[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 112-86]
THE FUTURE OF THE MILITARY
SERVICES AND CONSEQUENCES OF
DEFENSE SEQUESTRATION
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
NOVEMBER 2, 2011
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Twelfth Congress
HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON, California, Chairman
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland ADAM SMITH, Washington
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
JEFF MILLER, Florida ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota JIM COOPER, Tennessee
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
ROB WITTMAN, Virginia CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
DUNCAN HUNTER, California LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado BILL OWENS, New York
TOM ROONEY, Florida JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania
SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia TIM RYAN, Ohio
CHRIS GIBSON, New York C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri HANK JOHNSON, Georgia
JOE HECK, Nevada BETTY SUTTON, Ohio
BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas
STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi
ALLEN B. WEST, Florida
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama
MO BROOKS, Alabama
TODD YOUNG, Indiana
Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
Jenness Simler, Professional Staff Member
Michael Casey, Professional Staff Member
Lauren Hauhn, Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2011
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, November 2, 2011, The Future of the Military Services
and Consequences of Defense Sequestration...................... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, November 2, 2011...................................... 47
----------
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 2011
THE FUTURE OF THE MILITARY SERVICES AND CONSEQUENCES OF DEFENSE
SEQUESTRATION
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.............. 1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
WITNESSES
Amos, Gen James F., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps......... 9
Greenert, ADM Jonathan W., USN, Chief of Naval Operations........ 5
Odierno, GEN Raymond T., USA, Chief of Staff of the Army......... 3
Schwartz, Gen Norton A., USAF, Chief of Staff of the Air Force... 7
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Amos, Gen James F............................................ 75
Greenert, ADM Jonathan W..................................... 60
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''.............................. 51
Odierno, GEN Raymond T....................................... 55
Schwartz, Gen Norton A....................................... 67
Smith, Hon. Adam............................................. 53
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Bartlett................................................. 89
Mr. Garamendi................................................ 93
Mr. Hunter................................................... 91
Mr. Johnson.................................................. 92
Ms. Sanchez.................................................. 90
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Ms. Bordallo................................................. 97
Mr. Franks................................................... 97
Mr. Griffin.................................................. 111
Ms. Hanabusa................................................. 109
Mr. Loebsack................................................. 107
Mr. Palazzo.................................................. 112
Mrs. Roby.................................................... 113
Mr. Schilling................................................ 104
Mr. Scott.................................................... 107
THE FUTURE OF THE MILITARY SERVICES AND CONSEQUENCES OF DEFENSE
SEQUESTRATION
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, November 2, 2011.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:08 a.m. in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''
McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Good morning. The House Armed Services Committee meets to
receive testimony on ``The Future of the Military Services and
the Consequences of Defense Sequestration.'' To assist us with
our examination of the impacts of further defense cuts to each
of the military services, we are joined by all four service
chiefs. Gentlemen, thank you for your service. Thank you for
being here. I really appreciate your willingness to be here
before the committee today. I can't recall the last time that
we had all four service chiefs on the same panel. This is a
unique opportunity for our Members and greatly assists us with
our oversight responsibilities.
The committee has held a series of hearings to evaluate
lessons learned since 9/11 and to apply those lessons to
decisions we will soon be making about the future of our force.
We have received perspectives from former chairmen of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, former service chiefs and commanders of the
National Guard Bureau; former chairmen of the Armed Services
Committees; outside experts; Secretary Panetta; and Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dempsey. Today, we have the
opportunity to follow up on the testimony of the Secretary of
Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to determine
more closely the challenges faced by each of the Services.
As I continue to emphasize, our successes in the global war
on terror and in Iraq and Afghanistan appear to be lulling our
Nation into a false sense of confidence such as a September
10th mindset. Too many appear to believe that we can maintain a
solid defense that is driven by budget choices, not strategic
ones. But as we heard from witnesses again last week, defense
spending did not cause the current fiscal crisis. Nevertheless,
defense can and will be a part of the solution.
The problem is that to date, defense has contributed more
than half of the deficit reduction measures we have taken, and
there are some who want to use the military to pay for the rest
to protect the sacred cow that is entitlement spending. Not
only should that be a nonstarter from a national security and
an economic perspective, but it should also be a nonstarter
from a moral perspective. Consider that word ``entitlements.''
Entitlements imply that you are entitled to a certain benefit,
and I can't think of anyone who has earned the right ahead of
our troops. By volunteering to put their lives on the line for
this country, they are entitled to the best training, the best
equipment, the best leadership that our Nation can provide.
I hope our witnesses today can help us understand the
ramifications of these possible cuts in relation to our force
structure as well as our ability to meet the future needs of
our national defense. How can we make sure the military is a
good steward of the taxpayer's dollar without increasing the
risk to our Armed Forces? Where can we take risk? But what
changes would go too far?
With that in mind, I look forward to hearing from our
witnesses today. With that, I yield to Ranking Member Smith.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the
Appendix on page 51.]
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this hearing. It is an honor to be here with all four
of our service chiefs. I appreciate your leadership for our
military, and I also appreciate the series of hearings that
this committee has had to examine the impacts of budget cuts
and our deficit on the defense budget. I think it is critically
important that we make smart choices in this difficult budget
environment.
There is no question that our debt and deficit have placed
enormous pressure on our country, but also most specifically on
the Department of Defense and our ability to adequately provide
for the national security. Defense is 20 percent of the budget.
It is going to be part of the solution. But as the chairman
points out, it already has been. As part of the debt ceiling
agreement in August, the defense budget has agreed to somewhere
between $450 billion and $500 billion in cuts over the course
of the next 10 years. Getting to those cuts will be a great
challenge. But it is wrong to think the defense budget has
somehow been held apart from our debt and deficit problems. It
is quite the opposite. It has been front and center.
So what we really need to hear from our witnesses today is,
first of all, how they are going to handle those initial cuts
over the course of the next 10 years; how they are going to do
that in a way that continues to protect our national security.
Because keep in mind, even though we do have debt and deficit
problems, we also have growing national security threats.
Certainly the threat from Al Qaeda and their affiliates
remains. We have Iran and North Korea, who are both growing in
capability and belligerence. And we also have the rise of
China, both economically and militarily, just to name a few.
So our threats haven't gone away even though the money is
going to become harder to come by. So how we are going to
manage that is critically important. Also, as the chairman
said, to sort of point out the limitations on how far we can
cut the defense budget beyond what we have already done, the
true impact of sequestration, and how it would damage our
ability to provide adequately for our national security.
I would ask the witnesses in that testimony to get specific
about it. We have heard a great deal that if you cut below this
level, well, it is a question of raising the risk level. What
does that mean? I think our country needs to hear specifically
if you cut this much, here is what we won't be able to do and
here is how it can potentially threaten our national security.
So I applaud the witnesses, applaud the Department of
Defense for going through the process of restructuring our
defense budget, looking at a strategic review of where we are
spending our money. That process is ongoing. I think it is
critically important. And we look forward to hearing more about
what choices you face and what we need to do to make sure that
we adequately provide for our national security.
With that, I yield back.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 53.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
Now, let me please welcome our witnesses this morning. We
have General Raymond T. Odierno, Chief of Staff of the U.S.
Army; Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations;
General Norton A. Schwartz, Chief of Staff of the Air Force;
and General James F. Amos, Commandant of the Marine Corps.
Gentlemen, thank you again for being here. I appreciate
that, and we look forward to a candid dialogue this morning.
General Odierno.
STATEMENT OF GEN RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE
ARMY
General Odierno. Thank you, Chairman McKeon, Congressman
Smith, and other members of the committee. Since this is my
first time to appear before you as the Chief of Staff of the
Army, I want to start by telling you how much I appreciate your
unwavering commitment to the Army and the Joint Force. I look
forward to discussing the future of the Army and the potential
impact of budget cuts on future capabilities, readiness, and
depth.
Because of the sustained support of Congress and this
committee, we are the best-trained, best-equipped, and best-led
force in the world today. But as we face an uncertain security
environment and fiscal challenges, we know we will probably
have to get smaller, but we must maintain our capabilities to
be a decisive force, a force trusted by the American people to
meet our security needs.
Over the past 10 years, our Army--Active, Guard, and
Reserve--has deployed over 1.1 million soldiers to combat. Over
4,500 soldiers have made the ultimate sacrifice. Over 32,000
soldiers have been wounded, 9,000 of those requiring long-term
care. In that time, our soldiers have earned over 14,000 awards
for valor, to include 6 Medals of Honor and 22 Distinguished
Service Crosses. Throughout it all, our soldiers and leaders
have displayed unparalleled ingenuity, mental and physical
toughness, and courage under fire. I am proud to be part of
this Army, to lead our Nation's most precious treasure, our
magnificent men and women. We must always remember that our
Army is today and will always be about our soldiers and their
families.
Today, we face an estimated $450 billion-plus in DOD
[Department of Defense] budget cuts. These will be difficult
cuts that will affect force structure, our modernization
programs, and our overall capacity. And it will incur increased
risks. We cannot afford to repeat the mistakes of previous
reductions. I respectfully suggest we make these decisions
strategically, keeping in mind the realities of the risk they
pose, and that we make these decisions together, unified, to
ensure that when the plan is finally decided upon, all effort
has been made to provide the Nation the best level of security
and safety.
Our Army must remain a key enabler in the Joint Force
across a broad range of missions, responsive to the combatant
commanders, and maintain trust with the American people. It is
my challenge to balance the fundamental tension between
maintaining security in an increasingly complicated and
unpredictable world and the requirements of a fiscally austere
environment. The U.S. Army is committed to being a part of the
solution in this very important effort. Accordingly, we must
balance our force structure with appropriate modernization and
sufficient readiness to sustain a smaller but ready force.
We will apply the lessons of 10 years of war to ensure we
have the right mix of forces--the right mix of heavy, medium,
light, and airborne forces, the right mix between the Active
and Reserve components, the right mix of combat, combat
support, and combat service support forces, the right mix of
operating and generating forces, and the right mix of soldiers,
civilians, and contractors. We must ensure that the forces we
employ to meet our operational commitments are maintained,
trained, and equipped to the highest level of readiness.
As the Army gets smaller, it is how we reduce that will be
critical. While we downsize, we must do it at a pace that
allows us to retain a high quality, All-Volunteer Force that
remains lethal, agile, adaptable, versatile, and ready to
deploy, with the ability to expand if required.
I am committed to this, as I am also committed to fostering
continued commitment to the Army profession and the development
of our future leaders.
Although overseas contingency operation funding will be
reduced over the next several years, I cannot overstate how
critical it is in ensuring our soldiers have what they need
while serving in harm's way, as well as the vital role OCO
[Overseas Contingency Operations] funding plays in resetting
our formations and equipment, a key aspect of our current and
future readiness. Failing to sufficiently reset now would
certainly incur higher future costs, potentially in the lives
of our young men and women fighting for our country.
Along with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of
the Army, I share concern about the potential of sequestration,
which would bring a total reduction of over a trillion dollars
for the Department of Defense. Cuts of this magnitude would be
catastrophic to the military, and in the case of the Army,
would significantly reduce our capability and capacity to
assure our partners abroad respond to crisis and deter our
potential adversaries, while threatening the readiness and
potentially the All-Volunteer Force.
Sequestration would cause significant reductions in both
Active and Reserve component end strengths, impact our
industrial base, and almost eliminate our modernization
programs, denying the military superiority our Nation requires
in today's and tomorrow's uncertain and challenging security
environment. We would have to consider additional
infrastructure efficiencies, including consolidations and
closures commensurate with force structure reductions to
maintain the Army's critical capacity to train soldiers and
units, maintain equipment, and prepare the force to meet
combatant commanders' requirements now and into the future. It
would require us to completely revamp our national security
strategy and reassess our ability to shape the global
environment in order to protect the United States.
With sequestration, my assessment is that the Nation would
incur an unacceptable level of strategic and operational risk.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I thank you
again for allowing me the opportunity to appear before you. I
also thank you for the support you provide each and every day
to our outstanding men and women of the United States Army, our
Army civilians, and their families. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of General Odierno can be found in
the Appendix on page 55.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
Admiral Greenert.
STATEMENT OF ADM JONATHAN W. GREENERT, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS
Admiral Greenert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, Members of the
committee, it is my honor and I am, frankly, quite excited to
appear before you today for the first time as the Chief of
Naval Operations. I very much thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
Members of the committee, for all you have done for our sailors
and their families throughout the years.
In the interest of trying the characteristic of a picture
painting a thousand words, I have provided a little chart of
where we are today, where your Navy is. We do our best
operating forward at what I call the strategic maritime
crossroads. We deploy from the ports in the United States--they
are shown here as little dots--and in Hawaii. We have about 45
ships underway on the East Coast and West Coast collectively,
which are preparing to deploy; 145 ships underway today, total.
So that is about 100 ships deployed. About 35 to 40 percent of
our Navy--your Navy--is deployed today. It has been that way
for about 3 years. For a perspective, in 2001, we had about 29
percent of your Navy deployed.
We operate out and about around what I call the maritime
crossroads, where commerce is, where the sea lines of
communication are, because it is about ensuring economic
prosperity around the world and influencing in all the
theatres. Those areas, those crossroads, they look like little
bow ties perhaps or little bows, depending on your background.
We operate from what I call cooperative security locations.
Those are shown as little squares, from Guantanamo Bay in the
Caribbean to Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean to Singapore
through Guam through Djibouti, Bahrain, and of course in the
Mediterranean and in Rota. So we are clearly globally deployed.
We are required to be forward, flexible, and lethal, as we
demonstrated in Libya, Somalia, off the coast of Yemen, and of
course today in Afghanistan, where we provide about one-third
of the close air support for our brothers and sisters on the
ground. No permission is needed for our operations, and we are
all United States
sovereignty.
As I said, it is about freedom of the seas for economic
prosperity. And as we change operations in the Mideast from
perhaps a ground focus, your Navy and Marine Corps will retain
the watch forward. We will deter, we will dissuade, and we will
assure. We will be postured to fight as needed. We are your
offshore option. We won't be intrusive. We are stabilizing, and
we continue to build partnership capacity with allies and with
our friends.
I just add as a clip, today there is a Chinese ship, a
hospital ship, conducting operations in the Caribbean Sea, and
has been on an around-the-world tour recently, doing their
part, I guess, in the world.
Our focus in the future will be the Pacific and the Arabian
Gulf, but we won't be able to ignore the other regions. Where
and when trouble emerges next is really unknown. And as has
been stated in this room many times, the future is
unpredictable, as we know. We have to be prepared. We have to
respond when tasked. And our challenge is to posture for that
possibility.
But in the end, all that being said, we can never be
hollow. We have to be manned, trained, equipped with a
motivated force. We have to build the Navy of tomorrow--the
ships, the aircraft, the unmanned systems, the weapons, and the
sensors--and underpinning it all are our sailors and their
families. We have to take care of the sailors, the civilians,
and the families, and build, as I said, in the future the
motivated, relevant, and diverse force of the
future.
As John Paul Jones said years ago, and it still applies,
``Men mean more than guns in the rating of a ship.'' But above
all, we have to be judicious with the resources that the
Congress provides.
As we look ahead to this current budget plan that we are
working on, about a half of trillion dollars over 10 years, it
is a huge challenge. There are risks. It is manageable with a
strategic approach and with appropriate guidance given. On the
other hand, in my view, sequestration will cause irreversible
damage. It will hollow the military and we will be out of
balance in manpower, both military and civilian, procurement
and modernization. We are a capital-intensive force. Going in
and summarily reducing procurement accounts here and there will
upset quite a bit of our industrial base, which in my view, if
we get into sequestration, might be irrecoverable.
In 1998, we had six shipbuilder companies. Today, we have
two. We have six shipyards, going to five in 2013.
The impact of the Continuing Resolution if we go beyond
November 19th, I just mention two areas of concern in the near
term. In manpower, we are fine through November 18th. But we
would need additional funds through Continuing Resolution
language, if need be, because our manpower starts ramping up at
that point. So we would need assistance in that regard in
manpower in the continuing resolution.
Operations and management accounts are manageable through
late in the first quarter. As we start the second quarter, Mr.
Chairman, we would really be compelled to do what we have done
in the past--defer maintenance, defer modernization of our
shore sites, freeze travel, and maybe freeze civilian hiring,
in that case, to get through. It depends on the date. But we
have been engaged with your staffs. We appreciate their support
and the support of this committee.
I thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I look
forward to your questions. Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Greenert can be found in
the Appendix on page 60.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
General Schwartz.
STATEMENT OF GEN NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, USAF, CHIEF OF STAFF OF
THE AIR FORCE
General Schwartz. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, and
Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today. I am privileged to be a part of this
panel of service chiefs to share the obligation of service
leadership with them and to represent the Nation's airmen.
I think that we all can agree that our men and women in
uniform deserve all the support and resources that we can
provide them and their vital mission in protecting the Nation,
and on their behalf I thank you for your ongoing efforts to
ensure that we care for our service members and their families.
In this time of sustained fiscal pressures, the Air Force
joins its Joint and OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense]
teammates in helping to solve the Nation's debt crisis. Last
year, the Air Force identified $33 billion in efficiencies as
part of the broader Department of Defense effort to reallocate
$100 billion from overhead to operational and modernization
requirements. The Air Force subsequently found an additional
$10 billion in the course of completing the 2012 budget.
We will continue to make extremely difficult decisions to
prioritize limited resources and prepare for a wide range of
security threats that the Nation will potentially face. But
these difficult choices to assure effectiveness in a very
dynamic strategic and fiscal environment must be based on
strategic considerations, not compelled solely by budget
targets. We must prudently evaluate the future security
environment, deliberately accept risks, and devise strategies
that mitigate those risks in order to maintain a capable and
effective, if smaller, military force. Otherwise, a non-
strategy-based approach that proposes cuts without correlation
to national security priorities and core defense capabilities
will lead to a hollowed out force similar to those that
followed to a greater or lesser degree every major conflict
since World War I. If we fail to avoid the ill-conceived,
across-the-board cuts, we again will be left with a military
with aging equipment, extremely stressed human resources with
less than adequate training, and ultimately declining readiness
and effectiveness.
Those of us at the table remember when we faced similar
difficult situations in the years after Vietnam and the Cold
War. We therefore join Secretary Panetta and Chairman Dempsey
in advising against across-the-board cuts, particularly the
sweeping cuts pursuant to the Budget Control Act sequester
provision. At a minimum, they would slash all of our investment
accounts, including our top priority modernization programs
such as the KC-46, the tanker; the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter;
the MQ-9 Remotely Piloted Aircraft, and the Future Long-Range
Strike Bomber. They would raid our operations and maintenance
accounts, forcing the curtailment of important daily operations
and sustainment efforts, and they would inflict other second
and third order effects, some of them currently unforeseen,
that will surely diminish the effectiveness and the well-being
of our airmen and their families.
Ultimately, such a scenario gravely undermines our ability
to protect the Nation. But beyond the manner in which the
potential budget cuts are executed, even the most thoroughly
deliberated strategy will not be able to overcome the dire
consequences if cuts go far beyond the $450 billion-plus in
anticipated national security budget reductions over the next
10 years. This is true whether cuts are directed by
sequestration or by Joint Select Committee proposal or whether
they are deliberately targeted or across-the-board.
From the ongoing DOD budget review, we are confident that
further spending reduction beyond the Budget Control Act's
first round of cuts cannot be done without substantially
altering our core military capabilities and therefore our
national security. From the perspective of the Air Force,
further cuts will amount to further reductions in our end
strength, continue aging and reductions in the Air Force's
fleet of fighters, strategic bombers, airlifters, and tankers;
as well as to associated bases and infrastructure, and adverse
effects on training and readiness, which has been in decline
since 2003.
Most noticeably, deeper cuts will amount to diminished
capacity to execute concurrent missions across the spectrum of
operations and over the vast distances of the globe. So while
the Nation has become accustomed to and perhaps has come to
rely on effective execution of wide-ranging operations in rapid
succession or even simultaneously, we will have to accept
reduced coverage in future similar concurrent scenarios if
further cuts to the national security budget are allowed to
take effect.
For example, the Air Force's simultaneous response to
crisis situations in Japan and Libya, all the while sustaining
our efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, will be substantially less
likely to happen in the future, as would effective response to
other scenarios like Operations Tomodachi and Unified
Protector, requiring concurrent action spanning across the
globe in the operational spectrum; in this case, from
humanitarian relief in East Asia, to combat and related support
in North Africa.
In short, Mr. Chairman, your Air Force will be superbly
capable and unrivaled, bar none, in its ability to provide
wide-ranging game-changing air power for the Nation, but as a
matter of simple physical limitations it will be able to
accomplish fewer tasks in fewer places in any given period of
time.
While we are committed to doing our part to bring the
Nation back to a more robust economy, we are also convinced
that we need not forsake national security to achieve fiscal
stability. We believe that a strategy-based approach to the
necessary budget cuts and keeping those cuts at a reasonable
level will put us on an acceptable path.
Mr. Chairman, Congressman Smith, and Members of the
committee, on behalf of the men and women of the United States
Air Force, I thank you for your support of our airmen,
certainly their joint teammates, and their families. I look
forward to your questions, sir.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Schwartz can be found in
the Appendix on page 67.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
General Amos.
STATEMENT OF GEN JAMES F. AMOS, USMC, COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE
CORPS
General Amos. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, fellow
Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
testify about your United States Marine Corps. As we face the
challenging times ahead, the Marine Corps reaffirms its
commitment through its traditional culture of frugality. You
have my word that the Marine Corps will only ask for what it
needs, not for what it might want.
But before I begin, I cannot pass up the opportunity to
briefly comment on your marines in Afghanistan. We continue to
provide the best-trained and equipped Marine units to the
fight. This will not change. Your marines continue to apply
relentless pressure on the enemy and are setting conditions for
success in the Helmand Province today. They have made great
progress.
Our forward deployed marines continue to have all they need
with regards to equipment, training, and leadership to
accomplish the mission. Thank you for your continued support.
While our Nation moves to reset its military in a post-Iraq
and Afghanistan world, it does so in increasingly complex
times. As we explore ways across the Department to adjust to a
new period of fiscal austerity, there emerges a clear
imperative that our Nation retains a credible means of
mitigating risk while we draw down the capacity and the
capabilities of our Nation.
Like an affordable insurance policy at less than 7.8
percent of the total DOD budget, the Marine Corps and its Navy
counterpart, Amphibious Forces, represent a very efficient and
effective hedge against the Nation's most likely risk.
We are a maritime Nation. Like so much of the world, we
rely on the maritime commons for the exchange of commerce and
ideas. Ninety-five percent of the world's commerce travels by
sea. Forty-nine percent of the world's oil travels through
seven maritime chokepoints. Many depend on us to maintain
freedom of movement on those commons. We continue to take that
responsibility
seriously.
From the sea, we engage with and support our partners and
our allies. We respond to crisis where we have no access rights
or permissive facilities, and we represent our national
interests around the world. When the Nation pays the sticker
price for its marines embarked aboard amphibious ships, it buys
the ability to remain forward deployed and forward engaged to
assure our partners, confirm our alliances, deter our enemies,
and represent our national interests. With that same force, our
Nation gains the ability to globally respond to unexpected
crises, from humanitarian assistance to disaster relief
operations to noncombatant evacuation operations to counter-
piracy operations. That same force can quickly be reinforced to
assure access in the event of a major contingency. It can be
dialed up or dialed down like a rheostat to be relevant across
a broad spectrum of operations.
As America's principal crisis response force, we stand
ready to respond to today's crisis, with today's force, today.
Finally, the American people believe that when a crisis
emerges, marines will be present and will invariably turn in a
performance that is dramatically and decisively successful--not
most of the time, but always. They possess a heartfelt belief
that the Marine Corps is good for the young men and women of
our country. In their view, the Marines are extraordinarily
adept at converting unoriented youths into proud, self-reliant,
stable citizens--citizens into whose hands the Nation's affairs
may be entrusted. An investment in the Marine Corps continues
to be an investment in the character of the young people of our
Nation.
Thank you for the opportunity to offer this statement. I
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Amos can be found in the
Appendix on page 75.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
For the last few decades we have been spending money that
we didn't have, and I would say probably all across the
Government we have probably had some spending that included
some waste. And that probably is true in the Defense
Department, as in all other departments of Government.
I think Secretary Gates, looking ahead, seeing we were
going to have some cuts a little over a year ago, asked you to
find $100 billion in savings. He said that you would be able to
keep that for things that you needed more, just balancing,
finding efficiencies, finding ways to save money that had been
spent for things that we didn't need as much as other things.
You did that. And then he said you were only going to get to
keep $74 billion of it; $26 billion I think was the number that
had to be used for must-pay items.
In the course of that, he said we found another $78 billion
that we would be able to cut out of future defense costs.
Before that, he had been giving speeches saying we needed to
have a 1-percent increase over and above inflation just to keep
where we are in the future years. That $78 billion wiped that
out and it also caused a reduction in end strength in the Army
and the Marines of 47,000 by the year 2015.
And then the President gave a speech and said we had to cut
another $400 billion out of defense. All of this has happened
in the last year. And then we had the Deficit Reduction Act.
And that had a number in it. We keep seeing that--$350 billion.
