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**ARMY RESERVE, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
AND AIR NATIONAL GUARD READINESS,
TRAINING AND OPERATIONS**

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

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ARMY RESERVE, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND AIR NATIONAL GUARD READINESS, TRAINING AND OPERATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, September 21, 2011.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:00 p.m., in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

Mr. FORBES. Well, good afternoon. And I would like to welcome all of our members and our distinguished panel of experts to today's hearing that will focus on the training and operations tempo for our Army Reserve and our Guard and Air Guard Components.

Just 10 days ago, we marked the 10th Anniversary of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on our homeland. That day, as we all know, literally changed our world, and led us into a long-term global war on terrorism, a fight where our reservists and our National Guard members are full partners. In the intervening 10 years, our Reserve Components have been stretched thin as they have been called upon to provide many of the enabling capabilities for the Active Duty Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom, New Dawn and Operation Enduring Freedom.

They provide support, such as intelligence gathering, airlift, close air support and security forces. At the same time, the National Guard still must fulfill their traditional mission of supporting the states during emergencies such as the recent flooding and fires. There is no walking away from either mission.

Their significant combat support role in Iraq and Afghanistan makes it clear that we cannot go to the fight without our Reserve Components. According to the Department of Defense's recent study, the "Future Role of the Reserve Component," the Reserve Component is an irreplaceable and cost-effective element of overall Department of Defense capability.

The report specifically stated, "Unless we had chosen to dramatically increase the size of the active components, our domestic security and global operations since September 11, 2001 could not have been executed without the activation of hundreds of thousands of trained reserve component personnel."

Juxtapose this reliance on our Reserve Components against the backdrop of large U.S. force structure reductions in the \$400 billion

to \$900 billion in defense cuts proposed over the past several months, and you can see how current challenges can grow to become significant problems. For the Army Reserves and Guard and the Air Guard, their ability to take on additional missions that require significant military support will be severely strained if the force structure in budget era reductions of the magnitude being discussed take effect. Even fulfilling their steady-state missions could be severely impacted.

For example, let us look at just the Army for a minute. As was noted in our July hearing, general readiness indicators have gradually improved across the Army Active and Reserve Components over the past year. However, significant equipment challenges remain. While deployed units report high levels of equipment readiness, many home station and Reserve units report significant shortages of key items needed to fulfill their assigned missions and to conduct full-spectrum training.

Anticipated budgetary reductions will further challenge this trend and the Army's ability to simultaneously provide trained and ready forces for ongoing operations and other possible future commitments and contingencies. This will be particularly true as the Army has changed its role.

During the Cold War, the Army Reserve Components were considered strategic Reserves, which meant that only very limited training was done during their one weekend a month, two weeks a year, duty time. Units were not funded for significant training and had limited equipment sets.

In theory, these units would have significant time after mobilization to get up-to-date equipment and conduct extensive training. They would then deploy for the duration of the conflict, rotate back home afterwards and return to their strategic Reserve status. However, in the past 10 years, the Reserve Components have become more operational, which requires more training before mobilization and involves a reset training period upon a unit's return from theatre. It also requires substantial additional resources to enable more training prior to a unit's formal mobilization.

But is this model sustainable? I hope our witnesses will answer that question, especially as we are facing significant budgetary challenges. Since 1999, the overall Army Reserve O&M [Operations and Maintenance] funding almost tripled, but I worry whether we will be able to support such growth.

With regard to the Air National Guard, one of their important missions is protecting the homeland through the Air Sovereignty Alert [ASA]. This mission has not been without its challenges, primarily because it was not adequately resourced, programmed or budgeted for by the Active Air Force.

Also, unlike the cold war era when Air Force units were assigned to dedicated air defense units, the units that perform ASA operations today are part of the Air Force's total force and deploy overseas to support military operations. This can cause significant challenges for those Air Guard ASA units that must train for their primary contingency operations support missions, while simultaneously training and manning their ASA mission.

When an ASA Guard unit is deployed overseas, there is tension in how it also will meet its ASA mission, which is often accom-

plished by transferring personnel and equipment from non-deployed units to fill shortfalls. Here again, I hope our witnesses will help us understand the resources needed to maintain these domestic missions at a time when we face diminishing budgets.

Joining us today to discuss the challenges for resources, training and budget are three distinguished individuals. They have served their country well. We are very privileged to have them here today to provide their expertise, knowledge and counsel to us.

First, we have Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, the commanding general of the United States Army Reserve Command. General, thank you for being here. We also have Lieutenant General Harry M. Wyatt III, the director of the Air National Guard. And General, we thank you. And Major General Raymond W. Carpenter, the acting director of the Army National Guard. General, thanks for all that you do and for your time this afternoon.

I now recognize the ranking member, Ms. Bordallo, for any remarks she may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the Appendix on page 43.]

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A DELEGATE FROM GUAM, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and good afternoon, gentlemen.

Today, we continue our discussion on the overall readiness of our Armed Forces. We will hear from the directors of the Army and the Air National Guard, as well as General Stultz from the Army Reserve. And we look forward to the testimony from our witnesses.

As both Generals Wyatt and Carpenter know, I am indeed very proud that the Guam National Guard has the highest membership per capita of any National Guard in this country. And I think that is a real testament to the level of commitment and respect that our men and women on Guam have for our Nation and the National Guard.

The last decade of war and conflict has required our National Guard and Reserves to transform from a strategic Reserve to an operational force. Beginning on September 11, 2001, and continuing through today, our Air National Guard began flying combat air patrol missions over our cities and our most important landmarks. Days later, we saw the Army National Guard mobilize to provide security at airports throughout the Nation. Mission requirements expanded with the beginning of rotations to Afghanistan and then Iraq and other areas.

Our National Guard and our Reserves have answered every call to duty, and their support for our Nation has been invaluable. However, the roles and the missions fulfilled by the National Guard and Reserves have required greater resources to meet their increased training, equipment and manning costs. And the Nation's budget challenges will only amplify the difficulty of maintaining an operational National Guard and Reserve.

Over the past few years, this committee has taken significant steps to address critical shortfalls in dual-line equipment needs through the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account.

However, the Army National Guard's goal is to maintain 80 percent of critical dual-use equipment on hand at any one time. How will this be achieved in austere budget times?

Also, with the eventual drawdown of end strength in the Army, it is important for our witnesses to address what impact this may have on the rebalancing of missions and skill sets within the National Guard and the Reserves. What impact might this have on the readiness of these forces? This committee has also worked to ensure appropriate funding is authorized for increased training requirements due to continuing high operational tempo in Iraq, and especially Afghanistan.

In the Army Reserve alone, operation and maintenance costs have increased from \$1.4 billion in fiscal year 1999 to a requested \$3.1 billion in fiscal year 2012. Additional investments in the operation and maintenance accounts will be needed to support a home station training concept.

Such efforts are important toward ensuring the continued accessibility of the National Guard and Reserves. But there will be challenges in fully implementing this concept. So I hope the witnesses can discuss these challenges in their testimony today, and what risks would be associated with reduced funding for these purposes.

I also remain seriously concerned about aviation assets to our National Guard. Our House-passed Fiscal Year 2012 Defense Authorization bill contains a prohibition on retirement of C-23 Sherpa aircraft. What plan does the Army National Guard have to replace these aging aircraft? At one time, the C-27J joint cargo aircraft was the replacement. But former Defense Secretary Gates cut the buy to 38 planes, and shifted the program to the Air Force.

How will we meet this equipment requirement in a difficult budget environment? Will homeland defense missions and airlift capability that is needed to support such missions be factored into replacing the C-23 Sherpas? I also remain concerned that the Department of Defense has not acknowledged the need to incorporate homeland defense mission requirements into certain planning assumptions. Further, I remain concerned that the National Guard Bureau has not taken a more prominent role in working with the various services and secretary-level agencies to better define these requirements.

I hope that our witnesses, Mr. Chairman, can comment on when such requirements will be finalized and incorporated into the Department of Defense planning assumptions. If we do not have solid homeland defense requirements built into the planning process I fear we take significant risk in the readiness of our National Guard and Reserve to be appropriately trained and equipped to respond to these missions.

And finally, this committee will closely examine future budgets to ensure that we do not hollow out our National Guard and our Reserves. To remain an operational force, we will need to see investment in the training and the equipment accounts in future years. We must always have a ready, a reliable and an accessible Reserve Component. And I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Bordallo can be found in the Appendix on page 46.]

Mr. FORBES. Thank you for those remarks, Madeleine. And as we discussed prior to the hearing, I asked unanimous consent that we dispense with the 5-minute rule for this hearing and depart from regular orders so that members may ask questions during the course of discussion. I think this will provide a roundtable type forum, and will enhance the dialogue on these very important issues. And without objection, so ordered.

I also asked for unanimous consent that non-subcommittee members, if any, be allowed to participate in today's hearing after all subcommittee members have had an opportunity to ask questions. Is there any objection? Without objection, non-subcommittee members will be recognized at the appropriate time for 5 minutes.

Gentlemen, as we mentioned at the outset, we would like to, as a committee, first of all simply say thank you to each one of the three of you. Thank you for your service to our country, for the sacrifices that we know that each of the three of you have made. But also thank you to the men and women who serve under you, for the great job that they have done, for the sacrifices that we know they made for our country.

Your written statements have been introduced. We will be introducing those to the record. You do not need to read those again, but we are welcome to hear them if you would like to.

But what we would love to hear is just your opinions as to what you think this committee needs to know. The unfortunate thing is no good deed goes unpunished. And because you have done such a great job, the American people, many policymakers in Congress, will just assume you are going to continue to do that, regardless of the resources that we give you.

Many of us fear that we have an enemy coming over the horizon that we have not seen in years and that is some deficit reduction cuts that perhaps could impact what you do for a long time to come. And so it is very important that we hear from you as to the impact you think these cuts could have on the men and women that you represent.

So General Stultz, if it is okay with you we will start with you just because that is where you are seated in the great lineups. General.

**STATEMENT OF LTG JACK C. STULTZ, USA, CHIEF, U.S. ARMY
RESERVE**

General STULTZ. Chairman Forbes, Ms. Bordallo, other members, on behalf of the over 205,000 Army Reserve soldiers that I command, first and foremost let me say thank you for your enduring support. Support in terms of financial, but also support in terms just of moral support that you give our soldiers and our families as they continue to perform, as you indicated in a magnificent way.

And I was just down in Florida on Monday for a segment with Fox and Friends. And just a little snippet, you know, in-between their breaks, I had 140 soldiers with me there. And they cut to me and said, "What would you like to say?" And I just said, "You know, these people sitting around me in uniform are a national

treasure because it is a volunteer Army and they don't have to be here."

"And yet, for some reason they continue to raise their hand over and over." And I said, "There is Sergeant Dasher sitting right here in front of me. I just met him. He is a big, strapping E-7 and he has been to Iraq three times, 2003, 2006 and 2010. And he said, 'Sir, when you need me, I will go back again.'" That is a national treasure.

And so as you have indicated, it has cost more for us to become an operational force. But there is a reason for that, and there is a reason we have got to maintain that support. I brought along two charts just to illustrate why. The first chart here is, and I think you have a handout available to you, it demonstrates what we have done in terms of the force mix in our Army.

[The chart referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 123.]

General STULTZ. As we have grown the Army from a force of 482,000 in the Active Army to 569,000 we really have not grown our Reserve Components very much. In the Army Reserve, we are still at 205,000. That is where we were pre 9/11. I think the National Guard was at 352,000. They are at 358,000 now in authorized end strength.

So the growth has come in the Active Force, and that growth has come in greater combat capability with their great combat teams and greater aviation capability, with combat aviation, and other types of things.

At the same time, we have shifted the combat service support more and more to the Reserve Components. And so between the National Guard and the Army Reserve, the chart illustrates that 80 percent of the transportation capability for the Army is now in the Guard and Reserve. Seventy-five percent of the engineer capability is in the Guard and Reserve.

In the medical community, 75 percent, roughly, is in the Guard and Reserve. Civil Affairs, 85 percent. And it goes on and on. That is why the Army has become dependent on the Reserve Components is because we are no longer the Reserve. We are the Army. We are what the Army depends on for these kinds of capabilities. And yes, it does cost us more to keep those forces ready because we are utilizing them and we have got to train them and maintain them.

But we cannot afford as the Army has to come down in end strength to cut any support for our Reserve Components because they are going to be even more dependent on the Reserve Components if they have to come down in end strength on the Active side. More of this capability is probably going to shift our way.

And what we have to do is, we have to be good stewards of the dollars you give us. We have to be efficient and effective. And we in the Army Reserve have developed the training strategy that says, you know, we are going to take soldiers and put them in a 5-year rotational cycle. So in the fifth year, they deploy or they become available. And then they go back and reset and start training, and we gradually train them up so that we don't spend a lot of dollars until we are sure we are going to use them.

But in that third and fourth year prior to deployment, we need some extra training days and we need to make sure we have got the right equipment to train on so they are prepared to go to war. Because the Army depends on them.

And so my concern is just as you said, Mr. Chairman. As we are looking at some of these dramatic cuts that someone assumes we can just take the Reserve back to where it used to be prior to 9/11/2001. We can't. Because the Army is different today than it was 9/11/2001 in terms of the way they are structured and in terms of their dependence on the Army Reserve and the National Guard.

Now the next chart, if I could, will illustrate my concern. I call this the "dip chart," if you want to call it. But this indicates the end strength of the Army Reserve and how it has changed. But more importantly, it indicates how the Army Reserve has changed in terms of the composition of the force.

[The chart referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 124.]

General STULTZ. If you go back to 2002–2003 timeframe, we were at almost 215,000 of a 205,000 authorization, almost 10,000 over strength. And then we went to war. And what we realized is we had a strategic force. We did not have a force that was prepared for war. We had soldiers in our force that were not competent to go to war, physically, mentally, and other means.

We had soldiers in our force that said, "This is not what I signed up for. It is time for me to leave." And a lot of times we gave them a medal, and said, "Thanks for your service."

And that structure, or that end strength, went all the way down to almost 185,000 by 2006, when I came aboard as chief of the Reserve. That didn't mean we just lost 30,000. Every year we were recruiting an additional 30,000 into the force. So you multiply several years of 30,000, plus the 30,000 reduction, and it is well over 100,000 soldiers we lost out of our force—over 50 percent of our force.

And then we started building back. And we built back with soldiers like Sergeant Dasher that I mentioned earlier, with soldiers who said, "This is what I am signed up for. I want to go do something. I want to be something. I want something that is fulfilling."

And that is the heroes that we have today that is a national treasure. Those are those soldiers that stand there on Christmas Day with me in Baghdad with their hands raised, taking an oath of reenlistment to stay in the uniform, knowing that they are risking their lives every day they go into battle.

We can't afford to lose that. The Army is dependent upon that. That is a national treasure. And my fear, if we start cutting the force, if we start cutting resources, that dip will occur. It will occur again as those soldiers who are in our force today say, "I am not going back to a strategic 1-weekend-in-a-month, 2 weeks in the summertime force. I want to be part of something."

What we owe our Nation is to maintain that investment that we have got because we know our Reserve Components are a tremendous return on investment in terms of what it actually costs for a soldier in the Reserve versus a soldier in the Active Army.

We know that is a huge savings in terms of capability as long as you are confident it will be there when you need it and it will

be ready when you need it. And we have got that today. We have got to maintain it because if we are going to have to cut spending in the total defense budget, I think the Reserve Components are going to become even more critical as a way of saving capability and spending less.

And so my pledge to you is I will do everything I can to be as efficient, as cost-effective as I can. But I owe it to my soldiers to maintain their readiness, to give them the equipment they need to train on and the equipment they need to go to war, and to take care of their families while they are gone.

So I will look forward to your questions, sir. But again, thank you for all of you for your support for us.

[The prepared statement of General Stultz can be found in the Appendix on page 49.]

Mr. FORBES. General, thank you. And we owe them the same thing and thank you for helping us provide that to them.

General Wyatt.

**STATEMENT OF LT GEN HARRY M. WYATT III, USAF,
DIRECTOR, AIR NATIONAL GUARD**

General WYATT. Let me just say that it is an honor and privilege to be here with you today, and on behalf of the 106,700 Air National Guardsmen that are representing our country so well.

As we meet here today, there are over 6,289 Guard airmen deployed around the world in Iraq, Afghanistan, providing, for example, air logistic support to the National Science Foundation in Antarctica and Greenland, and helping to defend U.S. interests in every continent around the globe.

In addition, 3,437 Air National Guard men and women are protecting our homeland, including protecting the sovereignty of American airspace. And then, Mr. Chairman, you and Ranking Member Bordallo both referenced the ASA mission. I learned just recently that the mission that I traditionally referred to as ASA is now referred to by NORAD [North American Aerospace Defense Command] as ACA, Aerospace Control Alert.

So if I lapse back into an old vocabulary, please forgive me. They are one in the same, sir. So ASA, in my mind equates, to ACA. But these 3,437 Air National Guard airmen that are defending the homeland right now include not only those ASA-ACA folks, but assisting several authorities in the protection of life and property in the United States, flood control as we have recently seen here on the East Coast, tornado recovery efforts in the Midwest, and fire support in the southwest part of the country.

Air Guard members are helping U.S. Customs and Border Patrol on the border as we speak. And so far, in regard to that, the mobile air firefighting system, the Air National Guard, has delivered over 360,000 gallons of fire retardant in support of the National Forest Service interagency help.

When the air campaign of Operation Desert Storm began in January 1991—I am going to take you through just a really brief history of the percentage of support that the Air National Guard has given our United States Air Force—back in Operation Desert Storm, 1991, 11 percent of the U.S. Air Force aircraft that were

flown in that operation were maintained by Air National Guard airmen.

Fast forward to April 1993, when the U.S. Air Force was called upon to support NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] in the campaign to protect civilians in Bosnia. Recall also that, as a by-product of Operation Desert Storm, we were also doing Operation Northern Watch and Southern Watch over Iraq.

Continuing to support national security requirements around the world at that point in time, the Air National Guard provided 45 percent of the deployed United States Air Force aircraft for Bosnia, Kosovo, Northern Watch, and Southern Watch, in addition to providing countless support operations around the globe.

As demands upon the U.S. Air Force expanded beyond flight operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Air National Guard men and women were there providing medical assistance around the world. I had the privilege yesterday of attending the Air Force Association awards banquet. General Johns, representing Air Mobility Command, one of his units, his MAJCOM [Major Command] gained units, won an award for the medical assistance.

And he summoned General Stenner and myself to the stand, to the awards stand, because he recognized that 94 percent of the United States Air Force medical capability resides in the Reserve Component. This is a dual-use capability, as Ranking Member Bordallo pointed out, that is also available to our governors.

As you recall, Secretary Gates recently directed the National Guard to stand up 10 homeland response forces comprised of Army National Guard and Air National Guard members. They are about 556 strong. And one of the large pieces of that, on behalf of the Air National Guard, is this medical assistance, where we are able to deploy those skills that we have to support the warfighter overseas in support of our citizens here at home when we have a natural disaster or terrorist attack.

And in addition to medical assistance, some of the other capabilities that we provide, non-flying, our explosive disposal experts, security forces, battlefield airmen, and other combat and support task. Today, Guard airmen are serving alongside our Air Force Joint Force and coalition partners around the world. I provide some of these statistics to emphasize that the men and women of today's Air National Guard are ready. And not only are they ready, but they are willing and, in fact, anxious to serve their Nation both here at home and abroad.

As we look to the many challenges of this country ahead, my goal is to lay the foundations for an Air Force that has the capability and the capacity to meet tomorrow's challenges, within the constraints that we can foresee. I believe that the Air National Guard, as well as the Air Force Reserve, are a part of the solution. We have proven time and again to be ready, willing and accessible.

Operation Odyssey Dawn, Operator Unified Protector, the aerial tanking refueling was done by 22 aircraft, 16 of which were Air National Guard. There was no mobilization authority, but over 800 Air National Guard's airmen deployed in support of that operation, without any mobilization authority—100 percent volunteers.

After the Vietnam War, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird created the Total Force Concept, realizing that by increasing reliance

on the Reserve Components through improved equipment and increased training the Nation could maintain defense capability at a lower cost.

That concept is even more valid today than it was back in 1970. And your investment in the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account has been a critical component to the Air National Guard as we increased our readiness through the last 20 years. For example, without that investment our Block 30 F-16s, which are the backbone of protecting America's skies, would have been irrelevant by now.

The Air National Guard is a cost-effective, professional, ready airspace and cyberspace force. Based upon its traditional part-time professional workforce, and because we operate primarily from civilian airports and small community bases, we provide the cost-effectiveness that this country needs at this critical time.

You have created the most the professional combat-ready force in the history of the Air National Guard. Today's Guard airmen understand that the Nation needs more of them than one weekend a month and 2 weeks in the summer. And they are ready and willing to answer the call. All they ask is that we continue to provide them with the equipment, the training and the resources they need to accomplish the mission.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Wyatt can be found in the Appendix on page 82.]

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General.

General Carpenter.

**STATEMENT OF MG RAYMOND W. CARPENTER, USA, ACTING
DIRECTOR, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD**

General CARPENTER. Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Bordallo, it is an honor and a privilege to be here today to represent the 360,000-plus Army Guard soldiers. Currently there are 39,485 soldiers mobilized, and more than half of our force has combat experience. The sacrifice of our soldiers, their families and employers has been tremendous, and they deserve our deepest gratitude.

Looking back on the past decade, the Army National Guard has been there from the very beginning. The New York National Guard was among the first on the scene at the World Trade Center on 9/11, as was Maryland and Virginia in the days after the Pentagon was attacked.

Beginning with the 9/11 response, the Army National Guard has continued to shoulder our responsibilities in the overseas fight in Afghanistan and Iraq, while simultaneously responding to events in the homeland, the largest of which was Hurricane Katrina.

And the service of our Army National Guard continues. For example, the weekend of August 26 through the 29th past, the National Guard had more than 63,000 National Guardsmen on duty protecting this country at home and abroad. Over 47,500 National Guardsmen were deployed in support of overseas contingency operations and partnership-building missions.

Almost 10,000 members of the National Guard on that weekend, from 24 states, responded to Hurricane Irene. We staged three

ground task forces, three air task forces, and we pre-staged them in anticipation of landfall for Hurricane Irene. Another 1,000 National Guardsmen provided security on our Nation's southwest borders. An additional 4,000 National Guardsmen responded to a range of domestic emergencies across this country.

The experience of the past decade has transformed the Army National Guard to an operational force—"our national treasure," in the words of a recently-retired, four-star Active Duty general. As an operational force, the Army National Guard represents the best value for America. Force structure and military power can be sustained in the Army National Guard for a fraction of the regular cost. The Army National Guard is one-third of the total Army, but accounts for approximately 10 percent of the total Army budget.

Supporting capability in the Army National Guard makes good business sense. The Army National Guard could not have evolved into the operational force without the support of this committee and Congress. Our Nation has invested over \$37 billion in equipment for the Army National Guard in the past 6 years. The delivery of that equipment has increased Army National Guard equipment on-hand rates for critical dual-use equipment by 14 percent.

Because the Army Guard is a full partner with the Active Component, it is vital for the Guard to continue modernizing equipment. Modernization and interoperability are essential for training during the Army National Guard pre-mobilization periods, and critical for deployments.

It is no secret that the Department of Defense and the Army are facing reduced funding. We in the Army Guard understand that, and have already set about garnering efficiencies and developing new strategies that will allow us to continue to meet our dual-mission responsibilities with less funding. Those two missions have required an Army National Guard of 360,000 soldiers formed into 54 joint force headquarters, 8 combat divisions, 28 brigade combat teams, 8 combat aviation brigades, and over 70 enabling brigades during the past 10 years.

We are reminded regularly that we live in a very dangerous and unpredictable world. And it seems like the predicted 100-year natural disaster events are coming closer and closer together. We have built a capability to respond to the needs of our citizens at home and abroad. We ought to fully understand the risk associated with reducing that capability. Because, in the words of a combat commander in Afghanistan, "Sometimes all it takes is all you have."

The Army National Guard is a force forward-deployed in the area of operation, the homeland. We have built great capacity in the National Guard by establishing forces specifically designed to deal with emergencies, disasters and potential terrorist attacks.

Those units include Guard civil support teams, of which there are 57, 17 chemical-biological emergency response forces, 10 homeland response forces. General Wyatt mentioned that we are in the process of building the last eight of those in this next fiscal year, and two domestic all-hazards response teams.

By one estimate, 96 percent of the events that happen across our country are handled by local first responders, policemen, firemen and the National Guard. Only 4 percent require Federal support. It has taken years to build these organizations. We should not rush

to reduce the size, structure or capability of the Army National Guard without significant analysis and thorough deliberation.

I would like to specifically address a separate issue. And that issue is access to the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve in non-named contingencies. The Department of Defense requested a change in the statute section 12304 which would allow the Reserve Components to be involuntary called with prior coordination at the service-chief level, as well as the necessary budgetary authority to support the deployment.

The Army National Guard and the adjutant generals are staunch advocates of the change in statute. We think that it will allow for the continued critical contributions of our soldiers and units in the effective use of soft power—that is, theater security and cooperation—in the hope of reducing the possibility of mobilized military response in the future.

We think our soldiers, equipped with their battlefield experience and civilian skills as well as their strong desire to be used, can make meaningful contributions to their state and nation, are the right force at the right time. Without the change in statute, they will be denied the opportunity.

In the end, we have asked for the Army National Guard's share of the budget reductions to be given to us, the Army Guard. Let us, the Army Guard, figure out where to pay the bill. Don't direct reductions in Guard brigade combat teams or end strength.

In closing, the Army National Guard is battle-tested, and well-equipped for both of our missions. And this committee has been critical in building and sustaining the best manned, trained and equipped National Guard I have seen in my career. Truly a best value for America. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Carpenter can be found in the Appendix on page 92.]

Mr. FORBES. Thank you gentlemen. And we have got some individuals on this subcommittee who have a great deal of expertise when it comes to the Reserves and Guard, so we want to get to their questions. I am going to defer most of my questions until the end, but I do have two that I would like to just set up for you at the beginning.

General Stultz, the chart that you have does not reflect what I think is just a tremendous story for the Reserve and Guard that you gentlemen have played in it. And that is, how you have changed kind of the overall complexion of the Reserve and the Guard units.

As you mentioned, if you go back 15 years ago, maybe 20 years ago, I know a lot of people you talked to as to why they served in the Reserve or the Guard it is because it was easy. I mean, you know, they would do their one weekend a month and their 2 weeks. And we heard that a lot. Even when we began the beginning of this last decade we heard that from some people.

Something happened. You transformed that. And when most of us travel to Afghanistan and Iraq, we are trying to find those individuals now and we can't. When you go to anybody and say, "You know, here everybody says that you want to be home. How tough is it?" They all look you in the eye and say, "This is what we want to do. This is what we have signed up to do."

And so my question to all three of you, if you can help us with this is, why do men and women want to serve in the Reserve or the Guards today, you know, as opposed to the Active Duty? You have done just a wonderful job in recruiting top-flight people who are willing to pay those prices. What is it that draws them? And what risk do we have of losing that if we had these huge cuts?

And one other thing. General Stultz, can you just clarify for me in the chart you gave me? As I look at this, when I look at the medical between the Reserve and the Guard, it looks like to me that 74 percent of all the medical for the Army is being provided by the Reserve and the Guard, and 79 percent of the transportation. I just want to make sure I am not misreading that, and when we state that, it is accurate.

So, if all three of you would have at that.

General STULTZ. Yes, sir. With the question you just asked, the chart that I showed is the number of units in the Active and the Guard and in Reserve. And out of the total units in the medical force, 74 percent of them are in the Guard and Reserve. Out of the total units in the transportation force, 79 percent are now in the Guard and Reserve. So, it is the total number of units. So, it is that capability. Because that is what we deploy. We deploy units on the battlefield.

With regard to your first question, you know that is one of the things I said. And as I meet with soldiers in Iraq, Afghanistan, I ask myself and I ask them a lot of times—"Why?"

You know, when you are sitting there across the table having dinner with Lieutenant [inaudible] several years ago—he is from California—and I said, "So where did you go to school?" And he said, "Grad or undergrad?" So, I said, "Okay, grad school." And he said, "So I got my Ph.D. from MIT."

And I said, "So what do you do? What did you major in?" And he gave me this look like "You are not going to understand this." And he proceeded to prove himself because he talked about thought patterns turning into speech patterns and the processes and the neurons. And I said, "What do you do for a living?" And he said, "Sir, I develop artificial intelligence." And I said, "What are you doing here?"

And he said, "Sir, I was in grad school at MIT when 9/11 occurred, and I just felt compelled to serve my country. But I don't want to give up my civilian career and my education. I don't want to be a full-time soldier all the time. And the Army Reserve lets me do that. It lets me pursue my civilian goals, and also be part of something special, this brotherhood and sisterhood of men and women in uniform."

And I think that is part of the answer. It is this generation that we have got today that they are living the American dream, in some cases with good education, good jobs. But they just want to give back. But they don't want to give up what they have earned. And so the Reserve Component allows them to do that.

And for our military, you put a Reserve soldier, Guard or Reserve, on the battlefield you put a force multiplier on the battlefield. Because they bring civilian education and skills, in a lot of cases, that the Active Army just can't develop.

You know, when I am in Afghanistan, and I have a young sergeant come up to me and say, "Hey, sir. I want to get my picture taken with you because I work at Procter & Gamble, too." And I said, "Well, I retired from P&G when I took this job." And he said, "I know, sir. But I want to get my picture taken with you." And I said, "So what do you do at P&G?" And he said, "Sir, I am a scientist." And he says, "What did you do?" And I said, "Don't worry about it."

I mean, that is the quality of soldiers that we have got in our force today, and we can't afford as a nation to lose them. That is that right side of that chart. That is those individuals that said, "I just want to be part of something and give back to America, and still be a civilian career and education that I have got."

