[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: ASSESSING AIRPORT SECURITY AND PREVENTING A
FUTURE TERRORIST ATTACK
=======================================================================
FIELD HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT,
INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 16, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-45
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
_____
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Jackie Speier, California
Joe Walsh, Illinois Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Ben Quayle, Arizona William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Scott Rigell, Virginia Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Billy Long, Missouri Janice Hahn, California
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Mo Brooks, Alabama
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Billy Long, Missouri, Vice Chair Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Dr. R. Nick Palarino, Staff Director
Diana Bergwin, Subcommittee Clerk
Tamla Scott, Minority Subcommittee Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Oversight, Investigations, and Management:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable William R. Keating, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Massachusetts, and Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management...... 4
Witnesses
Mr. Stephen M. Lord, Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Issues, Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
Mr. Chris McLaughlin, Assistant Administrator for Security
Operations, Transportation Security Administration, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 17
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 18
Admiral George Naccara (Ret.), Federal Security Director,
Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 21
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 18
Mr. Edward C. Freni, Director of Aviation, Massachusetts Port
Authority:
Oral Statement................................................. 22
Prepared Statement............................................. 27
Major Michael P. Concannon, Major, State Police Troop F, Boston
Logan International Airport:
Oral Statement................................................. 32
Prepared Statement............................................. 35
TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: ASSESSING AIRPORT SECURITY AND PREVENTING A
FUTURE TERRORIST ATTACK
----------
Friday, September 16, 2011
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and
Management,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Boston, MA.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:37 a.m., at
the General Edward Lawrence Logan International Airport,
Terminal E, Departure Level, Boston, Massachusetts, Hon.
Michael T. McCaul [Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives McCaul and Keating.
Mr. McCaul. Well, good morning to everybody here. The
Committee on Homeland Security will come to order.
Let me first say thank you to the Massachusetts Port
Authority and everybody involved with putting this hearing
together. It's 10 years after 9/11. To be sitting in the very
airport where the hijackers took off that fateful day is really
something. I think it really brings a moment here as we reflect
back 10 years later on aviation security.
Let me thank the Ranking Member for being such a great
host. The Boston-Austin connection is still alive and well. I
had the pleasure to bring him down to Texas, and it was about
110 degrees, so I really appreciate the 60-degree weather and
sunny conditions. I think Mr. Keating is probably the envy of
almost every Member in the House as he represents Martha's
Vineyard, Nantucket, and Cape Cod. So I'm proud to represent
Austin to Houston. Boston is not exactly a stranger to me. I
did attend the Kennedy School at Harvard University many years
ago.
So with that, we'll begin the hearing. The purpose of this
hearing is to examine security at the Logan International
Airport and aviation security throughout the United States 10
years after 9/11. This is an official House hearing, and so all
of the rules of the House do apply to this hearing.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement. I know
that sounds kind of strange, but that's how we talk in
Washington. We have to recognize ourself to speak.
The morning of September 11, 2001, I remember watching the
television with one of my daughters, and the first airplane had
hit the Twin Tower and everybody thought it was an accident.
Then the second plane hit, and she asked me, ``Daddy, why did
that plane fly into the building?'' It was when that second
plane flew, at that point, we knew that this was not an
accident. We knew that America was under attack.
There were a total of almost 3,000 deaths that day. It is
estimated that the U.S. stock market lost $1.4 trillion in
value. The United States was at war. We've lost thousands of
men and women in the battle against terrorism, and we continue
to fight the terrorists and protect our homeland.
The terrorists began this war by using our airports as
launching pads. Over a period of 10 years, we've spent billions
of dollars to mitigate such a threat. However, the 9/11
Commission's 10th anniversary report card concludes, ``We are
still vulnerable to aviation security threats.'' Specifically,
the report states, ``We need to improve screening at airport
checkpoints using biometrics and standardized identification
documents to make it more difficult to circumvent security.''
In addition, the attempted terrorist bombing of Northwest
flight 253 on approach to Detroit on Christmas day 2009
provides a vivid reminder that commercial aviation remains an
attractive terrorist target and underscores the need for
effective airport security. Our major airports now have
multiple layers of security screening. Today's hearing will
examine two of those layers, airport perimeter security as well
as new security measures being tested here at Logan
International Airport.
This airport has led the Nation in new techniques and
innovative methods to prevent another 9/11 attack. Methods used
by airports to control access vary because of differences in
design and layout. But all access controls must meet minimum
performance standards established by the TSA. TSA requires
airports to control access using methods such as pedestrian and
vehicle gates, keypad access codes with personal identification
numbers, magnetic stripe cards and readers, turnstiles, locks
and keys, and security personnel.
The Government Accountability Office's 2009 report
concludes there have been thousands of security breaches at
airports across this country.
Additionally, it's been reported a young man breached
perimeter security at the Charlotte Douglas International
Airport and hid in the wheel well of a passenger plane. His
body was found along Boston's airport's flight path. Department
of Homeland Security Secretary Napolitano said, ``Clearly, if
somebody, a 16-year-old, is able to circumvent standards and
requirements and get into a wheel well of a plane, there has
been a breakdown.'' Although some of these breaches are
accidental, some may represent dry runs by terrorists.
The GAO examined airport perimeter security and concluded
that the TSA should develop a comprehensive risk assessment of
airport security and milestones for its completion and
evaluation plan for any future airport security pilot programs
and a National strategy for airport security that includes key
characteristics such as goals and priorities.
Not only is perimeter security a special concern, but
passenger screening is essential if we are to prevent another
9/11. TSA employees perform approximately 1.8 million screens
per day, 2 million on holidays and have screened more than 6
billion travelers since September 2001. The methodology has not
always been perfect, and the sheer magnitude of this effort is
certain to garner critics about the procedures.
TSA is attempting to improve security by testing a new
program designed to identify potentially dangerous passengers
before they board aircraft. The Screening Passengers by
Observation Technique, or SPOT, originated right here at Boston
Logan Airport in 2003. SPOT is designed to utilize nonintrusive
behavior observation and analysis to identify high-risk
passengers who may be a threat.
The Behavior Detection Program, a modification of SPOT,
will have specially-trained agents question passengers, engage
their reaction before they board the aircraft. Based on
physical clues or answers to questions, these officers should
be able to detect suspicious behavior. The analysis will help
determine if a passenger should go through additional
screening. The program is based, in part, on the Israeli model
of passenger screening. The GAO has examined this program and
concludes it should be fully validated before used in airports
throughout the United States.
I hope I never have to answer a question for my daughter
again about airplanes flying into buildings because of a
terrorist attack. We are here today to make sure security is in
place to prevent such questions and another tragedy.
Finally, I would like to, again, thank the Massachusetts
Port Authority for hosting this hearing. You would never know
that we're in an airport terminal here today. You've just done
a fantastic job putting this together. I want to thank all of
the witnesses for being here and everybody attending this
hearing. Thank you for your interest and your participation.
[The statement of Mr. McCaul follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Michael T. McCaul
The Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Oversight,
Investigations, and Management will come to order. The purpose of this
hearing is to examine security at the General Edward Lawrence Logan
International Airport.
I appreciate the effort taken on behalf of all of those involved to
have this important field hearing. This is an official Congressional
hearing, as opposed to a town hall meeting, and as such, we must abide
by certain rules of the Committee on Homeland Security and of the House
of Representatives. I kindly wish to remind our guests today that
demonstrations from the audience, including applause and verbal
outbursts, as well as the use of signs or placards, are a violation of
the Rules of the House of Representatives. It is important that we
respect the decorum and the rules of this committee. I have also been
requested to state that photography and cameras are limited to
accredited press only.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement. The morning of
September 11, 2001, I remember watching television with one of my
daughters and she asked ``why did that plane fly into the building?''
It was the second plane flying into the World Trade Center and at that
point we knew it was no accident. America was under attack. There were
a total of 2,996 deaths that day. It is estimated U.S. stocks lost $1.4
trillion in value. The United States went to war and we have lost
thousands of men and women in the battle against terrorism. We continue
to fight the terrorists and protect our homeland. The terrorists began
this war by using our airports as launch pads. Over a period of 10
years we have spent billions of dollars to mitigate such a threat.
However, the 9/11 Commission's tenth anniversary report card concludes
``we are still vulnerable to aviation security threats.'' Specifically
the report states we need to improve screening at airport checkpoints
using biometrics and standardize identification documents to make it
more difficult to circumvent security.
Additionally the attempted terrorist bombing of Northwest flight
253 on approach to Detroit on Christmas day 2009, provided a vivid
reminder commercial aviation remains an attractive terrorist target and
underscores the need for effective airport security. Our major airports
now have multiple layers of security.
Today's hearing will examine two of those layers; airport perimeter
security, as well as new security measures being tested here at Logan
International Airport in Boston. This airport has led the Nation in new
techniques and innovative methods to prevent another 9/11 attack.
Methods used by airports to control access vary because of
differences in the design and layout, but all access controls must meet
minimum performance standards established by The Transportation
Security Administration.
TSA requires airports to control access using methods such as
pedestrian and vehicle gates, keypad access codes with personal
identification numbers, magnetic stripe cards and readers, turnstiles,
locks and keys, and security personnel. The Government Accountability
Office 2009 report concludes there have been thousands of security
breaches at airports around the country. Additionally, it has been
reported a young man breached perimeter security at Charlotte/Douglas
International Airport and hid in the wheel well of a passenger plane.
His body was found along Boston airport's flight path. Department of
Homeland Security Secretary Napolitano said, ``Clearly if somebody, a
16-year-old, is able to circumvent standards and requirements and get
into the wheel well of a plane, there has been a breakdown.'' Although
some of these breaches are accidental, some may represent dry runs by
terrorists.
The GAO examined airport perimeter security and concluded that TSA
should develop a comprehensive risk assessment of airport security, and
milestones for its completion; an evaluation plan for any future
airport security pilot programs; and a National strategy for airport
security that includes key characteristics, such as goals and
priorities. Not only is perimeter security of special concern, but
passenger screening is essential if we are to prevent another 9/11. TSA
employees perform approximately 1.8 million screens a day, 2 million on
holidays and have screened more than 6 billion travelers since
September 2001. The methodology has not always been perfect. The sheer
magnitude of this effort is certain to garner critics about the
procedures. TSA is attempting to improve security by testing a new
program designed to identify potentially dangerous passengers before
they board aircraft. The Screening Passengers by Observation Technique
(SPOT) originated at Boston Logan airport in 2003. SPOT is designed to
utilize non-intrusive behavior observation and analysis to identify
high-risk passengers who may be a threat.
The Behavior Detection Program, a modification of SPOT, will have
specially-trained agents question passengers and gauge their reaction
before they board aircraft. Based on physical clues or answers to
questions, these officers should be able to detect suspicious behavior.
The analysis will help determine if a passenger should go through
additional screening.
The program is based in part on the Israeli model of passenger
screening. The GAO has examined this program and concludes it should be
fully validated before it is used in airports throughout the United
States.
I hope I never have to answer a question from my daughter again
about planes flying into a building because of a terrorist attack. We
are here today to make sure security is in place to prevent such
questions and another tragedy.
One final note; I would like to thank the Massachusetts Port
Authority for hosting this hearing, all the witnesses present and
especially my friend and colleague, Congressman Bill Keating for his
insights about aviation security. With that I recognize the Ranking
Member of the subcommittee, the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr.
Keating, for 5 minutes for the purpose of making an opening statement.
Mr. McCaul. With that, I would like to recognize my good
friend and colleague, the Ranking Member of the committee, Bill
Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Now, last Sunday was a somber reminder of our lives, all of
our lives, and the way that the tranquility that we had prior
to that had been lost and lost forever, frankly. In the midst
of our remembrance, there is still a great deal of struggle to
comprehend exactly what led to the tragedy and how it could
have been prevented.
The fact of the matter is that, on September 11, 2001, our
aviation security suffered a profound breach. This breach
resulted in over 3,000 lives lost and a new understanding of
what it means to be safe. We are living in a world where the
reality has changed, and we know now that harm can strike at
any moment on our own soil.
Thereafter, many things have occurred. I think it's fitting
and appropriate that the Committee on Homeland Security is here
today at Logan Airport to examine the strides we've made in our
aviation security since the terrible day of 9/11 and the steps
we need to continue to take to ensure that we remain ahead of
those who desire to attack us.
I'd like to thank the MassPort Authority for their
hospitality and their work in preparation for this hearing. I
want to welcome two Michael McCauls. First, if I could, young
Michael McCaul is here, 10 years old, and we welcome him to
Boston. I also want to welcome Chairman Michael McCaul to
Massachusetts. I'm happy to say that you're looking at two
people who generally support the spirit of bipartisanship.
Chairman McCaul's support was instrumental in conducting this
hearing, and I thank him for that.
Last month, I had the pleasure to travel to Houston to
conduct a field hearing in Chairman McCaul's home State where
we examined security procedures at the Port of Houston. Mr.
Chairman, just as the lessons we learned at that hearing at the
Port of Houston allowed me to better understand and address the
issues of concern at the Port of Boston, I hope the procedures
and pilot programs we'll examine here today at Logan Airport
can one day be applied to airports Nation-wide.
