

[H.A.S.C. No. 112-74]

**THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
AND THE U.S. MILITARY TEN YEARS
AFTER 9/11: PERSPECTIVES OF FORMER
CHAIRMEN OF THE COMMITTEES
ON ARMED SERVICES**

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

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WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 12, 2011

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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING:

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

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[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]

**THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE U.S.
MILITARY TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: PERSPECTIVES OF
FORMER CHAIRMEN OF THE COMMITTEES ON ARMED
SERVICES**

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, October 12, 2011.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m. in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. "Buck" McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. "BUCK" MCKEON,
A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COM-
MITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES**

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order.

Good morning. The House Armed Services Committee meets to receive testimony today on "The Future of National Defense and the U.S. Military Ten Years after 9/11: Perspectives of Former Chairmen of the Committees on Armed Services." We are very fortunate to have with us today Senator Warner from the other body. You know, I remember when he was over there, they used to do things over there. Nice to have him back.

Mr. WARNER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe you can just kind of swing by over there before you leave, give them a little prod?

Mr. WARNER. Yeah.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the last count we have over 100 bills sitting over there waiting to be addressed to start jobs and a few other things.

Mr. WARNER. You are on your own.

The CHAIRMAN. I am also really happy to see Chairman Hunter, who was my mentor from the day I got here, and Chairman Skelton, two guys that really worked hand in hand for many years. Both chaired this committee, and it is good to have them back.

This hearing is part of our ongoing series to evaluate lessons learned since 9/11 and to apply those lessons to decisions we will soon be making about the future of our Force. We received perspectives of former military leaders from each of the Services, as well as outside experts. Today we will have the opportunity to view these issues through the lens of the leaders of the Legislative Branch.

The individuals with us today in more ways than we can possibly imagine led the fight here on the Hill to ensure our warfighters got what they needed to defend this Nation and take care of their families, especially in the months following the attacks of September

11th, when it became clear that the procurement holiday of the 1990s had left gaps in our capabilities, the readiness was low, and that our Force was being stretched too thin. The chairmen of the Armed Services Committees ensured that not only Congress, but the Department of Defense and industry were doing their part to make it right for our Armed Forces.

Unfortunately our successes in the Global War on Terror and in Iraq and Afghanistan are lulling our Nation into the false confidence of a September 10th mindset. Too many appear to believe that we can maintain a solid defense that is driven by budget choices, not strategic ones; that the threats we face will be reduced along with funding for national security.

I am not arguing that the military can be held exempt from fiscal belt-tightening. Indeed, half a trillion dollars has been cut from the DOD [Department of Defense] already. The military has absorbed about half of the deficit reduction measures enacted to date, but these cuts have happened in advance of the development of a new strategy for national defense, and without any changes to the military's roles and missions.

Even more concerning is that if the Joint Select Committee does not succeed in developing and passing another deficit-reduction plan, an additional half a trillion dollars could be cut from our military automatically. It also remains to be seen whether or not additional cuts may be proposed by the Administration, even if the "super committee" [Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction] is successful. But all this talk about dollars doesn't trans well into actual impacts on the Force and risk to our Nation.

I hope our witnesses today can help us understand the lessons we learned 10 years ago and give us recommendations about how we might avoid repeating the same mistakes. How can we make sure the DOD is a good steward of the taxpayers dollar without increasing the risk to our Armed Forces?

The U.S. military is the modern era's pillar of American strength and values. In these difficult economic times, we recognize the struggle to bring fiscal discipline to our Nation, but it is imperative that we focus our fiscal restraint on the driver of the debt instead of the protector of our prosperity. With that in mind, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today.

I apologize, I am going have to leave for a HPSCI [House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence] briefing. Our vice chair, Mac Thornberry, will take the chair, and I look forward—I will return as soon as I can for the questioning and learn what we can from these witnesses.

With that I yield to our ranking member on the committee, Adam Smith.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 41.]

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to be here, and in particular it is an honor to have two of our former chairmen of this committee here and a great honor to

have a former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee as well. Senator Warner, Mr. Hunter and Mr. Skelton, welcome back.

My formative years on this committee were spent under Mr. Hunter and Mr. Skelton, and I could not have had two better mentors to see how they run this committee. And it is a great testimony that you are back together to the bipartisanship of this committee that both of you upheld in fine standing, which I might also add Chairman McKeon has done an excellent job of as well. You know, we work together on this committee. We have differences, but I think more so than any other committee out here, we definitely see this as a bipartisan issue, try and make sure that we adequately provide for the national security of our Nation. It is an honor to serve on this committee, and I think all Members take it very seriously. It is great to see you both again.

I thank the chairman for having this hearing and the series of hearings that we have had to discuss the future of our defense budget. Our country right now faces enormous challenges on the budget front, but we also continue to face national security threats, and I agree with the chairman that we cannot wish them away. We have had a number of successes over the course of the last decade in confronting Al Qaeda and dealing with the situation in Afghanistan, but those threats remain, and we have a world that is uncertain. We are uncertain of China's intentions in Asia. Iran and North Korea continue to be grave threats.

We have reason to make sure that we maintain a strong national security posture, and cuts will impact that. As the chairman has mentioned, the debt ceiling agreement that was passed in August has already put us on a path to cut somewhere in the neighborhood of \$500 billion out of the defense budget over the course of the next 10 years. The Pentagon is already planning for that. Secretary Panetta, who we will hear from I think it is tomorrow, gave a speech yesterday morning outlining their vision for how to implement those cuts. So it is not that Defense has not stepped up and offered reductions. It has. The question is what should those reductions be, and where do we go from here, what more might come at us?

But at the same time, as I have said on this committee, we have to be mindful of our debt and deficit situation. The math is unrelenting. We are 40 percent out of whack on our budget. That means we are borrowing 40 percent of every dollar that we spend. That is unsustainable and devastating to the national security of this country.

Now, it is my viewpoint that the debt ceiling agreement lumped all of that on the nonentitlement portion of the budget, of which defense is over half, and that the entire budget has to be part of the discussion. And, yes, though my colleagues to my right are sick of hearing me say this, revenue has to be part of the discussion as well.

I think there are incredibly powerful arguments that have been made by the majority for the devastating impact of further cuts on national security. We must prevent that, but unfortunately the debt ceiling agreement puts us on the path to doing it unless we come up with something else. And again, the math is the math. Unless you want to cut entitlements by somewhere around a third,

you have got to put revenue on the table. I think the importance of our national security needs is an argument for doing that, and I will continue to advocate very strongly for that, in part because of my belief that the national security budget has already been cut by as much as it can be, but also in part because there are other discretionary programs that are important to this country: Infrastructure, education, just to name a couple. They face those devastating cuts of sequestration as well. So I hope the committee can come together with the idea that we need to prevent sequestration.

As one final little bit of sequestration, which is not widely understood, it is an across-the-board cut that is required. It takes away any discretion on behalf of the Department of Defense. They have to cut every single line by the same amount, and that is one of the most ridiculous ways to budget I can possibly imagine. But that is what happens if we don't come up with some agreement to find at least another \$1.2 trillion in deficit reduction.

I will also say that the way we continue to do CRs [Continuing Resolutions] as the way to fund it also has a more profoundly devastating impact on our ability to budget than most people realize. I have heard people talking about the fact that we may not be able to get an appropriations bill this year, so the Department of Defense will once again have to live for months and months with a CR. A CR is not the same as having appropriated money. It makes it very, very difficult to plan and very, very difficult to do an efficient job of spending taxpayers' money.

We need to make decisions. We need to put everything on the table and make a comprehensive decision for how to get the deficit under control long-term. No one is talking about making big, deep, traumatic cuts right now, this year in the middle of a recession; we are talking about putting a plan in place to have a reasonable 10-year effort to get the deficit under control, and we need do that. Defense is but one of many places that will be impacted in a devastating way if we don't.

So I look forward to the testimony of our three esteemed witnesses on their expertise and experience sorely missed from this committee. We look forward to getting at least a little bit of it today to give us some guidance on where we should go and how we should make the right decisions going forward.

I yield back. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 43.]

Mr. THORNBERRY. [Presiding.] Thank the gentleman.

Let me add my welcome to our distinguished witnesses. Without objection, any written statement you would like to submit will be made part of the record. And with that I would yield first to Chairman Hunter for any comments he would like to make.

**STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN L. HUNTER, FORMER
CHAIRMAN, HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE**

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, and thanks to the Members of the committee for the opportunity for all of us to come back and give our views on where we stand today with respect to the security challenge and what the proposed budget cuts—the impact that they would have on security in the near term and the long term. And

it is neat to see everybody. It is great to be back and wonderful to see old friends. It is great to see our great staff members, who have made this committee work so effectively. And it is always good to be here with John Warner, my old colleague from the Senate who worked across the table with us for so many years putting together a defense package that served the country well; and also with Ike Skelton, one of the truly great Americans of all time, a guy that I knew for my entire congressional career, and just wonderful to be with him. So thanks for the homecoming. It has been good.

Now, I have got a written statement for the record, but let me just go straight to the point here, because I think it is important to have lots of time for questions if you have them.

First, I have looked at the proposed budget cuts that will occur under the Joint Committee's automatic pilot, if you will, if they don't find cuts elsewhere, and, in my opinion, the automatic budget cuts that are proposed by the Joint Committee will badly damage America's national security in the near term and in the long term. And let me explain why I think that is the case.

You know, after World War II, when we had over 8 million people under arms, we, in the words of John Marshall, didn't simply demobilize. General Marshall said it was a route. We stacked arms. A couple of years later a third-rate country with a third-rate military pushed Americans down the Korean Peninsula and almost pushed us into the ocean until we established a Pusan perimeter and pushed back, ultimately weathered the intervention of the Communist Chinese, and established that stalemate that prevails today.

We had a drawdown after Vietnam in which, as I recall, the Army was called hollow. We had 50 percent of our aircraft that were not fully mission capable, we had lots of ships that couldn't steam, and national security was in bad shape.

We rebuilt national security in the 1980s, and in doing so, we stood up to the Soviet Union. In fact, I think one of the first things I did as a freshman on this committee was join Ike in approving the President's 12.6 percent pay increase for all military personnel, because in 1979 you had about 1,000 petty officers a month who were leaving the Navy because they couldn't feed their families on military pay.

So we rebuilt national security, we brought down the Soviet Union, and at that point we went into a drawdown phase. And we went from 18 Army divisions, as Ronald Reagan walked out the door, to 14 Army divisions during the early years of the 1990s. We then went into a very devastating time in which we pulled the Army, for example, down to a little more than half of what it had been. We pulled it down from 18 divisions to 10 divisions by the time the Administration in 2000 walked out the door.

We had—and I recall this as the first procurement chairman and ultimately full committee chairman—we did an analysis on how much equipment we needed to buy each year to try to fill the gaps, and we were funding in the late years of the 1990s about half of what we needed, half the equipment that we needed. So we had that enormous drawdown, and even though Congress restored about \$40 billion during the late 1990s, we had that enormous

drawdown, and ultimately we came into 2000 with a vastly reduced military.

Now, we rebuilt to a large degree after 9/11, spurred by 9/11, I might say, and we filled up some of those things that the former Chief of the Army called the “holes in the yard,” the equipment yard. We replenished some of that equipment. We reinvigorated our missile defense program.

But at this point in this war, and I understand the American people are weary of war, you get weary of war, and this committee, I am sure, is weary of the long wars that we fought, but we won in Iraq. The Government in Iraq is holding, the military that we built from the ground up is holding, and we did that because we increased military end strength, we increased pay, we increased the people side of the defense budget, and we also put in place new modernization programs that are just now on the cusp of being fully fielded.

At this point we are about ready to go into a historic drawdown if these proposed budget cuts occur that will be devastating to national security near-term and long-term.

And, Mr. Chairman, let me know, I always hate to be cut off by chairmen, I have always hated that, but do let me know when I am close to my allotted time here. I don't want to—

Mr. THORNBERRY. I think the committee is going to extend a great deal of discretion to our former distinguished colleagues.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Could you tell somebody to turn my blinking light off?

Mr. Chairman, so let me talk about these cuts and what they do in the context of the world that we live in today.

First, we are still fighting the war in Afghanistan. It is a difficult, complex war, but a winnable war. And the war against terrorism is not over. Beyond that, we have a neighbor to Iraq, which, having failed to intervene successfully in the Iraq war, the Americans having won the Iraq war, even though they killed a number of Americans with their intervention, the special groups with explosively formed projectiles, and with their intelligence aid to the other side, they are proceeding apace with the development of a nuclear weapon.

Now, here is what we know about Iran in shorthand. The efforts by the West, by the Allies, to stop the enrichment of nuclear weapons material have failed. The path of the last 5 or 6 years is littered with failed sanctions because the meaningful sanctions have been invariably blunted by China and Russia. The 1,500 engineers, Iranian engineers, that have been trained by the Russians form now a permanent cadre, if you will, for the development of nuclear systems.

You know, if you go to a shooting gallery, you see the big ducks go by first, and they are easy to hit, and then you see the small ducks go by, and they are tough to hit. The big ducks are almost all gone with respect to Iran, because the big operations that are visible, that you can see with overhead surveillance, that you can assess, that is the huge stockpiles of material that needs to be refined until it is weapons grade and can be used in a nuclear device. Getting to the 5 percent refinement point with the centrifuges, the thousands of centrifuges that Iran has in places like Natanz, it is

a big, visible operation, but it is shortly going to be over, and the smaller work that can be done in clandestine sites, which are very difficult to see with National Technical Means and very difficult to assess, will finish up that work.

