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**NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE  
COMPONENT ACQUISITION  
AND MODERNIZATION**

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HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL  
AIR AND LAND FORCES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

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HEARING HELD  
OCTOBER 12, 2011



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#### NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE COMPONENT ACQUISITION AND MODERNIZATION

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**NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE COMPONENT  
ACQUISITION AND MODERNIZATION**

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES,  
*Washington, DC, Wednesday, October 12, 2011.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m. in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Roscoe G. Bartlett (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MARYLAND, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES**

Mr. BARTLETT. Our subcommittee will come to order.

Today, the Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee meets to receive an update on the equipment status and requirements of the Army and Air Force National Guard and Reserve Components.

Given the significant change in the budget outlook for fiscal year 2012 and beyond, we believe it necessary to obtain the current views of the Guard and Reserve senior leaders for the potential impact on their programs. We will also hear from the military services in two subsequent hearings later in the month.

We welcome our distinguished panel of witnesses: Major General Raymond Carpenter, the Acting Deputy Director of the Army National Guard; Lieutenant General Harry Wyatt, Director of the Air National Guard; Lieutenant General Jack Stultz, Chief, U.S. Army Reserve; and Lieutenant General Charles Stenner, Jr., Chief, U.S. Air Force Reserves.

Major reductions in the Federal budget need to be an element of correcting the Federal deficit. The Department of Defense must share in a fair and balanced way in those reductions. That process is already taking place under the Budget Control Act of 2011, with nearly \$500 billion in cuts planned for DOD [Department of Defense] over the next 10 years. However, cuts beyond that, up to approximately \$1 trillion over 10 years, are possible under what Secretary Panetta called the “doomsday mechanism” sequestration provision of the Budget Control Act.

Secretary Panetta and Director Lew of the White House Office of Management and Budget have stated that budget cuts to the Department of Defense as a result of the sequestration provision “could impose a significant risk to national security. DOD would most certainly be forced to furlough large numbers of civilian workers. Training would have to be curtailed, the force reduced, and purchases of weapons systems would have to be cut dramatically.”

Former Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn recently stated that “the imposition of the sequestration provision of the Budget Control Act on our Armed Forces could be catastrophic. Sequestration would give us the smallest Army and Marine Corps in decades, the smallest Air Force in history, and the smallest Navy since McKinley was President. The debate is not whether sequestration would wound our military; it is about whether sequestration is equivalent to shooting ourselves in the foot or the head.”

Against the backdrop of the Budget Control Act for 2011, today’s hearing is to get an assessment of the modernization needs and equipping challenges of the Army National Guard, Air National Guard, Army Reserve, and Air Force Reserve. We recognize the Department is making major improvements and progress in providing adequate funding to equip the National Guard and Reserve Components to enhance its role as an operational reserve. Sustaining this funding, however, will continue to be a major issue, given the acute national economic challenges we currently face.

During the April hearing, the subcommittee learned the importance of equipping and resourcing the Reserve Component as an “operational reserve” rather than the Cold War model of a strategic reserve. We also heard our witnesses testify that, since 2001, the Department has made significant strides in providing adequate resources to equip the Reserve Component as an operational reserve.

The Guard and Reserve Components have proven to be an invaluable asset during Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Operation New Dawn. These past 10 years have justified the need for an operational Reserve Component force that must be adequately manned, trained, and equipped.

Since September of 2001, almost 600,000 guardsmen and reservists have deployed in support of combat operations, representing 40 percent of the total Reserve force of 1.4 million troops. All 34 Army National Guard Component brigades have deployed to either Iraq or Afghanistan, and more than half of the force has combat experience. There are reservists operating in over 100 countries.

Over the past decade, the majority of modernization funding for the Reserve Components has come from supplemental overseas contingency operation funding requests, meaning funding that is not part of the base budget request. What happens when these so-called “OCO” [Overseas Contingency Operation] requests are no longer requested or funded? How will we continue to sustain the operational reserve and equip them for their missions?

Congress has not hesitated in trying to address the equipment-readiness needs that we have noted in many Guard and Reserve units over the years. National Guard and Reserve Component procurement from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2011 has totaled approximately \$47 billion, averaging almost \$6 billion per year. Since 2004, Congress has authorized approximately \$7.7 billion in the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account. The National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account helps maintain combat capability and should help to guarantee that equipment is relevant and upgraded in a timely manner. This funding has enjoyed sustained bipartisan support, both on this committee and throughout Congress.

The Department of Defense and Congress have made substantial progress in terms of adequate funding for and reorganization of the Reserve Components. But I am concerned that these anticipated budgetary challenges we currently face could potentially negatively impact the current operational status of the Guard and Reserves.

The ability to maintain a sustainable operational Reserve force with sufficient operational capability is predicated on having sufficient manpower and adequate resources. I want to express how much the subcommittee appreciates the contribution of the Guard and Reserve Components and want to recognize that they are maintained at a fraction of the cost of the regular military. We, as a nation, clearly cannot fight without them, because there is no way a 19-year-old can have the skill set and experience of a 39-year-old.

Before we begin, I would like to welcome—well, the subcommittee's newest member is not here, but let me tell you that we are very pleased to have Kathy Hochul from New York. And when she comes, we will welcome her officially to our subcommittee.

I would like now to turn to my good friend and colleague from Texas, Silvestre Reyes, for any comments that he might like to make.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bartlett can be found in the Appendix on page 35.]

**STATEMENT OF HON. SILVESTRE REYES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES**

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I would like to add my welcome to the panel and most especially to the three young men in the front row that recently returned from Afghanistan. We appreciate your service, and thank you for joining us here today.

Mr. Chairman, this past April, the subcommittee received testimony from the leadership of the Army and Air Force Reserve Components. Today, we have these same leaders back for an update on the equipment needs of the Army and Air Force Reserve.

During the April hearing, we heard that our Reserve Components remain as busy as ever; that the proposed FY [fiscal year] 2012 budget request would allow us to maintain the high-quality Reserve forces that we have today. We also heard that there were additional equipment needs for all of our Reserve Components. As a result, the full Armed Services Committee bill included \$325 million in additional funding in the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account. The House appropriators went even further, proposing an additional \$1.5 billion for the same account, with the Senate appropriators proposing \$500 million.

So the good news is that it appears that Congress will continue to provide support to the Guard and Reserve equipment needs over and above the budget request.

On the other hand, however, the Budget Control Act of 2011 will likely result in a substantial cut to the DOD base budget in FY 2012, perhaps as much as \$26 billion. In addition, the Budget Control Act mandates approximately \$450 billion in additional DOD cuts over 10 years when it is compared to the current DOD projec-

tions. And, finally, if the so-called “super committee” [Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction] does not reach its goal of \$1.5 trillion in additional reductions, the DOD could face additional significant cuts starting in FY 2013.

However, at this point, we don’t know how DOD will propose dealing with these budget restrictions. What we do know, however, is how similar cuts have been applied in the past. In previous budget reductions, DOD has often taken an across-the-board approach to making cuts, rather than a more focused, more thoughtful path.

Today, Mr. Chairman, I am concerned that if an across-the-board, cookie-cutter approach to funding reductions takes place across the entire force, including our Reserve Components, they will incur significant damage. For example, if the Air Force further reduces fighter aircraft fleets in the Active Duty Force, will similar cuts flow down to the Reserve Components? If Active Duty Forces are reduced by DOD, are there plans to increase the size of the Reserve elements to compensate for those cuts? If DOD is seeking budget efficiencies, does it make sense to strategically expand some elements of the Reserve forces? I certainly hope that those questions are being asked as part of the ongoing DOD strategic review.

The Nation has invested billions of dollars in additional funding to create the highly effective Reserve forces that we have today. As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, they have been more active than ever in the history of this country. With this subcommittee adding additional billions to that investment every year, to us it just makes good and common sense.

Beyond the immediate needs of our Reserve Components, I think it is also critical that we focus on the long term. If we get this right, we can end up with a high-quality Reserve force that also saves the Nation billions of dollars which in today’s budget system desperately may be needed elsewhere.

So I look forward to hearing our witnesses’ thoughts on these major issues facing the entire DOD, but in particular the Reserve Component is most critical to get your input.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I relinquish my time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Reyes can be found in the Appendix on page 38.]

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.

We will proceed with the panel’s testimony at this point. Without objection, all witnesses’ prepared statements will be included in the hearing record.

General Stultz, please proceed with your opening remarks.

**STATEMENT OF LTG JACK C. STULTZ, USA, CHIEF, U.S. ARMY  
RESERVE**

General STULTZ. Thank you, Chairman Bartlett, Congressman Reyes, and other members of the committee. It is truly an honor to be here today before you to testify.

And I didn’t plan this or orchestrate this, but I did find out that one of my units was at Fort Dix, New Jersey, just arriving back from Afghanistan, and some of the soldiers asked if they could come down, just to sit in and listen to what goes on in the halls



of Congress. And so I am going to use them as an illustration of why we have to do what we have to do, us and you together.

I put one chart up here in front of you, and I think there are copies on your tables in front of you. But this question of whether or not we need an operational reserve to me is not a question. We have to have the Reserve Components as part of the operational force, and the reason we have to is because the Army is dependent on us.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 117.]

General STULTZ. The chart there shows you that, over time, as we have grown the Active Force from 480,000 to 569,000, we have continued to push more of the combat-support/service-support capability into the Guard and Reserve. Today, as the chart shows, 83 percent of the transportation capability of the Army is in the Reserve; 75 percent of the engineer capability of the Army is in the Reserve; 70 percent of the medical capability is in the Reserve. And I can go on and on.

So it is not a matter of, do we want to make the Reserve an operational force? We have to. We have to make it part of the operational force, because we know the end strength of the Army is going to come down. And as the end strength of the Active Army comes down, currently projected to come from 569 [569,000] to 520 [520,000], the Army is going to be even more dependent on the Guard and Reserve, which means we have to resource the Reserve Component as an operational force.

And as you have indicated in your opening statements, it is a great return on investment. For what you would give us to invest in the Reserve, we give you a great return. These soldiers sitting behind me are evidence of that.

The soldiers here are out of the 744th Engineer Company of Ogden, Utah. First Lieutenant Tovey, I first met him in 2006 because I went out to Ogden, Utah, to welcome home this unit when they came back from Iraq. They had been out doing route clearance in the Anbar Province. They had taken a beating, lost soldiers in action, had a number of Purple Hearts that we handed out, Senator Bennett at the time and myself. And Sergeant Tovey helped me hand out coins. Sergeant Tovey got a direct commission to lieutenant. He is continuing his education today at Idaho State University, making a contribution back in his community, and now coming back from his deployment in Afghanistan.

Sergeant Lissy, you look at him and you say, he is in a different uniform. Well, he is in a different uniform because during this deployment he was severely wounded, shot through the leg, and the bullet traveled up and almost through the spine. So he has been back home recovering, but he wants to keep serving his country.

And then Corporal Pratt. Corporal Pratt hasn't been in the Army very long. He enlisted in February of 2009, finished his training in 2010, and now he is a combat veteran, back home in Utah.

They have been doing route clearance. They remove the IEDs [Improvised Explosive Device]. They detect; they get out there. They are the lead in harm's way. The equipment they use in Afghanistan is the best the Army has. The training they got before they went to Afghanistan is the best the Army can give.

The challenge we have is, that equipment is not setting back in Ogden, Utah. The equipment setting back in Ogden, Utah, is not modernized equipment. The training we do on that equipment back in Ogden, Utah, is not going to be the same level of training that we need to do for them to go back to Afghanistan or wherever we need them in the future.

And the fact of the matter is, 75 percent of the Army's capability sets right here behind me and in the National Guard. It is not as if we have another force out there to go to if we don't give them the equipment and the training they need. And so what we together, you and I, have to do is we have to band together, use the investments you give us wisely, modernize where we have to modernize, train where we have to train. And, by God, we can't waste it; we can't afford to.

Now, I have one other chart I would like to show you that I think is on your desk, and that is—this is what I call the “dip chart.” And these soldiers here illustrate what is on this chart.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 118.]

General STULTZ. You see, when we first went to war in 2003, in the Army Reserve we were almost 10,000 over-strength in soldiers. We were fat and happy. But we weren't trained and ready. And as we started trying to call the soldiers to the front, we found out we had a lot of holes in our formation. We had a lot of medically unready soldiers, we had a lot of morally unready soldiers, we had a lot of soldiers on the rolls that we couldn't find. And then we had a lot of soldiers who said, “This is not what I signed up for.”

And so, by 2006, when I first came into this job, we were down to almost 20,000 under-strength. And we lost that 10,000 over to 20,000 under while we recruited another 25,000 every year during that time period. So it wasn't just like we lost 30,000 soldiers.

And then we started growing back, and we grew back to over 206,000 soldiers. And that was the Sergeant Lissys, the Corporal Pratts, the Lieutenant Toveys that joined our force. They joined our force to say, “I want to go be something. I want to go do something.” And they tell me three things: Give me some predictability, because I have another life and I have an employer or a school. Don't waste my time; train me, and train me to the standard I need to be trained to, and hold me to that standard. And, thirdly, use me. I didn't sign up to go back to strategic reserve that is one weekend a month, two weeks in the summer. I want to be utilized.

And that is what we are building the Reserve of today around. And all we ask of Congress is, help us get the resources we need to maintain this operational readiness we have, to maintain that national treasure. Because if we don't, we will repeat that dip chart one more time because these young men won't stick with us, because they want to do something, they want to be something, they have too much invested, and they have too much pride in what they are doing. So my commitment to you, sir, is, the resources you give me I will invest in them, I won't waste.

So I look forward to your questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Stultz can be found in the Appendix on page 40.]

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.

General Carpenter.

**STATEMENT OF MG RAYMOND W. CARPENTER, USA, ACTING  
DIRECTOR, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD**

General CARPENTER. Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes, it is an honor and a privilege to again appear before this committee and represent the 360,000-plus soldiers of the Army National Guard.

Currently, we have almost 40,000 Army guardsmen mobilized and deployed, and, as you know, more than half of that force has combat experience. The sacrifice of our soldiers, their families and employers has been tremendous, and they deserve our deepest gratitude.

And I, too, would like to acknowledge the service of the three soldiers that General Stultz has accompanying him today. Coincidentally, I am an engineer officer. These three soldiers are engineers. I got to tell you, my connection with them as an engineer is a very strong connection. And I think those three soldiers could just as easily be from the Army National Guard, they could just as easily be from the Active Component, because we are seamless now as an Army.

And so, thanks for your service, gentlemen.

As I have noted before, the Army National Guard has been there from the start of this decade, from the very beginning. The New York National Guard was among the first on the scene at the World Trade Center on 9/11, as was the Maryland and Virginia Guard in the days after the Pentagon was attacked.

Beginning with the 9/11 response, the Army National Guard has continued to shoulder our responsibilities in the overseas fight in Afghanistan and Iraq while simultaneously responding to events in the homeland, the largest of which was Hurricane Katrina. And the service of your Army National Guard continues.

Let me illustrate with a snapshot in time, the weekend of August 26th through the 29th. During that weekend, the National Guard had more than 63,000 National Guardsmen on duty protecting this country at home and abroad. Over 47,500 National Guardsmen were deployed in support of overseas contingency operations and partnership-building missions. Almost 10,000 members of the National Guard from 24 States were responding to then-Hurricane Irene. Another 1,000 National Guardsmen provided security on our Nation's southwest border, and an additional 4,000 National Guardsmen responded to a range of domestic emergencies across this country.

The experience of the past decade has transformed the Army National Guard into an operational force, "a national treasure," in the words of a recently retired four-star Active Duty general.

As an operational force, the Army National Guard represents the best value for America. Force structure and military power can be sustained in the Army National Guard for a fraction of the regular cost. The Army National Guard is one-third of the total Army but accounts for approximately 10 percent of the total Army budget. Supporting capability in the Army National Guard is not only the right thing to do, it makes good business sense.

The Army National Guard could not have evolved into the operational force without the support of Congress. Our Nation has invested over \$37 billion in equipment for the Army National Guard in the past 6 years, much of that from the NGREA [National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation] account. The delivery of that equipment has increased Army National Guard equipment-on-hand rates for critical dual-use equipment by 14 percent.

Because the Army National Guard is a full partner with the Active Component, it is vital for the Guard to continue modernizing its equipment. Modernization and interoperability are essential for training during the Army National Guard pre-mobilization periods and critical for deployments, as General Stultz has pointed out.

I know this committee is interested in what has changed since our appearance here last spring. Simply put, it is the budget. Inside the Army, we have worked through multiple iterations of budgets based upon the latest proposed budget reduction. Secretary Panetta said on Tuesday that we would face difficult choices. He also cautioned that we should make budget choices based on strategy rather than expediency. He also suggested that modernization of weapons systems and maintenance programs were being examined as part of spending cuts and, specifically, contracts were being reviewed for savings.

We in the Army Guard understand that future funding will be less than in the past, and, frankly, we are prepared to shoulder our proportional share of the burden. To that end, we have already set about garnering efficiencies and developing new strategies that will allow us to continue to meet our dual-mission responsibility with less funding.

Those two missions have required an Army National Guard of 360,000 soldiers, 54 joint force headquarters, 8 combat divisions, 28 brigade combat teams, 8 combat aviation brigades, and over 70 enabling brigades over the past 10 years.

We are reminded regularly that we live in a very dangerous and unpredictable world, and it seems like the predicted 100-year natural-disaster events are coming closer and closer together. We have built a capability to respond to the needs of our citizens, home and abroad. We ought to fully understand the risk associated with reducing that capability, because, in the words of a combat commander in Afghanistan, sometimes all it takes is all you have.

The Army National Guard is a force forward deployed in our area of operation, the homeland. We have built great capacity in the National Guard by establishing forces specifically designed to deal with emergencies, disasters, and potential terrorist attacks. Those units include Guard Civil Support Teams, CBRNE [Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High Yield Explosives] Emergency Response Forces, Homeland Response Forces, and Domestic All-Hazards Response Teams. By one estimate, 96 percent of the events that happen across our country on a daily basis are handled by the local first responders—the policemen, the firemen, and the National Guard. Only 4 percent require Federal support.

It has taken years to build these organizations. We should not rush to reduce the size, structure, or capability of the Army National Guard without significant analysis and thorough deliberation. I think it is very important to note that eliminating a soldier

from the Army National Guard is a double hit because you not only take a soldier out of the warfight, you also take a soldier out of the emergency response team at home.

In the end, we have asked that the Army Guard's share of the budget reductions be given to us, the Army National Guard, and let us figure out where to pay the bill. Don't direct reductions in Guard brigade combat teams or end strength, because when that happens we will be forced to close armories, move out of communities, and be driven to a lower readiness level. Consistent with Secretary Panetta's comments, we think we can examine our contracts and our programs and become more efficient while maintaining our end strength and our force structure.

In closing, the Army National Guard is battle-tested and well equipped for both of our missions. And this committee has been critical in building and sustaining the best-manned, best-trained, and best-equipped National Guard I have seen in my career—truly a best value for America.

Again, it is my privilege and honor to appear before this committee today, and I look forward to your questions and comments. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Carpenter can be found in the Appendix on page 72.]

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you.

General Wyatt.

**STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. HARRY M. WYATT III, USAF,  
DIRECTOR, AIR NATIONAL GUARD**

General WYATT. Chairman Bartlett and Ranking Member Reyes, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today on behalf of the 106,700 Air National Guardsmen—combat-proven, dedicated, professional men and women—serving around the world. I thank you and all members of the committee for your support, continuing support, in these challenging times.

As we sit here today, over 6,000 Air National Guardsmen are deployed around the world in helping to defend U.S. interests on every continent, including Antarctica. In addition, nearly 3,500 Air National Guard men and women are helping to protect our homeland by protecting the air sovereignty of the American airspace, flying the Aerospace Control Alert mission; also by assisting civil authorities in the protection of life and property in the United States, including assisting flood and hurricane recovery efforts in the Midwest and in the Northeast. Air Guard members are currently helping the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol secure our southern borders. And this summer, Air National Guard aerial firefighting units dropped over 360,000 gallons of fire retardant on wildfires across the Southwest in support of the National Forest Service.

For the last 20 years, the Air National Guard has been at war alongside our Air Force Reserve and regular Air Force brothers and sisters. When the air campaign of Operation Desert Storm began in January of 1991, 11 percent of the U.S. Air Force aircraft were flown and maintained by Guard airmen. And the men and women of the Air National Guard have continued to answer the call to service ever since, adapting rapidly to the changing demands of the post-Cold War security environment. Today, the Air National

Guard provides approximately 34 percent of the total Air Force capability, at a fraction of the Air Force total budget.

As we look to the many challenges ahead, my goal is to lay the foundations for an Air Force that has the capability and the capacity to meet tomorrow's challenges within the constraints that we can foresee.

As you know, the Air National Guard relies on the Air Force for major modernization initiatives and weapons systems procurement. However, we work with the air staff to encourage them to equip the Air Guard in a manner that is concurrent and balanced with the Active Component, because I believe that if the Air National Guard is going to continue to be a reliable partner, able to integrate seamlessly into Air Force joint operations, it must have the equipment that is equal to the task and compatible with our Air Force Reserve and Active Duty partners.

The funds that Congress provides directly to the Air National Guard via the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriations, the NGREA account, have made a significant impact on our ability to support both the warfighter and civil authorities. We strive to use these funds as efficiently as possible by pursuing lower-cost, 80-percent solutions to the immediate needs of our warfighters at about 25 percent of the cost—needs that are identified directly by our warfighters and first responders out of our weapons and tactics classes.

Your investment through NGREA has been a critical component to the Air Guard increased readiness. For example, without NGREA, the Block 30 F-16, the backbone of protecting America's skies, would be irrelevant today. Given the future budget uncertainty, we have shifted NGREA focus in FY '12 to ensure we finish as many existing modernization initiatives as possible to avoid expensive and disruptive production breaks should the amount of NGREA be substantially reduced.

Ladies and gentlemen, you have created the most professional, combat-ready force in the history of the Air National Guard. Today's Guard airmen understand that the Nation needs more of them than one weekend a month and two weeks in the summer, and they are willing to answer the call. All that they ask is that we continue to provide them with the equipment, training, and resources they need to accomplish the mission.

If I could share with you an experience this morning that kind of puts all of this in perspective, I had the honor and privilege of going to Arlington and attending the services of Specialist Christopher Horton, a sniper with the 45th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, Oklahoma Army National Guard. I knew this young man because he signed up to join the 45th when I was the adjutant general in the State of Oklahoma. He was killed in action in Afghanistan on September 9th this year, along with two other members of the Oklahoma Army National Guard, when they were caught in an ambush.

I thought about other Oklahomans that were serving in harm's way today. My old 138th Fighter Wing, F-16 wing out of Tulsa, Oklahoma, currently flying combat missions in Iraq, trying to prevent what happened to Specialist Horton and his compatriots, trying to prevent that from happening. That F-16 unit would not be

able to do the combat operations that it is doing today, protecting people on the ground, had it not been for the NGREA accounts that allowed us to develop the targeting pods that those aircraft carry today. That is the importance of the NGREA account.

We have a tendency, as we meet here today, to talk about resources and talk about modernization and talk about funds and talk about equipment, talk about stuff. But when it comes down to it, what we are really talking about is providing the equipment, the training, the resources that our young men and women, regardless of service and regardless of component, need when they go into combat. That is the importance of why these gentlemen are here today and why all of you are here today.

It is an honor and privilege to be here, and I look forward to answering your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Wyatt can be found in the Appendix on page 97.]

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you.

Now General Stenner.

**STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. CHARLES E. STENNER, JR., USAF,  
CHIEF, U.S. AIR FORCE RESERVE**

General STENNER. Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes, committee members, thank you for inviting me to appear before you today.

I am here to report that the Air Force Reserve continues to be seamlessly integrated with the Active Component and the Air National Guard to complete all of the Air Force missions we are assigned. We accomplish this while continuing to provide a cost-effective and combat-ready force available for strategic surge and ongoing daily operations.

My written testimony outlines our modernization strategy and priorities. Today, I would like to discuss the profound impact NGREA funding has on our force readiness.

But, first, let me take the opportunity to introduce and thank Chief Master Sergeant Dwight Badgett. As the Air Force Reserve Command Chief for the past 2½ years, Chief Badgett has served as my senior enlisted advisor. He will be departing Air Force Reserve Command to join Northern Command's Joint Task Force North as the senior enlisted leader. There is no better example of jointness and total force than the selection of this highly capable and well-qualified chief to this post.

Chief, thank you for your continued service.

The Air Force Reserve has never had a more seasoned and capable force equipped to support missions around the globe. Our contributions range from the training of our institutional forces in associations and basic military training and pilot and navigator training to our continued involvement in joint and coalition combat operations and humanitarian airlift operations abroad.

Just a quick outline: To the left here on this chart is, as a percentage of what the total Air Force does, is what we as an Air Force Reserve bring to this fight. And I know my partner in the Air National Guard has a chart similar to that. And when you put those two Air Reserve Components together, you have a very powerful piece of what the Air Force brings to this Nation's defense.

We have also expanded our efforts in cyber, remotely piloted aircraft, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance based on Air Force and combatant commander requirements. The Nation depends on us, and it is therefore crucial that we continue to provide that force with the equipment, the training, and the resources they need to accomplish the missions that we have been asked to execute.

The National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account is absolutely vital to the way the Air Force Reserve operates today. It impacts every facet of our operational readiness and is the primary means of ensuring the Air Force Reserve is equipped with the most relevant, modern, and compatible fielded technologies, preserving our combat capability on a cost-efficient basis.

Since 1982, NGREA has allowed the Air Force Reserve to upgrade our operational equipment with better targeting, self-protection, and communication capabilities, all of which have proven to be critical, time and again, to supporting operations wherever we are called to serve around the globe. For more than 29 years, NGREA-funded programs tested and recommended for fielding by the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Command Test Center have resulted in multiple weapons systems and equipment being fielded to frontline operators through system program offices that support the total force warfighter.

Current levels of NGREA and supplemental funding have allowed the Air Force Reserve to make significant strides in meeting urgent warfighter requirements. For example, NGREA made possible state-of-the-art avionics upgrades unique to the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard F-16 Block 30 weapons systems, a highly sought-after capability during Operation Enduring Freedom.

Today, as another example, with NGREA funding, we are saving lives. A tool called the Smart Multi-Function Color Display provides air combat search and rescue helicopters, the HH-60Gs, Pave Hawks, with enhanced data link and situational awareness capabilities. In less than 20 months from contract award, the display was in use by tactical units in Afghanistan. This NGREA effort directly contributed to saving 331 lives with 268 assists during Operation Enduring Freedom.

Air Force Reserve NGREA funding of at least \$100 million per year will permit us to start modernization initiatives vital to maintaining our combat edge and to complete ongoing efforts that are essential to continuing our effective contributions to the total force and its wartime missions.

Properly equipping the Air Force Reserve preserves our capacity to continue providing forces as an operational reserve. The work of this committee, especially its consideration of Reserve Component modernization efforts, is essential to our support of joint and coalition operations.

Thank you for your work. And, again, thank you for asking me here today to discuss these important issues affecting the readiness of our airmen and our equipment. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Stenner can be found in the Appendix on page 105.]

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you all very much.



As is my usual policy, I will reserve my questions until the end, hoping that they will all have been asked by my colleagues.

Mr. Reyes.

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you all for your testimony here this afternoon.

In your written testimony, all four of you mention that Reserve Components offer a more cost-effective way to maintain and deploy military capabilities. In fact, some of the percentages that you cited were very impressive. But from time to time on the Active Duty side, others say otherwise, specifically pointing out to the high training cost for deploying Reserve forces.

