[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
NASA'S COMMERCIAL CREW
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM:
ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND CHALLENGES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 26, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-46
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov
----------
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. RALPH M. HALL, Texas, Chair
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
Wisconsin JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California ZOE LOFGREN, California
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas BEN R. LUJAN, New Mexico
PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia PAUL D. TONKO, New York
SANDY ADAMS, Florida JERRY McNERNEY, California
BENJAMIN QUAYLE, Arizona JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland
CHARLES J. ``CHUCK'' FLEISCHMANN, TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama
Tennessee FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi VACANCY
MO BROOKS, Alabama
ANDY HARRIS, Maryland
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois
CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana
DAN BENISHEK, Michigan
VACANCY
C O N T E N T S
Wednesday, October 26, 2011
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Ralph M. Hall, Chairman, Committee on
Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.. 17
Written Statement............................................ 19
Statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, Ranking
Minority Member, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
U.S. House of Representatives.................................. 20
Written Statement............................................ 22
Witnesses:
Panel I
Mr. John Elbon, Vice President and General Manager for Space
Exploration, The Boeing Company, Houston, TX
Oral Statement............................................... 26
Written Statement............................................ 28
Mr. Steve Lindsey, Director of Space Exploration, Sierra Nevada
Space Systems, Louisville, CO
Oral Statement............................................... 33
Written Statement............................................ 35
Mr. Elon Musk, CEO and Chief Technology Officer, Space
Exploration Technologies Corp., Hawthorne, CA
Oral Statement............................................... 40
Written Statement............................................ 42
Mr. Charlie Precourt, Vice President, ATK Launch Systems Group,
Brigham City, UT
Oral Statement............................................... 50
Written Statement............................................ 52
Dr. George Sowers, Vice President, United Launch Alliance,
Englewood, CO
Oral Statement............................................... 61
Written Statement............................................ 63
Panel II
The Hon. Paul Martin, Inspector General, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Oral Statement............................................... 89
Written Statement............................................ 90
Mr. William H. Gerstenmaier, Associate Administrator, Human
Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration
Oral Statement............................................... 94
Written Statement............................................ 95
Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Mr. John Elbon, Vice President and General Manager for Space
Exploration, The Boeing Company, Houston, TX................... 114
Mr. Steve Lindsey, Director of Space Exploration, Sierra Nevada
Space Systems, Louisville, CO.................................. 119
Mr. Elon Musk, CEO and Chief Technology Officer, Space
Exploration Technologies Corp., Hawthorne, CA.................. 123
Mr. Charlie Precourt, Vice President, ATK Launch Systems Group,
Brigham City, UT............................................... 131
Dr. George Sowers, Vice President, United Launch Alliance,
Englewood, CO.................................................. 135
The Hon. Paul Martin, Inspector General, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration........................................... 139
Mr. William H. Gerstenmaier, Associate Administrator, Human
Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration........................... 142
Appendix II: Additional Material for the Record
Statement submitted by Representative Jerry Costello, Committee
on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 152
Letter submitted by Representative Dana Rohrabacher, Committee on
Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.. 153
NASA'S COMMERCIAL CREW
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM:
ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND CHALLENGES
----------
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 26, 2011
House of Representatives,
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in Room
2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ralph Hall
[Chairman of the Committee] presiding.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Hall. The Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology will come to order, and I say good morning to
everyone.
Mrs. Johnson, before we get started with the meeting, I
will go ahead and ask the witnesses to indulge us just for a
few minutes to take care of some Committee business here. It is
my understanding Ms. Johnson as the Ranking Member of the Full
Committee has some housekeeping she would like the Committee to
undertake regarding the Democrat Caucus Subcommittee Ranking
Member assignments and rosters. The proposed modified roster is
in front of each of you here. I am not sure if some of their
members want to switch parties, or what this is about, but we
will yield to you as much time as you would like to have.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. We just
want to announce that we are taking applications for party
switches to this side.
But we do have a couple of Subcommittee vacancies to fill
on the Democratic side, and so pursuant to the direction of the
Democratic Caucus of the Committee, I move that the following
Subcommittee assignments be made: Ms. Edwards of Maryland to
serve as Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Technology and
Innovation; that Mr. Tonko of New York replace Ms. Edwards as
Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Investigations and
Oversight; and that Mr. Clarke of Michigan be assigned to serve
on the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics. And that ends our
report and request. Thank you.
Chairman Hall. All right. Without objection, it is so
ordered.
I now ask unanimous consent that the Committee adopt the
revised roster in front of them reflecting these appointments
as outlined by Ranking Member Johnson. Hearing no objection,
the revised roster is adopted.
Moving on, I would like to welcome everyone to today's
hearing, ``NASA's Commercial Crew Development Program:
Accomplishments and Challenges.'' That covers a long area there
looking back and looking forward, and in front of you are
packets containing the written testimony, biographies and Truth
in Testimony disclosures for today's witnesses, and today's
hearing will include two panels, and I recognize myself for
five minutes for an opening statement.
I say to all, good morning, and thank you. I know it takes
valuable time to travel here and to travel back and to prepare
yourselves for this, and we write legislation based on things
we hear from people like you because you know more about what
you are doing than we know about what you are doing, and we
want to be sure that we represent the greatest good for the
greatest number as we legislate. So I say good morning to all
of you, to NASA's commercial crew group, and I would like to
thank our witnesses for taking time from their very busy
schedules to be with us, and we will try to keep everybody to
the five minutes that we have allocated. I realize considerable
effort goes into the drafting and writing of your statements,
and I want you to know that your testimony, wisdom and
experience is going to be invaluable to help us through the
months ahead on issues that are related to NASA and its
Commercial Crew Program.
I would like to note for the Members of the Committee that
one company, Blue Origin, has received $14.9 million in federal
funds under this program but declined to testify today. I don't
really know why they did. Fourteen point nine million, I would
think I would want to come here and brag about it a little or
explain something. But they are not here and they will have to
explain that to the rest of the Committee when they want to.
Today's hearing is going to provide aerospace companies and
NASA an opportunity to testify about progress being made toward
the goal of establishing a purely commercial capability to fly
humans to and from low Earth orbit, with an initial emphasis on
ferrying NASA astronauts to the International Space Station.
Some have described the Commercial Crew Program as a
variation on the way NASA has traditionally managed our human
spaceflight program, implying that not much will change in the
relationship between the agency and aerospace companies in the
acquisition and operation of space vehicles. I find this
characterization to be a gross oversimplification that doesn't
fairly represent the degree of changes between the space launch
industry and NASA, nor does it do anything to highlight the
uncertainties of the business model going forward.
I am not opposed to the new approach, but in the time
remaining I want to focus my remarks on the business case, as
that is an area that I would like to see discussed at greater
length.
If indeed industry can perform safely and profitably, and
at substantially less cost, then I will be the first to
congratulate them and NASA. My hesitance, though, is based on
the very thin evidence provided to date by NASA that this new
business model is well understood and that it can succeed. I
have yet to be convinced that there is a sufficient commercial
market that will sustain multiple private, for-profit
commercial crew companies through the duration of America's
commitment to the International Space Station. I hope so. NASA
seemingly takes the position of ``build it and they will
come,'' and by starting these companies first, business will
soon follow. From my perspective, the business case is not very
compelling, at least for those companies intending on using
NASA as an anchor customer. Assuming two commercial companies
will be certified by the end of 2016, at two flights a year for
four years based on NASA's projections, government may need
only eight flights. That is four flights per company, probably
at a rate of one a year. The number may grow if the
International Space Station is extended, but there is no
guarantee. Four flights to recover some significant portion of
sunk investment, coupled with the goal to price the service at
a rate that doesn't dwarf the cost now charged by Russia,
suggests to me a perilous business proposition.
I think that NASA owes Congress and the laudable companies
that are before us today a much more thorough assessment of the
situation ahead. These companies have invested millions of
dollars and Congress has committed millions more. It is time
for NASA to deliver credible plans and analysis so that we can
move forward with more confidence.
What I do not want to see happen is putting government in
the position of stepping in to salvage one or more failing
companies in order to preserve a national capability. Many of
us are well aware of the debacle that confronted the Air Force
with its EELV program, and this Committee is not prepared to
let NASA repeat that mistake. To paraphrase my friend and
former Chairman of this Committee, Bart Gordon, I don't want to
find ourselves at some future time throwing additional sums in
this program because the commercial launch companies are ``too
important to fail.''
For all my seeming skepticism, I am willing to be convinced
that I am wrong, and I hope I am wrong. I want the private
markets to relieve NASA of the cost and burden of building a
new launch system for low Earth orbit. But as I said a minute
ago, NASA must do more to address these important questions,
and it is our role as the Committee of jurisdiction to ensure
that whatever path we ultimately take, government's investment
will be well understood and well spent.
In a time of constrained budgets, we have to first protect
our presence in space and keep the faith with the American
people and our foreign partners. Logically, we cannot expend
vast sums of money today going to Mars when our people can't go
to the grocery store. But we have to keep the dream alive by
moving forward as we are able. That is why it is vitally
important that we spend our limited NASA dollars wisely.
I want to offer thanks again to our witnesses. I greatly
admire the achievements of you and your companies. It is
undeniable that aerospace has directly contributed to this
country's greatness and our preeminence in space, and all of us
must work to ensure you have the missions and resources to
continue that good work in the years ahead.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hall follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Ralph Hall
Good morning and welcome to today's hearing entitled ``NASA's
Commercial Crew Development Program: Accomplishments and Challenges.''
I'd like to thank our many witnesses for taking time from their busy
schedules to appear before our Committee. I realize considerable effort
goes into the drafting and writing of statements, and I want you to
know that your testimony, wisdom, and experience will be of invaluable
help to our Committee and Congress as we deliberate in the months ahead
on issues related to NASA and its Commercial Crew Program. I would like
to note for the Members of the Committee that one company, Blue Origin,
has received $14.9 million in Federal funds under this program but
declined to testify today-and, I have declined to subpoena them.
Today's hearing will provide aerospace companies and NASA an
opportunity to testify about progress being made toward the goal of
establishing a purely commercial capability to fly humans to and from
low Earth orbit, with an initial emphasis on ferrying NASA astronauts
to the International Space Station.
Some have described the Commercial Crew Program as a variation on
the way NASA has traditionally managed our human space flight program,
implying that not much will change in the relationship between the
agency and aerospace companies in the acquisition and operation of
space vehicles. I find this characterization to be a gross over-
simplification that doesn't fairly represent the degree of changes
between the space launch industry and NASA, nor does it do anything to
highlight the uncertainties of the business model going forward.
I am not opposed to this new approach, but in the time remaining I
want to focus my remarks on the business case, as that is an area that
I would like to see discussed at greater length. If indeed industry can
perform safely and profitably, and at substantially less cost, then I
will be the first to congratulate them and NASA. My hesitance though,
is based on the very thin evidence provided to date by NASA that this
new business model is well understood and that it can succeed. I have
yet to be convinced that there is a sufficient commercial market that
will sustain multiple private, for-profit commercial crew companies
through the duration of America's commitment to the International Space
Station. NASA seemingly takes the position of `build it and they will
come'; that by starting these companies first, business will soon
follow.
Some say the business case is not very compelling, at least for
those companies intending on using NASA as an anchor customer. Assuming
two commercial companies will be certified by the end of 2016, at two
flights a year for four years based on NASA's projections, government
may need only eight flights. That's four flights per company, probably
at a rate of one a year. The number may grow if ISS is extended, but
there's no guarantee. Four flights to recover some significant portion
of sunk investment, coupled with the goal to price the service at a
rate that doesn't dwarf the cost now charged by Russia, suggests to me
a perilous business proposition. I think that NASA owes Congress and
the laudable companies that are before us today a much more thorough
assessment of the situation ahead. These companies have invested
millions of dollars and Congress has committed millions more--it is
time for NASA to deliver credible plans and analysis so that we can
move forward with more confidence.
What I do not want to see happen is putting government in the
position of stepping in to salvage one or several failing companies in
order to preserve a national capability. Many of us are well aware of
the debacle that confronted the Air Force with its EELV program, and
this committee is not prepared to let NASA repeat that mistake. To
paraphrase my friend and former Chairman of this Committee, Bart
Gordon, I don't want to find ourselves at some future time throwing
additional sums in this program because the commercial launch companies
are `too important to fail.'
For all my seeming skepticism, I am willing to be convinced that
I'm wrong, and I hope I'm wrong. I want the private markets to relieve
NASA of the cost and burden of building a new launch system for low
Earth orbit. But as I said a minute ago, NASA must do more to address
these important questions, and it's our role as the Committee of
jurisdiction to ensure that whatever path we ultimately take,
government's investment will be well understood and well spent.
In a time of constrained budgets, we must first protect our
presence in space and keep the faith with the American people and our
foreign partners. Logically, we cannot expend vast sums of money today
going to Mars when our people can't even go to the grocery store. But,
we must keep the dream alive by moving forward as we are able. That is
why it is vitally important that we spend our limited NASA dollars
wisely.
I want to offer thanks again to our witnesses. I greatly admire the
achievements of you and your companies. It is undeniable that aerospace
has directly contributed to this country's greatness and our
preeminence in space, and all of us must work to ensure you have the
missions and resources to continue that good work in the years ahead.
Chairman Hall. The Chair now recognizes Ranking Member Mrs.
Johnson for her five minutes, which could be 10. You have the
time that you choose to use, Ms. Johnson.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much, Mr. Hall, and good
morning. I would like to join Chairman Hall in welcoming all of
our witnesses this morning. The companies appearing before us
are doing exciting work, and they are a great example of
American industry's capacity for innovation. Today's hearing is
a unique opportunity to hear from each of them, or each of you,
about their accomplishments and aspirations and the challenges
they face, and I look forward to the testimony.
However, I want to be clear from the outset. I cannot let
my enthusiasm for entrepreneurial innovation override my
responsibility as a Member of Congress to take a clearheaded
look at the issues associated with NASA's commercial crew
proposal. And it is clear that there are many issues that need
to be addressed and questions that NASA still has not answered
more than a year and a half after the initiative was first
announced. In my opening remarks, I will focus on two of the
issues that need our attention: priorities and risk.
Let me first say a few words about the issue of priorities.
Given the cuts that are being made and contemplated to NASA's
and our other federal agencies' important missions as well as
to essential services for the most vulnerable in our society, I
have got to be convinced that the benefits of NASA's commercial
crew proposal outweigh the costs before I can be comfortable in
supporting it.
What are the benefits? As NASA and others have described
them, they are several-fold. First, Commercial Crew would
reduce, but not eliminate, dependence on Russia for
International Space Station-related goods and services. NASA
estimates that the cost to the U.S. government to purchase
Russian crew transportation and rescue services would be about
$450 million a year from 2016 to 2020, or a total of about $1.8
billion for those four years.
Second, NASA and others have argued that the commercial
crew initiative will help create a new commercial crew space
transportation industry with a wide range of public and private
customers, thus lowering costs and allowing NASA to focus on
deep space exploration.
What are the costs of the initiative? Last week, NASA's
Deputy Administrator was quoted as saying that ``we have an
analysis that says we believe we would require $6 billion over
five years'' to develop the commercial crew systems. I have to
take the Deputy Administrator at her word, as NASA still has
not provided Congress with the basis for its commercial crew
budget requests since the initiative was first announced almost
two years ago, though I find it unsettling that the $6 billion
estimate is almost $2 billion more than the amount actually
book-kept for Commercial Crew in the NASA five-year budget plan
that was submitted to Congress in February of this year.
Now, that $6 billion is just to develop the systems.
Perhaps we will hear otherwise today, but all of the
information provided by NASA to date indicates that it believes
that the U.S. commercial crew systems will be competitive with
the Russian Soyuz in price per seat but not significantly
cheaper. So, at this point it looks like NASA will still be
paying roughly the same amount to commercial crew providers
through 2020 that it would be to the Russians.
So as a result, I and other Members will have to decide
whether it is worth paying a $6 billion premium in taxpayer
dollars in order to make a domestic ISS commercial crew
capability available to replace the Russian system for a four-
year period, assuming the U.S. commercial crew systems are
certified operational by 2016. Now I would rather not pay money
to the Russians either, but I will find it very hard to justify
to my constituents spending an extra $6 billion to transport
our astronauts to the ISS for a limited amount of time unless I
can also credibly argue that doing so will open up a broad new
competitive market in commercial crew transportation for
American industry. Unfortunately, based on the information
provided by NASA and others to date, I can't make that
argument.
The only potential non-NASA markets of any significance
identified by NASA for the foreseeable future are a small
number of super-wealthy individuals seeking adventure trips,
provided the price is right, and a small number of non-U.S.
astronauts, provided their countries are willing to pay for
their trips. I will be frank: I don't think that the prospect
of spending $6 billion in taxpayer dollars to enable either
super-rich tourists or non-U.S. astronauts to fly into orbit is
going to be seen as a worthwhile priority by very many of my
constituents in the current fiscal environment, and I have a
feeling that many of my fellow Members will also find that to
be the case.
Let me close by saying a few words about risk. I am not
talking about risk to our astronauts, because I have to believe
that NASA will not put any of our astronauts on a commercial
system until it is convinced that NASA's safety standards have
been met. Instead, what I am talking about is the risk to the
U.S. government and the American taxpayer. That risk takes
several forms. For example, there is the risk that the cost and
schedule assumptions behind NASA's plans will not prove valid.
As it is, even if the President's commercial crew budget
request is approved in total, NASA's latest acquisition roadmap
projections indicate that any contract for commercial crew
transportation services to the ISS won't start until 2017,
which is almost two years later than originally estimated. NASA
cautions that even that date could slip further depending on
funding and the rate of progress made by the companies. Thus
the likelihood that the commercial systems will be able to meet
a significant portion of ISS crew transportation needs prior to
2020 is shrinking, and that is a risk to the viability of
NASA's proposal that I find worrisome.
That risk is also one reason we mandated in the NASA
Authorization Act of 2010 that NASA needs to put a credible
government backup capacity--capability in place as soon as
possible to support the ISS operations if needed.
And finally, if a public-private partnership is to protect
both the interests of the taxpayers and the companies, cost
risks need to be shared. However, NASA officials indicate that,
on average, 9 out of every 10 dollars spent to develop the
commercial crew systems will be taxpayer money. In addition,
unless we hear otherwise today, the would-be commercial
providers have indicated that they expect the government to
indemnify them in the event of an accident. That may or may not
be good public policy, but unless there is sufficient private
insurance coverage available to them to cover at least part of
their potential accident liability, the reality is that the
government may well be on the hook for the entire amount, at
risk--or risk losing the company that it is relying on, we are
relying on to get NASA's crews to and from the ISS.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, none of the issues I have
raised here should take away from the good work that the
companies represented at this hearing are doing. I applaud
their efforts and wish them well. I certainly plan to keep an
open mind regarding NASA's commercial crew initiative, and I
hope that NASA will provide all of the information and analyses
Congress will need to properly evaluate this initiative.
However, as Members of Congress, we must be vigilant
stewards of the taxpayers' dollars, and we cannot let either
enthusiasm nor hope blind us to that responsibility as we
assess NASA's proposals.
I thank you, and I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ranking Member Eddie Bernice Johnson
Good morning. I would like to join Chairman Hall in welcoming all
of our witnesses to this morning's hearing. The companies appearing
before us are doing exciting work, and they are a great example of
American industry's capacity for innovation. Today's hearing is a
unique opportunity to hear from each of them about their
accomplishments, their aspirations, and the challenges they face. I
look forward to their testimony.
However, I want to be clear from the outset. I cannot let my
enthusiasm for entrepreneurial innovation override my responsibility as
a Member of Congress to take a clearheaded look at the issues
associated with NASA's commercial crew proposal.
And it's clear that there are many issues that need to be addressed
and questions that NASA still has not answered more than a year and a
half after the initiative was first announced. In my opening remarks, I
will focus on two of the issues that need our attention: priorities and
risk.
Let me first say a few words about the issue of priorities. Given
the cuts that are being made and contemplated to NASA's and our other
federal agencies' important missions--as well as to essential services
for the most vulnerable in our society--I've got to be convinced that
the benefits of NASA's commercial crew proposal outweigh the costs
before I can be comfortable supporting it.
What are the benefits? As NASA and others have described them, they
are severalfold.
First, commercial crew would reduce--but not eliminate--dependence
on Russia for International Space Station-related goods and services.
NASA estimates that the cost to the U.S. government to purchase Russian
crew transportation and rescue services would be about $450 million a
year from 2016 to 2020, or a total of about $1.8 billion for those four
years.
Second, NASA and others have argued that the commercial crew
initiative will help create a new commercial crew space transportation
industry with a wide range of private and public customers, thus
lowering costs and allowing NASA to focus on deep space exploration.
What are the costs of the initiative? Last week, NASA's Deputy
Administrator was quoted as saying that ``we have an analysis that says
we believe we would require $6 billion over five years'' to develop the
commercial crew systems.
I have to take the Deputy Administrator at her word, as NASA still
has not provided Congress with the basis for its commercial crew budget
requests since the initiative was first announced almost two years
ago--though I find it unsettling that the $6 billion estimate is almost
$2 billion more than the amount actually bookkept for commercial crew
in the NASA five-year budget plan that was submitted to Congress in
February of this year.
Now that $6 billion is just to develop the systems. Perhaps we will
hear otherwise today, but all of the information provided by NASA to
date indicates that it believes that the U.S. commercial crew systems
will be ``competitive'' with the Russian Soyuz in price per seat but
not significantly cheaper. So, at this point it looks like NASA will
still be paying roughly the same amount to commercial crew providers
through 2020 that it would be to the Russians.
As a result, I and other Members will have to decide whether it is
worth paying a $6 billion premium in taxpayer dollars in order to have
a domestic ISS commercial crew capability available to replace the
Russian system for a four-year period--assuming the U.S. commercial
crew systems are certified operational by 2016. Now I would rather not
pay money to the Russians either, but I will find it very hard to
justify to my constituents spending an extra $6 billion to transport
our astronauts to the ISS for a limited amount of time unless I can
also credibly argue that doing so will open up a broad new competitive
market in commercial crew transportation for American industry.
Unfortunately, based on the information provided by NASA and others
to date, I can't make that argument.
The only potential non-NASA markets of any significance identified
by NASA for the foreseeable future are a small number of super-wealthy
individuals seeking adventure trips--provided the price is right, and a
small number of non-U.S. astronauts--provided their countries are
willing to pay for their trips.
I will be frank--I don't think that the prospect of spending six
billion taxpayer dollars to enable either super-rich tourists or non-
U.S. astronauts to fly into orbit is going to be seen as a worthwhile
priority by very many of my constituents in the current fiscal
environment, and I have a feeling that many of my fellow Members will
also find that to be the case.
Let me close by saying a few words about risk. I'm not talking
about risk to our astronauts, because I have to believe that NASA will
not put any of our astronauts on a commercial system until it is
convinced that NASA's safety standards have been met.
Instead, what I am talking about is the risk to the U.S. government
and the American taxpayer. That risk takes several forms. For example,
there is the risk that the cost and schedule assumptions behind NASA's
plans will not prove valid. As it is, even if the President's
commercial crew budget request is approved in total, NASA's latest
acquisition roadmap projections indicate that any contract for
commercial crew transportation services to the ISS won't start until
2017, which is almost two years later than originally estimated.
NASA cautions that even that date could slip further depending on
funding and the rate of progress made by the companies. Thus the
likelihood that the commercial systems will be able to meet a
significant portion of ISS crew transportation needs prior to 2020 is
shrinking, and that's a risk to the viability of NASA's proposal that I
find worrisome.
That risk is also one reason we mandated in the NASA Authorization
Act of 2010 that NASA needs to put a credible government backup
capability in place as soon as possible to support ISS operations if
needed.
Finally, if a public-private partnership is to protect both the
interests of the taxpayers and the companies, cost risk needs to be
shared. However, NASA officials indicate that, on average, nine out of
every ten dollars spent to develop the commercial crew systems will be
taxpayer dollars. In addition, unless we hear otherwise today, the
would-be commercial providers have indicated that they expect the
government to indemnify them in the event of an accident.
That may or may not be good public policy, but unless there is
sufficient private insurance coverage available to them to cover at
least part of their potential accident liability, the reality is that
the government may well be on the hook for the entire amount--or risk
losing the company that it is relying on to get NASA's crews to and
from the ISS.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, none of the issues I have raised here
should take away from the good work that the companies represented at
this hearing are doing. I applaud their efforts and wish them well. I
certainly plan to keep an open mind regarding NASA's commercial crew
initiative, and I hope that NASA will provide all of the information
and analyses Congress will need to properly evaluate that
initiative.However, as Members of Congress, we must be vigilant
stewards of the taxpayers' dollars, and we cannot let either enthusiasm
or hope blind us to that responsibility as we assess NASA's
proposals.Thank you, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Hall. I thank the gentlelady for yielding back,
and I thank you for a statement well done and I thank you as my
neighbor in Texas.
If there are Members who want to submit additional separate
opening statements, your statements will be added to the record
at this point.
Chairman Hall. And I say to the witnesses and those who are
important to this transaction, don't be dismayed by the empty
chairs because we are at a critical time in this Congress and
the world knows it and we all know it, and you as business
leaders know it. Most of these men and women who are not here
have other committee assignments and they are attending those,
but all of this is of record. They will have it. It will be
read and it will be here for people 200 years from now to read
what this Committee said and what questions this group asked.
So I will ask you to indulge with it.
At this time I would like to introduce, first, our panel of
witnesses. Our first witness is Mr. John Elbon, Vice President
and General Manager for Space Exploration at the Boeing
Company. Previously, Mr. Elbon led Boeing's effort as a Prime
Integration Contractor for the International Space Station. He
has been the Boeing Program Manager for several NASA programs
including Constellation and the checkout assembling and payload
processing services contract at Kennedy Space Center, and we
thank you, sir, for coming.
Our second witness is Steve Lindsey, the Director of Space
Exploration at Sierra Nevada Space Systems. Mr. Lindsey came to
Sierra Nevada this year after a distinguished 24-year career in
the United States Air Force. As a NASA astronaut, he has flown
five shuttle missions, his last two flights as commander
including STS-133 that flew earlier this year, and we certainly
welcome you.
Our third witness is Mr. Elon Musk, Chief Executive Officer
and Chief Technology Officer of Space Exploration Technologies,
also known as SpaceX. Mr. Musk has many accomplishments. He is
also the CEO and Product Architect of the electric car company
Tesla Motors and the Nonexecutive Chairman of Solar City.
Previously, Mr. Musk cofounded PayPal. We are very delighted to
have you here. And because your Congressman has been very proud
of your accomplishments, I am going to leave my last 2 minutes
for him to say a few kind words about you. He has paid me good
money to let him do this.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, there is a lot of good words to be
said about each and every one of our panelists today. All of
you are people that I admire. You are in keeping with the
American tradition of enterprise and technology, perhaps going
all the way back to the clipper ships when people wanted to do
business and designed ships and sailed off to distant shores,
and we had the best ships of any country in the world, but
today you all reflect those type of values.
Elon Musk, who I am going to say a few good words about
now, Elon is a native South African who is now a proud
American, and as you can see, as the Chairman just noted, he is
involved in the development of electric cars as well as been
involved in PayPal, which has enabled all of us to go into debt
over the Internet.
Chairman Hall. Your time is almost up.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So, let me just note that we are watching
all of your accomplishments and especially you, Mr. Musk. Thank
you for the 1,500 employees that you represent and everyone on
this panel represents people who are employed and people who
are getting something done by furthering America's tradition of
enterprise and technology. Thank you very much.
Chairman Hall. Thank you, and Mr. Flores is at another
committee hearing at this time. He wanted to be here to help
with the introduction.
Our fourth witness on this first panel is Mr. Charlie
Precourt, Vice President of Launch Systems Group of Alliant
TechSystems, also known as ATK. Prior to joining ATK, Mr.
Precourt also had a very distinguished 23-year career with the
United States Air Force as an F-15 pilot and was a commander as
a NASA astronaut, having flown on four shuttle missions
including two as mission commander, and we are really delighted
to have you here.
Our final witness on the first panel is Dr. George Sowers,
Vice President in Business Development and Advanced Programs
for United Launch Alliance. Dr. Sowers has a 30-year history
working with America's most successful launch vehicles
beginning with the Titan program and now with the Atlas V and
Delta IV rockets. Welcome, Dr. Sowers.
As our witnesses need to know, spoken testimony is limited
to five minutes, and after all the witness have spoken, Members
of the Committee will have five minutes each to ask questions.
We will try to stay with that five minutes if we can, but for
the sacrifices you have made and for the input that you surely
have and for the importance you are to this Committee, to this
Congress and to this Nation, if you go over five minutes,
nothing is going to happen. We don't have a hook or anything,
but we do want you to fully explain your presence here and your
hopes and desires and your history and your future.
I recognize our first witness on the first panel, Mr. John
Elbon of Boeing, to present his testimony.
STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN ELBON, VICE PRESIDENT AND
GENERAL MANAGER FOR SPACE EXPLORATION, THE BOEING COMPANY,
HOUSTON, TEXAS
Mr. Elbon. Good morning, Chairman Hall, Ranking Member
Johnson, Members of the Committee. On behalf of the Boeing
Company, I wish to convey my deepest gratitude for your
continued support of human spaceflight. Your efforts have
enabled a safe fly-out of the space shuttle, completion of the
International Space Station, and established a path forward for
human exploration of space. Without your Committee's support,
none of these achievements would have been possible. It is an
honor to be a participant with this distinguished panel to
elaborate on Boeing's development status to support reducing
the gap in U.S. crewed access to the International Space
Station.
Mr. Chairman, if it is okay, I have got a video I would
like to show to begin with.
Chairman Hall. Without objection. We want to see it.
[Video playback.]
Mr. Elbon. There are three cornerstones of NASA's path
forward for human spaceflight: utilization of the International
Space Station, commercial crew for transportation to low Earth
orbit and development of a capability for human exploration
beyond low Earth orbit. By providing affordable crew
transportation to the International Space Station, commercial
crew will increase utilization of this on-orbit laboratory and
free up funding and resources for NASA to focus on exploration
beyond low Earth orbit. Because of this relationship,
commercial crew should not be viewed as a competitor with deep
space exploration programs but instead as a complementary
program that contributes to achieving NASA's overall
objectives.
In selecting a design for commercial crew, Boeing adopted
three overarching principles. We would focus on transporting
crew to low Earth orbiting platforms only so the vehicle
capabilities could be kept as simple as possible. We would use
as much off-the-shelf proven technology as possible in order to
reduce the development risk and improve cost and schedule
certainty, and our design would be as uncomplicated as
practical to improve reliability and safety and to enable low
operations cost. To date in our program, we have completed
several significant design milestones and development tests.
Looking forward, prior to the completion of the second
phase of commercial crew development in June of next year, we
will mature the design of the complete integrated system, which
includes the spacecraft, launch vehicle and ground systems
through a preliminary design review, perform a parachute drop
test from a helicopter ending with a touchdown on deployed
airbags, integrate the emergency monitoring system of the Atlas
V with the avionics of the Crew Space Transportation system,
CST-100, to demonstrate the required data communication in the
event of a launch abort, and test-fire a new, lighter-weight
version of the abort engine.
Assuming we are selected by NASA for the next procurement
phases and that adequate funding is available and we complete
our critical design review, the 90 percent point in the design
process by the spring of 2013 and perform an ascent test later
that year. We also are planning on flying three flight tests,
which will culminate with the launch of two Boeing test pilots
in 2015, leading to the capability to fly to the International
Space Station by late 2015.
Human spaceflight is challenging and any program to develop
a capability to transport humans in space must address these
challenges. We have been transporting humans into earth orbit
in capsules for nearly 50 years using design and technologies
that are proven. We have reduced the technical challenges of
the program to manageable levels.
There are two significant challenges that remain from
Boeing's perspective, and they are programmatic in nature. The
first is stable funding. If we are to achieve an operational
capability by 2015, adequate funding levels must be provided
over the next four years.
The second is addressing liability risk associated with the
potential for accidents that result in damage to property or in
death or injury to crew members or passengers. Although the
likelihood of these occurrences is extremely low, the losses
would be tragic and the potential monetary consequences could
be high. With limited performance history, it will be difficult
for industry to insure against these monetary losses at
reasonable rates. As such, in order to close the business case,
it will be necessary for NASA, the FAA and Congress to work
together to provide indemnification and liability limitations.
With regards to the size of the potential market, it is
clear that there is a commercial market for transportation to
low Earth orbit. The depth of these markets is uncertain,
though, and a responsible business case cannot be closed on the
commercial business alone. Our business case assumes only NASA-
purchased transportation to the International Space Station and
treats revenue from private spaceflight participants and
commercial transportation to Bigelow Space Complex is upside.
The commercial crew market would not be as attractive as it
is if NASA were the only potential customer, but at the same
time to ensure a successful venture, we must be certain we can
have a viable business based on NASA flights alone. This is
important from the government's perspective as well. It
shouldn't be necessary for the government to gamble on the
development of a commercial market in order to ensure a viable
business will be in place to meet its needs for transportation
to the International Space Station.
In closing, commercial-provided transportation to low Earth
orbit is the right solution for enabling a complete and robust
portfolio of NASA programs in science and human spaceflight.
The risks in flying spacecraft to low Earth orbit are well
understood. We have been completing successful low Earth orbit
missions since John Glenn's historic flight in 1962. It is time
to leverage the efficiencies of a different model for the
relationship between NASA and contractors for the part of space
exploration where the risk levels warrant it. Commercial
transportation to low Earth orbit supports lower cost
utilization of the International Space Station and makes
additional funding available for human exploration beyond low
Earth orbit.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Elbon follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mr. John Elbon, Vice President and General
Manager for Space Exploration, The Boeing Company, Houston, TX
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Hall. I thank you. And once again, I will stress
the importance of your offerings here and your service here.
Heretofore back in September, we had Neil Armstrong, Gene
Cernan and General Tom Stafford here all day. We kept them from
early one morning until late at night, and anyone that says
Neil Armstrong is not generous with his time or won't sign
things for people, he did all day that day for us. That was
very important, and Buzz Aldrin would be here today but he had
a schedule problem, but he has been before this Committee a lot
of times. So we value you. You all are very, very important to
the future of NASA and help us work out the problem that we are
faced with.
I now recognize Steve Lindsey to present his testimony, and
thank you, John.
STATEMENT OF MR. STEVEN LINDSEY,
DIRECTOR OF SPACE EXPLORATION, SIERRA NEVADA
SPACE SYSTEMS, LOUISVILLE, COLORADO
Colonel Lindsey. Thank you, Chairman Hall, Ranking Member
Johnson and Members of the Committee for this opportunity to
present Sierra Nevada's perspective on the Commercial Crew
Program. Mr. Chairman, I have submitted a complete written
statement that I would ask to be made part of the record.
I have only recently joined Sierra Nevada after serving for
24 years in the United States Air Force and 16 years in NASA,
where I had the opportunity to fly on five space shuttle
missions including commanding the final flight of Discovery
this past February. What I would like to address this morning
is who Sierra Nevada is and what we are doing as part of NASA's
Commercial Crew Development Program. Sierra Nevada Corporation
is a proven systems integrator, electronic systems and space
systems provider with a reputation for rapid, innovative and
agile technology solutions. We employ a highly talented staff
of over 2,200 people, mostly engineers, scientists or technical
personnel serving in six business areas across 20 states. Our
strong financial track record and stable leadership structure
are key elements in the successful yearly execution of hundreds
of government aerospace contracts.
We are currently in our sixth year of the development of a
human-rated lifting body spaceflight, and you can see the model
here in front of me, called the Dream Chaser. The Heritage
Dream Chaser design evolved from the NASA Langley Research
Center's HL-20 spaceflight, which was originally designed as a
lifeboat for the International Space Station. Langley performed
more than 1,200 wind tunnel tests and performed thousands of
piloted simulations in its decade-long investment refining
their design. Sierra Nevada started with Langley's ten years of
research and has invested an additional six years of capital,
engineering, time and effort to develop a very sophisticated,
reusable space plane that can satisfy NASA's low Earth orbit
needs.
Sierra Nevada has assembled a world-class team of
spaceflight-experienced partners to execute the Dream Chaser
program including Boeing, United Launch Alliance, Aerojet and
nine other U.S. companies. In addition, we have formed a unique
industry-to-government partnership where we are funding seven
NASA centers to provide expert assistance in designing and
developing our spaceflight. This superb team of experienced
space companies and NASA centers employing aerospace workers
across 13 states and growing allows us to rapidly develop our
space system to provide a cost-effective and safe way to
transport people to and from low Earth orbit.
Sierra Nevada's Dream Chaser program has been a part of
NASA's Commercial Crew Program for the past four years. During
CCDev1, we completed all technical and performance milestones
on time and under budget, going well beyond the original
contract and completing several additional unfunded milestones.
We have completed the first four milestones of CCDev2 on time
and on budget with the fifth to be completed tomorrow.
While every human-rated spaceflight in our Nation's history
has in fact been built by a commercial company, there are some
subtle differences between today's program and previous ones.
Under the current program, the contractual mechanisms are the
Space Act agreement, a fixed-price, pay-for-performance,
milestone-based program. If we don't stay on schedule or meet
our milestones, then we aren't paid. Companies are expected to
contribute financially to the program and in fact Sierra Nevada
has invested heavily in the Dream Chaser. This contracting
mechanism is a cost-effective way for the government to retire
technology development risk in mature and integrated design. In
the next phase of the program, Sierra Nevada understands the
government's need for greater oversight and looks forward to
working with NASA under a tailored FAR-based contract.
The interaction between NASA and Sierra Nevada has evolved
into a very unique partnership. NASA provides us spacecraft
requirements which we have to meet or NASA simply won't
contract for our services. To accomplish both the oversight and
insight function, NASA has embedded a partner integration team
of spaceflight experts directly into our company to provide a
true inside view of our day-to-day operations. They participate
in every aspect of our program, providing complete government
insight into our design, development and testing. This approach
is very effective, requiring less oversight due to the
extraordinary level of insight.
Mr. Chairman, to conclude my remarks, I would like to talk
a little bit about safety. While at NASA, I had the privilege
to serve as Chief of the Astronaut Office for over three years
overseeing the final servicing mission of the Hubble and the
completion of the International Space Station. As Chief, my
number one responsibility was the safety of my crews, and under
my watch, we successfully executed 14 space shuttle missions
and 10 space station missions, each time bringing our crews
home safely. I made the difficult decision just a few months
ago to leave 30-plus years of government service to come to
Sierra Nevada. Why? Because I believe that access to space is
vital to our national interests and I want to do everything in
my power to get our Nation back into low Earth orbit as soon as
possible. Let me assure all of you that under my watch, we will
never, ever sacrifice safety for any reason. With our industry
partners and NASA's guidance, we will do the job right. The
space station is waiting and the clock is ticking. I strongly
encourage this Committee and the Congress to fully support and
fund NASA's Commercial Crew Program.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to share my
views this morning.
[The prepared statement of Colonel Lindsey follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mr. Steve Lindsey, Director of Space Exploration,
Sierra Nevada Space Systems, Louisville, CO
Thank you, Chairman Hall, Ranking Member Johnson and Members of the
Committee for this opportunity to present Sierra Nevada's perspective
on the Commercial Crew Program.
Sierra Nevada Corporation (SNC)
Before addressing the questions you asked in your invitation letter
directly, I'd like to provide you with a brief description of Sierra
Nevada Corporation to indirectly answer how the depth and breadth of
our company provide us with the capabilities necessary to develop a
human-rated spacecraft for our Nation. Sierra Nevada Corporation (SNC)
is a proven systems integrator, electronic systems and space systems
provider with a reputation for rapid, innovative, and agile technology
solutions. As a 100% U.S., privately held, woman-owned and operated
business, SNC has been under the current ownership since 1993. It
employs a highly talented staff of over 2,200 people, mostly engineers,
scientists, or technical personnel. Our seven business areas have
operations in 20 states. SNC has a very solid financial foundation and
an uninterrupted profitable growth history with no long-term debt.
SNC's strong financial track record and stable leadership structure are
a key element in the successful yearly execution of hundreds of
government contracts. SNC holds one of the highest possible Dunn &
Bradstreet rating scores.
Sierra Nevada Corporation is currently in our sixth year of
development of a human-rated spacecraft called the Dream Chaser Space
System. The SNC team has invested a substantial amount of capital,
engineering, time and effort to develop the technologies that support
our Dream Chaser spacecraft. These technologies and expertise include
hybrid propulsion systems, complex composite structures, airframe
design, spacecraft components, adapter rings, navigation and control,
life support, and integrated system design and testing capabilities.
This previous work and our continuing NASA partnership will
significantly lower development time and risk, and will help to ensure
program success.
SNC has also assembled a world-class team of spaceflight
experienced partners to execute the Dream Chaser Space System program.
Boeing Experimental Systems Group has great expertise in lifting body
spacecraft including analysis, avionics, Guidance, Navigation, and
Control software, and flight control. Their recent X-37 spacecraft
experience fits perfectly with our Dream Chaser development and risk
reduction activities. United Launch Alliance (ULA) has been on our team
for more than five years. jointly collaborating on an integrated launch
vehicle that rapidly brings a safe, reliable, and cost-effective
commercial Crew Transportation System to the Low Earth Orbit market.
ULA is assisting SNC with integrated aerodynamics and risk retirement.
Aerojet, a propulsion leader, is developing the main Reaction Control
System. Draper Lab, with unparalleled GN&C experience, is leading
orbital Guidance Navigation &Control development. NASA's Langley
Research Center adds expertise in HL-20 analysis and modeling, while
NASA's Dryden Flight Research Center adds flight test expertise for our
extensive flight test program. In fact, we are using the expertise from
seven NASA Centers to ensure we are building the best spacecraft
possible. AdamWorks is assisting SNC in structural fabrication using
our combined composite manufacturing capabilities. The University of
Colorado is applying young minds to conduct displays and controls
layout and evaluations and refine the integrated system Human Rating
Plan, with assistance from Special Aerospace Services. United Space
Alliance is using their extensive Space Shuttle experience to provide
operations and software development support. SNC and Virgin Galactic
are working together to plan for global marketing, sales, and
commercial operation of the orbital Dream Chaser. In addition to
coordinating and managing the team, SNC manages all internal systems,
propulsion, structure, Launch Vehicle integration, and systems
engineering. This superb team of experienced space companies allows us
to use heritage hardware and software to rapidly develop our space
system and provide a cost effective and safe way to transport people to
and from low Earth orbit.
