[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
MASSACRE AT CAMP ASHRAF:
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 7, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-52
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
----------
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ELTON GALLEGLY, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
RON PAUL, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MIKE PENCE, Indiana RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
CONNIE MACK, Florida GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas DENNIS CARDOZA, California
TED POE, Texas BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
DAVID RIVERA, Florida FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania KAREN BASS, California
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
VACANT
Yleem D.S. Poblete, Staff Director
Richard J. Kessler, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
RON PAUL, Texas DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TED POE, Texas KAREN BASS, California
DAVID RIVERA, Florida
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Michael Mukasey (former Attorney General of the
United States)................................................. 8
Colonel Wes Martin, USA (retired) (former Base Commander of Camp
Ashraf)........................................................ 15
Gary Morsch, M.D. (former Commander of Forward Operation Base
Ashraf)........................................................ 20
Mr. Ray Takeyh, senior fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, Council
on Foreign Relations........................................... 28
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Michael Mukasey: Prepared statement................ 11
Colonel Wes Martin, USA (retired): Prepared statement............ 17
Gary Morsch, M.D.: Prepared statement............................ 22
Mr. Ray Takeyh: Prepared statement............................... 30
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 54
Hearing minutes.................................................. 55
Colonel Wes Martin, USA (retired): Material submitted for the
record......................................................... 56
Gary Morsch, M.D.: Material submitted for the record............. 57
MASSACRE AT CAMP ASHRAF:
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
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THURSDAY, JULY 7, 2011
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:22 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana Rohrabacher
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I call this hearing of the Oversight and
Investigations Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee to order.
I will be having opening remarks. We will then have short
opening remarks from members of the committee, and then we will
go to our panel of witnesses.
I am Congressman Dana Rohrabacher. I welcome you to this
hearing.
As we move from the briefing on the April attack, it should
be noted that Camp Ashraf has for more than 20 years been the
home of 3,400 members of the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), a key
opposition group working against the radical Islamic Iranian
dictatorship. Re that, the 3,400 residents of Camp Ashraf are
declared enemies of the Mullah dictatorship in Iran, which is a
very significant fact to keep in mind when paying attention to
try to figure out what is going on.
Camp Ashraf residents were promised protection under the
Fourth Geneva Convention by senior U.S. commanders in the
aftermath of the liberation of Iraq as we kicked out Saddam
Hussein. Sovereignty was turned over to the Baghdad government
in 2004 and, with it, the transfer of responsibility for Camp
Ashraf.
When our congressional delegation discussed the situation
with Iraq's Prime Minister Maliki in Baghdad last month, his
authority to govern and the sovereignty of the people of Iraq
over their territory was not an issue. We in no way quarreled
with that. How the Iraqi Government exercises its authority,
however, is a matter of grave concern. The use of excessive
force--murder, massacres, and other such tactics is
illegitimate on the face of it.
What happened on April 8 was an excessive use of force. It
was an illegitimate use of power on its face. Using troops and
armored vehicles against unarmed civilians conjures up memories
of Tiananmen Square in Communist China, not the kind of
democratic rule that Americans have fought so long and hard,
that we have dedicated such of our own blood and treasure to
try to create a more democratic society. It certainly isn't
reflected in what happened at Camp Ashraf on April 8.
The wholesale murder of unarmed refugees simply cannot be
ignored.
After the attack, the State Department asserted that the
``crisis and loss of life was initiated by the Government of
Iraq and the Iraqi military.'' But what about before the
attack? Was the U.S. Embassy or the commander of U.S. forces in
Iraq notified of the Iraqi military build-up outside the camp
or of their intentions? Was the Iraqi Government contacted? Did
they contact us? If so, what was the response? What response
did we give them? And what was the Iraqi response if we
questioned them? Why was a United States unit, deployed at Camp
Ashraf, ordered away just hours before the attack?
We would like to ask the State Department these questions.
We would like them to have had a witness here, an official that
could have talked to us about this and been on the record in
answering these important questions. But we were told that no
one was available to testify today at this hearing. How
convenient.
This stonewalling can only go so far before it becomes a
cover-up. And, yes, illegalities not just of the Iraqi military
who murdered civilians, who committed a massacre, but of the
acquiescence by the United States and the United States
officials in this crime are part of the story. Covering up
wrongdoing is itself illegal.
A second issue of concern is whether the Maliki government
acted in concert with the Iranian dictatorship. Prime Minister
Maliki's political party is based on support from the Shiite
community of Iraq; and, of course, the Shiite community of Iraq
has, in some kind, a mutual relationship with the Shiite Mullah
dictatorship in Tehran. Maliki's majority in the Parliament
depends on the political block that is controlled by Mr. Al-
Sadr, an open agent of Tehran and whose Mahdi militia has often
clashed with U.S. forces.
Is the Camp Ashraf massacre a signal of even a larger
problem? Is this something that has resulted in the fact that
we are seeing a willingness on the part of the Government of
Iraq, of Prime Minister Maliki and his majority, to do the
bidding of the Mullah dictatorship next door?
Well, if something like that is happening and this is the
reason why Iraqi military forces felt compelled to go into Camp
Ashraf and massacre its residents, maybe this calls into
question the entire purpose of America's involvement in Iraq to
begin with. Has America spent its blood and treasure only to
allow a government to come to power in Baghdad that is a puppet
of the Iranian Mullah dictatorship?
In 1997, Iran and the State Department persuaded the
Clinton administration to put the MEK on the foreign terrorist
organization list. This naive gesture was supposed to improve
relations, but we know that relations did not improve with
Tehran because Tehran continued to support violence and
terrorism across the region and crush dissidents at home and
develop nuclear weapons.
So certainly putting the people of Camp Ashraf on the
terrorist list certainly didn't do any good, even if it was
dishonest in its intent to begin with. The MEK, however,
remains on the terrorist list, even though it is clear the
Mullahs didn't start coming around and becoming more, how you
say, acceptable in their behavior.
The United Kingdom and the European Union have removed the
MEK from the terrorist list. So we should quit playing games
and also remove the MEK from the terrorist list before it
results in another massacre, which is one thing that needs to
be answered: Did the fact that the United States Government
maintain the MEK on a terrorist list in any way contribute to
the string of decisions that led to the massacre of 34 innocent
people as well as the wounding of hundreds more?
Now we have much to learn today. What really happened on
April 8th? Can we continue to protect Camp Ashraf? What is the
solution? Should the residents be relocated to safe areas
outside of Iraq? What is the solution?
That is an interesting question for us to talk about today
as well. I would be interested in hearing suggestions from the
panel that we are about to hear from.
And one last point before we turn it over to Congressman
Carnahan for his opening statement.
I believe I read in a paper that 34 people were killed just
a day or two ago from bombs that went off in Iraq. And it is
very easy to think that those 34 people--well, people are still
being killed. Why are we concerned about Camp Ashraf when you
have other people being killed in these terrorist attacks?
Well, let me note, it is not equal when a terrorist plants
a bomb and kills innocent people. It is not equal to when a
government, exercising its sovereign authority, decides in a
willful way to massacre people and kill them, even though the
numbers are the same. A government is expected to be
responsible and to act legally and lawfully. A terrorist group,
you will expect them to be the dregs of society and of the
Earth.
Let us hope that the Maliki government understands that
there is a difference between terrorist activities which are
unacceptable and the activities of this government which are
totally inconsistent with law and civilization. So for
government troops to be openly killing people, as we just saw,
is unacceptable anywhere in the civilized world, and that is a
lot different than a terrorist attack. So we have a moral
obligation today as people to call people to task and to find
out exactly what happened.
Mr. Carnahan, do you have an opening statement?
Mr. Carnahan. Yes, I do; and I want to thank you, Mr.
Chairman, for this hearing today and for shining a bright light
on this issue, also for leading our delegation recently to Iraq
to meet with Prime Minister Maliki and officials there as well
as our own U.S. Government officials to really help get to the
bottom of this issue. Thank you.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much.
I would ask Congressman Poe to take over the chair. I have
been called to the floor. I have an amendment on the floor that
I have to take care of. I will be returning very shortly as
soon as we do business.
Mr. Poe, could you take over the chair? And I am sure you
have an opening statement as well.
Mr. Carnahan. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman; and I also
want to recognize my colleague, Mr. Poe from Texas, who is also
in our delegation, for his commitment on this issue as well.
In light of recent events, our trip to Iraq and the
scheduled departure of U.S. military this December, this
hearing is especially timely for us to assess not only the
humanitarian situation at Camp Ashraf but also to consider the
broader issues of U.S.-Iraq policy.
I would also like to note that several Missourians are here
today, including Mrs. Azam Shahriary--we are happy to have you
here--whose son is currently at Camp Ashraf. I want to thank
you all for being here and for your insight on these issues.
The history of MEK and Camp Ashraf is one that dates back
several decades. During our trip to Iraq last month, we met
with numerous people regarding the slaughter at Camp Ashraf on
April 8. Not surprisingly, we heard a lot of different and
conflicting stories. What is not in dispute is that over 30
Camp Ashraf residents were killed, over 300 wounded by Iraqi
security forces.
These killings have been widely condemned, and I concur. In
the week following the killings, the U.N. High Commissioner for
Human Rights called for ``a full, independent, and transparent
inquiry'' and further added ``any person found responsible for
the use of excessive force should be prosecuted.'' Again, I
concur. A full, fair, and independent investigation will
provide for the best means of finding a final determination of
what happened and will allow anyone found responsible to be
brought to justice and help prevent future attacks. I look
forward to hearing the insights of the witnesses here today
regarding the human rights abuses but also how we protect from
future abuses.
In 2003, the residents of Camp Ashraf had protected status
under the Geneva Convention; and pursuant to the statuses of
forces agreement between the U.S. and Iraqi Governments,
jurisdiction of the camp has been under Iraqi jurisdiction
since 2009. With the draw-down of U.S. forces in Iraq, I
believe that the U.N. or another independent body be given
access to the camp to assess the humanitarian situation there.
I would also like to have the panel address the issues with
regard to relocation of the residents. Is that an option or is
it not? And also to look at the broader implications to U.S.
policy as we shift from military to a State Department-led
effort, focusing on diplomacy and development.
With that, I am going to submit the balance of my opening
for the record so we can shift our time for the witnesses.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Poe [presiding]. I appreciate the ranking member's
comments.