So I have three questions for all of you: Does the DOD have an agreed-upon baseline to use in comparing the cost of Reserve versus Active Duty Forces? The second question is, what is your view of the right numbers that should be used to compare? And then, should we look at the—third one—should we look at the overall cost per service member or compare similar units to each other?

General STULTZ. Yes, sir, I will lead off.

To answer your first question, no, sir, I don't think we have an agreed-to number. I know there are a number of studies out there, and part of the challenge we have in identifying what is the agreed-to number are, it is not just pay and allowances and it is not just training days associated with it. We have to pay into accruals for medical and retirement. And because our retirement system is deferred—we don't draw retirement and don't become eligible until age 60—it is a lower accrual rate, which, in fact, says a Reserve soldier on active duty actually costs less than an Active Duty soldier on active duty because the accruals are lower. Not everyone agrees with—"Well, we don't count it that way."

My Reserve soldiers don't live on an installation, and all the costs associated with funding an installation and everything that goes with that. They drill in a Reserve center, which is a much lower cost facility to operate. But, again, a lot of the cost models say, "Well, we don't consider that when we are looking at it."

So I think part of the challenge we got is trying to get everybody to agree as to what really does a soldier cost us and what are all the things that go with it. So, no, we don't have.

Now, the second thing I would tell you is, in the cost analysis we have run on the Army Reserve, the cost of an Army Reserve soldier today, to get him deployed to Afghanistan—I will tell you, the cost of deploying the 744th today versus the cost of deploying the 744th back in 2004 and 2005 is much lower. And the reason is the chart right here. In 2003–2004, we weren't ready. And so, most the units mobilizing in the Army Reserve took 60, 90, 120 days just to get trained, which only left us 6 or 7 months of boots-on-the-ground time. And so, in the cost analysis, when you use those figures, you say, "Oh, yeah, I need two of these for every year because I only get 6 months out of them."

The cost of deploying this unit today is much less because I am able to train and deploy most of the Reserve units in the Army Reserve in 30 days or less because they are combat-seasoned, they are already trained in a lot of their skill sets, and they come together very quickly and we are able to push them out. So now we get 10

to 11 months of boots-on-the-ground time out of them versus 6 or 7 that we used to.

So that reflects the right side of that chart that says, here is a trained and ready force, and once you get it trained and ready, it is much more cost-effective because you don't have to invest as much up front as long as you maintain what you have already got. And so, our figures come out somewhere around a third of the cost.

And then the third thing we have said is, if we are going to train and get this force as an operational force, we don't necessarily have to utilize it in the future for 12 months at a time and 100 percent of the force. We can take an engineer battalion and I can go to a combatant command like AFRICOM [U.S. Africa Command] or SOUTHCOM [U.S. Southern Command] and I can say, let me give you the battalion that the 744th belongs to, but here is what I want you to do: Just use one company at a time for 90 days, and go do humanitarian—build schools, build medical clinics, do things like that.

And these gentleman back here go to El Salvador or Panama or Ethiopia or Uganda or Kenya for a 90-day rotation, followed on by their sister company out of Pocatello, followed on by their sister company out of Crater Lake. And we use the entire battalion during the year, but we only pay 25 percent of it at a time.

So the model I have for the use of the Reserve for the future is very cost-effective. And I think we are still going to have challenges on coming to the right number, what is the right number. But I can tell you, whatever the right number is, it is much lower in the Reserve Components than our Active counterparts.

General CARPENTER. Congressman, first of all, I would like to point out that each one of the three components has a role to play in the total Army. We, in the National Guard, have two missions: The homeland mission and the Federal mission. The Active Component has a primary mission for being the first response in terms of a national requirement, and General Stultz's force is providing the majority of enablers, in most cases, as that Active Force goes downrange.

So nobody should think that there is a cost savings to be had across the entire force by turning us into a purely Reserve or purely a National Guard organization. That is not the discussion at all.

On the surface of it, though, you have to accept the fact that when the National Guard only takes up 10 percent of the budget, we are definitely a lesser-cost organization from a Reserve standpoint. One-third of the cost is the calculation that we have as we look across the pay and allowance and the costs associated with having a unit in the Reserve in the National Guard.

There is no question, as we go toward mobilization, that that cost rises and we get close to 100 percent, close to the same parity as our Active Component counterparts. But to General Stultz's comment about the operational force, for a very modest investment we can sustain the combat edge, sustain the training and proficiency that we have garnered here in this operational force courtesy of the last 10 years of war.

And so, our pitch to the Active Army and to the Department of Defense is, it would make good sense to invest in this operational force and, for a modest amount, to be able to sustain that.

In terms of the right numbers, I think that in the discussions we have had with the Army, the Army recognizes the metric that I just described to you.

Overall, the cost per service member in comparison, you know, in some cases it depends on whose figures you are relying on and what all is factored into it. But in the final analysis, there is no question that the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve are a great investment for this country and provide a huge bang for the buck.

General WYATT. Congressman Reyes, the question you asked is an interesting one. And I would agree with my contemporaries here that I don't think the Department of Defense has an agreed-upon computation. There are lots of studies out there.

I would suggest that it would behoove all of us to ask questions of the analysts that try to answer that question and to consider the source of those analysts. I gave up a long time ago trying to out-analyze the Active Duty in the United States Air Force, because they outnumber me. They have a lot of Ph.D.'s and they are A9 [Analysis Directorate]. I don't even have an A9, you know?

We have 98 percent—98.5 percent of Air National Guardsmen are in warfighting UTCs [Unit Training Code]. Our core competency is not analysis. Our core competency is not weapons development. Our core competency is not acquisition. Those are all core competencies of the United States Air Force that adds to the cost of the Active Component. I recognize that.

But when you compare the cost of a warfighter to the cost of a warfighter, Active and Reserve, I prefer to look to sources of information that are not Active Duty and not Air National Guard.

If you consider the Government Accountability Office on Military Personnel, they say the relationship is one-sixth the cost—an Air National Guardsman costs one-sixth as much as an Active Component. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense says about one-fourth. The Heritage Foundation says about one-sixth. The Commission on the National Guard and Reserve said that they looked at all the studies that were out there, and while they all varied a little bit, they were all consistent, in that guardsmen and reservists cost less, especially if you consider the lifecycle.

Now, if you took all 106,700 of my Air National Guardsmen and you called them to Title X service and you put them all on active duty at the same time, yes, they would cost as much and perhaps maybe a little more than the Active Component, because we do need to train up a little bit—not much, because the Air Force already funds the Air National Guard to organize, train, and equip to the same standards as the Active Duty Air Force. So we don't need the boost in training to get to that level that the Air Force expects us to have.

Our DOC statements, our description of capabilities statements, in the Air National Guard for our units requires the same response time, the same level of response as the Active Component.

So when we say that the Air National Guard provides 34 percent of the Air Force warfighting capacity, that is what we are talking about. And if you look at our budget compared to the total Air Force budget, it is about 6 percent. We think that is cost-effectiveness.

General STENNER. Congressman, I do have an A9. They do analysis. But I quit doing dueling data. It doesn't help.

My baseline—and your first question went to, what is the agreed-upon baseline, do we have one? Mine is intuition. First of all, if you are only paying somebody when they are actually being used, intuitively they are cheaper than somebody that is being paid 100 percent of the time. So the next trick is, is it a third, is it a quarter? Doesn't matter; it is less.

And to your next question, what are the right numbers, it goes to balance. Every single mission has got to be looked at, in my opinion. What is the requirement for strategic depth? How much do you need in Reserve? And then how much is the combatant commander requiring of you? How much, then, do we need for the Active Force? And we put the rest of it in, in the Air Force anyway, the Guard and Reserve as appropriate by mission set.

So there a balance in each mission. And there is no real template that you can go to across all the missions and say, this is right. The mobility air forces, we have a significant portion of that, both the Guard and Reserve, on a daily basis. And we are paid for when we operate those airplanes around the world and not paid for when we are not operating those airplanes around the world.

Lastly, it is by mission set with the balance, and Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard, in my opinion, are the catcher's mitt for folks who, in fact, make a life-changing decision and decide that they need to move to a Reserve or Guard Component, and I want to give them the opportunity to serve in a part-time capacity, because there are huge costs included in retraining somebody. It takes how long to replace a 10-year staff sergeant? Ten years. Huge training costs. I want to keep that trained individual in our Reserve Component to ensure that they are there when the Nation needs them.

Capture them, comparing that to the training costs, we are definitely a cheap and effective and efficient—I don't want to say "cheap"—effective and efficient, cost-effective way to do business.

Mr. REYES. Thank you all.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much for a good question and good responses.

Mr. LoBiondo.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you for being here, and thank you all for your service to our country.

General Wyatt, we have had some discussions in the past. And I was hoping you could provide us with your best professional military opinion on the issue of replacing F-16 Block 30 fighter jets within the Air National Guard.

I understand that the Air Force has always stated their commitment to ensuring that the Air National Guard has the iron necessary to perform critical missions. However, has the Air Force presented you with a formal plan for dealing with the timeline and the numbers that you can expect to recapitalize your fighters over the next 5 to 10 years?

And I ask this question because I believe, you don't have a plan unless it is on paper. So people can talk about a lot of different

things, but that changes. And this committee, I think, really needs to have a better understanding of the path going forward, because, as we enter a new climate of defense spending, we really need to understand the justification for decisions before they happen, not after they happen.

And, additionally, as the F-35 keeps slipping to the right, I think this is going to have a huge effect on swapping out our aging Air National Guard fighters.

And I would really appreciate your comments on this.

General WYATT. Thank you, sir.

You know, we have had a discussion before about the age of the Block 30 F-16s in the Air National Guard. The Air Force has committed some money for structural sustainment that will buy 2 to 3 more years of life. But you are correct; in the next 10 years, these aircraft will age out. Some of them will start aging out before then.

There are a lot of different options: Flowdown of Block 40 F-16s, flowdown of Block 50 F-16s from the Active Component to the Guard as the F-35 is bedded down on active duty. Bedding down the Active Duty with F-35s in those units that performed ACA [Aerospace Control Alert] so that they could do not only the air sovereignty, the Aerospace Control Alert mission, but also the AEF [Air Expeditionary Force] rotations overseas, as they do.

But I think your question went to, has the Air Force shown you a written plan that shows you the numbers of aircraft, the types of aircraft, and the years that they will flow to the Air National Guard to replace the old Block 30 F-16s? Was that your question?

Mr. LOBIONDO. Yes, sir.

General WYATT. The answer is, no, sir, they have not. I have not seen that plan yet.

Mr. LOBIONDO. So, this is kind of troubling. Have you requested—have you made a request for a formal plan?

General WYATT. Yes, sir, I have. We began requesting a couple of years ago when I first—well, a little over 2 years ago when I first became the director, and we have been making some progress. I have seen some general plans but nothing that would show me, for example, how many jets may be coming to the Air National Guard in the next 3 or 4 years to replace an aging-out aircraft.

That is the type of detail that we would really need to be able to go forward to determine whether or not we are going to be recapitalized. But I have not seen that plan yet, sir.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Well, Mr. Chairman, you have been good on this, Chairman Bartlett. And I would like to think that this is a critical issue for the entire committee, but especially this subcommittee. And I would hope, Mr. Chairman, that we could find ways to address directly with the Air Force leadership. We have been posing this question now for a number of years. We keep getting sort of a dodge-and-weave on this. And, at a certain point, we are going to run out of time to be able to make accommodations, if we need to do that.

I think it is critical, given the integration that the Air Guard has had with the full Air Force, what they are doing, being deployed in the war against terrorism. And I would hope I could work with you directly on this matter to get a more substantial answer that

we could put our arms around and decide whether they actually have a plan or they are just giving us lip service.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. I concur with your concerns, and I will be happy to join you in a request for clarification of this to the appropriate people. Thank you very much.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you.

Mr. BARTLETT. Ms. Tsongas.

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you all for your testimony and for your service.

I represent a district in which many members of the Guard and Reserve have gone to serve in Afghanistan and Iraq, and see their extraordinary professionalism, the tremendous training that you have put in place so that they can do the tasks they are handed, and the various wounds that they sustain as a result of their deployment. So I just want to thank you and the fine young men who are with you today for your great work on behalf of our country.

And we are all looking at the budget cuts that we are facing as a Nation, and the Defense Department obviously having to absorb a significant portion of them, but we also want to be very thoughtful and careful. And so I appreciate your testimony today.

I have a question about the Quadrennial Defense Review. I am curious as to whether or not it provides a constructive template for future employment of the operational force that you have worked so hard to develop. And what impact will the Budget Control Act of 2011 and the possibility of sequester if we cannot come to an agreement have on some of the QDR's [Quadrennial Defense Review] underlying assumptions with regard to the Guard and Reserve?

And I will take an answer from any and all of you.

General STULTZ. I will lead off, and I will try to make it concise.

I think the QDR provides a framework for the Army, in terms of the role of the Army or the land component. And that, in turn, if you want to call it trickle-downs, but it shapes what kind of capability we need to have in the Reserve to support the role of the land component. And then I think the QDR also defines what we need to protect our Nation back home, our own soil, and respond to our disasters back here.

And I know there is legislation that is being put in place today to allow the Title X Reserve to be more of a homeland capability, not to get involved with the National Guard, because they do—and, as Ray indicated, 90, 95 percent of the time, everything is fine and handled at the State level. But when it comes to we need the Federal force to help us, today we revert to the Active Component, when, in many cases, there is a Reserve unit, Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps right there in your State with the capability you need, but legally we can't touch them.

So we are pushing that, and we appreciate your support to say, let us be part of the solution and let the QDR help us shape that.

Now, for the second part of your question, I think it could be devastating, ma'am. I think it could be devastating if we go forward into the sequester, because it is going to force cuts across the military. And I think it could lead, one, to parochialism, because they are going to be fighting for aircraft while I am fighting for soldiers, because we are all in it. And we are not fighting because we are,

you know, too protective or jealous. We are fighting because we say our Nation's security is at risk. And if we allow that to go forward, in the cuts we have, can I do what needs to be done to protect this Nation? Can I produce the 205,000 soldiers that the Army needs with all the capabilities I listed before, or am I going to not have the equipment, not having the training days, not having anything, and we go back to a 9/11/2001 stance with our Reserve, which is a hollowed-out strategic force?

So I think if we let these budget cuts go forward to the level that they could, it could have a devastating impact on our national security.

General CARPENTER. Congresswoman, a couple of observations.

The 2010 QDR was actually a study that was done in 2009 reported out in 2010. We find ourselves now in 2011 about ready to go into 2012. The reason why we do a Quadrennial Defense Review every 4 years is because things change. And, as Secretary Gates observed, our ability to predict the future—we have been 100 percent wrong across the board. And so, what we saw in the analysis in 2009 in terms of what the world looked like pre-Arab Spring, pre-budget issues, those kinds of things, are not factored into the QDR that we see now in 2010.

One of the things that the QDR did represent, however, was the building of Homeland Response Forces, which we are currently in the process of doing. And we validated 2 of those 10 last year, and we are about ready to validate another 8. It did recognize the responsibility to minimize the risk in the homeland and to try and make sure that we would prevent and deal with any terrorist attacks on our own soil. That is an enduring requirement.

I think that as you look at where we are at right now with regard to the relationship that we have inside the Army, the three components of the Army, and the budget issues that are out there, I agree with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army in their observation that if we end up having to take the reductions that are out there, it will decimate the Department of Defense.

And as you take a broader view, even if you dedicated the entire Defense Department budget against the requirement we have out there, it wouldn't solve—it wouldn't be the solution, because it is a much larger problem than inside the Department of Defense. It is going to take a shared sacrifice here to get us back into a configuration where we can sustain the economy we have right now.

And so, to Secretary Panetta's comment about we ought to take a strategic view of this rather than be expedient, I think that is exactly the right course.

General WYATT. You know, we talk about efficiencies, we talk about doing more with less, we talk about being lean and mean and moving tail to tooth—all these expressions. I would submit to you that the Air National Guard has been lean and mean before lean and mean was cool. We were efficient before efficiency was cool.

We had to because of the nature of our force. We often fall below the resourcing line—and I understand that—because the demands of our Air Force are such that a lot of times the resources aren't enough to pay for what the country expects the Air Force to do.

The Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard play a big part of that.

So all this talk recently about, “Well, we need to become more efficient,” I agree, we need to continue trying to find efficiencies. But in the Air National Guard I think we have squeezed just about all the blood out of this turnip that we can squeeze. We are at the point now that any further reductions, cuts, drawbacks, will adversely affect our readiness. You know, I am committed not to sending airmen into harm’s way unless they are fully trained, fully equipped, very capably led, and we won’t back off that standard at all.

So when you combine the two of those, the only thing I can say is that we may need to start taking a look at not doing some of those missions that the QDR laid out for the United States Air Force to do. That is a decision that will be made way above my pay grade, but as far as the Air Guard is concerned, I think we are at that point right now.

General STENNER. Your first question was, did the QDR provide a template? And, ma’am, no such thing.

There were several different scenarios, different sets of conditions that we were looking at and attempting to understand. And as General Carpenter has said, we have moved on to something that now is a fiscal reality. And regardless of which piece of QDR you look at, the Air Force Reserve needed to be and must be, would have been, a part of every single one of those and solution set in force-sizing.

And that is the real trick, is what is the force-sizing construct that we are looking at right here? And how do we handle that major combat operation and still be able to do the rotational force we are doing on a daily basis with the contingencies around the world and make sure we continue to be able to train and continue to be ready for either of those other two conditions? That now is couched in fiscal reality.

And to your second question, your second comment, sequester, when I go back to what I just said and I apply sequester to the force-sizing that we are trying very hard to figure out and the balance we are trying to figure out, there is no strategic look at sequester. And we will absolutely destroy some piece of the mission that we didn’t intend to do without a strategic discussion, and not just within the Air Force but likely across the Services.

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you all.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you.

Mr. Runyan.

Mr. RUNYAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you all for your testimony, and thank you for your service.

A question for all of you. Specifically, I know on the Army side we have talked a lot about personnel, but from an equipment perspective and the ability to do all your missions, compare equipment-wise pre-9/11 to now. Because we know that Active Duty, a lot of times, is taking the equipment you have and your ability to train your troops to the level they need to be trained.

General STULTZ. Yes, sir. We have—thanks to Congress giving us the appropriations they have and the NGREA funds that we have



been able to get and apply, our equipping posture in the Army Reserve is better than it has been in history.

However, it is not where we need it to be. And the challenge we have is, you can look and say, we are at 91 percent of our authorized equipment on hand; we are in pretty good shape. The problem is, we are at about 67 percent modernized. It is equipment that is a substitute for the modern equipment. And, more importantly, when you get into some of the critical pieces of equipment, the figure says you are at 90 percent on hand, but actually it is 29 percent modernized or 25 percent modernized.

And why is that important? Well, the importance is what I said earlier about this route clearance unit. They need that modernized equipment back home to train on because that is what they are going to be expected to operate when they get to Iraq, Afghanistan, or wherever the next call is.

We need the modernized equipment because the modernized equipment has the ability to put add-on armor. You see, I have probably 90 percent of my Humvee [H164 Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle] fleet, but only 15 percent of it can have add-on armor. So it is not really practical for use in an IED environment that we can counter. I would have to be dependent of somebody else giving me the equipment.

A lot of my 915 line-haul trucks that I have that haul all the containers that moved everything into Iraq and move a lot of stuff around Afghanistan are the old models that aren't add-on-armor-capable. We use what we call "ghetto armor"; we just slap what we can on there to protect them. We need the 915 A5s, which are the modernized cab that allows you to put an A or a B kit, depending on what level of threat is out there.

And just as you know in your district, sir, Fort Dix, New Jersey, is one of our premier training platforms. That is where all the soldiers we have—Active, Guard, and Reserve, in a lot of cases—go through there in their training getting ready to go to theater. And we need that equipment sitting there at Fort Dix as a training set so that I don't have to pay to transport a piece of equipment up there for the unit to train on and then transport it back home to them to be back in their motor pool.

So, to me, the bill out there, it is the modernization effort. To get the Army Reserve today to 100 percent modernized, 100 percent of everything we have and 100 percent modernized, is about an \$8.9-billion bill that is still out there. And that is because equipment has continued to change and that is because units have continued to change, but we can't stop.

We have to be effective and efficient in how we use it. If I am going to outfit a heavy transport truck company with 96 HETs [Heavy Equipment Transporters], I don't need 96 sitting in their motor pool back in Las Vegas, Nevada, but I need 96 setting at Fort Hunter Liggett, probably, so they can train on them, and for sure I need 96 modernized HETs to go with them where they go in theater.

So the modernization, to me, is much more important than the on-hand figure that we quote.

Mr. RUNYAN. General Wyatt, do you have anything? I am sure you have a similar concern in the Air Force.

General WYATT. I do, sir. You know, we face the same issue in the Air National Guard that General Stenner does in the Air Force Reserve and the Active Duty does, and that is that we have a lot of old stuff out there—you know, fighters that are 25 going on 30 years old, tankers that are over 50 years old. And so we have this recapitalization challenge.

We know in the Air National Guard that unless we go and the Air Force goes with concurrent and balanced recapitalization across the total force, that we are in the Air National Guard looking at obsolescence of equipment here before we see replacement equipment.

In the meantime, we can make that legacy equipment last a little longer with some modernization funds. Thank goodness for NGREA money because we use a lot of that to modernize our equipment. Although we look to the Air Force to modernize and equip us, we know that a lot of our needs fall below the funding line, and that is why NGREA is so important.

Our equipping levels are steadily dropping. We are losing the effectiveness of our equipment. And I am not necessarily talking about the aircraft. We have adequate aircraft to do the mission right now. We have weapons sustainment moneys. We will be able to fly the missions for a little while longer, but it is getting more difficult because these jets and our rolling stock is getting older and older, more difficult to maintain. A lot of the parts are not in production anymore. A lot of our radar systems are old mechanical scanned array, as opposed to the new electronically scanned array. And all that affects our combat capability and our readiness. It is getting more and more difficult and more and more expensive to maintain these legacy platforms.

So we face the same problem that the Air Force does, except our stuff is just a little bit older and a little bit more in need of modernization.

General CARPENTER. Congressman, if I could make a quick comment—

Mr. RUNYAN. Sure.

General CARPENTER [continuing]. Relative to New Jersey and the recent floods that were sustained in New Jersey because of Hurricane Irene.

The New Jersey National Guard was in a lot better shape to respond to that hurricane because of the modernized FMTVs [Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles] that were available for use to respond to the requirements of the citizens of New Jersey. And I think, as you look at that, if they hadn't had the modern equipment that they did have on hand, the response would have been a little bit more difficult and probably a little slower.

So, courtesy of this committee and the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account and the \$37 billion that has been plowed into our equipment over the last 6 years, it not only benefits the warfight but it benefits people in the homeland.

General STENNER. Congressman, if I could just put one more point on this particular discussion, because NGREA is hugely important.

The modernization pieces have all been talked about, but I think that there is one perhaps unintended positive consequence of

NGREA, and that is that it is execution-year dollars. It meets the urgent operational needs that come from combatant commanders. And, in several cases, the Guard and Reserve Test Center has responded to these urgent operational needs with commercial-off-the-shelf kinds of hardware and software that are able to be put on some of the airplanes, not only on Guard and Reserve, but started on Guard and Reserve airplanes and migrated to the Active Force.

We can get that quicker with NGREA dollars than you can get programmatically putting it into the funding streams. And it ends up migrating that direction, to the Active Force as well.

Mr. RUNYAN. Thank you all very much.

Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.

Mr. Critz.

Mr. CRITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Generals, for being here. Thank you for your service.

For those in the audience, thanks so much for being here with us, and thank you for your service.

General Carpenter, I just have one quick question for you, is that the Department of the Army is going to divest itself of the “Sherpas,” the C-23s. And, from my understanding, they have been used pretty extensively in theater. And I am just curious as to what the plan is, going forward, and what the impact will be to the Army National Guard.

General CARPENTER. Because of the resource management decision that was made last year, we are directed to divest ourselves of the C-23s ending in FY '15. We have actually parked four of them on the ramp in Texas right now, and they are no longer available for our use.

There is, in my estimate, a gap that is created by parking those C-23s both in the homeland and in the overseas operations. As I mentioned before a different committee recently, when we were in Iraq there were 10 Sherpas that were deployed to Balad. Nine were on the ramp that evening, and all nine flew operations. And the information that I got was that the combatant commander was actually looking for more Sherpas to be able to use in that mission.

We have two Sherpas now that are flying observations in MFO [Multinational Force and Observers] Sinai, in terms of the peace-keeping force there. They are, in the words of the Ambassador and the officials on the ground, the best aircraft that you could possibly have for that mission.

In the homeland—I am a South Dakota guardsman. Our C-23s flew pilots from North Dakota back and forth as they carried out the CAP [Combat Air Patrol] mission—the CAP mission in the east coast. And they ferried—not only that, but they ferried parts and various supplies to New York as they dealt with 9/11.

I think they provide a critical—a critical—part of the homeland mission and do great service in the overseas mission. We are concerned about what does that leave in terms of the effect after we have divested ourselves of all 15 of those—or, excuse me, all 42 of those.

Mr. CRITZ. Thank you.

General Wyatt, one thing that I just learned is that, you know, we are hearing that the Active Air Force is planning—may be plan-

ning significant retirements of Air National Guard aircraft—all C-5As; 3 F-16 wings; 72 C-130s, many of which were at the Guard; and some number of A-10s—and then terminating acquisition of the C-27J aircraft as a possible response to budget cuts.

Has the Guard been actively involved or consulted regarding these cuts? And, if so, how would the loss of these aircraft affect the Air National Guard? And then what alternative missions will those men and women who operate those platforms—what other missions will they be able to do with the loss of those aircraft?

General WYATT. The platforms that you have referenced, a lot of those are flown exclusively by the Air National Guard, C-27 being one of those. C-5As—we have two C-5A wings remaining in the Air National Guard. I believe General Stenner has some C-5As in his fleet.

When the Air Force leadership says that everything is on the table, I believe what the Air Force leadership says. I think it is too early in the budgeting process to reach any conclusion as to what may or may not survive. And we are still looking at, you know, what is the total budget bogey going to be.

But, you know, if those platforms were removed from service for whatever reason, budgetary or whatever, in essence what you would have is you would have the “Air” being taken out of the Air National Guard.

Mr. CRITZ. Yeah.

General WYATT. There are other missions out there that we could certainly roll into, and we are already doing that. Remotely piloted aircraft, we already provide about 20 percent of the total Air Force capability in remotely piloted aircraft. We would look to see if we could get more of that mission.

Cyber, I believe, is one of the areas identified where the Department of Defense needs to enhance its cyber capabilities. And we believe Air National Guardsmen are ideally suited for this role because a lot of our citizen warriors already work for some of the big IT [Information Technology] and computer firms across the country. They are already cyber-warriors in their civilian capacities. And those are the type of individuals that would find cyber-warfighting a patriotic thing to do.

So there are some things that we could do to step into other mission sets. We haven’t talked about, you know, RED HORSE [Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadron Engineers] engineering, communications, security forces. There are some other things that we could do. But if we lost those airframes, in essence you are taking the “Air” out of the Air National Guard.

Mr. CRITZ. And we are just—we are hearing about this, and that is why I am curious, too, are you part of any discussions about targeting certain airframes for possible retirement or lack of use?

General WYATT. Well, the Chief of Staff and the Secretary have both said that there are some difficult decisions that we will have to make. The Air Force does include the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve into decisionmaking processes. And General Stenner and I have cast our votes. I don’t know what the final verdict is going to be.

