[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 112-69]
THE FUTURE OF U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES: TEN YEARS
AFTER 9/11 AND TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER GOLDWATER-NICHOLS
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
SEPTEMBER 22, 2011
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman
JEFF MILLER, Florida JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
CHRIS GIBSON, New York TIM RYAN, Ohio
BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
ALLEN B. WEST, Florida HANK JOHNSON, Georgia
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York
DUNCAN HUNTER, California
Peter Villano, Professional Staff Member
Mark Lewis, Professional Staff Member
Jeff Cullen, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2011
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, September 22, 2011, The Future of U.S. Special
Operations Forces: Ten Years After 9/11 and Twenty-Five Years
After Goldwater-Nichols........................................ 1
Appendix:
Thursday, September 22, 2011..................................... 23
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THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 2011
THE FUTURE OF U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES: TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11 AND
TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER GOLDWATER-NICHOLS
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
Capabilities................................................... 2
Thornberry, Hon. Mac, a Representative from Texas, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities.............. 1
WITNESSES
Lumpkin, Michael D., Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict...................... 3
McRaven, ADM William H., USN, Commander, U.S. Special Operations
Command........................................................ 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Langevin, Hon. James R....................................... 28
Lumpkin, Michael D........................................... 30
McRaven, ADM William H....................................... 47
Thornberry, Hon. Mac......................................... 27
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Hunter................................................... 57
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Thornberry............................................... 61
Mr. Wittman.................................................. 63
THE FUTURE OF U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES: TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11 AND
TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER GOLDWATER-NICHOLS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities,
Washington, DC, Thursday, September 22, 2011.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mac Thornberry
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MAC THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND
CAPABILITIES
Mr. Thornberry. The hearing will come to order.
Twenty-five years ago, the Congress added an amendment to
Goldwater-Nichols legislation that created the Special
Operations Command. That law listed 12 core mission areas for
the command and gave SOCOM some unique authorities.
It certainly is appropriate, it seems to me, for Congress
to review its handiwork, especially as we look back now at a
decade of fighting terrorists, a decade in which SOCOM has
roughly doubled in personnel, tripled in budget, and quadrupled
in overseas deployments. We may not be able to quantify as
precisely the achievements of these last 10 years, but they
are, in my opinion at least, undeniable.
Looking back on the past decade, my strongest impression is
of the incredibly talented, committed, hardworking individuals
who serve our country in SOCOM units. As I travel to Iraq,
Afghanistan, and elsewhere, I am continually impressed and
inspired by them, just as I know other members of this
subcommittee are. The capability that these people, with their
training, their hardware, and their supporting organizations,
bring to our country is without parallel anywhere in the world.
Some of that capability was on display to the world in the
Osama bin Laden raid. But SOCOM does much more, often with
little or no fanfare, as it should be. It may well be that the
future of the command will require greater emphasis on some of
those other mission areas, such as unconventional warfare and
foreign internal defense.
Of course, we consider the future of SOCOM and our entire
military within the constraints of tight budgets. But it seems
to me it would be the height of foolishness to provide
insufficient resources to an entity charged with fighting
terrorists, preventing weapons of mass destruction from being
used and training other nations to defend themselves so that we
don't have to.
The first job of the Federal Government is to defend the
Nation, and SOCOM is truly the tip of the spear that does that.
We are honored to have Admiral McRaven in his first testimony
before this subcommittee since assuming his new position as
SOCOM commander and appreciate Assistant Secretary Lumpkin,
himself a former SEAL [U.S. Navy Sea, Air, Land teams], for
being here today as well.
Before turning to our witnesses, I would yield to the
distinguished gentleman from Rhode Island, the ranking member,
for any comments he would like to make.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Thornberry can be found in
the Appendix on page 27.]
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
RHODE ISLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS
AND CAPABILITIES
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you
for convening this hearing.
Secretary Lumpkin and Admiral McRaven, welcome, and thank
you very much for being here today. I look forward to your
testimony. The importance of SOF [Special Operations Forces] in
today's fight, while so often in the shadows, as the chairman
pointed out, was brought into the spotlight during the daring
raid into Abbottabad back in May. All of us in the room, and in
fact the Nation, owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to the men
and women who serve with you in SOCOM. Raids such as the one
which killed Osama bin Laden highlight the wisdom and the
prescience of the authors of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation.
Today, joint operations between the services are
commonplace and expected, and we have seen an unprecedented
rise in both the capability of our Special Operations Forces
and the prominence they play in our modern military.
It wasn't that long ago that SOF was looked upon as sort of
a boutique force, one with niche capabilities that performed
important but lesser activities around the edges of a primary
conventional force effort. Because of their efforts, they were
known often only to a few with the right clearances or keen-
eyed observers. Some even questioned whether we needed SOF at
all.
Well, 10 years after 9/11, and due in no small part to our
experience fighting Al Qaeda and its affiliates in Iraq and
Afghanistan, they are the stuff task forces are built around,
oftentimes augmented by conventional forces and a very central
component of our ongoing fights in the Middle East and
elsewhere. Those legislators who had the vision to create SOCOM
could not have envisioned exactly how SOF would evolve in the
25 years that followed. But they knew they had to create a
framework that would enable success, whichever way requirements
pulled the force. That remains our task today.
Now, I am not suggesting that we need another massive piece
of legislation, but we do need to think about whether the way
we are currently training, manning, and equipping our SOF today
is sufficient and appropriate for the future. We must utilize
the lessons learned from the past 10 years of warfare and ask
tough questions. Have our SOF forces withstood the last
decade--I should say how have our SOF forces withstood the last
decade? What factors, both internal and external, help and hurt
their growth and efficiency? As the defense budgets tighten in
coming years, where must SOF grow? And which areas have the
experiences that have yet to be explored?
The timing of this hearing couldn't be better, Mr.
Chairman. And we have to consider how best to posture our
forces for the future security challenges and contend with the
prospect of austere resources. I hope we see a wide-ranging and
robust discussion today about lessons learned and thoughts
about what is to come. Are the acquisition authorities agile
enough while still properly tailored to yield the specialized
equipment you need when you need it, without duplicating other
efforts and costs elsewhere in the greater DOD [Department of
Defense] budget? Would the rest of the force benefit from new
acquisition efforts, as appropriate? Can we train your people
properly? Are the authorities governing your operations crafted
so that you can do what you need to do, and yet still be
subject to appropriate control and oversight? And how have the
lines blurred between Title 10 and Title 50 affected the force?
And most importantly, are you able to stay true to your core,
to the SOF truths, which all operators know and understand in
spite of the current operational and fiscal realities? These
are the questions that we hope to explore today.
And Mr. Secretary and Admiral, thank you both for your
great service to our Nation. We are deeply in your debt, and to
those whom serve under you. And I look forward to your
discussion and your testimony here today.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for convening this hearing. I
yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Langevin can be found in the
Appendix on page 28.]
Mr. Thornberry. I thank the gentleman.
Now we will turn to our witnesses: Mr. Michael D. Lumpkin,
Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/
Low-Intensity Conflict; and Admiral William McRaven, Commander,
U.S. Special Operations Command.
Mr. Lumpkin and Admiral, without objection, your full
statements will be made part of the record. And please feel
free to summarize them and make such comments as you see fit.
Mr. Lumpkin.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL D. LUMPKIN, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE, SPECIAL OPERATIONS/LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT
Mr. Lumpkin. Good morning.
Thank you, Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Langevin,
and members of the committee. Thank you for the invitation to
be here today.
As we approach the 25th anniversary of the founding of
United States Special Operations Command and the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-
Intensity Conflict, I want to acknowledge the unique
relationship we have had with the Congress and this committee.
Your support, and that of the American people, for our Special
Operations Forces was essential in the creation of SOCOM and
SO/LIC, and continues to be the key enablers for us today. As
we reflect on the lessons learned over the past decade, it is
crucial that we put them into a broader context.