So the United States is nearing a moment of truth with respect to Iran. And the Iran has followed the model, I think, of the North Koreans, whom they have observed very closely, and that is to talk and build, and wrangle and build, and lie and build until you have a nuclear device. I think that is the path that they are taking.

And, of course, the Soviet Union, having been disassembled, leaves a residue of a strong strategic core in Russia, which, while the intent is not as ambitious or as aggressive as it was in the past, nonetheless you have a very strong strategic array of nuclear-tipped systems which have to be considered by American defense planners.

Now let me go to the big picture, the final picture, and, I think, the primary problem and defense challenge that the United States is going to have: China. China right now is surging its national security capability not necessarily in numbers, but in capability, the capability to kill Americans should we have a Taiwan Straits scenario or another scenario.

The Chinese have focused heavily on being able to blunt the United States Navy should it try to intervene in a Taiwan scenario or something similar and, in my estimation, they don't intend do that with a classic naval-on-naval engagement. They intend to use land-based ballistic missiles with antiship guidance systems where they can destroy the American fleet, or a good part of it, including aircraft carriers, 500, 600, 700 miles out from the Taiwan Straits. And if you look at the ballistic missiles that they are developing today with antiship capability, that is precisely the range that they have attributed to and built into these systems.

The Chinese also are building a high-end, multirole fighter. They are building about 100 medium-range ballistic missiles a year, which are staged and packed in the areas that can reach Taiwan. In fact, if we look at all the indicia that we used to look at when we try to decide whether they were going to at some point hit Taiwan, a lot of those boxes have now been checked, and they have done those things.

Now, the problem, the challenge with China goes not just to what they have, but to their ability. I am always reminded of the legendary statement by a Japanese admiral shortly after Pearl Harbor in which he told his colleagues, at some point the Americans will defeat us and overwhelm us with their industrial base. A great part of the American industrial base now resides in China, and while China isn't churning out submarines at a high rate this year, even though they have turned out as many as 7 submarines in 2004 and 7 submarines, attack submarines, in 2005, and, as I understand, a fairly large number in the last 14 months, they have the ability to surge this big industrial base, especially their shipbuilding base, their domestic shipbuilding base, pivot that base into a warship-building base, and far exceed the capability of the United States to quickly build a fleet.

The Chinese are also pushing very hard in very important areas, high-leverage areas. Along with their submarine capability, high-

end fighters, they are also working very hard in the area of electronic warfare. They want to neutralize American electronic warfare and our capabilities that are dependent on our electronic capability. They understand that, and they understand the massive leverage that they get if they develop an ability to neutralize precision weapons. They have watched the effect of precision weapons. They really came into their own in Iraq. In the first Gulf war, about 10 percent of our weapons were precision weapons. They knocked out about 40 percent of the targets, as I recall. About 60 percent of our weapons were precision weapons in this last war, and they were devastating, obviously. We took out many of Saddam Hussein's armor formations long before the Army and the Marine units came within range of those systems. The Chinese watched that, and they want to be able to neutralize precision-weapon capability.

They also want to be able to dominate space, and for those Members of this committee or Congress who would like to keep space a benign environment, it is too late. The Chinese understand the importance of space, and they are developing systems to be able to control and dominate space. It was 2007, I believe, when they shot down one of their own target satellites and proved an incipient ASAT [Anti-satellite] capability.

So China has a huge mobilization capability that will be very difficult for the United States to match because a large part of our industrial base now belongs to them. At the same time they have a lot of cash, and, for example, when they commission submarines, they buy *Kilos*. They not only produce submarines, they buy *Kilo* submarines from the Russians along with *Sovremenny*-class missile cruisers because they have ready cash, a lot of which came from the United States.

I would predict, Mr. Chairman, looking at the budget that you have here, at a time when the Navy needs to meet these threats, they need to meet the missile threat to be able to keep the Navy from being so vulnerable that it can't enter certain parts of the Western Pacific, that takes a lot of money. This budget, if these budget cuts of approximately \$1 trillion through 2021 go through, the Navy will not be able to do what it takes to defend itself in an exposed environment.

If you add to that the massive problems that the Navy has in other areas, the 288 ships that are spread very thin, the relatively small submarine force that we have now when a lot of Joint Chief studies have said we need close to 100 attack boats and we have got 50 or less, the Navy's problems right now in the face of a burgeoning Chinese industrial base and military capability are immense. If we as a government make these cuts, we will deprive the U.S. Navy of a future in the Western Pacific where it is a dominant force, and where it has a strong envelope of security over those Navy task forces that go out and deploy in those regions. And I would predict that this budget starts us on a road in which China by 2020 will be the dominant force in the Western Pacific, if they want to be. If they surge their warship production, with the declining road that this puts us on with respect to naval vessels and personnel and technology, they will be the dominant force in the Western Pacific.

Mr. Chairman, the gentleman to my left, and as well as the gentleman to my right, but especially the gentleman to my left, was one of those Americans who—you know, the great thing about this committee is you find common ground, Democrats and Republicans, and probably nobody did more to work on ensuring that the Army end strength was increased than Ike Skelton. And I will leave the comments with respect to the people side, of what this does on the people side, to him and to Senator Warner.

Let me just finish with this. Before this Government and this Congress votes to make these massive cuts on defense, they should ask this question: Has the world become a safer place? Another question: Is the war against terrorists over? Another question: Does it still make sense to shoot down incoming missiles? Because that is important, and these cuts will devastate the missile defense program. That is the ability to stop a fast-moving missile or a slow-moving missile from coming in and hitting either your troops in theater, your ships at sea, your allies, or your population here in the United States. Is defending against incoming missiles now a bad idea? Because this budget will devastate our missile defense program.

And finally, what is the most important obligation that we have to the American people as a government? You must ask yourself that question. I have always thought it was to provide them with security. And the first thing that we should take care of, and especially in this era, is national security and then work out the rest of the budget exercise after we have determined what it takes to defend America.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter can be found in the Appendix on page 44.]

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank the gentleman.
Chairman Skelton.

**STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, FORMER CHAIRMAN,
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE**

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, Members of the Armed Services Committee, it is a signal honor to return to this Chamber where I served three decades in support of our men and women in uniform to discuss a matter of great importance, whether the United States will continue to have the finest military force in history.

It is a special honor to be with my long-standing friend Duncan Hunter and my long-standing Senate compatriot Senator Warner. It is a real thrill to join them today. It is especially good to see my successor Mrs. Hartzler carrying the Missouri mantle as we move forward. So thank you again for the opportunity to be with you.

I am deeply concerned with the prospect of cuts to our defense budget while our sons and our daughters are still at work in Iraq and Afghanistan and still fighting Al Qaeda around the globe. Our pilots are often younger than the planes they fly. Our Navy is not growing even as China builds a fleet that may threaten our ability to preserve freedom of navigation in the Western Pacific, and yet significant cuts are being contemplated to our defense. In fact, the

Budget Control Act could lead to defense cuts that would be downright devastating.

I concur with the past statements of Admiral Mullen and Secretary Panetta that the cuts to the defense budget that could occur under sequestration would imperil our Nation. Should sequestration cuts happen, in 10 years our country will be relegated to the sidelines of history.

Congress has the sole power to raise and maintain our military under Article I, Section 8 of our Constitution. Thus my message to Congress is don't scuttle the American Armed Forces. Our military is the best ever. I implore Congress to pursue cuts to the defense budget with the utmost care. I recommend to the committee the report of "Hard Choices" released by the Center for a New American Security, where I serve on the board of advisors. This report outlines some of the significant consequences of cuts on American combat power. I echo the warnings of this report that budget cuts beyond the \$480 billion already designated will endanger our national security.

Cuts of this magnitude will jeopardize our ability to uphold our vital interests. Our future military must have the capability to deter potential aggressors and quickly and decisively defeat any direct threats. This means maintaining a strong ground force that can defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan and then transfer security responsibility to our Afghan partners. Yet any responsible defense budget must also prioritize the Navy and the Air Force. This is especially important in South and East Asia where rising powers such as China and India increasingly serve as fulcrums of global economic and political power. They can serve to bolster or challenge the security of global communion.

For this reason the United States cannot degrade our naval and air capabilities. Cuts to the Navy and Air Force will limit our power projection capability, make our allies and partners question our commitments to them, and give China a free hand in the Western Pacific.

The Army and Marines are also critical for this theater. The ground forces must support our Asian allies, improving American ties with those countries and discouraging China from bullying them.

The new strategic situation means that in the spirit of Goldwater-Nichols, which had its genesis in this committee, we must embrace a joint vision for our future military. An interdependent military will more effectively protect our national interests through greater cooperation, thereby making more intelligent battlefield decisions.

Already we have seen past attempts at this policy bear fruit. The Navy and the Air Force have made major strides through their evolving air-sea battle concept. Any future strategic concept must envision how a combined arms approach on air, sea and land will deter threats and defeat them if deterrence fails.

Significant defense cuts could also endanger the vitality of our Services by compromising our ability to keep and train excellent officers, especially if personnel cuts degrade our officer-training institution. The strength of the U.S. military flows from the dedication and skill of our All-Volunteer Force. Indeed, the new defense budg-

et must maintain our Nation's security by keeping the profession of arms professional.

The American military's most important edge over our adversaries comes from the unparalleled professionalism and training of our men and women; however, this edge is fragile. When just over 50 percent of service academy graduates remain in the service after 10 years, our military loses its best and brightest. We must combat this by incentivizing retention of officers in the military. The Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel last year recommended two new bonuses for high-caliber soldiers, regardless of rank, and reforming our up-or-out system. By completing these imperative reforms, we will significantly improve the quality of our officer corps.

We must complement these reforms by continuing our commitment to our professional military education. In the words of Admiral James Stavridis, we will prevail by outthinking the enemy. Our military service academies and the ROTC [Reserve Officers' Training Corps] programs are the best in the world, yet learning must continue as soldiers remain in the service. Warriors matching the strength of a Spartan hoplite, the flexibility of a Roman legionnaire, and the brilliant tactical mind of a Hannibal or Scipio are commissioned every year. As we face new domains of warfare in space and in cyberspace, officers who understand the past and anticipate the future will be well prepared to adapt the world's finest military to new ways of war.

Deep defense cuts could endanger professional military education programs needed to prepare officers and enlisted personnel for this future. If the military hopes to adapt to the ever-changing nature of warfare, we must commit fully to funding professional military education and providing scholarships and support to those individuals pursuing higher education. Doing so will broaden the expertise of soldiers and prepare men and women for the threats of the future. Doing otherwise will turn our military into a profoundly moribund organization.

Any defense budget must also not break faith with the men and the women and the families who comprise our All-Volunteer Force. We must honor the sacrifices of our soldiers and their families by preserving their hard-earned medical pay and retirement benefits.

We also must ensure that we provide the resources to confront a lethal crisis affecting our military: suicide. In light of the rising suicides since 2001, especially amongst the Army and Marines who served so faithfully in Iraq and Afghanistan, we must continue to pursue innovative ways to ensure mental wellness in the armed services.

I would like to conclude by emphasizing how important it is to get this right. It is no longer a question of if, but when the cuts will fall. Already the Department of Defense is looking at cuts of about \$489 billion over the next 10 years. Our future force must be able to quickly defeat threats all over the world and to respond properly to the growing importance of Asia. Our Congress must remain vigilant that budget cuts do not irreparably damage our military forces. It must fight to preserve the education, training and health care that make our military the best in the world. We must not break faith with those who have sacrificed so much over the past decade.

Again, thank you for the opportunity to return to this Chamber and to say a word on behalf of the young men and young women in uniform.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Appendix on page 52.]

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you.
Senator Warner.

**STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN WARNER, FORMER CHAIRMAN,
SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE**

Mr. WARNER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am deeply honored to be here. I again thank the chairman and ranking member and others who have found the time to come and attend.

My two distinguished colleagues and dear, dear friends of many years, we have worked together in this room and in rooms throughout the Capitol complex to resolve problems, and here we are today to try and give you a little advice.

Well, my first advice is I should be brief, because I am anxious to respond to questions, and I defer to the excellent summary of the world situation given by my good friend here from California. And then from the heartland of America, Harry Truman's land, Ike Skelton has talked about a subject I will touch on, and that is the All-Volunteer Force.

I submitted a statement. It is short, it is of no great consequence. It is sort of a few notes from the heart, but what I felt.

But I would like to say a personal thing. I looked around this morning at these portraits and reminded myself that I have been before this committee, this is my 41st year. I started with those two gentlemen over there as a youngster, Under Secretary of the Navy at that time, and with the exception of five short races for the Senate, I have been associated with Congress and working with the Armed Services Committee of the Senate and the House for certainly the 30 years that I finished in the Senate and the 5 years that I was in the Pentagon and the Navy Secretariat.

But what I thought I would do today is first commend the staff and the Members for having this series of hearings. I have got to say to myself, why didn't I do something like this at difficult times? Thanks to Bob Simmons and Katie Sendak, I read every one of the statements of the witnesses who preceded this here, and I learned quite a bit. They were beautifully prepared statements. I wish I had spent a little more time on my very brief statement. But nevertheless, the hearing records will be there for all to see, and I hope somehow you put them together, because they are a very valuable resource as the Congress of the United States heads towards what I believe will be one of the greatest achievements they have ever had.

I have not lost confidence in our Congress, our Senate, our House to work together. Both the chairman and ranking member in their opening comments referred to that magical word "bipartisan." The three of us saw it year after year with each bill that we had, and we never once failed to get a bill through that was bipartisan and signed by the sequence of Presidents. This Congress, I am confident, will achieve the same.

