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**LONG-TERM READINESS CHALLENGES
IN THE PACIFIC**

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD

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LONG-TERM READINESS CHALLENGES IN THE PACIFIC

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 15, 2011.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m. in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

Mr. FORBES. Good afternoon and we are calling this meeting of the Readiness Subcommittee to order. Several of my members will be coming in in a few minutes, so just to let our witnesses know they are in other meetings right now in subcommittees that are overlapping, and also we expect to have a vote probably about 2:30. So we may have to break briefly and go to that vote.

We want to welcome our witnesses here. We think this is going to be a crucial hearing for us on our readiness in the Pacific region. We have three witnesses that bring a great deal of experience and expertise to this issue, and we welcome them here today.

First of all, we have Mr. Michael Schiffer, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, East Asia. Michael, thank you for being here. We are looking forward to your testimony with our members.

We also have Major General Randolph Alles. General, thank you. The General is the Director of J-5 for Strategic Planning and Policy in the U.S. Pacific Command. General, as always, we appreciate your service to our country and we thank you for your willingness to be here today and to lend your expertise to the subcommittee.

And finally, we have the Honorable Jackalyne Pfannenstiel, and thank you for being here, Jackalyne. She is the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy, Installations and Environment.

This subcommittee is unusual in that it is probably one of the most bipartisan subcommittees in Congress. We are all trying to look to make sure that we have answered the question, "Are we ready?" And that is the purpose of the hearing.

My partner in this endeavor and the ranking member from Guam is Madeleine Bordallo, and I would like to defer at this time to Madeleine for her opening remarks.

Ms. Bordallo.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the Appendix on page 35.]

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM GUAM, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate your willingness to hold this hearing on long-term readiness challenges in the Asia-Pacific region, which is certainly very important to me. As we have heard from witnesses in our previous hearings and briefings, this area of the world requires our focus and our attention.

Before I begin with my statement, I would like to recognize the people of Japan and ask that we keep them in our thoughts and prayers as they recover from the horrific tragedy of last week's earthquake and tsunami. These unfortunate events, however, underscore the importance of our alliance and our strong relationship with the Japanese people. Our military forces in Japan are helping with search and recovery efforts. Further, other civilian agencies such as the USAID [United States Agency for International Development] and FEMA [Federal Emergency Management Agency] and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission are assisting Japan.

In the wake of this unfortunate tragedy, we must continue to focus our military resources on this important region of the world. Nearly 42 percent of all U.S. trade occurs with Asian-Pacific nations, which make this area critical to our national economic security.

And I applaud this Administration for its greatly increased focus on the Asia-Pacific region. To highlight this point, one of the first major actions of the Obama Administration was the signing of the so-called Guam International Agreement by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and then-Foreign Minister Nakasone.

However, despite greater focus, we must continue to assess the readiness of our forces to protect our economic, political and other strategic interests in this vital region.

One of the most important strategic matters is continuing to fulfill the United States' obligation under the Guam International Agreement, which is based on the 2005 U.S.-Japan Alliance Transformation and Realignment for the Future Agreement. This agreement outlines the numerous realignments of military personnel in Japan.

Of the greatest impact to Guam is the construction in northern Okinawa of a replacement facility for Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. This new facility will allow the transfer of more than 8,000 marines and nearly 9,000 family members from Okinawa, Japan, to Guam. This committee has been supportive of this strategic realignment in the past, and I hope that we will remain so in the future.

I ask our witnesses today to make clear to the committee the significance of tangible progress by Japan toward the Futenma Replacement Facility and what commitments the United States must make in the meantime to achieve the goal of moving the Marines to Guam.

While dealing with the challenges of the military buildup on Guam, we must not overlook the strategic importance of Guam's location and the value of the freedom of action from bases on Guam. Just this past weekend, several Global Hawks based at Anderson

Air Force Base, Guam, conducted sorties over Japan to assist the region with mapping the destruction caused by the massive tsunami. Our strategic location in the Pacific can never be overstated.

The Governor of Guam, Eddie Calvo, recently signed a Programmatic Agreement with the Department of Defense that outlines a process for consultations to ensure the preservation of certain historic sites and paves the way for spending military construction funding authorized in previous fiscal years. The Administration has budgeted for certain infrastructure support that will help to improve our quality of life on Guam and at the same time enhance the military mission.

Further, the U.S. Government has been successful in obtaining financing for certain other improvement projects on Guam that are needed for the buildup to be successful. However, I remain concerned about the placement of a proposed firing range on Guam and would ask today's witnesses to explain to the committee the strategic necessity of the range site as currently proposed.

Many have questioned whether alternatives to the Route 15 ranges were adequately vetted. There have also been questions raised as to whether the Navy properly examined alternatives that would keep the ranges within their existing footprint, thus negating the need to pursue leasing Government of Guam land adjacent to Route 15.

While I respect the ongoing process wherein the Department of Defense will conduct discussions with the Governor over the Route 15 range location, I would caution that it may be very difficult for DOD [the Department of Defense] to reach a deal that will be approved by the Guam Legislature, who ultimately approves the leasing or the sale of Government of Guam lands. I continue to urge DOD to consider alternatives such as more robust training capability on Tinian, to include individual skill qualifications.

Finally, it is important to reiterate, as I have in previous hearings, that we must keep in mind the threats we face in this region of the world. China's secretive military buildup coupled with North Korea's continuing nuclear ambitions are certainly at the forefront of our strategic posture in Asia. However, we must not lose sight of other nontraditional threats in this region, such as the southern Philippines or southern Thailand.

I hope that the witnesses will discuss our strategic posture in the Asia-Pacific region through both a military asset framework as well as a soft power framework. This Administration's focus on military-to-military engagements is very important to establishing greater cultural understanding and foster stability in our region.

In particular, the mil-to-mil [military-to-military] efforts with China I believe can help us avoid misunderstandings that will lead to far greater concerns in the future.

So ladies and gentlemen, I look forward to the testimonies from each of you as I yield back my time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Madeleine, for those remarks.

And as we discussed prior to the hearing, I ask unanimous consent that we dispense with the 5-minute rule for this hearing and depart from regular order so that members may ask questions during the course of the discussion. I think this will provide a round-

table-type forum and will enhance the dialogue of these very importance issues.

Without objection, that is so ordered.

And just so the witnesses know, we have explained it to all three of you, we do things a little differently in here. We try to really get at some issues, and rather than have 5 minutes of staccato questions, if one of the members wants a follow-up question, the chair will recognize them and we will try to do that to keep the dialogue going.

The other thing I ask the members for is permission to submit for the record a written statement that I prepared and any of the members that have written statements feel free to submit those for the record.

Without objection, all the statements will be entered in the record.

Ladies and gentlemen, I am going to ask you to do now what I am going to do myself, and that is take my written remarks and put them aside. For these kinds of hearings normally what we do is this. You submit to us written statements, which you have done very admirably, we thank you for that. We read your statements, and so we appreciate the time that you put in those statements and the fact that you delivered them to us. Then oftentimes what we have is our witnesses will take about 5 minutes each and they give us a regurgitation of what they have put in the written statements, but we have already read the written statements so we don't need to do that.

And so I want to change it a little bit today and I want you to take the written remarks that you might have and just put them aside for a moment. If you want to submit them for the record, we will read them. But here is what I want to pose to you, that you can start and we will give you each 5 minutes or so to have a bite at this question.

The goal of this committee is to ask a very simple question, "Are we ready?" And over and over again, our witnesses come in and the response that they rightly give us back is, "Ready for what?" We should be having a strategy that we can use as a yardstick so that we can compare where we are against that strategy. We try to do that in the Quadrennial Defense Review and the National Defense Strategy. But as you know, more and more, there is a consensus building that the Quadrennial Defense Review and the National Defense Strategy is driven a lot by budget and bureaucratic desires simply to reinforce what they are already doing. In fact, when the independent panel was created to look at the QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] that was the exact conclusion that that bipartisan group determined. And they used a word like "train wreck" if we continue doing what we are doing. So we have to kind of reach to get the strategy and build the yardsticks that we are comparing our military to to make sure that, in fact, we are ready.

Just last week we had our Deputy Chiefs sitting right where you are sitting, and where Mr. Schiffer is sitting we had the Deputy Chief for the Marine Corps; Jackalyne, where you are sitting, we had the Deputy Chief for the Army. And the two of them agreed on one thing. They said the greatest component that they could

have for readiness was time. They needed to be able to react quickly and as quickly as they possibly could.

So ladies and gentlemen, the question I have for you is this: If we look at the Pacific, and we recognize that we may not as a committee have a strategy to use as a yardstick, one of the things we know is that the most probable conflict we would have may not be with China, but if we ever had a conflict, probably the most devastating conflict we would have with China. None of us want that conflict. We hope it doesn't take place. But when we are looking for readiness, we want to make sure that we are prepared. Because oftentimes, if we have a lack of capability, that determines decisions that players make in that area.

So the question I would like for you to start within your 5 minutes or so today is this. We know if we don't have a strategy that we can get our hands around, we know that from our readings China does. One of their strategies, we know, is their Anti-Access/Area Denial strategy that they have been trying to implement. A year ago, Secretary Gates directed the Air Force and the Navy to develop an Air-Sea Battle concept to address that Anti-Access/Denial problem.

The first question I would like for you to respond to is, is that concept ready? Do we have it? And are we prepared in our readiness to implement that strategy? If not, when is it coming?

The second thing we know is my dear friend sitting to my left not too far from her home she has been willing to take me and she show me those huge fuel reserves that are sitting there on Guam. We know that one of the strategies as part of the denial strategy that China has would be able to do something to those fuel reserves.

So the other question I have for you to be responding to is if something happened to those fuel reserves, how long would it take us to replace them and where would that replacement have to come from?

And then the third thing is, if we look at China's strategy, it is very clear from their writings that one of the things they believe is that the United States can't endure a long conflict, that we need to have short conflicts, and they are prepared for a long one.

The question for you is, if we had a conflict and that conflict had a high-intensity operations that lasted more than a month, is our industrial base capable of supporting that kind of long-term conflict and, if so, for how long?

I know that is a lot. But it kind of sets the parameters that we need to be looking at for readiness in the Pacific.

And so with that, Mr. Schiffer, I am going to ask you if you would start whatever response that you might have to that and feel free to interject anything else that you would like to in that.

STATEMENT OF R. MICHAEL SCHIFFER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ASIAN & PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS, EAST ASIA

Mr. SCHIFFER. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Ranking Member Bordallo, and the other distinguished members of the committee, and thank you for the privilege of allowing us to appear before you today.

Let me try to provide you in my opening comments with the strategic context that underlies our approach to the Asia-Pacific region and how we are preparing our presence and pursuing our presence and our policy in the region, and I think in so doing I will be able to shed some light on the questions that you have raised.

Before I begin my comments, however, I want to join Ranking Member Bordallo in reiterating that our thoughts and our prayers today are with the people of Japan. I was in Japan last week when the earthquake struck, and though I was not near the area affected by the tsunami, the magnitude of the earthquake in both real and psychological terms was palpable. We are still learning the total extent of the devastation, and the United States is working side-by-side with the people of Japan, the Japanese Government, and the Self-Defense Forces to manage the consequences of the earthquake and the tsunami.

In addition to the humanitarian assistance in helping to address ongoing nuclear issues at the Fukushima Daiichi plant, U.S. Forces are engaged in helicopter search and rescue operations and support from U.S. Navy ships, including the Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group, are providing services such as water purification, medical teams and hospital beds.

Our forward presence in Japan and throughout the Asia-Pacific region has allowed us to respond to Japan's urgent needs quickly, and we will continue to facilitate rapid engagement to provide whatever assistance our Japanese friends require.

You have asked us to address the question "Are we ready?" and in your comments, Mr. Chairman, you elucidated some of the issues that we need to dig into as we address that question. It is an important question and one with many facets. And at the risk of stating what other witnesses have stated before, I do want to be clear from the outset that the Department of Defense and our men and women in uniform wherever they may be stationed, at home and abroad, are indeed ready to meet any of the challenges that we may face in the region in the near-, medium-, or in the long-term.

Our ability to respond rapidly and effectively to provide assistance to our Japanese friends is one facet of the question "Are we ready?" and especially the related question of "Ready for what?" It will come as no surprise to members of this committee, and as the ranking member pointed out, that the Asia-Pacific region is the most dynamic region in the world today. It holds over half the world's population, more than \$1 trillion in annual U.S. trade, 15 of the world's largest ports, and is home to six of the world's largest armies, China, India, North Korea, South Korea, Russia, Japan, and of course our own.

Over the past six decades, the region has experienced extraordinary growth, in large part because of the peace, stability, and prosperity that our security presence, our robust U.S. military presence, made possible for all states in the region. That military presence remains critical to our long-term readiness and to ensuring that peace and prosperity continue to prevail in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States and the Department of Defense remain committed to our enduring presence in the Asia-Pacific, and to the investments in forces and capabilities necessary for protecting our

national interests and those of our allies and partners in the region, as well as for meeting the full range of potential traditional and nontraditional 21st-century security challenges.

I would like to focus for a little bit in getting at some of the questions that the chairman raised, focus my attention on three particular issues: The rise of China, North Korea, and our evolving regional posture. I will keep my comments brief in the remaining time that I have, and my written testimony provides a more detailed assessment.

As you know, over the past 30 years, China has transformed itself from an impoverished country to the world's second largest economy. As its economy has grown, so has its capabilities across a range of measures, including its military capabilities. President Obama and Secretary Gates have stated that the United States welcomes and encourages a strong and prosperous China that makes positive contributions to the stability, resilience, and growth of the international system.

We continue to see positive examples of cooperation and partnership from China on certain regional challenges. There are, however, other areas, such as its military modernization efforts, its opaquely defined long-term strategic intentions, and questions about the development of its Anti-Access/Area Denial capabilities that are causing concern in the United States and around the region.

In this respect, long-term readiness means that the United States must continue to work with our allies and partners and with China to positively shape China's rise both within the Asia-Pacific region and globally. U.S. strategy must be flexible enough to anticipate and balance multiple possible outcomes and must be able to capitalize on the cooperative potential of the U.S.-China relationship while also managing the risks inherent in China's rise and that includes the investments that the Department is undertaking precisely to make sure that we can counter Anti-Access/Area Denial capabilities.

If I can ask the indulgence of the committee to continue for a little bit.

Mr. FORBES. You go ahead, Mr. Schiffer.

Mr. SCHIFFER. As China continues to rise and its military capabilities continue to increase, both the United States and China benefit from having a healthy, stable, and reliable military-to-military relationship.

During the recent state visit by President Hu Jintao, both sides agreed on the need for enhanced and substantive dialogue and communication at all levels. While we will continue to engage in dialogue with the Chinese, we will also continue to strengthen our posture, presence, and capabilities in the region and to strengthen our alliance partnerships to ensure a common view of how the United States can best continue to work in and with the region for peace and stability.

The second issue that I would like to highlight briefly is the continuing challenge of North Korean provocations. As members of the committee are well aware, North Korea continues to be a complicated security threat. In face of North Korean provocations, including the sinking of the *Cheonan* and the shelling of Yeonpyeong,

the United States and our ally, the Republic of Korea, are enhancing our deterrent capabilities and so ensuring that we are fully prepared to meet any threat from North Korea.

The United States has drawn ever closer in our bilateral relationship with our allies in South Korea and Japan and have also seen positive progress in the past year in trilateral relations as well.

Critical to ensuring our long-term readiness to meet a North Korean threat is maintaining a forward-deployed military posture on the Peninsula. It is our forward presence, 28,500 strong, that effectively communicates our resolve to defend the Republic of Korea and preserve our vital interests in Asia, and our regular exercises like Key Resolve and Full Eagle serve to enhance U.S.-ROK [Republic of Korea] alliance's ability to defend the ROK and to protect the region.

Lastly, let me address the efforts we are taking to implement the Realignment Roadmap and our broader posture moves in the region. As you know, the Department of Defense is evaluating U.S. global posture on an ongoing basis to better position us and our forces to meet the demands of the myriad emerging threats and provocations in the region. This subject will be addressed in greater detail in an upcoming global posture review.

However, the important point to note for this hearing is that the U.S. defense posture in Asia, where Secretary Gates has stated that our goal is to maintain or posture in Northeast Asia while enhancing it in Southeast Asia, is shifting it one that is more geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable.

While the focus on the implementation of the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma has been intense, the United States and Japan are working closely together on FRF [Futenma Replacement Facility] and on Guam. It is important to note that the Government of Japan has publicly affirmed the importance of the U.S. alliance, of the U.S. Marine Corps' having forward-deployed forces on Okinawa and of moving forward with the Futenma Replacement Facility at Camp Schwab, Henoko.

Indeed, events in the region have conspired to remind us of all of the importance and the necessity of marine forces in Okinawa and the vital role in both deterring potential conflict and responding to crisis played by U.S. Forces in Japan, including the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Forces in Okinawa.

This capacity to respond quickly to regional challenges, both traditional and nontraditional challenges, rests in no small part on the maintenance of rapidly deployable ground forces in the region, and we look forward to continuing to work with the Government of Japan to move forward with the full implementation of the Realignment Roadmap.

The Asia-Pacific region is one where America has deep roots and enduring interests. As the United States looks to the challenges, threats and opportunities of the future, the Department of Defense remains focused on protecting American interests and allies against the range of threats and challenges we will face together in the 21st century.

Thank you for your time. Thank you for your indulgence. I look forward to engaging more deeply on some of the questions that you raised, and let me turn to my colleagues for their comments.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Schiffer can be found in the Appendix on page 37.]

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Schiffer, and again we appreciate your expertise and coming here.

Now Mr. Schiffer did exactly the opposite, though, of what I am asking you guys to do. I know it is comfortable to hang on to those prepared remarks. But we have read those. What we want you to do is try to address the readiness issue. And General, maybe you are the perfect person to do that.

So General Alles, if you would please see if you could address those remarks and throw those written remarks away because we just want to hear your expertise. We can put those in the record. But the time we have got, how are we prepared and are we ready to meet those challenges?

General, thank you for being here.

General ALLES. All right, sir. I will keep my remarks brief here. I would ask that the written remarks that I have submitted be included in the record.

Mr. FORBES. And we are including all of your written remarks. We appreciate your time in preparing them.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. RANDOLPH ALLES, USMC, DIRECTOR, J-5, STRATEGIC PLANNING AND POLICY, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

General ALLES. Chairman Forbes and Ms. Bordallo and members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to appear today and discuss the readiness challenges here in the Pacific.

I do want to acknowledge before I continue with my responses here my condolences to our very close ally in Asia, Japan, as Mr. Schiffer has already mentioned during their ongoing trial here, this great earthquake and tsunami. I just want you to rest assured the U.S. Pacific Command is doing everything in our power to assist the Japanese people during this hour of need.