In 1970, American Special Operations Forces carried out one
of the most daring raids in American military history, the
attempted rescue of 61 American prisoners of war suspected of
being held in a North Vietnamese prison camp at Son Tay, a mere
40 miles west of Hanoi.
Only 10 years later, in 1980, our Special Operations Forces
attempted to rescue 55 American hostages held in Iran. That
operation failed, resulting in the death of eight service
members and damaging American prestige worldwide, principally
due to a decrease in operational capabilities.
Thirty-one years after the tragedy of Desert One, our
Special Operations Forces have come full circle. The daring and
successful raid at Abbottabad, approximately 40 miles north of
Islamabad, led to the death of Osama bin Laden, showcases the
superb skills of special operators today.
As we enter an era of constrained defense budgets, we must
not repeat the mistakes that led to the degraded SOF
capabilities throughout the 1970s. Our goal must be to retain
and, in fact, hone all of our SOF capabilities so that our
Nation will have them in full measure in the decades to come.
We must retain and sharpen our proven direct action capability,
the tip of the spear so to speak, which is what most Americans
think of when they hear Special Operations.
But this is only one aspect of what SOF does. There are
less obvious, but equally important SOF capabilities for
indirect activities that enable us to persistently engage
throughout the world, working with international partners to
build their capabilities before conflicts arise so that they
can defend themselves and, by extension, defend us.
Our experiences have validated the five SOF truths. First,
humans are more important than hardware. SOF is successful
because we equip the man, not man the equipment. It's all about
our people.
This leads us to the second SOF truth. SOF are uniquely
able to provide a Nation with targeted and precision
capabilities across the full spectrum of conflict, whether it
is training partner military units, countering terrorist
threats or conducting high-end direct action missions. Our
return on investment is the highest among all U.S. forces.
The third and fourth SOF truths are interconnected. SOF
cannot be mass-produced, and competent SOF cannot be created
after emergencies occur. It has taken the last decade to grow
our SOF capability from approximately 33,000 service members to
almost 58,000 today. As we increase the number of SOF, we must
ensure a commensurate growth in our enablers.
This takes us to the fifth SOF truth. Most Special
Operations require non-SOF support, including support from
general purpose forces and the interagency. We know that the
team approach in DOD and the interagency and with international
partners carries the day.
Another key lesson over the past decade relates to the old
adage that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. For
a relatively small cost, we are able to build partner forces
and gain access to better local intelligence, which can create
security without requiring a large, expensive U.S. footprint.
In the foreseeable future, disrupting, dismantling, and
defeating Al Qaeda, its adherents and associated movements,
will continue to dominate the SO/LIC and SOCOM agendas.
Supporting SOCOM's efforts to refine counternetwork targeting,
interagency collaboration, and organizational structures will
remain a priority. SO/LIC will continue to be the focal point
for coordinating DOD's role in the national strategic
counterterrorism activities.
Post-2014, DOD is projecting a baseline requirement of
10,500 to 12,500 deployed special operators on any given day.
SOF represents an exceptional value to our Nation, consuming
just 1.6 percent of the defense budget and comprising less than
3 percent of U.S. military personnel. The characteristics of
our Special Operation warriors guarantee that our military
possesses the capability for facing the unknown threats of the
future and general purpose forces downsize.
On behalf of everyone who serves in the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-
Intensity Conflict, I thank you for your long-standing support
of our Special Operations soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
marines, and the thousands of civilians that support them. This
concludes my opening remarks, and I look forward to your
questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lumpkin can be found in the
Appendix on page 30.]
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
Admiral.
STATEMENT OF ADM WILLIAM H. MCRAVEN, USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
Admiral McRaven. Good morning. Chairman Thornberry, Ranking
Member Langevin, and distinguished members of the committee,
again, thank you for the invitation to appear before this
committee and the opportunity to represent the men and women of
the United States Special Operations Command.
I am honored to command such a capable and effective
organization, and privileged to appear today alongside my
teammate, Secretary Michael Lumpkin, the Acting Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity
Conflict.
I have positioned a few posters around the room which
highlights SOCOM's rich history; our authorities, those
legislated by Congress and those directed by the President and
the Secretary of Defense; how Special Operations has changed
since 9/11; where we are today; and how we are preparing for
tomorrow.
As you know, SOCOM was legislatively created by Congress in
1986. Congress' vision and support, coupled with tremendous
military leaders and exceedingly talented operators, have
created the most capable Special Operations force the world has
ever seen. I applaud lawmakers' foresight in legislating this
command into existence. You can be very proud of the results.
U.S. SOCOM is one of nine unified combatant commands across
the Department of Defense. And while similar in many regards,
we are unique in that we also exercise numerous service,
military department, and defense agency-like responsibilities.
Among SOCOM's legislated responsibility is to prepare Special
Operations Forces to carry out assigned missions, including
training and equipping the force, and to command select Special
Operations missions when directed to do so by the President or
the Secretary of Defense.
Additionally, U.S. SOCOM is directed by the Unified Command
Plan to synchronize planning for global operations against
terrorist networks. In carrying out these tasks, we work
closely with the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the
geographic combatant commands, and appropriate government
agencies. These authorities have effectively prepared and
equipped our force to meet the threats of the last decade, and
to be postured appropriately for future challenges.
Since 9/11, our force has doubled in size, our budget has
tripled, and our deployment requirements have quadrupled.
However, congressional support has enabled U.S. SOCOM to
continue providing rapid global options to meet a broad set of
complex and dynamic challenges. Special Operations Forces
currently serve in both supporting and supported roles across
the battlefield.
With an annual budget of $10.5 billion, U.S. SOCOM
comprises only 1.6 percent of the Department of Defense
proposed fiscal year 2012 budget and, put simply, provides a
tremendous return on the Nation's investment. Our success in
these roles hinges on the application of the indirect and the
direct approaches, meaning that both approaches are required to
achieve the desired results.
The direct approach is characterized by precision, highly
kinetic strike forces enabled by technology and linked through
a digitally networked battlefield. Since 9/11, these largely
kinetic counterterrorism operations have had great effect
disrupting Al Qaeda and its affiliates by providing space and
time for the indirect approach to achieve its desired effect.
Conversely, the indirect approach is focused on advising,
assisting, and training our global partners. Our persistent
presence is enabled by a deep understanding of a local culture
and context. These two approaches are mutually supportive and
necessary elements of effective Special Operations employment.
Currently, more than 13,000 members of Special Operations
Command are deployed globally, with 85 percent of those forces
deployed to the Central Command area of responsibility. Of
these deployed forces, more than 10,000 SOF are in Afghanistan
and Iraq. The other 3,000 Special Operations Forces are
deployed to more than 75 countries around the world. Operating
at the invitation of the country and the approval of the
ambassador, these forces are performing noncombat missions in
diverse, challenging environments.
The goal of these forces deployed outside combat is to
build partner nation capacity. Building this capacity is
critical to enabling our partners to deal with their own
security challenges, strengthening their regional stability,
and decreasing the demand for U.S. support.
As many of you know, our total force faces challenges as
well. With a significantly increased operational tempo and
continued high demand for Special Operations Forces, the past
decade of continuous combat has resulted in increased pressure
on our forces and families. While SOF and their families are
resilient by nature, the effects of 10 years of focused combat
operations convinced my predecessor, Admiral Eric Olson, to
form a task force to examine what he described as the fraying
around the edges of the force. Over a period of several months,
the task force conducted over 400 focus group discussions with
more than 7,000 Special Operations service members and more
than 1,000 spouses from 55 different SOF units around the
world, including forces deployed in combat.
For SOF, there is no single cause responsible for the
fraying. It is the accumulation of a multitude of stresses
spread throughout the training and deployment cycle. While I
can assure you the state of Special Operations Forces is
strong, the pressure on our service members and their families
requires careful attention to ensure the long-term health of
the force. Compounding the stress on the force is the reality
that the demand for SOF continues to exceed supply.