But I met with Admiral Mullen not too long before his
retirement and he said he had given you the number $465 billion
that you had to come up with in savings over the next 10 years.
That is already done.
So when we all came back to start this new Congress and we
talked about the budget and everything had to be cut and
everything had to be on the table, people need to understand
that out of the first tranche of cuts that we made, it was
almost a trillion dollars, and defense was half of the table.
And you had already done it. Those cuts that we are talking
about are going to kick in in next year's budget, but you have
already made the steps of already making those cuts, and I am
not sure that that is happening across the rest of Government
and I know it is not happening in the area of entitlements,
which we are looking to the special committee to come up with.
I think it is important that everybody understands that
when we start seeing these cuts, they are going to find out
that they are real. And as most of you have said, many of it is
irreversible.
When I met over the weekend with Admiral Greenert, we were
down in Norfolk and I got to meet with the crew of the Cole.
One of them asked me, he said, I have been in the Navy now 12
years and they won't let me reenlist. I think that is just
starting. And then another sailor asked me: What is going to
happen to our retirement? What is going to happen to our
future?
All of those things are going to start coming. We have had
now five hearings, as I mentioned earlier, and then one that
talked about the impact on the Services. This will be the
sixth. And then we had one last week with three economists
talking about what will be the economic impact. And we don't
have the total number of jobs that will be lost out of
uniformed personnel, out of civilians working in defense, and
out of the contractors that make the things that our
warfighters use to protect our Nation. We do know that if the
sequestration hits, it will be about 1\1/2\ million jobs.
So we are talking about deep cuts in defense that will
affect our readiness--it has to; that will affect, when it gets
down to the bottom line, we are probably going to be talking
about training. We are going to be talking about all of the
things that we are trying to say are so important to have this
top military, the best that we have ever seen in the history of
this Nation, and all without a talk about threat or about
strategy. It just comes from budget driven.
Now I know if we had a clean sheet of paper, the first
thing we would probably do is say look at the risks that this
country faces, that the world faces, that we are the ones that
stand between the risk and the rest of the world. I just want
to make sure that when these cuts all start happening, when all
of our people in our districts and all of the people we
represent start calling us and saying, as they have been
telling me when I go home and talk to them: That isn't what we
meant; we just wanted to cut the waste. We didn't want to cut
the ability to defend ourselves.
I have seen this happen. We have played this movie before
after World War I, after World War II, after Korea, after
Vietnam. We draw down so that we won't be prepared for the next
one. That seems to be our DNA. I think we need to stop and take
a breath and relook at this because some of these cuts that are
coming down right now we are not going to be able to reverse
next year or 2 years from now. This sailor that is leaving that
has 12 years in the Navy, it is going to take 12 years to
replace him.
General Schwartz, in your testimony you stated that the
Department is confident that further spending reductions beyond
more than $450 billion--I have heard numbers up to $489 billion
that are needed to comply with the Budget Control Act's first
round of cuts--cannot be done without damaging our core
military capabilities and therefore our national security. This
is very serious stuff that we are talking about.
Further, General Dempsey told us that certain cuts would be
irrevocable. Nevertheless, the notion persists that the
Department can weather further cuts for a couple of years, so
long as we increase funding later.
That carrier that I saw those 20,000 people working on, if
we just said, let's just put that on hold, you 20,000 people
just take a little furlough, I have found though that many of
them are addicted to eating and providing for their families.
And we just ask them to take a little furlough and maybe next
year we will come and pick up where we left off. You know, that
is just not reality.
Can each of you tell us whether you agree with General
Schwartz's assessment and provide us with examples of cuts that
would have lasting impacts even if appropriations were
increased in a year or two?
General.
General Odierno. Chairman, thank you. First off, I would
remind everyone that as we look at cuts in the next 2 years or
so upfront, that today the Army still has over 100,000 soldiers
deployed forward in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other places. And
yes, we are coming out of Iraq at the end of the year, but
there is still a significant amount of burden that the Army
will face, at least through 2014, and it is important to
remember that as we look at 2013 and 2014 and the impact that
that would have on our ability to train and ensure that they
are ready and equipped and have the processes in place.
So some of the things, as you mentioned, we already are
going to reduce our force structure to 520,000. And that is
before we receive these additional cuts. And that will impact
the OPTEMPO [Operational Tempo] of our soldiers. It will
continue to impact the stress that is on the Army, its
soldiers, its families. And as important--or not as important,
but second in line, is equipment. And then ultimately this
could--if we try to fund our soldiers and equipment, which are
essential, it would then ultimately affect our training and our
readiness as we look to deter in other areas as our enemies and
adversaries watch us as we reduce our capabilities within our
Army.
It would also require--we have already had to consolidate
depots. We have had to consolidate other areas of
manufacturing. That is allowing us to save, gain efficiencies.
And additional cuts would cause us to look at that even further
and challenge our ability in our own industrial base to provide
for our soldiers and equipment that we will need and readiness
that we will continue to need. So it is across-the-board that
we would be affected as we move forward.
General Amos. Mr. Chairman, from our perspective, we share
the same anxieties that my fellow service chiefs have over
greater than a $450 billion addition to the bill. But what it
will do for our Nation, there is no question it will reduce our
forward presence.
Admiral Greenert talked today about the Chinese hospital
ship that is down in our hemisphere. Our lack of forward
presence as a result of drawing back because we can't afford
the operations and maintenance funds to deploy forward, we
can't afford the ships, we can't afford the personnel to be
able to do that, will be filled by somebody. That void will be
filled by another nation. And the net result, we don't know
what that might be. But down the road it could mean a lack of
access, a lack of ability to engage and shape a nation around
the world that our country believes it is important to be
involved in. So, forward presence.
There is no question that it will decrease our dwell time.
As we shrink our force to pay the bill, we only have three ways
that we can pay bills. One is in procurement, one is in
personnel, and the other one is operations and maintenance. So
you can dial those three dials in any combination, but there
are three dials that we have.
So as you increase the level of burden of the debt on the
military, you are going to reduce the force presence; in other
words, our force structure. That is going to decrease dwell
time between units. It is going to decrease the quality of life
of our service members.
Finally, it will stagnate the reset. There is no doubt in
my mind that we are going to struggle trying to reset the
Marine Corps coming out of Afghanistan. For all our time in
Iraq and Afghanistan, we purposely didn't rotate equipment in
and out of there. We maintained it in theatre. We did
maintenance in theatre and selectively rotated principal end
items back. We don't have the depth on the bench to afford not
to able to reset that equipment.
As it relates to irreversible damage, the kind that we
cannot regain again, I will offer a couple of thoughts. One
would be the industrial base for naval shipping. Admiral
Greenert talked a little bit about that, and I am sure he will
talk some more. That could be terminal. But selfishly, as I
look parochially at the Marine Corps, the two capabilities that
are being solely built throughout the world--the only place it
is being built is the United States of America--and that is
tilt rotor technology and that is the short takeoff and
vertical landing of the F-35B. There is not another nation in
the world. So if those lines were closed, that becomes
terminal. That will become irreversible. You will not be able
to gain that back.
The final and probably the most important point, because we
are a manpower-intensive organization, is we will lose that
leadership of those NCOs [noncommissioned officers] and those
staff noncommissioned officers at the 5-, 6-, 7-year mark that
have shouldered the burden of the last 10 years of our
conflicts. We will lose that. They will leave. And it will take
us another 6 to 10 years, as you said, to grow that sailor down
in Norfolk or that staff NCO or NCO within the Marine Corps.
Admiral Greenert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think General
Odierno and General Amos laid out the choices pretty well. Our
choices are similar. But I go to, as General Amos said, the
industrial base. Mr. Chairman, you were there. I was there.
So we brought a submarine in on budget--actually, under
budget, and early. And that is because they are in that mix.
They have got the welders there. They have got the people
there. They are rolling. If we interrupt that, clearly we will
pay a premium when we attempt to reconstitute because we won't
have that efficient process going in place.
Right now, looking just at nuclear ships--and that is where
you and I were, sir--we have 90 percent of the sub vendors--
these are the people that make reactors components, they make
turbines and these sorts of things for the nuclear-powered
ships--are single source. These folks, that is their
livelihood, is this naval nuclear technology. So if we
interrupt that, I don't know how many of these we lose or how
we reconstitute it. Just don't know. As you said before, folks
have to eat. So where will the welders go? Well, they will go
somewhere else to work.
We have design engineers--pretty unique skill--to build
nuclear carriers and build submarines. We are in the early
stages, as you know, of designing our next SSBN [Ballistic
Missile Submarine]. We need those folks. So giving them a
holiday is probably not going to work. When the British navy
did something similar, they were compelled to do it, it took
them 10 years to get to build the next submarine, and that is
really not very efficient, as we know. There will be layoffs,
as we mentioned before.
To preclude that, we would have to go to force structure.
So my pictorial here, you look around the world, so reduce
force structure, where do you reduce the ships that are
deployed? If you can't do that, then you will have to deploy
them in a shorter cycle. We call that go into our surge.
When you were down in Norfolk you heard the sailor say, we
are kind of tired, because we are on a pretty rapid pace and
turnaround now. So this would go on the backs of sailors. And
those ships, which we need more time to train and to maintain
the ships so that when we do deploy them they are fully ready,
as General Amos said, to do the job of the Nation. So we would
be compelled to go there to reduce force structure.
So it is not a very good set of choices. But that is what
we have to contend with. We have to do our best job realizing
and figuring out in that regard.
Thank you, sir.
General Schwartz. Sir, I can't amplify what my colleagues
have said, except to emphasize that your soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and marines are not going to go on break. I think that
is wishful
thinking.
General Odierno. Mr. Chairman, if I could follow up on
that. We talked at a low level of specific points but I think
it is also important to think about it in a more strategic
sense in the impact. From an Army perspective, I think about
our ability to prevent, our ability to win, and our ability to
build. I would just like to talk about this for a minute.
Our ability to prevent is based on our credibility. And
credibility is based on our capacity, our readiness, and our
modernization. Our ability to win is based on us being decisive
and dominant. If we are not decisive and dominant, we can still
win, but we win at the cost of the lives of our men and women
because of the time and capabilities that we have would not be
equal to what we believe would allow us to win decisively. And
third, as was discussed here with forward presence and other
things, we have to be able to build. We have to build through
engagement, through forward presence, through our ability to
build partner capacity, our ally capacity, so we can go hand-
in-hand in protecting not only the United States but our
allies. And ultimately, that is what this is about. And all
these things we just talked about affect that. I think that is
my biggest concern as we move forward.
And we will have those who attempt to exploit our
vulnerabilities if we are required to cut too much. They will
watch very carefully at what we will do and they will challenge
our credibility. They could miscalculate, which could cause
some significant issues down the road for our own security.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree very strongly
with the industrial base argument that you just made. It is a
matter of losing core capabilities that are critical to our
national security. And having U.S. companies that are capable
of those core capabilities is also critical. It is not that
well understood. But our U.S. companies are great partners in
our national security in many, many ways. And we have seen over
the course of the last 10 to 15 years a reduction in that and
an increase in our reliance on international companies to
provide some core capabilities. We don't want to see that slip
and we don't want to lose the skill sets of our workers that
are necessary to that.
I also would like to add to that that it has an impact on
the nondefense portion of our economy as well. The
manufacturing skills, for instance, that are developed as we
are trying to make some of our weapons systems have direct
applications on the commercial side that lead to businesses,
that lead to economic growth for us. So to hit that would be a
very, very devastating impact on our economy.
I do also feel the same arguments, however, apply to
infrastructure, apply to transportation and energy, and a lot
of the systems that that portion of our Federal budget funds.
And also to education. I was speaking with someone from
somewhere in Virginia, saying they are talking about maybe
going to a 3-day school week to try to accommodate some of the
local budget cuts that are being hit. That impacts our national
security and our defense as well.
And while I certainly agree with the chairman that
mandatory programs, which are 55 percent of our budget, you
can't deal with a 35- to 40-percent deficit and take 55 percent
of the budget off the table, they, too, are important.
Medicare, Social Security, Medicaid have a huge impacts on the
quality of life for our citizens, which is why I have argued
that revenue needs to be part of the equation, part of what we
discuss. If we have these crushing needs across many different
areas, part of it is making sure we have the money to pay for
them. And while certainly our spending has gone up
significantly in the last decade, our revenue has gone down
significantly in our last decade as a percentage of GDP [Gross
Domestic Product]. So I think we need to put everything on the
table and be responsible about it.
Those who may have watched the ``super committee'' [Joint
Select Committee on Deficit Reduction] hearing yesterday, if
the super committee's succeeding is that all stands between us
and sequestration, then we have cause for concern. And we have
an investment in trying to figure out a way to help the super
committee succeed. And it is not rocket science. Put everything
on the table, including revenue and mandatory programs. As long
as those two things are off the table, all that is left is the
discretionary budget.
I care about the portions of the discretionary budget that
aren't just defense. But if you just care about defense, that
is more than half of the discretionary budget. It puts us in a
very, very untenable position.
The one question I have is you gentlemen have talked a
great deal about our ability to project power and have a
foreign presence. And I agree that that is incredibly important
in maintaining our interests. One of the things that we
frequently hear from folks who are looking for ways to save
money in defense is overseas basing. Why do we have the troops
we have in Asia, in Europe. I think you have done a pretty good
job of explaining some of that. Talk a little bit more about
how that foreign presence and the presence of those bases helps
us and then also make clear the money. Because I think a lot of
people don't understand that a lot of foreign partners pay the
substantial amount of the costs of that forward presence. And
if we were the to get rid of those foreign bases and simply
bring those troops home, it would actually cost us more money,
in addition to costing us some of the partnerships we have with
countries like Korea and Japan. Could you lend a little bit of
your expertise to explaining that?
General Schwartz. Congressman Smith, if we want to be a
global power, we have got to be out and about. And that implies
having--and if we want to contribute to regional stability,
that includes being forward. And that is, different aspects of
the joint team can accomplish those tasks. But to be sure, if
the Western Pacific, for example, is rising in strategic
importance to the country, what we don't want to do--and you
have heard the Secretary of Defense say this--is to arbitrarily
reduce our presence there or reduce the capabilities, the
breadth of capabilities that the team provides there. And this
is true in other areas of the world.
Clearly, in some areas in the Western Pacific the allies do
assist us and provide us resources for basing and facilities,
and so on and so forth. This is true both in Korea and Japan.
And it happens elsewhere.
Mr. Smith. And if I may, General, when you say rising in
importance, I think it is important to point out why. It is
economics, primarily. Access to overseas markets is critical to
our economic growth. Certainly, access to energy. We all focus
on oil, natural gas, and all that. But also access to critical
minerals that are necessary for our economy. And if we don't
have that presence and China does, they are in a better
position to cut off critical economic needs for the health of
our Nation. So that is the link that I think people need to
understand.
I am sorry, go ahead.
General Schwartz. I will just conclude by saying that a
byproduct of that presence is access. If you want to have a
power projection military, it requires some measure of access.
Some require less than others, I acknowledge, but the bottom
line is having relationships with others and having access to
locations where one--``lily pads,'' if you will, from which you
can project power is vitally important to our Nation.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Admiral Greenert. Thank you for the question, Mr. Smith.
Again, my chart, the little squares where you see a foreign
nation, that is what I call a place, because it is not really a
base because that is their sovereign territory.
But we get on the order of--and it varies with the end
rate; so that given--somewhere around $4 billion of host nation
support from Japan. We have been partnered with them for over
60 years. They share information with us. They are an amazing
forward-leaning, high-end ally. It is more than information
sharing and it is more than host nation support, where they
take care of our families. We wouldn't be able to do Operation
Tomodachi if we weren't forward and right around there. We
wouldn't have been able to do the operation in Libya if we
weren't forward and somewhere around there. The Pakistan
earthquake. The Pakistan floods.
If you go to Singapore, they have built a pier facility
called Changi Pier, and they have provided that opportunity to
us. That is host nation money. There is a command and control
center there for humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and
they have offered us to use their piers for our deployments, to
repair our ships, et cetera.
Same story in Bahrain. We have had decades of interaction
of building a relationship there. And they, too, offer us to
berth our ships, repair our ships. Of course, as you know, our
headquarters are there for Navy Central Command.
So there is a host out there. You can see the advantage.
And if we are not there, it is hard to influence. You can't
surge trust and confidence. You have to build it.
Thank you.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
General Odierno. If I could just piggyback on the comments.
Clearly, we are going to have to prioritize, though. There is
going to have to be a prioritization that has to occur. As we
develop a strategy, it will have to be based on that strategy
where our forward presence is.
And as was stated, Korea, Japan, the Army has relationships
where we have shared costs and enabled us to be forward
deployed in Pacific Kuwait for a very long time. It has helped
us in funding many of the forces and capabilities that we have
in the Middle East. So these will continue. In fact, some
places, based on our strategy, we might want to expand those
relationships and in others we will have to look at: Is it
still viable and do we reduce? But we would have to come up
with new ways to engage and new ways to work with them.
As we look to Europe, one of the successes we have had is
based on the relationships we have had and the forward presence
we have had there, we have been able to develop our NATO [North
Atlantic Treaty Organization] partners to work with us now in
Afghanistan and as they did in Iraq and as they did in Libya.
And that is because of the forward presence and continued work
that we have done together for so many years.
So that is very critical. We might have to come up with
some unique ways to do those in the future in some areas. But
there are other areas where we just simply will not be able to
do that and will even consider increasing presence in some
areas. That is going to be based on where we believe our
interests are. I think those are the discussions that we have
to have as we move forward.
General Amos. Congressman Smith, one last thought about
this. From a purely altruistic perspective, there is an awful
lot of economics with regards to foreign presence. When you
take a look in the--especially in the Pacific area, the
Southwest Pacific area, if you take a look at the chokepoints
that are there and the maritime commerce is--as I said in my
opening statement, 95 percent of the world's commerce travels
by seas and oceans, and they travel through those seven
chokepoints. If you just take a look at the Gulf of Aden, take
a look at the eastern side off the coast of Africa, all the way
out in clearly blue water, with the piracy, imagine that
happening to a large degree down in the Southwest Pacific and
start thinking about oil and commerce.
So, very selfishly, the commerce and the economics would
want us--would seem to compel us to want to have forward
presence.
A year ago, I am reminded, just--it was in November, when
things began to get pretty exciting in Korea. As I look back on
that now, personally, I wasn't sure how that was going to turn
out. I wasn't sure that things were not going to escalate to a
point we might find ourselves back in Korea at a significant
footprint.
Our ability to have forward presence there in Korea, in
Japan, to assure our allies, assure Japan that we have had an
alliance for 70 years, is pretty significant. They do pay, to
your point--our allies over there pay a pretty hefty price of
their own moneys to forward-base and stage our U.S. forces
there. So it is not completely without cost on them.
So I think economics and forward presence are important,
sir.
Mr. Smith. Okay. Well, one thing is absolutely clear. We
are not going to have more economic opportunity in this country
if we have less influence in the world. It doesn't work that
way.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
My first question will be for the record because there will
not be time for an adequate response here.
Many of us remember how, in 1950, a 540-man battalion-size
task force of the 24th Infantry Division, under Lieutenant
Colonel Charles Smith, was rushed to Korea on transport planes
and moved north to block the enemy advance. Early in the
morning of July 5, 1950, Task Force Smith took up positions a
mile long just north of Osan. The North Koreans' advance was
equipped with
T-34 tanks. Fire from two American 75-millimeter recoilless
rifles did not damage the advancing T-34s. No anti-tank mines
had been brought along, and anti-ship guns, a vital part of
World War II armies, were no longer used.
As the enemy tanks continued, the Americans opened up with
2.36-inch bazookas. Second Lieutenant Ollie Connor fired 22
2.36-inch bazooka rounds at the North Korean T-34 tanks, all
from close range, with little or no apparent damage. Although
the task force had inflicted 127 casualties, they suffered 181
casualties and were so scattered it would thereafter be largely
ineffective.
The Battle of Osan is a low point in American history. It
symbolizes the price in blood our troops pay for ill-
preparedness and inadequate equipment.
Another part of this story is that, at the end of World War
II, a 3.5-inch bazooka had been developed, but the program was
terminated as part of the defense reductions following World
War II.
It is clear that if we continue to fight these
discretionary wars at a time and place chosen, provoked by an
enemy with weapons of his choosing, that any cuts in our
military are going to put us in a position that we are going to
be repeating the Army's experience at Osan or the Marines'
experience at Chosin Reservoir.
But the reality is that we borrow 42 cents of every dollar
we spend. If we spent nothing on our discretionary programs, if
we had no government at all, we would still have a several-
hundred-billion-dollar deficit. The reality also is that if
further cuts in defense are not on the table and you do not
have cuts in mandatory spending, you have to cut all of the
other discretionary programs 50 percent to balance the budget.
And balance we must, or we face bankruptcy as a country.
Assume that the super committee is going to default and the
sequestration is going to be triggered. What can you do with
the military that remains in your service? What kind of
missions can you perform?
This will be enormously important in informing a study, a
national strategy study, that we must conduct to determine how
we are going to use our military in the future. If you would
please include that for the record, because we do not have time
here.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on pages 89 and 90.]
Mr. Bartlett. General Schwartz, on October 12, 2010, you
were quoted on the F-35 competitive engine issue as saying,
``If Rolls and GE [General Electric] are so confident that
their product will succeed and bring value to the taxpayer, it
would be nice if they put a little more against the $1.9
billion bill they would like the taxpayers to undertake.''
This is exactly what the competitive engine contractors
proposed to do, but instead of taking advantage of this
opportunity, as evidenced by the original DOD F-35 acquisition
strategy that supported competitive engine development--by the
way, there never was a competition and the other engine won;
that just didn't happen. Instead, the Pentagon supports a sole-
source--what is, in effect, a $110 billion earmark, because
there is no competition, for the next 40 years for the single-
engine F-35 aircraft that is currently projected to comprise
over 90 percent of the fighter planes in all of our Services
and a major part of the fighter planes for all of our allies.
The original development for the primary engine was to have
been completed in fiscal year 2010, last year. It now is
projected for completion in fiscal year 2015. The F-35 primary
engine has been in development for 10 years, with another 4
years to go.
The Government Accountability Office in its F-35 engine
study indicated there is an opportunity for significant savings
to the F-35 engine program through competition and nonfinancial
benefits, including contractor technical innovation and
responsiveness. Further, former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry
said in his acquisition study that competition through dual-
source procurement competition is, and I quote, ``the only way
to control program costs.''
Were you quoted accurately regarding contractor funding? If
so, why do you now believe contractor self-funding for the
competitive engine, particularly in this budget environment,
isn't such a good idea?
And you ought to give most of this for the record because,
I am sorry, our time has run out. Will you please tell us for
the record why this is not a good idea now?
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 89.]
General Schwartz. I would be happy to. But, briefly, sir,
is, my comments were made prior to $400-plus billion. There
simply is no money for competition at this point in time.
Mr. Bartlett. But, sir, GAO says that it would decrease the
funding needed, the competition would reduce the costs. They
continue to contend that, sir.
General Schwartz. Based on the information I have seen,
sir, it would require development of two engines. With the test
programs and all that is associated with that, there simply is
no free money available to pursue a second development program.
Mr. Bartlett. But, again, I say, sir, that the GAO says
that it will save money, it will not cost money.
Thank you. I yield back.
General Schwartz. Ultimately, it might.
The Chairman. Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to begin by thanking you gentlemen for being
before us again today and for trying to take a stab at letting
us know what the world would look like from a military
perspective if we went into sequestration.
I think the $465 billion--and I have said this before, and
I will say it again, Mr. Chairman--is a lot to put on the
table. So I know we are trying to work through that, you are
trying to work through that, and figure out how we do that. So
I am not really excited about the super committee touching too
much more in defense, and I am not really excited about them
not getting their job done and going into a default position,
if you will.
And I think there is a lot of things not many of you--
although I know that it crosses across for all of you--cited
some of the issues that are really looming in front of us, for
example, cybersecurity, where we are truly--we are really
somewhat in the dark right now in trying to figure out just how
we are going to attack that problem. I think that is going to
take a lot more money than we think.
I am also looking at fact that when we talk about defense
cuts in this process, we are not just talking about the
Department of Defense, but we are talking about intelligence,
we are talking about homeland security, we are talking about
veterans. And when I look at the fact that we really, in a lot
of ways, haven't addressed our returning soldiers and airmen,
seamen, et cetera, marines who have been out there, and many of
them who are going to need additional help, especially after
all of those deployments and the types of hits that our people
have taken physically out in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is a
big underfunded issue in veterans and health care for those
returning people.
So I am really concerned--you know, I work with Mr. Turner
on missile defense and our nuclear arsenal, and there are a lot
of issues there. We are going to have to plus-up in the next
few years in order to get--especially if our testing goes
well--to get back on track with missile defense, for example.
So I see there are a lot of places that need money in the
future, and so I am not really thrilled about going into more
cuts than the $465 billion.
But there is a majority, at least in the House, who do not
want to put revenues, new revenues, on the table to pay for
this. And if that is the case, I have a feeling that, if this
super committee comes up with some solution they are going to
present to the rest of us, we are going to see cuts in defense.