Dream Chaser Space System
Our primary Dream Chaser Space System goals are to safely,
reliably, and cost effectively transport crew to the International
Space Station and return to a hard surface runway. The heritage Dream
Chaser design evolved from the NASA Langley Research Center's HL-20,
which was originally derived from the Russian BOR-4 orbital test
vehicle that flew 4 orbital flights. Langley performed more than 1,200
wind tunnel tests, wrote 60 journal papers and NASA contractor reports,
and performed thousands of piloted simulations in its decade-long
investment refining HL-20 aerodynamics, performance, and controls. To
take advantage of the orbital flight and wind tunnel heritage, SNC
retained the HL-20 design center of gravity limits and outer mold line,
but made significant upgrades in composite structures so as to take
advantage of modern construction techniques and materials and we
incorporated a new safer, more operable, flexible propulsion
capability. Bottomline, SNC consolidated the fragmented HL-20
aerodynamic data, filled in the database gaps with significant
additional analysis, and have designed a very sophisticated reusable
space plane that can satisfy NASA's low Earth orbit needs.
The Dream Chaser vehicle features a reusable, piloted lifting body
design capable of transporting two to seven persons and pressurized
cargo. Dream Chaser orbital missions are launched on an extremely
reliable Atlas V 402 booster rocket and return to land on a
conventional runway. The baseline launch site is Kennedy Space Center
and the baseline landing site is the Shuttle Landing Facility. But, The
Dream Chaser is designed to be able to reach and land on any 10,000
foot hard surface runway for any nominal or abort landing. The DC is
almost entirely reusable, with exception of some propulsion system
components and the chemical batteries. Post-flight Dream Chaser
spacecraft refurbishment and launch processing will occur at the
Kennedy Space Center prior to re-flight certification.
The Dream Chaser spacecraft has the capability for launch pad abort
and intact ascent aborts from any point on its trajectory to hard
surface runways. The Dream Chaser spacecraft's > 1,100 nautical mile
cross-range capability is significantly better than the typical capsule
cross range. Every-orbit deorbit to runway landing capability exists
for emergencies and there is sufficient cross range to accommodate
multiple daily Continental U.S. runway landing opportunities. Low 1.5 g
entry loads are considerably less than those experienced by capsules
during reentry which allows Dream Chaser to have large down-mass
capability for g-sensitive science experiments and touchdown shock is
far lower than capsule loads which can be as high as 15 g's for water
landing (e.g., Apollo 12 and 15). These reduced loads lessen the
possibility that a vehicle will require post-mission repair for re-
flight. Runway landings avoid expensive ship-based recovery and salt
water exposure.
We selected the reliable Atlas V launch vehicle specifically for
its heritage, demonstrated reliability, ability to human rate, and
compatibility with the DC spacecraft. This Nation has launched multi-
billion dollar national assets on the Atlas due to its reliability. The
Atlas has demonstrated 98 consecutive successes since 1993, including a
100% mission success record for all Atlas II, III, and V flights, with
all spacecraft reaching proper orbit.
After nominal orbital insertion, Dream Chaser is reconfigured for
orbital operations to support crew Flight Day 2 rendezvous and docking.
Orbit adjust is performed using the SNC-developed on-board hybrid
rocket motors and reaction control system. The hybrid motors are
improved versions of the successful SNC developed SpaceShipOne rocket
motors. This technology is also being used on the SpaceShipTwo program
resulting in extensive flight heritage and experience before our first
orbital flight. The DC is designed for 3.5 days of on-orbit loiter
without ISS docking. The DC is designed to dock to the NASA Docking
System (NDS) located at appropriate ISS docking locations.
The DC provides assured crew return capability while docked to the
ISS. DC can remain docked to ISS for extended periods (up to 210 days,
assuming the DC shares ISS cabin atmosphere while docked and receives
ISS power transfer to support battery trickle charge).
Dream Chaser Space System Accomplishments to Date
The following milestones were completed from December 2009 to
September 2010 during the Commercial Crew Development Program, Phase 1
contract (CCDev1):
Milestone 1: Program Implementation Plan Delivered. This included
management planning for design, development, testing, and evaluation
supplier engagement, risks and anticipated mitigations.
Milestone 2: Space Vehicle Manufacturing Review of Aeroshell
Tooling. This included manufacturing the aeroshell tooling, a review of
the aeroshell design, manufacturing plans, and readiness to begin
fabrication of the Dream Chaser's aeroshell.
Milestone 3: Space Vehicle Prime Motor Manufacture and Multiple
Restart Firings. This milestone include manufacture of and ground based
motor firings of a single hybrid motor with 3 restartable firings for a
minimum duration of 5 seconds for each firing, including one firing in
a vacuum condition.
Milestone 4: Space Vehicle Primary Structure Testing. In this
milestone the Dream Chaser's primary structure was designed,
fabricated, assembled, and tested to support landing gear and hybrid
motor thrust loads.
All milestones were completed on time and under budget.
In addition to these milestones, The Dream Chaser spacecraft went
through extensive aerodynamic, thermal protection system, guidance,
navigation, and control system analysis. We completed development of
our desktop simulator, completed extensive systems engineering,
developed a risk management plan, a human rating plan, and significant
program documentation to support further Dream Chaser development.
Since we finished our four milestones under budget during CCDev1
and because of our commitment to the success of this program, we added
multiple unfunded milestones. We designed, developed, and successfully
flight tested a scale model of the Dream Chaser spacecraft, dropped
from over 14,000 feet at the NASA Dryden Flight Research Center. This
flight test signaled the beginning of the atmospheric test program for
the Dream Chaser vehicle. We also developed our first simulator to
begin engineering development simulations, and built several mockups to
use for engineering development.
We are currently six months into the CCDev Phase 2 contract
(CCDev2). The following milestones have been completed (or are about to
be) in the CCDev2 program:
Milestone 1: System Requirements Review. Presented a briefing and
plan of the overall system requirements for the Dream Chaser Space
System.
Milestone 2: Canted Airfoil Fin Selection. Complete wind tunnel
tests and Computational Fluid Dynamics analysis on candidate airfoil
fin outer mold line and select final fin shape to ensure proper
aerodynamic performance of fins.
Milestone 3: Cockpit Based Flight Simulator. Complete fabrication
and assembly of cockpit structure, install simulator designs and
controls, and conduct a Simulator Readiness Review to verify readiness
for engineering and pilot evaluations.
Milestone 4: Vehicle Avionics Integration Laboratory (VAIL).
Design, manufacture, and integrate the VAIL to support testing,
verification, and validation of Dream Chaser avionics and software.
Once again, all completed milestones were finished on schedule and
under budget, with remaining funds being re-invested to accomplish
additional work to accelerate our program.
Remaining Milestones in CCDev2 and road to Critical Design Review
Milestone 5: System Definition Review. Conduct Dream Chaser
System Definition Review, which completes the first design cycle of the
Dream Chaser Space System architecture and design. This milestone will
be completed on Oct 27, 2011--on schedule.
Milestone 6: Flight Control Integration Laboratory. Design,
manufacture, and integrate the flight control integration laboratory to
begin developmental engineering tests of flight control actuators and
surfaces. Complete test hardware such that it is ready to support
Engineering Test Article flight control tests. This milestone will be
completed on Nov 17, 2011--on schedule.
Milestone 7: Engineering Test Article (ETA) Structure Delivery.
Complete assembly and deliver the ETA primary structure for start of
systems integration and installation of secondary structures. Scheduled
for completion in Dec. 2011.
Milestone 8: Separation System Test. Complete design and
construction of the prototype Dream Chaser separation system and
demonstrate activation to validate concept and verify performance of
the separation system. Scheduled for completion in Feb. 2012.
Milestone 9: Preliminary Design Review. Conduct Preliminary
Design Review of the Dream Chaser Space System. This review will
complete the second design cycle of Dream Chaser Space System.
Scheduled for completion in May 2012.
Milestone 10: Captive Carry Interface and ETA Landing Gear Drop
Tests. Complete fabrication of the ETA captive carry prototype
mechanism and perform release test to verify performance of system to
ensure readiness for captive carry. Perform drop test of ETA landing
gear to evaluate landing gear dynamic limit loads and landing load
attenuation capability to ensure adequate performance of landing gear.
Scheduled for completion in Jan. 2012.
Milestone 11: ETA Captive Carry Flight Test Readiness Review.
Complete Captive Carry Flight Test Readiness Review to verify ETA
readiness for captive carry testing. Scheduled for completion in March
2012.
Milestone 12: ETA Captive Carry Flight Test. Conduct ETA captive
carry flight test on carrier aircraft to characterize integrated
vehicle performance. Schedule for completion in April 2012
Milestone 13: ETA Free Flight Test. Conduct unpiloted ETA Free
Flight Test from carrier aircraft to characterize handling qualities
and approach and landing. Scheduled for completion in July 2012.
At the completion of the Preliminary Design Review in May of 2012,
the Dream Chaser team will begin Design Cycle 3, which will culminate
in our CDR (Critical Design review) in the mid to late 2013 timeframe.
During this design cycle, all systems will be matured through design,
analysis, building of flight-like hardware and extensive testing--
culminating in subsystem CDRs to support the overall system CDR. We
will build a Structural Test Article for further loads testing, and
continue test flights, both unpiloted and piloted in the Engineering
Test Article. Additionally, we will build our Suborbital Vehicle and
complete powered flight tests to validate and verify Guidance,
Navigation, and Control in the low supersonic region. The Suborbital
Vehicle flight test program will conclude with a Pad Abort test to
runway landing.
NASA's Commercial Crew Program: Procurement Strategy Challenges
A common question often asked about NASA's commercial crew program
is ``How can commercial companies build and provide spacecraft for crew
transportation in and out of low earth orbit?'' The answer to this
question is that commercial companies have been doing this for the past
50 years. Every single United States human-rated spacecraft has been
built by a commercial company. Companies such as McDonnell Aircraft
Company, prime contractor of the Mercury capsule, to Rockwell
International, builder of the Space Shuttle orbiter, to current
companies like Sierra Nevada which are today developing new crewed
spacecraft. Other spacecraft developed in the future for beyond earth
orbit missions will also be built by commercial companies.
So what's different about what we are doing when compared to
previous human-rated spacecraft programs? There are two primary
differences--the procurement mechanism, and how NASA and our companies
interact. Under the current Commercial Crew Development program, the
contractual mechanism is the Space Act Agreement--a fixed price, pay
for performance, milestone based program. Space Act Agreements are easy
to implement, easy to change, and easy to terminate. If companies don't
stay on schedule or milestones aren't met, then companies aren't paid.
Companies are also expected to contribute financially to the program.
Losses to the government for a non-performing company can by minimized
through the use of milestone-based payments, and cost overruns are
simply not possible. The next phase of the Commercial Crew Program is
planned to be a FAR based contract that will retain many of the good
things about SAAs, including fixed-price and milestone-based payments.
These types of contracting mechanisms are a cost effective way for the
government to retire technology development risk and mature an
integrated design.
Interaction between NASA and Sierra Nevada on our Space Act
Agreements has evolved into a very unique partnership. Typical
government interaction with commercial companies building spacecraft
involves providing guidance, receiving insight into our design, and
having oversight over our requirements. Guidance has been provided to
us by NASA in the form of spacecraft system requirements and
specifications, just as in traditional contracting approaches. We are
required, in the end, to meet those requirements and specifications or
NASA simply won't contract for our services. To accomplish the insight
function, NASA has embedded a `Partner Integration Team' of human
spaceflight experts directly into our company to provide a true inside
view of our day-to-day operations. They share offices with us and
attend all of our meetings, allowing complete government insight into
the development work we are doing. This has the dual advantage of
removing many of the burdensome day-to-day reporting requirements,
while at the same time providing our team with valuable government
advisors and consultants as we work together to build a new spacecraft.
Insight versus Oversight
In the next phase of the Commercial Crew Development Program, the
proposed contracting mechanism is a firm fixed price Federal
Acquisition Regulations-based contract. While the complexities of this
type of contract will be much greater than the current Space Act
Agreement milestone-based contract, the insight and oversight model
shouldn't change significantly for Sierra Nevada. During the current
CCDev2 contract, we have allowed complete NASA insight into our day to
day operations. NASA technical experts are embedded within all of our
design, development, and test teams--providing both expert advice to us
as well as critical insight to NASA's Commercial Crew Program. This
approach has proved to be very effective--requiring less oversight due
to the extraordinary level of insight.
The challenge with this next phase of the program will be to
balance oversight versus insight. For example, NASA should provide
oversight and direction in all cases where they see a need to improve
the safety of a spacecraft being developed for their use. However, that
does not mean that every technical change suggested by the government
should be accepted. If a change makes the design `better' but doesn't
impact safety, then the commercial company must have the leeway to
accept or reject the change, based on technical, cost, and/or schedule
considerations. This is where the partnership between NASA and a
commercial company that is truly responsible for the technical design
of a crewed spacecraft can make a huge difference--keeping costs and
schedule under control while at the same time developing the safest
spacecraft possible for the defined mission.
The future Low Earth Orbit commercial market
The SNC business case is strong. We have performed multiple
internal and external market research studies during our six-year Dream
Chaser program. We are developing multiple potential markets for our
Crew Transportation System, many of which are best serviced by a
lifting body such as ours. These markets are human transportation,
critical cargo transportation, orbital servicing, and orbital sensor
and testbed operations. Five primary client groups include: NASA and
other civil agencies, commercial space corporations, military agencies,
international markets, and tourism. NASA and crew transportation to ISS
will be the anchor tenant for Dream Chaser, but after an early start-up
period will not be the major revenue provider. SNC, through its
expanding operations expects to place hundreds of satellites in orbit
during the next few years and will become its own servicing client. All
of our markets are expected to grow substantially and are not limited
in time. SNC will develop a number of Dream Chaser vehicles from the
same platform, similar to an airplane platform like the 747 or C-130,
with each variant optimized for the specific mission. Virgin Galactic
recognizes the market for the DC and they have joined our team to begin
marketing and sales of orbital human transportation services.
A key advantage of the Dream Chaser is the ability to land on a
runway, allowing for many viable orbital and suborbital missions to be
accomplished. The spacecraft has substantial pressurized cargo down-
mass capability with low g reentry and runway landing at many landing
sites. It can be adapted from a full seven-person crew to two crew
members with increased cargo capacity to fully autonomous operations.
It is also scarred for potential future servicing Extra Vehicular
Activity capability and robotic manipulator use. Our low stress runway
landings will allow us to carry the greatest range of passengers, and
provide researchers with the best possible path for maintaining the
integrity of their experiments through a low-g return and quick access
to science samples. Our non-toxic propellants and runway landing
capability allow us to land at domestic and international locations
without special services. We are currently refining our business model
to capture variables such as market share, seat price, and launch
vehicle price while considering parameters such as turnaround time and
fleet size. This will allow evaluating the sensitivity to market and
technical factors.
We have a dedicated business development team who sell SNC space
services and products around the world. This team has relationships
with future customers who we periodically brief on our Dream Chaser
progress, receiving in return information on their needs and future
missions. Our relationship with Virgin Galactic will allow utilization
of its existing marketing infrastructure for the SpaceShipTwo program
to rapidly develop critical non-NASA global markets for the Dream
Chaser Space System.
Chairman Hall. And we thank you. And five words, on time
and under budget, are things we listen for. Thank you very
much.
I recognize Mr. Elon Musk for his statement.
STATEMENT OF MR. ELON MUSK,
CEO AND CHIEF TECHNOLOGY OFFICER,
SPACE EXPLORATION TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION,
HAWTHORNE, CALIFORNIA
Mr. Musk. Chairman Hall, Ranking Member Johnson and Members
of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to be here
today.
The American endeavor in space is uniquely inspirational,
and human spaceflight is one of the great achievements of
humankind. Although NASA only sent a handful of people to the
moon, in a sense we all went there vicariously. We shared in
the invention and profound achievement. Those are the things
that make life worth living.
The goal of SpaceX and our more than 1,500 employees is to
advance the course of space so that many more may experience
the great adventure of space exploration. I have to say, it is
actually not, as some may assume, to maximize profit. That is
why I have retained a majority ownership of the company to
ensure that the idealistic goals of SpaceX remain true.
We are very proud of our partnership with NASA, with whom
we share the success that we have achieved to date. SpaceX
would not have been able to get started without the work of
NASA nor would we have been able to achieve the point we have
achieved today without the great help of NASA. They are a
partner in the truest sense.
Soon we will see Dragon become the first commercial
spacecraft in history to deliver cargo to the space station,
and that may come as soon as January of next year.
Mr. Chairman, if I may show a small video?
Chairman Hall. Without objection.
[Video playback.]
Mr. Musk. This is not a simulation. That is the view that
an astronaut would have on our spacecraft.
I would like to focus on three areas: safety, affordability
and of course our partnership with NASA as it relates to
commercial crew. Safety is paramount. Safety is always first.
There is no more important responsibility than transporting the
heroes of America's astronaut corps into space. For many years,
Mr. Chairman, you have rightfully championed the development of
launch abort capabilities for astronauts in the event of a
launch failure. This is of critical importance. In fact, to
that end, our efforts on CCDev2 today have focused very heavily
on launch abort capabilities. In fact, later this year we
intend to demonstrate a launch abort engine, which I think will
be quite exciting.
Our focus on safety is reflected throughout the vehicle in
both the Falcon 9 launch vehicle and Dragon's basic designs.
Because our goal from day one has been to carry astronauts,
every design choice is made with crew in mind. In fact, Dragon
is fully equipped to handle crew habitation today since
astronauts will board Dragon while it is berthed with the space
station for our cargo resupply missions.
Our upcoming cargo missions will provide significant flight
experience on the Falcon 9 and Dragon systems so the first time
that astronauts fly will not be the first time that the
vehicles fly. In fact, they will have flown perhaps as many as
a dozen times before astronauts first step foot on our
spacecraft. We expect the launch vehicle to fly even more often
as we have over 35 missions under contract for our Falcon 9
launch vehicle.
With respect to the CCDev2 program itself, we are
leveraging our partnership with NASA to accelerate development
of our integrated launch abort system that flies with Dragon
throughout its mission and will for the first time provide
launch abort capability all the way to orbit. This has not been
the case with prior systems. NASA in fact recently approved our
preliminary design review of our launch abort system
components, so we have made some good progress in this
direction.
We believe we are on track to carry astronauts to the space
station in approximately three years. Of course, that does
depend to some degree on the funding that is allocated to
commercial crew, but we remain committed to the public
statement that I have been making for a while, which is that
within three years we will be able to carry astronauts to the
space station and do so safely.
It is good that NASA's effort for the third phase of
commercial crew development will be firm fixed price and
milestone-based. It is much better for the government to define
the standards and the ultimate goal than to actually do the
design itself. If you ask engineers to figure out a good
solution, tell them the goal rather than the method, and I
think that is a very good direction in that respect. I hope the
final RP4 commercial crew will indeed reflect the best aspects
of the public-private approach that has been employed under
COTS and CRS to date.
Second to safety and reliability as a competitive
commercial company, affordability is obviously extremely
important. This has been raised by Ranking Member Johnson as
well as Chairman Hall and many others. Because we have produced
by doing both cargo and crew with a vehicle that is
substantially similar, we are able to leverage the costs and
divide the costs over a larger number of missions. Instead of
it perhaps being over two missions per year, it is actually
going to be over six or even eight missions per year. This
allows for a dramatic reduction in costs while maintaining high
reliability. And of course, because our launch vehicle is being
used to fly many commercial satellites as well, there is an
even greater allocation of cost. Of the roughly $3 billion that
SpaceX has been awarded to date in contracts, only about half
is from NASA, so there is significant support from the private
sector. In fact, to this point it is over 50 percent in terms
of revenue. So this I think proves that space exploration can
be achieved affordably.
We look forward to continuing our partnership with NASA to
quickly end our reliance on Russia for human spaceflight and
fully realize the scientific potential of the space station.
Harnessing the power of American free enterprise, which I think
is one of the most powerful forces on earth, is the way to
achieve these goals on budget and on time. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Musk follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mr. Elon Musk, CEO and Chief Technology Officer,
Space Exploration Technologies Corp., Hawthorne, CA
Chairman Hall, Ranking Member Johnson and Members of the Committee,
On behalf of Space Exploration Technologies (SpaceX) and our more
than 1,500 employees across the United States, thank you for the
opportunity to participate in today's hearing.
I also want to thank you and the members of the Committee for your
continued support of NASA and America's space exploration programs. The
goals of this agency, unlike nearly any other, are focused on advancing
the state of human knowledge and human achievement. Even as we face
tough fiscal challenges as a Nation, NASA and the cause of space
exploration deserve support, particularly through efficient investments
and public-private partnerships that provide best value for the
taxpayer.
America's endeavors in space are truly inspirational. I deeply
believe that human spaceflight is one of the great achievements of
humankind. Although NASA only sent a handful of people to the moon, it
felt like we all went. We vicariously shared in the adventure and
achievement. My goal, and the goal of SpaceX, is to help create the
technology so that more can share in that great adventure.
With your support and NASA's invaluable partnership through the
Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) program, SpaceX made
history last year as the first commercial company to successfully
recover a spacecraft from Earth orbit. The inaugural flight of the
SpaceX Dragon confirmed what we have always believed--the
responsiveness and ingenuity of the private sector, combined with the
U.S. government's investment and technical support, can deliver an
American spaceflight program that is safe, achievable, sustainable and
affordable.
SpaceX is honored to continue our partnership with NASA as we work
together to develop commercial crew capabilities. Our goal is to
develop the safest, most reliable and affordable crew transportation
system to low Earth orbit and, ultimately, beyond. Indeed, carrying
humans into space has been a cornerstone of SpaceX's vehicle designs
from the day the company was founded. There is no more critical and
precious responsibility than having the opportunity and privilege to
transport the true heroes of America's astronaut corps into space and,
in the event of a mishap or failure, providing them with an effective,
life-saving abort capability. This awesome responsibility informs and
shapes SpaceX's every design, decision and operation.
Mr. Chairman, the United States needs safe and affordable domestic
systems for transporting American astronauts into space. Most pressing
is the need to restore our ability to carry crew to the International
Space Station (ISS) for which the country has spent so much effort,
sweat and national treasure. The ISS's research and scientific
potential is constrained by the current inability to achieve a full
complement of astronauts on board. Sole reliance on the Russian Soyuz
is not a remedy.
With our NASA colleagues, SpaceX is working hard to deliver a
solution. I am pleased to provide the Committee with an update on
SpaceX's human spaceflight advances to date and challenges ahead as we
progress toward the capability to transport human beings into space
aboard the Falcon launch vehicles and Dragon spacecraft.
I. Commercial Cargo Efforts Leading to Crew Carriage
In 2006, SpaceX partnered with NASA under the Commercial Orbital
Transportation Services (COTS) program. The COTS program was the first
of its kind for NASA: a ``pay for performance'' partnership between the
government and private business to rapidly design and prototype
critical technologies. NASA structured the COTS program as a
collaborative venture with commercial space companies--sharing the
risks, costs and rewards of developing new space transportation
capabilities. That ``experiment'' resulted in the first U.S. launch
vehicle developed since Saturn with engine out reliability. As
demonstration of its reliability, this launcher flew successfully for
its first two missions. This reliable launcher is also the only U.S.
launch vehicle that is competitive in the international marketplace and
will help bring launch dominance back to the U.S. This experiment also
resulted in a reusable spacecraft that will service our critical
national asset--the ISS.
One of the central tenets of the COTS program is that public-
private partnerships leverage private capital to supplement government
dollars, yielding products and services more cost-effectively and more
rapidly. In pursuing its mission to create ``new commercial space
transportation systems and demonstrate capabilities to provide cost-
effective transportation services to orbit,'' NASA's COTS office
granted its partners ``latitude to freely innovate and optimize their
launch vehicle and spacecraft designs and operations.'' \1\
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\1\ NASA COTS video, www.nasa.gov
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That latitude fostered SpaceX's ability to focus on safe, simple,
proven designs that are cost-effective. As a result, SpaceX developed
the Falcon 9 rocket for a fraction of the cost NASA would have paid
under a traditional acquisition model. NASA's internal studies using
the NASA-Air Force Cost Model (NAFCOM) concluded that it would have
cost NASA $1.7B to $4B to develop the Falcon 9 rocket. By contrast, in
partnership with NASA's COTS program, SpaceX developed the Falcon 9 for
approximately $300M. \2\ It bears noting that the Falcon 9's
development included designing, building and testing SpaceX's Merlin
engine, the first new all-American hydrocarbon engine for an orbital
booster in forty years.
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\2\ NASA independently verified SpaceX's total development costs of
both the Falcon 1 and Falcon 9 at approximately $390 million in the
aggregate ($300 million for Falcon 9; $90 million for Falcon 1). NASA,
Falcon 9 Launch Vehicle NAFCOM Cost Estimates, August 2011.
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Likewise, SpaceX developed the Dragon spacecraft--a free-flying,
reusable spacecraft--from a clean sheet of paper to the first
demonstration flight in just over four years for about $300 million.
a. SpaceX's COTS Flight Success and Upcoming Launch
In June of last year, SpaceX performed a successful demonstration
launch of the Falcon 9 on its maiden voyage. Then, on December 8, 2010,
SpaceX successfully launched the Falcon 9 with the Dragon spacecraft,
becoming the first commercial company in history to launch, reenter and
successfully recover a spacecraft from Earth orbit. SpaceX's COTS
demonstration mission blasted off from Launch Complex 40 at Cape
Canaveral. The Falcon 9 lofted the Dragon to orbit where it twice
circled the Earth and then reentered the Earth's atmosphere, splashing
down safely in the Pacific Ocean. Until late last year, launching,
orbiting, reentering and recovering a spacecraft was a feat previously
performed by only six nations or government agencies: the United
States, Russia, China, Japan, India and the European Space Agency.
NASA's expert advice and mentorship throughout the development process
helped SpaceX build upon 50 years of U.S. space achievements to reach
this goal.
In preparation for the next COTS demonstration mission, which is
set to occur in the next few months, the Dragon spacecraft design has
been upgraded to meet all requirements for ferrying cargo to and from
the ISS, including the proximity operations sensors to guide the
vehicle safely near the ISS. This mission will be an extended mission
to the ISS, lasting more than three weeks. Consequently, two solar
array wings have been added to the Dragon trunk to enable positive
power generation throughout the flight. Additionally, a redundant
active thermal control system loop has been installed in the Dragon
trunk to reject excess heat into space; protect the spacecraft from
excessively hot or cold temperatures; and provide an environment inside
the spacecraft that is acceptable for cargo and for the ISS crew when
berthed to station.
In accordance with our COTS milestones, a series of tests have been
conducted on the fully integrated Dragon spacecraft, including a 12-day
thermal vacuum test during which, the entire avionics system was
exercised while flowing telemetry 24/7. (No notable issues were
uncovered and the thermal data matched model predictions closely.)
Dragon's proximity sensors are critical for the ISS approach and
have been put through extensive performance testing in open loop and
closed loop simulation using flight hardware and software. Significant
testing emphasis has also been placed on the new Dragon mechanisms,
which have all completed qualification testing. These mechanisms
include the forward hatch, solar arrays, guidance, navigation and
controls (GNC) bay door that exposes the Flight Releasable Grapple
Fixture (FRGF) and a claw that provides electrical and data connections
between the capsule and trunk.
Several joint SpaceX-NASA tests have been completed, including the
Passive Common Berthing Mechanism (PCBM) testing and cabin acoustic
noise verification. Most recently, the vehicle completed radiation
testing of all avionics components and an Electromagnetic Interference
(EMI) test in keeping with NASA requirements.
We are rapidly progressing toward the next COTS demonstration
flight and are still engaged with NASA to finalize vehicle
verifications and the mission plan. This next COTS mission represents a
huge milestone not only for SpaceX, but also for NASA, the U.S. space
program and American free enterprise. When the astronauts stationed on
the ISS open the hatch and enter the Dragon spacecraft for the first
time, it will mark the beginning of a new era in space travel.
b. Commonality between Cargo Falcon 9/Dragon and Crew Falcon 9/
Dragon
SpaceX conceived the Falcon 9 and Dragon with crew carriage in mind
and undertook designs from inception to meet human certification
requirements, including increased structural factors of safety, triple-
redundant avionics, trajectories with acceleration limits within human
safety limits, and many others. Because SpaceX planned for the current
cargo Dragon to evolve into a crew version, many of the Dragon's
systems are identical in the cargo and crew versions. In fact, Dragon
was designed to meet NASA's human engineering safety requirements in
SSP 50808 because the cargo Dragon will fly in close proximity to the
ISS, berth with the ISS and support on-orbit crew habitation during
cargo transfer operations.
Designed to be as safe as possible from a clean sheet in 2005, the
Dragon crew transportation system takes advantage of 21st century
technology advances and lessons learned throughout the history of human
spaceflight. The Dragon spacecraft is comprised of three main elements:
the Nosecone, which protects the vessel and the docking adaptor during
ascent; the Spacecraft, which houses the crew and/or pressurized cargo
as well as the service section containing avionics, the Reaction
Control System (RCS), parachutes and other support infrastructure; and
the Trunk, which provides for the stowage of unpressurized cargo and
will support Dragon's solar arrays and thermal radiators.
As a result of the commonality between the cargo and crew versions
of Dragon, many of the critical components of the Dragon crew
transportation system are already operational and flight-proven. Other
systems for crew accommodation require some development, but the only
major development is for the launch abort system. This commonality
enables SpaceX to plan for crew demonstration flights in 2014, with a
rapid transition to operational capability.
c. Lessons Learned from the COTS Program Model
The NASA-SpaceX COTS partnership has successfully enabled and
promoted genuine innovation while maintaining safety and reliability
standards. The COTS program helped guide the development of Dragon and
Falcon 9 to pass a set of specific requirements and verifications
required for any ISS visiting vehicle, but left the design and aspects
of analysis and testing largely to the contractor. This allowed for
rapid prototyping and design iterations in which components could be
designed, tested, modified and retested, often times in a matter of
hours. And NASA could be confident in the final design because all
design and test data were available for review. Also critical for
innovation was the fact that decisions about ``how to meet the
requirements'' were generally left to the contractor. Rather the
critical metric was that the requirement was clearly met. I note here
that specificity as to how to meet requirements is inherently
prescriptive and often results in less innovation.
Safety and reliability standards have been maintained through
insight into the entire system design and insight and oversight into
safety critical systems. Systems that interface with the ISS are
thoroughly reviewed by independent contractors, NASA employees
providing regular and ongoing support, formal NASA panels and other
subject matter experts. These safety-critical systems are also subject
to strict requirements and verifications that ensure they will function
as intended.
Overall, this teaming approach with NASA has proven invaluable.
NASA has a wide array of resources and deep technical expertise that
was generally made available in a partnership approach. Testing
facilities, analyses, subject matter experts and a host of other
contributions helped solve difficult technical problems, improve the
safety and robustness of vehicle and help advance innovative
approaches.
II. Commercial Crew Development Efforts: CCDev2 and Flight by 2014
The goal of SpaceX's crew transportation system is to safely and
reliably transport up to seven crew members from our launch pad on Cape
Canaveral to the ISS, dwell on the ISS for up to 210 days and return
the same number of crew safely to Earth. A two-stage, liquid oxygen and
kerosene launch vehicle, the Falcon 9 possesses robust reliability
features. The nine SpaceX Merlin engines that power Falcon 9's first
stage provide engine-out reliability from liftoff--a feature not
offered by the Russian Soyuz--and the engine's turbopumps run at lower
pressure, making them more resistant to failure from foreign object
debris (FOD) ingestion. The Dragon offers improved avionics redundancy
and failure tolerance compared to Soyuz's single gyroscope and
accelerometer.
SpaceX selected the Dragon design so that it would be naturally
stable entering the earth's atmosphere, thereby maximizing the chances
of a safe return to Earth even in the event of the vehicle's control
systems' total failure. Other features vital to the cargo Dragon's
ability to safely reenter Earth's atmosphere, such as the PICA-X heat
shield, are already integrated into the Dragon capsule and will gain
significant flight heritage during the Commercial Resupply Services
(CRS) missions.
In the coming years, SpaceX will collect significant data and
experience on the Falcon 9 and Dragon system from upcoming COTS and
future CRS missions. Specifically, the Dragon spacecraft and Falcon 9
launch vehicle are currently scheduled to fly together at least eight
more times before a crew demonstration in 2014. The Falcon 9 itself is
scheduled to launch a total of 14 missions prior to the first Dragon
crew mission. The commonality between the cargo and crew versions of
Dragon allows for significant end-to-end flight heritage and
operational experience to be gained on critical functions--including
launch, navigation and control, thermal protection, thermal control,
power generation and distribution, avionics, software, entry guidance
and recovery--well before the first crew flight. The avionics hardware
is highly scalable, allowing SpaceX to significantly leverage the
architecture tested and proven on cargo missions for use on crew
missions.
Crew transport launch operations are similar to our cargo
transportation launch operations inasmuch as they will take advantage
of the safety, reliability and availability benefits of the ``aircraft-
like'' operations of the Falcon 9. For example, full-stage static fire
tests, similar to an aircraft ground run-up, are performed prior to
each launch. During terminal countdown, the Falcon 9 throttles up to
full power before being released for liftoff, allowing anomalies during
engine startup to be safely mitigated. The Falcon 9 can support
multiple full-thrust static fires and engine aborts without need for
refurbishment, allowing for true ``test-like-you-fly'' operations.
Additionally, Falcon 9 avionics support hardware-in-the-loop testing to
prove out flight software in the actual flight hardware configuration.
a. CCDev 2: the Criticality of Launch Abort Systems
Under NASA's Commercial Crew Development II (CCDev 2) program,
SpaceX has opted to focus on accelerating the development of an
efficient, life-saving launch abort system (LAS). SpaceX's crew Dragon
includes an integrated LAS, which we believe will yield numerous safety
and performance benefits. The Dragon's LAS is carried through orbit and
reentry, with the abort systems available for use throughout the time
the Dragon is boosted into space. Carrying the abort system all the way
into orbit also eliminates the jettison of the abort system as a
required event for the safe completion of a nominal mission.
SpaceX is further addressing launch vehicle malfunction detection
and initiation of automated aborts as well as developing the necessary
LAS engine hardware to implement such a design. This development will
culminate in a series of engine tests to demonstrate safety,
reliability, maximum thrust, minimum thrust, throttling capability,
throttling rate and specific impulse.
The Dragon LAS is a vehicle-integrated, side-mounted engine system
selected for its safety, reliability and performance after a system-
level analysis conducted by SpaceX. Eight abort engines (known as
SuperDracos because they are modified versions of Dragon's existing
Draco thrusters) are located around the periphery of the Dragon service
section and fed by hypergolic propellant stored in the spacecraft
propellant tanks. SuperDracos will carry the spacecraft away from the
booster and are capable of separating the Dragon crew spacecraft from a
failing booster while on the pad all the way through nominal on-orbit
separation of Dragon from the second stage.
The LAS will be enabled after crew ingress and securing on the pad
and will be disabled on orbit after Dragon separation from the second
stage. The launch vehicle malfunction detection system for automatic
abort will monitor the Falcon 9 and Dragon for engine failures, flight
control failure, failure of the booster propellant tank and failure of
the booster's primary structure, among other signatures.
Abort responses will be determined by failure(s) detected and the
phase of flight, in order to maximize survivability. For example, a
significantly off-nominal change in tank pressure while the vehicle is
on the pad may result in an instantaneous high-acceleration abort,
while a performance-related failure of the second-stage engine during
ascent may result in a delayed abort until ideal entry conditions are
met, a pre-abort shutdown of the second-stage engine and a low-
acceleration abort profile.
Ultimately, this technology, research, design and intellectual
effort are about one thing: protecting human life. No one has summed it
up better than Garrett Reisman, former astronaut and one of the heads
of development for the Dragon LAS at SpaceX, who said, ``We are not
going to design a vehicle that I wouldn't strap myself or my friends
into.''
b. CCDev 2: Successes To Date and Approach Going Forward
To date, SpaceX has successfully completed four of the ten
milestones in our CCDev2 Space Act Agreement (SAA) for a total of $40M
of the $75M under SpaceX's CCDev2 agreement. The first three milestones
included a detailed program plan roll out, LAS propulsion Conceptual
Design Review, Design Status Review and LAS Components Preliminary
Design Review (PDR). In successfully meeting those milestones on
schedule and on budget, SpaceX provided NASA with comprehensive Falcon
9/Dragon crew systems concept design insight including cabin layout,
seat design, space suit design, life support system design, abort
scenarios, concepts for the launch abort system, ground systems, abort
trajectories, aerodynamics of ascent and entry and mass margins. The
Design Status Review provided an opportunity for SpaceX to work with
both NASA and industry teammates as partners and make desired crew
systems design concept changes after peer review and feedback on the
system-level designs and concepts.
With regards to the LAS components PDR, our most recently completed
milestone, SpaceX engineers demonstrated to NASA's satisfaction that
the maturity of the LAS propulsion components design is appropriate to
support proceeding with detailed design, fabrication, assembly,
integration and test of LAS propulsion components test articles. We
also provided evidence that the LAS propulsion design meets all system
requirements with acceptable risk and can be developed within schedule.
Going forward, milestones will include abort engine fabrication and
testing and further maturation of the vehicle system design and concept
of operations. In addition, design and construction of a test facility
for the launch abort engine is underway at the SpaceX rocket test
facility in McGregor, Texas. The remaining hardware milestones will
culminate in all key launch abort system propulsion components
undergoing initial fluid and environmental development testing. Here,
the SuperDracos will be hot-fire tested for a full duration. We will
also demonstrate throttle capability, which is essential for abort
maneuvers.
With respect to the crew systems design efforts, SpaceX will
incorporate feedback from NASA and industry partners, present safety
and mission assurance studies and provide a draft of the Vehicle
Certification Plan (the path forward for getting crew flights certified
by NASA). SpaceX is also investing in two self-funded milestones for
crew cabin development with engineering prototypes of the cabin layout
including seats where NASA astronaut trials will provide feedback on
cockpit design.
c. CCDev 2: Designing Crew Accommodations for the Dragon
In parallel with the design and development work on the launch
abort system engine and components, SpaceX is working on the design of
other systems necessary to carry astronauts in the Dragon spacecraft.
These systems include seats, spacesuits, an environmental control and
life support system, displays and controls and ground systems.
SpaceX is designing the Dragon to carry seven crewmembers seated in
two rows. The seats will be conformal and a mechanical force
accommodation system will cushion any off-nominal landing impacts to
assure crew safety. The crew will wear spacesuits to protect them from
any rapid cabin depressurization emergency event. The suits will be
rated for operation at vacuum and provide communication and cooling
systems.
The Dragon environmental control and life support systems will
provide the crew with fresh air ventilation, remove carbon dioxide and
control humidity and cabin pressure. Fire detection and suppression
systems will protect the crew in the event of an emergency.
Accommodations will be provided for food preparation and waste
disposal.
During the span of the CCDev2 SAA, SpaceX is completing preliminary
designs on modifications to our launch pad and mission control center
to be ready to fly astronauts. The launch pad will have a new tower and
access arm to allow crew to enter the Dragon and egress quickly in the
event of a launch pad emergency. Mission control will have a new
console position for a flight surgeon for human missions.
In addition to these crew vehicle systems, the operation of the
vehicle for nominal, contingency and emergency situations is being
outlined for all phases of flight. A crew cabin mock-up is being
constructed to allow NASA astronauts to evaluate crew accommodations
and other human factors considerations. We are conducting preliminary
designs for crew display and manual control hardware. The detailed
operation of the launch abort system is also being characterized by
defining abort modes, triggering events and abort trajectories.
Finally, the safety and mission assurance analyses are being evaluated
with the goal of ensuring that the Dragon and Falcon 9 vehicle will
achieve a level of safety better than any human spacecraft ever flown.
This work on crew accommodations, along with the design and
development of the launch abort system, as part of NASA's CCDev2
program will result in a preliminary design of all the upgrades
necessary to convert the cargo Dragon spacecraft and Falcon 9 into a
certified crew transportation system.
d. Critical Design Review-level Development
Each flight of the Falcon 9 and cargo Dragon to the ISS brings us
one step closer to flying astronauts to the ISS. Each of these flights
will demonstrate many of the common elements between the cargo vehicle
and the crew vehicle. Ultimately, the Falcon 9 will be one hundred
percent common as between the cargo and crew vehicles. Therefore,
though there is much work ahead, SpaceX already is beyond a Critical
Design Review (CDR) equivalent level of maturity--and even into the
production phase--with respect to many aspects of the vehicle system.
This includes the main propulsion systems, structures, thermal
protection systems (including the Dragon heat shield), power generation
systems, altitude control, on-orbit propulsion systems, thermal control
systems and GNC systems.
Crew-related modifications that have yet to reach a CDR-equivalent
level of maturity include the remaining work on the launch abort
system. The most significant remaining milestones will be full-scale
pad abort and max-drag abort flight tests. In addition, crew displays
and controls, a voice communication system, cabin layout and seats,
space suits, environmental control and life support systems, launch pad
and control center modifications, final approach guidance and control
and the docking system will need to be matured to a CDR-equivalent
level. The most significant remaining technical milestones for these
systems will be human-in-the-loop testing of the environmental control
and life support systems and spacesuits as well as static and dynamic
testing of the seats and other mechanisms.
Beyond the launch abort system and crew accommodations, SpaceX's
efforts to transport crews aboard Dragon also require additional ground
facilities and crew training equipment. These would support flight crew
training for nominal, off-nominal and emergency conditions. Full-scale
spacecraft mock-ups may be required for training. Launch Control and
Mission Control teams will be certified as planned for other Falcon 9
and Dragon missions, including joint operations training with NASA
Mission Control Center--Houston (MCC-H). The launch pad will also be
modified to include gantry access for nominal ingress/egress and
emergency egress of crew and pad support team.
e. SpaceX Falcon 9 / Dragon vs. Russian Soyuz
The Russian Soyuz is an unquestionably capable vehicle with
significant flight heritage. Indeed, SpaceX has benefited from lessons
learned from Soyuz operations and predecessor spacecraft. That said, we
do not intend to duplicate the capabilities of Soyuz, but to improve
upon them. Critically, the Dragon will have the capability to transport
up to seven crew members to the ISS--four more astronauts than Soyuz.
Further, the Dragon has the capability to carry additional
unpressurized cargo to the ISS as well as the capability to return
cargo from the ISS--areas in which the Soyuz is highly limited.
Additionally, the Dragon and Falcon 9 offer several safety
improvements relative to the Soyuz, including:
modern electronic control systems and computers;
improved redundancy in the automatic control system;
simpler and safer egress from the vehicle during an
emergency on the launch pad;
improved data displays for ascent and entry;
capability for the crew to initiate an abort during the
launch phase of the mission;
capability for the crew to initiate the deploy of the
landing parachutes;
first stage engine out capability; and
NASA insight into design, testing and production (NASA
has limited insight to the Soyuz rocket design as well as limited
access to the production facilities for the spacecraft and the rocket).