Likewise, I was with Chairman Rohrabacher and the ranking
member on our trip to Iraq on June 11. We did visit with
Maliki, discussed many issues with him, and one of those issues
was we wanted to go to Camp Ashraf and get the residents' side
of what happened to them and the camp in April.
After almost 2 hours of talking and a lot of talk--as the
statement has sometimes been said, when all is said and done,
more is said than done--we were not allowed to go to Camp
Ashraf. He was adamant about that, and we respected his
decision since he was in charge of the nation.
But my question then and now is still the same: Why not?
What did Maliki have to hide? If he was right about his
position--and he articulated his position I thought quite
well--why couldn't he be open-minded enough to let us get the
viewpoint from the residents that live in Camp Ashraf? And he
denied us that access to those people. So, it seems to me, he
had plenty to hide, is the reason we weren't allowed to go to
Camp Ashraf and hear from the residents.
When the Iraqi soldiers stormed Camp Ashraf on April 8,
fired at the residents, and ran them over with American
Humvees, 36 were killed, including women and children. It was a
human rights atrocity. And the U.S., with thousands of troops
still fighting for peace in Iraq, has done little more than
issue just a statement, has not conducted its own
investigation, hasn't asked the U.N. to investigate, and there
is no point in the Iraqi Government investigating the attack
because they are the ones who ordered the attack. They
certainly are going to find no fault with the action of their
own military.
A week after the attack, a letter with 18 Members of the
House to Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates asked them to
shed some light on this violent attack. It is now July. To
date, there is blissful silence from the administration and
have given us no answer for this inhumane attack of Iraq on the
people of Iraq. I guess they are too busy bombing Libya in the
name of humanity to get back with us.
Instead, the administration has proposed a new relocation
plan for the camp. They want to move the camp to some other
location within Iraq. This is the same plan the Iranians
themselves proposed years ago.
We have heard how dangerous this would be to the residents
of the camp. In May, I sent a letter to Secretary Clinton
opposing this misguided plan. Camp Ashraf is recognized around
the world as a refuge for those who oppose the Iranian regime;
and if we move it within Iraq, they will lose that public
recognition, while leaving residents under the same control of
the army.
There is something directly under our control that we can
do, and that is we can take the MEK off the foreign terrorist
organization list. One of the obstacles in moving Camp Ashraf
to a peaceful third country is that they are still designated
as terrorists by the United States.
I have introduced bipartisan legislation, H.Res. 60, that
urges the Secretary of State to take the MEK off the foreign
terrorist organization list. I have seen and been in all the
classified briefings that I know of regarding the MEK, and I am
not convinced that they should remain on the list.
The State Department has not made their case to keep them
on the list. Therefore, they should be removed. The MEK should
not be used as a political tool to appease any dictators in the
world. Eighty-three of my colleagues agree with me.
As a Nation, we promised to protect these Iranian
individuals. No matter what we think of the MEK, we should all
agree that no group, especially one that has given up terrorism
and given up all of its weapons, deserves to have its human
rights trampled on by Iraq or Iran or anyone else.
We have given Iraq a democracy and freedom. It is time they
start acting like they deserve it and provide safety for Camp
Ashraf residents and the MEK.
And I will yield to the gentleman, Mr. Filner, for his
opening statement.
Mr. Filner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like a unanimous consent agreement that I be
allowed to officially sit here as a member of the committee.
Mr. Poe. Without objection.
Mr. Filner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate your courage and activism on this issue, also.
I was reading the testimony, Mr. Chairman, of our panelists
in advance, just to be prepared. I noticed one of the panelists
spends his whole time discrediting or trying to discredit the
MEK, almost as if to justify the massacre that occurred at Camp
Ashraf. I wish he had spent as much time undermining the regime
of Iran. We would be better off.
I don't know about you, Mr. Chairman, but I have tried to
look at the resistance going on inside Iran--and the MEK, and
its leader, has come up with, it seems to me, the one
legitimate policy that is best for us as Americans. They call
it the ``third way.'' That means we do not invade Iran, but we
do not appease the existing Mullahs. We get out of the way and
let the internal resistance do what it can and should and wants
to. The listing of the MEK as a terrorist organization is
getting in the way. So we ought to delist. And there are lots
of reasons, as you pointed out, why we should.
I was recently at a rally in Paris and Judge Mukasey was
there--where the first Homeland Security secretary
unequivocally said that the MEK is not a terrorist
organization. Nothing crossed his desk as the Secretary of
Homeland Security that indicated that in the years that he was
in that position. So I think we ought to look seriously at
this. And, besides, it is not even an issue. It should be for
us whether, whatever the ideology is--and we can talk about
that. There was a massacre. We should have prevented it. We
have a legal obligation to have prevented it. We should have
done it. We should do it in the future. I can't worry about
ideology when there are human rights violations going on,
although I think it is a, if I may say, a red herring.
So I appreciate your efforts, Mr. Rohrabacher's efforts,
Mr. Carnahan's efforts to make America more aware of this. This
is going to hit us, Mr. Poe--I think you know--as the American
pullout occurs of Iraq, after all our treasure of money and men
and women who have died and been injured there, do we want the
Iranians to take over? And yet that is a potential. Ashraf is a
symbol of what I think we need to prevent. After all this
intervention in Iraq in the decade, the Iranians come in. The
MEK favors a nonnuclear, democratic, secular regime. I think
that is something we can all agree to. I look forward to the
testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Poe.
Mr. Poe. Does the gentlelady from Texas have a brief
opening statement?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you for your courtesy.
Let me acknowledge the witnesses, and I get a special
opportunity to acknowledge General Mukasey. We were together
before, and I didn't have the opportunity to do so.
I do want to acknowledge as well, Mr. Chairman, receiving a
letter to my letter that I had written regarding the
involvement of the United States in this effort to resolve this
terrible crisis, and I do think it should be acknowledged. And
that is a letter from Joseph McManus, who wrote on behalf of
the State Department of the United States interests.
So let me just say that nowhere should we tolerate the
heinousness of the attack on the residents of Camp Ashraf; and
no matter how deep the friendship is or the recovering history
of Iraq, it should not be tolerated. And, as well, we should
not allow Iran to dominate and to violently infuse into the
response to Camp Ashraf actions that they would carry out
themselves. And if the actions were carried out by the military
in Iraq, they are as culpable as those who have either
instructed or created the atmosphere.
So I hope, as we find a solution, that it will be a
solution where we demand of the head of Government of Iraq to
cease and desist and to collaborate and cooperate a safe
passage for those in the camp, medical care. And the extreme
violation of human rights, civil rights should be completely
denounced.
But, more importantly, the world organizations, including
the United Nations, should immediately denounce this behavior;
and Iraq should pay a penalty in the world forum for the
treatment not only of those in Camp Ashraf but the many
citizens of their own who are in diverse backgrounds.
So I thank you for holding this hearing, Mr. Chairman. It
is frustrating to come back time after time with continuous
violence and no response by Iraq.
And I hope if the Ambassador of Iraq--I don't see that
person as a witness on this august body--but if the Ambassador
of Iraq can hear my voice, he needs to come to Congress. He
owes this Congress an apology. He owes this country an
explanation as to why he is, in essence, violating the civil
rights of a minority group in his country when we fought and
shed blood so that Iraqis might live free. He owes both an
apology to the people in Camp Ashraf, to the people of Iraq who
will suffer as well because they are diverse, and he owes an
apology and explanation to the world family and particularly
the United States of America for the treasure that we lost,
attempting to provide democracy there.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Poe. I will introduce the panel members.
I do want to introduce and recognize the numerous families
of residents who are in Camp Ashraf who are here. There are a
lot from my home State of Texas. I am glad to have those
individuals here.
Michael Mukasey served as Attorney General of the United
States from 2007 to 2009. Prior to joining the George Bush
administration, he had served for 18 years as a Federal judge.
He was appointed to the U.S. District Court by Ronald Reagan in
1988, served there until 2006, and is a graduate of Columbia
University and Yale Law School. He worked as an Assistant
United States Attorney in New York from 1972 through 1996,
serving as chief of the district's official corruption unit
from '75 through '76.
Judge, we welcome you today.
Retired Army Colonel Wes Martin is our second panelist. He
retired from active duty in 2010. In combat, he served as the
senior antiterrorism force protection officer for all coalition
forces in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom I and II, as J-3
operations officer for Task Force 134, which was detention
operations, and as commander of Forward Operation Base Ashraf.
He then served three tours in the Pentagon. He holds two
master's degrees and is currently a member of the technical
staff at the Department of Energy Sandia National Laboratories.
Our third panelist is Dr. Gary Morsch. He is the founder
and president of Heart to Heart International, a global
humanitarian organization. Dr. Morsch continues to practice
family and emergency medicine and does it through Docs Who
Care, a medical staffing company he founded. Dr. Morsch is a
member of Army Reserve with the rank of colonel and has been
deployed to Kosovo and to Germany as well as to Iraq where he
ran a hospital at Camp Ashraf.
Dr. Ray Takeyh is a Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern
Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, adjunct professor
for the Center for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown
University. He has a Ph.D. From Oxford University and has
served as special advisor for the Gulf and Southwest Asia at
the U.S. Department of State. He is also the author of the
Guardians of the Revolution, Iran's approach to the world,
which was published in 2009 by Oxford University Press.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today.
Judge Mukasey, we will hear from you first. There is a 5-
minute time limit on each of your comments. So if you want to
go longer than that, you can submit it to the record.
So, first, Judge Mukasey.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MICHAEL MUKASEY (FORMER ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES)
Mr. Mukasey. Thank you.
I want to thank the chairman, Ranking Member Carnahan,
Judge Poe, Representative Filner, and Representative Jackson
Lee for allowing me to testify at this important hearing on the
events in Camp Ashraf in April of this year that involved the
murder of some 36 innocents by Iraqi forces using weapons and
vehicles that were actually supplied to them by the United
States.
I have submitted seven pages of written testimony, making
several recommendations of what I would hope this committee
would do and could do to try to determine how this massacre
came to be and what can be done to prevent conditions at Ashraf
from deteriorating even further, and I thank the subcommittee
for making those a part of the record. But I know that the
chair of this committee and others have had direct experience
with the Iraqi Government insofar as Ashraf is concerned and
know a great deal more about that subject than I do. So I want
to focus my oral testimony today on what the United States has
done in the past, some of which has helped but some of which
has hurt, and what it can do in the future to prevent people
from being murdered.