So my question to you is, where would you cut? I am not
talking about another trillion dollars of cuts or another--but
where would you cut? I mean, where--after the $465 [billion]
that you are looking after, in each of your areas where would
you suggest we point to? If there is some money that has to be
put on the table to the super committee, where would you cut?
General Schwartz. Ma'am, for us, the prime imperative is,
whatever size we end up, we want to be a superb Air Force. So
that means readiness needs to be protected. And, given that,
the only two other areas where you can make reductions are in
force structure--the size, the number of squadrons, the number
of assets--and in modernization, that on which our future
depends.
Ms. Sanchez. On force structures, I recall you have
actually been decreasing----
General Schwartz. We have.
Ms. Sanchez [continuing]. In the Air Force.
General Schwartz. We have and we will to make the $450
[billion]-plus target. But the reality is that further
reductions will drive us to yet lower levels of force structure
and modernization.
Ms. Sanchez. Commandant?
General Amos. Congresswoman----
Ms. Sanchez. Now, you got plussed up 20,000 or was it
40,000 marines in these two wars?
General Amos. In 2006, we went up from 176,000 to 202,000.
And we are planning on drawing down right now. We did a force
structure review, I believe you are aware----
Ms. Sanchez. So when you draw down, are those troops, by
definition, going to actually--the force structure is actually
going to shrink?
General Amos. Yes, ma'am, it certainly is. And the plan was
to shrink to about 15,000 below that level, down to 186,000.
Ms. Sanchez. And that is under the $465 billion we are
looking----
General Amos. No, that actually was below that. With the
added cost now, there is a very good chance we will end up
below 186,000. And if we end up with more in the form of a
sequestration or the super committee adds more bills to the
Department of Defense, we are going to continue to go down.
So I would echo what General Schwartz says. You know, I
think, collectively, we have all agreed that whatever force we
end up with has to be the most capable and combat-ready force
for our Nation. It will be a smaller force. The ramifications
of that are some of what we have talked about: Less engagement,
less presence, the quicker turnaround time in forts. You will
reach a point where capabilities--you have capacity of the
Force, which is numbers of units, squadron ships, they will
come down. But eventually we will start seeing capabilities
leave the military. So, I mean, that is some of the danger.
But, for us, it will be dial the Force down and then reduce
the modernization and the procurement accordingly. But, at the
end of the day, we have to end up with a Marine Corps that you
can call upon and be confident that it will be able to
accomplish its mission.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Thornberry.
Ms. Sanchez. And, Mr. Chairman, if I could just have for
the record General Odierno's and the Admiral's comments on
that, I would appreciate it. Thank you.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 90.]
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you all for being here.
The chairman outlined what has already been reduced from
the defense budget this year. Most Members of Congress, most
Americans don't realize that. But you all have said that you
can handle that much, that it is okay.
Most of us, I think, agree that another $600 billion in
sequestration is not okay; that is unacceptable. But I think
the greater danger is that some of our colleagues will say,
``Well, if $465 [billion] is okay, why not $466 [billion] or
another $50 billion or another $100 billion out of defense?
And, after all, it is not the $600 billion, but it is just a
little bit more. And if $465 [billion] is okay, why isn't that
okay?''
And I would appreciate you all's answer to that argument,
because I think that is the greater likelihood of what we face.
General Odierno. First, Congressman, I would say $465
[billion] is not ``okay,'' it is something that we can manage.
But it comes at risk. It does not come without risk.
In the Army's case, we have been asked to reduce to $520
[billion], but that is even before the $465 billion cut. And so
we are going to have to significantly reduce the Army smaller
to meet the $465 billion cut.
If it goes further, we will have to decrease the size of
the Army even more, and we will now have to start significantly
decreasing the National Guard and the Reserve Component along
with it. So it will have dynamic and dramatic impacts on our
ability to respond, whether it be not only abroad but in
support of civil authorities, in support of national disasters,
and other things.
So, once you get beyond $465 billion, we have taken all of
the efficiencies we can take. We have taken out structure. We
have reduced modernization, in my mind, in some cases lower
than we really needed to reduce modernization, already. If we
go beyond that, we now--it becomes critical, and it becomes a
fact that we will no longer modernize. We will no longer be
able to respond to a variety of threats. We will have to get to
a size that is small enough where I believe, as I said earlier,
we might lose our credibility in terms of our ability to deter.
And that is the difference.
So it is not ``okay'' at $465 billion. It is something we
have been able to work ourselves through, with risk. But
anything beyond that becomes even higher risk.
Thank you, sir.
Admiral Greenert. Sir, that little chart that I gave you,
if you look at the number shifts, that is today. So we go to
the, as we have kind of said, ``okay''--and I agree with
General Odierno, it is not necessarily okay. With a new
strategic approach that says, this is what I want your Navy to
do, my Navy to do in the future, then perhaps it is manageable.
But that is less ships than you see on this little chart.
You go beyond that, we are probably talking about reducing
force structure, for the reasons my colleagues described. We
have to be a whole force, able to meet what you ask us to do
today. We have to have our sailors organized, trained, and
equipped to do that job, and motivated. The industrial base is
fragile, as we have described before.
So what area of the world do we not want to be in, and
where must we be? And then we have described Asia-Pacific, and
the Arabian Gulf is there. And the risk to not be in those
other areas--or if there, very episodically--is the risk we
have to understand, in my view, to go forward.
Thank you.
General Schwartz. Sir, I would give you one example.
Weapons systems support is vitally important to maintaining the
readiness of our platforms. It is spares, it is depot
maintenance, it is flight-line activity. And we are below 80
percent on the required funding for weapons systems support.
That is an example of the risk we are taking. Incremental cuts
that you talked about above that level will come out of
accounts like weapons systems support.
We have got to have an Air Force and Armed Forces that our
youngsters, who are the most battle-hardened ever, are proud to
be a part of. And being good is a vital part of that. I see
further incremental cuts, just marginal, as you suggested, as
affecting those accounts that are not major programs but,
rather, would reduce our readiness and therefore would be
unacceptable.
General Amos. Congressman, another example might be
helpful. When we designed--as a result of Secretary Gates'
direction last fall, when we designed the Marine Corps to come
down from 202,000 down to some number, he told the Marine
Corps, ``I want you to take risk in the high-end missions.''
That means major contingency operations, major combat. And so
we did. We built a Marine Corps using the lessons of 10 years
of war, incorporated that in there, and came up with a Marine
Corps of 24 infantry battalions and 186,800 marines.
That was a one-major-contingency-operation force. And what
that means is that, without naming an operational plan, if we
go to war, the Marines are going to go and they are going to
come home when it is over. There will be no rotation of forces;
there will be no dwell. There will be no such thing as dwell.
It will just go on and come home when it is over.
So when we went to $465 [billion] and dropped another 5,000
marines, effectively--we are still in the process of working
through that right now--we dropped the numbers of battalions
below that. So we are at risk right now for being able to take
your Marine Corps and deploy to a major contingency operation
and do what our Nation expects us to do. So if you go beyond
that, $1 billion, $2 billion, $5 billion, it is going to come
down in force structure, and it will be capabilities and the
ability to respond.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to the witnesses, who, again, are re-
enforcing the message we heard from Secretary Panetta a few
weeks ago.
And one thing that we are hearing, sort of, in a lot of
discussion and reports back, where we actually haven't really
seen it, is that there is a strategic review that is sort of
concurrent with trying to absorb this $465 billion reduction.
And I just wondered, first of all, if somebody could sort of
share with us where you think that strategic review is. Are we
going to see that publicly at some point?
And why don't I just leave it at that and see if anyone can
comment.
General Schwartz. It is being vetted throughout the
Department and the Executive Branch, and I think that it is
likely that we will have that product available by the end of
the year.
Mr. Courtney. And in terms of just, you know, programs that
you are already, sort of, grappling with right now--and,
General Schwartz, you know, one of them is the C-27, which I
asked General Breedlove about last week at a Readiness
Committee hearing that Mr. Forbes held. I mean, there has been
a delay in terms of an August, sort of, milestone that was
supposed to go forward.
And I guess what I think a lot of people are trying to
understand is, is that decision tied to this strategic review-
slash-$465 billion, again, reduction that you all are trying to
figure out?
General Schwartz. That decision is not final. But if it
turned out that way, it certainly would be tied to the resource
prioritization that is occurring and trying to tie that to the
strategy.
Let me just say at the outset, sir, that this--if that
occurs, it will be extremely painful for me personally. I made
a commitment to George Casey that I would not--I would not
make--I would not do this deal with him and then back out. That
was 2 years ago.
Mr. Courtney. Right.
General Schwartz. And so I have personal skin in this game.
And if it turns out that way, it will be very painful.
But the logic on this is simply, the reductions that we are
looking at require us to take out fleets of assets, not a few
here and a few there, but to bring out all of the
infrastructure and the logistics and all that that is related
to fleets of aircraft. That is the only way for us to do what
we have to do.
Mr. Courtney. Right.
General Schwartz. But I--we have purchased 21 C-27s. There
are 17 more to go. What the Department will do will be clear
here in a couple of months, ultimately. But I want to assure
you, and I have assured Ray Odierno, that the United States Air
Force will support our Army or die trying.
Mr. Courtney. Right. And I totally believe every word you
are saying. I guess what I am still trying to understand is, is
this stress that you are living with right now, I mean, is that
being driven by the $465 billion reduction or is it just sort
of the uncertainty about what is going to happen next?
General Schwartz. It is the former more than the latter.
Mr. Courtney. All right. Thank you. And that is helpful,
just to sort of get that clear.
Admiral, welcome to the committee. And I just wanted to ask
you, in terms of that strategic review that is ongoing right
now, there are some press reports that Asia and the Pacific is
really kind of where the whole, sort of, you know, organization
is going to be sort of shifting its focus to. And I was just
wondering if you had any comment in terms of whether or not
that is what you see the Navy's, sort of, priority or just
focus, you know, looking out at the strategic change or review
that is going on right now.
Admiral Greenert. Yes, Mr. Courtney, you have it right.
That is the--the focus is Asia-Pacific, one; Arabian gulf, two.
I think the Secretary testified to that recently.
If you look at the little chart I gave you, you can see
that that is where we are at today. Four of the six defense
treaties that our country is signed up to are in there. That is
the emerging economic countries and the economy--that is where
the, you know, sea lines of communication are at their highest.
And there is an emerging China and other issues out there, as
well, from counterterrorism to, obviously, North Korea.
So, yes, sir, I think you have it right.
Mr. Courtney. Great. Thank you.
And, lastly, you referred to the Libyan operations in your
testimony. I just would want to, sort of, finish the thought
there, that those three submarines are all going to be offline
in about 10 years. And that is why we have to keep this build
rate that, again, we have worked so hard to achieve this year.
Admiral Greenert. Yes, sir. Good point.
Mr. Courtney. I would yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Forbes.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Schwartz just commented that he would make a
commitment that the Air Force would be there to support the
Army or die trying. And I know the patriotism of all four of
you gentlemen and the men and women who serve under you. And it
is a fact that if the President asked any of you to perform a
mission, you would either perform that mission or you would die
trying. And that has been your history.
And we hear a lot of different opinions about the impact of
these cuts, whether it is $465 billion, $500 billion, whatever
there is, or $600 billion more. Do you gentlemen have any
historical background that you can offer this committee of
where we have made similar types of cuts and the impact it has
had to the lives of the men and women who serve in the Services
that you represent? And do you know of any time when we have
tried to make those kinds of cuts when the security situation
in the world was as unsettled as it is today?
And any of you who would like to take a stab at that, I
would just love to hear your thoughts.
Admiral Greenert. Mr. Forbes, I will take a stab, if you
don't mind.
Mr. Forbes. Please, Admiral.
Admiral Greenert. I remember a little anecdote. I went to
my first submarine; I am a lieutenant junior grade, an 02. I go
aboard the submarine. We are about to get under way for a
Western Pacific deployment. It is in the--it is 1979. We get on
board and look at the ball caps, and there are people from
several ships in the squadron--submarines in the squadron. We
couldn't man up. We had, at the sonar display there, mess cooks
who were being told, just when you see this, let me know. We
had, as you looked at the parts around the ship, valves of
different colors because they came from a different ship
because we were cannibalizing them. And we got under way 2 days
late, which was not necessarily unusual in that regard. And
this is for a major deployment.
My point, sir, is, it is the people. We did not get that
right--oh, by the way, there was this thing called ``drug
exempt'' we used to have, where we had a drug problem and a
serious drug problem, and it was okay if you came forward and
said, ``I used drugs,'' and therefore we said, ``Okay, you are
exempt'' and they left. You could get out of, in this case, the
submarine force.
So we can't go back there, sir. And that is a focus of the
people. They make all the difference. We must build, in my
view, around that as we take this on.
Thank you.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you.
General Odierno. Congressman, if I could--I would just echo
those comments. In the '70s, post-Vietnam, and the issues we
had with discipline standards and lack of direction for the
Army, lack of modernization, a lack of standards. But I would
also point out, in the '90s, following the fall of the Berlin
Wall, where we believed that we would not have any significant
amount of operations following that, and we cut the Army by a
significant amount of individuals at that time, reduced our
modernization program significantly, and we found ourselves
actually engaged in more amount of operations during the '90s
than any other time.
And I think that brings us to what Secretary Panetta has
talked about, and Secretary Gates as well, is our inability to
predict the future. And so it is about us being able to develop
a strategy, focus on Asia-Pacific, also then in the Middle East
as a second part, but also our ability to respond to unforeseen
contingencies.
And that gets specifically to readiness. And the mistake we
have made in the past is that we have allowed our readiness to
slip and then reduce our ability to forward deploy, reduce the
ability of our soldiers, which always costs lives in the end
when we do this. It also--the way we ramped down our Army in
the '90s left huge holes in our leadership, both at the
noncommissioned officer and officer levels, because of the way
we went about reducing our forces.
So it is critical that, as we go through this, we be
allowed to do this right. And that means it has to be constant
over time, with a consistent ramp that allows us to maintain
the capabilities of our leaders, both in our noncommissioned
officers and our officers, as we go through this process.
Because that ultimately will allow to us sustain our readiness
and also allow us to expand, if we have to, more quickly, which
might be required if we have an unforeseen contingency, sir.
General Schwartz. Sir, I would only ask you to recall the
American hostage rescue attempt in Iran. That is the classic
example of what can happen, both the tragedy and the
embarrassment of that event, if we don't do this right.
General Amos. Congressman, we have talked post-Vietnam and
the '70s. That was a different international landscape than we
have today. We all shared the same--interesting, in those days,
we didn't classify because we were lieutenants. We didn't
understand what a hollow force was, when we were taking out our
wing panels off an F-4 and putting them on our other airplane
so we could fly it. I mean, the significance of that hollow
force, as I look back on it now, was--when I look back on it,
it is embarrassing.
But the international landscape in the '70s and early '80s
is different than it is now. This is a very dangerous next two
decades we are in. I think that is the significant difference.
Mr. Forbes. And, gentlemen, none of us would pretend to
have your heroism, but let me assure you of one thing. We won't
go quietly in the night in trying to preserve and make sure
that you are never going there again. Some of us have fought
this $465 billion. We may have lost that battle; we don't
intend to lose this second one. So thank you for being here and
your testimony.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you very much for your service and for
your thoughtful attempt to answer our questions.
As I have been listening to this, I am hearing all the
reasons, in general, why we cannot do any cuts or limited cuts,
but I have not heard specifics. Surely, in each of your
organizations, you are doing some very serious planning about
what cuts really mean. And it seems to be critically important
for this committee and certainly for me as an individual to
note precisely what you are planning at various levels of cuts.
We know we have $450 billion. It may go to over $1 trillion.
What exactly does that mean? Not in general about hollowing
out, which may mean something but does nothing to inform me as
to what a precise cut is.
Now, to try to understand what cuts might mean, I have
asked my staff to go out and find out what others are saying.
And we have gone to the far-right think tanks and the far-left
think tanks and put together a matrix about cuts that they
think are possible, ranging up to a trillion and slightly over
a trillion dollars, including a certain Senator who thinks you
can cut a trillion dollars. It is interesting, the way they
match up.
And I would--I will share with you gentlemen that matrix,
and I would appreciate a specific response from you. Is it
possible? And, if so, what does it mean? That gives me some
information.
I appreciate the general tone of this hearing. I understand
that we need to do a lot of things. And one of the things that
apparently is going to be done is some very serious cuts. What
exactly can be cut? For example, do we need 5,300 nuclear
weapons? Do we need a triad? Does the Marine Corps really need
a new expeditionary vehicle? Or can we get by without a Marine
Corps vertical-takeoff F-35 version?
Those are serious. But those are the real things. The
generalities, yes, that is nice to hear, but we are getting
very close to some specifics. What exactly is going to happen?
This committee needs to know, and I certainly need to know.
I will share the matrix with you. If any of you would like
to respond with some specificity, I would be very interested in
hearing it.
General Schwartz. Sir, well, I am sure all of us will be
happy to respond to that.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 93.]
General Schwartz. The reality is that we all operate under
certain limitations in the Executive Branch and that you can be
frustrated, sir, but this is the way it is. It is not real
until it is the President's budget.
Nonetheless, we certainly will do our best to respond. I
can tell you that, in my case, we are talking about hundreds of
aircraft, we are talking about thousands of people.
Mr. Garamendi. I understand the generalities. Which
aircraft? What people? What bases? What does that mean?
And I understand that you have to wait. But as near as I
can tell, this committee is looking at less than a month and a
half where some decisions are going to be made by the United
States Congress. And, frankly, at this point, we don't have
much information other than bad things will happen. Well, yes.
It is time for some specifics. What exactly is going to be on
the table here?
General Schwartz. We will certainly share, sir, your----
Mr. Garamendi. I know. I told the Secretary the same thing.
General Schwartz [continuing]. Requirement with our
leadership.
Mr. Garamendi. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to thank each of you for being here today. I
particularly appreciate your service, your leadership. We have
the best military in the world. I know firsthand. I have three
sons currently serving in the Army, in the National Guard. I am
grateful I have a son who is in the Navy. I have a nephew in
the Air Force. And, General Amos, my late father-in-law and
late brother-in-law were very proud marines. So I cover--we are
a joint-service family. And I want to thank you for what you do
in bringing to the attention of the American people the danger
of the level of these cuts to the security of our country.
Last week, I had the privilege of being with General
Odierno at the Italian American Foundation dinner to honor
military families. And, General, I want to thank you for your
family's service--extraordinary service. You truly exemplify
what is best about our country, and I appreciate everything
that you have done and, particularly, the briefings that I had
when I visited with you in Baghdad. They were right on point.
Additionally, I want to point out that, in today's Roll
Call, we have Secretary John McHugh, the Secretary of the Army,
who is a former Member of this committee, he has written a very
thoughtful op-ed. It really backs up what Secretary Panetta has
said of the need for a strong national defense.
Now, he concludes--and, General, if you could comment on
this--``Just as we did not predict Pearl Harbor and 9/11, we
cannot predict the future with any certainty. We can, however,
remember the lessons of history. No major conflict has ever
been won without boots on the ground.''
And you being a military historian yourself, would you
please comment on this?
General Odierno. Well, I think, of course, we think that,
no matter what strategy we portray, we must have the ability to
project power on the land. It is critical to whatever we do.
And as we talk about the global commons, we talk about how we
have access and being able to use the global commons, but,
ultimately, the global commons is used by others to influence
populations either to improve their ways or dominate a
population. And, ultimately, what we need to do when that
happens is we might be asked to solve that problem on land. And
we have proven that over time and time and time again. So we
must be prepared to do that, even though we only want to do
that as a last resort. That is never something that we want to
do; it is something we must do as a last resort.
So it is important that we have the capacity and the
capability and credibility to be able to do that. Hopefully, we
have enough where it will deter people from causing us to go
and conduct significant land operations. But we must have the
capacity and capability to deter. And that should always be a
significant part of any strategy that we have, sir.
Mr. Wilson. And I appreciate you raising that point. Peace
through strength, that is how we can avoid and reduce the
potential of conflict.
And, General Amos, you hit on a series of specifics. And,
to me, very important is that people need to understand, the
American people, that the addition of military forces or a
reduction of military forces, it has an extraordinarily
negative impact. It just can't be done overnight, with
experienced military forces, senior NCOs, junior officers.
You have expressed it, and I would like to hear from your
colleagues how, when we talk about this, this is really real
world threatening our ability to respond. Beginning with
General Odierno.
General Odierno. Sir, as I said previously, as you know, we
have a hardened, battle-tested force, one that has known 10
years of combat, one where we have leaders that have grown up
with nothing but combat capability and experience. And for to
us move forward as an Army and as a joint force, we must be
able to sustain these individuals who are capable and
understand warfare, who understand the future, who can think
through what we might face in the future, what are the
capabilities and capacities we need.
We must remember that we have asked a lot of these
individuals. Many of them have been deployed three, four, five
times. And they believe that what we have done is important,
and they believe we must sustain this capability over time. My
concern is, if we start continuing to whittle away at our
capacity and capability to such an extent, they could get
frustrated. And if they get frustrated, they might decide to
leave the Force. And it would then cause us to have a
significant hole in the center of our Force, which is our
leadership. And I am a strong believer that leadership can
solve almost any problem if it is the right type of leadership.
Mr. Wilson. And not to cut off anybody else, but this has
direct effect on military families. And we want the military
families to be supportive of their loved ones who are serving.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
Thank you very much, Generals and Admiral, for being here.
Thank you for your leadership, particularly.
I am going to follow up just on a personnel question or
two, probably no surprise to you. I am wondering if, given the
really serious situation that we are looking at, we are
obviously focusing more on, kind of, a short-term sequestration
and some of those issues. But in the long term, could you help
me out with a discussion of what kind of reforms in the
personnel system we should be looking at today? I mean, is this
the time to address the military retirement issues? We know
that the Defense Business Board has done that.
The other issue that I think is an important one is
jointness in terms of health care. We know that, certainly,
Walter Reed, Bethesda, while there are growing pains in that
realignment, I think that, you know, we will be seeing how well
that works. We know also San Antonio, Brooke Army Center has
done that. Where are we on that issue?
And could we be thinking seriously about those reforms?
Perhaps there are others that you would like to suggest, so
that part of the question that the super committee is looking
at is not just tomorrow and next year, it is 10 years out.
Where are we on those reforms? How seriously are you looking at
those?
General Schwartz. Ma'am, I would just say at the outset
that we can't look at one piece of the overall compensation
package. It includes pay and benefits and so on, it includes
medical care, and it includes retirement. And a concern that I
think we all share, certainly that I have, is that we look at
this piecemeal and we make choices on this or that without
connecting the dots, and that if we proceed with reform or
change--and, certainly, we need to address this, to certainly
have an intelligent discussion about it--we should not do this
drip by drip. In other words, if we are going to do an
adjustment, we should do it all in a comprehensive, one-time
fashion so our internal audience can take this on and adjust
and move on. What we don't need is, sort of, incremental change
in this respect.
Briefly, with regard to DBB [Defense Business Board], there
were some aspects of what the Business Board suggested that are
interesting. But one thing they did not do--and I know you
believe this--is there is nothing in that report about
recruiting and retention. And what this whole package is about
is recruiting and retention. And to make suggestions and then
just blow off recruiting and retention just, you know, was not
a solid approach.
General Odierno. If I could just add on the reforms, I echo
General Schwartz's comments. I would just add to that that this
is not something that we can rush into. It has to be something
that is studied because of the second- and third-order effects
it can have on our ability to sustain an All-Volunteer Force.
The impacts--people sometimes tend to overlook and believe,
you know--overlook the sacrifices that are made, not only by
the soldiers, but the families themselves and what they have
given up so their soldiers and their marines and sailors and
airmen can perform their duties. And all of this plays a role
as we look at benefits and pay and retirement.
And I think we are taking a very quick, thin look at it
right now, and it has to be something that is much deeper, does
a study and understands the overall impacts it would have on
the individuals and their families and the future of our All-
Volunteer Force across all the Services.
Admiral Greenert. If I may, ma'am, there is a piece--I
completely agree with what General Schwartz and General Odierno
said. There is another piece. At the conclusion of this, there
will be a reaction by the Force. We will need to shape it. We
will need to recruit, as General Schwartz said. And where we
could use help is the authorities to do the right thing.
In my view, diversity is a big deal for the future. The
skills that are out there to make our force motivated and
relevant are such that we need to open our aperture in
diversity. And that and the ability to shape the Force
correctly, to be able to have a discussion with our people as
to why we may need to shape it--maybe ask more in, maybe lay
people off frankly, depending on how things go--that we can do
it properly and dignified.
Mrs. Davis. General Amos?
Is there time?
Nope. Sorry. All right.
The Chairman. Mr. Conaway.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here and your service.
The two roles on display here today, those are policymakers
and implementers. Obviously, we have a real chasm between them,
in a sense, of some of this stuff. Each one of you used the
word ``strategic'' in trying to figure out how we go about
squeezing the needs of the Nation into a smaller pie, so to
speak.
As a policymaker, we would love to be able to have clearer
information that says, all right, the Nation has these risks,
and if you don't want to protect the Nation against this risk,
then we can save money here and there.
There is a force-planning construct that you all operate
under that has a variety of things that the Nation says it
ought to be able to do at any one particular point in time.
