[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
ASSESSING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE FAILED STATE OF SOMALIA
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JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,
AND HUMAN RIGHTS
AND THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 7, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-99
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
_____
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ELTON GALLEGLY, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
RON PAUL, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MIKE PENCE, Indiana RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
CONNIE MACK, Florida GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas DENNIS CARDOZA, California
TED POE, Texas BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
DAVID RIVERA, Florida FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania KAREN BASS, California
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
VACANT
Yleem D.S. Poblete, Staff Director
Richard J. Kessler, Democratic Staff Director
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas KAREN BASS, California
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
------
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
TED POE, Texas BRAD SHERMAN, California
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Donald Y. Yamamoto, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Department of State. 8
The Honorable Nancy Lindborg, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for
Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Affairs, U.S. Agency for
International Development...................................... 17
Reuben Brigety, Ph.D., Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
Population, Refugees and Migration, U.S. Department of State... 25
J. Peter Pham, Ph.D., director, Michael S. Ansari Africa Center,
Atlantic Council............................................... 37
Ms. Bronwyn Bruton, fellow, One Earth Future Foundation.......... 52
Martin Murphy, Ph.D., visiting fellow, Corbett Centre for
Maritime Policy, King's College, London........................ 62
David H. Shinn, Ph.D., adjunct professor, Elliott School of
International Affairs, George Washington University............ 72
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Donald Y. Yamamoto: Prepared statement............. 12
The Honorable Nancy Lindborg: Prepared statement................. 20
Reuben Brigety, Ph.D.: Prepared statement........................ 28
J. Peter Pham, Ph.D.: Prepared statement......................... 40
Ms. Bronwyn Bruton: Prepared statement........................... 54
Martin Murphy, Ph.D.: Prepared statement......................... 64
David H. Shinn, Ph.D.: Prepared statement........................ 74
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 96
Hearing minutes.................................................. 97
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 98
Written responses from the Honorable Donald Y. Yamamoto to
questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Russ
Carnahan, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Missouri....................................................... 100
ASSESSING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE FAILED STATE OF SOMALIA
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THURSDAY, JULY 7, 2011
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Africa, Global
Health, and Human Rights, and
Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 12:30 p.m., in
room 2212 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H.
Smith (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Smith. The subcommittee will come to order. And good
afternoon, everyone. We are holding today's hearing for the
purpose of examining U.S. policy regarding the failed state of
Somalia, the possibility of recognizing breakaway areas such as
Somaliland, and the continuing problem of Somali piracy around
which the Obama administration has built a program.
Somalia's instability has encouraged other criminal
activity beyond its borders, endangering the stability of the
entire Horn of Africa.
Somalia once again heads the annual list of failed states
in the current issue of Foreign Policy Magazine. This eastern
African country has held that dubious distinction for the past
4 years. Sudan, Chad, Zimbabwe, and the Democratic Republic of
the Congo all have experienced horrific conditions during this
period, but none of them could overtake Somalia at the top of
the list of the world's failed states.
Since the fall of President Siad Barre in 1991, the United
States has been involved in addressing the consequences of
Somalia having no functioning government in Mogadishu that
effectively rules the entire country. This lack of governance
has resulted in Somalia being engaged in a chaotic civil war
that has abetted the growth of Islamic fundamentalism and
piracy.
Humanitarian, political and security conditions continue to
deteriorate across south central Somalia. In the past 2 years,
more than 22,000 civilians have been killed, an estimated 1.1
million people displaced, and at least 476,000 Somalis have
fled to neighboring countries.
Somalia is currently experiencing what is considered the
worst drought in the Horn of Africa since the 1950s. As a
result of this drought, and the continuing conflict, as Nancy
Lindborg, Assistant Secretary for USAID's Bureau of Democracy,
Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance will testify today, some
2.85 million Somalis are in need of humanitarian aid.
Doctor Reuben Brigety, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for the Bureau of Population, Refugee and Migration, will
testify that Somalis comprise the largest refugee population in
Africa. That represents more than 750,000 people in the greater
Horn of Africa region, 120,000 of whom have arrived in refugee
camps in the region since January of this year.
In 2003, young leaders of al-Ittihad, a radical Islamic
group that the Bush administration added to its list of
terrorist organization, formed the organization known as al-
Shabaab.
The primary objective of this group was to establish a
greater Somalia under Sharia. Since 2007, al-Shabaab has
increasingly controlled territory in Somalia, and by late 2008
the Transitional Federal Government, or TFG, has lost control
of most of south central Somalia to insurgent groups.
U.S. officials are concerned that al-Qaeda and its allies
in east Africa continue to pose serious threats. Al-Qaeda poses
a direct threat against U.S. interests and allies in east
Africa.
While al-Shabaab appears more focused at this point on
carrying out attacks against Somali citizens, the TFG, and
African Union peacekeeping forces in Somalia, it has, however,
threatened to attack neighboring countries, including Ethiopia
and Kenya.
For far too long, Somalia has been a cancer on the Horn of
Africa, and elsewhere on the continent. Criminals from Somalia
have not only plagued surrounding countries, but have been
reportedly involved in drug and human trafficking as far south
as South Africa.
However, the most serious involvement of Somalia in
international criminal activity is, by far, piracy. Pirate
attacks in the waters off Somalia, and off the Horn of Africa,
including those on U.S. flag vessels, have brought renewed
international attention to the long-standing problem of
maritime piracy.
According to the International Maritime Bureau, at least
219 attacks occurred in the region in 2010, with 49 successful
hijackings. Somali pirates have attacked ships in the Gulf of
Aden, along Somalia's eastern coastline, and outward into the
Indian Ocean.
Using increasingly sophisticated tactics, these pirates now
operate as far east as the Maldives in good weather, and as far
south as the Mozambique Channel.
Somalia's pirate economy has grown substantially in the
past 2 years, with ransoms now averaging more than $5 million.
The annual cost of piracy to the global economy ranges from
some $7-12 billion, by some estimates.
Two years ago, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced
a four part plan to combat Somali piracy that includes building
Somali capacity and will to rein in the pirates, coordination
with the International Contact Group, and encouragement of
cooperation between governments and shipping companies in
defending vessels against Somali pirates.
Yet the threat posed by Somalis is not confined to their
territory or surrounding waters. In recent years, dozens of
young Somalis, many of them from the Minneapolis area, have
left the United States to return to Somalia to fight with al-
Shabaab.
On August 5th, 2010, more than a dozen Somali-Americans,
permanent residents, were arrested. Attorney General Eric
Holder announced that 14 people were being charged with
providing support for al-Shabaab. Two indictments unsealed in
Minnesota stated that Amina Farah Ali and Hawo Mohamed Hassan
raised funds for al-Shabaab, detailing 12 money transfers in
2008 and 2009.
The danger to America posed by al-Shabaab and its
supporters in this country continues to be very serious. In his
nomination hearing to become Secretary of Defense last month,
CIA Director Leon Panetta noted that al-Shabaab's threat ``to
the U.S. homeland is on the rise.'' Mr. Panetta also expressed
concern that as al-Qaeda leadership in Pakistan comes under
pressure, that it is not able to find a safe haven in Somalia.
Since the fall of the last national government in Somalia
in 1991, Somaliland and Puntland, both now autonomous areas of
Somalia, have been the only areas with effective governance.
Somaliland seeks international recognition, while Puntland
currently does not. The question of whether the United States
and the international community fully recognizes Somaliland or
supports its eventual integration into a greater Somalia at
some future point requires ongoing examination and discussion.
Consequently, today's hearing offers a valuable opportunity
to examine U.S. policy on a variety of issues involving
Somalia.
I would like to now turn to the ranking member, Mr. Payne,
for any comments he might have.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much. Let me thank you and Mr.
Royce for calling this very important joint hearing on
assessing the consequences of the failed state of Somalia. And
it is a pleasure to see my good friend Mr. Royce back, who
chaired the Africa Subcommittee at some point in the past, and
has maintained a strong interest, as has Congressman Smith.
So it is a pleasure to be here at this very important
hearing. Unfortunately, I will have to leave a few minutes
before 2 o'clock. I have been invited to be a part of the
Presidential Delegation that will celebrate the new state of
South Sudan, and must leave in an hour or so to Juba to be a
part of that great achievement.
But I will stay as long as I can, and I certainly look
forward to your insights into the challenges facing Somalia,
witnesses here, and how the United States can best address the
root causes of these challenges.
And let me also say that I really commend our witnesses,
all of whom have distinguished backgrounds in dealing with
Somalia and other difficult places in the world, especially the
Honorable Donald Yamamoto, who has spent so much time in the
area and has been responsible for so many achievements that we
have seen in the very troubled parts of the world where he has
served.
I have had a long history of engagement with Somalia. My
most recent trip to Mogadishu in April 2009 gained
international attention because of the mortar attack on my
plane as I left Mogadishu.
But that was not my first visit to Mogadishu, nor was it
the first attack on a plane that I was boarding. The first
happening in early 1992, when I attended--and the plane was
fired on as we were getting ready to leave Mogadishu, but was
not airborne, as was the recent attack in 2009. Of course, with
my good luck, they didn't shoot straight, and therefore I am
here to give testimony.
I first traveled to Mogadishu in the summer of 1993, just
following the killing of the Pakistani peacekeepers. That was 2
years after Siad Barre had been overturned, and the country had
devolved into a state of lawlessness and warfare.
You may recall the United States and other U.N.-related
countries went to see that the children could get the food that
was being sent to Somalia, but the distribution was being
prevented by the warlords. And there was food there, but
children were dying because the warlords would not allow the
food to be distributed.
And so my first trip was then and I returned back again in
late '93, because I am from the State of New Jersey. We have a
large number of pharmaceutical corporations, and I asked them
if they would participate in a pharmaceutical drive that UNICEF
co-sponsored with me, to provide medications for children to
help in the situation, since the children were suffering so
much.
And we had the 100 percent cooperation from the New Jersey
pharmaceuticals to provide the medications that we needed. And
as a matter of fact, in my recent trip 2 years ago it was noted
by some of the participants that remembered the pharmaceutical
drive that brought millions of dollars of donated products to
the children of Somalia.
After leaving Mogadishu on my first trip in '93, I then
went to one of the largest Somali refugee camps in Kenya. The
camp was even larger than the Dadaab camp that we talk about
today, which exists in Kenya, which I have also visited several
times, most recently a year or so ago.
The refugee situation of Somalis throughout the region has
always been a very serious question and problem for the
surrounding countries. The people continue to suffer in these
rough conditions, but the spirit of the Somali people has
always impressed me.
Throughout the toughest times, Somalis remain hopeful, and
find ways to run a business, to make the best of a situation in
other ways. And I greatly admire their fortitude and stick-to-
it-iveness, and even creativeness, really creating a new
industry.
As we know, about 4 years ago, actually back 4 years
following my '93 trip, in 1997, I went to Hargeisa for the
first time. I met with former President of Somaliland--and we
met also recently with the current President, Silanyo, most
recently 1 year ago in Nairobi, before the elections. And
speaking by phone to him recently--I was the original sponsor
of a resolution on Somaliland in 1990, which called on the
United States to provide assistance to--and give Somaliland
observer status at the United Nations, and to recognize their
accomplishments.
As you know, Somaliland, Puntland, and Mogadishu Somalia
were all controlled by different colonial powers, and I think
that the reason that some have succeeded--for example,
Somaliland--is because some colonial powers gave more autonomy
to the locals, and provided them with the opportunity to
govern, whereas in Mogadishu there was very little of that.
This is the only resolution to be introduced in Congress that
focused on Somaliland in two decades, at that time.
I also met with President Farole of Puntland several times.
He testified at a hearing I chaired on Somalia in 2009, where I
encouraged the leaders of Somaliland, Puntland, and Mogadishu
to band together for the future of Somalia as a whole.
Finally, it was in April 2009 that I travelled to Mogadishu
after all the violence and upheaval that had occurred during
the Ethiopian invasion. I met with President Sheikh, Sharif
Sheikh Ahmed, ministers, journalists, and a prominent coalition
of women's organizations who were very, very active at that
time in Mogadishu. These were things that we did not hear
about, but that were going on in spite of the violence.
As a matter of fact, I was there the day following the U.S.
Navy SEALs taking down three Somali pirates, and of course I
was asked at a press conference by al-Jazeera what I thought
about this.
And I made it very clear that piracy is illegal, that the
United States of America would not tolerate the intrusion on a
U.S. ship, and that I totally supported President Obama and the
U.S. Navy SEALs in the taking down of the three Somali pirates.
I think that may have had something to do with al-Shabaab
taking a shot at my plane when I left.
In 2009, I introduced a resolution calling for the
recognition of the Transitional Federal Government, the TFG, by
the U.S., greater involvement, greater engagement on the
political and humanitarian crisis, and for the establishment of
a diplomatic presence in Mogadishu once conditions improved.
As you know, the TFG remains a weak government, but despite
recent shake-ups there are glimmers of hope. Last month,
President Ahmed and Speaker of Parliament Sharif agreed to hold
elections by August 20th, 2012. It was also decided that a new
Prime Minister would be appointed.
The TFG is planning a conference in Mogadishu, sponsored by
the U.N., to bring together all of the Somali stakeholders. It
is unclear whether Somaliland officials will attend. President
Ahmed must be given support as he attempts to increase
dialogue, promote stability, and fight off al-Shabaab, which
continues to wreak havoc on the population.
As you know, over the past several years more than 22,000
civilians have been attacked, an estimated 1.1 million people
displaced, 476,000 Somalis have fled to neighboring countries.
This is simply unconscionable. Many people in Washington
rightfully focus on the criminal aspects of piracy. I spoke
with Secretary Clinton while travelling with her in Nairobi
when she met with President Sharif, and she expressed the view
that piracy was a symptom and not a cause of Somalia's problem.