Because, make no mistake about it, what we are talking
about here literally is a matter of life and death. Back in
2003 when the multinational force went into Iraq, the residents
of Ashraf surrendered the weapons they could have used to
defend themselves and put themselves in the hands of the
multinational force and principally the hands of American
forces. They received a written guarantee from an American
general that I attached to my written testimony that they would
be treated as protected persons under the Fourth Geneva
Convention.
In 2009, General Petraeus signed off on the Iraqi
Government's assumption of control over the entirety of the
country, including the vicinity of Ashraf, only after he got
written and oral assurances that the people living in Ashraf
would be protected by Iraqi forces. And, as we know, those
assurances have been violated repeatedly, with the results that
we have seen here today.
I should mention that at both times, both in July 2009 and
in April 2011, when these attacks took place, our Secretary of
Defense was in country. It would be hard to imagine a more
calculated slap at this country than that.
And when you think about the terrible price that we have
paid to liberate Iraq, the lengths to which we have gone to
oppose the Iranian Government, when you think of the opposition
to the Iranian Government in the Gulf and elsewhere and the
strategic defeat that Iran suffered when it overreached in
Bahrain, you wonder what has made Iran and Iraq so bold as to
act in this way.
Well, I would suggest to you that what enables them and
what emboldens them is, as the chairman suggested, that the
United States and particularly the State Department has kept
the MEK on a list of foreign terrorist organizations, something
the European Union and the U.K. have long since stopped doing,
and thereby legitimized the behavior of both Iraq and Iran.
The State Department seems infected with the idea that it
must not do anything that might displease the Iranians, even
when doing so in fact would give the United States more
leverage against the Iranians, not less. So we have the
spectacle last week of the United States diplomat, our
Ambassador to Iraq, saying in one breath that Iran is, in fact,
sending IEDs into Iraq that are used to kill Americans but
saying in the next breath that MEK members should agree to
disband in order to facilitate the resettlement of the
residents of Ashraf. In other words, he is saying that a
principled, organized group that defines itself in large
measure by opposition to the tyrannical regime in Iran should
cease to be a group and should give up its identity in the
ridiculous hope that when the Iranians and the Iraqis can pick
them off one at a time that they will somehow be safer and not
less safe when that happens.
The MEK, as many of you know, went to court to get this
unjustified designation removed. The DC Circuit Court of
Appeals told the State Department that they had not presented
evidence that MEK has committed violence in the last 10 years
or has the ability or the inclination to do so now, and it
directed the State Department in September 2010 to review and
to reconsider that designation. That was almost a year ago, and
all the State Department has done in that time is to come
forward with documents that do not deal with any issue relevant
to the designation and to ask MEK questions which it has
answered that are not relevant to the designation.
It is long since time for the State Department to stop this
policy of delay which simply emboldens murderers. I urge the
committee to hold a hearing at which the State Department is
required to justify its policy or to change it and at which
this committee inquires also into what our Government is doing
to enforce the Leahy amendment that bars both military and
civilian aid from this country to military units like the Iraqi
units that murdered Ashraf residents. If you ask tough
questions, perhaps we will get answers that we and the
residents of Ashraf can live with.
I thank you very much for your attention and for hearing
me.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mukasey follows:]
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Mr. Poe. Thank you Judge Mukasey.
Colonel Martin.
STATEMENT OF COLONEL WES MARTIN, USA (RETIRED) (FORMER BASE
COMMANDER OF CAMP ASHRAF)
Colonel Martin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, ranking member,
for this opportunity to speak before the committee.
Mr. Chairman, I would also like to introduce the Courting
Disaster. It is the rebuttal to the RAND report on the MEK,
sir.
Mr. Poe. Without objection.
Colonel Martin. Thank you, sir.
As the first antiterrorism officer for all of Iraq, the
operations officer for Task Force 134, detention operations,
and the base commander for Ashraf----
Mr. Filner. Colonel, can you just speak more directly into
the mic?
Mr. Poe. And talk a little slower, if you would. Some of us
are from the South. We talk slower.
Colonel Martin. Hopefully, I will make, for the ranking
member, my northeast Missouri State education put to good use.
As the antiterrorism force protection officer for all of
Iraq and as the J-3 for detention operations and the base
commander of Camp Ashraf, I would like to make one point up
front. The MEK is not a terrorist organization.
In 2003, as the United States finalized its invasion plans,
the Iranian Government set to work how to quietly take over as
much of Iraq as possible. Today, the Iranian influence expanded
itself over the southern provinces throughout Baghdad and into
Diyala province where Camp Ashraf and the MEK is now located.
Iran's growing influence in the region is in keeping with
Ayatollah Khomeini's statement: The road to Jerusalem is
through Karbala. As the Maliki and Ahmadinijad governments grow
closer, the situation of the MEK becomes more critical, as
evidenced in the filmed footage of July 2009 and April 2011. In
these videos, we observe Maliki's forces using U.S.-supplied
vehicles and equipment to run down and shoot defenseless
people. We witnessed the courage of the residents of Ashraf.
Despite knowing they may be the next to die, they rush to the
rescue of their fallen comrades. Courage under fire is a
remarkable trait. Killing unarmed people is murder. Yet the
U.S. State Department has done nothing of substance to address
these attacks or the entire Ashraf situation.
As for the State Department, the action officer provided to
handle Camp Ashraf issues during my tenure was a never-ending
story of embarrassment and prejudice. Her visits were
disastrous. Her continual rumors and misinformation resulted in
my frequent unannounced and unfounded inspections into MEK
compounds. Despite warnings to all of us from the commanding
general of Task Force 134 not to provide the untrustworthy
Iraqi National Security Advisor Rubaie information, she
continued to do so. In turn Rubaie would pass it on to the
Iranian Government. Within a couple of weeks I would then
receive the information from the MEK. Upon my return to the
Pentagon I assisted State Department officials addressing the
MEK issue. This included providing a translated letter from Mr.
Zebari, head of the Kurdistan Democrat Party International
Relations, stating MEK did not attack the Kurds. Mr. Zebari
subsequently confirmed the letter to be true, yet several
months later when the annual report on terrorism was released
by the State Department the accusation for attacking the Kurds
remained. Upon my questioning the same State Department
officials about this, I was informed they don't communicate
with people who put out the annual report.
One perpetual rumor worthy of specific address concerns
members of the MEK being held against their will. I was able to
validate through specific occurrences anyone wishing to leave
has that choice.
The real benefactor of the fall of the Mujahedin will be
Ahmadinejad and the ruling religious fundamentalists. The
fundamentalists of the Iranian Government has always wanted the
MEK to be turned over to them. If it happens, executions will
be conducted to remind Iranian citizens of what happens to
people who oppose the government to break the spirit of anyone
considering resistance and to show the world what happens to
those who trust their lives to the United States.
The MEK surrendered to the United States military without
firing a shot, turned over all their weapons, accepted
consolidation at Camp Ashraf, renounced terrorism, accepted
protected person status under the 4th Geneva Convention,
provided the free world with crucial intelligence to include
Iran's development of a nuclear weapons program and fulfilled
every limitation and requirement placed on them. Yet when the
United States could no longer figure out what do with the MEK,
the protected person status was revoked and the organization
was turned over to the Iraqi Government. There are protocols
and expectations to surrender. The MEK has fulfilled their end,
the United States comes up very short. The price of that is now
being paid by the residents of Camp Ashraf.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Colonel Martin follows:]
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Mr. Poe. Thank you. Dr. Gary Morsch, 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF GARY MORSCH, M.D. (FORMER COMMANDER OF FORWARD
OPERATION BASE ASHRAF)
Dr. Morsch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and ranking member and
members of the subcommittee. Mr. Chairman, before I begin my--
--
Mr. Poe. Is your microphone on?
Dr. Morsch. Yes, it is on now. Thank you for this
opportunity, Mr. Chairman.
Before I begin my remarks with your permission I would like
to submit for the record a letter from General James Gardner,
Commanding General of MMNF-I to MEK Secretary General, dated
February 16th, 2006.
Mr. Poe. Without objection, it will be part of the record.
Dr. Morsch. I would like to also submit a statement by the
U.S. Central Commander on the full disarmament of the MEK. This
statement was released in 2003.
Mr. Poe. Without objection, it will also be part of the
record.
Dr. Morsch. Lastly, I would like to provide the written
submission of Mr. Stephen Schneebaum, an international human
rights law scholar, who has written on the rights of the
residents of Ashraf and attached to this written submission are
two legal opinions which he has also prepared on the subject.
Mr. Poe. Without objection, it is admitted.
Dr. Morsch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have submitted a fairly extensive prepared statement that
outlines my observations. These observations are based on my
direct role as the lead physician assigned to Camp Ashraf in
early 2004 where I lived and worked with the residents of
Ashraf on a 24/7 basis.
I arrived in Iraq knowing nothing about the MEK and left
Ashraf with a great knowledge and insight into the
organization, as great a knowledge or insight I believe as any
other American or more so. Let me just say I know the MEK.
Based on my observations I would like to express three
simple conclusions, which I believe are indisputable. Number
one, the MEK and Ashraf are not terrorists. In fact they are
allies, friends and collaborators in our mission in Iraq and
the Middle East. During my time in Ashraf they provided
intelligence and recon so that our convoys knew where IEDs had
been placed and could then avoid them. Even more importantly,
the MEK worked with local and regional populations to advocate
for their cooperation with the American mission.
The MEK even organized town hall like meetings with area
sheikhs, participating in roundtable discussions about
democracy in Iraq. Does this sound like the activities of a
terrorist organization? If so, I guess we could use a few more
friendly terrorist organizations like this group. Of course
they are not terrorists. The European Union does not consider
them terrorists, the French don't, the United Kingdom don't.
The U.S. is the only significant country that keeps them on the
terrorist list. This must change and change immediately.
