. All right. I thank you. Gentleman yields
back. Recognizes the gentlelady from Florida, Sandy Adams----
Mrs. Adams. Thank you, Mr.----
Chairman Hall. --for five minutes.
Mrs. Adams. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And I do want to talk
about the economics of it. Based on our economy today, and the
fact that I don't believe that there is--I think there is some
kind of correlation between the regulation, the unemployment
rate, the high spending rates in the Congress, all of this is
going up at record rates together. Our debt, our deficit, I
think it is all correlated together.
Dr. Montgomery, I want to discuss the questions with you,
and it is on the economic side because, as many of my
colleagues have said, we are broke. We are looking at it. We
have a high record of unemployment. People are making very
hard, tough decisions in their homes today on how to pay the
bills, and, if they can't pay all the bills, then how to
prioritize their bills. So, with that, I have a couple of
questions. I want to know if any of your data that you used to
formulate your opinions about the economic impacts of the
climate related to regulations have ever been called into
question?
Dr. Montgomery. No. Economists, like other researchers,
have disagreements about the emphasis to put on different
things, but the models and the data that we have used have been
accepted in major peer reviewed groups. We have published them.
We have argued, but they have been accepted by all of our
colleagues, and I think the academic community.
Mrs. Adams. Okay. Does the so-called danger posed to the
economy by not acting to reduce what some may call--some call
man made effects on climate change outweigh the economic costs
to the country, in your opinion?
Dr. Montgomery. No, it does not.
Mrs. Adams. Will the proposals that we have heard about
from this administration, such as the cap and trade regimen
create jobs and stimulate the U.S. economy?
Dr. Montgomery. No, it will not.
Mrs. Adams. Will it lose jobs, will it cost jobs?
Dr. Montgomery. In the short run, I think you raised all of
the right issues, that we are looking at a problem of deficits
that are hanging over the economy and discouraging investment
because of the prospect we have to pay them back someday, we
have to pay more taxes. I think that the onslaught of
additional regulatory requirements are imposing costs on
business and making them unwilling to hire. And I think that
adding additional regulations at this point is going to have an
effect on employment.
In the long run, people are going to have work. People are
going to find work. The question is, how much will they be
producing, and how much will they be earning for it, and how
much does the country as a whole get out of their effort? And
that, clearly climate change regulations will diminish.
Mrs. Adams. And we have already been at a record high of
months--coinciding months, side by side, of unemployment, so
this would just add to it, is basically--on the short term?
Dr. Montgomery. Yes, and if I could add to that, there have
been a number of claims that we need to have environmental
regulations because it is a way of getting more spending to
happen. If we need more spending, which I would question in
terms of our overall fiscal policy, then that is the issue, and
the issue needs to be looked at in terms of fiscal policy and
whether it makes sense or not. Using regulatory measures to
force businesses to spend money on things that we cannot
justify for other reasons does not make sense as a stimulus
measure.
Mrs. Adams. And I think earlier someone asked you about if
we were, in the U.S., to bring our carbon emissions down to
zero within 20 years and invest all of this, even though
countries such as China, India and the EU do not, there would
not be much of a difference in what is going on today, correct?
Dr. Montgomery. We would not notice a difference to the
U.S. in anything that was happening to us because of climate.
Mrs. Adams. If the Kerry-Boxer Bill, which it was rightly
rejected by last year's Congress, had passed, and we were on
track to lower U.S. emissions by 20 percent, below 2007 levels
by 2020, do you think the economic damage created by that bill
would have been worth the carbon emissions decrease it was
estimated to achieve?
Dr. Montgomery. No, because they were very similar, very
small reductions to ones that I mentioned, and that Dr. Christy
mentioned, that the costs of that by itself would have far
outweighed any benefit we could have gotten from those fiscal
changes.
Mrs. Adams. Okay. I am going to quickly conclude with these
two questions. How much of an investment in research and
development initiatives would you estimate is necessary for us
to cut its emissions in half by 2035, our emissions, and if we
were successful, how much would global emissions decrease as a
result of that success?
Dr. Montgomery. I have no idea of what it would take for
R&D, and I am not sure that 2035 is a target that R&D would get
us to in any event, but in none of these cases would it change
global emissions. Where the R&D could pay off is if it
developed over the longer term the kind of technologies that we
need much further out in the future to get our--to get the
world completely to a zero carbon economy. And we have to
remember, that is the goal. It is not a little bit of change
now, it is a wholesale change in the entire world's energy
system that you commit yourself to when you say, we are going
to go for preventing global warming.
Mrs. Adams. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Hall. Thank you. Ms. Lofgren? I think she just
stepped out. Somebody tell her she is up next. Yeah. She waited
a long time. You want to make him right now? She is asking if
we have closing remarks, and we don't usually, but if--I have
been waiting 30 years to be Chairman so I could make closing
remarks, and I don't have any closing remarks, but--because you
all have been so generous with your time, and--let me tell you,
don't be discouraged by the empty chairs here because this is
all taken down. The gentleman right over there is taking
everything down, and your total testimony will be in the record
for all the other Members to read, and they will be read, so
you are not wasting your time on empty chairs. This is the lady
that is worth waiting for. She has been in----
Ms. Lofgren. You are so nice.
Chairman Hall. --Congress for a long, long time, and we
recognize you now for--if you are ready to go.
Ms. Lofgren. I am ready to go, and I apologize. I was on
the phone. This has been a--quite a busy morning. I was unable
to be here during the delivery of the testimony because of--I
am the ranking Member of a Subcommittee that was meeting at the
same time, but I did have the opportunity to read the written
testimony.
And, you know, I--as I am listening to some of the
questions here, Dr. Emanuel, it seems like some people are
confused about the difference between climate and weather, and
I am wondering if you could give us a short summary of what the
difference is.
Dr. Emanuel. Well, my favorite answer that I have heard to
this question that you raise is one that was given by my late
colleague, Ed Lorenz, the father of chaos theory, who says
climate is what you expect and weather is what you get. It is a
murky line. One of the things that one tries to do is to look
in climate records at long term fluctuations, and depending
upon what is causing the climate to change, you have to average
over a lot of weather--a good example is the weather in
Washington today. A few weeks ago, it was very warm, right? The
trees were blooming. The temperature is clearly lower today
than it was a few weeks ago, but nobody in this room would say,
okay, because of that, we are not going to have summer here in
Washington. They don't make that mistake. They understand that
we are looking at a short term fluctuation. The temperature of
the planet was very hot in 1998 because we were experiencing a
very large El Nino that year. And people say, well, it has
gotten cooler since then. It is true. It means nothing, on the
other hand, about the longer term changes.
What we are relatively sure of is to see what is happening
with carbon dioxide, its influence, we need at least 30 years
of time series. And looking at what has happened over the last
five or ten years is virtually meaningless.
Ms. Lofgren. One of the things that--the--in terms of my
reading--and I read as a lay person. I mean, I am not a
scientist, but if you take a look at some of the historical
records, it seems that the influence--temperature influence in
global climate change does relate to sunlight and variability
of the sun, but right now we have got a decrease, and yet an
increase, an up ramp. And I remember about a decade ago, decade
and a half ago, I went to Stanford, and the analysis that they
were doing is--just look at the planet chemistry. Don't worry
right now about measuring the temperatures, look at the planet
chemistry. And everybody, I think, agrees that the amount of
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has spiked.
And--but one of the concerns I have is how conservative
scientists are by nature. You don't want to predict something
that you can't prove. And yet, if these things are occurring--I
worry about methane. When you take a look at the melting of
permafrost, I mean, if we were to stop all emissions today, we
are still going to have a very large spike in carbon dioxide,
methane, and other greenhouse gases.
Let me ask you about whether the scientific community is in
a posture where--I mean, you can't prove that the ice on
Greenland will melt. I mean, no one knows that. And yet, were
that to happen, that would be a rather catastrophic event. Can
you explain to me where the scientific community is, relative
to risk analysis, when you can't prove an unknown such as that?
Dr. Emanuel. You have put your finger on what makes the
whole enterprise so difficult. So one thing we do know beyond
much doubt is that current levels of carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere have not been experienced for at least a million
years on our planet. We also know that that Greenland ice
disappeared naturally in one of the previous interglacial
periods over the last 800,000 years, so we know it can happen.
And you had mentioned, and I think it is true, that science
tends to be conservative. I personally think that, you know,
people say the IPCC will turn out to be wrong. Yes, but with
equal probability it will turn out that they have
underestimated the effect, rather than overestimated. So in the
last IPCC report, scientists who were the authors of that
report concluded that they understood the Greenland ice problem
so poorly that they weren't even able to venture. And I said,
well, we are going to project an increase in sea level just
based upon what we know reasonably well, which is the thermal
expansion of sea water. And they said, we are not going to
consider the ice.
But if you want to consider the full range of possible
outcomes, given that Greenland ice has largely disappeared in
the past, one has to regard that as John Holdren correctly did,
as a possibility. You are talking about seven meters of sea
level rise. I think it is these issues that keep us all awake
at night.
Ms. Lofgren. Well, it certainly does me. And I will--I know
my time is up, but I would just like to say, I come from
Silicon Valley and, you know, some--the hottest part of our
economy right now is green technology. I mean, it is employing
thousands of people. It is a fast expanding part of technology,
venture backed. And so when I hear, gosh, you know, this is an
economic problem, wow, where I come from, it is an economic
opportunity. So--and I just think it is important that someone
point that out. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to
come back and still ask my questions, and I yield back.
Chairman Hall. Thank you. You are always worth waiting for.
And then--yeah. Mr. Rohrabacher, the gentleman from California,
recognized for five minutes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr.----
Chairman Hall. And you have been patient too.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, this is a very significant issue,
and deserves the type of honest debate that--we have seen some
of that here today, but we have also seen examples of some of
the type of debate that we have had in the past on this issue.
Let me note that Dr. Emanuel's statement earlier about the
disinformation and some of--have been going on in terms of
posturing and--which had not been conducive to a good
scientific discussion.
There is some validity to what you had to say there, Dr.
Emanuel, but let me just note, I have sat through two decades
of having those people who disagree with your position--seen
them belittled, seen their arguments dismissed without having
to address the actual scientific judgments that is based--we
have all heard case closed. How many of us have not heard the
phrase case closed, which is nothing more than an attempt to
shut off debate and honest discussion? Over and over again we
have seen these tactics. During the Clinton Administration, we
saw this even reach the extent where people who I know were
complaining that research grants were not available to people
in the scientific community unless they had a predisposition
towards proving man made global warming.
Mr. Chairman, what we have needed in this issue is an
honest debate and an honest discussion. I think today was a
first good step. Let me note that even with this first good
step, my colleagues on the left have been unable to prevent
themselves from trying to call into question the integrity of
the people who disagreed with them. One of my colleagues from
North Carolina just mentioned that--basically talking about
unethical lawyers or whatever, but could not prevent himself
from suggesting that campaign donations have something to do
with people's honest disagreement with his position. Well,
people could honestly disagree with this. And what is the
central issue? The central issue is whether or not mankind is
causing a change in the climate, especially with mankind's use
of fossil--what is called fossil fuels, and whether or not man
made CO2 is actually having a major impact on the
climate of this planet. And it is not whether it has some
impact. Everything has some impact. It is whether or not it has
a major impact.
And I would just like to ask our scientists here, Dr.
Armstrong, do you believe that the sun and natural causes may
have more to do with the climate cycles that the Earth is going
through, including the current one, than mankind's use of
fossil fuel?
Dr. Armstrong. I work with Willie Soon, who does a lot of
research on this particular topic, and that is what he tells
me. I actually try not to learn a lot about climate change. I
am the forecasting guy.
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. Well, I would ask that
everyone--I would like to make a couple more points before we
ask--by the way, just so you will note, again, asking people
whether or not they have received any money--research money
from any corporation I think, again, is an attempt to basically
steer away from the arguments as to whether someone has a
scientifically based argument, and what that argument is, and
trying to instead poison the well so you don't have to confront
the actual science.
And that is why, frankly, Dr. Emanuel, when you started
belittling people as making mascots out of scientific
mavericks, well, no, you can't dismiss someone as a mascot.
