[House Hearing, 112 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] NARCOTERRORISM AND THE LONG REACH OF U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT, PART II ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ NOVEMBER 17, 2011 __________ Serial No. 112-81 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign AffairsAvailable via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ _____ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 71-265PDF WASHINGTON : 2011 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey HOWARD L. BERMAN, California DAN BURTON, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York ELTON GALLEGLY, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey EDWARD R. ROYCE, California BRAD SHERMAN, California STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York RON PAUL, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York MIKE PENCE, Indiana RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri JOE WILSON, South Carolina ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey CONNIE MACK, Florida GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas DENNIS CARDOZA, California TED POE, Texas BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida BRIAN HIGGINS, New York JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania BILL JOHNSON, Ohio CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut DAVID RIVERA, Florida FREDERICA WILSON, Florida MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania KAREN BASS, California TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina ROBERT TURNER, New York Yleem D.S. Poblete, Staff Director Richard J. Kessler, Democratic Staff Director ------ Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman TED POE, Texas BRAD SHERMAN, California JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island BILL JOHNSON, Ohio GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina C O N T E N T S ---------- Page WITNESS Mr. Derek S. Maltz, Special Agent in Charge, Special Operations Division, Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Department of Justice........................................................ 8 LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from the State of California, and chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade: Prepared statement..... 3 Mr. Derek S. Maltz: Prepared statement........................... 11 APPENDIX Hearing notice................................................... 26 Hearing minutes.................................................. 27 NARCOTERRORISM AND THE LONG REACH OF U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT, PART II ---------- THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 2011 House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:12 p.m., in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward R. Royce (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. Royce. This hearing will come to order. The title of this hearing is ``Narcoterrorism and the Long Reach of U.S. Law Enforcement,'' and today we continue our look at that subject. A few weeks ago the subcommittee heard testimony from private witnesses on the growing nexus between drugs and terrorism. This afternoon we are joined by the head of the Drug Enforcement Administration's Special Operations Division. Nothing better illustrates this threat than the Iranian- directed plot to assassinate a foreign ambassador on U.S. soil, detailed by the Justice Department last month. A key conspirator in this plot approached a DEA informant seeking to hire a Mexican drug cartel and their hit squad to carry out this attack. The plot was planned over multiple meetings in Mexico between the man now in U.S. custody and people he believed to be cartel members. This foiled plot is the latest example of how the DEA has reached beyond U.S. borders to investigate, arrest, and bring to justice those involved in terrorist conspiracies. This plot wasn't a surprise to the subcommittee. In 2006 we held hearings on the border where we heard testimony from local law enforcement that the drug cartels would move, in their words, anyone or anything, ``so as long as the price was right.'' Iran apparently believed $1.5 million was the right price for this brazen attack. As we will hear today, an increasing number of U.S.- designated foreign terrorist organizations are involved in drug trafficking. As investigator Doug Farah testified last month, in his words, ``growing ties between transnational organized crime from multiple regions, and terrorist organizations, are morphing into something new, which represents unprecedented dangers'' for our country. Whether it is the Russian Mafia, or the FARC, or the Chinese Triads, or Zetas, Hezbollah, the Qods Force, al-Shabaab, many of these different groups may be connected through ``super-fixers,'' as they are called, ``super-fixers,'' or ``shadow facilitators'' is a word used sometimes here. These are individuals or groups that provide the weapons, provide the sophisticated document forgeries, provide the money-laundering capabilities, and they work for both the terrorists, and they work for the drug cartels. One premier ``super-fixer'' was Viktor