Number two, when our military forces entered Iraq in 2003
meetings were held between the MEK and U.S. Officials. The MEK
agreed to give up all their weapons, and arms, and to fully
cooperate with and support the mission and goals of the U.S. In
return for their giving up their weapons of self defense, the
U.S. promised to protect them. In fact, following an extensive
investigation into all aspects of the MEK, including lengthy
interviews of every resident of Ashraf, each resident of Ashraf
was given a signed document guaranteeing their safety as
protected persons under the 4th Geneva Convention, with the
United States promising to ensure that protection.
Ladies and gentlemen, the people of Ashraf have more than
upheld their side of this agreement. We have not. U.S. forces
have stood by, sometimes literally filming the assaults as they
were happening without intervening. To date 47 members of
Ashraf have been killed along with hundreds more wounded. Today
the City of Ashraf is a city under siege, and unless something
is done quickly and dramatically Ashraf will fall and thousands
more will be killed in a great genocide.
Number three, finally I have a specific recommendation on
what the U.S. should do to keep its word and carry out the
terms of the agreement that we made. Someone must take the
responsibility for protecting Ashraf and must take this
responsibility away from the Iraqis. Under the obvious
influence of Iran, Iran and Iraq intend to exterminate the MEK.
The status quo is not acceptable. We must intervene.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Morsch follows:]
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Mr. Poe. Thank you very much. Dr. Takeyh.
STATEMENT OF MR. RAY TAKEYH, SENIOR FELLOW FOR MIDDLE EASTERN
STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
Mr. Takeyh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me. It is
a privilege to be here with my copanelists. I have submitted
testimony for the record. I will just highlight certain aspects
of it.
Mujahedin-e-Khalq, the MEK, was founded in early 1960s in
Iran at a time of proliferation of various opposition groups
again the Shah. It distinguished itself by the discursive
nature of ideology that sought to mix a number of incompatible
dogmas. From Shia Islam they appropriated symbols of martyrdom,
from Marxism the notion of historic development of stages, from
Lenin they embraced the importance of a vanguard party
committed to mobilization of masses, and from Third World
revolutionaries they took the primacy of gorilla warfare and
violence as indispensable agents of political change.
The core of MEK ideology historically has always been anti-
imperialism, which has often been defined as opposition to
United States interests. They oppose the Shah's regime partly
because of this close association with the United States. It is
this impulse that propelled MEK in the 1970s toward embracing
an entire spectrum of anti-American forces ranging from the
Vietcong to PLO.
Given this mission of liberating the working class and
expunging the influence of predatory capitalism, the United
States has traditionally been identified as a source of
exploitation and abuse in MEK literature. Violence has been the
hallmark of MEK's strategy for assuming power. Through much of
its past the party exalted violence as a historic expression of
dissent.
One of the central precepts of the party is that a
dedicated vanguard challenging the authority of the state can
spark a mass revolution by bravely confronting that state. Once
the masses observe that the state is vulnerable to violence
then they will shed their inhibition and join the protest for
sparking the revolution. Thus, the most suitable means of
effecting political change has always been to some extent
including violence.
Although MEK victims have been mostly Iranians, there have
been Americans and American installations also victims of MEK
violence. In the early seventies the MEK Communique Number 3
stressed that violence against the United States was
permissible given America's suppression of legitimate
revolutionary movements such as those in Palestine. The first
such attack came in May 1972 on the occasion of President
Richard Nixon's visit to Iran. To derail that visit, MEK bombed
a U.S. Information Office and targeted an American company such
as General Motors and Pan American Airways. That same year the
party attempted to assassinate General Harold Price, the Chief
of U.S. Military Mission in Iran. Although General Price
escaped his assassins, the MEK did tragically succeed in
murdering Colonel Lewis Hawkins, the Deputy Chief of Mission,
outside his home.
It must be stressed that thought the 1970s, the MEK did
have support within Iran, particularly among the intelligentsia
and the working class. This message of resistance and this
record of resisting the Shah did attract substantial support.
The turning point for MEK's internal fortunes in Iran seems
to have been 1981, when the Islamic regime engaged in one the
most brutal acts of repression, executing vast numbers of
opposition members, including many MEK cadre. It is at that
time that the organization's political infrastructure in Iran
was largely subdued. However, a decision made by MEK personnel
also ensured that the party would not reclaim its place of
influence in Iran.
As MEK went into exile its willingness to side with
Saddam's Iraq against Iran in the Iran-Iraq war disturbed its
already diminished cadre.
During their 1983 meeting between Mr. Rajavi and Tariq
Aziz, an alliance was forged. The MEK personnel fought along
side of the Iraqis and were used in some of the most daring
missions of the war. Given the highly nationalistic nature of
the Iranian population, such act was viewed as a betrayal of
homeland and not necessarily a legitimate act of opposition
against an abhorrent regime.
The MEK would go on to assist Saddam's regime, they were
employed by him in the repression of the Sunni uprising--Shia
uprising, I'm sorry, in 1991. Given that the Shia community is
having a leading role in Iraq, that is indeed a disturbing
legacy.
The question then becomes what to do with MEK members in
Camp Ashraf. It would be wrong, it would be immoral to
forcefully repatriate inhabitants of the camp back to Iran.
Given that the Islamic Republic lacks even the basic rudiments
of impartial justice, they are likely to be met with certain
death.
Nonetheless, the international community under the auspices
of United Nations Refugee Committee has an obligation to the
members of the MEK currently at Camp Ashraf to ensure their
safety and their security. The MEK cadre cannot be repatriated
back to Iran, they cannot be returned to Iran, and they seem to
have a difficulty staying in Iraq. It becomes a question for
the international community and the United Nations to find a
safe haven for the remaining members of the MEK currently in
Camp Ashraf.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Takeyh follows:]
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Mr. Rohrabacher [presiding]. Thank you very much. This
happens when you are a Member of Congress and you may be
preparing for something for weeks and weeks and it happens at
the exact same time you have something on the floor, a bill on
the floor, that is your amendment on the floor, it happens to
come together at exactly the same time. I think that that is
God's way of just teaching us not to take everything for
granted and to be grateful for the time when we do have
together here.
I am going to actually ask Mr. Filner, he was not a member
of this committee, if he would like to have a few minutes of
questions as I organize my thoughts. Mr. Filner has been very
active and involved in this issue. Then I will turn to Mr.
Rivera.
Mr. Filner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And again thank you
for your incredible personal interventions in these things. It
really makes a difference in the world.
What struck me from the testimony is those who have had
such personal contact with Ashraf based on their own
information, their own investigations, their own witnessing,
their own talking to the people have come to the conclusion
that we do not have a terrorist organization. I don't see any
of us worried about all of these folks here, by the way, these
violent people that are about to overthrow us, to have come to
a conclusion that these are our allies. So I thank you for
having the courage to do that.
I was struck by, as I said earlier, by Dr. Takeyh's--is
that the right pronunciation, sir, Takeyh?
Mr. Takeyh. Yes.
Mr. Filner. Testimony. Do you think there should have been
a massacre given the horrible ideology of the MEK?
Mr. Takeyh. No.
Mr. Filner. Because you don't say that anywhere.
Mr. Takeyh. I said report of violence of Ashraf members.
Mr. Filner. The last so-called terrorist thing you
indicated in your written statement is 1972. Let's say that is
39 years ago, I don't see anything since then that would
substantiate your claim of a terrorist organization. By the
way, have you ever met this cult leader that you talk about
here?
Mr. Takeyh. No.
Mr. Filner. I have on several occasions.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I noticed that stare in your eyes after.
Mr. Filner. I know, I have been brainwashed. I have met a
lot of world leaders, I will tell you, I have not met someone I
can say is as intelligent, as humorous, as humane, as concerned
with other people around her and as humble as Ms. Rajavi. I
mean, I just don't understand.
In fact, when I last met with her it was raining in Paris
and I said to her, ``You are a cult leader, can't you stop this
rain here?'' She proceeded then to tell me that as the most
powerful Member of Congress, I should be able to stop the rain.
But clearly I never saw a cult leader act like that, by the
way. She is a political leader, a very humane and humble
person, a very intelligent person that obviously has the
support. I don't know what group could have gathered 100,000
people in one place to hear a former Attorney General speak to
them, a former Secretary of Homeland Security, former Chief of
Staff of President Bush, a couple of Congress Members.
It strikes me that if our view of the world is that Iran is
one of the most troubling, to say the least, actors on the
planet and they are heading toward an atomic bomb and they are
heading toward maybe a takeover of Iraq, at least in political
terms, we should be doing everything we can to stop that,
barring the use right now of American forces. Yet you want to
discredit one of resistance groups. You say how unimportant
they are. Well, if they are so unimportant, why worry about
them?
We should be helping everybody, seems to me. The MEK has
shown with its leadership and very structured program for the
United States it is in our interest, it seems to me, to adopt
that program and with its ability to organize vast
demonstrations, and I think these gentleman here would concur
that they gave us very important intelligence on the Iranian
nuclear capabilities and progress. It seems to me, I mean I
don't care what religion they are, what ideology they have,
they could even be Republicans as far as I am concerned, these
are our friends, these are our friends and we should----
Mr. Poe. Some of them are Republicans.
Mr. Filner. We should be getting out of their way and
delist them and just let them do what they can. If they are so
unimportant and so lacking of support so that will be proved in
history, but why are we helping the Iranian regime by not
helping the MEK? And that is just the way it is.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, thank you very much.
Mr. Filner. Dr. Takeyh, I don't know if you want to
respond.
Mr. Rohrabacher. We are going to give you time to answer
that.
Mr. Filner. Before you throw your credentials, I am a Ph.D.
Also.
Mr. Takeyh. That disqualifies us both. I do think we should
assist the opposition movements within Iran in order to deal
with the regime whose characterizations I don't dispute. There
is an opposition movement against Iran. It is called the Green
Movement. It features dissident clerks, it features liberal
elements, it features intelligentsia, it features middle class
elements, and the groups that you are supporting, Congressman,
has limited if not any support in Iran. That is just a fact.
Mr. Filner. So what----
Mr. Takeyh. And it has----
Mr. Filner. I don't agree, but even if you are right, so
what? What does that mean we shouldn't help them because they
have zero? So they will be proved and if there is an overthrow
of the Mullahs we will see who comes out as the thing, so what?
Mr. Takeyh. I think we share concern of Iranian human
rights.
Mr. Filner. I am not asking for millions of dollars, I am
just saying delist them.