Mr. CRITZ. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General STULTZ. Sir, if I could just add also, from the Army's or at least from my perspective, that has a huge impact on us. Because, originally, we had part of the C-27 program designed to take the load off our CH-47s, and then we handed it over entirely to the Air Force. Our CH-47s, our aviation are some of the highest OPTEMPO [Operational Tempo]; we are flying the blades off of those things. And if we don't get the C-27s to take the load off of it, it is going to have a significant impact on our CH-47 fleet.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.

Mr. Platts.

Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I will be brief. A number of my questions have been addressed, and especially the one regarding the impact on all the military and especially our Guard and Reserve units if sequestration of \$1.2 trillion or more occurs come January. And your frankness in assessing that is, I think, critically important to this committee and the full House and Senate in understanding the importance of avoiding that, and that the \$400-billion-plus already taken out of defense is going to create some hardships as is, let alone more, another \$600 billion.

The other, just a comment of gratitude. I certainly interact with the Guard and Reserve units in my district; we are close by a lot. With the 193rd Special Ops, I don't have the privilege of hosting the base, but many of their pilots and aircrews, support personnel are in my district. And with the Guard and reservists, in my 11 visits to Iraq and 8 to Afghanistan I see firsthand the amazing work they are doing.

And your leadership and advocacy for those men and women is so important and, I think, all the more important because of the fiscal challenges facing us. And, you know, whether it is one-third, one-sixth, a quarter, whatever that savings number is, we know we have an absolute professional soldier or airman out there at a fraction of the cost, but when we need them. So what you and your officers and soldiers and airmen are doing is much appreciated, and we, as a Nation, are indebted to you.

So, with that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.

General Carpenter, what percent of the Army fighting capability is represented by the Army National Guard?

General CARPENTER. Mr. Chairman, 40 percent of the operational force of the Army is resident in the Army National Guard. Inside of the Army National Guard formations, 51 percent of our formations are combat brigades and combat aviation brigades, combat organizations.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you.

General Wyatt, a similar number for the Air National Guard?

General WYATT. Mr. Chairman, we have about 34 percent of the combat capability of the Air Force. You can break that down. Tankers are around 43 percent; C-130 lift, about 30 percent, perhaps 29, just a little bit below that; fighter aircraft, about 32 to 33 percent; RPA [Remotely Piloted Aircraft] I mentioned, about 20 percent.

Cyber is kind of hard to count because we are still in the early stages in the Air Force of standing up cyber units and the capabili-

ties that the Air Force needs to lend its support to national defense. But a large portion, depending upon how you count combat communications, perhaps up to 10 to 11 percent of our total force, could be interpreted of being in cyber already. So we see that as an opportunity to contribute to the defense of this country.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you.

General Stultz, U.S. Army Reserve, what percent?

General STULTZ. Sir, we have a relatively small percentage of the combat force, because I have one light infantry battalion, which is out in the Pacific—Guam, Saipan, Samoa—

Mr. BARTLETT. Overall, what is your percentage, would you say?

General STULTZ. But our percentage of—we have 205,000 soldiers in the Army Reserve out of the 1.1 million force. And of the combat support/service support, on average I would say we are a full third of that force.

But we also have another force that we really never talk about very much, and that is in the generating force. I have 48,000 soldiers that are part of the Army's generating force. I have the training divisions that do the basic training mission at places like Fort Jackson, South Carolina; Fort Benning, Georgia; Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri; the drill sergeants that are down there training Active Duty Guard and Reserve soldiers. I have the AIT [Advanced Infantry Training] battalions that are training them in their MOS [Military Operation Specialty] skills. I have the 75th Battle Training Division that does the mission command training for the Army in the warfighter exercises.

So a huge piece of the Army's generating force is coming from my force, as well as the operational force. So you start putting those together and it gets somewhere around 33 to 40 percent, sir.

Mr. BARTLETT. General Stenner, a similar number for the Air Force Reserve?

General STENNER. Yes, sir. If you break it down by mission set, it is as I have depicted it here on this board. But as an overall number, very briefly, I would have to say it is approaching 20 percent.

Mr. BARTLETT. Twenty percent.

Okay, I would—these numbers are pretty big for the Army. Something like 73 to 80 percent of the total fighting force is represented in the Guard and Reserve. Since it is very much less expensive to maintain capabilities in Guard and Reserve, obviously, the bigger percentage the Guard and Reserve is of the total fighting force, the less it is going to cost us. But there are limits to that, and I just wanted to get a number from each of you. And I would like for you to write that number down so you are not influenced by your neighbor's response. And I will ask you for that number.

With due consideration to training and integration, what total percent of our fighting capability could be resident in Guard and Reserve if we are up against tight budget constraints and wanted to get the most for our dollar? If you would just write that figure down.

I know you are either in the Guard or the Reserve, but if you will for now combine the Guard and Reserve in your answer. And I will give you a moment to write that down, then I will just go

down the line and ask you for the number that you have written down.

Okay. General Stultz, what number have you written down?

General STULTZ. I wrote down 65 percent, sir.

Mr. BARTLETT. Well, you already had 73 to 80 percent.

General STULTZ. Yes, sir. And what I am taking into account is that we right now, out of a 1.1-million-man force, the Guard and Reserve make up a little over 50 percent of that force in the total force. So if you were to say what could we be, I would say more along a 60/40, 65 percent.

Mr. BARTLETT. Are you talking about only the Reserve now or Guard? Because the answers I got—

General STULTZ. No, sir, I am talking about Guard and Reserve combined.

Mr. BARTLETT. Because General Carpenter told me that 40 percent of the fighting capability is represented by the Guard, and you told me 33 to 40. If I add those up, it is somewhere between 73 and 80 percent already is represented by Guard and Reserve.

General STULTZ. But I am talking about the combat support/service support. And I am not sure if he is talking about the combat arms. See, that is where you—when you start talking about the fighting force and what I make up of that, I make up the service-support side of it, not the combat side of it.

Mr. BARTLETT. Okay. And that is how much bigger than the current number? You are 63 percent—

General STULTZ. Well, currently, today, between the Guard and Reserve, we make up a little over 50 percent of the Army's force.

Mr. BARTLETT. And you think that could grow from 50 to 65?

General STULTZ. Yes, sir, 60 to 65 percent.

Mr. BARTLETT. Okay.

General STULTZ. And I think part of that is going to happen as we come down from 569 [569,000] to 520 [520,000] to whatever number. If we just stay the same, it is going to change that balance.

Mr. BARTLETT. General—let's see—General Carpenter, what number did you write down?

General CARPENTER. I feel like I am taking an open-book test here a little bit.

Mr. BARTLETT. Well, you know the total already that you gave me was 64 percent, 34 and—I am sorry, 54 percent, 34 and 20, 54 percent.

General CARPENTER. And let me qualify this a little bit. It goes back to Secretary Gates' comment about being able to predict the future. And part of the discussion here has to be, what risk are we willing to take as we look at a very unpredictable and very dangerous world?

Post-Iraq, post-Afghanistan, the number I wrote down is 70 percent. But I have to tell you, you need to make sure you understand the risk associated with that.

Mr. BARTLETT. I understand. The higher that number is, the higher the risk is.

General CARPENTER. Absolutely.

Mr. BARTLETT. I understand that. Okay. And that is something you would have to factor—we would have to factor in.

General Wyatt, what was your number?

General WYATT. Well, at the risk of sounding greedy, I had 100 percent, but I thought that probably—

Mr. BARTLETT. That would be nice.

General WYATT. I think a lot would depend upon the particular mission set that you are talking about. Certainly, there are some mission sets in the Air Force that are better suited to the Guard and Reserve, other mission sets where the Active Duty is more suitable.

And I touched on this a little bit earlier when I was talking about warfighting UTCs. That is our specialty, is warfighting UTCs. We don't do very good acquisitions. We don't do very good research, development, test, and evaluation. We do some special operations. We do some special operations with the 193rd SOW, a special operations wing in Pennsylvania. But that is not our forte. Those folks are very, very good, but we don't have large numbers of those types of special forces. Space, we do some space, but a lot of those space missions are 24 hours a day, 365; that really doesn't fit the Guard construct.

So I think you have to—you know, if you asked me, you know, how much higher headquarters research and development acquisition should the Guard do, I would say probably zero. But when we are talking about the type of capability that the country needs to ramp up for a fight and then ramp down for a fight and then ramp up for a fight, you are talking about combat unit training codes in the United States Air Force. And I think that the appropriate answer, in my mind, would be 60 to 65 percent of that capability.

Mr. BARTLETT. Okay. Good. Thank you very much.

General Stenner.

General STENNER. Yes, sir. If I could qualify this by saying I need to go find my A9 analyst and see if we can't come up with a—but I will qualify with some assumptions.

First of all, if we continue with the same concepts we have within the Air Force right now—we are trained to the same standards, we are seamlessly integrated, we can deploy within 72 hours—maintaining those kinds of assumptions, maintaining a baseline number of MPA [Military Personnel Appropriation] dollars that we can in fact access—and that is a big concern of our Active Force compatriots, is the access to the Guard and Reserve, and I read “access” to mean military personnel appropriation dollars that get us into the exercises, into the theater security packages—doing all those kinds of things and getting it right in the baseline and, again, with the qualifiers on the institutional force, I threw 50 percent on the table.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you.

Thank you all very much.

I wanted to note my appreciation for the questions and answers relative to the C-27J. I have been concerned for a number of years that that was an airplane which the Army wanted and had considerable need for. In their wisdom, the Pentagon gave that plane to the Air Force and then asked the Air Force to please be Johnny-on-the-spot when the Army needed them. That was not anticipated to work very well. I am not sure that it is working very well. I do not believe that this program has been adequately resourced. And



I am very appreciative that we got that question and answer without me asking the question to get the answer.

Thank you all very much.

Because we want to make sure that we have all the information that may be necessary to make certain that we make the best possible case for making sure that you have all that you need in the future, there may be questions that we will need to ask for the record. So if you could respond to those, we would be very appreciative of that.

Thank you all very much for your testimonies.

Thank you, members of the subcommittee, for coming.

The subcommittee now stands in adjournment.

[Whereupon, at 3:49 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]



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**A P P E N D I X**

OCTOBER 12, 2011

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**PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD**

OCTOBER 12, 2011

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**Statement of Hon. Roscoe G. Bartlett**  
**Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces**  
**Hearing on**  
**National Guard and Reserve Component Acquisition**  
**and Modernization**  
**October 12, 2011**

Today, the Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee meets to receive an update on the equipment status and requirements of the Army and Air Force National Guard and Reserve Components. Given the significant change in the budget outlook for fiscal year 2012 and beyond, we believe it necessary to obtain the current views of the Guard and Reserve senior leaders for the potential impact on their programs. We will also hear from the military services in two subsequent hearings later in the month.

We welcome our distinguished panel of witnesses:

- Major General Raymond W. Carpenter, the Acting Deputy Director of the Army National Guard,
- Lieutenant General Harry M. Wyatt III, Director of the Air National Guard,
- Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz, Chief, U.S. Army Reserve, and
- Lieutenant General Charles E. Stenner, Jr., Chief, U.S. Air Force Reserve.

Major reductions in the Federal budget need to be an element of correcting the Federal deficit. The Department of Defense must share in a fair and balanced way in those reductions. That process is already taking place under the Budget Control Act of 2011, with nearly \$500 billion in cuts planned for DOD over the next 10 years.

However, cuts beyond that, up to approximately \$1 trillion over 10 years are possible under what Secretary Panetta has called the “Doomsday Mechanism” sequestration provision of the Budget Control Act.

Secretary Panetta and Director Lew of the White House Office of Management and Budget have stated that budget cuts to the Department of Defense as a result of the sequestration provision “could pose a significant risk to national security” and “DOD would almost certainly be forced to furlough large numbers of its civilian workers. Training would have to be curtailed, the force reduced, and purchases of weapons would have to be cut dramatically.”

Former Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn recently stated that the imposition of the sequestration provision of the Budget Control Act “on our Armed Forces could be catastrophic. . . . Seques-

tration would leave us with the smallest Army and Marine Corps in decades, the smallest Air Force in history, and the smallest Navy since McKinley was President. . . . The debate is not whether sequestration would wound our military. It is about whether sequestration is equivalent to shooting ourselves in the head or the foot.”

Against the backdrop of the Budget Control Act for 2011, today’s hearing is to get an assessment of the modernization needs and equipping challenges of the Army National Guard, Air National Guard, Army Reserve, and Air Force Reserve.

We recognize the Department is making improvements and progress in providing adequate funding to equip the National Guard and Reserve Components, to enhance its role as an operational reserve. Sustaining this funding, however, will continue to be a major issue given the acute national economic challenges we currently face.

During the April hearing the subcommittee learned the importance of equipping and resourcing the Reserve Component as an “operational reserve” rather than the Cold War model of a strategic reserve. We also heard our witnesses testify that since 2001 the Department has made significant strides in providing adequate resources to equip the Reserve Component as an operational reserve.

The Guard and Reserve Components have proven to be an invaluable asset during Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation New Dawn. These past 10 years have justified the need for an operational Reserve Component force that must be adequately manned, trained, and equipped.

Since September 2001, almost 600,000 guardsmen and reservists have deployed in support of combat operations, representing 40 percent of the total reserve force of 1.4 million troops. All 34 Army National Guard combat brigades have deployed to either Iraq or Afghanistan and more than half of the force have combat experience. There are reservists operating in over 100 countries.

The Army Reserve Components also comprise roughly 74 percent of all medical units, 80 percent of all transportation units, 75 percent of engineer units, and 70 percent of military police units in the Army. These are critical combat enablers for any type of combat operation.

The National Guard also has a dual-role responsibility and has to be mission-ready to rapidly respond to local, State, and Federal emergencies.

For example, for the Air National Guard, one of their more important missions is protecting the homeland through the Aerospace Control Alert mission. This mission has not been without its challenges—primarily because it was not adequately resourced, programmed or budgeted for by the active Air Force.

Since 2001 the majority of modernization funding for the Reserve Components has come from supplemental, overseas contingency operation funding requests, meaning funding that is not part of the base budget request. What happens when these so-called OCO requests are no longer requested or funded? How will we continue to sustain the operational reserve and equip them for their missions?

Congress has not hesitated in trying to address the equipment readiness needs we have noted in many Guard and Reserve units



over the years. National Guard and Reserve Component procurement from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2011 has totaled approximately \$47.0 billion, averaging almost \$6.0 billion per year.

Since 2004, Congress has authorized approximately \$7.7 billion in a National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account. The National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account helps maintain combat capability and should help to guarantee that equipment is relevant and upgraded in a timely manner.

This funding has enjoyed sustained bipartisan support both on this committee and throughout Congress.

The Department of Defense and Congress have made substantial progress in terms of adequate funding for and reorganization of the Reserve Components, but I am concerned that these anticipated budgetary challenges we currently face could potentially negatively impact the current operational status of the Guard and Reserve.

The ability to maintain a sustainable operational reserve force with sufficient operational capability is predicated on having sufficient manpower and adequate resources.

I want to express how much the subcommittee appreciates the contribution of the Guard and Reserve Components and want to recognize that they are maintained at a fraction of the cost of the regular military. We, as a Nation, clearly cannot fight without them because there is no way a 19-year-old can have the skill set and experience of a 39-year-old.

**Statement of Hon. Silvestre Reyes**  
**Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land**  
**Forces**  
**Hearing on**  
**National Guard and Reserve Component Acquisition**  
**and Modernization**  
**October 12, 2011**

This past April, the subcommittee received testimony from the leadership of the Army and Air Force Reserve Components. Today, we have those same leaders back for an update on the equipment needs of the Army and Air Force Reserve Components.

During the April hearing, we heard that our Reserve Components remain as busy as ever, and that the proposed FY 2012 budget request would allow us to maintain the high-quality Reserve forces we have today. We also heard that there were additional equipment needs for all the Reserve Components. As a result, the full Armed Services Committee bill included \$325 million in additional funding in the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account. The House Appropriators went even further, proposing an additional \$1.5 billion for this same account, while the Senate Appropriators proposed \$500 million.

So, the good news is that it appears that Congress will continue to provide support for Guard and Reserve equipment needs over and above the budget request.

On the other hand, the Budget Control Act of 2011 will likely result in a substantial cut to the DOD base budget in FY 2012—perhaps as much as \$26 billion. In addition, the Budget Control Act mandates approximately \$450 billion in additional DOD cuts over 10 years, when compared to current DOD projections. And finally, if the so-called “super committee” does not reach its goal of \$1.5 trillion in additional reductions, the DOD could face additional significant cuts starting in FY 2013.

However, at this point we don’t know how DOD will propose dealing with these budget reductions. We do know, however, how similar cuts have been applied in the past. In previous budget reductions, DOD has often taken an “across-the-board” approach to making cuts, rather than a more focused, thoughtful path.

I am concerned that if an across-the-board, cookie-cutter approach to funding reductions takes place the entire force—including the Reserve Components—will suffer significant damage. For example, if the Air Force further reduces fighter aircraft fleets in the Active Duty force, will similar cuts flow down to the Reserve Components? If Active Duty forces are reduced by DOD, are there plans to increase the size of the Reserve elements to compensate? If DOD is seeking budget efficiencies, does it make sense to *strategically expand* some elements of the Reserve forces? I certainly hope those questions are being asked as part of the ongoing DOD “strategic review.”

The Nation has invested billions in additional funding to create the highly effective Reserve forces we have today—with this subcommittee adding additional billions to that investment every year.

Beyond the immediate needs of our Reserve Components, I think it is also critical that we focus on the long term. If we get this right, we can end up with a high-quality Reserve force that also saves the Nation billions of dollars desperately needed elsewhere.

I look forward to hearing our witnesses' thoughts on these major issues facing the entire DOD, but the Reserve Component in particular.

United States Army Reserve

An Enduring Operational Army Reserve is a Positive Investment for America

2011 Posture Statement

The United States Army Reserve

2011 Posture Statement

Submitted by

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JACK C. STULTZ

Chief, Army Reserve and Commanding General, United States Army Reserve Command

and

Command Sergeant Major Michael D. Schultz

Command Sergeant Major, United States Army Reserve

To the Committees and Subcommittees of the

UNITED STATES SENATE and the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

First Session, 112th Congress

The annual Army Reserve Posture Statement is an unclassified summary of Army Reserve roles, missions, accomplishments, plans, and programs. The 2011 Army Reserve Posture Statement also addresses the support required by the Army Reserve to continue its transition to an operational force during FY 2012.

Unless otherwise noted, all statistics and facts are current through March 2011.

This document is available on the Army Reserve website at: [www.usar.army.mil](http://www.usar.army.mil).

March 2011

#### An Enduring Operational Force

For more than 100 years, the United States Army Reserve has served as the nation's federal strategic force in reserve, supporting the war and peacetime needs of the Regular Army. Since our nation's involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, combatant commanders have urgently called for many of the enabling capabilities resident within the Army Reserve, including logistics, engineering, security, medical and civil affairs support.

The steady, consistent, and recurring demand for Army Reserve capabilities during this decade has posed significant challenges for a force organized and resourced as a strategic reserve. In response, the Army Reserve recast itself from the part-time strategic reserve role to a fully integrated and critical part of an operational, expeditionary Army that supports the nation's evolving and challenging wartime requirements.

In today's national economic and political climate at home and around the world, it makes good business sense to sustain the enabling capability provided by the Army Reserve. Compared to the cost of expanding the full-time Army force, a relatively smaller investment in the Army Reserve provides security at home and supports the fight against terrorism abroad. The Army Reserve responds to domestic disasters, when authorized by the President of the United States, and also participates in security cooperation operations while protecting national interests around the world. In support of contingency operations, the Army Reserve responds to life-threatening situations and fosters stability in underdeveloped nations where conditions are ripe for terrorists to gain a foothold. The Army Reserve is a "best value" in that the nation pays the full cost for a reserve component Soldier only when he/she is mobilized.

Many companies in private industry use a similar strategy. Firms that specialize in tax preparation, for example, hire certified accounts/tax preparers to handle the heavier customer demand that occurs from the beginning of a new year to the filing deadline of April 15. They too cannot afford, nor would it make good business sense, to maintain a full-time accountant force during off-peak seasons. The relatively low cost of hiring seasonal workers adds to their bottom line.

The Army Reserve conducted an analysis that shows over a 15-year period, an enduring operational Army Reserve provides key capabilities for the Army at significant cost savings. We measure the savings by comparing the active component and reserve component costs of building readiness, deploying and employing forces.

The Army Reserve prepares for service by employing the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model—a five year structured progression of increased unit readiness over time resulting in periods of available trained, ready, and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment.

Under the current ARFORGEN process, an active component Army Soldier spends two years in a non-deployed status at a cost of \$140K per year—compared to his/her Army Reserve counterpart who spends four years in a non-mobilized/non-deployed status costing \$47K per year—that's about one third the cost of an active component Soldier for train-up. This cost savings is achieved by providing cyclical capabilities to the Army and predictability for Soldiers and their Families.

During a 15-year period, an active component Soldier spends five years deployed with an overall average cost of \$143K per year compared to the Army Reserve Soldier who spends three years mobilized/deployed with an overall average cost of \$68K—that's about half the cost of an active component Soldier.

An operational Army Reserve not only saves money, it helps the Army mitigate current capability shortfalls. For example, the Commander of Africa Command, General William E. "Kip" Ward, and the Commander of European Command, Admiral James G. Stavridis related in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 9, 2010, that employing an operational Army Reserve to support combatant commander security activities would provide significantly more capability for the mission while maintaining invaluable operational experience, hard-won from current operations. Using the Army Reserve in security cooperation missions also reduces the demand for active Army capabilities, allows the active component to maximize time at home between deployments, and provides the Army Reserve with the opportunity to employ and refine its multifunctional skills.

An operational Army Reserve can be key to developing cooperative security arrangements (collaboration with regional nations, interagency and non-governmental organizations, and regional institutions to respond to the broad range of regional contingencies) while building Partnership Capacity by strengthening and expanding relationships with allies and partners. The Army Reserve could also mitigate the costs that an active component unit would require in Korea (family housing, child-care, medical, etc.) by providing trained and validated units for one-year tours.

It makes good business sense to sustain the enabling capability provided by the Army Reserve for now and into the future. Army Chief of Staff, General George W. Casey, Jr., has said there is no viable alternative to having a fully operational Army Reserve to sustain today's combat support needs and those of the future. As the Army evaluates the resource requirements to sustain and improve Reserve "operational capabilities," decisions on full-time staff, funded training days, and sequencing of training (pre-mobilization/post-mobilization) drive the cost.

Operationalizing the Army Reserve has thus created a requirement for an enduring level of readiness support that cannot be sustained with current supplemental funding. The Army Reserve must have predictable funding in the base budget to ensure Soldiers are well trained, well prepared, and well equipped at all times to respond to the nation's needs. An enduring operational force cannot be fully effective if it has to borrow personnel and equipment from one unit to shore up another to meet mission requirements. Lending creates turbulence within units and diminishes gained efficiencies.

For now and into the foreseeable future, the Army Reserve will function as an operational force. The required institutional, policy, and systemic resource processes and procedures are being transformed to ensure a sustainable and ready force capable of operating across the full spectrum of conflict.

The Army Reserve is a positive investment for the nation. We provide necessary combat support and combat service support to combatant commanders where and when needed, thereby saving limited resources. We train Soldiers who accomplish daunting tasks and provide critical support on the battlefield. We give back to the nation highly trained, mature and refined Soldiers, who also provide civilian employers the kind of talent needed to sustain the local economy.

America can make no better investment than sustaining an enduring, operational Army Reserve.

Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz

Chief, United States Army Reserve

Command Sergeant Major Michael D. Schultz

Command Sergeant Major, United States Army Reserve

As America remains a nation at war, the Army Reserve continues to be a cost-effective force as evidenced by what we accomplished with the FY 2011 budget Congress appropriated to us. The \$7.9 billion Army Reserve appropriation represented only four percent of the total Army budget; yet in 2010, we achieved the following results within the four core elements (Human Capital, Materiel, Readiness, and Services and Infrastructure) of the Army Reserve Enterprise as outlined below.

## **Human Capital**

### **Human Resources:**

In FY 2010, the Army Reserve conducted 525 Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program events, serving 26,000 Soldiers and 28,000 Family members.

### **Chaplain:**

Army Reserve chaplains conducted over 300 Strong Bonds events throughout the country and territories, enhancing Soldier and Family communication and relationship skills. Some 12,500 Soldiers and Family members participated in these events and received this training.

### **Behavioral Health:**

Licensed clinicians are following up on the urgent referrals generated by the Periodic Health Assessment and Post Deployment Health Reassessments. Working on an "Assess and Refer" model, clinicians conduct bio-psycho-social assessments of each individual who is referred and determine the appropriate level of follow-up. They do not provide treatment. The major illnesses being identified that are Post Traumatic Stress, Major Depression and Substance Abuse.

### **Medical and Dental:**

Army Reserve medical readiness improved from 23 percent on 1 October 2008 to 60 percent as of 23 September 2010. Programs such as the Army Select Reserve Dental Readiness System (ASDRS) have been highly successful. Dental readiness, which is currently at 74 percent, has improved 21 percent over the last two years, and is one of the key elements improving medical readiness. We converted 168,829 Soldiers' paper records to an electronic Health Readiness Record, allowing us to take full advantage of efficiencies in time, cost, and services over the continued use of paper treatment records. The Army Reserve successfully conducted suicide prevention training throughout the force. As a result, we have seen an improvement in communication with at-risk Soldiers and proactive involvement on the part of our subordinate commands.

### **Family Programs:**

The Army Reserve Virtual Installation Program served some 5,501 military members and their families, from all branches of the armed services during FY 2010 - bringing the resources of active military installations to geographically dispersed military Families. Three pilot sites at Army Strong Community Centers offer information and assistance on many issues, such as concerns with TRICARE, legal matters, retirement, GI Bill, and child and youth services.

## **Materiel**

The Army Reserve established new Equipment Fielding facilities to increase throughput of new equipment issues to units. This has allowed the Army Reserve to execute the largest distribution of new equipment in recent history. Over 23,000 pieces of equipment were provided to Army Reserve units, enhancing their readiness. Using near real time databases in "bridging" logistics information and management systems led to an automated process to define manpower requirements in



equipment maintenance support structure. The Army Reserve is on track to successfully implement the Army's initiative for managing organizational clothing and individual equipment.

**Readiness****Operations:**

Army Reserve continues to provide vital capabilities to combatant commanders in support of overseas contingency operations. More than 196,711 Army Reserve soldiers have mobilized in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom/New Dawn (OIF/OND) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) since September 11, 2001. Today, more than 15,584 Warrior Citizens are serving in Iraq, Afghanistan and 22 other countries around the globe. Army Reserve Aviation continues to lead the way in Air Traffic Simulation. Thanks to funds approved by Congress, the Army Reserve fielded more than 630 Laser Marksmanship Training Systems to 346 Army Reserve locations during the past year, while having the means to develop and field "bridging" logistics management and information systems.

**Services and Infrastructure**

**Facilities Management:** The Army Reserve successfully awarded over \$432 million in Military Construction (MILCON) projects in 2010. Several new Army Reserve Centers will achieve net-zero energy usage (self-sufficient without drawing additional power from the electrical grid). The Army Reserve has developed innovative passive building design techniques to achieve low-technology, low-cost energy efficiency. We are installing solar collection fields, wind turbines, and geothermal plants at several new facilities. The Army Reserve has started a retrofit program, replacing lights, windows, roofs, and other components with new energy-efficient technology, resulting in substantial savings in utility costs.

The Army Reserved also realized monetary benefits totaling approximately \$232 million during the last year through the Office of Internal Review, which provides Army Reserve leadership timely, independent and professional review/audit, evaluation, and consulting services.