However, my colleagues have spoken to the draconian threat of the sequester procedure and the special committee and the like. The only prediction I make today, is that will not happen, and it will not happen for the reason that the Committees of the Armed Services and the respective Appropriations Committees on armed services will not let that happen, because you understand the severity of the issues as they relate to the men and women of the Armed Forces.

I sat here looking at that recitation from the Congress of the United States—excuse me, the Constitution, reminding Congress and the President, which constitute the Government together with our judiciary, it is the Federal Government's responsibility, national defense, no one else. It is the Federal Government. And these two committees, House and Senate, and the appropriators are the immediate ones responsible to see that this draconian chapter of a budget would not happen with \$500 billion more being extracted from the Department of Defense current and outyear budgets. It must not happen.

I want to also refer to the first thing I wanted to say in my statement was the All-Volunteer Force. I was in the Pentagon in the years 1969 to 1974 when the concept of that came about, and we recognized the need to do it. And when it passed, it was viewed that Congress had dumped onto the military the biggest gamble we had ever taken. But the military leadership at that time, and progressively since that period, have strengthened that all-voluntary concept. That is the very backbone of all of our defense. And every decision that this committee and others make in the context of this budget, you must keep foremost in mind the essential need to maintain that All-Volunteer Force.

I was Secretary of the Navy during Vietnam. I saw the difficulties that we encountered with the draft, the American public turning against colleagues, turning against those in uniform as they came back from performing their duties on that frightful battlefield, which laid a heavy toll on our men and women and their families. Now, bear in mind that it is this committee and that in the Senate that must make sure that that doesn't happen again.

Since that period the Armed Forces have continually, with strong leadership, be it from the generals and admirals or the privates and sailors, grown to where today they are respected more than any other segment of our society. They did it by their own sweat of their brow, their own sacrifice, their own ability to do with what Congress had provided and do it brilliantly.

Also we cannot look at this situation in the context of the United States alone. Our Nation stands like a beacon to the free world. We are viewed upon in various ways, but the record will be clear we, the United States, do not desire to dominate or take anyone else's land or property. We are there solely to help preserve freedom for those who will fight with us to do so. And in that context if we were to face this draconian budget cut, it would send a signal, like the old days in the Navy that I knew, we used to flash this signal to maintain electronic silence. That signal would be flashed across the world: The United States is beginning to withdraw. That we cannot do.

So I say to you the cuts in defense—and I will say right now we have taken—that is “we” collectively, the Department of Defense under the brilliant leadership of Bob Gates and Leon Panetta, and I have known those two fine men and worked with them for many years—we have taken a significant number of those cuts. But for symbolic reasons and other reasons, we cannot now say, in this current challenge to find more, that defense is off the table. I would not suggest we use that phrase. I suggest we use the depth of understanding in this committee to explain to your colleagues why certain cuts cannot be made against the defense. Some possibly can be, and we will participate the defense in somewhat meeting these obligations that must be met to avoid that draconian \$500 billion. But it is you, individually, singly and as a committee, that is the last bulwark to protect this.

So I just conclude I remain confident in Congress. Preserve that All-Volunteer Force, and the Nation will survive and continue to be a very strong, stabilizing force. If we were not continued to be viewed as a strong, stabilizing force, it could well be the incentive for other nations to start a race of armament and a race toward the ultimate weapons, weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. We are the stabilizer. We must remain so in being true to our men and women in the Armed Forces and their families. I thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Warner can be found in the Appendix on page 59.]

The CHAIRMAN. [Presiding.] Thank you very much.

I would like to acknowledge the presence of another former Member, longtime stalwart on the committee, Jimmy Saxton of New Jersey. Happy to have you here.

We have kind of a unique opportunity with former chairman Duncan Hunter and Duncan Hunter, Jr., here. I know you spent all night preparing questions for your dad. I will yield my time to Duncan at this time.

Mr. HUNTER OF CALIFORNIA. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I was hoping we could put him under oath first. I have got some questions about my childhood I would like to bring up right now.

Thanks, Mr. Chairman, and I just want to say it is great to be here, it is a humbling experience to be here. And to my dad, it is kind of sad actually. I wish you would have stayed. Your superior knowledge and your take on this stuff would be much appreciated right now. We would like to have you around in a think tank or something instead of out hunting elk in Idaho, in Colorado, in Wyoming and in New Mexico and whatever else you are doing.

Mr. HUNTER. The Hunters are a big family, you know

Mr. HUNTER OF CALIFORNIA. They are a big family, that is true.

I would like to ask the panel, with your experience coming prior, you know, during the Cold War in the 1980s, when Dad was elected in 1980—Ike, I don't know when you were elected. The same? 1980, 1982.

Mr. SKELTON. 1976.

Mr. HUNTER OF CALIFORNIA. That is the year I was born. So coming from that experience—

Mr. SKELTON. You didn't have to say that.

Mr. HUNTER OF CALIFORNIA. I am sorry.

Coming from that experience, just the breadth of knowledge and what you have seen, I would like you to kind of put these cuts in perspective for us. Because Presidents come and go. You gentlemen have been here a long time, and you have a lot of perspective. I would like you to just share that perspective with us. Thank you.

Mr. SKELTON. I remember when I first came to Congress, it must have been 1978, I went down to Fort Bragg and was with some young, relatively young, troops, and comparing what I saw then, the caliber and the training, to what I see now at Fort Leonard Wood in Missouri and other Army posts and Marine bases in training, it is night and day. We then did not have a military that can compare to what we have today.

Same year I went on an overnight visit on the USS *Saratoga*, which, of course, is now out of commission, and I met with a group of Missouri sailors after the dinner, roomful of them, and all of them were so discouraged, they were going to get out of the Navy, except one, who had been in some 19 years, who was going to stick it out another year. And the morale that I heard and witnessed that evening aboard that ship was, frankly, very discouraging.

In more recent years I have spent time aboard ships, on Navy bases with young men, young women all across the training spectrum, as well as in Iraq and Afghanistan. They are good. They are well-trained, their attitude is positive, they understand duty. And I am convinced though it is a small group of young men and young women—at any one time only one half of 1 percent of Americans are in uniform—but I am convinced that this group of young folks will return and make a great difference to the future of America. You are one of them. And I think that you will see, though they are small in numbers, a growing great generation come from them, because they understand duty, they understand patriotism, and they understand what makes America work.

That is why we can't lose what we have today. They are the best I have seen. They are good. Whether it be a trainee or whether it be a four-star admiral, they are very, very good at what they do.

Barbara Tuchman wrote a book, the historian, entitled, *The March of Folly*, and each chapter was about how a country made decisions that were contrary to their own vital interests. Should sequestration come to pass and our military be devastated, as we have predicted, another chapter could be added to that book. This is serious business.

Mr. HUNTER. I would say to the gentleman from San Diego—

Mr. HUNTER OF CALIFORNIA. Distinguished gentleman.

Mr. HUNTER. Distinguished gentleman from San Diego. I am in a familiar position being grilled by you, but it is really great to answer that question because you are part of the answer.

And, you know, when I came in in 1980, one thing that everyone arrives at when they come into this body, into this committee, and they have a relationship with lots of folks in the military, they get to know the military, we make trips to the bases, we meet with lots of them, lots of folks who have done extraordinary things, comparing that era to this era, which I think is part of your question, is I have always been impressed with the sameness.

When I say "the sameness," I am reminded of that book, *The Bridges at Toko-Ri*, by James Michener, when, when the hero

didn't come back—and I forget who played him in the movie—the captain of the ship stood on the deck of this carrier and said, Where does America get such men who fly off these tiny aircraft carriers, go into a difficult combat situation, and then try—those that survive—try to find that carrier somewhere at sea?

And then he said or he concluded with the thought that these people come from America's cities and villages and towns, and somehow they come in with this incredible devotion to duty, and they preserve our country and preserve our freedom. And I have always thought about that, because in 1980, when I came in and I met these wonderful people who make the United States work, make the United States military work, I always remembered that line, because they are still coming.

And I know Ike and I, and I am sure John, has had the same experience, and all of us and all of you in the committee have gone out into the warfighting theaters many times. When you meet these people, you meet people like J.A. Lamkin, the medic who alternately killed Al Qaeda and carried—performed an operation on his back in a firefight in—I believe it was in Baghdad, and then carried his wounded man down three flights of stairs, finished off a couple more enemy personnel, and finally successfully medevac'ed him; or Sergeant First Class Alwyn Cashe, who extracted his men from his Bradley who were burning, who were on fire after a fuel cell had exploded in an ambush, and he himself was burning, and continued to extract them until he couldn't move anymore; and the people that we know, and, Duncan, the people that you know, and the great young marines that you have brought to our house who have this sense of duty to our country.

And today they have something else, and that is something that Ike touched on and John touched on, and that is this: Many of the people who served in these warfighting theaters over the last 10 years are what I would call old hands. They have done two, three, and four tours, and I am talking about whether the Marines, the Army, the ground forces, but also the Air Force and the Navy, these are people who know how to make the military work and know how to win wars, and they have a creativity, an innovative capability, and a genius, and we are going to lose a lot of those people.

We are going to lose colonels like Joe L'Etoile, who took 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines into that dangerous area called the Zydon and turned that around, cleansed it of Al Qaeda by alternately being a brilliant warfighter and by getting the tribes on his side; guys like John Kelly, who is now the Deputy for the Secretary, who, when the widows of Anbar Province were destitute, got them milk cows so that they could have a little income, and it gave a benefit on both ends, and it brought the tribes closer together to us; guys like Paul Kennedy, who worked as a liaison here and then commanded 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines, and the day after his battalion had killed 300 insurgents in the battle of Ramadi, he held medical open house in the soccer stadium in Ramadi for the old people and the children and started to divide the insurgency from the tribes of Anbar Province.

The same type of operations, those same counterinsurgency geniuses are plying their trade in Afghanistan today. Those are the

old hands. Those are those colonels and lieutenant colonels who may never become generals, they may or may not, but they have the ability to win wars. They are creative, they are smart, they have enormous experience, and under these massive budget cuts, a lot of that great talent is going to be jettisoned.

Going back to 1980, I would say, that is—I was always impressed first and foremost with the dedication and the capability of our people. It has never been better than it is today, and we are in danger right now of losing it.

And so I would say to my son who joined the Marines, unlike my other son who joined the Army like me, whom I just left up at Fort Lewis and came back with the 4th Stryker Brigade, I had a little bit of that understanding the day that you quit your job and joined the Marines the day after 9/11 and deployed.

So this is a massive challenge for us is to keep this talent, and Ike has talked about it, and John has talked about it. We are on the verge of losing enormous talent that will never be recovered once it is gone. Let us not do it.

Mr. WARNER. The two colleagues to my left have covered beautifully, better than I could, most of your question, Mr. Hunter.

By the way, Semper Fi. You made the right choice. Marine Corps structured me and laid a foundation which enabled me. I am everlastingly grateful to that and the GI [Government Issue] Bill for what my country did for me, and I tried in my years in Congress to repay that debt.

But I am going to take a different segment of your question, and that is the magnificence of the warfighters they have described, but the warfighters have got to have in their hands the most modern, the most high-tech, the most advanced weapons obtainable, because we are fighting in situations where low-tech weapons are trying to be used to neuter high-tech weapons, and it has been successful, you see with the roadside bombs. No matter what amount of money and how hard we worked on that issue, it is still a mean, dirty, threatening issue, that type of ordnance.

But this goes to the acquisition process. I came to Congress in 1979, essentially we were all here in one block together, and I learned about that acquisition progress—process and how it takes really 10 years to develop and build and test and so forth the weaponry that the forward-deployed troops have today, and we have got to maintain a continuity of that modernization.

Cuts will be made, I am certain, to the programs, but that is where the wisdom of this committee comes in to make sure that those cuts are ones that will not, 10 years from now, leave that force that we will have, hopefully composed of the same brilliant men and women of the All-Volunteer Force that we have today—that they will have the weapons in order to deal with the array of challenges. Many of those challenges we cannot foresee today that will face our troops. Remember, that acquisition process has to have continuity and stability. Cuts will have to be made in some, but others have allowed to go forward to equip our troops for the future.

Mr. HUNTER OF CALIFORNIA. Thank the distinguished panel, and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to ask about the acquisition process, just dive down into that piece. You gentlemen have all had great experience with dealing with it.

We have not had a good decade when it comes to the acquisition process. A fair number of programs have gone way over budget. A number of others have turned out not to work and had to have been cancelled.

Without getting into my long-winded speech about the challenges here, I will just say that I think we need to be more flexible in terms of buying technology that is already out there and available and get off of so many programs of record that start us down the path of working forever on something that may or may not work.

But I am curious on your thoughts when we look to sort of get more out of the money we have spent. I mean, you can look back at the last decade and easily get up to \$50-, maybe even \$100 billion that we all wish we had back, and given where we are at right now, that is truly painful. Based on your experiences, what do we need to do going forward to have a better acquisition procurement process? And I will leave it to you in terms of what order. Well, Senator Warner, why don't you give us your take first, and we will work our way down.

Mr. WARNER. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Yes, indeed, I have had the acquisition process from both sides, working in the Pentagon and then coming to Congress, but I will have to be blunt and say the buck stops on your desk. You have got to exercise stronger oversight. You have got to put in place laws like Nunn-McCurdy and others to deter the very thing that you say.