Mr. Takeyh. You can have a hearing on a delisting. What I
can say to you is this is an organization with a very
discursive ideology, and with very peculiarities and also
violence.
Mr. Filner. So what?
Mr. Rohrabacher. I would suggest that we let the witness
answer the question.
Mr. Filner. So irrelevant.
Mr. Takeyh. I think the Congressman and I just simply
disagree on this.
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. Well, thank you very much. As I
get my notes together let us turn to Judge Poe and we will make
sure.
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to follow up on
Mr. Filner's comments about Iran. They are the problem, Iran is
the problem, they are the world's problem. And we got a group
of Iranian citizens that are in Camp Ashraf that the Iranian
Government does not like, wants them to go away, disappear from
the Earth if they had their way. Why is that? Probably because
they oppose the regime in Iran. And I actually agree with you,
Mr. Filner, that we should encourage groups that oppose the
Iranian regime because the best hope for the world is a
peaceful regime change in Iran and the Iranians have to do it,
wherever they are in the world. So I just don't know why our
State Department is so hardheaded about delisting them from the
MEK but they are.
So we need to intervene and get them off the MEK list.
Dr. Mukasey, or Judge Mukasey, which I prefer to call you
that if that is okay.
Mr. Filner. He likes General.
Mr. Poe. Judge Mukasey, the camp if it is moved somewhere
else in Iraq, what do you think will happen to the residents?
Mr. Mukasey. That can't possibly--nothing good is the short
answer. It is not in any way a threat to Iran where it is.
Certainly nobody from the camp has lobbed anything into Iran
nor have any of the incursions against the camp from come from
Iran. They have come from Iraq. So moving them within Iraq
isn't going to solve any problems. The only thing it will do is
take them out of sight and thereby allow the Iraqi Government
at the behest of the Iranians to finish them off. That would be
a disaster.
Mr. Poe. What is the relationship right now with Maliki and
Ahmadinejad?
Mr. Mukasey. It appears to be a close relationship. The
Iranians call the shots and Maliki acts in accordance with what
serves their interest.
Mr. Poe. Colonel, let me ask you this question since you
were there. Are there MEK terrorists today?
Colonel Martin. The MEK are not terrorists today. And if I
may continue, sir, in May 1972 the MEK leadership was rolled up
and Rajavi and many others ended up in prison just prior to
that, and then there was a split within the MEK to a Communist
Mujahedin Marxist regime and what we see now is the MEK and it
stayed that way.
The killings of Colonel Schaeffer, Colonel Turner and
Lieutenant Colonel Hawkins were accomplished in June and July
1975, and the Shah's own police interrogated the killers, and
they said they were part of the Marxist MEK.
When Rajavi was released from prison, he was able to bring
the MEK back together outside of the prisons, and that is the
organization you see today. It is not the MEK that was doing
those executions. They are not terrorists today, and whatever
activities they did in the past, if we were to hold that
against them, then we should have had nothing to do with
Menachem Begin or Anwar Sadat.
Mr. Poe. The United States is getting ready to leave Iraq.
So what happens when we leave?
Colonel Martin. When we leave?
Mr. Poe. To the camp.
Colonel Martin. When we leave, the camp will be
annihilated.
Mr. Poe. My last question is open to the panel. So what do
we do? What do we do? The United States Government, Congress,
what should we do?
Mr. Rohrabacher. I think that is such a good question. We
will have each witness give a 1-minute answer.
Colonel Martin. My recommendation, sir, is get them
delisted immediately. We get them out of camp as soon as
possible, certainly before the end of the year. I am willing to
get on the plane and go over and help load them up if that is
what it takes. When I was working with the State Department, we
tried to get Homeland Security to see can they come to the
United States. No, because they are a terrorist organization.
Well, we delist them. Well, they were once a terrorist
organization even though it was an erroneous delisting. We need
to get them out of there.
Mr. Poe. Judge.
Mr. Mukasey. I agree and if it takes, in order to get
around Homeland Security objections, a special bill I am sure
that that is something that is not beyond the power of this
body. To get some members, I am not suggesting that all of the
residents of Ashraf be settled here. But certainly if we take
the lead, taking some folks in, then we can persuade other
countries to do likewise, but the first step is delisting. If
they are still listed as a terrorist organization, it becomes
impossible to move them anyplace else. Delisting is for certain
the first and essential step.
Mr. Poe. Dr. Morsch.
Dr. Morsch. Delisting MEK must happen first. We must
recommit to fulfilling our promise that we made to the people
of Ashraf. You know, I appreciate what Mr. Takeyh has said. We
are talking about decades ago. Even if we want to debate this,
the U.K. has already debated it, the European Union, they have
already concluded the debate. There are 3,400 human beings in
Ashraf and there will be a genocide unless we intervene and do
something. I think the United States Government needs to take
responsibility for the solemn promise it made and to fulfill
it. Whether it is through the U.S. military forces, UNAMI,
somehow we have to keep our word in this world.
Mr. Poe. Dr. Takeyh.
Mr. Takeyh. As I mentioned in my testimony, Congressman, I
think the U.N. Refugee Commission should hold the
responsibility for them. If sizable members of the Camp Ashraf
are actually passport holders or residents of other countries,
Canada, France or something, I believe under international law
those countries are obligated to take back their citizens.
United States would be obligated to do so for those citizens
abroad in jeopardy, and the remaining of them the United
Nations should look for a safe haven for them.
I do agree that they cannot be repatriated to Iran
certainly, and the situation in Iraq does seem precarious.
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Sherman, you are not a member of the
subcommittee. We do have members of the subcommittee here. We
will recognize your contribution and the right to ask questions
as soon as the final subcommittee member, Mr. Rivera, has his
time. Mr. Rivera.
Mr. Rivera. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I understand from all
the testimony and all the information and the history that
certainly the Iraqi Government as it is currently constituted
does not seem to want the MEK in their country, and I certainly
understand that under no circumstances can they be sent back to
Iran. I also certainly understand the physical integrity of the
residents of the camp must be protected.
Given all of these different circumstances, I guess my
first question is what does the MEK, based on all of your
knowledge--I will start with the judge--what does MEK want
their fate to be, given all the constraints?
Mr. Mukasey. I think they simply want to be able to
function.
Mr. Rivera. Where?
Mr. Mukasey. Wherever they can, both within Iran.
Mr. Rivera. Within Iran?
Mr. Mukasey. Yes--no, I don't mean sending the Ashraf
residents back, but they want to have connection to people in
Iran with whom they have contact so that they can effect regime
change, but they can't function in that fashion as long as they
continue to be listed as a terrorist organization.
Mr. Rivera. In terms of physical residence, I will go to
the Colonel, what do they want their fate to be?
Colonel Martin. The first thing would be to continue to
operate in the Ashraf area unimpeded. However, Madam Parsai has
specifically told Lieutenant General Gardner and myself, if you
want us to move, we will move, we will come to the United
States or another country where they know they can be secure
and they can be protected. They are willing to leave.
Mr. Rivera. Well, if that is the case, does anyone--does
the United States have a plan toward that end to settle them to
have them leave or does anyone have a plan?
Colonel Martin. The United States I know for a fact has no
plan. And we have seen and it was mentioned this morning--this
afternoon, the State Department does not respond to the calls
of Congress, they are not responding to the findings of the
judicial branch. And if I may be so bold, as an American
warrior I carry a copy of the Constitution with me. The first
branch our Founding Fathers put down was the legislative
because it was the most important and it represented the will
of the people, and then came the executive to carry out that
will, and then came the judicial to make sure it was being done
right. We have a sub-element of the executive branch ignoring
both the legislative and the judicial branch.
Mr. Rivera. And Dr. Takeyh, maybe you are best qualified to
answer this, what is Iraq's plan?
Mr. Takeyh. I am not quite sure if Iraq has a plan to deal
with them. I think the Iraqi regime seems to be in control of
ill-disciplined forces who may not be able to control the
physical integrity of the camp, as you suggest. This is why I
suggest one of the ways we could go about this is to interview
individual camp members to see where they go, if they have
nationalities in Europe and others.
Mr. Rivera. If we would ask Maliki right now what is your
plan, what would he respond?
Mr. Takeyh. I am not quite sure if he has one. I think it
is a problem that neither Iraqis knows what to do, because it
endangers their relationship with Iran, it complicates their
relationship with the United States, and it also complicates
Maliki's own relationship with the Shia community given the
fact MEK has been implicated in violence against Iraqi Shias
during Saddam's tenure.
Mr. Rivera. Does anyone have a plan, European Union, Arab
League, anyone have a plan?
Mr. Mukasey. Not that I am aware of. A particular plan as
to the residents of Ashraf, not that I am aware of.
Mr. Takeyh. Congressman, the United Nations does have
experience in dealing with displaced refugees and they may not
have a specific plan for residents of Camp Ashraf, but they do
have experience with individuals.
Mr. Rivera. What can the United Nations do to implement
their plan? How can they enforce it?
Mr. Takeyh. Well, for one thing the camp can come under the
authority of the United Nations where they would be essentially
in control of----
Mr. Rivera. Would Maliki permit that?
Mr. Takeyh. Well, that is something that United Nations and
Maliki would negotiate with each other. The other thing they
can do is look for safe havens for them, which they have more
experience in doing. The United Nations does run refugee camps
in a vast number of countries.
Mr. Rivera. Safe havens also imply that those countries
provide assent to the camp residents going into--have any
countries expressed any interest?
Mr. Takeyh. Some of them who are dual nationals would have
to be taken back from their countries, if they are nationals of
Canada----
Mr. Rivera. Have any countries expressed interest in taking
back----
Mr. Takeyh. The dual nationals is a question of law, they
have to be taken back by their original----
Mr. Rivera. But has any country publicly expressed
interest?
Mr. Takeyh. I think some European countries have.
Mr. Rivera. Such as?
Mr. Takeyh. Sweden and so forth.
Mr. Rivera. Sweden?
Mr. Takeyh. Yeah.
Mr. Rivera. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rohrabacher. The chairman will when everyone else has
had their time questioning, I will begin my questioning. I will
now recognize Mr. Brad Sherman, who has also been very active
on this issue but not necessarily on this subcommittee.
Mr. Sherman. I thank the chairman for his patience.
Practical question or two to Mr. Attorney General. If someone
happens to have a visa to go to Sweden, are they allowed to
leave Camp Ashraf and go there?