If we cut support to them it is not just going to be a blow to the Reserve, it is going to be a blow to this Nation. Because the talent and the quality we have in our force—and for one-third of the cost, in a lot of estimates of what it costs for a full-time soldier—what we get in return is remarkable.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General.

General Wyatt.

General WYATT. Chairman Forbes, a lot of the things that General Stultz indicated are true in the Air Guard, too. I think, broadly, patriotism. And I will link that to some of my other comments here. But patriotism, the ability and the privilege to serve alongside Americans that are of like ilk.

I think the good feeling of joining an organization, a professional organization, that is trained to the same standards as our Active Duty brothers and sisters, an effective force, an opportunity to continue that service to country, the ability to live where they want to live and pursue the dreams that they want to pursue, both militarily and in their civilian lives.

I am no different than any other Guardsman. But I served my first 6 years on active duty. I had always wanted to go to law school, but back in the Vietnam days I decided to join the Air Force, and I wanted to be a fighter pilot.

And after I was a fighter pilot for about 6 years, that desire to get into law school came back, and I started checking out some programs. And the Air Force would send me to law school, but then I couldn't be a pilot anymore. I had to be a JAG [Judge Advocate General], and I wanted to be both. And the Air Guard offered me the opportunity to pursue both of my dreams.

I continued being a fighter pilot. I continued to go to law school. I graduated, practiced law. One point in time, when I was the wing commander at Tulsa in the F-16 unit, I was also a state court trial judge. And I tell people that, and they say, "How do you do that?" I say, "The same way that all the other Air National Guardsmen do it. Because we want to, because we can, and that is what we want to do. We want to serve this country, but pursue our individual dreams, too."

And I think when you can join an organization that has transitioned from being a strategic Reserve, like the Air Guard was when I first joined, into an operational force where you can't tell the difference, you go into combat and everyone, Guard, Reserve and Active Component are trained at the same standard.

You know, when you take a look at the contributions of that flight of four that took down al-Zarqawi in Iraq, it was Active Duty, Guard and Reserve. It was an Air National Guard targeting pod provided by Engria that spotted the guy and got him. That is how the total force works, and the Air National Guard gives our individuals that opportunity to make their contributions to the national defense in the way that they want.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General.

General Carpenter.

General CARPENTER. Chairman Forbes, we have a chart not unlike what General Stultz has in the Army Reserve in terms of our history with regard to end strength. And it is similar in terms of the dip that you see in 2005–2006. And what we saw in 2005–2006 was the change in the Reserve Component from the strategic Reserve to this operational Reserve that we have today.

And what happened in 2005–2006 is, we had a cohort that had joined back before 9/11. And we had talked and we had sold college benefits and those kinds of things in terms of service to country. And to their credit, they went down-range and they did a terrific job.

But when they came back and they were reunited with their families and their employers, there was an influence there that said, “You know what? I am not sure we are willing to do this again.” And we saw a lot of those soldiers make a decision, for the right reasons, to leave our formations.

At that point, we began changing the way we recruited people, the way we recruited soldiers. And what we did was, we recruited them for patriotism, for service to country. And we had soldiers who wanted to be part of something, who wanted to be part of a team, who wanted to go do something for their country, and yet were not interested in residing on Fort Hood or Fort Bliss or in the Active Component. And that Army National Guard team, that Army National Guard family, you find throughout our organization.

I was at the Gulf oil spill a year ago. I met a father-and-son team. They had both come into the National Guard since 9/11, and they were very proud of their service. They were not only doing work on the oil spill in Louisiana, they were getting ready to deploy into Afghanistan. And they have been mobilized, and they are down-range together. The son, by the way, has graduated from OCS [Officer Candidate School] and he is a second lieutenant. His father is an E–5 sergeant, about to be a staff sergeant.

I ran into a mother-daughter team at the southwest border in Texas 6 months ago when I was down there. Same story. They had joined since 9/11. The mother was so proud of her service, and she wanted her daughter to be part of something. And she invited her daughter into the organization, and invited her to be part of the Texas National Guard.

People don’t do that if they don’t feel good about their service, if they don’t like what they are doing. As a matter of fact, their tendency would be to serve and leave as opposed to invite their friends and, in this case family members, to be part of this organization.

So, we think we have got a great team in this Army National Guard. We think we have a treasure across this country, not unlike the other Reserve Components. And so it is my pleasure to represent them here today.

Mr. FORBES. Well, thank you, gentlemen. Thank all three of you for the great job you have done.

Ms. Bordallo is now recognized for any questions she may have.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I decided I am going to go ahead with my first question, on behalf of Congresswoman Gabby Giffords. General Wyatt, I believe this question might be for you.

As you know, Congresswoman Giffords is very proud of the brave men and women of Tucson's 162nd Fighter Wing. And she feels strongly their primary mission of building international partnerships via training tactical skill sets is a strategic imperative during these fiscally austere times.

So, as the Joint Strike Fighter comes online, how do you envision the Wing's mission evolving? And can you discuss strategic significance of the Barry Goldwater training range?

General WYATT. Ms. Bordallo, thank you very much for the question. I had the honor and privilege of being in Tucson last Thursday. We were at part of the 162nd Fighter Wing. An attendant unit there is the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard Test Center. And I was getting some out-briefs on our weapons and tactics conferences. This is where our warfighters come in across all of the core functions of the United States Air Force and tell us the equipment and the training that is critical to them in order to be a front-line military force.

It is a great treasure that we have in Tucson at the 162nd Fighter Wing. The Wing's main mission, as Ms. Giffords knows, is to train foreign military students in the F-16 and the skills that are necessary to do that. Not only do you have to have the skills of being a fighter pilot, but you have to be able to teach the skills. And there is a big difference in being able to do it, and being able to do it and teach it.

And you throw in the additional challenge of having students who may not be quite as proficient in the English language as we would like them to be, it takes a special talent, special skill, that exists nowhere else in the United States Air Force except Tucson, Arizona. So it is a national treasure.

As we are seeing in the paper, and we are following the development of the F-35, we know that in addition to the coalition partners that have signed on as part of the Joint Strike Fighter F-35 program there are a lot of other countries now who are recognizing the capability that this aircraft offers, and they are approaching the United States for opportunities to buy that aircraft.

I see a need, a continuing need, for the 162nd to continue doing not only the F-16 foreign military training mission, but to gradually transition into the F-35 as more and more of the F-35 become available to our coalition partners and allies that desire to get into that airplane. So I do see them transitioning into the F-35.

In fact, they were one of the training bases that was identified a year ago this last July by the Secretary and the chief of staff as one of the potential bed-down bases for F-35 training. They were

not selected as the primary location—I think Luke was and Eglin—but they were certainly on the list. And I would think, as this aircraft comes into the inventory, they will get closer and closer to realizing that mission.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, General. And I know that Congresswoman Giffords will appreciate what each of you do for our country, and we look forward to having her back with us again soon.

My question then for, I guess, each of the witnesses; what would be the impact on the National Guard and Reserves if you had to go back to the strategic Reserve model of training and deployments?

If you can just quickly answer that, beginning with you, General?

General STULTZ. Yes, ma'am. As I indicated, the chart here I think is indicative. I think we will lose a lot of soldiers. Just what Chairman Forbes asked, "Why are they here?" They are here because they want to serve and they want to do something, will say, "If I am not going to have the opportunity, if I am going to go back to a strategic one-weekend-a-month service, I don't want to stay in."

So we will lose that investment, and we will lose that talent. But additionally, this Nation will lose their ability to respond because of the capabilities that we have. We are the ones that open the theatre. We are the trucks, we are the boats, we are the logistics, we are the people who push that force into the theatre to respond to a contingency.

And if we don't invest and if we don't maintain this support we will lose that ability also. And the next time we have to respond to a contingency somewhere else in the world it will take us longer as a nation to respond and get the forces in, in the magnitude that we need.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you.

General.

General WYATT. Congresswoman, I think the answer is very similar. If we were relegated back to strategic Reserve, à la the Air National Guard that I joined back in 1977, I think we would have a mass exodus of people. Because they are joining our organizations now because they know they train to the same standards, they know they are as good as, they know they provide the top line combat capability, and they want to continue doing that.

We offer them the opportunity to do that at a significantly reduced cost to the country. And they recognize that they are the best bang for the buck as far as providing that military capability. If we put them back on the burner as a strategic Reserve they will still cost the country money, but they won't be able to provide that front-line—respond at the same speed of light—that the Active service responds. They won't be able to provide that capability.

The other thing we do is, we take away the abilities of the governors and the adjutants general to respond to the domestic demands of their offices as those guardsmen are in Title 32 status. We train to such high standards in the military, and we use the level of that training in response to our state missions, too.

So if we do that, we would actually be taking a double hit. We would lose military combat capability, besides losing our people.

And we would lose the ability to respond on a moment's notice on behalf of the governors and the adjutants general.

Ms. BORDALLO. I think that what comes to my mind is the experience they bring. I mean, that is just invaluable. It is—

General WYATT. Well, if I may—

Ms. BORDALLO. Yes.

General WYATT [continuing]. Along those lines, one of the reasons that we are cost-effective—and I will talk about fighter pilots because that is what I am most familiar with—is because of the experience level that we have in the combat air forces inside of the Air National Guard, our experience level is—this is based on the number of hours and sorties and numbers of deployments and other things, skill levels—we have a 90 percent skill level in the Air National Guard. The Active Component is 40 percent.

This allows us to maintain that high level of proficiency while we fly our people two less sorties per month than the Active Component gets. When you talk about an aircraft that costs \$10,000 to \$20,000 an hour to fly, we save perhaps a half million dollars per pilot a year just because of our experience level. And we can do that because of that experience level.

Ms. BORDALLO. General Carpenter.

General CARPENTER. Ma'am, I would echo everything that General Stultz and General Wyatt had to say. I would add this. With regard to returning to a strategic Reserve, there is no funding in the Army's base budget to support the mandates and the additional requirements that go along with this operational Reserve.

We have built this operational force on OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations funding], and when OCO goes away we in the Guard and the Reserve are going to be back to 48 drills and 15 days of AT [annual training]. So there will be no requirement for anybody to do anything except watch as this force is put back in the box, back to 48 drills and 15 days of annual training.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you very much. And one other quick question I have. This is in regard to the future of the C-27J. Can you talk about the future viability of the fleet, and the intended platform mission sets, given the growing concern that the reduced inventory will not be able to adequately support crew proficiency, operational readiness, and infrastructure investments?

As you know, this committee remains concerned that the Department plans to retire the C-23 Sherpas without accounting for how the tactical airlift will be accomplished. The C-27J was the replacement aircraft, but the program was significantly cut and shifted to the Air Force. So what are the plans to support domestic emergency operations and other contingencies?

General, begin with you.

General WYATT. Congresswoman, that is an excellent question, and one that I think is hard-pressed to answer right now. Let me just review a couple of things that have happened in recent years, talking about the C-27. I will let General Carpenter talk about the C-23.

But if you go back to 2005, BRAC [Base Realignment and Closure], the Air National Guard lost over 20 percent of its C-130s as a result of BRAC. We were able to respond to Katrina with over 220 aircraft because the effects of BRAC had not begun to be im-

plemented. Now our numbers are well below that 200 level, coupled at a time when the Army has put the C-23, perhaps, on the chopping block. And I will let General Carpenter address that.

As has previously been referenced, the program of record right now for the C-27J is 38. And so, we are marching to that tune. As we speak, the C-27 is deployed in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The Mansfield Air National Guard is flying that aircraft in combat today.

The anticipation of the need of this aircraft being flown in direct support to the Army in the theatre, and the reduced numbers, drives the Air National Guard then to consider ways to meet those mission requirements overseas with all the airplanes that will eventually be deployed overseas, at the same time as continuing our training here at home to keep our pilots and air crew proficient and also bring on new pilots and air crew.

This has required us to up the crew ratio per airplane—traditionally somewhere around two crews per airplane for an airlifter—to five, to allow enough air crews to do the deployment mission overseas and continue training here. So that is how that has affected us.

We continue to look forward to continue feeling of the C-27J. The demands for the domestic operation are where I have great concern. Because while the Air Force will tell you that there is sufficient airlift to handle the demands of the country around the world, the question I ask is, “Okay, but how long does it take us as an Air Force to do that?”

We look at the requirement for domestic operations, 72 hours is a lifetime. It is an unacceptable time-response frame. When the governors call upon airlift, they need the airlift right now. It speaks for a need of what I would call “organic airlift,” airlift that is in the Air National Guard at the behest of the governors so that they can respond to national emergencies.

The Mobility Capabilities Requirement Study 2016 that came out addressed support to the homeland, but it referenced the access to the Active Duty airplanes which will be available. But most of them are deployed, and I would submit to you it takes about 3 days to get a C-130 from Japan home. That is 72 hours.

Ms. BORDALLO. Oh, I agree with that, sir.

General WYATT. You know the time and distance. The response to the civilian fleet is the same thing. It takes about 96 hours to get a civilian aircraft on contract to do a domestic mission. All those are too late for the response to the homeland. So I am working with the Air Force, and I am getting a lot of support to go back and look at the domestic requirements for airlift. Especially in view of the fact that, subsequent to the Mobility Capabilities Requirement Study, Secretary Gates said, “Stand up these 10 homeland response forces, 556 soldiers and airmen, to be able to respond.”

Sometimes needing airlift, most probably needing airlift, as the National Level Exercise 11 in May showed us when we practiced for the fault line earthquakes—Mississippi, Ohio, et cetera. There is a need.

I think we need to determine what the requirements are for the homeland. I have asked for the help of NORTHCOM [Northern Command], and NORTHCOM is helping us develop those require-

ments in conjunction with Air Mobility Command, Transportation Command, so that we can get a true handle on the requirements for the domestic airlift, in addition to the warfight airlift requirements.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you General.

And quickly, General Carpenter. I know I have overstayed my time, I guess.

General CARPENTER. Yes, Congresswoman. A couple of key points. All the C-23s are in the Army National Guard. Because of a budget decision, we have been directed to divest ourselves of all of those C-23s by FY [fiscal year] 2015. We currently have four that are parked on the ramp in Texas. They are no longer available for us to use and we will progressively park the rest of them over the next 4 or 5 years.

We think that the gap that General Wyatt alluded to right now in terms of homeland defense and support, that is coming and is being accomplished by the C-23s. But for the C-23s, we wouldn't be filling that gap in terms of short takeoff and landing and tactical air kind of things that are being provided by the C-23s. We think that it is a pretty valuable aircraft.

I was in Balad 6 months ago, in Iraq. There were 10 aircraft on the ground there, 9 present for duty because 1 was in transit. All nine of those aircraft flew that evening. And they supported everything from Special Ops [Special Operations] to normal flights back and forth. And so this aircraft provides that kind of capability. It also provides observer support during the oil spill, for domestic operations.

We have two of them in the MFO [Multinational Force] Sinai mission that provide observer support in that venue to support the MFO Sinai mission there. So we think they are a great aircraft. Unfortunately, we are going to be divesting ourselves of those particular aircraft over the next 4 years.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much. Thank you, General.

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman from Nevada, Dr. Heck is recognized for 5 minutes.

Dr. HECK. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Thanks to all three of you for your lifetime of selfless service to our Nation. And in the interest of full disclosure, I will say that I am one of the over 205,000 Army Reservists that General Stultz commands.

Just a quick comment at first. I won't take away from the idea that those that join now do so out of patriotism, but I think it is also important to know it is a two-way street. Folks join the Reserves so they get to do some pretty neat things that they don't get to do—that that scientist at P&G [Procter and Gamble] or the MIT Ph.D. is not going to get an opportunity to jump out of airplanes, fast rope out of helicopters, and not to mention the incredible leadership training opportunities that will set them up for success in their civilian careers. So it is a two-way street.

General Stultz, as you know my area of concern mostly is military medical readiness, and we have had several discussions on that. First, I want to start off by congratulating Major General Stone and Colonel Kiernan for the things that they have done to help clean up some of the issues that we have seen with overdue profiles.

My question is, has there been an audit done of the LHI [Logistics Health, Inc.] contract and the costs associated with those mass events per unit soldier, the cost and the impact of no-shows on vouchers, and ways to look at cost containment by pushing more of what LHI does back to our military force?

I know we are doing ORWs [Operation Ready Warrior] for dental, which have been successful, rolling perhaps those out to include vision and immunizations, having our medical personnel perform the physical examinations for those that are being jammed up by temporary profiles.

So one, has there been an audit? If not, are there plans to have an audit? And what are the plans to move forward to push some of those activities being contracted out back to our TPU [Troop Program Unit] soldiers?

General STULTZ. To answer the first question, as a formal audit I can't say that we have done a formal—if you want to call it an audit—to run the traps on it. We have looked at how much we are spending and what it is costing us and is it cost effective.

As you well know, we have gone back to LHI to renegotiate some of the provisions of the contract to limit what they actually do for us. And I think the big question I have asked, to be perfectly straight with you, in the process of what LHI does for us when a soldier fills out the personal health assessment, a doctor from LHI who has no access to that soldier's records makes a determination of what care or what profile he needs.

But it still has to go to our Regional Support Commands to get further looked at by a doctor. And in a lot of cases further on, I am not sure what the value is there exactly. And what we have to do, I think, as we are going to be forced to draw down in our budgets, is do what we have already started, as you allude to.

We are going to have to do a lot of this stuff ourselves, and use our own resources. Now in the past, we have gotten away from that because of the demand and the op tempo [operations tempo] and the training needs and everything else we have had on our medical force.

But as that demand comes down, as we draw down out of Iraq and as we gradually draw down out of Afghanistan, those medical resources that we have got within our Reserve are going to become more available to us. We have got to take advantage of them. We have got to get back to the traditional, where we use our own resources to perform those medical examinations, those medical determinations, because we can do that on our time.

You know, when we try to send a soldier to get a medical exam, we have to do that based on when the doctor is available. And quite often we take that soldier away from his civilian job. When we use our own resources, we have a little bit more control over saying, "You are going to go here on this weekend, where the soldier is already there, and you are going to give him that examination and all."

So yes, sir. I am all for, and have our staff looking at, shifting more and more of that, as we started in American Samoa, as we have started in Alaska, as we have started in other areas where we are providing medical and dental support to our soldiers on ex-

ercises. Now, how do we get to them on the drill weekends and continue that support?

Dr. HECK. I appreciate that, and it is very encouraging. And I would encourage at some point that there is a full audit done of LHI to see whether or not what they are providing has been cost-effective. And as we start to move some of those activities back to our TPU or ARS [Army Reserve Soldiers] soldiers, that we can see whether or not it is truly cost-effective.

So thank you and thank you for your forthrightness.

General STULTZ. Roger, sir.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you Dr. Heck.

The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. LoBiondo is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentleman, thank you for being here. Thank you for your service.

General Wyatt, you know my sympathies were focused on the 177th and I classify them—I don't know if all of my colleagues would agree—as the premier homeland security base, primarily because of their strategic location and what they can bring to the fight in so many ways.

But could you give us some insight on where you see—and I am going to go with the old name too, ASA, because it is going to take me a while to get switched over—the ASA mission going and its construct in the future, in light of the Air Force budget cuts which may have an effect on critical Air National Guard missions?

And additionally, I am wondering if you have been speaking with the Air Force brass, their leadership, to ensure that the ASA units receive the upgrades necessary. I have been talking about this, and Mr. Chairman you have been helpful with this and this committee has been helpful. But some of these Air Guard units are running with iron that is just—their wings are going to fall off.

And if they can't fly they don't have a mission. So I would hope you could talk to us a little bit about this.

General WYATT. Mr. LoBiondo, first of all 177th, great organization. You are right. Their strategic location, along with probably the 113th here in DC to protect the National Capital Region, is strategically probably the two most important locations that we have. They are all important because they protect the American citizens.

But I see the ASA-ACA mission as one imperative for the safety of this country. It is mission number one. There has been a recent study done by a former commander of NORTHCOM, Admiral Sandy Winnefeld, who is now the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Some of that is classified, and I won't get into that.

But I think that a review of that report shows the importance of that mission for homeland security. So I see a continuing reliance upon the Air Sovereignty Alert mission for the safety of this country.

On September 11, 2001, we were up at seven locations. Today, in the continental United States, we have 16 locations. All of those are flown by the Air National Guard. The United States Air Force flies one in Alaska with F-22s.

We get into this discussion about whether you need fifth-generation fighters to do the Air Sovereignty Alert, not necessarily for the

stealth, but for all the other capabilities that fifth generation brings—ESR [electronically scanning radar] radar, integrated sensor fusion among not only the sensors on the aircraft itself, but all of the other sensors available—land-based radar, radio reports, chats, a lot of different sources for some information to help us in the intercept of these targets.

And then Hawaii Air National Guard location, who will be flying the ASA-ACA mission in F-22s. The airplanes, most of the airplanes, that we do the ASA-ACA mission with are the oldest F-16s in the inventory. And you are very familiar with that because the 177th flies a Block 30 F-16.

The Air Force has put in some weapons system sustainment money that will keep the airframes themselves viable, we think, for a couple of more years. We thought 2017-2018 would be the structural limitations. We think there are sufficient monies to keep them flying until 2019, maybe 2020. But the structural part is just a part of the issue.

The other part, and probably for the mission equally as important, is the ability to detect, meaning these aircraft need state of the art radars. The ones that they are flying with now are extremely expensive and difficult to maintain. A lot of the parts are no longer manufactured.

Only because we have the best maintenance people in the world in the Air National Guard are we able to keep some of these support systems onboard the aircraft working. They lack beyond line of sight radio communications that are necessary for this mission. They lack the ability to integrate and infuse all of the sensor data that is available for intercepts.

And so we are kind of operating with our hands behind our back here as we go forward. We can still accomplish the mission in the short term. My concern is the long term. And if we don't put money either into these aircraft to give them the capabilities that they need to continue, or if we don't replace them with the F-35 aircraft, we face a continuing rising expense, perhaps cost prohibitive, if there is such a thing for the Department's number one mission. Or we are going to see mission failure because we simply cannot stretch the life of these airplanes out any longer.

Right now, the only Air National Guard unit that performs Air Sovereignty Alert that has been named to receive the F-35 is Burlington, Vermont. No other Air National Guard unit has been named. And you have got to remember that the units that do ASA and ACA, that is not their only mission. They also rotate and do the AEF [Air Expeditionary Force] mission OCONUS [outside of contiguous United States] overseas, Iraq and Afghanistan, and other possible locations in the world where stealth is a requirement to be able to get into access-denied areas.

So I think a healthy investment in the F-35 and the Air National Guard is great, is required not only for the foreign fight overseas, but more importantly for the defense of this country with the ASA-ACA missions.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, General.

Mr. Chairman I had a couple of more questions, but maybe I can submit them for the record.

Mr. FORBES. We would be glad to take those into the record.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you.

Mr. FORBES. Gentleman from Texas recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. Reyes.

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And gentlemen, thank you for being here this morning. I apologize for having to leave, but we have got some conflicts in some of our committees.

As I fly home almost every weekend through Dallas, I get a chance to interact quite a bit with not just regular duty soldiers and airmen and sailors going through Dallas, but also recently a bunch of National Guard and Reserve individuals as well.

And one of the things I asked them, you know—particularly since 9/11—we have asked a lot of our Reserves and National Guardsmen. And one issue that keeps coming up is the predictability of military service. And it may be a contradiction in terms because it doesn't make sense. Because they tell me prior to 9/11 they had a good idea of whenever they might be called up because of floods, hurricanes, those kinds of weather-related issues.

Post 9/11, however, it is a completely different situation. We are asking a lot of them. We are asking them to leave their jobs for extended periods.

So my question is, how do you plan—or maybe it should be can you plan—to somewhere, at some point, normalize again the activation and mobilization of our Reserves and National Guardsmen. Is that viable now, post 9/11? Are we, at some point, going to be able to give them that predictability for activation?

Because retention is the big issue. You know, so many of them say, as my colleague was saying, “We get to do some pretty neat stuff.” And in the old days it was under more of a normal environment. So I kind of would like to get each of your comments on that aspect of it.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 127.]

General STULTZ. Yes sir. From the perspective of the Army Reserve, yes sir, I think we can. When I talk to soldiers and I ask them, “What do you want?” They really give me three specifics usually, the first one being predictability. “Because I have got another job, I have got another life, and I need to be able to predict when the Army is going to use me and when I am going to be able to focus on my other career.”

Then their second thing is, “Don't waste my time. If you are going to train me make it effective, make it worthwhile. Don't just waste my time.” And the third one is, “Use me. I have signed up to do something, I want to do something, so use me.”

And what we have adopted is, you have heard of the ARFORGEN, the Army Force Generation model, which is a 5-year model for the Army Reserve. For every 1 year, or whatever you are called up, you get 4 years back home of stability and progressive training readiness to get back to that fifth year.

Soldiers have said, and employers have said, “If you can give me that predictability, I can live with that. Because 4 years in a 20-year career, that means I would be used about three, four times at most. It gives me about 4 years back home.” Which for most of our kids—and I call them kids—they change jobs about every 4 or 5

years. So they start a different career anyway in a lot of cases. So they are used to kind of starting over.

That is the key. And the key to getting that ARFORGEN model is, one, we have got to be able to get the Army to say this is what we need from you each year. And then we have got to slice it into five slices, and build our force structure so we can give the Army what they require every year in a predictable manner.

And then we have got to build that training and equipping model, which requires the resources to be able to give that soldier what he wants, meaningful training. "Don't waste my time." It is going to be meaningful whether it is simulations, or whether it is in-the-dirt training with the modern equipment. And if we can do that the soldiers will say, "I will be here with you," and employers say, "We will be here with you also."

General CARPENTER. Sir, not unlike the situation that General Stultz just described for the Army Reserve, it is essentially the same for the Army National Guard. The Army Force Generation model has provided that level of predictability that we didn't have before.

On January 19, 2007, then Secretary of Defense Gates made the announcement the Reserves, the National Guard, would be mobilized for 1 year and 1 year only. And that provided the predictability in terms of how long you were going to be away from your job and be away from your family. A huge step forward for us in the Army National Guard.

Separate from that, when we started into this we did very short-term notification and mobilizations. And it was painful. Some of our units were notified, and at the MOB [mobilization] station and going down-range inside of 30 days at the start of what we saw in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that was certainly a shock to the system.

What we have derived to is a notification of sourcing. That is, notifying the unit at least 2 years in advance that they are going to be used, alerting them at 1 year out, and then providing the mobilization order 180 days out. And the 180 days out is very key because that allows for the soldier to have the TRICARE benefits that they didn't have before.

So if they do not get the mobilization order they don't get that TRICARE benefit. And we are seeing, as we come down now out of Afghanistan and Iraq, the off-ramps, first of all, delays in issuing the mobilization order for good reasons. Because we want to ensure that these soldiers are, in fact, going to go. And so they are being disadvantaged because they don't have the TRICARE eligibility.

And then beyond that, we are seeing some units off-ramped, in other words not going to the mobilization station. We recently had a Utah unit of about 400 soldiers that were planning on being mobilized and going down-range here on the 15th of September, and their mobilization was canceled because there was no requirement for the unit.

We have worked with the Army, and identified soldiers who have hardship cases and ones who left their jobs and don't have employment, those kinds of things. And we have found ways to do tours of duty separate for those particular soldiers. In the case of the Utah unit, TAG [The Adjutant General] Utah made arrangements

with the schools. And they have got 25 percent of those soldiers now back in school doing college instead of missing a semester.

So it is a painful process, but the predictability is absolutely key. Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General.

The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Wyatt, first of all I represent Robins Air Force Base in the 116th. I would like to invite you to visit us, see our J-STARS [Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System], and talk with you about the future of that program. Do you think we have enough J-STARS, just offhand?

General WYATT. I think we need more of the capability.

Mr. SCOTT. Yes, sir.

General WYATT. Whether it is in that particular platform or another one is, I guess, up for debate and something that we could talk about.

It has been several years since I have been to the 116th, but I have been down. And I know that with the GMTI, the Ground Moving Target Indicator, that that particular platform provides, it is in demand all over the world. The 116th is one of those high operations tempo Air National Guard units because there is, in my opinion, not enough for the GMTI capability.

The Air Force is trying to robust that capability through not only enhancement of the J-STARS, but other platforms that can provide similar capabilities. Not the same kind, because in the J-STARS you have the sensor operators and the folks in the back that can give you real-time analysis of what they are seeing through the sensor systems.

The sensor systems themselves are getting old and worn out. And, again, Air National Guard Maintenance keeps those things flying. But it is a great unit. To answer your question, we need more of the capability, and we can talk about how that might be provided.

Mr. SCOTT. Well they do an excellent job for this country and our allies. And if you get the opportunity, we would love to host you down there and do a tour of the planes.

Gentlemen, thank you for your service and the men and women that you represent. General Carpenter, I want you to know that I heard what you said—don't micromanage my command. Give me my budget number and let me handle it. And I hope that is the way we do it.

And one last question, if I could, General Carpenter. How many different budget numbers do you get in a year? How often, with continuing resolutions and other things, is your budget changing and how much difficulty creating for you and your command?

General CARPENTER. I think what we saw last year with the continuing resolutions and the stutter starts and stops were concerns by our soldiers about whether or not they were going to get paid or whether they weren't going to get paid.

I know that Congress, and I know the President have gone the extra mile to try and ensure that that worry goes away. But frankly last April when I was in Iraq and when we had the issue with the continuing resolution, it spread like wildfire across that com-

munity about the situation with regard to pay and allowances and benefits.

The goal here is for those soldiers down-range to concentrate on their mission.

Mr. SCOTT. Yes, sir.

General CARPENTER. To do what they need to do, to not be distracted. And our goal, and I am sure yours is the same, I think the extent that we are successful in that then we are going to see soldiers that are going to be successful in their mission.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, sir.

Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. FORBES. Thank the gentleman for his questions.

The gentlelady from Hawaii, Mrs. Hanabusa, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Carpenter, you have said certain things that have piqued my interest. First of all, you mentioned an amendment to a statute, I think it was Section 12304. Or did I hear you correctly? You want a change in the statute. Was that the right section?