After all, Logan has become the gold standard for airports
across the United States. The cooperation, security protocol,
and technology employed here are impressive in every respect.
Yet Logan's path to success originated in a place of sorrow
when, a decade ago, terrorists chose this airport as one of
their departure points in their quest to commit the most
heinous terrorist attack to occur on U.S. soil. The devastating
events of that day forever changed our Nation, and our security
procedures have to adapt and change as well.
On September 12, 2001, the leadership at Logan was faced
with a choice, to remain frozen in time or to move forward and
establish the reputation as one of the safest and most secure
airports in the United States of America. To the benefit of all
those who travel in and out of Logan, like I do each week, I'm
pleased to say, they chose the latter.
To date, Logan is the only airport in the country that
conducts a daily security briefing that includes Federal,
State, local law enforcement agencies, TSA, airport personnel,
airlines, and MassPort staff. I had the opportunity to observe
one of those briefings last June, and the high level of
communication and cooperation that occurs here is truly
outstanding.
This type of intelligence sharing should be routine. Yet as
we recently saw in the 9/11 Commission's latest report, it's
one of the areas where our homeland security continues to lack
efforts. I hope we learn today how you conduct it here, even
weekends, 7 days a week, and how important that is, and
hopefully, that can be a message that goes to every airport
across the United States of America.
Three weeks ago, Logan is the only airport in the country
instituting an on-site Joint Terrorism Task Force. Furthermore,
by December 31, 2002, Logan was the first and only major U.S.
airport to meet the Federally-mandated deadline to have 100
percent in-line baggage screening for passengers. Today, as
most people here heard, they're announcing the second
generation of that kind of screening.
In August 2006, the Massachusetts State Police started
roadblocks to conduct random vehicle searches entering the
airport premises. In March 2011, it became the first U.S.
airport to fully implement full-body scanners. At least 1,000
new cameras are in place, including a pilot for a state-of-the-
art 360-degree camera system that will improve video
surveillance by leaps and bounds. These changes are laudable
and should serve as the best practices Nation-wide.
But through my time as Norfolk District Attorney and now in
my capacity as Congressman for Massachusetts and a Ranking
Member in this Homeland Security subcommittee, I'm particularly
concerned about the lack of Nation-wide standards of perimeter
security. That addresses fences, barriers, areas that surround
airports.
According to the GAO, in their 2009 report on the TSA, TSA
hadn't conducted vulnerability assessments for 87 percent of
the Nation's 450 commercial airports, nor has it developed a
Nation-wide strategy that fully addresses perimeter security.
The lack of adequate perimeter security could, in one of the
worst-case scenarios, result in individuals with nefarious
purposes accessing secure airport areas by simply climbing over
a fence, and in some cases, overcoming even less of a barrier.
This region has witnessed first-hand the devastating
results that inadequate airport fencing can lead. In November
2010, the body of a 16-year-old tragically was found in Milton,
Mass., Delvonte Tisdale from North Carolina. As a District
Attorney, I was given the opportunity and the challenge to
investigate that. Mr. Tisdale's case remains on-going. But
investigators found that he breached the perimeter of a
Charlotte Douglas Airport, gained access to an aircraft by
climbing into and stowing away in the wheel well of a
commercial airline and subsequently fell to his death as the
aircraft made its final approach into Boston. Unfortunately,
this is not an isolated incident.
We hope today to learn what strides you've made here. We
hope to share that knowledge Nation-wide. I truly thank all of
you for taking the time to be with us this morning. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman. I'll yield my time back.
Mr. McCaul. I thank the Ranking Member, Mr. Keating. With
that, I'm going to introduce the witnesses and look forward to
hearing their testimony.
First, we have Mr. Stephen Lord. He is the Director of
Homeland Security and Justice Issues at the Government
Accountability Office. He is responsible for overseeing and
directing the GAO's various engagements on issues related to
aviation and service transportation. In addition to holding a
bachelor's degree from the University of Virginia, Mr. Lord
holds an MBA from George Mason University and an M.S. in
national security strategy from the National War College.
Thank you, Mr. Lord, for being here today.
Next, Mr. Chris McLaughlin. He is the Assistant
Administrator for Security Operations at TSA at the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security. He has over 10 years'
experience in airport security, leadership, and operations
management, as well as extensive experience in managing
multimillion-dollar projects, developing operational plans and
strategies, and improving operational and personnel
performance. Mr. McLaughlin holds a B.A. from Connecticut
College, where he graduated magna cum laude.
Next we have Admiral George Naccara. He is the Federal
Security Director for TSA at the Department of Homeland
Security. Prior to his work at TSA, the Admiral served 33 years
in the United States Coast Guard.
Thank you for your service, Admiral.
He holds a bachelor's degree from the U.S. Coast Guard
Academy and a master's degree from Central Michigan University.
Thank you for being here.
Next, Mr. Edward Freni--am I pronouncing that right?
Mr. Freni. Yes.
Mr. McCaul. I apologize.
He is director of aviation at the Massachusetts Port
Authority. Mr. Freni has over 30 years of executive experience
with Logan International Airport and American Airlines. Mr.
Freni holds a bachelor of science degree from the Whittemore
School of Business.
Thank you so much for being here, and thanks for all you've
done to make this airport safer.
Major Michael Concannon is a 26-year veteran of the
Massachusetts State Police. He currently serves as the
commanding officer of Troop F at Boston Logan International
Airport. In this capacity, he also serves as the director of
aviation security for the Massachusetts Port Authority. He is a
1987 cum laude graduate of the University of Massachusetts at
Lowell and a 1996 cum laude graduate of Suffolk University Law
School. He was admitted to the Massachusetts Bar in December
1996.
So I want to thank all of you for being here today.
With that, I recognize our first witness, Mr. Lord.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN M. LORD, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND
JUSTICE ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Lord. Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, thanks
for inviting me here today to discuss aviation security issues.
The first thing I'd like to note is, security and
commercial aviation operations is difficult given the hundreds
of airports, thousands of daily flights and millions of
passengers streaming through airport checkpoints on a daily
basis. I'd also like to note that TSA spends several billion
dollars each year in this endeavor.
Today, I'd like to discuss 2 of the 20 layers of aviation
security. The first is, as you mentioned previously, TSA's
Behavior Detection Program, also called SPOT. I'd also like to
discuss various airport perimeter security issues.
First, regarding TSA's Behavior Detection Program, we
issued a major report on this program in May 2010. The bottom
line of our report is, while DHS has made an effort to validate
the science underlying the program, more actions are needed.
Additional steps need to be taken to ensure its full validity.
As we noted in the report, TSA deployed the program on a
Nation-wide basis before first determining there was a valid
scientific basis for the program. Earlier this year, April
2011, DHS completed an initial validation study. But the study
itself made several important recommendations, additional
actions that need to be taken to ensure it had a sound
scientific basis. That was a positive step. But again,
additional work is going to be needed to be taken to ensure its
validity.
Some of the recommendations made in this report mirrored
the recommendations we made in our big report, such as doing a
cost-benefit analysis to help guide its deployment.
I'd also like to briefly highlight another important
recommendation we made in our SPOT report, and that was to
empower the Behavior Detection Officers to better link them to
the intel databases that TSA has at its disposal. We thought
those links could be improved, because we think it's really
important to fuse the screening personnel with the intel
process, sort of to help better connect the dots. As
Representative McCaul mentioned, that was an important 9/11
Commission Act recommendation.
In sum, while TSA has taken actions to address our report
recommendations, additional steps are still going to need to be
taken to ensure you can apply these behavior detection
principles on large-scale in the airport environment.
I'd now like to discuss some of the findings from our 2009
Report on Airport Perimeter Security. Now, first of all, I
think it's important to recognize, TSA undertakes a whole host
of activities to help secure airport perimeters and maintain
effective access controls. They do random worker screening.
They've expanded the requirements for name-based background
checks. They're encouraging industry to adopt biometric
security standards. However, at the time of our report, TSA had
not completed a comprehensive risk assessment of airports. It's
important to do a risk assessment, because that really helps
you decide where to focus your resources.
The risk assessment also that they did complete in July
2010 did not fully consider the potential vulnerabilities of a
so-called insider attack, which TSA views as a significant
threat. The good news is that the risk of an insider attack
will be included in the next update TSA is doing later this
year, which is due later this year.
We also recommended that TSA consider making greater use of
the so-called joint vulnerability assessments to identify
airport vulnerabilities, and these are really an important tool
in the TSA toolbox. In fact, we consider them the gold standard
because they're rigorous, they're documented and they're
completed with the FBI. The latest data shows, they've
completed these at 17 percent of the Nation's airports.
Again, just to clarify, we're not recommending that you
need to do them for 100 percent of the airports, but we think
it's an important tool that they could more effectively apply
on a larger scale.
Also one positive development I'd like to reflect is that
they've recently developed a new tool to help assess airport
vulnerabilities. It's called the Airport Security Self-
Evaluation Tool, or ASSET, and this thing is just being rolled
out. So I think over time, as they apply this to airports such
as Boston, it will help Federal Security Directors, such as Mr.
Naccara, to help get a better sense of where to focus their
protective efforts.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Keating, this concludes my statement, and
I look forward to answering any questions that you have. Thank
you.
[The statement of Mr. Lord follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stephen M. Lord
September 16, 2011
gao highlights
Highlights of GAO-11-938T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Oversight, Investigations, and Management, Committee on Homeland
Security, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study
The attempted bombing of Northwest flight 253 in December 2009
underscores the need for effective aviation security programs. Aviation
security remains a daunting challenge with hundreds of airports and
thousands of flights daily carrying millions of passengers and pieces
of checked baggage. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS)
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has spent billions of
dollars and implemented a wide range of aviation security initiatives.
Two key layers of aviation security are: (1) TSA's Screening of
Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) program designed to
identify persons who may pose a security risk; and (2) airport
perimeter and access controls security. This testimony provides
information on the extent to which TSA has taken actions to validate
the scientific basis of SPOT and strengthen airport perimeter security.
This statement is based on prior products GAO issued from September
2009 through September 2011 and selected updates in August and
September 2011. To conduct the updates, GAO analyzed documents on TSA's
progress in strengthening aviation security, among other things.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made recommendations in prior work to strengthen TSA's SPOT
program and airport perimeter and access control security efforts. DHS
and TSA generally concurred with the recommendations and have actions
under way to address them.
aviation security: tsa has made progress, but additional efforts are
needed to improve security
What GAO Found
DHS completed an initial study in April 2011 to validate the
scientific basis of the SPOT program; however, additional work remains
to fully validate the program. In May 2010, GAO reported that TSA
deployed this program, which uses behavior observation and analysis
techniques to identify potentially high-risk passengers, before
determining whether there was a scientifically valid basis for using
behavior and appearance indicators as a means for reliably identifying
passengers who may pose a risk to the U.S. aviation system. TSA
officials said that SPOT was deployed in response to potential threats,
such as suicide bombers, and was based on scientific research available
at the time. TSA is pilot testing revised program procedures at Boston-
Logan airport in which behavior detection officers will engage
passengers entering screening in casual conversation to help determine
suspicious behaviors. TSA plans to expand this pilot program in the
fall of 2011. GAO recommended in May 2010 that DHS, as part of its
validation study, assess the methodology to help ensure the validity of
the SPOT program. DHS concurred and stated that the study included an
independent review with a broad range of agencies and experts. The
study found that SPOT was more effective than random screening to
varying degrees. However, DHS's study was not designed to fully
validate whether behavior detection can be used to reliably identify
individuals in an airport environment who pose a security risk. The
study also noted that additional work was needed to comprehensively
validate the program. TSA officials are assessing the actions needed to
address the study's recommendations but do not have time frames for
completing this work.
In September 2009 GAO reported that since 2004 TSA has taken
actions to strengthen airport perimeter and access controls security
by, among other things, deploying a random worker screening program;
however, TSA had not conducted a comprehensive risk assessment or
developed a National strategy. Specifically, TSA had not conducted
vulnerability assessments for 87 percent of the approximately 450 U.S.
airports regulated for security by TSA in 2009. GAO recommended that
TSA develop: (1) A comprehensive risk assessment and evaluate the need
to conduct airport vulnerability assessments Nation-wide, and (2) a
National strategy to guide efforts to strengthen airport security. DHS
concurred and TSA stated that the Transportation Sector Security Risk
Assessment, issued in July 2010, was to provide a comprehensive risk
assessment of airport security. However, this assessment did not
consider the potential vulnerabilities of airports to an insider
attack--an attack from an airport worker with authorized access to
secure areas. In August 2011, TSA reported that transportation security
inspectors conduct vulnerability assessments annually at all commercial
airports, including an evaluation of perimeter security. GAO has not
yet assessed the extent to which inspectors consistently conduct
vulnerability assessments. TSA also updated the Transportation
Systems--Sector-Specific Plan, which summarizes airport security
program activities. However, the extent to which these activities were
guided by measurable goals and priorities, among other things, was not
clear. Providing such additional information would better address GAO's
recommendation.