Bout, who supplied weapons to insurgents and militias and terrorists. Bout was brought down by DEA agents in 2008 for conspiring to supply weapons to the FARC, a designated terrorist organization. After a long saga, Bout was extradited from Thailand to the United States and this month was found guilty of all charges against him. The team that nabbed Bout is part of DEA's Special Operations Division. They have had other high-profile successes. As Mr. Maltz will testify, these operations exemplify ``what DEA does best: Maximizing limited resources while working closely with foreign counterparts and leveraging [DEA's] vast array of confidential sources to infiltrate the highest levels of the world's most significant and notorious criminal organizations.'' But there are always ways to get better. A former top DEA official told us last month that these shadow facilitators haven't been ``attacked to the extent necessary.'' Even with the will, the Special Operations Division has only two of these field enforcement teams dedicated to narcoterrorism cases. With a unique set of authorities, and human sources, and experience in running complex organizations, the DEA has been bringing a cutting-edge approach to attacking narcoterrorism. But the DEA's presence in Africa is spread very, very thin. Despite the dramatic increase in drug trafficking across West and North Africa many of these countries are covered by DEA offices in Europe. With a mix of al-Qaeda presence, ungoverned spaces and weak institutions, the threat of narcoterrorism in this part of the world is a real concern. [The prepared statement of Mr. Royce follows:]
---------- Mr. Royce.I will now turn to Ranking Member Sherman for his opening statement. Mr. Sherman. I wonder how long we have until---- Mr. Royce. You have got 5 minutes, and you are faster than me, so I think we are well suited here. Mr. Sherman. I am more long-winded than you are. I want to thank the chairman for holding these important hearings. This hearing follows the subcommittee's hearing on October 12th on the same topic, and that hearing had private witnesses. Narcoterrorism, where drug profits fuel terrorism, where drug dealers adopt terrorist tactics in order to further their own ends, has destabilized several countries of vital interest to the United States. As one of the witnesses at the last hearing mentioned, whether you want to smuggle foreign nationals to enter the U.S. illegally, move AK-47s to a terrorist group, or move cocaine, a trafficker often passes through the same shadowy routes. The lines between terrorism and narcotrafficking have faded in many parts of the world. In our last hearing our witnesses had a number of recommendations for dealing with this growing threat, including expanding the DEA's confidential informant program in light of the failed Iranian plot. Frankly, I think we ought to go vote. Mr. Royce. Let me suggest that we recess and come back after the vote, and at that time we will reconvene. There are actually a total of three votes, so it will be a few minutes. [Recess.] Mr. Royce. Judge Poe, would you like to make an opening statement? Mr. Poe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you holding this hearing. If you can get to Mexico, you can get to the United States, so it makes sense that world terrorists want to use the drug cartels, who are the absolute best smugglers into the United States, to get into our country. Drug cartels like the Zetas remind me of the old TV series Paladin with Richard Boone, and their motto is ``have gun, will travel,'' and that, to me, is the Zetas. They will go anywhere, do anything for money, and they will use their weapons if they need to. If it means helping terrorists, I believe they are fine with that as long as they get paid. Terrorists meanwhile are realizing just how profitable the drug trade is. Branches of al-Qaeda and the Taliban are thought to rely on the drug trade as a source of income, especially when other ways of raising money is dried up because of the heat the DEA and other organizations in the United States and other countries have put on them. The point of all this is that the nexus between terrorists and drug cartels matters. We need to have a strategy, we need to know exactly what they are doing together, because they are outlaws in cahoots with each other. I believe strategy should include using the tools we have to fight terrorists to also bring down the drug cartels. To me, I think we should strongly consider, and I would like the witness to weigh in on this, on his opinion, whether or not we should put the Zetas and other specific drug cartels on the foreign terrorist organization list. I also believe we need to use more equipment. And we now have ready, available equipment coming from Iraq. Over 2 million pieces of equipment are coming back to the United States. If some of that can be used on the southern border of the United States either with Federal officials or State and local officials, such as Humvees, night surveillance equipment, UAVs, then we have, I think, an opportunity to send that equipment to the border to help fight the drug cartels and the terrorists. I have introduced legislation to do just that, and I would like the witness' opinion on that as well. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield back the remainder of my time. Mr. Royce. Thank you. Mr. Sherman. Mr. Sherman. Thank you. As I said earlier in our last hearing, our witnesses had a number of recommendations for dealing with this threat, including the DEA's confidential informant program in light of the foiled Iranian plot, breaking down the barriers separating counternarcotics and counterterrorism in our Government, and responding to the new reality that the lines that once separated organized crime from political terrorism, those lines seem to be fading. As we learned the day before, part I of these hearings, U.S. law enforcement officials uncovered the ``guns for hire'' plot of the Iranian Government to kill the Saudi Ambassador on American soil. The suspect is now facing trial in Manhattan. Our witnesses from the first hearing believe that this bold new plot by Iran to commit terrorism on American soil with the help of a Mexican drug cartel signals a new tactic for state sponsors of terrorism. But more importantly, we need to press again and again, as I have said for 15 years, to take the maximum possible actions to sanction Tehran for its sponsorship of terrorism and, of course, its efforts to develop a nuclear weapon. We need both stronger enforcement of existing laws and a new, tougher law designed to not only cripple the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps, but to threaten regime survival. The committee took an important step in that direction when it marked up the Iran Threat Reduction Act on November 2nd and voted in favor of it overwhelmingly, I believe, without objection. We know that drug production and drug trafficking is a source of income for terrorist groups from Colombia to Lebanon to Afghanistan. The FARC taxes local cocaine production to finance its guerrilla war against the Colombian Government. The Taliban taxes local opium farmers to finance its war against our troops in Afghanistan. While Hezbollah was long dependent on Iran for financing in recent years, it has developed other sources of income, including drug trafficking. In February of this year, the Treasury Department designated the Lebanese Canadian Bank, Lebanon's eighth largest bank, as a primary money-laundering concern under the PATRIOT Act. Our Government found that Hezbollah operatives were laundering $200 million per month in drug money. Bank managers were found to be complicit in the activities and immediately were linked to Hezbollah officials inside and outside Lebanon, including Hezbollah officials in Iran. Iran and Hezbollah have steadily increased their influence in Latin America since the brutal bombings at the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992 and the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association in 1994. All across Latin America, from Argentina to Mexico, Iranian and Iranian-backed Hezbollah activities are reportedly forming a nexus with--or their activists are forming a nexus with drug-traffic organizations. Finally as to Afghanistan, Afghanistan continues to be the source of the vast majority of the world's opium. The DEA has significantly boosted its enforcement activities in Afghanistan. The agency is increasingly involved in not only drug interdiction operations, but also financial investigations to track how drug proceeds are used to finance the Taliban. Several DEA officers who have been embedded in military units have lost their lives in the service of our country. One witness that I will preview--one question I will preview for the witness is should we spray the poppy fields in Afghanistan? This question needs to be looked at from three areas, and I realize our witness is more inclined to and more qualified to deal with only one. The first of these perspectives is what effect would that have on the streets of America, where another form of terrorism affects us every day, and that is the tremendous harm to our cities done by the selling of heroin? The second issue is what are the pluses and minuses that that would have for our activities in Afghanistan? We would be closing down a source of income for our enemies; at the same time we would be making America considerably less popular among many Afghans. And then finally, and I believe more important than its effect in Afghanistan, what effect would this have on Pakistan? I have said in this committee--before this committee more than once. Many think Pakistan is important because it is next to Afghanistan. I think Afghanistan is important because it is next to Pakistan. So our witness will address how our Government is responding to the fading lines between terrorism, narcotic traffickers and other criminal organizations, and what role we in Congress should play, and I look forward to the witness' testimony. Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Sherman. Mr. Duncan of South Carolina, do you have an opening statement? Mr. Duncan. No. Mr. Royce. Okay. Very good sir. We will go now to Mr. Maltz, our witness. He is Special Agent in Charge of Drug Enforcement Administration's Special Operations Division. What do you call that, SOD? Mr. Maltz. Yes, sir. Mr. Royce. Mr. Maltz began his career with the DEA in 1986. He has had a variety of positions in the agency, winning numerous awards for his accomplishments. And in 2005, he was Special Agent in Charge, where he manages a staff of 300 personnel, and they have 20 different government agencies there basically interlocking through your leadership. And this multiagency center uses sophisticated technology and intelligence resources to target narcoterrorism organizations. He serves as the DEA's lead spokesperson on merging technology and is the central link between the DEA and the Intelligence Community. Without objection, we are going to put your entire statement in the record, Mr. Maltz, but I would ask you if you could summarize your testimony and just give us 5 minutes here, and then we will get into our questions. Thank you very much, sir. STATEMENT OF MR. DEREK S. MALTZ, SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE, SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Mr. Maltz. Distinguished members of the subcommittee, on behalf of the Drug Enforcement Administration, I would like to thank you for this opportunity today to talk to you about the ties between drug trafficking and terrorism. I would also like to thank Chairman Royce and this committee for your tremendous support to DEA to address this threat, specifically your leadership in fully engaging in the issues that we faced during a very difficult extradition process of Viktor Bout. I am proud to say that this notorious arms trafficker that was causing havoc around the world, after a successful trial in the Southern District of New York, is no longer going to be a threat to the public. It took less than 6 hours for the jury to deliberate and find Mr. Bout guilty on all charges. The U.S. justice system prevailed. As the agent in charge of the Special Operations Division since 2005, I have had the privilege of working with numerous law enforcement agencies around the world, the Intelligence Community and the Department of Defense. I have witnessed the amazing results that we can accomplish when we share our intelligence and we coordinate our efforts against the common enemies. SOD is a multiagency center that coordinates and deconflicts investigations around the world. SOD personnel, regardless of the agency, focus on connecting the dots of these criminal networks, pooling the resources of all the participating agencies to maximize the U.S. Government's efforts to disrupt the criminal networks. In response to the September 11th attacks on America, the Department of Justice, the DEA and the FBI established a Counter-Narcoterrorism Operations Center at SOD. That center is responsible for coordinating all the narcoterrorism investigations of the DEA and works closely with the FBI and the National Joint Terrorism Task Force to pass any DEA information around the world on terrorist activity timely. Over the years clearly the nexus between drug trafficking and terrorism has grown. The recent example of the plotted assassination attempt on the Saudi Arabian Ambassador in the U.S. illustrates the extent to which terrorists will align themselves with drug traffickers to achieve their goals. In this case the Iranian Qods Force operative approached an individual to carry out the assassination. He thought the person was a member of the Mexican drug cartels. Fortunately for all of us, the individual he approached was a DEA informant, and the plot was thwarted. The American people expect the government to cooperate on these types of investigations, and that is exactly what the DEA and the FBI did. In addition to the coordination with our fellow domestic enforcement agencies, our global partnerships are critical as we battle these threats around the world. DEA has one of the largest law enforcement presence overseas, 83 offices in 62 countries, and works closely with our host counterparts daily. Because of these relationships DEA is extremely well positioned to go after the global threats. DEA also has a vast worldwide confidential source network; a robust judicial telephone intercept program; and talented and dedicated personnel that have the passion, the heart, the desire to pursue this critically important and often dangerous mission. Due to the immediate and dire consequences of international narcoterrorism, DEA cannot take a reactive approach to this threat. Only proactive investigative action can protect the lives and property of the innocent victims. To accomplish this the walls between counterterrorism and counternarcotics or criminal investigations must come down. This is critical for our safety and the security. Drug proceeds in the billions are funding terrorist activity around the world. By combining the expertise of multiple U.S. Government agencies, we are able to utilize all tools in the toolbox. For example, earlier this year we joined with the Treasury Department and DEA and announced the identification of the Lebanese Canadian Bank and all its subsidies as a financial institution of primary concern on section 311 of the U.S. PATRIOT Act. The organization was moving multiton quantities of cocaine into West Africa and North Africa up into