I also would like to extend my best wishes to Representative Giffords and her husband Mark. We hope to see her back soon fulfilling her responsibilities as a member of the committee.

I wanted to build on one comment that Mr. Schiffer had made as he talked about China and the rise of China, as we consider the rise of China. And I wanted to emphasize I had a conversation previously with Ms. Bordallo about the importance of dialogue between the Chinese and the U.S. sides. Both myself and Mr. Schiffer get to occasionally participate in dialogues with the Chinese, usually with the PLA [People's Liberation Army] is who we talk with, and I think those dialogues are beneficial. Yes, I mean they are scripted in a certain degree, there is a degree that we tend to hear the same points coming back from the Chinese, but the fact that we are able to meet and actually have a dialogue together I think is important.

One of my responsibilities is to function on the MMCA, the Military Maritime Consultive Agreement, which is our meeting that we have with the Chinese to discuss operational safety in the inter-

national air space and off the coast of China and in the international waters.

And I think I would comment that I have seen effect out of that dialogue. It has done much to ensure that tensions when U.S. and Chinese forces interact remain low, and I think there is great benefit in the overall dialogue between the two sides. Even if sometimes it may just appear to be an exchange of talking points, I think nevertheless it is an important interchange that we have.

Turning to the topic of the question on the Air-Sea Battle, I would like to just point out a few things about that. It is, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, an attempt to address Anti-Access/Area Denial. I would point out that it is a concept that is broader in thinking than just looking at the Chinese situation. We are looking at this more broadly across the globe on how countries are attempting to deny access to U.S. forces and how this might address it.

I do think there are significant and effective work going on currently in near-term initiatives. I would just note we have met on several occasions recently with the Under Secretary for Defense for AT&L [Acquisition, Technology & Logistics], Mr. Carter, and he has made substantial progress in addressing some of these Anti-Access/Area Denial issues in the current defense program.

Just as a list of a few items here, there is modernization efforts underway to the tune of \$4½ billion in the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program] on the F-22 to leverage radar and electronic protection technologies coming out of the JSF [Joint Strike Fighter]. We have \$1.6 billion over the FYDP going into the F-15 radars to address electronic attack and warfare issues that they would have in this A2AD environment. There are also efforts underway with the E-18 Growler, our AMRAAM [Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile] weapons systems, our Aegis-equipped ships, and improving antisubmarine capabilities that will address Anti-Access/Area Denial challenges.

So I think there has been great progress made in the Department here. They are moving forward rapidly, and I am encouraged by what I have seen. Even today we talked with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Development, addressing this particular issue of Anti-Access/Area Denial across the globe, and I think they are making good progress in their long-range strike family of systems that are addressing the issues we are going to have with Anti-Access/Area Denial holistically across the spectrum of military capabilities and capacities that we would need.

I do think it is a concept that is going to take a number of years to implement. It is not something that is going to occur in 1 or 2 years. I think it is a long-term question that the Department is addressing, so clearly funding the initiatives that the Department puts forward to address Anti-Access/Area Denial will be very important to us, but I think we have a good handle on how we are approaching this particular issue and the things that we are going to need to do in the future to ensure access for U.S. forces and to be that stabilizing influence that the U.S. has been in Asia really for over 60 years.

Thank you.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General.

[The prepared statement of General Alles can be found in the Appendix on page 50.]

Mr. FORBES. Madam Secretary.

STATEMENT OF THE HON. JACKALYNE PFANNENSTIEL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, ENERGY, INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Bordallo, distinguished members of this committee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today. I will focus my comments on the realignment in Guam, specifically to the question of "Are we ready?" And that will begin with the recognition of the strategic importance of Guam.

The Marine Corps relocation, along with the other Defense Department alignments to Guam, represents a unique opportunity to strategically realign the future posture in the Pacific for the next 50 years. We need to get this right.

And this time last year we were still working on the Environmental Impact Statement for the realignment. We had some 10,000 comments that we were working on. Since then, we have moved forward. We have issued the final Environmental Impact Statement, we have issued the Record of Decision, we have made decisions in certain areas for moving the facilities to Guam. We have deferred decision on the aircraft carrier berth and on the ranges, as the Congresswoman pointed out earlier.

We have made some progress. Just this week we signed the Programmatic Agreement, which allows us to move forward, completing the Section 106 for the National Historic Preservation Act process. With that, we are now able to start letting contracts and beginning some military construction associated with the realignment.

I should point out that a long-term, positive relationship with the people of Guam is essential to the success of the Marine Corps mission in the Pacific. With this in mind, we have laid out what we are calling the four pillars of working with the community in Guam. And they are that we will work towards OneGuam; in other words, that outside of the base and on the base will be of the same community, that we will pursue a green Guam, an environmentally preferred base, and help Guam with their renewable resources, and we will make sure that access to the cultural sites, specifically the Pagat site, would be protected.

In addition, in recognizing the amount of land the Department of Defense already consumes on Guam, we will commit to making sure that we do not expand and in fact that we reduce the footprint on Guam.

We believe that our commitment to these four pillars will allow us to work well with the Government, with the people of Guam. We have worked with Governor Calvo in trying to gain access to the land that we will need for the training, for the Marines' training.

And that is a really critical element of the "Are we ready?" We need to be ready to train the Marines when they come to Guam. And so we are spending, we are focusing our attention on getting the land that we are going to need for the training resources.

This is an important year for the Guam realignment. The start of construction is imminent, and additional contracts will be awarded in the next weeks and months.

Building on the projects from the fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011, we are seeking additional funding for fiscal year 2012 to begin vertical construction and to allow off-island workers.

Also this year, we will continue the discussions with the Government and the legislature and the private landowners to begin an agreement in principle for the land that we need for the ranges.

The Guam realignment is a multi-faceted, dynamic endeavor with many component parts. Successful execution will be the key to the Department's success in the Pacific. We will continue to work with our partners in Guam and Japan and the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas to develop solutions to the challenges we are facing.

Thank you for the opportunity to address you today. I look forward to continue to work with you, and I am available for your questions.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Pfannenstiel can be found in the Appendix on page 58.]

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Madam Secretary. I thank all of our witnesses for their comments. Normally I defer my questions to the end, but I am going to start because I am going to come back with the three questions that I asked at the beginning to see if anyone is willing to address them. And let me fill in the context for you.

There was a sunny summer day that took place when, before I was born, when Oahu was just beginning to wake up in the morning, most of the people who had been out doing what they would do on a Saturday night were still sleeping in, there were a handful of people that were policing the area. A fleet was making its way up to the northern portion of Oahu. It was sailing inside some rain squalls that were taking place, staying out of the commercial lanes so that shipping couldn't pick them up, the planes couldn't pick them up. As it got to the northern portion of Oahu, they launched three types of planes—fighters, bombers and torpedo planes. Just as they came into Oahu, the sun came up, they were able to see their targets, our battleships were all lined up in Battleship Alley. They did all the things they were supposed to do. By the time our fighters could scramble and get up, they had already gone. They landed back on the airfield. The next thing that happened as soon as they landed another wave came in, and that was successful.

As you would hear that, you would think that would be Pearl Harbor. As many of you know, that was not Pearl Harbor. That was a war game we did in 1932, 10 years before with Admiral Yarnell, and the Department of Defense threw it out because they basically said it was unfair to attack on Sunday, and nobody would attack on Sunday. If we had seen that 10 years ago before, we would have been better prepared 10 years later.

Now I say that because I come back to looking at the scenarios when we are asking if we are ready we are not just asking what our goals are or what our philosophies are. We are trying to ask, "Are we ready when those conflicts come?" We know that there is a strategy by the Chinese, we hope that that doesn't happen, all of us want to have the dialogue, but it is the Anti-Access/Area De-

nial problem. They have told me that, they have told many of the members here, they write about it all the time. If we deny the strategy, let us know, but if there is a strategy there, we had the Secretary saying a year ago we were going to create this concept.

My question for any of you today is do we have the concept? Not are we making good progress, but do we have that concept today and if we don't have the concept today, when can we expect to have that? Anybody want to tackle the question?

Mr. SCHIFFER. I will try to take a first cut at that question, Mr. Chairman.

I think it is fair to say that as we talk about Air-Sea that it is an evolving operational concept. But the important point, and I think this is something that General Alles got at, is that the Air-Sea concept needs to be put inside the larger framework of the activities that we are undertaking to counter Anti-Access/Area Denial challenges, not just as it might relate to China, but as the General said, globally, wherever those challenges may occur.

We take as a predicate the necessity for the United States to maintain its ability to project power across the globe and to maintain the integrity of U.S. alliances and partnerships and to achieve that objective and to make sure that Anti-Access/Area Denial threats and capabilities will not in fact slow the deployment of forces into a theater or prevent U.S. forces from operating in a particular theater.

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Schiffer, I don't want to cut you off but other people—

Mr. SCHIFFER. I am going to be getting to the enumeration. There are a number of things that we are currently engaged in. There are procurement activities that include the new penetrating bomber and pressing forward with the mass production of the F-35, that we are expanding procurement of proven cruise missile systems. We are looking to procure robust an air defense network that will prevail against ballistic and cruise missile attacks. We are upgrading the B-2 bomber. We are modernizing our fourth-generation fighters with new sensors, electronic protection and modernized missiles. We are ensuring resiliency by hardening key logistics infrastructures, building dispersed operating locations, and creating redundant and resilient command and control networks with increased bandwidth.

We are also pursuing in addition to these investments new concepts of operations, including new horizons and power projection by integrating the presence of the Navy with the global reach of the Air Force, which is the essence of what the Air-Sea Battle concept of operations is all about.

And we are pursuing new technologies and new technologies that will allow us to counter competitors' Anti-Access/Area Denial investments, specifically their investments in ballistic missiles, counter-space, and cyber capabilities, and we are examining such technologies as prompt global strike capabilities to be able to precisely strike time-sensitive, high-value targets.

So when you put that together as a package I think it provides a fairly robust response to the threats and challenges that you outline.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. General, do we have the concept?

General ALLES. The concept is in development, which is what we are currently doing and what the Navy and the Air Force are currently in the process of doing. And they have started that work over the past year or so, I think extending beyond a year, it is still something that is in development and there are many enabling pieces of that once we have that finally developed. So I think as Mr. Schiffer is saying, it is evolving in its development, it is at the point, it is not at the point where obviously I am going to deliver you a pamphlet on the Air-Sea Battle concept. It is something that we are still developing.

Mr. FORBES. Do you have any idea when we might expect it, General?

General ALLES. Candidly, I would have to ask the services and come back to you on that. I think I would be speaking out of turn to say we have an actual timeline for that.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 77.]

Mr. FORBES. Madam Secretary, question on Guam, if we lost that fuel capacity, how long would it take us to replace it and where would we have to get that energy from?

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. Mr. Chairman, I will have to get back to you on the date. I do know that there are other fuel sources in the Pacific and that we would be perhaps—in fact perhaps the General can be more specific on where that would come from.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 77.]

Mr. FORBES. General, maybe you can.

General ALLES. I would say that I can address the specifics. The specifics are classified in nature.

Mr. FORBES. That is okay. Don't tell us anything classified.

General ALLES. There are alternative fuel sources in the Pacific that we would leverage. There is a concern about the vulnerability of above-ground facilities there. There is a resiliency effort going on by the Air Force. Currently they have \$300 million put against that, I am not sure over the exact time period, but to address some of the vulnerability issues that we are going to have in this Anti-Access/Area Denial environment.

So I think we are looking at that and looking at the actions we need to take to make those facilities better protected.

But I think also, as described earlier, we talked about this briefly in your office this morning, is it is more than just a single piece, a single system. It is more than hardening. It is really as Air-Sea Battle is attempting to address it needs to address the end-to-end chain of operations. So it is complex and it is broad in nature.

Mr. FORBES. Before we go to Ms. Bordallo, Mr. Kissell has a quick follow-up question.

Mr. KISSELL. Just a quick question here. We talk about the fuel capacities on Guam and other set places, a specific location. But one of our colleagues in the last Congress said what about getting the fuel to the ships themselves because you wouldn't want the ships to have to come back to a set location, what about the refueling capacity at sea in the midst of battle? Do we have the ships that can do that?

General ALLES. Candidly, I am not aware of any shortages that we have in refueling the fleet. That one is the best I can address. So we would need to address it with the Navy.

Mr. FORBES. My last question, very quickly, if we had a protracted battle with high-intensity operations do we have the industrial base here to sustain that, and if so, for what period of time do you think?

General ALLES. Candidly, I am not qualified to answer that.

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Schiffer, any idea?

Mr. SCHIFFER. I would have to also plead that when it comes to speaking to the industrial base in the United States I am not qualified to answer that but will be happy to make sure that—

Mr. FORBES. If you can give us that information. And now my colleague and friend from Guam, Ms. Bordallo.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 77.]

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to ask my first question to Secretary Schiffer, and that is regarding the concept of tangible progress with regards to the construction of the new Futenma facility and what that means for the realignment on Guam. What exactly is tangible progress and when tangible progress occurs what will that allow the United States to accomplish?

And further, what must the United States be doing concurrently as the Government of Guam—the Government of Japan works through its processes to reach tangible progress in Okinawa?

Mr. SCHIFFER. Thank you. As we look at tangible progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility, we see it as not a single specific event but rather a series of steps roughly in parallel between Japan and the United States as spelled out in the Realignment Roadmap, the Guam International Agreement, and other bilateral agreements.

It will allow us to move forward with the Government of Japan as progress is made on the FRF to in turn take associated steps that we have to take on Guam. There are a number of different indicators that we are looking at, starting with the decision on the runway configuration for FRF that we expect at the upcoming “Two-plus-Two” meeting with Japan and then other issues that we expect to come down, down the line, including issuance of the landfill permit, construction of the seawall, and progress on the landfill itself.

The other critical point for the committee, which I know that you understand, is that preparation on Guam needs to begin well in advance of actual construction on the ground for the replacement facility at Camp Schwab and that relocation of the Marines from Okinawa will be phased with completion of suitable infrastructure on Guam sequenced in such a way as to maintain unit cohesion and operational readiness. And that is why this entire process has to move in lockstep and why we need to look at all of the different indicators as we go along, including for one other item to offer, Japanese financing for infrastructure improvements on Guam as part of this continuum that comprises tangible progress and that will enable us to relocate from Futenma Air Station to the Futenma Re-

placement Facility and to relocate the Marines from Okinawa to Guam.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

I have one quick question, Mr. Chairman. This is for Secretary Pfannenstiel. As you know, last year's defense authorization bill contained a provision that gave the Department of Defense the permissive authority to integrate the water and the wastewater lines on Guam. I have long believed that the Navy, indeed all services, should be out of the business of being a utility provider. And that said, I continue to believe that the integration of power in Guam provides us the right model for utility integration.

In that case, Madam Secretary, Guam took over control of the Navy's power system but did so after agreeing to reach certain performance milestones.

Additionally, there was a third-party expert that helped to oversee the integration process and ensure that the agreed-upon milestones were met. However, this was all done at no cost to the ratepayers on Guam.

Would you agree that this is a model that should be used for the consolidation of the water and wastewater system on Guam? And would you also agree that consolidation of the utilities should occur without burdening the ratepayers on Guam?

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. Thank you, Congresswoman Bordallo. We are, in fact, working with the Guam Water Authority to interconnect with their lines, and some of the money that will come from the Japanese financing for infrastructure will be used to improve the infrastructure for the water facilities, the water on base, and those will be interconnected.

Now, as I understand, the agreement in the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] about the integration set some conditions for meeting performance standards before there could be such thing as an integration, and that is what happened with power. And so my suggestion with water is that we continue to work towards meeting the standards that will work for the needs of the Department of Defense as well as the Guam water agency.

Ms. BORDALLO. Madam Secretary, I noticed in the agreement there that they are saying that the Navy should have a voting member on our utility board.

Can you indicate where else in the United States that the Navy is a voting member on a utility board or any other local governing body? Isn't this a cumbersome requirement for the Navy or any service and intrusive to the Federal, State, and local relationship?

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. I don't know of any place where it would be, but I believe that the requirement there was based on this need to make sure that certain operational standards were met, and I believe that was one way that that could be done.

Ms. BORDALLO. So your answer is then nowhere else in the United States?

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. None that I know of, Congresswoman.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FORBES. Now the chair recognizes Mr. Runyan from New Jersey for 5 minutes.

Mr. RUNYAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank all three of you witnesses for coming out.

General Alles, talking about readiness in a current light, how is Pacific Command engaging with our international partners over there to really address terrorism? I mean, you have elements of the Philippines, Indonesia, Southeast Asia that are obvious threats. How are our partners coming together and do we need more resources and/or funding to accomplish this and be ready for that?

General ALLES. Thank you, sir. That is being addressed at multiple levels. Let me talk about kind of current events. As you are probably aware, we have a Joint Special Operations Task Force operating in the southern Philippines of around 600 U.S. personnel. That has been there for a number of years and continues to be effective in addressing terrorist issues that were occurring in that part of the Philippines, I think very effectively. So that is one specific instance.

So we are also concerned, as we look at the South Asia region, with the LET, or the Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorist group, which emanates out of Pakistan but has a presence in India and Nepal and Bangladesh, and we are concerned how that—let me backtrack for a second. As you are aware, the LET was responsible for the Mumbai attacks, where so many people lost their lives. So we are very concerned about that interaction that LET is having on India and the effect, that compression effect that you had between two nuclear powers when there is an attack into India from LET.

So we are concerned about that very much in the South Asia area. We are attempting to address that by focusing not only in India but also in Bangladesh and Nepal to ensure that we work on facilitation networks, and, more importantly, how we address building the capacity of our partners to, in fact, address those internal issues so that they can secure their borders, so that they have developed networks for intelligence, they can develop intelligence on things that might be occurring inside of their country, and then also how they might—you know, law enforcement and actual counterterrorism operations.

So that is another line of our operation there, and we facilitate that mainly through your Theater Security Cooperation Plan, which addresses each of the countries in the Pacific AOR [Area of Responsibility] and the ones that are specific concerns for terrorist activities, clearly a big part of that, TCP [Theater Security Cooperation Plan] is addressing that building partner capacity to address either endemic or military issues that are causing those situations to occur.

Mr. RUNYAN. A kind of problem in the same realm to kind of defuse the tensions also with the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, is that kind of the same angle you are taking with that or is that a totally different game?

General ALLES. The real, the building partner capacity part of this I think is in a different sense, you know. Of course when we interact with the Chinese, it is a different interaction than we have with our allies and our partners, if that is what you are asking, sir.

Mr. RUNYAN. I was just curious about, we know there is a lot of tension there, specifically in the Strait and that type of thing and how we are dealing with that moving forward.

General ALLES. I think, again, and Mr. Schiffer may want to comment also, I think the importance of the interaction military-

to-military between ourselves and the Chinese is of prime importance, and we do remain concerned that the nature of that interaction tends to be episodic at best.

Mr. RUNYAN. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Runyan.