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and Members of the
subcommittee: I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's
hearing at Boston-Logan International Airport to discuss two key layers
of aviation security: The Transportation Security Administration's
(TSA) behavior-based passenger screening program and airport perimeter
and access controls.\1\ The attempted terrorist bombing of Northwest
flight 253 on December 25, 2009, provided a vivid reminder that civil
aviation remains an attractive terrorist target and underscores the
need for effective passenger screening. According to the President's
National Counterterrorism Strategy released in June 2011, aviation
security and screening is an essential tool in the ability to detect,
disrupt, and defeat plots to attack the homeland.\2\
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\1\ TSA's behavior-based passenger screening program is known as
the Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) program.
\2\ National Strategy for Counterterrorism (Washington, DC: June
28, 2011).
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Securing commercial aviation operations remains a daunting task--
with hundreds of airports, thousands of aircraft, and thousands of
flights daily carrying millions of passengers and pieces of checked
baggage. In the almost 10 years that have passed since TSA assumed
responsibility for aviation security, TSA has spent billions of dollars
and implemented a wide range of initiatives to strengthen the layers of
aviation security. For fiscal year 2011, TSA had about 54,800 personnel
and its budget authority was about $7.7 billion. However, risks to the
aviation system remain. Earlier this month, we reported on the progress
made in securing the aviation system in the 10 years since the
September 11, 2001, attacks and the work that still remains.\3\
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\3\ See GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made and
Work Remaining In Implementing Homeland Security Missions 10 Years
After 9/11, GAO-11-881 (Washington, DC: Sept. 7, 2011).
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In addition, while airport operators, not TSA, generally retain
direct day-to-day operational responsibility for airport perimeter
security and implementing access controls for secure areas of their
airports, TSA has responsibility for establishing and implementing
measures to improve security in these areas.\4\ Criminal incidents
involving airport workers using their access privileges to smuggle
weapons and drugs into secure areas and onto planes have heightened
concerns about the risks posed by workers and the security of airport
perimeters and access to secured areas.
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\4\ For the purposes of this testimony, ``secure area'' is used
generally to refer to areas specified in an airport security program
for which access is restricted, including the security identification
display areas (SIDA), the air operations areas (AOA), and the sterile
areas. While security measures governing access to such areas may vary,
in general a SIDA is an area in which appropriate identification must
be worn, an AOA is an area providing access to aircraft movement and
parking areas, and a sterile area provides passengers access to
boarding aircraft and where access is generally controlled by TSA or a
private screening entity under TSA oversight. See 49 C.F.R. 1540.5.
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My statement today discusses the extent to which TSA has taken
actions to: (1) Validate the scientific basis of its behavior-based
passenger screening program (referred to as SPOT), and (2) strengthen
the security of airport perimeters and access controls.
This statement is based on our prior products issued from September
2009 through September 2011, and includes selected updates conducted in
August and September 2011 on TSA's efforts to implement our prior
recommendations regarding SPOT and airport perimeters and access to
secure areas of airports.\5\ For our May 2010 report on SPOT, we
reviewed relevant literature on behavior analysis by subject matter
experts.\6\ We conducted field site visits to 15 TSA-regulated airports
with SPOT to observe operations and meet with key program personnel.\7\
We also interviewed recognized experts in the field, as well as
cognizant officials from other U.S. Government agencies that utilize
behavior analysis in their work. For the updates, we analyzed
documentation from TSA on the actions it has taken to implement the
recommendations from our May 2010 report, including efforts to validate
the scientific basis for the program. As part of our efforts to update
this information, we analyzed DHS's April 2011 SPOT validation study
and discussed its findings with cognizant DHS officials. For our
September 2009 report on TSA efforts to secure airport perimeters and
access controls, we examined TSA documents related to risk assessments,
airport security programs, and risk management. We also interviewed
TSA, airport, and industry association officials and conducted site
visits at nine TSA-regulated airports of varying size.\8\ For the
updates, we analyzed documentation from TSA on actions it has taken to
implement recommendations from our 2009 report, including efforts to
conduct a comprehensive risk assessment and evaluate the need to
conduct an assessment of security vulnerabilities at airports Nation-
wide, and to develop a National strategy for airport perimeters and
access controls security that identifies key elements such as goals and
priorities. As part of our efforts to update this information, we
analyzed TSA data on the number of vulnerability assessments conducted
at airports from fiscal year 2004 through July 1, 2011, by airport.
More detailed information on our scope and methodology can be found in
our prior reports.
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\5\ See GAO, Aviation Security: A National Strategy and Other
Actions Would Strengthen TSA's Efforts to Secure Commercial Airport
Perimeters and Access Controls, GAO-09-399 (Washington, DC: Sept. 30,
2009); Aviation Security: Efforts to Validate TSA's Passenger Screening
Behavior Detection Program Underway, but Opportunities Exist to
Strengthen Validation and Address Operational Challenges, GAO-10-763
(Washington, DC: May 20, 2010); Aviation Security: TSA Has Taken
Actions to Improve Security, but Additional Efforts Remain, GAO-11-807T
(Washington, DC: Jul. 13, 2011); and GAO-11-881.
\6\ National Research Council, Protecting Individual Privacy in the
Struggle Against Terrorists: A Framework for Assessment (Washington,
DC: National Academies Press, 2008). The report's preparation was
overseen by the National Academy of Sciences Committee on Technical and
Privacy Dimensions of Information for Terrorism Prevention and Other
National Goals. Although the report addresses broader issues related to
privacy and data mining, a senior National Research Council official
stated that the committee included behavior detection as a focus
because any behavior detection program could have privacy implications.
\7\ For the purposes of this testimony, the term ``TSA-regulated
airport'' refers to a U.S. airport operating under a TSA-approved
security program and subject to TSA regulation and oversight. See 49
C.F.R. pt. 1542.
\8\ See GAO-09-399.
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All of our work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted
Government auditing standards.
background
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act established TSA as the
Federal agency with primary responsibility for securing the Nation's
civil aviation system, which includes the screening of all passenger
and property transported by commercial passenger aircraft.\9\ At the
463 TSA-regulated airports in the United States, prior to boarding an
aircraft, all passengers, their accessible property, and their checked
baggage are screened pursuant to TSA-established procedures, which
include passengers passing through security checkpoints where they and
their identification documents are checked by transportation security
officers (TSO) and other TSA employees or by private-sector screeners
under TSA's Screening Partnership Program.\10\ Airport operators,
however, are directly responsible for implementing TSA security
requirements, such as those relating to perimeter security and access
controls, in accordance with their approved security programs and other
TSA direction.
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\9\ See Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). For purposes of
this testimony, ``commercial passenger aircraft'' refers to a U.S. or
foreign-based air carrier operating under TSA-approved security
programs with regularly scheduled passenger operations to or from a
U.S. airport.
\10\ Private-sector screeners under contract to and overseen by
TSA, and not TSOs, perform screening activities at airports
participating in TSA's Screening Partnership Program. See 49 U.S.C.
44920. According to TSA, 16 airports participated in the program as of
July 2011.
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TSA relies upon multiple layers of security to deter, detect, and
disrupt persons posing a potential risk to aviation security. These
layers include behavior detection officers (BDO), who examine passenger
behaviors and appearances to identify passengers who might pose a
potential security risk at TSA-regulated airports;\11\ TSA has
selectively deployed about 3,000 BDOs to 161 of 463 TSA-regulated
airports in the United States, including Boston-Logan airport where the
program was initially deployed in 2003. Other security layers include
travel document checkers, who examine tickets, passports, and other
forms of identification; TSOs responsible for screening passengers and
their carry-on baggage at passenger checkpoints, using X-ray equipment,
magnetometers, Advanced Imaging Technology, and other devices; random
employee screening; and checked baggage screening systems.\12\
Additional layers cited by TSA include, among others, intelligence
gathering and analysis; passenger prescreening against terrorist watch
lists; random canine team searches at airports; Federal air marshals,
who provide Federal law enforcement presence on selected flights
operated by U.S. air carriers; Visible Intermodal Protection Response
(VIPR) teams; reinforced cockpit doors; the passengers themselves; as
well as other measures both visible and invisible to the public.\13\
Figure 1 shows TSA's layers of aviation security. TSA has also
implemented a variety of programs and protective actions to strengthen
airport perimeters and access to sensitive areas of the airport,
including conducting additional employee background checks and
assessing different biometric-identification technologies.\14\ Airport
perimeter and access control security is intended to prevent
unauthorized access into secure areas of an airport--either from
outside or within the airport complex.
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\11\ TSA designed SPOT to provide BDOs with a means of identifying
persons who may pose a potential security risk at TSA-regulated
airports by focusing on behaviors and appearances that deviate from an
established baseline and that may be indicative of stress, fear, or
deception.
\12\ Advanced Imaging Technology screens passengers for metallic
and non-metallic threats including weapons, explosives, and other
objects concealed under layers of clothing.
\13\ Working alongside local security and law enforcement
officials, VIPR teams conduct a variety of security tactics to
introduce unpredictability and deter potential terrorist actions,
including random high-visibility patrols at mass transit and passenger
rail stations and conducting passenger and baggage screening operations
using specially trained behavior detection officers and a varying
combination of explosive detection canine teams and explosives
detection technology.
\14\ Biometrics are measurements of an individual's unique
characteristics, such as fingerprints, irises, and facial
characteristics, used to verify identity.
According to TSA, each one of these layers alone is capable of
stopping a terrorist attack. TSA states that the security layers in
combination multiply their value, creating a much stronger system, and
that a terrorist who has to overcome multiple security layers to carry
out an attack is more likely to be pre-empted, deterred, or to fail
during the attempt.
tsa has taken actions to validate the science underlying its behavior
detection program, but more work remains
We reported in May 2010 that TSA deployed SPOT Nation-wide before
first determining whether there was a scientifically valid basis for
using behavior and appearance indicators as a means for reliably
identifying passengers who may pose a risk to the U.S. aviation
system.\15\ DHS's Science and Technology Directorate completed a
validation study in April 2011 to determine the extent to which SPOT
was more effective than random screening at identifying security
threats and how the program's behaviors correlate to identifying high-
risk travelers.\16\ However, as noted in the study, the assessment was
an initial validation step, but was not designed to fully validate
whether behavior detection can be used to reliably identify individuals
in an airport environment who pose a security risk. According to DHS,
additional work will be needed to comprehensively validate the program.
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\15\ See GAO-10-763.
\16\ See DHS, SPOT Referral Report Validation Study Final Report
Volume I: Technical Report (Washington, DC: April 5, 2011). DHS's study
defines high-risk passengers as travelers that knowingly and
intentionally try to defeat the security process including those
carrying serious prohibited items, such as weapons; illegal items, such
as drugs; or fraudulent documents; or those that were ultimately
arrested by law enforcement.
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According to TSA, SPOT was deployed before a scientific validation
of the program was completed to help address potential threats to the
aviation system, such as those posed by suicide bombers. TSA also
stated that the program was based upon scientific research available at
the time regarding human behaviors. We reported in May 2010 that
approximately 14,000 passengers were referred to law enforcement
officers under SPOT from May 2004 through August 2008.\17\ Of these
passengers, 1,083 were arrested for various reasons, including being
illegal aliens (39 percent), having outstanding warrants (19 percent),
and possessing fraudulent documents (15 percent). The remaining 27
percent were arrested for other reasons. As noted in our May 2010
report, SPOT officials told us that it is not known if the SPOT program
has resulted in the arrest of anyone who is a terrorist, or who was
planning to engage in terrorist-related activity. According to TSA, in
fiscal year 2010, SPOT referred about 50,000 passengers for additional
screening and about 3,600 referrals to law enforcement officers. The
referrals to law enforcement officers yielded approximately 300
arrests. Of these 300 arrests, TSA stated that 27 percent were illegal
aliens, 17 percent were drug-related, 14 percent were related to
fraudulent documents, 12 percent were related to outstanding warrants,
and 30 percent were related to other offenses. DHS has requested about
$254 million for fiscal year 2012 for the SPOT program, which would
support an additional 350 (or 175 full-time equivalent) BDOs. If TSA
receives its requested appropriation, TSA will be in a position to have
invested about $1 billion in the SPOT program since fiscal year 2007.
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\17\ See GAO-10-763.
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According to TSA, as of August 2011, TSA is pilot testing revised
procedures for BDOs at Boston-Logan airport to engage passengers
entering screening in casual conversation to help determine suspicious
behaviors. According to TSA, after a passenger's travel documents are
verified, a BDO will briefly engage each passenger in conversation. If
more information is needed to help determine suspicious behaviors, the
officer will refer the passenger to a second BDO for a more thorough
conversation to determine if additional screening is needed. TSA noted
that these BDOs have received additional training in interviewing
methods. TSA plans to expand this pilot program to additional airports
in the fall of 2011.