Should all of this encompass a review or a redo of that force-
planning construct that says, ``We are only going to do X, and
all these other things that we might think are going to be
necessary that are out there, we are just simply not going to
do those,'' and help policymakers understand that there are
risks to doing some of the things that even now have been
agreed upon that you are trying to implement through your team?
So can you give us some comments about just, you know, what
the overall backdrop of what you are trying to plan to do,
should we change that first before we squeeze you guys through
these square pegs that we are putting you through?
General Odierno. Congressman, I think, first off, it is
about determining where our priorities are and what our
strategies are. And I think we are talking about that now.
But, ultimately, it comes down to what--ultimately, what is
the capacity and what we are able to do. And the force-planning
construct will have to be looked at and will have to be
changed. Because with the force reductions that we are looking
at--the Air Force and Navy have taken some already; the Army is
going to take a significant amount of force reduction--we are
going to have to look at the planning constructs that we have.
And we are going to have to be forthright and honest about what
we can do and what we can't do, because there are going to be
some things we no longer can do.
And I think we have learned some things over the last 10
years on what we thought we could do, and maybe we couldn't do
them as it was now. And as we get into these deeper cuts, we
are going to have to define and explain through our force-
structure planning factors of what we are able to do and what
we are not. And I think it absolutely has to be a part of what
we are doing.
Admiral Greenert. For me, Congressman, and for the Navy,
where do you not think we need to be? And the little chart,
that is where we are today; it will be less. And how much more,
where, what geographic combatant commander we have to have a
conversation with, and get a lot more innovative to conduct
this influence or decide where the force structure can deploy
to. Because we can't deploy quicker, if you will, just turn
around quicker. We are at limit right now.
General Amos. Congressman, there is an effort, as you are
well aware of, right now that is going on within the Department
of Defense and will eventually, as General Schwartz said, I
think, find its way here, too, to Congress. That effort is
informed by the future security environment. In other words,
what do the next two decades portray? What does it tell us that
the threats are that are out there? We have talked a little bit
about that this morning in our testimony. And then based on
that, then what do we need to do to mitigate that threat, those
risks? Then how much can we afford? Now it becomes informed by
the budget. It gets informed by the fiscal realities.
And so we are in that process right now. The national
strategy is being worked. It is a process that we are all a
part of. And I just wanted to give you the confidence that this
is being done the right way as we approach this. So we are just
not ready yet to be able to say, then, precisely what is it you
are not going to be able to do, but clearly there will be some
things that we will not be able to do. And that will have
resource implications, on force structure, procurement, and
operations and maintenance.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you.
I was out at the National Ground Intelligence Center
yesterday afternoon, or yesterday. And some of the things that
they are considering as a part of this, the OCO funding going
away and some of the other things, is they were able to say,
here is the capacity and here is what it does, here is why it
is important, and it will go away. Very clear. As a
policymaker, you say, well, that is a capacity that we really
need, that was important.
So, obviously, it is easy to do that on a small scale like
there versus across the entire, you know, Department of
Defense. But I do think our Nation needs to understand that
with these cuts, even the $465 [billion], there are risks we
will face that hindsight and Monday-morning quarterbackers, at
some point in time, will say, ``Shame on you for having done
that.''
Thank you, gentlemen.
The Chairman. Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Generals, Admiral, thank you very much for being here
today, for your testimony, your incredible service to our
Nation. We are all deeply in your debt.
Obviously, diplomacy, information, our military power, our
economic power, these are all vitally important to our national
security. All four pillars are important, not just one. And
that, obviously, makes the fiscal solvency of our Nation a
national security issue.
So, to ensure that we are never sacrificing our strategic
needs just to pay the bills, obviously we have to make smarter
decisions about where and how we spend our money and how we
address current and future threats. And two areas that I have
continuously focused on of the strategic defense of our Nation
are the nuclear arena as well as in the area of cybersecurity,
taking on the cyber front. We face particular challenges there,
and we haven't quite gotten our arms around what those
challenges are and how do we best guard against that threat.
But, in these areas, we face threats, obviously, from both
peer competitors and asymmetric actors, which make them
politically volatile and dangerous, and our investments in each
of these areas are critically important. Yet both are
threatened by the current budget situation.
So let me ask it this way. Our nuclear deterrent,
obviously, must remain credible while we are simultaneously
looking to components of our arsenal where we can save revenue,
such as tactical nuclear arms, and continue smarter
investments, such as the replacement for the Ohio-class
submarine.
So, in cyberspace, the Department has made upgrades,
upgrades to both our defensive systems and our strategic
thinking, but we still have a long way to go to keep pace with
the challenges and engagements our warfighters face every day
in the digital realm.
So, on both these points, where can we be making more
efficient investments in nuclear and cyber in order to soften
any larger program impacts from constraining budgetary
requirements?
General Schwartz. Sir, I would say that cyber may be the
only--or is the only one, two, or three areas in the entire
Department portfolio that may grow, by necessity, just as you
outlined, which means it will come from other places in the
broader portfolio. We have Cyber Command. Each of us have
component commands and expertise that both defends our nets and
operates potentially in a more offensive manner. That is
maturing, and it certainly needs your continued support.
With respect to the nuclear area, sir, I would make a
personal appeal, and that is that this committee needs to
influence the thinking of another jurisdiction, in Energy and
Water, with respect to, in particular, the renovation of the
B61 weapon. The reality is that that weapon is the item that is
paired with our bombers, and it needs to be updated, the
lifecycle improvement effort. And that needs committee support
and, likewise, from Energy and Water since it is NNSA [National
Nuclear Security Administration] that will perform that
function.
Admiral Greenert. I think General Schwartz had it right on
cyber. I think we could look at the organizational construct
that we are putting together; there may be efficiencies in that
regard. But with regard to the criticality of the capability,
there is no question. And it will probably grow.
With regard to strategic nuclear, how many Ohio-class
replacements, submarines we need can be studied. What is the
right number of force structure you need to deliver the effects
that you need for the requirements, that is under deliberation
as we speak. But the need to have credible, as you said,
credible and reliable and one that actually provides
deterrence, assured deterrence, is unmistakable. And that line
has to be held.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
With that, I want to thank you all for your testimony, and
I may have some questions for the record.
General Schwartz, if I could just mention, a couple months
back I had the opportunity to travel out to Creech. You and I
discussed that. And I was grateful for the incredible work that
is being done out there. And maybe we can talk in a closed
setting at some point about some of my thoughts about that. But
a great experience when I am out to visit our airmen out there,
and I am grateful for their service. And next week I am
traveling to Texas to visit the 24th Air Force. So I hope to
get an up-close look at what is happening out there.
But thank you all.
General Schwartz. Yes, sir. I look forward to it, sir.
Mr. Langevin. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
The panel needs to leave at 12:30. I am counting the number
of Members we have left. It should work out just about right.
Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you so much for your service to our
Nation.
And I want to begin by noting that everybody that serves in
our Armed Forces is special. They are special because they
volunteer, they put their lives on the line to defend this
Nation. But we also have a very elite force of airmen, marines,
soldiers, and sailors that serve this country every day in some
very, very challenging roles as we place them around the world
in what we know continues to ever expand in their mission. I
look at how we challenge them, and you look at what is
happening in Afghanistan. And we have used them in more and
more roles there, and, obviously, they are going to be there
past 2014. We see a mission now in Central Africa.
As we watch and we see the history of what has happened
there, we see some trends that I think ought to concern us.
Just last month, a 29-year-old sergeant first class in the 75th
Ranger Regiment was killed on his 14th deployment in the last 9
years. Fourteen times he boarded a plane knowing that he was
going downrange in harm's way.
In a situation where dwell times were short, time back home
was short, and they continue to be placed in some of the most
challenging conditions anywhere on the face of the Earth--and,
to their benefit, they serve this Nation, or, to our benefit,
they serve this Nation. And they continue to make sure that
they perform in a very admirable way under some very trying
conditions.
My concern is this. With looming budget cuts and looking at
the challenge we have going forward with resources, how are we
going to continue to attract the quality men and women that we
need across the Armed Forces in an All-Volunteer Force?
Secondly, as we look to not only recruit the best but to retain
the best, how are we going to make sure that the mission
capability stays where it needs to be for this Nation to meet
those challenges, especially when there are questions about
each of the service branches' budgets, what may be cut,
downsizing, the future pay of our men and women in uniform,
their future benefits, and also their families' welfare? I
think all those things are very, very concerning for me. And I
wanted to get your perspective on how do we meet those
challenges.
And I can tell you I am sure you all get the same questions
that I get. I get questions on a daily basis from men and women
that serve this Nation that are concerned about that. In fact,
we track the communications that come into our office. At the
top of the list for the past month have been service members
and their families' questions about what is going to happen
with my pay and my benefits, and what are you going to do to
support military families.
So, gentlemen, I will turn it over to you and get you to
give us your perspective on these things.
General Odierno. Congressman, first and foremost, as we go
through this process of budget reductions, the first thing we
think about are our soldiers and their families and the impacts
it will have on them. And whatever programs that we develop
into the future will ensure that we maintain programs that are
good enough and, frankly, allow them to want to continue to
serve. And we are focused on this. We are absolutely focused on
this.
I think what we have to do as we look at this is it is
about the profession of arms, it is about leader development,
it is about people understanding the importance of what we do,
why we do it, and it is about fair and balanced benefits and
pay, retirement, medical care, that they can be assured that
they will be taken care of and their families will be taken
care of based on what we ask them to do.
I know I am being somewhat general here, but I want to tell
you that we are absolutely focused like a laser on this in the
leadership because it is so important to our men and women, and
it is fundamental to the All-Volunteer Army and the All-
Volunteer Force. If we miss this, it will do irrevocable damage
to our capabilities.
And so I probably didn't answer you specifically, but I am
telling you we look at this very carefully every day, sir.
Admiral Greenert. We have a term in the Navy on budgeting
called ``fencing.'' Fence the programs. We are effectively
fencing family readiness programs because whatever mission may
be reduced, capacity is reduced, the problem is not reduced. As
you mentioned before, the kids are tired and they come home and
their families are tired, too, because that is who support
them. So that has to be done right up front.
I think we need to hold a covenant. General Odierno kind
of--I call it retain the covenant we have for them. They joined
for a reason. There was, again, a contract that we had, and we
need to own up to that contract to those that join.
Thank you.
General Schwartz. Sir, I would just say that, as an
example, like the Navy, we have said we are not going to cut
school liaisons, we are not going to cut exceptional family
member programs or child care. We will go other places because
we understand that more than ever, that service in any of the
Armed Services is a team sport.
General Amos. Congressman, we coined the term ``breaking
faith''--or ``keeping faith,'' which is the opposite of
``breaking faith.'' We talked of pay compensation here this
morning and we didn't really get to at what point is there a
``knee'' in the curve, where pay compensations begin to have an
effect on the All-Volunteer Force. You go back to what
Secretary Panetta began his tenure with. And he has got several
principles. One of the key ones he always goes back to and
every time he talks publicly is keeping faith. Now that can
mean a lot of different things to folks. But for us in the
Marine Corps, it means the institution, the people, the
marines, the families that are out there in Twenty-Nine Palms,
Pendleton, Camp Lejeune, Beaufort, look at us as an
institution, a leadership, those that wear this uniform, and
then those who are across the Potomac here in Congress, that we
have their best interest at heart, that even though they
understand there will probably be some adjustments in pay and
allowances and that type of thing, but we have their best
interests and we are not breaking faith with them.
That is pretty nebulous, but that is a sense. And the
minute we lose that, then we will have a difficult time
retaining them. We will have a difficult time bringing the
people back in the first place. So that is the first point. It
is the sense of faithfulness.
There is another side of this, which is interesting, which
concerns me. There is also a sense of fulfillment in the young
man or woman that joins the Marine Corps today. And you are
aware of that. They are actually getting to do precisely what
we advertise when we recruit them. There is a fulfillment. They
may be on their fourth or fifth deployment. And I absolutely am
not saying that that is easy or we should just continue to do
this for the sake of recruitment. But there is a sense of
feeling good about what they are doing for our Nation.
So as I look at drawdown, I look at coming out of
Afghanistan, within this institution one of the things we are
going to have to look at is; how do we address that need of
sense of fulfillment of doing something that is important for
our Nation?
I remember the inter-war years--the '70s, the '80s, the
'80s to '90s, one that was pretty bleak. We were trying to seek
missions. So that is going to have an effect on the retention.
That is one of the challenges we are going to have to look at.
But I think the programs, all the things we have talked about
here, there is a sense that we will need that. It is not that
we are buying people off. That is not it. But we are going to
satisfy their needs and keep our arms around them and they are
going to know that we are keeping faith with them.
Mr. Wilson. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Wittman. We will
proceed to Mr. Andrews of New Jersey.
Mr. Andrews. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank
each of you gentlemen for what you have done for our country.
We appreciate it very, very much.
I am hearing two points of consensus in the hearing today,
and I think that we could rather easily achieve a third one and
avoid the sequestration. The first point of consensus is that a
great country can't live on borrowed money forever. You can't
have a strong and growing economy by having a huge deficit and
debt. The second point of consensus is that the sequestration--
and I agree with this--is ill thought out, maybe not so much
because of the number--we can argue about numbers--but because
it is backwards. You shouldn't make decisions about defending
your country by saying, Here's the number we are going to hit,
now let's figure out what to do. You ought to make the
decisions by saying what do we need to do for our country and
then what number do we have to come up with to make that
happen.
This is not meant for the panel, but meant for my
colleagues. I think we could have a third point of consensus
pretty quickly here, that we could have a $4 trillion deficit
reduction plan that is three-quarters spending cuts. Probably
the military spending cuts would not go beyond what is already
in the August 1st law. If we had about a trillion dollars in
revenue from the top 5 percent of people in the country--that
is not for these gentlemen to debate, but it is for us to
debate--we could have a deal. We ought to get one.
Now on to the issue of what the sequestration would mean
and my point about let's not back into a decision on this. I
think I heard several of you say that there is a strategic
review, force review underway, and that would be shared with
the committee when it is completed. Did I hear that correctly?
Great. And do we have some sense of when that would be
available for us to look at?
General Schwartz. As I suggested earlier, I think at the
end of the year. Toward the end of the year.
Mr. Andrews. The end of the calendar year?
General Schwartz. Yes, sir.
Mr. Andrews. Thank you. Now, let me ask another question
that is not rhetorical. Honestly, it is sincere. If you exclude
the Overseas Contingency Operations and look only at the
remaining core defense budget and you compare what we are
spending in 2011 versus what we spent in 2001, in real dollars,
in inflation-adjusted dollars, the core defense budget is 40
percent higher than it was in 2001. Our end strength is
essentially the same. The number of ships and planes we have is
essentially the same. About a quarter of that increase has been
absorbed by greater compensation for our men and women in
uniform. I am for that. Absolutely, I am for that.
Where did the other 75 percent of that go? In other words,
we have increased the core defense budget by about 30 percent
over what it was in 2001 in real dollars, excluding the Iraq
and Afghanistan and excluding personnel increases and housing
increases, education increases. Where is that 30 percent? Where
is the money?
General Schwartz. Well, one place where the money is, we
had $35 a barrel oil in 2001, and it is now $135 a barrel.
Mr. Andrews. Yes, that is absolutely right. I know our fuel
costs are high. And they would be a lot lower if we had
independent energy sources. I agree with you.
Yes.
Admiral Greenert. For us, shipbuilding and ship repair in
some cases, the labor costs exceed the costs that we use for
indices for inflation. Materials have also exceeded those
indices that we use for when we procure.
Mr. Andrews. Do you know the order of magnitude of that
excess?
Admiral Greenert. I will follow up on that. It actually
marks what some note as a difference--a noted difference in our
costs for future shipbuilding, where we underestimate because
we use indices----
Mr. Andrews. One issue that concerns me of a similar mind
is if you look at our RDT&E [Research, Development, Technology
and Evaluation], we had explosions in RDT&E accounts before we
ever get to a fieldable weapon. I will just pick on one as an
example of SBIRS [Space-Based Infrared System]. SBIRS, when it
was originally looked at, was going to be $1 billion a copy. It
is now going to be $4 billion or so a copy. It has all been in
the RDT&E. Do you have any suggestions how we might get a
better grip on the RDT&E phase?
General Odierno. If I could, a couple of things that we
need to do. I think as we go through the process of
procurement, we have to look at competition and how we increase
competition, increase contractors' and private industry's use
of their R&D to help us solve our problems. I think we are
starting to figure that out. And I am pleased in some of the
areas where we are able to do that.
The other thing is I think it might be a time to look at
is, are we doing redundant and overlapping testing? Do we need
to take a review of our testing requirements? And in fact
sometimes we have tests that are done by the private industry
and yet we redo the tests because we have to meet certain
regulations and requirements. I think those are areas that we
could look at that could reduce those costs significantly.
Mr. Andrews. Thank you. I see my time has expired. Thank
you, again, gentlemen, for your exemplary service.
Mr. Wilson. Than you, Mr. Andrews. We proceed to Mr. Duncan
of California.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you
all for your service and all the time you have spent and your
families have spent. General Amos, I was just over at the
Marine Corps Birthday in the Library of Congress. And General
Dunford did a great job filling in for you and he gave a great
speech over there.
We like to talk about the families. I think my family, when
I was in Fallujah, was at the Delmar Beach at Camp Pendleton. I
don't think it was too tough for them. But that is the upside
to being a marine and being able to be stationed on the West
Coast.
Playing into Mr. Andrews' question, I would like to mention
a couple of things. Where is the money? There are a lot of
examples. He listed one. One is DCGS, Distributed Common Ground
System. The Marine Corps is using Palantir right now, JIEDDO
[Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization] is
using Palantir right now. The CIA [Central Intelligence
Agency], the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigations], the DOJ
[Department of Justice], a lot of other organizations are using
an intel software tool called Palantir because it is cheap. It
comes out of a private company called PayPal. A lot of us in
this room have used PayPal. But the Army insists going forward
spending billions of dollars on DCGS's alpha, saying the big
cloud is going to work at some point. It will be just like
everybody else at some point in time. DCGS's alpha came into my
office--the Army did--last week--or 2 weeks ago, and said,
Here's what we got; we are going to have it soon. The problem
is that they never really get there. And when you come with an
off-the-shelf product that at the most to field it for the
entire Army would be about $25 million, DCGS's alpha is still
going to be about $2 billion or $3 billion out and does not
have the capability as Palantir.
You have examples like that that I think any of us could
find. The LCS [Littoral Combat Ship]. The Navy owns a ship
right now in San Diego called the Stiletto. It is a carbon
fiber-hulled ship that uses air entrapment technology. It is
able to go 60 knots. It is totally stealthed out. The LCS is
not stealthed out. The LCS is not an LCS. The LCS is a fast
frigate. That is all it is. You can't operate next to China.
They would shoot it out of the water in a heartbeat. It is not
a real LCS. It is a fast frigate. So the Navy still doesn't
have an LCS, but they have two different models of a fast
frigate that are going to be used for different purposes based
on what type of modular technology you place on it. It is still
not stealthy. It is not as fast as the Stiletto, which the Navy
owns, in San Diego.
So my point is, it is time to prioritize. I think one of
the reasons we are here is because your predecessors, they
didn't mislead us, but they said, hey, we are okay. We can do
more with less. We will be fine. We can get the job done,
Congress. We can do what we need to do with what you have given
us.
The reality is that one of the reasons we are at this point
is because we are not going to able to do the job--you are not
going to be able to do the job that you are asked to do any
more with what you are given any more, period. I mean, we
probably need to double or triple the number of MEUs [Marine
Expeditionary Units] in the United States Marine Corps because
of everything that is going on.
So we are going to need to be more expeditionary, not less,
but we still seem bogged down in the old ways of doing things
to where if it is not being made by Northrop Grumman, Lockheed
Martin, Boeing, or one of the Big Five, then we are not going
to do it, we are not going to look at it because it is not
being done by one of those guys who has a lobbyist who was a
former general who was a friend of somebody in DOD. That is how
it works. That is the revolving door.
So my question I guess to everybody is how do we move
forward and prioritize and get out of the same old ways of
things that aren't the tried and true, they are the tried and
failed, which has kind of gotten us to where we are. We keep
spending money. And like Mr. Andrews said, we aren't getting
the bang for the buck anymore. The money is going somewhere and
it is not going into furthering current technology or
discovering better technology. How are we going to avoid that?
Because we are going to be doing more with less now. It is
going to take some outside-of-the-box thinking to do it.
General Odierno. Let me give you one example. Right now--
and you are probably familiar with it--we now started this
week--and it is our second one, we will have a third one--is
our network experiment that is going on down at Fort Bliss,
Texas. We have a unit out there where contractors, anybody, any
size contractor can come in, provide a product that they think
will meet the requirements for our network of the future. They
can test it, they can try it out. It will be evaluated.
Soldiers are actually using it. They will then provide them
feedback. It is on their own dollar to bring that in there.
After we do this, we will choose the best of breed across a
variety of small and large contractors on what might be the
best system for us to use. And as fast as our networks change
now and the technology continues to move, it will allow us to
continue to upgrade every few years.
I think these are the kind of things we have to do where we
see more competitiveness, which drives better products, which
drives cheaper products for us in the end state. I would invite
you to come out and take a look at that if you have not
already. I am very encouraged by what is going on out there. It
is those type of things that I think we have to do.
As we look at the JLTV [Joint Light Tactical Vehicle] that
we are developing along with the Marine Corps, we have
competitors coming in who are developing their own products,
four or five different competitors, not necessarily one of the
large defense contractors, who are coming up with systems and
ways for us to look at and provide us options that I think will
be much more fundamental and much more resource-friendly to us
as we move forward.
So those are the kind of things we are looking at now and
as we revamp and review how we want to do acquisition within
the Army.
General Amos. Congressman, there is actually a little bit
of goodness that happens when you get pressurized fiscally. One
of the things--and I know you are aware of this--we have
roughly 40,000 vehicles in the Marine Corps. That is tanks, 7-
tons, LVSs [Logistics Vehicle Systems], our AAVs [Amphibious
Assault Vehicles], our MRAPs [Mine Resistant Ambush Protected],
Humvees [High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles]. As we
built that Marine Corps to come down to 186,000, we aggregately
took the total vehicles in the Marine Corps down to about
30,000. Now of that, 23,000 or so are Humvees. As we look at
JLTV with the Army, as we look at replacing the ground tactical
vehicle strategy, we have had to go back and say, Okay, what is
good enough? What is it that over the next 10 years will be
good enough? And then how much modernization do you need?
There is a piece and a slice that need to replace utility
vehicles with JLTVs. But do we need to replace all 20,000? The
answer is no. Do we need 20,000 in the first place, utility
vehicles? The answer is no. So we are doing that internally
right now. We actually have the numbers. And we have built an
affordable plan on ground tactical vehicles that is built on
what is in fact good enough.
Now, we tried to do the same thing--in fact, we have done
the same thing as we looked at aviation, which is a high-dollar
cost item. You start taking a look at F/A-18s [Hornet multirole
fighter jets], Harriers [AV-8B vertical/short takeoff and
landing (V/STOL) ground-attack aircraft], recapitalization of
the H-46s [Sea Knight cargo helicopters] with the V-22s [Osprey
V/STOL transport tiltrotor aircraft], what is good enough, and
then how long will this last. So I mean that is the goodness
that is coming out of this stuff, and there is an awful lot of
that going on.
The final point I would say is that especially down in your
district you have seen the benefits of the energy efforts that
the Marine Corps is doing at MCRD [Marine Corps Recruit Depot],
at Miramar, with the methane plant; go to Twenty-Nine Palms, go
to Barstow. We are beginning to save or significantly save a
lot of money on energy. We are going to do the same thing in
the expeditionary field. We have got marines--as you know, the
Third Battalion Fifth Marines came back and they were our
guinea pigs. They were the first prototype to carry this
expeditionary renewable energy stuff into theater. We are on
that big time.
So that is another way we can save. So that is some of the
goodness that comes out of pressurizing our budget.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Duncan. A very important
question.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wilson. Our remaining witnesses can respond for the
record because this is such an important issue that Mr. Duncan
has raised.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 91.]
Mr. Wilson. We now proceed to Mr. Johnson of Georgia.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Odierno, following up on Mr. Hunter's question, the
Army's DCGS-A intelligence program is years behind schedule and
less effective than private sector alternatives used by other
Services such as the Marine Corps. The Army is slated to spend
billions in coming years trying to field this program, despite
its consistent shortcoming. Will you pledge to take a hard look
at this program as a possible source of savings?
General Odierno. Congressman, first, I am looking at every
one of our modernization programs and procurement programs to
see where we can get savings. I will certainly take an
extremely hard look at this and I will actually provide you
feedback to that look, both you and Mr. Hunter, as we go do
this.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 92.]
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, General. Also, General, do you
foresee that the Army could potentially find savings by
reducing the footprint of our ground forces on the European
continent where our allies are or should be capable of
defending their own territory?
General Odierno. Congressman, this will be part of the
strategy review we do as we prioritize where we decide to put
forces. And based on that strategy, if it is determined that we
can reduce our commitment to Europe, we will work very
carefully with our allies to take a look at that, sir.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you.