Maybe some of these scientific mavericks have something to say
worthwhile without having to be belittled by calling them
mascots. And I have been--we have been sitting through this
dishonest debate on this issue for 20 years. And thank God we
have at least one forum that present--is presenting the other
side today. What about you, Dr. Christy and Dr. Muller? Do you
think that the sun and natural causes has at least as great an
impact as humankind on climate change that has always existed?
Dr. Christy. Well, actually, the natural unforced
variability, which is not really the sun or volcanoes or
anything, but just the complexity of the system itself can
create those variations on its own.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Dr. Muller?
Dr. Muller. The amount of global warming we have had so
far, one degree Celsius, is hardly enough for anybody to even
notice, other than scientists who are bringing together large
numbers of instruments and measurements. I would say that
claims that global warming has harmed the Earth so far as not
scientific.
What worries me, however, is not that we have had global
warming which has impacted us. I worry that the excess reported
by the IPCC, this fact that the solar activity has turned down
a little bit, but the warming has gone up, is simply a risk. It
is a risk for the future. We have not had significant global
warming, enough to have many of the effects that are attributed
to it. But that doesn't mean that the carbon dioxide is going
up on a way that has been unprecedented during human existence.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Um-hum.
Dr. Muller. And that concerns me, and I think it means we
need to take a measured look at it and take--have a measured
response.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, we have had a--and by the way, Dr.
Emanuel, you are just excusing the manipulation of information,
calling it poor judgment rather than unethical activity on the
part of the----
Dr. Emanuel. Absolutely correct.
Mr. Rohrabacher. It is shocking.
Dr. Emanuel. And many panels----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Hold----
Dr. Emanuel. --who are in much better position to know than
you----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Doctor----
Dr. Emanuel. --concluded the same thing.
Mr. Rohrabacher. It is my time, let me just note, and I am
going to give you a chance to answer that, but I do want--I--I
am running out of time right now because I wanted to get to a
science thing, but--an actual science question.
Chairman Hall. We will give the witness time to answer, if
he chooses----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. Thank you. Dr. Christy, there was a
period--this--what we call this medieval warming period. Is
there any suggestion that that was caused by an increased level
of carbon--CO2, especially by human beings? And if
not, if the use of CO2 was actually less than it is
now, how can we then--and it was warmer then, how can we say
that, scientifically, that today's cycle, it seems to be a
little bit warming anyway, is caused by CO2?
Dr. Christy. I think you are thinking like a lawyer. It is
hard to convict carbon dioxide of warming back then when it
wasn't there.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right.
Dr. Christy. So the crime happened without the presence of
carbon dioxide. If you think of it as a crime, I think the----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay.
Dr. Christy. --we might like warmer, actually.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And I will be happy to let Dr. Emanuel
answer my challenge to his dismissal of the significance of the
alteration of information by scientists in presenting their
case to the American public and the world.
Dr. Emanuel. Thank you for the opportunity to make some
clarifications. Let me first state that, if you read my
testimony, I was very careful to say that mavericks are a very,
very important part of the scientific enterprise. I, in other
issues, am a maverick, and I know many of them, they
appreciate----
Mr. Rohrabacher. But you are not a mascot.
Mr. Emanual. I was criticizing extra-scientific
organizations who made mascots out of mavericks, and that is a
very different matter. And I just simply want to be clear about
that. Now, on the issue of this one proxy record, let us talk
about what it is. It was a tree ring proxy record, and the--
there is a well known problem that had been published for
several years before this report came out that noted that
several of the tree ring proxies diverged from the instrumental
record in modern times. There is clearly a problem. It is
discussed all over the literature. It is called the divergence
problem.
And the graph in question, the authors chose--and this was
not part of a peer reviewed report, by the way. It was supposed
to be kind of a popular report. They chose to take away that
part of one proxy record that was demonstrably false. I think
what they should have done, and what we all feel they should
have done, was taken that whole proxy away because it was
provably wrong, all right? There is no question that that was
scientifically wrong.
What we concluded, that there was not, on the other hand,
an intent to deceive anyone. If it was, it was very poorly
conceived, because anybody who wanted to could immediately
find, and did find, the original records. You could throw all
of that away. You could take away all the science done by
anybody in that group that you thought was questionable, and it
wouldn't change anything about the conclusions, because the
weight of the rest of the evidence is so large.
Chairman Hall. --have an answer from any of the others,
have you? Do you want to answer, Doctor?
Dr. Christy. I would just say I think that minimizes what
actually happened in that situation. It was the icon of the
TAR, the third assessment report. And what the tree ring record
did, in showing that it did not agree with temperatures,
indicated that the icon itself, which was based primarily on
tree rings prior to the 16th century, was therefore not very
good at explaining what the temperature was. So both were
improperly shown as--one was cut off, and one was shown as a
correct representation of temperature when it really wasn't.
Had no scale on that thing.
Chairman Hall. Go ahead.
Dr. Muller. Thank you. I was trained in science by Luis
Alvarez, who not only won the Nobel Prize and lots of other
discoveries, but is sort of a hero. He was over Hiroshima,
measuring the size of the blast when it happened. Luis Alvarez
taught me the fundamental scientific rule, which is you have
got to show everybody your dirty laundry. I remember vividly
the first time I was at a seminar in his home when Lena
Gautieri, a great physicist, got up there, and I heard she had
made a discovery. And she spent the first 35 minutes of her 45
minute talk showing all of the evidence against what she was
going to claim. In the end, when she showed her evidence, it
was compelling because it was stronger than everything else.
My problem with the way the hockey stick was derived was
that there was none of this. Luis Alvarez taught me that if you
hide something, if you don't show something, that you are
afraid people will draw the wrong conclusions, the person you
are most likely to fool is yourself.
Chairman Hall. Thank you.
Dr. Glaser. May I respond too, Mr. Chairman? I think--a
couple of things here. First of all, Climategate was about a
large number of things. The hockey stick has gotten all the
publicity, as rightly it should, because the hockey stick was
the fundamental way--it was the fundamental piece of evidence
on which climate change was presented to the public in the IPCC
report. So Climategate is about that, that is fundamental, but
Climategate is about a bunch of other things as well. It is a
large pattern of activity. And I think we have heard discussion
today about the various review panels that were undertaken,
mostly in England, and there are a few things that you need to
understand about those review panels.
First of all, the fact that the English felt that it was
necessary to investigate what had happened is something that we
wish EPA had done as well. They felt that there was enough here
to take a look and to have some kind of process, and that is
all that we have asked EPA to do here, is just take a look at
this, let the public comment. EPA looked at it and said,
nothing here. We are not even going to let the public comment.
That is a process flaw. That is number one.
Number two, none of these review panels, including the
Oxboro panel, operated according to any kind of procedures that
would even remotely approach the standards that we would use
here in the United States. We have heard about interviews that
weren't made public, failure to hear dissenting points of view.
That is all important also.
And then the third thing I would have to say is that
although this doesn't get publicized very much, all of those
review panels, in fact, were very critical of a lot of the
procedures that were used by the scientists that they were
reviewing, including the review panel that Dr. Emanuel served
on that said in specific that they were actually very
surprised. And that the statisticians in question, or the
climatologists in question that were producing material like
the hockey stick, which is fundamentally a statistical
analysis, did not think it necessary to consult with
disinterested professional statisticians.
There was concern expressed across all of these review
panels about failure to respond to Freedom of Information
requests, operating in a culture of secrecy, not providing
information to scientists who didn't share their views. That is
ultimately what Climategate is all about, and that is why it is
created so many questions.
Chairman Hall. Does that do it? Mr. Montgomery?
Dr. Montgomery. Just one thought, which is that even if all
of the climate science was accepted as good science, we still
need to worry about the bad economics and bad policy analysis
that have been used to leap from conclusions--to leap to
conclusions about what should be done from that basis.
Chairman Hall. Okay. Mrs. Woolsey is--wants to make a
closing remark. Recognize you for----
Ms. Woolsey. A minute.
Chairman Hall. --for a couple or three minutes. Whatever
time you take, as long as you don't take over five minutes.
Ms. Woolsey. I won't, I won't. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
would like to respond to Mr. Rohrabacher about today's panel
representing the other side, because I don't think that that is
the conversation we have had today, because every single person
said that global warming is happening. Every single person said
that human activity is a factor, and that science must be
continued. I think there is agreement in that. And I think the
challenge is exactly how we are going to have science that is
understandable and acceptable. So--without giving up real
science.
So--now, you know, it is clear, Mr. Chairman, this debate
has focused a lot on the IPCC, but, you know, even if you
reject the report--I don't, but I need to point out that there
are many other reputable sources of scientific information,
like the United States National Academy of Sciences, and we
have to--we accept their reports. In addition, every
significant relevant scientific society has put out statements
that are in agreement with the mainstream view of climate
science. And, obviously, all of those groups cannot be wrong.
So as I said when I came in, after hearing the esteemed
Secretary of Energy, Secretary Steven Chu, this morning at nine
o'clock, and then came in here, I really could be living in a
parallel universe, and I thank you for keeping me sane through
it.
Chairman Hall. Gentlelady's time has finally expired.
Dr. Armstrong. Could I make a comment on that? I think I
was misrepresented by her.
Chairman Hall. I recognize you for a minute, two minutes if
you need it.
Dr. Armstrong. She said every single person was recognizing
that global warming was happening. I did not say that. I said
it had happened, and that we would have no idea whether the
temperature is going to go up or go down. Secondly, the whole
notion of voting by scientists is not scientific method. In
fact, it is anti-scientific method. It is the way that
scientists prevent change.
Chairman Hall. Okay. Let me just say that this is a group
that I had heard had some questions about the science. You have
expressed that somewhere, or you wouldn't be here. We have
asked you to come. Dr. Montgomery, your testimony has been very
valuable because in a mile of here there is probably 1,000
places of business. Every one of them have a door people walk
through. They go in there and they pick out something, and what
is the next thing they have to do? They have to pay for it.
They have got to go by a cash register.
And I ran into some witnesses about five or six weeks ago
had they ever been to Wal-Mart, and had they--they said yes.
Did you buy anything? Yes. And what did you next do? They
didn't know, or they just didn't say anything. Did you see
anything unusual? And--did you see a thing called a cash
register? And I had a dictionary with me, and I wrote--I called
out to these Phi Beta Kappa people what a cash register was,
read them two or three paragraphs of it, still didn't agree.
You know, we have spent 30 billion dollars, and we are in
debt 14 trillion right now on our children, and we have only
got pamphlets to show for this since it came out in the '90s.
And we needed this hearing today, and we are going to have
other hearings that will give those other folks a chance to
justify their findings and answer the question just like you
all have. We are going to put them under oath. I hope they will
come. I hope they are as kind as you all have been in giving us
your time. And I certainly want to thank you for that.
And I will just close with this. I was a paperboy in the
'30s, and I served Bonnie and Clyde one time from a drugstore.
I gave them curb service. They wanted two Coca-Colas, a carton
of Old Golds and all of the newspapers we had. And--anyway, I
called the Greenville Police--it was just one road from Los
Angeles to Miami then, that was Route 66, came right through my
town--told them that they were headed in that direction. And
they said, well, dogs been killing some sheep out on the north
part of town. We are going out there and shoot them dogs, so--
you can always do the wrong thing with good information.
But we also had--let me finish. I haven't used up all my
time. We also had a fellow named Dr. Something that came to
Dallas with something that we had never heard of before. He was
a weather predictor, and he had a sling cyclometer. My God, I
had no idea what it was, but he would use that sling cyclometer
six o'clock every morning on WORR and tell what the weather
was.
Now, we used the word maverick up there. There was a
maverick projector up at Paris, Texas. He listened to him, and
he predicted just the opposite. He didn't have a sling
cyclometer or anything, and he was right 80 percent of the
time. I guess that is the way it goes.
Thank you very much for your time. Thank all of you, and I
thank you for your valuable testimony and answering the
questions. The Members of this Committee may have additional
questions for any one of you, and we will ask you to respond to
those in writing. Record will remain open for two weeks for
additional comments from Members. Witnesses are excused, and
this hearing is adjourned.
Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
Appendix I:
----------
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Dr. J. Scott Armstrong, Professor of Marketing,
the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
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Responses by Dr. Richard Muller, Professor of Physics, University of
California,
Berkeley and Faculty Senior Scientist, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory
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Responses by Dr. John Christy, Director, Earth System Science Center,
University of Alabama in Huntsville
Questions submitted by Chairman Ralph Hall
Q1. In your testimony, you describe that lead authors of IPCC chapter
are usually experts in the field the chapter discusses. While this
would make sense on its face, you also state that since the lead author
has essentially the final say on what goes in the chapter, it creates a
conflict of interest if there is information submitted that is counter
to the views of the lead author.
a. How could the process be changed to remove that conflict of
interest and allow for differing views to be incorporated into the
final product?
A1 (a) I have suggested a number of ways to improve the process. First
is to remove the controlling bureaucracy from being led out of the U.N.
Second is to create an electronic climate assessment system in which
there is much greater transparency and acceptance of alternate views
with the decision-process for conclusions made visible to the
community. Third, is to explicitly provide a means, i.e. a chapter or
two, whereby alternate views to be expressed (which to date have been
shut out) by credentialed scientists which deal with the scientific
evidence for, as examples, low climate sensitivity, inappropriate
paleo-reconstructions, the role of natural unforced variability, and
the lack of evidence for catastrophic weather and climate developments.
Oversight would be governed by those who do not have an agenda to
promote (i.e. no conflict of interest), but are careful to see that
fairness is adhered to. For an issue that has such tremendous impact on
the economy, the Congress needs to see the full range of evidence
regarding climate change. Given the lack of diversity in the current
IPCC process, I would recommend the U.S. congress ask for its own
assessment developed along the lines above. Please note that those who
perform research under federal programs may be viewed as ``conflicted''
because the current system is biased to support those trying to make a
case for dangerous human-induced climate change rather than
understanding natural, unforced variability.
b. Has there been anything suggested to or adopted by the IPCC that
would alleviate this conflict of interest problem?
A1 (b) I understand that there is a new document that appears to make
some effort at reducing conflict of interest problems (see discussion
here http://rogerpielkejr.blogspot.com/2011/04/ipccs-proposed-coi-
policy.html). However, as suggested in Pielke's report, rulings
regarding COI will be rather non-transparent. And, as mentioned, one
wonders if scientists who are government employees or do research on
government grants (of governments with strong agendas regarding
greenhouse-gas controls) would ever qualify as not having COI. I
suspect not much will actually change here as the IPCC continues to be
led by an establishment of scientists and bureaucrats who believe
humans are having a catastrophic impact on the climate system and who
desire strong greenhouse gas controls. It is important to remember that
the IPCC provides one view of climate change and that there are other
views equally backed-up by evidence but which have been marginalized or
eliminated from the IPCC venue. As such, at least one other venue
independent from the IPCC, such as a ``Red Team,'' is necessary.
c. Have other lead authors expressed this concern or pointed out this
deficiency as well?
A1 (c) I would point to Dr. Richard Lindzen and Dr. Richard Tol as two
former Lead Authors of the IPCC and Roger Pielke Sr as a former CCSP
Lead Author who are critical of the methodology and conclusions of the
IPCC. This may seem to be a small group, however, scientists critical
of the IPCC process are, in effect, excluded from the opportunity to
serve as Lead Authors since the IPCC itself selects whom they want.
There are certainly many other scientists who were never asked to serve
as Lead Authors whose credentials are exemplary and are well-qualified
to provide climate science information.
Q2. You discuss in your testimony Climategate email exchanges between
the lead author in the third assessment report with other scientists
regarding the Hockey Stick graph.
a. Are you aware of any group discussion about this matter with all
the lead authors and coauthors present?
A2 (a) To my knowledge, the elimination of the ``decline'' in Briffa's
tree-ring data was not discussed with all of the Lead Authors in an
open session--I certainly don't recall such a discussion. From the now
exposed email evidence, the deletion of the Briffa data (because it
disagreed with the Hockey Stick) occurred in late Sept. 1999 -after the
IPCC meeting in Arusha Tanzania and before the meeting in Auckland NZ--
through behind -the-scenes email discussions. These behind-the-scenes
exchanges were never entered into the formal review process.
b. Does the IPCC spell out a process requiring discussion of an issue
like this between all the authors or is there no process at all thereby
allowing a great amount of discretion to the lead author?
A2 (b) Controversies were intended to be discussed in the open.
However, much of what the Lead Authors did for the IPCC was rather ad
hoc, and of course done on a voluntary basis (if one is not a
government scientist.) At the time of the writing of the TAR, the Lead
Authors had considerable authority over the text and the review
process, and there was really no serious oversight on what individuals
did relative to formal review procedures. In this case a Lead Author
with some close associates somehow managed to truncate data without the
rest of the Lead Authors' knowledge.
c. The IPCC has stated it has changed some of its processes in
response to the report by the Interacademy Council. Was this process
deficiency addressed in the changes recently implemented?
A2 (c) Yes and no. The IPCC has announced changes, but it remains to be
seen how openly and honest the authors will be or how well they will
adhere to the new guidelines including rules about conflict-of-
interest. It must be understood that the IPCC is a well-established
organization with a need to affirm its past activity and to bolster the
perception that its documents are the best science on climate change
available today. The IPCC will continue to control its own message, and
will do so by selecting Lead Authors who will support this emphasis.
That basically implies that they will not address past failures and
will seek to make ever-more confident announcements about their view of
climate change. This is one of the reasons that a separate climate
science assessment be initiated with one of its missions to expose past
IPCC failures (which the IPCC will not do on its own, e.g. the Hockey
Stick and the Yamal paleo-record.)
Q3. I'd like to ask you about the ``hide the decline'' trick referred
to in the Climategate emails.
a. Am I correct in saying that this trick was to use tree ring data to
show temperature changes, but only up to a certain date, after which
satellite or surface temperature data was used to finish the graph?
A3 (a) There are three issues tied up together here that are discussed
to some extent in the Climategate emails. (1) The first issue concerns
the problem created when Mann's Hockey Stick and the Briffa's tree ring
result did not agree--Briffa's result showed a decline in temperatures
after 1960. But, Briffa's result was legitimately constructed and
published. To avoid showing this disagreement, the Briffa result was
simply chopped off after 1960 to ``hide the decline'' so it wouldn't
disagree with the Hockey Stick. (2) The second issue then dealt with
the splicing of thermometer readings into the various proxy depictions
in one way or another even though the proxy records didn't agree with
the thermometer records. This gave the impression of a rapidly rising
temperature after 1960 even though the proxy records did not have such
a feature. To describe this as a ``trick'' is accurate. (3) The third
issue deals with the Hockey Stick itself and the poor mathematics and
data utilized in that product.
b. How would one be able to discern what part of the data set was from
proxy data and what part was from real measurements?
A3 (b) One would never know about the real measurements from the Briffa
proxy dataset because they were amputated after 1960. The intentional
splicing-in of instrumental data was done in various ways at various
times during this period, so I can't be more specific here. However,
the splicing was a relatively minor problem compared with the brutal
truncation of data after 1960 in Briffa's dataset and the poor analysis
that went into the Hockey Stick.
c. Is this accepted scientific practice?
A3 (c) Eliminating data which were never shown to be ``wrong'' is not
acceptable scientific practice, indeed this is the antithesis of the
scientific method. Splicing instrumental data onto proxy data in this
way is comparing apples to oranges, and not acceptable in my view.
Q4. The IPCC describes itself as a scientific organization. Would you
agree with this characterization? If not, how would you describe the
IPCC and the assessment reports it generates?
A4. The IPCC is an organization of IPCC-selected authors and editors,
many of whom are scientists. The IPCC is not a scientific organization
in the sense that it does not sponsor or perform scientific research.
See also response to 2.c. above. The assessment reports by the IPCC are
simply one version of climate science generated by a U.N. body and do
not represent the complete view of evidence on climate change.
Q5. The 2006 National Academies report on temperature reconstructions
indicated that there were methodological problems in reconstructions
that have led to uncertainties which were subsequently underestimated.
Although you did not participate in the Fourth Assessment Report, did
you find that these methodological problems were addressed by the IPCC
when they reviewed temperature reconstructions? Or did the
reconstructions used in the IPCC report reflect the same deficiencies
identified by the National Academies report?
A5. I participated in the AR4 (Fourth Assessment Report) as a
``Contributing Author'', however, I did not participate in the section
referred to in this question (reconstruction of paleo-temperatures.)
What was disappointing in the AR4 was the fact they did not address the
problems from the previous IPCC report (outlined in the NAS report)
concerning the Hockey Stick and ``hide the decline'' even though they
were asked to do so in the review process. In AR4, they continued to
NOT show the full Briffa tree ring series, (i.e. continuing to ``hide
the decline.) This truncation of data was done over and over -see
Briffa and Osborn (Science 1999), Jones et al (Rev Geophys 1999),
Briffa et al (JGR 2001) Plate 3, Jones et al 2001 Plate 2A, Briffa et
al 2004 Figure 8, Hegerl et al Figure 5b. (CRU conceded most of this in
their March 1, 2010 submission to Muir Russell, see page 38). [From
http://climateaudit.org/2011/03/31/disinformation-from-kerry-emanuel/ ]
There continued to be another important deficiency, only obliquely
mentioned in the NAS report, regarding proxy reconstructions and the
common practice of selective use of tree rings (Yamal) which bolstered
a Hockey Stick shape while ignoring much larger and robust tree ring
samples (Polar Urals and Taimyr) which did not support Hockey Sticks
(see http://climateaudit.org/2011/04/09/yamal-and-hide-the-decline/ ).
This amounts to selective use of input data to provide an output that
is agreeable to the researcher. The IPCC AR4 did not address this
selective use of data. As one paleoclimate researcher (Jan Esper)
astoundingly admitted, ``The ability to pick and choose which samples
to use is an advantage unique to dendroclimatology.'' Picking and
choosing allows the bias of the scientist to create the result he/she
desires but this is not the way science should be performed.
Q6. In your testimony, you describe a situation where text was
inserted by the lead authors after the close of peer review. Could you
please elaborate how the peer review process in the IPCC is supposed to
work and its importance to the legitimacy of the overall assessments?
A6. Fundamentally, the way the IPCC review process works is ``trust us,
we are Lead Authors.'' In this sense, the IPCC peer-review process
boils down to whether a Lead Author can be completely objective about
the material. As indicated elsewhere, this was not to be.
It must be understood that the IPCC is not a peer-reviewed document in
the classical sense. The Lead Authors of the IPCC KNOW that their work
will be published, largely as they wish it to be published. One would
hope that the Lead Authors would accommodate the reviewer comments in
fairness, even if they did not agree with them. However, having the
``final word'' after the review is closed prevents this fairness from
occurring. Then, one would hope that the handful of IPCC Review Editors
would raise red flags when something was amiss. However, Review Editors
were largely ineffective since the Lead Authors were the main
authorities for determining the content. Indeed, in an email from IPCC
Chair Susan Solomon who responded to a question (arising out of a FOI
request from David Holland) states on 14 Mar 2008 the following:
The review editors do not determine the content of the chapters.
The authors are responsible for the content of their chapters and
responding to comments, not REs [Review Editors]. Further explanations,
elaboration, or re-interpretations of the comments or the authors
responses, would not be appropriate.
In the way that the IPCC operates, it really comes down to whom the
IPCC selects to serve as Lead Authors as to the type of content and
emphasis contained in the final report. As I've noted several times in
the past, there was a disturbing homogeneity-of-thought in those who
were selected in the AR4 and now AR5.