We need to work on that strategy announced in October, the
Dual Track strategy, which we will hear about. I think it's
something that needs to be discussed more. And just in
conclusion, while the State Department has stated that it will
not recognize Somaliland, State has commended the progress and
stability both of Somaliland and Puntland in what they have
achieved. This broadening of inclusion will allow a more
flexible and effective dialogue.
We have questions that we will be asking the panelists
here, but in deference to time I will just simply conclude that
we do have a problem with that one fourth of the country's
population is either refugee or internally displaced. This
year, nearly 100,000 people have fled to neighboring countries.
20,000 of them did so just 2 weeks' period ago, because of the
drought situation.
And so I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. And
with that, I will yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Payne. I would like to
yield to my co-chairman of this hearing, and a good friend, the
chairman of the subcommittee, Mr. Royce.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too held the gavel of
the Africa Subcommittee once. I just wanted to say, in working
with Don Payne in that capacity, over those years, his
willingness to speak out was always very impressive. And I know
he has to leave at some time today to speak out in terms of the
situation in South Sudan, at a meeting there.
But we were actually on a codel in Africa when we got the
word that Don had done two things. One, he'd had a press
conference. And minutes later, his plane was mortared as he was
flying out of town.
But it is because Don Payne was willing and has been
willing to speak out, and because of you, Mr. Chairman, that we
have got some light on this issue.
And it is an issue, this situation in Somalia, that is not
only a humanitarian crisis, it is also, frankly, a national
security threat. And that is the aspect of it--I chair the
Terrorism Subcommittee. This is the aspect of it that the State
Department has been talking to us about, and the Defense
Department.
And this is something that we are going to look at today--
because Somalia has been a failed state for an awfully long
period of time. But nowhere are the consequences of Somalia
more evident than when it comes to international terrorism and
the threat from al-Shabaab, which is, as we designate it, a
foreign terrorist organization.
And in the past few years, al-Shabaab threat, of course,
has grown dramatically to the U.S. We have seen in the theater
of Somalia, the roadside bombs, the suicide blasts that come
out of this organization. Militant compounds resemble, as the
press reports it, ``Pakistan-style terror training camps.''
And because of the influx of foreign fighters into this
area, the neighborhoods around Mogadishu are referenced by
locals there as ``Little Afghanistan.'' A year ago, al-Shabaab
conducted its first attacks outside of Somalia. They killed 76
people, including one American, in Kampala, Uganda.
So there is a growing concern that al-Shabaab leaders are
striving to strike targets, not just beyond Somalia now, but
beyond Africa. A European plot was recently uncovered. It was
in the works, and it was uncovered.
So links between al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula, the most active of all of the al-Qaeda franchises,
are becoming clearer and clearer to us in the United States.
They are communicating more about operations. They are working
together on training. They are working together on tactics.
The bomb-making capability that al-Qaeda has, the expertise
that they have there, is being combined with al-Shabaab's
recruits. And these recruits frequently have western passports.
Many of them have U.S. passports. This is quite a deadly
combination.
And that is why, last month, then-CIA Director Leon Panetta
called al-Shabaab's threat to the U.S. homeland, in his words,
``significant and on the rise.''
U.S. forces have gone on the offensive, of course,
targeting al-Shabaab's leaders from the sky. But we should have
a diplomatic attack as well, and that is where I would like to
focus my attention here.
We should target al-Shabaab's outside source of support.
The Government of Eritrea's support for al-Shabaab is well-
documented.
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Johnnie Carson
testified to Congress about Eritrea's supply of weapons to
terrorists inside Somalia. The U.N. Security Council, acting at
the urging of African neighbors, passed sanctions against
Eritrea, demanding that the country--and I am going to read
from the sanctions here--``cease arming, cease training and
equipping'' al-Shabaab.
With al-Shabaab under pressure, it is time to tackle its
state sponsors, its state supporters, before this menace
reaches the United States. We must have an honest recognition
of the destructive role Eritrea is playing in the region, and
designate it as a state sponsor of terrorism.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Smith. Chairman Royce, thank you very much. I
understand Mr. Connolly has to leave, but I yield 1 minute to
my friend from Virginia.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank
you, Mr. Payne and Mr. Royce, for holding this hearing.
In picking up sort of where Mr. Royce left off, the
inherent instability that has long dominated Somalia as a
failed state has spillover effects that certainly affect the
United States, national security, the shipping lanes off of the
Gulf of Aden, and I think are of deep concern.
I am particularly interested in this hearing in hearing the
views of our panelists on the piracy aspect of this
instability. There are lots of aspects, but we are seeing
pirates who are more emboldened. It is a cash business. They
are more and more successful in ransoming numerous ships.
That is a critical shipping lane that simply has to be
secured. And in American history, going back to Thomas
Jefferson, we have always had an interest in that part of the
world and putting an end to piracy. Here we are, over 200 years
later, dealing with something similar.
And so I would be very interested in hearing what you think
our options are or should be, and what steps we can take to
further enhance our capability to deter piracy in that part of
the world.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Smith. Mr. Connolly, thank you very much. Ms. Bass?
Ms. Bass. Just very briefly, Mr. Chair. As Somalia
continues to receive a rating of a failed country, our country
must continue to remain active and expand our diplomatic
commitment and support to restoring Somalia.
And once again, I appreciate your leadership in this
matter. Thank you.
Mr. Smith. Ms. Bass, thank you very much. I would like to
now introduce our very distinguished panel, beginning with
Ambassador Donald Yamamoto. Ambassador Yamamoto is no stranger
to the Africa Subcommittee, having testified before us in March
at a hearing on the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
He has served since 2009 as Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary for the Bureau of African Affairs of the Department
of State. His prior assignments included serving as U.S.
Ambassador to Ethiopia from November of '06 to July 2009, and
as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of African
Affairs from '03 to '06.
We will then hear from Nancy Lindborg, who is the Assistant
Administrator for the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and
Humanitarian Assistance at USAID. She has previously spent 14
years as president of Mercy Corps, where she focused on
international relief and development during her time with Mercy
Corps.
Nancy Lindborg also served in a number of positions in non-
governmental organizations, and in an advisory capacity to
government agencies, where she worked on issues related to
foreign relations and foreign assistance.
We have full bios, which will be made a part of the record,
because you are all very accomplished people.
We will then hear from Dr. Reuben Brigety, who is currently
serving as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau
of Population, Refugees, and Migration at State. In this
capacity, he supervises U.S. refugee programs in Africa,
manages U.S. humanitarian diplomacy with major international
partners, and oversees the development of international
migration policy.
He previously worked for Human Rights Watch, and has been
an active duty U.S. Naval officer. He recently returned from
East Africa, where he worked on the ground with Somali
refugees, and will be returning shortly to that area.
Ambassador Yamamoto, please proceed.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DONALD Y. YAMAMOTO, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF STATE
Mr. Yamamoto. Thank you very much, Chairman Smith, Ranking
Member Payne, and Chairman Royce, and distinguished members of
this committee. And I wanted to say especially, thank you very
much Mr. Chairman and to you all for holding this very
important hearing, and also for your very kind words for us.
The problems of Somalia are not isolated, and the solutions
to them are neither easy nor one-dimensional. There are signs
of progress and improvement to fortify our outlook and
encourage U.S. efforts. Most recently and significantly, Somali
National Security Forces under the control of the Transitional
Federal Government killed al-Qaeda terrorist Harun Fazul when
the car he was in ran a checkpoint in Mogadishu.
His death brings a sense of relief to the victims and their
families of the 1998 Embassy bombings in Nairobi and in Dar.
In October 2010, Assistant Secretary Carson announced the
Dual Track approach to Somalia after careful consultation and
review, and also listening to your advice, from this committee
and others, on the approach to Somalia. Taking into
consideration Somalia's past and present, as well as its
challenges and strengths, we continue to support the Djibouti
Peace Process, the Transitional Federal Government, its
National Security Forces, and the African Union Mission to
Somalia, or AMISOM.
However, we recognized there are large pockets of stability
in Somalia that merited greater U.S. engagement, and have
broadened our outreach to include greater engagement with
Somaliland, Puntland, and regional and local anti-al-Shabaab
groups throughout south and central Somalia.
We recognize the need to encourage grassroots support for
stability in Somalia, and are reaching out to Diaspora
communities and civil society to foster dialogue and peaceful
reconciliation.
In addition, we will continue to do everything we can to
provide urgently needed humanitarian assistance. Thanks to the
dedication and sacrifice of AMISOM and TFG Forces, al-Shabaab
can no longer claim control of Mogadishu or free rein to
operate in significant portions of the city.
Since 2007, the United States has supported this
development by obligating approximately $258 million of support
to AMISOM's training and logistical needs, as well as
approximately $85 million to support and build the capacity of
TFG forces.
Over the next year, we will support new AMISOM troop
contingents, as well as TFG and its needs for training,
equipping, and logistical support. We will continue to focus on
supporting the TFG's political progress over the course of the
next year.
After 5 months of political infighting relating to the
TFG's tenure coming to a close in August 2011, TFG President
Sheikh Sharif and Speaker of Parliament Sharif Hassan co-signed
the Kampala Accord on June 9th, and rededicated themselves to
finding an end to the transition period that has been in place
since 2004.
Ugandan President Museveni and U.N. Special Rep Augustine
Mahiga witnessed the agreement, with President Museveni serving
as its guarantor.
Under the agreement, the TFG recommitted itself to the
Djibouti Peace Process, and the Transitional Federal Charter,
to completing a set of transitional tasks to be monitored by
the international community, to the reform of the Parliament,
and to holding elections for the President and Speaker by
August 2012.
Under the Kampala Accord, the TFG appointed and confirmed
Prime Minister Abdiweli Mohamed Ali on June 28th. The Kampala
Accord is a sign that the TFG leadership realizes that neither
the Somali people nor the international community have the
patience to continue to accept incessant political infighting
that serves no purpose other than maintaining access to the
perks of office and influence for certain individuals.
We and our international partners, under the Kampala
Accord, will be pushing for timeliness, benchmarks over the
next year, including completion of a national constitution,
revenue transparency and accountability, meaningful engagement
with Puntland, Galmuduug, Ahlu Sunna, ASWJ, and other Somalia
stakeholders.
We have expanded our diplomatic outreach with these
regional authorities and partners, and have travelled to
Hargeisa five times. We advocate for representation from the
regions in conferences and other events, such as the U.N.'s
counter-piracy focused mechanisms known as the Kampala Process,
and the U.N.'s consultation in April, which focused on ending
the transition, in the Joint Security Committee.
The interaction between the U.S. and Somali interlocutors
is critical as we work to advance peace and security throughout
Somalia. We are reviewing how best to adapt our travel policy
for Somalia to more robustly execute our Dual Track approach.
The security of U.S. personnel is of paramount importance
when considering travel inside Somalia, and we will not shrink
from this obligation.
The current budget environment will have an impact on our
ability to effect positive changes in Somalia over the near- to
mid-term. Demands for support to AMISOM troop contingents close
to deployment and the needs of the fledgling TFG will continue
for some time.
On the development and peacebuilding side, in FY2011
Somalia received approximately $25 million in development
support to assist our Dual Track approach. We are also
providing $48 million in humanitarian assistance this year, as
well as $8.3 million for humanitarian assistance for those who
have fled Somalia.
Even in the resource-constrained budget environment, the
United States Government continues to do as much as possible to
promote our core goal of building a peaceful and secure
Somalia.
During 2011, we have used funding to assist Somalis in
clearing the streets of Mogadishu of garbage and sand, provided
streetlights in Mogadishu, and provided technical assistance to
the Ministry of Finance to combat corruption.
The increasing piracy problem off the coast of Somalia
stems from years of instability, lack of governance, and
economic fragility on land. The tragic death of four innocent
Americans this past February was tragic, and provided a sober
demonstration of the need to do more to address this problem.
My colleagues across the interagency, including in State's
Bureau of Political and Military Affairs at the Department of
Defense, have been at the forefront of the U.S. Government's
counter-piracy efforts. We must also work with Somali
authorities and other regional states to enhance their capacity
to prosecute suspected pirates and imprison those convicted.
Internationally, more focus should be placed on tracing
financial flows in order to determine who benefits most from
piracy, both within Somalia as well as externally. Though these
efforts take place in the context of other challenges, we will
continue to support efforts aimed at reducing the piracy
threat.
Al-Shabaab and its relationship to al-Qaeda is a
significant concern for the United States and its partners in
the region. With sustained military pressure from the TFG
National Security Force and AMISOM, al-Shabaab's hold on
Mogadishu has dramatically decreased.
The opening of additional fronts in Gedo and the middle and
lower Juba region last February has also placed additional
pressure on al-Shabaab's ability to hold these areas. As more
areas escape al-Shabaab's control, the challenge is for Somalis
to put into place effective administrations capable of
providing governance and services in order to prevent al-
Shabaab from returning.
While we see signs of al-Shabaab's control lessening in the
western region of Somalia and in Mogadishu, we remain strongly
concerned about the impact on Somalia and the region.
We continue to monitor events in Somalia, including the
influence of al-Qaeda on senior al-Shabaab leadership. However,
as an organization, al-Shabaab includes multiple factions with
competing objectives, and has lost significant areas of
territorial control in the areas of south and central Somalia.
Al-Shabaab's leadership is increasingly fractured and divided,
with questionable support from the Somali people in many areas.
Somalia's instability is a product of generations of
neglect and corruption, but a solution will be the product of
generations of concerted focus, legitimate engagement, and
expectations of results. We will continue to focus efforts on
Somalia in ways that grapple with its challenges effectively
and flexibly.
So thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to your
questions, and those of my colleagues.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Yamamoto follows:]
----------
Mr. Smith. Mr. Yamamoto, thank you very much for your
testimony, for your insights.