**ARMY RESERVE PRIORITIES**

- Continue to transform to an enduring operational force
- Continue to provide the best trained, best led, best equipped Soldiers and units to combatant commanders to achieve U.S. objectives and ensure national security
- Recruit, retain, and reintegrate through a Continuum of Service the best and brightest Citizen-Soldiers to sustain a robust and capable operational Army Reserve
- Provide Citizen-Soldiers and their Families with the training, support, and recognition to sustain a cohesive, effective fighting force
- Build and maintain a partnership with industry to facilitate Citizen-Soldier contributions to both a prosperous economy and a skilled, experienced, and capable Army

To advance these priorities the Army Reserve must:

Obtain from Congress full support and necessary authorities, in accordance with the Army Reserve FY 2012 budget request

**THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGET**

**THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGET WILL ALLOW THE ARMY RESERVE TO:**

- Continue Army Reserve internal transformation to an Enduring Operational Force.
- Shape Army Reserve End-strength by recruiting, retaining, and reintegrating, through a Continuum of Service, the best and brightest Citizen-Soldiers.
- Equip units and Soldiers to train and fight to achieve U.S. objectives and ensure national security.
- Provide quality medical and dental services and support to Soldiers and their Families.
- Sustain Army Reserve installations and facilities.

## THE POSTURE OF THE ARMY RESERVE:

## WHERE WE STAND TODAY

Today's Army Reserve is uniquely positioned and structured to provide operational support in complex security environments. We can meet Army requirements for combat support or combat service support roles. Many civil affairs, psychological operations, medical, transportation, engineer, and information operations capabilities reside exclusively, or predominately, within the Army Reserve. Our ability to mobilize quickly and responsively makes the Army Reserve ideally suited to meet our nation's future requirements. Army Reserve Soldiers will remain a vital part of the Total Army Force facing the national security challenges of the next decade and beyond.

During the Cold War era, the Army Reserve principally operated as a force in reserve. The first Gulf War, in 1990–1991, served as a catalyst for thinking about using the Army Reserve in a more operational capacity when large numbers of Reserve forces were engaged. Since the Gulf War, the nation has employed the Army Reserve in many different ways and at unprecedented levels, most significantly after September 11, 2001. The demands of persistent conflicts over the past nine years were—and continue to be—beyond the ability of the Active component to meet alone. As a result, the nation has relied heavily on the Army Reserve to fill operational requirements, fundamentally changing the role of the Army Reserve from a strategic to an operational force.

Today, with the drawdown of forces in Iraq nearing completion and the proposed drawdown in Afghanistan, we can expect to see declining Department of Defense budgets for the near-to-mid term, as well as potential end-strength reductions, while still preparing for future operations in a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous security environment. A Total Force, maximized for strategic agility at reduced cost, provides the necessary capabilities to the combatant commander.

The Nation and the Department of Defense are now at a strategic juncture with respect to the Army Reserve. Choices made now will determine the Army force mix and capability for the future. The choice can be to return to a strategic Reserve with limited readiness capabilities as the current conflicts resolve, or become an enduring operational force with the readiness levels that provide operational capabilities to meet the Nation's defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict.

Between 2001 and 2010 the Nation invested ~\$52.7 billion to man, equip, train, and employ an operational force. The Department can choose to forgo the \$52 billion investment, and over the next decade, the Army Reserve will revert to a strategic Reserve. This change would occur slowly over the first few years and then accelerate, by default, as the hard-won operational experience of our Soldiers atrophies and further resource constraints are implemented. Alternatively, for an estimated annual investment of ~\$652 million, the Army can retain and sustain an operational Army Reserve. This will provide the Army necessary capability on time and at best value.

Nine years of mobilization and employment for current contingencies has produced the most experienced, ready Army Reserve in history. Currently the Army Reserve is used as an operational force resourced only through Overseas Contingency Operations funding. With minimal recapitalization of readiness funded in the base budget and through annual employment of Army Reserve forces for operational missions such as Theater Security Cooperation, we can maintain these unprecedented readiness levels and support the National Security Strategy. This is the most efficient and cost-effective answer to the Nation's national security requirements.

The Army Reserve culture has changed since 2001. Many Soldiers of the legacy strategic reserve left service in significant numbers between 2004 and 2006. Today, the Army Reserve is fully manned to its Congressionally authorized end-strength with Army Reserve Soldiers who have joined or re-

enlisted to be part of an operational force. Reverting to a strategic Reserve would entail a similar significant loss of our most operationally experienced force and greatest asset—today's Army Reserve Soldier.

Today, we are exploring the Army's Continuum of Service initiatives as a way of making the Army Reserve more attractive for Soldiers, Families, and Employers. When these initiatives become a program of record, they will facilitate a Soldier transfer from one Army component (for example from the Army Reserve to active duty) to another in a seamless, efficient manner that meets the needs of the Soldier as well as the readiness requirements for the Total Force. There is no degradation in personnel management, career opportunities or benefits for a reserve component Soldier's military and civilian career. Continuum of Service will provide choices for Soldiers, their Family members and Employers, which is essential in family and career planning.

The Army Reserve Posture Statement lays out our accomplishments, our plans, and our continuing challenges in the Era of Persistent Conflict and it continues to illustrate through its capabilities and affordability that it is a good investment for the nation. An enduring operational Reserve will provide the Army necessary capabilities at best value. This is the Army Reserve of today and the future.

**BOX:**

DOCUMENT MAP

The 2011 Army Reserve Posture Statement (ARPS) is the Army Reserve's Annual Report to Congress of the current posture of the Army Reserve to fulfill its Title 10 responsibilities. The Posture Statement also serves to educate and inform Congress of Army Reserve resourcing priorities in the FY 2012 Budget Request that will enable the Army Reserve to continue its transition in support of an operational force. This document is organized to help advise Senate and House Committee appropriators in Committee Hearings addressing Personnel, Readiness and Equipping of the needs of an operational force.

Programs addressed in the President's Budget Request:

- Personnel: Shaping the Force, Building Resiliency, Health Promotion/Risk Prevention, Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program, Spiritual Care, Behavioral Health, Healthcare, Family Programs, Full Time Support, Employer Partnerships of the Armed Forces
- Readiness: An Operational Force, Homeland Operations, Training, Training Equipment, Physical Security, Anti-Terrorism, Aviation, Army Reserve Command, Control, Communication, Computers/Information Technology (C4/IT), Training Facilities
- Equipping: Army Reserve Materiel, Equipment Maintenance, Logistics Contract Support

**THE FY 2012 BUDGET REQUEST:****WHERE WE ARE GOING****Personnel****CRITICAL PERSONNEL NEEDS OF AN OPERATIONAL RESERVE**

- Appropriate resources for Recruitment and Retention of the right people and skill sets to sustain the force
- Provide robust Suicide Prevention support and resources for trained caregivers, and training for Applied Suicide Prevention Skills
- Continue support for the Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program events and Family Member training
- Resource Army Guard Reserve Family Life chaplain authorizations
- Align and balance Family Programs capabilities/workforce to serve a geographically dispersed population
- Ensure continuity of support to Army Reserve Soldiers and Families in the community where they live through Virtual Installations/Army Strong Community Centers
- Deliver responsive and relevant Family Assistance and Support services to mobilized and non-mobilized Soldiers, Civilians, and their Families during military operations, emergency activities, and natural disasters
- Improve and Sustain Medical, Dental and Behavioral Health Readiness
- Maintain support levels for Full Time Support

**Shaping the Force**

The Army Reserve has undergone its largest ever transformation from a strategic reserve to an operational force. Additionally, the Army Reserve has exceeded its end-strength objective of 205,000—but has an imbalance in skills, in particular at the mid-grade ranks. As a result, we have shifted our focus to shaping the force to meet the needs of an Operational Army Reserve that actively supports current operations via the Army Force Generation model, also known as ARFORGEN.

Our strategy will focus on proper balance and sustainment of the force rather than increasing end-strength. The Human Capital Enterprise will manage the accumulated end-strength to build and shape a force that best meets the nation's near-and long-term demands. The Army Reserve will recruit, retain and transition the best and brightest and position them in the right place, in the right job, and at the right time.

As part of shaping the force we requested and received Army approval to reimplement several boards that were previously suspended. These boards provide management tools that facilitate better management of senior grade positions, allow qualified Soldiers to progress at proper intervals in their careers, provide career incentives, and allow Soldiers to advance to higher grades at the peak years of their effectiveness. These boards include the Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) Release from

Active Duty (REFRAD) Board (convened in April 2010) and the Army Reserve Troop Program Unit (TPU) Enlisted Qualitative Retention Board (scheduled to convene in 3rd Qtr FY 2011).

#### **Building Resiliency**

The Army Reserve is continuing to build resiliency in our Soldiers, Families and Civilians—all of whom have been affected by the cumulative effects of nine years at war. We have developed a comprehensive approach that puts mental fitness on the same level as physical fitness to build a resilient force for the future. No one individual program builds resiliency; rather, it results from combining the benefits of health promotion-risk deduction education, Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program events, spiritual care, behavioral health programs, medical and dental readiness, and family program services.

#### **Health Promotion—Risk Reduction**

The Department of the Army and the Army Reserve have been in the forefront of health promotion—risk reduction efforts by using the Applied Suicide Intervention Skills Training (ASIST) program. Training materials ensure the education of first line supervisors, Army Reserve leadership, Army Civilians, and suicide prevention programs managers (DAC and other full-time support personnel). The key to suicide prevention is trained caregivers. The key requirement to success is to ensure that an appropriate number of individuals receive ASIST for Trainers across the Army Reserve, as well as having these ASIST Trainers conduct the required training to personnel throughout the fiscal year. The two-day ASIST workshop conducted by ASIST Trainers is by far the most widely used, acclaimed and researched suicide intervention skills training for our Soldiers. The ASIST Training done by qualified ASIST Trainers is the best way to increase the number of Gatekeepers trained to recognize Soldiers who are at risk and know how to intervene to prevent the risk of suicidal thoughts becoming suicidal behaviors. Since history has shown that Soldiers are better able to help other Soldiers at risk when they receive ASIST Suicide prevention training, the Army Reserve is committed to early identification of at-risk Soldiers before a serious incident occurs or a Soldier seriously contemplates suicide.

#### **Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program (YRRP)**

The mission for Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program (YRRP) simply stated is to support Army Reserve Families and their Soldiers with sufficient information, resources and services, referral, and proactive outreach opportunities throughout the entire deployment cycle. The goal is to build self-sufficient and resilient Families and Soldiers. We accomplish this by developing skills in each Family member and Soldier to assure they are prepared and able to cope with the difficulties of extended separation and deployment. We help Families network together, and connect with each other, and their unit/command and Family Programs' Office. We also attend to both the Family members' and Soldiers' physical, behavioral and mental health needs. This requires trained professional speakers to come to units and regional venues to educate and assist attendees with knowledge, skills and practical hands-on participation.

In FY 2010, the Army Reserve conducted 525 YRRP events, serving 26,000 Soldiers and more than 28,000 Family members. These events proved successful because of direct support from a caring command staff, involvement by a myriad of community agencies, and the commitment of volunteers. Providing these services and support to Army Reserve Families and Soldiers on par with those for the Active component is a challenge since most of our Families do not live near a fort, camp, post or station where services are readily available. The geographic dispersion and numbers of Army Reserve Soldiers and Families, combined with the challenges that may exist with a civilian employer or educational pursuits, is unparalleled by any other military service or service component.

#### **Spiritual Care**

While resiliency is the operative word in today's Army concerning Soldier and Family well-being, it has always been the end state of a chaplain's ministry. Spiritual fitness is vital to maintaining a healthy and vibrant force. While chaplains are helpful agents during times of crisis, their greater value lies in their ability to enable Soldiers and Families to endure and successfully overcome a crisis when it does occur.

As an operational force, it is important that we are properly structured and manned. In 2007, the Director of Force Management approved and directed the addition of Unit Ministry Team (UMT) force structure across all Army components. In order to support enduring requirements of an operational Reserve, this additional structure would enable the Army Reserve to place the Army Chaplaincy's Family Life function into its inventory. Family Life chaplains would oversee our successful Strong Bonds' program while also supplementing the Army Reserve's religious support capabilities in Family ministries and UMT training.

We appreciate the resources Congress has approved for the Army Reserve Strong Bonds program. During FY 2010, over 300 Strong Bonds events were conducted throughout the United States and its territories, enhancing Soldier and Family communication and relationship skills. Some 12,500 Soldiers and Family members participated in these events and received this training. Our goal is to provide Strong Bonds Relationship training to the maximum number of Army Reserve Soldiers and Families.

**BOX:**

When Families are supported, Soldier problems are lessened and Soldier retention increases. The Army Reserve is committed to providing its Soldiers and Families a level of benefits and quality of life that is commensurate with their service to the nation.

**Behavioral Health**

The Department of Defense Mental Health Task Force of 2006 recognized that the existing systems for psychological health were insufficient for current and future needs. Task Force recommendation 5.4.1.16 stated that "Each Reserve Component should appoint a full time director of Psychological Health to the staff of the Reserve Component Surgeon." It went on to specify that "Where Reservists are organized by region, a full time Regional Psychological Health Director should be appointed." The Army Reserve has acted on these recommendations and has developed a limited Behavioral Health program. There is a Deputy Surgeon for Behavioral Health at the Surgeon's office, whose responsibilities center on program development. Three of the four Regional Support Commands have Directors of Psychological Health. The licensed clinicians are responsible for following up on the urgent referrals generated by the Periodic Health Assessment and Post Deployment Health Reassessments. Working on an "Assess and Refer" model, they conduct bio-psycho-social assessments of each referred individual and determine the appropriate level of follow-up. They do not provide treatment. The major illnesses being identified, Post Traumatic Stress, Major Depression and Substance Abuse are treatable, but require a long-term commitment to care. Even as the current conflicts wind down, the psychological injuries sustained will require treatment far into the future. Four clinicians cannot adequately address the case management and monitoring needs that will be

required by the growing numbers of Soldiers in the Army Reserve who struggle with these difficulties, especially considering the geographical dispersion of our units.

A critical step for the future development of Behavioral Health programming within the Army Reserve is for all those who have a stake in the emotional well-being of Soldiers to share resources and develop multidisciplinary teams in order to most efficiently deal with the often complex and multidimensional needs of our Troops. The Army Reserve will be working with the other military Service reserve components and Congress to continue developing improvements to our infrastructure and processes to ensure our Soldiers receive appropriate care.

#### **Health Care**

The Army Reserve has served the nation well while transforming from a strategic to an operational force. Soldiers not medically and dentally ready impair our ability to ensure predictability and reliance for the combatant commander. Army Reserve medical readiness improved from 23 percent on 1 October 2008 to 60 percent as of 23 September 2010. Programs such as the Army Select Reserve Dental Readiness System (ASDRS) have been highly successful. Dental readiness, currently at 74 percent has improved 21 percent over the last two years, and is one of the key elements improving medical readiness. Influenza compliance within the Army Reserve reached its highest compliance rate ever at 77 percent, with H1N1 compliance at 79 percent.

In 2010, we converted the paper records of 168,829 Soldiers to an electronic Health Readiness Record, allowing us to take full advantage of efficiencies in time, cost, and services over the continued use of paper treatment records. To improve data sharing, we obtained view capability of medical records stored in the Armed Forces Health Longitudinal Application, the active component medical database. We implemented the Medical Reserve Ready Response unit program, which enables our Army Reserve Physicians to review medical profiles and approvals from their home, capitalizing on the unique clinical skills found in the Army Reserve.

Caring for our Wounded Warriors and assessing post deployment health issues are part of the Army's efforts to protect the health and well-being of Soldiers who have redeployed from combat. The Army Reserve tracks completion of the Post Deployment Health Reassessments to capture data and monitor the medical and behavioral needs of redeployed Soldiers. Soldiers complete these health assessments within three to six months after returning from theater. As of 15 September 2010, 84,419 Army Reserve Soldiers have been screened for post deployment health issues—a 95 percent compliance rate.

As medical screening has improved, so has the identification of Soldiers who are not medically ready, and much work remains. There are approximately 15,500 Medically Non-deployable (MNDs) Soldiers who require a medical board and we are moving out aggressively to improve the boarding process.

#### **Family Support Programs**

Transformation from a strategic reserve to an operational force resulted in the need for standardizing programs and services to ensure Soldier and Family needs are met with the right resources, at the right time. Baseline services and outreach capability that sustain the quality of life of our Soldiers and Families are being integrated into the cycles of the ARFORGEN model. We employ metrics and administer surveys to gauge the quality and integrity of family program services for effectiveness and their value to our customers. This allows for the investment in high return services and the retirement of those that do not meet the needs of an operational force.

An example of a promising high return service is the Army Reserve Virtual Installation Program. Operating at three pilot sites within three Army Strong Community Centers around the country, Virtual Installation brings the services and resources only found on active military installations to



geographically dispersed military Families—of all branches of the armed services. These centers provide hands-on problem resolution and follow-up for a myriad of concerns ranging from military benefits and entitlements to community resources. The Fort Family Support & Outreach Center at Fort McPherson, Georgia is the nerve center of the Army Reserve Virtual Installation where the Outreach Center staff use cutting-edge technology, mapping programs, and resource databases as well as live, personal contact with highly skilled subject matter experts to serve and build community-based capacity for each pilot site.

#### **Full-Time Support (FTS)**

In July 2010, the Secretary of the Army directed the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASA (M&RA)) to personally lead a study to determine the correct level of full-time support required for the Reserve Components. A memorandum and a term of reference will be sent to the reserve component leadership advising of the M&RA effort and task. There is also an initiative to have the reserve component re-validate the models that will identify/inform manpower requirements. These efforts will help the Army to determine the appropriate size of the FTS program for managing the reserve component as an operational force.

The Army Reserve is currently funded at 75 percent of its requirements. This funding level is based on the requirements of a strategic reserve and in accordance with the Headquarters, Department of the Army "HIGH RISK" funding methodology. Funding must be maintained at this level.

Civilian personnel programs (Military Technician and Army Civilians) are currently fully funded (based on 75 percent of FTS authorizations against validated requirements) and must remain so in order to provide required Army Reserve full-time support. The National Defense Authorization Act, Subtitle B—Reserve Forces, requires the Army Reserve to meet a Military Technician end-strength floor by 30 September each fiscal year. The ability to support an operational Army Reserve depends on being able to meet, or exceed within established standards, the authorized floor.

The Army Guard and Reserve (AGR) program must also remain fully funded (based on 75 percent of FTS authorizations against validated requirements) in order to provide the required Army Reserve full-time support. Currently authorized 16,261 Soldiers, this program provides the bulk of full-time support at the unit level. They provide day-to-day operational support needed to ensure Army Reserve units are trained and ready to mobilize within the ARFORGEN model. The AGR program is absolutely vital to the successful transition to, and sustainment of, an operational force.

BOX: The Employer Partnership of the Armed Forces has more than 1,300 employers and the list is growing. These Employer Partners represent 95 of the 2010 Forbes Fortune 500 companies; they are military-friendly; and they value the skills, experiences and work ethic of those who serve.

#### **Employer Partnership of the Armed Forces**

The Army Reserve's Employer Partnership Initiative has expanded far beyond serving only Army Reserve Soldiers. Today the Employer Partnership provides career continuum resources for the entire Service "Family." It serves the civilian employment and career advancement needs of members of all seven Reserve Components, their Family members, Wounded Warriors and the Nation's veterans. With this fully encompassing focus the program is now the Employer Partnership of the Armed Forces.

The Employer Partnership of the Armed Forces has more than 1,300 participating employers and the list is growing. These Employer Partners represent 95 of the 2010 Forbes Fortune 500 companies; they are military-friendly; and they value the skills, experiences and work ethic of those who serve.

Army Reserve leadership feels the Employer Partnership is realizing success, and that the program supports its Human Capital Strategy. Accordingly the Chief of the Army Reserve will spend as much as \$5 million during FY 2011 for the program. This funds operations which include program support personnel dispersed across the United States, and other resources that help connect seekers to jobs.

Last fall the Employer Partnership launched a state-of-the-art job search resource at the portal: [www.EmployerPartnership.org](http://www.EmployerPartnership.org). Through strategic partnerships the portal accesses approximately 600,000 jobs at any given time. In addition to robust search capabilities, seekers can use the resume builder and keep a detailed resume readily available within the portal. Employers may then reach in and conduct candidate searches based on seeker skills / experiences. This in effect allows "jobs" to actually "find" our seekers. The portal's user-friendly functionality makes it an efficient tool for both seekers and employers.

The partnerships forged with civilian employers build operational capacity for the Army Reserve and the Reserve components; they fortify the resilience of our Families; they serve those who have served; and they strengthen our Employer Partners. The Army Reserve's underwriting of Employer Partnership of the Armed Forces program represents a positive investment for America.

**THE EMPLOYER PARTNERSHIP PROMOTES SKILLS AND OPPORTUNITY SHARING WITH THE HOME FRONT**

**PROGRAM PROVIDES ADVANTAGE TO LOCAL COMMUNITIES AND THE MILITARY**

Employers realize that it makes sense to hire personnel already trained and experienced. Reserve Service members and Veterans fit this bill. They are skilled in a wide variety of disciplines including health care, transportation, logistics, supply chain management, law enforcement, public safety, construction, engineering, finance, information technology and telecommunications. By providing access to talented Service members, the Employer Partnership of the Armed Forces saves local employers time and money.

The military also benefits. Best practices from industry, and experience with cutting edge technology and medical procedures flows into our Armed Forces through Reserve service. And, as the Employer Partnership (EP) helps Service members progress in their civilian career fields, increased expertise is brought to military assignments.

Perhaps most important to the home front are the career opportunities the EP brings to Service members, their Families and our Veterans. The Employer Partnership program truly exemplifies a positive investment in America, and our commitment to taking care of our entire Military "Family."

**Career opportunities across America**

The EP program has written agreements with more than 1,300 Employer Partners; with jobs in every U.S. state and territory.

**Strengthens local economies**

Efficient access to trained and qualified work force saves time. Hiring costs also lowered by reducing need for duplicate drug and aptitude screening.

**Inside track to opportunity**

Provides Service members with an inside track to employers who are committed to hiring Reservists and Veterans.

**A concrete way to support troops**

The EP program gives employers a tangible way to support our troops while also strengthening America's economy.

**The Army Reserve's core Competencies:**

Battle Tested, Skill Rich Army Reserve Soldiers in an Operational Force Provide Strength For America And It's Economy

**LOGISTICS**

Logistics is one of the most important capabilities of the Army Reserve. From supply-chain management to land, water, and air operations, the nation's defense depends on the efficiency of our Expeditionary Sustainment Commands; Transportation, Petroleum, Quartermaster and Supply units. Army Reserve Soldiers are skilled and experienced in delivering the right product at the right time to our customers world-wide.

**HEALTHCARE**

Breakthroughs in trauma techniques and procedures often originate from battlefield medicine. The majority of the U.S. Military's medical capability resides in the Reserve components. As a result of their military service, Army Reserve doctors, nurses, technologists and other medical service practitioners are able to bring extraordinary practical experience to local care providing institutions across the U.S.

**INFORMATION/COMMUNICATIONS**

Information is critical to successful operations on the modern battlefield. Satellite, microwave, cell and fiber-optic are among the many means; code-division multiplexing, time division and frequency division multiple access are among the technical methods which enable this. Data collection, analysis and reporting activities form the information and intelligence that is communicated. The Reserve has operators, enablers and trainers in all of these disciplines. Army Reserve Communicators are information age proficient.

**MANAGEMENT**

The development of leadership and management skills begins early in every service member's career. Military training stresses leadership principles, sound decision-making and overcoming challenges. This is important because Soldiers are responsible for major equipment systems, and above all, are responsible for the well-being of those they lead. Army Reserve Soldiers are responsible and capable leaders.

## **Readiness**

### Critical Readiness Needs of an Operational Reserve

- Adequate resources to respond to Homeland Defense missions
- Additional mandays in the last three years of the ARFORGEN cycle
- Provide Simulations and Simulators to enable operationally relevant, full spectrum training for Soldiers anytime/anywhere
- Ensure Home station training capabilities to support critical home station pre-deployment training
- Sustain the availability of training equipment
- Support for programs to Protect the Force
- Continue support for a fully integrated operational Aviation force
- Provide a strong Army Reserve Network Defense
- Funding for essential and mandatory secure communications
- Creation of a standardized computing environment
- Construction and upgrade of Army Reserve Centers, and Training Facilities
- Support for programs to reduce energy usage, conserve natural resources, and develop alternate renewable energy
- Continue the work of Army Reserve Virtual Installation Program

## **Operations**

### **An Operational Force**

The Army Reserve continues to provide vital capabilities to combatant commanders in support of overseas contingency operations. More than 196,711 Army Reserve Soldiers have mobilized in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom/New Dawn and Operation Enduring Freedom since September 11, 2001. Today, more than 15,584 Warrior Citizens are serving in Iraq, Afghanistan and 22 other countries around the globe.

We execute a pre-mobilization readiness strategy that provides the Army ready formations and soldiers on an annual, predictable cycle. Through the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model, the Army Reserve synchronizes the plans and resources necessary to meet the readiness goals for units entering their available year. This maximizes "boots on the ground" time, builds cohesive teams and provides predictability for our Soldiers and Families.

### **Homeland Operations (HLO)**

Homeland Operations, which includes Homeland Defense, Homeland Security and Defense Support of Civil Authorities, has become an increasingly important mission for the Army Reserve and its applicable capabilities. The Army Reserve currently provides 37 units in support of the Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Response Enterprise. Properly managing this Army Reserve

commitment will necessitate growth of full-time manning and Troop Program Unit positions within the Homeland Defense Division.

The Army Reserve has relevant and capable units that we leverage in a Defense Support of Civil Authorities environment. This includes, but is not limited to, the following types of units: medical aviation, transportation, engineering, communications, and Civil Affairs. These capabilities can be packaged with the appropriate command and staff structure to facilitate assistance to civil authorities. This packaging can also provide necessary command and control of Title 10 Department of Defense resources in a defined joint environment. When combined with legislative efforts to amend existing mobilization authorities, the U.S. Army Reserve can provide significant resources to support civil authorities in domestic disasters and emergencies.

#### **Theater Security Cooperation Programs (TSCP)**

As requirements for Deployed Expeditionary Forces decrease as the result of planned force drawdowns in Operations New Dawn and Enduring Freedom, the Army Reserve is exploring other missions in an effort to sustain experience and readiness levels. Combatant commander TSCP programs require a wide range of forces, such as military police, for missions of varying duration. In many cases, Army Reserve formations are ideally suited to conduct these missions. The use of Army Reserve units: reduces stress on the active component, preserves the readiness gains made in the reserve component over the last decade, and spreads the burden of defending American interests across a larger portion of the citizenry.

#### **Training**

##### **Mandays to support an Operational Reserve:**

Using a progressive training strategy, the Army Reserve is committed to providing trained companies and battle staffs to combatant commands upon mobilization. With adequate resources that support reoccurring operational employments, we can effectively fulfill our mission. A sufficient number of training mandays, during the last three years of the ARFORGEN cycle, is imperative to meet established readiness aim points, which reduces post-mobilization training time and increases Boots on the Ground time for theater operations.

##### **Simulations and Simulators:**

The Army Reserve continues to engage the Army's Training Support System Enterprise that provides networked, integrated and interoperable training support capabilities that enable operationally relevant, full spectrum training for Soldiers anytime/anywhere. The use of simulations and simulators minimizes turbulence for Soldiers and their Families caused by training demands during the first two years of the ARFORGEN process by enabling individuals and units to train at their home station and during exercises in a safe environment without the increased wear and tear on equipment. An example of the simulators used to train Soldiers is the fielding of more than 630 Laser Marksmanship Training Systems to 346 Army Reserve locations over the past year.