In the case referred to here concerning Ross McKitrick, the IPCC
authors made a specific, but unsubstantiated, statistical claim in
response to criticism of their own dataset. This was done perhaps to
give them the comfort of providing cover for their own work, but to
which they knew there would be no rebuttal since the IPCC ``expert
peer-review'' process was over. It was only through the incredible
efforts of McKitrick that the information was eventually published
(McKitrick, R., 2010: Atmospheric oscillations do not explain the
temperature-industrialization correlation. Statistics, Politics and
Policy, Vol 1, No. 1, July 2010) which demonstrated the IPCC authors
apparently fabricated their response for the official text (see also
McKitrick, Ross R. (2011) ``Bias in the Peer Review Process: A
Cautionary and Personal Account'' in Climate Coup, Patrick J. Michaels
ed., Cato Inst. Washington DC.)
During the Muir Russell Inquiry in the UK, IPCC Author Jones was asked
if he could produce the statistical basis of the claim he and his
chapter coauthors had inserted. He was unable to do so, and even
claimed no such evidence was necessary (http://www.cce-review.org/
evidence/15%20April%20Jones%20follow%20up.pdf). The peer review process
at academic journals would almost surely have prevented unsubstantiated
material like this from going into print. By contrast the IPCC process
shielded it from review. For this reason the current IPCC process
should be seen as detracting from the legitimacy of the overall
assessment, and certainly does not qualify as peer-reviewed science in
the traditional sense.
Q7. Dr. Christy, you state that the current establishment dismisses
information that questions the belief that greenhouse gases are the
dominant cause of observed climate change. Would you agree that a
generally accepted methodology of the scientific process is that
theories gain credibility if they are rigorously tested, supported by
multiple lines of evidence and can rule out competing explanations? If
that is the case, can the actions of the climate establishment of
dismissing contrary information be considered as ruling out competing
explanations? How is this not adhering to the accepted process of
scientific inquiry?
A7 Dismissing contrary evidence based on opinion does not qualify as
rigorous hypothesis testing of multiple lines of evidence. If the
question here refers to the disagreement between models and
observations regarding temperature trends in the tropics, the evidence
is substantial that models fail a direct hypothesis test. Multiple
publications and multiple lines of evidence have demonstrated this
disagreement. However, the IPCC establishment seems to be impenetrable
to these results because they demonstrate a critical model failure -
and models are the basis for the IPCC alarm.
Q8. For its endangerment finding, EPA relied heavily on the IPCC and
the U.S. Climate Change Science Program and the U.S. Global Change
Research Program.
a. Are these groups independent of each other?
A8 (a) Absolutely not. If one reads the authorship and those who had
key roles in drafting these various reports, one will find the same
names again and again and the same material used in all three.
b. Can you tell us how much of the information generated for the IPCC
came from the U.S. programs and vice versa?
A8 (b) With regard to the one CCSP (U.S. Program report) addressing
surface and upper air trends, the CCSP report came out first, and the
IPCC adopted it almost entirely.
Regarding the EPA report in general, the Finding indicates at the
outset that it relied on the IPCC for the basis of its conclusions.
Q9. During the hearing, you mentioned that you have estimated the
impact of the proposed reductions in U.S. greenhouse gas emissions on
the global temperature. Can you provide your analysis for the record?
a. What climate sensitivity is assumed in your analysis? Why did you
choose that level?
A8 (a) The result above uses the IPCC median climate sensitivity (about
+3.0 +C for CO2 doubling) and shows virtually no impact even
with drastic emissions reductions from the United States and even if
one accepts the IPCC model simulations. This climate sensitivity was
selected as it was the ``best estimate'' used in the IPCC assessment.
This result uses the sensitivity that is closer to that which has been
observed (about +1.5 +C for CO2 doubling), and shows even
less impact from drastic U.S. emission reductions (0.07 +C by 2100 for
50% reduction and 0.11 +C for 80% reduction.)
Both studies utilize the MAGICC climate model tool also used by the
IPCC.
Questions submitted by Representative Randy Neugebauer
Q1. Supporters for a political action sometimes utilize extreme and
alarmist actions to gain favor with the public in order to encourage
government officials to act. Does the science currently available to us
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that human activity will result in
catastrophic and irreversible climate changes and disasters in the very
near future?
A1. In my opinion the evidence does not support catastrophic and
irreversible climate changes due to enhanced greenhouse gas
concentrations. I have examined numerous datasets of such ``change''
parameters (i.e. temperature, storms, tornadoes, snowfall, hurricanes,
etc.) and do not find remarkable changes outside of natural
fluctuations. Indeed, direct calculations of one key aspect of climate
sensitivity indicate the climate is not very sensitive to rising
greenhouse gases.
Q2. Even if one believes that human activity makes some contribution
to changes in the environment, is it possible to be fully confident
that it is the one driving force behind those changes or is the
modeling of such change too complicated?
A2. The climate system is extraordinarily complex, and no one can say
for certain what the cause and effects are when it comes to any
particular observation or whether greenhouse gases might be partly
responsible. Thus attributing an observed change in climate to
greenhouse gases is almost impossible to do. This is so because similar
events (i.e. a few-decade rise in temperature, a series of storms,
etc.) have occurred in the past so that an increase in greenhouse gases
can't be blamed. This provides evidence that greenhouse gases might not
be the guilty party in any current ``change.'' Fundamentally, natural,
unforced variability is a key and large uncertainty in any attribution
exercise. The climate system contains within it all of the freedom to
generate extreme events or long-term trends through natural, unforced
variability. And, since such variability is poorly modeled, one cannot
assume climate models tell the truth about cause and effect.
Questions submitted by Representative David Wu
Q1. If you surveyed climate scientists in 1990 and then again in 2010,
would the results indicate:
a. an increased consensus that climate change has been occurring?
A1 (a) ``Consensus'' is a political notion, not a scientific notion,
thus the question deals with a political idea and is mostly irrelevant
to science. I would speculate that every scientist would say that
climate change is occurring because the climate is never stationary -
it is always changing (with or without human intervention.) No matter
what period one might choose from the history of our planet, one would
find a changing climate.
b. that climate change is due to an increase in greenhouse gases?
A1 (b) What scientists believe as expressed in polling exercises and
what is real can often be two different things. I have not seen
specific polling data on this question (nor do I suspect the term
``climate scientist'' is ever accurately assessed.) This is a rather
odd question as it asks for survey of opinion rather than hard facts.
However, I can speculate that a majority of those individuals who
thought of themselves as climate scientists in 1990 and still do in
2010 would tend to think that increasing GHG concentrations is at least
partly a cause of some temperature rise (whether that might be called
``climate change'' is another matter.)
c. that the increase in greenhouse gases is primarily due to human
activity?
A1 (c) Without any regard for what the climate might be doing, it is
clear that the increase in GHG concentrations is due primarily to human
progress through (again primarily) carbon-based energy production which
is directly related to the improvement of human civilization and the
reduction of the terrible consequences of energy poverty. The human
desire to be free from the poverties of food, health care, light,
transportation, etc. is exceedingly strong, and it is energy that
alleviates those poverties.
Questions submitted by Representative Donna F. Edwards
Q1. Have you ever received either direct or indirect compensation for
any of your research, analyses, publications, testimony or a speech in
any form, at any entity, by a company, trade association, institute or
foundation that is represented, supported or funded by the oil, coal or
energy industry?
A1.:
Research-No.
Analysis-No.
Publications-I don't believe so.
Testimony-No.
Speeches-My policy is that I do not take honoraria for
speeches that may be viewed as supported by the energy industry. It is
possible that in 2003 I received an honorarium from participating in a
debate (i.e. not a speech) sponsored in part by the CATO Institute.
Q2. If you answered yes to question number one above please indicate:
A2 I have not found records of the 2003 event noted above, but will try
to answer.
a. The name of the entity that provided this compensation?
A2 (a) CATO
b. The year it was provided?
A2 (b) 2003
c. The amount of compensation?
A2 (c) I don't remember
d. A brief description of what specifically you were compensated for
doing?
A2 (d) I participated as one side of a debate about climate change.
Q3. Please indicate if you have ever appeared as an expert witness in
a civil or criminal court case?
A3. Yes, as an expert witness in U.S. District Court, Case Number 2:05-
CV-302 and 2:05-CV-304.
Q4. If you answered yes to question #3 above please indicate:
a. The name of the court case?
A4 (a) Green Mountain Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge-Jeep v. George Crombie,
et al.
b. The name of the court where the case was held?
A4 (b) United States District Court for the District of Vermont
c. The name of the plaintiff or defendant that you testified for?
A4 (c) Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep; Green Mountain Ford
Mercury' Joe Tornabene's GMC; Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers;
Daimlerchrysler Corporation; and General Motors Corporation
d. Please indicate the amount of compensation you received either
directly or indirectly for your testimony in each case mentioned above
and the name of the entity that paid your compensation.
A4 (d) No compensation for the testimony.
Responses by Mr. Peter Glaser, Partner, Troutman Sanders, LLP
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Responses by Dr. Kerry Emanuel, Professor of Atmospheric Science,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Questions submitted by Chairman Ralph Hall
Q1. You state in your testimony that the controversy over the ``hide-
the-decline'' email is much ado about nothing, and that data excluded
by scientists was ``provably false.'' Dr. Muller had a different take,
stating in a widely circulated Internet video that the ``justification
[for erasing the data] would not have survived peer review in any
journal that I'm willing to publish in.''
a. Please explain how the ``hide the decline'' data is ``provably
false.''
A1. The ``hide the decline'' remark appeared in an informal email
communication and has been widely taken out of context. The graph that
it was referring to was published in Science, among other places, and
Richard Muller has published in that journal. The heart of this issue
is the comparison between directly measured temperature and temperature
inferred from proxies, in this case, tree rings. Proxy inferences are
almost never perfect, and often multiple proxies are used to make the
best possible estimates of temperature in the period before the
instrumental record begins in the middle of the 19th century. There are
certain tree rings, especially in the northern part of Russia , that
agree well with the instrumental record up until about 1960, at which
point they ``decline'' while the directly measured temperature
increases. No one in the climate profession would prefer a proxy-
derived inference to a direct measurement, so when I said that the
proxy records in question were ``provably false'', I meant that they
would be regarded as false by anyone in the profession when they
disagree with directly measured temperature.
The serious question in publishing a proxy with problems such as that
mentioned above is whether to exclude the whole proxy record when it is
demonstrably false for part of the period in question. A case can be
made to omit only the false part of the record, if, for example, there
was something unusual about the period during which the proxy fails. If
the graph is published, it is imperative to state carefully that a part
of the record has been dropped and to state the reasons for dropping
it. In the peer-reviewed literature on this subject, for the most part,
such descriptions were either made explicitly or were implicit, in that
other graphs in the same paper showed the whole record. But in a (non
peer-reviewed) report published by the World Meteorological
Organization in 1999, a graph was presented without such qualifiers.
While graphs are often simplified for non peer-reviewed reports
directed at broader cross-sections of the public, one might
legitimately question the judgment of omitting the qualifiers in this
case. But if this was a conspiracy to deceive, it was poorly conceived
since the graph with the qualifications was (and is) readily available
in published literature for anyone with a serious interest in the
subject.
Q2. In response to comments questioning the independence and
objectivity of the people selected to peer review the EPA's
endangerment finding, the Administrator said that she relied on people
who were familiar with the assessment literature, even if those people
participated in the creation of that assessment literature.
a. Would you consider an editor of a journal having a co-author of a
paper review their own paper and calling it peer review since that co-
author was familiar with the paper an analogous situation to the
actions of the Administrator?
A2 (a) I would not. If I understand the question correctly, the EPA
sought peer review of the EPA's endangerment finding from scientists
some of whom were authors of assessment literature (and not authors of
the endangerment finding). I am not sure why being an author of an
assessment disqualifies one from peer-reviewing an endangerment
finding.
b. Does this practice fall within the normal and accepted processes of
peer-review?
A2 (b) Again, I am not sure how to compare the normal process of peer
review of scientific literature with peer review of a finding by the
EPA. If the peer review of the finding had been conducted by authors of
the finding, this surely would have been outside normal accepted
practice.