Assistant Administrator Lindborg.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE NANCY LINDBORG, ASSISTANT
ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT, AND HUMANITARIAN
AFFAIRS, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Ms. Lindborg. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Smith,
Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Payne, and distinguished members
of the committee. And I particularly wish you a safer journey
today, Congressman Payne, than your previous ones.
Thanks very much for this opportunity to testify today on
the humanitarian crisis of Somalia, and for your continued
interest and leadership on this issue. I have submitted longer
testimony for the record, and will just give you a brief----
Mr. Smith. Without objection, it is made a part of the
record, and that of all our witnesses.
Ms. Lindborg. I am sorry, what?
Mr. Smith. Without objection, your full statement will be
made a part of the record.
Ms. Lindborg. Yes.
Mr. Smith. And all of our witnesses, if you have a longer
submission, it will also be made a part of the record.
Ms. Lindborg. Great. Thank you. So today I will give you a
briefer update on the situation, as well as the U.S.
Government's assistance to help the 2.85 million people in need
in Somalia.
I want to emphasize that although we are focused today on
Somalia, this really is a regional crisis, with more than 10
million people in the countries of the Horn, who are all deeply
connected in an arc of drought, of crop failure, and high
livestock mortality.
The crisis is further complicated by the continuing
conflict in Somalia, and our inability to fully and reliably
reach more than 1.8 million Somalis, primarily in the south and
parts of central Somalia, and the outpouring of Somali refugees
into the drought-stressed areas of Kenya, Ethiopia, and
Djibouti.
There, as you know, have been cyclical droughts in the Horn
for decades, and as a result we have very advanced early
warning systems that we established and fund, including the
Famine Early Warning System Network, or FEWS NET, and the Food
Security and Nutritional Analysis Unit. They continually
collect data and provide analysis that has enabled us to pre-
position stocks in the region, to target our assistance where
we can, and to look ahead. And according to FEWS NET, the
drought that we are currently seeing in the region is the worst
in the Horn of Africa since the 1950s.
In Somalia, the combined effect of consecutive seasons of
poor or failed rainfall, coupled with the conflict, have
resulted in rising inflation, severe crop failure, very high
livestock mortality, and significant, even alarming,
malnutrition rates.
As a result, there are now 1.46 million Somalis who are
internally displaced, and taken through the years now, 800,000
Somali refugees in the greater Horn. It takes, indeed, great
resilience for the Somalis to continue forward.
In January 2011, our early warning systems estimated that
2.4 million people in Somalia were in crisis, and the latest
data now indicate 2.85 million people are in need of life-
saving assistance. This is a 19 percent increase in 6 months.
And that means, of the estimated 9.9 million people in Somalia,
one in four now needs international assistance to survive.
In May, I traveled to Kenya and Somalia to ensure that we
are able to respond as fully and responsibly as we are able to
to this crisis, and also to express the commitment of the
United States to the people of Somalia during this critical
period.
Along with U.S. Special Envoy Ambassador John Yates, I
traveled to Hargeisa in the semi-autonomous region of
Somaliland. We met with government officials, as well as local
and international non-governmental associations while there.
And we met with President Silanyo, who expressed his
concern over the failed rains, the loss of livestock, and the
need for assistance, while also expressing deep thanks to the
United States for our response and continued assistance.
I also spoke with the civil society leaders in Somaliland,
who said that we are seeing the end of the pastoral lifestyle
as we know it. With the drought and the conflict, continued
lack of water and pasture, we are seeing nomads migrate
increasingly into the urban areas, including to parts of
Somaliland and Puntland, adding strain to an already stressed
situation.
The impact of the drought on the people in Somalia is most
vividly illustrated in the refugee camps in Ethiopia and in
Kenya. As a result of an inability to get into other parts of
Somalia, I visited the Dadaab refugee camps in Kenya, and
talked to several families who had lost all of their livestock
or sold their land, had no remaining assets, and thus began a
long walk across Somalia to the Dadaab refugee camps in Kenya.
In Dadaab, we are now seeing Somali refugee populations
arriving with global acute malnutrition rates of 30 to 40
percent. This is more than double the World Health
Organization's emergency threshold number of 15 percent. And we
are seeing severe acute malnutrition rates at 23 percent in new
arrivals. That is seven to eight times higher than the 2 to 3
percent that is considered alarming.
We are seeing a similar increase in Ethiopia, with even
higher malnutrition data, which my colleague, Dr. Brigety, will
discuss. But let me make this data very simple to remember. One
out of two Somalis now arriving in Ethiopia is acutely
malnourished. One out of three arriving in Kenya is acutely
malnourished.
Unfortunately in Somalia, we have significant challenges in
providing humanitarian assistance, primarily in the south and
central parts of Somalia, due to the presence of armed groups,
especially al-Shabaab, which is a U.S.-designated foreign
terrorist organization.
General insecurity and lawlessness prevents aid workers
from reliably reaching more than 60 percent of the people in
Somalia who need life-saving assistance, again primarily in the
south.
In January 2010, the World Food Program suspended their
operations in southern Somalia because of threats and
unacceptable conditions created by these armed groups,
particularly al-Shabaab. Many other international NGOs are also
unable to operate safely in southern Somalia, and this lack of
access has created a severe, unabated humanitarian crisis and
contributed to the significant outflow of refugees.
In order to deliver assistance to these areas where
possible, we have developed a risk mitigation strategy with an
emphasis on assuring our assistance reaches those most in need.
We have put into place basic risk mitigation procedures, risk-
based assessments, and special conditions for our grant
agreements, and continue to work to ensure our programs in
Somalia are appropriately and accountably managed and
monitored, and reaching those areas that we can.
As a result, we have now provided $40 million in
humanitarian assistance inside Somalia this fiscal year. We
have been pre-positioning supplies in the region since FEWS NET
began warning of the crisis in August 2010.
We are helping to feed 1.2 million people in the accessible
areas of Somalia, and treat tens of thousands of severely
malnourished people in Somalia country-wide. We are providing
health care, clean water, rehabilitation of basic water
infrastructure, proper sanitation, hygiene education and
supplies.
And we are also working to improve long-term opportunities
with our development programs, with an emphasis on youth and
women. We will continue to identify additional opportunities to
meet the growing and concerning needs in Somalia.
Just 2 weeks ago, we released 19,000 metric tons of food
aid from our regionally pre-positioned stocks to support
general food distribution, supplementary feeding, emergency
school feeding, and mother and child feeding inside Somalia. To
help refugees who are fleeing the country, we have provided
over $76 million in life-saving assistance. Again, Dr. Brigety
will describe more.
In early June, we set up a Horn Drought Task Force in the
region. We have elevated that just this week to a Disaster
Assistance Response Team, with 20 members in the region.
Looking ahead, and looking at the most recent data, we
expect the perilous situation to worsen through the end of this
year. Given limited labor opportunities, dwindling food stocks,
sky-high cereal prices, we believe many households will
continue to experience a severe situation and be unable to put
food on the table. We will see an increased number of
households that can no longer meet their food needs in the
weeks and months ahead.
As unfortunate as that is, we also expect the situation in
Somalia to continue to decline, and will look for additional
ways to provide aid to those in Somalia, while also providing
assistance for those forced to flee.
We are coordinating our emergency response programs with
our ongoing development programs. We have an estimated budget
of $21 million for 2011 in our development programs, which will
continue to look at building economic and political stability
in areas that we can.
We consider this an extremely grave situation. We thank you
for your support of our ongoing programs, and thank you for
holding this important hearing today, as we continue to work
this issue. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Lindborg follows:]
----------
Mr. Smith. Assistant Administrator Lindborg, thank you very
much for your testimony, and for working so hard to meet the
needs of so many suffering people.
I would like to now ask Dr. Brigety if he would proceed.
STATEMENT OF REUBEN BRIGETY, PH.D., DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF POPULATION, REFUGEES AND MIGRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF STATE
Mr. Brigety. Good afternoon, Chairmen Smith and Royce,
Ranking Member Payne, and distinguished members of the
subcommittee. Thank you very much for including me on this
panel to review the situation of Somali refugees in the Horn of
Africa, which is one of the consequences of what many have
called a failed state in Somalia.
Today we are facing a critical emergency within what is a
protracted Somali refugee situation dating back to 1988, when
people in northern Somalia fled to Ethiopia and Djibouti to
escape attacks by their own government.
Somalis represent the largest refugee population in Africa,
with over 750,000 just in the greater Horn of Africa region
alone. Over 120,000 of those have arrived just since January of
this year.
A few weeks ago, Ethiopia opened its sixth camp for Somali
refugees, and it is already almost full. A seventh camp is
currently in the works. Djibouti has announced a second camp as
well, and the international community continues to press Kenya
to permit expansion of the Dadaab three-camp complex, which is
home to over 370,000 refugees, almost all of which are Somalis.
You already may be aware that the Dadaab camps were opened
some 20 years ago to house about 90,000 Somali refugees, and
now house over four times as many, making just the camp the
fourth largest population center in Kenya, and the largest
refugee camp in the world.
Even in this overcrowded state, more than 1,000 refugees
have arrived per day over the past few weeks in search of life-
saving assistance. Indeed, the refugee situation has worsened
dramatically in the last month, with reported new arrivals in
June almost double in Ethiopia, and triple in Kenya, from what
was reported in May.
Ironically, this may be partly a result of the success in
pushing back al-Shabaab that Ambassador Yamamoto has
highlighted, freeing some who could still move to do so, though
the main contributing factor remains the difficult conditions
within Somalia.
From a humanitarian perspective, what is most critical now
is addressing the desperate and deplorable state of
malnutrition, which threatens the lives of many newly-arriving
refugee children.
They have endured the ravages of ongoing conflict, and
struggled to survive the consequences of al-Shabaab's
obstruction of international food aid in wide swathes of south
central Somalia.
These new arrivals have faced the latest devastating
drought, as Assistant Administrator Lindborg noted, a drought
affecting the entire Horn and rivalling those on record going
back to the 1950s.
Having sold all that they have owned to survive, they have
made the arduous journey, mostly on foot, for days or even
weeks, to reach safety and humanitarian assistance in camps in
Kenya and Ethiopia.
To illustrate the severity of this situation, the
international humanitarian community considers it an emergency
when the rate of global acute malnutrition within a population
exceeds 15 percent. In Ethiopia, as Assistant Administrator
Lindborg noted, global acute malnutrition rates close to 50
percent have been reported among newly arriving refugee
children. In Kenya, global acute malnutrition rates of up to 40
percent have been reported among newly arriving refugee
children.
This situation is substantially worse than when I last
visited the Dolo Odo refugee camps in Ethiopia in February of
this year. Newly arriving children are now dying in the refugee
camp at the rate of two to three children every day.
During my most recent visit to the region just last week, a
senior advisor of the Ethiopian Government's refugee agency,
and a veteran of UNHCR, told me of the condition of near-death
of many children as they arrive in the camps, some so
emaciated, and with skin lesions so deep, that you can see
their bones in their skulls and in their arms through their
translucent skin.
In his words, ``People are coming from Somalia to die in
Ethiopia.'' We must ensure that as many as possible of these
children are saved through urgent and timely interventions,
such as emergency therapeutic feeding programs and rapid
registration to ensure prompt access of refugees to regular
food distribution.
Though some of these activities are already underway, the
level is not yet adequate to meet the considerable needs of the
population. Given the urgent nature of the situation, I will be
traveling to the Horn again tomorrow, and plan to visit the
camps in the southeast of Ethiopia, which are receiving the
vast majority of new arrivals. And I will be accompanied by our
Ambassador to Ethiopia, Ambassador Donald Booth.
Speed is of the essence as we seek to prevent additional
deaths. And yet, we cannot forget that this, too, is a regional
crisis that will require the combined efforts of the
international community, all the more so in that, as my
colleague Ms. Lindborg testified, this drought disaster is
putting some 10 million people at risk throughout the Horn.
The appalling state of Somali refugees is a stark example
of what the drought is doing to the people of the Horn, and
emphasizes the importance of a comprehensive response to
address the needs of all those suffering from this crisis.
Regrettably, famine experts tell us that the worst of this
regional drought crisis is still to come in the months before
the next possible rains this fall.
My bureau, the State Department's Bureau of Population,
Refugees and Migration, which supports all refugee protection
and assistance efforts except for food aid, which is supported
by my colleagues from USAID's Office of Food for Peace, is in
the process of programming over $63 million for the Horn, and
will be providing additional funds next week, when we expect a
new appeal from the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees, to which we will be responding.
There are clearly many challenges still ahead. Countries in
the Horn are understandably weary of hosting hundreds of
thousands of refugees. Some, such as Kenya in the early 1990s,
have seen refugee inflows reach 1,000 per day, and would very
much want to avoid repeating these experiences.
Some, such as Yemen, are in great turmoil themselves.
Events in Sudan could well generate more Sudanese refugees in
coming months. Security inside much of south central Somalia is
not conducive to mounting easily successful humanitarian
operations that might reach those in need where they are.
For example, I understand that the efforts of the U.N.
humanitarian team this week to assess conditions and
humanitarian access in areas along the border of Kenya and
Ethiopia were derailed by the presence of roadside bombs and
land mines.
As a consequence, we must ensure that safe places of asylum
in the countries neighboring Somalia continue to exist, and
that refugees can find security as well as life-saving
assistance.
We will continue to work with our colleagues in the U.S.
Government, and with our counterparts in other countries, to
achieve these goals. We welcome your support, we are grateful
for it, and I would welcome any questions you may have. Thank
you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Brigety follows:]
----------
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Dr. Brigety. Let me begin--
we do have a recorded vote, one of the vital and necessary
distractions that we face during the day. And it will be about
an hour's worth of voting.
So I will ask some questions at the outset, rapid-fire, and
ask my colleagues if we could all ask some questions. And
hopefully we can get it done that way, and then go to our
second panel when we return.