General CARPENTER. Yes, ma'am, it is Title 10, Section 12304.

Ms. HANABUSA. And what exactly is the change that you are looking for?

General CARPENTER. The situation inside of the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve, and the Air National Guard and Air Reserve, right now is that we have no authority to involuntarily call our soldiers to duty unless it is a named operation like Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom.

If we want to continue to use this operational Reserve and not use it for those kinds of contingencies—use it for theatre engagement, theatre cooperation, in our case, State Partnership Program initiatives, those kinds of things—we have got to be able to involuntarily call our soldiers to active duty as a team, as a unit, to be able to do that.

This modification of 12304 allows that. Initially, the proposal was that inside of the defense budget, the President's budget, was going to be the authority for 60,000 reservists to be called to duty during that budget year. And that those 60,000 soldiers or reservists would have a funding line associated with them.

So it was going to provide the authority, provide the funding. And that by way of it being inside of the President's budget de facto, it was the President's consent—

Ms. HANABUSA. Call.

General CARPENTER [continuing]. To be able to call those reservists to active duty.

I think that the Senate version, as I understand it, reduced that 60,000 to 10,000. And even at 10,000, at least it provides the opportunity for us to do the involuntary call-up.

Ms. HANABUSA. The reason it piqued my interest is because one of the issues that I raise with almost everyone who comes before us that is National Guard and/or Active is, that issue arises is really the conflict between Title 10 and Title 32 status, which, of course, involves the two of you there.

And something else that you said is also, I think, critical in understanding another issue. I think you also said that as the end

strength comes down you are concerned about OCO funding because a lot of the operational status of the Guard is tied to, basically, OCO, our overseas operation.

Pending, I think an issue that is dear to both of your hearts, is whether or not there will be, quote/unquote—a “fourth seat,” or the seat for the Guard on the Joint Chiefs. And it would seem that unless there is some understanding of all of us as to what exactly this change to Section 12304 would be one step, is that as we cut the end strength, or as maybe OCO starts to cut, which is anticipated by everyone’s budget, and if you go back to a strategic kind of command for the National Guard Reserves is always Title 10, does that not call into question this whole debate that they are now having about whether or not the Guard should then have a, quote/unquote—“seat” with the Joints. Because of the fact that if you go back to the pre 2005–2006 timeframe, the question will be how would that then be justified, because most of your rank and file would technically be under state control because they would be Title 32 status.

General CARPENTER. Ma’am, actually, unless called by the President we are in a Title 32 status. And the only exception for that, for the most part, are people who are mobilized and deployed down-range in Afghanistan and Iraq. And the response to Hurricane Irene, for instance, was totally done in a Title 32 state Active Duty status.

I think the great news story for us in the National Guard is that we do now have a four-star general to represent our interests. And his responsibility by the Guard Empowerment Act is to provide counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and to the Secretary of Defense on homeland matters and capabilities and requirements inside the National Guard.

So I think that is a very positive step forward.

Ms. HANABUSA. But the purpose of him being on equal status on the Joint Chiefs is for, I would assume, equal status in terms of military decision-making as well.

General CARPENTER. He does not have a seat on the Joint Chiefs.

Ms. HANABUSA. No, but there is an issue of whether he will have a seat. That is something that I think every one of your adjutants, your TAGs, have written in every local newspaper about why we should have it.

General CARPENTER. Yes, ma’am, they have.

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you.

The gentleman from New York, Mr. Gibson, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. GIBSON. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate the generals being here today.

The first question has to do with current readiness. And then if time, I will talk about future readiness. But with regard to current readiness, given the drawdown in Afghanistan and how the command over there is dealing with that and adjusting, in your view, to the panel, are you getting adequate preparation and adequate timing of the specific missions for your units so that they can go through man, equip, and train to prepare?

And particularly, now I am concerned about smaller units and how much lead time they are getting in terms of where they are going and what specific mission they are getting.

General STULTZ. Well, I think from the Army Reserves perspective, one of the metrics I can give you. If you went back 3, 4 years ago, when we mobilized a unit it was taking somewhere upwards to 60 days to 90 days post-mobilization to get them ready before we were confident they could go into a combat.

Today, the average unit in the Army Reserves spends less than 30 days. One, because you do have a lot of experience, previous deployers in those formations. Two, because we have a training strategy that trains them, prior to getting mobilized, on a lot of the skills that they need.

The concern I have got is not the forces deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan. That is kind of the easy one because I know where they are going, I know when they are going, and I know what their mission's going to be. My concern is the contingency forces of the future.

Those are the forces that we are going to train and have standing ready if this Nation needs them. And for those forces, I don't know when they are going to need to go, I don't know where they are going to need to go, and I am not going to have much time.

Mr. GIBSON. Yes.

General STULTZ. And so that is why we have got to focus on it is easy to fall in on existing equipment, it is already modernized, and existing systems that are already there and set in place. What we have got to focus on is, how do we train a force for the future, the Army depending on us, that is trained and ready and equipped prior to being needed, not afterwards.

Mr. GIBSON. Yes.

General STULTZ. And if you run the contingency plans we have for our op [operations] plans in other parts of the world, most of my forces are needed within the first 30 days. That is when they are most needed.

General WYATT. Sir, I would, on behalf of the Air National Guard, a little bit different model that the Air Force uses than the Army instead of mobilize, train, and deploy. Because we provide 34 percent of the combat capability of the United States Air Force, the Air National Guard does, at 7 percent of the budget.

We have to be trained, and then mobilized or volunteered, and deployed. So a little bit different structure. This requires an investment by the Air Force into the Air National Guard. And I am proud to say the Air Force has made that investment. They provide the Air National Guard, which is an organize, train, and equipped organization, with sufficient funds to train to the same level as they train to.

Our DOC statements, our description of capability statements, require Air National Guard units to be able to answer the call, muster, deploy within 72 hours, and generate combat sorties in-theater within 72 hours. Same requirement as the Active Component.

My concern as we go forward is, will there be sufficient funds to continue that level of training. I think there has to be for this coun-

try to have a viable Air Force. We are probably the leanest component, when you look at the Air Force, as far as combat capability.

Ninety-eight point five percent of our 106,700 people belong to UTC [Unit Task Code]-task units. They are the warfighters. We are a wing-centric organization. Most of our people are in wings and below. So that is our warfighting construct. Only 1.5 percent is what I would call what I do. You know, administration, policy and that sort of thing.

I think it is a key for the Air Force not only to continue organize, train, and equip funding to the Air National Guard to at least the level that it has this year, but continuing in the future. But also plan sufficient MPA [Military Personnel Appropriation] days so that once we are up on the step if we do have some sort of requirement nationwide we can respond and send our airmen in harm's way to bid the Nation's call.

Mr. GIBSON. Yes. And I will tell you that the 109th is not in my district, but it is very close. And I share that with Paul Tonko. I have had visits there, and I was really struck by the fact that for a very small portion of the budget they do an enormous number of requirements and do them very well.

And General Carpenter.

General CARPENTER. Congressman, I know you have got some background in this, based upon your service in the Army. We have come a long way since Desert Storm, when it took 180 days for the 48th Brigade out of Georgia to meet at least the standard set, at that point, for mobilization and deployment.

I know that you know that the 27th Brigade is in the queue to go down-range into Afghanistan. They are in the process right now of going to the National Training Center for an NTC rotation out there in anticipation of that mobilization. Because of that planning—the notification, the sourcing, the alert and that whole process—they have been able to plan for that mobilization, they have been able to prepare, and they have been able to increase their readiness.

When they get to the mobilization station, we anticipate they will spend a little bit more than 60 days before they deploy down-range on that mission. That is a long ways from where we started in this business, and I think it is a tribute to the New York unit and it is a tribute to the Army and it is a tribute to where we have come in this operational force.

Mr. GIBSON. No question on that. Good. Totally concur.

Did spend some time with them at their pre-mobilization family fair day. It was fantastic. I have got to tell you, it rivaled anything that we did on active duty the way they laid the whole community's resources out so families could come in and have access to health care questions, education questions, deployment type questions. It was quite extraordinary.

The genesis of the question actually was, I do hear periodically—not with the 27th, but with the dynamic, the changing in Afghanistan—that as the command comes to grips with that, given the changing scenarios, that is giving less time for Guard and Reserve units to know explicitly what their specific mission is going to be. And that is having cascading impacts on man, equip, and train going forward.

I know that you are monitoring that and doing everything that you can on that. I am short on time. I will tell you that I am working with Peter Welch from Vermont on the Yellow Ribbon Program. This is something of great interest to me.

I think it is a good program, but I think it can be even better. As we look to the mark next year, you know, certainly welcoming all your feedback on that so we can perfect that program.

General CARPENTER. Sir, one of the biggest problems that we are facing right now is behavioral health issues, and the Yellow Ribbon Program has been key in that. I think you know the Army has a suicide problem. We have been fortunate to trend ours down a little bit in the Army Guard. But, you know, one data point does not a trend make. Yellow Ribbon is key in that, and the funding for that program is essential.

Mr. GIBSON. Yes.

And gentlemen, I am out of time, regrettably. But I just want to thank you for your service, your tremendous leadership you provide, and I look forward to working with you going forward.

I yield back, Chairman.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you.

And the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Schilling, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. SCHILLING. Very good. Thank you, Chairman.

Chris had touched on a few of the things I was going to talk about or ask questions about. Anyway, first I want to thank you for your service to our country.

One of the concerns that I have for our country is with the debt problem that we have because I think we all understand that it is going to be a huge problem. I guess my concern is the warfighter because, basically, what is going on in the Middle East is definitely not going to go away anytime soon. And basically, what I would like to know is what you gentlemen are seeing with the cuts that are coming, how that is going to adversely affect us. And then, you know, basically anything that we can do to try to help out.

And General Carpenter, you know, I want to say one of the things that I think is totally wrong is when we have these CRs [continuing resolutions] and our warfighters are over there risking their lives. Literally, the worst thing that we can do here in the United States Congress is having them on the table whatsoever for any type of negotiating.

I think that they should be completely taken off the table, you know, because they have got enough on their mind. To have to worry about the paycheck for just one split second is all it takes, when they are out there trying to do their job and protect this great Nation.

So basically, just maybe some information on your thoughts on how this is going to affect us in the future warfighters.

General CARPENTER. You know, I think first of all I mentioned that we are looking at funding strategies and developing efficiencies inside of the Army and the Army National Guard. And it is a team effort between the Army National Guard, the Army, and the Army Reserve.

For instance, family programs are essential to us. And I mentioned the Yellow Ribbon Program. Family programs are just as

key. But we have hundreds of family programs out there. Many of them are duplicative. Some of them are redundant. Some are not even used. And so with the Army in the lead, we are looking across all those programs to try and determine which ones we can consolidate.

And we are not trying to reduce the service provided to the family by any means. But we think we can deliver it in a lot more efficient, effective manner. Those kinds of things are areas of opportunity for us across the Army to harvest those funds and redirect them into priorities and into essential areas.

But frankly, the Defense Department didn't get us into the budget problems we got right now, and the Defense Department is not going to get us out. But we are going to pay our fair share, at least from my perspective. So we are up for that. But again, before we default to reducing capability and deciding to hollow out the force or shallow the force, make it a lot smaller, we ought to look at those aspects first.

General STULTZ. I would just echo what Ray has said. And I think, as has been stated here by many of the members of the committee, one of the things that has been proven is the Reserve Component is a great return on investment for this Nation. And so as we look at trying to reduce defense cost, I think you have got to look at the Reserve Components and say what more can you give us. Are there other capabilities that we can invest in to save money, but also that confidence that they are going to be trained and ready when we need them and that we have got access to them.

And then just as Ray had said, we have got to look internally within our organizations and say, okay, where can we get more efficient and more effective? One of the things we are looking at in the Army Reserve is, as we get new modernized equipment I have said to my commanders, "You are not going to get a full set sent to your home station because at home-station training, you are probably going to train at platoon level. And so what I want to do is give you a set of modernized equipment to train on at that level."

Then I am going to take a set and put it at Fort Hunter Liggett, California, or Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, so that when you go for your 3 weeks of training the equipment's waiting there for you that is modernized, and we don't pay to transport your equipment up there. I mean, there is a lot of those kinds of things we can say to save money ourselves internally to help fund the bill.

General WYATT. Just briefly, we learned in Desert Storm One that when so-called hostilities supposedly ceased there is still a need for some air presence. And we anticipate that there will be continued need, if those countries desire, for continued air presence.

With the budget threats, you know, in my mind we have an option of either just shrinking the entire United States Air Force to meet those budgets which sacrifices not only capability but capacity, or we can take a look at force structure and recognize the cost efficiencies offered by the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve. And maybe take a look at, instead of sending airplanes and capability to the boneyard, maybe placing those in the Reserve Component, which can operate them less expensively.

It provides that capability, it provides that capacity. Because I think there is probably going to be another event one of these days, and we are going to need that capability and capacity. Just a thought.

Mr. SCHILLING. Very good. Thank you, gentlemen.

Mr. FORBES. Thank the gentleman for his question.

The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Palazzo, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. PALAZZO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Am I the last one to go? Can I have more than 5 minutes?

Mr. FORBES. You are next to the last, and you can have 4 minutes and 50 seconds.

Mr. PALAZZO. Oh, great, great. No.

Thank you all for being here today, definitely to testify. But more importantly, thank you for your service to our country. We greatly appreciate that.

Today I had the awesome honor of receiving 86 World War II veterans as a part of Mississippi's Honor Flight program. We have, in the past, had to depend on Alabama's Honor Flight program. So we decided to start our own, and we actually had some Alabama participants on the Mississippi Honor Flight.

Two of my major questions have pretty much been addressed, but I think it is worth asking again. And one is the CR. The multiple CRs that we had last year was just unnerving at so many levels. Lucedale's National Guard Unit is the 287th Engineering Company sapper platoon. They had the most dangerous mission, and they did an excellent job and came back 100 percent thanks to MRAPs [Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles] funded through prior Congresses and others and the support from the Guard.

But they had the most dangerous mission, the roadside clearance and IED [improvised explosive device] detection and stuff like that. The last thing these soldiers needed was to be worried about whether their spouses and their children were receiving their check so they could put gas in the car, food on the table, pay the rent. Because you know, we have to focus on our mission. It is dangerous enough, and then if you are distracted not only are you a danger to yourself, you are a danger to your teammates.

So again, could you just elaborate—because I think we just need to constantly reiterate this to my colleagues throughout the House and both parties—the dangers that we face doing multiple CRs.

General STULTZ. Well, I think it is—and I will make it real quick so that Ray and Bud can talk too—morale, obviously, as you have already alluded to. But also in terms of us being able to train our force professionally and productively when we don't know how much money we are going to have.

And I have got a 3-week training event for this soldier to go to that is going to be a good experience for him, and I have also got a school that he wants to go to improve himself professionally or technically, and I say, "But I can't afford to send you to both because I am not sure I am going to have enough money."

Then come the summertime or whatever, and we have got the money, but the soldier says, "You know, I can't go now because I have already committed my time and everything." We have lost an

opportunity to improve a soldier, improve his capability. And we end up giving that money back.

General WYATT. We see the same concerns about pay. But in addition to that, what we see is our wing commanders who are responsible for handling the budgets at the wing level become very conservative. They begin, as General Stultz said, taking a look at the training cost. And because some of this is lead time required for planning to set up training events and exercises, out of an abundance of caution they will begin canceling. And we lose training opportunities that you can't make up after.

In the acquisition world, a lot of our contracts have lead times. And if there is no assurances that the money is going to be there in subsequent years we will cancel contracts. And then if the money does flow at a later date, the cost of reinstating that contract goes up and we get less value for the dollar. So those are just some of the things that we face.

General CARPENTER. Sir, I already made part of my comments. And far be it from me to tell anybody how to do their business. But somebody mentioned earlier the exclusion of at least soldiers that are mobilized and deployed from that process would be helpful and would alleviate maybe that issue in terms of the angst associated with not getting paid.

The other issue that General Wyatt alluded to is, last year, when we finally got our budget for NGREA [National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation] and when we got our military construction budget it was midyear. And so we essentially had 6 months to execute that budget. We, at least my team I think, has done a terrific job in execution of NGREA for 2011, and we are going to hit the threshold of 80 percent. But I am telling you, we have had to do a lot to make that happen. So it causes some problems.

Mr. PALAZZO. I am kind of running short on time so I will just make some comments. First of all, I think it is extremely important that the National Guard has a seat at the table for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I don't see our Guard and Reserves ever going back to a strategic Reserve. It is just the world we live in, it is the reality we have to face, and you all are part of our operational forces.

As a citizen soldier that was a part of this strategic Reserve and a part of the operational Reserve, our force, that is just not going to happen. There is some discussion in the National Defense Authorization bill to do just that. And hopefully the Senate and the House can agree on that.

And the Yellow Ribbon Program is a wonderful program. I have participated in that, and I thank them for their service. This is not only returning, but also deploying soldiers. So we were taking advantage of both of them on the Mississippi Gulf Coast. And I offered all of them and their families that my office is open to assist you in any way possible. Just be sure to use your chain of command, and they will help you.

So thank you all for your service.

Mr. FORBES. Thank the gentleman.

And as you just pointed out, one of the things I think this committee is going to work very, very hard on, as Mr. Schilling raised, was to make sure that we try to get the pay and benefit for our men and women in uniform out of these discussions.

But the second thing we just want to alert you to and everyone who cares about defense. Everything is kind of relative, and it used to be we worried about the timing issues for our supplementals and the contingency questions there. Now we are worried about whether the money is ever going to come, not just the timing issue. So we have a different fear that we are looking at.

Mr. Conaway from Texas was very patient. He stayed from gavel all the way until he had to go to another committee. But General Wyatt, he had a question for you regarding missions on the border. And the question was this. What interaction do you have with the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration], and are there problems with flying remotely piloted aircraft along the southern border?

General WYATT. The answer is yes to both of those. There is an issue with getting remotely piloted aircraft into the national airspace. FAA does have that authority. We work very closely with them with the support of NORTHCOM and the United States Air Force, not only just for mission effects, but also for training.

To launch and recover some of these aircraft, move them from their base to a training area, sometimes you have to transit Federal Aviation-controlled airspace. It is not dedicated military airspace. We are not necessarily interested in changing the shape and the structure of the training airspace, but these aircraft are very sophisticated.

And while the FAA operates on principally a see-and-avoid—very conservative, and rightly so—safety measure, some of these RPA [remotely piloted aircraft], even though you don't have the pilot actually in the vehicle, with the sensing and the video and everything else that is in the airplane really can see better than a pilot can.

And we have got to prove that to the FAA, to their satisfaction that we can operate remotely piloted aircraft in the national airspace. We are making great process in doing that, and I think that day will come, sir.

Mr. FORBES. And General, if you don't mind, if you would have somebody maybe from your staff contact Mr. Conaway's office to see. I think you have a great ally there. He wants to help you with that in any way he can.

I have one follow-up question. I think Ms. Bordallo has one question. Because I know we are about ready for votes.

But can you tell us how important it is for you to have additional access to equipment for training, especially simulators? Because I know you don't always have the access to some of the types of simulators and all, maybe, that the Active forces have. And what can we do to help you guys with that?

General STULTZ. Yes, sir. I have, in the last 2 years, been particularly focused on simulators. What is available, what is out there, what is over the horizon. I have made a number of trips down to the Orlando, Florida, area to visit simulation training command and some of the corporations that are down there.

Because as I said earlier, what my soldiers say is, "Don't waste my time." So if they are going to come in on a weekend drill period, they want to come in and do something meaningful and put them back in that same environment they have come from. And that is where simulations come in.

But additionally, what was asked earlier about can we save money. One of the ideal examples for me is weapons training. In the Army Reserve, as you probably already know, we don't live close to an installation. So we look and say, "Where can we go do effective range fire?" Because we are required twice a year to do live fire.

In some cases, like in Florida where I have commanded a unit, we have to go all the way up to Camp Blanding, which means we got to put them on a bus. We got to take time, get them up there, feed them, house them, bring them back for our training. Or we default to go into the local sheriffs range, which is really not an effective training.

Meanwhile, we have got these Engagement Skills Trainers, EST 2000s, that can stimulate an M16, and M4, a 9-millimeter, whatever you want. And it can be more effective, really, in terms of training a soldier on breathing and aiming and everything else than ever putting him on a range.

And so I have said that is what we ought to be doing. Those types of training simulators where we can put them in that environment in their Reserve center and get just as effective and save a lot of money because we are not using ammunition, we are not paying travel, we are not doing any of that. And the soldier walks away that weekend saying, "This was a good experience. What are we going to do next month when I come back?"

General WYATT. Simulation in the United States Air Force has taken quantum leaps in the last few years. Used to, you could not get very realistic training unless you actually accomplished the mission in the airplane.

But with the high-fidelity simulators that we have now, the ability to link simulators and to fuse some of the sensors, and virtually create situations in the simulator, it is an excellent opportunity to train. Saves gasoline, saves petrol, saves wear and tear on our airplanes, and it is the wave of the future, I think, in a lot of our training. You cannot do all of it in the simulator, but we can do an increasing amount.

The problem is that just about all of the simulators are located on Active-Duty fields. We have only two F-16 units that have a simulator, only two C-130 units, three KC-135 units. That leaves 10 F-16 units, 5 F-15 units, 17 KC-135 units, and 15 C-130 units that to get access to a simulator they have got to travel now to an Active-Duty base to access the simulator.

The Active Component works with us to provide, in our budget, money to do that. But it is time-consuming, it is expensive, it burns fuel—not military fuel, but civilian fuel—to get there. And I think for us to really leverage the technologies that we have, save money—this is another cost efficiencies thing that we can do in the Air Force—we need to invest money in the simulators and get those out to the people that are going to use them.

General CARPENTER. Sir, with regard to the Army Guard, simulations is a big deal in the aviation world for us, the Army aviation world, because of the op tempo associated with Army aviation. We need to make sure that we do the advance scheduling so we do have access to those simulators. If we do that, it seems to work out. We do not have a simulator that I know of right now for the LUH

[Light Utility Helicopter] Program, although we are getting sufficient flight hours to work those.

And then beyond that, to get to General Stultz's point, you know, with the huge leaps and bounds that we are making in technology we see all kinds of computer simulation that can run everything from battle drills for Humvee evacuation to squad-on-patrol. So those kinds of simulations are going to save us in the long term as opposed to spending 4 or 5 hours to get to a training area and then 4 or 5 hours back. So it is a huge facet to our program in the future.

Mr. FORBES. If you will just have your staffs work with our staffs we will see what we can do to help get you those simulators that you need.

Ms. Bordallo is recognized for the last question.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Generals Wyatt and Carpenter, as I indicated in my opening statement I am concerned that the Department of Defense does not accurately account for homeland defense requirements. This hampers the ability of the Department to equip the National Guard or Reserve for such missions. What role is the Guard taking to work with the Department to make these requirements clear?

General Carpenter first.

General CARPENTER. Yes, a couple of things. The critical dual-use equipment discussion that we had earlier with regard to equipment that we have inside of our formations in the Army Guard that can be used both for deployment down-range and use in the homeland mission has been very, very important. We started out 5 years ago with Katrina and we had M35s. We did not have the right vehicles. We did not have high-water vehicles.

Fast-forward to what we saw with Hurricane Irene in North Carolina and New Jersey across the eastern border, we had modern equipment that provided capability out there to make sure that we could meet our responsibilities.

We are concerned about what is the future of funding for homeland defense, homeland security. We have, as I mentioned, civil support teams, homeland response forces. In order for them to maintain their proficiency they will have to be funded, and we would not like to see them be a casualty in the budget process.

Ms. BORDALLO. So you are working with the Department, would you say?

General CARPENTER. Yes, Congresswoman. We are.

Ms. BORDALLO. All right. General Wyatt.

General WYATT. Inside the United States Air Force, I see a continuing increasing focus on the homeland, homeland defense, homeland security. But we are not quite there yet. We have 12 core functions in the United States Air Force, and all of those do support the homeland, homeland defense, homeland security. But I think we need a core function that is domestic operations.

And so we are working with the Air Force to try to gain acceptance, recognizing domestic operations as a core function of the United States Air Force. If we are able to do that, there would come with that budget funding for training for domestic operations. There is not now. Even though we have authority from the Na-

tional Guard Bureau and regulation to conduct training, there is no funding line for that.

The important thing to recognize is that a lot of the training that we do for the warfight overseas, with the dual-use equipment and the dual capabilities, mirrors for the homeland. So we get, as kind of a byproduct of our training line for the Air Force, to train for domestic operations in some of those core functions.

But there are some differences, and I talked about our air medical evacuation folks. Ninety-four percent of that capability in the Guard and the Reserve. And we are very good at getting soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines out of tight spots, taking care of them in that golden hour, getting them the health care they need, transporting to Landstuhl and back here for treatment.

But when we get into a Katrina or an Irene, where we are transporting elderly geriatric patients or we might be transporting, you know, birth incubator-type youngsters out of harm's way, it takes a special type of training. That is just one example. We don't have a funding line for that.

So we are working with the Air Force. I see an increasing recognition of the importance of that, but we are not quite there yet.

Ms. BORDALLO. All right. General, just one last question. Commentary recently, from General Schwartz and Secretary Donley, seemed to indicate that core mission sets for the Active, the Reserve and the Guard Components will be transferred in the future because of budget limitations, when they are addressed.

Can we expect to see the Air Guard have a future role in ISR [intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance] and long-range strike missions?

General WYATT. I think it makes perfect sense, Madam Congressman, for that to happen. When you talk about the cost of being able to provide those capabilities, my answer to that would be yes in both arenas.

Ms. BORDALLO. Very good.

And I just want to close, Mr. Chairman, by saying that you have my full support—the Air Guard, the Army Guard and the Reserves. Thank you very much.

Mr. FORBES. We thank the ranking member for her questions.

Once again, thank all of you gentlemen. I think you can tell by the participation of this committee how much they care about what you are doing and want to be a part of it. We just want to once again thank you, and the men and women who serve under you, for the great job they do in defending our country.

And with that, we are dismissed.

[Whereupon, at 3:00 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

SEPTEMBER 21, 2011

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

SEPTEMBER 21, 2011

**Statement of the Congressman Forbes
Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness**

Army Reserve, Army Guard and Air Guard Training and Operations

September 21, 2011

I want to welcome all of our members and our distinguished panel of experts to today's hearing that will focus on the training and operations tempo for our Army Reserve and Guard and Air Guard Components.

Just 10 days ago, we marked the 10th anniversary of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on our homeland. That day literally changed our world, and led us into a long term global war on terrorism – a fight where our reservists and National Guard members are full partners.

In the intervening 10 years, our reserve components have been stretched thin as they have been called upon to provide many of the enabling capabilities for the active duty forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom/New Dawn and Operation Enduring Freedom. They provide support such as intelligence gathering, airlift, close air support and security forces. At the same, the National Guard still must fulfill their traditional mission of supporting the states during emergencies, such as the recent flooding and fires. There is no walking away from either mission.

Their significant combat support role in Iraq and Afghanistan makes it clear that we cannot go to the fight without our Reserve components. According to the Department of Defense's recent study of the "Future Role of the Reserve Component," the Reserve Component is an irreplaceable and cost-effective element of overall Department of Defense capability. The report specifically stated:

Unless we had chosen to dramatically increase the size of the Active Components, our domestic security and global operations since September 11, 2001 could not have been executed without the activation of hundreds of thousands of trained Reserve Component personnel.

Juxtapose this reliance on our reserve components against a backdrop of large U.S. force structure reductions and the \$400 - \$900 billion in defense cuts proposed over the past several months, and you can see how current challenges can grow to become significant problems. For the Army Reserves and Guard, and the Air Guard, their ability to take on

additional missions that require significant military support will be severely strained if the force structure and budgetary reductions of the magnitude being discussed take effect. Even fulfilling their steady-state missions could be severely impacted.

For example, let's look at just the Army for a minute. As was noted in our July hearing, general readiness indicators have gradually improved across the Army active and reserve components over the past year. However, significant equipment challenges remain. While deployed units report high levels of equipment readiness, many home station and reserve units report significant shortages of key items needed to fulfill their assigned missions and to conduct full spectrum training. Anticipated budgetary reductions will further challenge this trend and the Army's ability to simultaneously provide trained and ready forces for ongoing operations and other possible future commitments and contingencies.

This will be particularly true as the Army has changed its role. During the Cold War, the Army reserve components were considered "strategic reserves", which meant that only very limited training was done during their "one weekend a month, two weeks a year" duty time. Units were not funded for significant training and had limited equipment sets. In theory, these units would have significant time *after* mobilization to get up-to-date equipment and conduct extensive training. They would then deploy for the duration of the conflict, rotate back home afterwards and return to their strategic reserve status.

However, in the past 10 years, the Reserve components have become more operational, which requires more training before mobilization and involves a reset / train period upon a unit's return from theater. It also requires substantial additional resources to enable more training prior to a unit's formal mobilization. But is this model sustainable? I hope our witnesses will answer that question, especially as we are facing significant budgetary challenges. Since 1999, the overall Army Reserve O&M funding almost tripled. But I worry whether we'll be able to support such growth.

With regard to the Air National Guard, one of their more important missions is protecting the homeland through the Air Sovereignty Alert. This mission has not been without its challenges – primarily because it was not adequately resourced, programmed or budgeted for by the active Air Force. Also, unlike the Cold War era, when Air Force units were assigned to dedicated air defense units, the units that perform ASA operations today are part of the Air Force's Total Force and deploy overseas to support

military operations. This can cause significant challenges for those Air Guard ASA units that must train for their primary contingency operations support missions while simultaneously training and manning their ASA mission. When an ASA Air Guard unit is deployed overseas, there is tension in how it also will meet its ASA mission, which is often accomplished by transferring personnel and equipment from non-deployed units to fill shortfalls. Here again, I hope our witnesses will help us understand the resources needed to maintain these domestic missions – at a time when we face diminishing budgets.