Q3. The National Academy of Sciences' (NAS) Guide to Responsible
Conduct in Research states that ``When a scientific paper or book is
published, other researchers must have access to the data and research
materials needed to support the conclusions stated in the publication
if they are to verify and build on that research . . . [G]iven the
expectation that data will be accessible, researchers who refuse to
share the evidentiary basis behind their conclusions, or the materials
needed to replicate published experiments, fail to maintain the
standards of science.'' (http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record
id=12192)
a. What steps can the Federal government take to ensure that these
scientific data sharing standards are upheld and enforced?
A3 (a) In my view, the culture of and policies concerning sharing data
and research materials work quite well in this country. For a more
comprehensive statement of current policy, I refer you to the American
Meteorological Society's statement on this issue, Free and Open
Exchange of Environmental Data:
http://www.ametsoc.org/policy/freeopenexch--final.html
This statement does not cover the issue of the availability of such
items as computer programs and other tools that researchers might
develop in the course of their work. This is murkier territory. For
example, it would be unreasonable for a researcher in chemistry to
demand that another researcher make available his entire experimental
apparatus, though it would not be unreasonable to request a detailed
description of the apparatus. At the moment, most of us consider
computer programs we write to be our own property, but many of us share
them on request anyway.
There are more serious problems in other parts of the world, and in
Europe in particular. In many western European nations, environmental
data collected by governments are regarded as proprietary, and members
of the public, of other nations, and even of scientific research
communities are often forced to purchase the data, sometimes at very
high cost. At the time they purchase the data, they are usually forced
to sign nondisclosure agreements that prevent them from redistributing
the data. Thus they are legally prohibited from giving the data they
purchased to another researcher. Most American scientists (and indeed
many European scientists) hold these policies to be destructive of the
ends of science, and at various times since these policies originated
in the 1980s the U.S. government has pressured governments of western
Europe to abandon them in favor of the U.S. model of free and open
exchange of research data.
b. Should researchers that refuse to uphold the Academies' standard
requiring sharing of data and materials necessary to support research
conclusions continue to receive Federal funding?
A3 (b) In my view, it would be counterproductive to move these issues
into the legal arena. There are some delicate cases where judgment is
called for, so that upholding a simple standard is not always
straightforward. Here is an example: A scientific researcher devotes
many years of his professional life to the development of an instrument
to fly on a space mission. Finally, the mission is flown, and
scientifically valuable data are collected using the researcher's
instrument. Should that data become immediately available to all
researchers, so that the fruits of the instrument designer's labors are
reaped by another researcher? It is the practice, at least here in the
U.S., for the federal agencies that fund the instrument development to
grant the developer a short period of exclusive rights to the data.
This issue is addressed in the above-quoted AMS policy on free and open
exchange of environmental data. I believe that handling issues like
this is best left up to the agencies. I might add that a hypothetical
gross violation of the National Academy policy you quoted in your
question would cast the offender in a very poor light and would almost
certainly induce the agency that funded the collection of the data to
take action. I do not personally know of any instances of this nature
here in the U.S.
c. Should such research be excluded from use in authoritative
scientific assessments such as those prepared by the Academies or the
IPCC?
A3 (c) I find it difficult to imagine that an authoritative assessment
would quote research results that were regarded by the scientific
community as unreproducible. If they did, they would soon be taken to
task for it.
Q4. Dr. Emanuel, you strongly defend the IPCC in your testimony. Our
other witnesses are much more critical. For example, Dr. Christy notes
that ``after the close of peer review, the lead authors inserted text
into the IPCC report that was simply an assertion with no evidence, and
that the assertion was later quoted by the EPA in its Endangerment
Finding.
a. Do you believe it is acceptable for IPCC lead authors to insert
text into IPCC reports outside of the peer review process?
A4 (a) It is important to understand that the IPCC reports are reviews
and syntheses of published articles and reports, and is contributed to
by about 1,200 authors and 2,500 scientific expert reviewers. Without
asking Dr. Christy directly, I cannot be sure what he was referring to,
but I suspect he was talking about the summary for policymakers that is
included in the reports and is the main content on which policy makers
rely as they seldom have time to read the entire report. The authors
and expert reviewers typically contribute to small pieces of the whole
report. The topic of climate science is so broad that there are few if
any individual scientists whose expertise allows them to
comprehensively review the whole report. The summary for policy makers
(to which I think Dr. Christy must be referring) is written after the
main body of the report and summarizes only that material from the body
of the report that the vast majority of contributors agree to, leaving
out the more detailed or controversial aspects. While the language is
necessarily original, it does not introduce any science that is not
contained in the body of the report. Before being accepted by the IPCC,
the summary for policy makers must be agreed to by representatives of
all the governments present at a meeting where the report is finalized.
This makes the summary rather bland, since any points that any
country's representatives regard as controversial or incorrect cannot
be included. Consequently, the summary is frequently criticized by
those representing minority views, but it does contain findings that
are robust enough to be used by policy makers.
b. If it is not acceptable, shouldn't such text be avoided for use by
policymakers? If the IPCC process itself is broken with respect to
peer-review and inclusion of data, why should we have any confidence in
the product that is the result of a broken process?
A4 (b) Please see my response to (4) above. The contributions to the
IPCC report from so many scientists make the report rather
conservative, overly so in the opinion of many scientists. For example,
the most recent report omitted any projected contribution to sea level
rise from oblation of land ice (mainly Greenland and Antarctica). This
may prove to be the main contribution to sea level rise over the coming
centuries.
Q5. You state in your testimony that the four assessment reports
issued by the IPCC continue the conservative tradition of science.
a. Did you believe the IPCC was conservative in its estimate of
Himalayan glacier retreat prior to the discovery and admittance that
this information was incorrect?
A5 (a) The inclusion of an erroneous number in the report is of course
highly regrettable. However, a mistake of this kind should not be
regarded as either a ``liberal'' or a ``conservative'' estimate; it is
simply a wrong number. As I am sure you are aware, the IPCC has taken
concrete steps to reduce the probability of errors of this kind in its
future reports.
b. Did you believe the IPCC was conservative with its inclusion of the
hockey stick in the third assessment report, a graph that has been
subsequently discredited?
A5 (b) While the graph in question has been challenged by a number of
groups and corrections have been made, including in the more recent AR4
report of the IPCC, this does not amount to discrediting the figure in
question. Here is the figure, as published in the IPCC third assessment
report:
By the time of the IPCC Assessment Report 5, criticisms of some of the
proxy-based records of the Third Assessment Report had been addressed,
and other proxy data not available to the TAR had been added:
Comparing the updated figure to the figure published in the IPCCTAR,
it is a subjective judgment whether the TAR figure has been
``discredited''. Certainly, the most important findings, that the
recent temperatures are almost certainly unprecedented over the past
1000 years, and that the recent rate of increase is also unprecedented,
remain intact.
Q6. You note in your testimony that you investigated scientists
working at the University of East Anglia Climate Research Unit (CRU) as
a result of the Climate Gate emails and that you couldn't find any
evidence of scientific misconduct. Below are portions of three emails
out of dozens sent by Phil Jones, the head of CRU, to other climate
scientists:
a. ``Can you delete any emails you may have had with Keith re AR4? ..
Keith will do likewise. Can you also email Gene and get him to do the
same?''
b. ``If they ever hear there, is a Freedom of Information Act now in
the UK, I think I'll delete the file rather than send to anyone . . .
We also have a data protection act, which I will hide behind.''
c. [email from Phil Jones referencing inclusion of papers from rival
scientists in IPCC report]: ``Kevin and I will keep them out somehow-
even if we have to redefine what the peer-review literature is!''
T1These emails are just a sampling, but they include clear actions to
hide scientific information from review, including deleting data in
violation of the Freedom of Information Act, and conspiring to ``re-
define'' peer review literature to block publication of unwanted
science.
Did you consider this correspondence as part of your investigation?
Please explain how each of examples a, b, and c reveal ``no evidence''
of scientific misconduct?
A6. We did not consider this correspondence as part of our
investigation. The investigation of the activities of the CRU was
divided into three parts: the investigation by the House of Commons
Science and Technology Committee, the independent Science Assessment
Panel, and the Independent Climate Change Email Review, headed by Sir
Muir Russell. I served on the second of these, the Science Assessment
Panel, whose charge was to review CRU science as reported in a set of
peer-reviewed publications. As I noted in my testimony, our panel found
no evidence of scientific misconduct. The third investigative body, the
Independent Climate Change Email Review, was charged with investigating
any misconduct revealed by the emails, some of which you quoted above.
Here are the main findings of the Muir Russell Commission quoted
directly from their report \1\ (emphases are as in the original
report):
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Independent Climate Change E-mails Review. http://www.cce-
review.org/pdf/FINAL%20REPORT.pdf
Climate science is a matter of such global importance, that
the highest standards of honesty, rigour and openness are needed in its
conduct. On the specific allegations made against the behaviour of CRU
scientists, we find that their rigour and honesty as scientists are not
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
in doubt.
In addition, we do not find that their behaviour has
prejudiced the balance of advice given to policy makers. In particular,
we did not find any evidence of behaviour that might undermine the
conclusions of the IPCC assessments.
But we do find that there has been a consistent pattern of
failing to display the proper degree of openness, both on the part of
the CRU scientists and on the part of the UEA, who failed to recognise
not only the significance of statutory requirements but also the risk
to the reputation of the University and, indeed, to the credibility of
UK climate science.
And,
On the allegations that there was subversion of the peer
review or editorial process we find no evidence to substantiate this in
the three instances examined in detail. On the basis of the independent
work we commissioned (see Appendix 5) on the nature of peer review, we
conclude that it is not uncommon for strongly opposed and robustly
expressed positions to be taken up in heavily contested areas of
science. We take the view that such behaviour does not in general
threaten the integrity of peer review or publication.
But the Commission did find that CRU scientists were not always
helpful in responding to FoIA and EIR requests:
On the allegation that CRU does not appear to have acted in a
way consistent with the spirit and intent of the FoIA or EIR, we find
that there was unhelpfulness in responding to requests and evidence
that e-mails might have been deleted in order to make them unavailable
should a subsequent request be made for them. University senior
management should have accepted more responsibility for implementing
the required processes for FoIA and EIR compliance.
Personally, I find the language of the scientists you quote to be
vulgar, but talking about taking certain actions in what was considered
to be private and informal email correspondence is not the same thing
as actually taking such actions, and the Muir Russell commission found
no evidence that such actions were taken, though there was on occasion
some unresponsiveness to FoIA requests. As is well known in the U.S.
legal profession, FoIA is frequently used as an instrument of
harassment and there is some indication it was being used this way
against CRU and other scientists. While the language of the CRU
scientists you quoted in your question is certainly unpleasant, it does
not by itself rise to the level of scientific misconduct.
Questions submitted by Ranking Member Eddie Bernice Johnson
Q1. As it has been noted, science is an ever-evolving field and we
should be willing to be flexible in our thinking as the findings of
science change. Dr. Emanuel it is my understanding that you have not
always believed in the linkage between greenhouse gas emissions and
climate change.
a. As a political conservative atmospheric scientist, Dr. Emanuel
please explain your journey to accepting the scientific findings of
climate change.
A1. First let me state that I do not think science is about belief; it
is about evidence. Nor do I think that one's personal politics have
much if anything to do with one's activities as a scientist. When I
first became involved in climate science in the late 1980s, I did not
at the time judge that the evidence then available pointed conclusively
to anthropogenic causes of climate change as it had been delineated at
that time. I recognized, as did all of my peers, that climate theory
had long ago demonstrated that adding long-lived greenhouse gases to
the atmosphere should warm the climate, but the feedbacks were not well
understood, the models at the time were fairly primitive, and proxies
for past climate change were not very well developed. In the mean time,
there have been enormous advances in the field of paleoclimate, in both
simple and complex models, and in satellite-based observations of the
earth. At the same time, another 25 years have been added to the
instrumental record of the earth's climate. The evidence for an
anthropogenic contribution to climate change is now very compelling.
Q2. Dr. Emanuel, in your testimony you stated ``Those nations that are
first to develop sensible technology and policies to deal with climate
change and pollution will likely attain great economic advantages. The
market for clean energy in China alone is of staggering proportions.