And now our submarine expert from Connecticut, Mr. Courtney.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Actually to follow up on Mr. Runyan's question, a test of that military-to-military relationship was the sinking of the *Cheonan*, which again there was exhaustive forensic investigation that it was inescapable that it was a completely unprovoked attack by a North Korean mini sub, and yet we were unable to get China's acknowledgment of, again, something that was just totally black and white that North Korea was responsible for this.

And in terms of just the prospects of a productive military-to-military relationship, even government-to-government relationship, to not be able to even succeed in terms of getting a basic baseline of what actually happened there and in terms of just what impact that is going to have in terms of transit of traffic, both commercial and military, in that part of the world, I guess I would ask you to comment on that Mr. Schiffer, in terms of it seems like using that as a test, the relationship really is not doing that well and maybe it is just episodic, is the right way to describe it.

The second question in terms of readiness is the press reports show that there was clearly a gap there in terms of sonar technology, in terms of being able to detect that mini sub and when you gave your list of investments and help that we are giving to our allies in that region, that was one of the items that, I didn't hear it, and I am just wondering if maybe you could address that because clearly 46 sailors lost their lives because they didn't see that submarine coming or that attack.

Mr. SCHIFFER. Let me address part of the question, and then turn the floor over to General Alles.

I guess I would note first that when the *Cheonan* incident occurred, our military-to-military relationship with the People's Republic of China was in one of its periodic and, from our perspective, very unfortunate periods of suspension because the Chinese had suspended the relationship in January of last year following our announcement of an arms sale package to Taiwan. So we were actually unable at that point in time to have any discussions with the Chinese in the military channels about the *Cheonan*.

I am not sure that would have made much of a difference, frankly. And much like you, we continue to be somewhat mystified by how the Chinese have approached what seems to us to be very, very clear evidence about culpability in the *Cheonan* incident.

We hope now that we have resumed the military-to-military relationship with China, that we are going to be able to put it on stable and reliable footing and that in so doing, we will be able to reduce misunderstanding, miscommunication, and misapprehension, and perhaps have some real discussions with them about some of the larger strategic issues in the region, including how we each view and approach North Korea. That is certainly something that when Secretary Gates was in China this past January he engaged on.

Insofar as the readiness issue that you identified before, turning things over to General Alles, I will just note that the list that I offered was, by necessity, given the open nature of this hearing, not complete, and obviously we will be happy to brief any member of the committee that is interested in a closed session more fully on the fuller list of the capabilities that we are seeking to develop.

But I certainly can say in this open setting that, as you are no doubt aware, we have undertaken a series of very robust exercises with our ROK ally since the sinking of the *Cheonan*, including a number of exercises at sea off both coasts of Korea. And those exercises have been intended in no small part to increase ROK capabilities and increase alliance capabilities precisely so we are bettered postured to be able to respond to these sorts of provocations in the future.

General ALLES. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Schiffer.

I would make a couple of comments about *Cheonan*. One is the nature of the attack was unexpected. It was unprovoked and unexpected, so from that standpoint it was a surprise attack and a surprise to the Koreans.

As indicated, a lot of our focus here in the near term has been on increasing the capacity of the South Koreans in terms of ASW [Anti-Submarine Warfare]. We have conducted a number of ASW exercises with them to increase their capabilities in those areas.

I think the Chinese remain concerned about the stability of North Korea in general, and I think that is a large part, that is a large calculus in how they respond to these situations here. We, as all would expect, are mystified, given the evidence we saw for *Cheonan*, that that was not attributed to the North Koreans.

Thank you.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. Just to let everybody know, we have three votes that have just been called. Our witnesses have graciously agreed to wait as we run over and do those and come back. I want to try to get in one more set of questions. So I would like to turn now to the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Rogers.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Alles, I understand that the Department is reevaluating its prepositioned stocks as a part of Secretary Gates' efficiency drills, and we are already beginning to see reductions in funding for prepo in the 2012 budget that the Secretary just submitted to us. Was PACOM [U.S. Pacific Command] a part of this evaluation of the prepo strategy?

General ALLES. Yes, sir, we were a part of that evaluation. I would note that we have calculated the effects of that as it is booked against our operations plans to ensure those plans remain viable in execution, and they are from our standpoint.

So I can't address the whole worldwide posture of that. That is beyond my scope at PACOM. But from our standpoint of sourcing our plans and addressing the very difficult time-distance equation we have in the Pacific theater, we are currently satisfied.

Mr. ROGERS. And you feel like that is going to be adequate in the near future?

See, given what is happening with the recent national disaster in Japan and what is going to be required of resources and the volatility in North Korea, it seems to me that bringing those

prepositioned stocks down is risky, and you are saying you don't think that is true?

General ALLES. That was one of the concerns we addressed to the Department, was to ensure that we were looking beyond just the near term, really at the 5-year and beyond horizon, because of course, the dynamic, the security posture in Asia is changing as we consider the rise in powers in Asia itself. So that was part of our calculation there and part of our response back to the Department to ensure that we had adequate stocks for our operations plans.

Mr. ROGERS. I understand that we need to get use out of every dollar, but I also want to make sure we are ready, and I have very real concerns about these reductions.

We know that the readiness posture of PACOM is negatively affected by the ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and now by humanitarian assistance in Japan.

How significant is the shortage of forces and equipment required to effectively deal with the broad range of security concerns in PACOM's Area of Operation?

General ALLES. I would comment there, sir, that for our day-to-day theater security operations, I think we are adequately resourced, and I have had this conversation with Admiral Willard, my boss. There is a significant presence of U.S. forces from PACOM in Afghanistan and Iraq. Obviously, there is an effect of those forces. There is a long-term effect, I believe, about the strategic expression we are making by having those forces out of theater year after year after year, that we do have to address our operations. And I think as a long-term equation, we need to continue to look at that.

It is having, though, probably a different effect you may not be aware of. As the ground forces are gone obviously to Afghanistan and Iraq, we are relying more on our air and our Navy forces, so that requires more basic steaming days or air operations days out of those forces, which is more wear and tear on those aircrafts and those ships. It affects maintenance schedules and also the long-term viability of those. In other words, we are using those assets up because we are relying on them more with our deployment of ground forces out of theater.

Mr. ROGERS. What would you like to see this committee or this Congress do to help you with that wear and tear and that problem that you just described?

General ALLES. Well, I think in one sense, as we continue on the continuing resolution, that is going to affect maintenance schedules for our ships and our aircraft because of funding levels that they don't have. That is one aspect of it. I think, also, we have to look at the long-term equation of what our shipbuilding program looks like.

Mr. ROGERS. Just as a last point, I want to go back to this prepositioned stocks. When I asked you if PACOM had been involved in the evaluation, did you feel any pressure from the Secretary's Office or the Administration to tell them what they wanted to hear on that issue?

General ALLES. No, sir. I think we had a robust dialogue with them and clearly expressed what our positions were.

Mr. ROGERS. Excellent. Thank you, General.

That is all that I have, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FORBES. We will stand in recess until we return from the votes. Thank you for your patience. It will probably be about 30 minutes.

[Recess.]

Mr. FORBES. I will call the hearing back to order.

I thank our witnesses for their patience and apologize for us having to leave during the votes.

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Kissell, for 5 minutes.

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our witnesses for being here.

Mr. Chairman, being a past world history teacher, I couldn't help but to enjoy your story this morning about Pearl Harbor. When I was teaching, I would start out every semester by reading a preamble to a book, and I believe it was "Flyboys," but don't quote me on that. And it talked about the Japanese surprised the fleet, caught them in the harbor in December, and the end result of the battle was they sunk all of the fleet. I would tell my students, if you can tell me where that happened, I will give you an A for the semester and you don't have to come to class; you can do whatever you want. All of them would raise their hands, and of course they thought it was Pearl Harbor. I would say: Well, the next line in the book says that President Roosevelt wrote a letter to the Japanese and congratulated them to their great victory. That stumped them a bit. It was 1905, it was the Russians.

We have great capacity to think we have all of the answers, and we have to keep looking for the things that may surprise us.

The reason I asked the question, General, earlier about the supply ships, Gene Taylor was one of our former colleagues who was very knowledgeable of these things. I remember one session he was very concerned about how do we resupply the oil when we are on the seas, in the battle, do we have enough oilers. He had concerns whether we did or not. I will follow up with this with a question, and you can take it off the record.

My question being this: If we are in a prolonged engagement in the Western Pacific, do we have the resources, and the chairman asked do we have the industrial resources, well, not answering that, but do we have the resources, the capacity, whether it be ships, airplanes, whatever, to get what we need on a continuing basis to where the engagement may be.

I encourage you to be brief because I have a couple of other questions.

General ALLES. We can't get obviously into classified discussions, obviously. I would need to answer specifics off the record.

But generally, I would say yes, we do have the capacities we need in terms of resupply for the plans that I have booked right now, sir.

Mr. KISSELL. Good. One country we haven't specifically mentioned, even though we have said in the general area, is Vietnam. Where do we see Vietnam emerging? Or do we see them emerging in terms of the military, but where do we see them emerging politically, especially as it relates to our relationship with China?

Once again, whoever wants to jump at this one.

Mr. SCHIFFER. I think as a general statement we have been extraordinarily pleased by the progress that we have made in our relationship with Vietnam over the past number of years since normalization. And we certainly look to deepen and strengthen the relationship that we have between the United States and Vietnam in the years ahead.

Mr. KISSELL. Does China view that as a threat, because historically those two countries have been at odds?

Mr. SCHIFFER. I wouldn't speak and couldn't speak about Beijing's threat perception; but certainly, as you know, China and Vietnam have had a rocky history of their own. I am certain there are those in Beijing that probably do view our burgeoning relationship with Vietnam in a less-than-favorable light.

From our perspective, our deepening and strengthening relationship with Vietnam, and our desire to enter into a genuine partnership with Vietnam, is a relationship that we pursue in and of itself. It is not about China; it is about the United States and Vietnam.

But I should also note that we don't have any illusions, given our own history with Vietnam, about the future of that relationship either. There are issues that we have to continue to work out. There are human rights questions that we still have in terms of how Vietnam treats some of its own religious minorities that we still need to be able to cycle through as well.

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, and thank you once again for your patience. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Kissell.

Now, someone who the Pacific is near and dear to her heart, the gentlelady from Hawaii.

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I don't believe we can discuss readiness out of the context of what has happened and what the implications are of what happened, the devastation and the catastrophe in Japan. Having said that, I would like to know, Japan is considered like our anchor partner in terms of our security defenses in the Pacific. What impact is the tsunami and the earthquake having on whatever strategic locations we have in Japan? Mr. Secretary, if you can answer that.

Mr. SCHIFFER. Certainly. To begin with, I would say it would be speculative at best at this point to comment on any of the longer-term implications of the earthquake and the tsunami. But I would note that certainly I think the assistance that we have been able to offer, the engagement of the U.S. military and the U.S. Government across the board in response to this crisis has helped to strengthen the bonds that we have between our two countries and helped make a case, I think, for the logic of why we have a forward-deployed presence in the Asian-Pacific region, including the base and footprint that we have in Japan.

Ms. HANABUSA. I understand that part, Mr. Secretary. I guess my question is more in line of what role does Japan play, if any, in our readiness posture in the Pacific, and how is it now going to be affected by what has happened?

Mr. SCHIFFER. Japan is the cornerstone of our approach to security issues in the Asian-Pacific region, and there is a reason why we term it that way and it is not just rhetoric. Japan is an incred-

ibly important ally. The contributions that they bring to the alliance, including our base and footprint in Japan is absolutely critical to our enduring presence in the Asian-Pacific region.

I have absolutely no reason to believe that anything that has transpired in the past few days following the earthquake and the tsunami will undermine the commitment, the depth, the strength of the U.S.-Japan alliance. As I noted I think just to the contrary, that we will emerge from this and Japan will emerge from this with a closer, better, and deeper relationship.

Ms. HANABUSA. One of the issues that we are aware of is the fact that the Japanese Government structure has changed. We have gone from, since I think 1955 when the Liberal Democratic Party actually had control of their Parliament, and now we have the Democratic Party of Japan; and I don't believe necessarily the Democratic Party of Japan felt as strong about our military presence as the Liberal Democratic Party. Do you feel that somehow that structure is now going to be affected as well?

Mr. SCHIFFER. I would offer that we have been extraordinarily happy to be working with the DPJ [Democratic Party of Japan] Government over the past years. As I noted in my opening statement, the Prime Minister, the Defense Minister, the Foreign Minister, Chief Cabinet Secretary, all of the senior members of the DPJ Government have made very, very strong and forward-leaning statements about the value of the alliance, the value of the U.S. military presence in Japan, and about their commitment to move forward with the Realignment Roadmap and FRF. So we view them as a good and strong partner.

Ms. HANABUSA. I understand what you are saying, but isn't it true that the reality of it is as to the Futenma transfer that Japan has yet to come up with approximately their \$6 billion of the \$10 billion price tag for Futenma. Given the disaster, given the catastrophe, what are the probabilities that they are going to pay for the move of part of the Marines from Futenma to Guam?

Mr. SCHIFFER. Again, I think that would be highly speculative. I guess I would note that Japan has offered \$415.5 million in funding for Guam infrastructure improvements in the Japan fiscal year 2011 budget. That has already been approved by their lower house. We expect it to be fully approved, and that we are not aware of any effort, have not heard any voices in the past few days that would suggest that that funding is not going to go forward.

Ms. HANABUSA. Have you heard an affirmation that even if they have got this critical situation where they are going to be rebuilding a huge part of their nation that they are still going to continue with their commitments to the United States?

Mr. SCHIFFER. The discussions that we have been having with the Government of Japan in the past few days have been how to respond to the immediate humanitarian crisis and the situation at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. Once we have managed to deal with the management of the immediate consequences, the thousands of people that have died, the hundreds of thousands that are internally displaced, and the ongoing situation with the nuclear power plant, I am sure we will have those discussions. And I am fully confident that the Government of Japan will continue to be positively engaged.

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you for your questions.

To follow up on what the gentlelady from Hawaii was asking, Mr. Schiffer, you and General Alles have both talked about the importance of our allies working in a partnership fashion for us to be able to do the type of defense that we need in the Pacific. Have there been any thoughts about perhaps selling some export version of the F-22 to Japan or any of our other allies given the fact that we are concerned perhaps that the Russians may be selling their PAK FA [fifth-generation jet fighter] to other players across the world? And if we did that, and I am not suggesting we do, I am just asking for your thoughts, but there is arguments that it would help bring the cost of the F-22 down in doing that. Have there ever been any discussions about doing that?

Mr. SCHIFFER. I think Secretary Gates is very, very clear on where he is on the F-22 program. As I did not bring along a copy of my letter of resignation in my backpack, that will be the entirety of my remarks on the issue.

Mr. FORBES. Well placed.

General ALLES. I will leave the F-22 to Mr. Schiffer.

But I would just comment, we have had discussions with the Japanese about what their needs are in terms of aviation requirements. We think the F-35 makes a very logical fit for them. I think it is what they are exploring currently. So that makes eminent sense to us in many ways. I think it more adequately addresses the defense of Japan needs.

I think another aspect of this, back to our allies and partners in the region, in the Northeast Asia region we are seeing increased levels of cooperation between the Government of South Korea and Japan. Even this recent tragedy shows a degree of cooperation between them in terms of assistance. So we are encouraged by that and by the trilateral cooperation that we are having between the three sides.

Mr. FORBES. Madam Secretary, I am going to let you slide on that question, and we are going to go to Ms. Bordallo.

Ms. BORDALLO. Mr. Chairman, if you would bear with me. I have a number of questions to ask. I really just want to get answers for the record, so if the witnesses could make it very brief.

First, Secretary Pfannenstiel, now that the Programmatic Agreement has been signed, when can you expect task orders to be issued to contract awardees? And when will some initial construction efforts get underway on Guam?

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. Congresswoman Bordallo, we will be issuing contracts and notices to proceed on several of these contracts very soon. We have some contracts have already been awarded, and we will be able to issue notices to proceed on those. On a number of others we have specific dates that we are ready to go on them.

Ms. BORDALLO. Very good.

Regarding the training ranges, I hope that General Alles can help to answer this. The QDR addresses training in the Pacific. General, can you describe the current challenges to training in this region? And also, are there any efforts by PACOM to lead a com-

prehensive approach to develop a truly effective solution to training issues in the future?

General ALLES. Thank you, ma'am. There is an effort on the part of PACOM to start an EIS [environmental impact statement], which actually I think the funding is in the current year's budget, that would address holistically the issues for PACOM as far as joint training is concerned across the Pacific region. So I think that addresses partially the issues on Guam.

We have discussed earlier the sighting of ranges on Guam itself and the need for individual training of the Marines in terms of small arms and those issues and where the broader degrees of training can be conducted throughout the theater.

One of our prime considerations, though, as we have discussed, is that we maintain ready forces throughout our region. We think that is critical as a deterrence aspect. It is so very important to us at the combatant commander's levels that we are able to train our marines, soldiers, sailors, and airmen across their range of required skills.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you.

Secretary Pfannenstiel, I hope that you can help me better understand the rationale for a firing range on Guam. I have long expressed my concern about the preferred alternative location for the firing range on Guam. The Marine requirements seem to have shifted since the beginning of the EIS process in 2006; and as such, why are these individual qualifications needed to be met on Guam? Has a cost-benefit analysis, and I think we talked about this earlier, been conducted to determine why the Island of Tinian may or may not be feasible?

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. We have looked at the Island of Tinian, and in fact we will be doing some group training there. But the individual qualifying training needs to be on site close to where the Marines will be. We have looked at the ability to move the Marines as would be required, to move them to Tinian often, to support them there, to move them back. You end up not with just a lot of additional expense, you reduce the time they have to train. You reduce the throughput of training for them.

Given all of that, we have concluded that the training needs to be on the Island of Guam. And we have sought for, since we have been doing the process, to find a place on the island of Guam that meets the needs; that is, sufficient size, that has the least impact on the community, that does not interfere with business or recreation, that is operationally safe, which is why we ended up with a preferred alternative that we are now looking at.

Ms. BORDALLO. Another question for you, Secretary. Many institutions of higher learning have cooperative agreements with DOD to support the mission and provide technical studies and analysis. Are you open to developing a cooperative agreement with the University of Guam, and what steps are you taking to get an agreement on a cooperative agreement?

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. We have the highest respect—I personally have the highest respect for the University of Guam and Dr. Underwood. I have met with him every time I have gone to Guam. I believe that the university is a true asset for the island. I am not

sure what the cooperative agreement is that you would be proposing, but I am certainly open to talking about it.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you.

And another one for you, Secretary. As you know, included in the Record of Decision was a commitment to Adaptive Program Management throughout the duration of the military buildup. However, there is still a lack of common understanding of APM's [the Adaptive Program Management's] specific meaning for the buildup. What role do you see APM and CMCC [Civilian Military Coordinating Council] playing as the relocation moves forward?