Joining us today to discuss the challenges –for resources, training and budget – are three distinguished individuals:

Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz
Commanding General, United States Army Reserve Command

Lieutenant General Harry M. Wyatt III
Director, Air National Guard

Major General Raymond W. Carpenter
Acting Director, Army National Guard

Gentlemen, thank you for being here.

I now recognize the Ranking Member, Ms. Bordallo for any remarks she may have.

**Opening Statement by Ranking Member Madeleine Z. Bordallo
Readiness Subcommittee hearing on
National Guard and Reserve Readiness
Wednesday, September 21, 2011**

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Today we continue our discussion on the overall readiness of our Armed Forces. We will hear from the directors of the Army and Air National Guard as well as General Stultz from the Army Reserve. We look forward to the testimony from our witnesses.

As both Generals Wyatt and Carpenter know, I am very proud that the Guam National Guard has the highest membership per capita of any National Guard in this country. I think that's a real testament to the level of commitment and respect our men and women on Guam have for our nation and the National Guard.

The last decade of war and conflict has required our National Guard and Reserves to transform from a strategic reserve to an operational force. Beginning on September 11, 2001, and continuing through today, our Air National Guard began flying combat air patrol missions over our cities and most important landmarks. Days later we saw the Army National Guard mobilized to provide security at airports throughout the nation. Mission requirements expanded with the beginning of rotations to Afghanistan and then Iraq.

Our National Guard and Reserves have answered every call to duty, and their support for our nation has been invaluable.

However, the roles and missions fulfilled by the National Guard and Reserves have required greater resources to meet their increased training, equipment, and manning costs. And the nation's budget challenges will only amplify the difficulty of maintaining an operational National Guard and Reserve.

Over the past few years, this Committee has taken significant steps to address critical shortfalls in dual-line equipment needs through the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account. However, the Army National Guard's goal is to maintain 80% of critical dual-use equipment on hand at any one time. How will this be achieved in austere budget times?

Also, with the eventual drawdown of end strength in the Army, it is important for our witnesses to address what impact this may have on the rebalancing of missions and skill sets within the National Guard and Reserves. What impact might this have on the readiness of these forces?

This Committee has also worked to ensure appropriate funding is authorized for increased training requirements due to continuing high operational tempo in Iraq, and especially Afghanistan. In the Army Reserve alone, operation and maintenance costs have increased from \$1.4 billion in Fiscal Year 1999 to a requested \$3.1 billion in Fiscal Year 2012.

Additional investments in the operation and maintenance accounts will be needed to support a home-station training concept. Such efforts are important toward ensuring the continued accessibility of the National Guard and Reserves but there will be challenges in fully implementing this concept. I hope the witnesses can discuss these challenges in their testimony and what risks would be associated with reduced funding for these purposes.

I also remain seriously concerned about aviation assets in our National Guard. Our House-passed Fiscal Year 2012 defense authorization bill contains a prohibition on retirements of C-23 Sherpa aircraft. What plan does the Army National Guard have to replace these aging aircraft? At one time the C-27J Joint Cargo Aircraft was the replacement, but former Defense Secretary Gates cut the buy to 38 planes and shifted the program to the Air Force.

How will we meet this equipment requirement in a difficult budget environment? Will Homeland Defense missions and airlift capability that is needed to support such missions be factored into replacing the C-23 Sherpas?

I also remain concerned that the Department of Defense has not acknowledged the need to incorporate Homeland Defense mission requirements into certain planning assumptions. Further, I remain concerned that the National Guard Bureau has not taken a more prominent role in working with the various services and Secretary-level agencies to better define these requirements. I hope our witnesses can comment on when such requirements will be finalized and incorporated into Department of Defense planning assumptions.

If we do not have solid Homeland Defense requirements built into the planning process, I fear we take significant risk in the readiness of our National Guard and Reserve to be appropriately trained and equipped to respond to these missions.

Finally, this Committee will closely examine future budgets to ensure that we do not hollow out our National Guard and Reserves. To remain an operational force, we will need to see investment in the training and equipment accounts in future years. We must always have a ready, reliable, and accessible Reserve Component.

I look forward to the testimony from our witnesses.

United States Army Reserve

An Enduring Operational Army Reserve is a Positive Investment for America

2011 Posture Statement

The United States Army Reserve

2011 Posture Statement

Submitted by

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JACK C. STULTZ

Chief, Army Reserve and Commanding General, United States Army Reserve Command

and

Command Sergeant Major Michael D. Schultz

Command Sergeant Major, United States Army Reserve

To the Committees and Subcommittees of the

UNITED STATES SENATE and the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

First Session, 112th Congress

The annual Army Reserve Posture Statement is an unclassified summary of Army Reserve roles, missions, accomplishments, plans, and programs. The 2011 Army Reserve Posture Statement also addresses the support required by the Army Reserve to continue its transition to an operational force during FY 2012.

Unless otherwise noted, all statistics and facts are current through March 2011.

This document is available on the Army Reserve website at: www.usar.army.mil.

March 2011

An Enduring Operational Force

For more than 100 years, the United States Army Reserve has served as the nation's federal strategic force in reserve, supporting the war and peacetime needs of the Regular Army. Since our nation's involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, combatant commanders have urgently called for many of the enabling capabilities resident within the Army Reserve, including logistics, engineering, security, medical and civil affairs support.

The steady, consistent, and recurring demand for Army Reserve capabilities during this decade has posed significant challenges for a force organized and resourced as a strategic reserve. In response, the Army Reserve recast itself from the part-time strategic reserve role to a fully integrated and critical part of an operational, expeditionary Army that supports the nation's evolving and challenging wartime requirements.

In today's national economic and political climate at home and around the world, it makes good business sense to sustain the enabling capability provided by the Army Reserve. Compared to the cost of expanding the full-time Army force, a relatively smaller investment in the Army Reserve provides security at home and supports the fight against terrorism abroad. The Army Reserve responds to domestic disasters, when authorized by the President of the United States, and also participates in security cooperation operations while protecting national interests around the world. In support of contingency operations, the Army Reserve responds to life-threatening situations and fosters stability in underdeveloped nations where conditions are ripe for terrorists to gain a foothold. The Army Reserve is a "best value" in that the nation pays the full cost for a reserve component Soldier only when he/she is mobilized.

Many companies in private industry use a similar strategy. Firms that specialize in tax preparation, for example, hire certified accounts/tax preparers to handle the heavier customer demand that occurs from the beginning of a new year to the filing deadline of April 15. They too cannot afford, nor would it make good business sense, to maintain a full-time accountant force during off-peak seasons. The relatively low cost of hiring seasonal workers adds to their bottom line.

The Army Reserve conducted an analysis that shows over a 15-year period, an enduring operational Army Reserve provides key capabilities for the Army at significant cost savings. We measure the savings by comparing the active component and reserve component costs of building readiness, deploying and employing forces.

The Army Reserve prepares for service by employing the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model—a five year structured progression of increased unit readiness over time resulting in periods of available trained, ready, and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment.

Under the current ARFORGEN process, an active component Army Soldier spends two years in a non-deployed status at a cost of \$140K per year—compared to his/her Army Reserve counterpart who spends four years in a non-mobilized/non-deployed status costing \$47K per year—that's about one third the cost of an active component Soldier for train-up. This cost savings is achieved by providing cyclical capabilities to the Army and predictability for Soldiers and their Families.

During a 15-year period, an active component Soldier spends five years deployed with an overall average cost of \$143K per year compared to the Army Reserve Soldier who spends three years mobilized/deployed with an overall average cost of \$68K—that's about half the cost of an active component Soldier.

An operational Army Reserve not only saves money, it helps the Army mitigate current capability shortfalls. For example, the Commander of Africa Command, General William E. "Kip" Ward, and the Commander of European Command, Admiral James G. Stavridis related in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 9, 2010, that employing an operational Army Reserve to support combatant commander security activities would provide significantly more capability for the mission while maintaining invaluable operational experience, hard-won from current operations. Using the Army Reserve in security cooperation missions also reduces the demand for active Army capabilities, allows the active component to maximize time at home between deployments, and provides the Army Reserve with the opportunity to employ and refine its multifunctional skills.

An operational Army Reserve can be key to developing cooperative security arrangements (collaboration with regional nations, interagency and non-governmental organizations, and regional institutions to respond to the broad range of regional contingencies) while building Partnership Capacity by strengthening and expanding relationships with allies and partners. The Army Reserve could also mitigate the costs that an active component unit would require in Korea (family housing, child-care, medical, etc.) by providing trained and validated units for one-year tours.

It makes good business sense to sustain the enabling capability provided by the Army Reserve for now and into the future. Army Chief of Staff, General George W. Casey, Jr., has said there is no viable alternative to having a fully operational Army Reserve to sustain today's combat support needs and those of the future. As the Army evaluates the resource requirements to sustain and improve Reserve "operational capabilities," decisions on full-time staff, funded training days, and sequencing of training (pre-mobilization/post-mobilization) drive the cost.

Operationalizing the Army Reserve has thus created a requirement for an enduring level of readiness support that cannot be sustained with current supplemental funding. The Army Reserve must have predictable funding in the base budget to ensure Soldiers are well trained, well prepared, and well equipped at all times to respond to the nation's needs. An enduring operational force cannot be fully effective if it has to borrow personnel and equipment from one unit to shore up another to meet mission requirements. Lending creates turbulence within units and diminishes gained efficiencies.

For now and into the foreseeable future, the Army Reserve will function as an operational force. The required institutional, policy, and systemic resource processes and procedures are being transformed to ensure a sustainable and ready force capable of operating across the full spectrum of conflict.

The Army Reserve is a positive investment for the nation. We provide necessary combat support and combat service support to combatant commanders where and when needed, thereby saving limited resources. We train Soldiers who accomplish daunting tasks and provide critical support on the battlefield. We give back to the nation highly trained, mature and refined Soldiers, who also provide civilian employers the kind of talent needed to sustain the local economy.

America can make no better investment than sustaining an enduring, operational Army Reserve.

Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz
Chief, United States Army Reserve

Command Sergeant Major Michael D. Schultz
Command Sergeant Major, United States Army Reserve

As America remains a nation at war, the Army Reserve continues to be a cost-effective force as evidenced by what we accomplished with the FY 2011 budget Congress appropriated to us. The \$7.9 billion Army Reserve appropriation represented only four percent of the total Army budget; yet in 2010, we achieved the following results within the four core elements (Human Capital, Materiel, Readiness, and Services and Infrastructure) of the Army Reserve Enterprise as outlined below.

Human Capital

Human Resources:

In FY 2010, the Army Reserve conducted 525 Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program events, serving 26,000 Soldiers and 28,000 Family members.

Chaplain:

Army Reserve chaplains conducted over 300 Strong Bonds events throughout the country and territories, enhancing Soldier and Family communication and relationship skills. Some 12,500 Soldiers and Family members participated in these events and received this training.

Behavioral Health:

Licensed clinicians are following up on the urgent referrals generated by the Periodic Health Assessment and Post Deployment Health Reassessments. Working on an "Assess and Refer" model, clinicians conduct bio-psycho-social assessments of each individual who is referred and determine the appropriate level of follow-up. They do not provide treatment. The major illnesses being identified that are Post Traumatic Stress, Major Depression and Substance Abuse.

Medical and Dental:

Army Reserve medical readiness improved from 23 percent on 1 October 2008 to 60 percent as of 23 September 2010. Programs such as the Army Select Reserve Dental Readiness System (ASDRS) have been highly successful. Dental readiness, which is currently at 74 percent, has improved 21 percent over the last two years, and is one of the key elements improving medical readiness. We converted 168,829 Soldiers' paper records to an electronic Health Readiness Record, allowing us to take full advantage of efficiencies in time, cost, and services over the continued use of paper treatment records. The Army Reserve successfully conducted suicide prevention training throughout the force. As a result, we have seen an improvement in communication with at-risk Soldiers and proactive involvement on the part of our subordinate commands.

Family Programs:

The Army Reserve Virtual Installation Program served some 5,501 military members and their families, from all branches of the armed services during FY 2010 - bringing the resources of active military installations to geographically dispersed military Families. Three pilot sites at Army Strong Community Centers offer information and assistance on many issues, such as concerns with TRICARE, legal matters, retirement, GI Bill, and child and youth services.

Materiel

The Army Reserve established new Equipment Fielding facilities to increase throughput of new equipment issues to units. This has allowed the Army Reserve to execute the largest distribution of new equipment in recent history. Over 23,000 pieces of equipment were provided to Army Reserve units, enhancing their readiness. Using near real time databases in "bridging" logistics information and management systems led to an automated process to define manpower requirements in

equipment maintenance support structure. The Army Reserve is on track to successfully implement the Army's initiative for managing organizational clothing and individual equipment.

Readiness**Operations:**

Army Reserve continues to provide vital capabilities to combatant commanders in support of overseas contingency operations. More than 196,711 Army Reserve soldiers have mobilized in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom/New Dawn (OIF/OND) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) since September 11, 2001. Today, more than 15,584 Warrior Citizens are serving in Iraq, Afghanistan and 22 other countries around the globe. Army Reserve Aviation continues to lead the way in Air Traffic Simulation. Thanks to funds approved by Congress, the Army Reserve fielded more than 630 Laser Marksmanship Training Systems to 346 Army Reserve locations during the past year, while having the means to develop and field "bridging" logistics management and information systems.

Services and Infrastructure

Facilities Management: The Army Reserve successfully awarded over \$432 million in Military Construction (MILCON) projects in 2010. Several new Army Reserve Centers will achieve net-zero energy usage (self-sufficient without drawing additional power from the electrical grid). The Army Reserve has developed innovative passive building design techniques to achieve low-technology, low-cost energy efficiency. We are installing solar collection fields, wind turbines, and geothermal plants at several new facilities. The Army Reserve has started a retrofit program, replacing lights, windows, roofs, and other components with new energy-efficient technology, resulting in substantial savings in utility costs.

The Army Reserved also realized monetary benefits totaling approximately \$232 million during the last year through the Office of Internal Review, which provides Army Reserve leadership timely, independent and professional review/audit, evaluation, and consulting services.

ARMY RESERVE PRIORITIES

- Continue to transform to an enduring operational force
- Continue to provide the best trained, best led, best equipped Soldiers and units to combatant commanders to achieve U.S. objectives and ensure national security
- Recruit, retain, and reintegrate through a Continuum of Service the best and brightest Citizen-Soldiers to sustain a robust and capable operational Army Reserve
- Provide Citizen-Soldiers and their Families with the training, support, and recognition to sustain a cohesive, effective fighting force
- Build and maintain a partnership with industry to facilitate Citizen-Soldier contributions to both a prosperous economy and a skilled, experienced, and capable Army

To advance these priorities the Army Reserve must:

Obtain from Congress full support and necessary authorities, in accordance with the Army Reserve FY 2012 budget request

THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGET

THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGET WILL ALLOW THE ARMY RESERVE TO:

- Continue Army Reserve internal transformation to an Enduring Operational Force.
- Shape Army Reserve End-strength by recruiting, retaining, and reintegrating, through a Continuum of Service, the best and brightest Citizen-Soldiers.
- Equip units and Soldiers to train and fight to achieve U.S. objectives and ensure national security.
- Provide quality medical and dental services and support to Soldiers and their Families.
- Sustain Army Reserve installations and facilities.

THE POSTURE OF THE ARMY RESERVE:

WHERE WE STAND TODAY

Today's Army Reserve is uniquely positioned and structured to provide operational support in complex security environments. We can meet Army requirements for combat support or combat service support roles. Many civil affairs, psychological operations, medical, transportation, engineer, and information operations capabilities reside exclusively, or predominately, within the Army Reserve. Our ability to mobilize quickly and responsively makes the Army Reserve ideally suited to meet our nation's future requirements. Army Reserve Soldiers will remain a vital part of the Total Army Force facing the national security challenges of the next decade and beyond.

During the Cold War era, the Army Reserve principally operated as a force in reserve. The first Gulf War, in 1990–1991, served as a catalyst for thinking about using the Army Reserve in a more operational capacity when large numbers of Reserve forces were engaged. Since the Gulf War, the nation has employed the Army Reserve in many different ways and at unprecedented levels, most significantly after September 11, 2001. The demands of persistent conflicts over the past nine years were—and continue to be—beyond the ability of the Active component to meet alone. As a result, the nation has relied heavily on the Army Reserve to fill operational requirements, fundamentally changing the role of the Army Reserve from a strategic to an operational force.

Today, with the drawdown of forces in Iraq nearing completion and the proposed drawdown in Afghanistan, we can expect to see declining Department of Defense budgets for the near-to-mid term, as well as potential end-strength reductions, while still preparing for future operations in a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous security environment. A Total Force, maximized for strategic agility at reduced cost, provides the necessary capabilities to the combatant commander.

The Nation and the Department of Defense are now at a strategic juncture with respect to the Army Reserve. Choices made now will determine the Army force mix and capability for the future. The choice can be to return to a strategic Reserve with limited readiness capabilities as the current conflicts resolve, or become an enduring operational force with the readiness levels that provide operational capabilities to meet the Nation's defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict.

Between 2001 and 2010 the Nation invested ~\$52.7 billion to man, equip, train, and employ an operational force. The Department can choose to forgo the \$52 billion investment, and over the next decade, the Army Reserve will revert to a strategic Reserve. This change would occur slowly over the first few years and then accelerate, by default, as the hard-won operational experience of our Soldiers atrophies and further resource constraints are implemented. Alternatively, for an estimated annual investment of ~\$652 million, the Army can retain and sustain an operational Army Reserve. This will provide the Army necessary capability on time and at best value.

Nine years of mobilization and employment for current contingencies has produced the most experienced, ready Army Reserve in history. Currently the Army Reserve is used as an operational force resourced only through Overseas Contingency Operations funding. With minimal recapitalization of readiness funded in the base budget and through annual employment of Army Reserve forces for operational missions such as Theater Security Cooperation, we can maintain these unprecedented readiness levels and support the National Security Strategy. This is the most efficient and cost-effective answer to the Nation's national security requirements.

The Army Reserve culture has changed since 2001. Many Soldiers of the legacy strategic reserve left service in significant numbers between 2004 and 2006. Today, the Army Reserve is fully manned to its Congressionally authorized end-strength with Army Reserve Soldiers who have joined or re-

enlisted to be part of an operational force. Reverting to a strategic Reserve would entail a similar significant loss of our most operationally experienced force and greatest asset—today's Army Reserve Soldier.

Today, we are exploring the Army's Continuum of Service initiatives as a way of making the Army Reserve more attractive for Soldiers, Families, and Employers. When these initiatives become a program of record, they will facilitate a Soldier transfer from one Army component (for example from the Army Reserve to active duty) to another in a seamless, efficient manner that meets the needs of the Soldier as well as the readiness requirements for the Total Force. There is no degradation in personnel management, career opportunities or benefits for a reserve component Soldier's military and civilian career. Continuum of Service will provide choices for Soldiers, their Family members and Employers, which is essential in family and career planning.

The Army Reserve Posture Statement lays out our accomplishments, our plans, and our continuing challenges in the Era of Persistent Conflict and it continues to illustrate through its capabilities and affordability that it is a good investment for the nation. An enduring operational Reserve will provide the Army necessary capabilities at best value. This is the Army Reserve of today and the future.

BOX:

DOCUMENT MAP

The 2011 Army Reserve Posture Statement (ARPS) is the Army Reserve's Annual Report to Congress of the current posture of the Army Reserve to fulfill its Title 10 responsibilities. The Posture Statement also serves to educate and inform Congress of Army Reserve resourcing priorities in the FY 2012 Budget Request that will enable the Army Reserve to continue its transition in support of an operational force. This document is organized to help advise Senate and House Committee appropriators in Committee Hearings addressing Personnel, Readiness and Equipping of the needs of an operational force.

Programs addressed in the President's Budget Request:

- Personnel: Shaping the Force, Building Resiliency, Health Promotion/Risk Prevention, Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program, Spiritual Care, Behavioral Health, Healthcare, Family Programs, Full Time Support, Employer Partnerships of the Armed Forces
- Readiness: An Operational Force, Homeland Operations, Training, Training Equipment, Physical Security, Anti-Terrorism, Aviation, Army Reserve Command, Control, Communication, Computers/Information Technology (C4/IT), Training Facilities
- Equipping: Army Reserve Materiel, Equipment Maintenance, Logistics Contract Support

THE FY 2012 BUDGET REQUEST:**WHERE WE ARE GOING****Personnel****CRITICAL PERSONNEL NEEDS OF AN OPERATIONAL RESERVE**

- Appropriate resources for Recruitment and Retention of the right people and skill sets to sustain the force
- Provide robust Suicide Prevention support and resources for trained caregivers, and training for Applied Suicide Prevention Skills
- Continue support for the Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program events and Family Member training
- Resource Army Guard Reserve Family Life chaplain authorizations
- Align and balance Family Programs capabilities/workforce to serve a geographically dispersed population
- Ensure continuity of support to Army Reserve Soldiers and Families in the community where they live through Virtual Installations/Army Strong Community Centers
- Deliver responsive and relevant Family Assistance and Support services to mobilized and non-mobilized Soldiers, Civilians, and their Families during military operations, emergency activities, and natural disasters
- Improve and Sustain Medical, Dental and Behavioral Health Readiness
- Maintain support levels for Full Time Support

Shaping the Force

The Army Reserve has undergone its largest ever transformation from a strategic reserve to an operational force. Additionally, the Army Reserve has exceeded its end-strength objective of 205,000—but has an imbalance in skills, in particular at the mid-grade ranks. As a result, we have shifted our focus to shaping the force to meet the needs of an Operational Army Reserve that actively supports current operations via the Army Force Generation model, also known as ARFORGEN.

Our strategy will focus on proper balance and sustainment of the force rather than increasing end-strength. The Human Capital Enterprise will manage the accumulated end-strength to build and shape a force that best meets the nation's near-and long-term demands. The Army Reserve will recruit, retain and transition the best and brightest and position them in the right place, in the right job, and at the right time.

As part of shaping the force we requested and received Army approval to reimplement several boards that were previously suspended. These boards provide management tools that facilitate better management of senior grade positions, allow qualified Soldiers to progress at proper intervals in their careers, provide career incentives, and allow Soldiers to advance to higher grades at the peak years of their effectiveness. These boards include the Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) Release from

Active Duty (REFRAD) Board (convened in April 2010) and the Army Reserve Troop Program Unit (TPU) Enlisted Qualitative Retention Board (scheduled to convene in 3rd Qtr FY 2011).

Building Resiliency

The Army Reserve is continuing to build resiliency in our Soldiers, Families and Civilians—all of whom have been affected by the cumulative effects of nine years at war. We have developed a comprehensive approach that puts mental fitness on the same level as physical fitness to build a resilient force for the future. No one individual program builds resiliency; rather, it results from combining the benefits of health promotion-risk reduction education, Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program events, spiritual care, behavioral health programs, medical and dental readiness, and family program services.

Health Promotion—Risk Reduction

The Department of the Army and the Army Reserve have been in the forefront of health promotion—risk reduction efforts by using the Applied Suicide Intervention Skills Training (ASIST) program. Training materials ensure the education of first line supervisors, Army Reserve leadership, Army Civilians, and suicide prevention programs managers (DAC and other full-time support personnel). The key to suicide prevention is trained caregivers. The key requirement to success is to ensure that an appropriate number of individuals receive ASIST for Trainers across the Army Reserve, as well as having these ASIST Trainers conduct the required training to personnel throughout the fiscal year. The two-day ASIST workshop conducted by ASIST Trainers is by far the most widely used, acclaimed and researched suicide intervention skills training for our Soldiers. The ASIST Training done by qualified ASIST Trainers is the best way to increase the number of Gatekeepers trained to recognize Soldiers who are at risk and know how to intervene to prevent the risk of suicidal thoughts becoming suicidal behaviors. Since history has shown that Soldiers are better able to help other Soldiers at risk when they receive ASIST Suicide prevention training, the Army Reserve is committed to early identification of at-risk Soldiers before a serious incident occurs or a Soldier seriously contemplates suicide.

Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program (YRRP)

The mission for Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program (YRRP) simply stated is to support Army Reserve Families and their Soldiers with sufficient information, resources and services, referral, and proactive outreach opportunities throughout the entire deployment cycle. The goal is to build self-sufficient and resilient Families and Soldiers. We accomplish this by developing skills in each Family member and Soldier to assure they are prepared and able to cope with the difficulties of extended separation and deployment. We help Families network together, and connect with each other, and their unit/command and Family Programs' Office. We also attend to both the Family members' and Soldiers' physical, behavioral and mental health needs. This requires trained professional speakers to come to units and regional venues to educate and assist attendees with knowledge, skills and practical hands-on participation.

In FY 2010, the Army Reserve conducted 525 YRRP events, serving 26,000 Soldiers and more than 28,000 Family members. These events proved successful because of direct support from a caring command staff, involvement by a myriad of community agencies, and the commitment of volunteers. Providing these services and support to Army Reserve Families and Soldiers on par with those for the Active component is a challenge since most of our Families do not live near a fort, camp, post or station where services are readily available. The geographic dispersion and numbers of Army Reserve Soldiers and Families, combined with the challenges that may exist with a civilian employer or educational pursuits, is unparalleled by any other military service or service component.

Spiritual Care

While resiliency is the operative word in today's Army concerning Soldier and Family well-being, it has always been the end state of a chaplain's ministry. Spiritual fitness is vital to maintaining a healthy and vibrant force. While chaplains are helpful agents during times of crisis, their greater value lies in their ability to enable Soldiers and Families to endure and successfully overcome a crisis when it does occur.

As an operational force, it is important that we are properly structured and manned. In 2007, the Director of Force Management approved and directed the addition of Unit Ministry Team (UMT) force structure across all Army components. In order to support enduring requirements of an operational Reserve, this additional structure would enable the Army Reserve to place the Army Chaplaincy's Family Life function into its inventory. Family Life chaplains would oversee our successful Strong Bonds' program while also supplementing the Army Reserve's religious support capabilities in Family ministries and UMT training.

We appreciate the resources Congress has approved for the Army Reserve Strong Bonds program. During FY 2010, over 300 Strong Bonds events were conducted throughout the United States and its territories, enhancing Soldier and Family communication and relationship skills. Some 12,500 Soldiers and Family members participated in these events and received this training. Our goal is to provide Strong Bonds Relationship training to the maximum number of Army Reserve Soldiers and Families.

BOX:

When Families are supported, Soldier problems are lessened and Soldier retention increases. The Army Reserve is committed to providing its Soldiers and Families a level of benefits and quality of life that is commensurate with their service to the nation.

Behavioral Health

The Department of Defense Mental Health Task Force of 2006 recognized that the existing systems for psychological health were insufficient for current and future needs. Task Force recommendation 5.4.1.16 stated that "Each Reserve Component should appoint a full time director of Psychological Health to the staff of the Reserve Component Surgeon." It went on to specify that "Where Reservists are organized by region, a full time Regional Psychological Health Director should be appointed." The Army Reserve has acted on these recommendations and has developed a limited Behavioral Health program. There is a Deputy Surgeon for Behavioral Health at the Surgeon's office, whose responsibilities center on program development. Three of the four Regional Support Commands have Directors of Psychological Health. The licensed clinicians are responsible for following up on the urgent referrals generated by the Periodic Health Assessment and Post Deployment Health Reassessments. Working on an "Assess and Refer" model, they conduct bio-psycho-social assessments of each referred individual and determine the appropriate level of follow-up. They do not provide treatment. The major illnesses being identified, Post Traumatic Stress, Major Depression and Substance Abuse are treatable, but require a long-term commitment to care. Even as the current conflicts wind down, the psychological injuries sustained will require treatment far into the future. Four clinicians cannot adequately address the case management and monitoring needs that will be

required by the growing numbers of Soldiers in the Army Reserve who struggle with these difficulties, especially considering the geographical dispersion of our units.

A critical step for the future development of Behavioral Health programming within the Army Reserve is for all those who have a stake in the emotional well-being of Soldiers to share resources and develop multidisciplinary teams in order to most efficiently deal with the often complex and multidimensional needs of our Troops. The Army Reserve will be working with the other military Service reserve components and Congress to continue developing improvements to our infrastructure and processes to ensure our Soldiers receive appropriate care.

Health Care

The Army Reserve has served the nation well while transforming from a strategic to an operational force. Soldiers not medically and dentally ready impair our ability to ensure predictability and reliance for the combatant commander. Army Reserve medical readiness improved from 23 percent on 1 October 2008 to 60 percent as of 23 September 2010. Programs such as the Army Select Reserve Dental Readiness System (ASDRS) have been highly successful. Dental readiness, currently at 74 percent has improved 21 percent over the last two years, and is one of the key elements improving medical readiness. Influenza compliance within the Army Reserve reached its highest compliance rate ever at 77 percent, with H1N1 compliance at 79 percent.

In 2010, we converted the paper records of 168,829 Soldiers to an electronic Health Readiness Record, allowing us to take full advantage of efficiencies in time, cost, and services over the continued use of paper treatment records. To improve data sharing, we obtained view capability of medical records stored in the Armed Forces Health Longitudinal Application, the active component medical database. We implemented the Medical Reserve Ready Response unit program, which enables our Army Reserve Physicians to review medical profiles and approvals from their home, capitalizing on the unique clinical skills found in the Army Reserve.

Caring for our Wounded Warriors and assessing post deployment health issues are part of the Army's efforts to protect the health and well-being of Soldiers who have redeployed from combat. The Army Reserve tracks completion of the Post Deployment Health Reassessments to capture data and monitor the medical and behavioral needs of redeployed Soldiers. Soldiers complete these health assessments within three to six months after returning from theater. As of 15 September 2010, 84,419 Army Reserve Soldiers have been screened for post deployment health issues—a 95 percent compliance rate.