As we draw down the general purpose forces in Iraq and
contemplate drawdown in Afghanistan, SOF will likely be the
last force to experience relief. As Admiral Mullen said earlier
this year, SOF are typically the first force in and the last to
leave. With 85 percent of deployed SOF in the CENTCOM area of
responsibility, the pent-up demand across the other geographic
combatant commands continues to grow. And I do not anticipate
it to decrease.
Another challenge for SOF is our reliance on the general
purpose forces for supporting infrastructure and enablers. SOF,
by design, depends heavily on the service-provided capability
for support. Consequently, as we look at the drawdown in
Afghanistan, the potential drawdown in Afghanistan, and the
potential for additional SOF requirements, we need to make sure
the appropriate infrastructure and enablers remain in place to
make SOF as effective as possible on that battlefield.
Globally, Special Operations Forces are contributing well
beyond their numbers, and are known for their high return on
investment. In the future, I see great benefit in developing a
global SOF network. We are working through the geographic
combatant commands. And bolstering our ties with the
interagency and the allied SOF partners, we can react even more
rapidly and effectively against our enemies.
My number one priority is winning the current fight, while
maintaining the health of the force. But close behind that
priority is expanding this global SOF and interagency network
to deal with future challenges.
I would like to conclude with two final points. First, I
believe the Special Operations Forces have never been more
valuable to our Nation and to our allies around the world than
it is today. And the demand will not diminish for the
foreseeable future.
Second and lastly, I want you to know how proud I am to
command the greatest Special Operations force in the world. And
you have my promise that we will continue to fight as long and
as hard as you need us to in order to protect this great Nation
and the principles we hold so dear.
Thank you again for the opportunity to speak with you
today, and I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral McRaven can be found in
the Appendix on page 47.]
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Admiral. And I don't believe any
member of this subcommittee has any doubt about that. And that
is reassuring.
Let me ask for you all's brief comments for a couple of
issues within the time I have available. One is back to the
statute. As I mentioned, the statute lays out 12 specific areas
for Special Operations Command. If you look through them, it
seems to me it is a huge breadth of our security challenges
right now, from foreign internal defense, terrorism--
counterterrorism, you know, the whole list. Are there any of
them that you would recommend Congress at least examine to see
whether there should be changes, either additions or
subtractions, to that list of 12 that were put in, in the
original bill?
Mr. Lumpkin. Mr. Chairman, as we look at the missions that
were legislated within the Goldwater-Nichols, what we do is we
have the codified process of the Quadrennial Defense Review,
where we go through all of these missions and we scrub them to
make sure that we indeed are doing what needs to be done for
our Nation. So the process works very well.
What we have identified in, for example, the 2006 QDR was
that the missions were largely what we needed to be, but we
didn't have the force size to accomplish them completely. So
the QDR 2006 was the program growth of SOF itself, of the
operators.
In 2010, we saw the shortfall of the enablers to allow SOF
to do that, to execute their missions. So we saw that
programmed in the growth across the FYDP [Future Years Defense
Program]. And that is the program that we are executing right
now. So I think our missions are accurate and effective for
what our Nation needs, but I will defer to Admiral McRaven.
Admiral McRaven. Sir, I would agree with Secretary Lumpkin.
The great thing about this is a lot of those missions are
mutually supporting. So if you are training a Special Forces
officer and NCO [noncommissioned officer] in how do
counterinsurgency, that same skill set can apply to foreign
internal defense. If you are training an operator in how to do
counterterrorism, a lot of those same skill sets will apply to
countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
So the great thing is when we look at those mission sets
that we have, again, I think if you focus on kind of the direct
and the indirect approach, and we train all of our operators to
do both, the mission set, as Secretary Lumpkin said, I think is
exactly what we need now and for the future.
Mr. Thornberry. Okay.
Second issue I would invite you all's comments on is
budget. Under some scenarios, there could be reductions to
every account in the defense budget, as I understand the way
that potential sequestration would operate. I also understand
from reading the press that the Department of Defense has put
out some restrictions on how military officers can talk about
consequences of defense budget cuts. And I certainly am not
asking you to violate any orders that you received. But I would
appreciate, I think we all need to hear somewhat about the
potential for 5, 10 percent budget cuts to SOCOM's budget.
Mr. Lumpkin. Within the Department, as you are aware, Mr.
Chairman, is that we are doing a strategy-based review as far
as the budget reductions to make sure that we have a holistic
look at what the requirements are of the Nation and to make
sure that we have the forces that are prepared to respond to
those future situations globally.
So we are looking within the Department to find out where
we can find those efficiencies. The key that we are really
looking at, not only within the SOF portfolio, but also with
the enablers, because as the services look at reductions that
may impact them, they have a direct impact on us, for a number
of reasons.
First of all, that is where we draw a large portion of our
forces from. They come into the general purpose forces and then
will transition to SOF at some point. So we have them as a
talent pool, first of all.
Number two is that they provide the support that we need to
execute our mission so we can focus on those specifically. And
while we do have the need for organic combat support and combat
service support, we do rely heavily on the general purpose
forces. So we are looking very closely to see what the budget
impacts are going to have on them, which will in turn influence
and impact us.
Admiral McRaven. Sir, I just echo those comments.
I think, within OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense],
within the Department of Defense, they understand the value
that SOF brings to the current fight and the future fight.
Our real concern, as Secretary Lumpkin said, is the impact
on the services. And as the services have to potentially cut
key enablers, that is going to affect us. And we just have to
make sure that we are in constant dialogue with the services,
which we are through this whole process.
Mr. Thornberry. Okay. Just be in constant dialogue with us,
too, because I am concerned about where this could lead and the
idea that some people might have that, oh, we can keep the
counterterrorism effort going; we will just cut the Army, Navy,
Air Force, Marines. This enabler issue that you brought up I
think may not be apparent to most people.
The gentleman from Rhode Island.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again Mr. Secretary and Admiral, thank you for your
testimony here today and your service.
Given my roles on both the House Armed Services Committee
and the House Intelligence Committee, and the ability to have
transparencies into both Title 10 and Title 50
responsibilities, I wanted to focus on that area a bit this
morning.
I am increasingly aware of and to a degree concerned that
the lines between those two authorities are becoming blurred as
they relate to our military SOF capabilities. Ten years ago,
the 9/11 Commission, for example, recommended that
responsibility for paramilitary operations should be shifted
from the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] to U.S. Special
Operations Command. This recommendation was primarily based on
the belief that the CIA doesn't have a robust capability for
conducting these types of activities. But with over a decade of
warfare experience now under its belt, I certainly believe it
goes without saying that the CIA's capability has grown
tremendously in this area.
Without delving into classified information, and we will
talk more about this in a classified setting later, I would
like to hear your thoughts on the following: Has the Title 10-
Title 50 divide taxed your force significantly? Do you agree
with the 9/11 Commission that the U.S. military should take on
this traditionally agency-led role? And the third question in
this area, how can Congress best bridge the Title 10-Title 50
divide and provide the necessary oversight in this somewhat
gray area?
So, Mr. Secretary, do you want to start?
Mr. Lumpkin. Thank you for the question, sir.
We can go more in depth, of course, in the closed session
after this. I would submit that the 10-50 divide that you speak
of, we have a very good relationship with the interagency. We
have the processes and memorandums, in terms of reference, in
place to effectively ensure that we within the Office of
Secretary of Defense's Special Operations have oversight over
any activities that go on between U.S. Special Operations
Command and the interagency in that realm.
I don't believe that this is a mission at this point that
should migrate to DOD because the relationship is very good,
and it maximizes and gives us the capability to work through
the different authorities that each agency has. And the rest of
it I would prefer to defer to the closed session, if possible,
sir.
Mr. Langevin. Fair enough.
Let me ask this, and I think I can probably ask this in
open session, is the agency properly resourced to do the
missions that it is called upon to do, or is it the type of
thing where they are stressed and it is more of an area where
SOF forces would be more capable?