You can point fingers, you can look at tragic cases, but you cannot stifle innovation. You have got to take a measure of risk exploring new technology, some of which will fail, but at the same time when you do decide to go forward with a program, give it stability, give it continuity, but have oversight, and do not fear the threat to cancel that contract if the case merits it.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Smith.

Let me add to John's statement a few facts. One is that one thing that this committee came up with was an ability to quick-field critical systems on the battlefield, so one thing you have got to have is the ability to move out very quickly to push aside that—those stacks of massive bureaucratic regulations and all the people who attend those regulations and get things to the field quickly.

We drafted a one pager, a one-page law that became law that was used in the war in Iraq, and I will tell you how we did it, and the committee did it, this committee did it. It said this: It said if casualties are being taken on the battlefield, the Secretary of Defense is authorized and empowered with one stroke of his signature to waive all acquisition regulations and simply buy what is needed, get it to the battlefield.

We did that during the height of the Iraq war when we had IEDs [Improvised Explosive Devices] being defended against with a vast array, as John says, of big programs. We had the jammers, as you know, Adam, that go on the—150 pounds or so that go on our vehi-

cles that we would use to create a protective bubble over a convoy so that when somebody has a remotely detonated bomb on the road, and he tries to detonate that with some type of a remote device, a garage door opener, a radio, et cetera, that that signal is jammed.

And we said in the committee, well, how about the guys on foot? If a guy is walking through a courtyard in Fallujah, and somebody is remotely detonating a 52-artillery round on him, he can't carry a 150-pound jammer on his shoulders. We said we need a small jammer; we need it quickly. The committee passed this law that was signed into law that said the Secretary can immediately move out a piece of equipment to the battlefield, push all acquisition regs aside, and simply buy it and get it to the troops.

We built a small jammer that we called "Little Blue" that was man portable. It was about this big, weighed a couple of pounds, that a corporal could carry on his back on a dismounted operation. We got, as I recall, 10,000 of those invented and built and fielded in I believe it was 4 months, 3 or 4 months, and committee staff could correct the record if that is not the accurate time, but we did it very quickly.

So you have to fast-field equipment, and there is a disconnect between the bureaucracy here that doesn't want to let go of the acquisition process and the guys in the field. You may recall that is how we got the Predator. Remember, the Predator was early fielded in Bosnia, and the tests—some of the test bureaucracies said, wait a minute, we haven't fully tested it. For example, we haven't got the deicing fixed on it and several other things. The general who had already used it in theater said, well, I have tested it and I like it, send me some more. We actually flanked the acquisition system.

And so in my estimation, we have to streamline the bureaucracy. I know that is easier said than done.

When I was a freshman, Dave McCurdy and I were assigned by the chairman to go off, and I think he just wanted to get us out of his hair, but to go off and fix the procurement system in a couple of weeks. So we traveled around the country. One thing I do remember is we sat in front of the president of Boeing, and he said, let me tell you what I think is wrong with the procurement system. He said, I am making some planes right now for an airline. I am going to have them to the airline ahead of schedule under cost. He said, I have got one airline representative in my shop here in Seattle while we are making those planes for them. He said, I am also making these planes for the Air Force. I have got 222 engineers who stop my guys constantly and force them to brief them on what they are doing, and he said, as a result, your aircraft are going to be 30 percent over cost, and they are going to be delayed.

So we are in the business of protecting the system from ourselves and from the Pentagon by having a labyrinth of regulations which very often disservice, and then when we have a scandal, we have the \$200 hammer, for example, we lay on more regulations to fix that and go in exactly the wrong direction.

So individual responsibility and, as John said, risk taking. In the end you need to have people—and I don't want to use the term "bureaucrat" in a derogatory way, because a lot of those folks have some guts, have some leadership, and you have got to have some-

body that says, I am willing to take a chance on that system, let us get it to the battlefield, and if it doesn't work as well as it is supposed to, I will take the fall for that. We can't simply be in the business of justifying cost. We have to also be in the business of getting things out the door quickly and taking a risk. That is easy to say, very difficult to do.

Mr. SMITH. Those are good insights. I appreciate it.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you for the question.

I refer you to what this committee did in 2009 and again in 2010 under the leadership of Mr. Andrews and Mr. Conaway, a bipartisan panel on acquisition. In 2009, they reformed—a separate bill was passed regarding major weapons systems; in 2010, acquisition reform was passed regarding all other matters of acquisition.

I would hope this committee could revisit those laws and see how they are operating. They were supposed to solve money problems as well as time problems, and I am convinced that they were well written, and the question is whether there is follow-through in this committee, is there follow-through on it. I urge you to take a look at that if that would not at least solve part of your problem.

Mr. SMITH. Thanks once again.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Forbes.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, we are all awed by the experience and the expertise of the three witnesses today. Senator Warner set an example of professionalism and bipartisanship in his office that few have been able to reach. There has never been a more principled legislator, I think, sitting in that chair than Duncan Hunter when he chaired this committee, and Ike Skelton brought to the attention of Congress some of the risks of China before it was popular to be talking about that. So we thank all three of you.

Unfortunately, I do not share the optimism and confidence that Senator Warner has in Congress being able to do the right thing, and I think the American people probably are closer to me on that.

If we take a picture, a snapshot of where we are, that is one thing, but if we look at the curves, which is more of what life really is, we see some startling things that concern us. The first thing is that in 2010, for the first time in 100 years, we stopped being the manufacturing leader of the world. China became the manufacturing leader. Just recently we have ceded our expertise and superiority in the space program to the French, the Russians, and the Chinese, the first time in any of our lifetimes. And the third thing is, forget sequestration and forget these draconian cuts that could come down, just the \$450 to \$489 billion—and nobody knows the exact figure of cuts that we have already done. We were at the Pentagon last night, and it seems to be a conclusion that everybody shares that we are today the greatest military the world has ever known, but even without sequestration and even without these additional cuts, just the cuts we are going to make, this \$450- to \$480 billion, will take us down from being the greatest military the world has ever known. We may still be the greatest military in the world, but not the greatest military the world has ever known, be-

cause we are making some significant risks that we are going to have to undergo.

If the three of you, with your wealth of experience and expertise, had to issue one warning that we could carry to our colleagues, not about sequestration, not about additional cuts, but about where we are today with the cuts we have already made, what would that warning be that we could take to them and say, hey, we better listen to this, and we better heed this warning?

Mr. SKELTON. This committee probably got tired of hearing me say over and over again that from the time I came into Congress until my last year here, we had had a total of—which covered 34 years—we had had a total of 12 military contingencies, and if you add to that since I have been out of Congress the participation of America in the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] air strikes in Libya, that would be a total of 13. Some of those contingencies were small, some were pretty large, and if there is one thing to worry about, it is the uncertainty of our national security.

All of those 12 military contingencies save one were unexpected. Iraq, of course, is the one we initiated. The outcome, of course, was not predicted because many thought that it would be an in-and-out situation. You can't tell what is around the corner. Congress is charged to raise and maintain the military, but the military must be ready for the uncertainties, and there were 12 uncertainties while I sat in your seat in this Chamber, and we met them, some of them far better than others as time went on. But you don't want to have something bad happen and be unprepared for it.

I had a roommate in law school, my first year in law school. My roommate had been in the Pusan Perimeter in Korea, which was, as you know, a low moment in our Korean war effort. We don't want that to happen again, and it is the uncertainty that you must sell to your colleagues. Just as sure as God made little green apples, we are going to have another contingency. Let us hope it doesn't happen, but it will.

Mr. WARNER. First, may I say how proud I am of you and your representation of the great State of Virginia, which we are both so fortunate to have served. I have known you from the first time you started in politics, campaigned for you, and you and I campaigned on fiscal conservatism and a balanced budget, and you have adhered to that, and I commend you for it.

But at the same time, we have the need today to reduce spending, and I think collectively everybody in this room agrees with that. It is just how we go about doing it. And I come back time and time again that the strength of our economy is no less important than the strength of our weapons systems and the ability of our forces to protect us. They are tied together. And so you have got the most awesome challenge that you have ever had in your entire distinguished career as a member of this committee, as a Member of this Congress to somehow strike that balance between what we can do by way of spending reductions and at the same time not weaken to the point where we are perceived as a Nation that is beginning to withdraw from our global responsibilities.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you. A great question. I think I am tempted to give you my big three rather than the big one.

I think this Nation has to retrieve its industrial base. In World War II at Willow Run, Michigan, we turned out a bomber aircraft every hour to aid in that war effort. I think we did the same thing in San Diego.

The industrial base is locked intricately with the national security interests of this country, and we have gutted the country. We have sent a great deal of our industrial base, and the tragedy of the exodus is this: China has taken a large part of the American industrial base. As a result of that, they have cash. Nations that make things have cash; nations that don't make things borrow cash. We have discovered that. In the old days China could not afford to buy *Kilo*-class submarines from the Russians. They couldn't afford to buy *Sovremenny*-class missile cruisers. They didn't have any money. Today they use American dollars to buy weaponry, some of which is aimed at the United States. The missile cruisers that they bought were designed for one thing; that is, to kill American aircraft carriers. So the industrial base of China is booming, and it is accumulating more and more American companies, more transplants on a monthly basis.

At the same time, the American industrial base diminishes, and with it to some degree every time one of those facilities leaves, we become somewhat more impoverished. We have more people who need the social services that are at the heart of this budget debate.

If you look at the big picture, history may say that China accomplished two things by achieving the transplantation of the American industrial base. They allowed for the surging and mass mobilization of their own military capability with high-quality, high-capability military apparatus, and at the same time they impoverished the Americans to the point where we had to contract our national security, which is now at issue in these budget cuts that are called necessary.

So if there was one message that I would give to the American people and to this Congress, we must retrieve our industrial base. It is part and parcel of our national security. It builds these systems.

The question was asked by the gentleman from Washington Mr. Smith about large cost overruns, the fact that it is difficult to buy anything inexpensively in the defense sector. Part of that is attributable to the fact that we now have lot—we have onesies and twosies in this industrial base; that is, in many sectors we will have one company or maybe two companies that make a particular product, and that is it. You don't get good prices that way, and you don't get good innovation. You need competition. When you devastate your industrial base, you have less competition, and as a result you have higher prices.

If we retrieved a large part of the industrial base of this country, we would have more middle-class jobs, more high-paying manufacturing jobs, and we would have less of this budget problem which right now is bringing this major question before us.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Andrews.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a really special honor to have these three gentlemen before us today, and I thank them for their service to our country. And I especially want to

thank Chairman Hunter and Chairman Skelton for their mentorship and tutelage for many of us on this committee. It is a special honor in my career that I got to serve under both of you, and it is great to see all three of you today, especially our two chairmen coming back.

My premise is that we should learn from our successes and then also learn from our deficiencies, and in the last couple years I can point to two successes in the area of procurement that I think provide role models as to what to do, not just procurement, but the broader strategy.

The successful strike against bin Laden's compound on May 1st in large part happened because of the bravery of the individuals involved, but you three gentlemen gave them the tools to succeed. You supported a reordering of our intelligence operations so we were able to find that needle in that haystack in a very impressive way. You created the opportunity to move quickly, quietly, and lethally to the place of attack. You had the technology so our guys in that compound, our Navy SEALs [Sea, Air, and Land] and others, could see what the enemy could not and take full advantage of that situation. I don't think there is an American breathing who would say that whatever we invested in that effort was worth every penny.

The interesting thing is we didn't invest a whole lot in that effort relative to some other things. There weren't a whole lot of cost overruns on those helicopters, there weren't a whole lot of cost overruns on those night vision tools, and the intelligence money that we spent, if anything, has moderated in cost the last couple years because we reorganized it. So that is a success in my book.

The second success is one that I regret that we had to work on together, but I am glad we did, and that is the MRAP [Mine Resistant Ambush Protected] program that saved countless numbers of lives, and it happened because of this committee. We all heard the excuses and the lethargy from the bureaucratic community, how it was going to take years to figure out what to do, and, Chairman Hunter, you in particular, and Gene Taylor, who served on this committee at the time, supported by Chairman Skelton, just became impatient and intolerant of those explanations, and the result was, as you said earlier, we fielded much more successful up-armored vehicles, we did it in a hurry, and we saved a lot of people's lives, a lot of people's lives. And I think if you want to talk about an achievement in a legislative career, that is the best one I could possibly think of.

Now, that didn't have a whole lot of cost overruns, and it didn't have 222 engineers climbing all over the people making those things. It happened because there was a will, and there was a strategy, and there was a level of attention paid to it.

I contrast that with the deficiencies, a whole bunch of them. They add up to \$296 billion over a 7-year period in cost overruns of major weapons systems, and you pick any one you want. I will look at the SBIRS [Space-Based Infrared System] platform as an example. The R&D [research and development] cost that we poured into the SBIRS platform has made the per-unit cost of one of those things five times what it was supposed to be when we started out the program.

Now, I would be interested in the guidance the three of you could give us on the direction you think we should take to have more successes like the strike against bin Laden and the MRAP success and fewer failures like we have had in the one that I mentioned. What would you suggest that the role of the committee should be in maximizing those successes and eliminating the deficiencies?

Mr. HUNTER. First, to the gentleman from New Jersey, what a lot of fun it has been working with you, and together we on this committee have done some good things for the country. It is great to see you again.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you.

Mr. HUNTER. And great to see you continuing to work for America.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you.

Mr. HUNTER. We have got to break the pencil. You have so many systems that started out as \$5 systems and ended up being \$100 systems because of the proclivity to change the blueprints, change the design, and add bells and whistles, and that is human nature. Military people do what they think they are supposed to do, what they are ordered to do, what their challenge is, and when somebody comes up with a new idea, something that can be added to a system, he does everything that he can to get that thing in.