Admiral Greenert, how can the Navy develop better
partnerships with the Chinese navy to establish a collaborative
rather than adversarial relationship in maintaining
international security? And is that a naive question or is it--
I guess I should ask that first.
Admiral Greenert. It is not naive at all, Congressman. We
need to find those areas of security that we have common
ground. And we are working on that. Counter-piracy today; the
Chinese contribute to the counter-piracy effort in the Gulf of
Aden. They are not a part of the coalition, but they are--you
know, the defined coalition. But there are many nations that
are not part of the defined coalition. They come in. They check
in. We have liaison officers that swap. They are a relevant and
tangible part of that. So there is that. There is counter
smuggling, counter weapons of mass destruction on the seas,
search and rescue.
So we need to look for those areas which are of common
interest, develop those. That will get us to mil-to-mil
relations. These things have a fits and starts part because we
are part of the results of the political aspects of the
relationship of our nations and the diplomatic part of it. But
there are opportunities and we must continue to develop them to
eliminate miscalculation. That is probably the main concern we
would have. So we have a relationship.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you. General Amos, what would the Marine
Corps F-35B fleet contribute in a major conflict that one of
our carrier strike groups could not? Is the F-35B program an
essential program to our national security? Is it on pace?
General Amos. Congressman, I will start from the back and
progress to your first question. It is on pace. In fact, it is
ahead of schedule will right now. It is ahead of performance on
tests--test plans, test flights, test points. The five
engineering issues that they had a year ago at this time have
been resolved through engineering redesigns. In some cases,
they are already installed on the airplanes. In some cases, the
change has been approved and it will be fitted on the airplane
in the early part of next year. So the engineering pieces have
been fixed.
The airplane just came back from a very successful at-sea
period for about 2 weeks. Two F-35Bs on the USS Wasp off the
coast of Virginia, flying all their short takeoff and vertical
landings. And the early reports on that--and I went out to see
it with the Secretary of the Navy--the airplane performed
fabulously.
Now what you get out of that airplane for our Nation is the
capability to have, instead of just 11 carriers out and about
doing our Nation's bidding with fifth-generation airplanes on
it, you will have 22. Because the F-35B will be flying off the
smaller carrier variant or what we call the large deck
amphibious ship. So much like what is being operated off the
coast of Yemen and the Gulf of Aden right now with the Harriers
and off the coast of Libya in the early days of that operation.
Those were short takeoff and vertical landing airplanes.
Without that, our Nation reduces this capability to interact
around the world by 50 percent.
Mr. Johnson. Let me ask you this last question about those
trials on the USS Wasp. What was the effect of the F-35B's jet
blast on the ship's surface?
I apologize for interrupting you, but my time is running
out. I wanted to get an answer to that question.
General Amos. It was negligible. The expectations were that
it would be significant. It was shockingly negligible, to the
point where reports--and I was onboard the ship--reports back
from the ship's crew and the NAVSEA [Naval Sea Systems Command]
folks were that it was insignificant.
Mr. Johnson. Very good. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you. We proceed to Dr. Fleming of
Louisiana.
Dr. Fleming. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
gentlemen, for being here today. Our panel, patriotic and
distinguished careers, and we all appreciate the great work you
are doing.
Let me say, first of all, that I get what you are saying--
$465 billion in cuts that you are barely able to swallow and
now we are talking about plussing that up to maybe a full
trillion dollars over 10 years. And that takes us from a high
risk level to a very dangerous level. And certainly I get that.
That is precisely why I voted against the Budget Control Act,
because I knew we would be here today talking about these
problems.
My first question is for you, General Schwartz. We have
talked a number of times in hearings and offline. I understand
that there is a decision that has been made not to initially
certify the new long-range strike bomber for nuclear operations
and that Air Combat Command, not Global Strike Command, which
was newly stood up I think only a couple of years ago, will be
the lead major command on the program.
Can you please explain in detail the rationale behind these
two decisions? Obviously, I am concerned about a de-emphasis on
the nuclear rule. Again, let me kind of add in that with all
these risks involved, that obviously makes this world a more
dangerous place. But the one area where there is no tolerance
for risk is in the area of nuclear weapons. So explain that and
give us an idea about that rationale, sir.
General Schwartz. We certainly agree that there is no
tolerance for error in that business. There are two aspects to
this, Congressman. One is that the airplane will be dual
capable. It will be both nuclear capable and it will be a
conventional long-range strike platform as well. The logic is
to design and to build the airplane to perform the nuclear
mission. This will not be backed in later. This will be done in
the design and build process. But not to certify immediately.
And the reason is that we are trying to control costs. Part of
that is controlling how elaborate your test process is. And we
are going to phase this in a way that will initially introduce
conventional capability, which is easier to test, less costly
to test. And then, as we get closer to the time when the B-52
[Stratofortress strategic bomber] and the B-2 [Spirit stealth
bomber] begin to age out, we will well in advance of that
certify the airplane for nuclear operations.
Again, it will have the internals and all that is required.
We simply won't do the test and certification, which is quite
elaborate and includes electromagnetic pulse and so on, until a
little bit later in the sequence. We think that is the
prudential thing to do to bring this on cost and on time.
With respect to who is in charge, I am in charge. The
Secretary of the Air Force is in charge. The fact is their
Combatant Command is the lead command because they have the
acquisition and requirements capacity in their headquarters. As
you know, Global Strike is still somewhat new and will acquire
that capability over time. But the idea was to give this to the
command that had the capacity right now and we will certainly
think about when the time comes who is the daddy rabbit for the
platform.
Dr. Fleming. Thank you, General. I might come back to you.
General Odierno, I have a question for you, sir. Is it true
that certain requirements like the Army's longstanding need for
additional land to support full spectrum training operations
will require further resources in this constrained budget
environment? For example, do you believe that the ongoing range
expansion at the JRTC [Joint Readiness Training Center] at Fort
Polk is a mission critical initiative even as the Army draws
down its forces and alters its mix of units?
General Odierno. Congressman, as we draw down and as we
come out of Afghanistan and other places, it is imperative that
we continue to improve our jewels of our training programs,
which is the National Training Center, the Joint Readiness
Training Center, and CMTC [Combat Maneuver Training Center] in
Europe, and make them the most capable and qualified so we are
able to prepare ourselves for the upcoming threats, what they
might be, and so we can properly train our soldiers. And so it
is a very important part of our program. It will be reviewed
like we review everybody else as you look at these budget cuts,
but it is something we set a high priority on.
Dr. Fleming. As you know, Fort Polk already has money set
aside for land acquisition. That seems to be moving forward,
although it has been slower than expected. So you feel that
still is going to be a very important part of the future.
General Odierno. I believe that our training complexes,
especially JRTC, are very important, and they will have a high
priority as we do our review of our budget.
Dr. Fleming. Thank you, gentlemen. My time is up, and I
yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you, Doctor. We have one more, if we
could extend.
Congressman Scott of Georgia.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I appreciate you staying past and taking the
questions.
As you know, General Schwartz, I represent Robins Air Force
Base. The Depot Caucus met with Secretary Donley yesterday.
There were four members of the United States Senate and four
Members of Congress there, including myself. Obviously, some of
the information that was given to us we did not agree with and
felt like there should have been a business case analysis prior
to the decisions being made. And certainly I am personally
disappointed that my Generals that I try to work with to
represent our bases were asked to sign confidentiality
agreements and that there could not even be dialogue between
the command structure and a Member of Congress, who serves on
this committee, who is doing what--I did not vote for
sequestration; I am doing what I can to help you--prior to
hearing from Secretary Donley. But one of the things Secretary
Donley did do in that meeting--and he did it on three separate
occasions--is commit that there would be no change to who the
program managers reported to. And the program managers could
continue to report to sustainment. He said that that would
happen for at least the next 24 months and that there would be
no changes to that unless there was a business case analysis
presented to the Senate and Congress.
I appreciate his commitment on that, and I want to ask you
for your support, that the program managers will continue to
operate the way they currently do.
General Schwartz. That is the Air Force position, sir, and
I certainly support that. But I hope you will accept just
gentle pushback here. It is interesting--and, by the way, the
fact that there was interaction at the staff level----
Mr. Scott. Yes, sir, there was.
General Schwartz. As you are aware. I agree there was not
interaction at the principal level. I take note of that, sir.
Reporting lines of authority--the question is: Where is the
seam in this business between sustainment and acquisition? Our
judgment was that we would have at each of the depots an
acquisition element that would be aligned with the broader
acquisition team but would represent their interests at the
sustainment location and depot. That, to me, seemed to be
logical. In other words, they would be a geographically
separated unit.
I understand that any change is concerning about what it
might portend, ultimately. And we didn't convince you or the
other members of the caucus on this issue and so the Secretary
made a commitment. And we certainly would stand by the
Secretary's commitment. But all I would say is please allow us,
again, to come back to you, as he also said he would do, to
make the case as articulate as we can about why we think we
should organize this way.
Mr. Scott. And we would ask that a business case scenario
be presented and that there be dialogue between the Members of
Congress and the Generals that are operating the base. I don't
think anybody on this committee or any of you are naive enough
to think we can go through the type of budget reductions we are
without some changes. I am certainly not. But that was a very
serious concern to us. He did make that commitment yesterday. I
am glad to know that you are onboard with that because there
was some concern with the press release that maybe there had
been some misunderstanding, if you will, in the room. Thank you
for that.
Gentlemen, all of you play an important role in Georgia,
whether it is the Marine Corps Logistics Base in Albany or
Kings Bay or Benning. If I can ever be of assistance to you,
please let me know.
Thank you. And thank you for your commitment, General
Schwartz.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Congressman Scott. And thank each of
you for your dedication for service members, military families,
and veterans.
We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
November 2, 2011
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
November 2, 2011
=======================================================================
Statement of Hon. Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon
Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on
The Future of the Military Services and
Consequences of Defense Sequestration
November 2, 2011
The House Armed Services Committee meets to receive
testimony on ``The Future of the Military Services and
Consequences of Defense Sequestration.'' To assist us with our
examination of the impacts of further defense cuts to each of
the military services, we are joined by the four service
chiefs. Gentlemen, thank you for your service and I truly
appreciate your willingness to appear before the Committee
today. I cannot recall the last time we had all four service
chiefs in the same panel. This is a unique opportunity for our
members and greatly assists us with our oversight
responsibilities.
The Committee has held a series of hearings to evaluate
lessons learned since 9/11 and to apply those lessons to
decisions we will soon be making about the future of our force.
We have received perspectives of former chairmen of the joint
chiefs of staff, former service chiefs and commanders of the
National Guard Bureau, former chairmen of the Armed Services
Committees, outside experts, Secretary Panetta, and Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dempsey. Today we have the
opportunity to follow up on the testimony of the Secretary of
Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to examine
more closely the challenges faced by each of the Services.
As I continue to emphasize, our successes in the global war
on terror, and in Iraq and Afghanistan, appear to be lulling
our Nation into the false confidence of a September 10th
mindset. Too many appear to believe that we can maintain a
solid defense that is driven by budget choices, not strategic
ones. But as we heard from witnesses again last week, defense
spending did not cause the current fiscal crisis. Nevertheless,
defense can and will be a part of the solution. The problem is
that to date, defense has contributed more than half of the
deficit reduction measures we've taken and there are some who
want to use the military to pay for the rest, to protect the
sacred cow that is entitlement spending.
Not only should that be a nonstarter from a national
security and economic perspective, but it should also be a
nonstarter from a moral perspective. Consider that word,
entitlements. Well entitlements imply that you are entitled to
a certain benefit, and I can't think of anyone who has earned
that right ahead of our troops. By volunteering to put their
lives on the line for this country, they are entitled to the
best training, equipment, and leadership our Nation can
provide.
I hope our witnesses today can help us understand the
ramifications of these possible cuts in relation to our force
structure, as well as our ability to meet future needs of our
national defense. How can we make sure the military is a good
steward of the taxpayers' dollar, without increasing the risk
to our Armed Forces? Where can we take risk, but what changes
would go too far?
Statement of Hon. Adam Smith
Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on
The Future of the Military Services and
Consequences of Defense Sequestration
November 2, 2011
I would like to join the Chairman in welcoming General
Odierno, Admiral Greenert, General Schwartz, and General Amos.
In these times of budgetary uncertainty, your testimony is
particularly important.
Our country faces a budget dilemma--we don't collect enough
revenue to cover our expenditures. According to the House
Budget Committee, we currently must borrow about 40 cents for
every dollar the Federal Government spends. This problem must
be addressed in two ways: Spending will have to come down, and
we're going to have to generate new revenues.
Like many, if not most, of our members here, I share the
view that large, immediate cuts to the defense budget would
have substantially negative impacts on the ability of the U.S.
military to carry out its missions. I am sure that both our
witnesses share this view, and I hope the panel here today can
help us understand the impacts of additional potential cuts. I
am also deeply concerned about cuts to all non-entitlement
spending, which bore the brunt of the recent deficit deal. If
the ``super committee'' fails to reach a deal, then cuts
through sequestration will only impose deeper and more
dangerous cuts to our military and non-entitlement spending
such as infrastructure, education and homeland security.
I believe that we can rationally evaluate our national
security strategy, our defense expenditures, and the current
mission sets we ask the military to undertake and come up with
a strategy that requires less funding. We on this committee
like to say that strategy should not be driven by arbitrary
budget numbers, but by the same token not considering the level
of available resources when developing a strategy is
irresponsible. To that end, I congratulate the Administration
for undertaking a comprehensive review of our current strategy.
I know we all are looking forward to the results of that
ongoing review. I for one believe that we can and must spend
smarter and not just more.
It is also important that we address the revenue side of
our budget problem. We must consider raising additional
revenue. In order to avoid drastic cuts to our military and
other important programs, revenue streams must be enhanced.
It is my hope that this hearing will help remind everyone
here that we have to make some serious choices. Our budget must
be looked at in a comprehensive manner. If we are serious about
not cutting large amounts of funding from the defense budget,
something else has to give. Large, immediate, across-the-board
cuts to the defense budget, which would occur under
sequestration, would do serious damage to our national
security. In order to avoid large cuts to the defense budget,
we're going to have to stop repeating ideological talking
points and address our budget problems comprehensively, through
smarter spending and increased revenue.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing.
And thank you to our witnesses for appearing here today.
=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
November 2, 2011
=======================================================================
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT
General Odierno. With the Army that remains in service, there will
be significant challenges and risk of a ``hollow force.'' While
analysis is on-going, the Army anticipates being able to support the
most important parts of U.S. Strategy.
Sequestration will apply additional pressure on the balance of the
Force specifically as it affects people and structures; equipment and
modernization; readiness and training. Additionally, as a result of
sequestration, the Army expects an impact on its forward engagement
presence, and any long duration stability and support operations. [See
page 19.]
Admiral Greenert. After sequestration, our Navy will be capable of
some of the same missions the fleet conducts today. Over the past year,
Navy aircraft carriers and their aircraft supported troops on the
ground in Iraq and Afghanistan with electronic warfare, surveillance,
close air support and strikes. Navy surface combatants, submarines and
aircraft delivered strikes as part of Operation ODYSSEY DAWN in Libya.
Several ships aided our close ally, Japan, after a Tsunami devastated
Honshu Island. And Navy SEALs led a joint force to capture Osama Bin
Laden and also rescued the M/V ALABAMA's crew. After sequestration, our
Navy will continue to be able to perform these missions but will be
smaller--and less globally available--than the Navy today. With less
ships, response times to crises will be longer, non-deployed forces
will be less ready and naval presence will disappear from some regions.
The development of new capabilities will be slowed and the fleet may be
unable to overcome improvements by our potential adversaries in their
efforts to deny Joint operational access.
The budget reductions we are currently addressing as part of the
2011 Budget Control Act introduce additional risk in our ability to
meet the future needs of combatant commanders, but we believe this risk
is manageable if we introduce and comply with a revised strategy for
global force distribution. If sequestration occurs, however, the
Department of Defense and the Navy will have to rethink some
fundamental aspects of what our military should do. We would have to
develop a new national security strategy that accepts significant risk
in our ability to meet our defense needs. It would have to take into
account reductions or terminations in major weapons programs,
potentially including the Joint Strike Fighter, next generation
ballistic missile submarine, and the littoral combat ship. And the
strategy would have to address reductions in our maintenance and
training accounts that will severely limit the ability of our remaining
forces to meet combatant commander operational plans and engage with
key allies and partners around the world. [See page 19.]
General Schwartz. Further reductions driven by the Budget Control
Act would require an enterprise-wide review of all Air Force resources
and guidance from national and defense leadership on where to accept
strategic and operational risk. The estimated reductions that would
result from the sequestration provision would potentially drive
elimination of lower priority missions and capabilities--capabilities
that we would no longer offer the Joint team.
Sequestration would not produce an immediate across the board
reduction in readiness, but mid- to long-term effects would translate
into higher operations tempo with a smaller and and decidedly less
capable force. The Air Force will continue to assess the risks and
balance available funds among our force structure, readiness, and
modernization accounts to deliver trained, ready, and capable Airmen
and airpower for the highest priority mission areas. [See page 19.]
General Schwartz. The General Electric/Rolls Royce Fighter Engine
Team has offered to self-fund F136 development in FY12 with $100
million of their own funds. The Department estimates that $480 million
is required in FY12 and a total of $2.9 billion to complete the
development of the F136 engine. Therefore, $100 million is inadequate
to carry out a meaningful development effort in FY12. In addition, the
Government would likely incur additional cost if it has to provide F136
Government-owned property to support the self-funded effort. Given the
current budget environment and pressure to reduce future defense
spending, the Department supports the continued development of a single
engine provider for the F-35.
Note: Since the time of the hearing, the contractor has stated that
they will no longer pursue a self-funding plan. [See page 20.]
General Amos. The Marine Corps does not know the precise impact
sequestration would have on its readiness and capability; however, if
the Supercommittee defaults, the large triggered defense cut will have
serious repercussions. Uniform cuts of this magnitude could result in
significant cuts to manpower, equipment, modernization programs, and
training across the Service, leading to what is known as a ``hollow
force'', one whose unit structure is preserved but is under-resourced
to the extent of jeopardizing mission accomplishment. Sequestration
also may lead to reductions in end strength that constrain the Marine
Corps' ability to execute a major contingency with rotational forces
over a prolonged period. It also would break faith with the ``All
Volunteer'' force and their families who have sacrificed so much over
the past ten years of constant combat operations. With sequestration,
significant numbers of Marines responding to a major contingency, as in
Iraq or Afghanistan, would likely remain deployed for longer periods
with minimal time between deployments to rest, refit, and retrain. In
turn, this scenario would result in unfavorable dwell time ratios,
leading to increased levels of stress on Marines and their families.
Also, if committed to a major contingency, the Marine Corps risks being
severely limited in its ability to meet emerging requirements elsewhere
in the world.
Cuts to ground and aviation modernization programs already
jeopardize future readiness. Today the Marine Corps is challenged to
replace aging platforms that have reached the end of their service
lives or which have suffered accelerated wear reducing service life,
which will result in the loss of critical warfighting capabilities. All
this puts the Nation at risk of creating a force unable to keep pace
with adversaries. To avoid ``hollowness'', the Marine Corps must
achieve institutional readiness, which is a balance of:
Recruiting/retaining high quality people, including
appropriate compensation to recruit/retain a high quality
force;
Current readiness of the operating forces, including
appropriate operations and maintenance funding to train to core
missions and maintain equipment;
Force sizing to meet combatant commander requirements
with the right mix of capacity and capability; sufficient
structure and personnel/manning levels to achieve required
capacity;
Real property and maintenance/infrastructure
investment; and
Equipment modernization, both ground and aviation.
After ten years of constant combat operations, the Marine Corps is
not at an optimum level of balance today and must reset the force
coming out of Afghanistan. We must also address modernization
requirements to achieve balanced institutional readiness. [See page
19.]
______
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ
General Odierno. To meet the Army's share of the $450B plus
Department of Defense cut target, we will make significant, but
manageable, reductions. Specifically, this will require reductions in
the AC and RC end strength, directly reducing the number of Brigade
Combat Teams (BCTs), as well as requiring further reductions in the
Civilian workforce. Necessary cuts to Research, Development and
Acquisition funding, Military Construction, and Operations and
Maintenance will result in greater risk to training and readiness and
our ability to RESET the Force after ten plus years of operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan.
It is imperative that as we implement these adjustments, our Army's
readiness and our commitment to the Force remain steadfast. Cuts must
be carefully and deliberately determined as they relate to manpower,
modernization, training, maintenance, infrastructure and Soldier and
Family support.
More than anything, we must ensure that once these cuts are fully
implemented, we can still provide a Force capable of meeting the
current National Military Strategy with enough flexibility to provide
the National Command Authority the greatest possible number of options
for an uncertain future. [See page 22.]
Admiral Greenert. The Department of Defense has planned for budget
reductions of over $450 billion over the next ten years. These cuts are
already difficult and require the Department of Defense to assume some
risk in our national military strategy, but we believe those risks to
be manageable. Further reductions are not advisable and will require us
to accept more risk in the protection of our nation's security.
Due to the potential impact of the choices made to meet the current
reductions, Navy cannot independently tell you what it would cut next.
There are no obvious programs or activities the Navy can offer to meet
further cuts. Going forward, we will have to make reductions based on
an evaluation of the level of budget cuts and the strategic priorities
DOD establishes to defend the nation. These decisions would be
adjudicated with the other Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense to
ensure the new combined military force meets our national security
requirements with manageable risk. However, my priorities remain the
same for the Navy and my intention would be to:
Prioritize readiness to ensure the force we have is
fully mission capable
Ensure our Sailors, civilians and their families are
properly supported
Sustain relevant Navy-unique capabilities that
support the Joint Mission
Ensure a coherent balance of capability and capacity
of the force, and consider the stability of the industrial base
[See page 22.]
______
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER
Admiral Greenert. Constrained budgets and advancing threats will
challenge to our ability to build the future force. We will need to get
the most capability and capacity for our money. To maximize our
capacity, we will prioritize procurement of ships and aircraft on
proven designs that employ mature, dependable technologies. Platforms
just entering the fleet such as the F-35 and Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)
will be continued and bought in quantity to drive down technology risk
and per unit cost. To improve capability, we will increasingly focus
our research and development on what the platform carries, such as
sensors, weapons, unmanned systems, and network capabilities. These
systems can be developed more rapidly and at less cost than platforms,
but when married to our proven ships and aircraft, they can
dramatically improve the platform's capability.
We have experience in this model. Aircraft carriers, amphibious
ships, and the littoral combat ships are inherently reconfigurable,
with sensor and weapon systems that can evolve over time for the
expected mission. As we apply that same modular approach to each of our
missions, the weapons, sensors, unmanned systems, and electronic
warfare systems a platform deploys will increasingly become more
important than the platform itself. By shifting to modular capability,
the Navy will be able to deliver the latest technologies to the forward
deployed Sailor quickly and affordably.
We must also pay attention to how we acquire and manage the costs
of ships and aircraft. This remains one of the Navy's biggest
challenges, but we are taking action to reduce our acquisition costs
and incentivize our industry partners to remain on schedule and
maximize our return on investment. We strengthened acquisition policy
to improve program oversight, control cost growth, and more effectively
monitor contractor performance. The Department has also refined its
internal 2-Pass/6-Gate review process to ensure requirements are set
early and balanced against cost, and that this balance is visible and
managed throughout the acquisition process. Through this enhanced
internal review, Navy leadership challenges all aspects of the program
(warfighting requirements, program execution, design, and construction
efforts) to drive down engineering and construction costs while still
meeting the core military requirements for the given platform. [See
page 41.]
General Schwartz. In addition to following the acquisition
improvements outlined in the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of
2009, the US Air Force has implemented an Acquisition Improvement Plan
(AIP) and other related initiatives that will address some of the key
causes behind the development cost growth questioned here. It is
through the efforts associated with these multiple improvement
initiatives that the Air Force is gaining better control of the
development process, containing development budget fluctuations, and
providing for a more consistent, open, cost effective acquisition
process.
One of the major implementations of the Air Force AIP relates to
our approach to defining system requirements and conducting
development. Proposed system requirements will now undergo a more
rigorous senior leader validation and certification process to ensure
the initial requirements are sufficiently finite, testable, and can be
evaluated in source selection. Key performance parameters will be held
to a minimum to eliminate program volatility and an incremental
development approach will be utilized where feasible to better manage
technical, schedule, and cost risks. Our ultimate objective is to
develop a militarily useful and supportable capability within five
years and avoid the prolonged development activities. Another major
initiative within Air Force AIP is better visibility into program
budgets and an improved sense of budget discipline. We've worked
extensively with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and within our
Air Force Corporate Structure to improve budgeting and provide more
program manager and contractor accountability for our programs. The
ultimate intent is to better understand our target costs and then
stabilize and hold the budgets to those goals. Establishing credible
and consistent program cost estimates is the first step in program
funding stabilization and compliments our initiative for clearer and
simpler requirements. In the 2012 President's Budget, we added 84 new
cost estimator positions and laid the groundwork for more strenuous
budget reviews. During FY13 Program Objective Memorandum (POM)
discussions, we conducted an unprecedented number of cost estimates and
budget baseline reviews to better inform our POM decision makers and
determine where we needed to stabilize program funding based on the
most credible cost estimate.