Mr. Lumpkin. I have not run into a situation yet where they
were resource deprived to execute a mission that was uniquely
theirs that we could not help them with. When they find that
there is a shortage, we can work something through that to
bridging the gap to make sure they have the capabilities that
are necessary.
Mr. Langevin. Okay.
Admiral, do you care to comment?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, I am not sure there is much to add,
but I will tell you the relationship between CIA and Special
Operations Forces is as good as I have ever seen it. Both under
Director Panetta, and now, of course, under Director Petraeus,
I think we are going to see that relationship continue to
strengthen and blossom. And again, great relationship.
I think we clearly understand on the Department of Defense
side the lanes in the road in terms of Title 10 versus Title
50. And as Secretary Lumpkin said, I think we can certainly
address some of your other concerns in the closed session.
Mr. Langevin. Fair enough. Let me turn to budgets in the
time that I have left.
Mr. Secretary, in light of the budget debate here in
Washington and the inevitable shrinking of the defense budget,
I am concerned about the effects of this squeeze on the SOF
community, as is the chairman. During our brief meeting
yesterday, you had mentioned concerns about the effects of
ongoing DOD budget efficiency efforts on SOCOM and the various
forces who would enable SOF to do their mission so well. Can
you elaborate on those concerns more specifically, and which
enablers are absolutely vital? And are there any areas where
some flexibility exists in those enabling forces?
Mr. Lumpkin. Thank you, sir.
The principal concern goes back to the issue of enablers,
to making sure that those are in place to support our SOF. As
we see the general purpose force footprint reduced,
specifically in Afghanistan in the future, we understand there
is going to be a higher reliance on the Special Operations
community. So we are watching to see how those reductions will
impact SOF.
ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] in
particular is one thing that we rely heavily upon. And so we
have to make sure that we watch to see how that looks and how
that goes to make sure we fully recognize the impact on our
Special Operations community. So, again, it goes back to
largely to the enablers.
I think our Nation understands the benefit of SOF,
especially in the environment that we anticipate in the future
globally. So I think that we need to work with the services,
make sure that we are focused and adaptive to what happens in
the future as we look at the budgets in the coming years.
Mr. Langevin. Okay.
Thank you both for your testimony.
I yield back.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
Mr. Hunter.
Mr. Hunter. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
First question, Admiral, is you talked about pent-up
demand. I am assuming you mean Central America, South America,
Philippines. Can you expand on that a little bit?
Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir. As I mentioned in my opening
statements, we have got about 85 percent of our Special
Operations Forces currently in the CENTCOM area of operation.
And frankly, I think at this time and place, that is probably
the right percentage to have there.
But clearly, there remains demand in other theaters that
over the course of the last 10 years, we have had to draw from
some of the other theaters in order to support the wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan. So as we look at the future and the potential,
with the drawdown in Iraq and obviously, over time, the
drawdown in Afghanistan, certainly what I will try to do is
balance those requirements that are coming from the geographic
combatant commands in the various theaters so we can better
support them. But right now a lot of our lift, a lot of our
personnel have come from those theaters in order to support the
effort in CENTCOM.
Mr. Hunter. So when you look out the next say even 10 to 20
years and how SOF is going to need to transition, whether it is
being more in like Southeast Asia, what do you see as the most
important thing that--because you have people like Chairman
Thornberry, Chairman Langevin, they have been here for a long
time. They have seen administrations come and go. They have
been here prior to 9/11 and afterwards. So what is next,
looking forward, that we need to make sure that we don't take
our eye off the ball as those of us that are here longer,
through multiple administrations, through multiple changes,
multiple wars, what do we need to keep focused on over the long
term?
Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir. Our strength I think is this
global SOF network that I talked a little bit about in the
opening comments. We work through the theater Special
Operations commands [SOCs] in order to influence and support
the geographic combatant commanders. So as I look at the future
of the U.S. Special Operations Command, one of the areas where
I intend to put a lot of emphasis is building up the theater
Special Operations commands so that they have the entire
spectrum of capability that I think they will need for the
future.
Now, every theater Special Operations command will be a
little different. Clearly, as we look at someplace like PACOM
[U.S. Pacific Command] and SOCPAC [Special Operations Command
Pacific], can they use ISR, for example, unmanned ISR? And the
answer is I think in certain cases, they absolutely could for
disaster relief. If a tsunami hit someplace, somebody may want
to understand what the problem looks like. So ISR is probably
applicable in SOCPAC as well as SOCSOUTH [Special Operations
Component, U.S. Southern Command].
But as you look at a place like SOCEUR [Special Operations
Command Europe], I am sure our ability to fly into European
airspace with unmanned aerial vehicles is probably a
nonstarter. So we are going to have to balance out what comes
out of Afghanistan, as you point out, in the next--whatever
that timeline looks like, 5, 10 years--take those resources and
then again balance them out across the various theater SOCs.
But I believe that our future, SOCOM's future, lies in the
theater of Special Operations Forces and making sure that they
are robust enough to handle the problems in their particular
geographic areas.
Mr. Hunter. Going back to enablers again, you can talk
conventional Navy, which is your primary enabler
internationally--not right now in Iraq and Afghanistan, but
primarily after these--we draw down. Do you think that they are
set up in a way right now? Would you change anything in big
Navy, conventional Navy in the ships that they are buying, in
the way that they are going towards unmanned vehicles in their
movement, I guess trying to get involved right now in these two
wars and be somehow involved in these two wars and have a role
to play? Would you change their direction, or do you think that
they are doing enough to enable you in the future when we start
moving out of Iraq and Afghanistan?
Mr. Lumpkin. If I may, Mr. Hunter, we are working closely
with the Navy as far as when it comes to their structure,
especially in the realm of maritime ISR, to support SOF and to
make sure that they have a capability that can meet our needs
globally, especially in the expeditionary nature of the Navy as
we move forward and sometimes frequently with short or little
notice that if they are already in place, they can support our
forces through that maritime ISR. So that is one of the key
things that we are working with the Navy in particular on.
Mr. Hunter. What about shipbuilding? Are you guys happy
with the Littoral Combat Ship [LCS] and its capability?
Mr. Lumpkin. Candidly, I haven't had those discussions with
the Navy. As we look at it, a more robust capability is always
better for us that is out there. But I would like to take that
one for the record, if that is okay with you, sir.
Mr. Hunter. So SOF, just to make sure, SOF has not looked
at then the LCS as one of their primary vehicles for the
future? Especially the Navy SEALs?
Mr. Lumpkin. We have definitely, I know the force has
looked at the LCS and the Navy capability at large. I don't
have the answer to that question right now, and I would like to
take it for the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 57.]
Mr. Hunter. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And Secretary Lumpkin and Admiral McRaven, thank you both
for being here.
I especially want to welcome a fellow San Diegan, as well,
Mr. Secretary, thank you.
I think one of the things that has become really clear is
that our SOF members have become really the experts in the
whole-of-government approach. And I wonder if you could share
with us, I guess is there something that we really can take
from your experience, from the SOF's experience into the
military as a whole as we train and prepare individuals on all
of the--across the services? And also whether in fact we are
able to I guess send a clear message that, working with our
international partners, that it takes--you know, it is still,
as we deal with SOF, it is still the military. And yet we talk
about the whole of government as being something perhaps
different and added value to the military. How do you work that
in the field, particularly as we go into many areas where we
are trying to prevent those conflicts?
Admiral McRaven. Yes, ma'am, thank you.
And I am glad you asked the question. Frankly, from my
previous command tour as the commander of JSOC [Joint Special
Operations Command], I can tell you that not a single mission
that we conducted did not have a heavy interagency flavor to
it. And we learned very early on that what the interagency
brought in terms of diversity of their cultures and their
unique capabilities was a huge enabler for Special Operations
Forces, particularly the kinetic side. So if you are going to
go against a target, you are going to have intelligence support
from CIA, NSA [National Security Agency], DIA [Defense
Intelligence Agency]. You will have support from NGA [National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency] on the graphics. Everybody, and
of course State Department, a key player in all of this. FBI
[Federal Bureau of Investigation], as we are supporting certain
missions that the FBI may be conducting. So tremendous
interagency lash up between Special Operations and our
interagency partners.