As medical screening has improved, so has the identification of Soldiers who are not medically ready, and much work remains. There are approximately 15,500 Medically Non-deployable (MNDs) Soldiers who require a medical board and we are moving out aggressively to improve the boarding process.

Family Support Programs

Transformation from a strategic reserve to an operational force resulted in the need for standardizing programs and services to ensure Soldier and Family needs are met with the right resources, at the right time. Baseline services and outreach capability that sustain the quality of life of our Soldiers and Families are being integrated into the cycles of the ARFORGEN model. We employ metrics and administer surveys to gauge the quality and integrity of family program services for effectiveness and their value to our customers. This allows for the investment in high return services and the retirement of those that do not meet the needs of an operational force.

An example of a promising high return service is the Army Reserve Virtual Installation Program. Operating at three pilot sites within three Army Strong Community Centers around the country, Virtual Installation brings the services and resources only found on active military installations to

geographically dispersed military Families—of all branches of the armed services. These centers provide hands-on problem resolution and follow-up for a myriad of concerns ranging from military benefits and entitlements to community resources. The Fort Family Support & Outreach Center at Fort McPherson, Georgia is the nerve center of the Army Reserve Virtual Installation where the Outreach Center staff use cutting-edge technology, mapping programs, and resource databases as well as live, personal contact with highly skilled subject matter experts to serve and build community-based capacity for each pilot site.

Full-Time Support (FTS)

In July 2010, the Secretary of the Army directed the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASA (M&RA)) to personally lead a study to determine the correct level of full-time support required for the Reserve Components. A memorandum and a term of reference will be sent to the reserve component leadership advising of the M&RA effort and task. There is also an initiative to have the reserve component re-validate the models that will identify/inform manpower requirements. These efforts will help the Army to determine the appropriate size of the FTS program for managing the reserve component as an operational force.

The Army Reserve is currently funded at 75 percent of its requirements. This funding level is based on the requirements of a strategic reserve and in accordance with the Headquarters, Department of the Army "HIGH RISK" funding methodology. Funding must be maintained at this level.

Civilian personnel programs (Military Technician and Army Civilians) are currently fully funded (based on 75 percent of FTS authorizations against validated requirements) and must remain so in order to provide required Army Reserve full-time support. The National Defense Authorization Act, Subtitle B—Reserve Forces, requires the Army Reserve to meet a Military Technician end-strength floor by 30 September each fiscal year. The ability to support an operational Army Reserve depends on being able to meet, or exceed within established standards, the authorized floor.

The Army Guard and Reserve (AGR) program must also remain fully funded (based on 75 percent of FTS authorizations against validated requirements) in order to provide the required Army Reserve full-time support. Currently authorized 16,261 Soldiers, this program provides the bulk of full-time support at the unit level. They provide day-to-day operational support needed to ensure Army Reserve units are trained and ready to mobilize within the ARFORGEN model. The AGR program is absolutely vital to the successful transition to, and sustainment of, an operational force.

BOX: The Employer Partnership of the Armed Forces has more than 1,300 employers and the list is growing. These Employer Partners represent 95 of the 2010 Forbes Fortune 500 companies; they are military-friendly; and they value the skills, experiences and work ethic of those who serve.

Employer Partnership of the Armed Forces

The Army Reserve's Employer Partnership Initiative has expanded far beyond serving only Army Reserve Soldiers. Today the Employer Partnership provides career continuum resources for the entire Service "Family." It serves the civilian employment and career advancement needs of members of all seven Reserve Components, their Family members, Wounded Warriors and the Nation's veterans. With this fully encompassing focus the program is now the Employer Partnership of the Armed Forces.

The Employer Partnership of the Armed Forces has more than 1,300 participating employers and the list is growing. These Employer Partners represent 95 of the 2010 Forbes Fortune 500 companies; they are military-friendly; and they value the skills, experiences and work ethic of those who serve.

Army Reserve leadership feels the Employer Partnership is realizing success, and that the program supports its Human Capital Strategy. Accordingly the Chief of the Army Reserve will spend as much as \$5 million during FY 2011 for the program. This funds operations which include program support personnel dispersed across the United States, and other resources that help connect seekers to jobs.

Last fall the Employer Partnership launched a state-of-the-art job search resource at the portal: www.EmployerPartnership.org. Through strategic partnerships the portal accesses approximately 600,000 jobs at any given time. In addition to robust search capabilities, seekers can use the resume builder and keep a detailed resume readily available within the portal. Employers may then reach in and conduct candidate searches based on seeker skills / experiences. This in effect allows "jobs" to actually "find" our seekers. The portal's user-friendly functionality makes it an efficient tool for both seekers and employers.

The partnerships forged with civilian employers build operational capacity for the Army Reserve and the Reserve components; they fortify the resilience of our Families; they serve those who have served; and they strengthen our Employer Partners. The Army Reserve's underwriting of Employer Partnership of the Armed Forces program represents a positive investment for America.

THE EMPLOYER PARTNERSHIP PROMOTES SKILLS AND OPPORTUNITY SHARING WITH THE HOME FRONT

PROGRAM PROVIDES ADVANTAGE TO LOCAL COMMUNITIES AND THE MILITARY

Employers realize that it makes sense to hire personnel already trained and experienced. Reserve Service members and Veterans fit this bill. They are skilled in a wide variety of disciplines including health care, transportation, logistics, supply chain management, law enforcement, public safety, construction, engineering, finance, information technology and telecommunications. By providing access to talented Service members, the Employer Partnership of the Armed Forces saves local employers time and money.

The military also benefits. Best practices from industry, and experience with cutting edge technology and medical procedures flows into our Armed Forces through Reserve service. And, as the Employer Partnership (EP) helps Service members progress in their civilian career fields, increased expertise is brought to military assignments.

Perhaps most important to the home front are the career opportunities the EP brings to Service members, their Families and our Veterans. The Employer Partnership program truly exemplifies a positive investment in America, and our commitment to taking care of our entire Military "Family."

Career opportunities across America

The EP program has written agreements with more than 1,300 Employer Partners; with jobs in every U.S. state and territory.

Strengthens local economies

Efficient access to trained and qualified work force saves time. Hiring costs also lowered by reducing need for duplicate drug and aptitude screening.

Inside track to opportunity

Provides Service members with an inside track to employers who are committed to hiring Reservists and Veterans.

A concrete way to support troops

The EP program gives employers a tangible way to support our troops while also strengthening America's economy.

The Army Reserve's core Competencies:

Battle Tested, Skill Rich Army Reserve Soldiers in an Operational Force Provide Strength For America And It's Economy

LOGISTICS

Logistics is one of the most important capabilities of the Army Reserve. From supply-chain management to land, water, and air operations, the nation's defense depends on the efficiency of our Expeditionary Sustainment Commands; Transportation, Petroleum, Quartermaster and Supply units. Army Reserve Soldiers are skilled and experienced in delivering the right product at the right time to our customers world-wide.

HEALTHCARE

Breakthroughs in trauma techniques and procedures often originate from battlefield medicine. The majority of the U.S. Military's medical capability resides in the Reserve components. As a result of their military service, Army Reserve doctors, nurses, technologists and other medical service practitioners are able to bring extraordinary practical experience to local care providing institutions across the U.S.

INFORMATION/COMMUNICATIONS

Information is critical to successful operations on the modern battlefield. Satellite, microwave, cell and fiber-optic are among the many means; code-division multiplexing, time division and frequency division multiple access are among the technical methods which enable this. Data collection, analysis and reporting activities form the information and intelligence that is communicated. The Reserve has operators, enablers and trainers in all of these disciplines. Army Reserve Communicators are information age proficient.

MANAGEMENT

The development of leadership and management skills begins early in every service member's career. Military training stresses leadership principles, sound decision-making and overcoming challenges. This is important because Soldiers are responsible for major equipment systems, and above all, are responsible for the well-being of those they lead. Army Reserve Soldiers are responsible and capable leaders.

Readiness

Critical Readiness Needs of an Operational Reserve

- Adequate resources to respond to Homeland Defense missions
- Additional mandays in the last three years of the ARFORGEN cycle
- Provide Simulations and Simulators to enable operationally relevant, full spectrum training for Soldiers anytime/anywhere
- Ensure Home station training capabilities to support critical home station pre-deployment training
- Sustain the availability of training equipment
- Support for programs to Protect the Force
- Continue support for a fully integrated operational Aviation force
- Provide a strong Army Reserve Network Defense
- Funding for essential and mandatory secure communications
- Creation of a standardized computing environment
- Construction and upgrade of Army Reserve Centers, and Training Facilities
- Support for programs to reduce energy usage, conserve natural resources, and develop alternate renewable energy
- Continue the work of Army Reserve Virtual Installation Program

Operations

An Operational Force

The Army Reserve continues to provide vital capabilities to combatant commanders in support of overseas contingency operations. More than 196,711 Army Reserve Soldiers have mobilized in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom/New Dawn and Operation Enduring Freedom since September 11, 2001. Today, more than 15,584 Warrior Citizens are serving in Iraq, Afghanistan and 22 other countries around the globe.

We execute a pre-mobilization readiness strategy that provides the Army ready formations and soldiers on an annual, predictable cycle. Through the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model, the Army Reserve synchronizes the plans and resources necessary to meet the readiness goals for units entering their available year. This maximizes "boots on the ground" time, builds cohesive teams and provides predictability for our Soldiers and Families.

Homeland Operations (HLO)

Homeland Operations, which includes Homeland Defense, Homeland Security and Defense Support of Civil Authorities, has become an increasingly important mission for the Army Reserve and its applicable capabilities. The Army Reserve currently provides 37 units in support of the Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Response Enterprise. Properly managing this Army Reserve

commitment will necessitate growth of full-time manning and Troop Program Unit positions within the Homeland Defense Division.

The Army Reserve has relevant and capable units that we leverage in a Defense Support of Civil Authorities environment. This includes, but is not limited to, the following types of units: medical aviation, transportation, engineering, communications, and Civil Affairs. These capabilities can be packaged with the appropriate command and staff structure to facilitate assistance to civil authorities. This packaging can also provide necessary command and control of Title 10 Department of Defense resources in a defined joint environment. When combined with legislative efforts to amend existing mobilization authorities, the U.S. Army Reserve can provide significant resources to support civil authorities in domestic disasters and emergencies.

Theater Security Cooperation Programs (TSCP)

As requirements for Deployed Expeditionary Forces decrease as the result of planned force drawdowns in Operations New Dawn and Enduring Freedom, the Army Reserve is exploring other missions in an effort to sustain experience and readiness levels. Combatant commander TSCP programs require a wide range of forces, such as military police, for missions of varying duration. In many cases, Army Reserve formations are ideally suited to conduct these missions. The use of Army Reserve units: reduces stress on the active component, preserves the readiness gains made in the reserve component over the last decade, and spreads the burden of defending American interests across a larger portion of the citizenry.

Training

Mandays to support an Operational Reserve:

Using a progressive training strategy, the Army Reserve is committed to providing trained companies and battle staffs to combatant commands upon mobilization. With adequate resources that support reoccurring operational employments, we can effectively fulfill our mission. A sufficient number of training mandays, during the last three years of the ARFORGEN cycle, is imperative to meet established readiness aim points, which reduces post-mobilization training time and increases Boots on the Ground time for theater operations.

Simulations and Simulators:

The Army Reserve continues to engage the Army's Training Support System Enterprise that provides networked, integrated and interoperable training support capabilities that enable operationally relevant, full spectrum training for Soldiers anytime/anywhere. The use of simulations and simulators minimizes turbulence for Soldiers and their Families caused by training demands during the first two years of the ARFORGEN process by enabling individuals and units to train at their home station and during exercises in a safe environment without the increased wear and tear on equipment. An example of the simulators used to train Soldiers is the fielding of more than 630 Laser Marksmanship Training Systems to 346 Army Reserve locations over the past year.

Home Station Training Capabilities:

The Army Reserve remains dedicated to providing suitable platforms to support critical home station training for its units. Home station for the Army Reserve includes Reserve Centers, Local Training Areas, Regional Training Sites, and installations. Home stations must adequately portray the operational environment in training venues, facilities, and ranges with a mix of Live, Virtual (Simulators), and Constructive (Simulations), including gaming technologies. Modernizing our facility infrastructure through additional Military Construction and the retrofitting of existing facilities with state

of the art classrooms and simulator/simulation rooms enhances our ability to conduct individual and collective training, such as the inclusion of the weapons simulator rooms in our new Army Reserve Centers. Upgrading our existing Local Training Areas, and Regional Training Sites with ranges and training facilities provides units the capability to master critical tasks while training close to home.

Army Reserve Comprehensive Soldier Fitness

Comprehensive Soldier Fitness marks a new era for the Army Reserve by comprehensively equipping and training our Soldiers, Family members and Army Civilians to maximize their potential and face the physical and psychological challenges of sustained operations. We are committed to Comprehensive Soldier Fitness that will enhance resilience and coping skills enabling the Force to grow and thrive in today's Army Reserve.

This year, the Army Reserve trained over 100 Non-Commissioned and Commissioned Officers at the Department of the Army's Master Resiliency Trainer's Course. These trained leaders form the core of our resiliency effort and are currently conducting Resiliency Training at Army Reserve units globally. Initial feedback from Soldiers and Civilians that have attended this training, has been overwhelmingly positive.

Training Equipment

The Army Reserve has been able to meet both the logistics readiness requirements for mobilizing its units as an Operational Reserve force and the enduring standards outlined in regulations and directives. These results have been delivered through effective and intensive management, innovative programs, and strict adherence to priorities and effective enablers such as contracted maintenance and support to our units. We have developed and fielded "bridging" logistics management and information systems to augment those fielded and programmed by the Army. These systems have created a near "real time" data warehouse and responsive tools for our managers to quickly identify and resolve issues, especially in maintenance, property accountability and equipment distribution. We continue to find innovative ways to accomplish our missions with the resources provided as we move towards full implementation of our position as an Operational Reserve within the Army Force Generation Model.

Security

The Office of the Provost Marshall (OPM) manages the Force Protection of Army Reserve facilities and personnel. OPM's core functions are Antiterrorism, Police Operations, Physical Security and Law Enforcement. The Army Reserve has identified three mission priorities that OPM is responsible for managing which require funding:

Installation Access Control:

Army Reserve facilities are distinctive because they are stand-alone facilities in remote parts of the country. Maintaining positive control of access to these facilities is paramount to ensuring that the Soldiers and equities inside these facilities remain ready and available to combatant commanders. Funding to modernize access to Reserve facilities supports the Army Reserve objective of Protecting the Force.

Intrusion Detection System (IDS) Maintenance and Monitoring:

IDS systems monitor arms rooms at Army Reserve facilities 24-hours a day. Should an arms room at a remote facility be breached, creating the possibility that military weapons could fall into the hands of criminals or terrorists, the monitoring program ensures that authorities will be notified immediately.

Antiterrorism Program Management:

Antiterrorism (AT) Assessment Specialists are the key component of the Antiterrorism Program. AT Specialists conduct inspections of Army Reserve facilities across the nation to ensure facilities are in accordance with Department of Defense and Army standards. The Army Reserve spans over 1,100 stand-alone facilities across the continental U.S. With appropriate funding the Army Reserve can protect Soldiers and equipment vulnerable to criminal and domestic terrorist threats

Aviation

Army Reserve Aviation is a fully integrated, operational force with a fleet of more than 198 rotary wing and fixed wing aircraft. The diverse fleet provides speed, mobility, flexibility, agility, and versatility to the Army in support of full spectrum operations. Army Reserve Aviation has recently activated two new MEDEVAC companies. The MEDEVAC companies are located in Texas, Colorado, Pennsylvania, and Kentucky. Additionally, the Army Reserve aviation fixed wing units will accept delivery of six new C12V1 aircraft in 2011. These aircraft will fill a critical capability gap to meet Continental United States (CONUS) based training requirements in preparation for Overseas Contingency Operations. The Army Reserve continues to seek funds for the procurement four additional C12V1 aircraft. Lastly, Army Reserve Aviation continues to lead the way in Air Traffic Simulation. The first unit level Air Traffic Control simulator, located in the Marrayman Simulation Complex, Ft. Rucker, Alabama became operational this year. The system meets all Federal Aviation Administration requirements for certification. The simulator provides qualification and proficiency training for all Army controllers. This simulator is also used in aviation training exercises to validate controller skills prior to deployment.

Base Realignment and Closure

The Army Reserve is in its final year of the six-year execution of the BRAC 2005 mandated execution—which officially ends on 15 September 2011. Upon the conclusion of this BRAC window, the Army Reserve will have made significant changes shaping the force for relevant contributions well into the future. The year's execution will mark the culmination of the largest transformation of the Army Reserve since World War II by realigning the command and control structure into an operational configuration; realigning six major headquarters including Office of the Chief, Army Reserve and United States Army Reserve Command to new locations; disestablishing 12 Regional Readiness Commands; establishing four Regional Support Commands; activating five Sustainment Commands and eight Sustainment Brigades; constructing 125 Armed Forces Reserve Centers; and closing 190 facilities or activities.

BRAC provides an opportunity for the Army Reserve to power down to our major commands some of the functions that are typically managed at the Army Reserve Headquarters. We are implementing the Army's enterprise approach within our staff, which includes managing things like personnel issues and logistics issues at the lowest possible level of organization. When we power down some of these management issues to our regional and operational/functional commands during our BRAC move, it may make sense for those commands to retain management of some of those issues.

Completing the construction of 61 Armed Forces Reserve Centers and relocating units into these new facilities remains the largest priority of execution for Fiscal Year 2011 as all actions must be completed by September 15, 2011. The relocation of units into these new facilities will facilitate the closure and disposal of the remaining 143 of 176 Army Reserve Centers identified by BRAC for closure.

Over the next year the Army Reserve will execute and complete the remainder of all Army Reserve BRAC actions. These remaining actions will mark the end of the largest transformation efforts the Army Reserve has seen in its storied history.

Communication (Information Technology)

Army Reserve Network

The Army Reserve Network (ARNET) provides the Command and Control (C2) enablement in operationalizing the Army Reserve. The ARNET provides Army Reserve Leaders and Soldiers the ability to make timely informed decisions in the execution of overall C2 for all Army Reserve units throughout the contiguous United States and Puerto Rico. Over the past two years, the Army Reserve has worked closely with the Army in implementing the Global Network Enterprise Construct (GNEC) strategy as the way to grow and improve LandWarNet to an Enterprise activity. The ideal end-state is to provide Soldiers a universal email address, file storage, telephone number and a standardized collaboration tool set.

The Army Reserve's contributions to GNEC began in 2002 with an Army Business Initiative Council approved project. Elements of the project re-structured the legacy ARNET into a portion of the LandWarNet and developed a consolidated Data Center providing centralized core services (i.e., Active Directory, email, collaboration, file storage and centralized application hosting) for the entire Army Reserve. With approximately 85% of the consolidation completed, continued funding of the ARNET is integral in maintaining a global warfighting C2 capability. The Army Reserve's accomplishments and experiences have been applicable to the Army as we continue to participate in GNEC planning forums in aligning Army initiatives and timelines while ensuring Army Reserve Title 10 operational capabilities are met.

BOX: Cyber Operations

Army Reserve Soldiers offer current skill-sets and leap-ahead capabilities in the cyber environment. Warrior-Citizens employed in leading-edge technology companies have critical skills and experience in fielding the latest information technology systems, networks, and cyber security protocols.

Secure Communication

Secure communications is essential and mandatory, particularly with C2 and mobilization (i.e., deployment dates, passing mobilization orders, and C2 theater assets). Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPR) and Secure Video Teleconference (SVTC) for all Battalion and above units are vital in meeting all pre-mobilization training/readiness gates, mobilization training actions and day-to-day secure operational planning. The security of the Global Information Grid (GIG) is a constant challenge and reflected in DOD's standup of Cyber Command and the associated service elements. The same is true in the overall security posture of the ARNET in ensuring the uninterrupted flow of information to all ARNET authorized users. Continued investment in the Army Reserve secure communications and defense of the ARNET supplies Army Reserve Leaders, Soldiers and Civilians the capability of attacking and exploiting network threats.

Army Reserve Facilities

Reserve Centers, Training Support and Maintenance facilities are designed to meet the unique requirements of our community-based force. Our Soldiers, Families, and Civilians are strategically located across the country in over 1100 stand-alone facilities—Army Reserve Centers or Armed Forces Reserve Centers (which house other Department of Defense components along with Army Reserve). However, the needs of the Army Reserve are evolving. The Military Construction Army Reserve priorities for the FY2012-2017 Program Objective Memorandum are Army Reserve Centers, training support facilities, and maintenance facilities. The Army Reserve Centers are essential to

training Reserve Soldiers for the full spectrum of operations and the operations of the Army Reserve. Training Support Facilities are critical to conducting Army Reserve and active-component unit and collective training tasks in support of the Army Force Generation Model requirements. These facilities also provide the training platform to support The Army School System, which is composed of the reserve component, the active component Military Occupational Skill reclassification, and Officer and Non-Commissioned Officer Professional Military Education. Maintenance Facilities are the third priority to the facility strategy required as the logistics support to Army Reserve Equipment.

Base Realignment and Closure and emerging Army requirements for modular unit design, force protection, and energy efficiency continue to require new facilities or renovations to our existing facilities. Quality facilities are critical to the Army Reserve's ability to handle the increased training, mobilization, and Family and Soldier care activities that today's Army Reserve demands.

Energy Conservation

The Army Reserve is especially proud that our facilities are at the forefront of energy sustainability. In 2010, several new Reserve Centers will achieve net-zero energy usage (self-sufficient without drawing additional power from the electrical grid). We have established a solar energy farm at Fort Hunter Liggett, CA, and are installing wind turbines and geothermal plants at several new facilities. The Army Reserve has started a retrofit program, replacing lights, windows, roofs, and other components with new energy-efficient technology, resulting in substantial savings in utility costs. The Army Reserve was the first Defense component to commission partnerships with local utility providers and to solicit third-party energy investors. In five years every state and U.S. territory will have Army Reserve facilities that are energy self-sufficient (net-zero), with many providing renewable energy back to the electrical grid. To continue this progress, the Army Reserve must conduct a sustainability evaluation of each facility. This will establish a sustainability baseline, which will in turn enable us to create a sustainability strategy that addresses the unique characteristics of each site. Continuing to invest in sustainable facilities will enable the Army Reserve to meet or exceed the Department of Defense requirement for a completely net-zero footprint by 2025. More importantly, the Army Reserve will save American tax dollars, return a valuable energy resource to the community, and assure reliable energy for Army Reserve Soldiers and Families.

Until energy independence is realized, it is imperative that the Army Reserve have fully funded utilities. In previous years utility costs have risen substantially, requiring the Army Reserve to re-program funds and accept risk in other areas. The Army's increasing emphasis on home-station training, ongoing deployments, and the needs of Army families in the community means that the Army Reserve needs constant, reliable access to energy in our Reserve Centers and training facilities now more than ever.

BOX: The Army Reserve was the first Defense component to commission partnerships with local utility providers and to solicit third-party energy investors.

Equipping

Critical Equipping Needs of an Operational Reserve

- Resource Modernized equipment for the Army Reserve to improve Army Reserve readiness and capabilities within the ARFORGEN Model
- Maintain Army Reserve equipment at or beyond the Army standard of 90 percent Fully Mission Capable
- Provide Contracted Support for logistics operations and information systems to sustain logistics readiness
- Funding for state-of-the-art maintenance facilities

Army Reserve Materiel

The Army Reserve, thanks to the support of Congress, is at an aggregate total of nearly 90 percent of its required equipment on-hand. Sixty-five percent of our on-hand equipment is classified as "modernized." However, we remain short in several areas of critical equipment. Around 35 percent of our required equipment lines are at less than 65 percent on hand. These shortages include tactical communications networks (satellite and terrestrial), command and control items and night vision systems. We have been able to sustain the pace of operations and training as an Operational Reserve by the continuous cross-leveling of available equipment among units. This does create an unsustainable level of friction, where a critical amount of equipment is not immediately available as the equipment is in transit (geographical dispersion of our units across the country), undergoing maintenance or awaiting deployment. In addition, some of our equipment is already deployed. The Army continues to work with us on identifying and filling shortages to improve readiness and capability to act as an Operational Reserve force under the Army Forces Generation Model.

Equipment Maintenance

The Army Reserve maintains its equipment at or beyond the Army standard of 90 percent Fully Mission Capable. This ensures the availability of equipment for training and mobilization to support the operational force within the Army Force Generation Model. Units cannot train or mobilize without equipment that is ready to perform. Field level maintenance keeps the equipment ready for use. Funding for tools, consumables, military technician mechanics and contracted support sustains our field level maintenance activities. Good maintenance reduces the amount of "friction" (equipment in shop, in transit, etc.) that removes equipment from use. Depot maintenance is important in keeping older equipment operable, relevant and safe to employ. Recapitalization of equipment provides a source of modernized and more capable items when new procurement is insufficient to meet shortfalls or inventory losses. Funding for military construction provides new, modernized or expanded facilities to perform maintenance and staging of equipment.

Logistics Contract Support

It is prudent to fund the Army Reserve for contract support for logistics operations and information systems to sustain logistics readiness. Contract support allows the Army Reserve to execute a vigorous assistance program in managing inventory and identifying and disposing of excess; providing field level repair and services during "surge" periods when units draw equipment for training or mobilization and in sustaining our critical logistics information and management systems. Contract support also strengthens our ability to meet operational demands and serve as an operational force

within the Army Force Generation Model, while meeting Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities missions.

BOX: However, we remain short in several areas of critical equipment. Around 35 percent of our required equipment lines are at less than 65 percent on hand. These shortages include tactical communications network (satellite and terrestrial), command and control items and night vision systems.

Leveraging contracted support, especially during periods of “surge” in mobilizing units, has supplemented our organizational capabilities. This enabler assists us in maintaining and preparing our equipment for training, mobilization and deployment, in operating and sustaining our logistics management and information systems in support of logistics operations and in managing the distribution of our equipment and identification and disposal of excess. We continue to find innovative ways to accomplish our missions with the resources provided as we move towards full implementation of our position as an operational force within the Army Force Generation Model.

Equipment Facilities Management

State-of-the-art maintenance facilities are the cornerstone of the Army Reserve’s ability to sustain large equipment. The Army Reserve uses state-of-the art environmental control features in maintenance facility designs that meet or exceed federal design standards. Data ports at vehicle work bays, fluid distribution systems that eliminate spillage, and oil/water separators are examples of proven design features. These features improve efficiency and enhance collection of fossil fuel waste, further safeguarding surrounding communities’ land and waterways from contamination and pollution. Fire suppression systems and eye wash stations are standard safety design elements. The Army Reserve will continue to upgrade our older maintenance facilities, because the condition of maintenance facilities is directly related to our ability to maintain equipment in acceptable condition. Continued deployments and heavy training have taken a toll on both equipment and facilities. Facility sustainment is critical—in fact, it is a cost-saving measure realized over the life-cycle of the facilities, if done properly. Facility deficiencies, if left unchecked, tend to worsen exponentially over time. The ongoing investment in the facilities we build will ultimately reduce repair, renovation, and replacement costs in the future.

CONCLUSION:**THE FORCE IS IN GOOD HANDS**

As we travel around the United States and the world and witness what our Soldiers are doing for their country, it's just inspiring to see the quality, the dedication and the professionalism of our Soldiers serving in the Army Reserve. These are top-notch individuals that have put their civilian careers on hold. They are well educated and have very bright futures ahead of them—but they joined our ranks to serve their country.

With more than 170,000 Army Reservists mobilized since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the force is more experienced than ever before and the Troops feel good about what they've accomplished and proven about the Army Reserve.

Today's environment of multiple deployments is telling us, however, the Army Reserve will need to keep giving these quality Soldiers fulfilling training and missions, a fair benefits package and more balance in their lives to keep them on our team. We cannot continue to expect them to keep up with a rapid operational pace without more time at home with their families and civilian employers between deployments, and they need predictability about when they will deploy. Toward that end, the Army Reserve is working to give its Citizen-Soldiers a bit more time to be "Citizens."

Today's Army Reserve recruits are attracted to an operational force because it enables them to serve their country in a meaningful way while allowing them to pursue a civilian career. When considering the future posture of the Army Reserve, we are convinced that after playing key roles in an operational force, they'll never be satisfied reverting to their long-abandoned "weekend warrior" status. We have transitioned our personnel and our mentality to an operational force and have created an environment and culture our Soldiers want to be part of—and that they feel good about. We have told the Army leadership and others there's no turning back. We cannot go back to a strategic reserve—one, because the nation needs us; but two, because our Soldiers have proven themselves capable of supporting this role.

Equally compelling, we as a military have come to the realization that we can't fight an extended conflict without the reserve. We have built an Army that is dependent on having access to the reserve when it needs us; and with the expectation that it is going to be trained and ready—a predictable capability that is not possible in a strategic posture.

One thing is certain about the future—while looking for ways to cut costs and reap a "peace dividend" once the troops draw down in Iraq and Afghanistan, there will be the temptation to turn back the clock and reinstitute a strategic reserve. Such a plan would deprive the United States of an important, battle-tested and cost-effective resource.

Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom and now New Dawn have demonstrated the capabilities the reserve components bring to the military. Particularly important are the "enabling capabilities" resident in the Army Reserve: logistical, engineer, military police, medical and civil affairs support.

We are now at a point where current and projected demands for Army forces will require continued access to the Army's reserve components, making real what has been in policy for some time. This means that mobilization and operational use of reserve component Soldiers and units will have to continue for the foreseeable future. The Army of the 21st century will require a versatile mix of tailorable and adaptable organizations—both active component and reserve component—interdependently operating on a rotational cycle.

Transforming the Army's reserve components into an enduring operational force provides a historic opportunity for the Army to achieve the most cost-effective use of its Total Force through investing in and relying on the Army's reserve components to take on a greater role in our nation's defense.

I am an American Soldier.

I am a Warrior and a member of a team. I serve the people of the United States and live the Army Values.

I will always place the mission first.

I will never accept defeat.

I will never quit.