A 2008 report issued by the National Research Council of the
National Academy of Sciences stated that the scientific evidence for
behavioral monitoring is preliminary in nature.\18\ The report also
noted that an information-based program, such as a behavior detection
program, should first determine if a scientific foundation exists and
use scientifically valid criteria to evaluate its effectiveness before
deployment. The report added that such programs should have a sound
experimental basis and that the documentation on the program's
effectiveness should be reviewed by an independent entity capable of
evaluating the supporting scientific evidence.\19\ According to the
report, a terrorist's desire to avoid detection makes information-
gathering techniques, such as asking what a person has done, is doing,
or plans to do, highly unreliable. Using these techniques to elicit
information could also have definite privacy implications. These
findings, in particular, may be important as TSA moves forward with its
pilot program to expand BDOs' use of conversation and interviews with
all passengers entering screening.
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\18\ Specifically, the report states that the scientific support
for linkages between behavioral and physiological markers and mental
state is strongest for elementary states, such as simple emotions; weak
for more complex states, such as deception; and nonexistent for highly
complex states, such as when individuals hold terrorist intent and
beliefs.
\19\ A study performed by the JASON Program Office raised similar
concerns. The JASON Program Office is an independent scientific
advisory group that provides consulting services to the U.S. Government
on matters of defense science and technology.
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As we reported in May 2010, an independent panel of experts could
help DHS develop a comprehensive methodology to determine if the SPOT
program is based on valid scientific principles that can be effectively
applied in an airport environment for counterterrorism purposes. Thus,
we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security convene an
independent panel of experts to review the methodology of the
validation study on the SPOT program being conducted to determine
whether the study's methodology was sufficiently comprehensive to
validate the SPOT program. We also recommended that this assessment
include appropriate input from other Federal agencies with expertise in
behavior detection and relevant subject matter experts.\20\ DHS
concurred and stated that its validation study, completed in April
2011, included an independent review of the study with input from a
broad range of Federal agencies and relevant experts, including those
from academia.
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\20\ See GAO-10-763.
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DHS's validation study found that SPOT was more effective than
random screening to varying degrees. For example, the study found that
SPOT was more effective than random screening at identifying
individuals who possessed fraudulent documents and identifying
individuals who law enforcement officers ultimately arrested.\21\
However, DHS noted that the identification of such high-risk passengers
was rare in both the SPOT and random tests. In addition, DHS determined
that the base rate, or frequency, of SPOT behavioral indicators
observed by TSA to detect suspicious passengers was very low and that
these observed indicators were highly varied across the traveling
public. Although details about DHS's findings related to these
indicators are sensitive security information, the low base rate and
high variability of traveler behaviors highlights the challenge that
TSA faces in effectively implementing a standardized list of SPOT
behavioral indicators.
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\21\ The extent to which SPOT is more effective than random at
identifying fraudulent documents and individuals ultimately arrested by
law enforcement officers is deemed sensitive security information by
TSA.
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In addition, DHS outlined several limitations to the study. For
example, the study noted that BDOs were aware of whether individuals
they were screening were referred to them as the result of identified
SPOT indicators or random selection. DHS stated that this had the
potential to introduce bias into the assessment. DHS also noted that
SPOT data from January 2006 through October 2010 were used in its
analysis of behavioral indicators even though questions about the
reliability of the data exist.\22\ In May 2010, we reported weaknesses
in TSA's process for maintaining operational data from the SPOT program
database. Specifically, the SPOT database did not have computerized
edit checks built into the system to review the format, existence, and
reasonableness of data. In another example, BDOs could not input all
behaviors observed in the SPOT database because the database limited
entry to eight behaviors, six signs of deception, and four types of
prohibited items per passenger referred for additional screening.
Because of these data-related issues, we reported that meaningful
analyses could not be conducted at that time to determine if there is
an association between certain behaviors and the likelihood that a
person displaying certain behaviors would be referred to a law
enforcement officer or whether any behavior or combination of behaviors
could be used to distinguish deceptive from nondeceptive individuals.
In our May 2010 report, we recommended that TSA establish controls for
this SPOT data. DHS agreed and TSA has established additional data
controls as part of its database upgrade. However, some of DHS's
analysis for this study used SPOT data recorded prior to these
additional controls being implemented.
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\22\ DHS officials stated that this historical SPOT data was not
used in their analysis to determine whether SPOT was more effective
than random screening.
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The study also noted that it was not designed to comprehensively
validate whether SPOT can be used to reliably identify individuals in
an airport environment who pose a security risk. The DHS study made
recommendations related to strengthening the program and conducting a
more comprehensive validation of whether the science can be used for
counterterrorism purposes in the aviation environment.\23\ Some of
these recommendations, such as the need for a comprehensive program
evaluation including a cost-benefit analysis, reiterate recommendations
made in our May 2010 report. TSA is currently reviewing the study's
findings and assessing the steps needed to address DHS's
recommendations but does not have time frames for completing this work.
If TSA decides to implement the recommendations in the April 2011 DHS
validation study, DHS may be years away from knowing whether there is a
scientifically valid basis for using behavior detection techniques to
help secure the aviation system against terrorist threats given the
broad scope of the additional work and related resources identified by
DHS for addressing the recommendations. Thus, as we reported in March
2011, Congress may wish to consider the study's results in making
future funding decisions regarding the program.\24\
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\23\ The study made recommendations related to SPOT in three areas:
(1) Future validation efforts; (2) comparing SPOT with other screening
programs; and (3) broader program evaluation issues. TSA designated the
specific details of these recommendations sensitive security
information.
\24\ See GAO, Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in
Government Programs, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue, GAO-11-
318SP (Washington, DC: Mar. 1, 2011).
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tsa has taken actions to strengthen airport perimeter and access
controls security, but issues remain
We reported in September 2009 that TSA has implemented a variety of
programs and actions since 2004 to improve and strengthen airport
perimeter and access controls security, including strengthening worker
screening and improving access control technology.\25\ For example, to
better address the risks posed by airport workers, in 2007 TSA
implemented a random worker screening program that was used to enforce
access procedures, such as ensuring workers display appropriate
credentials and do not possess unauthorized items when entering secure
areas. According to TSA officials, this program was developed to help
counteract the potential vulnerability of airports to an insider
attack--an attack from an airport worker with authorized access to
secure areas. TSA has also expanded its requirements for conducting
worker background checks and the population of individuals who are
subject to these checks. For example, in 2007 TSA expanded requirements
for name-based checks to all individuals seeking or holding airport-
issued identification badges and in 2009 began requiring airports to
renew all airport-identification media every 2 years. TSA also reported
taking actions to identify and assess technologies to strengthen
airport perimeter and access controls security, such as assisting the
aviation industry and a Federal aviation advisory committee in
developing security standards for biometric access controls.
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\25\ GAO-09-399.
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However, we reported in September 2009 that while TSA has taken
actions to assess risk with respect to airport perimeter and access
controls security, it had not conducted a comprehensive risk assessment
based on assessments of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences, as
required by DHS's National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP).\26\
We further reported that without a full depiction of threats,
vulnerabilities, and consequences, an organization's ability to
establish priorities and make cost-effective security decisions is
limited.\27\ We recommended that TSA develop a comprehensive risk
assessment, along with milestones for completing the assessment. DHS
concurred with our recommendation and said it would include an
assessment of airport perimeter and access control security risks as
part of a comprehensive assessment for the transportation sector--the
Transportation Sector Security Risk Assessment (TSSRA). The TSSRA,
published in July 2010, included an assessment of various risk-based
scenarios related to airport perimeter security but did not consider
the potential vulnerabilities of airports to an insider attack--the
insider threat--which it recognized as a significant issue. In July
2011, TSA officials told us that the agency is developing a framework
for insider risk that is to be included in the next iteration of the
assessment, which TSA expected to be released at the end of calendar
year 2011. Such action, if taken, would meet the intent of our
recommendation.
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\26\ GAO-09-399. DHS developed the NIPP to guide risk assessment
efforts and the protection of the Nation's critical infrastructure,
including airports.
\27\ See GAO, Transportation Security: Comprehensive Risk
Assessments and Stronger Internal Controls Needed to Help Inform TSA
Resource Allocation, GAO-09-492 (Washington, DC: Mar. 27, 2009).
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We also recommended that, as part of a comprehensive risk
assessment of airport perimeter and access controls security, TSA
evaluate the need to conduct an assessment of security vulnerabilities
at airports Nation-wide.\28\ At the time of our review, TSA told us its
primary measures for assessing the vulnerability of airports to attack
were professional judgment and the collective results of joint
vulnerability assessments (JVA) it conducts with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) for select--usually high-risk--airports.\29\ Our
analysis of TSA data showed that from fiscal years 2004 through 2008,
TSA conducted JVAs at about 13 percent of the approximately 450 TSA-
regulated airports that existed at that time, thus leaving about 87
percent of airports unassessed.\30\ TSA has characterized U.S. airports
as an interdependent system in which the security of all is affected or
disrupted by the security of the weakest link. However, we reported
that TSA officials could not explain to what extent the collective JVAs
of specific airports constituted a reasonable systems-based assessment
of vulnerability across airports Nation-wide. Moreover, TSA officials
said that they did not know to what extent the 87 percent of commercial
airports that had not received a JVA as of September 2009--most of
which were smaller airports--were vulnerable to an intentional security
breach. DHS concurred with our 2009 report recommendation to assess the
need for a vulnerability assessment of airports Nation-wide, and TSA
officials stated that based on our review they intended to increase the
number of JVAs conducted at Category II, III, and IV airports and use
the resulting data to assist in prioritizing the allocation of limited
resources. Our analysis of TSA data showed that from fiscal year 2004
through July 1, 2011, TSA conducted JVAs at about 17 percent of the
TSA-regulated airports that existed at that time, thus leaving about 83
percent of airports unassessed.\31\
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\28\ GAO-09-399.
\29\ According to TSA officials, JVAs are assessments that teams of
TSA special agents and other officials conduct jointly with the FBI,
generally, as required by law, every 3 years for airports identified as
high-risk. See 49 U.S.C. 44904(a)-(b). See also Pub. L. No. 104-264,
310, 110 Stat. 3213, 3253 (1996) (establishing the requirement that
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the FBI conduct joint
threat and vulnerability assessments every 3 years, or more frequently,
as necessary, at each airport determined to be high-risk). Pursuant to
ATSA, responsibility for conducting JVAs transferred from FAA to TSA.
For more information on this issue, see GAO-09-399.
\30\ From fiscal years 2004 through 2008 TSA conducted 67 JVAs at a
total of 57 airports; 10 airports received 2 JVAs. TSA classifies the
Nation's airports into one of five categories (X, I, II, III, and IV)
based on various factors such as the number of take-offs and landings
annually, the extent of passenger screening at the airport, and other
security considerations. In general, Category X airports have the
largest number of passenger boardings and Category IV airports have the
smallest. According to TSA data, of the 67 JVAs conducted at 57
airports from fiscal years 2004 through 2008, 58--or 87 percent--were
Category X and I airports. Of the remaining 9 assessments, 6 were at
Category II airports, 1 at a Category III airport, and 2 at Category IV
airports. Since our September 2009 report was issued, the number of
TSA-regulated airports has increased from approximately 450 to 463.
\31\ From fiscal year 2004 through July 1, 2011, TSA conducted 125
JVAs at 78 airports; 47 airports received more than one JVA during this
period.
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Since we issued our report in September 2009, TSA had not conducted
JVAs at Category III and IV airports.\32\ TSA stated that the TSSRA is
to provide a comprehensive risk assessment of airport security, but
could not tell us to what extent it has studied the need to conduct
JVAs of security vulnerabilities at airports Nation-wide. Additionally,
in August 2011 TSA reported that its National inspection program
requires that transportation security inspectors conduct vulnerability
assessments at all commercial airports, which are based on the joint
vulnerability assessment model. According to TSA, every commercial
airport in the United States receives a security assessment each year,
including an evaluation of perimeter security and access controls. We
have not yet assessed the extent to which transportation security
inspectors consistently conduct vulnerability assessments based on the
joint vulnerability model. Providing additional information on how and
to what extent such security assessments have been performed would more
fully address our recommendation.
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\32\ From fiscal year 2009 through July 1, 2011, TSA conducted 58
JVAs at a total of 56 airports; 2 airports received 2 JVAs. According
to TSA data, of the 58 JVAs conducted, 47--or 88 percent--were at
Category X and I airports; 7-12 percent--were conducted at Category II
airports. TSA officials told us that since our report in September 2009
they have initiated a semi-annual report process that, in part,
included a data analysis of the JVAs conducted at airports for the
prior 6 months. The semi-annual report focuses on airport perimeter,
terminal, critical infrastructure, airport operations, and airport
services. Beginning in fiscal year 2011 the reports are to be developed
on an annual basis. The reports are also used to direct future JVA
efforts.