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. The Adaptive Program Management was developed as a way of slowing, if necessary, the activity of the buildup to keep from overwhelming the infrastructure of the island, whether it is water or wastewater or power or roads or any other aspect of the infrastructure. So the idea is that as the buildup happens, as construction happens, we will look continually at the logistics that are needed and slow down or change the schedule. And the CMCC, the Civilian Military Coordinating Council, would be the oversight body that would meet and decide whether the buildup was in fact moving too fast, whether it needed to be slowed down in some aspects.

Right now we are in the process of working with the other parties who would be involved in this to develop the operating charter for the CMCC.

Ms. BORDALLO. A follow-up on this, if a project related to the buildup is causing significant environmental impacts, how will DOD adequately adapt given the short timeframe for the buildup?

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. I believe that depends on what the impacts of the project would be. We are working with the Environmental Protection Agency and many other resources agencies to mitigate where we can, to slow down if that is what would be required.

Ms. BORDALLO. All right, and I have a further question for you, Secretary. Throughout the course of this series of hearings on "Are we ready?", we have discussed the element of risk in the operations and maintenance. Now, I would like to bring an element of serious risk in the acquisition strategy for the military buildup on Guam.

The current acquisition strategy requires that each contractor provides a certain level of medical care at each work site as well as health insurance coverage. The plan also calls for the prescreening of any guest workers at their origin. The fragmented strategy could result in seven different plans for how to care for workers. Given the state of the health care system on Guam, I think this part of the plan assumes way too much risk for our overall health infrastructure.

So can you detail for the committee why this strategy was settled on and what steps are being taken to ensure that the predeployment screening of guest workers is done to a certain standard?

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. Congresswoman, the concern here was to specifically avoid overwhelming the medical facilities available on Guam. So it became part of the contract award process that the contractors would have to provide medical care for their workers.

That is an important part of what determined whether they would be selected.

Our expectation is that these workers will be able to be treated by their employers. If they need to go to the hospital for stabilization, they would do that, then they would be airlifted off. They would be able to put the least possible impact on the island's existing medical facilities.

In terms of screening before they came, we would have to ensure that that would happen and that it would be effective.

Ms. BORDALLO. Can I get your word on working with my office further on this detail?

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. Oh, absolutely. I would be glad to do that.

Ms. BORDALLO. Very good.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 77.]

One last question for you. The Micronesian Bio-Security Plan was developed by various Federal agencies, to include the DOD and DOI [the Department of the Interior], to determine how to address the risks of terrestrial and marine invasive species to the Micronesian region resulting from the buildup. Can you tell me how the DOD will implement the MBP [Micronesian Bio-Security Plan] and what proactive actions the DOD will take to prevent new invasive species from being introduced?

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. We have a fairly elaborate plan of how it would work, and I would be glad to get more information on that to your office. I think that would probably be more productive than trying to walk through the various pieces of it here.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 78.]

Ms. BORDALLO. Very good, because we do have enough brown tree snakes now forever.

General Alles, the lease for the Guam shipyard is up next year. General, can you address what level of readiness our forward-deployed ship repair capability provides PACOM?

General ALLES. Ma'am, I will have to take that for the record. I am not in a position to address that one. But I can definitely get you the answer.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 77.]

Ms. BORDALLO. Mr. Chairman, that concludes. I wanted the answers to those questions for the record.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. Feel free to supplement any of those answers that you have for the record.

General, Admiral Willard when he was here last year, gave some testimony about the number of ships in the Chinese Navy. Do you have any idea how many ships the Chinese have in their Navy today?

General ALLES. I can comment on their modernization. The specific numbers, I would need to get.

Mr. FORBES. If you can get those numbers for us and supply them to us.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 77.]

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Schiffer, today is March 15, 2011. Ten years from now, do you have any idea, if we continue on the same building plan we are on right now, how will the number of submarines that we have in our Navy compare with the number the submarines the Chinese will have based on our projections of what they are building?

Mr. SCHIFFER. I will have to get back to you on the record in terms of the exact number.

Mr. FORBES. I understand. If you could get that number back to us so we can see it.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 77.]

Mr. FORBES. General, you and I talked the other day, one of the interesting things right now, most of our strategies are dependent upon our forces being able to attack and then move back to sanctuaries where they have basically safe harbors at that particular point in time. But if we had a major conflict in the Pacific, more likely than not these safe harbors or sanctuaries wouldn't be available. So my question is: Do U.S. forces typically operate under degraded battle network conditions when training for operations in the Western Pacific? And if so, what are the key lessons we have learned from such training? And if not, why are we not training in this manner, especially since the Chinese military writings cite our battle networks as our Achilles heel?

General ALLES. I think one of the areas that we have identified that we will continue to work on is the need to be able to operate in missions-controlled environments, and that is something certainly that we have done in a robust nature in the past. It is an area that we need to address now and into the future. It is an area that is not being ignored. It is not an area that we don't ever practice to, but I think, like other issues as we look at a potential country that would be a near-peer, we are going to have to look at the kinds of training we are doing and how we prepare for that kind of a situation.

Mr. FORBES. If you could keep our subcommittee posted on your progress on that, we would appreciate it.

Our Navy and Air forces, are they trained and ready to operated under sustained loss degradation based on space capabilities and capacities because we know that we see the Chinese perhaps looking at taking away some of those capabilities? Are we training to deal with that degradation if it were to take place?

General ALLES. Again, we are looking at that during our exercises. I think there is more improvement that we can gain in those areas, both in the type of technology we are using that provides a more robust space network as far as jam resistance, those kinds of things, and also from the standpoint of practicing those types of operations in degraded environments. There are certainly improvements that can be done there. I don't want to imply there that is not practiced at all now. That would be an incorrect statement, too.

Mr. FORBES. My last question, maybe all three of you could take a bite at this at how we can do better. I want to go back to the very first question that I raised, and it is the fact that the Secretary did direct the Air Force and the Navy to develop an Air-Sea Battle concept to address the growing Anti-Access/Area Denial

problem, which many people feel is the most acute in the Western Pacific.

We know from writings that this challenge has been emerging really for the better part of the last decade, and yet we had the instruction come out last year to develop the concept, and all of your testimonies today were that it was evolving. What takes us so long to create a concept to respond to a threat that we have? Any suggestions on how we can cut that timeline down?

Mr. SCHIFFER. I think that is an excellent question, Mr. Chairman, and one that I would very much like to be able to take back and consult with some of my colleagues on so we can provide you with a better answer on how we might be able to be more nimble in our own thinking.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 77.]

Mr. FORBES. I would appreciate it, and we are not pointing the finger at you. We are pointing the finger at us, too, and we want to work in a partnership so that we can respond faster. We would love to have that dialogue and any input you can give us to how we can make that work better.

General, you have lived with this most of your career. Any suggestions?

General ALLES. I don't have the answer for what takes so long. I do think that this has come into a much better focus over the past few years on the direction that China has done with this Anti-Access/Area Denial strategy of theirs. And as it has come into focus, I think that is moving us toward action in this one area of Air-Sea Battles, and numerous other areas.

Mr. FORBES. General, one thing I would just throw out, we are not just limiting it to the Anti-Access/Area Denial problem, it is generally when we are trying to deal with these concepts, sometimes it just takes us so long to get our arms around it. I know in many hearings that we had we were talking about this very problem, and we have the Department of Defense telling us it is no problem, it is no problem, it is no problem. And then it seems like everybody went to bed one night and woke up the next morning and said: Oh, my gosh, it is a problem. And so we would appreciate any insight you have from your years of experience on how we can make that better.

Madam Secretary, I know, not particularly on this issue, but on a lot of the other issues across agencies, you have lived with this a long time, too. What are your suggestions on how we cope with it a little faster?

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure that I have any wisdom beyond what my colleagues here have offered. I am, as you note, relatively new to the Pentagon and the processes. I see dedication, I see very knowledgeable people who are answering questions as well as they can, and I believe that the interaction with Congress is strong and is positive. Clearly if I have any ideas on this I would be glad to share them with you.

Mr. FORBES. We are about out of time. I just want to give our witnesses a couple of minutes to say anything that you left out or that you think is important or you got short-changed on that you didn't get to get in the record.

Mr. Schiffer.

Mr. SCHIFFER. No, Mr. Chairman, I think we have had ample opportunity, and thank you very much for this opportunity to come up and engage in this important dialogue with you.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Schiffer.

General.

General ALLES. I would just mention what we discussed in your office, and that is we look at this issue of Anti-Access/Area Denial. We are in kind of a formative period here, and the support of Congress in working on these particular programs I think will be essential to addressing the issue.

Mr. FORBES. Madam Secretary.

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank you and Congresswoman Bordallo for the opportunity to come and talk about what I see as a very important part of our Pacific posture, and I know Guam is one piece of it, but I think for many of us it is a key strategic piece.

Mr. FORBES. Our doors remain open to all three of you if there is anything we can do to help.

I would like to leave with Ms. Bordallo, any closing comments.

Ms. BORDALLO. Just a few seconds, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you very much for focusing on this very important move for the military, probably one of the biggest in the history, I understand. It is going to cost our Government and the Government of Japan about \$16 billion when all is concluded, and I just want to thank you very much for focusing on the Asia-Pacific area and its importance.

Mr. FORBES. With that, we are adjourned. Thank you all very much.

[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MARCH 15, 2011

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 15, 2011

Statement of Chairman J. Randy Forbes (R-Virginia)
House Subcommittee on Readiness
Hearing on
Long-Term Readiness Challenges in the Pacific
March 15, 2011

I want to welcome our distinguished panel of witnesses to discuss the readiness posture of our forces in the Pacific theater. Although I scheduled this hearing as the third in a series of hearings asking the question “Are we ready?”, the events unfolding in Japan as a result of Friday’s earthquake weigh heavily on these proceedings.

While the full extent of the damage is not yet known, the horrific property damage and loss of life is devastating. My thoughts and prayers are with the victims of this tragic disaster.

In our first session, a panel of independent witnesses agreed that issues in the Asia-Pacific region are at the top of the list when we look at potential global threats and challenges. At that hearing, Mr. Tom Donnelly testified that “China’s massive and accelerating military modernization has concentrated on complicating the ability of U.S. forces, and especially the Navy, to project power across the western Pacific.”

When we followed up on that discussion with the “Ops Deputies” from each of the military services at our hearing last Thursday, we heard that aging equipment, insufficient time to train for full spectrum operations, and the need to reset and recapitalize equipment worn out from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were their greatest readiness challenges.

There is no doubt that our military is under significant strain, but they are performing marvelously despite the many challenges they face. However, the work of this subcommittee is to not only ensure our force can continue to excel in Iraq and Afghanistan, but is also postured to respond to a myriad of potential challenges in the Pacific, both in the near term and in the long term.

China has annually increased their defense budget by almost 12 percent and their rapidly expanding economy will likely support such investments for the foreseeable future. China's voracious appetite for natural resources continues to threaten adjoining nations and serves to destabilize regional order. We must ask ourselves if we are ready to respond to the significant challenges posed by China's efforts to offset American advantages at sea, in the skies, in space, and cyberspace.

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ARMED SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE
ON READINESS

WRITTEN STATEMENT OF

MR. R. MICHAEL SCHIFFER

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, EAST ASIA

BEFORE THE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE

ON READINESS

15 MARCH 2011

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READINESS

Introduction

Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Bordallo, and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the privilege of appearing before you today to discuss the readiness of U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific region, the implications of China's rise, and the challenges North Korea poses to security. These are all issues of significance to U.S. defense and foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific. I am happy to be here this afternoon to speak with you and the Committee about the work that the Obama Administration and we, at the Department of Defense, are doing in the region. To be clear the Department of Defense, and the men and women in uniform wherever they may be stationed, at home or abroad, are ready to meet any challenges that they may face in the near, medium, or long-term. However, for purposes of this hearing I will focus on our state of readiness in the Asia-Pacific region.

Before I begin my testimony, I would like to reiterate that our thoughts and prayers are with the people of Japan. I was in Japan last week when the earthquake struck and though I was not near the affected area, the magnitude of the earthquake in both real and psychological terms was palpable. We are still learning the total extent of this earthquake and tsunami.

But right now, the men and women of Japan, its government, and its armed services are working around the clock to rescue survivors and those trapped by the earthquake. The U.S. government is offering, as President Obama directed, whatever assistance is needed by our Japanese friends. We have already offered support from USAID, the State Department, and from our navy, ground, and air personnel in Japan and around the Pacific. In addition to humanitarian assistance like drinking water, blankets, and emergency food, we are providing helicopter search and rescue operations, support from U.S. Navy ships including the Ronald Reagan Carrier strike group which is providing services such as water purification, medical teams and hospital beds, to expedite relief at this critical time. Our forward presence in Japan and throughout the Asia-Pacific has allowed us to respond to Japan's urgent needs very quickly, and will continue to facilitate rapid engagement where needed until the crisis is passed.

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We will work to provide all the support we can, while ensuring the highest-possible levels of safety for our service-men and women, especially in areas in or around the nuclear electricity facilities damaged by the earthquake.

Overview

By many measures the Asia-Pacific region is the most important and most dynamic region in the world today. It holds over half the world's population, more than 1 trillion dollars in annual U.S. trade is conducted with countries in Asia, 15 of the world's largest ports, and 5 of the world's largest armies, which includes the militaries of China, India, South Korea, North Korea, Russia, Japan, and the United States all reside in Asia. Also, as misfortune would have it, over 60% of the world's natural disasters occur in the Asia-Pacific region, as the most recent earthquakes in New Zealand and Japan remind us.

Looking to the future, if the Asia-Pacific is to maintain its extraordinary growth, it will have to find ways to manage traditional and non-traditional security challenges, as well as find ways to enhance and maintain peace, stability, and prosperity.

As remarkable as the region's stability and prosperity has been over the years, history teaches us that periods of regional transition – notably highlighted by the rise of China – without careful management - can precipitate discord or even conflict. Therefore, our principal objective must be to ensure that the region's hard earned peace and prosperity are maintained and that great power rivalries and “zero-sum” competitions do not arise.

In order to fully achieve this objective it will require broader actions and engagements from the United States with regional allies and partners, as well as a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive bilateral relationship with China (to include military-to-military relations).

The security environment within Asia is complex and dynamic. Increased provocations by North Korea against South Korea, and the growing threat North Korea poses to the United States, Japan, and others in the region have heightened security concerns in Northeast Asia. China's growing military capabilities, its assertive behavior, and insufficient transparency into its long-term intentions are also causing concern within the region. Additionally, the growing need to tackle non-traditional threats such as those posed by climate change, piracy, and natural disasters are increasing demands on our forces in the region. It is clear to the Department of

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Defense that the imperative for the United States to remain forward deployed and actively engaged in the Asia Pacific has not waned.

U.S. Force Posture in the Asia-Pacific

The United States will continue to be globally postured to secure our homeland and citizens from direct attack and to advance our interests around the world. There should be no mistaking the importance of U.S. military power as one of the essential elements of our strategy for protecting our national interests in the Asia-Pacific. The Department of Defense evaluates our global posture on an ongoing basis to better position our forces to maintain deterrence, contingency response, and to actively shape, the security environment in ways that strengthen stability, peace, and prosperity for all. This subject will be addressed in greater detail in an upcoming global posture review. However, the important point to note is that the U.S. defense posture in Asia is shifting to one that is more geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. For example:

- More geographically distributed in the Asia-Pacific means that we must enhance U.S. presence throughout the region by capitalizing on opportunities in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean to help better protect sea lines of communication.
- Operationally resilient means that we must work to ensure the U.S. advantage across a range of contingencies through greater hardening, redundancy, responsiveness, and dispersal of capabilities—as well as by having more flexible defense agreements and more predictable and sustainable basing arrangements that enable greater protection of military capabilities.
- Political sustainability means ensuring that our presence is acceptable to host nations and local populations in the region over the long-term.

U.S.-Japan Alliance

The U.S.-Japan alliance remains the lynchpin of U.S. posture in the Asia-Pacific and absolutely crucial to peace, stability, and prosperity in the region. The U.S.-Japan alliance celebrated its 50th anniversary last year and remains as important to regional security today as it was when it began—it is indeed the cornerstone of our future success and progress in the region.

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The fundamental underpinning of the Alliance remains solid. In short, by hosting our forces and providing significant Host Nation Support, Japan directly enables military readiness, which in turn enhances U.S. influence and capabilities in the region. As it pertains directly to this hearing, however, I would like to focus on our efforts to implement the Realignment Roadmap as the path we are taking with our Japanese partners to adapt the alliance to the evolving regional and global security environment. For this, the value of the work that has been done with our Japanese allies must be appropriately underscored.

Alliance Transformation and Realignment Implementation

The Departments of Defense and State have established an effective process with the government of Japan to implement the realigning of our military presence in Japan. Through this process, we have achieved important milestones of alliance transformation. I would like to offer a few examples of these achievements:

- We have deployed alliance missile defense capabilities including sensors, interceptors and other active defenses, and command and control capabilities that offered significant protections for the people of both our nations.
- We have built, tested and exercised the new Bilateral Joint Operations Command Center at Yokota Air base.
- The Government of Japan completed a nearly \$2.5 billion runway project at MCAS Iwakuni.
- The Government of Japan has met all of its agreed financial commitments to facilitate the expansion of defense capabilities on Guam.
- Expansion of the bilateral air combat training continues to improve the readiness of Alliance air defense.

In other areas, our progress has proven more difficult.

For example, the focus on the implementation of the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma has, for certain, been intense. However, our two governments are working closely together to identify ways to maintain a U.S. force posture in Japan ready to respond to the full range of operational requirements. It is important to note that both Prime Minister Kan and Defense Minister Kitazawa have publically affirmed the importance of the Alliance and of U.S. Marine Corps force forward-deployed to Okinawa.

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This view is shared by the senior leadership at the Defense Department. There is no substitute for maintaining a highly capable forward deployed ground presence – III Marine Expeditionary Forces – west of the international dateline. It provides us with the capacity to respond quickly to multiple regional challenges—both traditional and non-traditional challenges. In the Asia-Pacific, U.S. ground forces are the Marines. This means the only deployable U.S. ground forces between Hawaii and India are the U.S. Marines on Okinawa. Those are the ground forces assigned to defend Japan and to maintain security in the Asia-Pacific. It is impossible to deter, defend, and defeat without the ability to deploy ground forces rapidly in times of crisis. Without expeditionary ground forces, the deterrent power of our Alliance would be greatly weakened. Events in the region have conspired to remind all of us of the importance and the continued necessity of Marine forces in Okinawa. Actions by North Korea nearly a year ago in late-March—the sinking of the CHEONAN—highlighted for many Japanese the vital deterrent role played by U.S. forces in Okinawa and across Japan.