Europe, into the Middle East, laundering hundreds of millions of dollars monthly through the Lebanese Canadian Bank. This action also exposed Hezbollah's links to Lebanese Canadian Bank and the international narcotics- trafficking and money-laundering network. This was the first time a 311 action in this manner was done in conjunction with law enforcement on a drug case, and I thank the Treasury Department for their work in this case. DEA has been extremely successful in attacking numerous criminal organizations here in the United States, seized assets of approximately $3 billion in cash over the last 5 years and over $5 billion in assets domestically here in the United States. As state-sponsored terrorism is declining, terrorism fueled by drug trafficking is on the rise. Criminals are operating at full speed in their efforts to do us harm, and we must act with greater speed to stop them. Though law enforcement and the Intelligence Community has come a long way in sharing information and working jointly, there is still more work to be done to accomplish our shared goal, which is to protect this country and go against all those who want to do us harm. In the words of President Obama, ``Terrorists increasingly are turning to crime and criminal networks for funding.'' For example, this week a Malian citizen pled guilty in the Southern District of New York on one of DEA's cases for his role as a conspirator to provide material support to terrorists. He agreed to transfer cocaine throughout Africa into northern Africa, into Europe, with the intention to support al-Qaeda, AQIM and the FARC. Al-Qaeda is clearly looking for additional funding streams. The Special Operations Division has established itself as a multiagency law enforcement center that can immediately deconflict investigative information, coordinate operations and mitigate threats through its multiagency resources and global capabilities. We have numerous successes behind us and will remain focused on the emerging threats that we face in this country. Thank you for your opportunity to appear today to discuss this important topic. I am happy to answer any questions that you may have. [The prepared statement of Mr. Maltz follows:]
---------- Mr. Royce. I appreciate very much you coming down and testifying today, Mr. Maltz. First let me congratulate the DEA on its operation against the ``Merchant of Death,'' as he was known in Africa, Viktor Bout, the international arms trafficker. That was superlative work. The operative in charge of that operation made an observation, a former colleague of yours. He said, what in God's name do we do when a terrorist organization has the ability to collaborate with a Mexican drug cartel? Now we are getting to that point where we are beginning to see exactly that happen. We had Jameel Nasr arrested in Tijuana, a Mexican national with family ties to Lebanon attempting to set up a Hezbollah network in Mexico. You referenced another case. The sophistication of the explosives used by Mexican cartels that have been picked up, some of that has been learned from sources from the Middle East. I have been in some of those tunnels. You saw in the paper, I think yesterday, another massive tunnel operation linking Tijuana to San Diego, and as you go down there, these are the types of state-of-the-art tunneling operations that you also see on the Lebanon border, and Hezbollah has an influence with because of their tunneling capabilities. The ability to exchange expertise between drug traffickers and those who are involved in that kind of opportunity, it really sets up an interesting dynamic. And I wanted to ask you, how concerned are you about the possibility of this terrorist- cartel nexus? Mr. Maltz. Well, sir, I am very concerned. I have three children, and, like all of us, we are looking out for the best interests of the United States. Mexican drug cartels are extremely violent. There has been over 40,000 folks killed in Mexico since 2006. I remain very concerned. We have seen the growing nexus between these Middle Eastern terrorist organizations and different criminal organizations around the world. As you know, we have linked 19 out of 49--we have linked 19 out of 49 designated foreign terrorist organizations to be connected with drug trafficking. So we remain--we share your concern. We remain vigilant, working jointly with the Mexicans. We have not seen any connection to tunnels in Mexico coming into the United States, but obviously we remain focused on that, and we share your concern. Mr. Royce. I appreciate that. Another case I was going to ask you about is this North Korean case with the drug trafficking--150 kilos of pure heroin--not too long ago produced in North Korea. This is one of their exports. They do pretty well with counterfeit $100 bills, with missile exports, and with heroin and with meth. This is one of their sources of hard currency. So we did break up the operation there, I guess, on the way to Australia's shores for distribution by organized triads that operate in that part of the world. But are you targeting North Korean drug activity now? Has the State Department been asking you to make this a priority or not? Mr. Maltz. Sir, I have not