One of the largest safety distinctions between the Falcon 9 and
Dragon system over the Soyuz transport system is the reduction in
separation events--failure of separation events is one of the most
common events leading to mission failures of space systems. The Soyuz
launcher and spacecraft must release four side-mounted booster modules,
the second stage, the third stage, the launch escape tower, fairing,
propulsion module and habitation module prior to the point where the
crew can enter safely in the Soyuz descent module. For the Dragon and
Falcon 9, there are only four separation events which must occur prior
to the Dragon's entry: separation of the first stage, second stage,
external cargo module or trunk and for a nominal mission separation of
the nose fairing.
III. Commercial Crew Integrated Design Contract Proposal
NASA's recently issued draft request for proposals (DRFP) for the
Commercial Crew Integrated Design Contract (CCIDC) has incorporated key
features critical to facilitate successful commercial partnerships.
SpaceX appreciates the fact that the contract will be firm fixed-price
and milestone-based; includes cost sharing with fixed government
investment; and waives cost and pricing data requirements inherent in
certain Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) based contract
formulations. SpaceX has offered NASA several suggestions to improve
the DRFP and the subsequent contract implementation. Those suggestions
focus on resolving certain key technical issues prior to contract
award; focusing NASA approval authority with respect to design,
development and test activities; placing a greater emphasis on
development and test activities; and defining an insight plan that
creates a teaming relationship between NASA and the contractor.
The DRFP indicates that several documents, including any proposed
alternative technical standards, the integrated system baseline review
(ISBR) and integrated critical design review (ICDR) plans, and the
project management plan, are to be provided as drafts or initial
documents at the time the proposal is submitted. All of these documents
will have significant cost and schedule impacts and the technical
standards will also drive the design of the vehicle. However, the final
versions of these documents will not be approved until after the
contract is signed. This timing makes it difficult to know exactly what
commitments a contractor is making in its bid response. This concern
can be easily addressed by having these key documents agreed to prior
to signing the CCIDC contract.
SpaceX has found that the COTS and CRS public-private partnership
approach with NASA combines and capitalizes on the strengths of both
partners. The requirements in this DRFP have the potential to mitigate
the proven benefits of this approach by exponentially increasing NASA's
involvement in design, development and testing.
SpaceX has also suggested that insight personnel be teammates.
According to the DRFP, the NASA insight team is to be given full access
to the contractor's activities while being specifically precluded from
providing any NASA resources (services, technical expertise, or access
to Government property) to the contractor. As a result, the insight
team is tasked to ``audit and report'' and thus becomes a second
oversight team. Instead of an ``audit and report'' model, given
successes witnessed under the interactions to date on the COTS and CRS
programs, we propose that we work together as partners to a larger
degree.
IV. The Commercial Space Market
At present, SpaceX has over forty flights on manifest, representing
approximately $3.5 billion in revenues from the U.S. government,
commercial and international business customers. NASA missions
represent approximately 40 percent of those flights. Our ability to
compete successfully in the domestic and international commercial
market demonstrates the long-term viability of our business model and
allows us to keep our costs to the U.S. taxpayer low.
SpaceX currently has the lowest launch prices in the world and, as
noted by a Chinese government official earlier this year, even the
Chinese do not believe they can beat them. Although our prices shatter
the historical cost models of government-led developments, they are not
arbitrary or premised on capturing a dominant share of the market, nor
are they ``teaser'' rates meant to lure in an eager market only to be
increased later. SpaceX's prices are based on known costs and a
demonstrated track record and exemplify the potential of America's
commercial space industry.
Critically, as the provider of an end-to-end solution for crewed
missions, with our own manufacturing of the launcher and the
spacecraft, and with the provision of all launch and recovery
operations, SpaceX is uniquely positioned relative to competitors with
respect to the impact of sales of commercial crew missions on the
overall business. Each NASA purchase of our crewed capabilities
complements our booster sales and production because the Falcon 9 will
be the same for satellite carriage, cargo carriage, and ultimately crew
carriage. Moreover, the commonality of features between our cargo
Dragon and crewed Dragon likewise speaks to the economies of scale that
we can achieve with spacecraft production and operations, maximizing
efficiencies and driving down costs for the consumer. This is a key
differentiator as between SpaceX and others when considering the
commercial human spaceflight market.
However, as to the commercial human spaceflight market alone
(taking into account the concept above that this market ties directly
to the other well-known markets), NASA is the primary market driver for
launching human beings into space. NASA is currently purchasing those
services on the commercial market from Russia, the only currently
available supplier. As a Nation, we are paying too a high price for
those services--currently $56M per seat--due to the lack of competition
and supply.
There is ample evidence of a demand for spaceflight beyond NASA,
though it has yet to emerge as a substantial operational secondary
market. In the past decade, seven individuals bought eight very
expensive tickets to fly to the ISS on a Russian Soyuz. That may not
seem like much, but even as prices dramatically increased since Dennis
Tito first flew back in 2001, every seat available for sale has been
sold. No tickets have been sold for the past two years because Russia
is providing one hundred percent of their Soyuz capacity to serve the
ISS partnerships. This evidence ratifies our view that offering seats
for half or a third of the Soyuz price will expand the human
spaceflight market. Moreover, alternative low-earth destinations such
as the Bigelow space modules provide another strong market opportunity.
Non-spacefaring nations are also interested in space access.
Between 1978 and 2010, ninety-six astronauts from thirty-one nations
without indigenous spaceflight capabilities traveled into orbit. \3\
According to NASA's Commercial Market Assessment, there is a desire
among other countries ``to send astronauts into space to perform
scientific research, acquire technical knowledge, and increase national
prestige.'' \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ NASA. Commercial Market Assessment for Crew and Cargo Systems
Pursuant to Section 403 of the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 (P.L.
111-267), p.12, April 27, 2011.
\4\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further market potential also exists in the United States. The ISS
is America's national laboratory in space and like all laboratories its
productivity depends on how many scientists can visit the lab, conduct
their experiments and return to their public or private enterprises.
NASA currently bases astronauts at the ISS for six months. That
limitation is based on how many Soyuz capsules are produced each year,
how long the Soyuz is rated to last on orbit and the high price of
Soyuz seats.
The ISS can actually support seven crew members once we have a
better crew rescue capability. Commercial crew will deliver that
capability. Should the U.S. space industry lower the cost to between
$20 and $30 million per seat, it will be possible for research
scientists to visit the ISS for shorter periods of time, conduct
dedicated research and return to Earth. Less costly, more regular
access to ISS will enable more scientists to do more research in the
same amount of time, with the same amount of dollars.
Overall, SpaceX's business model is based on a diverse customer
base that spans multiple markets. We have increased the U.S. share of
the commercial space launch market since we started competing for and
winning launches in 2008. For the first time in more than three
decades, America last year began taking back international market-share
in commercial satellite launch. Whereas in 1980, one-hundred percent of
commercial launches took place from within the United States; last
year, it was less than twelve percent. NASA's and SpaceX's efforts and
investments are bringing critical launch revenue back to the U.S. and
will bring thousands of jobs with it.
This remarkable turn-around was sparked by the investment NASA made
in SpaceX in 2006 as part of COTS. By leveraging private funding with
federal investment, controlling our costs and developing a diverse
customer base, we are able to offer competitive pricing to our
commercial and government customers. Safe, reliable and affordable
transportation of cargo and astronauts to low Earth orbit by an
American company will keep jobs in the United States; eliminate
reliance on Russia to support the ISS; and providing significant
taxpayer savings that instead can be invested in what NASA does best:
pursuing the next frontier.
Mr. Chairman, I am honored by your invitation to provide testimony
today. Through continued public-private partnerships like the one that
helped develop the Falcon 9 and Dragon system, commercial companies
will transform the way we access space. Together, government and the
private sector can simultaneously increase the reliability, safety and
frequency of space travel, while greatly reducing the costs.
NASA's Commercial Crew Development Program has the potential to be
the most fiscally responsible means to rapidly advance American human
spaceflight. To date, it has protected taxpayer dollars with fixed-
price, pay-for-performance contracts. It has forced companies to
compete on safety, reliability, capability and cost. And it leverages
private investment--making taxpayer dollars go further.
Chairman Hall. Sir, I thank you.
I now recognize our fourth witness on the panel, Mr.
Charlie Precourt of ATK.
STATEMENT OF MR. CHARLES PRECOURT, VICE PRESIDENT, ATK LAUNCH
SYSTEMS GROUP, BRIGHAM CITY, UTAH
Colonel Precourt. Chairman Hall, Ranking Member Johnson and
Members of the Committee, thank you so much for allowing me to
present our plans at ATK for commercial crew and our Liberty
launch vehicle.
Liberty is a launch vehicle capable of lifting any of the
crewed spacecraft that are currently under consideration with
margin to the ISS orbit. We believe that Liberty is an
innovative way to support the ISS because it leverages
significant prior investments in NASA shuttle and Constellation
programs as well as the European space agency's RN-5 launcher.
To give you an easier reference as to what makes up
Liberty, I have a short video that lays out the system. Mr.
Chairman, if you would allow me, I would share that video.
As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, the recoupment of upfront
investments is a significant factor for us, so we have chosen
to use and leverage significant elements from both the space
shuttle, as you see here, the booster forms the first stage of
Liberty and the work that went into Constellation to provide
the five-segment booster is going to be leveraged here as well.
From Ariane, we chose the core element of that vehicle, which
is a liquid hydrogen/liquid oxygen stage which matches very
nicely in terms of performance and suitability to create the
Liberty vehicle concept. The design, as I mentioned, can carry
any of the spaceflight currently under consideration with
margin. The vehicle has 44,500 pounds of performance to the
space station's orbit.
The first-stage propulsion system benefits from many, many
years of flight on the space shuttle, where we realized 221
successful flight operations, and the Constellation program was
further evolved with improvements in materials, processing and
increased safety. In the current configuration that you see
here, this was the development motor test of the five-segment
motor. It produces 3.7 million pounds of thrust. The upper
stage is derived from the Ariane 5 vehicle, which is used by
the European space agency to launch the cargo module, the ATV,
to the ISS for the Europeans' contribution. Here is that stage
being assembled in its vertical assembly building. It uses the
Vulcain-2 engine, 46 consecutive successful flights. The
Ariane-5 enjoys the lowest premiums for insurance of any
launcher on the planet for commercial satellite operations.
Launch operations likewise will leverage activities at the
Kennedy Space Center facilities that are already in place,
again, minimizing the upfront investment for major elements. As
a matter of fact, from a business case standpoint, the ongoing
remaining investment has to do with the integration of the two
elements so that they can fly together. We have made
significant progress on the Liberty program over the past year
and a half and are continuing under an unfunded Space Act
agreement with NASA. Liberty was first proposed at a firm fixed
price for NASA under their CCDev2 solicitation, and although
NASA ultimately chose in that competition to fund only the
spacecraft providers, we are very pleased and honored that NASA
rated Liberty very high in both business and technical merits.
Only two of the 18 proposals submitted were rated better.
The Liberty focuses foremost on achieving the maximum
possible levels of safety for our astronauts. We believe
Liberty is the safest, most cost-effective launch vehicle
design available and is fully compliant with the
recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.
One such recommendation was to lower the complexity of the
launch vehicle and reduce the number of failure points. Liberty
draws its safety rating from a simple design with an absolute
minimum number of moving parts. A Valador study earlier this
year showed that Liberty was more than 10 times safer than
shuttle and even safer than the Ares I design because it uses
established stages. The integrated vehicle today has passed its
systems design review and is approaching preliminary design
review. We are approximately one year to critical design review
given adequate funding.
Challenges going forward include adequate funding as an
adequate funding profile is required. In the case of Liberty,
because it leverages flight-proven elements, much of the
development is complete and the amount of necessary government
funding is in fact quite modest. The infusion of outside
capital is available to Liberty but awaits customer endorsement
of the value proposition that Liberty presents. As a result,
working on an unfunded Space Act agreement has slowed our
milestone plans towards Liberty's first flight test.
Additionally, I offer a thought about strategy from an
acquisition standpoint in the government-private industry
partnerships. When NASA chose to fund only spaceflight in
CCDev2, it placed a higher burden on the launch vehicle
providers, and from a human rating standpoint, launcher
development is more challenging than the spaceflight
development because the preponderance of risk to the crew
during launch, which must be mitigated, emanates from the
launch vehicle. Therefore, we believe and suggest that in
NASA's acquisition strategy, it would benefit significantly
from a greater investment on the launcher side of the equation
than has been made to date. The August failure of the Russian
Soyuz launcher attempting to deliver progress cargo to the ISS
serves to underscore this point.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you and commend the
Committee for your attention to safety in fielding the next-
generation system. In the NASA Authorization Act, you asked
that the certification requirements be at least equivalent to
the requirements of crew transportation currently in use as
well as adherent to any relevant recommendations of the
Columbia Accident Investigation Board. As a former astronaut
and Chief of the Astronaut Office who personally selected the
crew of Columbia, I believe we are capable today of an order of
magnitude improvement in spaceflight safety, and I am also
confident that striving continuously to achieve the maximum
possible levels of crew safety in our human spaceflight systems
will pay the biggest dividends in the long run.
I truly appreciate the opportunity to introduce our Liberty
system to you today. The system is available in the near term
with a test flight possible within three years. Liberty offers
a great opportunity to foster the next level of cooperation
between Europe and the United States while reinstating and
sustaining our access to the ISS. I believe that Liberty is a
cost-effective solution posed to ensure America's commercial
crew program is safe, robust and enduring. Thank you so much.
[The prepared statement of Colonel Precourt follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mr. Charlie Precourt, Vice President, ATK Launch
Systems Group, Brigham City, UT
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Hall. And we thank you.
I now recognize our, it says here final witness. I don't
like the word ``final'' at my age. I will just say we will
recognize the fifth witness of the first panel, Dr. George
Sowers, to present his testimony.
STATEMENT OF DR. GEORGE SOWERS, VICE PRESIDENT, UNITED LAUNCH
ALLIANCE, ENGLEWOOD, COLORADO
Dr. Sowers. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee,
thank you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss NASA'S
Commercial Crew Program. My name is George Sowers and I am the
Vice President of United Launch Alliance. I don't have a video
but I have spent my career designing, developing, building and
launching rockets and was the Chief System Engineer for the
Atlas V development.
The formation of the United Launch Alliance in 2006 brought
together the launch industry's two most experienced and
successful launch vehicle teams and two of its most dependable
launch vehicles families, the Atlas and the Delta. Our history
spans over 1,300 successful space launches including the launch
of John Glenn, the first American to orbit the earth.
Since formation, we have conducted 54 launches, almost one
a month, with 100 percent mission success. We are entrusted
with delivering the Nation's most critical payloads to support
the war fighter, the intelligence community and national
decision makers. Within the last year, we successfully
completed the most ambitious launch campaign in the history of
the National Reconnaissance Office, putting up five nearly
priceless satellites in seven months. We are currently in the
midst of an unprecedented launch campaign of five NASA science
missions in six months. So far we have successfully launched
the Aquarius spacecraft, the Juno spacecraft to Jupiter, and
the Grail spacecraft to the moon. Within the next week, we will
launch the NPOESS Preparatory Project and we will finish up the
year with the launch of NASA's Mars Science Lab, an SUV-sized
rover powered by a nuclear battery that may discover the first
signs of life on that planet.
United Launch Alliance strongly supports Congress's and
NASA's efforts to develop a commercial crew capability. In my
mind, there are three main reasons for the Nation to invest in
commercial crew and together they form a compelling argument.
First, the Nation needs this capability. Now that the
shuttle is retired, our Nation is wholly dependent on the
Russians to transport our own crews to and from the ISS.
Currently, the government of Russia is NASA's sixth largest
contractor receiving over $350 million per year. The recent
Soyuz failure reminds us that the very existence of the ISS is
now in jeopardy and that we are reliant on a single, fragile
lifeline that we have little insight into or control over.
Second, the private sector has the expertise to provide
safe and affordable crew transportation. The private sector can
bring efficiencies and development and operations spurred by
competition unobtainable in a government-owned and -operated
system. In ULA's case, NASA can take advantage of the
investments we have already made, the rockets that are already
flying in synergy with other users of our rockets like the DOD
and NASA science.
The third reason is to stimulate and to promote commercial
human spaceflight. As an example, my good friend, Bob Bigelow,
is a visionary with a dream of a fleet of private space
stations, but Bob needs a safe and affordable transportation
system. NASA is in a unique position to create a transportation
system that can address the Nation's needs while also providing
opportunities for American entrepreneurs like Bob. NASA
shouldn't count on this new market but will benefit
substantially if it does develop.
Through NASA's investments in the Commercial Crew
Development Program, the private sector is making great
progress in developing a crew delivery capability. United
Launch Alliance is proud to have been chosen by three of the
four CCDev contractors, Sierra Nevada, Blue Origin and Boeing,
to provide launch services using the Atlas V launch system. The
Atlas program as a whole has a record of 98 consecutive
successes, the best in the world. The Atlas V has launched 27
times with 100 percent mission success. It is the only rocket
in its class certified by NASA to launch category 3 missions
such as Juno and the Mars Science Lab, and it is the only
rocket in the world certified to launch nuclear payloads.
The next step for Atlas is to launch humans. If NASA's
Commercial Crew Program is to be successful, every effort must
be undertaken to ensure the highest possible level of safety
and reliability. Under an unfunded Space Act agreement with
NASA, we are conducting a comprehensive assessment of the Atlas
design against NASA's stringent human certification
requirements. This entails a part-by-part, system-by-system
review of the design, analysis and test pedigree of the Atlas.
We are also making excellent progress on the relatively few
modifications required to accommodate human launch. These
include the development of the emergency detection system that
will provide a signal to the spacecraft to abort if a launch
vehicle failure is imminent.
Looking to the future, we believe NASA's recently announced
plans for the Commercial Crew Integrated Development Contract
strikes the right balance between a commercial approach to
delivering innovation and affordability and the appropriate
level of certification and oversight necessary to ensure
safety. The importance of insight and rigorous certification
has been highlighted by the recent Soyuz failure. For new,
unproven vehicles, this rigor is mandatory in addition to
establishing a track record of demonstrated and repeatable
success. With adequate funding, Atlas could be ready to support
test flights in 2014 and operational flights in 2015.
In conclusion, we strongly believe NASA's commercial crew
program is vital to extend our Nation's leadership in human
spaceflight. American industry represented by the companies
here today has the expertise and experience to create safe and
affordable crew access to the ISS and potentially stimulate an
entire new economic sector.
Thank you again for inviting me to testify, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sowers follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. George Sowers, Vice President, United Launch
Alliance, Englewood, CO
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear today to discuss NASA's Commercial Crew Program.
My name is George Sowers and I am the Vice President of Business
Development and Advanced Programs for United Launch Alliance. I was
educated as a physicist but have spent my career designing, developing,
building and launching rockets. I was the chief systems engineer for
the development of the Atlas V rocket.
Introduction
My company, the United Launch Alliance, LLC was formed in 2006.
ULA's heritage reaches back 50 years to the beginnings of the space age
and human spaceflight. The formation of ULA brought together the launch
industry's two most experienced and successful launch vehicle teams and
two of its most dependable launch vehicle families, the Atlas and the
Delta. Our history spans over 1300 successful space launches including
historic achievements as a part of the nation's first two human
spaceflight programs, Mercury and Gemini. At the height of the space
race, it was an Atlas rocket that launched John Glenn into orbit and
America into a proud space future. Since then, we've delivered payloads
with unprecedented reliability and unparalleled performance--helping
America become the world's leading space-faring nation.
Our current customers are the Department of Defense, the National
Reconnaissance Office, NASA, and commercial satellite system providers.
ULA was formed to provide the highest reliability launch services to
these customers while lowering cost through the consolidation of
infrastructure.
Since its formation nearly five years ago, ULA has conducted 54
launches, almost one a month, with 100% mission success. ULA is
entrusted with safely delivering the nation's most critical missions to
support the warfighter, the intelligence community and national
decision makers. Within the last year, we successfully completed the
most ambitious launch campaign in the history of the National
Reconnaissance Office, putting up five nearly priceless, irreplaceable
satellites in seven months. ULA has proven it can reliably deliver
critical missions safely and on schedule. Schedule reliability is also
critical for many missions and each of the dozen missions performed by
ULA in the last year has occurred within a day or two of its planned
launch date.
The evidence of ULA's success is literally on orbit. Every GPS
satellite, every missile warning satellite, nearly every intelligence
collection satellite, weather satellite, and military communications
satellite and nearly every major NASA science mission has been
launched-successfully-on a ULA or ULA heritage product. As a result,
America has been able to push the frontiers of innovation and
discovery; has the most capable spy satellites in the world; has the
best satellite navigation system ever imagined; and has more rovers on,
and more spacecraft orbiting distant planets than anyone else.
We are currently in the midst of an unprecedented launch campaign
for NASA's science program. So far, ULA has successfully completed
three of five planned missions, including the launch of the Juno
spacecraft to the planet Jupiter in August and the launch of the Grail
spacecraft to the moon in September. Our next launch in the campaign
occurs within the next week with the launch of the NPOESS Preparatory
Project (NPP), a precursor to the next generation weather satellite.
We'll finish up the year with the launch of NASA's Mars Science
Laboratory, an SUV sized rover powered by a nuclear battery that may
discover the first signs of life on another planet.
ULA's rockets are the most reliable in the world and we're
routinely tasked with launching the most challenging missions
imaginable. Five years ago, the fastest object ever created by man, the
Pluto New Horizons spacecraft, was launched on an Atlas. Two years ago,
we worked with NASA to guide a Centaur upperstage into the moon,
proving that there was indeed water hidden in its deep craters. The
missions performed by the Delta IV heavy, the nation's most capable
launch vehicle, are incredibly complex, but classified. We are
currently working with NASA to potentially use the Delta IV heavy to
launch the Orion spacecraft on its first uncrewed test flight.
Why Commercial Crew?
I'd like to start by commending this committee for having the
foresight and vision in its 2008 NASA Authorization Act to help spur a
commercial crew capability for the International Space Station, and its
subsequent support in the 2010 NASA Authorization bill. Nearly 50 years
after Glenn's first flight, these efforts are helping unleash a new
space race-this time it's an all-American space race to help us further
unlock the boundless possibilities of the space frontier.
ULA strongly supports both Congress' and NASA's efforts to develop
a commercial capability to meet U.S. obligations to deliver crew to and
from the International Space Station. In my mind, there are three main
reasons for the nation to invest in commercial crew and together they
form a compelling argument.
First, the nation needs this vital capability. Now that the shuttle
is retired, our nation is wholly dependent on the Russians to transport
our own crews to and from the ISS. Currently, the Government of Russia
is NASA's sixth largest contractor, receiving over $350M per year. Not
only does this represent thousands of high tech jobs sent overseas, but
it's ceding our leadership as a space-faring nation. Furthermore, the
Russian Soyuz vehicle now represents the only means to send crew to the
station. The recent failure of that normally reliable craft reminds us
that the very existence of the ISS is now in jeopardy, and that we are
reliant on a single fragile lifeline that we have little insight into
or control over.
We should have an urgency to get a commercial service up and
operating as quickly as possible to close the Human Spaceflight
``Gap.'' I have no doubt that the U.S. aerospace industry (represented
by the companies here today) is up to the task. We have the ingenuity
and the inventiveness necessary to meet this national imperative.
The second reason the U.S. Government should invest in commercial
crew is that the private sector has the expertise to provide crew
transportation safely and can provide the best value to the taxpayer.
The companies competing for the commercial crew service include those
with decades of experience in NASA's human spaceflight program, such as
Boeing. Newer companies bring fresh ideas and the entrepreneurial
spirit like Sierra Nevada, Blue Origin and SpaceX. The private sector
already possesses the world's most reliable rocket with the Atlas V.
Affordability is maximized by several factors. Specifically, the
private sector can bring efficiencies in development and operations,
spurred by competition, unobtainable in a government owned and operated
system. In ULA's case, the government can take advantage of the
billions we and the Air Force have already invested and the synergy and
cost sharing with other users of those rockets like the DOD, NRO, NASA
science and commercial companies.
The third reason the U.S. Government should invest in commercial
crew is to stimulate and promote commercial human spaceflight-a policy
consistently supported by numerous Congresses and Administrations,
including in the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 and the most recent
National Space Policy. We believe this is the right policy and that
free and competitive markets create the most efficient conditions for
promoting economic development.
As an example, my good friend Bob Bigelow is a visionary with a
dream of a fleet of private space stations. His customer base will be
countries that want a space program but cannot buy or beg time on the
ISS. But Bob needs a safe and affordable transportation system to
orbit. NASA is in a unique position to create a transportation system
that can address the nation's needs for access to ISS, while also
providing an opportunity to unleash the power of the U.S. entrepreneur
in Low Earth Orbit.
We don't know if ideas like Bob Bigelow's are viable. There is
extremely high uncertainty in this market and NASA shouldn't build its
program assuming it materializes. But if a market does emerge, everyone
will benefit: new jobs will be created and the Government's prices will
go even lower, across both the civil and military sectors.
ULA support to Commercial Crew
Through NASA's investments in the Commercial Crew Development
(CCDev) program, the private industry is making great progress in
developing a crew delivery capability. ULA is proud to have been chosen
by three of the four CCDev contractors (Sierra-Nevada, Blue Origin and
Boeing) to provide launch services using the Atlas V launch system. We
and our customers believe the Atlas V is the right launch vehicle to
help establish commercial human spaceflight. From its roots as the
launch vehicle for the manned Mercury program in the 1960s, each new
generation of the Atlas system has demonstrated advancements in
reliability and performance. The Atlas program has a record of 98
consecutive successes, best in the world. Today's Atlas V is the
culmination of decades of improvements and lessons learned. The Atlas V
has launched 27 times with 100% success. A list of those launches is
included in Table 1. It is the only rocket certified by NASA to launch
Category 3 missions, a category reserved for NASA's most important
science missions, like Juno and the upcoming Mars Science Laboratory.
It is the only rocket in the world certified to launch nuclear payloads
to orbit, and it's entrusted to launch many of our nation's most
critical national security missions.
The next step for Atlas is to launch humans. If NASA's commercial
crew program is to be successful, every effort must be undertaken to
ensure the highest possible level of safety and reliability. A key
element of this is the rigorous process of human system certification.
Under a Space Act Agreement with NASA, we are conducting a
comprehensive assessment of the Atlas design against NASA's stringent
human certification requirements. This entails a part-by-part, system-
by-system review of the design, analysis and test pedigree of the
Atlas. We are also performing a detailed analysis of the hazards faced
by the crew and their mitigation as well as a Probabilistic Risk
Assessment for the launch of crew. My expectation is that the Atlas
will fare very well. This is because of the rigor and attention to
detail we applied during the original design and development process as
well as the flight demonstrated performance of the system through 27
successful missions.
We are also making excellent progress on the relatively few
modifications to the Atlas required to accommodate human launch. These
include the development of the emergency detection system (EDS), a
health monitoring system that will provide a signal to the spacecraft
to abort if a launch vehicle failure is imminent. A prototype of this
system was demonstrated last year in our high fidelity systems
integration lab, correctly detecting a wide range of potential failures
and sending the abort signal in time to ensure a safe abort. We are
progressing on the design of the modifications required at the launch
pad to accommodate getting crew into and out of the spacecraft. And
we're working with several spacecraft providers on the details to
integrate their systems to the Atlas.
Looking to the future, we believe NASA's recently announced plans
for the Commercial Crew Integrated Development Contract (CCIDC) strikes
the right balance between a commercial approach delivering innovation
and affordability and the appropriate level of certification and
oversight necessary to ensure safety. The importance of insight and
rigorous certification criteria has been highlighted by the recent
Soyuz failure. For new, unproven vehicles, you need the rigor even
more, in addition to establishing a track record of demonstrated and
repeatable success.
With adequate funding, Atlas could be ready to support test flights
in 2014 and operational flights in 2015.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we strongly believe NASA's commercial crew program
is vital to maintain our nation's leadership in human spaceflight. The
U.S. private sector has the expertise and experience to create safe and
affordable crew access to the ISS and potentially stimulate an entire
new economic sector with thousands of high tech jobs. Affordability is
greatly enhanced by the use of Atlas which leverages synergy with the
DOD, NRO, NASA Science and other users. With adequate funding, we can
be ready to launch crew within three to four years.
Thank you again for inviting me to testify. I look forward to your
questions.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Hall. And I thank you, and I thank all of you for
your testimony. Reminding Members that Committee rules limit
questions to five minutes. We will try to stay as close to that
five minutes as we can, and the Chair at this point will open
the round of questions. The Chair recognizes himself for five
minutes.
As I mentioned in my opening statement, some of us remain
very concerned that the promise of commercial markets could put
the government in the position of supporting or bailing out
companies in order to preserve a national capability, and I
hope we are wrong in this fear, and I hope we will hear more
from NASA on the next panel. But my questions to all the
companies on this panel are, and these are to each of you and
probably I will start with Mr. Elbon of Boeing, what are the
non-NASA commercial crew markets that you intend to serve and
what is your company's business case if there are no customers
other than NASA?
Mr. Elbon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As I mentioned in my
testimony, we are basing our business case, structuring our
business case so that it can close if all we do is transport
NASA crew to the space station.
Chairman Hall. And in your statement, does your company
have the financial backing to see this development program to a
conclusion? That is very important. I would like for you to
give us all the explanation you can on that.
Mr. Elbon. Okay, sir.
Chairman Hall. Quickly.
Mr. Elbon. Okay. So Boeing has a history of executing
several X Prize programs for the government. Often it takes
company investment to complete those but we have a track record
of moving into fixed price kinds of contracting and then
completing those contracts. That will be no different for
commercial crew. We of course are laying in a very good program
plan, one that we believe can be executed for the funding that
we propose and that will be available. But our track record of
executing on those I think speaks for itself.
Chairman Hall. All right. Mr. Lindsey?
Colonel Lindsey. Yes. For our business case in terms of
closing, we too think we can close, even if NASA is our only
business. I think that the challenge will be getting there in a
timely fashion based on the funding that we have, but that is
what we are proposing.
But let me expand a little bit on the market beyond NASA
because that is the question you asked, sir, and the areas that
we think that we have another markets is in cargo
transportation, potentially orbital servicing with our vehicle
because of its unique capabilities and additional ability to
maneuver in orbit, potentially orbit sensor and test bid
operations, and we talk about other businesses, other business
areas besides NASA. We think there may be other civil agencies
involved. There is some tourism involved, potentially military
agencies, DOD.
One thing I wanted to expand on was international markets.
The Russians in their flying participants or tourists on the
Soyuz actually flew a crew member from both South Korea and
Malaysia, so we think there is potential that other nations
would want to fly into space. Right now, the International
Space Station partnership is limited to the founding partners
and the crew slots on the space station are based on your
contribution to the development and the building of the space
station. But in the future we think there is a possibility that
you could open up the International Space Station to additional
international partners with additional capabilities.
Chairman Hall. All right. Mr. Musk.
Mr. Musk. So I will address that in a couple of ways. With
respect to the launch vehicle, as I mentioned earlier, we have
other 35 launches under contract. In fact, for the last few
years SpaceX has won more launch contracts than any other
company in the world, in fact, any other country in the world.
So I believe that the costs associated with the launch vehicle,
the rocket part, is well taken care of.
Then with respect to the spacecraft, we are slated already
to provide more cargo servicing missions to the space station
than any other organization. And since our cargo and crew
vehicle are essentially the same, it means that the cost of
crew is divided over all of those missions and so it results in
a great deal of efficiency and a great deal of reliability.
And then thirdly, I will put it in the Congressional
Record, I will personally guarantee this.
Chairman Hall. Mr. Precourt.
Colonel Precourt. Mr. Chairman, as a launch vehicle
provider, we don't have a lot of the same challenges that the
crewed spacecraft do from a business case standpoint. We are
addressing a number of opportunities that customers could
leverage Liberty. We are gearing it toward commercial crew
because that is the most difficult design part of a launch
vehicle. Once it has that capability, it can serve other
customers. I would like to point out NASA's NLS, NASA Launch
Services, system that has been in place very successfully for
many years, launches deep space probes, payloads, science
platforms. Those are missions of interest that Liberty could
certainly service as well as other missions for other
government agencies in the satellite and payload interest
areas, leveraging the capabilities and performance of a vehicle
designed for crew. Crew and cargo, other science missions and
other government agency payloads really give you the leverage
you need there, and we would be designing a common interface
that could handle multiple users of the launch vehicle.
Chairman Hall. And I thank you.
Dr. Sowers.
Dr. Sowers. Yes. We are a little bit different than some of
the other companies up here. Our investment is already
substantially made. Our rockets are flying today. The Atlas V
that has been chosen by Boeing, Sierra Nevada and Blue Origin
has already had 27 successful flights. We have an ongoing
business of roughly six to eight missions per year consisting
of DOD, National Reconnaissance Office, NASA science and
commercial customers, and commercial crew would be merely
adding one to two missions a year into that already robust
manifest and so our business case does not count on other
customers. We have been working with Bob Bigelow for a number
of years and so we are optimistic about a new market but also
my company lived through the EELV experience where we made
assumptions about a commercial market that didn't materialize
and so that scar tissue is very fresh and tender in our
memories.
Chairman Hall. And we thank you, and my time has expired by
almost a minute.
At this time I recognize Mrs. Johnson.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much. I have listened very
attentively and I am very excited about this possibility. What
I would like each of you to comment on is whether or not you
think Congress is justified in making this initiative at this
time, and what realistically do you expect of the U.S.
government? And thirdly, where are your potential markets for
now? I want to make sure I make efficent use of my time, if you
will start, Mr. Elbon.
Mr. Elbon. I think it is very important that commercial
crew exists as part of an enabling system to provide low-cost
transportation to ISS, affordable transportation, in such a
manner that there is funding left over in NASA's budget so that
we can invest in capabilities for exploration beyond low Earth
orbit. So I think that investment is prudent at this time.
You asked about other markets, I believe. We believe there
are--as others have said, there are certainly--it has been
demonstrated that there are individuals that would pay to fly
to station but there is also, through the opportunities that
Mr. Bigelow is putting in place, other countries in the world
that would like to have their own space program, can't afford
the infrastructure associated with that and so that business
model I think has a really good opportunity of maturing and
becoming an additionally commerce in low Earth orbit that can
be served by commercial crew transportation.
Chairman Hall. Go ahead, Ms. Johnson.
Ms. Johnson. I was waiting for Mr. Lindsey.
Colonel Lindsey. Yes, Congresswoman. The reason I think we
need to be back in the business of commercial crew, I think--as
I mentioned in my remarks, low Earth orbit access to me is a
vital interest to this country. When we retired the shuttle, we
are in a gap period where we don't have that access and we are
relying on the Russians and spending, as you mentioned earlier,
$450 million a year paying the Russians to provide that
service. I think it is very important that we get back into
that business and establish our preeminence in space. So that
is probably my primary reason. That is why I am doing what I am
doing and why I think it is really important.
In terms of the markets that you asked us about, as John
mentioned, there are some commercial individuals that could
afford to do that. I think our bigger market, though, is
potentially with other governments, going to the International
Space Station. We know for a fact that there is interest in
doing that for other nations, not just International Space
Station partners, and there is, we think, there is interest in
doing other sorts of mission with our vehicle like satellite
servicing and things like that like we have done in the past
with space shuttle.
Mr. Musk. As I mentioned, with respect to the rockets,
those costs, those are a given. So then with respect to the
cargo version of the spacecraft, those costs are also given
because we are already doing that for NASA, so we have a high
certainty associated with those so it is really what is
incremental to carry crew, and we anticipate that that is
perhaps no more than about a 20 percent increment to carry
crew, primarily related to the launch escape system and
improved life support systems. And in fact, again, I am willing
to go on record and say that at a launch rate of four crewed
flights per year, we are willing to commit in current-year
dollars to $140 million per fight with a seven-astronaut
contingent so that would mean $20 million per astronaut and
compares very favorably with what we are currently paying the
Russians, which is $63 million per astronaut. So you have it on
record.
Colonel Precourt. Congresswoman, I think the investment, as
you asked, is necessary and urgent. We are many years behind
replacing the shuttle capability. I would also add that your
opening remarks were spot on. There are a number of questions
that I would vouch for the fact that we in industry are poised
and ready with a very capable workforce to go execute this job.
Between the Congress and NASA, the Administration and industry,
we are poised and capable, more than capable but a lot of
strategy and acquisition and the methods to get to the goal
line need to be laid out so that we can perform very well under
the right conditions, so I think you have asked all the right
questions.
Dr. Sowers. Thank you, Congresswoman. I think our
investment in commercial crew is justified, first of all, to
protect the investment that we have made in the International
Space Station. Right now the Soyuz is the only means of
transportation to the ISS, and we have seen just recently that
as reliable as the Soyuz has been historically, anyone can have
a bad day, and if we have a bad day, then there is no access to
the ISS, much less American-provided access to the ISS.
Secondly, in terms of markets we do think there is
potential for additional markets for this capability. If that
is true, then it will generate a tremendous number of jobs
right here in the United States servicing these other markets.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you. My time is expired.
Chairman Hall. Thank you, Ms. Johnson. You were exactly
five minutes. That is just perfection.
I ask the gentleman from California to take his five
minutes. Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just note before I ask my questions that I have been
surprised by a number of things in my 24 years here in
Congress, but one of the things that I have been surprised the
most about is the hostility that seems to be expressed towards
depending on and helping promote commercial space alternatives
to just government approaches to things like transportation,
and this has been much to my dismay that all of the worst
elements of decision making, for example, of what I call space
pork and just focusing on one's own district and what
government spending can be directed to one's district seems to
be having a major effect on a decision that is so important to
America's future as to how we will proceed into space, and I
consider this to be a historic moment for our country and for
this anti-commercial space alternative attitude that I see. I
think it could have very grave consequences. We had, for
example, the post office early on did have a fleet of
airplanes, and we decided, it was decided by our country, that
it would be better to contract out airmail rather than having
the government run a fleet of airplanes, and I think that
decision went a long way in helping make sure that America was
the number one aviation power on this planet, and I would have
to say that had we had the other approach, perhaps we would
have had a much more bureaucratic development of our aviation
capabilities, and certainly we wouldn't have thought that
having the government run airliners that only the government
can run, what would that have done to America's competitive
position in the world on some of the most important
technological developments of the last century.
With that said, we have got some problems within the
government in terms of approaching commercial, and I am not
sure if it is based on hostility to commercialism or it is just
a belief that we ought to have more government controls over
everything, but there is a fight now between these two
approaches of these contracts that the Federal Government is
approaching with these private sector companies. Apparently, we
have in the past--what we have and also with other types of
situation, we have a Federal Acquisition Regulation which is
FAR, which is a more traditional way of contracting with
companies but we have instituted with the development of this
commercial alternative, at least for the development stage, a
system based on the Space Act agreements, and I would just ask
very quickly for a comment from each one of you, and it has to
be quick because I only have a couple minutes left. Is this
vitally important that we move forward with an approach that
was dictated by the Space Act agreement which of course I
understand brings down the amount of bureaucratic costs to each
one of your projects? What does that mean to your projects and
your approach to space, the FAR versus Space Act agreement
approach? Just a little bit from each one.
Mr. Elbon. Thank you, Congressman. Two quick comments or
responses to your question. The first is, I think it is very
important that we differentiate the kind of model that we are
using for something like transportation to low Earth orbit that
we have been doing for 50 years in capsules, it is understood,
the challenges are understood, versus exploration beyond low
Earth orbit that is a new thing, very much not understood, more
complex, more challenging, so the level of NASA involvement in
those two programs, the dependence on contractors in those two
programs needs to be very different, in my view.
The second thing you asked was about a FAR versus SAA. I
would say that from our perspective, this can be done with
either of those instruments as long as the right environment is
being put in place. Boeing will execute this with the same
processes and procedures for design, for parts traceability,
for configuration management, for all those kinds of things,
not because the contract drives us to do that, we do these
things in government programs and commercial programs like
commercial airplanes because it is necessary to do those kind
of things to develop a safe and reliable vehicle that can
provide good transportation.
Colonel Lindsey. Yes, Congressman. Up to this point, we
have been executing under the Space Act agreements in the last
couple of phases, and it has worked very well for us. We have
been able to move very, very quickly, co-invest our own money,
and basically retire a lot of technology risk, and that is how
it has really helped us out. Eventually as a program develops,
you have to reach a point where you want to go a firm fixed
price and you want to have some chance of meeting cost and
schedule. That is really important to everybody. The advantage
of the Space Act agreement, it gets you to the point where you
can go to a FAR-based contract and succeed, and that is kind of
where we are now and so the question is, when is the right time
to transition, and right now, NASA is suggesting that the next
phase is the right time to transition. Either way, our company
will execute, but again, the Space Act agreements enabled us to
move quickly and we think we can execute under FAR-based as
well.
Mr. Musk. The COTS approach has been, I think, very
effective. To the degree that it can be extended, that is
desirable. If it can't, then as we transition to FAR-based
contracts, it is important that if the prices are fixed, that
the terms are fixed and that they are based on clear hardware-
based milestones. The challenge that will come with the FAR
contract is if the prices are fixed but the terms are not, if
the terms change over time. I think that is just common sense.
But I am increasingly optimistic that it can be made to work
under the right sort of FAR-based contract.
Colonel Precourt. Congressman, I would echo the comments
from my colleagues here. I think just trying to decide based on
FAR versus SAA kind of misses the point. We need to have a
mechanism that enables performance and accountability, and we
can perform under firm, fixed prices, John mentioned with low
Earth orbit, and our understanding of it. I think it comes down
to setting the organizational construct within the agreements
and we can make that happen. I think NASA is stepping up in
that way. They have taken the advantage of the FAR's ability to
be streamlined and enable us to perform in a streamlined
fashion.
Dr. Sowers. Congressman, ULA is comfortable operating under
a wide range of different contracting environments. We are
comfortable with the SAA. In fact, the entire development of
the EELV program was done under the OTA, the Other Transaction
Authority, of the FAR which is like a Space Act. We are also
very comfortable under the FAR acquisition approach but the one
caution is that the requirements in the contract need to be
understood very well up front, and especially in this case, the
human rating requirements.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and I
would like to submit for the record at this point an article in
Space News by Mike Gold, who works for the Bigelow company, who
is expressing his view on the regulatory requirements of the
FAR approach versus the Space Act agreements approach. Thank
you very much.
Chairman Hall. Without objection, it will be put in the
record.
[The information appears in Appendix II:]
Chairman Hall. And I think it ought to be stated in the
record too that NASA has put around $320 million in already,
and most of the recipients are in this room and they are
planning $4 to $6 billion that these folks will be competing
for, and we are trying to make that a level competition. We
just need to be sure that whoever bids can do more than sign a
contract, and that the fears that you all are here to allay,
and I thank you for your comments. I don't totally agree with
them but I always admire you for making them.