Mr. Mukasey. As far as I am aware, they are.
Mr. Sherman. And would the residents of Camp Ashraf be safe
anywhere in Iraq, say in a Sunni part of that country, or is it
critical that we get them out? I see the Colonel with an
answer.
Colonel Martin. I will gladly answer that question.
Mr. Sherman. Not to mention obviously any moving of them
would be dangerous and would have to be carried out, I think,
by U.S. forces, but if they arrived in some other part of Iraq
would they be any safer than they are now?
Colonel Martin. I agree with the young lady that was in the
video in the very front, they could not be safe.
Mr. Sherman. Either there has to be U.S. or U.N. protection
of Camp Ashraf or, much better, the people have got to be
outside of both Iran and Iraq?
Colonel Martin. That is correct. And if I may add to this,
we had approximately 195 defectors that was being protected at
the American camp. Working with Barzani, we were able to get
them released into Kurdistan and their fate was a very terrible
one, and they ended coming up and asking for financial help
from the MEK so that they could try to move on with their
lives.
So the answer as proven by evidence of that happening to
the defectors is nowhere in Iraq is safe.
Mr. Sherman. Dr. Takeyh, you seem to be the only person
here who thinks it might be okay for the MEK to stay on the
terrorist list. Are you aware of any terrorist action
attributed to the MEK after the last terrorist action
attributed to the IRA?
Mr. Takeyh. In terms of in Iraq itself there is allegations
of MEK being part of Saddam's regime against Shia residents
before their disarmament, throughout the tenure of Saddam.
Those are the allegations.
Mr. Sherman. Are those acts classified as acts of terrorism
by the State Department and are there any specific acts that
are attributed?
Mr. Takeyh. Well, there is certainly the contention of the
Iraqi Government that the MEK membership during Saddam
Hussein's era was acting as his praetorian guard.
Mr. Sherman. Well, what about the praetorian guard of
Saddam Hussein and his other--I mean is everyone who served in
the Iraqi Army considered a terrorist by the United States?
Mr. Takeyh. I am not suggesting that, Congressman. I am
just suggesting that they were used in specific campaigns, and
particularly against the Shia population in the south in 1991.
Mr. Sherman. Okay. Now the MEK was designated in 1997 but
every act of terrorism that you have described in your
statement, at least when I was in this room, were a long time
before then. Were they designated in 1997 because that was part
of an olive branch to Tehran or because the State Department
finally got around to looking at the actions taken in the 1980s
and 1970s?
Mr. Takeyh. I wasn't in the State Department in 1997 when
the designation took place. I am not quite certain of the
reasoning to do so at that time. I am sure there are
representatives of the State Department at that time or
subsequently can respond to your question.
Mr. Sherman. What I have been told is again and again that
the MEK is on that list as an olive branch to Tehran. It is not
working out real well.
Colonel, do you have any insight as to why action was taken
of all times in 1997, decades after the most offensive actions
taken by the MEK?
Colonel Martin. Sometimes when you have enemies you have to
compliment them for a great skill. Iran beautifully portrayed
itself as going to a more moderate government that was going to
open up to the West. There is nothing more moderate because the
Supreme Council would not have allowed, we saw what happened in
2009 when they did have a chance for a moderate President. So
they presented themselves as moderate and in turn we gave them
the olive branch that you mentioned. Then when it was
convenient for Tehran, then next thing you know Ahmadinejad is
now in power.
Mr. Sherman. So we twisted our semi-judicial or
administrative determination for political reasons and in this
case for the wrong political reasons?
Mr. Mukasey. I totally agree.
Mr. Sherman. Does anyone else on the panel have a comment?
I yield back.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. We have Mr. Carnahan
with us and you may proceed, Mr. Carnahan.
Mr. Carnahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the
panel. I apologize for missing some of your testimony. I had to
step out for just a minute. I wanted to come back and start
with Dr. Takeyh. And given that the PMOI MEK received safe
harbor under Saddam Hussein and helped Iraq fight against Iran
during the Iran-Iraq war in the eighties how does this group
hold enough legitimacy in Iran to be a viable opposition to the
current regime, particularly considering the nature of the
culture? Could you talk about that?
Mr. Takeyh. I don't think it is a credible opposition
movement within Iran as perceived by credible Iranian
opposition movements, such as the Green Movement
representative, which has forsworn any relationship with MEK
and have denounced it at every turn. I mean you see that in a
secular opposition in Iran and its umbrella organization that
comes under the auspices of the Green Movement.
Mr. Carnahan. We have limited means of engaging the Iranian
people now. How would U.S. support for the MEK affect the
Iranian popular opinion in the U.S. and, more broadly, how are
there better ways that we could engage with the Iranian people
and the Iranian opposition?
Mr. Takeyh. I think the task at hand is how does the United
States enable, empower the Green Movement in its attempt to
create a democratic society in Iran and try to liberalize the
Iranian Government and in due course displace the radical
regime that is in power. That is the key challenge we have
today. We have a lot of experience with that and are in a Cold
War with our assistance to solidarity in Poland, with our
assistance to other Eastern European opposition movements and
their efforts against Communist governments in the Eastern
Bloc. I think some of those lessons can be used to assist the
indigenous, viable, legitimate opposition within Iran, which
comes under the auspices of the Green Movement.
Mr. Carnahan. Thank you, and I just wanted to open this up
for the rest of the panel to address the issue of the
practicality of relocation as an option. Can that work, does
that work and what are your thoughts on that? Let me start with
General Mukasey and we will go down the line.
Mr. Mukasey. I think if people are going to be killed where
they are, then relocation is the only practical alternative, to
respond directly to your question. Also to comment on something
that Dr. Takeyh just said, there is as far as I know no, zero,
no example of any situation in which help to a dissident group
in a totalitarian country was successful. Poland was not a
totalitarian country at the time we helped solidarity. That
was--you try to help an organization that is in a totalitarian
country, there is only one way to get rid of a totalitarian
government, and that is to overthrow it.
Mr. Carnahan. Thank you, Colonel.
Colonel Martin. The Mujahedin needs to be moved completely
out of Iraq and not to Iran.
Mr. Carnahan. What else would that look like in your
opinion?
Colonel Martin. It would give the appearance that we are
bringing them under an umbrella and keeping them operational as
an organization, but the reality of it, they certainly would
not be a military force because the average age is now over 40
years old. They are a very valuable intelligence resource, and
that could be used in the future, but if we would bring them in
and pretend that we are training them up, it is just not
feasible.
Mr. Carnahan. And Mr. Morsch, Dr. Morsch, sorry.
Dr. Morsch. Ashraf is probably the safest place for them
right now. They are very close to Balad, Camp Anaconda, which
is one of the largest U.S. Bases in Iraq. They are very close
to Baghdad, relatively close to Baghdad. It is an area that is
very scrutinized. So to move them anywhere else within Iraq it
would certainly be less safe and more dangerous.
Mr. Carnahan. Thank you all very much. I yield back.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee is not a member of
this subcommittee, I believe, but she has interest in this
particular issue and, as I say, as chairman I will be the last
person to ask questions today, but I think I have several
important questions to ask. So you may proceed, Ms. Jackson
Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, again in your absence I
thank you for your kindness and indulgence and also allow me to
recognize both you and the ranking member on your astuteness on
issues in dealing with human rights and fairness and simple
practicality on questions that seem to be unanswerable but seem
to be common sense. I guess the question is how do you allow
persons to be murdered and the guns used against those persons
being funded by the United States of America. It continues to
baffle me.
Before I came into the room, and as I acknowledge again Mr.
Carnahan and my colleague Mr. Filner, we have both experienced
over the years enough indictment for our concern about the
individuals who are in a membership by the name of MEK, but
more importantly the brutality against several human beings. It
amazes me that again blood has been shed, treasure of the
United States has died in Iraq so that Iraqis might live free,
might have the blessings of democracy and choice of that
democracy. And yet we are covered with the blood of others at
the hands of, as we have come to understand the allegations, of
Iraqi soldiers.
Judge Mukasey, help me with--you have 7 pages that I will
read more extensively. Would you help me with laws that you say
that we are not enforcing? Give me those tools. You said we are
not enforcing certain laws that we need to do. Would you repeat
those again for me, please?
Mr. Mukasey. I think what is often described in shorthand
as the Leahy amendment, which is actually two statutory
provisions, one of which relates to use of foreign aid, the
second of which relates to use of military aid, and bars the
use of such aid when it goes to military organizations that
have committed human rights violations unless there is a
finding in the case of military, unless there is a finding by
the Secretary of Defense of overriding necessity. I don't know
of any such finding here. So the lay Leahy amendment is, it
seems to me, right on the nose. I think Senator Leahy was the
author of that amendment.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I have not looked at your bio, I can't say
in certainty whether you were in the military or not in the
military, but I know you have been both an outstanding jurist
and the Attorney General. Would you suggest that the actions of
this past incident counted for--do you believe it is well
documented that the violence was perpetrated by soldiers that
were in Iraqi uniforms or Iraqis with guns that resulted in the
deaths of the 30-plus individuals?
Mr. Mukasey. There is no doubt of it. We have identified,
as I understand it, the precise units that participated in this
operation. So that is relatively easy to come by.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Dr. Morsch, can you document or suggest
any reason why tanks and commandos and guns were approaching
that camp? Was there any national security reason?
Dr. Morsch. No reason other than I believe the Maliki I
government is planning to exterminate the people of Ashraf and
this is part of a long series of actions that are probably
going to occur until they are ultimately victorious.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Does that sound like to you a conspiracy
with Iran, a country who has potential nuclear capacity,
threatening the world, and the leader of Iraq is now in cahoots
to attack individuals who cannot defend themselves, or at least
defend themselves against tanks.
Dr. Morsch. Congresswoman, I arrived in Iraq in January
2004, shortly after the Iraq war began. And so from my first
days on the ground I saw the influence of Iran within Iraq
because Ashraf is close to that border. It has been there ever
since, it is growing, it is obvious, it is intentional, and in
fact in 2004 I made the comment to some of my fellow officers
Iran--we are basically going to come in here and take out
Saddam, create a power vacuum and create a greater Tehran right
here in Iraq. It is happening right before our eyes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me just conclude, Mr. Chairman, I see
the lights. Thank you very much.