On the indirect side, I would say it is very much the same.
Those forces out in the field are working with USAID [U.S.
Agency for International Development]. They are working with
NGOs [nongovernmental organizations], again, trying to build
host nation capacity. If they are in a noncombat area, they are
sitting at the table with the country teams to make sure that
the country team mission, that they are in support of that. So
interagency is really kind of a foundation of how we are doing
Special Operations today.
Mrs. Davis. Is there something unique about the way you
have been able to break down those barriers and perhaps we have
had more difficulty in other areas?
Admiral McRaven. I think a lot of it has do with at the end
of the day, there are results, in terms of if an interagency
supports an operation in Afghanistan with intelligence, or
graphics, or authorities, they will see a result of their
support to Special Operations.
And that tangible result really makes a difference in how
much they want to provide support. And you see that again down
range as well.
I think if you would talk to ambassadors across the 75
countries in which we are in kind of day in and day out, they
will tell you that the support provided by the military
information support teams, the civil affairs teams, and then
the joint training that happens with the Special Forces and the
SEALs is tremendous to support U.S. policy. So they see
immediate results when they invest in Special Operations. And I
think that is what brings us together.
Mrs. Davis. Is there something in particular we, though,
could generalize to training among our forces? I know we have
done cultural training. What is it that should be included
more, that should be a higher priority perhaps than what we
have today?
Admiral McRaven. In terms of Special Operations or the
conventional force?
Mrs. Davis. Conventional forces.
Admiral McRaven. Yes, ma'am.
I think the conventional forces are also embracing the
interagency. I can tell you from my time in Afghanistan, you
saw a little bit of what we had developed at the Joint Special
Operations Command in Afghanistan with all the way down to the
brigade combat teams and to the battalions that were on the
ground. They knew that the interagency support, the
intelligence community, along with the other supporting
agencies were a tremendous resource that they could use. And
again, they got results.
So I think the conventional force gets it. It is just that
we are dealing with a larger scale in the conventional force;
whereas the smaller scale of SOCOM and Special Operations
Forces allows us to turn that information more quickly.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
If I could make an editorial comment, I greatly admire Ms.
Davis's relentless pursuit of making sure that the Federal
Government can use all the tools available to it as effectively
as possible.
And I appreciate your answers on the good things that are
happening in the theater. But in my opinion, we have a ways to
go in this government to really be effective with all the tools
we have and to break down those barriers that still exist.
Mr. Conaway.
Mr. Conaway. Preach on, Mr. Chairman. Preach on.
Admiral, Mr. Secretary, thank you all for being here. I
appreciate it. Thank you for your service.
Admiral McRaven, you walked us through a little bit of the
things that you are doing and that Admiral Olson started with
respect to making sure that the folks we ask to do the most--
and quite frankly, we probably ask them do more than we should
have, but we will continue to ask them because they will stand
in and make it happen--that they and their families are
treated--not treated well, but have the tools and resources
they need to do whatever it is that must be done so that the
next time we ask them to go do something, they are ready to do
it. And then when they come back from that, that they go back
to being able to live as a family man and taking care of their
families.
Are there things that you would like to do, or things you
would like to have done that you can't do at this point in time
because you need authorities or something? I assume that the
things you can do you are doing. But is there anything out
there that needs to be done that this group needs to be aware
of?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, I think we have all the authorities
we need. And I think that we have the resources we need. I
think, frankly, it is a function of focusing our resources. The
Pressure on the Force Task Force that Admiral Olson started
just recently kind of reported out. And I have gotten the
recommendations from that task force. And in fact, I am sitting
down with my staff at USSOCOM to figure out how we are going to
implement those recommendations. Some of them I think are well
within our ability to implement. And some of them are just the
nature of the fight that we are in. You know, as long as we are
continuing to fight, there is going to be stress on the force.
But what I know I have an obligation to do as the commander
of SOCOM is to make sure we are making the predictability
factor as good as we can make it. And by that, when you talk to
most of the families, they will tell you that if they can get
more predictability in their spouse's deployment cycle, then
they can begin to plan things. And they may understand that
their spouse will be gone on Christmas or on Easter or another
holiday. And if they can plan for that, they are kind of okay
with it. But it is the unpredictability that drives a lot of
them--that drives a lot of the stressors I think around the
families. And I think we can certainly deal with that issue and
deal with it well.
The other piece is education. They want to understand the
effects of TBI [traumatic brain injury] and PTSD [post-
traumatic stress disorder]. And so there is an education piece
that I think we have got to broaden the aperture a little bit
with our families.
Mr. Conaway. I am sure everybody on this committee, as well
as the broader full committee, would be keenly interested in
tracking or watching those kinds of things that you do as a
result of the report that the task force put in place.
One of the tools that you have to have is language skills.
How are you dealing with the demand for language skills when
you are having folks at the operational tempo that you have got
them at? Talk to us a little bit about what the focus is there.
Admiral McRaven. Sir, we have got a magnificent language
program at Fort Bragg that the U.S. Army Special Operations
Command runs. And every Special Operations officer and NCO at
some point in time in his career is expected to get a language
baseline.
So we are continuing to invest a lot of money in language
because, as I pointed out in my opening comments, I mean, it is
about us being culturally aware. And I don't think you can
become culturally aware of a society until you can understand
their language. I think that is a big part of it at least. So
we are putting a lot of investment in it. And I know that is
going to pay huge dividends for us in the future. It is
certainly one of my top priorities.
Mr. Conaway. Well, in the time I have got left, General
Clapper made an interesting comment the other day in a
conversation in Intel spaces about not everything that the
intel community does is of equal value. And I don't need an
answer this morning, but one of the things that kind of
following on the chairman's questions about those 12 things
that we have asked you to do, is an honest, straightforward
analysis at some point in time that if there are things that
you can off-load, not that they are not super important, but
things that you can off-load to other places or that we simply
as a team don't need to do, that is something that I think
collectively the entire system ought to be thinking about and
looking at as we look at shrinking resources or resources that
stay flat, how do we manage that? And one of them has to be an
opportunity to say this is something that we did in the past,
you asked us to do in the past, and we don't think that is
necessary, and having an honest conversation.
Your tendency, I seem to hear from all the folks in
uniform, is that whatever it is you are asked to do, it is yes,
sir, yes, ma'am, and we will go do it. There ought to be an
opportunity for us at some point to have a rational
conversation around that issue that there are just some things
that you don't need do or don't need to be done. And we need to
have that conversation. I yield back.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
Mr. Gibson.
Mr. Gibson. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
I thank the panelists for being here today. To a degree I
think we are all products of our own experience. I am no
different. On this subject, I am informed by my experiences as
a G3 for Multinational Division North during the surge. A lot
of debate as to what may have gone into why the atmosphere, the
environment in Iraq changed over time. I think it is really a
combination of things. I think, yes, the Sunni Awakening had a
part of it. There is no question the surge also played a part,
because it was important to have security on the ground to
allow all the Iraqis to give some thought as to what kind of
future they wanted to have.
But then also very important the role that the Joint
Special Operations Task Force played in terms of killing and
capturing high-value individuals. I saw on a daily basis just
the remarkable integration of intel and operations for
effective action. And very keenly interested in seeing us raise
that level of play and focus at the national level. I am aware
of, to some degree, of global pursuit and some of the actions
and studies that have been done in the past. And I am trying to
bring that spirit to what we are doing nationally in terms of
policy.