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We also reported in September 2009 that TSA's efforts to enhance
the security of the Nation's airports have not been guided by a
National strategy that identifies key elements, such as goals,
priorities, performance measures, and required resources.\33\ To better
ensure that airport stakeholders take a unified approach to airport
security, we recommended that TSA develop a National strategy for
airport security that incorporates key characteristics of effective
security strategies, such as measurable goals and priorities. DHS
concurred with this recommendation and stated that TSA would implement
it by updating the Transportation Systems--Sector Specific Plan (TS-
SSP), to be released in the summer of 2010.\34\ TSA provided a copy of
the updated plan to Congressional committees in June 2011 and to us in
August 2011. We reviewed this plan and its accompanying aviation model
annex and found that while the plan provided a high-level summary of
program activities for addressing airport security such as the
screening of workers, the extent to which these efforts would be guided
by measurable goals and priorities, among other things, was not clear.
Providing such additional information would better address the intent
of our recommendation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ GAO-09-399.
\34\ TSA developed the TS-SSP to conform to NIPP requirements,
which required sector-specific agencies to develop strategic risk
management frameworks for their sectors that aligned with NIPP
guidance.
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Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and Members of the
subcommittee, this concludes my statement. I look forward to answering
any questions that you may have at this time.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, again, Mr. Lord.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. McLaughlin for his
testimony.
STATEMENT OF CHRIS MC LAUGHLIN, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR
SECURITY OPERATIONS, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. McLaughlin. Good morning, Chairman McCaul and Ranking
Member Keating. I'm pleased to appear before you today to
discuss aspects of the Transportation Security Administration's
security operations at U.S. commercial airports. I will
restrict my comments to broader TSA policies and objectives
while Federal Security Director Naccara will address issues and
initiatives specific to Boston Logan International Airport.
As you know, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act,
or ATSA, authorized TSA to work with U.S. airports and
operators to strengthen security at access and critical control
points throughout the United States. While TSA's aviation
security standards provide a foundation for a comprehensive
National program, the distinctive footprint, location, and
requirements of each airport require each facility to have its
own airport security program.
TSA secures commercial airports through a variety of
programs. The programs most familiar to the traveling public
include passenger screening operations conducted by
Transportation Security Officers at security checkpoints,
carry-on and checked baggage screening, and the Secure Flight
Program which fulfills a key 9/11 Commission recommendation to
implement a uniform watchlist matching program for all
passengers traveling from, within, or bound for United States
against names on Government terrorist watch lists.
Other layers of security play an equally important role and
focus on preventing and detecting the unauthorized entry,
presence, and movement of individuals and ground vehicles into
and within the secured and airport operations areas of an
airport. TSA maintains random and unpredictable security
measures that may be employed at direct access points and
airport perimeters, including vehicle inspections, explosive
trace detection, enhanced screening, accessible property
searches, as well as behavior detection.
As required by statute, TSA proscribes procedures for
screening individuals, inspecting goods, property, vehicles,
and other equipment before entering into the secure area of an
airport. These procedures safeguard against unauthorized
persons having access to aircraft, thereby reducing
opportunities for criminal behavior. These safeguards also help
ensure the safety and integrity of other individuals involved
in aviation, including aircraft service providers and workers
involved in catering and passenger amenities on-board aircraft.
Like-wise, TSA requires security access programs for vendors
with direct access to airfields and aircraft.
Ultimately, the airport authority is responsible for
abiding by the perimeter security regulations set by TSA and
must establish procedures for its personnel and resources. TSA
also conducts airport inspections to enhance security and
mitigate risk associated with perimeter security. These include
joint vulnerability assessments as well as regulatory special
emphasis inspections that focus on specific aspects of the
operation and the testing of airport access control processes.
Based upon the results of these inspections and assessments,
TSA develops mitigation strategies to enhance an airport's
security posture and determine if any changes are required.
To counter the potential risk to perimeter security, TSA
also deploys Transportation Security Inspectors to help
determine whether airport operators are complying with TSA
regulations and the airport's ASP. TSIs focus their assessments
on security throughout the airport environments ranging from
the curbside of the airport to the outermost perimeter fences.
TSIs can recommend that civil penalties be assessed by TSA when
repeated or egregious instances of noncompliance of regulations
and security procedures are discovered.
Earlier this year, TSA initiated a special emphasis
assessment and a special emphasis inspection of all Category X
and I through IV airports evaluating perimeter security,
including fencing, nonfence, manmade barriers, natural
barriers, CCTV, electronic intrusion and motion detection
devices and other barriers. Assessments are complete at all Cat
X and I airports and the remaining airport assessments are
expected to be completed later this month.
TSA's goal at all times is to maximize transportation
security and stay ahead of evolving terrorist threats while
protecting passengers' privacy and facilitating the efficient
flow of travelers and legitimate commerce.
I want to thank the subcommittee for this opportunity to
speak to you today and discuss these important issues, and I'm
happy to answer any questions that you might have.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. McLaughlin and Admiral
Naccara follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement of Christopher McLaughlin and George Naccara
September 16, 2011
Good morning, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. We are pleased to appear
before you today to discuss the Transportation Security
Administration's (TSA) security operations at U.S. commercial airports
and to address any questions you may have about security at Logan
International Airport (BOS) in particular.
As you know, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA),
(Pub. L. 107-71), authorized TSA to work with U.S. airport operators to
strengthen security at access and critical control points throughout
the United States to maximize the security of passengers and aircraft.
While TSA's aviation security standards provide a foundation for a
comprehensive National aviation security program, the distinctive
footprint, location, and requirements of each airport require each
facility to have its own Airport Security Program (ASP). The ASP at
Logan Airport incorporates specific security elements including
perimeter security measures, addressing the prevention and detection of
the unauthorized entry, presence, and movement of individuals and
vehicles into and within secured areas that may be unique to Logan.
tsa's primary mission: preventing terrorism and enhancing security
TSA secures our Nation's commercial airports through a variety of
programs. The programs most familiar to the traveling public include
passenger screening operations conducted by Transportation Security
Officers (TSOs) at security checkpoints; carry-on and checked baggage
screening; and the Secure Flight program, which fulfills a key 9/11
Commission recommendation to implement a uniform watch list matching
program for all passengers traveling from, within, or bound for the
United States against names on Government terrorist watch lists. Other
layers of security play an equally important role in safeguarding our
Nation against terrorist threats. These additional layers include the
prevention and detection of unauthorized entry, presence, and movement
of individuals and ground vehicles into, and within, the secured and
Airport Operations Areas (AOA) of an airport.
TSA's risk-based and intelligence-driven Security Playbook program
strengthens the transportation security environment by increasing
unpredictability and providing additional layers of security. This
program employs security measures at direct access points and airport
perimeters and uses a variety of resources and equipment to conduct
screening of individuals and vehicles entering the secured area.
Examples of the security measures that may be employed at direct access
points and airport perimeters include: Vehicle inspections, explosives
trace detection of individuals and property, enhanced screening,
accessible property searches, and identification/media verifications,
as well as behavior detection.
behavior detection pilot program at bos
TSA has long recognized the value of a layered, threat-based
approach to transportation security and the need to focus more of our
resources on people we know less about who potentially pose a threat to
aviation security.
As part of its on-going commitment to implement risk-based security
measures, TSA is conducting a pilot program at BOS designed to assess
the expanded use of behavior detection in the airport screening
process. Extensive research indicates behavior analysis and
interviewing are effective methods for detecting hostile intent and
potential high-risk individuals. TSA's own behavior detection program,
the Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) program--
whose indicators have been scientifically validated through research
conducted by the DHS Science and Technology Directorate--revealed that
behavior detection was effective for identifying persons attempting to
defeat the screening process. BOS was the first airport in the country
to implement the agency's SPOT program, which is now employed at more
than 160 airports Nation-wide.
As part of the pilot, TSA is utilizing specially trained and
certified Behavior Detection Officers (BDOs) who are focusing on
increased passenger interactions and behavior analysis in conjunction
with boarding pass and identification review at the entrance to the
checkpoint. The advanced training the officers receive includes both
classroom and on-the-job training designed to enhance their
communication skills to engage in conversations with passengers to
determine whether they pose a threat to transportation security.
Although the vast majority of passengers will experience a casual
greeting conversation with the BDO as they begin the security
checkpoint screening process, a small number of passengers may be
selected for an extended, but still limited, conversation and possibly
for additional screening.
The goal of this pilot is to understand how behavior detection can
be used to improve both the effectiveness of transportation security
and the passenger experience. TSA will evaluate how this pilot program
impacts security, screening operations and passenger throughput, among
other things, and these results will help determine how the agency
proceeds with the program.
collaboration: an essential component of security at bos
Collaboration is an essential component of transportation security.
Since its creation, TSA has engaged Massport, the Massachusetts State
Police, and the airline carriers in a cooperative and complementary
effort to enhance security throughout Logan Airport, best exemplified
by the daily morning security briefing. At this meeting, we discuss
incidents of the previous day, new security measures, and plans for the
coming days and weeks. It is an opportunity for everyone to share their
views and concerns to reach a common understanding of roles and
responsibilities.
Some of the tangible results arising from the cooperative
atmosphere include:
Massport and the State Police partnership with TSA assets to
develop and execute ``plays'' that deploy varying security
measures on a random basis throughout the terminals and the
secure areas of the airport;
In the event of an incident, TSA, Massport, State Police,
and the affected carriers convene an immediate conference call
to determine the facts, assess the risk, and jointly decide on
a course of action to resolve the matter with as little
disruption as possible to the continued operation of the
airport;
TSA and Massport have worked together to improve Closed
Circuit Television (CCTV) coverage of the airport's critical
areas, providing TSA officials with real-time access to all of
the camera views from within TSA offices; and
Cooperation extends across the Federal level as well, as
illustrated by the creation of the Nation's first airport-based
counterterrorism office. DHS components, including TSA, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) will work at the FBI's newly-opened
Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) office at Logan Airport to
improve communications on security-related tasks.
perimeter security: a shared responsibility
As required by statute, TSA prescribes procedures for screening
individuals, and inspecting goods, property, vehicles, and other
equipment before entry into the secured area of an airport. These
security access regulations, directives, and procedures safeguard
against unauthorized persons having access to aircraft, thereby
reducing opportunities for criminal violence, sabotage, or other
destructive acts. These safeguards help to ensure the safety and
integrity of individuals involved in the aviation domain, including
aircraft service providers and workers involved in catering and
passenger amenities on-board aircraft. Similarly, TSA requires security
access programs for vendors with direct access to airfields and
aircraft. Ultimately, the airport authority is responsible for abiding
by the perimeter security regulations set by TSA and must establish
procedures for its personnel and resources, which may include law
enforcement personnel, to ensure compliance with the regulatory
requirements.
transportation security inspectors monitor compliance
TSA conducts on-going and comprehensive airport inspections to
enhance security and mitigate risk associated with perimeter integrity,
including Joint Vulnerability Assessments, conducted with the Federal
Bureau of Investigations (FBI), regulatory Special Emphasis Inspections
(SEIs) that focus on specific aspects of operations, and the testing of
access control processes at airports. Based upon the results of these
inspections and assessments, TSA develops mitigation strategies that
enhance an airport's security posture and determines if any changes are
required. TSA collaborates with airport operators to identify effective
practices across the industry regarding access control and perimeter
security.
To counter the potential risks to perimeter security, TSA deploys
Transportation Security Inspectors (TSIs) to help determine whether
airport operators are complying with all aspects of TSA regulations and
the airport's ASP, as well as to provide strategic oversight regarding
an airport's compliance status. The collaborative effort between TSA
and the airport results in security enhancements to the airport and,
where appropriate, amendments to the airport's ASP.
TSIs focus their assessments on security throughout the airport
environments, ranging from the curbside of the airport to the outermost
perimeter fence along the edge of the airport property. Regional
Security Inspectors (RSIs) located at TSA headquarters also conduct
annual and periodic oversight assessments of inspection activity for
air carrier and airport facilities at Category X, I, and II airports.
TSIs can recommend that civil penalties be assessed by TSA when
repeated or egregious instances of noncompliance with regulations and
security procedures are discovered.
Earlier this year, TSA's Office of Security Operations--Compliance
Programs initiated a Special Emphasis Assessment (SEA) and an SEI of
all Category X and Category I through IV airports, evaluating perimeter
security, including fencing, non-fenced man-made barriers, natural
barriers, CCTV, electronic intrusion and motion detection devices, and
other barriers. Assessments are complete for all Category X and I
airports and the remaining airport assessments are expected to be
completed later this month.
conclusion
TSA's goal, at all times, is to maximize transportation security
and stay ahead of evolving terrorist threats while protecting
passengers' privacy and facilitating the efficient flow of travelers
and legitimate commerce. We want to thank the subcommittee for the
opportunity to discuss this important issue with you today and we are
happy to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. McLaughlin.
The Chairman now recognizes Admiral Naccara for his
testimony.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL GEORGE NACCARA (RET.), FEDERAL SECURITY
DIRECTOR, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Admiral Naccara. Good morning, Chairman McCaul and Ranking
Member Keating. As my colleague, Chris McLaughlin, stated, I
will now discuss TSA initiatives that are specific to security
operations at Boston Logan Airport.