Very quickly. Ms. Lindborg, the unmet food need--obviously,
you have outlined an absolutely catastrophic situation of
malnutrition. What is the lack of donor aid? What is the unmet
need there, dollars and cents? And is there an inability to
deliver it because of conflicts, just that we can't get the
security aid or the food aid to the people occupied by al-
Shabaab and the like?
FEWS NET, obviously, has given us a great insight as to
what is coming on malnutrition. What are we looking at in terms
of menacing diseases? We know many diseases are manifesting
already. Are there others on their way? If you could just go
through some of those diseases.
To Dr. Brigety, you mentioned a UNHCR appeal. I was going
to ask you about that. And if you might touch on what that
unmet need--what you anticipate the needs will be, so we can
hopefully meet our very significant obligations from a
humanitarian point of view.
And if you could maybe speak briefly about the relative
security inside and outside, in proximity to the refugee camps.
We know that camps all over the world are often menaced by
threats, especially to women. Do you find that with these as
well?
And then, Ambassador Yamamoto, on AU peacekeepers. Their
rules of engagement: Are they robust enough? There are some who
suggest that their actual presence hurts the TFG's ability to
rule, primarily because of a Somali aversion to a sense of an
occupying force, even if that force is benign, as the AU force
obviously is.
The resilience of al-Shabaab. Dr. Pham, in his testimony,
talks about their resilience, their ability to adapt. What is
our take on that?
And what is the troop strength, if you want to call them
troops, terrorist strength, of al-Shabaab? How big is it?
And are weapons coming through Sudan, Eritrea? And are any
of those weapons coming from China?
With regards to the pirates, Dr. Murphy points out in his
testimony--and others have pointed out in their testimony as
well--that there needs to be a land solution. And I think that
is obvious, but if you briefly could touch on that.
Chairman Royce? We'll do all the questions, so that----
Mr. Royce. Yes, and I will be very brief as well. Deputy
Assistant Secretary Yamamoto, if I could ask you this question:
When the last administration left office, there was an internal
debate over whether Eritrea should be designated a state
sponsor of terrorism for its support for al-Shabaab. It didn't
happen at that time, but just after she left government
service, former Assistant Secretary Jendayi Frazer wrote a good
piece in the Wall Street Journal, and the theme was Eritrea
should be listed as a state sponsor of terrorism.
We have got U.N. report after U.N. report citing their
support for al-Shabaab. The case is pretty cut and dry.
Assistant Secretary Carson testified flat-out that ``the
Government of Eritrea continues to supply weapons and munitions
to extremist and terrorist elements.'' We are trying to put
them on defense.
I think now is the time to press. We argue here that many
of these problems can't be solved by military means alone.
Well, here is a chance for diplomacy to add teeth to this.
So I put that question to you, and yield to Mr. Payne.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Chairman Royce. Mr. Payne?
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much. I would just like to ask,
with the 12-month--and anyone can answer it--the 12 months that
will be used now for elections in Somalia, do you think that
the TFG will be able to handle it? What do you think the new
move, with the new Prime Minister, the contention between the
President and the Prime Minister, do you think we will be able
to see the TFG be able to put elections on course?
The strength of the AU forces. Do you feel that they have
enough forces to contain al-Shabaab, who as you know is getting
support from al-Qaeda? And do you see whether the government is
being able to win that battle?
And finally, on Eritrea. As you know, I was the last Member
of Congress to visit there, several years ago, and have been
able to talk to President Isaias. I wonder, in your opinion, as
we are going to move for sanctions--and I have a lot of respect
for Congressman Royce's position--do you think that the
designation--you know, once you get on that terrorist list,
that is it forever. And that could close off any kind of
possibility.
Is there, in your opinion, a last-minute opportunity to see
whether President Isaias--I mean, the President of Eritrea did
write President Obama when he first came in, saying that he was
interested in having some dialogue. Do you think that to shut
it off totally--that ends it all, which I am not saying,
Congressman Royce, that--absolutely everything points to the
fact there should be something done--or do you think a last-
minute shot at attempting to see if the Government of Eritrea
could be convinced that it should try to cooperate?
I am still at the point where--I know once that designation
goes, it stays. I mean, President Mandela just was able to get
off the terrorist list last year, because they said ANC was a
terrorist organization in the '60s and '70s and '80s.
And for a birthday present, we were able to push the
administration to take the President's administration off the
terrorist list, just last year. So once you get on that list,
you are there forever. So I just wondered about your opinion.
Mr. Smith. Ms. Bass. Ms. Bass, do you have any other
questions?
Ms. Lindborg?
Ms. Lindborg. Thank you. Just to reiterate, as unfortunate
as it is, we do expect that the situation in Somalia will
continue to decline, and famine conditions are possible.
There is a concerted international effort to try to meet
what are not just food needs, but they are water, clean
drinking water needs, and the ability of people to access
supplies that are still available to them.
We are seeing about a $200-million funding gap, even with
the $349 million that we along with, primarily, ECHO, Japan,
UK, and Norway have provided toward the U.N. funding appeal.
Again, to reiterate, we have currently provided about $48.4
million. We have more in the pipeline, and we are looking hard
at how we can responsibly provide that assistance.
Unfortunately, there is difficulty in reaching nearly 61
percent of those Somalis who live in the south and parts of
central Somalia, because of the presence of armed terrorist
groups and the inability to reliably and safely provide
assistance.
In terms of diseases, because of the ongoing programs that
have been conducted by USAID and others, 93 to 95 percent of
Somali children that we can reach have received polio
immunizations, for example, just to show the power of those
interventions. And we have been able to prevent reoccurrence of
that.
What we are most concerned about is--and what we are seeing
as children come across the border is malnutrition, and
diseases that are related to lack of sanitation and lack of
clean drinking water. So respiratory diseases, gastrointestinal
and malnutrition diseases.
We are always alert for the possibility of those kinds of
epidemics that are all-too-frequently common in these
situations. And thus far, in the camps at least, we have been
able to address that.
The concern, of course, is as conditions continue to
deteriorate in those areas that are difficult to reach.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. Dr. Brigety?
Mr. Brigety. Congressman, thank you very much for your
questions. As you noted, in the interest of time, I will do my
best to be brief, but I am happy to elaborate in a written
response, if you would like that.
With regard to the UNHCR appeal, we do not yet know exactly
what the size of that shortfall is going to be. The U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees, Mr. Antonio Guterres, has publicly
said that obviously there is a shortfall, not only for the Horn
but indeed for the entirety of their African program.
He has directed UNHCR earlier this week to immediately
obligate $20 million out of their operational reserves to
respond very, very quickly to the crisis. He is also, I should
say, traveling to the region, and will be there tomorrow to go
to the camps in both Ethiopia and Kenya.
As I mentioned, we anticipate seeing their revised
emergency appeal probably on Monday. We are prepared to respond
generously. I suspect that we will respond as we have
traditionally responded, with about 25 percent of the total of
that appeal. Obviously, it will depend on exactly what the size
of it is. But we will be able to let you know as soon as we do.
With regard to security, camp security is always an issue
at every refugee camp. I think it is fair to say it is
particularly an issue in Kenya, and that is true probably for
two reasons.
One is the sheer size of the camp. I don't know if you have
had a chance to visit Dadaab. It is massive. It really, really
is massive. There are security incidents within the camp with
not a fair amount of infrequency. The Kenyan Interior Ministry
does have some guards on the periphery, but it continues to be
an issue.
With regard to the camps inside Ethiopia, I think it is
probably on a comparative basis, security is slightly better.
But that is largely because it is even more remote than the
camps in Dadaab are, frankly. And also, the nature of that
population--it is at least 90 percent women and children. Very
few men there, in those camps in Ethiopia.
But that is going to be one of the things that I will be
looking at really intensely when I go to the region tomorrow.
Mr. Smith. If you could let us know what you find there, as
well.
Mr. Brigety. I will do that.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, and be safe. Yes?
Ms. Lindborg. With your permission, Chairman Smith, I would
just add that, again, because this is a regional crisis, the
totality of United States assistance in the region is currently
$360 million.
And that is just to underscore the stresses that the
refugees are placing on the drought-affected communities in
Kenya and Ethiopia as well. So there has been, where we are
able to reliably reach people throughout the region, a generous
response from the United States that has been critical,
critical for saving lives throughout the region.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. Ambassador Yamamoto.
Mr. Yamamoto. Congressman, on the AU forces, right now it
is up to 10,000 troops. They are trying to get to the number
that we in the United Nations agreed to, which is about 12,000
troops. They probably will not make that number.
We are looking at other troop contributing countries from
west Africa to southern and central, but again we want to say
that we commend the Ugandans and the Burundians, who are doing
a tremendous job. And a lot of sacrifices. Since they operation
started, they have lost 200 troops. And we are trying to do the
best we can to provide the assistance and support that they
need.
As I said, over the last 4 years--and this is 4 years--we
have given about $258 million. Compared to other operations,
obviously, it is not a lot of money. But we are trying to do
the best we can to support the AMISOM as far as training,
logistical support, and to give them the capacity and
capability to protect their troops against al-Shabaab.
The other issue, too, is $85 million to the TFG troops to
get them trained to capacity so that they can fight the war.
Ultimately, the AMISOM troops can only do so much, that this
really has to be a fight, a war, conducted and executed,
prosecuted by the Somalis themselves. And that is what we are
trying to do, is to give them the support and the assistance.
Right now, just something on the piracy. You know, the
piracy is symptomatic of the instability within Somalia. When I
was first the Ambassador in Djibouti, we saw the first cargo
ship being hijacked, and we said, ``That is not a good thing.''
And so from that point on, we have seen the rates of
hijackings and hostage-taking grow from about 11 ships, about
276 hostages, to earlier this year about 53 ships and over 500
hostages. And that has kind of gone down now, to 17 and 390
hostages, but that is because of the monsoon season.
And this increase is taking place at a time when we are
expanding the international presence of Task Force 150, 151.
And so what it underscores is that the problem is basically not
a piracy issue, but reflective of the instability in Somalia.
And that is an issue that we need to target and to
confront. As you know, the Secretary of State outlined and
articulated several points that we need to do, and what we are
trying to do is to prosecute, and some naval operations, and
regional capacity-building.
Looking at prosecution and incarcerations, as you know
right now, the United States has taken 28 pirates. And of
those, 17 have been convicted, and the others are still
awaiting prosecution. The most recent one was, of course,
Abdiwali, who has been taken to New York City.
The other issue, too, is that we are looking at best
practices. We are looking at how we can expand and communicate,
and also disrupt piracy enterprises.
And Congressmen Royce and Smith, you had stated quite
clearly and articulately that we need to look at how we can
disrupt all the financial assistance that is being accumulated
by the pirates, and also the assistance coming in from outside
into the pirates, as well as the arms flows and other issues.
Going to your questions on the state sponsor of terrorism
for Eritrea, that is a very difficult question. At the end of
the last administration, Eritrea was designated as a country of
concern, and therefore it was a country that we are looking at,
not only because of its support for rebel groups not only aimed
against Ethiopia, but also the regional--at Camp Sawa and other
camps in Eritrea--we are also looking very carefully at also
the arm flows, but not just Eritrea, but from all countries, in
all areas.
And one of the things that we have learned in Somalia is
that we need to keep out the Eritreans, and all outsiders, and
to give the Somalis an opportunity to resolve the problems
themselves. Because ultimately this has to be a Somali approach
and a Somali solution.
The SST designation is a difficult one. It is an issue that
we are discussing. We are trying to get as much evidence
together, and to discuss this.
Congressman Payne, you do raise a very cogent argument. The
last U.S. official to visit Eritrea was----
Mr. Smith. May I interrupt you, just very briefly? Greg
Simpkins, our Chief Specialist for African Affairs on the
subcommittee on the majority side will stay and hear the
remainder of your comments. We are at zero on the House floor
in terms of the votes, so I am going to run over.
If you could respond, Dr. Martin did raise an issue--and
then go back to your response--about the maritime--the ships at
sea that are attacked. And talks about restrictive rules of
engagement. If you could speak to that, as well.
Because as he points out, being in the citadel is a
harrowing experience, and he goes into great detail about the
fact that the seas need to be controlled by the Navy. So if you
could speak to that.
I do thank you all for your extraordinary testimony, and
your work.
Mr. Yamamoto. As far as the issue on rules of engagement
for piracy, the International Task Force 151 was set up to
address the piracy issue. The U.S. Navy, along with probably
around 24 other countries, have contributed troop ships, around
48, over 48 ships, to look at an area that is extremely
expansive and very difficult to monitor.
And during the non-monsoon seasons, the pirates are able to
use mother ships to go really far from their bases in Somalia,
into other areas, the Red Sea, and then the Gulf area, to
capture ships.
It is a very difficult task. It is a very tremendous
problem to get all these mother ships. But I think the rules of
engagement, as the Secretariat articulated, is to coordinate
with our allied countries, but also to coordinate with all the
other countries within the region to address the piracy issue.
We have talked to, and negotiated with, countries such as
Mauritius, Seychelles, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya,
to--and also Somaliland and Puntland--to look at how we can
address the capturing of these pirates, how to handle these
pirates.
But more important is to work with these countries, as well
as our international partners, that there has to be assured
prosecution of all the pirates who are captured, and that they
have to have assured prosecution, imprisonment, through the
legal process and procedures.
Going back to what Congressman Payne had said on the
Eritrea issue, the last visit by a U.S. official, again, was
last June 2010. And in that process, our message to President
Isaias and the Eritrean leadership has been clear, and it has
been clear ever since.
It is that we extend a hand of discussion, negotiations, of
opening, of discussion, of dialogue. But we have not received
any response from Isaias or his government. In fact, since that
time, my visa to return to Eritrea remains in the Eritrean
Embassy, unacted-upon.
Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson's visa application has
remained at the Eritrean Embassy for over a year and a half.
And so our position is still to engage the Eritreans, to look
at areas where we can engage with them. But again, the response
from the Eritreans has been negative.
Again on the SST, we continue to look at Eritrea on a wide
variety of areas, from their gold mining factories run by a
Canadian firm, Nevsun, which is probably producing profits in
excess of several million dollars for the Eritreans this year,
and in the future will probably be even more.
We are looking at the tax collection that they obtain in
the United States. We look also at the foreign exchange
reserves that Eritreans send to Eritrea, and say, ``Is this
according to the U.S. and international financial laws and
institutions?''
So everything is being looked at and examined. We have--I
do not wish to make any statements or comments at this point,
because those things are still under research. And it is not
just Eritrea. It is a lot of actors that are in Somalia that we
are trying to prevent from playing a destructive or non-
constructive role.
The other question that you asked, one last thing, was that
again, on the financing et cetera for the African Union and the
Transitional Federal Government--again, we work very closely
with the Transitional Government to ensure that they will
address this 1-year period.
As you know, the Kampala Accord, which was signed on June
9th, really resolved a stalemate where we were headed into
August 2011 without any resolution to the Transitional
Government.
And so what we want to do is look at this agreement
achieved in Kampala that in the next year, how can we push the
government toward those elections? How can we act on and
implement the agreements made by the Kampala Accord? Which is
reform, electoral process, and to remove the TFG. And those are
areas that we will continue to look at and look closely, not
only with the TFG and AMISOM, and the United Nations, but also
the regional states and our other donor countries.
That is kind of a summary of the efforts that we will make.
Mr. Simpkins [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. And
thanks to all the panel. And on behalf of the chairmen, we are
in recess. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 1:52 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to
reconvene at 2:47 the same day.]
Mr. Smith [presiding]. The subcommittees will reconvene and
consider they are sitting. I would like to now, first of all,
apologize to our very distinguished witnesses for that long
delay. There were 13 votes on the House floor, and obviously it
took some time to complete that business.
But we will now complete this hearing. Our second panel, I
welcome to the witness table. Dr. Peter Pham, who is the
director of the Michael Ansari Africa Center at the Atlantic
Council in Washington, DC. He is the incumbent vice president
of the Association for the Study of Middle East and Africa, an
academic organization which represents more than 1,000
scholars, and he is editor in chief of the organization's
Journal of the Middle East and Africa.
Dr. Pham was the winner of the 2008 Nelson Mandela
International Prize for African Security and Development. He
has authored half a dozen book chapters concerning Somali
piracy, terrorism, and stabilizing fragile states, as well as
more than 80 articles in various journals, and has been over
the years a very distinguished witness before our subcommittee.
And I want to thank you for being here again today.
We will then hear from Bronwyn Bruton, of the One Earth
Future Foundation. Ms. Bruton is a democracy and governance
specialist with extensive field experience in Africa. She has
worked for the National Endowment for Democracy, USAID, and GAO
as a 2008/2009 international affairs fellow at the Council on
Foreign Relations.
Ms. Bruton offered a series of prominent reports and
articles on Somalia, and has provided expert commentary on
Somalia to various media outlets. She has traveled frequently
to the northern regions of Somalia, and collaborated with
hundreds of Somali community-based and non-governmental
organizations. She is currently a fellow at the One Earth
Future Foundation.
Then we will hear from Dr. Martin Murphy, who is an
internationally recognized expert on piracy and unconventional
conflict at sea.
He is a visiting fellow at the Corbett Center for Maritime
Policy Studies at King's College, a research fellow at the
Center for Foreign Policy Studies, and was a senior fellow at
the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments between 2008
and 2010. He has authored a number of books, chapters, and
articles on Somali piracy, international piracy laws, and
related topics.
And finally, we will hear from Dr. David Shinn, who has
been a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs
at George Washington University since 2001.
Prior to that, he served 37 years in the U.S. Foreign
Service, and held the following positions, among others:
Ambassador to Ethiopia, Director of East African Affairs,
Deputy Director of the Somalia Task Force, Political Officer at
the U.S. Embassy in Kenya, and Desk Officer for Somalia and
Djibouti.
Moreover, he has served as the State Department Coordinator
for Somalia during the international intervention in the early
1990s. So thank you, Ambassador, as well for being here, and
all of you for your patience.
Dr. Pham, if you could begin your testimony?
STATEMENT OF J. PETER PHAM, PH.D., DIRECTOR, MICHAEL S. ANSARI
AFRICA CENTER, ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Mr. Pham. Thank you, Chairman Smith. Thank you very much
for this invitation to appear before you today, and to
contribute to your assessment of the consequences of the failed
state of Somalia in general, and in particular the policy of
the United States toward the challenges that arise. I will just
summarize my prepared testimony, which I have already
submitted.
As we meet, the situation in Somalia has reached a critical
point. Two decades after the collapse of the last entity that
could be possibly described as a Government of Somalia, and no
fewer than 14 failed attempts to reconstitute such a
centralized authority later, the country is still fragmented,
and is fragmenting into multiple fiefdoms.
The current Transitional Federal Government, TFG, is
limping toward the August 20th expiration of its already-
extended mandate with little indication that it has made any
progress toward the goals that were its reason for being and
existing.
And while the Islamist insurgency spearheaded by al-Shabaab
has suffered a series of setbacks in the last 9 months or so at
the hands of the African Union Mission in Somalia, to say
nothing of recent air strikes by unmanned aerial vehicles,
operated or at least coordinated by U.S. forces, it is far from
defeated.
Moreover, even allowing for the most optimistic
interpretation of recent gains by the Ugandan and Burundian
peacekeepers fighting in Mogadishu, the fact remains that their
commanders claim to have secured barely half of the 16
districts of the city, and the total area under the effective
control of the AMISOM forces today is actually smaller than
that which the departing Ethiopian forces relinquished just 2
years ago.
Finally, the fate of Yemen is still very much undetermined.
There is the specter of the existing links between al-Shabaab
and al-Qaeda in the Arabian peninsula, those links expanding
and proving an even greater threat to international and
regional security, to say nothing of the increased threat posed
by maritime piracy in the waters of the Gulf of Aden between
the two countries and beyond, as the Greek oil tanker Brillante
Virtuoso, carrying 1 million barrels of fuel oil, which was set
ablaze yesterday just 20 miles off the port of Aden after a
failed pirate attack, attests.
Unfortunately, compounding its poor political and military
prospects, Somalia currently also faces environmental
challenges which only exacerbate the former. In this context, I
would like to make five points.
First, rather than being a solution to the challenge of
state failure in Somalia, the TFG has clearly shown itself to
be a part of the problem. What we are confronting is not just
political incompetence, but outright criminality.
Last year, the U.N. Security Council's Sanctions Moderating
Group for Somalia documented how senior TFG officials,
including the Deputy Prime Minister and other members of the
cabinet, were directly involved in visa fraud, including in one
case facilitating the travel to Europe by two suspected al-
Shabaab cadres.
More recently, the TFG's own auditors, reviewing the books
for the years 2009/2010, revealed that while during the
relevant period bilateral assistance to the regime totaled
$75.6 million, only $2.87 million could be accounted for.
The auditors determined that the balance, more than 96
percent of international aid, was simply stole, and
specifically recommended forensic investigations of the Office
of the President, the Office of the Prime Minister, the
Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Telecommunications.
Anyway, is it any surprise that such an outfit has had
little success in rallying even minimal public support behind
it, much less accomplishing any of the basic tasks which are
its reason for existence?
There is perhaps no more telling indicator of the TFG's
dismal prospects than the fact that no fewer than three
different western initiatives to train a military force for it
have recruited and trained and armed more than 9,000 troops,
yet fewer than 1,000 of these remain loyal.
Two, AMISOM is neither sustainable as a military operation
nor viable as a strategy. Despite its recent success in combat
operations, the African Union force remains limited in the ways
in which it can accomplish, due to lack of manpower and
materiel.
Even if the personnel could be found to bring the force up
to the new ceiling authorized--and Ambassador Yamamoto
testified earlier that that was unlikely--it would still be
beyond delusional to think that a 12,000-strong contingent
would succeed where infinitely more robust and better-trained
U.N. forces failed just a little over a decade and a half ago.
I would add, Mr. Chairman, that our reliance on AMISOM
causes difficulties for our policy objectives elsewhere in
Africa. Take, for example, the lamentably ham-fisted way in
which the regime in Uganda has dealt with political opponents
in recent months.
President Museveni knows that as long as the United States
and other members of the international community insist on
backing the corrupt and ineffective TFG, American and its
partners will be constrained insofar as their ability to bring
any meaningful pressure on him with respect to human rights.
Third, the resilience of al-Shabaab and other insurgent
forces should not be underestimated, especially when the TFG
and AMISOM continually fuel fires of local discontent.
Fourth, the process of devolution in the one-time Somali
state continues, and represents a trend which, after more than
20 years, has become irreversible. Without necessarily
precluding any future confederal arrangement, it seems a
foregone conclusion that the political momentum among the
Somali is moving overwhelmingly in the direction of multiple
divisions, and against a heavily centralized top-down
arrangement.
Fifth, a new approach is desperately needed if the worst
consequences of Somalia's state failure are to be mitigated.
Encouragingly, there have been various signs that parts of the
international community may be finally coming, however
reluctantly, to this conclusion.
Last fall, Assistant Secretary Carson announced a second-
track strategy that would include greater engagement with
government officials from Somaliland and Puntland, with an eye
to looking to strengthen their capacity both to govern and
deliver services.
While the new U.S. policy has yet to be fully worked out,
to say nothing of receiving adequate resources, it nonetheless
represents a dramatic and long-overdue shift. The challenge now
is to be equally creative in developing the appropriate
vehicles for political, economic, and security engagement with
the appropriate Somali partners.
The forthcoming posting of Ambassador James Swan to Nairobi
as the new coordinator of U.S. efforts on Somalia ought to be
an occasion for a thorough review of our policy, its
implementation, and the consequences thereof.
Certainly, if pragmatism counsels that we must endure
another year of the TFG's existence for want of a ready
alternative, then by all means let us ensure that this final
year is exactly that, and avail ourselves of the time to
carefully consider alternative paths for achieving what the
Somali people deserve and our security interests demand.
Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pham follows:]
----------
Mr. Smith. Dr. Pham, thank you very much for your testimony
and your insights.
Ms. Bruton, the chair recognizes you.
STATEMENT OF MS. BRONWYN BRUTON, FELLOW, ONE EARTH FUTURE
FOUNDATION
Ms. Bruton. Thank you, Congressman Smith. I wish to thank
the subcommittees for inviting me to testify today, and for
allowing me to contribute to this assessment of the
consequences of state failure in Somalia.
My remarks will explore the pitfalls and possible benefits
of the proposed U.S. engagement with alternative forms of
governance in Somalia, in particular homegrown administrations
at the local, municipal, or regional level.
In the interest of time, I have summarized my views in a
short prepared statement, which I would ask to be entered into
the record.
Mr. Smith. Without objection, your testimony and that of
all of our colleagues and witnesses will be made a part of the
record, the longer versions.
Ms. Bruton. Since October 2010, al-Shabaab has suffered
severe military setbacks at the hands of African Union troops.
The movement appears increasingly weak and preoccupied with
internal power struggles. No analyst would suggest, however,
that al-Shabaab's decline is related to the emergence of the
Transitional Federal Government as a viable alternative to
radical Islamist rule.
On the contrary, al-Shabaab's decline has occurred just as
international support for the TFG has visibly begun to wane, as
international attention has strayed elsewhere, to the
surprising events in Libya, Sudan, and Tunisia, and perhaps
precisely because the Somali conflict has settled into an
interminable and fruitless stalemate between AU troops and the
radical al-Shabaab.
Washington's measured response to the Kampala bombings,
when it wisely refused to bow to regional pressure to pump
additional money and troops into Mogadishu, has made it
painfully clear that the Obama administration will not allow
Somalia to become a quagmire for U.S. troops, or funds, or
forces, that the utility of al-Qaeda investment there is
therefore limited, and that the only real victim of the ongoing
military stalemate is Somalia's endlessly suffering civilian
population.
In light of this analysis, I wish to emphasize the
following five points.
First, bolstering AMISOM to the desired level of 20,000
troops will not end the stalemate, nor will it magically
transform the TFG into a government worthy of international
support.
At best, aggressive U.S. backing of AMISOM could
inadvertently refocus and re-energize al-Shabaab and its
backers, and produce a new, more energetic, round of violence.
The use of invasive and unpopular counterterror tactics could
also have the same effect.
Two, the State Department's new Dual Track strategy better
reflects the political reality on the ground in Somalia, and
has the potential to do less harm than previous policies. If
pursued cautiously, the Dual Track strategy could provide the
space and resources for a much-needed period of stabilization,
normalization, and economic growth in Somalia.
Normalization is not as grand a goal as state-building, but
it is not a modest policy goal either. It is the shortest path
to reconciliation, and to the emergence of a truly homegrown
solution to the Somali crisis.
Third, though less risky than a top-down state-building
approach, decentralized strategies are not a magic bullet. In
fact, most of the pitfalls that have been associated with top-
down state-building efforts can quickly reappear at the local
or regional level.
As international funding flows downwards, powerful spoilers
will succeed in crowding out more legitimate voices, clan
tensions can and will be aggravated, and the concerns of
disempowered minority clans will often be drowned out.
Fourth, the U.S. can minimize these risks of stoking
clannism, corruption and conflict by actively pursuing
stability, rather than governance, as a primary policy goal. A
strategy of development without regard to governments will
simply require the United States to prioritize the delivery of
immediate benefits to communities over any attempt at
institution-building or at picking political winners on the
ground in Somalia.