Nations that invest in energy research and in novel ideas in such
fields as carbon sequestration and that foster enterprises that are in
a position to sell such technologies to rapidly developing countries
will prosper.''
a. Indeed, there is more we need to learn about climate change but
in your opinion, with what we already know, should we start developing
clean technologies now?
A2. I will answer your question as a citizen who, by profession, knows
something about climate, but I do not claim to be an economist. The
evidence points to an increasing demand for clean energy technology, if
not here in the U.S., then abroad. One does not have to accept the
compelling evidence for anthropogenic climate change to recognize the
growth in this demand. To the extent that enterprises in the U.S. can
meet this demand competitively, they, and by extension the U.S.
economy, should benefit.
Questions submitted by Representative Donna F. Edwards
Q1. Have you ever received either direct or indirect compensation for
any of your research, analyses, publications, testimony or a speech in
any form, at any entity, by a company, trade association, institute or
foundation that is represented, supported or funded by the oil, coal or
energy industry?
A1. No.
Q2. If you answered yes to question #1 above please indicate:
a. The name of the entity that provided this compensation?
b. The year it was provided?
c. The amount of compensation?
d. A brief description of what specifically you were compensated
for doing?
Q3. Please indicate if you have ever appeared as an expert witness in
a civil or criminal court case?
A3. No.
Q4. If you answered yes to question #3 above please indicate:
a. The name of the court case?
b. The name of the court where the case was held?
c. The name of the plaintiff or defendant that you testified
for?
d. Please indicate the amount of compensation you received
either directly or indirectly for your testimony in each case mentioned
above and the name of the entity that paid your compensation.
Questions submitted by Representative James Sensenbrenner
Q1. On page 2 of your written testimony you stated: ``Global climate
models were first developed in the 1960s and have advanced rapidly over
the past few decades; they are used as tools to help us understand and
predict climate, but it is not the case that they are the single or
even most important tool for these purposes.'' Please list what, in
your view, are the main tools for understanding and predicting climate,
and which one is the most important.
A1. The contemporary understanding of climate rests on a number of
important tools:
Basic physics. The physics of radiative and convective
heat transfer were well established more than a century ago. By 1896
the Swedish chemist Svante Arrhenius was able to do a calculation that
doubling the carbon dioxide content of the atmosphere would lead to a
global annual mean temperature increase of 5-6 degrees centigrade. He
did these calculations entirely by hand. Also, the physics governing
the earth's orbit and rotation have established very precisely how the
distribution of sunlight across our planet has changed over geologic
time; together with paleoclimate records (discussed below), this has
allowed us to come to understand the underlying cause of the great
glacial cycles over the past 2 or 3 million years.
The instrumental records of meteorological variables such
as temperature and precipitation. Such records tell us how climate is
changing and together with theory and models allow us, to some degree,
to attribute changes we observe to purely natural, random variability
and to changes in radiative forcing of climate by both natural agents
(such as changing sunlight and volcanic eruptions) and manmade agents
such as greenhouse gases and aerosols.
Paleoclimate records.There have been rapid advances in
paleoclimate techniques and applications over the past few decades. We
have learned, for example, how to use the isotopic composition of ice
and of the fossil shells of microorganisms to estimate temperature and
sea levels of the past. We now have detailed records of sea level and
atmospheric composition going back many hundreds of thousands of years.
We have also started to learn how to use such proxies as tree ring
width and density and coral characteristics to reconstruct records of
temperature going back hundreds of years.
Simple models. Relatively simple models that embody the
basic physics of climate have been used for many decades to help
understand and predict climate change. Some of these are so simple that
they can be solved with paper and pencil; others require very small
computers (e.g. laptops). Among the most important of these are
``single-column'' models that treat the globally averaged atmosphere as
a function of time and altitude. Models like these were a basis for the
first comprehensive study of climate change by the National Academy of
Sciences in 1979 \1\. These models give predictions of the response of
global mean temperature to changing atmospheric composition that are in
good accord with those produced by far more complicated global models.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Carbon Dioxide and Climate: A Scientific Assessment. National
Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., 1979.
Global climate models. As mentioned in my testimony,
these are relative newcomers and allow one to explore the roles of
atmospheric and oceanic transports of heat, water, and momentum and to
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
make predictions of the spatial patterns of climate change.
All of these tools are important in understanding climate and so it
is difficult to rank their importance. But the scientific community
would be concerned about human-induced climate change even if there
were no such thing as a global climate model, based on evidence from
the other approaches listed above.
Q2. On page 3 of your written testimony, you say: ``One of the more
robust consequences of a warming climate is the progressive
concentration of rainfall into less frequent but more intense events.''
a. Are you referring to model projections or observations, or
both?
A3 (a) I am referring to observations, theory, and model projections.
b. Please cite some published literature indicating whether
observed rainfall events have become less frequent and more intense in
the United States over the past century.
A2. Observational evidence that rainfall is becoming more concentrated
into more intense events:
a. Karl, T. R., and R. W. Knight, 1998: Secular trends of
precipitation amount, frequency, and intensity in the USA. Bulletin of
the American Meteorological Society, 79, 231-241.
b. Groisman, P. Y., R. W. Knight, D. R. Easterling, T. R. Karl, G.
C. Hegerl, and V. N. Razuvaev, 2005: Trends in intense precipitation in
the climate record. Journal of Climate, 18, 1326-1350. doi:10.1175/
JCLI3339.1.
Basic theory and the robust response in precipitation in climate
models:
a. Held, I. M., and B. J. Soden, 2006: Robust responses of the
hydrological cycle to global warming. Journal of Climate, 19, 5686-
5699. 1 Carbon Dioxide and Climate: A Scientific Assessment. National
Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., 1979.
Q3. On page 3 of your written testimony, you state: ``The potential
for political destabilization of these regions is large and is matter
of great concern to our Department of Defense, as outlined in their
2007 report National Security and the Threat of Climate Change.'' But,
the inside cover of the report states: ``This document represents the
best opinion of The CNA Corporation at the time of issue''.
a. Is it not true this report was prepared The CBA Corporation,
and not the Department of Defense as implied by your testimony?
A3. Yes, I did quote from a report prepared by the CNA corporation and
thus I stand corrected. (I assume that ``CBA'' in the question is a
typo.) But here is what the Department of Defense had to say in their
February 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review \2\:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
"Assessments conducted by the intelligence community indicate
that climate change could have significant geopolitical impacts around
the world, contributing to poverty, environmental degradation, and the
further weakening of fragile governments. Climate change will
contribute to food and water scarcity, will increase the spread of
disease, and may spur or exacerbate mass migration.
While climate change alone does not cause conflict, it may act as
an accelerant of instability or conflict, placing a burden to respond
on civilian institutions and militaries around the world. In addition,
extreme weather events may lead to increased demands for defense
support to civil authorities for humanitarian assistance or disaster
response both within the United States and overseas.''
Q4. On page 4 of your written testimony you say ``In assessing risk,
scientists have historically been notably conservative. It is part of
the culture of science to avoid going out on limbs, preferring to
underestimate risk to provoking the charge of alarmism from our
colleagues.'' At the same time, on page 3 of written testimony you
quote at length from pages 6 and 7 of the CNA Corporation report
''National Security and the Threat of Climate Change,'' as follows:
A4. Economic and environmental conditions in already fragile areas will
further erode as food production declines, diseases increase, clean
water becomes increasingly scarce, and large populations move in search
of resources. Weakened and failing governments, with an already thin
margin for survival, foster the conditions for internal conflicts,
extremism, and movement toward increased authoritarianism and radical
ideologies. And, The U.S. and Europe may experience mounting pressure
to accept large numbers of immigrant and refugee populations as drought
increases and food production declines in Latin America and Africa.
Q4(b.) Do you personally endorse these forecasts? Would you describe
them as ``conservative''?
A4. Estimating the political and social consequences of climate change
is far removed from my own field of expertise, and so I am not in a
position to assess whether the authors of the CNA or DoD reports cited
in this question and in my response to the previous question are
conservative or not. It has not been my personal observation that,
historically, DoD concerns have been overblown.
Q5. On page 5 of your written testimony you state: ``Consider as an
example the issues surrounding the email messages stolen from some
climate scientists. I know something about this as I served on a panel
appointed by the Royal Society of Great Britain, under the direction of
Lord Oxburgh, to investigate allegations of scientific misconduct by
the scientists working at the Climate Research Unit of the University
of East Anglia.'' Please provide a copy of the terms of reference for
the Oxburgh Panel established by the Royal Society, together with a
copy of the letter or any other correspondence from the Royal Society
appointing you as a member of the panel.
A5. I attach all the relevant material in my possession as a zip file.
I did not include email correspondence but am happy to do so if
requested.
Q6. Page 1 of the ``Report of the International Panel set up by the
University of East Anglia to examine the research of the Climatic
Research Unit, (Oxburgh Report) states that ``the eleven representative
publications that the Panel considered in detail . . . were selected on
the advice of the Royal Society.'' However, subsequent inquiries have
demonstrated that the eleven publications were selected by Trevor
Davies, Pro-Vice Chancellor for Research and Knowledge Transfer at the
University of East Anglia. Please explain the basis for the Oxburgh
Report's claim that the eleven publications had been selected by the
Royal Society.
A6. As a member of the Scientific Assessment Panel (SAP), I was indeed
asked to review eleven publications and was told that they had been
selected with the advice of the Royal Society. I had no reason to
question this information. In the event, we went beyond this mandate
and asked questions based on other material we reviewed.
Q7. During the hearing you were asked if the Oxburgh Panel interviewed
any outside critics of the Climatic Research Unit of the University of
East Anglia (CRU).
a. Can you confirm that neither you nor any other member of the
Oxburgh Panel conducted any such interviews, and that none of the
information supplied to you by CRU scientists was shown to outside
critics for response or rebuttal?
A7 (a) Prior to the meeting, I informally sent emails to two critics of
the CRU work asking for their input. Specifically, I sent emails to
Roger Pielke, Sr. and Stephen McIntyre, on March 27th 2010. (I am
willing to supply the Committee with copies of these emails.) Dr.
Pielke responded very soon thereafter with material that I found very
helpful in querying CRU members about corrections to individual
meteorological station data. Mr. McIntyre did not respond until after I
had returned from Norwich, and then only to say that he would see what
he could do.
b. If, as you state on page 5 of your written testimony, the Panel's
task was to ``investigate allegations of scientific misconduct,'' did
any member of the Panel, at any time, recommend that, as part of the
investigation, interviews should be conducted with critics of the CRU
or with individuals making the allegations of misconduct?
A7 (b) The allegations of misconduct at that time focused on comments
by CRU staff contained in email correspondence. Reviewing such emails
was not in the purview of the SAP on which I served but rather on the
Independent Climate Change Email Review, headed by Sir Muir Russell.
(Please see by response to Question 6 of Representative Hall.) I do not
remember hearing a specific suggestion that we conduct interviews of
critics of CRU, though we were familiar with the points raised by such
critics.
c. Did any member of the Panel request that interviews with the
scientists under investigation be recorded and released?
A7 (c) No, not that I remember.
d. Can you also confirm that the Panel did not issue a call for
evidence or hold public hearings, and if not, why not?
A7 (d) There was never any discussion by anyone involved about a call
for evidence or a public hearing. Having participated on both sides of
academic department reviews at MIT, these have never been open to the
public; doing so would have greatly impeded the frank discussion and
questions that are necessary to the conduct of a review of this nature.
This was an investigation, not a trial.
e. Do you believe that you, as a member of the Panel, were
sufficiently knowledgeable about the work of CRU scientists and the
specific allegations of misconduct to evaluate the truthfulness of the
information given to you by CRU scientists without seeking input from
any of their critics?
A7 (e) As mentioned in my response to 7a) above, I did seek information
from critics, though only one of the two responded. Moreover, the
criticisms were made public at an early stage, so that in my
preparation for the panel review, I became well acquainted with most of
them. Therefore, yes, I feel that by the time of the panel meeting, I
was sufficiently knowledgeable about at least some of the work of the
CRU scientists to participate in the Panel.