TSA has long recognized the value of a layered threat-based
approach to transportation security and the need to focus more
of our resources on people we know less about who may pose a
threat to aviation security. As part of its on-going commitment
to implement risk-based security measures, TSA is conducting a
Proof of Concept here in Boston to assess the value of
expanding behavior detection in the airport screening process.
Extensive research indicates this process is effective for
detecting hostile intent and potential high-risk individuals.
TSA's Behavior Detection Program, as you mentioned earlier,
sir, the Screening of Passengers by Observation Technique, also
known as SPOT, reveal that behavior detection was effective for
helping identify persons attempting to defeat the screening
process. Logan Airport was the first airport in the country to
implement the agency's SPOT program, which is now employed at
over 160 airports Nation-wide.
As part of this Proof of Concept, TSA is using specially
trained and certified Behavior Detection Officers, called BDOs,
who are focusing their efforts on passenger interactions and
behavior analysis. This is also being done in conjunction with
boarding pass and identification review at the entrance through
the checkpoints. The advanced training the officers receive
includes both classroom and on-the-job training, and they are
designed to enhance their communication skills to engage in
conversations with passengers to determine whether they may
pose a threat to transportation security. Although the vast
majority of passengers will experience a casual conversation
with our BDOs, a small number of passengers may be selected for
an extended but still limited conversation and some possibly
for additional screening.
The goal of this Proof of Concept is to understand how
behavior detection can be used to improve the effectiveness and
efficiency of transportation security and also the passenger
experience. We will evaluate how this Proof of Concept impacts
security screening operations and passenger throughput, among
other things, and these results will help us determine how the
agency proceeds with the program.
Now, I would like to describe how we are cooperating with
our other essential partners at the local level to closely
coordinate our security efforts. As you mentioned before,
collaboration is essential to strengthening transportation
security. Since its creation, TSA has engaged MassPort, the
State police, and the airline carriers here to enhance security
throughout Logan Airport, best exemplified by our daily morning
briefing.
As an explanation, at this briefing, we discuss incidents
of the previous day, new security measures, as well as longer-
term plans for the coming days and weeks. It is an opportunity
for everyone in the security environment to share their views
and concerns and to reach a common understanding of our roles
and responsibilities in respect to security.
Many positive tangible results arose from this cooperative
atmosphere, including a partnership with MassPort, the State
police, and TSA to develop and execute plays that deploy
varying security measures on a random basis throughout the
terminals and secure areas of the airport allowing us to
address vulnerabilities heretofore unaddressed.
In the case of a security incident, TSA, MassPort, State
police and the affected carriers immediately convene a
conference call to determine the facts, to assess the risks and
to collaboratively decide on a course of action to resolve the
matter with as little disruption to traffic as possible. TSA
and MassPort have also worked together to improve the closed
circuit TV coverage of the airport's critical areas, providing
TSA officials and airport officials with real-time access to
all available cameras in the airport.
This cooperation also extends across the Federal level as
illustrated by the creation of the Nation's first airport-based
counterterrorism office, as you've mentioned before. In that
office, several DHS components, including TSA, the Customs and
Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, will
all work with FBI's newly-opened Joint Terrorism Task Force
office at Logan Airport. We will certainly improve
communications, and this will also enhance intelligence
sharing.
Thank you for your time, and I look forward to answering
any questions that you may have, sir.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Admiral.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Freni for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF EDWARD C. FRENI, DIRECTOR OF AVIATION,
MASSACHUSETTS PORT AUTHORITY
Mr. Freni. Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, welcome
to Boston Logan International Airport. I want to thank you for
giving us the opportunity to describe some of the measures that
we've taken at Logan Airport to emerge from the tragedy of 9/11
into an airport recognized by both the Federal Government and
our peers in the airport industry as a National leader in
aviation security.
For the record, my name is Edward C. Freni, and I'm
Director of Aviation for the Massachusetts Port Authority which
owns and operates Logan Airport as well as Worcester Regional
Airport and Hanscom Field in Bedford.
Last Sunday, America marked the 10th anniversary of the
worst terrorist attack on this country in our history. More
than 3,000 of our fellow Americans, as well as many citizens
from other nations, were brutally killed in New York City,
Washington, DC, and in a remote field in rural Pennsylvania.
One hundred and forty seven of those fatalities were from Logan
Airport, as two flights departing Boston for Los Angeles on the
morning of September 11, 2001, American Airlines Flight 11 and
United Airlines Flight 175, were commandeered by terrorists and
used to attack New York's World Trade Center towers. Logan is a
place where the scars left by the 9/11 attacks ``still run
deep,'' as security expert Stephen Flynn said, accurately, as I
can attest.
September 11 had a profound impact on MassPort. Since that
fateful day, MassPort has implemented an aggressive program of
smart and focused security initiatives to strengthen defenses
against potential threats. In the days and months following the
attacks of 9/11, MassPort has worked tirelessly to implement
strategies, policies, and programs suggested by security
experts in the industry. MassPort continues to explore new
technologies and ideas in order to maintain our status as a
security innovator.
Logan responded to that challenge and is now recognized as
a National leader in aviation security. Logan is frequently
chosen by the TSA and the Department of Homeland Security to
pilot new techniques and technologies before they're installed
and implemented Nation-wide. Behavioral pattern recognition
surveillance techniques were pioneered by our State police here
at Logan. The TSA took note of this new technique, which is an
adopted version of methods used by the Israelis to spot
terrorists using information derived from observed behavior
rather than racial or ethnic categories and transformed it into
a National program that TSA calls SPOT.
Today, the TSA is again recognizing Logan's appreciation of
this behavior approach by using us as their initial test site
for risk-based screening using specially trained behavior
assessors who ask passengers a short list of questions to help
them determine if passengers might be pursuing a hostile
agenda.
Logan was the first airport in the country to meet the 2002
Congressional mandate for 100 percent baggage screening when we
completed on time an automated in-line system of screening all
checked baggage. MassPort is also a leader in evaluating new
transportation security technologies on its own. To help weigh
the effectiveness of new technologies, MassPort's Office of
Corporate Security created the Transportation Security Center
of Excellence that invites inventors, vendors of emerging
technologies to test their products at MassPort's airport and
Seaport facilities.
Logan also tries to make security everyone's business, from
the CEO to the front-line ticket agents and baggage handlers.
We've even badged and deputized the clammers who fish in the
mudflats off Logan's runway ends, recruiting them to be an
additional set of eyes and ears, reporting suspicious activity
out there in our vulnerable airport perimeter.
But the most significant improvement we've made toward
keeping our airports and the flying public safer and more
secure is the communication, coordination, and close working
partnerships that now exist between agencies who have met every
day since 9/11 to review the latest information and
intelligence together and to plan an appropriate response for
that day. MassPort's daily 8:30 morning security meeting
bringing together all agencies with security responsibilities
is well-known throughout the industry.
For the sake of simplicity, Logan Airport's response after
9/11 can be grouped under three broad categories. First were
steps to physically harden Logan Airport and our other airport
and seaport facilities against the possibility of their being a
target of direct terrorist attack such as a suicide bombing.
Under this category, I must include the consolidation of 11
points of access to Logan airfield pre-9/11 into just 2 heavily
fortified, military-style security gates post-9/11 capable of
withstanding an attempted breach from even a heavy vehicle.
Second are the technological innovations we've made to the
airport's security. Here I would like to include our baggage
screening system, the biometric controlled access systems and
surveillance cameras that we've installed, as well as the
technologies we field-tested in real-time real-life settings
including those screening technologies we pilot-tested for the
TSA.
Third are the steps we've taken to marshal and better
organize the human assets that protect this airport. That
includes everything from the Massachusetts State Troopers from
Troop F who patrol Logan's terminals to the Sky Caps who work
the terminal curbsides. There is an old saying that goes, ``You
can't manage what you can't measure.''
Also unique to Logan is the development and use of over 200
line items of security metrics that help MassPort manage its
multi-million dollar security program. Our metrics enable us to
achieve a high level of visibility on the performance of all
our security program components and track their performance
over time by comparing performance year over year. This has
lead to many improvements such as the camera surveillance
program current metric that no camera is out of service more
than 24 hours on average.
Hardening Potential Targets: Let me begin with some of the
steps we took physically to harden Logan Airport as a future
terrorist attack. I've already mentioned the restricted access
to the Logan airfield that now exists with a single heavily
fortified gate at both the northern and southern ends of the
airfield.
In addition, Logan erected pillars, concrete barriers in
front of every terminal to prevent a terrorist from driving a
bomb into the airport. We also replaced its 8-foot-high chain-
link fence around the perimeter to a 10-foot-high concrete
wall.
After 9/11, MassPort's security organization was thoroughly
reviewed and analysis was completed of all of the procedures
currently in place along with the placement and security of all
fences, doors, windows, gates, underground utility tunnels, air
intakes, and hundreds of smaller details bearing on the
security of those critical assets.
While Logan's Nationally-recognized bag screening system
garnered most of the attention and accolades, there were other
equally important initiatives undertaken to improve the overall
security of MassPort's facilities. Shatter-proof laminate was
installed in every airport terminal window to reduce injuries
from flying glass should an explosion occur. Hundreds of bomb-
resistant trash receptacles were installed in all of our
terminals and our parking garages. Barriers were erected to
prevent vehicles from approaching sensitive buildings. Idling
limos and taxis were relocated so that they could be screened
away from the terminal areas before proceeding to pick up our
passengers.
Tow trucks were deployed in forward positions alerting
motorists that unattended or illegally parked vehicles at
terminal curbsides would be removed. This was especially true
when the security threat level went up triggering MassPort's
zero tolerance policy that compels the immediate impoundment of
improperly parked vehicles anywhere on our property. A vehicle
inspection system was instituted to reopen parking lots near
terminals that were closed by order of the FAA after the
terrorist attacks.
Authorized by a special act of the Massachusetts State
Legislature, a 500-foot security zone was established around
Logan's waterside perimeter. The perimeter is marked off with
buoys and enforced by stepped-up patrols, which also gave
MassPort an opportunity to strengthen our relationship with the
U.S. Coast Guard, our local harbormasters, and the City of
Boston's maritime security efforts. Random roadblocks were
conducted by State police troops at the entrance points of our
airport.
Technological Innovations: Logan Airport is also in the
forefront of technological innovations used to improve
security. Logan was the only Cat X airport to complete the
project of December 31, 2002, Federal deadline, 4 years later
remained among the few large airports to have achieved a fully
in-line explosive detection system. This was among the
achievements that helped Logan earn Air Safety Week Airport
Security Report's Exceptional Performance of Airport Security
in 2004.
Workers travelled to Logan from more than 40 States after
9/11 often sleeping in trailers they hauled themselves to
install nearly 3 miles of bag belts, powered by more than 300
motors, construct 85,000 square feet of new bag rooms, renovate
55,000 square feet of existing bag rooms and construct eight
new power substations.
Logan is also making the needed structural changes. We have
also installed about 200 security cameras throughout every
airport concourse and airfield access points that can be
monitored simultaneously at one central security office. A
high-resolution surveillance camera currently being tested in
Terminal A can record activity in an area the size of a stadium
all the way to a Coke spilled on the floor.
Along the airport perimeter, we have an extensive defense
in depth which combines camera surveillance technology with
police and fireboat patrols, police, fire, and operations
vehicle patrols, and special fencing. We're also pursuing an
automated intrusion detection system for this area. In 2007, we
installed new access control systems to ensure that only
authorized personnel are able to enter our secure areas.
Our Human Assets: Technology is an important tool, but more
important are the people who use it. While new technologies and
capital construction projects grab the headlines, good security
starts with people, communication, and organization. Logan
believes that security is everyone's business, from the
MassPort's CEO to the hundreds of vendors who work in the
terminals.
Through our Logan Watch Program, the airport instills a
culture of security awareness among Logan's front-line staff,
the eyes and ears of this airport who deal face-to-face with
Logan's customers every day, by giving them counterterrorism
training to help them spot and report activity that may be out
of the ordinary or suspicious.
A list of employees to help guard against threats is
important. But equally important is to ensure that prospective
employees are not threats to themselves. This is why we
instituted an intensive system of background checks and badging
for everyone that works in this airport, whether in a secure
area or the public space.
But perhaps the most important improvement made since
September 11 has been the improved communication and
cooperation that now exists among State, local, and Federal
agencies that have responsibilities to keep Logan safe and
secure.
Admiral Naccara, Major Concannon, and I were not merely
picked at random to be on this panel. We are part of a much
larger team which first met on the afternoon of September 11
and has continued to meet and is meeting every single morning
since then at 8:30 to assess current security information and
threat intelligence. Seven days a week, Logan's security team
assembles, MassPort Operations security teams, MassPort Fire
Rescue and the Massachusetts State Police, the FAA, the TSA,
the FBI, the Federal Air Marshals Service, the U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, the airlines, our major tenants, and
construction contractors are among those who attend this
meeting.
At the meeting, we review the events of the past 24 hours,
set the priorities and actions for the coming day. This is
tremendously effective because all of the key decision-makers
are present in one room at the same time every day. All
agencies can now simultaneously review intelligence from the
preceding 24 hours and adjust our priorities and response for
the day ahead.