Fifth and last, in order for the Dual Track strategy to
stand any chance of succeeding, the U.S. needs urgently to
revisit its de facto decision to suspend humanitarian funding
to the Somali territories controlled by al-Shabaab. Without a
dramatic increase in humanitarian aid, tens of thousands of
Somalis will die.
But providing food to Somalia is not solely a humanitarian
imperative. The failure to meet the most basic human
requirements of Somalia's population conflicts with every
precept of counterinsurgency strategy, and will undoubtedly
deliver some desperate communities into the hands of al-
Shabaab.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Bruton follows:]
----------
Mr. Smith. Ms. Bruton, thank you very much for your
testimony.
Dr. Murphy, please proceed.
STATEMENT OF MARTIN MURPHY, PH.D., VISITING FELLOW, CORBETT
CENTRE FOR MARITIME POLICY, KING'S COLLEGE, LONDON
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to give
evidence on the issues confronting Somalia, and the
implications of those issues for the United States and the
wider international community.
My expertise lies in the areas of piracy and maritime
terrorism. I wish to focus on the problems of piracy in
particular, and provide some insights into what is driving this
economic crime, and its implications for U.S. Government
policy.
I have a prepared statement. I would like to summarize my
views in eight points.
First of all, piracy is a symptom, not a cause, of
Somalia's current predicament. Dealing with it requires
engagement on land. This necessity is recognized widely, and
equally widely rejected because of fears that the Black Hawk
Down experience will be repeated in some form.
Piracy, however, is an economic crime that requires
political and economic engagement if it is to be controlled.
The concern is that piracy will become endemic the longer
engagement is delayed. The number of direct and indirect
stakeholders will grow, thus making the problem increasingly
difficult to eradicate.
Secondly, to avoid this, piracy needs to be crowded out
using political and economic engagements in the areas of
Somalia that host piracy operations, such as Puntland. Pirate
rewards need to be decreased; economic alternatives need to be
increased. The aim must be to change the incentives away from
piracy and toward legitimate economic activity.
Thirdly, the costs of economic alternatives need not be
great. Whatever the cost, it will almost certainly be less than
maintaining even the moderately effective naval presence that
is operating off the Somali coast currently. Delay in
initiating land-based development will merely increase the
eventual cost.
My fourth point is that the approach must contain a
substantial bottom-up element. Development assistance is not
aid. Investment in judicial capacity will be necessary, but the
primary objective must be to encourage international commercial
and diaspora investment on business terms. Somalis are a proud
and independent people, not all of whom are looking for
handouts.
Fifthly, we must work with the grain of Somalia's messy and
decentralized politics. It cannot be imposed. Local
stakeholders need to take responsibility. Hopeless candidates
should be discarded, but development providers should not aim
on picking winners.
Winners will emerge. Failure is to be expected. The
successful will attract more support and will crowd out the
less effective alternatives.
Sixthly, the current policy of containment at sea is not
politically and strategically risk-free for the United States.
Piracy has a political significance that often exceeds its
economic impact.
The U.S. Navy is the ultimate guarantor of maritime
security globally. When shipping comes under sustained attack
without an effective response, as it has done off Somalia, then
the U.S. commitment to maritime security is brought into
question, and space is created for state and even non-state
competitors to intervene to their political advantage.
In a strategy paper published last December by the Central
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, for example, anti-
piracy operations were described as a way China could gain a
foothold in a geostrategically vital region.
Seventhly, in relation to containment, and possibly to
avoid landward engagement, it has been suggested that the
United States should outlaw the payment of ransom in cases of
piracy, and to make this measure enforceable internationally by
means of a United Nations Security Council resolution.
Although it would eliminate piracy if it proved
enforceable, which must be in doubt, it would take time to take
effect, possibly as long as 2 or 3 years, during which time the
hostages--currently there are in excess of 400--would be at
risk.
Most of those held come from developing countries which are
America's friends, such as India, Bangladesh, the Philippines,
and Indonesia. The outcry in those countries would be loud and
politically damaging.
So long as the U.S.-led international community is
unwilling to either intervene or engage on land in Somalia,
then the payment of ransom will remain the only way that
hostages can be brought home.
My final point is that if Yemen were to fail, maritime
disorder in the region would likely worsen considerably. If
both sides of the Gulf of Aden were to become launching sites
for pirate and potentially terrorist attacks, it is possible
that ship operators would demand a much higher level of naval
protection.
If that was not forthcoming, they may seek alternative
routes, which would add to the costs of both finished goods and
raw materials, including oil and gas. Economic development will
crowd out Islamist extremism as effectively as it will
undermine piracy.
Once again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to
be here today. I am happy to answer any questions you might
have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Murphy follows:]
----------
Mr. Smith. Dr. Murphy, thank you very much for your
testimony.
Ambassador Shinn.
STATEMENT OF DAVID H. SHINN, PH.D., ADJUNCT PROFESSOR, ELLIOTT
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
Ambassador Shinn. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. The
administration's Dual Track policy is essentially sound. The
TFG is the only entity other than al-Shabaab with any claim,
albeit a weak one, to speak for the Somalis in that part of
Somalia.
It extended its mandate from August 2011 to August 2012,
and if it cannot make significant progress by the end of the
extended mandate it is difficult to imagine that there will be
any support left for it in the international community.
The United States should indeed devote more development
resources to Somaliland and Puntland. I would also argue that
U.S. Government personnel should have more flexibility in
visiting Puntland and Somaliland. The hard part of the two-
track policy is that which calls for reaching out to and
supporting anti-Shabaab groups in south and central Somalia.
The United States has not yet figured out how to reach
these groups, because they are, after all, under al-Shabaab
control. Whatever strategy is pursued, however, it must be
Somali-driven and not have an outcome that, by supporting sub-
clans and small groups, results in the permanent Balkanization
of the region.
The Somali diaspora can be an important part of the
solution to Somalia, but it is not united on a solution.
On the issue of counterterrorism and military strikes,
following 9/11 counterterrorism became the overwhelming U.S.
policy in Somalia, and continues as a major factor.
counterterrorism, while important, should not overwhelm U.S.
and international community actions that might make a stronger
contribution to diminishing the influence of al-Shabaab in the
region.
Military strikes need to be limited to high-value targets,
where the intelligence is almost incontrovertible and the
likelihood of collateral damage is virtually non-existent.
It will be a mistake if these strikes become the U.S.
default policy for countering al-Shabaab and other extremists
in Somalia. A policy of military strikes in isolation does
nothing to mitigate the root causes that led to the rise of and
continues to generate support for al-Shabaab and similar
organizations.
On the issue of contact with al-Shabaab, a controversial
topic, while there are rank and file members of al-Shabaab who
have no ideological commitment and can be lured away. I just do
not see anyone in a leadership position with whom
representatives of the international community should be in
dialogue. To the extent there is any role for a dialogue with
al-Shabaab, it should be done by Somalis and not by foreigners.
On the issue of piracy, I think probably as much has been
said on that as is necessary, so I will pass over that. I would
only add, though, that in addition to dealing with piracy per
se, there is a Somali element of this that needs addressing,
and that is for the international community to focus on
ensuring that illegal fishing in the 200 mile economic zone of
Somalia be dealt with, and the international community in the
future not permit that to happen. There has been a bad history
of that in the past.
There have also been a few cases of toxic waste dumping in
the waters off Somalia. I think there has been a lot of
exaggeration on that point, but it is important that the
international community do whatever it can to ensure that there
not be toxic waste dumping.
On the recognition of Somaliland, Somaliland should be
rewarded for the relative stability that it has established and
the fact that it has become the most democratic entity in the
Horn of Africa. But I think any decision on the recognition of
Somaliland should be led by the Africans, either the African
Union collectively or individual African countries.
And finally, I would like to make a plea for greater
consideration of regional economic integration in the area. I
think this is a long-term goal that has major implications for
the future.
Somalia is one of the most conflicted countries in the
world and has been for a long time. I think if it is possible
to identify ways to increase regional economic integration for
all of the Horn and East African countries, it has the
potential to mitigate significantly conflict in this part of
Africa.
I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for hearing my views.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Shinn follows:]
----------
Mr. Smith. Ambassador Shinn, thank you very much for your
testimony and for your service.
Let me just ask a few questions. You mentioned, Dr. Murphy,
that there are some 400 hostages. I wonder if you could tell
the subcommittees, how are they treated? What is the average
stay of incarceration? I don't know how else to explain it. Are
they tortured, any of these individuals?
Mr. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes, there are about
450 hostages currently. The average stay has increased. It is
probably around 5 to 6 months now, and that is all to do with
the time it is now taking to negotiate the ransom payment.
There have been a number of stories of bad treatment. I
think it would be unfair to be that they have had pleasant
treatment heretofore, but it has generally been safe. There has
been all sorts of reports of their food being prepared
correctly, and so on and so forth.
But we have, as I said, had some reports over the last 6
months or so of pirates--of their being treated badly, a number
instances of heads being submerged below the water, hostages
being dragged behind ships, mock executions, and so on and so
forth.
What is difficult, really is to ascertain what the actual
evidence for that is. We know it has occurred, but is it
systematic? There doesn't seem to be a systematic pattern
behind it. It seems to be related to one or two cases. However,
there is concern that, partially because of the drought and
partially because of general migration within Somalia, the
Somali pirates are attracting--or the Somali pirate enterprise,
to put it that way, is attracting more people from the interior
who don't have an understanding of the sea, or possibly an
understanding of the business model that has been heretofore so
successful for the pirates, which is essentially a peaceful
one.
So it is a situation one has to keep under review. At this
stage, I think it is important not to exaggerate it, but it
does seem to be occurring, and what we need is better and more
reliable information upon which to make a judgment.
Mr. Smith. Have there been reports of sexual abuse? And are
women among those who have been detained?
Mr. Murphy. There was one woman detained. I think it was on
a Ukrainian ship. There was no report of any sexual harassment.
Mr. Smith. Are shipping companies purposely keeping women
off those ships?
Mr. Murphy. There are very few women in the international--
--
Mr. Smith. But there are some?
Mr. Murphy [continuing]. Crewing business. Yes. They tend
to be officers, not in the crew, but it is a very, very small
proportion. I don't know if there is any particular policy to
keep women out of the Arabian Sea theater.
Mr. Smith. With regards to when they are repatriated, what
has been the experience of those men, and the woman, once they
are back home? Are there any signs of PTSD, or is anybody
monitoring their psychological or physical health once they are
freed?
Mr. Murphy. Given the way that the international shipping
industry works, I should imagine there is very little
monitoring of what happens afterwards. There is no hard
evidence as to what is happening to these people, and that is
partly because of the way the international shipping industry
does work, which is to say it tends not to want crew or
officers to be interviewed. People tend to be kept away from
the press. We don't know, really, how these people are dealing
with it.
Historically speaking, the vast majority of people who have
been pirated never went to sea again unless they had to, and
that usually meant, clearly, the lowest-paid portions of the
crew.
Many of the officers, historically, did not go back to sea
again because the trauma was so significant, but we don't have
particular surveys as to what has happened to the people who
have been held in Somalia.
Mr. Smith. Let me ask Ambassador Shinn, if you could, you
mentioned that the Somali Diaspora in America can be part of
the solution in Somalia. But while remittance has maintained
Somali families, young Somalis in some number are joining al-
Shabaab on the battlefield.
Do we have any sense as to how many Somali emigres have
gone back and are now a part of the fighting? And those who are
being radicalized here, what is their game plan? Do we have any
sense of their hostility or lack of it toward the United
States?
Ambassador Shinn. Well, we have a fairly good idea of the
numbers who have gone back and joined al-Shabaab. And the last
figure I saw was around 30 from the United States. There are
other members of the Somali Diaspora in other countries who
have gone back.
Larger numbers, I believe, have gone back from the United
Kingdom. I saw a figure of around a dozen from Sweden, maybe
five from Denmark, and small numbers from other European
countries. So the total may very well be a couple of hundred by
the time you add them all up.
What I have not seen is any number of Somalis in the
American Diaspora who have, as you say, been radicalized, or
who might have sent money to al-Shabaab.
The FBI may have some better numbers on money transfers,
but that is very hard to follow, because most of that money is
sent back by what is called the Hawala organization, where you
literally can go into a large Somali mall in downtown
Minneapolis, which I have done, and where there will be a
little office where a Somali-American can deposit $100--
actually, $105. There is a $5 commission.
That $100 will just show up, almost miraculously, anywhere
in Somalia several days later. Someone will literally deliver
it to the intended person, and it is very, very hard to track
this sort of thing.
So I don't think anyone really knows with any certainty the
degree to which al-Shabaab has benefitted by financing from the
Diaspora, but it definitely has. The numbers just aren't there.
Mr. Smith. Ms. Bruton, you had faint praise for the Dual
Track. You said it was less harmful than the previous policies.
And I am wondering if you and the other panelists might want to
speak to how well you think the Dual Track, especially track
two, is progressing.
Ms. Bruton. I think that the Dual Track policy has really
yet to get off the ground. In theory, it could work very well,
and I specified that I think that will require the U.S. to use
a very light footprint, and not to use the Dual Track strategy
as an opportunity to pursue political ends at the local level.
If the U.S. pursues political ends on the ground, I think that
the results will be very similar to what we have seen in
Mogadishu.
I believe that the Dual Track policy has been held up by
the tremendous difficulties that are involved in formulating a
decent strategy for engaging at the ground level, particularly
in south central. And I know that USAID and other entities are
working very hard to come up with such a strategy, given the
evolving political situation, and I think particularly given
the fear that some of this funding could ultimately go into the
hands of al-Shabaab.
But I think that the dialogue needs to move much more
quickly. Most people who have worked in Somalia will tell you
it is not anywhere near as difficult as people think it is. If
you take a few precautions, it is possible to do amazing,
amazing projects with relatively little funding. And I am
personally very hopeful that Dual Track will be able to
accomplish some of those things.