Next, Mr. Clarke from Michigan.
Mr. Clarke. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
This question is for anybody who chooses to address it, but
in particular for Mr. Musk. Essentially, how can the
technologies developed for the Commercial Crew Program create
jobs outside of the space industry, especially jobs in the
automotive industry? The reason why I ask that primarily is
because of the region that I represent, which is Detroit and
includes metro Detroit. Now, the city that I was born and
raised in, it has been affected by many tough economic forces
that is creating a lot of blight in the city, so as a result,
we just have acres and acres of vacant, abandoned land but it
also has the infrastructure that you need--the roads, the water
lines, the sewers. Also, on the positive side, we have the best
manufacturing know-how around and the best trained workforce,
and the best engineers in the country in metropolitan Detroit.
Typically, when U.S. auto manufacturers sell more U.S.-made
automobiles to folks that live in the United States, that
creates jobs not only for Detroit but for our entire country,
and in particular, Mr. Musk, you referenced the power of
innovation resulting from the free enterprise system, you know,
your career in business, you are a personal example of that
success and growth. And in particular, I received information
that your suppliers made around $2 almost $3 million in
supplier purchases in Michigan.
So essentially it is this. This technology that you are
working on, can it be leveraged to create jobs outside of the
space industry to help revitalize certain areas in this country
like metropolitan Detroit? I believe the answer is yes, but if
you could help illustrate that for the record, any of you, that
would be appreciated.
Mr. Musk. I actually have quite a bit of knowledge of and
respect for the automotive industry, and in fact, if you think
about the amazing things that the automotive industry does,
they create these man-rated devices called cars which are
supposed to last for ten years and provide incredible safety
over that period of time, and yet cost only a few tens of
thousands of dollars. That is actually amazing, when you think
about it. So I have really been pushing SpaceX to use more and
more automotive suppliers because the quality is actually so
good. And in fact, for our Merlin engine, I will give you one
example, we use a company called Experimental, which does the
engine jackets, outer engine jackets on our engines and does an
amazing job, and we are actually hiring people from the
automotive industry to bring more of that expertise and cross-
pollinate into the space industry and bring the decades of
expertise and trillions of dollars that have been spent on
automotive and apply that effectively to that space industry. I
very much agree with your point.
Dr. Sowers. I have got one example from my company. We are
currently working with a company in Michigan in the Detroit
area called Rausch to take piston engine technology from the
automotive industry and apply it to rocket engines.
Traditionally, rocket engines have been turbo pump-based but we
are doing some research right now that says that piston pumps
could be superior to turbo pumps for certain applications and
the precision machining capability that we found at this
company is just absolutely amazing and so we are actually
looking to bring automotive technology back into the aerospace
industry.
Mr. Elbon. I will just add, Congressman, that through the
history of space, investments in space exploration have spun
off incredible industries in the United States. As an example,
the telecommunication industry, the computer industry, those
all were spawned by technologies developed in space. It is
often difficult to predict what the next technologies will be
but there is certainly a proven track record of that investment
returning a dividend.
Colonel Precourt. Congressman, I would add that one of the
things we share in common is the manufacturing of high-tech
equipment, and the automotive industry has a lot of cross-
pollination. We have in our company several who have come from
the automotive industry to help us with manufacturing lean
processes that really increase the performance and cost value
of the product, and likewise it has gone back the other way and
that continues I think as we cross-pollinate and we share
technologies that excite and enable improvement in both
industries.
Mr. Clarke. Thank you. Just with the brief time I have,
representing metropolitan Detroit and also now newly appointed
as a Member of the Science and Aeronautics Subcommittee, which
I think is an extraordinary tie-in, we can show how investing
in space technology can mean growth for jobs and a stronger
U.S. economy over time, so I look forward to that type of
partnership. Thank you very much.
Chairman Hall. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Hultgren of Illinois.
Mr. Hultgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all
for being here. I really appreciate the amazing work that you
have done and continue to do. I am very excited about the
future.
I have a couple of questions. Mr. Musk, I wonder if I could
start and ask you a question quickly. Vertical integration is
something certainly that is new to the space industry. I wonder
if you could speak to how much you currently outsource to other
U.S. subcontractors and how much you plan in the future to do
that, and as a percentage of government program dollars, what
is that percentage and how much trickles back to other smaller
companies across the United States of the work that you are
doing at SpaceX?
Mr. Musk. So at SpaceX, we make all the major components of
the vehicle in-house so the engine, air frame, avionics and
launch operation. However, feeding into that are a vast number
of smaller suppliers. Now, we have to do the major components
internally in order to achieve a revolutionary improvement in
the cost of space transportation because to the degree that we
inherited the legacy components, we would inherit the legacy
limitations and costs. But we have several hundred suppliers
throughout the country and I mentioned some in the automotive
industry. By value, if you look at our expenditures on a weekly
basis, about half of the money is spent internally and about
half is spent externally.
Mr. Hultgren. Thank you.
I wonder for all of you, if you could address, the name of
NASA's Commercial Crew Program implies a significant amount of
private investment and not simply government funding. We have
talked about that a lot today and really that discussion, of
how important it is. I wondered if briefly each of you could
discuss just how much private investment is going into your
company's commercial crew program beyond the government funding
from NASA and the Department of Defense, and if you are not
willing to say an amount due to proprietary concerns, I wonder
if you could give a range or percentage.
Mr. Elbon. Congressman, I would characterize that our
program includes the preponderance of the investment from the
government. I think this is important for a couple of reasons.
In order to keep the services prices low, it is important that
there not be a significant investment that requires a return on
that. I think it is also important that the government can be
assured that a product and a service will be delivered and that
the government won't make an investment that doesn't realize
that because the company couldn't follow through with the
investment that it was required to make.
Colonel Lindsey. And Congressman, for us, we are a private
company, so one thing that is unique about us is that because
we are a private company, we invest a significant amount of
money into R&D each year into various business areas. For this
program, we are passionate about it, our owners are passionate
about it, and our percentage right now we are running is
somewhere around 40 percent is what we are investing.
Mr. Musk. Well, if you looked at, say, our expenditures
through the end of last year, our total expenditures of SpaceX
time including every check we have written, we are about $800
million, and approximately 300 of that came from the
government, so 500 private.
Mr. Hultgren. Okay. Thank you.
Colonel Precourt. Congressman, in the case of Liberty, our
concept, as I mentioned, was to leverage developed and flying
elements so it has required a large amount of the startup cost
and also the amount of cost you have to recoup through pricing
and operations. So we have an integration cost to go to make
these two elements fly together. We are leveraging huge
investment from both European Space Agency and NASA on previous
systems, so we have a little bit different problem in terms of
business case, but we are poised to have greater than 50
percent of that remaining cost for development come from
outside investment. And as I mentioned, it also does require a
head nod from our customers that there is a commitment to the
design and enabling the investors to climb onboard.
Dr. Sowers. So from United Launch Alliance perspective, the
rockets we are planning to use for commercial crew for Boeing,
Sierra Nevada, and Blue Origin were substantially developed
under commercial funds; about 80 percent of the cost of the ELB
development was commercial. Going forward, the investments to
human rate are quite modest and we are currently funding our
participation in the Commercial Crew Program with ULA internal
funds.
Mr. Hultgren. Thank you. I just have a few seconds left,
but if I can ask you each quickly just a two-sentence answer of
just terminology. I wondered if you could each describe your
definition of what ``commercial'' means.
Mr. Elbon. In the environment that we are in, I think
``commercial'' means that we are working towards developing
markets in addition to NASA. I think that we are doing this as
a company with reduced government involvement as compared to
programs that we have done in the past and that we are doing
this in at least a fixed-price environment where the financial
risk for performance is on the companies that are
participating.
Colonel Lindsey. Sir, for us I would define ``commercial''
much as John did in terms of we have other markets we are
looking at and we are co-investing and participating. Probably
the most significant difference between what--now and what we
have done in the past is when we are done with this and when we
go contract for services to orbit, instead of the government
actually owning the entire vehicle and operating it, they will
actually pay for services where we own the vehicle and operate
it jointly with them.
Mr. Musk. Yeah, I think you are going to hear much the same
answer, but essentially, ``commercial'' would mean that the
commercial companies are deciding on the design but NASA is
deciding on the objective. These are the standards and the
objectives that need to be achieved, but then the solution to
those standards and objectives is arrived at backed by the
commercial company. And then secondly--that in terms of the
funding that goes into making it happen--that there is a
substantial portion of our funding that comes from entities
other than the government.
Colonel Precourt. Congressman, I might offer a little
different perspective based on a number of proposed programs
that we have for different customers. We have everything from
the range of a small rocket motor that serves the Pegasus
launching for Orion all the way up through the space shuttle
and in between. We have Minuteman missiles and the Trident
missiles for the government. And in the purest sense,
``commercial'' means that we as the company would invest in the
development completely, and then it would be based on a return
on a number of sales of that product, whether it be a
government or another buyer would purchase enough that we could
recoup that investment. We do some of those in proposing and we
do others that are purely cost-plus where the government takes
on the risk.
I think in this particular environment, we are trying to
get towards the place where the businesses can invest and there
is enough there, but in the case of what we are doing here
today, I don't know that there is enough market to draw that.
So we are moving in a direction where I believe the advantage
will be getting some of the benefits of outside investment
while delivering on a valuable product. And I think it is
laudable to try to get to a place where we are streamlined in
the interface between the government and the contractors.
Dr. Sowers. I think in the context of the Commercial Crew
Program, it means that the government is purchasing a service
from a private company using a commercial contract. And in that
sense, all of NASA's science missions are performed that way,
as well as all of our military space launches and intelligence
community's space launches are done that way with the
government purchasing a service from a private company.
Mr. Hultgren. Again, thank you all.
Chairman, I have gone over. I yield back. Thank you.
Chairman Hall. Thank you for yielding back. And it might
have been more in keeping with our thrust if we had the Virgin
Galactic people here. Ms. Johnson and I were just talking about
them. I don't know what Galactic means but I think their space
port out there that they, for suborbital flights, it might be
of interest to the gentleman's questions there. And it would be
of interest to everybody here. We will look into that later.
Mr. Tonko of New York, you have five minutes.
Mr. Tonko. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Good morning, gentleman, and thank you for your testimony.
Let me direct this to you--each of you. If a commercial
launch vehicle experiences a serious anomaly or failure, what
should NASA require of the companies before they are allowed to
resume flights carrying NASA astronauts?
Mr. Elbon. I would assume as we go forward that we will
follow processes and approaches like we have used for Space
Shuttle, Space Station, other programs that have carried crew
into orbit. If there is an incident, it is very important to
stand down, understand what that incident is, resolve that
incident, and fix whatever needs to be fixed before we proceed.
So we will need to do things like that as we move forward.
Colonel Lindsey. From my perspective, exactly the same
thing--a full investigation needs to happen. I think the
entities involved, be it the government or other folks
involved, need full insight into what happened, what is going
on, full investigation, study, basically nail the problem--or
pound the problem down flat is a must as we have done in the
past when we had anomalies. And we eventually need something
called a Flight Readiness Review that everybody has to agree,
including with the same opinions exposed before we are ready to
go back to flight and follow a very disciplined pass--path much
like NASA has done in the past.
Mr. Tonko. Mr. Musk?
Mr. Musk. I agree with those comments. NASA is
fundamentally the customer and the customer decides what they
want to do next so------
Mr. Tonko. Mr. Precourt?
Colonel Precourt. Congressman, its root cause and then
corrective action. And getting to the root cause is somewhat
technically challenging at times and it requires a degree of
openness and collaboration across both sides of the interface
between the customer and getting to really, truly understanding
what that root cause is such that the corrective action can be
appropriately designed to it.
Mr. Tonko. Dr. Sowers?
Dr. Sowers. NASA already has a working model of what you
are talking about for the science missions that they purchase
commercially, and they have a very rigorous certification
process, that has different levels, depending on the importance
of the payload. And once you are certified, if there is an
anomaly, then there is a process of going back through the
anomaly investigation, corrective action, and then there is a
recertification that has to occur back to those same standards
of rigor.
Mr. Tonko. In the case of those circumstances, who should
bear the cost?
Mr. Elbon. That will be something that we will need to
focus on and work as we go forward and develop the services
contract. Clearly, if that risk is on the provider, the cost of
service will need to be a higher amount in order to cover that
risk. If the government decides to carry that risk, the price
of the service could be lowered. So I think it is a cost-risk
trade that will be made as we go forward and work on the
services contract. Clearly, the provider community needs to
step up and bear its share of that risk.
Colonel Lindsey. Yeah, I agree. I think it will be a cost-
risk trade, but ultimately, just like in design, it is our
responsibility to design it adequately and test it adequately
before we go flying. It is part of the root cause investigation
when you have an anomaly. We will have to get at the root cause
and that will be part of the determination, I think, as what
caused the problem. And as a result of that, then, will
probably determine who bears the most cost in this case.
Mr. Musk. Yeah, I think it is a shared cost situation. I
think there are parallels here in aviation, automotive, and--
yeah, so it is going to be a shared cost so------
Colonel Precourt. Congressman, I think the Ranking Minority
Member stated it very well with the indemnity question. I think
that, as John mentioned, the services contract would be laid
out such that it is clear to a certain degree. There are some
very low probability events with very extremely high costs that
we as companies probably would not be able to cover, and that
is where the indemnification comes in is at what level does
that occur and how would it be handled. When we fly off a
range, there is a presumption of certification with the Air
Force, and some of those costs--certainly for government
missions--are borne beyond a certain liability level that
protects us all.
Dr. Sowers. I think I agree with my colleagues up here.
Everyone up here has every incentive to make sure all of our
missions are successful. The viability of our companies depends
on being successful. The question of liability I think is one
that we need to work on in the future. On commercial space
missions right now, there is the Commercial Space Launch Act,
which does provide some indemnification of third parties off of
government ranges.
Mr. Tonko. Finally, Mr. Chair, if I might, are there any
assurances--other assurances that you can offer the Members
that there would be no additional hidden cost to taxpayers in
the event of failure or anomaly?
Mr. Elbon. I would offer that that will be specified in the
contracts that we have and it will be up to us to honor those
contracts. There are lots of contracts the Boeing Company has
with the government, and it is very important for us to execute
on those and honor those if we are going to continue as a
responsible company doing business with the government. So we
will be highly motivated to do that.
Colonel Lindsey. Part of the philosophy of this whole
Commercial Crew Program is to be a firm, fixed price pay for
services, no hidden costs, know exactly what we are getting
into, so I think as mentioned by my colleagues, we need to nail
down the indemnification and how we are going to do that before
we proceed and have that as part of the contract. And then we
will know so there won't be any surprises. But I think it is
really important we nail that down before we proceed forward
with services contracts.
Mr. Musk. I think it is tempting to think of space as
somehow fundamentally different from other modes of transport,
but I think it is not. It is a new mode of transport, or a
newer mode of transport, but I think there are many parallels
with other modes of transport. And NASA, for instance,
purchases air tickets on airlines. And in a sense, that is
extending that model to space flight. It works very well with
airliners. So I don't think that this is something that should
be a very fundamental concern because of parallels to other
industries.
Colonel Precourt. I would just echo from John and Steve
that setting out the right ground rules in the contract for
services is really the way to address that--I completely agree
with that--and being as detailed as you can up front so it is
well understood and managed. We are all here to serve the
customer and if we don't, then we won't be a producer for them
for long------
Dr. Sowers. Yeah, I agree. As we get further down the road
with it, all those details will be worked out and at that point
there will be no hidden costs.
Mr. Tonko. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Hall. The gentleman yields back.
We all have other questions. In fact, I would like to ask
about NASA oversight, what they think is necessary for the
safety of passengers and the crew, but each of us will have the
right to write to you and give you a reasonable amount of time
to answer those questions. And we are trying to be as thorough
as we can and let everybody ask all the questions they can
while we have you here. That is how important you are to us.
Mo Brooks, you are recognized for five minutes.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
NASA is pursuing a commercial approach to crew
transportation to the International Space Station. While the
word ``commercial'' has been used, I am not really sure how it
is used and how this approach actually exists when put against
the traditional definition of commercial. And I would like to
get a better understanding of the business approaches that we
might be using when we use this word ``commercial.'' And I do
it in this context:
It does not seem to me that there is really a commercial
market in the normal sense that you might have with airline
flights or you might have with food or anything else where you
have a large base of people out there that want to demand
consumption of whatever good or service that might be produced.
In fact, if I were to look at it in terms of private sector,
non-NASA crew transportation, it would appear to me that the
market is somewhere between minimal and nonexistent. You might
read about the random private person who will pay money to go
up in space using a Russian aircraft--excuse me--spacecraft,
but that seems to be the extent of it.
And if that is the case that there is not truly a private
sector commercial market that space launch companies can
pursue, then I am very much concerned that we might be running
into a case of inverse economies of scale. With economies of
scale, generally speaking, the more you produce of something,
economies of scale come into place and that product or service,
whatever it is that you are producing, the price goes down
again because of economies of scale. And when I say inverse
economies of scale, I am talking about where we have a limited
market, if it is limited just to NASA, and we keep creating
more and more companies competing for that constant slice of
the pie, then in fact we are going to have increasing cost per
launch rather than decreasing cost per launch.
With that concern on the record, please, if each of you
would, describe for me what actions are you taking to fully
explore the non-NASA crew transportation market or search for
customers in the private sectors; and second, what would be the
impact to your NASA pricing if you fail to capture these
commercial opportunities in the private sector? And I am
limiting it to human spaceflight. So with that, if all of you
could respond and assist as best you can with helping us better
understand the impact of this plethora of companies pursuing
what appears to be a rather constant human spaceflight market.
Mr. Elbon. Thank you, Congressman. I will start by agreeing
with your assessment of the market. I think that there
definitely is potential for a commercial market. It is in my
view, not well defined, the depth of it is difficult to
estimate, and so developing a business case that depends on it
is a difficult thing. So we have chosen to develop a system
that will be affordable if the only transportation that we do
is government transportation to ISS, that the investment, et
cetera, will allow us to do that at a reasonable basis.
In parallel, though, we are also working hard to develop a
commercial market independent of that. We have teamed with
Space Adventures, who is the company that brokered the flights
you mentioned to International Space Station on the Russian
rockets, and also with Bigelow Aerospace to help provide a
reliable transportation system so that Bigelow's business model
serving countries who can't afford their own space program but
would like to send astronauts to the space station.
So I think the fundamental thing is to develop a capability
based on the transportation to space station, but at the same
time, work really hard to cultivate this adjacent commercial
market, and then as that matures, the cost for the NASA
transportation will go down.
Mr. Brooks. That was a part of my question. Have you or
anybody else been able to ascertain any private sector market
for human spaceflight, and if so, can you give us a judgment as
to how many you anticipate on the private sector you could take
into space on an annual basis within five or ten years?
Mr. Elbon. We traveled with Mr. Bigelow to Farnborough
about a year and a half ago now and met with several of his
potential clients. As I mentioned, there are sovereign
entities, countries that would like to have their own space
program, and we met with six of those, and I can tell you from
that conversation that if there is a Bigelow Space Complex that
exists and that is dependent on reliable transportation that
those countries are willing to sign up now to do that. So I
think the potential is there for a significant number of
flights to low Earth orbit, but as I said, we aren't basing our
business model on that because we don't want to not be able to
execute the primary business of taking U.S. crew to space
station and have that be dependent on this commercial market
maturing.
Colonel Lindsey. Yes, Congressman, we also are basing our
business model on the core business, which is taking U.S.
astronauts back and forth to the International Space Station,
but we have been doing a lot of work looking at other markets.
We think there are significant markets out there or we wouldn't
be doing this investing of our own company's money in it. We
think that foreign governments, other countries have already
flown with the Russians and there are a lot of them out there
that would like to join, I think, the international partnership
that we have with the space station that is not there.
One thing I would like to point out is that the current ops
concepts for how we operate the International Space Station is
really based on our ability to launch and land and get resupply
up to space station. And I would suggest to you that if that
paradigm changes in the future, if we are successful, that ops
concept will change as well just as aircraft have evolved over
time and ended up doing missions you never expected them to
start doing.
So I think there is a market there. I think the more we fly
up in space, the cheaper the launch costs get. There is an
economy of scale there. And so for all these reasons, we think
there is a market--a significant market well beyond just the
core of transporting astronauts to the space station.
Mr. Musk. I think your concern about inverse economies is a
good one, I think it applies only to a portion of the cost per
flight. If you look at the cost per flight for transporting
astronauts to the space station, at least in the case of
SpaceX, about 40 percent of that is the rocket, about 40
percent of that is the non-manned elements of the spacecraft,
and then maybe 20 percent incrementally is the human element.
For the--for rockets, we already have two-thirds of our
launches with commercial entities. So NASA has about one-third
of our missions; two-thirds go to launching commercial and
communications and broadcast satellites and that kind of thing.
For the spacecraft, driving the spacecraft, we already will
be doing roughly four, perhaps going up to six missions per
year for cargo transport to the space station. And it is the
same basic spacecraft that is used for human elements. So it is
really just that remaining 20 percent where there is
potentially a concern of inverse economies of scale.
However, I would like to make another prediction which is
that in ten years there will be more commercial flights--manned
flights to space than there will be government. I am quite
confident of that. But we need to have constantly improving
technology. The cost needs to get lower because there are only
a few people that can afford to spend $20 or $30 million just
to go to space.
Colonel Precourt. Congressman, thanks for your question. I
agree with your assessment of the market, and as a launch
vehicle provider, we are looking at broader markets for other
users besides crew through a common interface with multiple
payloads, whether it be crew cargo, science, other satellite
missions, et cetera. And so we need to be able to leverage a
market that is broad like that to make this work.
I would like to add to that, though, that what I would hope
would emerge from this commercial approach for NASA is a better
outcome in terms of cost affordability for a highly reliable
product. And what we learned with Constellation and with
Shuttle and other programs is that it comes down to how you
organize with your people as to how much it is going to cost in
the long term, both on the government's side and the
contractor's side. And we at ATK have streamlined to the degree
about 50 percent of our overheads in the last two years with
essentially the same production capabilities, and that is due
to the way we organize both internally and with the interface
to the customer. We were able to do that because we have
customer interfaces of a broad nature, all the way from pure
commercial where we invested in the product and delivered it
from our own internal monies and had a market that pulled on it
to return that investment all the way to the full cost-plus
that you are familiar with.
So in doing so, we talk a lot about, okay, so in
theoretical terms, how do you get to a point which is optimum
from a customer-contractor interface so that there is not too
much oversight and not too little? And we began to look at it
in quantifiable means and measure, and there have been a number
of reports on this, but you can look a lot of my programs, and
they range in two ratios that are of interest. One is what we
call the contractors' workforce in support to touch labor
ratio. Those ratios range in industry from anywhere from one-
half of a person for every person producing a product to over
three people that are doing support work for the touch labor
people.
Then you look at that total labor ratio of the industry to
the government, and the programs range from one industry--
sorry, one government person for every four in the industry in
the contract all the way to 20 industry for each government
member on the contract. And so we need to use those metrics to
try to drive ourselves to an optimum position, and I would hope
that as we strive in this commercial crew process, we can get
to those. I have seen in a lot of our commercial programs that
the safety records remain very, very high even though those
ratios of labor across the interfaces are much lower.
Dr. Sowers. Congressman, United Launch Alliance is not
planning to develop new rockets to support commercial crew. We
are going to use the rockets that are currently flying NASA
science and military payloads all built in Decatur, Alabama.
From a market-sized standpoint, I agree with the rest of the
panel up here that the commercial market is highly uncertain,
but I think there are promising business plans like Bob
Bigelow's and the traffic models I have seen from Mr. Bigelow's
business plan are truly stunning. They could get the industry
into a launch rate that we have never experienced before,
doubling or tripling the demand that we currently see out
there. So the promise is very high; the uncertainty is also
very high.
Mr. Brooks. I thank the gentlemen for your insight. And Mr.
Chairman, thank you for allowing these witnesses to go way
beyond my allotted time.
Chairman Hall. Your time really has expired. Thank you. But
good questions and good answers. Thank you.
Now, I recognize Mrs. Lofgren, gentlelady from California.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This is I think a very important hearing because really I
think the gentleman from Alabama's question is a good one. I
have been enthusiastically supporting this effort, but the
question is whether we are helping a transition or whether this
is it. And there is no way to know that at this point except
that the payoff is so enormous that we have to take some risks
sometimes. And that is I think what we are doing at this point.
I think it is a risk worth taking.
But I--one of the things I would like to know--I mean we
need to have a safe product. And I am interested if you can
each tell me what is the most challenging aspect of meeting
NASA's safety requirements that you are facing today?
Mr. Elbon. So we are accustomed to NASA's safety
requirements, having worked on Shuttle and Station most
recently, but Apollo, Gemini, Mercury before that. It is kind
of ingrained in what we do, so things like safety reviews,
design reviews, traceability, configuration management, all of
those processes are baked into our system.
And as I mentioned earlier, we have learned over the years
that it is not a function of whether it is a government program
or commercial program that you use those processes; we have
learned that in order to have a safe, reliable transportation
system, you must follow processes like that.
Ms. Lofgren. Um-hum.
Mr. Elbon. And so the same kinds of things that we have
done in the past on Shuttle, Space Station, and other programs
will be implemented in our Commercial Crew Program.
Colonel Lindsey. Yes, Congresswoman, as far as the most
challenging single safety aspect, we don't really have one
technical issue that is the most challenging. We also follow a
process. The process is very disciplined. It is very known.
Having flown on Shuttle, I really appreciate the safety process
because it kept me safe, and that is exactly the same kind of
process we are implementing in our design and our development
in terms of safety reviews, putting the SNNA processes
together, tracking all those, identifying all of our hazards,
identifying our failure tolerance and establishing that.
The challenging part is doing all of it--the verification
and validation of that. And our approach to those have been to
team very, very closely with NASA and have them involved from
the very beginning looking over from a safety standpoint,
looking over our designs, identifying early those areas that we
may not have enough tolerance, for example, in fixing those
early. So it is process--it is a continual process. The most
important thing is to stay vigilant and stay on top of that
process all the way through, and that has been our approach.
Mr. Musk. Well, the single toughest thing I think having
gone through this with our Dragon spacecraft approaching the
space station, where it has to be a human rate system because
it is a robotic spaceship that is approaching and berthing
robotically with the space station, which is $100 billion asset
and it has astronauts from several countries on board. The
biggest challenge is two-failure tolerance. So in other words,
you have to be able to fail any two things at any time and
still be okay. And when you consider all the systems on a
spacecraft, that is just very difficult to achieve. We have
been able to achieve it and we are going through--this is the
final verification now, but that was the single most
challenging thing.
Colonel Precourt. Congresswoman, we also have had decades
of human rating considerations driven into our processes, and
our partner on Liberty, Astrium Corporation, similarly on the
Ariane 5, which was designed with human rating in it for the
Hermes space plane that Europe had planned brings our elements
already to the table understanding and integrating human
rating. The distinction that is being made at NASA right now,
it is one thing to be human-rated; it is yet another to be
determined that you are certified. So these new systems that we
are bringing onboard have to go through a certification process
even if we bring a human-rated full understanding of the
requirements for human rating into the design. The question
that we have is what will be the extent of the certification
process that is not well known to us yet? And how many testing
and verification activities and the cost of those will we have
to include in our planning?
Dr. Sowers. Congresswoman, we are also very accustomed to
the rigor that is required to have repeatable success,
especially given the nature of the payload to be launched for
the national security community. I would say one of the
interesting challenges that we are faced with is providing the
abort capability, and this is one thing that all of the systems
that are being talked about for Commercial Crew that Space
Shuttle didn't have and that is the ability to sense an
impending failure of the launch vehicle and to have the
spacecraft come back safe and sound with the crew intact. And
working out all those different abort scenarios is a very
interesting challenge. I think it is also very worthwhile.
Ms. Lofgren. I would just say, Mr. Chairman, looking at the
timeline that NASA has provided, it is really not until 2017
that we are looking to get this mission accomplished. To me,
coming from Silicon Valley, that seems like an awfully long
time. Is there any possibility that we could significantly
reduce that time frame in your judgment with the private sector
involvement that we have?
Mr. Elbon. Congresswoman, the baseline plan that we have
laid in place has us flying by late 2015. That, of course, is a
function of funding. And I think it is also a function, as NASA
goes forward with the program, how many providers they decide
to carry and so how many providers will that funding be divided
amongst. But certainly with adequate funding we can be ready to
go by the end of 2015 and so start in earnest missions in 2016.
Colonel Lindsey. Congresswoman, our internal plan also has
us starting to fly by the end of 2015, so I have heard the 2017
number from NASA and I haven't talked to NASA about that
number. But our internal number is 2015, and again, if we get
adequate funding and--we will accelerate. If we don't get
adequate funding, then the schedule is the one thing that has
to give.
Mr. Musk. Yeah, I totally agree. Six years seems like
infinity. So SpaceX has only been around for nine years. During
that time we developed from scratch two launch vehicles and
flew them and complex spacecraft and flew that. So I would be
disappointed if this was not accomplished within 3 years.
Colonel Precourt. Congresswoman, acceleration is possible.
It is one of the reasons we chose the Liberty concept because
the elements are flying today on other vehicles and have that
experience. So the long lead for us is actually the ordering of
components in the supply chain and the lead time available to
get those components ready to do a test flight. The other
integration engineering happens in parallel, and so
acceleration is feasible with the right funding profiles.
Dr. Sowers. So given that we are using existing rockets
that are flying today, we can be ready as soon as any of these
other companies can provide a spacecraft to launch.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I see my time has
expired.
Chairman Hall. I thank the gentlelady.
I now recognize the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr.
Palazzo.
Mr. Palazzo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, everyone. The great thing about going last I
guess is I can just eliminate question after question that has
already been asked and answered. But it is definitely good to
see you all here today.
The Chairman mentioned something earlier about how he was
excited to hear on time and within budget, and I have always
liked that, too, especially within the private sector--on time,
within budget, but also to the customer's satisfaction. So
please don't forget that aspect of it as well.
I would like to ask each of our witnesses here today to
share their perspective with this Committee on ground-based
testing. What do you see the value in the ground-based testing?
What have you done in regards to ground-based testing? What are
you planning to do in regards to that? And also how can we also
make sure that we stay focused with this critical component
throughout the development and the procurement process? And we
will start with Mr. Elbon.
Mr. Elbon. Ground-based testing is an important part of any
development program, particularly human spaceflight development
programs. You saw on the video we have test-fired a couple
engines. We will be doing ascent--or an ascent-abort test that
will happen without a rocket so it will go from the ground. We
are integrating our avionics now in Houston. I am traveling in
about a month to visit Mr. Galloway at Stennis and to look at
the capabilities there and determine what kind of testing might
be possible at Stennis. So we will have a comprehensive ground-
based testing that is in line with what we have traditionally
done on human spaceflight programs.
Colonel Lindsey. Thank you, Congressman. That is a great
question for us because actually, our philosophy on the Dream
Chaser Program is test, test, test. You know, you can do
thousands of wind tunnel simulations, but the best wind tunnel
in the world is to actually go drop test and see if your
vehicle really flies. You take more programmatic risk, but we
think you can accelerate and go faster doing that. So we are
all about test. And the first phase of the program, instead of
just coming up with a Power Point vehicle, we actually built a
real vehicle, put it in University of Colorado's earthquake lab
and tested it structurally. We did drop-model tests; we have
done all kinds of testing. Our rocket motors, which are
actually the same rocket motors that are used by Virgin
Galactic for SpaceShipOne and SpaceShipTwo are extensively
tested on the ground, and we continue to test those.
Every component, every aspect of what we do will be ground-
tested, so we think it is invaluable to do all of that before
we go into flight test and we think it enables us to move
faster and accelerate our program by doing an extensive amount
of testing.
Mr. Musk. At SpaceX we do a great deal of ground-testing,
but I should point out that we also flight-tested our launch
vehicle and our Dragon spacecraft. So it is not just the
ground-testing. We do--actually flight-test the vehicles and
there is going to be a great deal of flight-testing to come.
One of the big milestones is coming in about 3 months or so
where we will dock with the space station or berth with the
space station. And so that should be pretty exciting.
Colonel Precourt. Congressman, flight-testing is critical,
and many of the people in your State know that very, very well
and we have worked for decades in many NASA programs exploiting
the test capabilities in Mississippi. We actually have a plan
with Liberty at leveraging a lot of testing that has already
gone on behind us and then to leverage existing facilities like
at Stennis and other places in the country that would further
mitigate the risks of the systems as we take them into flight.
Testing is all about a build-up approach. An example I can
give you is we removed 1,500 pounds from the weight of our
booster. We didn't do that on one fell swoop; we did it
incrementally over several ground tests. And when you are
handling 3.5 million pounds of thrust, you have to do that with
a build-up approach, not jumping to the end state immediately.
So that testing is ultimately critical to the reliability that
we get out of the product.
Dr. Sowers. Congressman, ground-based testing is
fundamental to our philosophy of mission assurance. For every
rocket that we fly, every part is tested as a part. They are
built into subsystems and tested at the subsystem level. They
are built further up into systems and tested at the system
level. And then finally, the whole rocket is integrated on the
launch pad and tested as an entire rocket, and that is before
every single flight, and that is key to establishing repeatable
mission success.
Mr. Palazzo. I appreciate that. When we had an opportunity
to talk to Commander Cernan I asked him the importance of
ground-based testing, and he pretty much said everybody that we
sent up to the moon came home from the moon safely. So it is
extremely important to our space program that we stayed
committed to testing and we don't try to take shortcuts, fly
before we test, save costs, I don't think that is in the best
interest of the program at all.
Chairman Hall. Judge Miller has kindly said that he will
not ask any more questions, but he like others that were here
have been on other committees during this time and knows that
we have the full report to read. And Judge, thank you for
yielding your time.
Mrs. Adams is here. She has five minutes if she would like.
Mrs. Adams. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Hall. Thank you for being here with us.
Mrs. Adams. Thank you. I am sorry I am late. I was in
another committee.
I understand that with the recent failure of the Russian
cargo mission, it highlighted some problems with depending on
foreign countries to access ISS, so we need to build capacity
for American astronauts to reach space on U.S. spacecraft and
U.S.-built spacecraft built quickly but safely and with, I
would believe, aggressive oversight by Congress based on what
has happened in the past.
Mr. Musk, can you talk about the importance of your rocket
being 100 percent made and what business advantage you gain
from that?
Mr. Musk. One hundred percent even American-made? I believe
it is important to avoid a foreign dependency on American
launch vehicles. You never know what the future security
situation of the world will look like. And so in order to have
good control over our costs and not face potential future
foreign dependency, we sourced the vehicle 100 percent in the
United States.
Mrs. Adams. And what is your biggest concern with the
management of the Commercial Crew Program?
Mr. Musk. Well, I should say right now I think NASA is
doing a pretty good job. Going forward, the most important
thing is that the terms and the costs be well defined. Where
things can go wrong is if the price is fixed but then the terms
change over time and that is obviously not a workable situation
for any contract.
Mrs. Adams. In the document given to the Committee dated
February 19, 2008, SpaceX laid out an ambitious schedule which
has all demonstration flights for commercial crew ending in
April of next year. Can you tell the Committee what NASA can do
to help you meet any schedule you lay out in the future and why
the demonstrations have been so delayed?
Mr. Musk. Okay, but that could be a bit of a longer answer.
So we are getting ready to do our first flight to the space
station, which I think could occur in the January time frame.
So I think that is doing pretty well. I think by the standards
of the space industry, I think we are doing very well on
schedule. The space industry is not known for being on time, so
I guess if you are running a little bit late, that is maybe by
most other standards being on time. I hate to say that but it
is unfortunately true. And you know, I think I feel highly
confident that if the funding is there for commercial crew that
we can get crew safely to the station and back within three
years.
Mrs. Adams. Mr. Precourt, could you tell the Committee how
much money that ATK spent on this application and CCDev-2?
Colonel Precourt. How much we invested in going through the
CCDev-2? We have a partner in Astrium from Europe, and together
in putting together our program, we took the concept to a
systems requirements review on our own funding, and it is north
of $10 million.
Mrs. Adams. And were you told that both launch vehicles and
spacecraft were eligible for awards under CCDev-2?
Colonel Precourt. That was NASA solicitation. They
specifically requested elements of vehicle, of spacecraft
services such as launch vehicles and spacecraft.
Mrs. Adams. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Hall. Ms. Adams yields back.
I think we really want to thank you for your good time. And
I just want to comment on Ms. Lofgren's question because she
asked a good one about acceleration of those dates, 2017 and
2020. They seem a little far off to me but I can remember we
are in an emergency, and this country is in an emergency right
now. NASA is in an emergency. Our space program is in an
emergency. We can do better than those dates I think, and I
refer to a time back toward the end of World War II when the
Japanese were headed for Midway and we had broken their code;
we knew they were coming. We had two aircraft carriers, one of
them ready for battle, the other being worked on in Pearl
Harbor to be worked on for eight months Admiral Nimitz went
aboard it on Monday and said by Thursday we are going to go out
of here and meet the other. We only had two aircraft carriers
to fight to five aircraft carriers that were attacking us. They
did it in those five days. And somebody just needs to say damn
it, let us go. And I think you all are the ones to do it and
hope you will.
And I thank the two astronauts who are there and all five
of you. I am very grateful to you. We do have Garrett Reisman
who has--flown three shuttle missions. I recognize him. And Bob
Walker who chaired this Committee is here. We welcome you, Bob.
And we are going to close this hearing in just a few minutes
with thanks to Bart Gordon for the four years he served here.
The round of questions are completed, and I thank you for
your testimony. If Members of the Committee have additional
questions for anyone, we will write to you and ask you to
respond to those in writing if you will.
You are excused. You can stay if you like. You are welcome
to stay; you are wanted to stay. I know how busy you are. You
are not going to stay, but we once again on behalf of all--
everybody here, we really do appreciate you and the time you
have given us, each one of you.
Okay. At this time we will get our very patient second
panel seated, I want to welcome you, too. Our first witness on
the panel is the Honorable Paul Martin, the Inspector General
of NASA, who was confirmed in November 2009. Prior to NASA, Mr.
Martin served as Deputy Inspector General at the U.S.
Department of Justice, a great background and good for service
now. Mr. Martin, we are really delighted to have you here.
Our second witness on the panel is Bill Gerstenmaier, a
very knowledgeable Associate Administrator of the Human
Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate. We don't need
any of that at NASA. He has been at NASA since 1977, led a
number of activities with the Space Shuttle and the Shuttle Mir
and International Space Station before becoming Associate
Administrator for Space Operations prior to this summer. Mr.
Gerstenmaier, thank you for your leadership in ensuring safe
and successful human spaceflight program and for coming before
us today.
As our witnesses should know, spoken testimony is limited
to five minutes after which Members will have five minutes each
to ask questions. We won't hold you to the five minutes. Stay
as close as you can but we are honored to have you and we will
be very lenient. We don't have a hook or anything. If they go a
little over when they are as important as you two are.
So at this time, I will recognize Mr. Martin to present his
testimony.
STATEMENT OF THE HON. PAUL MARTIN,
INSPECTOR GENERAL, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS
AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Martin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Members of the
Committee. Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the
progress made and the challenges remaining with NASA's efforts
to encourage a market for privately owned commercially operated
space transportation.
To date, NASA has spent $320 million in its commercial crew
development effort, most recently making awards to four
companies to help foster a commercial space industry that can
meet NASA's need to transport its crews to the International
Space Station. Although NASA has over 50 years of experience
with contractor-built government-owned space vehicles, it has
never purchased transportation for its astronauts aboard a
commercially developed system. Of primary concern in this new
paradigm is how NASA will work with its commercial partners to
ensure that their vehicles meet NASA's safety and human rating
requirements. How NASA addresses this challenge will to a large
degree determine whether the nascent commercial space
transportation industry can evolve into a viable commercial
enterprise.
To examine NASA's progress as it transitions from its
traditional role of owning human spaceflight vehicles to
purchasing these services, the Office of Inspector General
reported this summer on the Agency's efforts to modify its
safety and human rating requirements and acquire and certify
commercial crew transportation services. Our June 30 report
concluded that NASA has made sustained progress toward its goal
of obtaining commercial transportation services to low Earth
orbit. At the same time, we identified a series of significant
challenges. My written statement summarizes each of these
challenges, and I will not attempt a summary of that summary
here. But let me highlight three important issues.
First, NASA has not finalized the process it will use to
certify that a commercial partner's vehicle can safely
transport NASA personnel. Every requirement NASA imposes has a
cost associated with it in time, money, or potentially
decreased innovation. Conversely, incurring these costs is
often necessary to appropriately manage risk, particularly when
the issue is human crew as opposed to cargo. In the coming
months, NASA must finalize a set of crew safety requirements
that help reduce development and operation costs for its
commercial partners.
Second, NASA has recently announced acquisition strategy
that calls for a firm fixed-price contract in its first phase.
NASA's decision to move away from funded space act agreements
toward far-based contracts has drawn criticism from some
quarters over fears that it may create administrative burdens
and reduce the control companies have over their own system
designs. NASA counters that its contract eliminates much of the
time-consuming paperwork of a more traditional far-based
contract. Going forward, one of the key challenges for NASA is
to strike a balance that will enable innovation and
flexibility, yet provide the appropriate amount of direct
government involvement to ensure the safety of NASA astronauts,
which leads to my third and final point.
NASA initially plans to operate in an insight role while
companies are beginning development of their launch systems. In
later stages, NASA may assume more oversight role in directing
or granting approval to partners on the path to certification.
Selecting the appropriate level and mechanisms of insight and
oversight will be critical to provide NASA with sufficient
information to assess partners' technical, schedule, and cost
risks with the goal of certifying that commercially developed
vehicles are safe for NASA astronauts, all without unduly
affecting the commercial partner's ability to operate in a
cost-effective manner.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would
be pleased to answer any questions, preferably easy questions.
I would leave the hard ones to my colleague. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Martin follows:]
Prepared Statement of The Hon. Paul Martin, Inspector General, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
Thank you for inviting me to discuss the progress made--and
challenges remaining--with NASA's efforts to develop privately owned,
commercially operated crew launch capabilities.
With the final Space Shuttle flight in July 2011, the Agency turned
its attention to the manned space program called for in the NASA
Authorization Act of 2010 while continuing to encourage development of
commercially operated U.S. space transportation systems. When these
commercial capabilities are matured and available to the Government and
other customers, NASA intends to use them to replace its reliance on
the Russian Soyuz for transporting astronauts to the International
Space Station (ISS).