Partly as a result of these events, the way ahead to a Futenma Replacement Facility, while still unresolved, is so important for the alliance and the region. The Joint Statement issued on May 28, 2010 by Secretaries Gates and Clinton and their Japanese counterparts designates the location of the new facility in the Camp Schwab area. We also anticipate a configuration decision by the upcoming 2+2 meeting, and we are working with the Government of Japan to develop the timetable for construction to begin.

Of course, the Futenma Replacement Facility at Camp Schwab is but a single component of a larger plan to consolidate the U.S. military presence on Okinawa and to move our forces away from the densely populated southern portion of the island. The full Okinawa realignment package will allow us to reposition more than 8,000 Marines from Japan to Guam and return nearly 70 percent of the land south of Kadena Air Base. This will ensure a much more sustainable and enduring presence for U.S. forces on Okinawa that also preserves the alliance's operational needs and capabilities. Most importantly to the Okinawans, it directly addresses their noise, safety, and environmental concerns.

Strategic Value of Guam

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The realignment of more than 8,000 Marines and their families from Okinawa to Guam is a critical element of the Roadmap. It will further several related strategic goals:

- First, the realignment will ensure the continued long-term presence of U.S. forces in Japan and in the Western Pacific, sending a positive message to our friends and allies in the region.
- Second, it will strengthen our alliance with Japan, which serves as the foundation of our presence in the Asia-Pacific. By reducing our footprint on Okinawa, while keeping forces in Guam ready to respond to regional contingencies, we create conditions for a more stable presence, thus helping to further strengthen the Alliance.
- And third, by making better use of Guam's strategic location and advantages, we will array U.S. forces in Asia more effectively for the evolving security environment.

Guam is an essential component of U.S. strategy in Asia and of U.S. national security more broadly. Guam's advantages as a stable, secure, and robust operating base on American soil make it a unique and critically valuable location. The island provides flexibility and freedom of action necessary to support peacetime engagement, humanitarian assistance and disaster response, and capacity-building of partners in Asia more broadly.

Issues on the Korean Peninsula

The U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) Alliance is another key pillar of U.S. strategy and long-term readiness for a region undergoing tremendous political, economic, and security-related change. This comprehensive relationship, spanning the defense, diplomatic, and economic spheres, continues to serve as a source of stability in the face of unpredictable and provocative North Korean behavior.

Last year we commemorated the 60th anniversary of the start of the Korean War. At its most basic level, the mission of our Alliance today remains the same as it did 60 years ago: to deter aggression against the ROK, and to fight and win should deterrence fail. In the last 12 months, North Korea has attacked and sunk a ROK naval vessel, killing 46 sailors, publicly revealed a uranium enrichment program in contravention of multiple UN Security Council Resolutions, and launched an artillery attack that killed both ROK Marines and civilians. These

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provocations are a somber reminder of the active threat that North Korea poses to regional stability and of our need to remain forward deployed, highly capable, and ready to deal with growing threats emanating from North Korea.

In such a high-threat environment, the U.S.-ROK Alliance's mission to deter and defend takes on a very real significance and remains our primary focus. While this "deter and defend" mission remains the top priority of the Alliance, the U.S. investment in Korea's security has helped create an alliance whose value extends far beyond the security of the Korean Peninsula to also help to promote a peaceful and prosperous Asia.

To achieve this, the United States must maintain a forward military posture on the Peninsula. It is our forward presence, more than 28,500 strong, that most effectively communicates our resolve to defend our allies and preserve our vital interests in Asia. Successful deterrence relies on credibility as much as, if not more than, capability. In making sure that capability is enhanced and maintained we engage in regularly scheduled annual exercises with our ROK allies. Exercises like Key Resolve and Foal Eagle, enhance the ROK-U.S. alliance's ability to defend the ROK and protect the region. These exercises demonstrate U.S. commitment to the ROK-U.S. alliance and enhance the combat readiness of ROK and U.S. supporting forces through combined and joint training.

The security dividend resulting from our longstanding military presence in the region is generally well known, but the ongoing efforts to transform the alliance for the future deserve some attention as well. Strategic Alliance 2015 (SA2015) is an umbrella concept that encompasses and harmonizes many different alliance transformation efforts. The foundation of SA2015 is a plan to transition wartime operational control (OPCON) of forces to the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff. Some of the related initiatives that support OPCON transition, which is now scheduled to take place by December 2015, will result in military plans and exercises that are updated to better account for the most probable threats we could face today and in the near future.

China's Rise and Regional and International Role

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As important as it is to maintain our presence and adjust our future posture in Asia to maintain long-term readiness, our relationship with China will also play an important role in promoting Asia-Pacific peace and prosperity. As the second largest economy in the world, China is translating wealth into improved capabilities and capacity in a number of other areas, including its military. The future of the Asia-Pacific region would benefit significantly from further positive contributions from China. From climate change to non-proliferation, there are many issues that our positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship with China is addressing. Likewise, it is easy to imagine the global challenges problems that could worsen if China does not contribute to their ultimate resolution.

As President Obama and Secretary Gates have said, the U.S. welcomes a strong, prosperous and successful China that plays a greater role in world affairs. And we welcome and strongly encourage China's active and positive contributions to the stability, resilience, and growth of the international system. We see some positive examples of cooperation and partnership from China on certain regional and global challenges, and we will look to China to grow its contributions.

Uncertainty over China's Rise and Strategic Intentions

Over the past several years, China's growing capabilities, uncertain regional and global ambitions, and assertive behavior in recent years (particularly in the South China Sea and maritime domains) have been a source of anxiety in the Asia-Pacific and, over the long-term, could pose serious security challenges to U.S. national interests. This is a topic that we discuss quite openly and frankly with Chinese policymakers at all levels of government. Given the two decades of neglect of its military following initiation of its reform period in 1979, it is quite natural for China to modernize its military beginning in the mid-1990s. However, the lack of transparency, both in terms of capabilities and intentions, about the nature of its modernization program has caused concern in the United States and the region.

China's Military Modernization

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At the Department of Defense, we have a special responsibility to monitor China's military and maintain deterrence. Consistent with this responsibility is the Department's annual report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China.

What is clear from several years of publishing this report is that the pace and scope of China's military transformation has increased in recent years, fueled by acquisition of advanced foreign weapons, continued high rates of investment in its domestic defense and science and technology industries and far-reaching organizational and doctrinal reforms of the armed forces.

PLA modernization trends suggest Beijing is interested in generating capabilities to employ military force to support a broad array of mission sets. Preparing for a Taiwan contingency appears to be the primary driver, but as we have seen in recent years, China's forces are also focused on operations other than Taiwan.

China's comprehensive military modernization is supported by continued increases in funding. On March 4, 2011, China announced a 12.7% increase in its defense budget, an increase to 601.1 billion RMB (\$91.5 billion). This continues more than two decades of sustained annual increases in China's official military budget. We continue to believe, however, that even this figure under represents actual military expenditure in China.

China sustained defense investments have paid off. Of note, China has the most active land-based ballistic and cruise missile program in the world. In addition to some 1,000-1,200 conventional SRBMs opposite Taiwan, China is quickly developing a variety of long range land attack and anti-ship cruise missiles, and conventional medium range surface-to-surface and anti-ship ballistic missiles. China continues to invest heavily in a robust undersea warfare program with a mixture of second generation nuclear and conventionally powered submarines. Likewise, China is building the capability to project air power through development of an aircraft carrier, and long range land based air superiority and multirole aircraft, including its first stealth fighter (J-20). China is also continuing to invest in an array of strategic capabilities, including modernized nuclear forces, space and counter-space systems, and cyber warfare capabilities. Taken as a whole, we see the potential for China's armed forces to contribute to the delivery of public goods, but we also see these capabilities enabling China to engage in regional aggression or coercion, and to restrict freedom of access and freedom of maneuver in peace time or greater

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ability to engage in regional conflict scenarios using what we would term anti-access or area denial capability.

It is imperative that the United States maintain its ability to project power around the region and across the globe. In this respect, long-term readiness means that the Department of Defense must be prepared to respond to this challenge by procuring new capabilities, modernizing our existing inventories, and developing new ways to counter these emerging threats.

U.S.-China Military-to-Military Relations

Long-term readiness also means that the United States must continue to work with our allies and partners and China to positively shape China's rise both within the Asia-Pacific region and globally. U.S. strategy must be flexible enough to anticipate and respond to multiple possible outcomes, and it must be able to capitalize on the cooperative potential of the U.S.-China relationship while also managing the risk inherent in China's rise.

As China's military capabilities continue to improve, both the U.S. and China benefit from having a healthy, stable, and reliable military-to-military relationship. During the recent visit by President Hu Jintao, both sides agreed on the need for enhanced and substantive dialogue and communication at all levels: to reduce misunderstanding, misperception, and miscalculation. Indeed, it is precisely because we see the serious security concerns dividing our two countries that we need to temper them by building cooperative capacity, fostering greater institutional understanding, and work to build common views on the international security environment and related security challenges.

We are seeing positive momentum in the wake of Secretary Gates' trip to Asia and President Hu's visit to Washington in January. We are working with the PLA to arrange spring meetings of the Defense Policy Coordinative Talks (at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level), Military Maritime Consultative Agreement Working Group meetings, and a meeting to discuss developing a frame to guide the military-to-military relationship. Admiral Mullen is preparing to host his counterpart PLA General Chen Bingde in the late spring as well. We are also working with our colleagues at the Department of State to open a dialogue with China to discuss strategic security issues.

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The U.S. remains committed to building a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive U.S.-China relationship for the 21st century, which serves the interest of the American and Chinese peoples and the global community. We are currently experiencing positive momentum in the military-to-military relationship, which we look forward to continuing throughout 2011. However, we are also mindful of the need to maintain our strong presence in the region and robust alliance structure, further develop our own capabilities, and clearly communicate our resolve to maintain peace and stability in the Asia Pacific.

Conclusion

The United States is an Asia-Pacific power, as evidenced by our long-term commitment to and military presence in the region. We are—and will remain—forward deployed and highly capable to defend our interests and maintain our commitment to defend our allies and partners well into the 21st century. However, being ready to meet the dynamic nature of the security challenges in the region will, however, require a strong commitment to work with and enhance the capabilities of our allies and partners, and the ability to manage and shape in a positive way the rise of China. Thank you for allowing me to appear before you today. I look forward to your questions.

**Michael Schiffer****Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Asian & Pacific Security Affairs, East Asia**

Michael Schiffer is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs. Mr. Schiffer came to the Office of the Secretary of Defense in April of 2009 from the Stanley Foundation where he was a program officer in Policy Analysis and Dialogue responsible for the foundation's Asia programs as well as a range of other US national and global security issues from 2006-2009. From 2004-2005 he was a Council on Foreign Relations Hitachi International Affairs Fellow in Japan.

From 1995-2004, Schiffer worked on the staff of US Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), where he was her senior national security adviser and legislative director. Prior to that, he was director of International Security Programs at New York University's Center for War, Peace, and the News Media and also managed a bed and breakfast inn in Hawaii.

Schiffer is a Center for Asia and Pacific Studies Fellow at the University of Iowa and has published widely on a range of international security, political and media issues. He received his undergraduate degree from Georgetown University and graduate degrees from the London School of Economics and New York University.



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STATEMENT OF
MAJOR GENERAL RANDOLPH D. ALLES, U.S. MARINE CORPS
DIRECTOR FOR STRATEGIC PLANS AND POLICY, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND
BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
ON
LONG-TERM READINESS CHALLENGES IN THE PACIFIC
15 MARCH 2011

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Chairman Forbes, Ms. Bordallo, Members of the Committee. On behalf of the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), thank you for the opportunity to discuss the long term readiness challenges we face in the Asia-Pacific region. As you know, the Asia Pacific is vital to our national interests. This region is home to five of our nation's seven mutual defense treaties, three of the world's largest economies, and over one trillion dollars in U.S. two-way trade. For over 60 years, the United States, through USPACOM, has provided a secure environment that has allowed the nations of the Asia-Pacific to focus on developing their economies and building strong institutions of government. This security, which has allowed this region to prosper, is a direct result of the readiness of our forward-deployed forces and the strong relationships we maintain with our allies and partners in the region.

While the region remains relatively secure and stable, the security conditions that have underpinned this unprecedented prosperity for decades remains challenged by both traditional and emerging challenges.

North Korea. For decades, the potential for major conventional conflict between North and South Korea has been a significant concern. Unable to rely on its ageing conventional force, North Korea increasingly relies on its nuclear and missile programs, and special forces to project a credible threat within East Asia. Caring little for its people, the regime stays in power through repression, fear, and limiting access to information about the outside world. Its economic approach of self-reliance has been proven unsuccessful, and its faltering economy is aided by cash generated by an increasing criminal activity network and proliferation of its weapons technology to other rogue regimes and organizations.

The transition of power within the DPRK also is a source of concern as we watch Kim Jong Il accelerate a timeline that ensures his youngest son continues his family's reign. The speculation that the recent acts of provocation committed against South Korea, such as the sinking of the ROK ship CHEONAN and the killing of innocent civilians in the artillery attack on Yeonpyeong-Do Island are designed to build the legitimacy of his son, Kim Jong Un, as his successor cannot be ignored. The secrecy surrounding the Kim regime makes understanding their intentions and capabilities one of our greatest challenges. This lack of transparency, coupled with the uncertainty associated with the dynastic succession of the Kim family, make North Korea a potential source of regional instability and significant concern to PACOM.

China. Another challenge for Pacific Command is to advance the complex U.S.-China relationship. While our military-to-military relationship with China is episodic, we continue to press for opportunities that provide mutual benefit and positive interactions that support a lasting peace and stability within the region. That being said China's powerful economic engine continues to fund a military modernization program with capabilities that appears to be designed to challenge freedoms of action in the region and enforce China's influence over its neighbors, including our regional allies and partners. China recently overtook Japan as the world's second largest economy, and this month, announced a 12% increase to their defense budget. This new found wealth is being invested to rapidly modernize its military and develop anti-access systems capable of holding air and maritime forces at risk at extended distances from Chinese shores. As if to underscore this point, the Chinese publicly tested their next generation fighter, the J-20, during Secretary Gates' trip to China in January, 2011. Other Chinese

developments include anti-space and cyber capabilities as well as an aircraft carrier and an ever growing missile inventory. These capabilities appear inconsistent with China's stated goals of a defense-oriented military capability and highlight the need for frank conversations and predictable actions within the context of a functional military-to-military framework.

Force Posture. USPACOM embraces a theater strategy that leverages an evolving force posture that maximizes strength, balances and biases disposition, sustains readiness, and includes effective forward forces substantial enough to overcome threats and protect U. S. interests. Current Force Posture throughout the Asia-Pacific remains heavily influenced by post-World War II and Cold War era basing and infrastructure, concentrated primarily in Northeast Asia. While this posture is necessary to address the demands in Northeast Asia, to include reassuring our allies of our continued U.S. commitment to regional security, it is not optimized for shaping and responding to 21st century demands elsewhere. Our Posture in South and Southeast Asia is achieved almost entirely with deployed U.S. forces. As such, posture adjustments are needed to meet current and emerging threats in these areas as well as reinforce budding partnerships and strengthen existing alliances.

DPRI. To transform and realign our forces in Japan, the Government of Japan (GOJ) and the Government of the United States agreed in 2005 to implement changes which would allow our forces to adapt to the changing regional and global security environment. Composed of 19 Agreed Implementation Plans (AIPs), the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) remains a key transformation goal of the U.S.-Japan alliance. PACOM remains committed to its implementation. Major realignment elements include

relocating two U.S. air bases from urbanized to rural areas; co-locating U.S. and Japanese command and control capabilities; deploying U.S. missile defense capabilities to Japan in conjunction with their own deployments; and improving operational coordination between U.S. and Japanese forces. Most of the 19 AIPs are on track due to the significant contributions provided by the Government of Japan (GOJ). The one lacking progress and most familiar to Members of Congress is the development of a Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) and the subsequent move of approximately 8000 Marines to Guam. While this lack of progress is disappointing, it does not undermine our ability to maintain trained and ready forces in the region, or our ability to satisfy our treaty commitments to Japan. We will continue to operate from the existing facility at Futenma MCAS while we work with our leadership in DOD and the Japanese to find a solution acceptable to both our nations.

Guam. Progress on construction to support the rebasing of 8,000 Marines and their dependents from Okinawa to Guam has been delayed due to progress on the development of the FRF and historic preservation issues. Once complete, Guam-based Marines, in addition to those Marine Forces that remain on Okinawa, will enhance the flexibility of forward-based ground forces in the Pacific Command AOR. Increases to U.S. military capabilities on Guam will fully leverage transformational advancements of the joint force, serve as a central hub for the ISR/Strike force capability within the region, and provide infrastructure to allow for agile and responsive employment of assigned or transient naval forces. Whether deployed to or permanently based in Guam, forces operating on and in the vicinity of Guam provide regional and global military power to meet our nation's needs.

ROK Transformation. The U.S.–ROK Alliance remains strong and critical to our regional strategy and posture in Northeast Asia. Like the U.S.-Japan Alliance, this alliance is also transforming to ensure it matures as an effective contributor to Peninsula and regional security. Current initiatives to mature the alliance are underpinned by the transition of military wartime operational control of combined defense forces to the ROK by the end of 2015. Overall, this transformational effort is designed to improve responsiveness to an evolving peninsular, regional, and global security environment. To this end, the transformation must ensure U.S. forces, which are stationed on the Korean Peninsula to deter aggression and respond to DPRK hostility, are also accessible for regional and global employment. Further, the transformation will ultimately support the ROK military's continued development of extra-peninsular capabilities and capacities.

For over 60 years, U. S. Pacific Command has underpinned the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region and help set the conditions for increased prosperity. This security is a direct result of the credible combat power we maintain through our forward-deployed forces and the close relationships we have with our allies and partners. Although our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines and Civilians should be complimented on success, it would not have been possible without the continued bipartisan support we receive from this Subcommittee. On behalf of our Commander, Admiral Willard, and the men and women serving in the Asia-Pacific, please accept our sincere appreciation for your support.

Thank you and I look forward to answering your questions.



Major General Randolph D. Alles Director, J-5, U. S. Pacific Command

Major General Alles is currently assigned as the Director for Strategic Planning and Policy at the U. S. Pacific Command.

He hails from San Antonio, Texas and attended Texas A&M University. He was commissioned during August of 1976 and was designated a Naval Aviator at Naval Air Station Kingsville, TX in September of 1978.

Major General Alles completed F-4 transition training and reported to VMFA-232 at MCAS Kaneohe Bay, HI in August of 1979. There he served as the NATOPS Officer, Maintenance Material Control Officer, Flight Line Officer, Avionics Officer, and Assistant Aircraft Maintenance Officer.



During the fall of 1982, Major General Alles transitioned to the F/A-18 and reported to VMFA-323 at MCAS El Toro, CA. He served as the Assistant Aircraft Maintenance Officer, Quality Assurance Officer, and Logistics Officer. During this assignment he was embarked with VMFA-323 on USS CORAL SEA (CV-43) and participated in Operation El Dorado Canyon.