Mr. Smith. Would anybody else like to--Dr. Pham?
Mr. Pham. I would just add to that, I think that we need to
also flesh out the Dual Track strategy. Conceptually, I think
it makes a great deal of sense, and it certainly is a move in
the right direction.
But we need to flesh it out, both in terms of distinctions
within the secondary track between entities that are
approaching quasi-state status, like Somaliland and Puntland,
and more grassroots organizations which, although they may
aspire to that, are a very long way from that. So I think we
need to distinguish between that.
And secondly, we need to be able to put resources--it is
good to say, ``We are having a Dual Track strategy,'' but
unless development assistance and other things flow to
privilege that, it remains just a rhetorical concept. Thank
you.
Mr. Smith. Ambassador Shinn.
Ambassador Shinn. Mr. Chairman, if I might add, there are
two particularly sensitive and important areas where one would
like to see the Dual Track policy take root. One that I alluded
to earlier, and that is south central Somalia, the areas that
al-Shabaab controls.
It clearly is very difficult to work there. One of the
things we are going to find out in the coming weeks, as the
United States Government tries to deal with this horrific
drought that was talked about earlier today in this hearing, is
the degree to which one can actually provide food in areas
controlled by al-Shabaab.
Interestingly, al-Shabaab has said in the last 48 hours or
so that it will now let international organizations and non-
governmental organizations into that area to provide food. They
threw them all out earlier.
But what we haven't heard yet are the conditions for those
organizations to go into al-Shabaab territory. In the past, al-
Shabaab organization has tried to extract money from these
groups, either assessing fees or taxes, or insisting that
anyone who works in their area use al-Shabaab transportation
companies. This is money that ultimately ends up in the coffers
of an organization that is an enemy of the United States.
So it is a very, very tricky situation. On the one hand,
you don't want Somalis to be dying in this area. On the other
hand, you don't want to be supporting, directly or indirectly,
al-Shabaab.
The other area where the whole Dual Track system is
critical is in the pirate-held ports along the Puntland coast.
I think this is an area where we need to be a little more
innovative as to how we deal with it. Right now, we are
entirely focused on spending between $1 billion and $2 billion
a year on a huge naval effort in the Indian Ocean, and it
clearly has not worked.
Maybe it is time to see if there is any way of working with
local communities--elders, religious leaders, community
leaders, et cetera--in the existing pirate port areas, going in
with some ideas for development assistance, the international
community collectively, not just the United States, and seeing
if there is any way to convince the elders that, look, there is
another way here than just existing on the basis of pirate
money.
This would be hard to do, because there is no way to
compete with the amount of money that the pirates obtain, but
you might be able to find some good-minded local leaders who
would be willing to look at another way of creating jobs and
employment, and try to reconstruct the economy there.
Mr. Smith. Yes, Dr. Murphy?
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I obviously endorse my
colleague's comments about the need for economic development in
the piracy-prone areas. However, I think it is important that
we do not couple development aid simply to the fact that you
have been a bad boy as a pirate. The economic aid has to be
spread much more even-handedly, otherwise we are rewarding
malfeasance.
Mr. Smith. Let me just ask you a couple of final questions,
then I will yield to my good friend, the vice chairman of our
subcommittee, Mr. Fortenberry.
Ms. Bruton, you mentioned earlier that it is time to
revisit the territories that are not getting the kind of
humanitarian aid that they desperately need. As a matter of
fact, Ms. Lindborg suggested that some 61 percent of the unmet
need is in those areas.
She also pointed out that there is about a $200-million gap
in terms of what is needed and what is certainly not there yet.
And I wonder if any of you might like to speak to that gap, and
whether or not you are confident the U.S. and our other donors
will stand up and provide the sufficient amounts of money.
Let me also, if I could, address human trafficking. The
human trafficking report, the TIP Report, has just been
released a week ago. And it points out that, as in previous
years, trafficking victims were primarily trafficked within the
country, from Somalia's south and central regions to Puntland
and Somaliland regions. And it points out that the government
made no known effort to prevent trafficking in persons.
And I am wondering if the international community, the
government, the TFG, in your view, are even aware that this
problem is going unattended-to. And obviously, it is usually
women and children who are the victims of human trafficking.
And finally, Dr. Pham, you spoke about the African Union
deployment, and pointed out that that is one of the rallying
cries against the government. I am wondering, if not the AU
troops, who? I mean, who would provide that necessary lifeline
or protection, minimal as it may be, but certainly very
hazardous for those troops who are deployed there.
And I do have a question, if you could, about the whole
issue of rules of engagement. Do the AU troops have a
sufficiently robust mandate to protect? And secondly, on the
high seas, is our Navy, are the navies of other interested
parties sufficiently robust in their efforts, as well?
So those questions.
Ms. Bruton. Thank you, Congressman Smith. I am very, very
grateful to have the opportunity to address this question,
because my memory of the suspension of U.S. humanitarian relief
differs significantly from some of my colleagues.
As I recall, it is certainly true that al-Shabaab was
attempting to collect some fees from humanitarian agencies.
Typically, those fees were about $20,000 every 6 months. Forty
thousand dollars a year for every large humanitarian NGO.
That is not a huge amount of money, particularly when you
contrast this with the amount of funds and weaponry that al-
Shabaab has derived from, for example, the sale of weapons by
TFG troops, who have been trained by the United States and
other European and western donors.
Al-Shabaab can be very difficult to work with. They have
always been difficult to work with. But the United Nations,
ICRC, and other humanitarian agencies have almost always
succeeded in gaining access to the territories after
negotiations.
There are some subsets of al-Shabaab that certainly will
refuse to allow humanitarian actors into their territory if
they perceive them as political rivals. But I think that those
instances are fairly few and far between, and under the current
circumstances, certainly, I think it is very important that the
United States do everything possible to ensure that
humanitarian relief flows to those many, many communities that
are not receiving any aid at all.
We can't allow our political ideas about what al-Shabaab
may or may not do in the future to allow people to starve
today.
Mr. Pham. To pick up on the questions concerning the
African Union Mission in Somalia, AMISOM, one has to
acknowledge that its performance has improved a great deal in
the last year, partially because of increased training by U.S.
and European Union countries, partially because of a change in
command.
The current commander, Major General Nathan Mugisha from
Uganda, certainly is making a valiant effort at it. The problem
is in resources, both in personnel and ultimately in political
resources.
Currently, there are just shy of 10,000 African Union
Forces out of an authorized strength of 12,000. Earlier we
heard testimony from Ambassador Yamamoto that it seems unlikely
anyone is going to come up with those 2,000 to make up the
force.
But even if the 2,000 were found, we would have 12,000
troops with a mandate to do something that a decade and a half
ago, against an insurgency that was nowhere as ideologically
committed or as well armed and trained as al-Shabaab and the
Islamists, the U.N. failed with 37,000 troops. It is beyond
delusional to think that 12,000 is going to pull it off.
And if you look at the numbers, right now AMISOM has
roughly one soldier for every 500 people. The surge in Iraq,
when that turned the tide, the ratio there in the
counterinsurgency was one U.S. soldier for every 187 Iraqis. So
they are woefully under-resourced.
Beyond mere troop strength, however, you also have the
issue of political agenda. You may be able to gain space, as
difficult as it is, but in order to hold that space, one has to
have a political solution.
The government has to be ready to offer services, goods to
people to hold their loyalty. And what we have in the
Transitional Federal Government is an outfit that is good for
one thing, which is robbing, stealing the resources they have.
In the last two fiscal years, the government offices have
stolen 96 percent of the bilateral assistance. We have a Prime
Minister, until recently, who was a U.S. citizen. During the
period when he was in office, the payroll account for his
office was 864,000--he was only in office about 9 months--of
which only 216,000 can be accounted for. 648,000 has simply
disappeared just from one account.
That is not the type of political figure or government that
is going to inspire people to shift away and, as much as they
dislike al-Shabaab, they are not going to shift their loyalty
to an institution like this.
And so we have to acknowledge what AMISOM is improving. It
has certainly gotten better. But ultimately, it cannot hold
without a political strategy.
Mr. Fortenberry [presiding]. Let me intervene here, and
thank you all for your patience. You have come at a difficult
time, as we have got defense authorization and defense
appropriations votes occurring, and we have got people in and
out.
So I apologize that I haven't had the benefit of the
fullness of the testimony today. But before we conclude, let me
thank you all for coming, and also just pull back a little bit
and ask a broader question, if you care to answer.
When the people of the United States think about Somalia,
they will have the recollection of a loss of, if I recall, 23
soldiers in the 1990s. They will see piracy. They will have a
notion that this is a, perhaps, ungoverned space, if you will,
that is ripe for the potential for terroristic landing,
engagement, and potentially expansion.
Then, on top of that, there would be a broader concern, in
terms of the humanitarian problems that some of you have
addressed in the brief time that I am here.
So I think it is important to step back and say, for a
moment, why--or to point out, why is this strategic? Why is
this important, that Somalia at least begin--at least we have a
semblance of a vision for a transition of Somalia to a
stabilized--a place with a stabilized government that has the
potential to at least keep out the threats of those who would
land there and expand for terroristic purposes, or affiliate
with other terroristic organizations?
Explain why this is important, please.
Ambassador Shinn. Mr. Chairman, let me answer that
question, if I may. I have worked on Somali affairs literally
going back to the 1960s, off and on. And I think what the
United States is facing--and I believe you quite aptly
described the American perception of Somalia today. I think you
are right on target.
The problem is that you have an entity which has been a
failed state since 1991. If that entity kept its problems
entirely to itself, there probably wouldn't be a great deal of
concern in the United States about what was happening there.
But it has gone far beyond that, now. Not only is it
harming the Somali people themselves--and there are some
Americans who inherently are interested in the Somali
population, particularly the Somali-American population. So
there is that direct interest.
But now that it has gone so far beyond the borders of
Somalia, with piracy, with terrorism that has extended outside,
with even American links to terrorism in the form of Somali-
Americans, some 30 of them or so who have been directly
implicated, and the fact that it is impacting the stability of
neighboring countries which are allies of the United States,
particularly Ethiopia and Kenya, it is an issue that I think is
properly of concern to the United States Government. It is in
our interest to try to do something to help create a government
that can, in fact, control the country.
And until that time comes, my guess is these problems are
going to get worse, not get better. I think that, essentially,
is the rationale for it.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you. I approach the issue of Somalia very
much from the sea, and my concerns about the International
Maritime Commons, freedom of navigation, our ability as a
nation to maintain, if you like, the way of life that we have
had for the last 200 or so years.
I see the Somali pirates as presenting a major challenge to
that international maritime security regime. I have argued that
it possibly represents the most significant challenge to the
peaceful use of the sea since the Second World War.
How this affects the United States is, the United States is
the ultimate guarantor of the maritime security system, and as
I argued in my testimony, where that is challenged and is not
responded to, that gives opportunities for competitor states.
And I drew an example of a statement recently made by the
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, which
indicates that they are prepared to take advantage of
weaknesses in this area specifically to gain advantage for
themselves in what they view--and we should also be viewing--as
a geostrategically very important area.
In fact, if anything, I am more concerned about that than I
am, necessarily, about the now-you-see-it, now-you-don't
changes in the terroristic threats in the region.
Ms. Bruton. I have argued many, many times over that the
U.S. has a very limited set of reasons for engaging on the
ground in Somalia. For a long time it has been common sense to
assume that because it is a security vacuum, it is a terrorist
threat.
The reality is that after the U.S. pulled out of Somalia in
1995, after the Black Hawk Down incident that you have alluded
to, Somalia became more stable, more economically viable, and
less threatening than it had ever been in the past.
In 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, there was
virtually no discernable terrorist threat in Somalia at all. In
2006, the Counter-Terrorism Center at West Point wrote a report
in which it said that Somalia was--I think the term they used
was ``fundamentally inhospitable to foreign terrorist groups
like al-Qaeda.'' Basically arguing that it was an inherently
bad place for terrorists to work.
Obviously now there are terrorists in Somalia, but the
thing that changed was not the Somalis. It was the level of
U.S. engagement in the country, which dramatically increased
starting in 2004. The reason for that stepped-up interest on
the part of the United States was nothing to do with what was
happening on the ground in Somalia, and everything to do with
9/11.
I am all in favor of caution, and erring on the side of
caution when we are talking about counterterrorism, but in
Somalia our preemptive efforts have tended to backfire in
really terrible ways, and I think that should be the source of
most U.S. thinking on Somalia now.
Not, ``If we intervene, is there a chance that we can make
things better?'' but, ``If we intervene, what are the odds that
we will actually wind up making things significantly worse
because of unforeseen consequences?''
And when I look at the counterterror efforts that are
taking place there now, I am equally concerned that they are
being driven not by events on the ground in Somalia, which are
actually more or less moving in our direction, but by things
that are happening in Afghanistan, in Pakistan, in Yemen.
And I simply urge this subcommittee, and these
subcommittees, to let Somalia guide your Somalia policy, rather
than any other country.
Mr. Pham. Mr. Vice Chairman, I echo my colleague's
sentiments. In answer to your question, I think we need to look
at not only the threat that emanates from there, which does
affect our way of life, the freedoms we enjoy, commerce,
threats to navigation, the very real threat now that--
irrespective of how they got there or when they got there, the
fact that al-Shabaab has been hospitable to other terrorist
movements and extremist groups, allowing them to operate in
Somalia, becoming sort of a hodge podge of characters who have
gathered there, introduced to you, including--I worry a great
deal about--introduced to these 30 Americans and others with
European and Australian passports, who now pass through there.
For all those reasons, we need to be concerned. But we also
need to be concerned because we take for granted the areas in
Somalia--the country itself as a whole is not that chaos that
we often imagine. Rather, specific regions are, mainly the
south central areas where the conflict is.