The emergence of commercial companies seeking to provide access to
the ISS and low Earth orbit presents NASA with both opportunities and
challenges. In April 2011, NASA announced a second round of funded
Space Act Agreements with four companies totaling $269.3 million as
part of the Agency's Commercial Crew Development (CCDev) effort. NASA
has since reported that these four companies--Blue Origin, Boeing,
Sierra Nevada Corporation (Sierra Nevada), and Space Exploration
Technologies Corporation (SpaceX)--have successfully met all initial
milestones set for them. Furthermore, NASA has amended its agreements
with Boeing and Sierra Nevada to include optional milestones for
specific tests intended to accelerate development efforts. If met,
these new milestones bring the potential value of the companies'
agreements to $112.9 million and $105.6 million, respectively.
Additionally, in July 2011 NASA and United Launch Alliance (ULA)
entered into an unfunded Space Act Agreement to share personnel,
infrastructure, and information to accelerate the potential use of
ULA's Atlas V launch vehicle as part of a commercial crew
transportation system. Similarly, last month NASA and Alliant
Techsystems (ATK) entered into an unfunded Space Act Agreement to
collaborate on the development of ATK's commercial launch system known
as Liberty. Under the agreement, ATK and NASA will review and discuss
Liberty system requirements, safety and certification plans,
computational models of rocket stage performance, and avionics
architecture designs.
These Space Act Agreements illustrate the progress NASA has made to
date with its CCDev initiative. However, significant challenges remain
as NASA attempts to cultivate privately owned, commercially operated
crew launch capabilities and foster a commercial space industry that
could meet the Agency's low Earth orbit crew transportation needs.
Although the Agency has over 50 years of experience with contractor-
built, Government-owned space vehicles, NASA has never procured
transportation for its astronauts aboard a commercially developed
vehicle. Of primary concern in this new paradigm is how NASA will work
with its commercial partners to ensure that commercially developed
vehicles meet NASA's safety and human-rating requirements, which seek
to ensure that spaceflight systems accommodate human needs, control
hazards, manage safety risks and, to the maximum extent possible,
provide the capability to recover the crew safely from hazardous
situations. How NASA responds to this challenge will to a large degree
determine whether the nascent commercial space transportation industry
evolves into a viable commercial enterprise that meets NASA's crew
transportation needs. To examine NASA's progress as it transitions from
its traditional role of contracting for and owning human spaceflight
vehicles into the role of purchasing crew transportation services from
industry, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) earlier this summer
reported on the Agency's efforts to modify its existing safety and
human-rating requirements to make them applicable to commercially
developed vehicles. We also evaluated the overarching challenges
associated with possible approaches NASA may use to certify and acquire
commercial crew transportation services.
Our report, issued on June 30, 2011, concluded that NASA has made
sustained progress toward its goal of obtaining commercial
transportation services to low Earth orbit. \1\ At the same time, we
identified a series of challenges NASA faces as it expands its
Commercial Crew Transportation program:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``NASA's Challenges Certifying and Acquiring Commercial Crew
Transportation Services,'' NASA Office of Inspector General (June 20,
2011) accessible at http://oignasa.gov/audits/reports/FY11/IG-11-
022.pdf.
modifying NASA's existing safety and human-rating
requirements for commercially developed systems;
managing its acquisition strategy for commercial crew
transportation services;
implementing the appropriate insight/oversight model for
commercial partner vehicle development;
relying on an emerging industry and uncertain market
conditions to achieve cost savings; and
managing the relationship between commercial partners,
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and NASA.
I summarize each of these challenges in turn.
Modifying NASA's Existing Safety and Human-Rating Requirements for
Commercially Developed Systems. In December 2010 NASA issued a
consolidated set of health and medical, engineering, and safety and
mission assurance requirements that commercial partners will have to
meet to obtain certification to transport astronauts (``Commercial Crew
Transportation System Certification Requirements for NASA Low Earth
Orbit Missions ''). These Requirements describe NASA's certification
philosophy; the content and timing of the certification packages
commercial companies will be required to deliver to NASA; and NASA's
expectations for system safety, human control of the vehicle, and crew
survival. In addition, the Requirements reference a set of 93 other
documents, each containing additional requirements the companies must
consider in order to obtain certification. NASA has categorized the
underlying 93 documents into three types: Type 1-mandatory, must be
implemented as written; Type 2-alternatives allowed with NASA approval;
and Type 3-suggested best practices. Each of the 93 documents reference
other documents that set forth additional requirements. According to
one estimate, NASA's Certification documents contain more than 4,000
requirements. However, NASA has not finalized the processes Agency
officials will use to verify that commercial partners have met these
requirements and certify that a commercial partner's vehicle can safely
transport NASA personnel. In May 2011 the Agency released for industry
comment six draft documents (the 1100-series) that supplement the
Certification Requirements relating to missions to the ISS. These
documents provide additional information to commercial partners
regarding roles and responsibilities, technical management processes
supporting certification, crew transportation system and ISS services
requirements, and the application of technical and operations
standards.
Since issuance of our report, NASA has received industry's
feedback, reviewed and updated the 1100-series documents, and is
working to validate the requirements for development of commercial
services to deliver crew to the Space Station. Updates to these
requirements will continue through the formal NASA document change
process with final approval and release planned for early November
2011.
Despite the absence of finalized requirements from NASA, the
private sector is already developing systems and vehicles to meet
NASA's crew transportation needs. During the comment phase, companies
have suggested that NASA (1) modify existing requirements to the
greatest extent possible and ensure they are achievable so that
industry fully understands what is expected; (2) coordinate with the
FAA --which has regulatory oversight of U.S. companies providing
commercial space transportation services --to ensure NASA requirements
and FAA regulations are compatible; and (3) allow for flexibility so
that changes in vehicle or system design are attainable within
reasonable costs. For its part, NASA said that it has reduced its
compliance documents to those truly necessary to meet Government
requirements. Additionally, the Agency has stated that it will allow
commercial partners to propose alternative standards, where applicable.
Every requirement NASA imposes on commercial vehicles has a cost
associated with it in time, money, or decreased innovation. Conversely,
incurring these costs is often necessary to appropriately manage risk,
particularly when the issue is human crew as opposed to cargo.
Consequently, many of the requirements NASA will impose on its
commercial partners are the same as those the Agency applies to its own
spaceflight programs. NASA must determine if, when, and how it will
oversee commercial partners' development efforts in order to ensure
they meet Agency requirements and maximize safety and reliability
without burdening commercial partners with unnecessary demands that
lead to higher development and operations costs.
Managing the Acquisition Strategy for Commercial Crew
Transportation Services. When we issued our report in late June, NASA
was still developing its acquisition strategy and had not settled on
the specific mechanisms it planned to use for procuring commercial crew
transportation services. Therefore, our report discussed the financial
and programmatic challenges of several possible strategies, including
those that rely on funded Space Act Agreements; competitive
procurements, in particular fixed-price contracts; or a combination of
both.
With respect to funded Space Act Agreements, we reported that their
use limits Government control compared to traditional procurement
contracts based on the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR). As one
potential customer of the private sector market, NASA expects CCDev
Space Act Agreements to result in commercial capabilities that consider
the Agency's Certification Requirements. However, under such agreements
the Agency cannot dictate specific system concepts or elements or
mandate compliance with its requirements. Rather, commercial partners
are free to determine the system requirements and concepts they believe
will best serve their target markets. Because crew transportation for
NASA is the most viable segment of the human spaceflight market in the
short term, it is in the companies' best interests to ensure compliance
with NASA requirements if they hope to obtain NASA's business.
Nevertheless, the lack of mandatory compliance with NASA's requirements
would have presented some risk that differences between partner designs
and Agency requirements could occur. In addition, according to Agency
policy, NASA may only enter into funded Space Act Agreements when its
objective cannot be accomplished through a contract, grant, or
cooperative agreement. Moreover, under the law a procurement contract
is required if NASA is the sole beneficiary of the expected
deliverables.
Similarly, we reported that the use of fixed-price contracts for
crew transportation services also presented challenges. Traditionally,
cost-reimbursement rather than fixed-price contracts have been used on
projects in which costs and risks are not clearly defined. While fixed-
price contracts lock in the Government's initial investment, proceeding
in this manner may not eliminate cost risks. Some of NASA's potential
commercial crew partners are building spacecraft for the first time and
design and development are under way without fully defined and
finalized requirements. In this type of environment, there is a risk
that during the period of contract performance NASA's requirements may
change so significantly that contractors could successfully argue that
the Agency is changing the contract's scope, in which case NASA could
be required to pay the contractor to make necessary modifications.
In September 2011, NASA released an outline of its acquisition
strategy to achieve a certified crew transportation capability from
private industry no later than the end of fiscal year 2016. The draft
request for proposal calls for a firm fixed-price Commercial Crew
Integrated Design Contract in the first phase to be awarded to one or
more companies that will result in a complete end-to-end design
compliant with NASA Crew Transportation System requirements, including
spacecraft, launch vehicle, launch services, ground and mission
operations, and recovery. The contract value could be up to $1.61
billion from July 2012 through April 2014. In the second phase, NASA
will issue a separate, formal solicitation for follow-on contracts for
development, test, evaluation, and certification activities with
optional ISS service flights.
NASA's decision to move away from funded Space Act Agreements and
toward FAR-based contracts has drawn criticism from some quarters over
fears that this approach may cause significant delays and limit the
flexibility of participating companies. In rolling out its new
strategy, NASA has described it as a non-traditional contract approach
that eliminates certified cost and pricing and Cost Accounting
Standards requirements and incorporates tailored requirements, limited
deliverables, and focused insight and oversight. Nevertheless, industry
representatives have expressed concerns that NASA's plans for a more
hands-on FAR-based approach may be prohibitively expensive, create
undue administrative burdens, and curtail the innovation and control
they have over their system designs. Conversely, NASA believes the risk
of commercial partners' inability to meet its human-rating requirements
could cause costly and time-consuming redesigns, pose safety concerns,
and require NASA to be more involved in the development of any
commercial transportation system. Going forward, one of the key
challenges for NASA will be to strike a balance that will enable
innovation and flexibility yet provide the appropriate amount of direct
Government involvement to ensure the safety of NASA's astronauts.
Establishing the Appropriate Insight/Oversight Model for Commercial
Partner Vehicle Development. In selecting the timing and
appropriateness of its procurement mechanisms, NASA must balance its
role as a supporter of commercial partners with its responsibility to
ensure that commercially developed vehicles are safe for NASA
astronauts, meet the Agency's needs, and provide for a viable domestic
alternative to the Soyuz vehicle. As we reported in June 2011, the
Commercial Crew Office is in the process of developing the model for
NASA's insight and oversight of commercial companies. According to NASA
policy, ``insight'' means acquiring knowledge and an understanding of
contractors' actions by monitoring selected metrics and milestones.
Methods of achieving insight include reviewing documents, attending
meetings and tests, and conducting compliance evaluations.
``Oversight'' combines technical insight of contractor activities with
approvals that provide the contractor with formally documented
authority to proceed or formal acceptance of plans, tests, or other
criteria.
With the issuance of the draft request for proposal for the
Commercial Crew Integrated Design Contract, NASA has confirmed that it
plans to function in an insight role while commercial partners are
designing and beginning development of their launch systems. For
example, the Agency intends to assign a core Partner Integration Team
comprised of NASA employees to follow each contractor as they design
and begin to develop their systems, performing insight activities at
commercial facilities as needed. Additionally, a board headed by a NASA
Commercial Crew Program Manager and co-chaired by an industry
representative will approve commercial systems and determine whether
they meet NASA requirements.
As each contractor moves forward with development, demonstration,
and flight test activities, NASA will still need to maintain insight
into the development of each vehicle but may assume more of an
oversight role in granting approval or direction to each partner on the
path to certification. To our knowledge, NASA has not finalized the
oversight model for this phase that will include defining the key
milestones commercial partners must successfully meet. Selecting the
appropriate level and mechanisms of insight and oversight is critical
to provide NASA with sufficient information to assess partners'
technical, schedule, and cost risks and certify that commercially
developed vehicles are safe for NASA astronauts without unduly
affecting the commercial partners' ability to operate in a cost-
effective manner.
Relying on an Emerging Industry and Uncertain Market Conditions to
Achieve Cost Savings. In the NASA Authorization Act of 2010, Congress
stated that commercial companies offer the potential of providing lower
cost crew transportation services to support the Space Station. In
fact, NASA's acquisition strategy for procuring crew transportation
services is premised on competition and a healthy commercial human
spaceflight industry that would allow NASA to solicit bids from a
number of partners and make informed, competitive procurement decisions
that meet individual mission requirements and provide the best value
for the taxpayer. However, the commercial human spaceflight industry is
in its infancy and the market beyond NASA's own crew transportation
needs is uncertain. Many of the risks associated with achieving
anticipated cost savings are largely out of NASA's control,
particularly in the area of creating non-Government demand for
commercial human spaceflight services. The 2010 Authorization Act
directs NASA to work with the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA)
Office of Commercial Space Transportation and assess the potential non-
Government market for commercially developed crew and cargo
transportation systems and capabilities. In April 2011, NASA and the
FAA reported that over time the market for commercial crew and cargo
services may emerge and provide significantly more customers, more
flights, and potentially lower prices to the U.S. Government. The
continuing challenge will be to determine at what point the market can
sustain a number of commercial partners, allowing NASA to transition to
the role of consumer and ultimately realize cost-effective commercial
crew transportation.
Managing the Relationship Among Commercial Partners, the FAA, and
NASA. The FAA is responsible for regulatory oversight of companies
seeking to provide commercial human space transportation. To date, the
FAA has issued regulations pertaining to launch and reentry activities
that could affect the public safety. However, in December 2012 the FAA
is authorized to begin proposing regulations concerning the safety of
passengers and crew involved in commercial spaceflight. As previously
discussed, NASA plans to impose its own set of requirements, standards,
and processes that commercial partners must meet to obtain a
certification before transporting Agency personnel. Accordingly, NASA
must coordinate with the FAA to avoid an environment of conflicting
requirements and multiple sets of standards for commercial companies
seeking to transport Government and non-Government passengers to low
Earth orbit. Toward that end, the FAA and NASA have expressed a spirit
of cooperation, and both groups have agreed that the ultimate goal is
FAA licensing of commercially developed vehicles used to transport NASA
personnel. Additionally, the agencies are co-locating personnel at NASA
Headquarters, FAA field offices, and Johnson and Kennedy Space Centers
to optimize Government oversight of commercial partners through
compatible requirements, standards, and processes.
While we did not make specific recommendations for corrective
action in our June report, we continue to believe NASA must pay
particular attention to these challenges as it continues to partner
with commercial companies seeking to provide safe, reliable, and cost-
effective access to the ISS.
This concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to answer
any questions.
Chairman Hall. That makes sense to me.
I now recognize Mr. Gerstenmaier to present his testimony.
And he will accord you the same opportunity I am sure.
STATEMENT OF MR. WILLIAM H. GERSTENMAIER,
ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR, HUMAN EXPLORATION
AND OPERATIONS MISSION DIRECTORATE, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND
SPACE ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Commercial Crew Program represents a shift in near
Earth operations to the private sector, freeing NASA and NASA's
limited resources to pursue other human spaceflight goals
including the utilization of the International Space Station
and setting out on missions of exploration.
Commercial Transportation Systems, together with the
capabilities to explore deep space provided by the Space Launch
System and by the Orion Multipurpose Crew Vehicle will enable
NASA to move forward on a robust, comprehensive U.S. human
spaceflight program. We had the right mix of government-managed
programs and new commercial acquisitions. Technical
considerations drove these acquisition approaches.
NASA is committed to managing the requirements, standards,
and processes for Commercial Transportation Systems
certification to ensure that the commercial missions are held
to the same safety standards as government missions. NASA will
be responsible for defining, managing, reviewing, and approving
certification plans and verifying requirements related to
commercial crew program missions. However, more direct
accountability will be shifting to the commercial companies
providing these services to NASA.
We have listened to the comments from the IG, the Aerospace
Safety Advisory Board, and the GAO. We have amended our
acquisition approach based on their input. We have listened to
industry's comments from the draft RFP and learned from cargo
transportation experiences. We have worked corporately with the
IFA and worked cooperatively with the FAA. We have attempted to
strike a balance among the many competing objectives. The plan
that we have will have many challenges and will not be easy to
execute. We will continue to listen and adapt as we move
forward. We have put together a solid plan to deliver safe and
reliable crew transportation for the Nation at low cost.
NASA's 2012 budget request of $850 million in fiscal year
2012 for the Commercial Crew Program would provide for the
development of commercial crew transportation system designs
with crew transportation services available to the ISS in 2016.
Reduction in funding from the President's request could
significantly impact the program's schedule, risk posture, and
acquisitions strategy. NASA's initial analysis shows that a
2012 funding level of $500 million consistent with the 2010
NASA Authorization Act would delay initial capability to the
ISS to 2017 assuming additional funding is available in the out
years. During that roughly one-year period of delay, NASA would
be paying approximately $480 million to Russia for crew
transportation services. Therefore, NASA seeks funding for the
Commercial Crew Program and the final conference action on the
fiscal year 2012 appropriation as close to the NASA fiscal year
2012 request as possible.
Providing inadequate funding to this delicately balanced
acquisition approach represents an unacceptable risk to program
execution and would force us to relook at our overall approach.
We need the appropriate funding for this challenging program.
The commercial program is the Nation's strategy for ending sole
reliance on the Russians for crew transportation capability to
the space station. Private enterprise and affordable commercial
operations in low Earth orbit will enable a truly sustainable
step in our expansion into space.
NASA plans to acquire these services in a unique, cost-
effective, and timely manner that will maintain safety for the
crew. This acquisition will have many challenges. NASA is
addressing these challenges in a systematic way. We will need
your continued support and help in supporting this program.
This program is part of a larger plan for the exploration
of space that will keep the United States a leader in space
exploration. I look forward to your questions and thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gerstenmaier follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mr. William H. Gerstenmaier,
Associate Administrator, Human Exploration and Operations
Mission Directorate, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss NASA's efforts to
support the development of commercial crew transportation systems. We
are pleased with the progress our industry partners have made in this
new and innovative approach to human spaceflight development. Their
success is critical to ensuring that we re-establish an American
capability to transport U.S. astronauts--and their cargo--to the
International Space Station (ISS), and quickly end the outsourcing of
this work to foreign governments. And they need robust funding from
NASA, to achieve timely success in this critical endeavor. Not only
will the availability of one or more commercial crew transportation
systems represent the emergence of a brand new domestic capability for
carrying our astronauts to Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and the ISS, it will
also enable the Agency to focus on developing its own systems for
sending astronauts on missions of exploration beyond LEO.
Commercial Crew Development (CCDev)
NASA's investments have been aimed at stimulating efforts within
the private sector to develop and demonstrate human spaceflight
capabilities through the CCDev initiative. Since 2009, NASA has
conducted two CCDev rounds, soliciting proposals from U.S. industry
participants to further advance commercial crew space transportation
system concepts and mature the design and development of elements of
the system, such as launch vehicles and spacecraft. In the first round
of CCDev, NASA awarded five funded Space Act Agreements (SAAs) in
February 2010, which concluded in the first quarter of 2011. Awardees
and the amounts of the awards were: Blue Origin, $3.7 million; the
Boeing Company, $18 million; Paragon Space Development Corporation,
$1.44 million; Sierra Nevada Corporation, $20 million; and United
Launch Alliance, $6.7 million. Under these SAAs, companies received
funding contingent upon completion of specified development milestones.
All milestones were successfully accomplished by the CCDev industry
partners.
During the second CCDev competition, known as CCDev2, NASA awarded
four funded SAAs that are currently being executed with the following
industry partners:
Blue Origin's work involves risk-reduction activities
related to development of a crew transportation system comprised of a
reusable biconic shaped Space Vehicle launched first on an Atlas V
launch vehicle and then on Blue Origin's own Reusable Booster System.
The company is working to mature its Space Vehicle design through
Systems Requirements Review (SRR), maturing the pusher escape system,
and accelerating engine development for the Reusable Booster System. As
of September 30, 2011, Blue Origin had successfully completed five of
ten milestones and NASA had provided $11.2 million of the $22 million
planned for this effort.
The Boeing Company is maturing its commercial crew
transportation system through Preliminary Design Review (PDR) and
performing development tests. Boeing's system concept is a capsule-
based spacecraft reusable for up to ten missions that is compatible
with multiple launch vehicles. Boeing's effort will include launch
abort engine fabrication and static test fire, landing air bag drop
demonstration, wind tunnel testing, parachute drop tests, Service
Module Propellant Tank Development Test, and Launch Vehicle Emergency
Detection System/Avionics System Integration Facility Interface
Simulation Test. As of September 30, 2011, Boeing had successfully
completed five of fifteen milestones and NASA had provided $52.5
million of the $112.9 million planned for this effort milestones.
Sierra Nevada Corporation (SNC) is maturing its
commercial crew transportation system, the Dream Chaser, through PDR
with some subsystems to Critical Design Review (CDR). The Dream Chaser
is a reusable, piloted lifting body, derived from NASA's HL-20 concept
that will be launched on an Atlas V launch vehicle. SNC's effort also
includes fabrication of an atmospheric flight test vehicle, conducting
analysis and risk mitigation, and conducting hardware testing. As of
September 30, 2011, SNC had successfully completed four of thirteen
milestones and NASA had provided $30 million of the $105.6 million
planned for this effort.
SpaceX is maturing its flight-proven Falcon 9/Dragon
transportation system focusing on developing an integrated, side-
mounted Launch Abort System. The uncrewed version of Dragon is already
being demonstrated as part of the Commercial Cargo project, and will be
used operationally as part of the ISS cargo resupply services effort.
Their crew transportation system is based on the existing Falcon 9
launch vehicle and Dragon spacecraft. The Launch Abort System, an
essential safety-critical system, represents the longest-lead portion
of the Falcon 9/Dragon crew transportation system. As of September 30,
2011, SpaceX had successfully completed four of ten milestones and NASA
had provided $40 million of the $75 million planned for this effort.
In addition to the four funded agreements mentioned above, NASA has
also signed SAAs without funding with three companies: Alliant
Techsystems, Inc. (ATK); United Launch Alliance (ULA); and Excalibur
Almaz, Incorporated (EAI). The ATK agreement is to advance the
company's Liberty launch vehicle concept. The ULA agreement is to
accelerate the potential use of the Atlas V as part of a commercial
crew transportation system. The EAI agreement is to further develop the
company's concept for LEO crew transportation. As of September 30,
2011, ATK had successfully completed one of five milestones; ULA
successfully completed two of five milestones. NASA and EAI are
initiating activities under the SAA now, and milestones are planned to
continue through May 2012.
Commercial Crew Program (CCP)
The CCP is a partnership between NASA and the private sector to
incentivize companies to build and operate safe, reliable, and cost
effective commercial human space transportation systems. In the near
term, NASA plans to be a reliable partner with U.S. industry, providing
technical and financial assistance during the development phase. In the
longer term, NASA plans to be a customer for these services, buying
transportation services for U.S. and U.S.-designated astronauts to the
ISS. We hope that these activities will stimulate the development of a
new industry that will be available to all potential customers,
including the U.S. Government.
Success of the CCP would also end the outsourcing of space
transportation to foreign providers. Together with the capabilities to
explore deep p space provided by the Space Launch System and the Orion
Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle, NASA is moving forward on a robust,
comprehensive U.S. hum man spaceflight program. Reductions from the
President's FY 2012 requested funding level would affect our ability to
successfully implement this program's procurement strategy, and could
leave us depend dent on foreign transportation services for a longer
period of time at a cost of approximately $480 million per year. The
success of this program will ensure that U.S. companies will provide
these services.
Commercial Crew Program Acquisition Roadmap
The CCP acquisition lifecycle is comprised of an overall hybrid
structure that originated d with the funded SAAs for subsystem, system
and element design during the separate CCDev efforts, to be followed by
a series of competitively awarded contracts for an integrated Crew
Transportation System (CTS). NASA's review and analysis led to the
development of a phased acquisition strategy incorporating separate,
sequential, full and open competitions, tailored to meet the Program
objectives throughout each phase of design, development, test,
evaluation, certification, and ISS transportation services. A
combination of funded agreements and contracts for separate phases was
determined to be the ideal strategy to capitalize on the strengths of
each in the appropriate lifecycle phase, while balancing technical,
schedule and cost risks. Figure 1.0 illustrates the overall hybrid
approach for the CCP acquisition strategy.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
CCP's acquisition approach focuses on reducing the risk and
uncertainty of the development cycle and on the incentives provided
through competition by separating the design and early development
content (Phase 1) from the longer-term Development, Test, Evaluation,
and Certification (DTEC) activities (Phase 2). This multi-phased
approach provides a shorter period of performance for the Phase 1
contract, thereby limiting the potential financial risk involved in
utilizing long periods of performance with multiple commercial
partners. Separating the early design from the longer-term development
also provides a phased approach to cost assessment and management. The
separation between Phase 1 and Phase 2 is distinctly defined to
finalize design requirements in Phase 1, prior to a financial
commitment to invest in the required capital assets associated with
development and testing. Additionally, the approach encourages
competition among multiple companies at each stage, which results in
lower costs for each lifecycle phase and allows for well-timed
incorporation of lessons learned.
On September 19, 2011, NASA released a draft Request for Proposals
(RFP) for Phase 1, entitled Commercial Crew Integrated Design Contract
(CCIDC), inviting industry to comment on the process. The final CCIDC
RFP will incorporate input from industry as appropriate and solicit
proposals for a complete end-to-end crew transportation system design,
including spacecraft, launch vehicles, launch services, ground and
mission operations and recovery. NASA plans to release the final RFP
for this effort by the end of 2011. The Agency anticipates that one or
more operational CTS will be available for the transportation of
astronauts to and from the ISS--as well as the provision of rescue
services--by the middle of this decade, assuming that the CCP is funded
at the requested level. Competition among multiple partners is a
fundamental aspect of the strategy. Competition incentivizes
performance, supports cost-effectiveness, and eliminates NASA
dependence on a single provider.
Human Rating/Safety
The commercial crew program represents a shift in near Earth
operations to the private sector, freeing NASA (and NASA's limited
resources) to pursue other human space flight goals, including
utilizing the Space Station and setting out on missions of exploration.
Within this new paradigm, NASA will maintain its stringent safety
requirements and standards. We have always used contractors to build
our space systems. In these programs, we are planning to use an
acquisition approach that will allow the contractors more freedom to
pursue cost-effectiveness, but still allow NASA the appropriate level
of insight and oversight to ensure that the systems will be safe.
Developing crew transportation systems to achieve LEO does not require
any significant technological breakthroughs which is a key factor in
using a unique insight/oversight approach. We will maintain crew safety
by way of a crew transportation system certification, and no system
will receive this certification until NASA has confidence that our
personnel will be safe.
NASA is committed to managing the requirements, standards, and
processes for CTS certification to ensure that commercial missions are
held to the same safety standards as Government missions. NASA will be
responsible for defining, managing, reviewing and approving
certification plans and verification closure of requirements related to
CCP missions.
To implement the lessons learned from Apollo, Challenger, and
Columbia relative to the independent oversight of design, test and
certification, CCP will map program processes to the Agency's
programmatic guidelines for all NASA spaceflight programs (NASA
Procedural Requirements 7120.5, NASA Space Flight Program and Project
Management Requirements) while working to minimize bureaucratic
hurdles. These processes will include independent review of the
commercial providers' performance of key milestones and major technical
risks to crew safety. NASA CTS certification will evaluate and assure
that the commercial provider's CTS design and implementation can safely
conduct the required crew transportation mission. NASA CTS
certification includes evaluation of design features and capabilities
that accommodate human interaction with the CTS to enhance overall
safety and mission success. NASA, through our CTS certification
process, is fully accountable for the safety of the NASA crew on CCP
missions.
The underpinning of the certification process is the CTS
requirements. To date, NASA's CTS requirements have matured
considerably. On May 21, 2010, NASA released its first version of
commercial human rating requirements to industry in a document titled
Commercial Human Rating Plan (CHRP). Through a Request for Information,
NASA received extensive and valuable feedback on the CHRP and
incorporated that feedback, along with refined NASA understanding and
planning, into the preparation of the next release of the requirements.
In response to the release of CHRP, industry identified that there
was a lack of clarity about the Agency's approach to certifying
commercial transportation systems. As a result, NASA released the
Commercial Crew Transportation System Requirements for NASA LEO
Missions to the public on December 10, 2010. This document provides
requirements, standards and processes that will be applied to any NASA
or NASA-sponsored commercial crew transportation mission to LEO.
CCP currently is refining the requirements identified in the
Commercial Crew Transportation System Requirements for NASA LEO
Missions into several documents to clearly communicate NASA's
requirements, standards, and processes for CTS certification. The
clarification provided by these documents will allow NASA and industry
to ensure all necessary requirements, standards, and processes are met
by commercial partners to safely transport NASA and NASA-sponsored
crewmembers to the ISS. CCP refers to the program-level requirements as
the ``1100-series'' documents, which are depicted in Figure 2.0. The
initial public release of a subset of the program-level requirements
was accomplished on October 25, 2010, along with the announcement for
CCDev 2.
The second release of the 1100-series documents to industry
occurred on April 29, 2011. As a result, all program-level requirements
and standards were made available to industry for review and comment.
CCP hosted a requirements workshop with industry on May 24-25, 2011 to
communicate the intent of the documents, and to continue a dialogue
with industry with respect to the documents.
NASA provided a third release of the 1100-series documents in
conjunction with the draft Request for Proposals (RFP) for the
Integrated Design Contracts on September 19, 2011, followed by another
requirements workshop with industry on October 4, 2011. Baseline
versions of the 1100-series documents are expected to be released to
industry in December 2011 in conjunction with the final RFP for the
Integrated Design contracts.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
As an additional ``check and balance'' in the area of safety, all
CCP activities will be subject to evaluation by organizations
independent of and funded separately from CCP, including the NASA
Safety and Mission Assurance independent technical authority, the NASA
Space Flight Safety Panel which is chaired by a member of the Astronaut
Office, and the NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel.
Coordination with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
Both NASA and the FAA envision a state where the FAA licenses
commercial human spaceflights provided by a robust industry, from which
NASA and the private sector can purchase transportation services. The
requirements and processes of these separate agencies must be carefully
coordinated and aligned to assure that both Agencies' roles are
accomplished with thoroughness and rigor. At the same time, it will be
critical to the success of the industry ventures to minimize the burden
of Government requirements and regulations imposed by multiple
agencies.
The nature of the FAA involvement in NASA's commercial crew
activities will vary through the development and operation of each
potential flight system. NASA will establish initial certification and
operations requirements for the services it wishes to acquire from
commercial providers. NASA will partner with the FAA for the purposes
of determining common standards and uniform processes to ensure both
public safety and protection of crews and spaceflight participants for
the NASA-sponsored missions. NASA and the FAA will work towards
minimizing the duplication of requirements, developing a streamlined
process and addressing indemnification issues.
This will be accomplished by clearly defining roles and
responsibilities of each Agency, sharing relevant data and jointly
performing assessments to enable the commercial partner to be
successful in support of NASA-sponsored missions and non-NASA
commercial human spaceflight missions. NASA and the FAA are in the
process of documenting agreements that solidify each Agency's
commitment to this partnership.
Budget and Recent Accomplishments
NASA has been told consistently by a broad range of potential
providers that private sector partners expect to be able to achieve the
capability to provide commercial spaceflight services to the ISS within
3-5 years from initial development start. NASA's FY 2012 budget request
of $850 million for CCP would provide that initial start in FY 2012 for
the development of commercial crew transportation systems which NASA
believes would enable services to ISS to be possible in the 2016
timeframe. A reduction in funding from the President's request could
significantly impact the program's schedule, risk posture, and
acquisition strategy. NASA's initial analysis shows that a FY 2012
funding level of $500 million (consistent with the 2010 NASA
Authorization Act) would delay initial capability to ISS to 2017,
assuming additional funding is available in the out-years. During that
roughly one-year period of delay, NASA would be paying approximately
$480M to Russia for crew transportation services. NASA remains
concerned about potential reductions to the CCP budget and the
anticipated schedule delays and additional costs that they will cause.
NASA therefore requests sufficient funding for the CCP to avoid
delaying the development of U.S. crew transport capabilities and
lengthening the period during which the United States will need to pay
Russia to transport crew to the Space Station.
It is worth noting that subsequent to the passage and signing of
the 2010 NASA Authorization Act in October 2010, several milestones or
similarly important events have occurred which shed new light on the
importance, viability, and criticality of NASA's commercial crew
efforts.
In April 2011, NASA completed its CCDev agreements with five
industry partners. These agreements yielded significant progress on
multiple commercial crew transportation concepts for a relatively
modest $50 million investment from NASA. Under CCDev, U.S. private
industry was able to mature long-lead capabilities that accelerated
commercial crew transportation concepts.
As part of CCDev, NASA received and reviewed over 20 proposals from
U.S. companies, ultimately making four awards in April 2011. NASA was
very impressed with the quality of the proposals which suggested that,
given the right investment and appropriate schedule, multiple U.S.
companies could develop safe, reliable, and cost effective commercial
CTS.
n December 2010, the SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket successfully launched
for the second time and the accompanying Dragon spacecraft successfully
orbited the Earth and safely returned to the Pacific Ocean. This
achievement helps demonstrate the viability of the Government/private
sector partnerships like the one envisioned for commercial crew and
provided further evidence that innovative approaches to spacecraft
development efforts can be successful, and considerably less expensive
than traditional NASA procurements. However, significant work still
remains for delivery of cargo to ISS. The commercial companies are
continuing to make sound progress in these activities. I expect to see
cargo demonstrations in the next several months.
Lastly, on August 24, 2011, Russia's Progress 44 cargo vessel
crashed in Siberia after the third stage of its Soyuz rocket failed.
That rocket is similar to the one NASA depends on to transport
astronauts to the ISS. A Russian commission recently pinpointed the
Soyuz problem as a quality-control issue, not a major design flaw. NASA
concurs with that assessment. However, the failure emphasized the need
to have a robust capability to transport and provide rescue services
for our ISS astronauts. Currently, we have three systems to carry cargo
to the ISS, and that number will soon expand to five when Orbital
Sciences and SpaceX are successful in completing their systems.
However, we only have one system to rely on, the Russian Soyuz, to
transport and provide rescue services for our ISS astronauts. If that
system is unavailable for any reason for a significant length of time,
there can be serious impacts to the productivity of the ISS.
Challenges
Currently, the biggest challenge confronting commercial crew
developers as they attempt to develop and demonstrate their systems is
financial. This challenge has been consistently cited as the top risk
to commercial crew development and NASA's financial commitment is
critical to mitigating this risk. For example, in the fall of 2009, the
Augustine Report concluded, ``.unless NASA creates significant
incentives for the development of the [commercial crew] capsule, the
service is unlikely to be developed on a purely commercial basis.''
NASA's CCP is designed to reduce the risk for private industry by
providing significant financial (and technical) assistance for the
development of these systems. NASA believes that by providing both
assistance in the system development and demand for the service, the
``business case'' for commercial human spaceflight providers can close
for one or more U.S. aerospace companies in a manner that also yields a
safe and cost-effective capability for meeting NASA's crew
transportation needs.
For these reasons and the timing issues discussed earlier, it is
important that the Congress provide robust funding for NASA's
commercial crew initiative. This political and financial commitment
from the Congress will also reduce the risk for private industry. This
Congressional support will support industry in obtaining investment
capital above the amount provided by NASA.
In addition to financial challenges, each of the commercial crew
developers has unique technical challenges associated with its system.
Given NASA's current understanding of the state of the commercial crew
development efforts, the Agency is confident that the commercial crew
developers can overcome these challenges. However, in order to mitigate
the risk associated with technical challenges, NASA plans to support
multiple commercial providers, thereby insulating the Agency in the
event a commercial provider cannot complete its development effort. In
addition, NASA plans to be fully supportive of in the commercial
development activities, providing technical assistance, lessons
learned, and past experience and knowledge in the area of human
spaceflight development and operations.
A final challenge is balancing the need for NASA involvement in
order to obtain a safe and reliable system and allowing the providers
the freedom to seek innovative and cost effective solutions. Striking
the right balance will be key to successful and timely delivery of the
crew transportation systems.
Conclusion
The Commercial Crew Program has great promise, but also some
significant challenges ahead. Human spaceflight is a very difficult
endeavor, and our industry partners will have the responsibility for
the full end-to-end system.
We cannot guarantee their success; however, we can structure an
approach that provides the highest probability of success. I believe
the approach outlined by NASA provides a solid path for developing and
acquiring crew transportation services in a manner that is cost
effective, and provides for crew safety. We need your support to
provide the funding required for this effort.
In July the Space Shuttle Atlantis rolled to ``wheels stop''
signifying the end of Space Shuttle operations. But, it also signaled
the end for now of the ability of the U.S. to transport its astronauts
into space, leaving the Nation dependent on the Russian Soyuz for crew
transportation to the ISS. The CCP seeks to ensure that American
companies will transport our crews to the ISS by mid-decade and that
aerospace jobs and taxpayer dollars remain here in America.
The CCP is the Nation's primary strategy for ending sole reliance
on the Russians for crew transportation capability to the Space
Station. Private enterprise and affordable commercial operations in LEO
will enable a truly sustainable step in our expansion into space-a
robust, vibrant, commercial enterprise with many providers and a wide
range of private and public users will enable U.S. industry to support
NASA--and other Government and commercial users--safely, reliably, and
at a lower cost. This is the ultimate goal--one that I believe unites
all of us.
Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to respond to any question you or
the other Members of the Committee may have.
Chairman Hall. All right. And I thank you. And Members, the
two Members that are here know very well, it was three Members.
I am sorry. Welcome--that we have a five minute limit on our
questions. Let us try our best to stay with it and I will try
to set the first record for it myself. I will ask some
questions.
My first question is developing any new systems typically
takes a lot longer than expected. We know that; we have watched
that happen. I know you all have seen it. My question is does
NASA plan to negotiate the purchase of additional Soyuz seats
that might be necessary in 2016 and 2017 and they are talking
about 2020? We don't know what is going to happen between now
and then. There has been suggestions that we can accelerate the
action prior to that time and then a lot of people think when
we had the three birds we had, we ought to rob from two of them
and still be flying that one. So there is a lot of arguments
pro and con, but we have to face the facts and face what funds
are going to be available, and I think it is a shame. As
important as NASA is and as important as the space program is
that we have less than half a percent of the whole dang budget
of the entire Congress when really we are a national defense.
We may be defending the next war out of space. It is important,
I think, that the people that set the budget really realize
this.
The question is whether or not NASA plans to negotiate the
purchase of additional seats, and a related question, what
would be the impact on the International Space Station if
Congress fails to extend the Iran, North Korea, Syria Non-
Proliferation Act? And that is a general act that prohibits any
American government from purchasing from Russia, but we also
have an exception to it called INKSNA that allows them to do
it. And you all are familiar with that and you know how to work
that and work around it. What are you going to do if we fail to
extend that act and the exception?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Okay. First of all, we have purchased all
the seats from Russia that we can under the existing exemption
to the act. So in other words, we have purchased all the things
we can up to the period where we will need an exception to the
Iran, North Korea, Syria Non-Proliferation Act if we are going
to do any additional purchases.
At this time, I think it is too early to say exactly
whether we are going to make those purchases or not with
Russia. We need to start into this program, see what funding
levels we get, see how good of progress these commercial
companies can make. As you heard in the previous session, they
think they can do better than the dates that I read to you in
my opening statement, so we will let them go ahead and progress
through and see and in the next year or so we will see------
Chairman Hall. Now, them, who are you talking about?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. The commercial companies.
Chairman Hall. All right.
Mr. Gerstenmaier. The commercial companies look like they
can provide earlier dates than what I verbally just read to
you. So we will see what happens in the next year, how much
progress they make, how well we do on issuing the contracts,
and then we will make the decision on what the right risk
posture is, should we purchase additional seats from Russia. In
the meantime, we are going to have to pursue some relief to the
Iran, North Korea, Syria Non-Proliferation Act. We are working
that through the Administration now to see what needs to be
done there. We think we need an exemption to that even for
basic sustaining engineering onboard space station, independent
of transportation. So we are starting to do that planning now
and I would say we are probably about a year away before we are
ready to answer the question that you asked, whether we will
make additional purchases.
Chairman Hall. And you think the exception would fall right
in line?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. We will work to get the exception in
place to support our needs for crew transportation.
Chairman Hall. All right. I have a minute and 23 seconds I
am going to give back to Mr. Miller for his five minutes. You
can have my minute and 20 seconds.
Mr. Miller. Six minutes and 23 seconds?
Chairman Hall. Yes, sir.
Mr. Miller. That is exceptionally generous, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gerstenmaier, in the past, we have paid all the costs
of developing human space systems and we have owned them. To
paraphrase Ronald Reagan on the subject of the Panama Canal, we
bought it, we paid for it, it was ours, and we kept it. In your
testimony today you say that the reason to go to commercial
firms is to free up money to do other things, but I really have
some questions about how that math works. It does appear that
we are paying the Soviets--no longer the Soviets--the Russians
about $62 million per seat per flight. That is right, isn't it?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. That is correct.
Mr. Miller. Okay. And we are presumably--you kept using the
term companies but we are probably going to only have one
contractor for this, right?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Again, we need to go through the
acquisition process and do the awarding process and we can see
based on what proposals we get how many contracts we can carry
through this process. So there may be an option of carrying
more than one contractor through this process. We will see once
we start getting responses to our proposals that we have put
out for them to evaluate.
Mr. Miller. Okay. The estimates are that they will pay some
of the costs, whoever we have a contract with, and it is still
hard to imagine that we are going to have two or three primes.
I mean we are going to have just one company that we deal with
in buying seats, right?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Again, I think it is a little early to
speculate on that. We have a two-phase procurement where the
first portion of the procurement would essentially put the
vehicle design in place------
Mr. Miller. Right.
Mr. Gerstenmaier. --and we would like to make--drop the
request for proposal in the middle of December of this year for
that activity. Then, there is a second phase where we do
demonstration phases and then we finally go to a service phase
at the end. That service phase could be one. Again, it depends.
You heard in the earlier------
Mr. Miller. Okay.
Mr. Gerstenmaier. --hearing that there may be a market out
there that is larger. It is up to these companies, the
commercial companies to see if there is a larger market, and if
there is, we may be able to choose more than one company. So
the answer is, I think, it is too early to say definitely we
are going to be down to only one provider.
Mr. Miller. All right. In terms of developing the system,
though, they may pay something but we are going to pay 90--
probably 90 cents on the dollar and that is going to end up
being around $6 billion. Is that correct?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Again, the 90 cents on the dollar
discussion appeared from the previous hearing to be different.