I will never leave a fallen comrade.

I am disciplined, physically and mentally tough, trained and proficient in my warrior tasks and drills. I always maintain my arms, my equipment and myself.

I am an expert and I am a professional.

I stand ready to deploy, engage, and destroy the enemies of the United States of America in close combat.

I am a guardian of freedom and the American way of life.

I am an American Soldier.

Army Reserve Snapshot

Mission: The Army Reserve provides trained, equipped, and ready Soldiers and cohesive units to meet global requirements across the full spectrum of operations.

Vision: As an enduring operational force, the Army Reserve is the premier force provider of America's Citizen-Soldiers for planned and emerging missions at home and abroad. Enhanced by civilian skills that serve as a force multiplier, we deliver vital military capabilities essential to the Total Force.

Key Leaders

- Secretary of the Army: The Honorable John McHugh
- Army Chief of Staff: General George W. Casey, Jr.
- Chief, Army Reserve and Commanding General, U.S. Army Reserve Command: Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz
- Assistant Chief, Army Reserve: Mr. James Snyder
- Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Army Reserve Command: Major General Jon J. Miller
- Deputy Chief Army Reserve, Individual Mobilization Augmentee: Major General Keith L. Thurgood
- Deputy Chief Army Reserve/Human Capital Enterprise: Brigadier General Leslie A. Purser
- U.S. Army Reserve Command Chief of Staff: Brigadier General William J. Gothard
- Director for Resource Management/Materiel Enterprise: Mr. Stephen Austin
- Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7/Force Programs Division/Readiness Enterprise: Colonel (P) Brian J. McKiernan
- Chief Executive Officer/Director, Services and Infrastructure Enterprise: Mr. Addison D. Davis
- Command Chief Warrant Officer: Chief Warrant Officer 5 James E. Thompson
- Command Sergeant Major: Command Sergeant Major Michael D. Schultz

Army Reserve Basics

- Established: April 23, 1908
- Designated Direct Reporting Unit to Army: October 1, 2007
- 2010 Authorized End Strength: 205,000
- Selective Reserve Strength: 205,281
- Accessions for FY 2009: 23,684 (105% of actual goal)
- Reenlistments for FY 2009: 12,227 (105% of annual goal)
- Accessions Goal for FY 2010: 20,000
- Soldiers Deployed Around the World: 15,584
- Soldiers Mobilized Since September 11, 2001: 196,711

- Number of Army Reserve Centers: 1,100

Distinctive Capabilities:

The Army Reserve contributes to the Army's Total Force by providing 100% of the:

- Theater Engineer Commands
- Civil Affairs Commands
- Training Divisions
- Biological Detection Companies
- Railway Units
- Replacement Companies

...more than two-thirds of the Army's:

- Medical Brigades
- Civil Affairs Brigades
- PSYOPS Groups
- Expeditionary Sustainment Commands
- Dental Companies
- Combat Support Hospitals
- Army Water Craft
- Petroleum Units
- Mortuary Affairs Units

...and nearly half of the Army's:

- Military Police Commands
- Information Operations Groups
- Medical Units
- Supply Units

Army Reserve Demographics

Ethnicity

Caucasian: 58.9% Pacific Isl: 1.0%

Black: 21.8% Native Amer: 0.7%

Hispanic: 12.8% Other 1.1%

Asian: 3.7%

Average Age: 32.1

Officers: 40.7

Enlisted: 30.3

Warrant: 43.1

Married 45.3%

Officers: 66.9%

Enlisted: 40.8%

Warrant: 72.2%

Gender

Male: 76.6%

Female: 23.4%

Army Reserve Budget Figures

Total FY 2011 Budgeted: \$8.1 Billion

Operations and Maintenance: \$3.2 Billion

Military Personnel: \$4.7 Billion

Military Construction: \$318 Million

Total FY 2012 Programmed: \$8.8 Billion

Operations and Maintenance: \$3.1 Billion

Military Personnel: \$5.3 Billion

Military Construction: \$318,175 Million

Army Reserve Installations

Fort Buchanan, P.R. Fort McCoy, Wis.

Devens, Mass. Fort Hunter Liggett, Calif.

Fort Dix, N.J. Camp Parks, Calif.

Legislative Affairs Contact: 703-601-0863 / 0854

YOUR ARMY RESERVE

The United States Army Reserve provides trained units and qualified Soldiers available for active duty in the armed forces in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require. Throughout the United States, the Army Reserve has four Regional Support Commands that provide base support functions, and 13 Operational and Functional Commands available to respond to homeland emergencies and expeditionary missions worldwide.



LIEUTENANT GENERAL JACK C. STULTZ
Chief, Army Reserve; Commanding General, U.S. Army Reserve Command

Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz became Chief, Army Reserve, and Commanding General, United States Army Reserve Command, on 25 May 2006, after serving as the Command's Deputy Commanding General since October 2005. Prior to assignment to the Army Reserve Command, Lieutenant General Stultz served as the Commanding General of the 143rd Transportation Command, which provides command and control to 12 units in the southeast United States.

Lieutenant General Stultz entered active duty in 1974 after receiving his commission from the Reserve Officer Training Corps at Davidson College, North Carolina, graduating with a Bachelor of Arts Degree. After completing the Engineer Officer Basic Course and Airborne School, he was assigned to the 20th Engineer Battalion, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, serving as Platoon Leader, Executive Officer, and Commander, Company B, 20th Engineer Battalion.

Lieutenant General Stultz left active duty in June 1979 to pursue a civilian career. At the same time, he began his Army Reserve career with assignment to the 108th Division (Infantry OSUT), headquartered in Charlotte, North Carolina. Stultz served in a variety of positions with the 108th Division, including Brigade Assistant S-3, Battalion S-1, Commander, Company D, 4th Battalion 108th Regiment, and Division Assistant G-3. Lieutenant General Stultz began his career with the Transportation Corps in February 1987 with an assignment to the 32d Transportation Group (Composite), which was mobilized and deployed in November 1990 in support of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Stultz was responsible for providing transportation support to XVIII Airborne Corps and VII Corps in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Kuwait. Returning from the desert in July 1991, Stultz assumed responsibilities as the Group Executive Officer. Stultz took command of the 257th Transportation Battalion (Movement Control) in 1995. The battalion deployed to the Balkans in March 1997 in support of Operation Joint Endeavor/Joint Guard, providing movement control support for operations in Hungary, Croatia, and Bosnia. He took command of the 32d Transportation Group in 1998, and served in this capacity until assuming duties of Deputy Commanding General, 143rd TRANSCOM in 1999. Stultz deployed to Kuwait in October 2002 as Commander 143rd TRANSCOM (Forward), establishing initial RSOI operations in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Moving forward into Iraq with the initial ground offensive, he established the first forward logistics hub at Tallil and initial rail operations at Garma, located west of Baghdad. In October 2003 he was assigned as Director of Movements, Distribution and Transportation, Combined Forces Land Component Command Kuwait, responsible for the deployment/redeployment of sustainment supplies for US and Coalition forces in Kuwait and Iraq. Stultz returned to the United States in August 2004 after 22 months in Theater. In October 2004, Stultz assumed command of the 143rd TRANSCOM, Orlando, Florida.

Honors: Lieutenant General Jack Stultz is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College and the Army War College. His awards and decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star (w/1 Oak Leaf Cluster), Meritorious Service Medal (w/3 Oak Leaf Clusters), Army Commendation Medal (w/4 Oak Leaf Clusters) and the Army Achievement Medal. As a Citizen-Soldier, Stultz retired from Procter and Gamble as an operations manager with 28 years of service. He is married to the former Laura Brown. They have four children and four granddaughters.

STATEMENT BY

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARRY M. WYATT III

DIRECTOR, AIR NATIONAL GUARD

BEFORE THE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY READINESS

FIRST SESSION, 112TH CONGRESS

ON

AIR FORCE AND ARMY NATIONAL GUARD TRAINING,

OPERATIONS, AND MAINTENANCE

September 21, 2011

NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION
UNTIL RELEASED BY
THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

Opening Remarks

Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Bordallo, and distinguished members of the subcommittee; I am honored to appear before you today on behalf of the outstanding men and women serving in our nation's Air National Guard. I would like to begin by expressing my sincere appreciation to the Committee for its tremendous support to the Air National Guard. Your work ensures America continues to have an Air National Guard that is responsive to our domestic needs as well as providing operational capabilities critical to the success of our Total Force. As we face increasingly limited resources and shifting budget priorities, we must accentuate the strength of the Air National Guard—our cost effectiveness.

Air National Guard in National Defense

Facing a need to reduce the Defense budget in response to domestic priorities and the need to sustain defense capabilities in light of growing foreign challenges, Secretary of Defense Melvin B. Laird put his faith in the Reserve Components. Secretary Laird wrote in 1970, "Within the Department of Defense...economics will require reductions in overall strengths and capabilities of the active forces, and increased reliance on the combat and the combat support units of the Guard and Reserves."¹ He understood that by increasing the readiness of the Guard and Reserves and then relying upon them "to be the

¹ Melvin B. Laird, Memorandum to the Secretaries of the Military Departments, Subj: Support for Guard and Reserve Forces, August 21, 1970.

initial and primary source for augmentation of the active forces in any future emergency”² the nation would maintain its defense capability and capacity while decreasing the overall costs.

The US Air Force leadership at the time recognized that as the nation’s first military responder, increased reliance on the Reserve Components meant the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard must be ready to respond quickly and integrate seamlessly into any operation; they would require equipment and training comparable to the regular, active duty Air Force. The ANG, with significant help from Congress, traded in its obsolete Korean War vintage equipment for newer, and in some cases brand new aircraft. The ANG also received additional funds for training, including modern flight simulators, and full-time Guard Airmen (Active Guard & Reserve (AGR) and Technicians) to oversee the increased training regimen.

Improved operational readiness brought with it a rejuvenated desire by Guard Airmen to do more than just train – a desire to demonstrate their capabilities. ANG units began volunteering to augment the Regular Air Force by participating in on-going operational missions around the world. To the customer, the Air National Guard became indistinguishable from the Regular Air Force. This was done within the fundamental framework of a part-time professional force operating modern compatible equipment. It was the second generation of Secretary Laird’s Total Air Force that fought in Operation DESERT SHIELD, Bosnia, Kosovo, responded to the attacks on 9/11, maintained the no-fly zones in Iraq (Operation NORTHERN WATCH and SOUTHERN WATCH), Operation

² *Ibid.*

IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM. Last year (CY2010), Guard Airmen filled 48,538 manpower requests, and 89% of these Guard Airmen responded to the call voluntarily, without the need for "involuntary mobilization." On 17 March this year, as the United Nations Security Council passes the Libyan no-fly zone resolution, Air National Guard aircraft and air crews were at Forward Operating Bases awaiting orders.

The world is a very different place today than when Secretary Laird established the Total Force, but the underlying principle of the Total Force remains true: the nation can maintain defense capabilities at less total cost through careful balance of Active and Reserve Component forces.

Secretary Gates charged the Department "to generate efficiency savings by reducing overhead costs, improving business practices, or culling excess or troubled programs."³ While our leadership is making tough decisions, we know the Air National Guard is well situated as a cost-effective answer in both our defense and domestic response roles.

The Air Guard provides a trained, disciplined, and ready force for a fraction of the cost. The Air National Guard savings are due to our part-time business model. Approximately 70% of our Guard Airmen are traditional part-time professionals, meaning that they are only paid when serving on active duty or training. Also, the Air National Guard seldom pays subsistence or housing allowances, or for permanent change of station moves for the members and their families.

³ Robert M. Gates, Statement on Department Budget and Efficiencies, January 06, 2011.

Another key factor to our cost effectiveness is the infrastructure savings inherent in the Air National Guard basing model that not only allows us to operate efficiently, but also allows us to be a part of, and contribute to, communities across the country. With some of our leases costing as little as one dollar annually, the Air Guard is able to realize even more cost savings through its supporting infrastructure. In fact, for less than \$4 million annually through Joint Use Agreements, the Air National Guard provides stewardship to approximately \$12 billion in infrastructure.

Domestic Operations

A third element to Air National Guard cost-effectiveness is its contribution to homeland defense and support to domestic civil authorities. As an example, on July 6, 2011, there were 2,516 Guard Airmen actively engaged in homeland defense and support to civil authorities including protecting American skies through Air Sovereignty Alert, assisting with critical infrastructure protection, and assisting their local communities with disaster recovery in North and South Dakota, Missouri, and Nebraska. This also includes 570 Guard Airmen supporting local and national counterdrug programs and 130 Airmen assisting the US Border Patrol on our southwest border. On July 6th, Air National Guard Modular Aerial Fire Fighting (MAFFS) units dropped 7,208 gallons of fire retardant supporting the National Forestry Service in New Mexico.⁴

⁴ ANG MAFFS units have flown 127 missions, 133.9 flight hours, and dropped 320,195 gallons of retardant since the beginning of the 2011 fire season.

Many are unaware of the contributions and skills our Guard Airmen provide to domestic support to civil authorities. The Air National Guard has particular core capabilities for which we are uniquely trained and equipped.

Many have been used in the past year alone, to include:

- Air Defense (Air Sovereignty Alert)
- Air Traffic Control
- Airlift (transportation, supply, & evacuation)
- Civil engineering
- Specialized medical care & evacuation
- Incident awareness & assessment
- Aerial firefighting
- Search and rescue (aerial & ground)
- Communications

The Air National Guard's support to civil authorities is based upon the concept of "dual-use," *i.e.*, equipment purchased by the Air Force for the Air National Guard's federal, combat mission, can be adapted and used domestically when not needed overseas. For example, an Air National Guard F-16 wing contains not only F-16 fighter aircraft but fire trucks, forklifts, portable light carts, emergency medical equipment including ambulances, air traffic control equipment, explosives ordinance equipment, etc., as well as well trained experts – all extremely valuable in response to civil emergencies. However, if the F-16 wing converts to a non-flying mission or even a Remotely Piloted Aircraft mission, much of this dual-use equipment may leave with the F-16 aircraft. As

the Air Force proceeds with its recapitalization and modernization plans, we need to ensure our citizens are not left without essential disaster response capabilities.

Future of the Air National Guard

Our National Guard Airmen want nothing more for the future than to continue to serve their country, state, and local community. These are men and women who are very proud of the National Guard's 375 years of service, but they also understand that the nation's needs are changing and are dedicated to ensure the Air National Guard remains an essential element of the Total Force, and at the same time, is cost-effective. But we also know that in today's uncertain world cost alone is not sufficient; the Air National Guard must also be ready and accessible if it is to be effective

For the Air National Guard to be effective, it must have equipment capable of performing the mission and able to integrate seamlessly into joint operations. Our Airmen must also be capable of performing the mission through training and professional education.

And finally, effectiveness requires accessibility. The proposed changes to Title 10, Section 12304 will improve the accessibility to the Air National Guard as a rotational, operational force to augment the Air Force as well as providing support to local, state, and federal civil authorities during emergencies. Furthermore, the provision requiring manpower costs be included in the budget will help ensure that the funding is available for using the Reserve Components. If the nation is to continue to rely upon the Reserve Components, as we believe it

should, then the Reserve Components must be equipped and trained commensurate with the Regular Components and the Department must budget for their use.

Closing Remarks

Our National Guard Airmen have proven themselves to be ready, reliable, and accessible in recent actions here at home and overseas. Every dollar spent on the Air National Guard provides our nation an unmatched return on investment. Given adequate equipment and training, the Air National Guard will continue to fulfill its Total Force obligations and seamlessly integrate into the Joint theater operations and respond to domestic emergencies.

We need your help to ensure that the Air National Guard of tomorrow is as a ready, reliable, accessible, and cost effective as it is today.

Thank you for the opportunity to be here today, I look forward to your questions.



BIOGRAPHY

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARRY M. WYATT III

Lt. Gen. Harry M. Wyatt III is the Director, Air National Guard, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. He is responsible for formulating, developing and coordinating all policies, plans and programs affecting more than 106,700 Guard members in more than 88 flying wings and 200 geographically separated units throughout the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam and the Virgin Islands.

General Wyatt entered the Air Force in 1971 and graduated from undergraduate pilot training at Laredo Air Force Base, Texas, in 1973. He is a command pilot with more than 3,000 hours in the A-7, C-26, F-16, F-100, F-106, T-33, T-37 and T-38 aircraft. Before assuming his current position, General Wyatt served as the Adjutant General of Oklahoma, responsible for commanding units of the Air and Army National Guard.



EDUCATION

1971 Bachelor of Arts degree in business administration, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas
 1980 Juris Doctor degree, University of Tulsa, Okla.
 1994 Air War College, by seminar
 2010 Pinnacle General and Flag Officer Course, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
 2010 Leadership at the Peak, Center for Creative Leadership, Colorado Springs, Colo.

ASSIGNMENTS

1. January 1972 - January 1973, student, undergraduate pilot training, 38th Student Squadron, Laredo AFB, Texas
2. January 1973 - September 1973, student, F-106 pilot training, 4756th Combat Crew Training Squadron, Tyndall AFB, Fla.
3. September 1973 - September 1976, F-106 pilot, 5th Fighter Intercept Squadron, Minot AFB, N.D.
4. September 1976 - August 1977, weapons controller, Headquarters Air Defense Command, Tyndall AFB, Fla.
5. August 1977 - March 1979, F-100 pilot, 125th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Tulsa Air National Guard Base, Okla.
6. March 1979 - June 1982, A-7 pilot, 125th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Tulsa ANGB, Okla.
7. June 1982 - June 1983, liaison officer for U.S. Air Force Academy, Headquarters Air Reserve Personnel Center, Denver, Colo.
8. June 1983 - June 1984, weapons and tactics officer, 138th Tactical Fighter Group, Tulsa ANGB, Okla.
9. June 1984 - December 1984, electronic countermeasures officer, 125th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Tulsa ANGB, Okla.
10. December 1984 - December 1985, A-7 pilot, 125th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Tulsa ANGB, Okla.

11. December 1985 - June 1987, A-7 flight commander, 125th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Tulsa ANGB, Okla.
12. June 1987 - December 1988, flight test maintenance officer, 138th Consolidated Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, Tulsa ANGB, Okla.
13. December 1988 - August 1994, A-7 flight commander, 125th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Tulsa ANGB, Okla.
14. August 1994 - May 1996, Chief of Plans, 138th Operations Support Squadron, Tulsa ANGB, Okla.
15. May 1996 - September 1996, Commander, 138th Logistics Group, Tulsa ANGB, Okla.
16. September 1996 - February 1998, Vice Commander, 138th Fighter Wing, Tulsa ANGB, Okla.
17. February 1998 - December 2001, Commander, 138th Fighter Wing, Tulsa ANGB, Okla.
18. December 2001 - January 2003, Chief of Staff, Joint Force Headquarters Oklahoma Air National Guard, Oklahoma Military Department, Oklahoma City, Okla.
19. January 2003 - February 2009, Adjutant General, Joint Force Headquarters Oklahoma ANG, Oklahoma Military Department, Oklahoma City, Okla.
20. February 2009 - present, Director, Air National Guard, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS

January 2003 - February 2009, Adjutant General, Joint Force Headquarters Oklahoma ANG, Oklahoma Military Department, Oklahoma City, Okla., as a major general

FLIGHT INFORMATION

Rating: Command pilot

Flight hours: More than 3,000

Aircraft flown: A-7, C-26, F-16, F-100, F-106, T-33, T-37 and T-38

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

Legion of Merit

Meritorious Service Medal with oak leaf cluster

Air Force Outstanding Unit Award

Combat Readiness Medal

National Defense Service Medal with bronze star

Global War on Terrorism Service Medal

Humanitarian Service Medal

Air Force Longevity Service Award with silver and two bronze oak leaf clusters

Armed Forces Reserve Medal with silver hourglass

Small Arms Expert Marksmanship Ribbon

Air Force Training Ribbon

OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS

1971 Officer Training School, 50,000th graduate

PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS AND ASSOCIATIONS

Oklahoma Bar Association

U.S. District Court, Northern District of Oklahoma

Craig County Bar Association

National Guard Association of the United States

National Guard Association of Oklahoma

Oklahoma Trial Judges Association

Rotary Club of Vinita, Oklahoma

American Legion, Dale Peace Post 40, Vinita, Okla.

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION

Second Lieutenant Nov. 24, 1971

First Lieutenant Nov. 24, 1973

Captain Nov. 24, 1975

Major Nov. 24, 1985

Lieutenant Colonel Nov. 24, 1992

Colonel June 30, 1996

Brigadier General July 1, 2002

Major General Oct. 28, 2005

Lieutenant General Feb. 1, 2009

(Current as of February 2011)

STATEMENT BY

**MAJOR GENERAL RAYMOND W. CARPENTER
ACTING DIRECTOR, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD**

BEFORE THE

**HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS**

FIRST SESSION, 112TH CONGRESS

ON

**AIR FORCE AND ARMY NATIONAL GUARD TRAINING,
OPERATIONS, AND MAINTENANCE**

21 September 2011

NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION
UNTIL RELEASED BY
THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

Opening Remarks

Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Bordallo, it's an honor and privilege to be here today to represent the 350,000 plus Soldiers of the Army National Guard. Currently, 37,266 Soldiers are mobilized. More than half have combat experience. The sacrifice of our Soldiers, their Families, and employers has been tremendous: they deserve our deepest gratitude.

Over the weekend of August 26-29, the National Guard once again demonstrated its value to America and its ability to remain focused as an operational force with its unique, dual mission. During that time, more than 63,000 National Guardsmen protected this country—at home and abroad:

- Over 47,500 National Guardsmen were deployed in support of Overseas Contingency Operations and partnership-building missions.
- Almost 10,000 members of the National Guard from 24 States responded to Hurricane Irene.
- Another 1,000 National Guardsmen provided security on the southwest boarder.
- An additional 4,000 National Guardsmen responded to a range of domestic emergencies across the country.

From Citizen Soldiers to an Operational Force

Our Army National Guard (ARNG) is approaching a decade of war with an all-volunteer force. Army National Guard Mobilizations in Support of Overseas Contingency Operations in FY10, including Soldiers who have mobilized multiple times, were 41,744 for Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) and

Operations Iraqi Freedom & New Dawn. There were an additional 3,115 mobilizations to the Balkans, Sinai, and elsewhere around the world. A staggering 480,000 Soldier mobilizations (number of individual ARNG Soldiers mobilized was 353,474) have been activated since 9 /11, and 39,325 Soldiers are currently mobilized as of 14 September, 2011.

We are an operational force in a transition mode within the ARFORGEN rotational cycle. To the credit of our Soldiers and their leaders, we are experiencing huge successes in our homeland defense and overseas missions. We continue to see young, and not-so-young, people who want to join and serve in the ARNG. Just as impressive are the retention rates of our current serving force; most are combat veterans who make the decision to continue to serve at historic rates. They clearly understand we are at war.

Our reenlistment rate as of the end of March 2011 for enlisted Soldiers is 76.2% of our total force and 79.9% of our Soldiers with Mobilization experience. These retention numbers are especially impressive when we consider that at the end of FY10 the average dwell time for our Soldiers with mobilization experience was 2.4 years. As a first step, the Army goal is to achieve 4 years dwell by 2014, but balancing the force will not happen overnight.

The experience we have gained since 9/11, the modern equipment fielded, the training delivered to our Soldiers, and the frequency of deployments, have resulted in a highly seasoned, well-equipped combat force.

- As of the end of August 2011, 50.5% of ARNG Soldiers are combat veterans – and we are working to retain that elevated level of experience.
- At the end of FY10, 84.45% of ARNG forces were Duty Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) Qualified
- This represents an escalating increase from 73.27% at the end of FY08 and 83.06% in FY09.

Our current level of ARNG combat experience and expertise is unparalleled. Prior to 9/11 the Reserve Component's role as a strategic reserve was focused on providing a hedge against major combat operations. This role assumed a significant training period prior to deploying RC forces and we required ample warning of their impending usage. Following 9/11, it became clear that the RC needed to respond quickly as part of the operational force in order to sustain combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as continue on-going US military obligations around the globe. Transitioning from a strategic reserve into an operational force required significant resources to properly man, equip, and train our RC formations to necessary readiness levels.

Now, after a decade of successful operational usage of the Reserve Component, it is clear the RC role as an operational force is critical to enabling the total Army to fulfill its mission to our Nation. The RC is at unprecedented levels of readiness, fully compatible with our Active Component brethren, and capable of accomplishing any mission across the full spectrum of operations.

Maintaining the RC as an Operational Force will also minimize the need for significant future investments. An array of Army and DoD studies, including the OSDRA and the General Reimer Study, has indicated that the cost of the RC and the AC are relatively equal when employed. However, when not employed in an active mission the RC is significantly less expensive. As the demand for forces decrease, maintaining an Operational Reserve will provide our Nation with a premiere military capability while preserving the gains of the last decade at a significantly favorable cost-to-benefit ratio.

For a fraction of the investment to date, the RC can preserve this level of readiness and maintain our interoperability – both imperative for an operational reserve. This can be achieved in a budget-constrained environment making the Army National Guard an extremely cost-effective, substantially paid-for option that the nation needs to sustain. With this in mind, it is important that we maintain our key force structure elements of 8 Divisions, 8 Combat Aviation Brigades, and 28 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs).

Equipment and Critical Dual Use

Our nation has invested more than \$37 billion in equipment for the Army National Guard in the past six years. That investment was made in both Critical Dual Use (CDU) and other required equipment, used for both domestic homeland crisis response missions and overseas contingency operations. Overseas contingency operations have spurred improvements in the capacity of the ARNG to support the war effort, to respond to natural and man-made disasters, to

provide critical assistance during state and national emergencies, and to be prepared to respond to potential terrorist attacks in defense of the homeland. Our homeland response enterprise includes 10 Homeland Response Forces (HRFs) – 2 validated in FY11 and 8 in FY12, 17 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFPs), and 57 Civil Support Teams (CSTs).

CDU equipment includes tactical radios, rotary aircraft, ground transportation vehicles, and digital command and control enablers. The Army has made significant efforts to improve the ARNG CDU equipment posture and remains committed to ensuring the ARNG has the CDU equipment required to support Homeland Defense/Homeland Security (HLD/HLS) and Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) operations. To highlight this level of commitment, ARNG equipment-on-hand rates for Critical Dual Use equipment are projected to increase to 94% by October 2012. That's an increase of 19% over the four years since the ARNG began monitoring CDU rates.

During fiscal year 2010, the ARNG received over 154,000 pieces of new equipment valued at \$9.8 billion. With this influx of new equipment, the on-hand percentage for all equipment is currently at 92% and continues to be maintained at levels greater than 90%. The Army continues to improve the equipment on hand and modernization levels for the Army National Guard. The Army views this as critical for the ARNG to be employed as an operational force. The Army Equipping Strategy established aim points for units as they progress through the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process which will help build unit

readiness and maintain unit parity in terms of both modernization and interoperability.

Quality Facilities and Readiness

The Army National Guard is a community based force. As such, our facilities are often the foundation for community support of an all-volunteer force. The ARNG has made some great progress with several LEED (Leadership in Environmental and Energy Design) Silver certified facilities meeting the qualifying requirements for recycled material usage, natural lighting, and energy conservation. We have further opened the call for volunteer installations to take part in Army IMCOM's Net Zero initiative. The ARNG, however, still has much work to do to provide quality facilities that support the ARNG dual mission across the 54 States and Territories. Quality facilities link directly with Soldier readiness, family, youth, and morale programs such as Yellow Ribbon and Youth Challenge. The ARFORGEN model requires increased usage of ARNG facilities. However, forty percent of ARNG readiness centers are more than 50 years old and require substantial modernization or, in some cases, total replacement to meet the needs of an operational force. To achieve quality in facilities, we have thus far executed 99% of MILCON funds in FY10 and estimate we will need \$774 million in MILCON dollars for FY12.

Aviation Support

The Army National Guard (ARNG) aviation program, both fixed and rotary wing aircraft, provided huge benefits in supporting Domestic Operations this past year. Every year offers ARNG aviation a new set of challenges.

Last year, fixed-wing aircraft transported emergency supplies and personnel during floods, wildfires, and other emergencies across the nation and throughout the Gulf Coast during the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. During the oil spill recovery effort, ARNG aviation crews logged 3,722 hours and moved over 16 million pounds of cargo. The Operational Support Airlift Agency provided critical combat support by transporting blood donations and Wounded Warriors across the United States. Fixed-wing aircraft also transported much-needed supplies and personnel to Haiti after the January 2010 earthquake. At home and abroad, these aircraft flew 53,029 hours, completed 11,312 missions, transported over 3.5 million pounds of cargo, and carried more than 70,000 passengers.

Rotary wing units and aircraft in FY10 flew approximately 50,000 hours in civil support. These missions included support of disasters and declared emergencies in which Guard aviation displayed versatility and flexibility such as responding to the largest oil spill to affect the U.S., the Deepwater Horizon spill. ARNG rotary wing crews flew missions such as sand bag emplacement, personnel evacuation, engineer damage assessment, and law enforcement agency support. In Haiti the Puerto Rico National Guard flew two UH-60s based out of the Dominican Republic in support of the American Embassy in Port-au-

Prince giving an early signal that help was on the way to support the restoration of health services. ARNG Security and Support aircraft and crews continue to provide planned support to counterdrug operations nation-wide and notably along the southwest border. Our aviation forces responded to floods in Arizona, North Dakota, Louisiana, and West Virginia; provided wildfire support in Minnesota; and flew search and rescue missions in California, Colorado, New Mexico, Nevada, and Oregon. ARNG rotary wing missions crossed the full spectrum of domestic support.

ARNG fixed wing and rotary wing capabilities have been and continue to be a critical dual use asset that the Army and Adjutants General rely heavily upon. The operational tempo of our ARNG aviation units continues to be elevated as overseas commitments and domestic support requirements remain steady.