In June of 1986 he was ordered to instructor duty at the Navy Fighter Weapons School, NAS Miramar, CA serving as the Asst Maintenance Officer, Staff Standardization Officer, and Training Officer while at "Topgun."

During August of 1989 Major General Alles was transferred to VMFA-312 at MCAS Beaufort, SC where he was assigned duties as the Aircraft Maintenance Officer and then as the Operations Officer. In September 1991 he was transferred to HQMC serving as the Anti-Air Warfare Coordinator and as the Tactical Aircraft Plans Officer. In August 1994, he attended the Marine Corps Command and Staff College.

In Oct 1995 Major General Alles assumed command of VMFA-312. While he was in command the squadron was embarked on USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT (CVN-71) and participated in Operations Deliberate Guard and Southern Watch and was awarded the MCAA's Robert M. Hanson Award.

In August 1997, Major General Alles assumed duties as Executive Officer, Marine

Aircraft Group 31. In August 1998, he reported as a student at the Naval War College, Newport, R.I. graduating in June 1999 with a Master's in National Security & Strategic Studies. From June of 1999 until July 2001 he was assigned as Chief of the Strategy and Policy Division, U.S. Pacific Command.

Major General Alles was Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 11 from Aug 2001 until July 2003. During his tenure the group deployed to Southwest Asia participating in Operation Iraqi Freedom. In Sept 2003 he assumed duties as Branch Head for the Aviation Weapons Systems Requirements Branch, HQMC.

In May 2004 he was assigned as Deputy Director for Operations at the National Military Command Center. He was Commanding General, Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory from July 2005 to May 2007. During Jan 2008 he was assigned as Commanding General, Third Marine Aircraft Wing (forward) participating in Operation Iraqi Freedom 08. His most recent assignment was as Asst Wing Cmdr of 3D MAW.

His awards include the Defense Superior Service Medal with Oak Leaf cluster, the Legion of Merit with Combat V and Gold Star, the Meritorious Service Medal with Gold Star, the Air Medal with strike/flight numeral 3 and the Navy Commendation Medal with Gold Star. He has over 5,000 flight hours.

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ON READINESS

STATEMENT OF

MS. JACKALYNE PFANNENSTIEL
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF NAVY
(ENERGY, INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT)

BEFORE THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE

ON READINESS

15 MARCH 2011

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HOUSE ARMED SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE ON
READINESS

Chairman Forbes, Representative Bordallo, and members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the Department's efforts to plan and execute the Guam military realignment. Over the last four years, the Department of the Navy has worked closely with stakeholders from the Government of Japan, Government of Guam, and federal agencies to plan the realignment, which is the most significant peacetime force posture change since post-World War II.

The Marine Corps relocation, along with other DOD efforts to realign forces and capabilities to Guam, represents a unique opportunity to strategically realign the U.S. force posture in the Pacific for the next 50 years. This is a major effort and one we must get right. The Department of Defense recognizes Congress' concerns regarding execution of the Guam military realignment and is taking steps necessary to resolve critical issues that will allow the program to move forward.

BACKGROUND

Under the October 2005 agreement, "U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future" (ATARA), the U.S. Government and Government of Japan agreed to realign U.S. and Japanese forces throughout the Pacific. As part of this realignment effort, the U.S. Government and Government of Japan agreed to relocate approximately 8,000 Marines and associated dependents from Okinawa, Japan to the U.S. territory of Guam.

The relocation of approximately 8,000 Marines and their dependents to Guam both reduces frictions on Okinawa and strengthens U.S. force posture in the western Pacific in order to best support our alliance and regional strategies. Guam's location, the expanding presence of other U.S. forces there, and the fact that it is a U.S. territory make Guam uniquely suited to supporting this relocation.

The Realignment Roadmap keeps approximately 10,000 Marines in Okinawa, consisting of Marine Air-Ground Task Force elements, such as a Marine Expeditionary Unit and other ground, aviation, and combat service support units, as well as a base support capability.

The Realignment Roadmap also outlines the Government of Japan's financial contributions to the Guam military realignment. The Government of Japan has committed to contributing a total of \$6.09 billion, with \$2.8 billion in direct cash contributions and \$3.29 billion in the form of financial instruments, which will fund family housing and utilities infrastructure on Guam.

PARTNERSHIP WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF GUAM

The Guam community has been a gracious host to military personnel and families for decades. As we ask the people of Guam to now host a new Marine Corps base, the Department recognizes that close partnership with the Government and people of Guam is essential so that a long-term, positive relationship is fostered. The effort to relocate thousands of Marines and their family members is complex and though there remain

issues which separate the Department and the Government of Guam, we are committed to working together to address issues such as cultural preservation, land use, and lessening the impacts on the community.

As such, the Department has outlined four pillars that will guide the approach to the coordinated effort to execute the military realignment. By committing to these four pillars, the Department is demonstrating its willingness to listen and respond to the concerns of the people of Guam.

First, the Department recognizes the added strain that the relocating Marines and their family members will place on Guam's infrastructure and is committed to the pursuit of "One Guam". Improvements to quality of life on Guam will result from direct investments in projects to improve and upgrade civilian infrastructure. These projects include those which are directly related to the military realignment, such as upgrades to the commercial port, roads, and utilities systems; and those identified by the Government of Guam as necessary to support the community's socioeconomic needs. The Department has committed to work with other federal agencies to advocate for support for Guam's needs so that the One Guam vision can become a reality.

Second, the Department understands and supports the great emphasis the people of Guam place on protecting the island's precious natural resources. We will do our part to protect resources and achieve a "Green Guam" by developing the most energy efficient facilities possible and supporting Guam's efforts to develop sustainable and renewable energy projects. We have projects underway with the Guam Power Authority, Guam Waterworks Authority, University of Guam, Department of Energy and other federal

agencies to bring public and private funds to Guam for sustainable projects. We will work with the University of Guam's Center for Island Sustainability to develop and secure funding for green programs.

Third, as discussed in further detail below, the preferred alternative site for the live fire training range complex on Guam that was identified in the Final EIS would require restricted access for safety reasons to the culturally-significant sites of Pagat village and cave when the ranges are in use. Over the past year, the people of Guam made it clear that our plan to provide access to the area only during times when the ranges were not active was unacceptable and had to be changed. In response, we have developed options that will ensure that access to Pagat village and cave will be available 24 hours per day, seven days per week.

Fourth, we recognize that land is a valued and limited resource in Guam. In response to concerns regarding the expansion of our footprint on Guam, we have committed to a "net negative" growth in the amount of property controlled by DOD. This strategy means that at the completion of the military realignment, the Department's footprint will be smaller than it is today, which directly responds to long-standing concerns regarding land use on Guam.

On Guam, the military realignment is viewed as a federal government action, not just a Department of Defense effort. In addition to the concerns noted above that are directly related to the military realignment, Guam's leaders and members of the community are seeking support from across the federal government to resolve several long-standing issues. In our role as a partner to the Government of Guam we have

committed to advocate for Guam's needs in Washington, as demonstrated by the Department's support for the Guam Loyalty Recognition Act. A whole-of-government approach, including the participation of federal agencies and Congress, is necessary to demonstrate that the federal government at large is sensitive to the concerns of the people of Guam as we prepare to ask them to host an increased military presence.

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

As it is designed to do, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process and associated studies helped us identify and address environmental issues and constraints, and develop effective mitigation strategies. In November 2009, the Department of the Navy released for a 90-day comment period a Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the development and construction of facilities and infrastructure to support the relocation from Okinawa to Guam of approximately 8,600 Marines and their associated dependents; development and construction of facilities and infrastructure to support training and operations on Guam and Tinian for the relocated Marines; construction of a new deep-draft wharf with shoreside infrastructure improvements to support a transient nuclear powered aircraft carrier (CVN); and development of infrastructure on Guam to support the relocation of approximately 600 Army personnel and their 900 dependents for the establishment and operation of an Army Missile Defense Task Force (AMDTF). Over 10,000 public comments were received on the Draft EIS.

A significant concern raised in public and agency comments was the impact on the island's environment, infrastructure and social services resulting from the aggressive construction timeline laid out in the Draft EIS. Guam's infrastructure currently faces limitations today, and a sudden introduction of thousands of off-island construction workers would likely further strain utilities systems, roads, medical care, and other critical civilian services. Resource agencies were also concerned regarding the impact to coral reefs as a result of dredging for the transient CVN wharf, as well as impacts related to biosecurity (spread of brown tree snakes outside of Guam), endangered species, and cultural resources.

Under the leadership of the White House Council on Environmental Quality, we worked closely with other federal agencies to resolve these and other significant issues. A Final EIS, which included resolutions for several of the significant issues raised in public comments, was released in July 2010, and in September 2010 a Record of Decision (ROD) was signed.

The ROD included decisions on the locations of the Marine Corps main cantonment area, family housing, aviation and waterfront operations, training on the island of Tinian in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and selection of utilities and road improvement solutions to support the military realignment effort. Action was deferred on a transient CVN wharf, pending additional coral surveys and studies as required to complete National Environmental Policy Act requirements; and on the site specific location of a live-fire training range complex on Guam, pending resolution of the National Historic Preservation Act Section 106 consultation process.

The Section 106 consultation process was completed last week with the signing of a Programmatic Agreement. Now that the Section 106 consultation process is complete, the Department will consider all data and recent input in order to release a ROD for the training ranges.

The ROD also included commitments to several mitigation measures that will help lessen the impact of the realignment on the environment and people of Guam. Most notably, in response to concerns regarding the aggressive construction program, the Department committed to the use of Adaptive Program Management. With implementation of Adaptive Program Management, we will work with local and federal agencies to ensure infrastructure capacity limitations are not exceeded and significant environmental impacts are avoided. This will be accomplished by adjusting the construction tempo and sequencing of projects. This would result in adjustments to the growth in the workforce population so as to not overwhelm Guam's utilities, port, roadways and other systems. The Department, recognizing the complexity and scale of the construction effort, committed in the ROD to forming a Civil-Military Coordination Council (CMCC) comprised of representatives from the military, federal agencies, and the Government of Guam. The CMCC will coordinate DOD, Government of Guam, and private construction efforts. The CMCC is currently working to finalize its operating charter.

PROGRAM EXECUTION

Over \$1 billion in U.S.- and Japanese-funded projects has been secured thus far. The Government of Japan continues to contribute to the Guam military realignment in accordance with the Realignment Roadmap. Of the \$6.09 billion Japanese share, \$834 million in direct cash contributions have been received to date. The Japanese FY-2011 (JFY) budget (which runs April 1, 2011 through March 31, 2012) includes a request for \$167 million in direct cash contributions for facilities and design. The JFY-2011 budget request also includes \$415 million in funding for utilities financing, pursuant to the Realignment Roadmap, for water and wastewater projects. This financing will be applied to make improvements to wastewater treatment plants off-base, and to the Navy's water system on-base that will interconnect with Guam's water system. The U.S. FY-2012 budget request includes \$181 million to design and construct facilities in support of the relocation, including a project that will support the water requirements on-base and for the off-island construction workforce that will interconnect with the Government of Japan-funded water projects. The projects requested for U.S. FY-2012 provide the horizontal infrastructure (utilities, site improvements, etc.) necessary to enable subsequent vertical construction to support Marine Corps operations.

Last week, a Programmatic Agreement was finalized following close coordination between the Department and the new Governor of Guam and his staff. The Programmatic Agreement outlines the anticipated effects of the realignment on the historic sites on Guam and Tinian, procedures for ongoing reviews of specific projects, and measures to mitigate adverse effects. The signing of the Programmatic Agreement completes the Section 106 consultation process, thus allowing for construction work to begin on the two

FY-2010 military construction projects awarded in September 2010, as well as the award of additional FY-2010 and Japanese-funded projects. Signature of the Programmatic Agreement marked an important step in the Section 106 consultation process that is critical in the consideration of the approval of the ROD for the live-fire training range complex on Guam.

CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE

Guam is a small island that currently faces challenges with its infrastructure capacity and reliability. With the Guam military realignment, the community faces significant near- and long-term growth that necessitates a comprehensive strategy for ensuring the needs of the civilian community can be met.

The Department recognizes concerns regarding Guam's existing and future infrastructure and socioeconomic needs, as highlighted in our NEPA documents. Thus far, the Department has contributed funding to address infrastructure needs directly related to the military realignment. We appreciate Congress' support for the \$50 million in funding provided last fall for upgrades to the Port of Guam. This funding, coupled with \$54 million in funding from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, will increase the port's throughput to handle an increased flow of goods and materials during the military construction effort. The Department has also provided funding for road improvement projects through the Defense Access Road program, with \$49 million appropriated in FY-2010 and an additional \$67 million authorized for appropriation in FY-2011.

DOD has worked closely with both the Government of Japan and with Guam's utilities providers to identify utility system improvement projects for Japanese financing which both support the relocation of Marines and improvement of Guam's infrastructure systems. In particular, improvements to Guam's potable water and wastewater infrastructure are needed to mitigate the impact of both the construction program and the force realignment. As discussed earlier, in its JFY-2011 budget the Government of Japan has requested \$415 million of its required \$740 million contribution in utilities financing. The projects that will be financed by this funding will provide utility system upgrades that are critical enablers to the construction program. Specifically, they will provide for upgrades and improvements to wastewater treatment plants that will support the off-island workforce and future population growth associated with the Marine Corps realignment, as well as treatment, production and storage for potable water on-base.

As mentioned earlier, the Department is committed to improving the quality of life for both the people of Guam and the military personnel who make the island their home. The Final EIS acknowledges that the military realignment will affect Guam's social services, such as education and medical facilities, due to the added demand on services to Guam as a result of potential population growth that may result from the military realignment. If the issues surrounding existing infrastructure and other major socioeconomic issues impacting Guam are left unaddressed, we risk creating disparity between conditions on- and off-base and losing the support of the people of Guam, which will adversely affect our ability to achieve our mission. The Department of Defense is

committed to ensuring this does not happen, and is leading the effort to coordinate an interagency approach to “One Guam.” The DOD-led, interagency Economic Adjustment Committee (EAC) is working with the Government of Guam to review socioeconomic needs both directly and indirectly related to the military realignment. The U.S. FY-2012 budget request includes \$33 million in Defense-wide O&M funds to address projects assessed by the EAC. In addition, other federal agencies’ FY 2012 budget requests include \$30 million in funding for Guam to assist with the implementation of the projects requested by DOD or support other Guam infrastructure and financial management requirements identified by the EAC. We will continue to work closely with other federal agencies and the Government of Guam to achieve “One Guam.”

LAND ACQUISITION

Over the past year, senior Department leadership has engaged the Government of Guam to better understand the community’s concerns, identify potential solutions, and develop a way forward in implementing the realignment program. From these discussions, we better understand concerns regarding issues such as access to cultural sites and the expansion of DOD’s footprint. However, as training is essential for Marine Corps forces, the Department also shares Congress’ concern with ensuring Marine Corps training requirements are delivered on Guam.

Non-DOD property adjacent to Route 15 on the eastern side of Guam was identified in the Final EIS as the preferred alternative location for a live-fire training

complex to support the relocating Marines. This site was deemed the preferred alternative because it best balanced the need to meet Marine Corps training requirements with the desire to limit the impacts on the surrounding community as much as possible. Other sites on Guam were dismissed early in the alternatives analysis process for reasons such as impacts on existing military operations, the inability to physically fit ranges required by the relocating Marine Corps forces, encroachment upon nearby communities, disruption to recreational activities, impacts to significant natural and cultural resources, and impacts to airspace. As discussed earlier, a decision on the site for the live-fire training range complex is currently under consideration now that the Section 106 consultation process has concluded with the signing of a Programmatic Agreement.

Implementing the conceptual plans contained in the Final EIS for the training ranges would have required DOD to gain a controlling interest over both the range footprint and the area encompassed by surface danger zones, including the culturally significant Pagat Village and cave sites. Military personnel and civilians would have been prevented from accessing Pagat Village and cave for safety reasons while some of the live fire ranges were being used. As discussed earlier, in response to the community's concerns regarding restricted access to Pagat village and cave, we have developed options that allow for access to these sites to remain as it is today—accessible at all times.

The Department of Defense currently controls approximately 29 percent of the total land available on the island of Guam. Throughout the planning for the Marine

Corps realignment, the Government and people of Guam have voiced concern regarding the potential for DOD to further expand its footprint. As discussed earlier, in response to these concerns, we have communicated to the Governor of Guam and the Guam Legislature that, following the completion of the realignment, DOD will have a smaller footprint than it has today. This concept is currently in the early stage of development; studies will be conducted to determine if missions can be relocated and assess any potentially underutilized properties.

As a result of these discussions, the Governor of Guam has stated publicly his willingness to discuss land use issues with the Department. The goal is to have an agreement in principle with the Governor by the Fall of 2011, allowing formal land negotiations to commence once appropriate Congressional approval for land acquisition has been received. The Department will continue to update the Congress on land use matters and the status of discussions with the Government of Guam.

CONCLUSION

The Guam realignment is a multi-faceted, dynamic endeavor with many complex components. Successfully executing the Marine Corps realignment program is a key piece of the Department's strategy in the Pacific. We continue to work with our partners in Japan, Guam, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands to develop solutions to program challenges.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I look forward to continuing to work together to ensure that the realignment moves forward smoothly and in a manner which is beneficial to both the Marine Corps and the people of Guam.



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
ENERGY, INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT

The Honorable Jackalyne Pfannenstiel

Ms. Jackalyne Pfannenstiel was appointed Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Energy, Installations and Environment) on March 5, 2010. In this position, Ms. Pfannenstiel develops Department-wide policies, procedures, advocacy and strategic plans. She also oversees all Department of Navy functions and programs related to installations, safety, energy, and environment.



Ms. Pfannenstiel has established herself as a champion of implementing the Secretary's energy goals, including producing 50 percent of the Department's energy consumption from alternative sources by 2020, through innovative energy strategies, policies, and guidance. She has become a critical liaison to the government and citizens of Guam, working to implement the U.S.–Japanese agreement that will relocate 8,000 Marines and their families from Okinawa. She also serves as the Secretary's Deputy on the National Ocean Council, working with other agencies to uphold the Nation's stewardship responsibilities for our oceans, coasts, and Great Lakes.

Ms. Pfannenstiel's other responsibilities include effective management of real property, housing, and other facilities; natural and cultural resource protection, planning, and compliance; safety and occupational health for both military and civilian personnel; and timely completion of closures and realignments of installations under base closure laws.

From 2004-2009, Ms. Pfannenstiel served as Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger's appointed Chairman of the California Energy Commission. Her responsibilities included licensing new energy-generating facilities and developing California's integrated energy policies. She worked on the creation of California's low carbon fuel standards and chaired the Governor's Climate Action Team subgroup on Energy and Land Use.