So in the intel authorization bill, got an amendment that
looks at consolidating the intel community to better fuse it
with operations. And I wanted to make you aware that with the
chairman and the ranking member's help, we did put in the mark
something you alluded to earlier, Admiral, and that is the 1986
law that created SOCOM. And I am of the mind that we should
revisit that and take a look at, are there changes,
restructuring within the headquarters, that may allow us to
more effectively fuse intel and ops and to really neutralize
this threat? Even helping us work in concert with friends and
allies as you bring this to a finer point and to a higher
priority.
And so I guess I wanted to make you aware of that, if you
weren't aware, that I have had conversations with your
predecessor about this. I am particularly frustrated with the
Christmas Day bomber and the fact that that radicalized young
youth's dad called our country, and we didn't have the agility
to process that information. And you know, had we had the same
facility as we had in Iraq at the operational and tactical
level, I think at the national level, we would have been in a
better position to address that threat.
So I just want you to know I am going to be supportive
going forward to your efforts, and certainly welcome your
dialogue at this point on these comments.
Admiral McRaven. Well, sir, first, thank you very much. And
I certainly appreciate your interest in those efforts, because
we think they are exceedingly important. And as you know from
your time in Iraq, we took those lessons learned, you know, how
do you fuse ops and intel, and we migrated that over to
Afghanistan. And I would contend that the reason the Special
Operations Forces on the kinetic side have been so successful
in Afghanistan is because of the fusion of that ops and intel.
Having said that, I will tell you that I think our greatest
success in Afghanistan has come from the Special Forces
officers and NCOs who have been on the ground trying to change
the landscape, if you will, in terms of our relationships with
the Afghans. The village stability operations [VSO], developing
the Afghan local police [ALP], this is, I think, the most
promising effort we have in Afghanistan right now. And the
fusion of the ops-intel piece, as you know, much like Iraq, you
know, we are not going to be able to kind of kill our way to
victory in Afghanistan. We have always understood that. Every
soldier understands that you can't do that in a
counterinsurgency.
So the effort that we are putting in to supporting the VSO
and the ALP I think is going to be critical. The real question
is how do we take that concept of fusing ops and intel, get it
down to the ALP level, the village stability operation level,
and ensure that those young SF officers and NCOs and SEALs that
are out there doing this have got the same sort of situational
awareness that we have kind of on the kinetic side. It is a
different requirement. The kinetic side, frankly, is a lot
easier than understanding the human landscape out there in the
districts and the provinces.
Mr. Gibson. Without question, tremendous integration of the
indirect and direct approach there. And in particular, I just
wanted to, as we close here with my time, that your predecessor
had some ideas on how we may be able to reorganize the
headquarters there so that we could elevate the priority, the
very successful actions that are happening in the Central
Command area of responsibility so that we recognize we face a
global threat here. And in protecting our cherished way of
life, we are going to have to I think step it up a little bit.
And really it is us in the Congress I think that can be helpful
to you, because every day, the Herculean efforts that are done
throughout your command, there may be ways that we can organize
more effectively.
Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Thornberry. I thank the gentleman.
And I appreciate, Admiral, your comments on the village
stability operations. Members of this subcommittee have been in
Afghanistan walking in some of those villages, and are also
incredibly impressed at the progress being made through that
effort. And as you say, it is a complicated, different sort of
mission. But incredibly promising.
Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You know, it can never be said often enough how much those
of us on this committee appreciate all of you. It is easy to
say that, Mr. Lumpkin, Admiral McRaven, those of you that are
attending, it is easy to say you are the best of the best.
Everyone knows that. But oftentimes I think it is something we
overlook, that those of you in this position don't--aren't
motivated for glory, but you are committed to fight because you
love what is behind you, not because you hate what is in front
of you. And we just want you to know this committee appreciates
that very deeply. And some of the recent discussions on the
budget may not reflect that.
And so I don't want to ask the wrong question here. I know
that those of you in the military and in uniform always handle
some of the most awkward questions so well. Sometimes you get
asked the most stupid questions on the planet, and you come
back with great decorum and answer them like they were coming
from the deepest intellect possible. And I am grateful.
But at a time when there are, as you put it, Mr. Lumpkin,
Special Forces warriors spending more time in a year in a
deployed or training posture than at home, you know, there are
those of us that are very concerned about the budget hollowing
out our forces and doing things that put enormous pressures on
all of you. So I guess I have to ask a little bit of a question
that you can't possibly answer. And that is, do you feel
forgotten by Congress? Do you feel Congress doesn't care?
Mr. Lumpkin. Absolutely not.
Mr. Franks. He had to say it that way, didn't he?
Mr. Lumpkin. The Congress, especially this committee, has
been very supportive of U.S. Special Operations Command, and my
office, to make sure that we are resourced, whether it was
through QDR, the different QDRs, 06 and 10, to build us a force
that can meet the needs of the future. The key is we have to
stay and continue that growth that is already programmed to
make sure that we are there for the Nation in the future.
Mr. Franks. Well, I can tell you, there are a lot of us
that are deeply committed to that. But when you talk about
fraying around the edges, there is a conviction on our parts,
many of us, that part of that rests with Congress. And we want
to make sure that you have the resources and everything that
you need. So let me just ask a general two-part question to
both of you, and it will probably take the rest of my time for
you to answer. If you had any area that you could point to as
your front line in your agencies, in the Special Forces, the
things that you think represent the greatest challenge that you
have, can you elaborate on that a little bit?
And also can you say to this committee, if you were able to
speak as candidly as possible, what would be the greatest need
that you have? What would be the greatest--not request, but
admonition that you might make toward this committee as to what
we might do, whether it is in an area of funding, or the focus
of that funding, or in the area of policy? What is it that you
need most from us to do the tremendous job that you do?
And Mr. Lumpkin, I will start with you.
And then I hope, Admiral McRaven, you will follow up.
Mr. Lumpkin. Thank you, sir. And I will be brief here. As
we look at the fiscal challenges that we face, the sequester in
particular would be very problematic for us.
Mr. Franks. Problematic. That is a nice way to put it.
Mr. Lumpkin. In that it doesn't allow us to be strategic.
So in order to make sure that we don't go down that road would
be very helpful to us and the Nation as a whole. And the
greatest need, frankly, is to stay on the current program
growth that we have got as we are moving forward. Because that
will get us where we need to be as a Nation and to make sure
that our SOF is properly resourced.
Admiral McRaven. Sir, if I could add to that, I think our
greatest challenge in SOF right now is that we are in great
demand. And that is a good place to be, but obviously, that
demand is in fact taxing our soldiers, sailors, airmen,
marines, and civilians that support SOCOM. I would tell you
that the greatest need is to continue to have great Americans
and congressional delegations come down range and continue to
show the soldiers their support.
I have probably done hundreds of congressional delegations
that have come to visit me in Iraq and Afghanistan. And every
one of them sends a signal to those young soldiers that America
cares. So it is vitally important, I think, for the Congress to
continue to come down range to see what is going on, to have an
understanding of what the needs of the soldiers are, and then
come back here and be able to put that into play.
But I can tell you as a commander, I always welcome the
congressional delegations and the staffdels. And I think you
should continue that to show support for the effort.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you both. Thank you all for your
noble service. Thank you.
Mr. Thornberry. I thank the gentleman.
Let me ask about a specific authority. There has been talk,
Admiral, about having your position have greater influence on
personnel management issues. And as you know, there has been a
proposal to change one of the words in Title 10, where it would
give you--change from monitoring to coordinating. The idea
would be to kind of strengthen the hand you have in personnel
management. Now, as I understand it, DOD has put out kind of a
new directive, but to date, only the Navy has reached an
agreement on how to implement that. So it comes back to my mind
saying, well, maybe we need to take another look at the law, if
the other services are not able to work with SOCOM, to have
some sort of arrangement on how the personnel issues will fit
together. Tell me where we are, and shouldn't we look at that
issue?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, as you know, I have been in command
about 5 weeks now. And but I can tell you from my discussions
with Admiral Olson, this was clearly a concern of his. Having
said that, I think the relationships between Admiral Olson and
the service chiefs was very strong. And he made a point on a
very routine basis to sit down with the service chiefs to
ensure that between what the service chiefs felt was their
responsibility, what the service responsibility was for
advancement and for promotions, was kind of consistent with
what Admiral Olson and how Admiral Olson wanted to kind of
shape the force. So I think the dialogue and the discussion
between the services and SOCOM has been very good. But that is
at a very thin level, if you will, of the force.