And you can go back and look at what each individual company
said their contributions were, but I think they varied off of
that.
Mr. Miller. Okay, but we think our part is going to be
about $6 billion. Is that correct?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. We are estimating somewhere between $4
and $6 billion.
Mr. Miller. Okay. And we think that we will end up needing
about 40 seats, eight to ten missions to the space station with
four astronauts on each, a maximum of about 40 seats, and then
we will also be charged presumably per seat at the time. This
is just development costs is four to six billion and then we
will also have to pay them per seat to go there, isn't that
right?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Yes, there will be some additional cost
for the actual transportation services we------
Mr. Miller. Any notion at all what that might be, any clue?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Well, we think it will be obviously less
than what the Soyuz seat price is today.
Mr. Miller. Okay. More than a bus ticket, less than Soyuz.
Have you considered whether we will likely be requested or
actually demanded by the companies we deal with that we
indemnify them for any liability?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. I think that is one of the key issues we
need to work with the companies and go through in this process.
The amount and specific details of the indemnification needs to
be worked out with the companies.
Mr. Miller. Well, there probably will be at least some kind
of indemnity?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. There will be some indemnification.
Mr. Miller. Okay. It certainly appears that we are paying a
lot more per seat than we are paying the Russians now. Is that
math wrong?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Again, we need to see the actual
proposals from the companies to make that statement. In our
estimates, we think we can equal the Soyuz seat price or be
slightly better than the Soyuz seat price, but we need to see
the actual proposals and actually see the concepts get fleshed
out by the companies.
Mr. Miller. And when it comes time to negotiate the per-
seat flight, you really think there is a possibility of having
more than one company we would negotiate with so there might
actually be a market? There might actually be competition? That
is a little difficult to imagine but------
Mr. Gerstenmaier. It is difficult for me to speculate on
that one way or the other. I think I would wait until we get a
little bit further down the process, see if the market starts
maturing as some of the commercial companies talked about in
the previous hearing, and then we can make some definitive
statement.
Mr. Miller. Well, with the minute and 33 seconds that
Chairman Hall yielded to me, Mr. Martin, have you looked at
those numbers and does this appear to be a good deal or how
does this compare to the deal we have with the Russians now to
pay them $62 million per seat?
Mr. Martin. We have not looked at those numbers yet. There
are still far too many unknowns with respect to firm fixed
requirements and time frames and, importantly, external
funding. So we have not looked at those numbers yet.
Mr. Miller. Okay. Have any of my questions been
misdirected? Is there anything in the math that I have laid out
that has been incorrect? I mean it certainly sounds like this
is going to be a lot more expensive to build a space system for
a private contractor who will then own it or pay 90 cents on
the dollar, whatever it is, and then contract with them and pay
them to transport astronauts. It sounds like it is a lot more
expensive than the deal we have now.
Mr. Martin. I am going to defer to my colleague here, I am
a lawyer but my understanding is that, yes, one of the
objectives of course is to get NASA astronauts to the
International Space Station, but under the Space Act Agreement
was also want to foster this commercial space market. So there
is at least two broad objectives in NASA's moving forward here.
Mr. Miller. Okay. Mr. Chairman, I think I have used my five
minutes and your minute and 43 seconds.
Chairman Hall. All right. At this time, I recognize Mr.
Rohrabacher, the gentleman from California.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Hall. Five full minutes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. All right. Let us just note that the
testimony we just heard indicated that there had been major
investment of money in the private sector and that if we can
have up to a billion dollars of private sector money invested
in space technology development, that is a good thing. That is
a very good thing. And it is bound to have a positive result
than not having that $1 billion in private money being used for
space-based technology development. And I will just note
SpaceX, in answer to the question to my colleague, suggested
that they had put in $500 million in development of their
Falcon System and only 300 of that--only $300 million came from
the government. So SpaceX was actually putting in several
hundred million dollars more than what the government actually
put into this. That is a good thing that we have a private
sector company putting in $500 million in developing a new type
of space transportation systems.
So I would suggest that not only in the end by taking this
approach. Had NASA been only totally in charge of this goal--of
achieving this goal rather than trying to encourage the private
sector companies, the major question we have is would that have
cost the people, taxpayers, more than what in the end it will
cost them when one of these companies wins the competition. Do
you have any thoughts on that, either one of you?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Again, I think we have been able to use
the private company investment very effectively to leverage the
NASA investment to get a substantial amount of technology and
research and activities done. So I think, so far, it has been a
very good process for us in terms of getting return on their
investment.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yeah. And in the end we hope we will have
a product that it will cost less than what Soyuz or at least
equal to what Soyuz is offering today and much less than if
this was simply a NASA project that was being done in-house
with NASA. So at a time when we have $1.5 trillion more in
federal spending than we have in money coming in, having
private sector money invested seems to me to be a very laudable
goal.
And I would like to ask for the last two minutes that I
have got here, Mr. Martin, in your June report you describe
several potential acquisition strategies that NASA could use
for the Commercial Crew Program moving forward, including the
use of funded Space Act agreements. Could you confirm the
finding in your report that while every acquisition strategy
has its strengths and weaknesses, which we have just heard,
that the SAA's could theoretically be used by providing
certification requirements to participating companies in a non-
mandatory fashion?
Mr. Martin. Yes, sir. I don't believe our report went that
far and I think whether or not------
Mr. Rohrabacher. It did not. I am trying to push it a
little farther.
Mr. Martin. No, we did not go that far. It really comes
down to sort of a procurement law and a legal question, and I
think Bill is in a better position, at this particular stage,
certainly with the first phase of this next stage in CCDev,
perhaps you may have been able to use either acquisition
vehicle.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right. Well, you said it is a legal
requirement from a policy. According to agency policy, NASA may
only enter into funded Space Act agreements when its objectives
cannot be accomplished through contract, grant, or other
agreements. I understand that is the ``policy,'' but legally,
this is not a ``legal'' requirement, is it? It is just the
``policy'' requirement?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. My understanding is it is a legal
requirement that once we say we need to have a service or we
have a requirement for a capability, at that point we need to
go into a FAR-type instrument.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. Is that your understanding, Mr.
Martin, a legal requirement versus this is just what the policy
is?
Mr. Martin. It is.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. So you agree with that. Thank you
very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Hall. The Chair now recognizes the temporary
Ranking Member of the Committee, Ms. Donna Edwards, the
gentlelady from Maryland.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
gentleman, for your testimony. And I apologize; I had to step
out just briefly but I did have a chance to read your
testimony. I want to go back to the earlier panel because one
of the things that I haven't heard, Mr. Gerstenmaier, is
whether you all have in your cost estimates factored things--
that at least some of the companies have said that the taxpayer
is going to have to underwrite--like indemnification. Is that
factored into your cost considerations?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. It is a consideration but it is really
difficult to estimate exactly what that cost could be and how
that gets accounted in our budgets. So until we get into that
portion of negotiation with the individual companies, it is
very difficult to estimate. So we have some assumptions based
on where we think it is. We think there will be some
indemnification required but------
Ms. Edwards. But the companies--excuse me. But the
companies in their testimony actually said that they can't do
this without the taxpayer providing the indemnification. So it
would seem to me that sooner rather than later the taxpayer
needs to know how much they are going to be on the hook for in
the cases of failure.
Let me just go to something else. Also, the companies
talked about--Boeing in particular talked about the ownership
of intellectual property rights. This is something that has
long concerned me that basically taxpayers are underwriting a
lot of the early development work where an awful lot of
intellectual property assets are acquired and then the taxpayer
basically gets no benefit, no real benefit of that bargain. Why
is that in taxpayers' interest not to receive at least some
portion of the long-term profitability of intellectual property
rights?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Again, the model is that the companies
are going to invest some of their own money in this activity,
and as we have heard, varying amounts depending upon the
company. And for that investment, the company expects some
return on that investment, so they would like------
Ms. Edwards. The taxpayer does, too.
Mr. Gerstenmaier. I agree. And so the return for the
taxpayer is we get a service at a lower price. The return for
the company is that they have a vehicle which they own which
they can then go market to other users that has really brought
down the cost of development for the U.S. taxpayer.
Ms. Edwards. Right, I have to tell you I am just not
actually clear where or who this other market is that somehow
is out there. I haven't been convinced at all about this
market, and it sounds to me that the companies that were in
front of us are presuming that the biggest consumer here is
going to be the U.S. taxpayer for our space program. And so
this sort of ephemeral market and consumer out there I don't
think has quite materialized enough.
Let me just go to another question. Your Deputy
Administrator was recently quoted as saying, ``We have an
analysis that says we believe we would require $6 billion over
5 years.'' If you have that analysis, I think it would be
helpful for this Committee to see that analysis to know upon
which you base that $6 billion over five years. Do you have an
analysis?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. We have the basis for our budget submit
and the basis of our estimate. It is roughly a range between 4
and $6 billion.
Ms. Edwards. Well, what is the analysis that the Deputy
Administrator was referring to?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. It is a portion of that same analysis,
but the way it is going to work is when we actually get the
proposals from the contractors next year, we can then really
definitize that and we can show you a much more definitive
budget. The problem with this acquisition is there is a lot of
uncertainty of how much the companies will invest in their
piece that we don't know right now. We have some other issues
to work out with them in terms of those prices. So we have
estimates, we have a basis and a model that we have based our
budgeting on, but we need to get that data from the companies
to actually get more of a definitized model. So we have------
Ms. Edwards. For those of us who do numbers, can you show
us the basis of your analysis?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Yeah, we can--it will be a range and you
can see the range.
Ms. Edwards. No, I guess I am trying to figure out all of
your underlying assumptions in making the analysis. I mean if
your Deputy Administrator is going to say definitively that we
are going to need $6 billion over five years, I kind of want to
know where that is coming from.
Mr. Gerstenmaier. We can show you the basis for that
estimate.
Ms. Edwards. And then, Mr. Martin, how well do you have an
understanding of NASA's budget and the schedule estimates for
the Commercial Crew Development Program?
Mr. Martin. We have not--in preparing our June audit report
on the status commercial crew challenges, we did not have
access to those. We did not analyze those documents.
Ms. Edwards. So NASA hasn't given you an analysis that
provides the basis for the estimates that they are making?
Mr. Martin. They have not but they wouldn't in normal
course.
Ms. Edwards. Would you ask for one?
Mr. Martin. I will.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you. And then lastly, I just want to go
to this point. It seems to me that we are running on a course
of eventually the taxpayer subsidizing a monopoly, and my worry
about that is that in subsidizing a monopoly, we will end up
footing an even bigger bill than we can anticipate in the
beginning because there will be no other, you know, I don't
know, horse in the race, you name your analogy. And so how
does--how do you, Mr. Gerstenmaier, then estimate what the
overall cost to taxpayers is going to be in terms of
subsidizing essentially one entrant, maybe you say another,
into this program?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. We tried to structure the acquisition
approach in two phases. The first phase of the acquisition
approach is essentially where we have the companies work on
developing the design, and that means we get all the
requirements in place, we see how well they understand our
safety requirements, we see how well they can respond to our
relaxed contracting requirements, we can actually see company
performance with some milestones and development tests during
that phase, and then we can enter into the second phase. So we
can limit our exposure by doing this as a two-phase procurement
so we can see the first portion of the procurement activities
and see how well it progresses, see if we are making
significant progress, see if these estimates that we put
together for our budget hold up. If they do, then we can
proceed into the second phase. If we see through this first
phase something just doesn't look right, it is totally
different than we have got, we can adapt to that and then move
forward to the next phase. So therefore we can------
Ms. Edwards. Just as you close because I know the
Chairman------
Mr. Gerstenmaier. --minimize the risk to the taxpayer.
Ms. Edwards. Thank you. Just one last question and just a
yes or no answer. Have any of the companies that were here
before us ever provided safe crew transport?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. I guess if you--under this model, no, but
if you look at the space shuttle and------
Ms. Edwards. Have any of the companies that were here that
we have invested in at this point ever provided that? NASA has
but these companies haven't right?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Well, Boeing did the work in cooperation
with NASA to develop the space shuttle which delivered crew to
space.
Chairman Hall. Ms. Edwards did a good job, but golly, I
miss Ms. Johnson.
Mr. Palazzo, I recognize you for five minutes.
Mr. Palazzo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gerstenmaier, you were developing an acquisition
strategy for commercial crew and I think you were using the
$850 million mark. What would you do differently if you have
less than that, or more specifically, based on the $500 million
that the Senate is pushing?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Again, based on our models and our
internal estimates which have some softness in them because
this is a new approach for procurement for us, if we ended up
with $500 million in 2012, as long as we have got some
additional funding in the out years above the levels that we
put in our budget request, we think that would delay the
commercial crew service to space station by about 1 year.
Mr. Palazzo. What is the total estimated cost of taxpayer
dollars that NASA is committed to spending on each current
commercial contractor?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. We have not broken it out by individual
contractor. We have the total budget estimate that I described
before of roughly four to six billion.
Mr. Palazzo. Do you have any legitimate studies that
provide a realistic picture of the commercial market for human
space flight activities that will exist in the next five years?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. We have in our report which we provided
to Congress there is a wide range of potential activities that
sit out there or potential market that sits out there in the
future. There is a lot of uncertainty in that market, and I
think again you can--as you heard in your previous panel--they
can better describe what that market is than I can.
Mr. Palazzo. How many commercial crew providers can NASA
support if the commercial market fails to materialize?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Again, we will see what the cost is for
those services, and depending upon the cost for those services,
we could potentially support more than one but we need to see
what the actual cost of the services is and then we will
determine what that is--what we can afford in terms of number
of providers.
Mr. Palazzo. How many flights per year are you planning to
support the space station?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. It would be roughly two flights per year.
Mr. Palazzo. Two?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. And we could change that model if the
research demand changes and someone wants some other
activities, but right now, that is our basic plan is two.
Mr. Palazzo. What is your estimated cost per flight once
the development stage is completed?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Again, we would look at it as equal to or
less than what we would be paying for Soyuz at that time.
Mr. Palazzo. Some------
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Roughly $480 million or so.
Mr. Palazzo. How much would that come down per astronaut
since that seems to be the common way of looking at it?
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Roughly $80 million per crew seat.
Mr. Palazzo. Okay.
Mr. Gerstenmaier. Six seats per year, $480 million total
per year.
Mr. Palazzo. All right. Well, thank you for your testimony,
and I yield back.
Chairman Hall. I thank the gentleman, and the round of
questions are completed. And I really thank both of you. You
are very important, you are knowledgeable, and thank you for
sharing that knowledge with us. Time and time again we have had
you before.
Members of the Committee have additional questions of
witnesses, we will ask the witnesses to respond to those in
writing. They might and we will send them to you. The record
will remain open for two weeks for additional comments from
Members, and witnesses are excused.
And this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:59 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
Appendix I:
----------
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Mr. John Elbon, Vice President and General Manager
for Space Exploration, The Boeing Company, Houston, TX
Questions submitted by Chairman Ralph Hall
Q1. How confident are you about NASA's and FAA's ability to coordinate
their requirements for commercial crew launches? Have you seen any
evidence yet that the two agencies are attempting to define roles and
responsibilities, and to minimize overlap?
A1. NASA and the FAA both have key roles in establishing requirements
for commercial crew launches, and have demonstrated willingness to work
together to define the requirements. The regulatory body controlling
NASA commercial crew flights to the ISS has not been definitively
established to our understanding, but NASA and the FAA are working
closely to finalize those details. Commercial crew flights in support
of customers other than NASA will need to be regulated by the FAA. It
is important for Congress to provide the FAA the ability to establish
regulations to the existing Part 400 in support of this emerging
market. Earlier regulatory ability will play a key role in stimulating
the commercial space market in several ways. Regulations will help the
insurance industry baseline safety for underwriting, resulting in more
affordable insurance premiums. Regulations will also provide a level
playing field, ensuring that all potential providers and operators duly
consider safety concerns. A lack of safety regulations also increases
business risk for all participants. An accident prior to regulation
enforcement could produce three negative economic drivers: increased
insurance costs, a pendulum swing to over-regulate, and lessened demand
due to simple fear.
Q2. Launch abort systems are one of the most critical technically
challenging features to design, integrate and test. What type of launch
abort system do you intend to build into your crew system, and how
mature is the design? Do you intend to demonstrate it in a relevant
launch environment?
A2. Boeing's CST-100 capsule utilizes a ``Pusher type'' launch abort
system (LAS) with four 40,700-lb thrust launch abort engines which are
derived from the Atlas II sustainer engines. Our LAS design ensures a
controllable, stable abort from pad through orbit insertion with no
``black zones,'' meeting or exceeding all requirements for separation.
During CCDev-2, we performed three full duration LAE development tests.
During the future phases of the program, we plan to perform additional
single engine hot-fire tests prior to full-up Service Module cold flow
tests and hot fire tests. These tests precede a pad abort test that is
similar in nature and uses the same test stand as the abort test
conducted for the Orion spacecraft.
Questions submitted by Ranking Member Eddie Bernice Johnson
Q1. NASA's plan requires the development and certification of the
commercial crew systems to occur within a tight timeline, requires the
commercial systems to capable of safe and reliable flight operations by
2016, makes use of new and unproven government-industry development and
safety approaches, and has development and operations costs that are
still unknown. In that regard, please provide the following questions:
What is the evidence that you believe provides the
justification for Congress to invest in this commercial crew
initiative, and
What your company realistically would require from the
U.S. government to make this initiative a success.
A1. The government-industry partnership on Commercial Crew has been
highly successful as demonstrated by Boeing's ability to complete a
system preliminary design review in March 2012, less than two years
from program start, with $120M of government funding. This is
significantly faster and less expensive than traditional programs. In
addition, we are designing the system with a firm understanding of
NASA's safety and certification requirements, based on five decades of
building and operating HSF systems. Boeing's CST-100 will provide safe,
reliable, and affordable domestic transportation capability to ensure
the full utilization of the ISS. This affordable transportation
capability will also allow additional NASA resources to be applied to
exploration beyond LEO with the Space Launch System and Orion vehicles.
The commitment demonstrated by Congress and NASA to support the
infrastructure development is critical to support the emergence of the
commercial space market. Boeing, in partnership with NASA, will deliver
a safe, reliable, and affordable commercial crew system. Boeing has
invested a significant amount prior to and during the performance of
CCDEV, and will continue to invest throughout the development phase.
Q2. What is your understanding of how third-party liability and
indemnification will be addressed for both launch and reentry and for
on-orbit operations of any commercial crew transportation system used
for NASA ISS servicing:
How important an issue is liability and indemnification to
any decision your company might make to enter into a Phase 1 or Phase 2
development contract with NASA for commercial crew systems, or to enter
into a service contract with NASA to transport astronauts to the ISS?
Do you plan to purchase insurance for your systems as part
of your business plan, and how confident are you that adequate
insurance coverage will be available privately? If it isn't, what do
you plan to do?
A2. There are two viable paths for liability protection in support of
commercial crew launches to the ISS. If NASA is the final regulatory
authority, they could offer indemnity protection for the launch, on-
orbit, and re-entry phases of these launches. However, if the FAA is
determined to be the regulatory authority for launches to the ISS, the
launch and re-entry phases would be licensed through the CSLA. In this
situation, insurance would be procured up to the maximum probable loss
determination, and additional liability would be covered through the
congressionally approved indemnity ceiling. Damage to the ISS would not
be insurable, and adequate cross-waivers would need to be provided by
NASA through their planned certification approach.
FAA, COMSTAC and industry have been working together on defining an
approach for addressing third-party liability for both launch and
reentry phases. FAA has proposed an extension to the Commercial Space
Launch Act (CSLA) with informed consent as the path to limit liability.
Boeing will require adequate cross waivers of liability prior to
docking with ISS. For areas of risk not addressed by legislative limits
of liability or indemnification, Boeing has included insurance
protection in our cost estimates and business plan.
Q3. During the hearing, you testified that your company could provide
commercial crew transportation services within the 2015-2016 timeframe.
Please provide 1) the assumptions behind the date, including a) the
magnitude and timing of funding from NASA, b) the timeline assumed for
development, integration, testing, and certification, and c) the number
of certification flights you are assuming will be required.
A3. The details of the Boeing plan for completing development of our
Commercial Crew Transportation System--including assumptions, magnitude
and timing of NASA funding, timeline, and certification approach--
represent our proposal to NASA in response to the Commercial Crew
Integrated Capability (CCiCAP) announcement for proposals. This is an
ongoing competitive procurement, with awards expected July/August 2012.
The CCiCAP AFP projected maximum awards during the 21-month base period
of $300-$500 million. This funding level is below the funding level
required to support a 2015 crewed test flight. However, if NASA is able
to provide additional funding to Boeing during this phase, the launch
date could move up to as early as 2015. The total funding required for
the development and certification of the Boeing system is approximately
$2 billion. This includes extensive qualification testing on the
service module, structural test article, and qualification test
articles. In addition, the cost includes a pad abort test, un-crewed
orbital flight test, and a crewed flight test. Note that Boeing's
system cost above is for the development of the entire commercial crew
mission capability, which includes ground operations, mission
operations, crew training, and the launch vehicles to support the
flight tests.
Q4. Would you anticipate any additional capacity on CST-100 flights
after taking into account NASA's crew requirements on ISS crew
rotations?
How will that overcapacity be dealt with?
Will NASA be required to procure the entire spacecraft, or
will they be able to just purchase the required number of seats for
each flight?
If passengers not paid for by NASA are transported on the
flight, how will their stay on the ISS be accommodated and for how
long?
Are you assuming the ISS partnership will host the non-
NASA spaceflight participants on the ISS?
If you are planning to fly extra passengers on each
flight, how do you plan to get them back from the ISS in an emergency
if the CST-100 capsule is also supposed to serve as an ISS crew rescue
vehicle?
A4. NASA has identified a transportation requirement for crew and
limited cargo. The Boeing CST-100 spacecraft can accommodate up to 7
crew or a combination of crew and cargo. As part of our business plan,
we anticipate a market for private space flight participants to travel
to ISS, and if NASA were to approve such participation, the resulting
revenue could offset the NASA mission cost. NASA could also use the
additional cargo capacity available on each flight to support science
payloads or logistics requirements. In the event private spaceflight
participants were approved for travel to the ISS, it is projected that
they would return on the Boeing CST-100 spacecraft that was docked to
the ISS, serving as the prior rescue vehicle.
Q5. NASA has proposed that the first phase of its commercial crew
procurement--the Integrated Design Contract--be awarded fixed-price
contract. From your perspective, is that a manageable approach?
How would you plan to balance risk mitigation and flight
test programs, which can be expensive, against the need to keep within
the contracted-for fixed-price limits?
A5. NASA has changed its acquisition approach from a FAR-based fixed-
price contract to an SAA, which also requires fixed price milestones.
Boeing believes that a fixed-price contract is acceptable for this
procurement. The design solution is low-risk, benefiting from the
incorporation of flight proven hardware previously flown on other
Boeing programs, including the X-37, Orbital Express, Space Shuttle,
and other programs. Efficient design and manufacturing approaches
proven on Boeing commercial and defense programs are being incorporated
in the CST-100 design to ensure successful program execution. Our
approach has already included numerous risk mitigation hardware
development tests to ensure success early in the development phase,
significantly reducing the risk of costly redesigns later in the design
phase. At Boeing, our brand and our business are fundamentally
dependent on the safety of our products. We do not sacrifice safety for
cost performance, because there is nothing more costly than an unsafe
product. We have demonstrated repeatedly--across a range of commercial
and defense aircraft and spacecraft--our ability to develop and
manufacture safe and reliable products, and to do so in such a manner
as to run a profitable, well-performing business.
Questions submitted Representative Paul Broun
Q1. What obligation does your company have under space act agreements
to report anomalies to NASA?
A1. Under the CCDev, CCDev2, and CCiCap space act agreements, NASA
embeds a Partner Integration Team with our team for ongoing insight
into our development process. NASA has visibility into our tests,
demonstrations, and reviews as we are performing them and is aware of
the outcomes as they occur.
Q2. What information do you believe your company is obligated to
provide NASA about anomalies under a space act agreement?
A2. See response to item 1 above.
Q3. How long after an anomaly is detected, observed, or identified, do
you believe your company is obligated to report such an anomaly to NASA
under a space act agreement?
A3. See response to item 1 above.
Q4. What obligations does your company have under traditional
contracting to report anomalies to NASA?
A4. The planned NASA insight approach is the same, regardless of
contracting mechanism. Whether under SAA or FAR-based contract, NASA
embeds members of their Partner Integration Team with our team, and
they have full visibility into our tests, demonstrations, and reviews
as they occur.
Q5. What information do you believe your company is obligated to
provide NASA about anomalies under traditional contracting?
A4. See response to item 4 above.
Q6. How long after an anomaly is detected, observed, or identified, do
you believe your company is obligated to report such an anomaly to NASA
under traditional contracting?
A6. See response to item 4 above.
Q7. What obligations does your company have under the modified FAR
acquisition to report anomalies to NASA?
A7. Boeing is unable to answer as NASA did not provide the final terms
and conditions for their proposed modified FAR acquisition prior to
switching to a space act agreement approach. However, the NASA insight
approach, in which the NASA Partner Integration Team has full ongoing
insight into our development effort, obviates the need for such
reporting as NASA is aware as events emerge.
Q8. What information do you believe your company is obligated to
provide NASA about anomalies under a modified FAR acquisition?
A8. See response to item 7 above.
Q9. How long after an anomaly is detected, observed, or identified, do
you believe your company is obligated to report such an anomaly to NASA
under a modified FAR acquisition?
A9. See response to item 7 above
Questions submitted Representative Jerry Costello:
Q1. NASA's FY 2012 budget request proposes a total of $4.25 billion
over five years, or $850 million a year through 2016, to fund the U.S.
government's share of commercial crew capabilities development for one
or more systems. What do you believe, in terms of a percentage of total
development costs, the private sector might realistically contribute?
What percentage is your company planning to contribute?
A1. Boeing has invested significantly over the past five decades as
well as directly in the performance of commercial crew development on
hardware and technologies that support our offering. We will continue
to offer significant investment throughout the development phase. NASA
and the Congress have taken a tremendous step to stimulate this
emerging market by committing to funding the preponderance of the
development cost. Without this commitment, the market would take
significantly longer to mature. In addition, the ability to provide a
safe, reliable, and affordable domestic transportation capability vital
to the ISS would not be available.
Q2. Is private sector investment contingent on additional, non-
financial U.S. government support too? If so, what would that support
involve?
A2. The support provided by NASA and the Congress to fund the
preponderance of the development cost, along with significant industry
investment, will ensure the ability of a safe, reliable, and affordable
domestic transportation capability to the ISS. In addition, this
commitment will allow the stimulation of the commercial space
transportation market. The ability of NASA and/or the FAA to regulate
these launches will be required prior to the services phase.
Q3. What is your reaction to NASA's proposed approach to human-rating
future commercial crew transportation systems? Do you believe NASA's
proposed approach will both ensure astronaut safety and facilitate
eventual FAA licensing of launches for non-government customers? Are
there any changes you would like to see made to the approach?
A3. NASA is applying their considerable experience in human space
flight to baseline a set of human rating requirements to ensure crew
safety and facilitate FAA licensing for non-government customer
launches. Boeing incorporated the NASA requirements into our own design
requirements to ensure that our system can achieve NASA and FAA
certification. Although Boeing has adopted the NASA human rating
requirements in our design, there is no contractual requirement to do
so. We don't have insight into other competitors' plans, but we feel it
is important that NASA have the ability to contractually levy design
requirements in the future to ensure design safety, and an equitable
competitive environment.
Q4. During the hearing, you testified about the investment your
company is making in commercial crew activities relative to what the
government is investing in your program. Do you intend to maintain that
percentage should you receive an award for the design and development
contracts from NASA? If not, what level of investment would you
anticipate contributing for the design and development contract phase?
A4. Boeing will continue to invest at the previous percentage level,
providing NASA evidence at our commitment to provide a safe, reliable,
and affordable commercial crew transportation system.
Responses by Mr. Steve Lindsey, Director of Space Exploration,
Sierra Nevada Space Systems, Louisville, CO
Questions submitted by Chairman Ralph Hall
Q1. How confident are you about NASA's and FAA's ability to coordinate
their requirements for commercial crew launches? Have you seen any
evidence yet that the two agencies are attempting to define roles and
responsibilities, and to minimize overlap?
A1. Sierra Nevada Corporation is working directly with both NASA and
the FAA to coordinate our flight test program, set to begin in 2012. We
don't have any direct evidence that the two agencies are defining roles
and responsibilities to minimize overlap, but we do know that the FAA
has a person directly assigned to NASA's Commercial Crew Program and
that they have been working cooperatively on our program. We hope that
meeting NASA's defined requirements will also lead to a smooth
licensing process through the FAA. This, of course will depend upon
close communications, cooperation, and agreement between the FAA and
NASA.
Q2. Launch abort systems are one of the most critical and technically
challenging features to design, integrate and test. What type of launch
abort system do you intend to build into your crew system, and how
mature is the design? Do you intend to demonstrate it in a relevant
launch environment?
A2. SNC plans to utilize the Atlas V rocket which is well known to both
the DoD and NASA as it is their primary launch vehicle for high value
payloads. The Atlas V has had 30 flights to date, all successful, and
its characteristics are well known. SNC has been working with ULA for
over five years studying and demonstrating through testing that our
vehicle will not pose any significant challenges. We require no solid
boosters which contribute to safety. On board the Sierra Nevada Dream
Chaser we use our internally developed hybrid rocket motors as our
abort system, which are designed to ensure a runway landing from
anywhere along the ascent trajectory. We do not require a separate
launch abort system external to the vehicle. These flight-proven rocket
motors have already successfully flown into space on Spaceship 1 and
the technology has already had over 50 tests to date. We just completed
wind tunnel tests further validating positively our ascent models and
intend to test our motors during powered flight drop testing.
Additionally, prior to our first orbital flight we will demonstrate a
powered abort from a simulated launch pad to a runway landing at
Edwards Air Force Base as part of an end to end flight test program. We
also plan to do an uncrewed autonomous orbital flight where the hybrid
motors will again be tested on-orbit prior to the first crewed mission.
Questions submitted by Ranking Member Eddie Bernice Johnson
Q1. NASA's plan requires the development and certification of the
commercial crew systems to occur within a tight timeline, requires the
commercial systems to be capable of safe and reliable flight operations
by 2016, makes use of new and unproven government-industry development
and safety approaches, and has development and operations costs that
are still unknown. In that regard, please provide the following
questions:
What is the evidence that you believe provides the
justification for Congress to invest in this commercial crew initiative
, and
What your company realistically would require from the
U.S. Government to make this initiative a success.
A1. Sierra Nevada Corporation is the ideal partner for NASA to develop
a U.S. capability to provide safe, reliable, and cost-effective access
to Low Earth Orbit (LEO). We are an experienced systems integrator and
a builder of 100% reliable space hardware that meets the goals and
objectives of the commercial crew program. Over our 25 years we have
been engaged on over 400 space missions and have built over 4,000
systems, subsystems and components all of which have operated
successfully on orbit. We successfully completed the first two phases
of the NASA commercial crew program by performing extensive risk
reduction and building hardware. To date we have completed all our
milestones, 12 in total, on time and on budget while providing NASA
complete insight and access to our technical program. We have brought
together over 12 heritage space companies, three aerospace universities
and 7 NASA centers to be part of our program with employment happening
in over 10 states, including expected significant growth in Texas where
we have opened a new office.
With all of the necessary partnerships, facilities and investment in
place, we are ready to take the next step in the development of our
integrated crew transportation system. The Dream Chaser Space System is
based upon a NASA program called the HL-20 which had over ten years of
development, includes the reliable Atlas V launch vehicle which has
flown over 30 times, and has ground and mission systems that leverage
the known infrastructure of the Kennedy and Johnson Space Centers,
including Johnson's Mission Operations Directorate which has
successfully controlled and flown almost all of NASA's human
spaceflight missions. The Dream Chaser lifting body spacecraft offers
significant advantages over capsules including low g reentry,
substantial cross range and gentle runway landings. Our goal is to
bring the jobs currently being outsourced to the Russian Space Program
back to the United States and in doing so continue to drive America
technology and manufacturing base forward while creating STEM
opportunities for the next generation. Without this effort we are
consigned to purchase our space needs from aboard. We realize that
these are difficult economic times which are why as a Company we have
substantially co-invested alongside of NASA. What we need most from the
USG is predictability in the program and support to this mission of
returning jobs to the U.S. It is difficult to build on a program that
takes years without a commitment. We support this commitment being
conditioned on our being able to continue to meet our milestones.
Q2. What is your understanding of how third-party liability and
indemnification will be addressed for both launch and reentry and for
on-orbit operations of any commercial crew transportation system used
for NASA ISS servicing?
How important an issue is liability and indemnification to
any decision your company might make to enter into a Phase 1 or Phase 2
development contract with NASA for a commercial crew system, or to
enter into a service contract with NASA to transport astronauts to the
ISS?
Do you plan to purchase insurance for your systems as part
of your business plan, and how confident are you that adequate
insurance coverage will be available privately? If it isn't, what do
you plan to do?
A2. Per the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act (CSLAA), all
applicants applying for a launch and/or re-entry license from FAA must
demonstrate financial responsibility through liability insurance or
other means to cover third-party liability as well as damage or loss to
Government property. The amount of the liability that has to be covered
is determined by the FAA as part of the licensing process and is called
the Maximum Probable Loss. We understand that we are responsible for
that liability. Currently, there is limited indemnification for license
applications received no later than December 31, 2012. Liability and
indemnification is a very important issue for all commercial service
providers, but we understand that it will take some time to finalize
all the related issues, so this would not keep us from proceeding with
development contracts with NASA. It will be a factor in our eventual
pricing for a service contract since we will have to include the costs
for liability insurance for all phases of the service. We do plan to
purchase all the necessary insurance as part of our business plan and
have had discussions with space insurance brokers and underwriters and
believe that insurance coverage will be available privately.
Q3. During the hearing, you testified that your company could provide
commercial crew transportation services within the 2015-2016 timeframe.
Please provide 1) the assumptions behind that date, including a) the
magnitude and timing of funding from NASA, b) the timeline assumed for
development, integration, testing and certification, and c) the number
of certification flights you are assuming will be required.
A3. As part of the competitive Commercial Crew Integrated Capabilities
(CCiCap) proposal due to NASA on March 23, 2012, bidders are required
to provide all of the information that is asked in this question as
well as to identify the magnitude and timing of the company investment
on the program. Since this is a competitive proposal that is still
under review we respectfully cannot provide detail to this question at
this time. We can however state that we are able to meet or exceed the
requirement for flight times and costs as outlined in that RFP and
would be available to provide information at a future date.
Q4. Would you anticipate any additional capacity on the Dream Chaser
after taking into account NASA's crew requirements to ISS crew
rotations?
How will that overcapacity be dealt with?
Will NASA be required to procure the entire spacecraft, or
will they be able to just purchase the required number of seats for
each flight?
If passengers not paid for by NASA are transported on the
flight, how will their stay on the ISS be accommodated and for how
long?
Are you assuming the ISS partnership will host the non-
NASA spaceflight participants on the ISS?
If you are planning to fly extra passengers on each
flight, how do you plan to get them back from ISS in an emergency if
the Dream Chaser is also supposed to serve as an ISS crew rescue
vehicle?
A4. NASA's stated ISS requirement is to provide transportation to four
crewmembers for crew rotation. Sierra Nevada's Dream Chase Space System
has a capability for seven seats. The additional three seats can be
used in several ways. Those seats can be replaced by equivalent cargo
to ISS or used to fly additional ISS crewmembers or payload
specialists. Sierra Nevada plans to provide transportation services by
the seat, so NASA will not be required to procure the entire
spacecraft. We also assume that we are responsible for the logistics
associated with any spaceflight participants that are not NASA
crewmembers. We will either provide all support for these additional
participants, or negotiate support with NASA/ISS, or a combination of
the two. Extra passengers will only be flown if the ISS crew rotation
model is `direct handover'--which means there will be a second Dream
Chaser already on-orbit. In this case the non-NASA astronauts would
only be on the ISS as long as it takes to swap out crews; they would
all return to earth with the ISS crewmembers rotating home. In our
traffic model, no non-NASA spaceflight participants would spend more
than a few days on the ISS.
Q5. NASA has proposed that the first phase of its commercial crew
procurement--the Integrated Design Contract--be awarded as a fixed-
price contract. From your perspective, is that a manageable approach?
How would you plan to balance risk mitigation and flight
test programs, which can be expensive, against the need to keep within
the contracted-for fixed-price limits?
A5. SNC believes that our vehicle can be successfully designed, built,
tested, and certified within the framework of a fixed-price contract.
We have been in the aerospace business for over 25 years and have
successfully completed hundreds of fixed price programs. There can be
no compromise when it comes to astronaut safety. Of the greatest
advantage to us is that a majority of our systems have significant
flight heritage. For example the Atlas V, which pricing is known and
our environmental systems which are NASA heritage. This provides us
with the visibility to more accurately predict our costs. To back this
up, SNC has available to it a substantial and existing financial
capability which provides ample contingency for future program changes.
Questions submitted by Representative Paul Broun
Q1. What obligation does your company have under space act agreements
to report anomalies to NASA?
Q2. What information do you believe your company is obligated to
provide NASA about anomalies under a space act agreement?
Q3. How long after an anomaly is detected, observed, or identified, do
you believe your company is obligated to report such an anomaly to NASA
under a space act agreement?
Q4. What obligation does your company have under traditional
contracting to report anomalies to NASA?
Q5. What information do you believe your company is obligated to
provide NASA about anomalies under traditional contracting?
Q6. How long after an anomaly is detected, observed, or identified, do
you believe your company is obligated to report such an anomaly to NASA
under traditional contracting?
Q7. What obligation does your company have under the modified FAR
acquisition to report anomalies to NASA?
Q8. What information do you believe your company is obligated to
provide NASA about anomalies under a modified FAR acquisition?
Q9. How long after an anomaly is detected, observed, or identified, do
you believe your company is obligated to report such an anomaly to NASA
under modified FAR acquisition?
A1-9. Sierra Nevada's approach to the NASA's Commercial Crew Program is
to be completely transparent, whether we are on a Space Act Agreement
or a FAR-based contract. NASA is invited to any and all technical
meetings we have, and learns of any anomalies in our technical
development as they are happening. This completely honest and open
approach enhances the NASA-Sierra Nevada team environment, promotes
trust, and ultimately results in a much better product for both Sierra
Nevada and NASA. We would expect no difference in dealing with
anomalies under any contract type. Our safety program is consistent and
is based upon doing what is right for the astronauts and the success of
the program. We cannot answer how NASA may have dealt with such issues
under a FAR or modified FAR contract as there was not a final RFP that
was issued and that is a question better asked to NASA.
Questions submitted by Representative Jerry Costello
Q1. NASA's FY 2012 budget request proposes a total of $4.25 billion
over five years, or $850 million a year through 2016, to fund the U.S.
government's share of commercial crew capabilities development for one
or more systems. What do you believe, in terms of a percentage of total
development costs, the private sector might realistically contribute?
What percentage is your company planning to contribute?
Is private sector investment contingent on additional,
non-financial U.S. government support too? If so, what would that
support involve?
A1. As part of the competitive Commercial Crew Integrated Capabilities
(CCiCap) proposal due to NASA on March 23, 2012, bidders are required
identify the magnitude and timing for all required NASA funds and all
planned company investments both for a base contract period of 21
months, and for full system development through a crewed orbital
demonstration flight. The percentage of company investment and how it
relates to required NASA funding will be evident in our proposal. As
this is in the competitive stage we cannot answer this question,
however, we can say that our contribution was significant in the first
two phases of the program and, for us, is not expected to be contingent
on additional non-financial U.S. government support.
Q2. What is your reaction to NASA's proposed approach to human-rating
future commercial crew transportation systems? Do you believe NASA's
proposed approach will both ensure astronaut safety and facilitate
eventual FAA licensing of launches for non-government customers? Are
there any changes you would like to see made to the approach.
A2. SNC believes that NASA's approach to human rating will ensure both
astronaut safety and eventual FAA licensing. SNC is designing the Dream
Chaser spacecraft to NASA's 1100 and 50808 series requirements--which
are the most recent NASA human rating requirements. Meeting these
requirements will ensure we have the safest spacecraft possible--they
are derived from ISS, Space Shuttle, and Constellation program
requirements. FAA licensing should follow if there is tight
communications, cooperation, and agreement between NASA's requirements
and the FAA's licensing requirements for commercial spacecraft.
Q3. During the hearing, you testified that your company is investing
about 40 percent of the cost of your commercial crew activities
relative to what the government is investing in your program. Do you
intend to maintain that percentage should you receive an award for the
design and development contracts from NASA? If not, what level of
investment would you anticipate contributing for the design and
development contract phase?
A3. The percentage of our company investment and how it relates to
required NASA funding will be disclosed in our proposal. As this is in
the competitive stage we cannot answer this question at this time.
Responses by Mr. Elon Musk, CEO and Chief Technology Officer,
Space Exploration Technologies Corp., Hawthorne, CA
Question Submitted by Chairman Ralph Hall
Q1. How confident are you about NASA's and FAA's ability to coordinate
their requirements for commercial crew launches? Have you seen any
evidence yet that the two agencies are attempting to define roles and
responsibilities, and to minimize overlap?
A1. SpaceX is confident that NASA and FAA will effectively coordinate
their requirements for commercial crew launches. As you know, SpaceX
previously secured FAA licensing for launch and reentry under the NASA
Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) program. For
Commercial Crew, we understand that NASA and FAA are in ongoing
discussions to ensure that FAA regulations support NASA requirements
and that duplication of efforts is minimal. The divisions of labor
between NASA and FAA are clear: since NASA is both the leading federal
agency for human spaceflight and the end user of the Commercial Crew
Program, NASA should set requirements for human spaceflight systems.
FAA should retain its current regulatory scope of protecting public
safety during launch and reentry using its authority under the
Commercial Space Launch Act (CSLA) of 1984, as amended.
NASA and FAA collaboration for future commercial crew missions is
already underway. A NASA employee from the Commercial Crew Program
office is on a rotational assignment at FAA headquarters. Similarly, a
FAA representative is assigned to the Commercial Crew Program office at
NASA's Kennedy Space Center. NASA is supporting FAA definition of
regulations for crew and participant safety and FAA is participating in
CCP safety certification requirements development. Both Agencies are
ensuring compatibility between NASA requirements and FAA regulations.
Furthermore, the FAA participates in the Commercial Crew Program
milestone reviews.
Q2. Launch abort systems are one of the most critical and technically
challenging features to design, integrate and test. What type of launch
abort system do you intend to build into your crew system, and how
mature is the design? Do you intend to demonstrate it in a relevant
launch environment?