To continue the momentum of AIP, the SecAF recently approved a
follow-on effort called Acquisition Continuous Process Improvement
(CPI) 2.0. This effort will continue to implement the OSD (AT&L) Better
Buying Power (BBP) initiatives in the Air Force and continue our
momentum towards improving our acquisition workforce skills.
As part of the effort to recapture acquisition excellence, the Air
Force is also implementing increased scrutiny in contractor performance
and a new approach to space platform procurements. The contractor
performance focus is on controlling contractor overhead rates and
matching profit to risk and performance. The Air Force is working with
DCMA to drive down contractor overhead rates and improve contractor
cost accounting factors and award fee processes to get the most for
each Air Force dollar. With regards to space platform procurements, the
Air Force is pursuing block buys of space vehicles to stabilize
production and invest in competitive, Government-directed, research and
development. It's expected that this revamped space procurement
approach will incrementally improve production performance and increase
affordability. A foundational component of the block buy construct is
to provide a stable amount of research, development, test and
evaluation re-investments annually that will mitigate impacts of parts
obsolescence, address critical industrial base concerns, and sustain
long-term architectures. [See page 41.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER AND MR. JOHNSON
General Odierno. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army intends to
meet with Congressional members to respond in person. In brief for the
record--Schedule: The Distributed Common Ground System-Army Major
Automated Information System (MAIS) is required to achieve a full
deployment decision by December 2012. Its Initial Operational Test and
Evaluation (IOT&E) is scheduled this fiscal year. All is in accordance
with acquisition rules and is on schedule. Savings: The Army began
investing in the DCGS-A family of systems in order to modernize and
enhance 9 legacy programs of record including signals intelligence,
imagery intelligence, weather/targeting, and national intelligence
capabilities. In 2006, an Acquisition Category III DCGS-A capability
was approved to address urgent wartime requirements by enhancing the
all-source analysis systems, as well as deploying quick reaction
capabilities (QRC) requested by Warfighters. In order to leverage the
nation's previous investments in these legacy and QRC intelligence
capabilities, as well as the developmental program, the Army
streamlined the DCGS-A acquisition strategy to combine the best of all
these investments into a converged software baseline. This revised
acquisition strategy brings enhanced capabilities to the field faster,
accelerating fielding to the force by at least four years. An
independent program cost estimate was conducted by the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Cost and Economics (DASA-CE) and a cost
benefit analysis for using the software strategy estimates a cost
avoidance of $3 billion within the program. Private sector
alternatives: The DCGS-A program, which has adopted the Intelligence
Community (IC) information technology way ahead, has invested in
hardware, software and people from dozens of industry partners to
implement commercial best practices and innovative software solutions.
The Army consulted with Army users, IC members, and Service
counterparts and concluded that no organization has committed to
wholesale use of Palantir and no single industry partner can provide
the enterprise solution that meets all of our Army Intelligence
requirements. The transition to a software-centric model within a
robust computing framework allows for entrepreneurial expansion from
across the nation by creating jobs in smaller innovative, flexible
companies while relying on our traditional industrial base for
necessary platforms. [See page 42.]
______
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
General Odierno. Everything is on the table--to include, military
and civilian force structure, readiness, and modernization. The
magnitude of these cuts would be devastating. The indiscriminate nature
of the reductions would not give the Army flexibility to provide a
force that is ready to deal with unknown contingencies. However, we are
bound by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Office of
Management and Budget to wait for specific budget guidance before
providing the impacts you request.
In general, such reductions would require the Army to consider
force structure options below the already planned decreases; would
drive shortfalls in our readiness accounts; would reverse efforts to
improve our infrastructure; and would desynchronize our investment and
modernization strategies.
We risk breaking faith with our Soldiers and their Families who
have performed superbly over ten years of continuous conflict.
Sustaining the all-volunteer force is absolutely essential for the
Army's ability to support our Nation's defense. While recognizing the
Nation's deficit challenges, it is imperative that any future
reductions to Army's budget be based on comprehensive strategic
analysis. We must ensure that we preclude hollowing the Army by
maintaining balance in force structure, readiness, modernization
efforts, and commitments to the all-volunteer force. The Army will take
a comprehensive approach towards executing these potential cuts to
ensure we do not create a hollow Army. [See page 28.]
Admiral Greenert. Compared with the President's budget plan for FY
2012, the Department of Defense is already planning a combined
reduction over the next ten years of more than $450 billion. This
reduction is being developed in conjunction with a new defense strategy
and both the strategy and the resulting budget are still being
completed. These cuts are difficult to make and will require us to take
some risks, but they are manageable. However, if sequestration is
triggered it would require an additional $500 to 600 billion dollar
reduction over the next ten years. The impact of these reductions would
be devastating to the Navy.
Sequestration applies uniform percentage cuts to each ``program,
project, and activity''--this means that every weapons program,
research project, and military construction project is cut by an equal
percentage. DOD and DON leadership is not allowed to manage or
prioritize these reductions causing our readiness and procurement
accounts to face a reduction of about 18 percent, rising to
approximately 25 percent in the event military personnel funding is
exempted from full sequestration.
With this magnitude of reduction to each procurement and
construction account, the Navy would be forced to terminate or
significantly reduce most large procurement or military construction
programs. We simply cannot buy three quarters of a ship, submarine, or
building. Specifically, the Navy may need to delay and reduce the total
quantity of the next generation ballistic missile submarine, delay or
terminate unmanned ISR systems, terminate the Joint Strike Fighter
program, and cancel the Littoral Combat Ship and associated mission
module acquisitions. The combination of these measures and other cost-
saving proposals will result in a fleet of fewer than 230 ships, the
smallest level since 1915. These reductions and cancellations will
likely cause cost overruns and schedule delays due to increased
overhead costs per unit and industrial base workforce reductions that
will further complicate the execution of the programs and program
elements that remain.
Although our military personnel accounts can be exempted from
sequestration, our civilian personnel accounts cannot. The Department
of Defense would be required to reduce its civilian personnel by about
20%. This would result in the smallest civilian workforce the DOD has
had since becoming a department. [See page 28.]
General Schwartz. Sequestration would drive an additional reduction
of 10 percent above the Budget Control Act reductions to the Air Force
FY13 budget request and the Act directs reductions equally spread
across all programs, projects, and activities. For military personnel
(MILPERS), Office of Management and Budget indicates the President
might exempt MILPERS accounts, which will correspondingly increase the
reductions to all other accounts. This would have a broad impact across
the Air Force and necessitate multiple reprogramming actions to
preserve critical Air Force capabilities.
The Department of Defense has proactively pursued a budget
reduction/efficiencies strategy and the Air Force has taken its share
of reductions over the past two decades. As a rule, budget reductions
should be informed by strategy. Arbitrary reductions as prescribed by
sequestration will drive program restructuring, deferrals, and
terminations in our investment portfolio. All investment accounts will
be negatively impacted, including our high-priority Acquisition
Category 1 modernization efforts such as KC-46A, F-35A, and MQ-9.
Reduced operations and Maintenance (O&M) accounts would drive
reductions in areas such as flying hours and weapon systems
sustainment; curtailment of training; civilian hiring slowdowns and
potential reduction-in-force actions; reduced daily operations to only
mission critical operations (i.e. training, supplies, equipment); and
deferral or cessation of infrastructure enhancements and new mission
bed downs. Absorbing these reductions would negatively impact readiness
and ``hollow out'' the force, and simultaneously make our ability to
cover any emergent execution year requirements (e.g., fuel price
increases or Libyan-type episodic operations) extremely difficult.
The Air Force understands that no Government agency will be immune
from reductions as we tackle our deficit reduction challenges. However,
budget reductions must remain strategy-based and congruent with
national objectives. Reductions without corresponding relief from
mission requirements would be detrimental to the Air Force's ability to
support the Joint warfighter. [See page 28.]
General Amos. Yes, the Marine Corps requires an Amphibious Combat
Vehicle (ACV) to replace our legacy Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAV)
that have been in service for more than 40 years. The programmatic
priority for our ground forces is the seamless transition of Marines
from the sea to conduct sustained operations ashore whether for
training, humanitarian assistance, or for combat. The Amphibious Combat
Vehicle is important to our ability to conduct surface littoral
maneuver and seamlessly project Marine units from sea to land in
permissive, uncertain and hostile environments. The ACV is a central
component to our Ground Combat and Tactical Vehicle strategy that is
focused on the right mix of assets, balancing performance, payload,
survivability, fuel efficiency, transportability and cost.
The former Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) program was
established to replace the AAV but was ultimately determined to be
unaffordable. That program was canceled in January of 2011 . Upon the
EFV program's cancelation, we conducted a Capabilities Based Analysis
to study Marine Corps' operational requirements and current and future
threats. When those requirements and threats were measured against the
current AAV's capabilities, several gaps (command and control,
mobility, force protection, survivability, and lethality) were
reaffirmed and documented in the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD)
for the ACV. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council validated the
gaps and capabilities in the ICD in October of 2011. We are currently
conducting an Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) to determine a cost and
operationally effective solution to the capability gaps identified in
the ICD. Potential solutions range from a significant upgrade of our
current AAV fleet to a completely new vehicle. In parallel with the
AOA, we are conducting studies to underpin the quantity of vehicles
needed to support operational requirements.
Given the threats we will face in the future and the traditional
need for the Marine Corps to operate in austere and expeditionary
environments, the Short Take-Off Vertical Landing (STOVL) F-35B is
clearly the tactical aircraft needed to meet our operating requirements
at sea and ashore. Once fielded, the F-35B will support the Marine Air
Ground Task Force from now until the middle of this century. Our
requirement for expeditionary tactical aircraft has been demonstrated
repeatedly since the inception of Marine aviation almost one hundred
years ago. From the expeditionary airfields and agile jeep carriers of
World War II, to close air support in proximity to troops in Korea and
Vietnam, to forward basing on cratered runways and taxiways throughout
Iraq, through to today's fight in Afghanistan, and the flexible
expeditionary response demonstrated in Libya; our ability to tactically
base fixed wing aircraft in close proximity to our maneuvering ground
forces has been instrumental to our success on the battlefield.
The STOVL F-35 is a capability that allows the Marine Corps to
provide fixed-wing aviation assets to support the Combatant Commanders
where land-based or carrier-based aircraft are not present.
Additionally, it doubles the number of naval platforms capable of
carrying fixed-wing strike aircraft and increases the number of usable
airfields worldwide for these aircraft. [See page 28.]
?
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
November 2, 2011
=======================================================================
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS
Mr. Franks. General Schwartz, you stated in your testimony that any
further budget cuts beyond those necessary to comply with the Budget
Control Act's first round ``cannot be done without damaging our core
military capabilities and therefore our national security.''
Practically speaking, you and I share the concern that further cuts
will amount to ``continued aging and reductions in the Air Force's
fleet of fighters, strategic bombers, airlifters, and tankers, as well
as to associated bases and infrastructure.'' Specifically, I'm
concerned about the F-35A, which you call the ``centerpiece of our
future tactical air combat capability.'' As you know, some people are
calling for the F-35 program to be mothballed. Can you please provide
assurances that the F-35A will continue to be a vital and viable
program and the future of the Air Force, and that the Air Force is
committed to having this fighter in the near future?
General Schwartz. The Air Force must modernize our aging fighter
force and that modernization depends on the fifth generation
capabilities of the F 35A. There is no alternative to the F-35 program.
The Air Force remains committed to maintaining air superiority and
holding any target at risk and the F-35A is required to fulfill that
commitment. In addition, the F-35A brings the benefit of increased
allied interoperability and cost sharing across the Services and our
partner nations.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO
Ms. Bordallo. General Odierno, you stated in your opening remarks
that ``We cannot afford to repeat the mistakes of previous
reductions.'' End-strength reductions and force structure changes will
certainly impact Army's O&M account, requiring commensurate reductions
in associated infrastructure, maintenance, sustainment, and training.
What actions is the Army taking to ensure that critical and deliberate
planning is completed to ensure reductions are directly linked to
workload, and that appropriate workforce mix is maintained? We have
heard a lot about civilian workforce reductions, and while appealing,
that workforce is difficult to reconstitute in future years if
workload, readiness, or risk require civilian performance. What are you
doing to ensure policies promulgated by the USD(P&R) regarding
workforce mix, in-sourcing, and reliance on contracted services are
being adhered to preclude conversion of work to contract performance as
you drawdown military and civilian levels and revise force structure?
General Odierno. The Secretary of the Army directed that civilian
reductions not be implemented by realigning work to contractors, which
has been promulgated in Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and
Reserve Affairs) policy guidance to the field. The Assistant Secretary
of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs has also issued guidance
to enforce the statutory prohibitions against direct conversions of
civilian employees to contractor performance.
Ms. Bordallo. General Odierno, you stated that you must ensure
``the right mix of operating and generating forces, and the right mix
of soldiers, civilians, and contractors.'' What specifically does that
mean in practical terms? What criteria are you applying to ensure
military personnel aren't being used as ``borrowed labor'' for
functions that don't contribute to readiness? How are you linking
civilian and contracted support structures to workload and how does
this reconcile with the direct to hold to FY10 civilian funding levels?
How is P&R guidance on workforce mix and in-sourcing being applied
across the Army to ensure this ``right mix''?
General Odierno. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower
and Reserve Affairs issued guidance limiting the use of Borrowed
Military Manpower (BMM) to include restricting BMM to within a
Soldier's military occupational specialty, limiting the duration of
BMM, fencing deploying units, and requiring cost benefit analysis.
Additionally, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and
Reserve Affairs is responsible for determining the requirements for the
generating force (military, civilian, and contract) based on workload
and available funding.
Ms. Bordallo. General Odierno, you spoke of resetting equipment in
theater rather than rotating it out. As you know, much attention has
been paid to the role of contractors in theater--as well as the
sustainment, infrastructure, and maintenance support provided to the
Department by the private sector. However, as we shape the force of the
future and discuss the likely impact the possibility of retirement and
compensation reforms will have on the Department's ability to recruit
and retain a ready and capable force, what steps are being taken to
ensure that the future mix of the Department's workforce is
appropriately balanced? Declining end-strengths and civilian personnel
limitations would seem to lead to a ``default'' of contracted support
to meet future operational needs (similar to the post 1990s drawdown).
What controls are being implemented, related to contracted service
levels, to prevent favoring one element of the Total Force overt
another?
General Odierno. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower
and Reserve Affairs issued guidance to enforce the statutory
prohibitions against direct conversions of civilian employees to
contractor performance and issued further guidance limiting the use of
Borrowed Military Manpower (BMM). I understand that the Assistant
Secretary continues to work diligently to ensure compliance and
identify functions at risk of inherently governmental performance or
unauthorized personal services based on the contractor inventory.
Additionally, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and
Reserve Affairs is responsible for determining the requirements for the
generating force (military, civilian and contract) based on workload
and available funding.
Ms. Bordallo. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness submitted a report over the summer in response to a Committee
request to assess the Department's shift from using contract security
guards. The authority to rely on contract security guards is expiring
at the end of this fiscal year. How many contracted security guards
does the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force have across its
installations, as well as in theater, and what are you doing to reduce
that reliance? Will the Army, Navy, Marine Corps or Air Force meet the
ratios required by law for having civilians or military perform that
work? And what protections are there to ensure Soldiers aren't
performing routine functions that do not contribute to the overall
mission readiness?
General Odierno. I understand that we are currently refining the
process to more robustly consider operational risk and document the
contractor requirement. The Army is evaluating the possibility of using
civilian employees to perform these currently contracted functions
where military police law enforcement units are not available, when
authority to contract expires at the end of Fiscal Year 2012. The
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs issued
guidance limiting the use of Borrowed Military Manpower (BMM) to
include restricting BMM to within a Soldier's military occupational
specialty, limiting the duration of BMM, fencing deploying units, and
requiring cost benefit analysis.
Ms. Bordallo. This committee has heard of specific instances across
the Air Force, Marine Corps and Army where work performed by Government
employees is being directly converted to contract performance. Section
2461 of title 10 prohibits the conversion of work currently performed
(or designated for performance) by civilian personnel to private sector
performance without a public-private competition, which are currently
precluded under a moratorium from being conducted. Specific instances
reported to this Committee include work at Minot, Eglin, Lackland AFBs,
Army's Installations Management and Medical Commands as well as in
Albany, Georgia. While these are just some instances, the pressures of
the budget and decreases in civilian workforce levels make this a very
real concern across the entirety of the Air Force. Please address these
three instances and also what actions are being taken to preclude such
illegal conversion of work across the Air Force in the future?
General Odierno. The Secretary of the Army directed that civilian
reductions not be implemented by realigning work to contractors. The
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs issued
detailed guidance to enforce the statutory prohibitions against direct
conversions of civilian employees to contractor performance. I
understand that the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and
Reserve Affairs) is coordinating with Medical Command (MEDCOM)
regarding the corrective action in the case of the direct conversion
issue and is assessing the facts associated with the Army Installation
Management (IMCOM) and Medical Commands.
Ms. Bordallo. There is significant focus placed on the health and
well-being of the industrial base and the impact on the economy as we
enter this era of budget decreases for the DOD. And as was noted in an
earlier hearing, the industrial base is not only our builders of
weapons systems and platforms, but also companies that provide
services. Yet, there has been significant concern with overreliance on
contracted services within the Department which in the past resulted in
the in-sourcing of certain services. Is there an office within the
Army, Air Force, Marine Corps or Navy that is tasked and resourced to
assess the ``health and well-being'' of the Department's organic
capabilities and competency base within the civilian workforce in this
era of budget decreases? Specifically, how can the Army, Air Force,
Marine Corps or Navy prevent further increasing reliance on services
provided by the private sector in facility related, knowledge based,
and equipment related services, among others, as its military and
civilian personnel are so drastically being cut?
General Odierno. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower
and Reserve Affairs is responsible for determining the requirements for
the generating force (military, civilian, and contract) based on
workload and available funding. In addition, under its Civilian
Workforce Transformation effort, the Assistant Secretary of the Army
for Manpower and Reserve Affairs is conducting competencies-based
analysis to ensure the proper skill sets and staffing of our organic
workforce to support emerging threats and required new competencies.
Ms. Bordallo. What actions is the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps
taking to ensure that critical and deliberate planning are completed to
ensure reductions are directly linked to workload, and that appropriate
workforce mix is maintained? We have heard a lot about civilian
workforce reductions, and while appealing, that workforce is difficult
to reconstitute in future years if workload, readiness, or risk require
civilian performance. What are you doing to ensure policies promulgated
by the USD(P&R) regarding workforce mix, in-sourcing, and reliance on
contracted services are being adhered to preclude conversion of work to
contract performance as you drawdown military and civilian levels and
revise force structure?
Admiral Greenert. Workforce balance and in-sourcing skill sets are
some of the principles the DON and USD(P&R) staff use to establish the
appropriate mix of military, civilian, and contractor employees in our
workforce to affordably accomplish its missions. In addition to having
``the right skill set in the right position,'' our workforce must be
appropriately sized to meet baseline workload requirements while
maintaining the flexibility to meet emerging needs. Therefore, each
major command (Budget Submitting Office (BSO)) within the DON has the
ability to hire civilians within the command's budget to allow for
staff attrition and anticipated workload demands.
Contracts for services and contracted functions are reviewed
annually by BSOs based upon identified priorities. The Department is
currently limiting growth in civilian positions to reduce overhead.
This reduces the number of overall positions we will in-source, but
balances the skill sets of our workforce and alleviates redundancy. The
Department is currently monitoring the impact of the overhead
efficiency efforts taken during FY11 (and will continue doing so in
FY12) through specified periodic reviews with the DON and OSD staff.
Ms. Bordallo. Admiral Greenert, you stated that you may have to
``freeze civilian hiring'' beyond the first quarter in the event of a
continuing resolution. What mechanisms does the Navy have in place to
preclude work for being absorbed by contractors in such an event?
Specifically, the Navy hasn't taken any actions, despite clear
Congressional direction, to work with P&R and adapt the Army's approach
to the inventory of contracts for services. Accounting for direct labor
hours of contractors as the law requires would help the Navy get an
accounting of its contracted services and ensure that in this era of
civilian personnel constraints, we do not shift to increased reliance
on contracted services. What progress is being made in this area?
Admiral Greenert. As directed in the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) memo,
``Implementation Directive for Better Buying Power--Obtaining Greater
Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending,'' the Department of
the Navy established the Senior Services Manager (SSM) organization
within DASN (Acquisition and Procurement). The SSM, along with the DON
financial and manpower communities, is tracking the reduction of
services acquisition including the 10% reduction in headquarters
support contractors directed by SECDEF and the 15% reduction in certain
administrative support categories directed by the Office of Management
and Budget. The SSM is tracking these reductions as part of a review of
services portfolios to identify opportunities for increasing
efficiencies and reducing costs.
The SSM is actively engaged with DON and OSD stakeholders to
develop the required tools to manage services contracting requirements
as part of the total force. DON (DASN(Acquisition and Procurement))
submitted a plan of action and milestones to USD(P&R) to inventory
contractor work as directed in the FY08 NDAA, and leverage the Army's
CMRA as directed in Section 8108 of Public Law 112-10. As described in
the POA&M, DON will gather direct labor hours for contracted services
work, define reporting requirements in new contracts, and activate the
annual reporting of FY12 contractor data by October of 2012.
Ms. Bordallo. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness submitted a report over the summer in response to a Committee
request to assess the Department's shift from using contract security
guards. The authority to rely on contract security guards is expiring
at the end of this fiscal year. How many contracted security guards
does the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force have across its
installations, as well as in theater, and what are you doing to reduce
that reliance? Will the Army, Navy, Marine Corps or Air Force meet the
ratios required by law for having civilians or military perform that
work? And what protections are there to ensure Soldiers aren't
performing routine functions that do not contribute to the overall
mission readiness?
Admiral Greenert. At the start of FY12, Navy had 485 contract
guards across 70 installations under PL 107-314 authorization. The Navy
entered FY12 exceeding the NDAA07 reduction requirement and ratios, and
will meet the NDAA07 requirement to eliminate our reliance on these
guards completely by end of FY12. We have accomplished this reduction
and transition through a combination of Government civilian
replacements, technology and automation investments, and by reducing
the overall security guard requirement. The Navy awarded all non-guard
and routine Security services (e.g. vehicle pass and registration)
under OMB Circular A76 which ensures our military Security
professionals are performing only critical, inherently governmental
functions.
Ms. Bordallo. There is significant focus placed on the health and
well-being of the industrial base and the impact on the economy as we
enter this era of budget decreases for the DOD. And as was noted in an
earlier hearing, the industrial base is not only our builders of
weapons systems and platforms, but also companies that provide
services. Yet, there has been significant concern with overreliance on
contracted services within the Department which in the past resulted in
the in-sourcing of certain services. Is there an office within the
Army, Air Force, Marine Corps or Navy that is tasked and resourced to
assess the ``health and well-being'' of the Department's organic
capabilities and competency base within the civilian workforce in this
era of budget decreases? Specifically, how can the Army, Air Force,
Marine Corps or Navy prevent further increasing reliance on services
provided by the private sector in facility related, knowledge based,
and equipment related services, among others, as its military and
civilian personnel are so drastically being cut?
Admiral Greenert. The Department of the Navy's (Navy and Marine
Corps) growth in contractor support resulted in part from the
significant drawdown of the civilian workforce in the 1990's, which is
currently being revitalized through Acquisition Workforce, Defense
Acquisition Workforce Development Fund, and other initiatives. The
Offices of the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy for Manpower & Reserve
Affairs, Research Development & Acquisition, and Financial Management &
Comptroller have partnered to ensure all statutorily required organic
capabilities are maintained, ensure Government employees are equipped
to provide oversight of resources and programs, and assess requirements
for military, civilian employees, and contractors to sustain a
proficient and flexible workforce. Under OMB Circular A-76 Performance
of Commercial Activities, the Department prepares an annual inventory
of commercial and inherently governmental activities.
Ms. Bordallo. What actions is the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps
taking to ensure that critical and deliberate planning are completed to
ensure reductions are directly linked to workload, and that appropriate
workforce mix is maintained? We have heard a lot about civilian
workforce reductions, and while appealing, that workforce is difficult
to reconstitute in future years if workload, readiness, or risk require
civilian performance. What are you doing to ensure policies promulgated
by the USD(P&R) regarding workforce mix, in-sourcing, and reliance on
contracted services are being adhered to preclude conversion of work to
contract performance as you drawdown military and civilian levels and
revise force structure?
General Schwartz. The Air Force continually strives to provide an
optimal workforce mix that supports its strategic objectives, its daily
operation, and provides for effective and economical administration. In
accordance with Department of Defense (DOD) direction, the Air Force
routinely looks at ways it can improve its workforce mix. Instructions
set forth in Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 1100.22 (Policy
and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix), as well as Federal
Acquisition Regulations 7.5, Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation
207.5 and Air Force Instruction (AFI) 38-204, Programming USAF
Manpower, provide the overarching guidance for Air Force workforce mix
determinations. To that end, the Air Force performs a comprehensive
annual Inherently Governmental and Commercial Activities (IGCA) review
to ensure it has the proper work force mix. This review allows the Air
Force to evaluate the total workforce's categorization as inherently
governmental, military essential, or a commercial activity subject to
review for private sector performance.