As Mr. Simmons, the staff director of the committee, used to say, at some point you have to break the pencil. You have got to say, okay, this is the design, we are going with it, we are not going to redesign this thing every couple of months.

Mr. ANDREWS. Right.

Mr. HUNTER. And I think there needs to be a major directive on that. I think that is a very important thing.

Just one point, because you talked about the committee. When we were having a tough time getting a huge load of MRAPs out, that was—I believe it was in 2005, that were going to be delivered in December. Mr. Simmons, our staff director, went to the—this was up-armored Humvees.

Mr. ANDREWS. Yep.

Mr. HUNTER. It was going to be a long run before we got the next load of some 10,000, as I recall. He went to the company, and they said—he said, what is the problem here, because Mr. Simmons was a CEO [Chief Executive Officer] of an aerospace company before he came to D.C. to be our staff director. They said, steel. They said, we got this, this is our steel schedule, we have to live with it. He said, where is the steel company? He went to the steel company, and they said, this is our schedule. He said, why can't you do three shifts? They said, well, we would have to work with the unions. He said, let me talk to them. Mr. Simmons, our staff director, sat down with the union leadership. They said, we have got kids in Iraq and Afghanistan, we will run three shifts.

Mr. ANDREWS. Right.

Mr. HUNTER. We pulled up that shipment of up-armored Humvees to protect lives of our folks in Iraq, I believe, and I have the staff—maybe Jenness can get the exact numbers on this. As I recall, we advanced it from instead of getting it in December of 2005, we got them in April of 2005.

So I would say that in the area of acquisition and trying to change this bureaucracy, the same things work that work on the battlefield: Initiative, leadership—

Mr. ANDREWS. Focus.

Mr. HUNTER [continuing]. And the willingness to take risk.

Mr. ANDREWS. Focus.

Mr. HUNTER. Yeah.

Mr. WARNER. I want to pick up on a very important point that you made, and that is the remarkable apprehension of—eventually of bin Laden. It showed a lot of courage on behalf of the President to make that tough decision. Say what you want and criticism, it was an extraordinary—

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes, sir.

Mr. WARNER [continuing]. Operation and teamwork from the Commander in Chief right on down. But ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance], those magical three letters that you used, laid that foundation, and if I may recall, this threesome right here, about 15 years ago the unmanned system was not a very popular thing. The Air Force said, well, they will—we will lose cockpits. We have got to have so many cockpits. The three of us put together a law at that time, became law, a bill and it became law, directing the Department of Defense to accelerate, and we set benchmarks and time schedules on the number of programs that they should try and initiate to have unmanned systems, Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines, and they did it.

As a matter of fact, that law, they left us in a cloud of dust in about 3 years and went off on their own and really achieved it.

I got a note that I am affiliated with two companies that are in it, but I was a champion of ISR long before that.

That is the type of cuts you have got to look at—when you are coming to grips with this awesome responsibility of the budget problem. Take out those areas that led to the capture of bin Laden, which we needed to get, and the other magnificent things we have done, and protect those sources so that we can have the modern weapons not only for the current generation, but 10 years down the road for the next generation of all-volunteers.

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes, sir. Thank you.

Mr. SKELTON. I think simply you should revisit what you have already done, whether it be the air/land subcommittee or it be an extension of the panel that you and Mr. Conaway headed, see how those two laws are working. From the testimony and the comments prior to passing that out of this committee, a lot of those problems would be solved. And I can only refer you to what you have already done and what this committee has already produced. Take a look at it.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is up.

I just want to say that the chairman has implemented another panel to follow up on the financial statement side of this, which Mr. Conaway is chairing, and we are diligently meeting every Thursday morning at 8 o'clock to make sure we get you a good work product.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Wittman.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you all so much for joining us. Senator Warner, Chairman Hunter, Chairman Skelton, thank you so much for your service. You really have shown the way for us here on the House Armed Services Committee.

And I wanted to begin by talking in a broad perspective about risk. And you all have been through a number of efforts to look at our defense posture, to look at defense reviews, whether it is our National Defense Strategy, Quadrennial Defense Review. So you have seen how the threats have changed through the years, you have seen how the breadth and scope of our military has changed, where the challenges are. And if you look today, obviously we are in an extraordinarily challenging world with many different chapters that have been written, but many to be written, about what we do and how do we respond. And there are a lot of things we can do to look at the force structure and determine how do we change that, but as you have heard, the concern is that strategy should drive budgets, budgets shouldn't drive strategies.

Regardless of what goes on, those threats are there, they are real, and this country has to make sure that we are properly prepared for that. And the realm that we exist in is what are the risks; what are the risks in the what-if scenarios? And I really am focused on what happens with our Marine Corps and our Navy.

We talk about ships, we talked about the industrial base, and we have had recently some great successes there with USS *Nimitz* in that class have been very successful; the USS *Arleigh Burke*, a very successful class; the USS *Virginia*, Senator Warner, your brainchild there to make sure that was put forward, a very, very successful program. We talk about having those assets in addition to, as you all spoke so eloquently about, the men and women in our military, the best absolutely in the world and doing a fantastic job.

The question is this: If you could give us your estimate, based on some of the proposed budget scenarios that have been put out there about reductions, both the \$450 billion existing and then the sequestration that could result in an additional \$500 billion, what do you believe are the risks that this Nation faces in the future? And specifically with a Navy that may have less than 250 ships, with a Marine Corps that may lose a number of units, what is your estimate about the risk that we face and what this Nation would be looking at?

Our challenge is to communicate not just to Members of this body, but to the public about what does this mean for this country and what are those risks. So you all have been through this process, know it intimately. I would like to get your perspective on the risks that this Nation faces with these budget scenarios.

Mr. WARNER. Well, we start with the fundamental proposition which is eminently clear to all of us: We are an island Nation. Yes, this is a global community, a global economy, a global defense, but the fact is that we are dependent on the sea lanes of the world, which we call the common property of the world, observing sovereignty rights and others, but operating those sea lanes and protecting those sea lanes such that we can have our trade and the necessity of bringing in the raw materials and regrettably an abundance of fuel that we must have to support our economy. That is

the prime mission of the United States Navy, and we have had it that way for years.

Now, people argue about fewer and fewer ships. I remember a 600-ship Navy, 300-ship Navy. Actually when I was privileged to serve in the Navy Secretariat, we had close to 900 ships. Most of them regrettably were old World War II ships which we had to scrap. But the point is, don't let the numbers tangle you up. It is the capacity and the ability of the ship. The ship today is far greater in its capacity and ability and its weapons systems than the destroyers of the early era, and the same with the carriers. So they are magnificent ships.

We simply must keep a replacement cycle, a modernization cycle going, but the numbers are not the magic. The key is come back to the island Nation and our reliance on those sea lanes that must be kept open.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Wittman, we—China is developing the ability, and I think their—at this point their game plan with respect to taking on the U.S. Navy is not to try to build a counterpart to the carriers and the attending ships, but to have the ability to kill them at long range with ballistic missiles which are launched from the mainland, which have a high-capability, antiship targeting system. And they are developing those systems right now, and we are very concerned about those.

Offsetting that capability, that move, which we see right now, and we are analyzing, will require a lot of money. If we have these draconian cuts that are proposed, we are going to lose the ability to protect our carrier battle groups in those areas of the far Pacific. We will lose it, and I would predict that it will be gone by 2020. We will not be the dominant force; in fact, we will be a subservient force in the western Pacific. It will take an enormous investment.

And there is several things you have to do, incidentally, with missile defense. You not only have to have the ability to shoot down those first several antiship missiles that come in, you have to be able to shoot down salvos of antiship missiles that come in. That means you need to have endurance built into your antimissile programs. That requires money, it requires investment, requires innovation. The Navy will not be able to meet that challenge with the massive cuts that we have posited. So we lose the western Pacific. And I think this clearly puts us on a glide slope to lose the western Pacific.

We lose the space battle. We lose the competition in space, which is key to our military operations. All the countries in the world watched with interest as they saw American precision munitions devastate Saddam Hussein's armored formations far ahead of our advancing 3rd Marines—or 1st Marine Division on the right and 3rd Army Division on the left as we advanced up the Euphrates and the Tigris River plains in Iraq. They saw that; they saw that use of precision.

If you knock out the satellites, those highly targeted precision munitions become dumb bombs and become much less effective. They understand that, and they have a military doctrine of going after a superior force by targeting a weakness and hitting it. So I think the space competition is part and parcel of maintaining a viable Navy.

Now, with respect to the Marines and the Army, we have—we are looking at scenarios that might occur at some point, and especially if China becomes expeditionary. That means it is able to move its forces to Africa or other places or other parts of the world where they want to protect an extractive industry, and they end up planting a military flag, and there is a confrontation.

Putting explosives on target with electronics today has changed the face of warfare. As I said, precision munitions used for the first time in the majority in Iraq were devastating to the enemy.

If we allow China to have that ability to knock out our precision capability, that is, if we lose the space contest, those marines and soldiers who have to in the end carry the battle to the enemy—and we learned in Iraq that this isn't a push-button world. As Kip Yeager fought his last battle and finished it with a knife, the grandson of the great Chuck Yeager who broke the speed of sound, in a small room in Fallujah, we learned that it is not a push-button world. It is a world that ends up with young men fighting at close range, and they are marines and they are soldiers, and the investment that we have made in blunting the capability of the other side to kill those young men becomes very critical. So the exposure to land forces that would work in any of a number of scenarios in the western Pacific will be massive, and we will take massive casualties.

A second way we would take casualties is this: We have very few bombers today. We are at an historic low point with respect to bomber aircraft, long-range bomber aircraft. They are very important in armor battles. Now, we didn't have big armor battles in Iraq and Afghanistan, but if you have armor battles, and you need to have—utilize bomber strikes to neutralize the armor capability of the other side, all of our analyses that we have taken now say even with the number of bombers that we have today, if we have two scenarios that involve armor, we are going to have to swing the bombers. The Air Force calls this swinging the bombers. Swinging the bombers means that you take them out of one theater where you are fighting, which is risky, and you expose that theater, and you take them over to the other theater and let them make a strike. And when you ask the question, what does the risk translate into, in the end the briefer will tell you, increased casualties, because if you don't have those bomber aircraft there to blunt that armored attack, you will take American casualties.

So as our investment in protecting our ground fighting elements goes down, protecting them by continuing to advance the technology that protects them, like having precision missile guidance that allows you to knock out armored formations far ahead of your infantry, if we cease to have a—to keep up with other nations that are trying to neutralize that ability so they can get in and kill our soldiers and marines, then you will have a massive increase in the risk of death and high casualty numbers in those ranks. So that is a second major risk.

Lastly, airlift, sealift, you can't undertake the airlift and sealift that we need in these expeditionary roles that we have been in with these massive cuts. You simply can't do it. We are down to a fairly historic low with respect to our airlift. You have got roughly—we have got a little more than half of the airfields available to

us around the world that we had in the 1960s. So having long-range lift and intratheater lift, very important.

Our lift assets will go down measurably under these massive budget cuts. That means we won't be able to move men and materiel into locations in a timely manner, and that means that you lose contests, and you lose people, and you lose ground.

So those are several of the risks that are inherent in these proposed cuts.

Mr. SKELTON. Your question is that of risks. Of course, we are aware fully of the trend in China, fully aware of what is happening in the Arab world, but we really don't know where the next shoe will drop.

I strongly suggest keeping a very strong intelligence network, including paying more attention to the HUMINT [human intelligence] element thereof, which was devastated a good number of years ago and now slowly being built up. In addition to that, you will need to have and to educate and to protect strategic thinkers within our military who will be listened to by Members of Congress and by the administration.

I once asked General Robert Scales, who is a former president of the Army War College and a great historian, I asked him out of an average graduating class from the Army War College how many could immediately have a serious conversation with George C. Marshall, and he said two or three, but that is all right. These would be strategic thinkers that others have relied on—Harry Truman had them around him, Dwight Eisenhower had them around him—and you have to identify them and protect them in their career. I cannot emphasize that enough, because when some of them are identified and not shepherded into solid positions and kept in the military, you are losing a national asset. These are the ones who can say “look out for,” and 9 times out of 10 they are right. That is the best I think you can do, intelligence and strategic thinkers.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yield back.

Mr. HUNTER OF CALIFORNIA. [Presiding.] I would like to recognize our colleague from San Diego, Ms. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and it is a pleasure to sit here and listen to the pearls of wisdom from all of you, and it certainly was a pleasure serving with you both, Duncan, and I thank you very much for your leadership and your mentoring.

I have wanted to ask some questions about oversight, but I think we probably have had a chance to delve into a number of those. Sometimes it still falls short for me, that we could do a better job. I think the chairman has brought to the committee a number of witnesses recently, and we have had a chance to look at particularly many of the costs, irrespective of the wars of Iraq and Afghanistan, and the fact that many of those costs have escalated to such a degree that we now are in a position where we really do have to pull back in many, many ways, and I wonder whether our role in that oversight could certainly have been sharper and more focused.

If you would like to share any additional insight in that, I would really entertain that, and then I have a few other questions. I just want to be sure that we have had a chance to get all of your thoughts out about that.

Mr. HUNTER. First, so nice to see my colleague, and thank you for your long years of service on this committee. And here is what I would say. With respect to costs, there is no more compelling force than competition; that is, the threat that someone else might get the program. One problem with the shrinking industrial base is we have left in some areas one company or two companies that might be able to make something. As a result of that, you can jaw-bone them all you want. We can pull companies in that make particular especially major weapons systems, and we can beat them up verbally, and they go back and the costs continue to rise because we haven't done anything substantive or real.