Prior to chairing the Energy Commission, Ms. Pfannenstiel was an independent energy consultant, providing assistance to wind energy development projects and helping local housing authorities manage energy costs in public housing facilities.

From 1980-2000, Ms. Pfannenstiel worked for Pacific Gas and Electric Company and its parent, PG&E Corporation. In 1987, she was promoted to Vice President of Corporate Planning—the first woman to become a corporate officer. At PG&E, she led the

company's participation in a multi-party collaborative proceeding, which produced many of California's innovative regulatory policies promoting energy efficiency. She also directed the development of PG&E's strategies for responding to electric industry restructuring.

Ms. Pfannenstiel is a former member of the Board of Trustees of Clark University and Board of Directors of the Alliance to Save Energy. She was also a Director of Energy Recovery, Inc., which manufactures components for seawater desalination.

Ms. Pfannenstiel graduated from Clark University with a B.A. in Economics and from the University of Hartford with an M.A. in Economics.

**WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING**

MARCH 15, 2011

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES

Mr. SCHIFFER. The United States defense industrial base is sufficient to meet general current and projected DOD requirements. However, the Department has faced capacity concerns centered on difficulties associated with rapidly increasing production of “critical” (based on unique evolving operational scenarios) items; for example, those items associated with body armor, up-arming vehicles, and precision-guided munitions. As the Department continues to improve its requirements generation process, particularly for contingency operations, it will provide better and timelier guidance to its industry partners, who will then be better able to plan and build their capacity accordingly. However, in circumstances where capacity for certain items becomes problematic for unforeseeable reasons, the Department has a variety of tools at its disposal to address these situations, such as prioritizing industry deliveries to meet the most critical war fighting needs first. [See page 15.]

Mr. SCHIFFER. Ten years from now, China and the United States are likely to have roughly the same number of submarines, although with very different capabilities. Currently, China possesses approximately 55 submarines, most of which are diesel-electric, and its submarine force is likely to grow by approximately 15 submarines in the next 10–15 years, primarily due to the introduction of new diesel and air independent power (AIP) submarines. Over the next decade, the U.S. submarine force is projected to decline from 71 to 67 submarines.

The U.S. Navy operates three types of submarines—nuclear-powered attack submarines (53 in service), nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (14 in service), and nuclear-powered cruise missile and special operations forces (SOF) submarines (four in service).

The Navy’s proposed FY2012 budget requests \$3,232.2 million in procurement funding to cover the procurement cost of two additional attack submarines. Based on U.S. Navy projections, the total number of U.S. attack submarines will peak in 2013–2014 and will then decline to a total of 49 submarines by 2021. [See page 28.]

Mr. SCHIFFER. The Air-Sea Battle concept is a “next-step” evolution in U.S. joint warfare. It builds on the extensive experience of the Department of the Air Force and the Department of the Navy in conducting joint operations together over the last twenty years. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review emphasized the importance of preparing for the broadest possible range of conflicts, requiring continuous operational innovation and rebalancing. This is consistent with our aims as we continue to develop the Air-Sea Battle concept as an effective approach to serve U.S. security interests most effectively.

In the future, the Air-Sea Battle concept will be a driver of new and innovative programs. The military capabilities envisioned in the initial Air-Sea Battle concept either exist at present or are currently funded programs. [See page 29.]

General ALLES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] [See page 14.]

General ALLES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] [See page 27.]

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. There are alternative fuel sources in the Pacific that could be leveraged and there exists a concern about the vulnerability of above-ground facilities as stated by General Alles during the hearing. More specific information on subject matter is classified in nature.

Additional information on specific time required to replace or replenish fuel capacity in Guam can most appropriately be answered by the Department of Defense’s lead activity for this project, Defense Logistics Agency. [See page 14.]

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO

General ALLES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] [See page 27.]

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. The Department of the Navy has put in place strict contractual requirements for workforce health care to be enforced through an aggres-

sive and coordinated oversight program cooperatively managed by DON and regulatory agencies including the Guam Department of Labor and the U.S. Department of Labor. All contractors are required to have plans to cover health care needs associated with the introduction of an off-island workforce, including detailed medical screening and surveillance, primary care and emergency care needs. This efficient and cost effective approach has been coordinated with the Center for Disease Control (Pacific Region), the Government of Guam Public Health and Social Services, Navy Medicine West and Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (Occupational and Environmental Medicine Policy). During a recent visit to Guam (April 2011) by the Navy Medicine's Occupational and Environmental Policy Expert and Special Assistant for Asia-Pacific Affairs, Navy Medicine West, DON's current plan for addressing medical care requirements for H-2B workers was endorsed and supported by the private medical sector, the medical insurance industry, representatives of the regional CDC and the Government of Guam Department of Public Health.

The Department of the Navy is committed to working with Guam health providers, CDC, you and your staff regarding workforce medical care on Guam. We will continue to review and provide feedback on amendment language regarding this subject, as we did prior to the committee's mark-up on the FY-2011 National Defense Authorization Act. [See page 27.]

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. The Department of Navy (DON) has contracted with the National Invasive Species Council, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the US Geological Survey, and the Smithsonian Institute to develop and coordinate risk assessments and prepare a Micronesian BioSecurity Plan (MBP) in cooperation with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Guam Division of Aquatic and Wildlife Resources, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands Division of Fish and Wildlife, and other interested parties. The approach will integrate techniques involving exclusion, detection, rapid response, and control of non-native and invasive organisms that can be readily implemented into standard operating procedures, training instructions, and construction projects. Experts in various fields are collaborating to provide the best scientific decision support to develop the MBP. The MBP is still under development, and the final plan is anticipated in December of 2011. After the MBP is finalized, DON will develop an implementation plan that will identify feasible mitigation and management actions associated with DOD activities. DON will implement biosecurity measures identified in the MBP that will reduce the risk of introduction and spread of invasive species via DON activities. Implementation of identified mitigation/management actions will be dependent on forecasts of the tempo and sequencing of the realignment construction effort, compliance with regulatory requirements, and compatibility with military training. [See page 27.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

MARCH 15, 2011

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES

Mr. FORBES. The 2006 International Agreement between the United States and Government of Japan requires that the Government of Japan make “tangible progress” on the construction of a Marine Corps Air Station Futenma replacement facility in northern Okinawa before implementing the Guam realignment. How does the U.S. define “tangible progress”? If the Government of Japan has not made “tangible progress” in Okinawa, should Congress continue funding for the Guam realignment?

Mr. SCHIFFER. We see tangible progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF), not as a single specific event, but rather as a series of steps taken roughly in parallel between Japan and the United States, as spelled out in our bilateral understandings on realignment. As the Government of Japan makes progress on the FRF, the United States will take associated steps to move forward on Guam. There are a number of different indicators of this progress, starting with the decision on the runway configuration that we expect at the upcoming two-plus-two meeting with Japan, the issuance of the landfill permit, the construction of the sea wall, and progress on the landfill itself.

An essential point of our realignment understanding with Japan is that preparations for facilities on Guam need to begin well in advance of the actual construction of the replacement facility at Camp Schwab. It is necessary to ensure that when we are satisfied with the progress Japan has made on the FRF, suitable facilities will be available on Guam to allow the phased relocation of Marines from Okinawa, such that any relocation can be sequenced to maintain unit cohesion and operational readiness.

Mr. FORBES. The Japanese Prime Minister has indicated that he intends to “start from scratch” in reviewing options to relocate the U.S. Marines on Okinawa and has proposed a May 2010 deadline to provide a new basing proposal. What information can the Department of Defense provide regarding the status of negotiations in providing for a Marine Corps Air Station Futenma Replacement Facility?

Mr. SCHIFFER. On May 28, 2010, the Security Consultative Committee (2+2) issued a Joint Statement reconfirming both governments’ commitment to the Realignment Roadmap, and in particular, to the establishment of a Futenma Replacement Facility in the Camp Schwab/Henoko location identified in the Roadmap.

Mr. FORBES. A) The relocation of U.S. forces within South Korea has been postponed for several years beyond 2008. Why?

B) Is it correct that the Yongsan portion of the relocation plan is now set for 2015? Are there also new dates for other elements of the relocation plan? How likely is it that there will be further delays beyond these dates?

C) What defense capabilities will be gained or reduced from the relocation, and how will it improve or potentially hinder our ability to respond to a North Korean attack against the South?

Mr. SCHIFFER. A) Both the Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP) and the Land Partnership Plan (LPP) have been delayed due to challenges with the procurement of land in the Republic of Korea, slow construction of facilities, and Korean bureaucratic challenges that have delayed funding of projects.

B) Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP)- and Land Partnership Plan (LPP)-related construction projects are scheduled for completion in 2015, with relocation of forces scheduled to be complete in 2016. YRP relocates a majority of U.S. forces and HQ United Nations Command activities in and around the capital city of Seoul to U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys. LPP relocates and consolidates U.S. forces north of Seoul into areas in the south and expands infrastructure at Osan Air Base and Camp Mujuk. The YRP/LPP initiatives were incorporated into the Strategic Alliance 2015 (SA 2015) plan signed by both the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the Republic of Korea Minister of Defense in October 2010. The progress of these initiatives, as well as others included in the SA 2015 plan, are tracked regularly through a series of governing committees to ensure milestones are effectively met. Any deviations are addressed by the next higher committee, and ultimately by the Secretary and Minister for adjudication if necessary.

C) The U.S. and Republic of Korea (ROK) governments reached an understanding to consolidate and relocate American forces stationed in the ROK onto installations south of the capital city, Seoul. Prior to the year 2005, the United States had 107 installations in Korea. Once relocation is complete, the United States will utilize 49 sites, concentrated for the most part around two enduring hubs: a southwest hub and a southeast hub. The southwest hub is centered on Osan Air Base and U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys. It will be the future centerpiece of U.S. military force structure in Korea. The southeast hub will include installations located in the cities of Daegu, Chinhae, and Busan. This hub will serve as the logistics distribution center and storage location for wartime and contingency prepositioned stocks.

The consolidation of forces onto two enduring hubs improves warfighting capabilities in a number of ways. First, the 2nd Infantry Division and future Korea Command will be collocated at U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys, improving coordination and planning between staffs of the two organizations. Similarly, relocating 2nd Infantry Division to U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys consolidates the division's subordinate units at a single location, increasing direct face-to-face contact among unit personnel while reducing the physical span of control and infrastructure needed to support the division. The unit is better postured to train and fight.

Consolidation at two enduring hubs also enhances command and control and coordination. In addition to strengthening relationships between operational staffs of the 2nd Infantry Division and a future Korea Command, 2nd Infantry Division is better positioned to effect initial liaison and coordination during reception, staging, and onward movement of deploying maneuver and sustainment brigades. Early liaison and coordination sets the conditions to more reliable and effective command and control during later phases/stages of conflict. Positioning of the 2nd Infantry Division at U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys also improves tactical flexibility by posturing the division in a better tactical location for rapid commitment in support of either of the forward stationed ROK armies and corps. This position also shortens logistical lines during the initial phases of conflict that better postures the division for successful employment later.

Consolidation also enhances the execution of noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO). By reducing the dispersion of transportation assets, movement times are cut. By separating U.S. forces from initial wartime threats such as North Korea's long-range artillery and its ground forces threatening Seoul, the vulnerability of these forces is reduced and their survivability enhanced. A 2nd Infantry Division located at U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys will be better able to integrate follow-on maneuver and sustainment brigades while not under the fire of North Korean long-range artillery. This factor supports the division's preparation for combat activities. Finally, force consolidation enhances warfighting capabilities by improving soldier quality of life, realization of stationing efficiencies, optimizes use of land in Korea, and enhances force protection and survivability.

Mr. FORBES. The readiness posture of PACOM is negatively affected by the ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. How significant is the shortage of forces and equipment required to effectively deal with the broad range of security concerns in PACOM's AOR? What does PACOM need to meet existing requirements?

General ALLES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. FORBES. On April 5, 2009, North Korea launched a Taepo-Dong-2 (TD-2) missile over Japan and on May 25, 2009, it conducted a second nuclear test. The regime has also kicked out inspectors and re-started its nuclear facilities. How do existing basing arrangements in South Korea, Japan and Guam contribute to the defense of South Korea?

General ALLES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. FORBES. The Chinese have an extensive conventional missile capacity and range to strike many of our existing bases. How does the Department assess the adequacy of the U.S. military's capacity to withstand a Chinese air and missile assault on regional bases? How do our existing basing arrangements in South Korea, Japan and Guam serve to impede the growing Chinese extra-territorial ambitions? What steps are being pursued to further strengthen regional bases' capacity to survive such an assault and continue or resume operation?

General ALLES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. FORBES. How does PACOM assess the adequacy of resources available to Department of Defense programs that seek to defend forward-deployed U.S. bases to include theater missile defense and early warning systems, hardened structures and hangers, air defense systems, and runway repair kits?

General ALLES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. FORBES. The U.S. agreed to draw down its troops on the Korean peninsula from 37,000 to 25,000, but in June 2008, DOD announced that the drawdown would halt at 28,500 and that level would be maintained indefinitely. What changed? If eventually there is a peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula, how will this affect U.S. troop requirements on the peninsula? Is there a long-term rationale for U.S. troop presence there?

General ALLES. U.S. Pacific Command exercises operational control over U.S. military forces assigned and allocated to it by the Secretary of Defense. In accordance with the Presidential decision of April 2008, the Department of Defense maintains an authorized end-strength of 28,500 U.S. Service members in the Republic of Korea. I respectfully refer the Congressman to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy/Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs for further information regarding the policy background of this matter.

U.S. force posture in the Republic of Korea is tailored to meet current U.S. security and alliance commitments. A peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula would, presumably, necessitate changing U.S. force posture; however, specific force requirements would depend on the actual security situation and on the particular missions assigned to U.S. Pacific Command.

U.S. military forces on the Korean Peninsula support the U.S.-ROK Alliance, whose mission is to defend the Republic of Korea through a robust and combined defense posture. The Alliance is vital to the interests of both nations in securing peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.

Mr. FORBES. The United States and Japan concluded an international agreement to move 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam by 2014. The Guam Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) uses the 2014 date as a benchmark to complete the overall realignment. However, there are indications that completing the move by 2014 is unachievable, and Navy's MILCON Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) supports completing the move beyond 2015. What is the target date to conclude the Marine Corps realignment to Guam and what are the principal impediments to completion?

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. The Record of Decision for the Guam and CNMI Military Realignment EIS indicated the Department was implementing Adaptive Program Management (APM) as a mitigation measure to ensure that Guam's utility infrastructure is not overstressed and significant environmental impacts do not occur. Through the use of APM, the pace and sequencing of construction projects will be adjusted. As such, the construction timeline and force flow of Marine Corps units into Guam from Okinawa will ultimately depend upon improvements to Guam's infrastructure capacity and proper management of environmental impacts. Investments are being made to increase infrastructure capacity by addressing improvements to utilities systems, the Port of Guam, and roadways, all of which will allow the construction program to ramp-up.

We have developed an updated cost estimate and notional timeline for the Guam realignment and we are prepared to brief the Chairman or committee staff regarding these issues at their convenience.

Mr. FORBES. What is the overall cost of the Marine Corps relocation from Okinawa to Guam? Does this include the expanded training capabilities that the Marine Corps is pursuing?

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. The Department understands Congress's concerns regarding the total cost of the Guam realignment and is committed to providing an accurate picture of current costs. We have developed an updated estimate and notional timeline and have offered to brief committee staff regarding these issues.

Mr. FORBES. How can the Department of Defense move forward with the Guam realignment without having resolved Guam land acquisition issues that are integral to the overall Marine Corps capability? If Congress provided land acquisition appropriations to support training and family housing requirements, would the Navy pursue eminent domain to acquire land?

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. The projects appropriated in FY-10 and FY-11 and those requested in FY-12 are necessary to enable subsequent construction. Waiting to begin military construction projects until after training range land acquisition issues are resolved would create a significant bottleneck in Guam's limited construction capacity, which could ultimately result in a delay the Marines' ability to relocate from Okinawa in fulfillment of our international agreement with Japan.

Discussions between the Department and Guam's leaders have enabled the DOD to better appreciate concerns regarding issues such as access to cultural sites and the expansion of DOD's footprint. Senior DOD officials and Guam's leaders are committed to work together to resolve such issues. The Department has committed to four principles for reaching a negotiated settlement for acquiring land necessary for the proposed training range complex:

- One Guam: Address infrastructure improvements outside the fence that are directly related to the buildup, and work with other federal agencies to identify solutions for addressing Guam's needs indirectly or unrelated to the military realignment.
- Green Guam: Develop the most energy efficient base possible and support Guam's efforts to develop sustainable and renewable energy projects.
- Unfettered Access to Pagat Village and Cave: Conduct training activities in a manner which will allow access to the Pagat Village and Pagat Cave historical sites 24 hours per day, seven days per week, as it is today.
- Net Negative: Following the completion of the realignment, DOD will have a smaller footprint than it has today. This commitment will directly address concerns regarding an expanding DOD footprint on Guam. This concept is currently in the early stage of development. Studies will be conducted to determine if missions can be relocated and assess any potentially underutilized properties.

As a result of these discussions with Guam's leaders, the Governor of Guam has stated publicly his willingness to discuss land use issues with the Department and we believe that we will be able to reach a negotiated agreement. We will continue to have discussions with the Governor and Guam Legislature with a goal of being ready to commence formal land negotiations once appropriate Congressional approval for land acquisition has been received. The Department will continue to update the Congress on land use matters and the status of informal discussions with the Government of Guam. The Navy position is and remains, that we seek agreement with landowners on the fair market value for the land, using existing authorities and processes, and thus the use of eminent domain will not be necessary.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO

Ms. BORDALLO. The Civil-Military Coordination Council was established to implement Adaptive Program Management (APM) on Guam; however there is still a lack of common understanding of APM's specific meaning for the build-up. What role do you see APM and the CMCC playing as the Relocation moves forward? From my understanding, the build-up is not the first time APM has been used however; its short timeline differs from previous federal projects. If a project related to the build-up is causing significant environmental impacts, how will the DOD adequately adapt given the short timeframe for the build-up?

"Adaptive" means you will be using data to adjust, can you tell me how the DOD will be monitoring and collecting new data as projects move forward? If you are not collecting new data, how can you prevent any unforeseen environmental impacts? Can you detail what efforts are being taken to develop specific metrics that will help decision makers in the CMCC ensure the build-up does not overly burden the local Guam community? To what extent is the Government of Guam integrated into the development of these metrics?