All Military Departments brief USD (P&R) on its IGCA Inventory
results within three weeks of the annual submission. This process
ensures that the processes used to establish the composition of our
workforce are predicated on defense missions, are consistent with DOD
policy, and provide a means for continual improvement as we seek to
achieve the proper balance of military, DOD civilian, and private
sector support.
Ms. Bordallo. General Schwartz, what mechanisms does the Air Force
have in place to prevent work from being absorbed by contractors as a
result of the drastic cuts recently announced to the Air Force's
civilian workforce? Specifically, the Air Force hasn't taken any
actions, despite clear Congressional direction, to work with P&R and
adapt the Army's approach to the inventory of contracts for services.
Accounting for direct labor hours of contractors as the law requires
would help the Air Force get an accounting of its contracted services
and ensure that in this era of civilian personnel constraints, we do
not shift to increased reliance on contracted services. What progress
is being made in this area?
General Schwartz. The Air Force continues to work closely with
OUSD(C), OUSD (P&R), and OUSD (AT&L) to fulfill contractor accounting
mandated by Congress. We are using the two million dollars provided in
Section 8108 of the 2011 Department of Defense Appropriation Act to
leverage Army's Contractor Manpower Reporting Application for our use.
This system will capture contractor-provided labor hours and other
associated factors. We provided OUSD(P&R) our implementation plan as
directed in Section 8108. This plan establishes, beginning 1 Oct 2012,
that as new contracts for services are awarded, performance work
statements will require contractors to report the data elements needed
to answer the mandates of Section 8108 and 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2330a.
We are tracking, on a monthly basis, our use of contractors
performing knowledge-based services, service support, and advisory
studies to ensure that we achieve already programmed reductions. These
actions, coupled with the current monthly tracking of the financial
obligations of contract usage, facilitate prevention of inappropriate
migration of workload.
Ms. Bordallo. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness submitted a report over the summer in response to a Committee
request to assess the Department's shift from using contract security
guards. The authority to rely on contract security guards is expiring
at the end of this fiscal year. How many contracted security guards
does the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force have across its
installations, as well as in theater, and what are you doing to reduce
that reliance? Will the Army, Navy, Marine Corps or Air Force meet the
ratios required by law for having civilians or military perform that
work? And what protections are there to ensure Soldiers aren't
performing routine functions that do not contribute to the overall
mission readiness?
General Schwartz. The Air Force security contract portfolio does
not include installations in combat theaters; those forces are managed
by Combatant Commanders.
The Air Force portfolio of security guard contracts peaked at
approximately 2,000 contractor personnel full-time equivalents in
Fiscal Year 2007 and for Fiscal Year 2012 totals about 700. Consistent
with statute, all contracts are anticipated to end by last day of
Fiscal Year 2012.
Consistent with expiring authorities, the Air Force, over the last
several years, has replaced the majority of the contract security
guards that were performing these functions while military personnel
were deployed with 1,300 General Schedule term over-hire police
positions, not permanent. Over-hires have been used since the
deployments are not permanent; the Air Force will continue to use over-
hires as a means of maintaining installation security when military
forces are deployed.
Of the remaining 700 Fiscal Year 2012 contract personnel, 600 are
Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budgeted/funded. These
contractors are temporary replacements for deployed Air Force Security
Forces (military police). These Air Force Security Forces (military
police) are assigned to installation security tasks when not deployed.
Of the 600 OCO contractors, 400 are being converted to General Schedule
police officers on term over-hire appointments. Installation security
is being enhanced by the conversion of security guards into more highly
trained police officers. About 150 contract positions are not being
converted due to reduced military deployments and availability of
military personnel. As Air Force military personnel return from
deployments to their primary jobs at home station, temporary
replacements will no longer be needed. The release of the civilian term
over-hires has no impact on force protection standards.
Of the current Air Force portfolio, the remaining 150 of the 700
contractor equivalents are being converted to permanent General
Schedule positions. These baseline budget contract positions were
transferred to the Air Force from sister Services as a result of Joint
basing.
The Air Force manages manpower to ensure that military personnel
are not required to routinely perform functions that do not contribute
to the overall mission readiness. Since the attacks of 9/11, the Air
Force has increased installation security manpower by 15 percent (about
3,000 personnel) and has provided flexibility to commanders in meeting
their force protection responsibilities.
In the Air Force, reliance on contracted security guards was
temporary in nature. Of the 2,000 Air Force contracted security
positions overall, only 100 are projected to be sourced permanently
through the Joint base realignment baselining.
Ms. Bordallo. This committee has heard of specific instances across
the Air Force, Marine Corps and Army where work performed by Government
employees is being directly converted to contract performance. Section
2461 of title 10 prohibits the conversion of work currently performed
(or designated for performance) by civilian personnel to private sector
performance without a public-private competition, which are currently
precluded under a moratorium from being conducted. Specific instances
reported to this Committee include work at Minot, Eglin, Lackland AFBs,
Army's Installations Management and Medical Commands as well as in
Albany Georgia. While these are just some instances, the pressures of
the budget and decreases in civilian workforce levels make this a very
real concern across the entirety of the Air Force. Please address these
three instances and also what actions are being taken to preclude such
illegal conversion of work across the Air Force in the future?
General Schwartz. Policy guidance was issued throughout the Air
Force that implemented a moratorium on public-private competition in
accordance with 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2461. The Air Force investigated the
allegations of civilian to contractor direct conversions at Minot,
Eglin, and Lackland AFBs and found that no direct conversions occurred.
The manpower, legal, and contracting communities will continue to
communicate and mandate compliance with National Defense Authorization
Act guidance and future Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and
Readiness) (USD (P&R)) policies to all key stakeholders.
Ms. Bordallo. There is significant focus placed on the health and
well-being of the industrial base and the impact on the economy as we
enter this era of budget decreases for the DOD. And as was noted in an
earlier hearing, the industrial base is not only our builders of
weapons systems and platforms, but also companies that provide
services. Yet, there has been significant concern with overreliance on
contracted services within the Department which in the past resulted in
the in-sourcing of certain services. Is there an office within the
Army, Air Force, Marine Corps or Navy that is tasked and resourced to
assess the ``health and well-being'' of the Department's organic
capabilities and competency base within the civilian workforce in this
era of budget decreases? Specifically, how can the Army, Air Force,
Marine Corps or Navy prevent further increasing reliance on services
provided by the private sector in facility related, knowledge based,
and equipment related services, among others, as its military and
civilian personnel are so drastically being cut?
General Schwartz. Instructions set forth in DODI 1100.22, Policy
and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix, as well as Federal
Acquisition Regulations 7.5 and Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation
207.5, are guidance the Air Force uses to ensure organic capabilities
are not contracted to the private sector. Additionally, the Air Force
performs an annual Inherently Governmental and Commercial Activities
review to ensure those capabilities remain within the Government. Our
collective manpower and personnel community (A1) assesses the ``health
and well being'' of the civilian workforce. To prevent further
increasing reliance on services provided by the private sector the Air
Force has two mechanisms in place:
1) Funding of service contracts is closely scrutinized and
limited; and
2) the Deputy Chief Management Officer monitors financial
metrics to ensure dollars and the associated work do not
inappropriately migrate to the private sector.
In-sourcing has been, and continues to be, a very effective tool to
rebalance the workforce, realign inherently governmental and other
critical work to Government performance (from contract support), and in
many instances to generate resource efficiencies. Those contracted
services that meet the in-sourcing criteria (consistent with governing
statutes, policies, and regulations) will be in-sourced several ways:
1) absorbing work into existing Government positions by
refining duties or requirements;
2) establishing new positions to perform contracted services;
3) eliminating or shifting equivalent existing personnel from
lower priority activities; or
4) on a case-by-case basis, requesting a Department of
Defense exception to the civilian funding levels.
Ms. Bordallo. General Schwartz, you stated that cyber was of maybe
three areas in the entire department portfolio that may grow by
necessity. Acquisition has been another focus area for the Department
and the Congress, as has financial management. Growing these areas to
meet the emerging mission and oversight necessary, you indicated it
will have to come at the expense of other areas in the broader
portfolio. What such portfolios can afford to be minimized and how is
that consistent with the strategic human capital planning that
Personnel & Readiness is focused on?
General Schwartz. The Air Force has applied a holistic, competency-
based approach in order to identify efficiencies and allow growth in
areas such as acquisition and cyber. Our proposed reductions preserve
the Air Force's core capabilities and ensure continued support to
Combatant Commanders. Corporately, the Air Force has sought
efficiencies through management headquarters reductions, eliminating
overhead, merging like functions, and streamlining the way installation
support services are provided to include partnering with communities.
Ms. Bordallo. What actions is the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps
taking to ensure that critical and deliberate planning are completed to
ensure reductions are directly linked to workload, and that appropriate
workforce mix is maintained? We have heard a lot about civilian
workforce reductions, and while appealing, that workforce is difficult
to reconstitute in future years if workload, readiness, or risk require
civilian performance. What are you doing to ensure policies promulgated
by the USD(P&R) regarding workforce mix, in-sourcing, and reliance on
contracted services are being adhered to preclude conversion of work to
contract performance as you drawdown military and civilian levels and
revise force structure?
General Amos. The Marine Corps conducted a self-initiated,
capabilities-based Force Structure Review (FSR) one year ago in order
to answer this exact question regarding reductions directly linked to
workload. The Marine Corps employed a panel of senior officers (O-6)
representing all elements of the Marine Corps. The panel received
guidance from the Commandant, applied operational planning scenarios of
the future, and developed a force structure that satisfied both from a
capabilities perspective. In this way, the Marine Corps directly tied
anticipated operational workload to planned reductions in manpower. The
results of the FSR detailed a Marine Corps force that is specifically
tailored in capability to anticipated workloads. Additionally, the
Marine Corps is presently conducting a review of all civilian billets
and service contracts. This three phase review began in July of 2011
and will be completed in December. We are also developing polices
supporting the direction given by Under Secretary of Defense for
Programs and Resource. These polices will be published in Marine Corps
Orders which guide the development of our Total Force.
Ms. Bordallo. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness submitted a report over the summer in response to a Committee
request to assess the Department's shift from using contract security
guards. The authority to rely on contract security guards is expiring
at the end of this fiscal year. How many contracted security guards
does the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force have across its
installations, as well as in theater, and what are you doing to reduce
that reliance? Will the Army, Navy, Marine Corps or Air Force meet the
ratios required by law for having civilians or military perform that
work? And what protections are there to ensure Soldiers aren't
performing routine functions that do not contribute to the overall
mission readiness?
General Amos. The only contract security guards supporting the
Marine Corps are currently at the National Museum of the Marine Corps
near Quantico, Virginia. Next year, these nine guards will be replaced
by civilian police from the Marine Corps Civilian Law Enforcement
Program. The Marine Corps is in compliance with legal ratios. Although
the Marine Corps has civilian contractors performing routine support
functions (e.g. 911 dispatch, alarm monitoring, vehicle pass and
registration, police supply, court liaison, physical security,
commercial vehicle inspection, and other support tasks), contractors
are not involved in core security/policing work. Having civilian
contractors available in a supporting role allows Marine military and
civilian police to focus exclusively on access control measures and
other appropriate security and police tasks.
Ms. Bordallo. This committee has heard of specific instances across
the Air Force, Marine Corps and Army where work performed by Government
employees is being directly converted to contract performance. Section
2461 of title 10 prohibits the conversion of work currently performed
(or designated for performance) by civilian personnel to private sector
performance without a public-private competition, which are currently
precluded under a moratorium from being conducted. Specific instances
reported to this Committee include work at Minot, Eglin, Lackland AFBs,
Army's Installations Management and Medical Commands as well as in
Albany Georgia. While these are just some instances, the pressures of
the budget and decreases in civilian workforce levels make this a very
real concern across the entirety of the Air Force. Please address these
three instances and also what actions are being taken to preclude such
illegal conversion of work across the Air Force in the future?
General Amos. Marine Corps Installation Command recently examined
an allegation that civilian positions at our base in Albany, GA were
being directly converted in contravention of 10 USC 2461. After
ascertaining the facts and reviewing the applicable legal provisions,
we have determined that no direct conversions or improper use of
contractors has occurred there.
Ms. Bordallo. There is significant focus placed on the health and
well-being of the industrial base and the impact on the economy as we
enter this era of budget decreases for the DOD. And as was noted in an
earlier hearing, the industrial base is not only our builders of
weapons systems and platforms, but also companies that provide
services. Yet, there has been significant concern with overreliance on
contracted services within the Department which in the past resulted in
the in-sourcing of certain services. Is there an office within the
Army, Air Force, Marine Corps or Navy that is tasked and resourced to
assess the ``health and well-being'' of the Department's organic
capabilities and competency base within the civilian workforce in this
era of budget decreases? Specifically, how can the Army, Air Force,
Marine Corps or Navy prevent further increasing reliance on services
provided by the private sector in facility related, knowledge based,
and equipment related services, among others, as its military and
civilian personnel are so drastically being cut?
General Amos. Yes, there is such an office that exists in the
Department of the Navy (DON). Namely, The DON created the Office of the
Director for Services Acquisition within the Office of the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Acquisition and Logistics
Management to assess the ``health and well-being'' of the Department's
organic capabilities and competency base within the civilian workforce.
To prevent increased reliance on services provided by the private
sector in facility related, knowledge based, and equipment related
services, we have conducted a comprehensive review of all civilian
structure across the service for the purpose of determining those
critical positions that we must retained based upon the projected
financial environment. The results of that review are being assessed at
the service manpower management level and will ultimately be presented
to the service leadership for consideration and decision. Those
determinations will drive further decisions regarding how to source any
shortfalls to mission demand signal.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCHILLING
Mr. Schilling. Gen. Odierno, you stated that sequestration would
mean that you would have to look at infrastructure efficiencies. Can
you expand on how this would affect the organic base? How would our
arsenals, the organic base that helps the Army to be a ready force, be
affected?
General Odierno. If sequestration were to occur and funding were to
decrease to the suggested limits, the Army would have to implement a
plan to cease funding less critical functions and functions that can be
deferred. We have not yet determined which installations, programs or
functions will be listed first for the operational forces, the organic
base supporting them or our industrial base. Concerning the Army
Arsenals and the rest of the organic industrial base, as the effects of
the overall drawdowns ripple through the Army, resources will decrease
causing industrial workload to do the same. As that occurs we will have
to look at a number of options, all of which will potentially include
decreases in personnel and capability at the Army Arsenals and other
industrial facilities. Our intent will be to implement budget
decrements in a logical and organized way to ensure we have a balanced
organization capable of executing the total spectrum of requirements
from high intensity operations to organic industrial maintenance.
Mr. Schilling. Adm. Greenert, you talked about having to end
procurement programs. Can you expand on how many procurement programs
you would need to end? In ending these programs, you mentioned that
some businesses would face the possibility of shutting down and have
long-term consequences to the fleet. Can you speak to how that would
harm the military's industrial base's ability to ``keep warm'' in case
of war and what that would mean to our reaction time as a country?
Would this also place our warfighters at risk?
Admiral Greenert. Sequestration applies uniform percentage cuts to
each ``program, project, and activity''- this means that every weapons
program, research project, and military construction project is cut by
an equal percentage. DOD and DON leadership is not allowed to manage or
prioritize these reductions causing our readiness and procurement
accounts to face a reduction of about 18 percent, rising to
approximately 25 percent in the event military personnel funding is
exempted from full sequestration.
With this magnitude of reduction to each procurement and
construction account, the Navy would be forced to terminate or
significantly reduce most large procurement or military construction
programs. We simply cannot buy three quarters of a ship, submarine, or
building. Specifically, the Navy may need to delay and reduce the total
quantity of the next generation ballistic missile submarine, delay or
terminate unmanned ISR systems, terminate the Joint Strike Fighter
program, and cancel the Littoral Combat Ship and associated mission
module acquisitions. The combination of these measures and other cost-
saving proposals will result in a fleet of fewer than 230 ships, the
smallest level since 1915. These reductions and cancellations will
likely cause cost overruns and schedule delays due to increased
overhead costs per unit and industrial base workforce reductions that
will further complicate the execution of the programs and program
elements that remain. The DOD has estimated that these effects may
result in order quantity reductions by one third or more of the
original, even though the accounts will only be cut by approximately
25%. Reducing production quantities, eliminating skilled personnel, and
closing production lines will stress individual companies fiscally and
operationally, and destabilize the small group of companies that
comprise Navy's industrial base. If these actions are taken, our
partners in the industrial base will be hard-pressed to reconstitute
its highly skilled workforce and re-open these production lines, to
provide our nation additional war fighting capacity in the event of
prolonged conflicts. The inability to rapidly reconstitute and employ
this national asset will increase the risk to war fighters.
Mr. Schilling. Gen. Schwartz, you stated that the Air Force would
still be the best in the world even with these cuts. However, we must
get used to a smaller Air Force if sequestration goes forward. Can you
elaborate to how much of a squeeze this would put on our military as a
whole if the Air Force cannot meet as many missions as it has for the
last 20 years? What will this smaller Air Force mean in terms of
modernizing our force and the work the Air Force does with our
industrial base?
General Schwartz. Further reductions driven by the Budget Control
Act would require an enterprise-wide review of all resources and the
potential elimination of lower priority missions and capabilities
currently assigned to the Air Force. The Air Force will stay focused on
strategic priorities and continue to build and improve key capabilities
that support those priorities, while reducing other capabilities that
we can no longer offer to the Joint team. It is likely that across the
board reductions will be required to meet budget projections--including
force structure and infrastructure--to avoid hollowing the force.
The Air Force, regardless of its size, will continue to rely on
national technology and the industrial base to develop, produce, and
sustain the weapon systems and equipment required to fulfill our
national security obligations in the air, space, and cyber domains. As
our force structure adjusts to the emerging fiscal realities, so will
the demands the Air Force places on the industrial base.
Mr. Schilling. Gen. Amos, you mentioned that organic logistics
capabilities are vital to a high state of unit readiness and logistical
self-sustainment capability. Can you expand on what you mean by organic
logistics capabilities?
General Amos. At all warfighting levels, the Marine Corps operates
as a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF), a balanced air-ground-
logistics team. Logistical self-sufficiency is an essential element of
the MAGTF enabling our ability to rapidly deploy and sustain ourselves
for extended periods upon arrival in hostile, austere, and uncertain
environments without reliance on host nation support. This means that
the Marine Corps' logistics mission, at all command and support levels,
is to generate MAGTFs that are rapidly deployable, self-reliant, self-
sustaining, flexible, and capable of rapid reconstitution. Moreover, a
MAGTF's logistics capabilities and accompanying supplies enable it,
depending on size, to self-sustain its operations for extended periods
while external resupply channels are organized and established.
Mr. Schilling. Gen. Amos, you also mentioned that reset is
distinguishable from modernization. How will a decrease in
modernization affect the current fleet, the future fleet, and the
current industrial base, both private and organic?
General Amos. As we look forward, we must address our deficiencies
and replace the equipment that is worn out from operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan over the past decade. This process is known as reset and is
wholly separate from modernization. Modernization entails judiciously
developing and procuring the right equipment we will need for success
in the conflicts of tomorrow, especially in those areas that underpin
our core competencies. While budgetary pressures will likely constrain
modernization initiatives we will mitigate that pressure by continuing
to prioritize and sequence both our modernization and our sustainment
programs to ensure that our equipment is always ready and that we are
proceeding in a fiscally responsible manner. We recognize that our
planned reduced force structure following our commitment in Afghanistan
will necessitate some level of decreased modernization. However, any
sizeable reductions in this regard could impact our ability to posture
ourselves for response against future adversaries and threats.
We are currently undertaking several initiatives to modernize the
Total Force. The programmatic priority for our ground forces is the
seamless transition of Marines from the sea to conduct sustained
operations ashore whether for training, humanitarian assistance, or for
combat. Our ground combat and tactical vehicle strategy is focused on
the right mix of assets, balancing performance, payload, survivability,
fuel efficiency, transportability and cost. In particular, the
Amphibious Combat Vehicle is important to our ability to conduct
surface littoral maneuver and seamlessly project Marine units from sea
to land in permissive, uncertain and hostile environments. We are
firmly partnered with the U.S. Army in fielding a Joint Light Tactical
Vehicle to replace critical light combat weapon carriers. The two
initiatives are sequenced to minimize budget bulges during their
procurement phases and both programs will rely on a competitive and
effective U.S. automotive and combat vehicle industrial base for more
than the next decade. We have just completed the modernization of our
medium tactical truck fleet and are moving toward completion of our
heavy tactical truck fleet modernization. As we move into the
sustainment phases for these vehicles, a healthy organic maintenance
depot capability supported by a reliable parts supply will be necessary
to keep the vehicles at a high state of readiness. Our remaining fleet
of over 14,000 HMMWVs will require a similar maintenance capability.
We are nearing completion of our ground fire support modernization
with the completion of fielding of M777A2 howitzers, High Mobility
Artillery Rocket Systems, and Expeditionary Fire Support Systems.
Sustainment of those critical platforms is similarly dependent on a
stable maintenance and supply capability. Our modernization focus will
shift from platforms to munitions to seek greater ranges and increased
precision while also seeking effective replacements for artillery
cluster munitions.
Another critical modernization effort is the Ground/Air Task
Oriented Radar (G/ATOR), an expeditionary, short-medium range radar
with state of the art technology against low observable threats. G/ATOR
replaces five legacy radars with a single, multi-mission system,
reducing life-cycle costs similar to JSF replacement of current air
frames. G/ATOR supports Air Surveillance/Air Defense, Ground Weapons
Locating and Air Traffic Control mission sets, and has the potential to
replace aging radar systems across multiple Services. Currently
entering the developmental test phase, the radar will begin low rate
initial production in 2013. At the same time the Marine Corps is
managing critical modernization programs across the spectrum of
command, control, intelligence and surveillance.
Marine Corps Aviation, which is on the cusp of its centennial of
service to our Nation, continues its modernization that began over a
decade ago. The continued development and fielding of the short take-
off and vertical landing (STOVL) F-35B Joint Strike Fighter remains the
centerpiece of this effort. Once fully fielded, the F-35B replaces
three legacy aircraft--F/A-18, EA-6B and AV-8B. DOD has already
purchased 32 of these aircraft. Delivery is on track, and we look
forward to receiving them at Marine Corps Air Station Yuma just nine
months from now. The MV-22B Osprey continues to be a success story for
the Marine Corps and the joint force. Our squadron fielding plan is
well under way as we continue to replace our 44 year old, Vietnam-era
CH-46 helicopters. We must procure all required quantities of the MV-
22B in accordance with the program of record. Unmanned Aircraft Systems
(UAS) will continue to play a vital intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance role from the platoon through Marine Expeditionary Force
level and modernization of our Group 1 and 2 classes of UAS ensures
this critical capability is carried into the future.
When combined with the capabilities of our individual Marines and
the flexibility of the Marine Air Ground Task Force, all of the above
initiatives enable the Marine Corps as a responsive, multi-capable
expeditionary force in readiness today and well into the future. These
combined efforts require and support a stable organic maintenance
capability, an innovative industrial base and an efficient supply
chain. There will likely be significant impacts to the U.S. industrial
base if large scale programs such as our aircraft and shipbuilding
production lines are shut down due to decreased procurement in our
current acquisition strategy. Once shut down, these lines simply cannot
be restarted later at a moment's notice; and there likely would be
ripple effects at the subcontractor/small business level from which
parts and other supplies are made to support these programs. Moreover,
the technical expertise of those working in these fields can atrophy
over time or be attracted to competitor nations, impacting our national
security. Therefore, it is critically important that all prevailing
factors be weighed when making the tough decisions on modernizing the
Corps for the future.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LOEBSACK
Mr. Loebsack. General Odierno, as the Army continues its ongoing
efficiency reviews and continues work on the FY 2013 budget request,
how are you working to ensure that the Army's organic manufacturing
capabilities are preserved? What is the Army doing to ensure that the
arsenals, ammunition plants, and depots are workloaded sufficiently to
maintain their critical capabilities? Additionally, how are you working
to ensure that the organic manufacturing workforce, and the skills they
have developed over the last decade that will be critical to our
ability to respond to future contingencies, are being maintained?
General Odierno. The Army has committed to maintain workload and
skill sets for our arsenals and ammunition plants by exploring Foreign
Military Sale opportunities to manufacture components for foreign
nations; investing in arsenal and ammunition plant infrastructure
(facilities & equipment) to ensure that they are modernized with
advanced technological capabilities; encouraging arsenals to partner
with commercial firms to meet future requirements; and encouraging
involvement with the Program Managers (PMs) at the beginning of the
acquisition process to optimize consideration of arsenal plant
capabilities. The Army has taken a number of steps to ensure that our
depots are postured to support base requirements by identifying and
prioritizing core depot requirements; sizing our organic base
facilities, infrastructure, and workforce to meet and sustain those
core depot requirements; and using proven practices like Lean Six Sigma
to ensure that our maintenance depots maintain their core competencies
and capabilities to meet future requirements. The Army continues to
invest in the manufacturing arsenal infrastructure to ensure that our
facilities are modernized with advanced technological capabilities.