##### **Home Station Training Capabilities:**

The Army Reserve remains dedicated to providing suitable platforms to support critical home station training for its units. Home station for the Army Reserve includes Reserve Centers, Local Training Areas, Regional Training Sites, and installations. Home stations must adequately portray the operational environment in training venues, facilities, and ranges with a mix of Live, Virtual (Simulators), and Constructive (Simulations), including gaming technologies. Modernizing our facility infrastructure through additional Military Construction and the retrofitting of existing facilities with state

of the art classrooms and simulator/simulation rooms enhances our ability to conduct individual and collective training, such as the inclusion of the weapons simulator rooms in our new Army Reserve Centers. Upgrading our existing Local Training Areas, and Regional Training Sites with ranges and training facilities provides units the capability to master critical tasks while training close to home.

#### **Army Reserve Comprehensive Soldier Fitness**

Comprehensive Soldier Fitness marks a new era for the Army Reserve by comprehensively equipping and training our Soldiers, Family members and Army Civilians to maximize their potential and face the physical and psychological challenges of sustained operations. We are committed to Comprehensive Soldier Fitness that will enhance resilience and coping skills enabling the Force to grow and thrive in today's Army Reserve.

This year, the Army Reserve trained over 100 Non-Commissioned and Commissioned Officers at the Department of the Army's Master Resiliency Trainer's Course. These trained leaders form the core of our resiliency effort and are currently conducting Resiliency Training at Army Reserve units globally. Initial feedback from Soldiers and Civilians that have attended this training, has been overwhelmingly positive.

#### **Training Equipment**

The Army Reserve has been able to meet both the logistics readiness requirements for mobilizing its units as an Operational Reserve force and the enduring standards outlined in regulations and directives. These results have been delivered through effective and intensive management, innovative programs, and strict adherence to priorities and effective enablers such as contracted maintenance and support to our units. We have developed and fielded "bridging" logistics management and information systems to augment those fielded and programmed by the Army. These systems have created a near "real time" data warehouse and responsive tools for our managers to quickly identify and resolve issues, especially in maintenance, property accountability and equipment distribution. We continue to find innovative ways to accomplish our missions with the resources provided as we move towards full implementation of our position as an Operational Reserve within the Army Force Generation Model.

#### **Security**

The Office of the Provost Marshall (OPM) manages the Force Protection of Army Reserve facilities and personnel. OPM's core functions are Antiterrorism, Police Operations, Physical Security and Law Enforcement. The Army Reserve has identified three mission priorities that OPM is responsible for managing which require funding:

##### **Installation Access Control:**

Army Reserve facilities are distinctive because they are stand-alone facilities in remote parts of the country. Maintaining positive control of access to these facilities is paramount to ensuring that the Soldiers and equities inside these facilities remain ready and available to combatant commanders. Funding to modernize access to Reserve facilities supports the Army Reserve objective of Protecting the Force.

##### **Intrusion Detection System (IDS) Maintenance and Monitoring:**

IDS systems monitor arms rooms at Army Reserve facilities 24-hours a day. Should an arms room at a remote facility be breached, creating the possibility that military weapons could fall into the hands of criminals or terrorists, the monitoring program ensures that authorities will be notified immediately.

##### **Antiterrorism Program Management:**

Antiterrorism (AT) Assessment Specialists are the key component of the Antiterrorism Program. AT Specialists conduct inspections of Army Reserve facilities across the nation to ensure facilities are in accordance with Department of Defense and Army standards. The Army Reserve spans over 1,100 stand-alone facilities across the continental U.S. With appropriate funding the Army Reserve can protect Soldiers and equipment vulnerable to criminal and domestic terrorist threats

#### **Aviation**

Army Reserve Aviation is a fully integrated, operational force with a fleet of more than 198 rotary wing and fixed wing aircraft. The diverse fleet provides speed, mobility, flexibility, agility, and versatility to the Army in support of full spectrum operations. Army Reserve Aviation has recently activated two new MEDEVAC companies. The MEDEVAC companies are located in Texas, Colorado, Pennsylvania, and Kentucky. Additionally, the Army Reserve aviation fixed wing units will accept delivery of six new C12V1 aircraft in 2011. These aircraft will fill a critical capability gap to meet Continental United States (CONUS) based training requirements in preparation for Overseas Contingency Operations. The Army Reserve continues to seek funds for the procurement four additional C12V1 aircraft. Lastly, Army Reserve Aviation continues to lead the way in Air Traffic Simulation. The first unit level Air Traffic Control simulator, located in the Marrayman Simulation Complex, Ft. Rucker, Alabama became operational this year. The system meets all Federal Aviation Administration requirements for certification. The simulator provides qualification and proficiency training for all Army controllers. This simulator is also used in aviation training exercises to validate controller skills prior to deployment.

#### **Base Realignment and Closure**

The Army Reserve is in its final year of the six-year execution of the BRAC 2005 mandated execution—which officially ends on 15 September 2011. Upon the conclusion of this BRAC window, the Army Reserve will have made significant changes shaping the force for relevant contributions well into the future. The year's execution will mark the culmination of the largest transformation of the Army Reserve since World War II by realigning the command and control structure into an operational configuration; realigning six major headquarters including Office of the Chief, Army Reserve and United States Army Reserve Command to new locations; disestablishing 12 Regional Readiness Commands; establishing four Regional Support Commands; activating five Sustainment Commands and eight Sustainment Brigades; constructing 125 Armed Forces Reserve Centers; and closing 190 facilities or activities.

BRAC provides an opportunity for the Army Reserve to power down to our major commands some of the functions that are typically managed at the Army Reserve Headquarters. We are implementing the Army's enterprise approach within our staff, which includes managing things like personnel issues and logistics issues at the lowest possible level of organization. When we power down some of these management issues to our regional and operational/functional commands during our BRAC move, it may make sense for those commands to retain management of some of those issues.

Completing the construction of 61 Armed Forces Reserve Centers and relocating units into these new facilities remains the largest priority of execution for Fiscal Year 2011 as all actions must be completed by September 15, 2011. The relocation of units into these new facilities will facilitate the closure and disposal of the remaining 143 of 176 Army Reserve Centers identified by BRAC for closure.

Over the next year the Army Reserve will execute and complete the remainder of all Army Reserve BRAC actions. These remaining actions will mark the end of the largest transformation efforts the Army Reserve has seen in its storied history.



**Communication (Information Technology)****Army Reserve Network**

The Army Reserve Network (ARNET) provides the Command and Control (C2) enablement in operationalizing the Army Reserve. The ARNET provides Army Reserve Leaders and Soldiers the ability to make timely informed decisions in the execution of overall C2 for all Army Reserve units throughout the contiguous United States and Puerto Rico. Over the past two years, the Army Reserve has worked closely with the Army in implementing the Global Network Enterprise Construct (GNEC) strategy as the way to grow and improve LandWarNet to an Enterprise activity. The ideal end-state is to provide Soldiers a universal email address, file storage, telephone number and a standardized collaboration tool set.

The Army Reserve's contributions to GNEC began in 2002 with an Army Business Initiative Council approved project. Elements of the project re-structured the legacy ARNET into a portion of the LandWarNet and developed a consolidated Data Center providing centralized core services (i.e., Active Directory, email, collaboration, file storage and centralized application hosting) for the entire Army Reserve. With approximately 85% of the consolidation completed, continued funding of the ARNET is integral in maintaining a global warfighting C2 capability. The Army Reserve's accomplishments and experiences have been applicable to the Army as we continue to participate in GNEC planning forums in aligning Army initiatives and timelines while ensuring Army Reserve Title 10 operational capabilities are met.

**BOX: Cyber Operations**

Army Reserve Soldiers offer current skill-sets and leap-ahead capabilities in the cyber environment. Warrior-Citizens employed in leading-edge technology companies have critical skills and experience in fielding the latest information technology systems, networks, and cyber security protocols.

**Secure Communication**

Secure communications is essential and mandatory, particularly with C2 and mobilization (i.e., deployment dates, passing mobilization orders, and C2 theater assets). Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPR) and Secure Video Teleconference (SVTC) for all Battalion and above units are vital in meeting all pre-mobilization training/readiness gates, mobilization training actions and day-to-day secure operational planning. The security of the Global Information Grid (GIG) is a constant challenge and reflected in DOD's standup of Cyber Command and the associated service elements. The same is true in the overall security posture of the ARNET in ensuring the uninterrupted flow of information to all ARNET authorized users. Continued investment in the Army Reserve secure communications and defense of the ARNET supplies Army Reserve Leaders, Soldiers and Civilians the capability of attacking and exploiting network threats.

**Army Reserve Facilities**

Reserve Centers, Training Support and Maintenance facilities are designed to meet the unique requirements of our community-based force. Our Soldiers, Families, and Civilians are strategically located across the country in over 1100 stand-alone facilities—Army Reserve Centers or Armed Forces Reserve Centers (which house other Department of Defense components along with Army Reserve). However, the needs of the Army Reserve are evolving. The Military Construction Army Reserve priorities for the FY2012-2017 Program Objective Memorandum are Army Reserve Centers, training support facilities, and maintenance facilities. The Army Reserve Centers are essential to

training Reserve Soldiers for the full spectrum of operations and the operations of the Army Reserve. Training Support Facilities are critical to conducting Army Reserve and active-component unit and collective training tasks in support of the Army Force Generation Model requirements. These facilities also provide the training platform to support The Army School System, which is composed of the reserve component, the active component Military Occupational Skill reclassification, and Officer and Non-Commissioned Officer Professional Military Education. Maintenance Facilities are the third priority to the facility strategy required as the logistics support to Army Reserve Equipment.

Base Realignment and Closure and emerging Army requirements for modular unit design, force protection, and energy efficiency continue to require new facilities or renovations to our existing facilities. Quality facilities are critical to the Army Reserve's ability to handle the increased training, mobilization, and Family and Soldier care activities that today's Army Reserve demands.

### **Energy Conservation**

The Army Reserve is especially proud that our facilities are at the forefront of energy sustainability. In 2010, several new Reserve Centers will achieve net-zero energy usage (self-sufficient without drawing additional power from the electrical grid). We have established a solar energy farm at Fort Hunter Liggett, CA, and are installing wind turbines and geothermal plants at several new facilities. The Army Reserve has started a retrofit program, replacing lights, windows, roofs, and other components with new energy-efficient technology, resulting in substantial savings in utility costs. The Army Reserve was the first Defense component to commission partnerships with local utility providers and to solicit third-party energy investors. In five years every state and U.S. territory will have Army Reserve facilities that are energy self-sufficient (net-zero), with many providing renewable energy back to the electrical grid. To continue this progress, the Army Reserve must conduct a sustainability evaluation of each facility. This will establish a sustainability baseline, which will in turn enable us to create a sustainability strategy that addresses the unique characteristics of each site. Continuing to invest in sustainable facilities will enable the Army Reserve to meet or exceed the Department of Defense requirement for a completely net-zero footprint by 2025. More importantly, the Army Reserve will save American tax dollars, return a valuable energy resource to the community, and assure reliable energy for Army Reserve Soldiers and Families.

Until energy independence is realized, it is imperative that the Army Reserve have fully funded utilities. In previous years utility costs have risen substantially, requiring the Army Reserve to re-program funds and accept risk in other areas. The Army's increasing emphasis on home-station training, ongoing deployments, and the needs of Army families in the community means that the Army Reserve needs constant, reliable access to energy in our Reserve Centers and training facilities now more than ever.

**BOX:** The Army Reserve was the first Defense component to commission partnerships with local utility providers and to solicit third-party energy investors.

### **Equipping**

#### Critical Equipping Needs of an Operational Reserve

- Resource Modernized equipment for the Army Reserve to improve Army Reserve readiness and capabilities within the ARFORGEN Model
- Maintain Army Reserve equipment at or beyond the Army standard of 90 percent Fully Mission Capable
- Provide Contracted Support for logistics operations and information systems to sustain logistics readiness
- Funding for state-of-the-art maintenance facilities

### **Army Reserve Materiel**

The Army Reserve, thanks to the support of Congress, is at an aggregate total of nearly 90 percent of its required equipment on-hand. Sixty-five percent of our on-hand equipment is classified as "modernized." However, we remain short in several areas of critical equipment. Around 35 percent of our required equipment lines are at less than 65 percent on hand. These shortages include tactical communications networks (satellite and terrestrial), command and control items and night vision systems. We have been able to sustain the pace of operations and training as an Operational Reserve by the continuous cross-leveling of available equipment among units. This does create an unsustainable level of friction, where a critical amount of equipment is not immediately available as the equipment is in transit (geographical dispersion of our units across the country), undergoing maintenance or awaiting deployment. In addition, some of our equipment is already deployed. The Army continues to work with us on identifying and filling shortages to improve readiness and capability to act as an Operational Reserve force under the Army Forces Generation Model.

### **Equipment Maintenance**

The Army Reserve maintains its equipment at or beyond the Army standard of 90 percent Fully Mission Capable. This ensures the availability of equipment for training and mobilization to support the operational force within the Army Force Generation Model. Units cannot train or mobilize without equipment that is ready to perform. Field level maintenance keeps the equipment ready for use. Funding for tools, consumables, military technician mechanics and contracted support sustains our field level maintenance activities. Good maintenance reduces the amount of "friction" (equipment in shop, in transit, etc.) that removes equipment from use. Depot maintenance is important in keeping older equipment operable, relevant and safe to employ. Recapitalization of equipment provides a source of modernized and more capable items when new procurement is insufficient to meet shortfalls or inventory losses. Funding for military construction provides new, modernized or expanded facilities to perform maintenance and staging of equipment.

### **Logistics Contract Support**

It is prudent to fund the Army Reserve for contract support for logistics operations and information systems to sustain logistics readiness. Contract support allows the Army Reserve to execute a vigorous assistance program in managing inventory and identifying and disposing of excess; providing field level repair and services during "surge" periods when units draw equipment for training or mobilization and in sustaining our critical logistics information and management systems. Contract support also strengthens our ability to meet operational demands and serve as an operational force

within the Army Force Generation Model, while meeting Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities missions.

**BOX:** However, we remain short in several areas of critical equipment. Around 35 percent of our required equipment lines are at less than 65 percent on hand. These shortages include tactical communications network (satellite and terrestrial), command and control items and night vision systems.

Leveraging contracted support, especially during periods of "surge" in mobilizing units, has supplemented our organizational capabilities. This enabler assists us in maintaining and preparing our equipment for training, mobilization and deployment, in operating and sustaining our logistics management and information systems in support of logistics operations and in managing the distribution of our equipment and identification and disposal of excess. We continue to find innovative ways to accomplish our missions with the resources provided as we move towards full implementation of our position as an operational force within the Army Force Generation Model.

#### **Equipment Facilities Management**

State-of-the-art maintenance facilities are the cornerstone of the Army Reserve's ability to sustain large equipment. The Army Reserve uses state-of-the-art environmental control features in maintenance facility designs that meet or exceed federal design standards. Data ports at vehicle work bays, fluid distribution systems that eliminate spillage, and oil/water separators are examples of proven design features. These features improve efficiency and enhance collection of fossil fuel waste, further safeguarding surrounding communities' land and waterways from contamination and pollution. Fire suppression systems and eye wash stations are standard safety design elements. The Army Reserve will continue to upgrade our older maintenance facilities, because the condition of maintenance facilities is directly related to our ability to maintain equipment in acceptable condition. Continued deployments and heavy training have taken a toll on both equipment and facilities. Facility sustainment is critical—in fact, it is a cost-saving measure realized over the life-cycle of the facilities, if done properly. Facility deficiencies, if left unchecked, tend to worsen exponentially over time. The ongoing investment in the facilities we build will ultimately reduce repair, renovation, and replacement costs in the future.

**CONCLUSION:****THE FORCE IS IN GOOD HANDS**

As we travel around the United States and the world and witness what our Soldiers are doing for their country, it's just inspiring to see the quality, the dedication and the professionalism of our Soldiers serving in the Army Reserve. These are top-notch individuals that have put their civilian careers on hold. They are well educated and have very bright futures ahead of them—but they joined our ranks to serve their country.

With more than 170,000 Army Reservists mobilized since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the force is more experienced than ever before and the Troops feel good about what they've accomplished and proven about the Army Reserve.

Today's environment of multiple deployments is telling us, however, the Army Reserve will need to keep giving these quality Soldiers fulfilling training and missions, a fair benefits package and more balance in their lives to keep them on our team. We cannot continue to expect them to keep up with a rapid operational pace without more time at home with their families and civilian employers between deployments, and they need predictability about when they will deploy. Toward that end, the Army Reserve is working to give its Citizen-Soldiers a bit more time to be "Citizens."

Today's Army Reserve recruits are attracted to an operational force because it enables them to serve their country in a meaningful way while allowing them to pursue a civilian career. When considering the future posture of the Army Reserve, we are convinced that after playing key roles in an operational force, they'll never be satisfied reverting to their long-abandoned "weekend warrior" status. We have transitioned our personnel and our mentality to an operational force and have created an environment and culture our Soldiers want to be part of—and that they feel good about. We have told the Army leadership and others there's no turning back. We cannot go back to a strategic reserve—one, because the nation needs us; but two, because our Soldiers have proven themselves capable of supporting this role.

Equally compelling, we as a military have come to the realization that we can't fight an extended conflict without the reserve. We have built an Army that is dependent on having access to the reserve when it needs us; and with the expectation that it is going to be trained and ready—a predictable capability that is not possible in a strategic posture.

One thing is certain about the future—while looking for ways to cut costs and reap a "peace dividend" once the troops draw down in Iraq and Afghanistan, there will be the temptation to turn back the clock and reinstitute a strategic reserve. Such a plan would deprive the United States of an important, battle-tested and cost-effective resource.

Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom and now New Dawn have demonstrated the capabilities the reserve components bring to the military. Particularly important are the "enabling capabilities" resident in the Army Reserve: logistical, engineer, military police, medical and civil affairs support.

We are now at a point where current and projected demands for Army forces will require continued access to the Army's reserve components, making real what has been in policy for some time. This means that mobilization and operational use of reserve component Soldiers and units will have to continue for the foreseeable future. The Army of the 21st century will require a versatile mix of tailorable and adaptable organizations—both active component and reserve component—interdependently operating on a rotational cycle.

Transforming the Army's reserve components into an enduring operational force provides a historic opportunity for the Army to achieve the most cost-effective use of its Total Force through investing in and relying on the Army's reserve components to take on a greater role in our nation's defense.

I am an American Soldier.

I am a Warrior and a member of a team. I serve the people of the United States and live the Army Values.

I will always place the mission first.

I will never accept defeat.

I will never quit.

I will never leave a fallen comrade.

I am disciplined, physically and mentally tough, trained and proficient in my warrior tasks and drills. I always maintain my arms, my equipment and myself.

I am an expert and I am a professional.

I stand ready to deploy, engage, and destroy the enemies of the United States of America in close combat.

I am a guardian of freedom and the American way of life.

I am an American Soldier.

**Army Reserve Snapshot**

**Mission:** The Army Reserve provides trained, equipped, and ready Soldiers and cohesive units to meet global requirements across the full spectrum of operations.

**Vision:** As an enduring operational force, the Army Reserve is the premier force provider of America's Citizen-Soldiers for planned and emerging missions at home and abroad. Enhanced by civilian skills that serve as a force multiplier, we deliver vital military capabilities essential to the Total Force.

**Key Leaders**

- Secretary of the Army: The Honorable John McHugh
- Army Chief of Staff: General George W. Casey, Jr.
- Chief, Army Reserve and Commanding General, U.S. Army Reserve Command: Lieutenant General Jack C. Stultz
- Assistant Chief, Army Reserve: Mr. James Snyder
- Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Army Reserve Command: Major General Jon J. Miller
- Deputy Chief Army Reserve, Individual Mobilization Augmentee: Major General Keith L. Thurgood
- Deputy Chief Army Reserve/Human Capital Enterprise: Brigadier General Leslie A. Purser
- U.S. Army Reserve Command Chief of Staff: Brigadier General William J. Gothard
- Director for Resource Management/Materiel Enterprise: Mr. Stephen Austin
- Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7/Force Programs Division/Readiness Enterprise: Colonel (P) Brian J. McKiernan
- Chief Executive Officer/Director, Services and Infrastructure Enterprise: Mr. Addison D. Davis
- Command Chief Warrant Officer: Chief Warrant Officer 5 James E. Thompson
- Command Sergeant Major: Command Sergeant Major Michael D. Schultz

**Army Reserve Basics**

- Established: April 23, 1908
- Designated Direct Reporting Unit to Army: October 1, 2007
- 2010 Authorized End Strength: 205,000
- Selective Reserve Strength: 205,281
- Accessions for FY 2009: 23,684 (105% of actual goal)
- Reenlistments for FY 2009: 12,227 (105% of annual goal)
- Accessions Goal for FY 2010: 20,000
- Soldiers Deployed Around the World: 15,584
- Soldiers Mobilized Since September 11, 2001: 196,711



- Number of Army Reserve Centers: 1,100

**Distinctive Capabilities:**

**The Army Reserve contributes to the Army's Total Force by providing 100% of the:**

- Theater Engineer Commands
- Civil Affairs Commands
- Training Divisions
- Biological Detection Companies
- Railway Units
- Replacement Companies

**...more than two-thirds of the Army's:**

- Medical Brigades
- Civil Affairs Brigades
- PSYOPS Groups
- Expeditionary Sustainment Commands
- Dental Companies
- Combat Support Hospitals
- Army Water Craft
- Petroleum Units
- Mortuary Affairs Units

**...and nearly half of the Army's:**

- Military Police Commands
- Information Operations Groups
- Medical Units
- Supply Units

**Army Reserve Demographics**

**Ethnicity**

Caucasian: 58.9% Pacific Isl: 1.0%

Black: 21.8% Native Amer: 0.7%

Hispanic: 12.8% Other 1.1%

Asian: 3.7%

**Average Age:** 32.1

Officers: 40.7

Enlisted: 30.3

Warrant: 43.1

**Married** 45.3%

Officers: 66.9%

Enlisted: 40.8%

Warrant: 72.2%

**Gender**

Male: 76.6%

Female: 23.4%

**Army Reserve Budget Figures**

**Total FY 2011 Budgeted: \$8.1 Billion**

Operations and Maintenance: \$3.2 Billion

Military Personnel: \$4.7 Billion

Military Construction: \$318 Million

**Total FY 2012 Programmed: \$8.8 Billion**

Operations and Maintenance: \$3.1 Billion

Military Personnel: \$5.3 Billion

Military Construction: \$318,175 Million

**Army Reserve Installations**

Fort Buchanan, P.R. Fort McCoy, Wis.

Devens, Mass. Fort Hunter Liggett, Calif.

Fort Dix, N.J. Camp Parks, Calif.

Legislative Affairs Contact: 703-601-0863 / 0854

**YOUR ARMY RESERVE**

The United States Army Reserve provides trained units and qualified Soldiers available for active duty in the armed forces in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require. Throughout the United States, the Army Reserve has four Regional Support Commands that provide base support functions, and 13 Operational and Functional Commands available to respond to homeland emergencies and expeditionary missions worldwide.

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**STATEMENT BY**

**MAJOR GENERAL RAYMOND W. CARPENTER  
ACTING DIRECTOR, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD**

**BEFORE THE**

**HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES**

**FIRST SESSION, 112<sup>TH</sup> CONGRESS**

**ON**

**NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE COMPONENT ACQUISITION  
AND MODERNIZATION**

**OCTOBER 12, 2011**

NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION  
UNTIL RELEASED BY  
THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

**Opening Remarks**

Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes, it's an honor and privilege to be here today to represent the 350,000 plus Soldiers of the Army National Guard. Currently, 37,266 Soldiers are mobilized. More than half have combat experience. The sacrifice of our Soldiers, their Families, and employers has been tremendous: they deserve our deepest gratitude.

Over the weekend of August 26-29, the National Guard once again demonstrated its value to America and its ability to remain focused as an operational force with its unique, dual mission. During that time, more than 63,000 National Guardsmen protected this country—at home and abroad:

- Over 47,500 National Guardsmen were deployed in support of Overseas Contingency Operations and partnership-building missions.
- Almost 10,000 members of the National Guard from 24 States responded to Hurricane Irene.
- Another 1,000 National Guardsmen provided security on the southwest boarder.
- An additional 4,000 National Guardsmen responded to a range of domestic emergencies across the country.

**From Citizen Soldiers to an Operational Force**

Our Army National Guard (ARNG) is approaching a decade of war with an all-volunteer force. Army National Guard Mobilizations in Support of Overseas Contingency Operations in FY10, including Soldiers who have mobilized multiple times, were 41,744 for Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) and

Operations Iraqi Freedom & New Dawn. There were an additional 3,115 mobilizations to the Balkans, Sinai, and elsewhere around the world. A staggering 480,000 Soldier mobilizations (number of individual ARNG Soldiers mobilized was 353,474) have been activated since 9 /11, and 39,325 Soldiers are currently mobilized as of 14 September, 2011.

We are an operational force in a transition mode within the ARFORGEN rotational cycle. To the credit of our Soldiers and their leaders, we are experiencing huge successes in our homeland defense and overseas missions. We continue to see young, and not-so-young, people who want to join and serve in the ARNG. Just as impressive are the retention rates of our current serving force; most are combat veterans who make the decision to continue to serve at historic rates. They clearly understand we are at war.

Our reenlistment rate as of the end of March 2011 for enlisted Soldiers is 76.2% of our total force and 79.9% of our Soldiers with Mobilization experience. These retention numbers are especially impressive when we consider that at the end of FY10 the average dwell time for our Soldiers with mobilization experience was 2.4 years. As a first step, the Army goal is to achieve 4 years dwell by 2014, but balancing the force will not happen overnight.

The experience we have gained since 9/11, the modern equipment fielded, the training delivered to our Soldiers, and the frequency of deployments, have resulted in a highly seasoned, well-equipped combat force.

- As of the end of August 2011, 50.5% of ARNG Soldiers are combat veterans – and we are working to retain that elevated level of experience.
- At the end of FY10, 84.45% of ARNG forces were Duty Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) Qualified
- This represents an escalating increase from 73.27% at the end of FY08 and 83.06% in FY09.

Our current level of ARNG combat experience and expertise is unparalleled. Prior to 9/11 the Reserve Component's role as a strategic reserve was focused on providing a hedge against major combat operations. This role assumed a significant training period prior to deploying RC forces and we required ample warning of their impending usage. Following 9/11, it became clear that the RC needed to respond quickly as part of the operational force in order to sustain combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as continue on-going US military obligations around the globe. Transitioning from a strategic reserve into an operational force required significant resources to properly man, equip, and train our RC formations to necessary readiness levels.

Now, after a decade of successful operational usage of the Reserve Component, it is clear the RC role as an operational force is critical to enabling the total Army to fulfill its mission to our Nation. The RC is at unprecedented levels of readiness, fully compatible with our Active Component brethren, and capable of accomplishing any mission across the full spectrum of operations.

Maintaining the RC as an Operational Force will also minimize the need for significant future investments. An array of Army and DoD studies, including the OSDRA and the General Reimer Study, has indicated that the cost of the RC and the AC are relatively equal when employed. However, when not employed in an active mission the RC is significantly less expensive. As the demand for forces decrease, maintaining an Operational Reserve will provide our Nation with a premiere military capability while preserving the gains of the last decade at a significantly favorable cost-to-benefit ratio.

For a fraction of the investment to date, the RC can preserve this level of readiness and maintain our interoperability – both imperative for an operational reserve. This can be achieved in a budget-constrained environment making the Army National Guard an extremely cost-effective, substantially paid-for option that the nation needs to sustain. With this in mind, it is important that we maintain our key force structure elements of 8 Divisions, 8 Combat Aviation Brigades, and 28 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs).