had any conversation with the State Department on the North Korea drug situation. We have agents around the world. We have had information in the past about drug trafficking in North Korea, but we would have to get back to you on more details. Mr. Royce. Here is what I am interested in. When the Illicit Activities Initiative was at its height, we were really trying to move on the counterfeiting over there and the other sources of hard currency that assist the regime because they are able to continue their weapons program because of the hard currency they get overseas, they don't really have any domestic capability of paying for the gyroscopes that they buy on the black market and so forth, they need hard currency to do this. So a special coordinator was tasking agencies like the DEA, ATF, FBI, Secret Service, who tackle the counterfeiting part of this. All of those were supposed to work in tandem to squeeze North Korea on this illicit activity front. I wonder if that has sort of fallen off the radar a little bit. I bring it up because there are very real benefits to getting a handle on their ability to use this kind of criminal enterprise for the hard currency. You got to shut off the spigot, and this is one way to do it. So I will bring that up to you. Let me ask you about North and West Africa as well. You are spread pretty thin in Africa. And one of the questions I have is West Africa in particular is a center of operations for an awful lot of drug smuggling. It is expanding very, very rapidly; Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, these areas are now covered by the DEA from your Paris office rather than on the ground. I was going to ask if that hampers your operations out there at all and your opinion on that. Mr. Maltz. Well, clearly we have seen increases of cocaine flowing out of South America into West Africa for distribution in Europe and the Middle East, so we are very concerned about that drug flow. Of course, we are working closely with counterparts throughout West Africa. We have had some significant success. As you may know, in Liberia and Ghana on some joint cases, we actually had the President of Liberia's son doing undercover work for the DEA in a joint operation when the Colombian traffickers were trying to corrupt officials in Liberia to stash cocaine in the multi ton quantities. So we have had success. We are going to continue to do the best that we can with the personnel that we have on the ground in Africa and in Europe, but like anything else, you know you can always do better if you have more resources. Mr. Royce. I appreciate that. And I do understand you are going to open up potentially an office in Kenya. Mr. Maltz. Yes. Mr. Royce. I really hope we can get a focus, going back to my point on North Korea. And maybe you and I can circle around afterwards, but it has become a national security issue. This regime has nukes. It is trying to get the money to pay to miniaturize those nukes to put it on an ICBM. And while they are running their gulags over there and involved in their illicit activity, at times it is escaping the world's attention because of all the other problems out there. And you have got two teams to handle all of this. I hope we can beef up your resources at some point, but I also hope we can keep this on the radar. And we will talk later, Mr. Maltz. We will go to Mr. Sherman. Thanks for your good service to this country. Mr. Maltz. Thank you, sir. Mr. Sherman. I second that comment. And, Mr. Maltz, I kind of previewed my questions. Let us talk about the possibility of spraying the poppy fields in Afghanistan. Let us put aside the policy aspect, including the policy aspect of how that would affect public opinion in Afghanistan toward the United States, and let us just look at the technical biology here. If we really made an effort, could we significantly reduce the amount of opium produced in Afghanistan by spraying the crops? Mr. Maltz. Sir, I run an operational center for the DEA, and unfortunately I don't have the background to answer that question appropriately. Spraying, of course, is run by the State Department, and you know my concern is to go after the threats to the best of our ability as an investigating agency, and I really do not have the details to answer that question. I apologize for that. Mr. Sherman. So you are not involved in trying to stamp out the production so much as to deal with the drug trafficking after the poppies have been produced? Mr. Maltz. Well, DEA, in working jointly with the Department of Defense, State Department and the Afghan National Police, are involved with going after the production of heroin in Afghanistan. We have had very significant successes just last month, in September, some of the largest seizures ever in production of heroin. Mr. Sherman. If I can, I am focusing now on the poppy. The next phase, and more, perhaps, akin to what you do, is after it has been refined into heroin, or at least partially refined toward becoming heroin, then it becomes less of a ``stamp out the crop'' process and much more of a deal with the drug traffickers process. I gather from your answer that your focus tends to be on the heroin and the money rather than