In conclusion: From the challenges of 9/11, Boston Logan
International Airport has emerged as a Nationally-recognized
leader in airport security. The airport's layered approach to
security creates a gauntlet of information-sharing, interagency
cooperation, cutting-edge technology and top-to-bottom human
interaction that helps identify and thwart potential threats to
the safety and security of Logan's workers and passengers,
whether from terrorism or other sources.
Logan was the first major airport in the Nation to have 100
percent in-line checked baggage screening, a 10-foot-high
perimeter concrete wall around its landside boundary, a
behavioral detection program that has been implemented and
replicated by the TSA Nation-wide, and 100 percent biometric
access control to restricted areas of the airport. The list of
Logan's new security initiatives over the last 10 years is
long, yet however many initiatives MassPort may have launched
over the past decade since 9/11, security involves much more
than formulating countermeasures to identify threats and
vulnerabilities.
At its core, good security is an extension of leadership.
The commitment to use scarce resources to meet potential
threats when other competing demands crowd for attention, the
skill to educate the public about its responsibilities for
improved security and the trade-offs it must make in lost time
and convenience if the system is to work, the consistency to
maintain organizational vigilance despite the inevitable and
the almost endless lulls and false alarms, this requires
strong, consistent leadership for a security system to work.
These have been the hallmarks of MassPort's efforts as it has
become a leader in transportation security.
Last Sunday the Nation paused to honor the memories of
those lives that were tragically lost on September 11, 2001 and
paid tribute to the courage and dedication to the duty of the
heroes and first responders of that day, many of whom have lost
their lives. Memorials now exist at Ground Zero in New York
City, at the Pentagon in Washington, DC, and in a remote field
in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, and here at Boston Logan
International Airport where the attacks of 9/11 were both a
National tragedy and a personal one for all of us.
Yet I believe that the most fitting memorial we could make
to those who were lost that day is to continue doing everything
humanly possible to ensure that the tragedy which took their
lives never happens again. With this committee's help, I'm
confident that we will.
Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Freni follows:]
Prepared Statement of Edward Freni
September 16, 2011
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and Members of the
committee. Welcome to Boston Logan International Airport.
I want to thank you for giving us this opportunity to describe some
of the measures we've undertaken at Logan Airport to emerge from the
tragedy of 9/11 into an airport recognized by both the Federal
Government and our peers in the airport industry as a National leader
in aviation security.
For the record, my name is Edward C. Freni, Director of Aviation
for the Massachusetts Port Authority which owns and operates Logan
Airport as well as Worcester Regional Airport and L.G. Hanscom Field in
Bedford.
Last Sunday, America marked the 10th anniversary of the worst
terrorist attack on this country in our history. More than 3,000 of our
fellow Americans, as well as many citizens from other nations, were
brutally killed in New York City, Washington, DC and in a remote field
in rural Pennsylvania.
One hundred forty seven of those fatalities were from Logan Airport
as two flights departing Boston for Los Angeles on the morning of
September 11, 2001--Americans Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines
Flight 175--were commandeered by terrorists and used to attack New
York's World Trade Center towers.
Logan is a place where the scars left by the 9/11 attacks ``still
run deep,'' as the security expert Stephen Flynn said, accurately, as I
can attest.
I was the senior aviation official in charge at Logan that morning
as our airport director at the time, Tom Kinton, was in Canada along
with many other airport directors from around the world attending the
annual conference of Airports Council International. I had just gotten
off the phone with Tom telling him the weather was beautiful and
everything was going smoothly when we first learned a plane had hit the
World Trade Center.
At first we thought it was just a single engine private plane whose
pilot had either lost control or become disoriented and veered
tragically off course. But then we learned it was a commercial
jetliner, and also that it had originated from Logan Airport.
Then the second plane hit. In those first few hours after two
flights from Logan Airport were hijacked, we couldn't be sure whether
Logan itself might also be a target for attack.
The rest of that day, and those that followed, were a blur. Though
we could not know the precise details at the time, all of us who were
there that day at Logan Airport knew that from that moment on, our
world would never be the same.
The tragic fact that Logan will forever be linked to 9/11 means
there is a ``never again sense of mission,'' as Flynn called it, among
those of us at Massport and throughout the law enforcement community in
Boston to raise the bar on the way we manage the risk of a possible
future attack at Logan Airport.
September 11 had a profound impact on Massport. Since that fateful
day, Massport has implemented an aggressive program of smart and
focused security initiatives to strengthen defenses against potential
threats.
In the days and months following the attacks of 9/11, Massport
brought in National and international security experts, including a
team from Israel, to work with the authority in developing a program
second to none.
Since then, Massport has worked tirelessly to implement strategies,
policies, and programs suggested by security experts in our industry.
And Massport continues to explore new technologies and ideas in order
to maintain our status as a security innovator.
Because of what happened at Logan that day, Massport has always
felt a special obligation and urgency to be on the forefront of
whatever new techniques or technologies are out there that promise to
make aviation more secure.
We have been, because we knew that Logan Airport would always be in
the National spotlight with a public anxious to believe in the air
travel system again that would use Logan as a yardstick to measure how
far we'd come to improve the security of that aviation system.
Logan responded to that challenge and is now recognized as a
National leader in aviation security. Logan is frequently chosen by the
TSA and the Department of Homeland Security to pilot new techniques and
technologies before they are installed or implemented Nation-wide.
Behavior pattern recognition surveillance techniques were pioneered
by our State Police here at Logan. The TSA took note of this new
technique--which is an adopted version of methods used by the Israelis
to spot terrorists using information derived from observed behavior
rather than racial or ethnic categories--and transformed it into a
National program the TSA calls ``SPOT.''
Today, the TSA is again recognizing Logan's appreciation of this
behavior approach by using us as their initial test site for risk-based
screening using specially-trained behavior assessors who ask passengers
a short list of questions to help them determine if passengers might be
pursuing a hostile agenda.
Logan was the first airport in the country to meet the 2002
Congressional mandate for 100% baggage screening when we completed on
time an automated, in-line system for screening all checked baggage.
Massport is also a leader in evaluating new transportation security
technologies on its own. To help weigh the effectiveness of new
technologies, Massport's Office of Corporate Security created the
Transportation Security Center of Excellence that invites inventors and
vendors of emerging technologies to test their products at Massport's
airport and seaport facilities.
Logan also tries to make security everyone's business, from the CEO
to the front-line ticket agents and baggage handlers.
We've even badged and deputized the clammers who fish in the
mudflats off Logan's runway ends, recruiting them to be an additional
set of eyes and ears, reporting suspicious activity out there on that
vulnerable airport perimeter.
But the most significant improvement we've made toward keeping our
airports and the flying public safer and more secure is the
communication, coordination, and close working partnerships that now
exist between agencies who've met every day since 9/11 to review the
latest information and intelligence together and to plan an appropriate
response for that day.
Massport's daily 8:30 morning security meeting, bringing together
all agencies with security responsibilities, is well-known throughout
the industry.
For the sake of simplicity, Logan Airport's response after 9/11 can
be grouped under three broad categories:
First, were steps to physically harden Logan Airport, and our other
airport and seaport facilities, against the possibility of their being
a target of a direct terrorist attack, such as a suicide bomber. Under
this category I might include the consolidation of 11 points of access
to the Logan airfield pre-9/11 into just two heavily fortified,
military-style security gates post-9/11 capable of withstanding an
attempted breech from even a heavy vehicle.
Second, are the technological innovations we've made to the
airport's security. Here, I would include our baggage screening system,
the biometric-controlled access systems and surveillance cameras we've
installed, as well as the technologies we've field tested in real-time,
real-life settings, including those screening technologies we've pilot-
tested for the TSA.
Third are the steps we have taken to marshal and better organize
the human assets that protect this airport, and that includes
everything from the Massachusetts State Troopers from Troop F who
patrol Logan's terminals to the Sky Caps who work the terminal curbs
outside.
There is an old saying that goes: ``You can't manage what you can't
measure.'' Also unique to Logan is the development and use of over 200
line items of security metrics that help Massport manage its multi-
million dollar security program.
Our metrics enable us to achieve a high level of visibility on the
performance of all our security program components and track their
performance over time by comparing performance year over year. This has
led to many improvements, such as the camera surveillance programs
current metric that no camera is out of service for more than 24 hours,
on average.
hardening potential targets
Let me begin with some of the steps we took to physically harden
Logan Airport against a future terrorist attack. A facility like Logan
Airport designed for easy public access and serving as many as 28
million passengers a year--77,000 passengers a day--is often called a
``soft target'' because the open and publicly-accessible nature of its
mission presents unique security challenges for those who operate and
protect them.
I have already mentioned the restricted access to the Logan
Airfield that now exists, with a single, heavily-fortified gate at both
the northern and southern ends of the airfield.
In addition, Logan erected pillars and concrete barriers in front
of every terminal to prevent a terrorist from driving a bomb into the
airport. We also replaced its 8-foot-high chain link fence around the
perimeter with a 10-foot-high concrete wall.
After 9/11 Massport's security organization was thoroughly
reviewed. An analysis was completed of all the procedures currently in
place, along with the placement and security of all fences, doors,
windows, gates, underground utilities tunnels, air intakes, and the
hundreds of smaller details bearing on the security of these critical
assets.
Deterrence and prevention, of course, are always the primary
objective. But prudence dictates that it is also necessary to adopt
measures to decrease the deadly toll of a terrorist attack should one
be attempted.
While Logan's Nationally-recognized bag screening system garnered
most of the attention and accolades, there were other, equally
important initiatives undertaken to improve the overall security of
Massport's facilities:
Shatter-proof laminate was installed to every airport
terminal windows to reduce injuries from flying glass should an
explosion occur.
Hundreds of bomb-resistant trash receptacles were installed
in all terminals and parking garages.
Barriers were erected to prevent vehicles from approaching
sensitive buildings.
Idling limos and taxis were relocated so they could be
screened away from terminals before proceeding to pick up
passengers.
Tow trucks were deployed in forward positions, alerting
motorists that unattended or illegally parked vehicles at the
terminal curbside would be removed. This was especially true
when the security threat level went up, triggering Massport's
zero tolerance policy that compels the immediate impoundment of
improperly parked vehicles anywhere on the property.
A vehicle inspection system was instituted to reopen parking
lots near terminals that were closed by order of the FAA after
the terrorist attacks--another security initiative that
provides significant customer service benefits for Logan's
passengers.
Authorized by a special act of the Massachusetts State
Legislature, a 500-foot security zone was established around
Logan's waterside perimeter. The perimeter is marked off with
buoys and enforced by stepped-up patrols, which also gave
Massport an opportunity to strengthen our relationship with the
U.S. Coast Guard, local harbormasters, and the City of Boston's
maritime security efforts.
Random road-blocks were conducted by State police troops at
the entrance to our parking garages.
technological innovations
Logan Airport is also in the forefront of technological innovations
used to improve security.
Compelling proof of this commitment is Logan's baggage screening
system.
Logan was the only Category X airport to complete the project by
the December 31, 2002 Federal deadline and 4 years later remained among
the few large U.S. airports to have achieved a fully in-line Explosive
Detection System.
That was among the achievements that helped Logan earn Air Safety
Week Airport Security Report's ``Exceptional Performance in Airport
Security Award'' in 2004.
Logan's bag screening system was a massive undertaking successfully
completed by nearly 800 bricklayers, electricians, carpenters,
ironworkers, HVAC workers, bag belt workers, and others--all of whom
had to be monitored daily to ensure security--and who worked around the
clock to compress 2 or 3 years of construction work into less than 1.
Workers traveled to Logan from more than 40 States after 9/11,
often sleeping in trailers they hauled themselves, to install nearly 3
miles of bag belts powered by more than 300 motors, construct 85,000
square feet of new bag rooms, renovate 55,000 square feet of existing
bag rooms, and construct eight new power substations.
Logan's was the first bag screening system given the go-ahead to
begin construction on the Federally-mandated system by the new TSA, and
Massport's Board committed nearly $150 million to expedite construction
before the reimbursement formula that eventually repaid those funds was
even in place.
At the same time the bag screening project was moving forward,
Massport was designing and constructing modern security checkpoints for
the TSA's passenger screening.
The system incorporated updated equipment, better layout for
increased flow, and the development of exit lane security doors and
video monitoring to prevent the need to empty a terminal or concourse
should there be concern about a possible security breach. Since then
Logan has made significant investments to improve efficiency by
retrofitting our terminals to consolidate checkpoints in both Terminal
B and Terminal C.
These are just a few examples where Logan is improving security
with technology. Logan is also making needed structural changes.
We have also installed about 200 security cameras throughout every
airport concourse and airfield access points that can be monitored
simultaneously from a central security office. A high-resolution
surveillance camera currently being tested in Terminal A can record
activity in an area the size of a stadium, all the way down to a Coke
spilled on the floor.
Along the airport perimeter we have an extensive defense in depth
which combines camera surveillance technology with police and fire boat
patrols; police, fire, and operations vehicle patrols, and special
fencing. We are also pursuing automated intrusion detection for this
area.