#### **Equipment and Critical Dual Use**

Our nation has invested more than \$37 billion in equipment for the Army National Guard in the past six years. That investment was made in both Critical Dual Use (CDU) and other required equipment, used for both domestic homeland crisis response missions and overseas contingency operations. Overseas contingency operations have spurred improvements in the capacity of the ARNG to support the war effort, to respond to natural and man-made disasters, to



provide critical assistance during state and national emergencies, and to be prepared to respond to potential terrorist attacks in defense of the homeland. Our homeland response enterprise includes 10 Homeland Response Forces (HRFs) – 2 validated in FY11 and 8 in FY12, 17 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFPs), and 57 Civil Support Teams (CSTs).

CDU equipment includes tactical radios, rotary aircraft, ground transportation vehicles, and digital command and control enablers. The Army has made significant efforts to improve the ARNG CDU equipment posture and remains committed to ensuring the ARNG has the CDU equipment required to support Homeland Defense/Homeland Security (HLD/HLS) and Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) operations. To highlight this level of commitment, ARNG equipment-on-hand rates for Critical Dual Use equipment are projected to increase to 94% by October 2012. That's an increase of 19% over the four years since the ARNG began monitoring CDU rates.

During fiscal year 2010, the ARNG received over 154,000 pieces of new equipment valued at \$9.8 billion. With this influx of new equipment, the on-hand percentage for all equipment is currently at 92% and continues to be maintained at levels greater than 90%. The Army continues to improve the equipment on hand and modernization levels for the Army National Guard. The Army views this as critical for the ARNG to be employed as an operational force. The Army Equipping Strategy established aim points for units as they progress through the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process which will help build unit

readiness and maintain unit parity in terms of both modernization and interoperability.

#### **Quality Facilities and Readiness**

The Army National Guard is a community based force. As such, our facilities are often the foundation for community support of an all-volunteer force. The ARNG has made some great progress with several LEED (Leadership in Environmental and Energy Design) Silver certified facilities meeting the qualifying requirements for recycled material usage, natural lighting, and energy conservation. We have further opened the call for volunteer installations to take part in Army IMCOM's Net Zero initiative. The ARNG, however, still has much work to do to provide quality facilities that support the ARNG dual mission across the 54 States and Territories. Quality facilities link directly with Soldier readiness, family, youth, and morale programs such as Yellow Ribbon and Youth ChalleNGe. The ARFORGEN model requires increased usage of ARNG facilities. However, forty percent of ARNG readiness centers are more than 50 years old and require substantial modernization or, in some cases, total replacement to meet the needs of an operational force. To achieve quality in facilities, we have thus far executed 99% of MILCON funds in FY10 and estimate we will need \$774 million in MILCON dollars for FY12.

**Aviation Support**

The Army National Guard (ARNG) aviation program, both fixed and rotary wing aircraft, provided huge benefits in supporting Domestic Operations this past year. Every year offers ARNG aviation a new set of challenges.

Last year, fixed-wing aircraft transported emergency supplies and personnel during floods, wildfires, and other emergencies across the nation and throughout the Gulf Coast during the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. During the oil spill recovery effort, ARNG aviation crews logged 3,722 hours and moved over 16 million pounds of cargo. The Operational Support Airlift Agency provided critical combat support by transporting blood donations and Wounded Warriors across the United States. Fixed-wing aircraft also transported much-needed supplies and personnel to Haiti after the January 2010 earthquake. At home and abroad, these aircraft flew 53,029 hours, completed 11,312 missions, transported over 3.5 million pounds of cargo, and carried more than 70,000 passengers.

Rotary wing units and aircraft in FY10 flew approximately 50,000 hours in civil support. These missions included support of disasters and declared emergencies in which Guard aviation displayed versatility and flexibility such as responding to the largest oil spill to affect the U.S., the Deepwater Horizon spill. ARNG rotary wing crews flew missions such as sand bag emplacement, personnel evacuation, engineer damage assessment, and law enforcement agency support. In Haiti the Puerto Rico National Guard flew two UH-60s based out of the Dominican Republic in support of the American Embassy in Port-au-

Prince giving an early signal that help was on the way to support the restoration of health services. ARNG Security and Support aircraft and crews continue to provide planned support to counterdrug operations nation-wide and notably along the southwest border. Our aviation forces responded to floods in Arizona, North Dakota, Louisiana, and West Virginia; provided wildfire support in Minnesota; and flew search and rescue missions in California, Colorado, New Mexico, Nevada, and Oregon. ARNG rotary wing missions crossed the full spectrum of domestic support.

ARNG fixed wing and rotary wing capabilities have been and continue to be a critical dual use asset that the Army and Adjutants General rely heavily upon. The operational tempo of our ARNG aviation units continues to be elevated as overseas commitments and domestic support requirements remain steady.

Army National Guard aviation not only supports Domestic Operations such as responses to hurricanes, oil spills, search and rescue operations, forest fires, floods, and weather emergencies, in addition, we continue to support overseas deployments such as Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation New Dawn, and Kosovo. We do so with an aging aircraft fleet. Since 2001, the ARNG has retired over 600 legacy aircraft and fielded 300 modernized aircraft. The ARNG is simultaneously modernizing aircraft to reduce sustainment costs, increase readiness, and support interoperability for the deploying force. ARNG aviation also includes Unmanned Aircraft Systems and related Ground Support

Equipment. Aviation and related support systems remain persistent items of interest on modernization priority lists.

The Army needs to continue its modernization plan if the ARNG is to meet current and future demands in the Homeland and on missions abroad. The ARNG fleet currently has shortfalls in CH-47 Chinook and AH-64D Apache airframes.

The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisitions, Logistics and Technology) recently directed the Program Executive Office-Aviation to divest the C-23 Sherpa aircraft not later than 31 December 2014. In accordance with Army guidance, the ARNG developed a plan to retire the 42 existing C-23 aircraft in 2011-2015. The 2010 Vice Chief of Staff, Army capability portfolio review directed a requirements-based assessment on the need for Army utility fixed wing aircraft. The ARNG expects more fidelity from HQDA in the coming months on the number of utility fixed wing aircraft the ARNG will continue to retain and operate to meet Army fixed wing requirements.

#### **National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation**

The National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation (NGREA) is a special Defense Appropriation that complements each Service's base appropriation. NGREA is intended to procure critical modernization items of equipment that the base appropriation is not able to fund.

The Army's goal is to ensure that ARNG units are equipped properly with Critical Dual Use (CDU) capabilities to execute Homeland Defense and Defense

Support to Civil Authorities (HLD/DSCA) missions effectively. These include federal missions, such as overseas deployments, and state missions, such as disaster relief in support of the governors.

Our specific ARNG goal is to equip the ARNG with over 80% of the CDU requirement. The Army has committed to keeping CDU equipment levels above 80% on hand. According to the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report (NGRER) 2010 report, the ARNG has the following key equipping challenges:

- Achieving full transparency for procurement and distribution.
- Equipping units for pre-mobilization training and deployment.
- Equipping units for their Homeland Missions
- Modernizing our helicopter fleet
- Modernizing our Tactical Wheeled Vehicle (TWV) fleet

The above challenges involve obtaining a full complement of “heavy tactical vehicles, small arms, communications systems, field artillery systems, and combat systems” (NGRER, 2010, p. 1-8).

#### **Military Construction (MILCON)**

Currently, 40% of our Readiness Centers are over 50 years old. Not only do many of these facilities fail to meet the needs of a 21<sup>st</sup> century operational force, many fall short of DoD, federal, or state building standards and requirements to include: anti-terrorism/force protection, energy efficiencies, and Americans with Disabilities Act (ACT) requirements. The Army National Guard

fiscal year 2012 military construction request for \$774 million is focused on improving this situation and making additional MILCON improvements in the categories of Grow the Army, Modernization, Transformation, Training Support, and Planning and Design and Unspecified Minor Military Construction. Under the Grow the Army category, we are submitting a request of \$101 million for 11 Readiness Centers. These new Readiness Centers will be implementing the energy efficiencies. For Modernization, our budget request includes \$197.7 million for 11 projects including readiness centers and aviation support centers in support of our modern missions. For Transformation, we are requesting \$197.9 million for ten projects which include three Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System Facilities (TUAS), five Readiness Centers, one Army Aviation Support Facility, and one Field Maintenance Shop. For Training Support: In fiscal year 2012, the Army National Guard is requesting \$245 million for 16 projects which will support the training of our operational force. These funds will provide the facilities our Soldiers require as they train, mobilize, and deploy. Included are five Operations Readiness and Training Complexes (ORTC), seven range projects, one Maneuver Area Training and Equipment Site (MATES), one railhead expansion and container facility, and two deployment processing facilities. For Other Support Programs, our fiscal year 2012 Army National Guard budget contains \$20 million for planning and design of future projects and \$12 million for unspecified minor military construction to address unforeseen critical needs or emergent mission requirements.

Lack of a fully funded MILCON request creates a significant backlog for construction projects. Deficiencies primarily exist in four main areas within ARNG facilities: readiness centers, training facilities, maintenance facilities, and infrastructure. The funding backlog for readiness centers is \$30.3 billion; the majority of these facilities cannot meet anti-terrorism/force protection (AT/FP) requirements.

### **ARNG Resilience**

People are our most precious resource. The quality of the Citizen Soldiers of the Army National Guard is unprecedented. However, we are experiencing a troubling increase in the incidence of suicides. In Calendar Year 2010, the ARNG suicide rate nearly doubled; the number of ARNG suicides for CY2009 and CY2010 were 62 and 112, respectively. Ninety-one percent of the ARNG Soldiers who committed suicide were Traditional Drilling Guardsmen vs. full-time Army National Guard and are not eligible for many of the support services available to the AC or our Title 32 Active Guard and Reserve Soldiers. Some had deployed in support of Army operations and over half had not deployed or were still in the process of being indoctrinated into the ARNG. While we do not know what triggers their actions, we do know the stressors that may affect their outlook. Employment issues, relationship issues and previous behavioral health issues must be identified and mitigated to promote Soldier welfare and well-being. Subsequently, the ARNG is teaming with DoD and the Army to



incorporate Traditional Drilling Guardsmen into future studies such as the Study to Access Risk and Resilience in Our Service Members (STARRS).

The ARNG has made the promotion of Resilience and Risk Reduction with a corresponding decrease in suicidal behavior our top priority. The ARNG has developed a holistic approach to enhance the resilience and coping skills of our Soldiers, Families, and Civilians by promoting risk reduction through leadership awareness, training and intervention programs. The ARNG Resilience, Risk Reduction and Suicide Prevention Campaign Plan was developed to promote an integrated program of prevention, intervention and mitigation at all levels. This document nested all other collaborative efforts within DOD, Army and NGB to promote unity of effort and synchronize our objectives. The plan was also distributed to State Leadership to shape and focus their efforts on improving the mental, physical, and spiritual health of their Soldiers and Families throughout our formations.

Since our Citizen-Soldiers are reflective of American society, it comes as no surprise that in-depth analysis indicates the increased ARNG suicide rate may correspond to an increasing national trend in at-risk and suicidal ideations and attempts. In addition to our efforts to promote Soldier resilience, the ARNG leadership also recognizes the role of ARNG Families, Peers, and Employers as providing the foundation of each Soldier's support network. These groups are present in the Soldier's life between their traditional drill periods and have the ability to identify and address negative behaviors before they lead to functional impairment or at-risk behaviors. The ARNG provided the States with training

programs for both family members and employers to assist in identifying those that should be referred to unit leadership for assistance and the applicable support services available in their community. States have capitalized on community based resources and solutions to provide services beyond the installation.

The ARNG resourced 54 Suicide Prevention Program Managers in the States in FY10 and trained over 356 Master Resilience Trainers assigned to brigades and battalions. We are striving to help each of our Soldiers become ready and resilient. For instance, the ARNG Leader's Guide to Soldier Resilience was developed to provide "battle drills" for common Soldier issues; this publication complements the ARNG CSM's Soldier to Soldier Peer Support program promoting "Buddy Aid" including basic intervention skills and trigger points for referrals or emergent care. The ARNG CSM has emphasized the roles and responsibilities of leadership during his two national CSM conferences this past year. Our Soldiers and families are encouraged to take the Global Assessment Tool, which identifies individual resilience levels and uses the self developmental modules to increase self awareness and resilience. Additionally, we increased collaboration with the Army Center for Substance Abuse in order to address substance abuse prevention, outreach and treatment for Soldiers, as well as Leaders and Families, so they understand their roles. Our efforts to increase assets available to Commanders to improve Soldier resilience include partnerships with national and community organizations such as the American

Red Cross, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Agency, counselors and clergy, and use of the Army's Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program.

Within the Army National Guard, we have set an ultimate goal of zero suicides. Our current count is 64 suicides so far this calendar year versus 84 this time last year. At this time it is too early to determine State level trends but we will continue to monitor them. Several States have developed comprehensive social support and mental health initiatives. These programs emerged out of a need to promote Soldier and family resilience and reduce potential stressors including employment and financial issues, domestic strife and promoting reintegration following deployment. Several of our States including Michigan, Nevada, Nebraska, California, Wisconsin, Kansas, and Illinois have innovative resilience programs and the National Guard Bureau is encouraging the exchange and expansion of best practices. The Army National Guard, in conjunction with the Active Army, the Department of Defense, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and each of the States, territories, and District of Columbia has made turning this trend around a priority. Many more efforts too numerous to cover here are ongoing and I am confident that, as a team we will turn this trend around. In the end, I believe the Soldiers and Families of the Army National Guard will be more resilient and ready in the service to the communities, States and the nation.

While the ARNG is making great strides within States to integrate suicide prevention, intervention, and risk mitigation at all levels, more work needs to be done. Desired ARNG capabilities, in terms of resilience, risk reduction, and suicide prevention, include emergent care and treatment for ARNG Soldiers

regardless of status; behavioral health and substance abuse treatment for Soldiers, regardless of status; resources to train and support State Resilience and Crisis Intervention personnel; and embedded behavioral health capability at the brigade level to promote healthy lifestyles and provide early identification of the potential at-risk Soldiers. After a nearly decade-long era of “persistent engagement,” ARNG families have been truly remarkable and their health and well-being are absolutely critical to the security of the nation. The services are vital to sustain our role as an operational force as well as promoting the continuum of care for those AC Soldiers who will transition to the RC during the upcoming reduction in the Army’s end strength.

Acknowledging unemployment as a stressful challenge affecting our Soldiers and Families, the Army National Guard implemented employment outreach as a necessary step in building resilience. The Job Connection Education Program is an employment initiative designed to help improve quality of life for unemployed or underemployed Soldiers. This program focuses on how Soldiers seek, obtain, and retain civilian employment.

In 2009, the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard became partners in a collaborative effort to build relationships with employers. In 2010, the employment program was renamed to the Employer Partnership Office (EPO). The goal of the EPO program is to create employment opportunities for Soldiers by establishing a good working relationship with the private sector. The program, in 2011, is known as the Employer Partnership of the Armed Forces. Members

from all the Reserve components, their Families, and Veterans have access to the tools and benefits of this program.

Of most importance is the effort to build resilience in our Soldiers. We are training "Master Resilience Trainers" and "Resilience Training Assistants" both of whom are Soldiers with acquired resources and insights. They will be assigned to every Company-size unit and will be responsible for teaching Soldiers coping skills. There are many more efforts too numerous to cover here that are ongoing and I am confident that, as a team we will turn this trend around. In the end, I believe the Soldiers and Families of the Army National Guard will not just be physically strong, but will be an emotionally and spiritually stronger force in service to our States, territories, District and nation.

#### **Medical Readiness**

Medical readiness of the Army National Guard is one of our highest priorities and as such we have provided the states with additional resources in support of the medical readiness mission. A national Case Manager/Care Coordinator contract has been in place since 2006 to assist in supporting the management of Soldiers identified with medical conditions that prevent deployment. Currently 100 Nurse Case Managers and 328 Care Coordinators are supporting all medical issues to ensure Soldiers have the best opportunity to regain medical deployability status.

In the past two years we have added full-time Medical Readiness NCOs (Non-Commissioned Officers) located in Battalion and above organizations.

Medical Readiness NCOs are responsible for the identification of medical conditions which may require some action by the case management team and serve as the medical readiness advisor to the commander.

Medical care has always been in place to support any Soldier in the ARNG with an injury or illness proven to be in the Line of Duty (LOD). The care is coordinated with the Military Medical Support Office through our Joint Force Headquarter Health Systems Specialist (HSS). Medical care provided based on an LOD is limited to the condition that occurred while in a duty status. With this in mind there are additional facts on the ground to consider:

- Traditional Mobilization-day Soldiers are not authorized to receive care from uniformed providers during IDT training. The only care authorized is to save life, limb or eyesight.
- Soldiers are directed to local emergency room for care that often times could be completed by ARNG provider assigned at training site.
- Minimal medical care is available when medical providers are serving on their 15 days of annual training. Anything more than urgent care is referred to local emergency room.
- All medical providers in the ARNG are credentialed and privileged.

There is no question that with the authority to perform medical or dental care from uniformed credentialed AMEDD providers in the ARNG, we could contribute to building the overall readiness in the ARNG. ARNG providers could assist firsthand in assuring a level of continuity of care and involvement in Soldier

medical/dental care that is currently restricted, based on current law and regulation. As a result, we are only authorized to provide emergency care in IDT status and limited routine care in AT status. Actually being able to provide limited treatment would assist greatly in building overall readiness and would shift cost from contracted care to uniformed care.

Additional efforts have been made administratively to provide assistance to those Soldiers identified who have certain medical conditions. The ARNG Medical Management Processing System was introduced this past December and provides a framework to manage Soldiers identified with medical conditions through the complexities of our health care systems. Effective use of this framework can assist in the return of Soldiers into our formations or into the Physical Disability Evaluation System (PDES).

In an effort to assist reserve component Soldiers who were having difficulty in negotiating the Army PDES, the Army established the Reserve Component Soldier Medical Support Center. The purpose of the RC SMSC is to expedite and assist Soldiers with PDES processing and ensure packets going through this system are complete, validated and tracked by the Electronic Medical Board system (eMEB). It appears up to 12,000 Soldiers in the ARNG may require processing through the Medical Evaluation Board/ Physical Evaluation Board (MEB/PEB).

When preparing our Soldiers for mobilization much time and effort is taken to ensure all Soldiers meet the medical standards as outlined by the theater of

operation. Today, units arrive at mobilization stations with over 90% of all Soldiers in the ARNG ready for deployment. The other 10% have minimal medical actions required in order to clear them for deployment. With that said less than 1% of the ARNG Soldiers sent to mobilize come back to the state with an identified medical concern that prevents them from deploying into their theater of operation.

Since September 2001, 494 ARNG Soldiers have paid the ultimate sacrifice in combat operations while 5,433 were wounded in action as of 13 Sep 11. As of 15 Sep 2011, the ARNG has 1,686 Soldiers assigned to the Warrior Transition Unit (WTU), 1,431 assigned to the Community Based Warrior Transition Unit (CBWTU) with a combined population of 3,119 Soldiers currently assigned. The cumulative numbers of Soldiers assigned to a WTU or CBWTU since its official start date of 1 June 2007 is 10,643. Additionally, 5,433 Soldiers have been wounded in action and 11,090 suffered from disease or non-battle injuries while deployed in support of contingency operations.

Soldiers who have deployed in support of a contingency operation have additional medical resources to call upon when the need arises. All Soldiers who deploy are eligible for TRICARE Early Eligibility 180 days prior to mobilization and 180 days post mobilization through the Transitional Assistance Management Program (TAMP). Eligible family members are also able to participate in TRICARE during the Soldiers mobilization. In addition, Soldiers can enroll in the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) health care system during demobilization. Recently discharged combat Veterans are eligible to take advantage of an enhanced health care enrollment opportunity for 5 years after discharge. After



the 5 year period, these Veterans will still be able to apply for health benefits with VA, but will have their status for receiving VA health care determined under normal VA procedures that base health care priority status on the severity of a service-connected disability or other eligibility factors. This would mean some Veterans could face income or asset-based restrictions, as well as delays in establishing their VA health care eligibility while their disability status is determined.

Providing care for our Soldiers who have never deployed has improved since Congress passed legislation in 2008 to support participation in the TRICARE network via TRICARE Reserve Select (TRS). TRS is a premium based health plan available for members of the Ready Reserve and their family members. Current premiums are \$53.16 per month for member only coverage and \$197.76 a month for member and family coverage. Although that might not seem like a lot of money, for a junior enlisted Soldier that could mean his or her entire monthly drill check going to pay for health care premiums. As of January 2011, 15,769 Soldiers are currently enrolled in TRS in the Army National Guard. The ARNG is focusing on reducing the number of medically non-deployable Soldiers within our formations, but without a full-time health care benefit medical readiness, remains a challenge.

**Exercise, Exchanges, and Theater Engagement** - The ARNG currently fills 63% of all exercise requirements for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). With a budget of approximately \$17M, the ARNG sends in excess of 20,000 Soldiers

OCONUS to participate in bilateral and multilateral exercises in direct support to the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) Campaign Plans. Each FY, approximately 400 Soldiers annually participate in exchanges with the United Kingdom, Germany, Norway, France and Italy. As a key component towards building partner capacity, the ARNG has apportioned a Maneuver Enhancement Brigade to US Army Africa and an Engineer Brigade to US Army South to provide a subordinate level command and control headquarters as well as an available pool to fill ASCC requirement shortfalls. More than 7,000 Soldiers will participate in engagement activities in support of the State Partnership Program and its 62 members. The ARNG should continue to support engagement requirements from the Army Global Civil-Military Emergency Preparedness Program, Security Assistance Training Management Organization, and other programs to enhance the Army Service Component Command Campaign Support Plans.

ARNG Citizen-Soldiers, through the SAATS methodology, advise developing nations on improving internal defense capabilities and provide assistance in establishing infrastructures and economic bases for regional stability. Proposed SAATs mission sets would include:

- Emergency Preparedness & Consequence Management.
- Border/Port Security Mentorship and Training.
- Counter Drug Training & Demand Reduction Education.
- Cyber Security Training to include Computer Network Defense.
- Professional Military Development at the small-unit leader level.

**Cyber Future Capacity** - Since the focus of Cyber initiatives remain within building a national, operational defense capacity, the ARNG is uniquely available to accomplish this objective. Data Processing Units could be used as the model for building organic Cyber-Unit capacity within the ARNG. These Citizen-Soldier Cyber-Units would then serve as the first responders to a Cyber attack in the states; given a physical attack on the Homeland would likely be preceded by a Cyber event. Possible organizational growth in each FEMA region further enables Homeland Defense response and orchestration.

#### **Increased Training Requirements Prior to Mobilization**

ARFORGEN training will follow the standard progressive path starting with individual/crew/squad-section advancing to platoon and ending with company level proficiency (not precluding Staff CPXs, BN FTXs thru MRXs, etc.). As such training requirements will be dependent on a specified mission, or the requirement to maintain/sustain MTOE mission readiness pending a potential mobilization.

- Deployment Expeditionary Forces (DEF) units will train on specified tasks and requirements IAW their assigned mission.
- Contingency Expeditionary Forces (CEF) units will conduct their MTOE mission training ISO full spectrum operations, or on tasks mandated for assigned mission. CEF units continue their wartime MTOE training

during the Available Phase until assigned a DEF mission and mobilized.

- Any additional mission-specific training for re-designated DEF units will be completed during post-mobilization and prior to deployment.

**Closing Remarks**

The ARNG has, by any measure, exceeded all expectations required by operational deployment. These have been real-world missions. They have run the gamut from global engagements half a world away to rapid responses when disasters occur on America soil.

Our evolutionary arc toward an operational force has been accelerated by the right equipment and the right training. The result is the right ARNG for the nation.

In 2011 the ARNG offers a double return on investment:

- In the near term we are more cost effective - even in times of fiscal constraint.
- In the long term we are more ready – to help avert (or respond to) another 9/11 event, to play an integral role in the Total Army and to safeguard the Homeland.

I appreciate the opportunity to be here today and invite your questions and comments. Thank you Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Bordallo and the distinguished members of the subcommittee.

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**STATEMENT BY**

**LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARRY M. WYATT III**

**DIRECTOR, AIR NATIONAL GUARD**

**BEFORE THE**

**HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE**

**SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR & LAND FORCES**

**FIRST SESSION, 112<sup>TH</sup> CONGRESS**

**ON**

**NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE COMPONENT ACQUISITION  
& MODERNIZATION**

**OCTOBER 12, 2011**

NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION  
UNTIL RELEASED BY  
THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

**Opening Remarks**

Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes, and distinguished members of the subcommittee; I am honored to appear before you today on behalf of the outstanding men and women serving in our nation's Air National Guard. I would like to begin by expressing my sincere appreciation to the Committee for its tremendous support to the Air National Guard. Your work ensures America continues to have an Air National Guard that is responsive to our domestic needs as well as providing operational capabilities critical to the success of our Total Force. As we face increasingly limited resources and shifting budget priorities, we must accentuate the strength of the Air National Guard—our cost effectiveness.

**Air National Guard in National Defense**

Facing a need to reduce the Defense budget in response to domestic priorities and the need to sustain defense capabilities in light of growing foreign challenges, Secretary of Defense Melvin B. Laird put his faith in the Reserve Components. Secretary Laird wrote in 1970, "Within the Department of Defense...economics will require reductions in overall strengths and capabilities of the active forces, and increased reliance on the combat and the combat support units of the Guard and Reserves."<sup>1</sup> He understood that by increasing the readiness of the Guard and Reserves and then relying upon them "to be the

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<sup>1</sup> Melvin B. Laird, Memorandum to the Secretaries of the Military Departments, Subj: Support for Guard and Reserve Forces, August 21, 1970.

initial and primary source for augmentation of the active forces in any future emergency<sup>2</sup> the nation would maintain its defense capability and capacity while decreasing the overall costs.

The US Air Force leadership at the time recognized that as the nation's first military responder, increased reliance on the Reserve Components meant the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard must be ready to respond quickly and integrate seamlessly into any operation; they would require equipment and training comparable to the regular, active duty Air Force. The ANG, with significant help from Congress, traded in its obsolete equipment for newer, and in some cases brand new aircraft. The ANG also received additional funds for training, including modern flight simulators, and full-time Guard Airmen (Active Guard & Reserve (AGR) and Technicians) to oversee the increased training regimen.

Improved operational readiness brought with it a rejuvenated desire by Guard Airmen to do more than just train – a desire to demonstrate their capabilities. ANG units began volunteering to augment the Regular Air Force by participating in on-going operational missions around the world. To the customer, the Air National Guard became indistinguishable from the Regular Air Force. This was done within the fundamental framework of a part-time professional force operating modern compatible equipment. It was the second generation of Secretary Laird's Total Air Force that fought in Operation DESERT SHIELD, Bosnia, Kosovo, responded to the attacks on 9/11, maintained the no-fly zones in Iraq (Operation NORTHERN WATCH and SOUTHERN WATCH), Operation

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<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*

IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM. Last year (CY2010), Guard Airmen filled 54,604 manpower requests, and 89% of these Guard Airmen responded to the call voluntarily, without the need for "involuntary mobilization." On 17 March this year, as the United Nations Security Council debated the Libyan no-fly zone resolution, Air National Guard aircraft and air crews were already en route Forward Operating Bases awaiting orders.

The world is a very different place today than when Secretary Laird established the Total Force, but the underlying principle of the Total Force remains true: the nation can maintain defense capabilities at less total cost through careful balance of Active and Reserve Component forces.

The Air Guard provides a trained, disciplined, and ready force for a fraction of the cost. The Air National Guard savings are due to our part-time business model. Approximately 70% of our Guard Airmen are traditional part-time professionals, meaning that they are only paid when serving on active duty or training. Also, the Air National Guard seldom pays subsistence or housing allowances, or for permanent change of station moves for the members and their families.