the poppy cultivation? Mr. Maltz. No. We are concerned about the poppy cultivation, but the State Department would have the oversight and the lead on spraying, whether that is advantageous. And we are going to continue to work with our partners in Afghanistan on the ground to go after the lab operators and the kingpin organizations to try to make a difference in that way. Mr. Sherman. Focusing on the testimony we had from Michael Braun, he said at our first hearing on this subject that our missions are stifled by the distinct operational authorities and sources of funding, between those focused on counternarcotics and those focused on counterterrorism. Do you see advantages of combining our counterterrorism and counternarcotics capacities and operations? Mr. Maltz. Yeah. I mean, at SOD, like I said, we have the counterterrorism operation, counter-narcoterrorism operations center. And we work with the FBI's counterterrorism, we work with the CIA and all the other agencies involved with counterterrorism, and we are working jointly on these operations. The case with the assassination attempt, clearly that was a seamless operation between DEA and FBI, exactly what the public would expect. So there is a big advantage because criminals turn--I mean, terrorists are turning to criminal networks for funding, so you have to look at it as one network of bad guys around the world that are looking to do this country harm. You cannot separate out---- Mr. Sherman. So you don't think that there are bureaucratic, stovepiping or barriers that prevent good coordination and communication between those who, like yourself, are involved in counternarcotics and those who are focused on counterterrorism? Mr. Maltz. Sir, I worked in the Special Operations Division prior to 9/11, and I have been at the SOD operation now for over 6 years, and I can say that the cooperation is continually getting better. There is always going to be stovepiping because it is a personality situation depending on where you are working in the world. Mr. Sherman. If I can interrupt to try to squeeze in one more question. Those engaged in counterterrorism have to focus not only on how to hit the terrorists, but also on winning over the hearts and minds of those who might be terrorists or might be thinking of becoming terrorists. Those who are engaged in counternarcotics usually don't focus so much on the hearts and minds of the criminals involved. Is there a clash of approach between a law enforcement and anti--counternarcotics approach that focuses on nailing the bad guys and a counterterrorism approach that talks an awful lot about winning over the bad guys? Mr. Maltz. Well, all I can say is in our efforts, we are looking to prosecute the bad guys. We have approaches where we are looking to develop evidence, we are looking to work with whoever we can work with around the world, combine the resources to maximize your efforts. In counterterrorism operations a lot of times they may be looking to disrupt something that is going to happen, and they have to take action immediately, and, you know, collecting evidence may not be as important. But to go back to your question, I think that there are some walls that need to come down, there are some stovepipes that need to come down, but the good news is we are making a lot of progress, and we hope to make more progress. Mr. Sherman. Thank you. Mr. Royce. Mr. Duncan. Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Agent Maltz, thanks for being here. I just came back from Afghanistan and Iraq, and we met with some DEA agents over there. I understand the good work that is going on to eradicate some of the opium poppy fields and other things and turn those areas into food production and the work that DEA is doing there. I want to focus on Iran and the threat in the Western Hemisphere. I notice in your testimony you say this: Luckily the individual who was allegedly approached was a DEA agent and informant, or a DEA informant, and the plot was thwarted. Many of us that have been following this issue for a long time--I have been in Congress since January--this issue of Iran and Qods Force; Hezbollah being involved with the Mexican drug cartel; and drug trafficking utilization of tunneling, a lot of the sophisticated tunnels we see are very similar to what you see in maybe Lebanon. The issue with Qurani and ties to Hezbollah are very, very clear. I think you guys got that. I don't think you are completely lucky. I think you had the right resources in place to be lucky. I would rather be lucky than good any day, and that is an old saying, but I am glad you had those guys in place. A lot of folks question me why Iran, why Hezbollah would be involved with the drug cartels. And I go back to the 1980 fatwa by Hezbollah that gives rationale to that, why they should engage in drug production and trafficking, and I am sure you are familiar with that. But I want to bring your attention to H.R. 429. It is a resolution I have put forth that got bipartisan support, and hopefully we are going to get some movement on it. But it basically says that under the next counterterrorism strategy, that will include North America--excuse me, the Western Hemisphere in