A2. SpaceX concurs that launch abort systems (LAS) are critical and
technically challenging, which is why our LAS development is the
centerpiece of our commercial crew effort. SpaceX's crew Dragon will
include an integrated launch abort system (LAS), which will yield
numerous safety and performance benefits. The Dragon's LAS is carried
through orbit and reentry, with the abort systems available for use
throughout the time the Dragon is boosted into space. Carrying the
abort system all the way into orbit eliminates the jettison-effectively
a stage separation event-of the abort system as a required event for
the safe completion of a nominal mission. Separation events are,
historically, a leading factor of launch failures.
The Dragon LAS is a vehicle-integrated, side-mounted engine system
selected for its safety, reliability and performance. Eight abort
engines, or SuperDracos, are located around the periphery of the Dragon
service section and are fed by hypergolic propellant stored in the
spacecraft propellant tanks. In the event of a mishap or launch
failure, the SuperDracos will push the Dragon spacecraft and crew away
from the booster. This abort capability is maintained from the pad all
the way through nominal on-orbit separation of Dragon from the second
stage.
To date, SpaceX has successfully completed five of the ten milestones
in our CCDev2 Space Act Agreement (SAA). The completion of these
milestones represents $40M of NASA's $75M funding under SpaceX's CCDev2
agreement. During the execution of these milestones, SpaceX provided
NASA with comprehensive Falcon 9/Dragon crew systems concept design
insight, including cabin layout, seat design, space suit design, and
life support system design. Further, SpaceX provided detail for abort
scenarios, concepts for the launch abort system, ground systems, abort
trajectories, and aerodynamics of ascent and entry and mass margins.
The Design Status Review provided an opportunity for SpaceX to work
with NASA and industry teammates as partners and make desired crew
systems design concept changes subsequent to peer review. This feedback
on the system-level designs and concepts constituted a successful
collaboration between NASA and SpaceX under the SAA contracting
structure.
With regard to the LAS components PDR-our fourth milestone-SpaceX
engineers demonstrated to NASA's satisfaction that the LAS propulsion
components design is mature enough to support proceeding with detailed
design, fabrication, assembly, integration and testing of LAS
propulsion components test articles. SpaceX also provided sufficient
evidence to demonstrate that the Dragon LAS propulsion design meets all
system requirements within acceptable risk and can be developed within
schedule.
Future milestones will include abort engine fabrication and testing,
as well as further maturation of the vehicle system design and concept
of operations. To achieve these milestones, SpaceX has already begun
design and construction of a test facility for the launch abort engine
at our Rocket Development Facility in McGregor, Texas. The remaining
hardware milestones will culminate in all key launch abort system
propulsion components undergoing initial fluid and environmental
development testing. Here, the SuperDracos will be hot-fire tested for
a full duration. SpaceX will further demonstrate throttle capability,
which is necessary for abort maneuvers.
Question Submitted by Ranking Member Eddie Bernice Johnson:
Q1. NASA's plan requires the development and certification of the
commercial crew systems to occur within a tight timeline, requires the
commercial systems to be capable of safe and reliable flight operations
by 2016, makes use of new and unproven government-industry development
and safety approaches, and has development and operations costs that
are still unknown: In that regard, please provide the following
questions:
What is the evidence that you believe provides the
justification for Congress to invest in this commercial crew
initiative, and
What your company realistically would require from the
U.S. Government to make this initiative a success.
A1. The NASA Commercial Cargo and Crew Program is a public-private
partnership with the U.S. commercial space sector that leverages
financial and technical resources to develop, demonstrate, and provide
safe, reliable, and low-cost space transportation capabilities to the
International Space Station (ISS). At SpaceX, government investment is
leveraged with two additional nongovernment sources of capital: private
investment and revenue from other markets. In other words, NASA's
investment in commercial space transportation capabilities is augmented
both by private investment and by advance sales revenue in the
commercial and international launch market, such as telecommunication
satellite launches and others.
Since the retirement of the Space Shuttle earlier this year, the U.S.
has no option but to send hundreds of millions of dollars to Russia
annually to purchase seats on Soyuz spacecraft. While the Russians have
been a reliable partner in space, they have continually increased their
prices, from $48 million per seat in 2007 to $63 million in 2011--an
increase of 31 percent in just five years. With the purchase of six
seats annually, this equates to a transfer of wealth of over $336
million per year to the Russian government, with an increase to $378
million annually in 2014. This cost escalation demonstrates clearly the
need to expeditiously develop new American human spaceflight
capabilities to low Earth orbit. The U.S. is outsourcing its space
missions and jobs to Russia by relying on Russian Soyuz vehicles to
reach the ISS.
The U.S. has always been a human spaceflight leader. However, no new
launch vehicle has been developed since the Space Shuttle, an
engineering and technical marvel, primarily due to inefficient
contracting structures that led to extreme cost and schedule overruns,
leading to program termination. This has been a familiar history in
recent years. The innovative approach that forms that basis of NASA's
Commercial Crew Program, in which private contractors have ``skin in
the game,'' and are required to meet performance milestones to receive
payment, has already contributed to the successful development of the
Falcon 9 launch vehicle and a cargo version of the Dragon capsule.
A robust U.S. Commercial Crew program-built on a firm fixed price,
milestone-based, pay-for-performance approach-will leverage private
investment to create thousands of American jobs in Florida, Nevada,
Colorado, Virginia, Texas, California, Washington, and Alabama
depending on the companies that remain involved going forward.
According to an April 2010 Tauri Group study, fully funding and
implementing the Commercial Crew and Cargo Program would result in an
average of 11,800 direct jobs per year over the next five years
nationwide. Further, Commercial Crew provides the only affordable way
to regain America's human spaceflight capability within the next
several years. If Congress is committed to the restoration of this
capability for America, it should ensure robust and consistent funding
for the program.
Commercial crew and cargo providers actively seek as many new markets
as possible for their services, increasing the volume of flights and
thus reducing the cost of access to space for all, including NASA.
SpaceX already has a substantial non-government customer base, with
over 60 percent of our launch manifest consisting of commercial
launches. This market diversity allows us to disperse our costs widely
and keep them low for U.S. government customers. More broadly, markets
for commercial spaceflight include scientific research flights,
national security missions, commercial launches for satellites, private
space travel, and others. A strengthened U.S. commercial spaceflight
industry would bring space launches back to the United States-an
outcome SpaceX has already contributed to-from foreign governments to
whom the U.S. has recently surrendered that market.
Subsequent to the Committee's hearing in October, NASA has announced
that it will initiate another competition for Space Act Agreements for
the next round of Commercial Crew development. The details on the next
round and the guidelines for proposals have not been released, but
SpaceX is planning to participate and submit a proposal. Once we have
additional details about the next commercial crew development phase, we
will be better able to estimate the necessary federal investment.
Q2. What is your understanding of how third-party liability and
indemnification will be addressed for both launch and reentry and for
on-orbit operations of any commercial crew transportation system used
for NASA ISS servicing?
How important an issue is liability and indemnification to
any decision your company might make to enter into a Phase 1 or Phase 2
development contract with NASA for a commercial crew system, or to
enter into a service contract with NASA to transport astronauts to the
ISS?
Do you plan to purchase insurance for your systems as part
of your business plan, and how confident are you that adequate
insurance coverage will be available privately? If it isn't, what do
you plan to do?
A2. While NASA has not released its final plans for acquiring crew
services to the ISS, NASA contracts have traditionally contemplated
third-party liability and indemnification. The cross-waiver,
indemnification, and insurance requirements in NASA contracts are set
forth in 14 CFR 1266, NASA FAR Supplement Part 1828, and FAR Part 28.
We anticipate that any commercial crew transportation system that is
conducted under a NASA contract will accord with the legal and
regulatory requirements guiding third-party liability and
indemnification. Should that system require an FAA license, then
contractors will be required to obtain that license pursuant to the
Commercial Space Launch Act, 51 U.S.C. Ch. 509, Sec. Sec. 50901-23
(2011).
Liability and indemnification are one of many important factors that
impact SpaceX's decision to enter into contracts with NASA. Prior to
entering into a development or services contract to transport
astronauts to the ISS, it is essential that the applicable liability
and indemnification regime be clearly defined. It would be very
difficult to appropriately price the services without clearly
delineated responsibilities, including any costs associated with the
relevant insurance requirements.
SpaceX will purchase appropriate levels of insurance consistent with
prudent business practices and all relevant legal, regulatory and
contractual requirements. We have no reason to believe that adequate
insurance will not be available on the private market as insurance
products meeting current FAA/NASA requirements are readily available.
In the unlikely event insurance is not available on the private market,
a contractor could self-insure or seek indemnification by NASA under
the Space Act (Pub. L. No. 85-568).
Q3. During the hearing, you testified that your company could provide
commercial crew transportation services within the 2015-2016 timeframe.
Please provide the assumptions behind that date, including:
the magnitude and timing of funding from NASA,
the timeline assumed for development, integration,
testing, and certification, and
the number of certification flights you are assuming will
be required.
A3. In the coming years, SpaceX will collect significant data and
experience on the Falcon 9 and Dragon system from upcoming COTS and CRS
missions. According to the current schedule , the Dragon spacecraft and
Falcon 9 launch vehicle will have flown together at least 8 more times
before a crew demonstration if it were to occur by 2015. The Falcon 9
itself is scheduled to launch a total of 14 missions prior to the first
Dragon crew mission. The commonality between the cargo and crew
versions of Dragon will generate significant end-to-end flight heritage
and operational experience for our system well in advance of any crew
flight.
Ultimately, the Falcon 9 will be one hundred percent common as
between the cargo and crew vehicles. Therefore, though there is much
work ahead, SpaceX already is beyond a Critical Design Review (CDR)
equivalent level of maturity--and even into the production phase--with
respect to many aspects of the vehicle system. This includes the main
propulsion systems, structures, thermal protection systems (including
the Dragon heat shield), power generation systems, altitude control,
on-orbit propulsion systems, thermal control systems, and GNC systems.
SpaceX has been steadily progressing through our CCDev2 milestones,
which are focused on accelerating development of our launch abort
system. As you know, NASA recently elected to pursue Space Act
Agreements (SAA) for the next phase of the Commercial Crew Development
program. NASA determined that an SAA approach will ``offer more
flexibility and efficiency in adjusting to future appropriations'' and
enhance ``partner flexibility in technical development through the next
phase.'' \1\ SpaceX looks forward to receiving more details on NASA's
plans for this phase, will be better able to predict our future
schedule for development, integration, testing and, depending on NASA's
certification process, provide transportation services within the 2015
timeframe. SpaceX defers to NASA with regard to the number of
certification flights that will be required and makes no assumptions in
that regard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ NASA Commercial Crew Program, Commercial Crew Program Near Term
Strategy Discussion. December 2011.
Q4. Would you anticipate any additional capacity on the Dragon capsule
after taking into account NASA's crew requirements on ISS crew
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
rotations?
How will that overcapacity be dealt with?
Will NASA be required to procure the entire spacecraft, or
will they be able to just purchase the required number of seats for
each flight?
If passengers not paid for by NASA are transported on the
flight, how will their stay on the ISS be accommodated and for how
long?
Are you assuming the ISS partnership will host the non-
NASA spaceflight participants on the ISS?
If you are planning to fly extra passengers on each
flight, how do you plan to get them back from ISS in an emergency if
the Dragon capsule is also supposed to serve as an ISS crew rescue
vehicle?
A4. The goal of SpaceX's crew transportation system is to safely and
reliably transport up to seven crew members from our launch pad on Cape
Canaveral to the International Space Station (ISS), dwell on the ISS
for up to 210 days and return the same number of crew safely to Earth.
As America's national laboratory in space, the ISS productivity depends
on how many scientists can visit the lab, conduct their experiments and
return to their public or private enterprises. NASA currently bases
astronauts at the ISS for six months. That limitation is based on how
many Soyuz capsules are produced each year, how long the Soyuz is rated
to last on orbit and the high price of Soyuz seats.
The ISS can actually support seven crew members once we have a better
crew rescue capability. Commercial crew will deliver that capability.
Should the U.S. space industry lower the cost to between $20 and $30
million per seat, it will be possible for research scientists to visit
the ISS for shorter periods of time, conduct dedicated research and
return to Earth. Less costly, more regular access to ISS will enable
more scientists to do more research in the same amount of time, with
the same amount of dollars.
Since NASA has not released its final plans for acquiring crew
services to the ISS, it is too soon to anticipate if the Dragon will
have additional capacity beyond NASA's crew. SpaceX anticipates that
NASA will purchase seats on the Dragon in a similar fashion as NASA
procures seats on the Russian Soyuz. SpaceX's commercial crew proposals
to date have been premised on developing a safe and affordable crew
capability that NASA will be able to procure as a commercial service
rather than bearing the burden of acquiring the entire spacecraft.
The Commercial Crew Program is still in the development stage. Should
NASA select SpaceX for future crew development efforts and eventually
for a crew services contract, SpaceX will work with NASA to resolve
questions about excess capacity, non-NASA participants, ISS visits and
ISS emergency evacuations.
Q5. NASA is providing your company with an additional 42% of the
original funding provided for developing a commercial cargo
transportation system to buy down risk and assure that commercial cargo
resupply services to the ISS are ready when NASA needs them. How can
Congress have confidence that a commercial crew program, which is more
challenging than developing systems to deliver cargo, will be any
different and not require additional funding further down the road?
A5. The Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) augmentation
milestones exceeded the tests and demonstrations originally agreed to
by SpaceX and NASA for COTS when the parties first signed their Space
Act Agreement. Specifically, certain milestones augmented pre-planned
ground and flight testing, others accelerated the development of
enhanced cargo capabilities, and the remaining focused on
infrastructure improvements. The additional milestones further
developed the ground infrastructure needed for cargo carriage
operations and helped improve the launch and recovery operations, test
site and production facility infrastructure. In short, COTS
augmentation milestones were meant to further reduce risk and enhance
the execution of the cargo demonstration and operational missions to be
performed under the COTS and CRS programs. NASA divided these
milestones among multiple amendments due to the uncertainty in Fiscal
Year 2011 funding.
Since the hearing in October, NASA has announced that it will alter
its approach to the next stage of commercial crew development and is
delaying moving forward with the Commercial Crew Integrated Design
Contract (CCIDC). Instead, NASA is planning to initiate another
competition for Space Act Agreements. NASA specifically cited the
Fiscal Year 2012 funding level and "the uncertainty with the FY13 and
FY14 budget levels" as a key cause for ``adjusting the near-term
strategy.'' \2\
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\2\ NASA Commercial Crew Program, Commercial Crew Program Near Term
Strategy Discussion. December 2011.
Further details on the next round and the guidelines for NASA's
commercial crew development Space Act Agreements have not been
released. Once those are released, the industry and Congress will have
a better sense of the funding required to participate in the next
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
commercial crew development and the timeline for the program.
Q6. NASA has proposed that the first phase of its commercial crew
procurement--the Integrated Design Contract--be awarded as a fixed-
price contract. From your perspective, is that a manageable approach?
How would you plan to balance risk mitigation and flight
test programs, which can be expensive, against the need to keep within
the contracted-for fixed-price limits?
A6. NASA has elected to pursue Space Act Agreements (SAA) for the next
phase of the Commercial Crew Development (CCDev) program rather than
the previously-proposed Commercial Crew Integrated Development Contract
(CCIDC). SpaceX strongly supports firm fixed-price contracts, whether
SAAs or FAR-based, as providing the best value for the taxpayer. To
date, SpaceX has solely operated under firm fixed-price contracts, and
believes this approach is manageable, provides contractors with proper
incentives, and will help keep costs low as compared with cost-plus
contracts. Firm fixed-price (FFP) contracts have proven that they
deliver those results. For example, development of the Falcon 9 and
cargo Dragon under the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services
(COTS) program was undertaken under a FFP.
By contrast, cost-plus contracts have resulted in cost overruns and
schedule delays, and ultimately have resulted in no new domestic launch
vehicle since the Space Shuttle. Indeed, NASA's internal studies using
the NASA-Air Force Cost Model (NAFCOM) concluded that it would have
cost NASA $1.7B to $4B to develop the Falcon 9 rocket. By contrast, in
partnership with NASA's COTS program, SpaceX developed the Falcon 9 for
approximately $300M under its firm fixed-price Space Act Agreement.
Firm fixed-price contracts make the most sense when requirements are
properly identified and milestones are effectively negotiated. NASA and
SpaceX will incorporate risk mitigation and flight testing into its FFP
milestone-based, pay for performance contracts under Space Act
Agreements as the CCDev program progresses. The clearest example of
this approach is the Falcon 9/Dragon demonstration mission under the
COTS program. FFP contracts do not inhibit risk mitigation or rigorous
testing. In fact, they allow NASA and the contractor to negotiate those
terms and milestones at a high level of specificity on the front end of
a contract, prompting payments when milestones are reached.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has recently identified
NASA's firm fixed-price approach for CCDev as one its ``good
acquisition practices.'' Further, GAO states: ``We have reported that
the use of firm-fixed-price contracts-along with well-defined
requirements and a sufficient level of knowledge about critical
technologies-presents the least risk to the government. Firm fixed-
price contracts place the onus on the contractor to provide the
deliverable at the time, place, and price negotiated by the contractor
and the government. In addition, firm fixed-price contracts place the
maximum risk on the contractor as well as full responsibility for all
costs and any resulting profit or loss'' (GAO-12-282 NASA Commercial
Crew Program).
Question Submitted by Representative Paul Broun
Q1. What obligation does your company have under space act agreements
to report anomalies to NASA? What information do you believe your
company is obligated to provide NASA about anomalies under a space act
agreement? How long after an anomaly is detected, observed, or
identified, do you believe your company is obligated to report such an
anomaly to NASA under a space act agreement?
A1. The obligations to report anomalies under a Space Act Agreement are
well-defined. Under SpaceX's Space Act Agreement (SAA) for the
Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) program, we are
required to ``[i]dentify any anomalies with preliminary assessment of
cause'' for each mission. When SpaceX documents an anomaly, we report
it to NASA with our preliminary analysis of the anomaly's cause and
then we work to NASA on the resolution.
SpaceX's COTS SAA provides NASA with significant insight into
SpaceX's operations and includes a number of obligations and reporting
requirements that include anomaly reporting assessment and corrective
actions. SAA's provide NASA with the ability to require anomaly
reporting and information as well as a process for reviewing and
resolving any anomalies observed during work taking place under the
SAA.
Q2. What obligation does your company have under traditional
contracting to report anomalies to NASA? What information do you
believe your company is obligated to provide NASA about anomalies under
traditional contracting? How long after an anomaly is detected,
observed, or identified, do you believe your company is obligated to
report such an anomaly to NASA under traditional contracting?
A2. The obligations to report anomalies under a traditional contracting
mechanism are determined by the contract. SpaceX's Commercial Resupply
Services (CRS) contract to provide NASA with ISS cargo services is a
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) contract. The FAR provides a
framework for NASA to include mission-specific requirements in its
contracts, including anomaly reporting. During its procurement process
and negotiations with its contractors, NASA determines the level of
insight and oversight it requires.
For example, the following obligations are part of NASA's insight and
approval authority under SpaceX's CRS contract:
The Contractor shall notify NASA of qualification or test
anomalies involving ISS Commercial Resupply launch and orbital
vehicles, systems, subassemblies, components, software and similar
launch and orbital vehicles that the Contractor is aware of.
In the event of an in-flight anomaly or launch, on-orbit or
entry failure, the Contractor shall allow NASA to participate fully in
the Contractor`s Failure Investigation Board including those for non-
NASA missions.
Our CRS contract provides NASA with significant insight into
SpaceX's operations and includes a number of obligations and reporting
requirements that include anomaly reporting assessment, corrective
actions. Those requirements appear in various parts of the contract.
Q3. What obligation does your company have under the modified FAR
acquisition to report anomalies to NASA? What information do you
believe your company is obligated to provide NASA about anomalies under
a modified FAR acquisition? How long after an anomaly is detected,
observed, or identified, do you believe your company is obligated to
report such an anomaly to NASA under modified FAR acquisition?
A3. Please see the response above. Any differences in anomaly reporting
obligations between a traditional FAR acquisition, a modified FAR
acquisition, or a Space Act Agreement would be determined by NASA in
the contract.
Question Submitted by Representative Jerry Costello
Q1. NASA's FY 2012 budget request proposes a total of $4.25 billion
over five years, or $850 million a year through 2016, to fund the U.S.
government's share of commercial crew capabilities development for one
or more systems. What do you believe, in terms of a percentage of total
development costs the private sector might realistically contribute?
What percentage is you company planning to contribute?
Is private sector investment contingent on additional,
non-financial U.S. government support too? If so, what would that
support involve?
A1. At SpaceX, government investment is leveraged by at least one
additional nongovernment source of capital, including private
investment and revenue from other markets. In other words, NASA's
investment in commercial space transportation capabilities is augmented
both by private investment and by advance sales revenue in the
commercial and international launch market, such as telecommunication
satellite launches and others.
Commercial crew and cargo providers actively seek as many new markets
as possible for their services, increasing the volume of flights and
thus reducing the cost of access to space for all, including NASA.
Markets for commercial spaceflight include scientific research flights,
national security missions, commercial launches for satellites, private
space travel, and others. A strengthened U.S. commercial spaceflight
industry would bring space launches back to the United States from
foreign governments who have increasingly taken over the market.
Since the hearing in October, NASA has announced that it will alter
its approach to the next stage of commercial crew development to
initiate another competition for Space Act Agreements. The details on
the next round and the guidelines for proposals have not been released,
though SpaceX is planning to participate and submit a proposal. Once we
have greater details about the next commercial crew development phase,
we will be better able to estimate the private sector contribution.
Our continued investment will not be contingent upon that support
continuing; however, we believe it provides valuable benefits to NASA
and its industry partners. Under NASA's Space Act Agreements for COTS
and commercial crew development, industry has received non-financial
U.S. government support, generally in the form of technical assistance
by NASA experts and centers. SpaceX's participation in COTS and CCDev2
has not been contingent upon non-financial U.S. Government support,
though NASA's technical support has contributed to the success of our
partnership.
Q2. What is your reaction to NASA's proposed approach to human-rating
future commercial crew transportation systems? Do you believe NASA's
proposed approach will both ensure astronaut safety and facilitate
eventual FAA licensing of launches for non-government customers? Are
there any changes you would like to see made to the approach?
A2. NASA has been safely transporting astronauts into space for 50
years. Building on its decades of experience, earlier this month, NASA
released the baselined version of the CCT-1100 Series. Those documents
will provide valuable guidance to industry on NASA's human rating
requirements as we continue development of future commercial crew
transportation systems. NASA's oversight coupled with SpaceX's
innovative vehicle design--which in many cases exceeds the NASA
requirements--will improve safety by a factor of ten compared to
previous human-carrying spacecraft. The resulting transportation system
is also expected to satisfy the FAA licensing requirements.
Q3. During the hearing, you testified that your company is investing
about 60 percent of the cost of your commercial crew activities
relative to what the government is investing in your program. Do you
intend to maintain that percentage should you receive an award for the
design and development contracts from NASA? If not, what level of
investment would you anticipate contributing for the design and
development contract phase?
A3. Since the hearing in October, NASA has announced that it will alter
its approach to the next stage of commercial crew development to
initiate another competition for Space Act Agreements. The details on
the next round and the guidelines for proposals have not been released,
though SpaceX is planning to participate and submit a proposal. Once we
have greater details about the next commercial crew development phase,
we will be better able to estimate the private sector contribution.
However, SpaceX is committed to substantial investment as part of this
program.
Q4. During the hearing, you testified that you would commit in current
year dollars to a price of $140 million for commercial crew for a seven
astronaut flight and at a flight rate of four crewed flights per year.
a. Do you anticipate any additional capacity on the four flights,
after taking into account NASA's requirements for ISS crew rotations?
If so, how would you plan to fill the remaining seats on those flights
included in the four flights per year rate?
b. Would NASA assume the cost of the entire flight if any seats
were not filled?
A4. The goal of SpaceX's crew transportation system is to safely and
reliably transport up to seven crew members from our launch pad on Cape
Canaveral to the International Space Station (ISS), dwell on the ISS
for up to 210 days and return the same number of crew safely to Earth.
SpaceX's commercial crew proposals to date have been premised on
developing a safe and affordable crew capability that NASA will be able
to procure as a commercial service.
Since NASA has not released its final plans for acquiring crew
services to the ISS, it is too soon to anticipate if the Dragon will
have additional capacity beyond NASA's crew. SpaceX anticipates that
NASA will purchase seats on the Dragon in a similar fashion as NASA
procures seats on the Russian Soyuz. Should NASA select SpaceX for
future crew development efforts and eventually for a crew services
contract, SpaceX will work with NASA to resolve questions about excess
capacity, non-NASA participants, ISS visits and ISS emergency
evacuations.
Q5. Following the hearing, it was reported that SpaceX may not bid on
the commercial crew development contract if NASA does not change the
terms in the draft version of the contract. Is that correct?
A5. The report was inaccurate and was changed by the reporter. SpaceX
plans to submit a proposal to participate in the next phase of NASA's
commercial crew development program. The company was founded to develop
the safest, most reliable and affordable crew transportation system to
low Earth orbit and, ultimately, beyond. Indeed, carrying humans into
space has been a cornerstone of SpaceX's vehicle designs from the day
the company was founded.
Since the hearing in October, NASA has announced that it will pursue
competitively-awarded Space Act Agreements for the next stage of
commercial crew development. The details on the next round and the
guidelines for proposals have not been released, though SpaceX is
planning to participate and submit a proposal.
Responses by Mr. Charlie Precourt, Vice President,
ATK Launch Systems Group, Brigham City, UT
Question Submitted by Chairman Ralph Hall
Q1. How confident are you about NASA's and FAA's ability to coordinate
their requirements for commercial crew launches? Have you seen any
evidence yet that the two agencies are attempting to define roles and
responsibilities, and to minimize overlap?
A1. ATK believes that a working relationship is being developed between
the two agencies for the ISS Commercial Resupply program which can be
evolved to manage a Commercial Crew Transportation program. The FAA
also has established a Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Council
that includes industry membership to engage in issues surrounding roles
and responsibilities for commercial spaceflight operations. The input
from the COMSTAC informs the FAA on approaches that can be taken in its
interface with NASA and other government agencies relative to
commercial space activities.
Question Submitted by Ranking Member Eddie Bernice Johnson
Q1. Please provide the evidence that provides the justification for
Congress to invest in this commercial crew initiative and what would
your company realistically require from the U.S. Government to make
this initiative a success.
A1. The question raises appropriate issues relative to the commercial
crew program's readiness to support ISS schedule requirements as well
as the expected levels of safety, reliability, and the costs of
development and operations in fielding a commercial system. One of the
biggest factors that will influence the outcome of all of these
questions is the certification process to be used by NASA for the
commercial vehicles. The amount of testing and certification
documentation required to be awarded a commercial crew delivery
contract is not yet known. The certification process ultimately will
affect schedule, cost, performance, reliability and safety.
It is hoped the process for certification can become clear during the
next phase of the development program, so that industry can better
estimate the costs to be carried in its business approach. To make this
initiative a success, our company would require a contract for services
beyond the development program that is specific in terms of numbers of
flights and prices. This was done for commercial cargo services during
NASA's COTS program. The Commercial Resupply Services contracts were
awarded to the COTS contractors while development was still underway.
This enabled the companies to project realistic returns on investment
for the program. To date, this has not been addressed by NASA for the
commercial crew program. The development activities for commercial crew
could take longer than for cargo services, making the need for early
services contracts all the more important to ensure reasonable returns
on investment are achievable.
Q2. What is your understanding of how third-party liability and
indemnification will be addressed for both launch and reentry and for
on-orbit operation of any commercial crew transportation system used
for NASA ISS servicing?
A2. At this time, ATK understands that NASA will procure commercial
launch services, and the services will be provided and licensed under
the FAA authority, which dictates the required insurance coverage, as
well as the Government indemnification coverage. We also anticipate
that a Cross Waiver of Liability for Space Station Activities, similar
to Commercial Resupply, will be incorporated into any resulting
contract.
Q3. How important an issue is liability and indemnification to any
decision your company might make to enter into a Phase 1 or Phase 2
development contract with NASA for commercial crew system, or to enter
into a service contract with NASA to transport astronauts to the ISS?
A3. While there are extremely talented people designing rockets and
conducting a rigorous certification process, there are potential risks
that could financially destroy a company. Without insurance coverage
and ultimately indemnification, the risks would be too great to enter
into the launch services business.
Q4. Do you plan to purchase insurance for your systems as part of your
business plan, and how confident are you that adequate insurance
coverage will be available privately? If it isn't, what do you plan to
do?
A4. ATK plans to acquire the insurance required by an FAA License and
has had discussions with the Insurance industry and believes that
insurance will be available.
Question Submitted by Representative Paul Broun
Q1. What obligation does you company have under space act agreements
to report anomalies to NASA?
A1. ATK does not have any space act agreements that spell out a
requirement for anomaly reporting. However, as a result of ATK's
ongoing relationship with NASA on several contracts, ATK provides NASA
insight to events and anomalies as soon as they occur, whether required
contractually or not. Generally, the aerospace industry openly reports
anomalies to ensure that they aren't unnecessarily repeated on other
operating systems, or on other programs, due to lack of insight. This
is a common lessons learned practice in the industry, and is done in a
manner that enables learning while protecting proprietary information.
Q2. What information do you believe your company is obligated to
provide NASA about anomalies under a space act agreement?
A2. This is dependent on the type of space act agreement, the scope of
the agreement, and the requirements contained in the agreement. For
example, if an agreement required hardware performance and anomaly
reporting, ATK would be obligated to provide information relative to
the anomaly.
Q3. How long after an anomaly is detected, observed, or identified, do
you believe you company is obligated to report such an anomaly to NASA
under a space act agreement?
A3. This is dependent on the type of a space act agreement, the scope
of the agreement, and the requirements contained in the agreement. As
noted in the response to question #1, we generally report anomalies as
a normal way of doing business.
Q4. What obligation does your company have under traditional
contracting to report anomalies to NASA?
A4. ATK is required to report failure and anomalies upon occurrence or
detection for any and all anomalies.
Q5. What information do you believe your company is obligated to
provide NASA about anomalies under traditional contracting?
A5. ATK is required to provide reporting on ten items
1. A failure
2. An overstress or a result of an overstress of equipment and/or
material
3. An unsatisfactory condition
4. An unexplained anomaly
5. An alert applicable to flight hardware
6. Failure of Critical Items List (CIL) hardware that fail in
critical failure modes
7. Affects accepted delivered hardware
8. In-flight anomaly
9. Ground Support Equipment (GSE) Nonconformance
10. Contractor/Customer request
Q6. How long after an anomaly is detected, observed, or identified, do
you believe you company is obligated to report such an anomaly to NASA
under traditional contracting?
A6. Upon occurrence or detection (as soon as feasible).
Q7. What obligation does your company have under the modified FAR
contracting to report anomalies to NASA?
Q8. What information do you believe your company is obligated to
provide NASA about anomalies under a modified FAR acquisition?
Q9. How long after an anomaly is detected, observed, or identified, do
you believe you company is obligated to report such an anomaly to NASA
under modified FAR acquisition?
A7-9. As noted in my response to question #1, we feel we are morally
obligated to provide anomaly reporting as soon as practical regardless
of contractual requirements. In our history, there have been numerous
examples where we were assisted by both the contracting agency and
competitors in anomaly resolution and similarly, we assisted
competitors and contracting agencies in analyzing and resolving their
anomalies. Typically the industry works in this fashion to avoid
unnecessary failures on similar systems on other programs. The process
is as open as possible while protecting proprietary data. ATK feels
that providing the launch services NASA is pursuing, be it payloads or
people, is an extremely valuable and critical requirement for the
nation. As such, ATK would not alter the approach to anomaly reporting
currently in practice for the vast majority of our contracts if a
modified FAR acquisition approach is taken.
Question Submitted by Representative Jerry Costello
Q1. What do you believe, in terms of a percentage of total development
costs, the private sector might realistically contribute? What
percentage is your company planning to contribute? Is private sector
investment contingent on additional non-financial U.S. government
support too? If so what would that support involve?
A1. The percentage contribution from the private sector is directly
proportionate to the return on investment that can be expected from the
future sales of the product (in this case a launch service). Currently,
for commercial crew services, there are many assumptions being made to
create future business models. As a point of reference, one can look to
the production of commercial aircraft for the airline industry, where
100% of the upfront investment is borne by industry. This is achievable
because of the high numbers of aircraft ordered resulting in a positive
return on investment.
In the case of commercial crew services however, the number of
flights (demand levels for the service) is likely to be six per year or
less. The flight rate expectation will set the price levels required to
generate a positive return on investment. If industry invested 100% in
system development while anticipating these flight rates, the cost per
flight required to recoup the investment would be extremely high.
Therefore, government must offset the upfront costs so that investments
from industry can be reasonably amortized. Using assumptions based on
our best understanding of the NASA plan during the CCDev2 timeframe,
ATK required 50% or less of the up-front investment from the
government. However as changes in the NASA plan occur, the amount that
ultimately is our contribution would change accordingly. For example,
should NASA test and certification requirements prove to be more costly
than we have assumed, then the investment percentages would be
affected.
Similarly, if NASA's acquisition strategy changes, or the number of
flight services ordered is lower than currently anticipated, then the
cost per flight or the upfront government investment, or both would be
affected. Given these uncertainties in the ultimate flight rates or
contractual requirements through demonstration, test and initial
operational capability, it is essentially impossible to define a set
percentage investment that would be reasonable for industry to make. In
the absence of this clarity, we make reasonable assumptions as a
starting point for our investment with the expectation there will be
changes as NASA's final requirements, and the means to pay for them,
become better understood. Finally, private sector investment also
depends on other additional, non-financial U.S. government support.
This is most notable in the area of launch site infrastructure and
other government facility and equipment access. Costs to industry for
access to the government owned assets will ultimately affect the
viability of the commercial approach. There are various means to
address these costs, but will be the government's responsibility to
determine.
Q2. What is your reaction to NASA's proposed approach to human-rating
future commercial crew transportation systems? Do you believe NASA's
proposed approach will both ensure astronaut safety and facilitate
eventual FAA licensing of launches for non-government customers? Are
there any changes you would like to see made to the approach?
A2. The most important consideration for human-rating is to ensure that
standards we know to be technically achievable, and that would result
in increases in astronaut safety relative to Shuttle, are not
compromised for budget or other financial reasons. Although NASA has
released its human rating requirements, it is not yet clear what will
be required to be certified to those requirements. The means to prove a
system meets the human rating requirement are still to be defined in a
certification process. The cost for this process therefore is also an
unknown. As those costs become better understood, there may be pressure
to do less than what is achievable in the way of safety and reliability
for the astronauts in a crew transportation system. NASA should
maintain the highest achievable standards for both their human rating
requirements and their certification process to ensure we deliver the
safest, most reliable system possible.
Q3. During the hearing, you testified your company plans to have 50%
of the cost come from outside, non-government investment. Do you intend
to maintain that percentage should you receive an award for the design
and development contracts from NASA? If not what level of investment
would you anticipate contributing for the design and development
contract phase?
A3. Please see the answer to Question 1 above. Additionally, we would
intend to maintain a level of investment that minimizes government
costs and would strive to maintain our original business model and
carry the original assumptions. However, as mentioned in the answer to
question 1 above, the NASA acquisition strategy, schedule and ultimate
requirements continue to evolve, all of which affect the business model
and the required costs to be amortized over the life of the system. As
a result, the exact percentages of our investment relative to the total
system development cost are likely to change in an iterative fashion as
the NASA plans become clearer.
Responses by Dr. George Sowers, Vice President,
United Launch Alliance, Englewood, CO
Question Submitted by Chairman Ralph Hall
Q1. How confident are you about NASA's and FAA's ability to coordinate
their requirements for commercial crew launches? Have you seen any
evidence yet that the two agencies are attempting to define roles and
responsibilities, and to minimize overlap?
A1. ULA strongly supports both Congress' and NASA's efforts to develop
a commercial capability to meet U.S. obligations to deliver crew to and
from the International Space Station. ULA has been extremely encouraged
at the level of cooperation between NASA and the FAA in working jointly
to develop and coordinate requirements and certification processes for
commercial crew launches. Both agencies are bringing their expertise
and unique experience to work cooperatively towards the goal of
developing a safe and affordable domestic capability to transport crew
to low earth orbit. NASA has decades of human spaceflight experience
which directly complements the FAA's decades of experience certifying
commercial and civilian aircraft, and licensing of commercial space
launches. ULA is confident that both agencies will work cooperatively
to define mutually beneficial roles and responsibilities, while
proactively seeking input from the commercial crew service providers.
Question Submitted by Ranking Member Eddie Bernice Johnson
Q1. NASA's plan requires that development and certification of the
commercial crew systems to occur within a tight timeline, requires the
commercial systems to be capable of safe and reliable flight operations
by 2016, makes use of new and unproven government-industry development
and safety approaches, and has development and operations costs that
are still unknown. In that regard, please provide the following
questions:
a. What is the evidence that you believe provides that justification
for congress to invest in this commercial crew initiative, and
A1 a. The primary justification to invest in the commercial crew
initiative is that the nation needs this strategic capability to
maintain our nation's leadership in human spaceflight and is required
to meet U.S. obligations to the ISS partners. We should have an urgency
to get a commercial service up and operating as quickly as possible to
close the U.S. Human Spaceflight ``Gap'' and to continue to exploit the
investment that we've made in the ISS.
The Government of Russia is NASA's sixth largest contractor,
receiving over $350M per year. Not only does this represent thousands
of high tech jobs sent overseas, but it's ceding our leadership as a
space-faring nation. Furthermore, the Russian Soyuz vehicle now
represents the only means to send crew to the station. The recent
failure of that normally reliable craft reminds us that the very
existence of the ISS is now in jeopardy, and that we are reliant on a
single fragile lifeline that we have little insight into or control
over.
Finally, the establishment of a commercial crew initiative has the
potential to stimulate an entire new economic sector with thousands of
high tech jobs. For example, Bob Bigelow is a visionary with a dream of
a fleet of private space stations. His customer base will be countries
that want a space program but afford time on the ISS. But Bob needs a
safe and affordable transportation system to orbit. NASA is in a unique
position to create a transportation system that can address the
nation's needs for access to ISS, while also providing an opportunity
to unleash the power of the U.S. entrepreneur in Low Earth Orbit.
b. What your company realistically would require from the U.S.
Government to make this initiative a success
A1 b. The private sector has the expertise to provide crew
transportation safely and can provide the best value to the taxpayer.
The companies competing for the commercial crew service include those
with decades of experience in NASA's human spaceflight program, such as
Boeing. Newer companies bring fresh ideas and the entrepreneurial
spirit like Sierra Nevada, Blue Origin and SpaceX. The private sector
already possesses the world's most reliable rocket with the Atlas V.
In order to make the commercial crew initiative a success, U.S.
Industry needs the Congress to commit to provide adequate development
funding. With adequate funding, Atlas could be ready to support test
flights in 2014 and operational flights in 2015.
Q2. What is your understanding of how third-party liability and
indemnification will be addressed for both launch and reentry and for
on-orbit operations of any commercial crew transportation system used
for ISS servicing?
a. How important an issue is liability and indemnification to any
decision your company might make to enter into a Phase 1 or Phase 2
development contract with NASA for a commercial crew system, or to
enter into a service contract with NASA to transport astronauts to the
ISS?
A1 a. Liability and indemnification are very important considerations
to ULA. With the addition of crew members, gaps in coverage exist
currently for ISS on-orbit activities under existing indemnification
regimes like the Commercial Space Launch Act, and the unavailability of
insurance for certain potential claims, it is important that our
company be protected against new and significant risks associated with
these missions. Gaps in statutory liability coverage and lack of
insurance for on-orbit activities have the potential to expose
companies to significant risk in the event of damage to the ISS or
injury to its occupants and crew members during on-orbit activities.
b. Do you plan to purchase insurance for your systems as part of your
business plan, and how confident are you that adequate insurance
coverage will be available privately? If it isn't, what do you plan to
do?
A1 b. ULA intends to purchase insurance for third party liability
claims associated with the ascent phase of the mission--up to
separation of the crew capsule from the launch vehicle second stage.
This is consistent with our existing CSLA and NASA Act obligations.
However, this coverage only protects against third party liability
claims for bodily injury and property damage. In addition, we intend to
seek waivers from crew members or rely on statutory and/or prime
contract protections to protect us against claims from crew members in
the event of a launch accident. Insurance may also be an option to
protect against crew member claims, although cost and availability has
not been fully determined. Although we have no performance obligations
beyond the ascent phase, we intend to request coverage from the prime
contractor for any potential crew member or third party claims beyond
this phase. To our knowledge, insurance coverage for on-orbit
activities is unavailable and we have not examined coverage for crew
re-entry activities because we will not be performing that phase of the
mission.
Q3. In you prepared statement, you note that the Atlas 5 is the only
launch vehicle certified by NASA to carry Category 3 missions, ``a
category reserved for NASA's most important science missions''. What
did it take for ULA to achieve Category 3 certification and how does
that compare to the requirements for commercial crew certification as
you understand them?
A3. NASA Policy requires that launch vehicles are selected based on the
complexity and risk of the payload. As such, NASA has identified a
rigorous certification process that includes such things as a NASA
Flight Margin Verification (FMV) which is verification by NASA that the
launch vehicle meets the predicted vehicle and performance parameters.
In addition, all flight anomalies and mission failures are required to
be resolved. NASA also requires a comprehensive IV&V assessment of all
analyses, involving independent modeling, model evaluation, and/or
analytical review.
In order to ensure the highest levels of safety, ULA envisions an
equivalent assessment that builds upon the Category 3 Certification,
with particular emphasis on launch vehicle designs and operations that
my pose a safety hazard to the flight crew.
Question Submitted by Representative Paul Broun
Q1. What Obligation does your company have under space act agreements
to report anomalies to NASA?
Q2. What information do you believe your company is obligated to
provide NASA about anomalies under a space act agreement?
Q3. How long after an anomaly is detected, observed, or identified, do
you believe your company is obligated to report such an anomaly to NASA
under a space act agreement?
Q4. What Obligation does your company have under traditional
contracting to report anomalies to NASA?
Q5. What information do you believe your company is obligated to
provide NASA about anomalies under traditional contracting?
Q6. How long after an anomaly is detected, observed, or identified, do
you believe your company is obligated to report such an anomaly to NASA
under traditional contracting?
Q7. What Obligation does your company have under the modified FAR
acquisition to report anomalies to NASA?
Q8. What information do you believe your company is obligated to
provide NASA about anomalies under a modified FAR acquisition?