So, Admiral Olson, again I will defer to his wisdom on
this, was always very strongly committed to getting the
language changed from monitoring to coordinating, to again give
SOCOM a little bit more strength over the advancement and the
promotion of our service members.
Mr. Thornberry. Well, it is certainly something that I am
personally very interested in, especially given the delays in
having the other services work out an arrangement. Let me ask
this, Admiral. I have been appalled, frankly, at the amount of
public disclosure of, not just the Osama bin Laden raid, but a
variety of Special Operations missions. Some of that is illegal
leaks. Some of it comes from briefings by senior officials of
various kinds. Has the tremendous amount of information that
has gotten into the public sphere on operations that are
carried out by Special Operations Command folks increased the
danger that people operate under in, not just Iraq and
Afghanistan, but around the world?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, as you know, we go to great pains to
protect our operations and make sure that we maintain our
operational security as best we can. But the reality of the
matter is, you know, we live in a very media-intense
environment in this day and age. And I think there are certain
red lines, as we look at what we expose to the public, whereby
things like the names of the operators, which obviously would
bring greater risk to them and to their families, we are very,
very conscious of that. And frankly, I have found that the
American public understands that and the media understands
that. And they are generally pretty good about ensuring they
stay below that red line, that threshold of protecting the
individual operators and their families. Clearly, certain
tactics, techniques, and procedures are of concern to us. So if
we have something that is exceedingly sensitive, that is
something we need to protect very, very carefully. However,
having said that, a lot of the operations that the media gets a
hold of and will tend to embellish upon, is a fairly routine
operation. Again, in a 1-year period of time in Afghanistan, we
conducted 2,000 raids. Well, those raids are a pretty standard
kind of infantry tactic, if you will, on how to get to an
objective. And the media tend to sensationalize it a little
bit. But frankly, there is very little I think of that aspect
of it that is compromising to Special Operations.
Now, again, when we get into some of the much more
sensitive operations and the areas in which we conduct them,
then absolutely, sir, that is a red line, and we have to be
very careful about the exposure of those operations.
Mr. Thornberry. Obviously, we kind of think about this in a
counterterrorism sense. But if you think about
counterproliferation and a variety of other missions in your
set, then it even increases concern.
Unless somebody else has a pressing question they would
like to ask in the open session, we will adjourn and reconvene
in a closed briefing.
[Whereupon, at 11:07 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
September 22, 2011
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September 22, 2011
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
September 22, 2011
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RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER
Mr. Lumpkin. Special Operations Forces (SOF) are very pleased with
the Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). Looking to a future in which we
anticipate increased mission complexity for our special forces, the
transformational capability of the LCS is well suited for operating in
difficult littoral environments. The speed of the LCS will enable SOF
to infiltrate objective areas quickly. The mission bays and the launch
and retrieval system of the LCS provide unique and flexible mechanisms
for supporting special operations. More specifically, the launch and
retrieval system will allow surface or subsurface insertion of SOF.
Moreover, the LCS will provide SOF the ability to embark with organic
rotary-wing systems or to utilize Navy assets.
In addition, the Navy's Firescout Vertical Takeoff Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) system is
particularly relevant to SOF. Firescout recently conducted a proof of
concept deployment in support of SOF and provided significant ISR
support from the sea. This capability is designed to deploy and operate
with the LCS, and it will give SOF a versatile ISR platform to find and
fix targets.
U.S. Naval Special Warfare Command participated in the design of
the LCS in 2003, and the command continues to be closely integrated
into the ongoing training, testing, and doctrine development of the
LCS. One example of SOF's involvement is the development of the
Irregular Warfare Enhancement to the Surface Warfare Package. This
enhancement, supported by the Navy, will provide expanded medical,
training, communications, planning, and storage capability for embarked
SOF and expeditionary forces.
In summary, the LCS is an important platform, which provides sea-
based support for the full spectrum of Special Operations. It will
serve as the primary vehicle for SOF when mission requirements dictate.
[See page 13.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
September 22, 2011
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. THORNBERRY
Mr. Thornberry. Can you outline your approach to update the current
outdated fleet of SEAL underwater delivery vehicles (SEAL SDVs)?
Mr. Lumpkin. Our approach to updating the SEAL Delivery System
(SDV) envisions a mix of dry and wet submersible vehicles. The Shallow
Water Combat Submersible (SWCS) is the program of record for
replacement of the SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV), Naval Special Warfare's
wet combat submersible capability. The SWCS, an Acquisition Category
III (ACAT III) Program, achieved Milestone B on October 1, 2010, and on
June 20, 2011, Teledyne Brown was down selected to develop and build
the Engineering Development Model. The SWCS program not only includes
important technology improvements but also includes improved
capabilities in range and payload. The SWCS is expected to reach
Initial Operational Capability at the second quarter of Fiscal Year
2015.
Mr. Thornberry. Are you concerned that we do not have a capable
long range mini-submarine to deliver SEALs to denied maritime
environments?
Mr. Lumpkin. Yes. We are concerned that we do not have a long-range
submersible capability to deliver Special Operations Forces (SOF) into
denied maritime environments. USSOCOM's proposed solution to this
challenge is to develop a dry combat submersible. The current program
of record is the Dry Combat Submersible-Medium (DCS-M), which is
designed to provide our forces a capable, long-range, dry submersible
to deliver SOF into denied maritime environments. USSOCOM is procuring
a technology demonstrator to refine the attributes and capabilities of
the DCS-M. We are working together closely during the current Program
Budget Review process within the Department to address this
requirement.
Mr. Thornberry. With the disestablishment of Joint Forces Command,
who is now responsible for SOF joint doctrine and training? Are there
any concerns in this area?
Mr. Lumpkin. USSOCOM, in coordination with the Joint Staff J7, is
responsible for developing SOF joint doctrine and training for SOF and
its assigned forces. Prior to the disestablishment of U.S. Joint Forces
Command, Special Operations Command--Joint Forces (SOC-JF), was
responsible for training Joint Task Force commanders and staffs on
integration and employment of SOF capabilities. In April 2011, SOC-JF
was reassigned to USSOCOM and renamed Special Operations Command-Joint
Capabilities (SOC-JC).
SOC-JC's mission is to train conventional and SOF commanders and
their staffs, to support USSOCOM international engagement training
requirements, and to support the implementation of capability solutions
that improve strategic and operational warfighting readiness and joint
interoperability. Enhancing the interoperability of conventional and
SOF commanders and staffs through robust strategic and operational
level joint training remains a core function of SOC-JC. SOC-JC--in
conjunction with the Joint SOF University (JSOU)--will continue to
provide world-class training and education support for SOF and
conventional forces worldwide.
The Department is confident that USSOCOM and SOC-JC--like U.S.
Joint Forces Command--will continue to maintain the high standards of
joint training and education for SOF.
Mr. Thornberry. The hearing highlighted the importance of indirect
special operations. Civil Affairs (CA) and Military Information Support
Operations (MISO) are central to indirect special operations and are
being used across the globe. What is your view of our current CA and
MISO capabilities and can you outline any chances you are considering
to improve these important but lesser known communities within SOF?
Mr. Lumpkin. Our Civil Affairs (CA) and Military Information
Support Operations (MISO) are critical special operations capabilities,
and they have never been better. Cultural awareness, regional
knowledge, language ability, and interagency expertise are crucial
components of the CA and MISO skills that SOF employ in irregular
warfare and contingency operations in support of theater security
cooperation objectives. One example of these critical Special
Operations capabilities is the essential contributions they make to
Village Stability Operations (VSO) for the war in Afghanistan.