the area of focus, which I think was left out in the 2011 area of focus. I think it should be part of the next one. And we need to constantly be aware of the fact that Iran opened six Embassies in the Western Hemisphere in the last 5 years that many folks have testified in front of our committees that see that possible lily pad effect of Hezbollah and the Qods Force using those Embassies and those relationships to leapfrog into threatening this country. And so one thing that you said concerns me, and I want to ask you about the wall, the wall between the counterterrorism and counternarcotics that you mention, and the fact that it needs to come down, because that struck a cord with me, because the 9/11 Commission identified the wall that existed between government agencies that kept information from flowing that could have thwarted that attack. So if you could delve into that, the wall aspect that you mentioned, and what we can do as Congress to help eradicate that wall and have more information sharing. Mr. Maltz. Thank you. Well, the good news is, as an example, the United States attorney in the Southern District of New York took unprecedented action, and he broke down those walls. In his prosecution--with his prosecution units in New York, there is no longer a drugs and a terrorism unit, it is one unit of very aggressive, very competent prosecutors that are going to work together to go after the threats. The U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia has done the same. He has restructured his units so he has the best prosecutors available to go after the biggest threats to the country. So we are working on taking down these type of walls, and we have made a lot of progress, but I am concerned because there are different philosophies, different ways of looking at going after a terrorist organization, a drug organization--I don't know what happened to the sound. Mr. Duncan. We can hear you. Mr. Maltz. So I am still concerned about the walls. And I worked very hard on trying to convince others out there on the reasons we have to work very closely together. Bottom line is it is about the money. If a terrorist organization wants to carry out a terrorist act against this country, they need money, and drugs are generating billions of dollars around the world. So whether it is drug smuggling, alien smuggling, arms trafficking, the bad guys are going to generate money from criminal activity, and they are going to provide that money to terrorists. So we have to continue to look at this issue as a problem of a criminal organization that wants to do harm to this country and just do the best we can to share information with everybody that has a role, all the law enforcement agencies and the Intelligence Community. Mr. Duncan. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Mr. Royce. Let me thank Mr. Duncan, too. He has legislation that he has been working on in terms of Hezbollah's operations in our hemisphere, and his staff has been working with the committee staff on this legislation. We hope to move it, and we wanted to acknowledge that. Mr. Maltz, in your circumstances is there anything else that you would like to share with us, you would like us to be pondering, you think we should be thinking about? Mr. Maltz. I am just very thankful of what this committee has done already, the fact that you engaged very heavily. And I read the letter that you wrote regarding the Bout extradition, and I just appreciate that, personally appreciate that, because we have done a lot of work in that investigation, and we were very happy at the results. But just the fact that we are having this hearing is appreciated by me. Mr. Royce. I made several phone calls to people in more than one government. Mr. Maltz. I recognize that, sir. Mr. Royce. But I know what you did as well. And I think it is a great message to the next arms trafficker, the fact that your team could go out there, reach out there, catch this individual who was about to escape justice, make sure he faced justice, bring him back to the Southern District of New York, charge him, convict him. It is impressive. It is very, very impressive, and I would say it has not gone unnoticed by others that are involved in this type of work out there. So if you can keep up that pace and remove somebody who has done as much damage and brought as much destruction and death as Viktor Bout, you have done something for world peace. Mr. Maltz. Thank you, Chairman. I mean, after we arrested Monzer Kassar, Mr. Untouchable, in Spain, and brought him to justice in the Southern District of New York, and were able to be recognized by the Klinghoffer daughters at a ceremony in New York that we never forgot the killer of their father, we appreciate your comments, and we are going to continue to conduct business just like we have been doing. Mr. Royce. Thank you, sir. Thanks for your testimony today. And I thank the members of the subcommittee. Mr. Maltz. Thank you very much. Mr. Royce. We stand adjourned. [Whereupon, at 3:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] A P P E N D I X ---------- Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
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