Q9. How long after an anomaly is detected, observed, or identified, do
you believe your company is obligated to report such an anomaly to NASA
under modified FAR acquisition?
A1-9. Regardless of the contacting method, ULA standard policies
require prompt identification, government customer notification, and
initiation of an investigation are key tenets of successfully resolving
and learning from anomalies. ULA has instituted processes to ensure
that when an anomaly occurs, a proper investigation is performed,
proper leadership is involved, independent oversight is included, and
ULA and customer management team members are regularly briefed on the
status of the investigation. For example, within hours following the
occurrence of a major anomaly, ULA notifies Customer/government
representative(s) and major subcontractor/partner representative(s).
In addition to these formal notifications, government awareness is
often instantaneous since NASA or Air Force representatives typically
participate in launches and major tests. ULA accommodates this
participation even if the operation is not specifically for that
government customer. Depending on the level of anomaly, customers and
government representatives are invited to participate in the Anomaly
Investigation Teams and Oversight Boards. All of this is consistent
with ULA's practice of providing open and detailed technical insight to
the U.S. Government.
Question Submitted by Representative Jerry Costello
Q1. NASA's FY 2012 budget request proposes a total of $4.25billion
over five years, or $850 million a year through 2016, to fund the U.S.
government's share of commercial crew capabilities development for one
or more systems. What do you believe, in terms of a percentage of total
development costs, the private sector might realistically contribute?
A1. ULA is providing the flight-proven Atlas V launch vehicle as one
element of the overall commercial crew capability. Atlas V was
developed by the Lockheed Martin Corporation as part of the Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) Program. Lockheed Martin invested
nearly $2.0B in the development of the Atlas V.
ULA will not be providing the entire crew transportation services
from launch through landing, and as such, is not in a position to
comment on the total development costs for the services. ULA has
identified the relatively few enhancements required to Atlas V for the
commercial crew initiative. These enhancements will be funded via a
combination of contracted activities and company funded development.
a. What percentage is your company planning to contribute?
A1 a. ULA embraces a philosophy of ``Continuous Improvement'' whereby
we fund initiatives that improve our efficiency and reduce our costs.
We are currently investing approximately $40M per year in initiatives
that will directly benefit all our customers, including the commercial
crew initiative.
b. Is private sector investment contingent on additional, non-
financial U.S. government support too? If so, what would that support
involve?
A1 b. ULA does not have a need for additional, non-financial U.S.
government support for the commercial crew initiative.
Q2. What is your reaction to NASA's proposed approach to human-rating
future commercial crew transportation systems? Do you believe NASA's
proposed approach will both ensure astronaut safety and facilitate
eventual FAA licensing of launches for non-government customers? Are
there any changes you would like to see made to the approach?
A2. If NASA's commercial crew program is to be successful, every effort
must be undertaken to ensure the highest possible level of safety and
reliability. A key element of this is the rigorous process of human
system certification. Under a Space Act Agreement with NASA, we are
conducting a comprehensive assessment of the Atlas design against
NASA's stringent human certification requirements. This entails a part-
by-part, system-by-system review of the design, analysis and test
pedigree of the Atlas. We are also performing a detailed analysis of
the hazards faced by the crew and their mitigation as well as a
Probabilistic Risk Assessment for the launch of crew. Our expectation
is that the Atlas will fare very well. This is because of the rigor and
attention to detail we applied during the original design and
development process as well as the flight demonstrated performance of
the system through 28 successful missions.
The importance of insight and rigorous human certification criteria
has been highlighted by the recent Soyuz failure. For new, unproven
vehicles, you need the rigor even more, in addition to establishing a
track record of demonstrated and repeatable success.
We have been impressed with the thoroughness and rigor that NASA has
used to determine how Atlas met their requirements. Based on this
experience, it is our belief that NASA will not compromise astronaut
safety solely to develop a commercial crew capability.
Responses by The Hon. Paul Martin, Inspector General,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Question Submitted by Ranking Member Eddie Bernice Johnson
Q1 a. Your report, NASA's Challenges Certifying and Acquiring
Commercial Crew Transportation Services, states that some of NASA's
potential commercial crew partners are building spacecraft for the
first time, and design and development are under way without fully
defined and finalized requirements. What are the risks of developing
systems without a set of finalized requirements?
A1 a. Having finalized requirements enhances vehicle reliability,
improves mission success, maximizes crew safety, and reduces risks. In
addition, final requirements clearly communicate to NASA's commercial
partners the design, development, testing, and operations parameters
they must meet to achieve certification of their systems. To mitigate
the risks of commercial crew partners building spacecraft for the first
time without fully defined and finalized requirements, NASA refined the
requirements identified in the December 2010 ``Commercial Crew
Transportation System Certification Requirements for NASA Low Earth
Orbit Missions'' (Certification Requirements) and on December 8, 2011,
NASA released baseline versions of its commercial crew requirements
relating to missions to the International Space Station (ISS). Known as
the ``1100-series,'' these documents provide additional information to
commercial partners regarding roles and responsibilities, technical
management processes supporting certification, crew transportation
system and ISS services requirements, and the application of technical
and operations standards. The release of these documents should help
communicate NASA's requirements, standards, and processes for
commercial transportation system certification.
Q1 b. Do you agree that NASA has adequately mitigated such risks?
A1 b. It remains to be seen whether NASA has adequately mitigated these
risks. However, NASA has taken steps to date to ensure that commercial
partners understand the Agency's health and medical, engineering, and
safety and mission assurance requirements. As previously stated, in
addition to issuing its December 2010 Certification Requirements NASA
recently released baseline versions of its 1100-series documents
relating to missions to the ISS.
In addition, as we discussed in our June 2011 report, the use of
funded Space Act Agreements limits Government control compared to
traditional procurement contracts based on the Federal Acquisition
Regulations (FAR). \1\ Specifically, under such agreements NASA cannot
dictate specific system concepts or elements or mandate compliance with
its requirements. Accordingly, continuing to use Space Act Agreements
in the later stages of the acquisition process could pose risks that
the systems developed by commercial partners may ultimately not meet
NASA's human-rating requirements and that costly and time-consuming
redesigns will be required. To mitigate this risk, at the time we
issued our report NASA appeared to be moving away from funded Space Act
Agreements toward FAR-based contracts (which allow for more direct
Government involvement). However, in mid-December 2011 NASA announced
plans to shift back to funded Space Act Agreements due to concerns
about overall program funding levels.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``NASA's Challenges Certifying and Acquiring Commercial Crew
Transportation Services,'' NASA Office of Inspector General (June 20,
2011) accessible at http://oig.nasa.gov/audits/reports/FY11/IG-11-
022.pdf.
Q2. Your report goes on to say ``In this type of environment, there is
a risk that during the period of contract performance NASA's
requirements may change so significantly that contractors can
successfully argue that the Agency is changing the contract's scope, in
which case NASA could be required to pay the contractor to make
necessary modifications.'' Do you feel that there is a likelihood
NASA's requirements will change during the contract? Is this a common
trait in development efforts? Has NASA adequately accounted for this
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
cost risk?
A2. Changes in requirements are not uncommon in large scale development
efforts. NASA's requirements for crew transportation to the ISS may
change based on the needs of the ISS Program and the Agency's future
exploration goals. However, NASA has taken steps to minimize this
possibility. For example, the Agency has reduced its list of
requirements to those it believes are essential to ensure safe and
reliable systems. In addition, when possible NASA will allow
contractors to propose alternative methods for meeting Agency
requirements. Finally, NASA's approach of dividing its acquisition
process into phases that separate system design from development, test,
evaluation, and certification should help limit the Agency's financial
risk.
Question Submitted by Representative Paul Broun
Q1-3. What obligations do companies have to report anomalies to NASA
under Space Act Agreements? What information do you believe companies
are obligated to provide NASA under a Space Act Agreement? How long
after an anomaly is detected, observed, or identified, do you believe a
company is obligated to report such an anomaly to NASA under a Space
Act Agreement?
A1-3. NASA establishes its expectations with regard to reporting by
partner companies in each Space Act Agreement. For example, NASA's
funded Commercial Crew Development 2 (CCDev2) Space Act Agreement with
Sierra Nevada Corporation requires the company to hold quarterly
project status briefings with NASA personnel describing the progress
made using a mutually agreed upon quantifiable performance method, any
difficulties encountered and corrective action necessary, and the
company's plans to move forward. Similarly, the unfunded CCDev2 Space
Act Agreement with Excalibur Almaz, Inc. requires the company to hold
project status briefings with NASA at each milestone review. To the
extent that an anomaly would impact the company's ability to achieve
progress or complete an agreed-upon milestone, the Office of Inspector
General would expect the company to report such an event to NASA.
Moreover, with respect to funded agreements, partner companies will
not receive payment until they demonstrate successful completion of
each specified milestone. Further, NASA may terminate agreements for
failure to demonstrate progress and timely achievement of milestones.
For example, in October 2007 NASA terminated its funded Space Act
Agreement with Rocketplane Kistler due to the company's failure to meet
agreed-upon milestones.
Q4-6. What obligation does a company have under traditional
contracting to report anomalies to NASA? What information do you
believe a company is obligated to provide NASA under traditional
contracting? How long after an anomaly is detected, observed, or
identified, do you believe a company is obligated to report such an
anomaly to NASA under traditional contracting?
A4-6. Reporting requirements vary by contract based on factors such as
the types of supplies or services purchased, the type of contract
vehicle selected, and the dollar value of the acquisition. Specific
reporting requirements for technical, cost, and schedule anomalies are
reflected in the final negotiated contract. Generally, NASA's FAR-based
contracts require the contractor to perform monthly program status
reviews to communicate the status of the technical effort, program
schedule, and resource conditions, and provide a summary of all open
anomalies, problem reports, and program technical issues that may
impact the contracted work. Contractors are also required to submit
monthly financial management reports that describe actual and planned
costs and labor hours, short-term cost projections, estimates to
complete, and contract values. Finally, pursuant to NASA regulation,
contractors may be required to notify the Government of any mishaps
within 1 hour of occurrence.
Q7-9. What obligation does a company have under the modified FAR
acquisition to report anomalies to NASA? What information do you
believe a company is obligated to provide NASA under a modified FAR
acquisition? How long after an anomaly is detected, observed, or
identified, do you believe a company is obligated to report such an
anomaly to NASA under a modified FAR acquisition?
A7-9. We anticipate any ``modified FAR acquisition'' undertaken as part
of NASA's Commercial Crew Program will be negotiated similar to a
traditional FAR-based contract described above.
Q10. Please explain, in detail, the role of NASA's Safety and Mission
Assurance Office in the design, development, construction, testing and
acquisition of hardware associated with commercial crew services.
A10. NASA's Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) has been
involved in the development of the Commercial Crew Program from its
inception. Many of the requirements that the commercial partners must
adhere to are derived from OSMA policies and standards. In addition,
according to NASA's plans at the time of our audit, OSMA personnel will
participate as members of the NASA Performance Integration Teams that
will be embedded at contractor locations during the acquisition phases
of the program. These teams will gain insight into the contractor's
progress through observation, document reviews, tests, and compliance
evaluations, and will work side-by-side with contractor personnel to
provide expertise and aid in the resolution of technical issues. The
insight gained will be used to determine whether the contractor has
successfully completed agreed-upon milestones.
Question Submitted by Representative Jerry Costello
Q1. In describing fixed-price contracts, your report, NASA's
Challenges Certifying and Acquiring Commercial Crew Transportation
Services, makes the following caution: ``[A]lthough fixed-price
contracts provide the maximum incentive for contractors to perform
effectively while controlling costs, they also place on the contractor
the maximum risk of loss if it is unable to so. This situation can
create incentives for a contractor to ``cut corners'' to protect its
profit margin.'' How can NASA guard against creating such incentives?
A1. As previously discussed, NASA planned to embed at contractor
locations Performance Integration Teams and chair or co-chair program
control and technical review boards to review the verification of
requirements and recommend disposition when a requirement cannot be met
by the contractor. The insight and collaboration provided by the
Performance Integration Teams, along with the oversight provided by the
boards, is designed to identify developmental challenges and prevent
the contractor from cutting corners.
Q2. Given the possibility of NASA having only one provider, what would
be NASA's recourse if the provider cannot deliver at the agreed-to
fixed price, other than paying for the cost increase?
A2. A determination would first have to be made regarding whether the
cost increase is due to a requirement change that is outside the scope
of the original contract. The contractor is responsible for absorbing
cost increases caused by changes that are within the original scope of
the contract. However, if the contractor becomes insolvent or refuses
to proceed, NASA's only recourse may be to purchase more seats aboard
Russia's Soyuz vehicle. As stated in our report, because of the long
lead-time required for procuring Soyuz seats and planning a mission to
the ISS, NASA would have to make the decision to purchase additional
Soyuz seats for flights in 2016 and beyond by spring 2013--at least
three years before commercial partners are expected to be ready to
provide transportation services.
Additionally, Congress would have to grant another waiver from the
restrictions on paying Russia for ISS-related activities contained in
the Iran-North Korea-Syria Nonproliferation Act because the current
waiver expires in 2016.
Q3. Do you have any examples at NASA or in the Federal government
where firm fixed price was used for development programs, both
successfully and unsuccessfully?
A3. NASA has most frequently used cost-plus-award-fee contracts for its
development programs. Moreover, for approximately 18 years federal
agencies were prohibited from using fixed-price contracts for
development efforts except in limited circumstances. \2\ Consequently,
we are not aware of any recent examples of successful development
programs using fixed price contracts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Section 818 of the 2007 Defense Authorization Act repeals
Section 807 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year
1989, which prohibited the use of firm fixed-price contracts except in
limited circumstances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Responses by Mr. William H. Gerstenmaier, Associate Administrator,
Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Question Submitted by Chairman Ralph Hall
Q1. Are any changes in launch indemnification being contemplated,
especially for flights carrying NASA astronauts?
A1. On December 15, 2011, NASA announced that it will continue to use
competitively awarded, funded Space Act Agreements (SAAs) rather than
transitioning to contracts for the next phase of the Commercial Crew
Program (CCP). Commercial launch and reentry activities under SAAs are
subject to licensing by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The
Commercial Space Launch Act (51 U.S.C. Sec. 50901, et. seq.)
prescribes methods to indemnify the licensee for third-party liability
arising during the licensed activities.
For future phases of commercial crew development, NASA's approach to
allocating third-party liability between the Government and industry
will be dependent on NASA's approach to FAA licensing, which is still
under development. For any commercial launch and reentry activity that
requires an FAA license, the Commercial Space Launch Act
indemnification provisions will apply. For launch and reentry
activities of NASA missions that do not require an FAA license, NASA
intends to use contract provisions that match the intent of the FAA
authority to limit third-party liability. Contract provisions similar
to those used in NASA's Launch Services (NLS) contracts, which are
commercial, may be incorporated into future CCP contracts to allocate
liability, but this is still being reviewed.
Q2. (a) NASA is proposing the next phase of the Commercial Crew
program to be a firm-fixed price procurement. As an experienced program
manager do you believe that NASA's requirements in developing human
spaceflight systems are mature enough for NASA's industry partners to
bear all of the technical, safety, and schedule risks with a fixed-
price contract?
Q2. (b) Given the track record of previous attempts to build a
replacement for the Space Shuttle over the past 20 years, why is NASA
so confident that the technical, safety, and schedule risks have been
mitigated enough to allow for a firm-fixed price procurement?
A2 a. On December 15, 2011, NASA announced a modified competitive
acquisition strategy designed to make the best use of available
resources and to define the most cost effective path to the achievement
of a commercial crew capability, as directed by Congress. Instead of
transitioning to firm-fixed price contracts for the next phase of the
Program, the Agency plans to continue to use multiple, competitively
awarded funded Space Act Agreements (SAAs). Using competitively-awarded
SAAs instead of contracts will allow NASA to maintain multiple partners
during this phase of the Program, and provide NASA with the flexibility
to adjust technical content and funding levels based on available
funds. This new acquisition strategy will allow the Agency to preserve
competition and maintain momentum to provide a U.S.-based commercial
crew launch capability at the earliest possible time.
A2 b. NASA recently completed the baseline technical and safety
requirements for a crew transportation system. The requirements
documents are complete (i.e., there are no items yet ``to be
determined'') and they reflect over two years of effort on the part of
the Agency. There were several draft versions that were released to
industry, and NASA received and addressed extensive comments to the
earlier drafts. The requirements are publicly available at http://
commercialcrew.nasa.gov/page.cfm?ID=28 for use by the commercial
partners during the SAA phase. Thus, NASA believes that the
requirements are sufficiently mature to enable the Agency to
confidently enter the next phase of the Program.
Q3. Launch abort systems are one of the most critical and technically
challenging features to design, integrate, and test. What are NASA's
plans for verifying the performance of each company's systems? For
instance, will they be required to successfully flight-test their
launch abort systems?
A3. In future phases of the Commercial Crew Program, NASA will manage
the crew transportation system certification process to ensure that
commercial partners have met NASA requirements--including crew safety
requirements--in their certification plans. Crew transportation system
certifications will culminate with a successful mission to and from the
International Space Station (ISS), or a comparable target. Results of a
commercial partner's tests, analyses, demonstrations, and/or
inspections of spacecraft systems, including launch abort systems, will
be formally evaluated to obtain NASA concurrence of the commercial
partner's progress towards certification. To date, NASA has not
dictated that a specific test program be followed for all crew
transportation systems. Instead, NASA plans to evaluate the overall
test program for each specific system.
Following the NASA determination of readiness, NASA will facilitate
an Agency-level review to grant the commercial partners approval to
transport NASA and NASA-sponsored personnel to the ISS, based on
evidence of satisfactorily completing the crew transportation system
certification.
It should be noted that, as part of its efforts to support the
development of safe, reliable, commercial transportation systems, NASA
has provided technical assistance to companies that participated in the
Commercial Crew Development (CCDev) effort, and the Agency anticipates
continuing to provide ``lessons learned'' information to its Commercial
Crew Program partners.
Q4. What steps is NASA taking to coordinate requirements and
regulations with the Federal Aviation Administration to ensure
compatibility?
A4. Both NASA and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) envision a
state where the FAA licenses commercial human spaceflights provided by
a robust industry, from which the government and the private sector can
purchase transportation services. The FAA has already developed and
implemented processes and procedures for licensing and regulating
commercial space activities to protect the safety of the public.
Additional regulations for protection of crew safety are in
development.
Although it is not a regulatory Federal agency like the FAA, NASA is
responsible for assuring the safety of the public, as well as NASA
crews/workforce and assets during NASA or NASA-sponsored space
operations. In support of those responsibilities, NASA is currently
developing the certification requirements and program processes for
commercial transportation of NASA crews to the ISS.
The requirements and processes of these separate agencies must be
carefully coordinated and aligned to assure that both agencies' roles
are accomplished with thoroughness and rigor while remaining consistent
in areas of mutual consideration. At the same time, it will be critical
to the success of the industry ventures to minimize the burden of
Government requirements and regulations imposed by multiple agencies.
Early collaboration between NASA and the FAA during the formulation of
requirements, certification processes and regulatory compliance
processes will encourage an efficient and effective synergy between
NASA and the FAA in the execution of their responsibilities.
In collaboration with the FAA, NASA has recently baselined the
initial certification and operations requirements for the services it
wishes to acquire from commercial providers. NASA will continue to
partner with the FAA for the purposes of determining common standards
and uniform processes to ensure both public safety and protection of
cargo, crews, and spaceflight participants for the NASA-sponsored
missions. NASA and the FAA will work towards minimizing the duplication
of requirements, developing a streamlined process and addressing
indemnification issues. This will be accomplished by clearly defining
roles and responsibilities of each agency, sharing relevant data and
jointly performing assessments to enable the commercial partner to be
successful in support of missions with and without NASA-sponsored
personnel. NASA and the FAA are in the process of documenting
agreements that solidify each agency's commitment to this partnership.
Q5. According to the IG, NASA will not be ``human rating'' commercial
systems that will fly NASA astronauts. Instead, the Agency is planning
to ``certify'' commercial vehicles to carry NASA astronauts. What is
the difference between ``human rating'' NASA vehicles and simply
certifying commercial systems to carry NASA astronauts?
A5. The term `human rating' is intentionally not used by NASA when
referring to the certification of commercial systems because it implies
a broader context of certification to fly any humans on any missions.
NASA's current efforts to define a certification process only involve
Agency-sponsored personnel on low Earth orbit (LEO) missions to the
ISS. NASA will not be involved in the certification of commercial
systems when they are used to transport non-Agency-sponsored personnel.
Question Submitted by Ranking Member Eddie Bernice Johnson
Q1. NASA has stressed the importance of competition as a means for
achieving cost- effectiveness during development of the commercial crew
systems.
If appropriated funding is only enough for one development
contract, how much confidence can Congress have in the cost-
effectiveness of that development plan, especially given NASA's
critical need for the capability?
Are you prepared to go forward in the event there is only
one contractor at the end of the day? What, if any alternative, do you
have?
If there is only one contractor, you would be in effect
setting up a monopoly in commercial crew transportation services. How
comfortable would you be with that, and what does that mean for the ISS
in the event of a launch failure from that single contractor?
A1. NASA agrees that a key objective of the CCP is to maintain as many
viable commercial vendors as possible in order to keep the cost of crew
transportation services down and reduce the risk that U.S. astronauts
might be grounded by a technical anomaly. The Agency's ability to fund
more than one commercial crew provider is contingent upon the
availability of appropriated funds. While the $406M for the Commercial
Crew Program funded in the Consolidated and Further Continuing
Appropriations Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-55) will enable the Agency to move
the Program forward, NASA has had to reassess its acquisition strategy
for this Program to maximize the effectiveness of limited resources.
On December 15, 2011, NASA announced a modified competitive
procurement strategy designed to make the best use of available
resources and to define the most cost effective path to the achievement
of a commercial crew capability, as directed by Congress. Instead of
transitioning to contracts for the next phase of the Program, the
Agency plans to continue to use multiple, competitively awarded funded
Space Act Agreements (SAAs). Using competitive SAAs instead of
contracts will allow NASA to maintain a larger number of partners
during this phase of the Program, and provide NASA with the flexibility
to more easily adjust to various funding levels. This new acquisition
strategy will allow the Agency to preserve competition and maintain
momentum to provide a U.S.-based commercial crew launch capability at
the earliest possible time.
This new strategy has resulted in an estimated availability date for
U.S. commercial crew services likely by 2017. NASA's current exception
to the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA)
extends through June 2016. In order to procure transportation and
rescue services using the Russian Soyuz spacecraft, the Agency will
require modifications to INKSNA. Separate from the need for INKSNA
relief for Soyuz crew transportation and rescue services, INKSNA relief
will be needed for Russia-unique ISS goods and services for the life of
the ISS Program. Given the lead-time required to manufacture Soyuz
spacecraft, contractual arrangements for crew rotation and rescue for
launch in the spring of 2016 should be in place by the spring of 2013.
As NASA has testified, some modification of the INKSNA provisions will
likely be required for the continued operation of ISS and other space
programs after 2016. The Administration plans to propose appropriate
provisions and looks forward to working with the Congress on their
enactment.
NASA plans to procure U.S. commercial crew transportation and rescue
services from one or more U.S. commercial providers, depending on
funding availability. Having more than one domestic capability will
provide the advantages of keeping costs low through competition, and
ensuring that if one vendor's vehicle is grounded due to an anomaly,
NASA would still retain a domestic option for the transport and rescue
of its astronauts to the ISS. Having a contract in place with Russia,
if we have the necessary INKSNA modification, would provide another
layer of redundancy that would ensure that the Agency could meet its
transportation obligations in the event of a commercial vendor stand-
down in a single vendor scenario but this would force the program to
again rely on foreign providers for transportation services.
The Agency believes that it will be able to fund multiple commercial
crew transportation providers at least for the next phase of the
program. Funding only a single provider would entail greater technical
risks for the Agency and reduce the providers' incentive to keep the
costs of crew transportation down. The GAO recently concluded that
using competition for CCP was a ``good practice'' in its report,
``Acquisition Approach for Commercial Crew Transportation Includes Good
Practices but Faces Significant Challenges.'' (GAO 11-282). If NASA is
limited to funding a single provider, the Agency will assess its
options, risks, and resources availability to determine the feasibility
and impacts of having a single U.S. provider. Adequate funding will be
important to maintaining the ability to retain multiple providers.
Q2. How will the international partnership ``certify'' the crew rescue
capability of commercial crew vehicles, or will certification be solely
a NASA decision?
A2. It is NASA's responsibility to provide crew transportation and
rescue capability for U.S., European, Japanese, and Canadian astronauts
(the Russians are responsible for providing these capabilities for
their cosmonauts). NASA is responsible for certifying the crew
transportation and rescue capabilities of the commercial service
providers from whom it procures services, though the Agency would keep
the other ISS Partners apprised of its review. NASA responsibilities
include assessment of compliance with the ISS Visiting Vehicles policy,
thereby ensuring that the safety and integrity of the ISS will be
maintained for all concerned parties.
Q3. I understand that the Phase 1 design contract will last
approximately two years and that an RFP for the Phase 2 development
contract could be issued about halfway into Phase 1. Please explain the
rationale for issuing a development RFP when work on the design Phase
is not complete? How does that approach meet the objective of reducing
risk through a two-phase procurement strategy?
A3. NASA has recently re-assessed its approach to the Commercial Crew
Program in light of available funding (please see response to question
#1), so the phasing of the design and development work is under review.
However, in general, the overlapping approach was adopted to reduce
development risk while at the same time ensuring that the period
between the retirement of the Space Shuttle and NASA's ability to send
astronauts to the ISS aboard new U.S. vehicles was kept to a minimum,
without sacrificing safety considerations.
Q4. How much weight will you give to a commercial proposer's business
strategy when it comes time to award contracts for the initial design
and later for the development of commercial crew systems to meet NASA's
needs? Is a proposer's ability to obtain revenue from markets other
than NASA ISS flights a requirement, and if so, by what timeframe?
A4. On February 7, 2012, NASA released an Announcement for Proposals
(AFP) for the next phase in Commercial Crew development. The effort is
known as Commercial Crew Integrated Capability (CCiCap). Proposals from
industry will be due on March 23, 2012, and NASA expects to award
multiple funded Space Act Agreements (SAAs) in the July/August
timeframe. The overall CCiCap strategic goal is to advance multiple
integrated commercial crew transportation system concepts to the stage
of an orbital crewed demonstration flight capability as soon as
possible while ensuring crew safety and considering potential customer
standards.
NASA has been and will continue to refine its cost modeling
capability to help understand potential crew transportation system
development costs. In addition, NASA will evaluate the total government
investment being requested by participants in their Commercial Crew
Integration Capability (CCiCap) proposals to determine the
effectiveness of their proposed approach and to establish a confidence
factor for each company's likelihood of successful performance.
Q5. Witnesses on the first panel testified that should the ISS
international partnership open up to other countries, there would be a
possibility for an expanded market to provide services for the other
partners who would then need access to the ISS. Have the international
partners contemplated inviting new partners to the ISS? What would be
involved in expanding the partnership? What would be entailed in
allowing access to other potential partners? Does NASA have plans to
seek an expanded partnership?
A5. Expanding the ISS partnership would entail significant multi-
lateral negotiations, including extensive discussions on the allocation
of Space Station crewing, resources, and research time. In addition, if
a hypothetical new partner were to provide their own hardware or
vehicle for use with the ISS, such equipment would need to be assessed
and certified as being safe for use in or near the Station, and their
systems would have to be compatible with those used aboard ISS. While
the addition of new partners is a possibility, NASA and its current ISS
partners have no plans to seek an expanded partnership at this time.
However, the ISS partnership will continue enabling research
opportunities for non-partner countries. Such participants are
currently sponsored by an existing ISS partner.
Question Submitted by Representative Paul Broun
Q1. What obligations do companies have to report anomalies to NASA
under space act agreements?
A1. Just like FAR-based contracts, there is no standard requirement
that companies report anomalies to NASA under Space Act Agreements.
However, a company may be required to report anomalies as part of its
performance under a Space Act Agreement if that obligation is
negotiated between NASA and the company and included in the Space Act
Agreement. For example, in order to receive a milestone payment for a
demonstration mission under its COTS Space Act Agreement, SpaceX is
required to provide NASA with an identification of any anomalies
associated with the mission along with its preliminary assessment
regarding the cause of the anomaly.
Q2. What information do you believe companies are obligated to provide
NASA under a space act agreement?
A2. Just like FAR-based contracts, there is no standard requirement
that companies report anomalies to NASA under Space Act Agreements.
However, a company may be required to report anomalies as part of its
performance under a Space Act Agreement if that obligation is
negotiated between NASA and the company and included in the Space Act
Agreement. For example, in order to receive a milestone payment for a
demonstration mission under its COTS Space Act Agreement, SpaceX is
required to provide NASA with an identification of any anomalies
associated with the mission along with its preliminary assessment
regarding the cause of the anomaly.
Q2. How long after an anomaly is detected, observed, or identified, do
you believe a company is obligated to report such an anomaly to NASA
under a space act agreement?
A2. If a Space Act Agreement includes a requirement for a company to
report anomalies to NASA, the Space Act Agreement will also specify the
time frame for the report. For example, if reporting anomalies is a
requirement for a milestone payment then the report would be due at the
same time other documentation is provided to NASA to support the
milestone payment.
Q4. What obligation does a company have under traditional contracting
to report anomalies to NASA?
A4. There is no standard contract requirement regarding anomaly
reporting. When needed, a clause is tailored for the specific contract.
Under the previous acquisition strategy for the Commercial Crew
Program, the Integrated Design Contract (IDC) would have required the
Contractor to notify the Government of qualification or test anomalies
involving the Crew Transportation System (CTS) design (e.g., launch and
orbital vehicles, systems, subassemblies, components, software) and
similar launch and orbital vehicles that might affect the CTS design.
Under the contract, the Contractor would have been responsible for
conducting any investigation of test anomalies and presenting any
findings and proposed corrective actions to the Government. In
addition, the Government would have had the right to conduct its own
investigation of any anomaly. The Contractor would have been required
to cooperate with any Government investigation and to allow the
Government to observe and participate in any Contractor-led
investigation.
Q5. What information do you believe a company is obligated to provide
NASA under traditional contracting?
A5. Each contract includes data reporting and deliverable provisions as
appropriate for the purpose and requirements of that contract. Under
the IDC draft RFP, NASA identified the information to be provided by
prospective Contractors through use of a Data Requirements List (DRL)/
Data Requirements Description (DRD). This Data Requirements List (DRL)
set forth the data requirements in each Data Requirements Description
(DRD) describing the data required for the contract. There were
fourteen (14) detailed DRL/DRDs contained in the draft RFP for IDC.
Q6. How long after an anomaly is detected, observed, or identified, do
you believe a company is obligated to report such an anomaly to NASA
under traditional contracting?
A6. NASA Policy Directive (NPD) 8621.1, for Mishap and Close Call
Reporting, Investigating, and Recordkeeping, requires that Contractors
notify NASA of anomalies within 24 hours. Anomalies that are classified
as mishaps or high-visibility close calls must be reported to NASA
telephonically as soon as practicable, and followed up within 24 hours
in writing to HQs with detailed descriptions. These NPD reporting
requirements were incorporated into the IDC contract as part of DRL
CCIDC-S-001.
Q7. What obligation does a company have under the modified FAR
acquisition to report anomalies to NASA?
A7. There is no standard contract requirement regarding anomaly
reporting. When needed, a clause is tailored for the specific contract.
Under the previous acquisition strategy for the Commercial Crew
Program, the Integrated Design Contract (IDC) would have required the
Contractor to notify the Government of qualification or test anomalies
involving the Crew Transportation System (CTS) design (e.g., launch and
orbital vehicles, systems, subassemblies, components, software) and
similar launch and orbital vehicles that might affect the CTS design.
Under the contract, the Contractor would have been responsible for
conducting any investigation of test anomalies and presenting any
findings and proposed corrective actions to the Government. In
addition, the Government would have had the right to conduct its own
investigation of any anomaly. The Contractor would have been required
to cooperate with any Government investigation and to allow the
Government to observe and participate in any Contractor-led
investigation.
Q8. What information do you believe a company is obligated to provide
NASA under a modified FAR acquisition?
A8. Refer to answer provided for Question 5. Under the IDC
solicitation, NASA used a more streamlined, commercial approach to
limit the quantity of deliverables and reporting requirements while
still ensuring NASA access and insight into information generated by
the Contractor in performance of the contract.
Q9. How long after an anomaly is detected, observed, or identified, do
you believe a company is obligated to report such an anomaly to NASA
under modified FAR acquisition?
A9. NASA Policy Directive (NPD) 8621.1, for Mishap and Close Call
Reporting, Investigating, and Recordkeeping, requires that Contractors
notify NASA of anomalies within 24 hours. Anomalies that are classified
as mishaps or high-visibility close calls must be reported to NASA
telephonically as soon as practicable, and followed up within 24 hours
in writing to HQs with detailed descriptions. These NPD reporting
requirements were incorporated into the IDC contract as part of DRL
CCIDC-S-001.
Q10. Please explain, in detail, the role of NASA's Safety and Mission
Assurance Office in the design, development, construction, testing and
acquisition of hardware associated with commercial crew services.?
A10. NASA's Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) is governed
by NASA Policy Directive (NPD) 1000.0A, the NASA Governance and
Strategic Management Handbook and NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR)
7120.5, NASA Program and Project Management. For the Commercial Crew
Program (CCP), as with other NASA programs, a Chief Safety and Mission
Assurance Officer (CSO) has been assigned to carry out the roles of the
SMA Technical Authority for CCP. The CSO reports independently through
the Center SMA Director, the Center Director, and then to the Chief,
OSMA.
OSMA, along with the other two NASA Technical Authorities and the
Mission Directorate, were key contributors to, and are key stakeholders
of, the Commercial Crew Transportation System Requirements Document
(ESMD-CCTSCR-12.10). This document includes the appropriate set of
safety, reliability, maintainability, and quality assurance policies,
procedures, and requirements which must be met before NASA will certify
a commercial provider to fly NASA or NASA-sponsored crew aboard their
vehicle. Included are requirements and standards that govern the safety
and mission assurance aspects of design, development, construction, and
testing of commercial vehicles that will be used to transport NASA
crew. The requirements defined herein must be met prior to flying NASA
crew, regardless of the acquisition or procurement strategy followed.
As far as acquisition, the Chief, OSMA, is involved in NASA
Acquisition Strategy and Procurement Strategy forums for each NASA
Program. Currently, the strategy for CCP is for NASA to procure
transportation services, not hardware. The services contract will
include the mechanisms necessary for the appropriate amount of
government insight needed to assure verification of the requirements in
ESMD-CCTSCR-12.10. NASA will perform assessments to determine if the
contractor has met all these requirements. If all requirements have
been successfully met, NASA will grant CCTS Certification. If NASA
cannot verify these requirements as having been met, NASA will not
grant Certification.
Question Submitted by Representative Jerry Costello
Q1. What is NASA's backup plan if commercial crew systems are not
available in the 2015-2016 timeline you anticipate? What contingency
plan does NASA have for ensuring its requirements to service the ISS
will still be met?
What will you do if there is an incident that requires a
stand-down after you have started commercial crew flights? Will the
Russians be willing and able to provide a backup crew transport
capability without a crew transport contract extension already in
place?
At what point would NASA have to make a decision to extend
its contract with the Russians for the use of Soyuz seats to transport
NASA crews to the ISS, and what conditions would be required for NASA
to make that decision?
A1. While the $406M for the Commercial Crew Program (CCP) funded in the
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2012 (P.L.
112-55) will enable the Agency to move forward with its plans to
advance commercial services for crew transportation and rescue
capabilities in support of the International Space Station (ISS), NASA
has had to reassess its acquisition strategy for this Program.
On December 15, 2011, NASA announced a modified competitive
procurement strategy designed to make the best use of available
resources and to define the most cost effective path to the achievement
of a commercial crew capability, as directed by Congress. Instead of
transitioning to contracts for the next phase of the Program, the
Agency plans to continue to use multiple, competitively awarded funded
Space Act Agreements (SAAs). Using competitive SAAs instead of
contracts will allow NASA to maintain a larger number of partners
during this phase of the Program, and provide NASA with the flexibility
to more easily adjust to various funding levels. This new acquisition
strategy will allow the Agency to preserve competition and maintain
momentum to provide a U.S.-based commercial crew launch capability at
the earliest possible time.
This new strategy has resulted in an estimated availability date for
U.S. commercial crew services likely by 2017. Thus, additional Soyuz
purchases will be necessary to fill the gap until commercial crew
becomes available. Fabrication of Soyuz vehicles must begin
approximately 36 months prior to launch. Contractual arrangements for
crew rotation and rescue services for launch in spring 2016 should be
in place by spring 2013.
NASA's current exception to the Iran, North Korea, and Syria
Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) extends through June 2016. In order to
procure transportation and rescue services using the Russian Soyuz
spacecraft, and for Russia-unique ISS goods and services for the life
of the ISS Program, the Agency will require modifications to INKSNA.
Given the lead-time required to manufacture Soyuz spacecraft,
contractual arrangements for crew rotation and rescue for launch in the
spring of 2016 should be in place by the spring of 2013. As NASA has
testified, some modification of the INKSNA provisions will likely be
required for the continued operation of ISS and other space programs
after 2016. The Administration plans to propose appropriate provisions
and looks forward to working with the Congress on their enactment.
NASA plans to procure U.S. commercial crew transportation and rescue
services from one or more U.S. commercial providers, depending on
funding availability. Having more than one domestic capability will
provide the advantages of keeping costs low through competition, and
ensuring that if one vendor's vehicle is grounded due to an anomaly,
NASA would still retain a domestic option for the transport of its
astronauts to the ISS. Having a contingency contract in place with
Russia, presuming appropriate INKSNA modifications, would provide
another layer of redundancy that would ensure that the Agency could
meet its transportation obligations in the event of a commercial vendor
stand-down in a single vendor scenario but this would force the program
to again rely on foreign providers for transportation services.
Q2. Do you envision commercial spaceflight participants to be sitting
on the same commercial crew flights as NASA astronauts? Would including
spaceflight participants add risks and liability concerns, and if so,
what would NASA require of the commercial providers to mitigate those
risks and liability concerns?
A2. It is a central part of NASA's CCP strategy that the commercial
providers be able to sell human space transportation services to
customers other than the Agency. Thus, NASA does envision the
possibility that crew transportation system missions will include both
NASA and non-NASA personnel at some point. There would need to be other
agreements on the use of ISS resources if a commercial crewmember
wanted to visit the ISS. For example, the ISS partnership would likely
require compensation for consumables and resources consumed or used by
the commercial crewmember.
Including spaceflight participants on missions involving NASA
personnel may add some unique risks to the flight, depending on the
flight training and acceptance requirements of the spaceflight
participants. Once those flight training and acceptance requirements
have been established, NASA will be able to specifically address/
mitigate any risk or liability concerns.
Q3. What is the plan for crew rescue vehicle stay time requirements at
the ISS once NASA transitions to the use of commercially provided crew
transportation to the ISS?
A3. NASA's requirements for crew rescue include the ability to rapidly
and safely evacuate crewmembers from the ISS during a six-month
Expedition, or ``increment.'' Currently, this capability is provided by
the Russian Soyuz spacecraft, which remains docked to the ISS for the
entirety of a given increment, so that it is close at hand in the event
of an anomaly which might require evacuation.
Requirements for commercially provided crew transportation systems
were recently baselined by the Agency. The following are the relevant
excerpts regarding crew rescue:
``3.1.2.2 Return Crew
The CTS shall return 1, 2, 3, and 4 NASA crew during a single entry/
landing. [R.CTS.011] [I]
Rationale: Four NASA crew are required to be transported and
returned to the ISS to meet the USOS demand for crew time based on full
utilization of the ISS to perform science and support the ISS National
Laboratory Program. All docking and undocking operations are a
significant impact to the completion of ISS science, resulting in the
determination by the ISS Program that the most efficient crew rotations
strategy is to launch and return four crewmembers on a single vehicle.
Additionally, the CTS must be able to accommodate one, two, three, or
four crewmembers in a single launch or landing to provide flexibility
in the ISS crew rotation plan. The spacecraft's secondary objective is
to serve as the rescue vehicle for all personnel that were launched
onboard and must have the capability to return all crewmembers in the
event of an early mission termination or ascent abort.
3.1.2.3 Docked Duration
The CTS shall be capable of being docked to the ISS for 210 days to
provide an assured crew return capability for four NASA crew.
[R.CTS.012] [I]
Rationale: The ISS requires continuous presence of the spacecraft to
support sustained operations. The 210 days provides 30 days of
contingency on the nominal 180-day turnaround.
3.1.2.4 Rotation Intervals
The CTS shall be capable of exchanging up to four NASA ISS
crewmembers every 150 to 210 days. [R.CTS.013] [I]
Rationale: The nominal crew rotation will occur at approximately 180
days based on the ISS human research program medical data collection
needs. It is possible for this rotation to be altered by one month
(earlier or later) in order to accommodate other overall ISS Program
requirements or anomaly resolution/response.''
Appendix II
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Additional Material for the Record
Additional Material for the Record
Statement submitted by Representative Jerry Costello
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
U.S. House of Representatives
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding today's hearing to receive
testimony on the accomplishments and challenges of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA's) Commercial Crew
Development Program.
Since 2009, NASA has committed to developing a commercial crew
system that utilizes innovation and entrepreneurship to build safe and
affordable vehicles for transporting astronauts to and from low-earth
orbit.
With the retirement of the Space Shuttle earlier this year, and
NASA's contract for Russian crew services set to end in five years,
commercial crew systems are an important part of human spaceflight's
future and will ensure we fully utilize the International Space Station
(ISS) through at least 2020.
While NASA's commercial crew development activities offer exciting
opportunities for the future, these public-private partnerships
represent a new approach to acquisition and human spaceflight that pose
unique questions and challenges for the agency, its commercial
partners, and Congress. I look forward to hearing how NASA and the six
companies participating in the program are working together to ensure
that the program remains efficient, cost-effective, and, most
importantly, safe for our astronauts.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses more about the
progress made and the challenges that remain in achieving NASA's goal
of a viable commercial system by 2016.
First, I would like to understand how confident NASA is in the cost
and schedule estimates for achieving U.S. commercial crew services by
about 2016 as well as the basis for those estimates. Second, I would
like to understand what steps NASA and its commercial partners are
taking to ensure that future U.S. commercial crew transportation
systems are safe. Third, I would like to understand if there are trade-
offs on risks given NASA's plans for a fixed government investment in
the development of those systems.
I welcome our panel of witnesses and look forward to their
testimony. I yield back the balance of my time.
Additional Material for the Record
Letter submitted by Representative Dana Rohrabacher,
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
U.S. House of Representatives
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