Facilities capital investment improvements alone totaled close to $25
million (M) in Fiscal Year 2011 (FY11) and are expected to remain at
this level through the Five Year Defense Plan. Mechanisms such as
Public Law 105-261, Section 806, and Procurement of Ammunition provide
the Army authority to limit procurement of ammunition to the National
Technology and Industrial Base to maintain facilities for furnishing
ammunition. The Army also began, a year ago with the FY12-16 Program
Objective Memorandum (POM), to realign the depot maintenance resource
prioritization process to ensure that workloads required to meet core
depot requirements are fully resourced. This process ensures that, at a
minimum, our organic maintenance depots will retain the critical skills
and capabilities to repair our key warfighting equipment in order to
sustain our core depot capability requirements annually. Permanent
workforces at the depots are sized to sustain core depot workload
requirements with temporary and contractor workforces adjusted
accordingly as fluctuations in workloads occur. This process was
implemented during the depot maintenance requirements determination and
budget process for FY13-17 POM and will continue into the foreseeable
future.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
Mr. Scott. Currently, the Army is considering two program
solicitations for small arms--one for a new Individual Carbine to
replace the M4 & M16 and another for product improvements to the
current M4/M16 platform. In your judgment, does the Army have the funds
to do both?
General Odierno. The Army currently has enough funding to execute
both programs. However, funding for the programs in Fiscal Year 2019
and beyond will depend upon the Army's revised priorities for that time
frame and allocation of funds to meet those priorities across all Army
programs. It is also dependent upon the outcome of the Individual
Carbine competition and a possible decision to completely equip the
Army with carbines.
Mr. Scott. In recent testimony, both General Ham of AFRICOM and
General Mattis of CENTCOM commented about the utility of Joint STARS in
their theaters. Could you describe how Joint STARS was used in Libya
and the importance of its battle management/command and control role
there and for future conflicts?
General Schwartz. The Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
(JSTARS) aircraft and its on-board Battle Management/Command and
Control (BMC2) system was used over Libya to provide real-time
detection, tracking, and attack coordination against ground moving
targets. During the Libyan operations, the Air Force surged the JSTARS
aircraft from March through October 2011 without reducing support to
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. The Joint STARS provided wide area sensor
data of Libya and was effective in detecting, classifying, tracking and
dynamically targeting regime forces.
Mr. Scott. Last February, you told this committee that an important
study was underway to determine future investments in Joint STARS and
the study would be released in the ``late spring'' [of 2011]. In the
fiscally constrained environment we're in, it seems upgrading a proven
platform best serves to reduce costs and help meet warfighting needs.
It appears Joint STARS will be around for a long time and modernization
makes sense. From your testimony earlier this year: Where are you with
the Joint STARS study--when will it be released, and what are your
plans to modernize Joint STARS in the upcoming years, FY13 and beyond?
General Schwartz. Air Combat Command (ACC) has worked diligently on
the Synthetic Aperture Radar/Moving Target Indicator (SAR/MTI) and
Joint STARS mission area Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) with cost,
risk, and effectiveness analysis to ``evaluate materiel solutions to
fulfill all, or part of, the Departments overall SAR/MTI
requirements.''
The detailed results of this two-phased analysis were presented to
the Air Force Requirements Oversight Committee (AFROC) on 15 September
2011. The AFROC directed the AoA team to pare down their list of
alternatives by providing actionable cost, risk, and effectiveness
results. ACC provided the SAR/MTI Joint STARS Mission Area AoA Final
Report to the AFROC for validation on 30 November 2011. Now that the
AFROC has validated the Final Report, we anticipate its release by the
Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force in early 2012.
The Air Force has several JSTARS modernization projects in FY133
and beyond. These include: installation of an Enhanced Land Maritime
Mode (ELMM) modification to add maritime and improved land tracking
radar modes; 8.33 kHz VHF radios with Single Channel Ground and
Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) voice and data communication; new
Cryptographic Modernization Program (CMP) compliant Multifunction
Information Distribution System Joint Tactical Radio System (MIDS JTRS)
radios for Link-16 communication with other aircraft; and new Clipper
Operator Workstation (OWS) computers and Radar Airborne Signal
Processors (RASP) to address Diminishing Manufacturing Sources (DMS).
Mr. Scott. General Mattis stated he needed more Joint STARS in
CENTCOM and that GMTI was the number one intelligence shortfall
reported by his field commanders. Are you doing everything you can to
maximize the availability of this key aircraft given the growing
demands by the combatant commanders?
General Schwartz. The Air Force continues to work diligently to
maximize the employment availability of the Joint Surveillance Target
Attack Radar System (JSTARS) in the CENTCOM area of responsibility to
best meet overall mission requirements. Over time, we have managed the
JSTARS as a limited supply/high demand asset by maintaining steady
state combat capability in CENTCOM with the capacity to support short-
term surges such as Operations ODYSSEY DAWN and UNIFIED PROTECTOR.
The JSTARS, which includes the E-8 aircraft, the ground based Joint
Services Work Station and the Common Ground Station, has provided
ground moving target information and airborne battle management and
command and control (C2) to Combatant Commanders since the 1991 Gulf
War. The Air Force currently has 12 JSTARS aircraft serving on the
front lines with another five aircraft for training and backup
inventory.
In this challenging fiscal environment we must carefully balance
modernization requirements against basic sustainment needs. Despite
limited funding, the Air Force has identified several key modernization
projects that will deliver much-needed capability improvements
throughout the fleet. This includes aircraft modifications to improve
the radar tracking of maritime and land targets and updated VHF radios
with ground and airborne voice and data communication capability.
Additionally, integration is planned for Link-16 capability to connect
JSTARS with other aircraft. Development is also underway to integrate
new computers and radar processors that will improve system performance
and address diminishing manufacturing sources issues.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. HANABUSA
Ms. Hanabusa. Should the Super Committee fail to act and the
Government heads toward sequestration what would your branch of service
look to first as a means to find additional savings?
General Odierno. Should the Super Committee fail to act and the
Government heads toward sequestration, the Army will look toward
balanced reductions in all Army accounts (manpower, force structure,
maintenance, equipment, training, and infrastructure accounts in all
components). Disproportionate changes in any one account risks creating
an Army out of balance. The Army is committed to responsible management
of the required budgetary cuts and not jeopardizing the effectiveness
and safety of our Soldiers at war. However, cuts of this magnitude
could be devastating, and effecting every aspect of the Army and
challenging our ability to sustain an All Volunteer Force.
Ms. Hanabusa. Should the Super Committee fail to act and the
Government heads toward sequestration what would your branch of service
look to first as a means to find additional savings?
Admiral Greenert. Sequestration applies uniform percentage cuts to
each program, project, and activity by individual budget line item.
This methodology for reduction, required in the Budget Control Act,
does not allow the Department of Defense or the Navy to adjust our
reductions.
Ms. Hanabusa. Should the Super Committee fail to act and the
Government heads toward sequestration what would your branch of service
look to first as a means to find additional savings?
General Schwartz. The Department of Defense has proactively pursued
a budget reduction/efficiencies strategy and the Air Force has taken
its share of reductions over the past few years. Further cuts should be
based on changes in strategy and corresponding reductions in force
structure. Additional reductions would drive programs to be
restructured, reduced and/or terminated in the investment portfolio.
All investment accounts would be impacted including our high-priority
Acquisition Category I modernization efforts such as MQ-9, Joint Strike
Fighter, and KC-46A. Sequestration would drive potential internal
realignment and loss or de-scoping of military construction projects.
The Air Force would need to implement actions to the operations and
maintenance appropriation such as reductions to flying hours and weapon
system sustainment; curtail training; slowdown civilian hiring and
implement potential furloughs or reductions in forces; reduce daily
operations to emphasize mission critical operations (i.e. training,
supplies, equipment); and defer/stop infrastructure investments and
mission bed downs. Absorbing these reductions would drive readiness
impacts ``hollowing out'' the force while making our ability to cover
any emergent execution year requirements (i.e., fuel price increase or
Libya operations) extremely difficult.
Ms. Hanabusa. Recently, General Dempsey and Secretary Panetta have
both stated that we need a forward deployed presence in the Pacific. In
your opinion, where specifically does this forward presence need to be
placed?
General Amos. Forward deployed Naval expeditionary forces are vital
in the Pacific where the ocean is the dominant domain. National policy
and the Commander of United States Pacific Command (PACOM) determine
the specific location of forward deployed Marines in the Pacific Rim
Area of Responsibility. The Marine Corps is working closely with PACOM
to determine how best to posture the Marine Corps to support
operational requirements in the Pacific.
Forward presence is both a combination of land and sea based Naval
forces. The enduring bases in Okinawa and mainland Japan have served
U.S. National Security interests well for over 60 years. Rotational
presence in locations such as Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and
Singapore reassures our allies and partners. Sea basing using
amphibious warships is uniquely suited to provide the Combatant
Commander with flexibility to deploy forces anywhere in the Pacific
region without having to rely on multiple bases or imposing our
presence on a sovereign nation. Sea basing offers forward deployed
presence, which serves as deterrence and provides a flexible, agile
response capability for crises on contingencies. Maritime
prepositioning also offers the capability to rapidly support and
sustain Marine forces in the Pacific for training, exercises, or
operations.
Ms. Hanabusa. You have mentioned that the USMC has the capability
to provide forward expeditionary forces in the Pacific. Within the
context you are using it, what constitutes an expeditionary force (in
terms of the number of troops, equipment, supplies, training capability
and readiness level)? Why do you believe the USMC is uniquely suited to
provide this capability as it relates to the overall mission in the
PACOM AOR?
General Amos. Forward deployed Naval expeditionary forces are vital
in the Pacific where the ocean is the dominant domain. The completeness
and sufficiency of the MAGTF across the range of military operations as
well as its expeditionary naval character make it conspicuously
relevant in the Pacific where no other forward deployed component of
the Joint Force possesses the flexibility to operate simultaneously in
the required sea, air, and land domains.
Forward presence is both a combination of land and sea based Naval
Forces. This is exemplified by the forward basing of III Marine
Expeditionary Force in the Pacific. The enduring bases in Okinawa and
mainland Japan and presence of Marines there have well-served U.S.
national security interests well for over 60 years. Rotational presence
of Marines in locations such as Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and
Singapore reassures our allies and partners. Sea basing using
amphibious ships is uniquely suited to provide the Combatant Commander
with flexibility to deploy forces anywhere in the Pacific region
without having to rely on multiple bases or imposing our presence on a
sovereign nation. Sea basing offers forward deployed presence, which
serves as deterrence and provides a flexible, agile response capability
for crises on contingencies. Maritime prepositioning also offers the
capability to rapidly support and sustain Marine forces in the Pacific
for training, exercises, or operations.
National policy and the Commander of United States Pacific Command
(PACOM) determine the specific location of forward deployed Marines in
the Pacific Rim Area of Responsibility. The Marine Corps is working
closely with PACOM to determine how best to posture the Marine Corps to
support operational requirements in the Pacific.
Marines organize around the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF),
which is our principal warfighting organization for conducting missions
across the range of military operations. The MAGTF is a scalable,
versatile force that is able to respond to a broad range of
contingency, crisis, and conflict situations. There are four types of
MAGTFs: the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), the Marine Expeditionary
Brigade (MEB), the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), and the Special
Purpose MAGTF (SPMAGTF). The chart below depicts the approximate sizes
of the MEU, MEB, and MEF in terms of personnel, supplies (logistical
sustainment), and equipment:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MEF MEB MEU
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TROOPS 20-60,000 14-17,000 1,500-2,500
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUPPLIES 60 days 30 days 15 days
------------------------------------------------------------------------
EQUIPMENT ................. ................ ................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
VEHICLES 493* 115* 32*
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AIRCRAFT 348 178 29
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Only accounts for M1A1 Tanks, Amphibious Assault Vehicles, Light
Armored Vehicles, and Artillery Howitzers.
MAGTFs are expeditionary in nature and are trained to deploy aboard
amphibious ships, which provides commanders with great operational
flexibility. They are balanced force packages containing organic
command, ground, aviation, and logistics elements. The MAGTF's fixed-
and rotary-wing aircraft, ground combat forces, and full range of
logistics capabilities make it a complete combat formation with the
required capabilities to operate across the spectrum of conflict. This
completeness of capability, combined with sufficient capacity (mass and
combat power), give the MAGTF the ability to respond to unexpected
crises from humanitarian disaster relief efforts and non-combatant
evacuation operations to counter-piracy operations, raids, or precision
air strikes. When rapidly reinforced, the MAGTF can assure access
anywhere in the world in the event of a major contingency and, along
with the joint force, prosecute a major land campaign.
Ms. Hanabusa. Should the Super Committee fail to act and the
Government heads toward sequestration what would your branch of service
look to first as a means to find additional savings?
General Amos. To ensure the Marine Corps is best organized for the
challenging future security environment, we conducted a comprehensive
and detailed force structure review aimed at identifying a balanced
force that is postured for the future. Using the lessons learned from
10 years of constant combat operations, the review arrived at an end
strength of 186,800 following our commitment to Afghanistan. The Marine
Corps affirms the results of that initial strategy-driven effort, but
has begun to readjust its parameters based on the fiscal realities of
spending cuts outlined in the Budget Control Act of 2011.
If sequestration is ``triggered'', the Marine Corps likely will be
driven to a force structure significantly below 186,800 Marines. We
will also be forced to reduce our reset and modernization programs that
are required to meet the demands of the modern battlefield, and there
would be negative impacts to our operations and maintenance accounts.
These decisions collectively could result in a high degree of risk at a
time when the world is increasingly more dangerous.
Equally as important, sequestration will make it difficult for the
Marine Corps to be ``the most ready when the nation is least ready'' as
directed by the 82nd Congress. Sequestration would likely result in a
decreased forward presence of Marines which in turn would degrade our
responsiveness to contingencies and crises. Moreover, the dwell time of
service members would be reduced, impacting the quality of life for our
Marines and their families. In addition, sequestration would slow the
necessary reset of our equipment coming out of Afghanistan. In short, a
reduced Marine Corps end strength level combined with reduced
modernization and operation and maintenance accounts presents
unacceptable risk both institutionally and for the Nation.
We also must be faithful to the obligations we have made to those
who serve honorably, and guard against breaking the chain of trust that
exists with them. This idea is central to the concept of the All
Volunteer Force. Sequestration-initiated cuts with precipitous
reductions in manning, early retirement boards and the like would cause
us to break faith with our Marines and their families who have
sacrificed so much over the past decade.
Through it all, we will make the hard decisions and redouble our
commitment to our traditional culture of frugality. We will continue to
ask only for what we need, not what we want. Ultimately, we will build
the most capable Marine Corps the nation can afford.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GRIFFIN
Mr. Griffin. Has the Air Force analyzed what effect sequestration
would have on Air Force Bases. Could it result in another BRAC?
General Schwartz. A Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round would
require specific authorizing legislation. While a sequester would
clearly worsen the Air Force's facilities surplus by forcing across the
board reductions in Air Force activities it would not itself result in
a BRAC.
Mr. Griffin. What effect would sequestration have on the future of
the C-130 Avionics Modernization Program. Have there been any
discussions of reducing the number of C-130s that would receive the
AMP?
General Schwartz. Based on the ongoing Department of Defense budget
review, we are confident further spending reductions beyond the Budget
Control Act's first round of cuts cannot be done without substantially
altering our core military capabilities and therefore our national
security.
In the current fiscal environment, the Air Force will continue to
closely evaluate modernization programs and how they relate to future
strategy and capability while also considering budgetary limitations.
Like most Air Force modernization efforts, C-130 AMP is currently being
evaluated in terms of future Global Mobility strategy as well as cost
versus benefit relative to the legacy C-130 fleet.
Mr. Griffin. The Air Force continues to experience a high
operations tempo, which has resulted in detrimental effects on
equipment such as engine and structural fatigue, deterioration,
corrosion, and increased rates of component failures. The increased
tempo also delays routine maintenance. What effect would sequestration
have on our C-130s and other airlift planes that provide essential
services to our troops overseas?
General Schwartz. In a sequestration environment, the Air Force
will need to make sustainment and modernization decisions to optimize
readiness for all weapon systems, which includes our C-130s and other
airlift systems. The Air Force will identify maintenance to defer based
upon capability priorities in line with Department of Defense
priorities and guidance. Without updated funding status, force
structure changes, flying hour distribution, and prioritized
distribution of sustainment funds, an accurate assessment of impacts to
specific systems cannot be made. Presently, the Air Force has not
deferred any required depot maintenance for airlift platforms,
including the C-130.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. PALAZZO
Mr. Palazzo. The navy is short about 30 ships from the 313 goal set
by Secretary Mabus as the minimum necessary to meet current operational
needs. How does the navy intend to reach its goal in the budgetary
environment, especially when current shortfalls in maintenance funding
have left one in five of existing vessels unfit for combat?
Admiral Greenert. Although less that the 313 ship floor, the
current Navy battle force of 284 ships provides a fleet capable of
meeting Combatant Commander demands with manageable risk. Going
forward, our current shipbuilding and aviation plans balance the
anticipated future demand for naval forces with expected resources.
With anticipated funding being flat or declining in the future, we will
focus our investments to ensure the battle force has the capability for
Navy's core missions such as ensuring Joint operational access and the
capacity to remain forward in the most critical regions. Our plans also
take into account the importance of maintaining an adequate national
shipbuilding design and industrial base.
Our deployed ships are materially fit for combat. Ships that are in
deep maintenance are not ready for combat operations and are a normal
part of our ongoing Fleet Readiness and Training Process. As for
operating ships, recent readiness reports by the fleet indicate that
the trend of higher failure rates by surface ships on inspections by
the Navy Board of Inspections and Survey is turning--and we will remain
vigilant and proactive. We conducted a review of Surface Force
readiness over the last year, which identified a number of root causes.
These include reduced surface ship and intermediate maintenance center
manning and the disestablishment (by BRAC 1995) of the surface ship
life cycle engineering organization. These changes stopped updates to
ship class maintenance plans, eliminated the technical support to plan
maintenance periods, and reduced the ability of crews to complete
required maintenance.
To address these problems, we put executive-level oversight in
place and initiated a multi-prong plan to improve surface ship
readiness. This plan includes increases to surface ship manning,
restoring organizations to plan and manage ship lifecycle maintenance,
and reestablishing technical support for planning and conducting
maintenance periods. These corrections are all in place or in progress.
We also significantly increased the FY 2011 and FY 2012 baseline Ship
Maintenance budget submissions (compared to FY 2010). Today, Navy's
maintenance account is fully funded.
While our ability to plan and conduct maintenance is much more
comprehensive, an additional factor affecting surface ship readiness is
the high operational tempo of the last ten years. Since 2001, underway
days per ship increased by 15 percent while fleet size decreased by 10
percent. This reduces the time a ship is available in port to conduct
maintenance--even if it is pre-planned and fully funded. The Navy is
investigating options to improve the balance between presence and pre-
deployment training and maintenance requirements, in order to achieve a
sustainable level of operations that is consistent with the size of the
fleet.
Mr. Palazzo. Can we get to 313 ships? If not what is the impact to
readiness?
Admiral Greenert. The Fiscal Year 2012 Long-Range Shipbuilding
Tables submitted to Congress show the fleet reaching 313 ships by
Fiscal Year 2019. The main assumptions behind this plan are that our
ships reach their expected service lives and that we and our
shipbuilders can continue to build and deliver ships on schedule.
Today, these key assumptions are not being met. Since 2000, the
fleet has about 10% fewer ships, and on average each ship spends about
15% more days underway each year to meet Combatant Commander demands.
The greater amount of underway time comes at the expense of training
and maintenance. Today we are unable to complete all the maintenance
needed on each ship and aircraft, reducing their service lives.
Resources alone cannot alleviate this issue. We will need to establish
a sustainable level of deployed forces through the DOD Global Force
Management process. In conjunction with adjusting the GFM plan, we are
adjusting our Fleet Readiness and Training Plan to establish a
sustainable operational tempo and complete required maintenance and
training between deployments. This will constrain the number of ships
and aircraft we deliver to Combatant Commanders in the future, but will
ensure ships and aircraft reach their expected service lives and help
avoid a further decrease in fleet capacity.
To reach our ship inventory goals, we also need to build and
deliver ships on schedule. We continue to work to reduce costs and
incentivize our industry partners to remain on schedule and maximize
the Navy's return on investment. To reduce costs in general, our
shipbuilding strategy leverages existing designs and proven
technologies as much as possible. The Department has also refined its
internal 2-Pass/6-Gate review process to ensure requirements are set
early and balanced against cost, and that this balance is visible and
managed throughout the acquisition process. The Navy has strengthened
acquisition policy to improve program oversight, control cost growth,
and more effectively monitor contractor performance. The ability to
build and deliver our fleet on time and under cost continues to require
the combined effort of and collaboration between the Navy, the
Congress, and the shipbuilding industry.
Mr. Palazzo. Air Force Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Philip Breedlove
testified last week that the Air Force will ``not back off of the
requirement'' to deliver goods to ground forces, but he said it's no
longer clear whether the Air National Guard's newest airlifter, the C-
27J, or the C-130 will fill that role. He said ``that is still pending
and is all part of this ongoing budget review'' I know many of my
colleagues on the Committee care deeply about the C-27J program, and
this statement startled a few of us.
Could you please clarify and elaborate on General Breedlove's
statement?
General Schwartz. Based on the ongoing Department of Defense budget
review, we are confident that further spending reductions beyond the
Budget Control Act's first round of cuts cannot be done without
substantially altering our core military capabilities and therefore our
national security. In the current fiscal environment, the Air Force
will continue to closely evaluate all weapon system programs and how
they relate to future strategy and capability while also considering
budgetary limitations. Like most Air Force airlift programs, the C-27J
program is currently being evaluated in terms of future Global Mobility
strategy as well as cost versus benefit relative to the legacy C-130
fleet. No decision has been formalized and the Air Force is working
with the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense to review
all options to minimize risks given increased fiscal constraints.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. ROBY
Mrs. Roby. I proudly represent the Second District of Alabama that
has Fort Rucker-the home of the U.S. Army Aviation Center of
Excellence. Recently, we had the privilege of Chairman McKeon visiting
the base and to see the training that our rotary wing aviators go
through and the great work that our soldiers are doing there. Our
rotary wing war fighters have been key to our mission in the Middle
East.
However, helicopter incidents are the third-leading cause of
fatalities in the Iraq War. In Afghanistan, in 2008 helicopter-related
losses was the number 1 cause of deaths with direct fire being the
second cause and IED attacks as third. Weather-related issues,
disorienting brownout conditions, engine failure, wire strikes and
flying into terrain of which the pilot was unaware accounts for 80
percent of Iraq and Afghanistan helicopter losses. Environmental
conditions affect every facet of rotary wing operations. However, many
of these losses can be mitigated with various new technologies, glass
cockpit, and other capabilities to give the pilot the necessary tools.
My question is how is the Army moving to encompassing these new
instruments and capabilities to provide the war fighter with the
necessary tools to mitigate many of these causes of helicopter
incidents?
General Odierno. Every aircraft currently under procurement has a
fully modernized cockpit which includes flight symbology for all modes
of flight, moving maps and enhanced flight controls improving
controllability.
The Army is demonstrating significant improvement in the most
damaging class of accidents attributed to Degraded Visual Environment
(DVE). This improvement can be attributed to the ongoing aircraft
modernization investment. However, DVE remains a significant factor in
the majority of non-hostile accidents. Despite noted improvements, the
Army continues to evaluate potential systems to enhance the pilot's
ability to maintain situational awareness when visual references are
lost. In addition, we are seeking focused solutions including active
radar penetrating sensors to ``see through'' brownout in the non-
modernized fleet which may also supplement our modernized fleet's
capability. As technology improves, the Army will continue to develop
the right mix of mission planning systems, symbology, flight controls,
displays and sensors to turn DVE from a hazard to a tactical advantage
on the battlefield.
Mrs. Roby. In working with the bases in my state, I understand the
Army has a goal to have a joint multi-role aircraft for rotary wing
transport on the books by 2030. The concern is that emphasis has been
placed on modernizing our current rotary wing fleet and we may have
lost sight on moving to a new platform. Current platforms are going
limited even with modernization in several areas that we must move
forward including: need crafts to go faster than 200 knots, reducing
logistic footprint and reduce fuel consumption. With all of the
concerns of what the action of Joint Select Committee on Deficit
Reduction will have on DOD appropriations, what will the possible
reduction in appropriations do in impacting that deadline?
General Odierno. Reductions in appropriations for the Department of
Defense could delay the development of technologies that could be
applicable to the Joint Multi-Role Aircraft (JMR). Stable funding is
key to developing and maturing these required technologies.
The Army fully intends to continue to pursue development of the JMR
to fill capability gaps that cannot be addressed now because current
technologies are either infeasible or too immature. These capability
gaps are in the areas of survivability, lethality, performance,
maintainability, supportability, flexibility, and versatility.
Development of the JMR will lead to common aircraft components that
will be scalable in size and will provide a common aircraft
architecture to support mission-specific equipment packages to meet
future vertical lift requirements.
While the Army pursues the development of the JMR, it must also
continue with modernization efforts on current platforms to ensure that
Army aviation units are modular, capable, lethal, tailorable, and
sustainable. These modernization efforts mitigate capability gaps until
the JMR technologies mature.