Q8. Did Phil Jones tell the Oxburgh Panel (or any members of Panel)
that it was ``probably impossible to do the 1000-year temperature
reconstructions with any accuracy''?
a. If so, why was this admission not cited in the Oxburgh Report?
A8 (a) I do not remember Phil Jones saying that.
b. If this is Jones' view, do you agree that this caveat should have
been included in articles published by CRU scientists, and that the
failure to include this caveat is not ``compatible with a fair
interpretation-of the original data''?
A8 (b) The published, peer-reviewed literature of the CRU group and
their collaborators is mostly about uncertainties. As the review panels
have consistently noted, there was no failure to communicate these
uncertainties. Please look at Figure 1 in my response to the questions
posed by Representative Hall; this is the famous ``hockey stick'' graph
from the IPCC Third Assessment Report; the gray shading shows the range
of uncertainty in the estimates. Indeed, the title of one of the
original and most cited papers on the temperature reconstructions,
published in 1999, is ``Northern hemisphere temperatures during the
past millennium: Inferences, uncertainties, and limitations''.
Q9. Upon the completion of the Oxburgh Report, did you tell a
colleague that there were some ``real issues with TAR that needed to be
investigated, but that these were beyond the purview of the
committee.'' If so, please identify these issues.
A9. I do not remember saying that, but if I did say anything like that
I must have been referring to the ``hockey stick'' figure in the IPCC
TAR and whether that figure had been adequately documented.
Q10. On page 5 of your written testimony, you stated that CRU
scientists had ``omitted that part of [a particularly dubious tree-
ring-based proxy] that was provably false'' in a ``figure for a non
peer-reviewed publication'' and that this was a ``single lapse of
judgment''.
a. Are you referring to the graph prepared by Phil Jones for the
cover of a 1999 World Meteorological Organization (WMO) report?
A10 (a) Yes.
b. Can you confirm that the ``particularly dubious'' tree ring proxy
is the ``Briffa'' temperature reconstruction?
A10 (b) Yes.
c. Can you confirm that the part of the Briffa reconstruction that
CRU scientists ``omitted'' in the WMO diagram was the portion of the
Briffa reconstruction after 1960 when tree ring densities declined?
A10 (c) Yes.
d. You say that this was a ``single lapse of judgment''. At the
interviews of the Oxburgh Panel that you attended, did you or any other
Oxburgh Panel member ask CRU scientists asked whether they had
``omitted'' the declining part of the Briffa reconstruction in any
peer-reviewed publication? If so, what was their answer?
A10 (d) Discussion of the ``divergence problem'' was a focus of our
meeting.
e. Did the Oxburgh Panel perform any due diligence to determine
whether CRU scientists had ``omitted'' the declining part of the Briffa
reconstruction in their peer reviewed publications? If so, what were
the results?
A10 (e) It was well known prior to the meeting that they had done this,
but we re-confirmed it with them.
f. When you made your testimony that the omission in the WMO report
was a ``single lapse of judgment,'' were you aware that CRU scientists
had ``omitted'' the declining part of the Brfffa reconstruction in
figures in numerous peer reviewed publications, including P.D. Jones et
al., Rev. Geophys., 37(2), 173 (1999); K.R. Briffa and TJ. Osborn,
Science 295, 2227 (1999); K.R; Briffa et al., J. Geophys. Res. 106,
2929 (2001); K.R. Briffa et al., Global Planet. Change 40, 11; and S.
Rutherford et aI., J. Clim. 18, 2308 (2005)?
A10 (f) Yes, certainly.
g. When you made your testimony that the omission in the WMO report
was a 'single lapse of judgment'', were you aware that the declining
part of the Briffa reconstruction had been omitted in figures in the
IPCC Third Assessment Report and the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report?
A10 (g) Yes, certainly.
h. Do you still maintain that the deletion of data was a ``single
lapse of judgment'' and that it was only in connection with one ``non
peer-reviewed publication'' and if so, what is your justification?
A10 (h) The error in judgment was not the omission of the data from the
graph. There are many instances in the published proxy literature in
which authors omitted data that in their judgment was flawed. The error
in judgment was the failure, in the case of the 1999 WMO report to
explain that that had been done and the basis for doing so, either
explicitly in the report or paper or by virtue of the context in which
the graph is presented. As far as I can tell, this failure was confined
to the 1999 WMO report and possibly the IPCC TAR. My opinion is shared
by the Muir Russell Commission (which I did not participate in); here
is what they had to say about this in their report (emphasis theirs):
On the allegation that the references in a specific e-
mail to a ``trick'' and to ``hide the decline'' in respect of a 1999
WMO report figure show evidence of intent to paint a misleading
picture, we find that, given its subsequent iconic significance (not
least the use of a similar figure in the IPCC Third Assessment Report),
the figure supplied for the WMO Report was misleading. We do not find
that it is misleading to curtail reconstructions at some point per se,
or to splice data, but we believe that both of these procedures should
have been made plain--ideally in the figure but certainly clearly
described in either the caption or the text.
i. On page 5 of your written testimony you described the editing of
the Briffa tree ring record as follows: ``Rather than omitting the
entire record of a particularly dubious tree-ring-based proxy, the
authors of the figure only omitted that part of it that was provably
false.'' Did the Oxburgh Panel carry out any due diligence to establish
that this portion of the Briffa reconstruction was ``provably false''?
Please provide support for your claim.
A10 (i) I do not recall whether we did or did not, but at any rate when
proxy inferences and direct measurements disagree, one concludes that
the proxies are in error.
j. In your testimony, you state that the Briffa tree ring data was
``particularly dubious'' and that it would have been a valid
alternative not to show the Briffa reconstruction at all. Did the
Oxburgh Panel carry out any due diligence to establish that the Briffa
data was ``particularly dubious,'' and if, what did it do?
A10 (j) Yes, we did. We spent considerable time with Keith Briffa
discussing the methodology, the environment in which the trees in
question were found. We even examined some tree sections under a
microscope. A great deal of the meeting was spent discussing the so-
called ``divergence'' problem, which is well known in the community and
discussed extensively n the peer-reviewed literature. By no means all
of the tree data show the divergence problem.
k. In light of the failure of the large Briffa proxy network to show
increases in tree ring density and width in line with warming in the
last half of the 20th century (the ``divergence problem ''), how do you
rule out the possibility that proxy data in the preinstrumental period
might also fail to record historical warming intervals?
A10 (k) This is an excellent question and drives to the heart of the
true scientific controversy as well as the judgments that were brought
to bear in portraying this information in the IPCC report and other
reports intended for a broad audience. The simple answer is that one
cannot rule out the possibility that the proxy data in question in the
preinstrumental period might also fail to show a warming. There is no
such thing as a perfect proxy for past climates; all of the ones I am
familiar with have their own drawbacks. This provides a strong
motivation for looking at many different proxies based on different
techniques and comparing the results; by doing this one gains some idea
of the probable uncertainties in the temperature reconstructions. The
last two IPCC reports presented information based on many proxies, and
by showing these different proxies explicitly (in the case of the IPCC
AR4) or indirectly by presenting error bars (in the case of the IPCC
TAR), the uncertainty is conveyed. Please examine the two figures I
provided in my responses to Representative Hall.
l. By deleting the most conspicuous modern divergences between
proxies and temperatures in IPCC and WMO reports, would you agree that
the CRU scientists concealed this problem from readers of the IPCC
report and from policymakers?
A10 (l) I see no evidence that there was any intent to deceive, as
implied by your question. We scientists are increasingly strongly
encouraged to communicate with the public and policy makers and are
frequently chastised for failing to simplify our points and for making
our discussions too technical. In trying to simplify material for
reports such as the two you quote above, intended for a broad audience,
judgments must be made in how far to go to simplify the material. Had
the graphs in the two reports you quote been based on information from
the problematic tree proxies alone, then I think a case could be made
that the graphs are deceptive. But taken in their actual entirety, they
do a good job in summarizing our best estimates of the 1000-year
history of northern hemisphere temperature, including the uncertainties
in those estimates. I do not believe that any rational person examining
these graphs could fail to appreciate the large uncertainties in the
estimates, especially in the preinstrumental era.
Q11. The Oxburgh Report (page 2) states that tree ring chronologies
``are subject to change when additional trees are added'' and
``commended'' CRU for ``continuously updating and reinterpreting their
earlier chronologies.'' The Polar Urals and the regional chronology
combining Yamal, Polar Urals and other chronologies were issues of
controversy immediately prior to Climategate and were identified as
important topics of investigation in submissions to the House of
Commons Science and Technology Committee by prominent CRU critics.
a. If CRU had calculated an updated version of the Polar Urals
chronology presented in K.R. Briffa et al., Nature 376, 156 (1995) that
differed materially from the published version, in your opinion; would
CRU scientists have an obligation under acceptable scientific practice
to report the updated version?
A11 (a) Yes, if by ``updated'' you also mean superior.
b. If CRU had calculated a regional chronology combining the Yamal,
Polar Urals and other shorter chronologies, in your opinion, did CRU
scientists have an obligation under acceptable scientific practice to
report this calculation either in connection with the publication of
regional chronologies in K.R. Briffa et al., Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B
363,2271 (2008) or otherwise?
A11 (b) If they found errors in the original analysis then yes, they
would have an obligation to publish the corrections. If they examined
different data that led to differing conclusions, they should also
publish that unless, in their judgment, the new data is flawed or
inferior to the previously published data.
c. Did any member of Oxburgh Panel ask CRU scientists whether they
had ever calculated an updated version of the Polar Urals chronology?
If so, what was their answer?
A11 (c) Not that I recall.
d. Did any member of the Oxburgh Panel ask CRU scientists whether
they had ever calculated regional chronology combining the Yamal, Polar
Urals and other shorter chronologies? If so, what was their answer?
A11 (d) Not that I recall.
Questions submitted by Represenative David Wu
Q1. If you surveyed climate scientists in 1990 and then again in 2010,
would the results indicate:
a. an increased consensus that climate change has been occurring?
A1 (a) Yes, certainly.
b. that climate change is due to an increase in greenhouse gases?
c. that the increase in greenhouse gases is primarily due to human
activity?
A1 (c) Yes, certainly.
This fact was already well accepted in 1990.
Responses by Dr. W. David Montgomery, Economist
Questions submitted by Chairman Ralph Hall
Q1. In your testimony, you note that access to affordable and abundant
energy, in fact, is clearly correlated with the quality of life enjoyed
by a society. This appears obvious throughout our society. For example,
inexpensive electricity allows refrigerators to prevent food from
spoiling and energy-consuming hospitals save lives with all of their
electronic equipment.
a. Can you provide some other examples of the social benefit of
affordable and abundant energy?
A1 (a) The most important necessities often are the cheapest. Most
people in the United States pay little for water and yet could not live
without it. That is a very desirable state of affairs, as long as the
use of water is not subsidised to encourage wasteful use. Thus we can
say with confidence that what water is worth far exceeds what it costs.
The same is true of energy. Although on the margin, there are
discretionary uses of energy, most of the energy we use makes
contributions to our lives far greater than what we pay for it. Coming
into a warm home in winter is worth far more than the fuel bill, the
flexibility and freedom of travel that we gain from readily available
energy is ``priceless'' as the credit card advertisement puts it, and
raising the price of energy means we must make do with less of these
enjoyments or less of something else. With forces we cannot control
driving up the price of some forms of energy, any government action
that will raise those costs further needs to be scrutinized very
carefully to make sure that it provides more than it takes away from
the American consumer.
b. Do economic models that calculate the cost of climate-related
policies adequately take into consideration the higher social cost
resulting from more expensive energy?
A1 (b) Some do and some do not. Mainstream economic models like EPA's
ADAGE model and the MRN-NEEM model that my colleagues and I have used
in studies of climate policy do so. This class of models recognize that
society's resources are limited, and that choosing to make energy more
expensive will divert those resources away from producing other goods
and services that consumers want. The loss of other good things--or
having to make do with less comfort and convenience from using energy--
is the social cost of more expensive energy. Other models do not. The
kind of models used by organizations like PERI to support claims that
regulations that make energy more expensive also create jobs completely
ignore the social costs of more expensive energy.