One thing that we initiated in this committee that I thought was a very good thing, we established the Challenge Program. We did that with a law that said if you are a company in the United States, and you think you can make a particular product, a primary product or a component, cheaper and with better warfighting capability than the other guy, than the incumbent, we are going to let you challenge them. And you can come in and brief the Pentagon on why your product is better for the taxpayers and gives you more warfighting capability, or a combination of those factors, and if we find that to be true, we can kick out the incumbent, and we can put you in. There is no kick in the pants so effective for somebody who is going over cost than looking over his shoulder and seeing somebody else getting the job.

The Pentagon hated the Challenge Program. It upset the apple cart, and as a result of that, they have pigeonholed it down to a kind of a semi-small business set-aside status. I would reinvigorate the Challenge Program.

Mrs. DAVIS. Yeah, I appreciate that, because I was going to say I don't think that that is working, and what we need to have perhaps is—

Mr. HUNTER. It is not being utilized by the Pentagon.

Mrs. DAVIS [continuing]. Greater reporting of those kinds of programs and reinstate them.

Mr. HUNTER. It is not being used by the Pentagon.

Mrs. DAVIS. Yeah, yeah.

Mr. HUNTER. It upsets them.

Mrs. DAVIS. And it is that partnering, I think, with the Pentagon so that the goals, the strategic goals, are really in sync with what the needs are that we can play a greater role.

I would like to turn to personnel and my dear friend Mr. Skelton. You always certainly encouraged me in that area to be very, very mindful of the men and women who are serving, and obviously their families, and I think we have tried to do that.

I can remember that a number of people would say that the military benefits were basically sucking all the, you know, oxygen out of the room when it came to defense systems, and that, in fact, you know, we needed to look at those more seriously.

What would you say to people today who look at that? We know that many of those issues around health benefits are perhaps unsustainable, but at the same time I think we believe that we must do everything in our power to support the men and women who serve. That is going to be an important part of the discussion

as we move forward, and I am looking for some pearls of wisdom around that issue that we can go forward with.

Mr. SKELTON. Well, it is not brain surgery that you need the highest-caliber young men and young women in uniform, whether they be recent graduates of basic training, or whether they be a lieutenant colonel leading a battalion, or whether they be a strategic thinker advising the President and the Secretary of Defense.

I think that you should do your very, very best to keep the very best you have in uniform, because if you go back to what I saw in 1978 aboard the USS *Saratoga*, you are going to start losing some conflicts, you are going to have bad things happen, and, as a result, recruitment, retention goes down, and you will end up with a second-class military. And even if you had the finest weapons in the world, you would not have the bright, able, innovative young people to use those weapons.

You lose proportionally, or I should say disproportionately, ability when you cut the ability of your force. They are all volunteers, they don't have to be there, and so many of them could make better money elsewhere, but they are there for patriotism, a sense of duty, and you want to keep them.

I would put as many eggs as you can stand into keeping them happy. And there is an old saying, if Mama ain't happy, ain't nobody happy, and this is so true. How many of your spouses have said to the other spouse who is in uniform, Honey, you have been over there three times, let us go home.

So my message to you today is to do the best you can in health care, benefits, training, education so you can keep that brain power in uniform.

Mr. WARNER. I would simply add to that—and, by the way, thank you for—I have been sort of watching everybody. You have paid great attention to this and nodded your head on occasion when some of us have made a statement, and that is reassuring.

But I would like to point out, and I have seen quite a span of the history from closing year of World War II to today, this country, its profound and deep respect for the men and women in uniform is manifested today in how well we try and care for the wounded and for the families who have lost their loved one as a combat casualty. I think we have made great strides in that direction, and at the same time as we see what we do there, there are young men and women standing at this moment in recruiting stations signing up to come in and be a part of this force, well knowing and full well knowing that they someday could be the casualties themselves.

That is the magnificence of our system today, the one that we cannot let break, the one we cannot lose faith with those men and women in uniform today, nor prepare those that will come 10 years from now with anything less than the best of weapons. But you still have to deal with your budget.

And I want to close by one—two subjects that we didn't turn to, and that is the nuclear triad that gives us the nuclear deterrence today. It deters not only anyone from attacking us, but from others feeling the necessity they have got to develop their systems. That has to be made strong, because it is at the very heart of our ability as a Nation working with others to prevent the proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction, another very dangerous area. I do hope such cuts as this committee will have to face will not be borne by those very important areas of our defense.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you.

Mr. WITTMAN. [Presiding.] Thank you, Ms. Davis.

Ms. Hanabusa.

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

To the three chairs, it is an honor to hear you. I didn't have the pleasure of serving with any of you, but you have touched upon subjects that are very dear to me. I represent the congressional—the First Congressional District of Hawaii, so you can imagine how important the Pacific theater is to me and what is going on, and one of the topics that I have been following very carefully, of course, is China.

So if I can begin with Chairman Hunter, you said many things, and I wish I had more time, but given the time limitation, I want to concentrate on certain portions of it. I agree with you that we need to be that great industrial Nation that we were, and the statement made that World War II, about the fact that America is going to win. And I think the other comment that was made was that it is the sleeping giant, and it is something that everyone knows, yet we seem to have lost that edge, if we can call it that.

I also was listening very carefully to your statements regarding how China's navy or—may build—and we know that they are putting a lot of money in their military, but more important than that, your emphasis on the use of ballistic missiles on their part to take out our naval force.

Trying to put all of that together, I guess my fundamental question is, so what do we do? I mean, we do know that we need to, I believe, keep up our research and development. That is going to be very critical. We need to be able to counter that, because I can't see us not having a force because of the fact that we need that force because we are what really protects—as Senator Warner talks about us going back to the concept that we are an island Nation, so you can imagine we are an island State. So I can identify that.

So how do we do this? How do we build up our industry, then also protect our naval fleet in the Pacific, which is critical, because we are what I believe holds the peace in the Pacific and protects the rest of this Nation, because that is the theater.

So there is so many things in what all of you said, but I would like to understand what you think is where we go.

And, you know, I will also tell you one of the issues we always face, especially in Hawaii, is how do we preserve shipbuilding, the Jones Act, for example, and the fact people forget it was part of the Merchant Marine statute, and how do we do all of that? What is your recommendation?

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you very much for that question. And congratulations on representing a wonderful part of the world in the United States.

There is two aspects. Number one is how do we offset what I see as a coming dominance of the Western Pacific by China. And the second question is how do we get that industrial base back, as I understand it.

Let me just take the first part, that first question. There are four categories. The Chinese plan, the strategy, it appears to me, in looking at their development programs that are being developed and fielded right now, is heavily reliant on missiles, about 1,000 midrange ballistic missiles now placed around the Taiwan Straits, approximately 100 years being developed, and extremely critical to our Navy's plans right now is the antiship ballistic missile. That is a ballistic missile that can travel 600, 700, 800 miles with an antiship guidance system. Toward the end of its flight, as it comes in toward an aircraft carrier, it has a secondary guidance system that allows it to adjust and maneuver until it hits that carrier.

An aircraft carrier has 5,000 Americans on board. The killing of an American aircraft carrier is devastating in any type of a scenario. You stop missiles with missile defense. Now, one thing this committee did, incidentally, years ago is when we started doing theater missile defense systems, that was systems that could shoot down short-range ballistic missiles, we insisted in this committee and wrote it in the language that they had to start fielding those on ships. That became the Aegis defense system that we have now fielded. That is the ability to shoot down what I would call moderate-speed missiles. You have to have the ability to shoot down fast missiles; that is, a missile that comes from a long range and reenters with high speed.

There is a secondary class of missiles, and that is cruise missiles. And some of them are maneuverable; that is, they jink around like a running back running down to a goal line as they come in toward the ship they are intended to kill, and they are hard to shoot down. So having an ability to shoot down missiles, missile defense, is critical to maintaining the dominant presence in the western Pacific, and it is going to be expensive. As John said, you make mistakes, and you spend money, and you have to go back and keep at it until you get a system that works. It is expensive. You can't do that under this budget. So missile defense is a critical aspect.

Submarines. Submarines are the leverage system of the United States Navy. The submarines at times in our history have sunk hundreds of boats, single submarines, hundreds of cargo ships, and the reliance on the Pacific Rim of those sea lanes that pull in 50, 60, 70, 80 percent of their petroleum products, including our allies, is a very strong one, and one that could be very much threatened by a submarine system.

Our submarines are the best in the world. There are not many of them. We are going to go down below—even without these cuts, we will go below 50 attack submarines, and the smart people that I know, and I know John knows and Ike knows, too, in the submarine areas tell us it would be best if we had close to 100 attack submarines, which we used to have. We are going to go down much lower. Submarines are expensive. We are not going to be able to build the submarine fleet that we need with these cuts. So submarines is the second aspect of defending the western Pacific.

Space. If we can be blinded successfully, the entire forward projection apparatus, the United States Navy, is devastated if we can be blinded in space, because so much of what we do depends on a space apparatus. You have to be able to do two things: One, defend the assets that you have got that are sending those signals and

making your equipment and your weapons operate; and the other is to take out the other guys's stuff so when his missile is coming in on your aircraft carrier, you can turn off his missile and make it go down. So having a strong position in space, winning the space competition is a key to the western Pacific and, I might say, lots of other military operations. That is the third one.

The fourth one is having an enduring strike program; that is, the ability to shoot and shoot and shoot again, meaning we have to have our own capability to launch ship-to-ship missiles, ship-to-shore missiles, and be able to maintain that and, incidentally, maintain those defenses that I talked about for long periods of time, not just to handle one or two missiles, but salvos of missiles. That is very expensive, being able to put that infrastructure in place that allows a carrier battle group to defend itself for days against sporadic missile attacks, very expensive and something that is going to require more development.

Those are four areas that are necessary in the western Pacific.

And lastly, the industrial base, I think we have got to bring it back. We see more and more American companies going to China, taking huge pieces of our employment and our technology with them, because they feel they have to. I think we should put tariffs on Chinese goods, fairly strong tariffs in the national interest, so that Americans over here—so that when a businessman sits at his table, and he is told that he can jettison his American workers who are getting \$22 an hour in return for folks that will work for \$22 a day, roughly one-tenth of the labor cost, he says, there are other considerations. The only thing that is real is the tariff, meaning it is going to cost money to bring those products to the people that pull the train, which is the American consumer.

We also need to punish this manipulation of the yuan, of their currency, which gives them an advantage, and the VAT [value-added tax] tax, meaning if this microphone costs \$100 and is made in China, when it goes down to the docks to be sent to the United States to be sold to you, the Chinese Government rebates all the tax money, 17 percent VAT. That takes the cost down from \$100 to \$83. If you make this microphone for \$110 here and send it there, the Chinese Government gives you a \$17 penalty when you get to the docks. That means yours just went—they both started at \$100. Yours went to \$117 when the consumer gets it, theirs went to \$83. You have a 34-point advantage before the opening kickoff in this football game called international trade competition.

That is bad business. We should change that. We should retrieve the American industrial base, and with it we will retrieve a part of our defense capability which we have lost, which is the ability to mobilize, and to build things quickly and effectively that we use for national security.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. Hunter has covered quite well the question you have asked. I just wish to note that I am privileged to be a part of the group that is trying to work to build the museums at Ford Island and restore the tower as a constant reminder of how Hawaii is at the very basic, pivotal spot of our defense system, as it was then on that fateful day, as it is now.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I must ask the courtesy of the chair to excuse this humble Senator. I leave it in good hands,

and it has been a memorable hearing for me to join here once again and with this distinguished committee. I predict that you will resolve this issue, Members of Congress, and it will be looked upon as one of your finest hours. Thank you very much.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Senator Warner. We appreciate that.

Mr. SKELTON. I appreciate your question, but Mr. Hunter has discussed it far better than I. When I look up at the portrait of my old friend Bob Stump, and I recall walking around on Ford Island with him and how he was telling me what happened here and what happened there, and the ramp that the PBVs [Navy patrol seaplanes] came up on, and this was during the war. And I hope whatever you do there, and I am very much supportive, will be a tribute to the Bob Stumps in this world for the efforts that they did in the moment of American greatness.

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you very much for the plug for Ford Island.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WITTMAN. Gentlemen, thank you so much. Thanks for your service to our Nation. Thanks for coming in today and providing your reflection. As I said, your experience there and seeing where this Nation has been and letting us know where it needs to go, especially in these tough times from a budgeting standpoint, is critical. So again, thanks much for taking the time today, thanks for your service to our Nation, and we look forward to continued conversations about where we go in the days and months to come.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing us to be here. And especially it is so wonderful for being here with Ike Skelton, who is always the corporate history of this committee and largely of our military history of this last—the last 100 years or so. Ike Skelton could always apply a lesson that was learned in history to a present problem, a wonderful gift and one that served us well.

And let me tell you, thank you for letting me get grilled, lightly grilled, by that Member of Congress from California, Duncan Hunter. And I have got to tell you, I am as proud of him as I am my Army son, but it was good to be able to have the new, improved Duncan Hunter ask those questions. Thanks a lot.