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. Adaptive Program Management (APM) is a mitigation measure designed to keep the military construction effort within the infrastructure capabilities on Guam. With implementation of APM, DOD would evaluate infrastructure capacity/limitations and adjust the tempo and sequencing of construction activities accordingly. This would result in adjustments to the growth in the workforce population so as to not overwhelm Guam's utilities, port, roadways and other systems, and ultimately can result in a stretched out timeline for implementing the buildup. The Record of Decision for the Guam/CNMI Military Realignment included an initial operating charter for a Civil Military Coordination Council (CMCC). The CMCC, comprised of military, federal agency, and Government of Guam representatives, will assist in implementing APM. The focus of the Council will be to coordinate military, public, and private construction activity conducted during the military realignment effort. It will develop recommendations on how to integrate future DOD construction activity and other actions undertaken by Guam or federal agencies associated with the military realignment to avoid or reduce the potential adverse impacts on Guam's environment, infrastructure, public agencies, and the public at large. Efforts continue to finalize the CMCC charter.

Two possible actions could result from a finding that significant impacts may occur in the future: 1) change the pace of construction (i.e. contract awards or construction start dates, and/or 2) modify the sequence of construction projects. Decisions regarding the pace and sequencing of construction remain with each participating organization as dictated by existing roles and authorities.

The CMCC is comprised of multiple working groups responsible for developing metrics, thresholds, and trigger points that can inform decision-making regarding

the implementation of APM. The working groups will exhaust all available sources for relevant data including reports, surveys, ongoing projects and similar sources generated by local, federal and other organizations.

The Government of Guam is an integral participant in the CMCC with the Guam Buildup Office serving as the primary point of contact. As many as ten executive agencies, the University of Guam and representatives from several legislative offices continue to participate in workshops, organizational and planning meetings. As the need arises, DOD anticipates a dynamic environment in which other working groups and Guam agencies may join the effort.

Ms. BORDALLO. The Secretary of Defense laid out a framework of pillars for the development on Guam to accommodate the movement of Marines from Okinawa. The “Net Negative” pillar implies that the Department of Defense will have less land overall on the island of Guam after the buildup is complete than when it began. My question is whether or not that footprint would include leased lands under that plan? In other words, does DOD consider leased lands towards their overall footprint? Will leased land be factored in to the overall “Net Negative” sum?

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. As stated by Under Secretary Work, the Department understands the Guam community’s concerns regarding the amount of land controlled by DOD. In response, we have committed to the Net Negative concept, which means that at the completion of the military buildup DOD will have a smaller footprint that it currently has today. If property is reserved for military use, and therefore unavailable for the public, we would consider that property to be part of our inventory regardless of the method of acquisition.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. PALAZZO

Mr. PALAZZO. I represent South Mississippi, a heavy military district where all branches of service are represented. My district has also seen its share of devastation due to natural disasters, most memorably Hurricane Katrina. Last week we saw another example of the destructive power of Mother Nature as Japan was hit by a major earthquake followed by a devastating tsunami.

1. Almost exactly one year ago, in his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Admiral Willard mentioned that “In the Asia-Pacific, we respond to natural disasters about every 60 days.” Following the recent devastation in Japan, could you comment on our military’s readiness to respond to natural disasters in the Pacific at this point?

Mr. SCHIFFER. 1. The United States Armed Forces are ready. We maintain the capabilities necessary to respond to the full range of contingencies that may occur in the region whether they are natural or man-made. In addition to being well-trained and highly capable, when it comes to military readiness, there is no substitute to being forward deployed. Our highly capable forces have a history of rapid response and have been present on the scene after some of the most devastating natural disasters to hit the Asia-Pacific region. After the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, the 2008 Cyclone Nargis in Burma, the 2009 Typhoon that hit the Philippines, the 2010 Typhoon Fanapi that struck Taiwan, and most recently the earthquake, Tsunami, and nuclear crisis in Japan, our forces have shown an ability—unmatched in the region or elsewhere—to respond to these crises and help to save lives.

Following the 11 March earthquake and tsunami in Japan, we launched Operation TOMODACHI, which enabled us to provide support to the Japanese Government and people. We provided continuous airlift, delivering goods and services to remote, hard to reach, devastated areas in the northern part of Japan most affected by the quake. To respond to challenges posed by the nuclear crisis, we deployed an Incident Response Force (IRF), comprised of personnel specifically trained to operate in contaminated environments. The IRF provided a rapid response capability as well as capabilities for monitoring support for agent detection and identification; casualty search, rescue, and personnel decontamination; and emergency medical care and stabilization of contaminated personnel.

Our experience in Operation TOMODACHI underscores the importance of being forward deployed in the region and the value of partner capacity building as an integral part of our theater security cooperation activities with all of our regional allies and partners. This serves not only to enhance the preparedness of partner forces, but also the readiness of our own.

Mr. PALAZZO. 2. Do you feel that this high rate of humanitarian missions, particularly in the Pacific, is hurting our readiness to respond or plan for other, more traditional threats in the region?

Mr. SCHIFFER. 2. The high operations tempo of our humanitarian response missions has not diminished our readiness. Quite the contrary, through these operations, we are able to conduct critical training of our forces in real-world scenarios that allow us to exercise command and control and interoperability. The Department of Defense maintains a high-level of readiness to respond to an array of 21st century threats and challenges. As the first decade of the 21st century taught us, the United States Armed Forces must remain prepared to address threats that range from the impacts of climate change on the environment to the dangers posed by global terrorism and piracy. And wherever traditional threats may linger, such as in the case of North Korea, we must remain forward deployed and maintain our capabilities, while bolstering those of our allies and partners.

Mr. PALAZZO. 3. Who pays for these humanitarian responses?

Mr. SCHIFFER. 3. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is the lead federal agency for foreign disaster assistance and is appropriated funding to support these efforts. The Department of Defense may be asked to support USAID in providing foreign disaster relief, which is funded through the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) appropriation. Through OHDACA, DOD was able to respond to Japan's earthquake and resulting tsunami; U.S. forces supported U.S. operations to assist Japan with airlift support, at-sea search and rescue, and the provision of relief commodities.

Mr. PALAZZO. 4. What Asia-Pacific countries concern you most at this point and where are we lacking to respond (equipment, technology, manpower, money) to realistic threats from potential hot spots in the region?

Mr. SCHIFFER. 4. Within Northeast Asia, the United States has concerns about North Korea. In the last 12 months, North Korea has attacked and sunk a ROK naval vessel, killing 46 sailors; publicly revealed a uranium enrichment program in contravention of multiple UN Security Council Resolutions; and launched an artillery attack that killed both Republic of Korea (ROK) Marines and civilians. These are examples of the type of destabilizing actions of concern to the United States and reasons why we need a forward-deployed presence in the Asia-Pacific area.

The United States also continues to have concerns about China's military modernization program. As China's economy has grown, it has understandably invested in its military. However, the United States continues to have concerns about the lack of transparency from China regarding its capabilities and its intentions. This is something we discuss with the PRC regularly, and on which we hope to see continuing progress over time.

There are a range of non-traditional security threats in Asia that also concern the United States. These include proliferation prevention, countering the impacts of climate change, and, as we have seen most recently in Japan, responding to disasters.

As we plan and prepare for a range of possible uses of the U.S. Armed Forces, we have worked—and will continue to work—with our regional Allies and partners to maintain peace and ensure stability throughout Asia. For example, we intend to enhance our forward presence in the Pacific as it is a critical region to long-term U.S. economic security. We are investing in base resiliency to protect critical infrastructure and also developing new concepts of operation for how we will project power when challenged by emerging capabilities in the future.

We will continue working with Japan to implement the bilateral Realignment Roadmap and relocate 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam in order to offer strategic flexibility, enhance contingency response capabilities, and improve peacetime engagement.

We will enhance the readiness of our forces in Korea with Tour Normalization. This initiative will further our long-term commitment to provide greater stability for forward-stationed service members and their families. We will also continue transition of wartime operational control to South Korea in December 2015. The ROK and the United States will establish separate, complementary national commands consistent with the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty and focused on the defense of the ROK.

Mr. PALAZZO. 5. If we were to face a threat from China, would it be more beneficial for our marines to be in Japan or Guam?

Mr. SCHIFFER. 5. Our bases across Asia, including in Japan and in Guam as well as our rotational forces and ship deployments, contribute to a U.S. defense posture in Asia that is becoming more geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. In addition to being well-trained and highly capable, when it comes to military readiness there is no substitute to being forward deployed. There should be no mistaking the importance of U.S. military power as one of the essential elements of our strategy for protecting our national interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

Our realignment agreement with Japan is intended to ensure a stable basing arrangement for our U.S. Forces in Japan, while at the same time addressing long-standing local concerns about a substantial presence in the relatively small island of Okinawa. Relocating a portion of the Marines to Guam helps ensure that we meet objectives while retaining capable and sustainable posture.

Guam is becoming a strategic hub for our presence in Asia, helping to ensure the resiliency and geographical distribution that we seek. Our Marine Forces will be configured in the most operationally effective manner consistent with our commitments to our partners and allies in the region.

The Department of Defense evaluates our global posture on an ongoing basis to position our forces most effectively to maintain deterrence and contingency response capabilities, and to shape the security environment in ways that best strengthen stability, peace, and prosperity for the region.

Mr. PALAZZO. 6. Do you believe that Japan wants us to demobilize our Marines?

Mr. SCHIFFER. 6. I believe the Government of Japan recognizes the importance of the US-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty to the security of Japan, and the critical contribution of the forward-stationed US Marine Corps forces to fulfilling that commitment. Senior Japanese leaders, including Prime Minister Kan, have in the last six months made several public statements regarding the central importance of the U.S. force presence in Japan to regional stability and the defense of our nation. They recognize that the Marines provide an essential element of that presence. The capabilities and responsiveness of the Marines forward-deployed to Japan was highlighted to the Japanese public by their high-profile in the response effort following the 11 March earthquake and tsunami.

Even after the movement of some Marines to Guam, the realignment agreement with Japan will keep approximately 10,000 Marines on Okinawa, and another 3,500 Marines on mainland Japan.

A true sign of the value Government of Japan places on the Marine Corps is their willingness to fund nearly \$3 billion towards the construction of some of the facilities on U.S. territory, in Guam, for the exclusive use of the Marines. As then Defense Minister Ono explained at the time of the agreement, doing so helps to “maintain the deterrence, while reducing the burden.”

The Government of Japan has also committed to providing an additional \$3 billion in financing for utility improvements on Guam and family housing for Marines.

Mr. PALAZZO. 7. In 2009 the U.S. imported over 220 billion dollars in goods from China, over double the imports of any other western nation. Do you believe that this U.S. consumer behavior is actually fueling China’s military buildup?

Mr. SCHIFFER. 7. China’s leaders can draw from a diverse range of sources to support PLA modernization, including: domestic defense investments, indigenous defense industrial development, a growing research and development and science and technology base, dual-use technologies, and foreign technology acquisition. Although the United States currently imports more in goods from China than China imports from the United States, China has committed to expanding its domestic consumption and imports in order to promote a more balanced trade relationship with the United States.

Mr. PALAZZO. I represent South Mississippi, a heavy military district where all branches of service are represented. My district has also seen its share of devastation due to natural disasters, most memorably Hurricane Katrina. Last week we saw another example of the destructive power of Mother Nature as Japan was hit by a major earthquake followed by a devastating tsunami.

1. Almost exactly one year ago, in his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Admiral Willard mentioned that “In the Asia-Pacific, we respond to natural disasters about every 60 days.” Following the recent devastation in Japan, could you comment on our military’s readiness to respond to natural disasters in the Pacific at this point?

General ALLES. USPACOM is able to respond to natural disasters through detailed understanding of the region and potential requests through the following: 1) Understanding the regional perspective, 2) Joint response, 3) Force availability, and finally understanding of funding to support Host Nation requests, military response, and return to Host Nation, Non Governmental Organizations, and other efforts upon our exit.

1. Regional Perspective: USPACOM is divided into 4 regions: Northeast Asia, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia. Northeast Asia: North Korea and potential need for FHA/HADR may arise from natural or manmade disasters. Disaster in this affected state would cause great concern because of ability to interact, visibility, and other concerns that naturally arise. Central Asia: China. Although disasters in China have occurred since 2009, access is limited and typical requests are

in the form of funding or spare parts for military hardware. Southeast Asia: We have seen significant improvement within the Philippines and their ability to respond to FHA. Additional support is still required for Indonesia, but access is not always guaranteed, granted, or requested. As seen in 2007, Burma and associated relief is problematic. Lastly, South Asia: Concern and planning has been focused on the Government of Nepal (GON) due to its geographical isolation and recent predictive earthquake models that suggest potential earthquake on the scale of Haiti 2010. Just recently, USPACOM has concluded strategic and operational level planning to address these concerns.

Refinements are being made through tactical planning to best support GON and help mitigate potential disaster through leveraging regional neighbors, international and non-governmental organizations, and United Nations support. In summary, countries that have adversarial relationships with USG are the most problematic to support and provide FHA and HA/DR.

2. Joint Response: USPACOM forces are capable through joint effort and unity of command to execute Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA)/Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HADR) from the strategic to tactical level. Natural disasters that occur in our Area of Responsibility (AOR) are frequent, but PACOM readiness is not adversely affected. Although FHA/HADR is not a *trained* military skill set, it is inherent to all the services. To mitigate strain on force readiness, USPACOM employs a variety of forces “tailored” for response related to the scope of the disaster.

Common to all disaster response from USPACOM are the following: Command and Control, tailored forces, legal authorities, funding, and ability to effectively/efficiently transfer response to appropriate Host Nation, International Organizations, or Non Government Organizations.

Operations such as TOMODACHI are unique. The Japan Disaster of March 2011 incorporated an earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster and increased the aperture for response and need to best support our alliance with Japan. Operation TOMODACHI incorporated FHA, Foreign Consequence Management (FCM), and Department of State (DOS) Voluntary Authorized Departure (VAD). In each case USPACOM forces were prepared, able to quickly respond and adapt to the natural and manmade disaster, while bolstering and strengthening our alliance with Japan.

3. Force Availability: FHA and HA/DR are inherent to USPACOM forces. As stated, although FHA and HA/DR skills are not a skill set specifically trained by the services, our subordinate units understand the importance and strategic implications to respond with accuracy, effectiveness, and compassion to the Host Nation (RN) affected. Additionally, our response within our AOR signifies to our Allies and Partners our commitment to the region. Conversely, our response in the AOR leverages our potential adversaries and provides strong strategic communication throughout the region. In short, we do not just respond with “monetary” assistance, if requested, we provided a tailorable and scalable joint force to support the affected host nation, thus improving our position and alliances within the AOR.

4. Funding: With respect to monetary assistance, Humanitarian Responses are paid for through USAID/OFDA. The Host Nation (RN) must request DOD support through the Ambassador or American Embassy. Upon approval and request of DOD forces from DOS, funding for HA/DR or FHA commences. ***Caveat: DOD forces may initiate crisis response and HA/DR or FHA with a 72 hour Vocal Command, IOT safeguard lives, alleviate human suffering, and mitigate great property damage.***

Simultaneously, as funding is being approved and adjudicated, the Disaster Response Team (DART) from DOS or military equivalent may be vectored to the HN IOT to provide initial assessment, scope of the disaster, and potential cost. As first responders work under the first 72 hours, additional authorities and funding must be approved by USAID/OFDA and OSD. The funding approved outlines the military support that will be provided by the USPACOM to the Host Nation. Typically, funding will support helicopter lift, food, water, shelter, and other consumable items. Modification of funding may be requested if the disaster warrants. As funding dissipates, USPACOM anticipates departure of tailored forces and enables transfer back to the Host Nation or Non Governmental Organizations or other efforts IOT for our forces to reset the force posture and prepare for other potential crisis or contingencies.

Mr. PALAZZO. 2. Do you feel that this high rate of humanitarian missions, particularly in the Pacific, is hurting our readiness to respond or plan for other, more traditional threats in the region?

General ALLES. The recovery effort in Japan was a first-class effort which underscored the United States’ commitment to Japan, one of our most important regional

allies. United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), with help from the United States Interagency, was able to provide humanitarian assistance to Japan without impacting our capability to support other potential operations or contingencies. The Japan Self Defense Force's (JSDF) ability to quickly respond to the disaster and integrate U.S. Force support into its efforts was impressive. U.S. assistance and assets were vital to the rapid and successful implementation of disaster response measures, the voluntary departure of American Citizens and the timely and effective execution of nuclear response and cleanup procedures. This disaster, and the effective coordination of relief efforts between USPACOM, the United States Government and the Government of Japan, provided a valuable platform for us to exercise our rapid response capability for emergencies and disasters and to improve bilateral processes with a key ally, Japan. Throughout Operation TOMODACHI, USPACOM had the ability to quickly redirect forces, if required, to other areas in the Pacific. Absent a large on-going crisis in the Pacific Area of Operations, USPACOM is positioned to accomplish a variety of humanitarian operations without having an immediate, adverse effect on its readiness to respond to or plan for traditional threats in the region.

Mr. PALAZZO. 3. Who pays for these humanitarian responses?

General ALLES. USD (P) is the primary stakeholder in DOD for humanitarian response with USG HA/DR issues primarily managed by USAID. Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) funding as approved by USD (P) is utilized to support incremental costs associated with military humanitarian assistance operations.

Mr. PALAZZO. 4. What Asia-Pacific countries concern you most at this point and where are we lacking to respond (equipment, technology, manpower, money) to realistic threats from potential hot spots in the region?

General ALLES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. PALAZZO. 5. If we were to face a threat from China, would it be more beneficial for our marines to be in Japan or Guam?

General ALLES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. PALAZZO. 6. Do you believe that Japan wants us to demobilize our Marines?

General ALLES. The Marines that participated in the rescue and relief efforts following the earthquake and the resulting tsunami and nuclear incident have returned to their normal duties. Their ability to react swiftly following these events was a direct result of being forward based in Japan. Local reaction to the efforts of the Marines, and all the participating members of our other services in Operation TOMODACHI, was overwhelmingly positive. While there will always be opponents to the forward basing of our forces, this event provided a tangible domestic example of the value of our forward military presence in Japan and highlighted the strength of our alliance. The Government of Japan strongly supports the presence of U.S. military forces in Japan and their commitment to the defense of their homeland and our fulfillment of obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.

Mr. PALAZZO. 7. In 2009 the U.S. imported over 220 billion dollars in goods from China, over double the imports of any other western nation. Do you believe that this U.S. consumer behavior is actually fueling China's military buildup?

General ALLES. This is not PACOM's area of expertise. I would defer to the U.S. Treasury or Department of Commerce for response.

Mr. PALAZZO. 1. Do you believe that Japan wants us to demobilize our Marines?

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. United States Pacific Command (US PACOM) is the appropriate organization to respond to questions about military strategy in the Asian-Pacific region.

Mr. PALAZZO. 2. If we were to face a threat from China, would it be more beneficial for our marines to be in Japan or Guam?

Secretary PFANNENSTIEL. United States Pacific Command (US PACOM) is the appropriate organization to respond to questions about strategic military capabilities in the Asian-Pacific region.