Q2. Over 1.6 billion people--25 percent of the world's population--do
not have access to electricity. Many of them soon will, thanks to
expanded use of coal, which is forecast to increase 50 percent by 2030.
The affordable electricity provided by coal will enable economic
development and help alleviate poverty in places such as China, India,
and Africa.
a. How will U.S. efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions have any
impact on climate change give the expected dramatic increases globally?
Should the U.S. impose higher energy costs on its citizens if the
benefits are negligible?
A2. Unilateral actions by the U.S. will not have a noticeable impact on
climate change worldwide, and therefore they can only provide
negligible benefits to U.S. citizens. We do have a responsibility
toward the poor, in the U.S. and worldwide, but policies to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions will do the poor in the United States no good
at all, and worldwide we would do far better to spend what climate
regulations would cost us on direct aid to the neediest.
Q3. Some advocates of international action have pointed to China's
commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions as an indication they are
willing to participate in a binding international agreement. Do you
agree with this hypothesis?
A3. No, nor do I see any evidence of a real commitment by China to
undertake effective policy measures to reduce their emissions below
levels that are already in their economic interest. What we have is a
political statement in the Copenhagen Accords that is neither binding
nor, in terms of its magnitude, likely to represent any sharing of real
costs by China.
Q4. Should China, in response to an international treaty, commit to
some sort of carbon restriction; is there reason to believe China would
adhere to their commitment, given their repeated disregard of other
international agreements, such as enforcement of intellectual property
rights?
A4. No. Indeed there is no reason to believe that any nation will
adhere to the kinds of commitments that are now being discussed in
negotiations to extend the Kyoto Protocol, because just about every
study of how those commitments relate to national interests find that
such an agreement would be unstable. Moreover, it is far from clear
given the nature of the Chinese political system that the central
government could enforce such a commitment even if it did believe it
was in China's national interest. Regional governments in alliance with
their regional industries seem to be the real power in China's economy.
This alliance of government and industry has directed China's growth
since market reforms in the direction of massive investments in heavy
industry, which are largely responsible for the continuing growth in
China's greenhouse gas emissions. They can do so despite creating
massive overcapacity because of the access of local governments to
loans from State banks, which they use to support uneconomic local
industries. Without some way of breaking up this crony capitalism there
is little chance that Beijing could greatly change the direction of
emissions growth in China.
Q5. A lot of discussion relating to mandating a ``clean energy''
market surround the increased manufacturing base that would appear due
to the newly mandated market. Yet, if energy costs increase
substantially, as expected from such a mandate, is there reason to
believe energy-intensive manufacturing companies wouldn't follow
previous industries across the border or overseas?
A5. Absolutely not. Mandating purchases of ``clean energy'' through
regulation is ineffective in creating an increased manufacturing base.
Manufacturing will take place in the region that has the greatest
comparative advantage, and raising energy costs through clean energy
mandates only reduces the U.S. advantage in manufacturing. We are
seeing this already, as a large share of the wind and solar equipment
now being installed in the U.S. as a result of renewable energy
standards is being manufactured overseas. And Europe, despite its
massive subsidies to use of renewable energy, is having the same
problem keeping manufacturing of the equipment at home.
Q6. President Obama recently proposed instituting a ``Clean Energy
Standard'' of 80% energy from clean sources by 2035, presumably with
the goal to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. As an expert economist,
how do you anticipate such a standard would impact the economy?
A6. First, it would be exceptionally difficult to meet because getting
from the current level of renewable use to 80% requires an
unprecedented and premature turnover of the capital stock, the adoption
of very costly or technically unproven technologies, and a level of use
of intermittent and uncontrollable resources like wind and solar that
would threaten the reliability of electricity supply. Moreover, being
renewable does not mean that an energy source is without environmental
problems of its own or that the indirect effects would be benign. The
continued support for corn-based ethanol despite its making global
warming worse and raising the cost of food is a case in point. Taking
all this into account, the result would be a large increase in energy
costs and likely massive unanticipated environmental problems and
impacts on food supply.
Q7. A key assumption in the process of economic modeling is the
availability of carbon offsets. Presumably, widespread availability of
offsets would allow for a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions to be
achieved at a cheaper cost by having another entity do so.
a. Can you outline why you believe carbon offsets will not be as
widely available as assumed by many economic models?
A7. Carbon offsets can either be plentiful or valid, but it is hard to
devise a system that can achieve both those goals. Any carbon offset
represents the difference between what is actually happening and what
would have happened otherwise, and determining that counterfactual is
always to an extent arbitrary and likely to create moral hazards that
lead to gaming the system. Moreover, the most prolific source of
offsets is expected to be from reduced deforestation in developing
countries. But the reason for that deforestation is largely the lack of
adequate institutions like property rights in land and effective
governance in the countries where deforestation is occurring, and
without fundamental institutional change those countries will be unable
to deliver credible offsets. Finally, valid offsets from forestry and
prevented deforestation are likely to be competing with use of land for
food production, and therefore will be costly to the world's food
supply and likely to run into severe opposition when that is realized.
b. Outside of the availability of such offsets, can you comment on the
concept of ``additionality'' and its impact on the ability to produce
tangible environmental benefits?
A7 (b) ``Additionality'' is the requirement that a program bring about
reductions in emissions that would not be achieved in its absence. Some
such requirement is necessary to make sure that there are tangible
environmental benefits, but it is an area where ``the best is the enemy
of the good.'' The tighter the requirement to demonstrate
``additionality,'' the less likely it is that useful real world
measures will be credited with reducing emissions. For example, nuclear
power in the U.S. is an accepted technology so that building additional
nuclear powerplants might not count as ``additional'' emission
reductions, even though significant policy aid is required. Also, in
programs like the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) a project will
satisfy additionality only if it is not economically feasible without
CDM credits. But if a host country adopts a broader policy, such as
raising gasoline taxes, that make some projects economic, they will no
longer qualify. The opposite kind of gaming has been observed in
countries that use different feed-in tariffs to pay for electricity
from different sources; those countries can make any project comply
with the ``additionality'' rules by lowering the feed-in tariff until
it is uneconomic without CDM credits. Thus additionality is a worthy
idea that has produced great mischief in application.
Q8. In your discussion of economic impacts, you neglect to mention the
often-cited ``Stern Report,'' conducted by British economist Nicholas
Stern. Can you mention some of the flaws in the process of the Stern
Report?
A8. Despite the charge to the Stern Commission to review the economic
issues, the Stern Report turned into an advocacy report supporting a
particular set of attitudes toward climate policy. Although there is
some good thinking buried in the body of the report, the overall
summary and in particular its conclusion that the benefits of radically
reducing emissions far exceed the cost are highly misleading. Numbers
are twisted and distorted in ways that have no support in the economics
profession to come up with the conclusion about benefits versus costs,
largely because the report fails to mention that the benefits will
accrue to future generations far richer than ourselves, while the costs
fall on current generations, and that as a percentage of income we give
up far more than the future generations gain. Sir Nicholas organized
reviews of his draft report by leading American environmental
economists, among which I was included, and the universal message to
him was that the calculations in the report were absurd and would
destroy its usefulness in enlightening policy. He ignored that advice.
Q9. A recent report by an English business consulting firm examined
the costs and benefits of government policy to support the renewable
energy industry in United Kingdom. It found that for every job created
in the UK in renewable energy, 3.7 jobs are lost. [http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-12597097]
The primary reasoning in support of this conclusion is that the
opportunity costs associated with pushing consumers to more expensive
renewable energy greatly outstrips any benefit from the creation of
``green jobs.''
a. What is your reaction to this conclusion that the push for ``green
jobs'' is economically damaging?
A9. It is correct. To the extent that renewable energy makes economic
sense, either because it can be produced more cheaply than fossil fuels
or is a cost-effective way to comply with environmental performance
standards, it will be adopted without specific support for renewable
energy. For the most part, neither of these conditions hold. There are
more cost-effective ways to meet environmental goals, and renewable
energy costs significantly more than available alternatives to meet
energy needs.
Questions submitted by Representative Randy Neugebauer
Q1. Dr. Montgomery, even President Obama has said that under his
climate change policies, ``electricity prices would skyrocket.'' Some
estimates of the benefits of even the most drastic climate change
initiatives find that we would abate global temperature increases by
less then one degree Fahrenheit by 2100. Based on the scientific and
economic information we have available to us, how would you describe
the cost-benefit analysis of imposing massive subsidies and mandates on
energy producers and consumers?
A1. The costs are high and the benefits are nearly non-existent.
Although there are many uncertainties and disagreements about climate
science, there is no dispute about two calculations: the U.S. will be
contributing a declining share of global emissions over the next
century no matter what we do, and President Obama's climate policies
will make next to no difference in global concentrations of greenhouse
gases and temperature change. No matter how costs are minimized by
proponents of specific positions, including the frequent statement by
EPA that ``even 1% of GDP is only half of a year's growth'' or Al Gore
that ``it's a postage stamp a day,'' the clear conclusion from the
numbers is that the benefits to the U.S. of those actions are even
smaller.
Questions submitted by Representative David Wu
Q1. If you surveyed climate scientists in 1990 and then again in 2010,
would the results indicate:
a. an increased consensus that climate change has been occurring?
b. that climate change is due to an increase in greenhouse gases?
c. that the increase in greenhouse gases in primarily due to human
activity?
A1. I have seen so many widely differing ``surveys'' purporting to
state the views of ``climate scientists'' that I have no clear answer.
Looking just at historical data, there does appear to be an increasing
likelihood that recent temperatures are not just normal random
fluctuations but it is by no means an unambiguous signal. That an
increase in greenhouse gases in the atmosphere will lead to an increase
in temperature has never been in dispute, at least since Arrhenius.
Whether the increase in greenhouse gases up to now is primarily due to
human activity is a question that I never thought was worth worrying
about, since it is clear that there will at some point in the future be
large increases that are attributable to human activity.
Questions submitted by Representative Donna F. Edwards
Q1. Have you ever received either direct or indirect compensation for
any of your research, analyses, publications, testimony or a speech in
any form, at any entity, by a company, trade association, institute or
foundation that is represented, supported or funded by the oil, coal or
energy industry?
A1. I was employed for most of the past 21 years by a consulting firm,
Charles River Associates, and received all my compensation from that
company. CRA had many clients from the oil, coal and energy industry,
but overall its energy practice represented only a small fraction of
its business.
Q2. If you answered yes to question #1 above please indicate:
a. The name of the entity that provided this compensation?
b. The year it was provided?
c. The amount of the compensation?
d. A brief description of what specifically you were compensated for
doing?
A2. I cannot answer this question. All client engagements were covered
by a confidentiality agreement between CRA and the client, and I am
bound by my own confidentiality agreements with CRA. Even if I were not
under that obligation, I no longer have access to information about
CRA's revenues from any engagement because I am no longer employed by
CRA.
Q3. Please indicate if you have ever appeared as an expert witness in
a civil or criminal court case?
A3. I have.
Q4. If you answered yes to question #3 above please indicate:
a. The name of the court case?
b. The name of the court where the case was held?
c. The name of the plaintiff or defendant that you testified for?
d. Please indicate the amount of compensation you received either
directly or indirectly for your testimony in each case mentioned above
and the name of the entity that paid your compensation.
A4. All the information requested in questions a, b, and c was provided
in my resume delivered to the Committee before my testimony. I am
unable to answer question d. for the same reason that I am unable to
answer question 2. Moreover, since I was paid a salary and bonus at the
discretion of my employer, I have no knowledge of what the connection
between my compensation and any of these engagements might have been.
Nor would it matter, because I have always conducted my own independent
research in every engagement, and stated my own conclusions objectively
and honestly no matter who my client was.
Appendix II
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Additional Material for the Record
Additional Material for the Record
Material Submitted by Chairman Ralph M. Hall
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Material Submitted by Mr. Peter Glaser, Partner, Troutman Sanders, LLP
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Full document can be found at: http://science.house.gov/hearing/full-
committee-hearing-climate-change
Material Submitted by Representative Dana Rohrabacher
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