Army National Guard aviation not only supports Domestic Operations such as responses to hurricanes, oil spills, search and rescue operations, forest fires, floods, and weather emergencies, in addition, we continue to support overseas deployments such as Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation New Dawn, and Kosovo. We do so with an aging aircraft fleet. Since 2001, the ARNG has retired over 600 legacy aircraft and fielded 300 modernized aircraft. The ARNG is simultaneously modernizing aircraft to reduce sustainment costs, increase readiness, and support interoperability for the deploying force. ARNG aviation also includes Unmanned Aircraft Systems and related Ground Support

Equipment. Aviation and related support systems remain persistent items of interest on modernization priority lists.

The Army needs to continue its modernization plan if the ARNG is to meet current and future demands in the Homeland and on missions abroad. The ARNG fleet currently has shortfalls in CH-47 Chinook and AH-64D Apache airframes.

The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisitions, Logistics and Technology) recently directed the Program Executive Office-Aviation to divest the C-23 Sherpa aircraft not later than 31 December 2014. In accordance with Army guidance, the ARNG developed a plan to retire the 42 existing C-23 aircraft in 2011-2015. The 2010 Vice Chief of Staff, Army capability portfolio review directed a requirements-based assessment on the need for Army utility fixed wing aircraft. The ARNG expects more fidelity from HQDA in the coming months on the number of utility fixed wing aircraft the ARNG will continue to retain and operate to meet Army fixed wing requirements.

National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation

The National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation (NGREA) is a special Defense Appropriation that complements each Service's base appropriation. NGREA is intended to procure critical modernization items of equipment that the base appropriation is not able to fund.

The Army's goal is to ensure that ARNG units are equipped properly with Critical Dual Use (CDU) capabilities to execute Homeland Defense and Defense

Support to Civil Authorities (HLD/DSCA) missions effectively. These include federal missions, such as overseas deployments, and state missions, such as disaster relief in support of the governors.

Our specific ARNG goal is to equip the ARNG with over 80% of the CDU requirement. The Army has committed to keeping CDU equipment levels above 80% on hand. According to the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report (NGRER) 2010 report, the ARNG has the following key equipping challenges:

- Achieving full transparency for procurement and distribution.
- Equipping units for pre-mobilization training and deployment.
- Equipping units for their Homeland Missions
- Modernizing our helicopter fleet
- Modernizing our Tactical Wheeled Vehicle (TWV) fleet

The above challenges involve obtaining a full complement of “heavy tactical vehicles, small arms, communications systems, field artillery systems, and combat systems” (NGRER, 2010, p. 1-8).

Military Construction (MILCON)

Currently, 40% of our Readiness Centers are over 50 years old. Not only do many of these facilities fail to meet the needs of a 21st century operational force, many fall short of DoD, federal, or state building standards and requirements to include: anti-terrorism/force protection, energy efficiencies, and Americans with Disabilities Act (ACT) requirements. The Army National Guard

fiscal year 2012 military construction request for \$774 million is focused on improving this situation and making additional MILCON improvements in the categories of Grow the Army, Modernization, Transformation, Training Support, and Planning and Design and Unspecified Minor Military Construction. Under the Grow the Army category, we are submitting a request of \$101 million for 11 Readiness Centers. These new Readiness Centers will be implementing the energy efficiencies. For Modernization, our budget request includes \$197.7 million for 11 projects including readiness centers and aviation support centers in support of our modern missions. For Transformation, we are requesting \$197.9 million for ten projects which include three Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System Facilities (TUAS), five Readiness Centers, one Army Aviation Support Facility, and one Field Maintenance Shop. For Training Support: In fiscal year 2012, the Army National Guard is requesting \$245 million for 16 projects which will support the training of our operational force. These funds will provide the facilities our Soldiers require as they train, mobilize, and deploy. Included are five Operations Readiness and Training Complexes (ORTC), seven range projects, one Maneuver Area Training and Equipment Site (MATES), one railhead expansion and container facility, and two deployment processing facilities. For Other Support Programs, our fiscal year 2012 Army National Guard budget contains \$20 million for planning and design of future projects and \$12 million for unspecified minor military construction to address unforeseen critical needs or emergent mission requirements.

Lack of a fully funded MILCON request creates a significant backlog for construction projects. Deficiencies primarily exist in four main areas within ARNG facilities: readiness centers, training facilities, maintenance facilities, and infrastructure. The funding backlog for readiness centers is \$30.3 billion; the majority of these facilities cannot meet anti-terrorism/force protection (AT/FP) requirements.

ARNG Resilience

People are our most precious resource. The quality of the Citizen Soldiers of the Army National Guard is unprecedented. However, we are experiencing a troubling increase in the incidence of suicides. In Calendar Year 2010, the ARNG suicide rate nearly doubled; the number of ARNG suicides for CY2009 and CY2010 were 62 and 112, respectively. Ninety-one percent of the ARNG Soldiers who committed suicide were Traditional Drilling Guardsmen vs. full-time Army National Guard and are not eligible for many of the support services available to the AC or our Title 32 Active Guard and Reserve Soldiers. Some had deployed in support of Army operations and over half had not deployed or were still in the process of being indoctrinated into the ARNG. While we do not know what triggers their actions, we do know the stressors that may affect their outlook. Employment issues, relationship issues and previous behavioral health issues must be identified and mitigated to promote Soldier welfare and well-being. Subsequently, the ARNG is teaming with DoD and the Army to

incorporate Traditional Drilling Guardsmen into future studies such as the Study to Access Risk and Resilience in Our Service Members (STARRS).

The ARNG has made the promotion of Resilience and Risk Reduction with a corresponding decrease in suicidal behavior our top priority. The ARNG has developed a holistic approach to enhance the resilience and coping skills of our Soldiers, Families, and Civilians by promoting risk reduction through leadership awareness, training and intervention programs. The ARNG Resilience, Risk Reduction and Suicide Prevention Campaign Plan was developed to promote an integrated program of prevention, intervention and mitigation at all levels. This document nested all other collaborative efforts within DOD, Army and NGB to promote unity of effort and synchronize our objectives. The plan was also distributed to State Leadership to shape and focus their efforts on improving the mental, physical, and spiritual health of their Soldiers and Families throughout our formations.

Since our Citizen-Soldiers are reflective of American society, it comes as no surprise that in-depth analysis indicates the increased ARNG suicide rate may correspond to an increasing national trend in at-risk and suicidal ideations and attempts. In addition to our efforts to promote Soldier resilience, the ARNG leadership also recognizes the role of ARNG Families, Peers, and Employers as providing the foundation of each Soldier's support network. These groups are present in the Soldier's life between their traditional drill periods and have the ability to identify and address negative behaviors before they lead to functional impairment or at-risk behaviors. The ARNG provided the States with training

programs for both family members and employers to assist in identifying those that should be referred to unit leadership for assistance and the applicable support services available in their community. States have capitalized on community based resources and solutions to provide services beyond the installation.

The ARNG resourced 54 Suicide Prevention Program Managers in the States in FY10 and trained over 356 Master Resilience Trainers assigned to brigades and battalions. We are striving to help each of our Soldiers become ready and resilient. For instance, the ARNG Leader's Guide to Soldier Resilience was developed to provide "battle drills" for common Soldier issues; this publication complements the ARNG CSM's Soldier to Soldier Peer Support program promoting "Buddy Aid" including basic intervention skills and trigger points for referrals or emergent care. The ARNG CSM has emphasized the roles and responsibilities of leadership during his two national CSM conferences this past year. Our Soldiers and families are encouraged to take the Global Assessment Tool, which identifies individual resilience levels and uses the self developmental modules to increase self awareness and resilience. Additionally, we increased collaboration with the Army Center for Substance Abuse in order to address substance abuse prevention, outreach and treatment for Soldiers, as well as Leaders and Families, so they understand their roles. Our efforts to increase assets available to Commanders to improve Soldier resilience include partnerships with national and community organizations such as the American

Red Cross, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Agency, counselors and clergy, and use of the Army's Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program.

Within the Army National Guard, we have set an ultimate goal of zero suicides. Our current count is 64 suicides so far this calendar year versus 84 this time last year. At this time it is too early to determine State level trends but we will continue to monitor them. Several States have developed comprehensive social support and mental health initiatives. These programs emerged out of a need to promote Soldier and family resilience and reduce potential stressors including employment and financial issues, domestic strife and promoting reintegration following deployment. Several of our States including Michigan, Nevada, Nebraska, California, Wisconsin, Kansas, and Illinois have innovative resilience programs and the National Guard Bureau is encouraging the exchange and expansion of best practices. The Army National Guard, in conjunction with the Active Army, the Department of Defense, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and each of the States, territories, and District of Columbia has made turning this trend around a priority. Many more efforts too numerous to cover here are ongoing and I am confident that, as a team we will turn this trend around. In the end, I believe the Soldiers and Families of the Army National Guard will be more resilient and ready in the service to the communities, States and the nation.

While the ARNG is making great strides within States to integrate suicide prevention, intervention, and risk mitigation at all levels, more work needs to be done. Desired ARNG capabilities, in terms of resilience, risk reduction, and suicide prevention, include emergent care and treatment for ARNG Soldiers

regardless of status; behavioral health and substance abuse treatment for Soldiers, regardless of status; resources to train and support State Resilience and Crisis Intervention personnel; and embedded behavioral health capability at the brigade level to promote healthy lifestyles and provide early identification of the potential at-risk Soldiers. After a nearly decade-long era of "persistent engagement," ARNG families have been truly remarkable and their health and well-being are absolutely critical to the security of the nation. The services are vital to sustain our role as an operational force as well as promoting the continuum of care for those AC Soldiers who will transition to the RC during the upcoming reduction in the Army's end strength.

Acknowledging unemployment as a stressful challenge affecting our Soldiers and Families, the Army National Guard implemented employment outreach as a necessary step in building resilience. The Job Connection Education Program is an employment initiative designed to help improve quality of life for unemployed or underemployed Soldiers. This program focuses on how Soldiers seek, obtain, and retain civilian employment.

In 2009, the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard became partners in a collaborative effort to build relationships with employers. In 2010, the employment program was renamed to the Employer Partnership Office (EPO). The goal of the EPO program is to create employment opportunities for Soldiers by establishing a good working relationship with the private sector. The program, in 2011, is known as the Employer Partnership of the Armed Forces. Members

from all the Reserve components, their Families, and Veterans have access to the tools and benefits of this program.

Of most importance is the effort to build resilience in our Soldiers. We are training "Master Resilience Trainers" and "Resilience Training Assistants" both of whom are Soldiers with acquired resources and insights. They will be assigned to every Company-size unit and will be responsible for teaching Soldiers coping skills. There are many more efforts too numerous to cover here that are ongoing and I am confident that, as a team we will turn this trend around. In the end, I believe the Soldiers and Families of the Army National Guard will not just be physically strong, but will be an emotionally and spiritually stronger force in service to our States, territories, District and nation.

Medical Readiness

Medical readiness of the Army National Guard is one of our highest priorities and as such we have provided the states with additional resources in support of the medical readiness mission. A national Case Manager/Care Coordinator contract has been in place since 2006 to assist in supporting the management of Soldiers identified with medical conditions that prevent deployment. Currently 100 Nurse Case Managers and 328 Care Coordinators are supporting all medical issues to ensure Soldiers have the best opportunity to regain medical deployability status.

In the past two years we have added full-time Medical Readiness NCOs (Non-Commissioned Officers) located in Battalion and above organizations.

Medical Readiness NCOs are responsible for the identification of medical conditions which may require some action by the case management team and serve as the medical readiness advisor to the commander.

Medical care has always been in place to support any Soldier in the ARNG with an injury or illness proven to be in the Line of Duty (LOD). The care is coordinated with the Military Medical Support Office through our Joint Force Headquarter Health Systems Specialist (HSS). Medical care provided based on an LOD is limited to the condition that occurred while in a duty status. With this in mind there are additional facts on the ground to consider:

- Traditional Mobilization-day Soldiers are not authorized to receive care from uniformed providers during IDT training. The only care authorized is to save life, limb or eyesight.
- Soldiers are directed to local emergency room for care that often times could be completed by ARNG provider assigned at training site.
- Minimal medical care is available when medical providers are serving on their 15 days of annual training. Anything more than urgent care is referred to local emergency room.
- All medical providers in the ARNG are credentialed and privileged.

There is no question that with the authority to perform medical or dental care from uniformed credentialed AMEDD providers in the ARNG, we could contribute to building the overall readiness in the ARNG. ARNG providers could assist firsthand in assuring a level of continuity of care and involvement in Soldier

medical/dental care that is currently restricted, based on current law and regulation. As a result, we are only authorized to provide emergency care in IDT status and limited routine care in AT status. Actually being able to provide limited treatment would assist greatly in building overall readiness and would shift cost from contracted care to uniformed care.

Additional efforts have been made administratively to provide assistance to those Soldiers identified who have certain medical conditions. The ARNG Medical Management Processing System was introduced this past December and provides a framework to manage Soldiers identified with medical conditions through the complexities of our health care systems. Effective use of this framework can assist in the return of Soldiers into our formations or into the Physical Disability Evaluation System (PDES).

In an effort to assist reserve component Soldiers who were having difficulty in negotiating the Army PDES, the Army established the Reserve Component Soldier Medical Support Center. The purpose of the RC SMSC is to expedite and assist Soldiers with PDES processing and ensure packets going through this system are complete, validated and tracked by the Electronic Medical Board system (eMEB). It appears up to 12,000 Soldiers in the ARNG may require processing through the Medical Evaluation Board/ Physical Evaluation Board (MEB/PEB).

When preparing our Soldiers for mobilization much time and effort is taken to ensure all Soldiers meet the medical standards as outlined by the theater of

operation. Today, units arrive at mobilization stations with over 90% of all Soldiers in the ARNG ready for deployment. The other 10% have minimal medical actions required in order to clear them for deployment. With that said less than 1% of the ARNG Soldiers sent to mobilize come back to the state with an identified medical concern that prevents them from deploying into their theater of operation.

Since September 2001, 494 ARNG Soldiers have paid the ultimate sacrifice in combat operations while 5,433 were wounded in action as of 13 Sep 11. As of 15 Sep 2011, the ARNG has 1,686 Soldiers assigned to the Warrior Transition Unit (WTU), 1,431 assigned to the Community Based Warrior Transition Unit (CBWTU) with a combined population of 3,119 Soldiers currently assigned. The cumulative numbers of Soldiers assigned to a WTU or CBWTU since its official start date of 1 June 2007 is 10,643. Additionally, 5,433 Soldiers have been wounded in action and 11,090 suffered from disease or non-battle injuries while deployed in support of contingency operations.

Soldiers who have deployed in support of a contingency operation have additional medical resources to call upon when the need arises. All Soldiers who deploy are eligible for TRICARE Early Eligibility 180 days prior to mobilization and 180 days post mobilization through the Transitional Assistance Management Program (TAMP). Eligible family members are also able to participate in TRICARE during the Soldiers mobilization. In addition, Soldiers can enroll in the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) health care system during demobilization. Recently discharged combat Veterans are eligible to take advantage of an enhanced health care enrollment opportunity for 5 years after discharge. After

the 5 year period, these Veterans will still be able to apply for health benefits with VA, but will have their status for receiving VA health care determined under normal VA procedures that base health care priority status on the severity of a service-connected disability or other eligibility factors. This would mean some Veterans could face income or asset-based restrictions, as well as delays in establishing their VA health care eligibility while their disability status is determined.

Providing care for our Soldiers who have never deployed has improved since Congress passed legislation in 2008 to support participation in the TRICARE network via TRICARE Reserve Select (TRS). TRS is a premium based health plan available for members of the Ready Reserve and their family members. Current premiums are \$53.16 per month for member only coverage and \$197.76 a month for member and family coverage. Although that might not seem like a lot of money, for a junior enlisted Soldier that could mean his or her entire monthly drill check going to pay for health care premiums. As of January 2011, 15,769 Soldiers are currently enrolled in TRS in the Army National Guard. The ARNG is focusing on reducing the number of medically non-deployable Soldiers within our formations, but without a full-time health care benefit medical readiness, remains a challenge.

Exercise, Exchanges, and Theater Engagement - The ARNG currently fills 63% of all exercise requirements for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). With a budget of approximately \$17M, the ARNG sends in excess of 20,000 Soldiers

OCONUS to participate in bilateral and multilateral exercises in direct support to the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) Campaign Plans. Each FY, approximately 400 Soldiers annually participate in exchanges with the United Kingdom, Germany, Norway, France and Italy. As a key component towards building partner capacity, the ARNG has apportioned a Maneuver Enhancement Brigade to US Army Africa and an Engineer Brigade to US Army South to provide a subordinate level command and control headquarters as well as an available pool to fill ASCC requirement shortfalls. More than 7,000 Soldiers will participate in engagement activities in support of the State Partnership Program and its 62 members. The ARNG should continue to support engagement requirements from the Army Global Civil-Military Emergency Preparedness Program, Security Assistance Training Management Organization, and other programs to enhance the Army Service Component Command Campaign Support Plans.

ARNG Citizen-Soldiers, through the SAATS methodology, advise developing nations on improving internal defense capabilities and provide assistance in establishing infrastructures and economic bases for regional stability. Proposed SAATs mission sets would include:

- Emergency Preparedness & Consequence Management.
- Border/Port Security Mentorship and Training.
- Counter Drug Training & Demand Reduction Education.
- Cyber Security Training to include Computer Network Defense.
- Professional Military Development at the small-unit leader level.

Cyber Future Capacity - Since the focus of Cyber initiatives remain within building a national, operational defense capacity, the ARNG is uniquely available to accomplish this objective. Data Processing Units could be used as the model for building organic Cyber-Unit capacity within the ARNG. These Citizen-Soldier Cyber-Units would then serve as the first responders to a Cyber attack in the states; given a physical attack on the Homeland would likely be preceded by a Cyber event. Possible organizational growth in each FEMA region further enables Homeland Defense response and orchestration.

Increased Training Requirements Prior to Mobilization

ARFORGEN training will follow the standard progressive path starting with individual/crew/squad-section advancing to platoon and ending with company level proficiency (not precluding Staff CPXs, BN FTXs thru MRXs, etc.). As such training requirements will be dependent on a specified mission, or the requirement to maintain/sustain MTOE mission readiness pending a potential mobilization.

- Deployment Expeditionary Forces (DEF) units will train on specified tasks and requirements IAW their assigned mission.
- Contingency Expeditionary Forces (CEF) units will conduct their MTOE mission training ISO full spectrum operations, or on tasks mandated for assigned mission. CEF units continue their wartime MTOE training

during the Available Phase until assigned a DEF mission and mobilized.

- Any additional mission-specific training for re-designated DEF units will be completed during post-mobilization and prior to deployment.

Closing Remarks

The ARNG has, by any measure, exceeded all expectations required by operational deployment. These have been real-world missions. They have run the gamut from global engagements half a world away to rapid responses when disasters occur on America soil.

Our evolutionary arc toward an operational force has been accelerated by the right equipment and the right training. The result is the right ARNG for the nation.

In 2011 the ARNG offers a double return on investment:

- In the near term we are more cost effective - even in times of fiscal constraint.
- In the long term we are more ready – to help avert (or respond to) another 9/11 event, to play an integral role in the Total Army and to safeguard the Homeland.

I appreciate the opportunity to be here today and invite your questions and comments. Thank you Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Bordallo and the distinguished members of the subcommittee.



Biography

National Guard Bureau

General Officer Management Office, Arlington, VA

MAJOR GENERAL RAYMOND W. CARPENTER



Acting Director of the Army National Guard, National Guard Bureau

Major General Raymond W. Carpenter assumed duties as Acting Director, Army National Guard, National Guard Bureau, Washington, District of Columbia on May 29, 2009. As Acting Director, he guides the formulation, development and implementation of all programs and policies affecting the Army National Guard; a force of over 350,000 Soldiers in the 54 States, Territories and the District of Columbia.

General Carpenter began his military service when he enlisted in the South Dakota Army National Guard in May of 1967. He later joined the United States Navy where he attended the Defense Language Institute for 48 weeks to learn Vietnamese. His next assignment was at the Naval Support Activity in Danang, South Vietnam. Upon completion of his service in the United

States Navy, he returned to the South Dakota Army National Guard where he was commissioned in 1974. He has commanded at all levels from Lieutenant to Colonel. In 1993, he became the Executive Officer of the 5,000 plus Soldier Task Force Rushmore which was a humanitarian mission in Panama building 27 kilometers of road and rebuilding 10 schools and 14 clinics. In July 1999, General Carpenter was awarded the Silver de Fleury Medal for his work at a national level in support of the Engineer branch. He was a founding member of the Director of the Army National Guard's Engineer Advisory Team and went on to be the Chairman until May 2006. As the Chief of Staff and the Assistant Adjutant General for the South Dakota Army National Guard, he was engaged at the senior leader level in the largest mobilization of the South Dakota National Guard since World War II. General Carpenter served as the Deputy Commanding General for the Maneuver Support Center and had a number of duties including responsibility for overseeing Joint Training at Ft. Leonard Wood.

EDUCATION:

1975 Black Hills State College, Bachelor of Science, Business, Spearfish, South Dakota
1994 University of South Dakota, Master of Business Administration, Vermillion, South Dakota

ASSIGNMENTS:

1. July 1974 - August 1974, Platoon Leader, Detachment 1, 842d Engineer Company, South Dakota Army National Guard, Belle Fourche, South Dakota
2. August 1974 - October 1974, Student, Engineer School, Engineer Officer Basic Course, Fort Belvoir, Virginia
3. October 1974 - June 1976, Platoon Leader, Detachment 1, 842d Engineer Company, South Dakota Army National Guard, Belle Fourche, South Dakota
4. July 1976 - October 1978, Platoon Leader, Detachment 3, 842d Engineer Company, South Dakota Army National Guard, Deadwood, South Dakota
5. November 1978 - July 1982, Company Commander, 842d Engineer Company, South Dakota Army National Guard, Spearfish, South Dakota
6. August 1982 - April 1985, S-4, Headquarters, Headquarters Detachment, 109th Engineer Battalion, South Dakota Army National Guard, Sturgis, South Dakota
7. April 1985 - July 1986, Executive Officer, Headquarters, Headquarters Detachment, 109th Engineer Battalion, South Dakota Army National Guard, Sturgis, South Dakota
8. August 1986 - August 1987, S-3, Headquarters, Headquarters Detachment, 109th Engineer Battalion, South Dakota Army National Guard, Sturgis, South Dakota
9. September 1987 - December 1989, Executive Officer, Headquarters, Headquarters Detachment, 109th Engineer Battalion, South Dakota Army National Guard, Sturgis, South Dakota
10. January 1990 - August 1991, Chief Internal Review, Headquarters, State Area Command, South Dakota Army National Guard, Rapid City, South Dakota
11. August 1991 - September 1993, Facilities Management Officer, Headquarters, State Area Command, South Dakota Army National Guard, Rapid City, South Dakota
12. September 1993 - June 1995, Battalion Commander, Headquarters, Headquarters Detachment, 109th Engineer Battalion, South Dakota Army National Guard, Sturgis, South Dakota
13. July 1995 - June 1996, Director of Personnel, Headquarters, State Area Command, South Dakota Army National Guard, Rapid City, South Dakota
14. June 1996 - June 1997, Student, United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
15. June 1997 - May 1998, Director of Human Resources, Headquarters, State Area Command, South Dakota Army National Guard Rapid City, South Dakota
16. May 1998 - June 1999, Group Commander, Headquarters, Headquarters Company, 109th Engineer Group, South Dakota Army National Guard, Rapid City, South Dakota
17. July 1999 - January 2000, Director of Plans, Operations and Training, Headquarters State Area Command, South Dakota National Guard, Rapid City, South Dakota
18. February 2000 - March 2003, Chief of Staff, Headquarters, State Area Command, South Dakota Army National Guard, Rapid City, South Dakota
19. April 2003 - April 2006, Assistant Adjutant General, South Dakota Army National Guard, Rapid City, South Dakota
20. September 2004 - April 2006, Dual-hatted as the Deputy Commanding General, Maneuver Support Center, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri
21. April 2006 - April 2009, Special Assistant to the Director of the Army National Guard,

National Guard Bureau, Arlington, Virginia

22. April 2009 - May 2009, Acting Deputy Director, Army National Guard, National Guard Bureau, Arlington, Virginia

23. May 2009 - Present, Acting Director, Army National Guard, National Guard Bureau, Arlington, Virginia

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS:

Legion of Merit (with 1 Bronze Oak Leaf Cluster)

Meritorious Service Medal (with 1 Silver Oak Leaf Cluster)

Army Commendation Medal (with 2 Bronze Oak Leaf Clusters)

Army Achievement Medal (with 3 Bronze Oak Leaf Clusters)

Army Reserve Components Achievement Medal (with 1 Silver Oak Leaf Cluster and 3 Bronze Oak Leaf Clusters)

National Defense Service Medal (with 2 Bronze Service Stars)

Global War on Terrorism Service Medal

Vietnam Service Medal

Humanitarian Service Medal

Armed Forces Reserve Medal (with Silver Hour Glass Device)

Army Service Ribbon

Army Reserve Component Overseas Training Ribbon (with Numeral 4)

Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal (with Silver Date Bar)

South Dakota Achievement Ribbon

South Dakota Distinguished Service Award

South Dakota Recruiting Medal

South Dakota Service Medal (with Service Device)

South Dakota Desert Storm Ribbon

South Dakota Distinguished Unit Award (with 1 Bronze oak Leaf Cluster)

South Dakota Unit Citation

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTIONS:

Second Lieutenant ARNG 29 July 1974

First Lieutenant ARNG 28 July 1977

Captain ARNG 28 July 1979

Major ARNG 26 April 1985

Lieutenant Colonel ARNG 01 October 1990

Colonel ARNG 01 July 1995

Brigadier General ARNG 1 April 2003

Major General ARNG 9 December 2006


(Current as of February 2010)

The date of publication indicated on this biography reflects the most recent update. It does not necessarily reflect the date of printing.

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

SEPTEMBER 21, 2011

Army Reserve Endstrength





Essential Capabilities of the Operational Force

2013 Authorized Endstrength
206,000 Warrior Citizens
(19% of the Army)

Selective Reserve Strength
205,446 Warrior Citizens

Troop Program Units
(TPU): 186,757

Active Support
(AGR): 15,765

Individual Mobilization Augmentees
(IMA): 2,924

We are the Army! Below is the percentage of total Army units, by type, assigned to the Reserve Component.

	USAR %	ARNG %	AC %
JAG	93	7	0
Civil Affairs	85	0	15
Chaplain	80	20	0
Military History	75	22	3
Psy Ops	63	0	37
Postal & Personnel	63	10	27
Quartermaster	59	16	25
Medical	57	17	26
Chemical	41	35	24
Public Affairs	40	45	15
Transportation	40	39	21
Military Intelligence	36	2	62
Engineers	29	46	25
Military Police	24	46	31

NOTE: Depicts MTOE Units only



**WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING**

SEPTEMBER 21, 2011

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. REYES

General WYATT. The Air National Guard (ANG) is currently deploying Airmen in several duty statuses, which affords our Airmen different levels of predictability for future deployments. In the mobilization (non-volunteers) process, the units identified to be activated are notified in a two-year planning document. This gives the units two years of predictability, enabling them to discuss with unit members the possibility of future mobilization deployments. The individual members which are specifically identified for mobilization are notified of their pending activation at approximately 330 days out from the mobilization start date. This gives the member approximately 330 days to initially notify their employers of the pending activation. The member will receive orders in hand 180 days from the mobilization start date, giving the member and their employer an official document indicating the member will be placed on non-voluntary mobilization orders. ANG members that are placed on mobilization orders are also given a means of future predictability by means of AF Mobilization Business Rules. These rules guarantee a member a minimum of one year dwell, time before they can be mobilized again, after being placed on mobilization orders. These rules also guarantee the member a minimum dwell period based off the total mobilization time period. A typical 179-day deployment will give the member the predictability that they will not be mobilized again for another 1105 days.

Not all ANG Airmen are receiving the early notification as outlined above. The predictability afforded our Airmen is hindered when the planning objectives of a deployment are changed or cancelled. Examples would be when an Aviation KC-135 mobilization plan is altered due to the changing number of requirements, or the start dates of the deployments changing. If the requirements are reduced, ANG Airmen that were planning on deploying, some of whom may have already notified their employer, no longer are required to be activated. As activation dates change, the member must repeatedly coordinate with their employer their expected date of departure from their job.

Other ANG members are not receiving the early notification mentioned above because of "Emergent" requirements needing to be filled in a relatively short period of time. These ANG Airmen are receiving notification of their deployment 30-90 days before the deployment start date. There is no way of giving ANG Airmen predictability in this case, because of the nature of "emergent" needs.

ANG members that are deploying on a volunteer duty status are also afforded approximately 330 days of predictability. The process established for volunteerism outlines a Projected Participation Plan which accounts for the members to volunteer for activation 11 months before the deployment date. These members are receiving orders for their employers 210 days before the activation start date.

The majority of ANG Airmen who are volunteering to be activated are filling "help-wanted" requirements. These ANG Airmen are volunteering to fill Active Component shortfalls, sometimes with as little as two weeks' notice before the activation start date. On the average, the notification time for these volunteers is approximately 90 days before the activation start date. [See page 24.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

SEPTEMBER 21, 2011

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES

Mr. FORBES. What are some examples of the impact to training of O&M funding reductions?

General STULTZ. The Army Reserve is presently not funded to train for full-spectrum combat and Counter Insurgency (COIN) operations—two of the most likely requirements posed by the threats in the next decade. The O&M funding level currently supports training proficiency at the platoon level. The following are examples of the impacts of O&M funding reductions:

1. Maintenance on vehicles and equipment will be deferred. This could significantly impact the readiness of older equipment that already requires intensive levels of maintenance.
2. Supply purchases will be scaled back.
3. Repair part purchases will be reduced allowing only the highest priority items to be ordered.
4. Shipment of equipment and travel of Soldiers to training events will be curtailed.
5. Building renovations will be delayed or cancelled.
6. Base operations service levels will be reduced at the four Army Reserve installations. For example, trash may be picked up less frequently and grass cutting could be reduced.
7. Soldiers will only be trained to proficiency below the platoon level. This will affect unit performance on deployments and other operational missions.