With respect to CA, there is currently one SOF brigade composed of
1,288 personnel, of which 230 are operationally deployed to 21
locations representing each Geographic Combatant Command (GCC). The
preponderance of CA forces--roughly 90 percent--are Army assets.
Historically, Army CA was characterized as a SOF asset, and U.S. Army
Special Operations Command (USASOC) was the proponent responsible for
managing and overseeing the training, education, equipping, and
organization of these forces.
We have learned through our operations since 2001 that CA is not a
uniquely SOF capability. Accordingly, proponent responsibilities for CA
were transferred from USASOC to the Department of the Army, and a
significant effort will be made to improve CA effectiveness and
efficiency in Fiscal Year 2012. This transfer of responsibility will
meet two requirements: (1) it will allow SOF CA to focus on support to
Special Operations; and (2) it will enable the Army leadership to
develop, build, and maintain the Army's CA capability directly, while
working to align CA with Stability Operations doctrine and
requirements.
In addition to the Army, the other Services have recognized the
value of developing an organic CA capability. For instance, in 2001 the
Navy established a 562-person CA capability within its Maritime Civil
Affairs and Security Training Command (MCAST).
MISO and persistent engagement are the primary means by which
Combatant Commanders seek to counter al-Qaida's ideology as well as
other violent extremist messaging. And, although the majority of the
Department's MISO forces are part of a small and segmented community
within the Army, major initiatives are underway to strengthen DOD's
MISO capabilities. These initiatives include USSOCOM's efforts to
establish a more robust MISO planning capability at the regionally
focused Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC), and to reorganize
its MISO forces to enable a global network that can better coordinate,
integrate, and execute MISO in support of the U.S. Government and DOD's
efforts to Counter Terrorism (CT) and Counter Violent Extremism (CVE).
Earlier this year, the Commander of USSOCOM submitted a Force
Design Update requesting the establishment of a Military Information
Support Operations Command (MISOC), to strengthen our Inform and
Influence capabilities, and to provide greater capacity to meet
anticipated future demand. Given the size, complexity, and global reach
of the MISOC's mission, he requested this command billet be a general
officer billet.
I recognize the asymmetric importance of CA and MISO to SOF's
Irregular Warfare portfolio of capabilities. The Department is working
to refocus and hone these capabilities within SOF, to maximize the CA
posture of Army forces, and to enhance the global capacity of our MISO
forces. These actions are intended to position U.S. SOF to prevail in
the uncertain security environment of the future.
Mr. Thornberry. How should special operators and CIA's paramilitary
forces share responsibilities that interlock and overlap, given
respective strengths and weaknesses are distinctively different?
Mr. Lumpkin. USSOCOM and the CIA currently coordinate, share,
exchange liaison officers and operate side by side in the conduct of
DOD overt and clandestine operations and CIA's covert operations. Our
activities are mutually supportive based on each organization's
strengths and weaknesses and overall capabilities.
Whichever organization has primary authority to conduct the
operation leads; whichever organization has the superior planning and
expertise plans it; both organizations share information about
intelligence, plans, and ongoing operations fully and completely.
Whether one or both organizations participate in the execution depends
on the scope of the plan and the effect that needs to be achieved.
Currently all USSOCOM and CIA operations are coordinated and
deconflicted at all levels.
The current DOD-CIA Memorandum of Agreement allows for these
activities to be coordinated at the lowest execution coordinating
authority feasible--forward in the Geographic Combatant Commander's
area of operation. It also allows each organization to socialize
differences up through respective leadership chains for resolution.
This partnering with respect to all operations has strengthened in
recent years and ensures the application of the correct USG capability
against agreed upon threats.
USSOCOM reports all of its clandestine activities quarterly through
DOD to Congress for appropriate oversight.
Mr. Thornberry. How may the roles of women in SOF change in the
future?
Admiral McRaven. a. Because of the combat exclusion policy USSOCOM
does not have females assigned to SEALs, Special Forces, Rangers, Air
Force Special Tactics Teams or Marine Special Operations tactical
units. SOCOM does have female information (MISO) and civil affairs
specialists.
b. SOF are constantly adapting to an increasingly intricate and
unpredictable operating environments. Because of the restricted access
to the Afghan female population, females have been used to perform
tasks deemed culturally inappropriate for male service members and to
engage the local population in/around secure objective areas.
c. As a result of the operating environment in Afghanistan, SOCOM
developed Cultural Support Teams (CST) to support SOF. Incorporating
female military personnel into our post operation activities have
allowed our forces greater access and integration with the Afghan
civilian populace which were not previously accessible.
d. CSTs are attached to SOF units to influence a larger segment of
the rural populations enhancing their ability to connect and
collaborate with a critical part of Afghan society. Currently, there
are (53) CST-qualified females supporting SOF operations in
Afghanistan.
e. This is a capability that we will continue to develop and use in
the future global operations.
Mr. Thornberry. What challenges remain with SOF integration with
conventional or general purpose forces?
Admiral McRaven. a. 5th SOF Truth: Most special operations require
Non-SOF Support. The integration of GPF's and SOF has produced
quantifiable success across Afghanistan. This force multiplication
construct has enabled rapid expansion (60% increase) of Village
Stability sites in the past 18 months; definitively improving GIROA
legitimacy, security and stability.
b. This adaptive organizational design combined with the resultant
mission requirements of operating in geographically remote and austere
locations has dramatically increased SOF dependence on GPF logistical
support. GPF logistical assistance accounts for approximately 50% of
the total support for all Village Stability sites.
c. There has been some institutional capacity challenges associated
with this integration. GPF service and support personnel familiarities
with SOF unique equipment have impacted repair and sustainment efforts.
Additional time has been required to train and familiarize GPF with SOF
vehicles, radios, weapons and other equipment.
d. SOF will become increasingly reliant on the Special Operations
Forces Generation Process (SOFORGEN) to integrate SOF pre-mission
training with supporting GPF. This process is critical to forming the
Special Operations Task Forces in CONUS and conducting training before
deployment. This construct will definitively expand national security
options, provide opportunity for greater force employment and
collective force capabilities. This enhanced interoperability between
GPF and SOF units will increase their functionality and effectiveness
once the force is forward deployed into the CENTCOM Theater.
Mr. Thornberry. Please outline for the committee any changes you
are considering to SOCOM's acquisition framework and authorities?
Admiral McRaven. USSOCOM is not considering any major changes to
our overall acquisition framework. However, we have asked for a change
to the threshold reprogramming limits within the Defense-Wide
Investment Accounts (Research Development and Procurement) for USSOCOM
in the FY12 conference report. By changing one word in the current
reprogramming language; changing ``lesser'' to ``greater'', in the
language will provide USSOCOM the flexibility within the current
Acquisition Framework to meet our expanded role in deterring,
disrupting and defeating global terrorist threats. This simple change
will provide us the ability to rapidly procure new capabilities and
upgrade existing equipment to meet emergent SOF requirements. We are
not requesting a change in public law, but stated in the FY12
Conference Report. The change would not generate any new reporting
requirements, since the transparency required for congressional
oversight is already in place within the Planning, Programming,
Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES).
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN
Mr. Wittman. The Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations is
currently conducting an investigation focused on Guantanamo Bay
detainee transfers and rising reengagement rates. The Director of
National Intelligence James Clapper recently testified that the
recidivism rate for former detainees has risen to an estimated 27
percent demonstrating that a significant number of detainees have
returned to the fight. Can you share your thoughts on this trend and
its impact on operations?
Admiral McRaven. SOCOM does not dispute that the trend of terrorist
recidivism has risen. Admiral Olson testified before this sub-committee
last year that the recidivism rate was 20% with an expected rising
trend due to several factors, but the most concerning reason is the
repatriation of detainees to their country of birth and that particular
country's decision not to further detain the individual and he returns
to the battlefield.