Another key factor to our cost effectiveness is the infrastructure savings inherent in the Air National Guard basing model that not only allows us to operate efficiently, but also allows us to be a part of, and contribute to, communities across the country while providing a military presence and recruiting base in all 54 states, territories, and the District of Columbia. With some of our leases costing as little as one dollar annually, the Air Guard is able to realize even more



cost savings through its supporting infrastructure. In fact, for less than \$4 million annually through Joint Use Agreements, the Air National Guard provides stewardship to approximately \$12 billion in infrastructure.

### **Domestic Operations**

A third element to Air National Guard cost-effectiveness is its contribution to homeland defense and support to domestic civil authorities. As an example, on October 1, 2011, there were 3,434 Guard Airmen actively engaged in homeland defense and support to civil authorities including protecting American skies through Aerospace Control Alert,<sup>3</sup> assisting with critical infrastructure protection, and assisting their local communities with disaster recovery in North and South Dakota, Missouri, and Nebraska. This also includes 578 Guard Airmen supporting local and national counterdrug programs and 121 Airmen assisting the US Border Patrol on our southwest border. Air National Guard Modular Aerial Fire Fighting (MAFFS) units dropped 20,000 gallons of fire retardant supporting the National Forestry Service in the Southwest.<sup>4</sup>

Many are unaware of the contributions and skills our Guard Airmen provide to domestic support to civil authorities. The Air National Guard has particular core capabilities for which we are uniquely trained and equipped.

Many have been used in the past year alone, to include:

- Air Defense
- Air Traffic Control

<sup>3</sup> USNORTHCOM and NORAD changed Air Sovereignty Alert (ASA) to Aerospace Control Alert (ACA).

<sup>4</sup> ANG MAFFS units have flown 162 missions, 210.1 flight hours, and dropped 393,784 gallons of retardant since the beginning of the 2011 fire season. On 3 October, there were 2 MAFFS and 1 C-130 supporting the NFS.

- Airlift (transportation, supply, & evacuation)
- Civil engineering
- Specialized medical care & evacuation
- Incident awareness & assessment
- Aerial firefighting
- Search and rescue (air & ground)
- Explosive Ordnance Disposal
- Hazard Material (HAZMAT) detection, identification, & removal
- Communications

The Air National Guard's support to civil authorities is based upon the concept of "dual-use," *i.e.*, equipment purchased by the Air Force for the Air National Guard's federal, combat mission, can be adapted and used domestically when not needed overseas. For example, an Air National Guard F-16 wing contains not only F-16 fighter aircraft but fire trucks, forklifts, portable light carts, emergency medical equipment including ambulances, air traffic control equipment, explosives ordinance equipment, etc., as well as well trained experts – all extremely valuable in response to civil emergencies. However, if the F-16 wing converts to a non-flying mission or even a Remotely Piloted Aircraft mission, much if not all of this dual-use equipment may leave with the aircraft. As the Air Force proceeds with its recapitalization and modernization plans, we need to ensure our citizens are not left without essential disaster response capabilities.

**Future of the Air National Guard**

Our National Guard Airmen want nothing more for the future than to continue to serve their country, state, and local community. These are men and women who are very proud of the National Guard's 375 years of service, but they also understand that the nation's needs are changing. They are dedicated to ensuring the Air National Guard remains an essential element of the Total Force, and at the same time, is cost-effective. But we also know that in today's uncertain world cost alone is not sufficient; the Air National Guard must also be ready and accessible if it is to be effective.

For the Air National Guard to be effective, it must have equipment capable of performing the mission and able to integrate seamlessly into joint operations. Our Airmen must also be capable of performing the mission through training and professional education.

And finally, effectiveness requires accessibility. The proposed changes to Title 10, Section 12304 will improve the accessibility to the Air National Guard as a rotational, operational force to augment the Air Force as well as providing support to local, state, and federal civil authorities during emergencies. Furthermore, the provision requiring manpower costs be included in the budget will help ensure that the funding is available for using the Reserve Components. If the nation is to continue to rely upon the Reserve Components, as we believe it should, then the Reserve Components must be equipped and trained commensurate with the Regular Components and the Department must budget for their use.

**Closing Remarks**


Our National Guard Airmen have proven themselves to be ready, reliable, and accessible in recent actions here at home and overseas. Every dollar spent on the Air National Guard provides our nation an unmatched return on investment. Given adequate equipment and training, the Air National Guard will continue to fulfill its Total Force obligations and seamlessly integrate into the Joint theater operations and respond to domestic emergencies.

We need your help to ensure that the Air National Guard of tomorrow is as a ready, reliable, accessible, and cost effective as it is today.

Thank you for the opportunity to be here today, I look forward to your questions.

## United States Air Force

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Presentation

Before the House Armed Services Committee,  
Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces

### ***National Guard and Reserve Component Acquisition and Modernization Posture***

Statement of  
Lieutenant General Charles E. Stenner, Jr.  
Chief, Air Force Reserve

October 12, 2011

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED  
BY THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

**Introduction**

The 21<sup>st</sup> Century security environment requires military services that are flexible -- capable of surging, refocusing, and continuously engaging without exhausting their resources and people. The United States Air Force continues to present capabilities in support of joint operations, and the Reserve Component has evolved to the point that we are critical to those operations. In an increasingly limited fiscal environment, Reservists remain efficient and cost-effective solutions to our Nation's challenges.

It is in this dynamic environment that the Air Force Reserve excels. Reserve Airmen are supporting our Nation's needs; providing operational capabilities around the globe. Today, Air Force Reservists are serving in every Area of Responsibility (AOR); there are approximately 4,300 Air Force Reservists activated to support operational missions worldwide. Not only are Reservists serving in the more commonly known conflicts such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, but they are also serving in lesser publicized locations such as Austin where Air Force Reserve crews are fighting fires with C-130 aircraft equipped with the Modular Firefighting System from the intense wildfires continuing to burn in Texas.

Primarily volunteers, Citizen Airmen are ready and willing to answer the call—wherever and whenever that call might be. The Air Force Reserve has never had a more combat-ready, seasoned force. It is crucial we continue to provide them with the equipment, the training, and the resources they need to accomplish the mission. The Air Force Reserve has sustained our operational capabilities for nearly twenty years—at a high operations tempo for the past ten. We accomplish this while continuing to provide a cost-effective and combat ready force available for strategic surge or on-going operations.

**Overview**

The Fiscal Year 2012 President's Budget Request would fund Air Force Reserve requirements of approximately \$5 billion. It provides for the operation and training of 34 wings, funds 117,769 flying hours, maintains 344 aircraft, and provides for the readiness of 71,400 Reservists and 4,157 civilian employees. Our budget request is about 4% of the total Air Force budget, and includes \$2.27 billion for operations and maintenance for air operations, service support and civilian pay; \$1.7 billion for military personnel; and \$34 million for military construction.

Not only does our FY12 budget request ensure Air Force Reservists are trained and prepared to support Air Force and Combatant Command requirements, but it also demonstrates our commitment to the DOD's focus on efficiencies. Through better business practices, by leveraging new technology, and by streamlining our force management efforts, we identified \$195 million in efficiencies for FY12 alone. With your continued support, we have focused our efforts this year on rebalancing our force, recapitalizing our equipment and infrastructure, and supporting our Reservists and the balance between their civilian and military lives.

#### **Air Force Reserve Rebalancing the Force**

The Air Force leverages the value of its Reserve Components through association constructs in which units of the three components share equipment and facilities around a common mission. To ensure our integrated units achieve maximum capability, the Air Force Reserve must be interoperable not only with the Guard and Active Component, but with Joint and Coalition forces as well.

Properly training and equipping the Reserve Components to train and fight in concert with their active duty counterparts will ensure the Nation continues to have the "Strategic Depth" necessary to meet existing and future challenges. After years of continuous combat operations and development of the association construct, the Air Force Reserve has become seamlessly integrated with its Guard and Active Component counterparts--we cannot afford to be placed "back on the shelf".

From a financial perspective, our Airmen are a cost-effective force provider, comprising nearly 14 percent of the total Air Force authorized end-strength at only 5.3 percent of the military personnel budget. The Air Force Reserve Airmen cost per capita is 27.7 percent of Regular Air Force Airmen, or roughly 3.5 Reserve Airmen for the cost of one Active Component Airman.<sup>1</sup> It's important to emphasize when traditional Air Force Reserve Airmen are not training or performing an operational mission – they are not being paid; yet they remain ready to

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<sup>1</sup> FY 2010 Budget, figures derived from ABIDES (Automated Budget Interactive Data Environment System), the budget system currently in use by the Air Force and recognized as the official Air Force position with respect to the Planning, Programming and Budget Execution (PPBE) system. Inflation data used for any constant dollar calculations were based on average Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) rates for the past ten years: roughly 2.6% average annual rate of inflation. Medicare Eligible Retirement Health Care (MERHC) is an accrual account used to pay for health care of Medicare-eligible retirees (age 65 and beyond). Cost per capita figures were derived dividing cost of Selected Reserve program by Selected Reserve end-strength. When MERHC figures are included, the cost of Air Force Reserve Airmen to Regular Air Force Airmen increases to 30.4%.

respond to crises world-wide within 72 hours if and when they are called upon. Given the resource challenges affecting our Nations' security, this fulltime readiness/part-time cost is the most cost efficient model for doing business.

Reserve Airmen are among the most experienced Airmen in the Air Force. Air Force Reserve officers average roughly 15 years of experience, and enlisted members average 14 years of experience, compared to 11 years and 9 years for Regular Air Force officers and enlisted members, respectively. Sixty-four percent of Air Force Reserve Airmen have prior military experience that crosses all Services and Components--further demonstrating the economic benefit of the Reserve components. This experience translates into additional cost efficiencies, such as reduced aircrew training costs for experienced aviators, who require fewer flying hours for training. By enabling Airmen to continue serving, we also retain the significant training investment made by the Active Component in these professionals.

Last month, the Air Force Reserve announced the re-missioning of its three Numbered Air Forces (NAF), along with their three Regional Support Groups, to better focus on their primary roles of command and readiness. All three NAFs are charged to ensure their subordinate units are trained and ready to deploy. This modernization initiative reorganizes the administrative functions of the higher headquarters resulting from a 13-month analytical effort intended to ensure we are operating as effectively and efficiently as possible—in short, we are reducing manpower and redirecting resources to the war-fighter.

While restructuring our NAFs we established a Force Generation Center (FGC) that provides a single point of entry for accessing all Air Force Reserve forces. The FGC's intent further modernizes our force management practices; providing a unified picture of our combat capability to our Combatant Commanders while providing our customers with a single point of entry with a consistent set of business rules. In addition to improving our services to the Combatant Commanders, the FGC allows the Air Force Reserve to be more responsive to the needs of individual Reservists, providing them greater predictability. Collectively, these actions contribute to the overall health of the Air Force—making us a leaner organization while improving the lives of the men and women who serve with us.



**Air Force Reserve Modernization**

The Air Force Reserve's modernization strategy has consistently focused on providing our force with modern systems (Precision Engagement), protecting our force while they defend our nation (Defensive Systems), and equipping our force for Irregular War Operations (Personal Protective Equipment). The National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account (NGREA) is the funding engine that allows us to do this on a cost-efficient basis. It is our primary means of ensuring the Air Force Reserve is equipped with the most relevant, modern and compatible fielded technologies, thereby increasing our combat capability. Since 1981, NGREA has allowed the Air Force Reserve to upgrade our equipment with better targeting, self protection and communication capabilities; and it has proven critical in support of combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.<sup>2</sup>

Our modernization and equipping strategy intends, first and foremost, to alleviate critical mission capability shortfalls. Critical shortfalls are those whereby the mission cannot be accomplished without modernization or where mission failure or loss of life could occur to lack of the capability. Upgrade of defensive system capabilities, communications equipment and data links, situational awareness enhancements, precision engagement to include target identification, safety-related enhancements and replacement of obsolescent mission equipment are currently the typical drivers of our critical shortfalls.

We are also participating in a cooperative effort with the Air National Guard, Air Force Materiel Command and Air Staff to review Air Force obligation processes and develop improvements. While improvements should begin to manifest themselves during FY12, meeting the 80% first-year obligation goal will always be a challenge for NGREA. As an unprogrammed

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<sup>2</sup> NGREA made possible state-of-the art avionics upgrades to the F-16 Block 30 weapons system. As a result, the Air Force Reserve was asked to remain in Afghanistan to support the air campaign against the Taliban as this upgrade was not available to the active component at that time. Litening Pods purchased with NGREA funds allow for an availability of training that the active component does not get. ARC F-16 and A-10 pilots are the most experienced targeting pod users in the Combat Air Force. The BLOS (Beyond Line of Sight) SATCOM and SLOS (Secure Line of Sight) radios installed on our F-16s and A-10s were also purchased using NGREA dollars. Communication has traditionally been one of our largest obstacles in the AOR and these systems have immensely improved communication necessary to respond to rapidly changing situations on the ground allowing us to protect our ground forces. These systems were so successful that our active duty component has followed our successful lead and installed the systems on their aircraft.

appropriation, NGREA execution is hindered as it has no obligation authority under continuing resolutions and contractual solicitations cannot be issued prior to appropriation of funds.

I am happy to report to you that NGREA dollars are at work today in the AOR, saving lives. For example, a tool called the Smart Multi-Function Color Display (SMFCD) provides our combat search and rescue (CSAR) helicopter, the HH-60G Pave Hawk, with enhanced datalink and situational awareness capabilities. This SMFCD has been priceless in the overall situational awareness enhancement for pilots, allowing the aircrew to receive survivor information while airborne without using precious satellite communications assets that need to be used elsewhere in theater. The SMFCD clarifies critical information on patient location and medical condition, resulting in more accurate and expeditious treatment of our wounded. Furthermore, the SMFCD has allowed the Flight Engineer and Pararescuemen to see all available mission and flight data reducing crew workload, increasing crew safety and ensuring mission success. The SMFCD allows all HH-60G crew members to monitor aircraft performance, the ground order of battle and threats surrounding Landing Zones. Most importantly, time spent on the ground waiting for patient data is eliminated, enabling rescue aircrews to launch in only 5-7 minutes of notification. While enroute to the patient, critical mission information is sent directly into the cockpit. With use of the SMFCD equipment, rescue crews have optimized the time within the golden hour to provide trauma care, rather than in transport.

In 2006, we identified the need for this capacity at an annual Weapons and Tactics conference. Air Combat Command granted our request to pursue our own SMFCD program in June 2009. Just three months later, a contract was awarded. In May 2010, the Air National Guard Air Force Reserve Command Test Center (AATC) started to test the SMFCD. On September 7, 2010 the first production kit was installed on a Reserve Component HH-60G. From start to finish, our acquisition and integration process through NGREA funding took only 15 months.

In total, 15 Air Force Reserve and 17 Air National Guard aircraft were subsequently modified. In less than 20 months from contract award, the SMFCD was in use by tactical units in Afghanistan. It's important to note that the Active Component does not have this capacity and won't for another two to three years. This upgrade satisfies a Combatant Commander directed requirement for units to arrive in theater with datalink capability. Most importantly, this

NGREA effort directly contributed to saving 331 lives and 268 assists during OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM.

Additionally, using FY09, FY10 and FY11 NGREA funds, the Air Force Reserve responded to a Combatant Commander Urgent Operation Need (UON) related to the capabilities of our A-10 and F-16 fleet. Through acquisition of the Helmet Mounted Integrated Targeting (HMIT) system we were able to enhance our pilots' capability to cue aircraft sensors and weapons well outside the Heads-Up Display (HUD) field of view of their aircraft. This commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) system is a common solution for both the A-10 and F-16 aircraft. Additionally, HMIT incorporates color displays in its system and is compatible with current night vision goggle systems to enhance night time flying capabilities. These capabilities increase the situational awareness of our A-10 and F-16 pilots by 400% and decrease incidents of friendly fire deaths caused when pilots move their heads away from their controls to see targets on the ground. We have completed purchasing and expect delivery of this upgrade in FY12.

In addition to improving our combat capabilities, it is important to note that NGREA has enabled us to upgrade equipment associated with Homeland Defense and those missions that are specific solely to the Air Force Reserve. For example, recent NGREA funding has enabled us to begin replacing the unique aerial spray systems maintained by the 910th Airlift Wing, the only unit within the Department of Defense with this capability. This system has been used recently in response to mosquito control in the Midwest and during last year's BP Deep Water Horizon Oil Spill clean-up. We have allocated \$4.5M of FY11 funds to initiate the Modular Aerial Spray System, with contract award anticipated no earlier than September 2012.

Modernization is not just about equipment and weapons systems. It includes force structure, such as our NAF reorganization. It also includes Military Construction (MILCON) and Infrastructure Modernization. The Air Force Reserve continues to face significant challenges in modernizing our facilities and infrastructure.

During budget formulation this year, all three components applied asset management principles to our programs and attempted to ensure maximum efficiency without compromising the effectiveness of our installation weapon systems-- the platforms from which we fly and fight.

The Total Force MILCON request ensures construction is closely aligned with weapon system deliveries and strategic basing initiatives—spending money in the right place, at the right

time. Despite the Air Force Reserve's best efforts to efficiently allocate our facility funding, the challenges inherent in today's budget environment has resulted in a backlog of infrastructure requirements exceeding a billion dollars.

The Air Force Reserve MILCON budget request for Fiscal Year 2012 is \$33.6 million. This request funds our highest priority current mission project, the construction of a Control Tower and Base Operations facility for the 452nd Airlift Wing at March Air Reserve Base, California. It also includes one new mission project to construct a Readiness and Training facility at Charleston Air Force Base, South Carolina for a new RED HORSE Squadron. It provides Planning and Design funds needed to prepare for the FY13 and FY14 programs along with Minor Construction funds that will be used to accomplish urgent and compelling projects which cost less than two million dollars.

As we continue to work within a fiscally constrained environment, we will pursue further optimization of space allocation with increased facility consolidation and demolition, and mitigate risk where possible. But, we must be mindful that our Airmen deserve a safe and adequate working environment.

#### **Conclusion**

The Air Force Reserve would expect negative impacts in inventory of aircraft as well as a reduction in training should funding reductions occur in FY12. Any reduction in funding will translate in a decrease in readiness.

Orderly completion of on-going programs has first call on appropriated NGREA funds, barring emergence of a significant new requirement, such as an Urgent Operational Need. Failure to fund on-going programs causes significant disruption in acquisition programs and fielding plans which can propagate into deployment plans, depending on deferred or lost operational capabilities. Deferred procurements incur increased costs and may incur risks associated with diminishing manufacturing source issues.

While it is impossible to say what possible industrial base impacts may result from potential funding reductions, I would ask this committee to consider that Citizen Airmen live and work in communities across America. When local economies are negatively impacted, unit readiness may suffer as members leave their communities in search of civilian employment.

We take pride in the fact that when our nation calls on the Air Force Reserve, we are trained and ready for the fight. As an operational force over 70,000 strong, we are mission-ready and serving operationally throughout the world every day.

In a time of constrained budgets and higher costs, it's important that processes exist to effectively prioritize our needs. We must understand the vital role we play in supporting our nation's defense and concentrate our resources in areas that will give us the most return on our investment. Optimizing the capabilities we present is a top priority, but we must simultaneously support our Airmen, giving them the opportunity to have a predictable service schedule that meets the needs of Reservists, their families and their employers.

The Air Force Reserve must also remain flexible, capable of surging, refocusing, and continuously engaging without exhausting resources and people. Looking beyond FY12, it is imperative that we preserve the health of our strategic reserve and improve our ability to sustain our operational capability. Going forward, we need to continuously balance capabilities and capacity against both near-term and long-term requirements. These actions we continue to advance in 2011 will preserve the health of our force.



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**DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD**

OCTOBER 12, 2011

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## Army Reserve: Indispensable Capabilities of the Operational Force

**2013 Authorized Endstrength**  
*206,000 Warrior Citizens*  
*(19% of the Army)*

**Selective Reserve Strength**  
*205,600 Warrior Citizens*

*Troop Program Unit*  
*(TPU): 186,969*

*Active Support*  
*(AGR): 15,762*


*Individual Mobilization Augmentees*  
*(IMA): 2,869*

**We are the Army Below is the percentage of total Army units,  
by type, assigned to the Reserve Component:**

	<b>USAR %</b>	<b>ARNG %</b>	<b>AC %</b>
JAG	88	12	0
Civil Affairs	70	0	30
Chaplain	80	20	0
Military History	78	16	6
Psy Ops	61	0	39
Postal & Personnel	62	9	28
Quartermaster	67	16	17
Medical	59	15	26
Chemical	43	36	21
Public Affairs	44	42	14
Transportation	44	39	17
Military Intelligence	26	21	52
Engineers	31	47	21
Military Police	24	45	31

As of 9 September 2011

# Army Reserve End Strength



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**QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING**

OCTOBER 12, 2011

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## QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT

Mr. BARTLETT. Given the possibility of major budget cuts to the Department of Defense, please discuss your concerns regarding how these anticipated cuts would impact the capability of the Guard and Reserve Components.

General STULTZ. The Army Reserves is currently resourced at a lower per capita rate than any other Army component. While the Army expects the Army Reserve to be capable of conducting Full Spectrum Operations that capability will not exist if additional investments are not made in equipment, personnel and training.

Additional days for any schooling, professional development, combatant command support, exercises and overseas training are over and above the statutory level. The statutory requirement for training is 39 days for the Army Reserve. The current structure of the Army is dependent upon the Combat Support and Combat Service Support capabilities predominantly resident in the Army Reserve. That capability cannot be built and sustained with 39 days of training per Soldier per year. The Army Reserves has proven itself in every contingency, manmade or natural, for the last two decades. It has done so by using limited resources and applying them in an efficient and cost effective manner. It must continue to have resources to man, equip and train its Soldiers and Units.

Mr. BARTLETT. Have the Army and Air Force decided yet, in response to the pending budget cuts, if they will reduce force structures and the amount of equipment needed to fill out the brigades and other units? If so, to what extent will that help to balance the equipment capabilities between the active and Reserve Components? For example, I have heard that the number of Abrams tanks (A1) needed overall will be reduced and rather than upgrading the A1 AIMS in the Army National Guard, they would get the A1 SEPs from the Active Component.

General STULTZ. The Army will have to reduce force structure in response to the pending budget cuts. The extent of the overall cut and the specific units to cut has not been decided yet. The Army is addressing these decisions as part of the ongoing Total Army Analysis 2014–2018 process. Once the specific reductions are decided the equipment requirements will be analyzed to determine what equipment can be moved from the Active Component to fill Reserve Component shortages. Equipment on-hand levels are similar across the Army Components; however, the Army Reserve remains the least modernized at 67%. We are hopeful that cascaded equipment from the Active Component will displace older equipment in the Army Reserve resulting in improved modernization levels.

Mr. BARTLETT. How are other Army and Air Force initiatives, such as reset, affecting equipment needed for training and domestic missions?

General STULTZ. Other Army initiatives (e.g. Reset) currently have minimal to no impact on Army Reserve Training and Mission execution. However, as theater provided equipment is returned, reset and redistributed to all components, both equipment on-hand and modernization levels should improve. This will enhance our ability to train with modernized and compatible equipment.

Mr. BARTLETT. As the Services down-size their inventories of older model HMMWVs, is that expected to impact the Army National Guard and Army Reserve more than the Active Component?

General STULTZ. No. The Army Reserve supports the acquisition strategy for HMMWVs. The AR is 94% equipment on hand for HMMWVs.

The Army Reserve is 17% armored capable and 83% of non-Armored capable. As we divest of these older non-Armored capable models, we will work with Army to fill the shortfall with Reset HMMWVs as they return from theater. We anticipate that the USAR HMMWV armored-capable and reset fleet will increase.

The Army's tactical wheeled vehicle investment strategy is to balance the quantity, quality, and sustainment of the fleet through new production, rebalancing and fleet Recapitalization (RECAP). We are working with Army to rebalance our fleet and to send older vehicles through RECAP programs to provide the AR with the more armored capable vehicles to support full spectrum operations.

AR HMMWV Required: 21,624 On-Hand: 20,334 or 94% On-Hand.

- Up-Armored HMMWV (UAH)—3,051 (15%) of On-Hand
- Extended Capability Vehicle (ECV) (armored)—406 (2%) of On-Hand

- Legacy—8,541 (42%) of On-Hand
- M1097R—8,336 (41%) of On-Hand

The M1097R is non-armored capable. The RECAP extends the life of vehicle. All future RECAP distributions will be Armored Capable. The last M1097R was delivered to the AR in FY 10. HMMWV Production was FY 05–10.

Mr. BARTLETT. Given the possibility of major budget cuts to the Department of Defense, please discuss your concerns regarding how these anticipated cuts would impact the capability of the Guard and Reserve Components.

General CARPENTER. The Army National Guard is capable of executing the full spectrum of operations, given the appropriate time and resources, and consistently found to be an affordable, effective, and efficient component of the Army's Operational force. Major budget cuts would adversely impact the Army National Guard's capabilities across a broad spectrum of functional areas. Below are the immediate capability concerns:

Personnel: The Army National Guard has refined its capacity to provide ready, trained, and equipped forces to the Army since 9/11 by recruiting and retaining a quality campaign force. The Army National Guard continues to provide the Army a vehicle by which critical force structure and personnel are retained at a significant savings (the Army National Guard operating budget is pennies on the dollar when compared to the Active Component). However, major budget cuts will reduce capabilities across every personnel management sector, which in turn adversely affects the depth and breadth of the Army National Guard's domestic and global capabilities in support of the Operational Force.

Medical: Medical readiness is a critical component of attaining the personnel readiness status required by the Department of the Army for deployable units. Without appropriate levels of medical readiness funding, the Army National Guard will not be able to provide medically ready Soldiers or units to support State and Federal operations in accordance with Department of Defense requirements and regulations in the following areas:

1. The Army National Guard will be unable to reach regulatory goals for mandated dental and medical requirements, which then decreases the number of fully medically ready Soldiers and units the Army National Guard can provide for Federal or State missions.
2. Lack of funding will significantly and negatively impact important occupational health requirements.
3. Major funding cuts will directly impact the ability of the Army National Guard to provide specialized Case Management to mitigate service connected injuries sustained by the force following the previous ten years of sustained war.
4. Funding cuts will impact the ability of the Army National Guard to maintain medical readiness data repository and reporting systems.
5. The ability of the ARNG to train for and meet the recently proven domestic standard of trauma and critical care will be eliminated. Fifty-six percent of Army medical evacuation assets reside in the Army National Guard.

Family Support: Army National Guard Soldiers and families face unique challenges in accessing services due to the geographic dispersion unique to this service component. Budget cuts to existing Soldier and Family Support programs will further impair the capability of the Army National Guard to provide baseline services in support of State and Federal roles. In addition to adversely affecting support to geo-dispersed Army Soldiers outside the footprint of the Active Component installations, the following capabilities will significantly degrade by cuts across these programs:

1. Family Assistance Centers: a vital resource to National Guard families. They are the Reserve Component equivalent of the installation-based Army Community Services and these locations (more than 380) cover the gap in services between an active duty installation and the 2,900 Army National Guard communities.
2. Family Readiness Support Assistants: support traditional, drilling Army National Guard units with full-time support, assistance to unit Family Readiness Groups, and enhanced family readiness throughout the Deployment Support Cycle.
3. Resilience programs: improve the abilities of Citizen-Soldiers to train, deploy, and reintegrate effectively by applying enhanced coping skills and the awareness of post-deployment challenges.