The other regions--Somaliland has been actually, as
Ambassador Shinn said earlier, the most democratic state
actually in the region. Puntland has its problems, some of
which are of its own making, because of the piracy, but
relatively speaking it is stable.
But we take that for granted at our own peril. Somaliland
will not remain the way it is forever if it is left in this
limbo, neither engaged by the international community nor part
of Somalia.
Puntland, their money buys a great number of things,
including at times governments and elders and others who
accommodate pirate action. But we have to avoid the moral
hazard Dr. Murphy spoke about. We also need to realize that
there is no solution to piracy, without some engagement there.
So we need to hold what we have, even if we recognize the
limits of the positive action we can do. Thank you.
Mr. Fortenberry. Well, your answers are very helpful in
terms of pulling back and seeing the larger picture, as to both
the reasons for concern here, whether they manifest themselves
in maritime stability, the potential spread of terrorist
activity into the neighborhood in the Horn of Africa, as well
as things that transcend that, such as humanitarian concerns
for the people.
It seems as though we have some contrarian views here. And
again, not having the benefit of your full testimony earlier, I
appreciate you raising some different perspectives in that
regard.
If we could, before I conclude, let us just go back to one
key point that you raised, Ambassador Shinn, regarding the
spread of al-Shabaab into the surrounding neighborhood, or its
affiliation, potentially, with other groups who could leverage
this--I don't want to quite call it ungoverned space, but the
semblance of governed space, for destabilization purposes,
ideological and destabilization purposes.
Ambassador Shinn. I would be happy to do that. I would
agree with Bronwyn on one part of her comment on this, in that
it is quite true that if you go back to the early 1990s, we
have documentary evidence, that is documents from al-Qaeda that
were collected by the United States Government, and they are
now translated, declassified, and available at West Point.
They do point out that al-Qaeda had a horrible time getting
engaged in Somalia back in 1991/1992. They ran into the same
problem that everyone runs into with Somalis. Somalis are very
individualist; they are very hard to get along with, and it is
very hard to get them to do anything. Al-Qaeda was tearing its
hair out. But at some point along the way, al-Qaeda did make
some recruits, did have some progress in Somalia, and----
Mr. Fortenberry. Ms. Bruton pointed to events in 2006,
specifically citing intensified U.S. engagement as the reason
for that. Do you agree with that?
Ambassador Shinn. Only partially. The next step in all of
this is that you go to 1998, the bombings of the U.S. Embassies
in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, and it turns out that several of
the key al-Qaeda actors had support from Somalia during that
planning period, and they took refuge, three of them, in
Somalia.
All three happen to be dead now. It took a long time to
track them down, but they are now all gone. The point is, that
at some point between the very early 1990s and the late 1990s,
there began to be a stronger connection between Somalia and the
whole terrorist network.
That was before the United States got off on its
counterterrorism preoccupation after 9/11. I think I would
agree with Bronwyn that after 9/11 there was an excessive focus
on counterterrorism, and that did contribute, to some extent,
to the problems that you have in Somalia today.
But the problem was well underway before that, and I don't
think that part of it can be attributed to U.S.
counterterrorism policy at that time.
So moving it all the way up to the present, what you have
is a clear link between al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab, not
operational control of al-Shabaab but a link to it. There has
been training provided. There has been, probably, minimal
funding.
Most of al-Shabaab is funded internally in south and
central Somalia, by taxing and by controlling the port at
Kismayo, where it makes tons of money with all the shipments
going through Kismayo.
But they do get some outside money. They have also clearly
established in the last year or so rather close links with al-
Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula, and this is a very scary
organization; this linkage is of real concern to the United
States.
Mr. Fortenberry. Is that purely ideological? Is that
religious ideology?
Ambassador Shinn. It is hard to know whether it is strictly
ideological, or whether it is a marriage of convenience, to
some extent. There have always been long-term links between
Yemen and Somalia. They go back centuries. So this is nothing
new, that they are visiting each other's countries. The fact
that you now have the two terrorist groups linking up is
different, and that is what is of great concern to the United
States.
I think there is a lot we don't know about this link yet,
because it is a relatively new connection.
Mr. Fortenberry. Could you address the magnitude of this?
Ambassador Shinn. I really can't. I am afraid that I would
be getting into an area that, since I don't have access to
classified information, that I may simply be getting it wrong.
But I do know from the anecdotal information that is out
there, including the announcement just the other day in the
Washington Post and the New York Times of the Somali who has
now been brought to the United States for trial, he was picked
up commuting between Yemen and Somalia, and according to the
press reports he was in contact with AQAP.
This is a clear piece of evidence of it; but that in and of
itself doesn't prove a lot. I have also heard from African
Union personnel that they are greatly concerned about the link
between AQAP and al-Shabaab, and I think it is very worrisome.
So this has gone beyond Somalia. We also have the bombing
by al-Shabaab in Kampala, Uganda, just a year ago this month.
There are links that are now starting to extend beyond the
borders, and this is what should concern the United States.
Mr. Fortenberry. Well, there is a refugee problem in Kenya
now, as well.
Ambassador Shinn. There is that also.
Mr. Fortenberry. One more question. Back to the strength
and the potential for the African Union for stabilization
purposes. Minimal? What is the trajectory here?
Mr. Pham. I think the African Union Forces made--when they
went in there, they went in without a clear strategy other than
a broad mandate to be peacekeepers and to protect this
government.
For most of the last 4 years, until about maybe 9 or 10
months ago, their chief duty was literally the physical
protection of this so-called government that was confined to
the presidential villa and occasional mad dashes to the
airport.
Mr. Fortenberry. But they are concentrated in one place?
Mr. Pham. In one place. Since then, they have made some
expansion, but they don't have enough to hold that. That
presupposes a trained Somali national security force, but those
have largely--eight out of nine have deserted, so that is not
coming.
Secondly, you need a political strategy. That is clearly
absent, whether you give them a year or what. Unless that
develops, that is going to--so we have to rethink the political
goals, because, you know, Clausewitz said, ``War is the
continuation of politics by other means.'' We haven't figured
out what political objectives, achievable ones, we want these
warriors to do. And I think it does them a disservice.
If I could just return, sir, just one moment to the earlier
discussion of al-Shabaab, the anecdotal evidence that
Ambassador Shinn alluded to is there are quite a number of
links going back, and it is both ideological and of
convenience.
Two years ago, we had the suicide bombing which took the
lives of a number of South Korean tourists in the Hadramut. The
fellow who carried out that attack, a Haramuti, we have from
both intelligence and his martyrdom video, he went to Somalia,
was trained there, came back, and carried out his attack.
It goes both ways. Earlier, the Yemeni extremists had
helped rescue al-Shabaab when they were on their last ropes
after the Ethiopian invasion, when the Islamists made the
mistake of engaging the Ethiopian defense forces out in the
open, and were pretty much destroyed.
So there has been a back and forth, it continues. And what
is worrisome is al-Shabaab's reach into the Diaspora community.
Clearly it has that reach, and if it provides that facility, if
you will, to the Yemenis and other al-Qaeda groups, I think we
are in for some serious trouble.
Mr. Fortenberry. Address that issue, though, of motivation.
Is it religious ideology? Some strange nationalism that we are
not able to identify clearly with? Or is it something else? Is
it just convenience?
When you are talking about it spreading to the Diaspora,
then I assume it would have to be based on primarily religious
ideology.
Mr. Pham. Yes. And it is a mixture of religion and
nationalism on the Somali side, but the ideology is clearly
there at the leadership of al-Shabaab. Most of them are
veterans of jihad in South Asia. They have been to Kashmir,
Pakistan, Afghanistan.
Some of the middle commanders are actually foreigners, so
there is----
Mr. Fortenberry. Do you have an idea of the magnitude,
size, of this problem?
Mr. Pham. Well, the size of al-Shabaab shifts, because you
have got the core group, and then you have got militias that--
clan militias that switch allegiances very quickly depending on
circumstance and happenstance.
The number most analysts at least play around with, and it
is only a guess, is probably in the low thousands, maybe up to
five. But at times, they can capture the loyalty of certain
clans or sub-clans, because each sub-clan has its own armed
force, and those can be purchased. And at other times, they can
purchase whole units, even from the Transitional Government's
own forces.
Ambassador Shinn. Congressman Fortenberry, if I might just
add to that, I have done a lot of research on the issue of
particularly the foreign element in al-Shabaab, and the
strength of the organization.
No one knows, other than al-Shabaab, with certainty how
many armed followers it has in the country. The low estimate is
about 4,000. The estimates go up to about 6,000 or 7,000 of
armed persons at any given time in the country.
The more interesting part of the equation, though, is the
number of those who are not local Somalis from inside Somalia
itself. And there is pretty much agreement that in terms of the
true foreigners, that is those who have no Somali ethnic
connection, not from the Somali Diaspora, the number is
probably around 300.
We used to say 200. We think it may have gone up a bit.
Maybe 200 or 300. So not a huge number of true foreigners, that
is, Pakistanis, or folks from the Swahili coast. Actually, most
of them do tend to be from the coast of Kenya and Tanzania, and
other parts of Africa, from India, from Bangladesh, from the
Arab countries. They will constitute that 200 or 300.
Then there is another category of Somalis from outside
Somalia who have a foreign passport, who have lived for either
all or much of their life somewhere outside of Somalia,
including the 30 from the United States that we talked about.
And that number could be as high as 1,000 or so. Again, the
numbers are very, very fuzzy, but it is a fairly significant
number. And that is what we are facing with al-Shabaab.
Primarily, Somalis from Somalia, and then this group of 1,000
or so from the Somali Diaspora, or with some Somali ethnic
link.
And then you have this real hardcore group, which is very
ideological and very committed and ruthless. They are the folks
who come from other jihad battles, or they come from the
Swahili coast of Kenya, but they are not Somalis.
Mr. Fortenberry. Is there complicity with al-Shabaab in the
piracy issue, or is that random criminal activity?
Mr. Murphy. That has been searched for, and continues to be
searched for. The links appear to be certainly not
motivational. Pirates are criminals that are inspired simply by
the need for money. Al-Shabaab, certainly in the core
leadership, is certainly ideologically motivated. I think there
is a penumbra around that that, as Dr. Pham has talked about,
that they are allies of convenience, that they will come and
go, and they are as likely to be motivated by access to money
as anybody else. So the situation is not crystal clear.
There seems to be--clearly some financial transactions have
gone on between the pirates and al-Shabaab. Exactly how much
money is involved is unclear, but they are almost certainly
going to be, really, a version of a shakedown, a version of
extortion.
In the same way that the pirates are paying, if you like, a
fee or taxes to clan leaders or political figures in various
parts of Puntland and the north of the south central region,
al-Shabaab appears to have got in on the act and are squeezing
some of the more southerly pirate groups. So some money is
probably migrating across.
Where exactly that money is going within al-Shabaab is
unclear. Is it staying within some of these peripheral groups,
or is it going into the center? Somebody might know; I
certainly don't. And it is not in the open sources.
Ambassador Shinn. If I might just add, Congressman
Fortenberry, I agree with everything that Dr. Murphy said.
There is a fascinating reporting piece, a rather long piece,
that Reuters did yesterday, that claims to document payments
that al-Shabaab has extracted from various pirate
organizations.
It is about the most thorough, allegedly documented, piece
of reporting that I have seen, and I would be happy to share it
with your staff.
Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you very much.
Ms. Bruton. If I may point out----
Mr. Fortenberry. Yes.
Ms. Bruton [continuing]. It concerns me somewhat that we
are using the word al-Shabaab as if it refers to a cohesive
entity with a single ideology. I think it is very important to
point out that probably 90 percent or more of the members of
al-Shabaab, the people who call themselves al-Shabaab from day
to day or once a week, are motivated by money. So far we think
that the pirate connection is largely motivated by money.
And it is also important to remember that al-Shabaab, in
addition to having a money motive, has a local agenda, which so
far has been shown to vastly supersede any international agenda
that it has.
When we talk about these 30 Americans who have gone from
Minnesota and other parts of the U.S. to fight for al-Shabaab,
the vast majority of them went in 2007, during the Ethiopian
occupation, when there were rampant reports of Ethiopian troops
raping Somali women.
The number of recruits that have gone from the U.S. to join
al-Shabaab since the Ethiopian invasion ended is quite small.
I am also concerned when we talk about potential links with
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Of course it is a worry, but
I think that there is a big difference between being worried
and having actual proof.
In 2006, the United States stated that the Union of Islamic
Courts, which was then in control of Mogadishu, was being run
by members of al-Qaeda. That turned out to be an absolutely
inaccurate claim, but we used it to justify the Ethiopian
invasion, which then triggered all of these migrations from the
U.S. to Somalia. It brought al-Shabaab to power.
Basically, the risks, I think, are much higher here than we
are allowing. I think that the U.S. has had a much more direct
role in stimulating the terrorist threat from Somalia than we
feel comfortable admitting. And in particular, I think that we
should really keep in mind that al-Shabaab has a motive to
associate with al-Qaeda that has nothing to do with ideology
and everything to do with dollar signs.
Mr. Fortenberry. Clearly a complex situation in a place
where governing structures are weak or collapsing, and other
forces, whether that be nationalistic, religiously ideological
motives, and criminal activity are filling the space, with the
potential for exporting of those activities, which should be a
worry, mitigated by some of the concerns that you raise that
might round the edges of the conversation.
So if you all accept that, I think that is as fair a
summary as I can make of what has been said here. But it has
been very helpful to me to hear your testimony on what clearly
is a complex situation.
But to raise awareness of this for the American people
through this hearing, I think, has been an important outcome.
And I appreciate your time and your willingness to testify
here, as well as your background and expertise on these issues.
So with that, if any members of the committee have further
questions, they will submit that to you in writing. And the
committee is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:02 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Material Submitted for the Hearing RecordNotice deg.