Let me conclude by saying my outrage cannot be expressed
and again I ask our Government, which I have great respect for,
to immediately denounce and ask for a ceasing of the
collaboration between the Iraqi Government of which we are
funding and Iran, which has become the world's enemy to destroy
and kill innocent persons and whatever laws that we have,
Chairman Rohrabacher, that we can use, the Leahy amendment,
should be implemented immediately.
I yield back.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Ms. Jackson Lee, and
to all of our other members who have participated today. I
again apologize that earlier I had to leave. I did actually go
from here straight to the floor to deal with an amendment that
would defund our friends in Pakistan which has something to do
with some of the issues we are discussing today, and so is
vitally important. However, I am very pleased we were able it
get the questioning in from those of us here able to spend the
entire time with us. Let me just ask you a few questions here.
Dr. Morsch, you were in Camp Ashraf in what year?
Dr. Morsch. 2004.
Mr. Rohrabacher. 2004. Now in 2004, correct me if I am
wrong, the FBI actually went to Camp Ashraf and interviewed all
of the residents of Camp Ashraf to find out if any of them were
indeed terrorists; is that correct?
Dr. Morsch. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Are you aware of what the FBI determined
by their questioning of all of--each and every one of the
people there at Camp Ashraf?
Dr. Morsch. Yes, sir. I was there during the entire
investigation phase and from the beginning to the end all 34 or
at that time maybe a few more were interrogated. I did not see
the official report of the FBI but I talked to the agents and
interviewers on a daily basis as they came back from spending
the day in these interviews. And they expressed tremendous
frustration that they had come to Ashraf with particular people
they thought they were going to be able to take back to the
U.S. To prosecute for various nefarious criminal or terrorist
activities. And day by day they were not able to find any
evidence on any illegal criminal or terrorist activities and
finally left empty handed, as they said, and were quite
disappointed.
Mr. Filner. Mr. Chairman, I just want to ask----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Excuse me, I have the floor now.
Mr. Filner. I want to make sure he meant 3,400.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I will be happy to let you do this after
my questions.
Mr. Filner. I just wanted a question of fact.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you, Mr. Filner.
To the point that was just made, Dr. Takeyh, have you seen
this FBI record?
Mr. Takeyh. I have not.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And you question that the FBI was
conducting a proper investigation?
Mr. Takeyh. I have no insight into the investigation.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. And when you have expressed your
concern about the MEK since 19---well 2004, so that's 6 years,
you have been expressing concern that the MEK might, you know,
be worthy of designating a terrorist organization but you have
not bothered to go and find the FBI report that went in and
investigated that specifically.
Mr. Takeyh. I am not sure if that FBI report is actually
for public consumption, nor have I been intensely engaged in
the MEK terrorism debate, as you suggest, in the past 6 years.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So you are not sure whether the FBI report
is for public consumption?
Mr. Takeyh. Congressman, I simply cannot comment on a
report I haven't seen.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I understand, but I guess what the
question is you are a Ph.D.?
Mr. Takeyh. Uh-huh.
Mr. Rohrabacher. When these people are talking, as you
might say, a credible witness on issues, especially when
someone has a scholarly background, a Ph.D., that you would
expect they would go to all sources, especially ones that were
directly related to investigating a specific charge, but you
did not go to----
Mr. Takeyh. I don't think----
Mr. Rohrabacher. You didn't try to seek out the FBI report?
Mr. Takeyh. I don't think that FBI report was publicly
available. I believe it is under classification.
Mr. Rohrabacher. The operative words I think which means
you did not.
Mr. Takeyh. I would be happy to look at the report.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Usually if one was to be someone to argue
a case they would at least take the time to see if something
was available or not. Dr.----
Mr. Takeyh. Ordinarily, Congressman, FBI reports of this
nature are not available and my colleague has himself said he
hasn't seen the report.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay, well, I am not sure whether the FBI
report is available or if the conclusion was available. My
guess is that at the very least the conclusion that the FBI
made was made available and that has----
Mr. Takeyh. I am not sure if that is correct.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Is it your understanding that the FBI
concluded, that is your testimony today, that the charge that
these people were still a terrorist organization was debunked;
is that correct?
Dr. Morsch. Yes, sir. That was the point of the
investigation and again they didn't find anything. This is my
unofficial discussion with numerous members of the OGA
personnel who were there on site for the several months of the
investigation.
Mr. Rohrabacher. When you are suggesting that all 3,400
people there were questioned by the FBI.
Dr. Morsch. All of them questioned by the FBI and or other
representatives that had arrived, perhaps 100 outside
personnel, a very efficient, organized interrogation process.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Now, let me just note that I have been
involved politically since I was in my teens and I have seen
different organizations evolve into different things and my
understanding of the MEK is that it had a Marxist beginning and
that there were questions about--that I would have about an
organization that was involved in the type of activity that was
at the same time espousing some sort of Marxist ideology.
Apparently that was a long time ago and there seems to be a lot
of evidence that MEK evolved out of that position. I did not
get involved in this issue for a long time because many people
in Iran, many of the Iranian exiled community still remembered
the MEK as an organization that was involved in assassinating
members of the Shah's government. By the way, not to say that
the Shah was not a dictatorship as well and when people are
struggling for democracy against a dictatorship usually you
have to use force, but that still would not necessarily say
that what the MEK was doing was acceptable because I understand
they were targeting unarmed officials who worked for the Shah
and worked for his administration.
Is there some reason, Mr. Takeyh, that we have to believe
that the MEK is still after all of these years and all of these
individuals have been involved with them that that they are
still involved in some sort of terrorist operation?
Mr. Takeyh. The MEK use of violence did not stop with its
opposition to the Shah's regime. It continued in the aftermath
and has continued throughout the aftermath of past 30 years,
and it has continued against Iranian civilians within Iran and
Iraqis within Iraq once they relocated there. So it is a long
history of violence.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Let me just note for you. This is a
territory that is filled with violence, whether you are talking
about the Shah or you are talking about the Mullah regime, you
are talking about incredible violence. I wouldn't be surprised
if there was any organization that existed that wasn't in some
way involved with the use of force at least to protect
themselves.
Mr. Takeyh. Oh, I disagree with that. Within Iran there are
many opposition movements such as the Green Movement that
explicitly rejects violence for civil disobedience and protest
and demonstrations.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Or like the American Revolution where we--
oh, wait a minute, we did use violence there, didn't we? Let me
suggest that I would ask our friends in the audience not to
applaud, or to be fair to all of our witnesses.
You have got a lot of courage, thank you for being here, I
appreciate your being here today, knowing that you are going to
get some very poignant questions.
So your suggestion is the MEK today has been branded as
unacceptable by the leaders of the Green Movement in Iran.
Mr. Takeyh. Yes, that is right.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Is that the case? Does anyone know about
that detail? Agree? Disagree?
Colonel Martin. I am not sure if it is going to be in
agreement or disagreement. But I remember in 2009, when all the
riots and everything were going on, the MEK was very, very
quiet, and they were not involved in any of those activities.
So to say they have been accepted by the Green Movement, I
don't believe so. I do believe the National Council of the
Resistance of Iran, Maryam Rajavi's other organization, is very
much accepting of it.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Let us note that the Green Movement has, I
believe--and please correct me if I am wrong--has dissociated
itself from violence as a means of achieving its goals.
But also let us note that just because some--that does not
mean that an opposition group to a despicable dictatorial
regime that uses torture and violence against its people, that
anyone who chooses to resist it in a violent fashion doesn't
make them right or wrong. We are not going to get the Mullahs
to give up power simply by proving that they are thugs, by
letting them beat people up and suppress people at will.
In fact, I will have to admit one of the things that
attracts me to this movement is that it is willing to fight for
the rights of the people of Iran against a very oppressive
regime that is willing to kill people to stay in power.
But if the Green Movement has not accepted that and that
the use of force has been something that the MEK is willing to
do and it separates it from the Green Movement, let us accept
that. That has been a reality. That doesn't necessarily make it
the right position of the United States to back just pacifists
in the world. Backing people who fight against tyranny is also
something the United States could be doing.
Colonel, you seemed like you are anxious to say something.
Colonel Martin. I thank you, sir.
One point that needs to be pointed out, in the membership
of the MEK inside Camp Ashraf there are only two people that
were involved in the organization in the early 1970s, and I am
holding their names for their own safety. One was in prison
with Rajavi, and the other one I know personally, and he is a
good friend. I can honestly say neither one of those two people
were involved.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, it is very difficult for me, after
seeing the video that we had, which is very clear evidence of a
massacre of unarmed people, to then in some way focus attention
on perhaps somewhere they might have people in their
organization that believe in violence in order to overthrow the
Mullah regime in Iran. And that is something that in some way
should turn us off toward that organization.
About the massacre, how do we feel about whether this
terrorist designation, which it seems impossible for the United
States, as compared to all of our European allies, to get rid
of this designation, did it play a significant role in the
decision of whoever it was to commit this massacre? Is there
any reason for us to believe that if they were not designated a
terrorist organization that the person who ordered them to go
in with those troops and shoot down unarmed civilians might not
have issued that order?
Colonel?
Colonel Martin. I will lead out on that one, sir.
I think yes. Because the State Department has been
basically moving at the pace of a startled snail. And when you
see the Maliki government doing things wrong--and to include
the attack 2 years ago--and our State Department and our
Government does nothing about it but we keep them on the
terrorist list, claiming they are a bunch of bad people, we are
giving justification. And then when the attack is over, we also
do nothing about it.
We remember the pictures of pictures of Abu Ghraib. This,
Abu Ghraib, was minor compared to what happened at Camp Ashraf.
It was very hideous, and it was very wrong. But all of a sudden
our whole Nation was enflamed, and the world was enflamed, and
it was a recruiting tool for the al Qaeda. But then we see
blatant murder and then we look the other way. That just
encourages more.
Mr. Rohrabacher. The point is very well made, Colonel.
I think that there are consequences to political
designations, and consequences in the actions of the people who
order them and the people who are decision makers in other
countries, which leads us to Prime Minister Maliki. Does this
slaughter that we have seen of the people in Camp Ashraf
indicate that the government now of Prime Minister Maliki is
perhaps in a subservient position to the Iranian Mullah regime?