4. Risk reduction and mitigation programs: suicide prevention, substance abuse prevention/response, and sexual assault prevention remain underfunded for the Army National Guard and are vital to readiness. In many cases, the minimal expense for prevention and basic substance abuse or behavioral health treatment options provides a significant return on investment when compared to the training and replacement costs for Soldiers with service-related issues. Resource reductions in these areas will increase recruiting and training costs because quality Soldiers will not be retained.

Aviation: All Army National Guard rotary-wing airframes are being replaced or upgraded. Reduced funding may cause aircraft fielding delays or cancellations, which increases long-term fleet costs for the aging airframes maintained in our inventory. Major budget cuts will result in a decreased ability to support Army National Guard aviation missions and readiness reductions for fiscal year 2012 and beyond.

Training: Army National Guard unit readiness is predicated on trained Soldiers. (Individuals are qualified in their military occupational specialties, critical functional skills, and for Officers and Non-commissioned Officers, timely completion of required professional military education). Major budget cuts to the Army National Guard will cause the number of Duty Military Occupational Specialty Qualified Soldiers in the Guard to fall potentially impacting unit mobilizations without additional post mobilization time and resources. In fiscal year 2012, Army National Guard requirements for individual training were funded at only 64 percent (Army National Guard received \$496 million to meet a \$771 million training requirement). The current funding gap results in critical skills training shortfalls, increased backlogs for professional military education, and military occupational specialty qualifications. Further budget cuts could impact the Army National Guard's ability to provide ready units in support of operational requirements at home and abroad, placing the Nation at risk.

Logistics: Cuts in Ground Operations Tempo funds impact the day-to-day operations of all Army National Guard units, as well as the collective training for units designated in upcoming rotations for the Army Force Generation Model strategy. Major budget cuts would result in the degradation of mission execution across numerous logistics venues: depot-level maintenance, reset operations, the National Maintenance Program, unit Readiness Reporting, calibration monitoring for sensitive equipment, repairing tactical wheeled vehicles to fill critical shortages, and tracking Army "payments" back to the Army National Guard for equipment the Army requested to remain in theater after national Guard deployments (Department of Defense Directive 1225.6). Further budget cuts impact the Guard's ability to purchase repair parts. For example, many weapons systems fall below required readiness levels if repair parts are not in place in a timely fashion. Overseas Contingency Operations Reset funding cuts can be highlighted by the following:

1. A 15 percent reset budget reduction equates to five Army National Guard Brigade Combat Team equivalents failing to achieve Field Level Reset in 365 days.
2. A 30 percent reset budget reduction equates to nine Army National Guard Brigade Combat Team equivalents failing to achieve Field Level Reset in 365 days.
3. A 40 percent reset budget reduction equates to eleven Army National Guard Brigade Combat Team equivalents failing to achieve Field Level Reset in 365 days.

The Army National Guard brings a broad array of capabilities to the Nation's defense—all for a minimal cost—at home and abroad. We understand each component must continue to provide services at the highest level even with planned budget decreases. However, major cuts to the already proportionally smaller Army National Guard budget would slice deep into our dual-mission capabilities and adversely affect the Nation at home and abroad.

Mr. BARTLETT. Have the Army and Air Force decided yet, in response to the pending budget cuts, if they will reduce force structures and the amount of equipment needed to fill out the brigades and other units? If so, to what extent will that help to balance the equipment capabilities between the Active and Reserve Components? For example, I have heard that the number of Abrams tanks (A1) needed overall will be reduced and rather than upgrading the A1 AIMS in the Army National Guard, they would get the A1 SEPs from the Active Component.

General CARPENTER. The Army is currently examining force structure changes, and anticipates releasing a complete analysis in the second quarter of fiscal year 2012. The Army analysis will determine the proper mix of organizations required to comprise a balanced and affordable force necessary to meet the guidance issued

by the President, Congress, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Army leadership. Once the Army Analysis is complete, the Army will then determine any potential equipment modernization impacts, to include the Combat Vehicles for the Army National Guard.

Mr. BARTLETT. How are other Army and Air Force initiatives, such as reset, affecting equipment needed for training and domestic missions?

General CARPENTER. Since 9–11, the Army National Guard operates at a pace unlike any other time in its history. The current strategic environment places high demands on both personnel and equipment. The Army National Guard continues to be a resilient and committed professional component in the Army's Operational Force. Unfortunately, the Total Force is out of balance and must Reset to restore personnel and equipment capabilities for future missions. Reset establishes a balanced process after an extended deployment. It systematically restores deployed units to a level of personnel and equipment readiness that permits the resumption of training for future missions. The fully implemented Reset model will accelerate reconstitution of the force, increase unit readiness, and improve preparation for next-to-deploy units. Reset improves the readiness of the force, increases training time on unit equipment prior to deployment, and demonstrates good stewardship of funding. Equipment readiness is key to the Army National Guard's Reset Strategy and vital to the Army's efforts to build sufficient strategic flexibility and operational depth to deal with unforeseen contingencies. In a strategic environment of uncertainty and unpredictability, it is imperative that the Army National Guard supports these efforts by accurately tracking and reporting equipment repair, replacement, recapitalization, and expenditures to ensure the Army sustains equipment readiness at a rate that meets or exceeds operational demand.

Mr. BARTLETT. Earlier this year, the Army announced the cancellation of the Surface-Launched Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (SLAMRAAM) program. The SLAMRAAM program was scheduled to replace the old Norwegian Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS), which is currently being used in defense of the National Capital Region (NCR). What impact, if any, does the cancellation have on the National Guard units conducting the NCR mission?

General CARPENTER. The impact of Surface-Launched Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile program cancellation on the Army National Guard is that a replacement for the Norwegian Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System for the National Capital Region Mission is still undetermined. The contract for the Norwegian Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System ends in fiscal year 2017. The Army National Guard Avenger rebuild program is scheduled through fiscal year 2015; while Avenger sustainment concludes in fiscal year 2018, and currently no decision to extend either program. There are only small levels of modernization planned for the Avenger platform and no planned replacement currently identified.

Mr. BARTLETT. The Army National Guard operates more than 800 Black Hawk helicopters for both domestic and overseas missions. However, as you know, more than 500 of these are the older "A" models, which are quickly becoming obsolete. The active Army is slated to receive funding for at least 75 new UH–60M and HH–60M Black Hawk helicopters in FY2012, and only 4 of those 75 will go to the Guard, despite the fact that they fulfill 40 percent of the missions. Can you talk about the current state of the Black Hawk fleet and the impact that using older Black Hawks and not receiving the newer "M" models will have on the Army Guard?

General CARPENTER. The Army National Guard is programmed to receive six (6) HH–60M Black Hawk aircraft to complete a twelve (12) aircraft company requirement in fiscal year 2012. The Army National Guard's position with the Army states that sourcing and deployments guide fielding plans to ensure units operating in combat areas are equipped with the newest and most capable aircraft. In terms of costs, the UH–60A is more expensive to operate per flight hour, less modern, and more difficult to maintain than the HH–60M. Conversions of UH–60A aircraft to UH–60L models, a cascade of UH–60Ls from the Active Component, and fielding of the newer UH–60Ms will retire most of the remaining UH–60A model aircraft in the Army National Guard. As long as additional budget cuts do not reduce the number of UH–60A to UH–60L conversions or UH/HH–60M procurements, the current plan to retire Army National Guard UH–60As will conclude roughly in 2023.

Mr. BARTLETT. The current Department of the Army plan is to divest all Army National Guard C–23 Sherpas by 2015. What impact will this have on the ability of the Army National Guard to respond to domestic situations, as well as the overseas mission, where the Sherpa has been heavily used to provide intra-theatre airlift?

General CARPENTER. The current Army plan will reduce the number of Army National Guard fixed wing aircraft available for domestic operations from 114 aircraft to 64, or potentially as low as 48 aircraft. This plan also includes the divestiture



of 42 C-23 Sherpas. The Army approach to domestic fixed wing requirements is one in which the Army National Guard utilizes those Army National Guard fixed wing assets not deployed in federal service.

These facts, coupled with the Air National Guard fielding of C-27J aircraft to replace Army National Guard C-23s, the likelihood of Air National Guard deployments with their C-27Js, and the extensive equipment training requirements for this aircraft will limit routine Army National Guard logistical support requirements, as well as Army Service-specific missions. Airframe inventory reductions and diminished access to fixed wing capabilities decreases Army National Guard capabilities for future domestic operations and catastrophic incidents.

Mr. BARTLETT. In 2010, Army Materiel Command outlined a plan for the drastic reduction/elimination of the National Guard's participation in the National Maintenance Program by 2013. Do you agree with this decision? Do you believe the National Guard's participation in the National Maintenance Program offers the potential for further cost savings, enhanced performance and mission accomplishment?

General CARPENTER. National Maintenance Program is a reimbursable, requirements driven program designed to save the Army money by using excess maintenance capacity. Since requirements vary annually based on Army Working Capital Fund supply requirements, the Army National Guard's participation would fluctuate as well. Therefore, it is advisable to view the Army National Guard's participation on a percentile basis of the total annual National Maintenance Management program. The fiscal year 2010 Army National Guard share was 18.2 percent. The fiscal year 2011 Army National Guard share is at 24.97 percent (as of 31 May 2011). The fiscal year 2012 projection ranges from 19 to 25 percent. The Army National Guard has not received fiscal year 2013 National Maintenance Management program projections.

Army Materiel Command seeks to maximize their efficiencies through increased work at depots, and repeatedly stated that this will occur when economically prudent. The Army National Guard has a collaborative relationship with Army Materiel Command, one built on quality service and products at reasonable prices. The Army National Guard, through the National Maintenance Program, has a proven surge capability for Army Materiel Command.

Mr. BARTLETT. To what extent do Guard and Reserve units get to operate and train with Up-Armored HMWWVs and MRAP class vehicles? Other than when they deploy overseas, do they have any need for tactical wheeled vehicles with high levels of protection?

General CARPENTER. Units do not have Up-Armored HMWWVs or MRAPs in the continental United States, and most of the actual vehicles are in theater. The Army National Guard does, however, use simulators which focus on how to survive vehicle rollovers, and driver trainers which simulate multiple vehicles to include MRAP variants, Tanks and Strikers. The driver trainers focus on driving and maneuvering through cities and off-road as part of convoys, route clearance missions etc.

Mr. BARTLETT. As the Services down-size their inventories of older model HMMWVs, is that expected to impact the Army National Guard and Army Reserve more than the Active Component?

General CARPENTER. No, the down-sizing of older model HMMWV inventories will not impact the Army National Guard more than the Active Component Army. The Army National Guard achieved 100 percent Equipment On Hand during fiscal year 2011 and the Army National Guard up-armored HMMWV rate is commensurate with the Active Army. However, the Army National Guard will still retain approximately 4,000 legacy HMMWVs after downsizing.

Mr. BARTLETT. Given the possibility of major budget cuts to the Department of Defense, please discuss your concerns regarding how these anticipated cuts would impact the capability of the Guard and Reserve Components.

General WYATT. The Air Force plans and programs for its components as a Total Force and ensures the same level of readiness across the entire force. Any major budget cuts have a potential of greatly affecting the equipping and readiness of the Air Reserve Components. The Air National Guard is deeply concerned that any additional budget demands have the potential to severely degrade of its overall capability. Due to an already lean business model, the Air National Guard is able to operate with less than 6-percent of the Total Air Force Budget, while representing more than 34-percent of overall capability.

For perspective, for 2011, the Air National Guard has supported worldwide contingencies with more than 6,000 deployed per month. In addition, on October 1, 2011, there were 3,434 Guard Airmen actively engaged in homeland defense and support to civil authorities including protecting American skies through Aerospace Control Alert, assisting with critical infrastructure protection, and assisting their

local communities with disaster recovery in North and South Dakota, Missouri, and Nebraska. This also includes 578 Guard Airmen supporting local and national counterdrug programs and 121 Airmen assisting the US Border Patrol on our southwest border. Air National Guard Modular Aerial Fire Fighting units dropped 20,000 gallons of fire retardant supporting the National Forestry Service in the Southwest. This level of contribution is provided with less than two-cents on every dollar spent on defense.

Mr. BARTLETT. Have the Army and Air Force decided yet, in response to the pending budget cuts, if they will reduce force structures and the amount of equipment needed to fill out the brigades and other units? If so, to what extent will that help to balance the equipment capabilities between the Active and Reserve Components? For example, I have heard that the number of Abrams tanks (A1) needed overall will be reduced and rather than upgrading the A1 A1Ms in the Army National Guard, they would get the A1 SEPs from the Active Component.

General WYATT. The Secretary of the Air Force has produced plans to reduce the number of weapon systems throughout the Air National Guard (ANG). While this reduces the number of aircraft and support equipment in the ANG, it does not create any sort of equipment equity between the Active Component and the ANG, rather it will reduce the ANG's overall capability. Furthermore, the plan creates potential barriers for the National Guard to support its domestic requirements.

Mr. BARTLETT. How are other Army and Air Force initiatives, such as reset, affecting equipment needed for training and domestic missions?

General WYATT. The House Armed Services Committee was recently briefed on the status of Aviation Assets for the National Guard on 1 June 2011 in accordance with House report 111-49-257. In addition, concerns from the Chief, National Guard Bureau that Department of Defense programmatic decisions may have degraded National Guard aviation capabilities to adequately support Homeland Defense/Defense Support to Civil Authorities (HD/DSCA) missions prompted the Chief to request a Capabilities Based Assessment to analyze the National Guard aviation capability and its support for Domestic Operations. Air National Guard staff is guiding the assigned Capabilities Based Assessment, but because of the sheer size and scope of the study, it has been outsourced for commercial contract. The Capabilities Based Assessment to analyze the National Guard aviation capability is currently in the contracting process and is expected to be completed 240 days from contract signature. Once the Capabilities Based Assessment is complete, the National Guard should be able to provide the House Armed Services Committee a clearer picture of the National Guard's capability to support Domestic Operations. The following observations have been made:

- Programmed changes to domestic airlift present the most eminent impact for successful completion of current and future domestic operations missions. Since 2005, and with current programmed reductions in FY11 and FY12, the Air National Guard will have lost 22% of its C-130 fleet, 226 aircraft, down to 175.
- Mission requirements and demands levied on the NG routinely are difficult to codify as to which missions are requirements and which are demands. The NG has requirements that are federally recognized, defined by joint and service doctrine and demands only defined by National Guard Regulation.
- A New Madrid Earthquake scenario could create an estimated need of 1000 C-130 sorties for aero-medical evacuation alone. This is in addition to moving our CBRN Enterprises, supplies and equipment.
- National Guard Aviation assets currently available to supply major military support to civilian authorities are stressed to meet all emergency response requirements and scenarios.

Mr. BARTLETT. Recently, the Air Force has concluded that its requirement for fighter aircraft has been reduced from 2,200 in 2008, to 2,000 in 2010. How will that reduction of 200 aircraft affect the Air National Guard's ability to perform the Aerospace Control Alert (ACA) mission?

General WYATT. The reduction in fighter aircraft does not directly affect the Air National Guard's ability to perform the ACA mission. The Air National Guard has the ability to manage the reductions to prevent ACA locations from losing aircraft and making the reductions at non-ACA locations.

Mr. BARTLETT. We understand that the Air National Guard operates 16 of 18 Aerospace Control Alert (ACA) sites and that by 2013, retirements of F-16 aircraft will affect 10 of 18 ACA sites. Are plans in place to replace the retiring force structure for all of the Air National Guard's ACA sites?

General WYATT. The Air National Guard (ANG) operates 17 of 18 ACA sites. Currently, there are no ANG programmatic retirements of F-16 aircraft in 2013; how-

ever the F-15s and F-16s executing the mission at these sites are the oldest in the in Air Force's inventory. The F-22s that replaced the F-15Cs at Hickam AFB, HI, and the F-35s scheduled to replace the F-16s at Burlington, VT are the only two planned 5th generation ANG bases. Analysis indicates there will be sufficient ACA capable aircraft to accomplish the ACA mission for the foreseeable future; however, presently there is not a specific plan to recapitalize ANG ACA units with 4th and 5th generation aircraft.

If in the future, there are fighter force structure changes that affect ANG ACA units, the Air Force needs to produce a well articulated recapitalization plan. The ANG requires a concurrent and balanced recapitalization approach if America is to maintain air dominance over our sovereign skies.

Mr. BARTLETT. The recent Mobility Capabilities Requirements Study identified an overmatch in C-130 tactical airlift force structure. How will future reductions affect ANG units? Have you, the Adjutants General, and Governors been consulted on potential future force reductions?

General WYATT. If the Air Force C-130 fleet is reduced, there will be a reduction to the ANG C-130 units as well. To further complicate C-130 reductions, the Active Component vs. Reserve Component C-130 distribution, or "AC/RC mix" debate continues.

Due to the sensitive and pre-decisional nature of future program deliberations, Adjutants General and Governors are not consulted. However, consistent with the National Guard Bureau's statutory responsibility of providing advice on the federalized and non-federalized National Guard, I was consulted on the Air Force's FY13 POM position.

Mr. BARTLETT. Given the acknowledged importance of the Aerospace Control Alert (ACA) mission, why do the readiness ratings of ACA units not reflect their ACA mission? What is being done to insure that readiness assessments and inspections include the ACA mission?

General WYATT. The readiness ratings of ACA units are not directly shown due to the lack of a formal and complete tasking process to account for this combatant command requirement in the Global Force Management/Joint Operations Planning and Execution System process. The ACA mission does not have the manpower and equipment specific details normally used in the process Combatant Commanders use to request forces. This missing information hides the level of effort for this tasking and makes ACA specific accounting difficult. Currently, an effort to garner this specific information from the combatant command through the force providers is underway. Once accomplished, the level of effort necessary for this tasking will be reflected in the already existing readiness system. By formalizing this process, we will have the ability to show each ACA unit's level of commitment to the mission and also provide information about the remaining capacity at each unit for additional tasking.

Mr. BARTLETT. O&M costs (flying hour costs) vary by aircraft type as do the overall costs to operate any given aircraft between the Active Air Force and the Reserve Component. If an aircraft costs more to fly but is flown less by more experienced pilots in the Reserve Component, wouldn't it make fiscal sense to put those aircraft in the Air National Guard rather than the Active Air Force? And, wouldn't we get a longer lifetime out of those aircraft this way?

General WYATT. This is a scenario based question based upon the aircrew readiness of the fleet's aircrews and the pilot management of the fleet and therefore, out of the Air National Guard's purview. However, given that the Reserve Component could squeeze aircrew training efficiencies out of its Rated Aircrew Program (RAP), then the weapon system would ultimately be cheaper and last longer in the Guard or Reserve. Historically, the Reserve Component has enjoyed more experienced aircrew than the Active Component and has been able to schedule fewer training sorties to maintain flying qualification.

Mr. BARTLETT. The Air Force "Strategic Basing" Process (AFI 10-503) is used to make basing and bed down decisions for current and future weapon systems. There are 21 representatives who sit on this steering group, including representatives from Air Force Public Affairs and Air Force Legislative Liaison . . . but only "one" representative from the Air National Guard (NGB/CF). Considering the fact that the Air National Guard represents 43 percent of the air-refueling mission, 33 percent of the fighter mission, 30 percent of the cargo and transport mission, 20 percent of the remotely piloted aircraft mission, and 20 percent of the distributive common ground station mission, in your opinion, does the Air National Guard have an equitable voice in this process?

General WYATT. Yes. Each member of the Air Staff has a single representative on the steering committee. Numbers of representatives are not proportional to mission percentages, however no voting takes place. The current system makes it im-

perative that one builds a consensus among the other members of the steering group in order to get basing action approval. As a force provider, the Air National Guard normally gains major command (MAJCOM) support for the missions that are in the best interest of the MAJCOM. As a result, the Air National Guard is able to obtain appropriate and sufficient support to obtain approval for necessary Air National Guard basing actions.

Mr. BARTLETT. We often hear from the Air Force that the Air National Guard is not “accessible.” What do they mean by this? Has the Air National Guard ever turned down a request from the Air Force to fulfill a mission? And, on average, how many aircraft does the Air National Guard provide to combatant commanders compared to the Active Air Force?

General WYATT. Accessibility is often misunderstood and we continue to educate Air Force senior leaders on how to access the Air National Guard. In our view, there are three components to accessibility:

- Law: Voluntary mobilization—the ANG has historically fulfilled more than 85% of requests through volunteerism. Involuntary mobilization—full or partial—allows for unencumbered access.
- Policy: Currently established through SECDEF memorandum and places minimal restrictions on access.
- Funding: The ANG is funded to train and prepare for its federal mission; therefore access to the ANG requires allocation of resources through Military Personnel Appropriation Days.

The Air National Guard is accessible. To date, we have answered every request for forces with more than 85% volunteerism. On average, we provide 25% of Air Force capability used to meet Combatant Commander requirements. Some examples Air National Guard accessibility: within six minutes of the terrorist attacks on 9/11 Air National Guard aircraft were airborne protecting America’s skies. On 17 March 2011, the United Nations passed the no-fly resolution for Libya. Air National Guard tanker aircraft were the first on station, and within 48 hours, Air National Guard tankers were flying missions and provided 14 of the 24 tanker aircraft involved in the effort.

Mr. BARTLETT. We are hearing that the Active Air Force may be planning significant retirements of ANG aircraft (all C-5As, 3 F-16 wings, 72 C-130s—many of which are in the Guard, and some number of A-10s) and terminating the acquisition of C-27J aircraft as a possible response to proposed defense budget cuts, especially if the cuts exceed the \$400 billion mark over 10–12 years. Has the Guard been actively involved or consulted regarding these possible cuts? And, if so, how would the loss of these aircraft affect the ANG, and what alternative missions is the Air Force offering to ensure the highly trained men and women who currently operate these aircraft have a new mission?

General WYATT. Air Force budget deliberations are ongoing. We are hopeful that the Air National Guard’s proven lean business model, the age of its equipment and its contribution to the Total Force will be considered as the Air Force seeks solutions in this greatly constrained budget environment. Any major budget cuts have a potential of greatly affecting the equipping and readiness of the Air Reserve Components. The Air National Guard is deeply concerned that any additional budget demands have the potential to severely degrade of its overall capability. Due to an already lean business model, the Air National Guard is able to operate with less than 6-percent of the Total Air Force Budget, while representing more than 34-percent of overall capability.

Mr. BARTLETT. Given the possibility of major budget cuts to the Department of Defense, please discuss your concerns regarding how these anticipated cuts would impact the capability of the Guard and Reserve Components.

General STENNER. Depending on where cuts were targeted in the language of the NDAA and Defense Appropriations, major budget cuts could impact the capability of the Air Force Reserve. Cuts to reduce manpower costs would result in lower participation in military airlift, combat air forces, space and ISR missions. It could also potentially eliminate Air Force Reserve contributions in entire mission areas. Force structure reductions to aircraft would immediately affect the targeted mission area (airlift, combat, etc.) and drive personnel cross-training and relocation costs.

Lower “life cycle costs” achieved through part-time duty, a delayed points-based retirement system, and lower healthcare costs ensure combat capability at reduced costs.

Rebalancing the Active Component/Reserve Component mix toward the Reserve Component would reap immediate savings. The Citizen-Airman model has served

the Air Force well for over 60 years, and expanded use of this construct will provide more combat capability for lower cost in this fiscally constrained environment.

Mr. BARTLETT. Have the Army and Air Force decided yet, in response to the pending budget cuts, if they will reduce force structures and the amount of equipment needed to fill out the brigades and other units? If so, to what extent will that help to balance the equipment capabilities between the Active and Reserve Components? For example, I have heard that the number of Abrams tanks (A1) needed overall will be reduced and rather than upgrading the A1 AIMs in the Army National Guard, they would get the A1 SEPs from the Active Component.

General STENNER. With regards to Air Force Reserve (AFR) readiness and equipment modernization—any budget-driven force structure reductions will be accomplished through the Air Force corporate process and will balance the needs of warfighters, combatant commands, the national military strategy, and the AFR. The Air Force corporate process takes into account the vast experience of our Citizen-Airmen and ensures the cuts do not disproportionately benefit one component to the detriment of another. AFR Airmen provide the same capability as Active Component Airmen, and we will continue to do so as the USAF maps out its modernization and recapitalization plans.

Mr. BARTLETT. How are other Army and Air Force initiatives, such as reset, affecting equipment needed for training and domestic missions?

General STENNER. In order to Recapitalize Infrastructure, meet Emerging Mission/TFI Requirements, and meet the Air Force's 20/20 by 2020 Facilities and Energy Goals, the Air Force Reserve requires \$125M in MILCON per year. Additionally, \$200M in O&M per year is required for Facility Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization to recapitalize infrastructure and support new missions through adaptive re-use of existing facilities.

In these economic times, we fully understand that difficult budgetary decisions must be made. In 2007, AFRC instituted a program we call FOCUS (Facilities Operational Capabilities Utilization Survey) to independently validate our real facility requirements and guide decisions on where to get the greatest return on investment. This program has validated \$1.24 Billion backlog in unfunded MILCON requirements supporting on-going AFRC missions, as well as improved resource utilization through Total Force Integration initiatives with our Active Duty and Air National Guard partners.

Underfunding AFRC MILCON has increased our average facility recapitalization rate for FY11–15 to 376 years, a 33 percent increase above last year's projection.

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. ROBY

Mrs. ROBY. I know you are given your equipment by Army and Air Force, so with this in mind:

With the Reserve Components taking on a huge volume of deployments, weekend training is crucial. If our warriors are being asked to deploy into the fight, and they were trained on anything other than the exact same equipment they will use in theater (other than minor differences), this is an unacceptable situation. If this is the case, I have to wonder how valuable their training really is. Granted not every UTA involves operational training, but when operational training does occur, are we giving them the best, most applicable training that we can give them? There is no argument that they deserve our very best.

We all know that the Reserve Components are vital to the success of our national defense efforts, but I ask you are we setting our warriors up for failure if we are training them on sub-standard equipment?

General STULTZ. No, we are not setting our Soldiers up for failure.

The Army Reserve equipment modernization rate is currently at 67% and with funding in the base POM and through the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation we are working towards reaching the 100% modernization goal.

Training on exactly the same equipment we'll use in theater is certainly the optimal solution. Soldiers use the most up-to-date equipment available to the Army Reserve at Annual Training exercises just prior to mobilization. In conjunction with US Army Forces Command and the Army Service Component Commanders, the Army Reserve ensures that our Soldiers receive training on the most up-to-date, but limited supply, items at the post-mobilization sites or in theater prior to assuming their operational mission.

The Army Reserve continues to improve its use of both low and high fidelity simulators to train Soldiers on the latest equipment available. Low-fidelity simulators focus on operator controls and generic safety procedures while high-fidelity simulators allow multiple simulators to work together in a virtual world allowing equip-

ment operators and their leaders to plan and execute missions. These simulators are cheaper than actual equipment, are generally available as Commercial off the Shelf, and can be used at Unit Training Assembly sites/Reserve Centers without major facility improvements. As with actual equipment, funding shortfalls hinder our fielding of simulators to each unit.

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General CARPENTER. Training on the exact equipment used in an operational situation absolutely enhances the Army National Guard training experience. When the Army National Guard lacks the modernized equipment used during deployments, pre-mobilization readiness and “boots on the ground” time can be affected. The recent increase in both quality and numbers of Army equipment transferred to the Army National Guard greatly aid in rapidly building and maintaining pre-deployment readiness standards—consistent with a fully operational force. However, tactical training on similar equipment still has value and the Army National Guard trains on any and all available equipment.

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General STENNER. Air Force reservists train and deploy with the same equipment. In some instances our equipment is older than the Active Component's. However, it is well maintained due to the highly experienced Citizen-Airmen who often work on the same equipment their entire career. This personal investment pays off with Air Force Reserve mission-capable rates among the highest in the Air Force.