Mr. FORBES. How are you adapting to the \$73 million reduction in FY 2011? What challenges would you experience should additional cuts be levied against you?

General STULTZ. The reduction in Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funding in FY11 impacted training and base operations. Reduced Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO) funding forced the Army Reserve to curtail year-end maintenance operations, supply purchases, and travel. The decrement to base operations funding resulted in postponement of two major building renovations and reduction of service levels provided at Army Reserve installations. If additional cuts to O&M are levied, the Army Reserve will be challenged to adequately train its Soldiers and to fund the installations that support the Army Reserve training base. More maintenance of equipment will have to be deferred, supply purchases will be cut back, and travel and shipment of personnel and equipment to training exercises and other key events will be reduced.

Mr. FORBES. What barriers continue to slow or prevent the transition from a strategic force to an operational force? And what would be the impact on the Army Reserve if you had to go back to the “strategic reserve” model of training and deployments?

General STULTZ. The prevailing barriers that continue to impede our transition from a strategic force to an operational force are funding and access to reserve personnel.

While fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last 10 years, the operational reserve has been funded through the use of OCO dollars. With the reduction of OCO funds, dollars must be programmed into the base budget in order to maintain an operational reserve.

If costs to sustain readiness of the RC are not migrated into the base budget, what will remain post-OCO are the statutory 15 days of annual training and 48 unit training assemblies—resourcing levels we know will reduce the Army’s operational depth—and RC readiness in particular. This strategic Reserve level of funding will prevent us from building a level of readiness in ARFORGEN to adequately meet the Army’s contingency needs. Extended post-mobilization, pre-deployment training periods will again be required to prepare RC units for deployment.

For the Army Reserve to continue as an Operational Force the Army needs to have access to us. Currently, authority to use Army Reserve forces falls within two areas: Annual Training and mobilization and revisions to existing mobilization. However, “Assured Access” to the Army Reserve for “Non-Emergency”, and “Steady-State Security Cooperation Missions” requires changes to current legislation and the language in the current Senate Bill is a big step in the right direction. By giving

the Service Secretary Authority, we can take full advantage of the hard-won operational experience of our Army Reserve Soldiers and sustain that experience through predictable regular use. The Army is dependent on the Army Reserve as mission “enablers” that are critical when generating and sustaining theater forces. This is a fully integrated total Army. USA&R enablers provide a best value capability to the nation. Changes to legislation are critical to the national defense of our nation as we leave Iraq and Afghanistan and shift our focus to preventing conflict in the future. Combatant Commands are asking the Army for engineer, medical and logistics capability for theater security cooperation missions—all capabilities that exist primarily in the Reserve Component. This isn’t a matter of back filling the Army. We are uniquely capable of responding to immediate global requirements across the full spectrum of operations. Security Cooperation and Capacity-Building Partnerships present opportunities to draw from the unparalleled experience and training levels of an operational force. The Army Reserve must remain an enduring operational force within the Total Army. If the Army Reserve had to go back to a strategic reserve, it would be very detrimental to the Army. The Army Reserve is a crucial element of the Army’s overall deployable strength and war fighting team. We provide support units and specific functions integral to the operational force. Army Reserve enablers provide cyclical capability across the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model, including the flexibility to surge forces. This contribution is particularly important if the Army encounters security demands and global commitments that exceed the steady-state capacity of supply-based ARFORGEN.

Today and in the future the Army will require recurrent, assured and predictable access to the RC to meet operational requirements as requirements increase for Army forces to conduct overseas engagement activities. This can best be accomplished through leveraging an Operational Reserve.

It is essential that the Army sustain the increased levels of RC readiness and availability achieved since 2001. America’s enemies have demonstrated both resiliency and adaptability. Against such an enemy, America’s Army must be able to sustain steady state engagement and be prepared to surge a sustained response to the unexpected. Operational depth and fiscal advantages make an operational reserve force essential to meeting this challenge. Our Soldiers are a national treasure that must continue to be used in a meaningful way or we will lose them, and we simply cannot afford that as a nation.

Mr. FORBES. What are some examples of the impact to training of O&M funding reductions?

General WYATT. The overall impact of O&M funding reductions has been minimal on the Air National Guard’s (ANG) Non-Prior Service Training, Formal Training, & Flying Training Programs because 99 percent of our formal schools training dollars are resourced through Military Personnel Appropriations funding. Only one of these three programs, the ANG Formal Training Program, has O&M funding attached to it (\$1.135M in FY12 O&M), which funds civilian instructor personnel at the ANG’s Training Education Center and Academy of Military Science, and provides administrative supplies/equipment for these two training sites.

However, O&M reductions can impact day-to-day training at the unit level by reducing flying hours, Dual Status Military Technician pay, supplies and equipment, travel, and facilities. The impact of these unit level reductions could result in pilots not retaining currency, inability to maintain mission capable aircraft, and the inability to provide training for our maintenance and a host of support personnel.

Mr. FORBES. How are you adapting to the \$73 million reduction in FY 2011? What challenges would you experience should additional cuts be levied against you?

General WYATT. While the ANG did not take a reduction in FY2011, additional cuts beyond those scheduled through the President’s Budget submission for FY12, depending on the depth, could seriously impact our ability to organize, train, and equip our troops in preparing for domestic and federal operations. As the ANG is already a lean organization, further reductions could impact our ability to induct our aircraft for depot maintenance, create shortfalls in funds utilized by the unit commanders to effect training, and/or reduce our flying hour and civilian pay programs.

Mr. FORBES. NORAD’s ASA and Operation Noble Eagle report stated that the National Guard Bureau traditionally runs a deficit in execution-year funding for the ASA mission. To what extent is the Guard experiencing cost overruns while conducting ASA operations? What are the underlying causes for these overruns? What, if any, impact do these cost overruns have on the Guard’s other missions? What impact do continuing resolutions have on your execution of funding?

General WYATT. The ANG coordinated response to the NORAD ASA (now referred to as Aerospace Control Alert, or ACA) and ONE report indicated the ANG continually runs a deficit in execution-year funding. This deficit, while not always the

same amount, was approximately \$4.0M dollars per year over the past two to three years. This is caused by unforeseen changes in requirements that the COCOM must react to in mission. A recent example is the hurricane, which prompted significant movement in locations due to evacuation, which in turn prompted airborne coverage over certain areas. Also, runway repairs and closures, inspection failures, backfills, and facility upgrades that drive re-locations, all incur additional costs. Air Combat Command contributes Military Personal Appropriations day funds when they are available. However often these funds are not available and the ANG is ultimately responsible.

This impacts the ANG's ability to fund their training requirements. The Active Duty Operations Support (ADOS) coding of the funds utilized for the ACA mission is the same as our Special Training (ST) Days fund. Therefore, the ANG "assumes financial risk" in their ST Day accounts to pay for these deviations from the program. The ANG must limit exercise or individual unit training funding from this account to provide the funds to the ACA mission. Additionally, even if the funding is repaid at the end of the fiscal year, the opportunity to attend the exercise or specific event has often already passed. Hence, there is a financial cost when the funds are not repaid and an opportunity cost involved even if the funds are repaid.

The continuing resolution also impacts the ANG's ability to provide training funds. Approximately 4 of every 70 personnel at an ACA unit are funded through the ADOS funding line. During a continuing resolution, the ANG is permitted to commit a percentage of their funds that equates to a portion of the fiscal year that the budget is approved. A first quarter continuing resolution allows the ANG to spend 25% of the previous years' funding. However, for the ACA mission, it is not practical to do such time limited funding. Therefore, the ANG will maximize the timeframe the ACA mission personnel are funded, which in turn decreases the amount of funds available for the other items. Since the number of pilots doing the mission on ADOS funding is small, the ANG can place these limited individual on 365 day orders and use the remaining money to fund all the other items for a smaller amount of time (possibly 70 days). The total amount utilized is within the continuing resolution amount (25% of the year) but the money spending is now unevenly spread to ensure the ACA mission does not suffer from the "stop and go" funding.

Mr. FORBES. Both the Army and Air National Guard are divesting fixed-wing airframes. What impact will the loss of airframes have on the National Guard's capability to conduct routine domestic operations and catastrophic incidents today and in the future?

General WYATT. Since 2005, and with current programmed reductions in FY11 and FY12, the Air National Guard will have lost 22% of its C-130 fleet, from 226 aircraft down to 175. Programmed changes to domestic airlift could impact successful completion of current and future domestic operations missions. In addition, mission requirements and demands routinely levied on the NG are difficult to codify as to which missions are requirements and which are demands. The NG has requirements that are federally recognized, defined by joint and service doctrine and demands only defined by National Guard Regulation. A New Madrid Earthquake scenario could create an estimated need of 1000 C-130 sorties for aero-medical evacuation alone. This is in addition to moving our CBRN Enterprises, supplies and equipment. National Guard Aviation assets currently available to supply major military support to civilian authorities are stressed to meet all emergency response requirements and scenarios.

Concerns that these programmatic decisions may have degraded NG aviation capabilities to adequately support Homeland Defense/Defense Support to Civil Authorities missions prompted the Chief, National Guard Bureau to request a Capabilities Based Assessment to analyze the National Guard aviation capability and its support for Domestic Operations. Once the Capabilities Based Assessment is complete, the National Guard should be able to provide a clearer picture of the National Guard's capability to support Domestic Operations.

Mr. FORBES. What are some examples of the impact to training of O&M funding reductions?

General CARPENTER. Reductions to base training funds will impact the ARNGs ability to sustain Individual/Crew/Squad levels of readiness by reducing training events such as Combat Training Centers, inactive duty training (drill) and Annual Training opportunities. Current O&M funding level provides Individual/Crew/Squad levels of readiness. Units preparing for mobilization must report to their mobilization station at or above platoon level readiness.

Additional resources provided through Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding enables the ARNG to meet readiness requirements of deploying units. These additional OCO funds typically prepare deploying ARNG units to achieve Pla-

toon level of proficiency. Upon full mobilization, ARNG units conduct additional training in order to achieve Company level of proficiency. Training conducted under post-mobilization and prior to and during deployment is funded through Army Active Component OCO funds.

Mr. FORBES. How are you adapting to the \$73 million reduction in FY 2011? What challenges would you experience should additional cuts be levied against you?

General CARPENTER. Army National Guard (ARNG) absorbed \$73 million in Congressional reductions from Operations and Maintenance Appropriations (\$42 million spread across multiple Operating Forces funding accounts) and Administrative Support (\$31 million). The Operating force programs most impacted were Sustainment Restoration and Modernization (SRM). Due to this reduction, the ARNG pushed a number of SRM projects into future fiscal years. Our force was able to absorb much of the Administrative Support budget reduction from efficiencies gained in recruiting and retention advertising.

Continued annual funding cuts force the ARNG to regularly postpone SRM projects into fiscal out-years. The shift to an Operational Force structure/Army Force Generation Model has shown the ARNG to be more than capable of successfully accomplishing our Constitutionally-mandated missions both here and abroad. However, the increased usage levels our facilities must now meet to ensure our future mission success equates with increased funding for proper maintenance. Large reductions in budget out years will directly—and negatively—impact Air and Ground operations tempo and training for the ARNG.

Mr. FORBES. Both the Army and Air National Guard are divesting fixed-wing airframes. What impact will the loss of airframes have on the National Guard's capability to conduct routine domestic operations and catastrophic incidents today and in the future?

General CARPENTER. The current Army plan reduces the number of Army National Guard (ARNG) Fixed Wing (FW) aircraft available for domestic operations from 114 aircraft down to 64, or, potentially as low as 48 aircraft. This decrement includes the divestiture of 42 C-23 Sherpa aircraft. The current Army approach to domestic FW requirements is a derivative approach: the ARNG utilizes ARNG FW assets not deployed in federal service. With the Air National Guard (ANG) fielding C-27J aircraft that replace ARNG C-23s, ANG C-27J deployments and extensive new equipment training requirements will likely limit the availability of these assets for routine ARNG logistical support requirements and Army Service-specific missions. Loss of airframes—coupled with reduced access to fixed wing capabilities—increases the concern that the ARNG will fall short of needed fixed wing capabilities for future domestic operations and catastrophic incidents.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. Given the high ops tempo of your Joint STARS Wing, how well is the system doing in supporting increased COCOM requirements, and what stresses are you seeing on the system?

General WYATT. JSTARS is providing exceptional support to increased global requirements. To date, JSTARS has flown over 77K combat hours and has been continuously deployed for more than 3.6K days. In FY11, JSTARS supported five COCOMs, the highest level of support in the history of the weapons system. The Active Component is maintaining an average 1:2 dwell rate; ANG personnel are maintaining an average equivalent dwell rate of 1:4 through volunteerism.

Increased Operational Tempo continues to stress JSTARS personnel and the E-8C fleet. The E-8C fleet remains postured to meet COCOM requirements, but does so at a cost to home station operations. Surge operations in support of increased COCOM requirements directly affect the availability of resources for the co-located JSTARS FTU. In FY11, high levels of support for deployed operations caused JSTARS to fall short of the Air Combat Command standard for Mission Capable rate of 78% by 0.4%. There were also numerous shortfalls in key maintenance metrics, driven by engines (top contributor to Non-Mission Capable Rate) and the Oil Pressure Indicating System (number one cause of air aborts in theater).

Mr. SCOTT. Given the small size and increasing demands on Joint STARS fleet, is the USAF doing all it can to ensure sufficient Joint STARS are operationally ready and available to meet the demands?

General WYATT. COCOM requirements significantly exceed JSTARS' sourcing capacity. The 116 Air Control Wing and 461 Air Control Wing deploy forces at the maximum sustained level and have dynamically conducted surge operations in support of increased COCOM requirements. Improvements to operational readiness and

availability can be made by addressing personnel and fleet availability issues including:

- Personnel
 - Taskings in support of the MC-12 program and Task Force Torch directly increase the dwell rates of JSTARS Airborne Mission System Specialists and Airborne Battle Management Specialists enlisted aircrew positions to almost 1:1. These requirements negatively impact the OPTEMPO for both Active Component and ANG aircrew members. Reducing or removing these additional taskings would improve OPTEMPO and raise overall aircrew readiness levels.
- Fleet availability
 - Disposition of Aircraft -0597: This aircraft has been in non-flyable condition at the CENTCOM Forward Operating Location since 13 Mar 2009 following a fuel system related Class A Mishap. The repair of aircraft -0597 would preserve a critical fleet asset and the associated manpower and ensure JSTARS support to COCOM requirements is not degraded by 17%. However, repair of this aircraft is not currently funded.
 - Aircraft -0416 (flight deck proficiency trainer): This aircraft has significant structural and corrosion issues and the ability to return the aircraft to service is currently being assessed. It is utilized at maximum capacity and handles 61% of JSTARS annual flight deck proficiency training requirements. Loss of this aircraft increases the homestation requirement, thereby reducing resources available for OCO support.
 - E-8C engines are the single highest contributor to fleet-wide non-mission capable rates. The re-engining program is not funded past the development stage.

Mr. SCOTT. What upgrades are being considered to improve Joint STARS performance and readiness to better support the Joint STARS crews, maintainers, and users of the Joint STARS information?

General WYATT. Air Combat Command (ACC) is the lead command responsible for planning and budgeting for JSTARS modernization. The National Guard Bureau is responsible for JSTARS sustainment.

ACC's currently planned modernization upgrades include:

1. Enhanced Land Maritime Mode: provides JSTARS the capability to accurately track, target, and engage moving land and maritime targets using GPS-guided weapons from other aircraft.
2. Multi-Functional Information Distribution System Joint Tactical Radio System-Joint Tactical Information Distribution System: datalink replacement for diminishing manufacturing sources.
3. Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below "Blue Force Tracker". A scheduled upgrade of the system will render JSTARS' version obsolete. This upgrade ensures continued access to US Army and US Marine Corps tactical datalink. Phase 1 is funded. Phases 2 and 3, which enable access to new secure system, are currently unfunded.
4. Prime Mission Equipment/Diminishing Manufacturing Source: replaces current onboard mission equipment, such as the Radar Airborne Signal Processor and Clipper Operating Work Stations computers, that have become obsolete from the manufacturing sources.
5. JSTARS Radar Modernization: radar improvement demonstration to improve radar area rate coverage; provides the ability to detect, track and identify both stationary and moving ground vehicles. Funded through a Congressional mark in FY08/09. Demo will continue through FY12.

The following upgrades to JSTARS are being considered by ACC but are not currently funded:

1. Organic Combat Identification: provides the ability to independently identify ground targets, removing reliance upon other traditional and non-traditional Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance sensors.
2. Diminishing Manufacturing Source Replacement of Avionics for Global Operations and Navigation: system upgrade is required to maintain access to global navigation.
3. Intelligence Broadcast Service: would provide access to beyond line of sight self-defense information; current system is obsolete.
4. Maintenance and sustainment upgrades: include updates to the oil pressure indicator system, fuel flow transmitter, aft thrust reverser and E-8C radio system evaluation and adjustment tool.
5. JSTARS Network Enabled Weapons Program: allows JSTARS to acquire and engage targets using weapons, such as Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile-

Air Surface Warfare-Anti-Surface Warfare, from other aircraft via a Link 16 communications network.

Mr. SCOTT. Do you see an opportunity to provide additional support to NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM as a result of deblending the Joint STARS wing into separate Guard and Active wings?

General WYATT. The Active Associate organizational structure of Team JSTARS between the Air National Guard 116 Air Control Wing and the Active Component 461 Air Control Wing does not affect the overall level of COCOM support that JSTARS can provide. Organizational changes have aligned how the two wings organize, train and equip forces with respect to Title 32 and Title 10 authorities. Under the current COCOM taskings, JSTARS is able to provide support to NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM through utilization of homestation sorties on a non-interference basis. Additional support to these two COCOMs would require a reduction in the current CENTCOM and AFRICOM taskings.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. PALAZZO

Mr. PALAZZO. Do the Guard and Reserve components feel that it would be advantageous to increasing operational readiness capabilities if the Guard Bureau were to have the flexibility to use NGRE funding on maintenance of training systems?

General STULTZ. From the perspective of the Army Reserve, "maintenance of training systems" is a potential requirement most likely appropriate for Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funding. Traditionally, National Guard and Reserve Equipment (NGRE) funds provided to the AR have been for procurement purposes. Should the Congress choose to supplement the President's budget request for the purpose of ensuring adequate maintenance of Reserve Component training systems, it is our view that this is best done by adding resources to the appropriate areas of the O&M appropriation.

Mr. PALAZZO. We are currently looking at passing a CR to continue funding the government until the end of the year. When I first came into office last January, we passed multiple CRs to keep our government functioning because of the failure of the previous Congress to pass the annual appropriations bills. Now we are looking at another CR, likely followed by an omnibus, that will carry us through. While we were working on the CRs we received a great deal of testimony from the DOD officials about the problems that CRs cause in their planning process. Could you elaborate on the issues you will have to deal with if Congress ends up producing another series of CRs? What is the overall effect on the readiness of the Guard and Reserve Components?

General STULTZ. There are numerous issues caused by a series of CRs. The Army Reserve is reliant on contracts for much of its daily operations. Under a CR, many contracts must be incrementally funded instead of being fully funded when approved. This creates a significant additional workload for the organization that has the contract requirement and for the contracting office that is processing the action. Additionally, the incremental funding of contracts creates uncertainty for all of the vendors that are providing products and services to us. Contract bids are valid for 90 days in many cases—when the bids cannot be exercised due to funding restrictions under a CR, the process must be restarted. MILCON projects are also significantly disrupted due to the lack of authority to start new projects.

A CR also causes problems for the Army Reserve offices that manage and that execute funds. Each additional CR period requires calculation of spending authority to be distributed and distribution of the approved amounts to all organizations falling under each office that manages funds. This is a tremendous administrative burden that would not be necessary if appropriations were received at the beginning of a fiscal year. Also, trying to get be good fiscal stewards in an environment of uncertainty, absent total funding, commands may not take advantage of all training opportunities available.

The overall effect on the readiness of the Army Reserve is limited, but could become more significant as CRs become the norm year after year. We are able to fund and complete training under a CR even though there is a dramatic increase in administrative workload. The most significant impact is likely the uncertainty generated by a series of CRs year after year. Soldiers that are deployed and already under stress are burdened by the thought that a government shutdown or delay in funding could impact their pay and their families back at home. The Army Reserve financial workforce is forced to set aside the normal analysis that could lead to more efficient operations to complete the repeated distribution of funds required under a CR or series of CRs.

Mr. PALAZZO. Do the Guard and Reserve components feel that it would be advantageous to increasing operational readiness capabilities if the Guard Bureau were to have the flexibility to use NGRE funding on maintenance of training systems?

General WYATT. No. The ANG does not feel that expanding the uses of NGREA to include maintenance of training systems would be advantageous to increasing operational readiness capabilities.

While NGREA is used to purchase equipment, fielding of this equipment drives a sustainment bill that includes daily maintenance, training, and support. The NGREA process includes identification of these issues, funding requirements and submissions into the ANG POM.

Changing the purposes for which NGREA can be used would be counter to the current laws and regulations governing the uses of the money and would divert funds away from critical equipping and modernizing efforts.

NGREA is a procurement appropriation, while maintenance on existing systems of any kind, to include trainers, is currently funded with Operations and Maintenance funds, one year funding. Expanding uses of NGREA across "purposes" is a violation of current law. Granting an exception would legally complicate what heretofore has been a clearly defined set of laws and policies.

More importantly, allowing NGREA to be used for O&M would detract from the intended purpose of NGREA: to equip and modernize the ANG in areas where ANG equipment lags the active component or in mission areas such as domestic operations where the active component does not provide funding.

Mr. PALAZZO. General Wyatt, as you know, the Air Force announced that it would beddown four operational C-27J aircraft and two additional training aircraft at Key Field Air Guard Station in Meridian, MS. Unfortunately, the documented permanent manning positions required to stand up this operational mission has yet to be provided and the base has had to rely on temporary manning slots for the past two fiscal years. Do you foresee NGB providing Key Field with the needed permanent positions later this year? If not, when do you expect these positions to be provided? Also, this unit has been asked to lean forward in preparation for the training piece of this mission. Can you tell me if that manning will be provided on time?

General WYATT. NGB understands the resourcing challenges for Mississippi this fiscal year. Despite our desire to provide the state clarity on permanent funding, due to the lack of an FY12 approved appropriations bill and the current H.J. Res 79, Continuing Resolution to fund the government through 18 November 11, NGB is unable to provide further information on the timeline of receipt of permanent funding. Every effort is being made by the NGB staff to communicate the current status of the budget and how it affects the individual units. NGB is standing ready to update the Manpower Resource Vouchers to reflect programmatic funding as soon as the budget is passed or the Continuing Resolution allows. Currently the Manpower Resource Vouchers indicate that the fulltime positions will remain capped at FY11 levels and show projected funding until 1 April 12. To alleviate personnel impacts, Key Field Air Guard Station currently has FY11 resourcing extended through FY12 with execution year funds.

Mr. PALAZZO. General Wyatt, as a Congressman representing a district that is especially prone to natural disasters such as hurricanes, I anticipate the capabilities of the C-27J will be very important to my district and others like it across the country. Do you foresee budget cuts affecting this program?

General WYATT. The C-27J was designed by the Army to deliver Time Sensitive/Mission Critical personnel and equipment to strategic points across the battlefield. It is currently serving and meeting that expectation overseas at this time. The C-27J can provide that same time critical airlift for states and first responders during national or state emergencies. The aircraft is right-sized to deliver tailored or specialized response and support assets to those areas impacted by an emergency. The C-27J program is now completing its Low-Rate Initial Production, and delivering the first 21 aircraft to the first four of the seven designated Wings. The Systems Program Office is presently awaiting its Full Rate Production decision from the AF and Office of the Secretary of Defense. However, the decision has been delayed due in part to present state of the budget. This will likely impact delivery of final 17 aircraft to final three Wings, but will not deter the NGB from supporting this mission. Given the lack of an FY12 approved appropriations bill and the current H.J. Res 79, Continuing Resolution to fund the government through 18 November 11, NGB is unable to provide further information on any foreseeable budget cuts and what impacts, if any, would be forced upon this program. NGB staff is committed to this program and continues to aggressively train, equip, and field the C-27J in order to provide its defined capability not only to the warfighter but also to our states for domestic operations.

Mr. PALAZZO. Do the Guard and Reserve components feel that it would be advantageous to increasing operational readiness capabilities if the Guard Bureau were to have the flexibility to use NGRE funding on maintenance of training systems?

General WYATT. The ANG does not feel that expanding the uses of NGREA to include maintenance of training systems would be advantageous to increasing operational readiness capabilities.

While NGREA is used to purchase equipment, which drives a sustainment bill to include daily maintenance, training, and support. The NGREA process allows the ANG to identify these funding requirements and plan for future budget submissions.

Changing the purposes for which NGREA can be used would be counter to the current laws and regulations governing the uses of the money and would divert funds away from critical equipping and modernizing efforts.

NGREA is a procurement appropriation similar in purpose to the three year AF 3010 or 3080 funding. Maintenance on existing systems of any kind, to include trainers, is currently funded with Operations and Maintenance funds, one year funding. Expanding uses of NGREA across "purposes" is a violation of current law. Granting an exception would legally complicate what heretofore has been a clearly defined set of laws and policies.

More importantly, allowing NGREA to be used for O&M would detract from the intended purpose of NGREA: to equip and modernize the ANG in areas where ANG equipment lags the active component or in mission areas such as domestic operations where the active component does not provide funding.

Mr. PALAZZO. We are currently looking at passing a CR to continue funding the government until the end of the year. When I first came into office last January, we passed multiple CRs to keep our government functioning because of the failure of the previous Congress to pass the annual appropriations bills. Now we are looking at another CR, likely followed by an omnibus, that will carry us through. While we were working on the CRs we received a great deal of testimony from the DOD officials about the problems that CRs cause in their planning process. Could you elaborate on the issues you will have to deal with if Congress ends up producing another series of CRs? What is the overall effect on the readiness of the Guard and Reserve Components?

General WYATT. Overall, the productivity and economic costs associated with CRs are not in our best interest, however the effects of the CR depends on the level of funding, and length of the authorities. A CR that keeps funding at current or expected levels for greater periods of time tends to reduce negative impacts. Inversely, we have begun operating in FY12 under a reduced authority for a short period, which is causing all units across the ANG to inefficiently manage their daily obligation rates. There are inherent costs associated with short term funding cycles, such as the loss of training opportunities and increased expenses associated with the inability to negotiate longer term contracts for services and supplies. Additional reductions beyond those scheduled through the President's Budget submission for FY12, depending on the depth, could seriously impact our readiness. Specifically, further reductions could impact our ability to induct our aircraft for depot maintenance, create shortfalls in funds utilized by the unit commanders to accomplish training, and/or reduce our flying hour and civilian pay programs.

Mr. PALAZZO. Many of my colleagues are familiar with these efforts and I assume you are too but I would like to know your thoughts on the matter. Earlier this year, in the House Defense Authorization Bill a provision was included that would include a seat of the Joint Chiefs for the National Guard. It is my understanding that a similar provision is being worked on for the Senate version of the bill. Could you give me your thoughts on the necessity of a National Guard Representative on the Joint Chiefs of Staff? We have seen a largely increased role for the National Guard during this past decade, but do you believe that another 10 years down the road a seat with the Joint Chiefs will be necessary or warranted?

General WYATT. During the 10 Nov Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, General McKinley, Chief of the National Guard Bureau stated:

It is now in the best interest of the American people for the Chief of the National Guard to be made a full member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff . . . Only full Joint Chiefs of Staff membership for the Chief of the National Guard Bureau will ensure that the responsibilities and capabilities of the non-federalized National Guard are considered in a planned and deliberate manner that is not based upon ad hoc or personal relationships, but is, instead, firmly rooted in the law and the national strategy.

The domestic mission of the National Guard must be taken into account when making military contingency plans, when allocating scarce readiness resources, and when advising the President, the Secretary of Defense, the National Secu-

... rity Council, and the Homeland Security Council on strategies and contingency response options. ...

Adding the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to the JCS, in my opinion, would ensure that in the post-9/11 security environment the National Guard's non-federalized role in homeland defense and civil support missions will be fully represented in all JCS deliberations. This would not detract, in my opinion, in any way from its other critical JCS functions.

Mr. PALAZZO. Do the Guard and Reserve components feel that it would be advantageous to increasing operational readiness capabilities if the Guard Bureau were to have the flexibility to use NGRE funding on maintenance of training systems?

General CARPENTER. As defined in Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation, National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account procurement funds should not be used for sustainment and maintenance expenses. These funds are not programmed—they are annually appropriated—and are for procurement appropriations. An increase in National Guard Operations and Maintenance funding would directly and positively impact the maintenance and sustainment of ARNG training systems, as well as provide the flexibility of National Guard Bureau to focus those funds where most needed.

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General CARPENTER. When operating under a Continuing Resolution (CR), a portion of the budget is withheld from the Army National Guard (ARNG) in anticipation of Congressional downward adjustments. This process creates uncertainty at the execution level for the ARNG, because the States lack a clear picture on their programmatic funding for the year. Unplanned requirements directed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense or the Executive Branch to the ARNG place additional risk to funding. The longer the CR, the greater the level of uncertainty, and the greater the number of negative impacts observed at the local level to funding obligations and execution.

Once the Department of Defense (DoD) appropriations bill was passed, it took roughly three weeks for Office of Management and Budget, DoD, and Department of the Army to complete all the fiscal transactions necessary to provide funding to the ARNG. The ARNG appropriations were balanced in May, seven months into Fiscal Year 2011. Due to the severely curtailed budget window, the ARNG was unable to execute an 80% obligation rate for its Operations and Maintenance appropriation.

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