Mr. WITTMAN. Well, we are glad to have him, and I am glad to have him as my seatmate. He is carrying on the Hunter tradition and legacy here very well, so—

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you very much. It has been a real thrill, particularly being with my old friend and compatriot, Duncan Hunter. We had a lot of fun together, and actually I think we did a few good things. We hope that Congress today can meet its challenges, as we had different ones, but we felt we met them and provided for as the Constitution requires. Thank you for having us. It is good to be back.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Chairman Skelton. We appreciate that. Thanks again for the perspective that you bring. Your viewpoints on Goldwater-Nichols, the idea of jointness and where we can go there to really have a multiplying effect on our Force, I think, is very, very important for all of us to realize. You know, as you have watched that effort grow, it is going to be a critical

part of our future.

So, gentlemen, thank you both. We look forward to continued conversations with where we go as a Nation. Thank you, and God bless you.

[Whereupon, at 12:24 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

OCTOBER 12, 2011

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

OCTOBER 12, 2011

Statement of Hon. Howard P. “Buck” McKeon
Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on
The Future of National Defense and the U.S.
Military Ten Years After 9/11: Perspectives of
Former Chairmen of the Committees on Armed Services
October 12, 2011

This hearing is part of our ongoing series to evaluate lessons learned since 9/11 and to apply those lessons to decisions we will soon be making about the future of our force. We have received perspectives of former military leaders from each of the Services, as well as outside experts. Today we will have the opportunity to view these issues through the lens of the leaders of the legislative branch. The individuals with us today, in more ways than we can possibly imagine, led the fight here on the Hill to ensure our warfighters got what they needed to defend this Nation and take care of their families. Especially in the months following the attacks of September 11th, when it became clear that the procurement holiday of the 1990s had left gaps in our capabilities, that readiness was low, and that our force was being stretched too thin, the Chairmen of the Armed Services Committees ensured that not only Congress, but the Department of Defense and industry, were doing their part to make it right for our Armed Forces.

Unfortunately, our successes in the global war on terror, and in Iraq and Afghanistan, are lulling our Nation into the false confidence of a September 10th mindset. Too many appear to believe that we can maintain a solid defense that is driven by budget choices, not strategic ones—that the threats we face will be reduced, along with funding for national security.

I am not arguing that the military can be held exempt from fiscal belt-tightening. Indeed, half a trillion dollars has been cut from DOD already—the military has absorbed about half of the deficit reduction measures enacted to date. But these cuts have happened in advance of the development of a new strategy for national defense and without any changes to the military’s roles and missions.

Even more concerning is that if the Joint Select Committee does not succeed in developing and passing another deficit reduction plan, an additional half a trillion dollars could be cut from our military automatically. It also remains to be seen whether or not additional cuts may be proposed by the Administration, even if the “super committee” is successful.

But all this talk about dollars doesn't translate well into actual impacts on the force and risk to our Nation. I hope our witnesses today can help us understand the lessons we learned 10 years ago and give us recommendations about how we might avoid repeating the same mistakes. How can we make sure DOD is a good steward of the taxpayers' dollar, without increasing the risk to our Armed Forces?

The U.S. military is the modern era's pillar of American strength and values. In these difficult economic times, we recognize the struggle to bring fiscal discipline to our Nation. But it is imperative that we focus our fiscal restraint on the driver of the debt, instead of the protector of our prosperity. With that in mind, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today.

Statement of Hon. Adam Smith
Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on
The Future of National Defense and the U.S.
Military Ten Years After 9/11: Perspectives of
Former Chairmen of the Committees on Armed Services
October 12, 2011

I wish to join the chairman, and I am sure, all my colleagues here today, in thanking our witnesses for appearing here today. Collectively, you served more years than you probably want to think about—writing the defense budget and overseeing defense spending. I am glad we will continue to benefit from that experience here today.

Our country faces a budget dilemma—we don't collect enough revenue to cover our expenditures. Currently, we must borrow about 40 cents for every dollar the Federal Government spends. This problem must be addressed in two ends—spending will have to come down, and we're going to have to generate new revenues.

Like many, if not most, of our members here, I share the view that large, immediate cuts to the defense budget would have substantially negative impacts on the ability of the U.S. military to carry out its missions. I am also deeply concerned about cuts to all non-entitlement spending, which bore the brunt of the recent deficit deal. If the "super committee" fails to reach a deal, then cuts through sequestration will only impose deeper and more dangerous cuts to our military and non-entitlement spending such as infrastructure, education and homeland security.

I believe that we can rationally evaluate our national security strategy, our defense expenditures, and the current mission sets we ask the military to undertake and come up with a strategy that requires less funding. We on this committee like to say that strategy should not be driven by arbitrary budget numbers, but by the same token not considering the level of available resources when developing a strategy is irresponsible. We can, I believe, spend smarter and not just more.

It is also important that we address the revenue side of our budget problem. In order to avoid drastic cuts to our military and other important programs, revenue streams must be enhanced.

We have to make some serious choices. Our problems must be looked at in a comprehensive manner. If we are serious about not cutting large amounts of funding from the defense budget, something else has to give. Large, immediate, across-the-board cuts to the defense budget, which would occur under sequestration, would do serious damage to our national security. In order to avoid large cuts to the defense budget, we're going to have to stop repeating ideological talking points and address our budget problems comprehensively, through smarter spending and increased revenue.

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. And thank you to our witnesses for appearing here today.

STATEMENT OF DUNCAN L. HUNTER, FORMER MEMBER, U.S HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TO THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, good morning. Thanks for allowing me to give my views on America's security challenges and the adequacy of our present force structure, as well as that which is projected under the massive automatic cuts that would occur should the Joint Committee on Deficit Reduction dead-lock or should the contingency plan requested of DOD by OMB, which requires 10% cuts, be carried out.

Bluntly, these massive cuts disserve: 1) the present war against terrorists; 2) the difficult build-up of the Army and Marine Corps in which this committee has played such a significant role; and 3) the constitutional obligation of this government to defend its citizens.

In the last century, World War I, considered to be the "war to end all wars" was followed by a period of neglect for America's defense apparatus. In 1941, jolted by the Axis Powers and particularly the attack on Pearl Harbor, we mobilized massively, aided by a robust industrial base and a secure homeland, and saved the world. Only a few years after World War II, America stacked arms to such a degree that a third-rate military power drove our defenders down the Korean Peninsula and almost into the ocean before we managed to hold the Pusan perimeter and push north, weathering a Chinese intervention and stalemating the communists into a divided Korea that continues to this day.

After Vietnam, America's defenses declined precipitously, resulting in the so-called "hollow army" of the late 1970's, a period in which fewer than 50% of our tactical fighters were fully combat mission-capable and a time when more than 1,000 petty officers a month were leaving the Navy due to inadequate pay and support.

In 1981 we commenced to rebuild defense, with President Ronald Reagan partnering with this committee to enhance our ground forces, build the Navy toward a goal of 600 ships, initiate a missile defense program, and increase airlift, sealift, and sustainability.

With this new muscle we stood up to the Soviet Union, which, disassembled by American strength, released hundreds of millions of its people from its tyranny into the sunlight of freedom.

The 1990s found the U.S. dominating the First Gulf War with an array of conventional weapons from the build-up of the 1980s. Then, in the mid-1990s defense was cut substantially. The Army was reduced from 18 to 10 divisions and only about fifty per cent of our aging weapons systems were adequately replaced. Administration budget cutters went after defense. This committee lead the Congress in adding back over 40 billion dollars during this period. It wasn't enough.

In 2001, spurred by the 9-11 terrorist attack, our nation went into a period of rebuilding aging systems, increasing end strength and moving ahead on missile defenses. While the build-up was not as robust as that of the Reagan years, we did fill many of the short-falls of the 1990s.

Today the Iraq War is won, with Iraq's elected government enduring and the military that we built from the ground-up holding. Iraq is now an ally thanks to the one million American volunteers who served in uniform in that war. The Afghanistan mission continues, complex, but winnable.

China is emerging as a military super-power, stepping into the shoes of the former Soviet Union, developing high performance missiles, aircraft and ships, out producing the U.S. in key areas such as attack submarines (5 to 1), and ballistic missiles.

Iran, having failed to defeat America with its interference in the Iraq War, is continuing apace with its program aimed at producing a nuclear weapon. Its path over the past five years is littered with failed sanctions, imposed by the allies and blunted by China and Russia. Iran is following the model of its fellow nuclear weapons aspirant, North Korea which talked, wrangled and lied until it had produced a nuclear device.

Russia, shorn of its captive nations, retains an immense strategic strike capability.

This, Mr. Chairman, is the state of the world, the back-drop against which America is poised to massively cut defense.

To assess the huge cuts that are projected, I use the committee's calculation on the numbers: 1 trillion dollars cut from the Presidents FY 2012 FYDP, counting 465 billion dollars in cuts already enacted.

The enormity of these cuts will almost certainly result in large reductions in the size of the Army and Marine Corps.

A few years ago, we began correcting the downsizing of our land forces. Remember that we cut the Army almost in half during the 1990s.

During the height of the Iraq war our troops felt the pain of the downsizing as multiple deployments and 15 month tours stressed the force. We stressed the force. We policy makers swore “never again” and increased the Army to 569,400 and the USMC to 202,000.

Now we are poised to repeat the mistake of the 1990’s downsizing.

People costs are “right now” expenditures the projected cuts cannot be carried out without slashing end strength.

The cuts will also disserve the Navy in multiple ways. The 288 ships will face an unprecedented threat in the near future.

China has clearly moved to implement a new strategy to handle the U.S. Navy in a “Taiwan scenario.” They are building the capability to destroy American warships. Including carriers, at long ranges, before U.S. Naval projection can reach the straits.

China’s ship killers are ballistic missiles, tipped with anti-ship precisely targetable war-heads.

Never before has the US Navy had such an immense survivability challenge.

The projected budget cuts will preclude the Navy from fielding missile defense systems of necessary robustness to defend against sustained anti-ship ballistic missile attacks.

Also, the Navy’s “leverage weapon”, its fleet of attack submarines, will be reduced substantially. Meanwhile, China’s submarine program accelerates.

Our heavy bomber force is already at its historical low point of 135. A two war contingency involving heavy Armed Forces will require a “swinging “ of bombers from one war to the other, with a risk that substantial casualties will be taken without the fist of immediate air power.

Today, the U.S. has less than 70% of the airfields available worldwide that we had in the 1960's. Yet our strategic and tactical airlift is comprised of only 651 aircraft.

In this age of quick flare contingencies, tactical aircraft are high leverage. Today the Air Force has only 1990 fighters, half of what we had at the end of the Cold War.

The questions this committee must ask the President and your colleagues are these:


- Is the world suddenly safer to the degree that we can let our guard down and cancel the insurance policy that a strong defense has given the U.S.?
- Is the war against terrorism over?
- Do we want to “unlearn” the lesser of the “too small” Army and Marine Corps, and reduce them again?
- Should we concede space competition to our potential adversaries?
- Does it still make sense to stop incoming missiles?
- Do we want our Navy to have fewer than 250 ships?
- Do we want to cede military dominance in this century to communist China?
All these questions stage this greater question for every Member of Congress:
- Isn't our primary duty to defend our nation?

The defense cuts already made should be restored and any new reductions soundly rejected.

These cuts, should they be attended, along with China's military ascendance and growing industrial base, guarantee that China will become the world's dominant military power in this century.

Thank you Mr. Chairman

The Honorable Duncan Hunter



Congressman Duncan Hunter represented San Diego County in the House of Representatives for 28 years. He was first elected in 1980. A Vietnam veteran, he served in the 173rd Airborne and 75th Army Rangers. Hunter utilized the G.I. Bill to attend Western State University Law School in San Diego and, while completing his degree, he supplemented his income by working in farming and construction. After graduating, he opened a storefront legal office where he served many in the Hispanic community, often without compensation. In 1980, he was asked to mount a challenge for the Congressional seat held by an 18-year incumbent, Lionel Van Deerlin. Despite the district having a 2-to-1 Democrat registration, Hunter won the seat in an upset.

Coming to Washington, the new Congressman immediately sought a seat on the House Armed Services Committee where he could work on America's national security needs. Hunter became Chairman of the full committee in 2002. As Chairman, Hunter oversaw a \$500 billion defense budget and focused his efforts on providing America's men and women in uniform with the necessary resources to win our Nation's military conflicts and developing modernization initiatives that will move new and more effective technologies into the field of battle.

Hunter also has made securing the California-Mexico border a top priority. Congressman Hunter worked tirelessly to ensure that the region is safe for communities on both sides of the border and to put a stop to illegal immigration and drug trafficking. His provision to extend the San Diego Fence for 700 miles across Arizona, New Mexico and Texas was signed into law in 2006.

Congressman Hunter's other legislative priorities included retaining and increasing jobs in the 52nd District and across this Nation, providing tax relief to hard-working families and keeping our promises to America's veterans. Most recently, in December 2010 Hunter published a book on the Iraq War, titled *Victory in Iraq: How America Won*.

FISCAL YEAR 2009

Federal grant(s)/ contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
n/a			

Federal Contract Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2011): _____ n/a _____;
 Fiscal year 2010: _____;
 Fiscal year 2009: _____.

Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:

Current fiscal year (2011): _____ n/a _____;
 Fiscal year 2010: _____;
 Fiscal year 2009: _____.

List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2011): _____ n/a _____;
 Fiscal year 2010: _____;
 Fiscal year 2009: _____.

Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:

Current fiscal year (2011): _____ n/a _____;
 Fiscal year 2010: _____;
 Fiscal year 2009: _____.

Federal Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2011): _____ n/a _____ ;
Fiscal year 2010: _____ ;
Fiscal year 2009: _____ .

Federal agencies with which federal grants are held:

Current fiscal year (2011): _____ n/a _____ ;
Fiscal year 2010: _____ ;
Fiscal year 2009: _____ .