Colonel Martin. If I may again, sir, I see him subservient
to three different elements. One is the Iranian regime, two is
Hakim, and three is Muqtada al-Sadr.
And we saw this even in the execution of Saddam. Muqtada
al-Sadr was the one who said to his followers, Saddam will not
live to see the light of a new year. And then suddenly Task
Force 134 gets a call from Maliki himself saying, I want Saddam
turned over tomorrow. And you remember the spectacle of that.
Maliki is taking orders from three different elements. And,
as you recall, Allawi won the election but Maliki would not
follow the constitution and work with Allawi. And, as a result,
Allawi won the election but he lost the government.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well the Mullah regime obviously--let me
just say, Dr. Takeyh, you have suggested that actually the MEK
is not a major force in this part of the world, that in Iraq
they are not considered to be an important player----
Mr. Takeyh. In Iraq?
Mr. Rohrabacher. Excuse me. In Iran. They are not a major
part of the resistance or the opposition. Why would the Mullah
regime be so concerned about them if they weren't a player?
Mr. Takeyh. Oh, the paranoid politics of the Islamic
Republic are beyond my comprehension. They are concerned about
every expression of dissent. That is what totalitarian
governments are like. They try to squash any form of dissent.
But in terms of array of forces that could displace their
current regime, I don't think MEK would play a role in that.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I am not sure what role MEK will play. I
am not sure what their position is in terms of the people of
Iran and the Green Movement, et cetera, as well as the Mullahs.
But it does seem to be clear that Maliki, the Prime Minister of
Iraq, thought that he was doing a favor for his buddies in
Tehran in committing this massacre.
Let's go to a little bit about the relocation and such. Are
all of you suggesting then that relocation in the United States
is what you think will probably be the end result of this?
Mr. Takeyh. I suggest in my testimony it should come under
the auspices of the United Nations Refugee Commission.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right. But the United Nations is located
in New York, I think.
Mr. Takeyh. Well, it has offices all over the place.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Maybe we could house them in the U.N. in
New York. Yes.
Dr. Morsch. Mr. Chairman, I think that the United States
should be prepared to take all or the majority of them. But I
do think that many other countries, as we are seeing in Europe,
who are unilaterally taking actions in Libya and other places
that they think are in the best interests on the world stage, I
believe there is tremendous momentum, critical mass building.
And I believe if the United States would take a lead--or the
U.N.--I believe we would find a host of countries that would be
willing to take the members of Ashraf.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Colonel Martin certainly has made that
point, that we have got citizens from various countries there.
And the witness that we had at our briefing prior to the
hearing today was a young lady from Canada. And maybe, Doctor,
you could let me know, how many people there at Camp Ashraf
would you suggest have such ties? What percentage of that 3,400
have ties to elsewhere?
Dr. Morsch. While I was there, I did not consider whether
they were citizens or whether they had Green Cards or visas.
But I was impressed with the number of people who had received
graduate and postgraduate degrees in developed countries, in
Europe and in the United States and Canada. I mean, many, many,
many hundreds of the residents were very well educated, spoke
very good English, and obviously had ties with the West.
If you would poll the people behind me, my guess is half of
them have family members today in Ashraf. And as I have
traveled the world and met Iranians from throughout the world,
there are a lot of families that are following their loved ones
in Ashraf, and I have to assume there is some type of legal
status tied to that.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Do the other two witnesses agree with this
assessment? Maybe half the people in Camp Ashraf have families
that could in some way take care of them if they are forced out
of Ashraf?
Colonel Martin. I would have to agree, sir.
I would have to make one point to an earlier comment. If we
put them in the United Nations building, we would have to take
them out once a year when Ahmadinijad comes for his annual
rant.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thanks.
Mr. Mukasey. I should point out that the strong statements
from the European Parliament introduced actually a European
plan to first provide security at Ashraf via UNAMI, a United
Nations entity, with the help of the U.S. military and then, at
the same time, with the EU and the U.S. to resettle residents
in Europe and the U.S. But that when the U.S. Ambassador to
Iraq, Ambassador Jeffrey, says that he supports the idea of
resettling these folks within Iraq, that is not helpful.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, let's just note that my
observation--personal observation is that the people involved
in this movement are highly educated people and highly
motivated and have a great sense of unity. And while the United
States has been in Iraq--which I will close with a closing
statement about the wisdom of us going into Iraq in the first
place, considering what this incident is telling us about the
Iraqi Government--but as long as we were there, we could make
promises, and we did make promises to the people of Camp
Ashraf. And the people of Camp Ashraf kept their word to us,
and they gave us intelligence information and disarmed and were
as sincere in their pledges to us as we were to them.
However, the reality is the United States is leaving Iraq
within 2 years. I believe the American presence in Iraq will be
probably nothing. I mean, we will probably not have combat
troops in Iraq. That means we will no longer be able to protect
these individuals with the promise of protection from the
United States. I would hope that we can work together to try to
make sure that these individuals have an alternative that gives
them safety and will not--but let me tell you what is
unfortunate about this is that the closing of Camp Ashraf--and
I disagree with you, Dr. Takeyh, on this--and that is, I think
the Mullah regime does see the MEK and does know they are
there. That is why this massacre took place. And I think that
disbanding Camp Ashraf and just scurrying away, retreating from
the border of Iran, will be viewed by the Mullahs not as--oh,
look how sincere the Americans are being--but will be looked at
as a retreat. And, basically, it will encourage the
dictatorship and the Mullahs to even have a tougher grip on
their own people because of the fact that we now are taking
3,400 souls who are standing against their dictatorship and we
are disbanding them and we are demobilizing them.
And that is unfortunate. That is an unfortunate reality.
But the reality is, is that we can no longer protect them once
we are out of the country.
But I think that we should be proud as when we were there
in Iraq that we didn't send the wrong message to the Mullahs
that we were cowards and that we didn't believe that only
pacifists can bring down the Mullah regime. It won't be just
pacifism. It will be people with courage and people who stand
up, people who have their own motives, whether they have their
own religious group or their own social group.
There were groups of patriots during the American
Revolution that brought down the British control of America.
And they all weren't just of one mind. Some of them, in fact,
were religious fanatics. Some were Christian cults that lived
in the United States who supported us. And that is our history.
But they had their rights, and they were willing to fight for
them.
So let me just leave with one last thought, and I want to
give you a chance to express a last thought, and then I want to
express maybe 1 minute worth of thought.
Mr. Carnahan.
Mr. Carnahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, again, I just want to personally say to the chairman
for his work on this issue, his leadership, and leading our
delegation there, demanding answers to tough questions, both
from the Maliki government but also from our own Government in
terms of how we go forward, bring people to justice, and find
out how we can go forward to find a safe haven for the people
there. So, again, thank you and thank you to the witnesses who
are bringing your expertise to bear here today.
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. And I will finish with this.
Number one, there will be a list of questions offered to
the State Department concerning the massacre at Camp Ashraf,
including when they knew about what and who gave orders for our
military to leave, et cetera, et cetera, and I detail some of
those questions. There will be official lists of questions from
this committee to the State Department. And we will expect an
answer. If we do not get an answer, I will proceed with making
sure that we have a follow-up hearing until those questions are
answered.
And, finally, let me just leave with this thought: The
invasion and the liberation, you might say, of Iraq was
something that I supported. I mean, I trusted President Bush
that he knew what he was doing, that he had a good grip on how
to make sure that we got that job done, and that it was
necessary, that it was absolutely necessary for us to go into
that country with heavy armored divisions in such a big way.
I was wrong. I was wrong. I was wrong to put my trust in
his judgment. I worked for the President of the United States,
and I assumed that he had a similar responsible position toward
the American people and sending the American military, as did
the President who I worked for, which was Ronald Reagan. And
that was not the case.
The United States has paid a dear price, probably $1
trillion of wealth, which may have been one of the major
factors in kicking us into this horrible economic crisis that
we are on the edge of today, as well as thousands and thousands
of our young people dead and many tens of thousands more who
lost parts of their bodies or their faces were blown off or
they now live in misery because their home lives are destroyed.
And that is the price we Americans have paid.
And Americans don't mind fighting for freedom. Americans
don't. That is our job. We come from every race, every
religion, and every ethnic group. So we can show the world
there is a better way.
But the ingratitude that I have found in our visit to Iraq
was overwhelming. The people of Iraq--at least those in their
government, the government of Prime Minister Maliki--showed
absolutely no gratitude and in fact were contemptuous of the
price that the Americans have paid to dislodge the Saddam
Hussein dictatorship.
Let us note that Saddam Hussein murdered hundreds of
thousands of his people, many more than have been killed in
that 7-year, 8-year period since Americans dislodged Saddam
Hussein. And many of the people being killed in Iraq are being
killed by their fellow Iraqis. And here we just jumped in there
and have paid such a heavy price.
Well, we Americans think it is okay as long as--you know,
as I say, we have got a place in the world. We have got to show
the world there is a better way where people can get along and
not explode car bombs off because they worship God in a
different way. And that is what we are all about.
I think that the members of the MEK that I have met here in
the United States exemplify a commitment to freedom. And no
matter how activists or what their organization did in the
past, they are committed to freedom and democracy today. And
certainly the slaughter there at that camp, we should have
taken more caution and more care to see that that did not
happen. And I think we all believe that.
So, with that said, when we make decisions in the future
about what countries we are going to commit to and what we are
going to jump into in a big way, we are going to have a lot of
second thoughts about that. Americans are going to have a lot
of second thoughts about that. In the meantime, we are going to
do our best to live to what our traditions and our values are
all about as a people.
I want to thank each and every one of you. Doctor, you were
courageous to come here knowing that you were going to get the
hardest questions. But I want to thank our other witnesses as
well, because you have all contributed to a better
understanding of this issue that has led to this horrible
massacre. Let's just make sure that no more of these people who
are friends of freedom are murdered by the Mullah regime and
Tehran or by their stooges who now control the Government of
Iraq.
Thank you very much. This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Material Submitted for the Hearing RecordNotice deg.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Material submitted for the record by Colonel Wes Martin, USA (retired)
(former Base Commander of Camp Ashraf)
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Material submitted for the record by Gary Morsch, M.D. (former
Commander of Forward Operation Base Ashraf)
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[Note: Additional papers by Mr. Schneebaum, submitted for the
record by Dr. Morsch, are not reprinted here but are available in
committee records.]