List of subjects of federal grants(s) (for example, materials research, sociological study, software design, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2011): _____ n/a _____ ;
Fiscal year 2010: _____ ;
Fiscal year 2009: _____ .

Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held:

Current fiscal year (2011): _____ n/a _____ ;
Fiscal year 2010: _____ ;
Fiscal year 2009: _____ .

Statement of
Ike Skelton, Former Chairman
House Armed Services Committee
United States House of Representatives
October 12, 2011

Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, members of the Armed Services Committee, it is a signal honor to return to this chamber where I served three decades in support of our men and women in uniform to discuss a matter of great importance: whether the United States will continue to have the finest military force in history. I am deeply concerned with the prospect of cuts to our defense budget while our sons and daughters are still at war in Iraq and Afghanistan and still fighting Al Qaeda around the globe. Our pilots are often younger than the planes they fly, and our Navy is not growing even as China builds a fleet that may threaten our ability to preserve freedom of navigation in the Western Pacific. And yet significant cuts are being contemplated to our defense budget.

In fact, the Budget Control Act could lead to defense cuts that would be downright devastating. I concur with the past statements of Admiral Mullen and Secretary Panetta that the cuts to the defense budget that could occur under sequestration would imperil our nation. Should sequestration cuts happen, in 10 years our country will be relegated to the sidelines of history.

The Congress has the sole power to raise and maintain our military under Article 1, Section 8 of our Constitution. Thus, my message to the Congress is: don't scuttle the American armed forces. Our military is the best ever. I implore the Congress to pursue cuts to the defense budget with the utmost care. I recommend to the committee the report "Hard Choices" released by the Center for a New American Security (or CNAS), where I serve on the Board of Advisors. CNAS's report outlines some of the significant consequences of cuts on American combat capabilities. I echo the warning of this report that budget cuts beyond the \$480 billion dollars already designated will endanger our national security.

Cuts of this magnitude will jeopardize our ability to uphold our vital interests. Our future military must have the capacity to deter potential aggressors and quickly and decisively defeat any direct threats. This means maintaining a strong ground force that can defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan and then transfer security responsibility to our Afghan partners. Yet any responsible defense budget must also prioritize the Navy and the Air Force. This is especially important in South and East Asia where rising powers such as China and India increasingly serve as fulcrums of global economic and political power. They could serve to bolster, or challenge, the security of the global commons.

For this reason the United States cannot degrade our naval and air capabilities. Cuts to the Navy and Air Force will limit our power projection capability, make our allies and partners question our commitments to them, and give China a free hand in the Western Pacific. The Army and Marines are also critical for this theater. The ground forces must support our Asian allies, improving American ties with those countries and discouraging China from bullying them.

The new strategic situation means that in the spirit of Goldwater - Nichols, which had its genesis in this Committee, we must embrace a joint vision for our future military. An interdependent military will more effectively protect our national interests through greater cooperation, thereby making more intelligent battlefield decisions. Already we have seen our past attempts at this policy bear fruit: the Navy and the Air Force have made major strides through their evolving "Air-Sea" Battle concept. Any future strategic concept must envision how a combined arms approach on Air, Sea, and Land will deter threats, and defeat them if deterrence fails.

Significant defense cuts could also endanger the vitality of our services by compromising our ability to keep and train excellent officers, especially if personnel cuts degrade our officer training institutions. The strength of the U.S. military flows from the dedication and skill of our All-Volunteer Force. Indeed, the new defense budget must maintain our nation's security by keeping the "Profession of Arms" professional. The American military's most important edge over our adversaries comes from the unparalleled professionalism and training of our men and women.

However, this edge is fragile: when just over fifty percent of service academy graduates remain in service after ten years, our military loses its best and brightest. We must combat this by incentivizing retention of officers in the military. The Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel last year recommended new bonuses for high-caliber soldiers, regardless of rank, and reforming the up-or-out system. By completing these imperative reforms, we will significantly improve the quality of our officer corps.

We must complement these reforms by continuing our commitment to our professional military education; in the words of Admiral James Stavridis, we will prevail by "out-thinking the enemy". Our military's service academies and ROTC programs are the best in the world, yet learning must continue as soldiers remain in the service. Warriors matching the strength of a Spartan hoplite, the flexibility of a Roman legionnaire, and the brilliant tactical mind of a Hannibal or Scipio are commissioned every year. As we face new domains of warfare in space and in cyberspace, officers who understand the past and anticipate the future will be well prepared to adapt the world's finest military to new ways of war.


Deep defense cuts could endanger Professional Military Education programs needed to prepare our officers and enlisted personnel for this future. Indeed, if the military hopes to adapt to the ever-changing nature of warfare, we must commit to fully funding Professional Military Education and providing scholarships and support to those individuals pursuing higher education. Doing so will broaden the expertise of soldiers and prepare our men and women for the threats of the future. Doing otherwise will turn our military into a profoundly moribund organization.

Any defense budget must also not break faith with the men, women, and families who comprise our All-Volunteer Force. We must honor the sacrifices of our soldiers and their families by preserving their hard-earned medical, pay, and retirement benefits. We also must ensure that we provide the resources to confront a lethal crisis affecting our military: suicide. In light of rising suicides since 2001, especially amongst the Army and the Marines who have served so faithfully in Iraq and Afghanistan, we must continue to pursue innovative ways to ensure mental wellness in the armed services.

I would like to conclude by emphasizing how important it is to get this right. It is no longer question of if, but when, the cuts will fall: already the Defense Department is looking at cuts of about \$489 billion over the next ten years. Our future force must be able to quickly defeat threats all over the world and to respond properly to the growing importance of Asia. Our Congress must remain vigilant that budget cuts do not irreparably damage our military forces. It must fight to preserve the education, training, and health care that make our military the best in the world. We must not break faith with those who have sacrificed so much over the past decade.

Thank you again for this opportunity to address this committee, Chairman McKeon.

Ike Skelton
Partner, Husch Blackwell LLP



Ike advises clients on a variety of legal and public policy issues, especially matters relating to national defense, small business and international trade.

Prior to joining the firm as Partner, Ike served as the U.S. Representative from Missouri's Fourth District (1977-2011). As U.S. Representative, Ike's focus was on issues involving jobs and the economy, the War in Afghanistan, military health insurance reform and standing up for the U.S. men and women in uniform.

He also served as the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee from 2007 until his departure. Ike also served on the Small Business Committee as Subcommittee Chair for Procurement, International Trade and Technology.

Voters first chose Ike to represent them in 1971, in the Missouri Senate, when he won his first election to that body. He held this position until joining the U.S. House in 1977. He began his career when he was elected County Prosecutor and later served as a special assistant Missouri Attorney.


Ike was instrumental in the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which simplified the chains of command, reduced inter-service rivalries, and implemented shared procurement processes between the branches.

He also played an active role in bringing the B-2 Stealth Bomber to Whiteman Air Force Base and the Army Engineer, Chemical and Military Police Schools to Fort Leonard Wood, both located in Missouri's Fourth District.

More recently, Ike drafted and helped institute the Weapons Acquisition Systems Reform Act, reform-minded legislation which overhauls the defense procurement process and provides additional checks against cost overruns and schedule changes.

**DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES
CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION**

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(4), of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 112th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants (including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Armed Services Committee in complying with the House rule.

Witness name: Ike Skelton 

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

Individual

Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented: Not Applicable

FISCAL YEAR 2011

federal grant(s)/ contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant

FISCAL YEAR 2010

federal grant(s)/ contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant

FISCAL YEAR 2009

Federal grant(s)/ contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant

Federal Contract Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, please provide the following information: Not Applicable

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2011): _____;
 Fiscal year 2010: _____;
 Fiscal year 2009: _____.

Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:

Current fiscal year (2011): _____;
 Fiscal year 2010: _____;
 Fiscal year 2009: _____.

List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2011): _____;
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Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:

Current fiscal year (2011): _____;
 Fiscal year 2010: _____;
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Federal Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please provide the following information: Not Applicable

Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2011): _____;
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Current fiscal year (2011): _____;
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Fiscal year 2009: _____.

Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held:

Current fiscal year (2011): _____;
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**Statement of
Senator John W. Warner (ret.)
Before the House Armed Services Committee
October 12, 2011**

I am deeply privileged to accept the Committee's invitation to testify in this very important series of hearings regarding the future of our nation's defense posture.

I am joined today by two highly valued colleagues Duncan Hunter and Ike Skelton. It's interesting to note that each of us had a very long period of service on our respective Armed Services Committees and each served, at various times, as a Chairman and as a Ranking Member. Likewise, we alternated over many years being the Chair of the House – Senate Conference Committees and never failed in getting an authorization bill – on behalf of the men and women of the armed forces – to be signed into law by a sequence of Presidents.

Working with our Committee colleagues during our tenure, we strengthened the foundation of laws that today supports our nation's defense posture and provides for the needs of our brave uniformed personnel and their families.

Today, the citizens of our nation rank members of the armed forces at the very top of public esteem.

That leads me to the first of several points I will offer today.

The concept of an all-volunteer force had its origins during the period – 1969 to 1974 – when I was privileged to serve as Undersecretary, then Secretary of the U.S. Navy. A very serious, costly war was in progress to preserve freedom for the people of South Vietnam. There was substantial controversy among elements of our population; and, month by month, the controversy became more intense. I well remember appearing to testify, time and time again, before the Committees of Congress.

This history you know well but out of this cauldron emerged the law, regarded by many, upon passage, a big “gamble” which Congress thrust onto the military.

As you know well, the concept has worked exceptionally well; indeed well beyond any expectations.

The challenge facing Congress today, is not just to preserve what we have, but make it even stronger.

I say most respectfully, every action the Committee takes must keep that challenge in mind.

My next concerns are the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and how rogue elements, and persons participating in violent extremism, can interact to threaten our way of life and that of other nations.

As you make your programs and other budget decisions, place emphasis on how we can increase and support new ideas in the fields of intelligence and surveillance. In these areas spend wisely; and, accept a level of risk with new innovations. Our military will always do their best, at whatever sacrifice; but every citizen must help in their own way.

As you look to future programs I urge your support for innovations to come in the unmanned systems. About a decade, or more, ago I introduced legislation directing each of the services to place greater emphasis on such programs, with specific benchmarks and dates for each service to meet. There was strong opposition from all Department of Defense; but, with the strong support of the two House leaders sitting with me today the language survived in Conference and became law. Within but a few years thereafter each of the Services needed no inducement to move out way ahead of the benchmarks with the many systems operational today. Now it's an international race and we must stay well ahead.


As I closed out my 30 years in the Senate I worked again with the bipartisan team to write a new G.I. Bill. Again, the Authorizing Committees did it; and, wherever I go service persons step forward to thank us for including as beneficiaries families as alternates for the educational benefits earned by the uniformed member.

May I share a personal story? I was privileged to speak just months ago at the Navy Post Graduate School at Monterey, California. As guests were filing past me to say good-bye a proud husband and wife stopped to say we are soon to be blessed with our first child, whereupon her hands dropped, and she said "you made it possible for this child to have my husband's G.I. Bill." Having advanced my career largely because of the old G.I. Bill, I shall always remember this young happy family.

All of us who have had the good fortune to serve in Congress must remain ever mindful of the needs and hopes of others.

I thank you for this opportunity.

JOHN WILLIAM WARNER
Senior Advisor, Hogan Lovells, Washington, D.C.



John Warner rejoined the firm after his decision not to seek a sixth term as U.S. Senator for the Commonwealth of Virginia. During his 30 years in the Senate, he served on the Senate Armed Services Committee, including three periods as Chairman, and was viewed as one of the most influential senators on military and foreign policy issues. At varying times, the Senator also served on the Senate Health, Education, and Pensions Committee; Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs; Select Committee on Intelligence (where he served as Vice Chairman for several years); Commerce Committee; Environment and Public Works Committee; and Rules Committee (where he served as Chair for several years). Most recently, he was the lead co-sponsor with Senator Joseph Lieberman (I-Conn.) on climate change legislation.

The Senator volunteered for two periods of active military duty: the first as an enlisted sailor in the final years of World War II (1945-46), and the second as a Lieutenant in the U.S. Marines during the Korean War (1950-52).

After completing his law degree at the University of Virginia School of Law, he clerked for The Honorable E. Barrett Prettyman, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. From 1955 to 1960, the Senator was an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia. He joined Hogan & Hartson as an associate in 1961 and became a partner in 1964.

He left Hogan & Hartson in 1969 when he was appointed, and confirmed by the Senate, as Under Secretary, and later as Secretary, of the U.S. Navy, positions he served in for a total of more than five years during the Vietnam War.

Between 1974 and 1976, the Senator served as Administrator for the American Revolution Bicentennial Administration, where he administered federal programs in all 50 states and with 22 foreign nations that participated in this historic 200-year anniversary of the founding of our nation.

Subsequently, he waged two years of political campaigning, winning election to his first of five Senate terms in November 1978. On January 3, 2009, he completed his fifth consecutive term and retired, establishing a record of being the second longest-serving U.S. Senator in the history of the Commonwealth of Virginia.

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Witness name: John W. Warner

John W. Warner

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

Individual

Representative

*Retired from U.S. Senate
January 2009 as the
new congress convened
so I have received no
grants - Have done few bomb
work for U.S. Govt intel
service
entire*

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented: _____

FISCAL YEAR 2011

federal grant(s)/ contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant

FISCAL YEAR 2010

federal grant(s)/ contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant

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