In 2007, we installed a new Access Control System to ensure that
only authorized personnel are able to enter secure areas.
Logan also tries to be on the cutting edge of the development of
new techniques and technologies to make our Nation more secure than it
has ever been before. We have become a laboratory for the field testing
of promising new security innovations. To separate what works from
what's a waste of time Massport has assembled a special Security
Advisory Committee.
This group of experienced professionals, with contacts in New
England's academic and business communities, works with our Director of
Corporate Security to evaluate new security technologies and how they
might be used.
The council helps us to quickly decide which ideas are worth
pursuing as we continue to launch pilot projects that push the envelope
on ways to improve security--without sacrificing operational
effectiveness.
These tests, for example, proved the value of handheld wireless
computers that were issued to our State Police, allowing troopers on
foot patrol to conduct criminal history and license plate checks via a
secure wireless network.
human assets
Technology is an important tool. But more important are the people
who use it. While new technologies and capital construction projects
grab the headlines, good security starts with people, communication,
and organization.
Logan believes that security is everyone's business, from
Massport's CEO to the hundreds of vendors who work in the terminals. To
remind everyone of this fact and to keep workers vigilant and on their
toes, Logan has instituted a public recognition program called
``SAFE''--Security Awareness is for Everyone--to single out those
workers who do their part to protect this airport.
Through our ``Logan Watch'' program the airport instills a culture
of security awareness among Logan's front-line staff--the eyes and ears
of this airport who deal face-to-face with Logan's customers every
day--by giving them counter-terrorism training to help them spot and
report activity that may be out-of-the-ordinary or suspicious.
To help employees do that more effectively, while also providing
customer service benefits, Massport established an ``English for
Speakers of Other Languages'' program at Logan Airport that has been in
effect for the past 2 years. This joint effort of Massport, UGL Unicco,
and SEIU Local 615 provides 32 weeks of intensive English instruction
for airport workers whose primary language is not English.
With the emphasis Logan Airport places on front-line airport
employees to provide clear and accurate information to law enforcement
officials about potential threats to airport security and public
safety, Massport knew it was important to improve the English
proficiency skills of everyone who works at this airport.
While improving airport security may have been the primary impetus
for a program that gives all airport workers the confidence to
communicate effectively with the public, providing language skills also
improves customer service for our passengers and opens new career doors
for our workers.
Enlisting employees to help guard against threats is important. But
equally important is to ensure that prospective employees are not
threats themselves. This is why we have instituted an intensive system
of background checks and badging for everyone who works at this
airport, whether in secure areas or public spaces.
A program was implemented to check the fingerprints and criminal
history records of all airport employees, contractors, and construction
workers. These innovations don't stop at Logan Airport as Hanscom Field
in Bedford became the first airport of its size to have a security
badge program using FBI fingerprint background checks to better
identify people who have access to the airfield.
These were just some of the measures Logan adopted after turning to
Nationally and internationally respected experts on counter-terrorism
in order to better understand and prepare for the new world we woke up
to on the morning of September 11, 2001.
Airports in America have a lot to learn from the experience of
airports in those parts of the world that have had to deal with the
threat of terrorism much longer than we have. So immediately after 9/11
Logan hired the former head of security for Israel's El Al Airlines and
Ben Gurion Airport, Rafi Ron, whose experience as a security specialist
in one of the world's most dangerous regions was invaluable to Logan in
preparing to counteract today's the new threats.
By bringing Rafi Ron to Logan Airport we have been able to learn
about the strict security that is standard operating procedure in
Europe and Israel, while learning how these security measures can be
adopted and incorporated into the operations of large, complex American
airports like Logan with their unique demands and constraints.
But perhaps the most important improvement made since September 11
has been the improved communication, cooperation, and cooperation that
now exists among State, local, and Federal agencies that have
responsibilities for keeping Logan safe and secure.
Admiral Naccara, Major Concannon, and I were not merely picked at
random to be on this panel. We are part of a much larger working team
which first met on the afternoon of September 11 and has continued
meeting every morning since then at 8:30 to assess current security
information and threat intelligence.
Seven days a week, Logan's security team assembles: Massport
operations and security teams, Massport Fire Rescue, the Massachusetts
State Police, the FAA, the TSA, the FBI, the Federal Air Marshal
Service, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the airlines, our major
tenants and construction contractors, among others.
At the meeting we review the events of the past 24 hours and set
the priorities and actions for the coming day. This is tremendously
effective because all the key decision makers are present in one room,
at the same time, every day. All agencies can now simultaneously review
intelligence from the preceding 24 hours and adjust our priorities and
response for the day ahead.
Another example of the close inter-agency cooperation you find at
Logan Airport is the Joint Terrorism Task Force composed of Federal,
State, and local law enforcement and security professionals.
In another security first, Massport and the FBI announced just last
month the opening of a Joint Terrorism Task Force headquarters here at
Logan International Airport--the first ever, airport-based FBI-Joint
Terrorism Task Force Unit in the country.
Thanks to the new headquarters of the joint terrorism task force
here at Logan, these agencies will be able to remain in constant
physical contact even after the 8:30 morning meeting breaks up--further
contributing to the teamwork that exists.
The offices, located on-site at Logan, were formally opened in July
by FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III. The facility is a tangible
example of the collaborative approach to security at this airport.
The agencies with a daily presence at the facility are the FBI,
TSA, Federal Air Marshall Service, U.S. Department of State Diplomatic
Security Service, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Massachusetts
State Police, Boston Police Department, Homeland Security
Investigations, and Massport.
The opening of the JTTF Annex has greatly enhanced the task force's
ability to share vital information and dramatically strengthen
investigative support in a timely manner with those that may be
affected by criminal acts.
conclusion
From the challenges of 9/11 Boston Logan International Airport has
emerged as a Nationally-recognized leader in airport security. The
airport's layered approach to security creates a gauntlet of
information-sharing, inter-agency cooperation, cutting-edge technology
and top-to-bottom human interaction that helps identify and thwart
potential threats to the safety and security of Logan's workers and
passengers, whether from terrorism or other sources.
Logan was the first major airport in the Nation to have 100% in-
line checked baggage screening, a 10-foot-high perimeter concrete wall
around its landside boundary, a behavior detection program that has
been replicated by the TSA Nation-wide, and 100% biometric access
control to restricted areas of the airport.
The list of Logan's new security initiatives over the past 10 years
is long. Yet, however many initiatives Massport may have launched over
the past decade since 9/11, security involves much more than
formulating countermeasures to identified threats and vulnerabilities.
At its core, good security is an extension of leadership. The
commitment to use scarce resources to meet potential threats when other
competing demands crowd for attention; the skill to educate the public
about its responsibilities for improved security and the tradeoffs it
must make in lost time and convenience if the system is to work; the
constancy to maintain organizational vigilance despite the inevitable,
and almost endless, lulls and false alarms--this requires strong,
consistent leadership for a security system to work. These have been
the hallmarks of Massport's efforts as it has become a leader in
transportation security.
Last Sunday the Nation paused to honor the memories of those whose
lives were tragically lost on September 11, 2001 and pay tribute to the
courage and dedication to duty of the heroes and first responders of
that day, many of whom also lost their lives.
Memorials now exist at Ground Zero in New York City, at the
Pentagon in Washington, DC, in a remote field in Shanksville,
Pennsylvania and here at Boston Logan International Airport, where the
attacks of 9/11 were both a National tragedy and a personal one as
well.
Yet I believe that the most fitting memorial we could make to those
who were lost that day is to continue doing everything humanly possible
to ensure that the tragedy which took their lives never happens again.
With this committee's help, I am confident we will.
Thank you.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Freni. Let me just personally
thank you for your service and the Massachusetts Port Authority
for its service. I know you were here that fateful day. I can't
imagine what was going through your mind, at that time. But
you've been a real leader for the Nation, in terms of airport
security, and you've really done a great job making this
airport safer. So thank you so much.
Mr. Freni. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McCaul. Next the Chairman now recognizes Major
Concannon.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL P. CONCANNON, MAJOR, STATE POLICE TROOP F,
BOSTON LOGAN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
Mr. Concannon. Good morning, Chairman McCaul and Ranking
Member Keating. It's my honor and pleasure to speak with this
committee regarding the topic of assessing airport security and
preventing a future terrorist attack. Thank you for this
opportunity.
For the record, my name is Major Michael D. Concannon. I'm
the Commanding Officer of Troop F of the Massachusetts State
Police, charged with providing law enforcement and security
services here at Boston Logan International Airport as well as
at other MassPort properties.
I'd first like to acknowledge the tremendous and
professional working relationships that exists among the
numerous entities that make up the security team at Logan
Airport. It is my sincere belief that it is because of these
incredibly strong partnerships that Logan Airport has been able
to get it right when it comes to securing the large Category X
international airport in the post-9/11 era.
Those of us who work hard each day to protect the people
and infrastructure at Logan understand that nothing less than a
true team effort will work. Clearly, there is a sensitivity at
Logan Airport due to the history here that drives this high
level of commitment. The exceptional professional and personal
relationships that have been forged through the years here at
Boston have laid the foundation for any number of historic and
groundbreaking security enhancements.
Among these achievements are an historic playbook
collaborative effort, an effective and coordinated State police
and TSA canine effort, a comprehensive advanced imaging testing
resolution protocol, an effective and efficient coordinated
effort to maximize the resources of the TSA's bomb appraisal
officers, as well as our own bomb squad, a practical and
legally sound checkpoint response protocol, a unified breached
resolution protocol, an on-airport robust ICE/DEA task force,
and a recently established first in the Nation on-airport FBI
Joint Terrorism Task Force Annex. These are just some of the
advancements that we've been able to implement here at Logan
Airport in recent years, and they are an example of, as well
as, the fruits of the solid partnerships in place here at
Logan.
We continue to cultivate a very positive culture within the
Logan security team where all of the airport's stakeholders,
each and every employee is expected to understand, appreciate,
and perform a security rule. These efforts were recently
recognized at the highest levels of the TSA when the newly-
appointed administrator, Mr. John Pistole, on his very first
airport visit upon being appointed came to Logan Airport. He
commented that the security operation here was ``one of the
best, most secure'' of all of the airports in the Nation. We
strive each day to ensure that our efforts are worthy of such
high praise.
In my role as Troop F Commander, I'm involved in all
security matters that concern Logan Airport as well as other
MassPort properties, and I work every single day with all of
our partners, most notably, the TSA. In addition to being the
Troop F Commander, I also serve as MassPort's Director of
Aviation Security, and I'm afforded a seat at the table for all
security-related discussions.
The specific assets that the Massachusetts State Police
offer in protecting these properties are numerous. Troop F
consists of several components, including uniform troopers who
perform patrol duties, troopers in tactical units such as the
bomb squad and canine units, as well as troopers in
investigative units and support units. We also have an officer
assigned full-time to the newly created JTTF Annex. Each
officer views his or her role as a member of the larger airport
community and has embraced the cooperative and collaborative
approach that is so vital in protecting the airport, its
stakeholders, and the traveling public.
Troop F is different from other geographic troops that make
up the Massachusetts State Police, most of which include among
their duties patrols of long stretches of State highways. While
Troop F does not have the traditional patrol function, we do
have the unique responsibility for maintaining a layered
security approach at Logan Airport including the waterside and
landside perimeters, the terminal and curb area, both with the
public side of the passenger terminals and the sterile side as
well as the aircraft operating area, the ramp area. The focus
at Troop F primarily here at Logan Airport is a blend of a
proactive security strategy coupled with a strong customer
service approach. Our goal is the professional delivery of the
highest levels of police and security services to MassPort
through a combination of vigilance and courtesy.
Not only is the specific mission of Troop F different than
other State police troops, but the approach to fulfilling the
mission is also different. Rather than a traditional response
model whereby police officers respond to calls for service
after the fact, the model at Troop F is a proactive one. Every
officer here, regardless of unit assignment, has been trained
in behavior pattern recognition and is expected to utilize
these skills on a daily basis throughout the airport. Troopers
are expected to be alert for anything or anybody who appears
out the ordinary, whose behavior does not seem to fit in with
normal actions and routines of travelers. When such behavior or
action arises or raises questions, troopers engage that person
in conversation to further assess the situation. This proactive
preventative approach to security is certainly different than
many of the assignments on the State police, and this mind-set
is reiterated and reinforced repeatedly here at Troop F.
Boston Logan was the first airport in the Nation to deploy
this BPR program which was modeled after the Israeli airport
security program and has been adapted for U.S. airport
environment by Mr. Rafi Ron, an international aviation security
expert hired by MassPort immediately after 9/11. The BPR
program contributes to the creation of an efficient
multilayered security system for the airport. As has been
mentioned, this concept was the forerunner of the SPOT EDO
program that you've heard about.
It should be pointed out that, whenever a new security
strategy is introduced, its vital to ensure that the Security
team is on the same page. Beyond that, it's also critically
important that the public supports the efforts as well.
The BPR program and its observation and conversation
techniques have been well-received at Logan Airport and have
been embraced by the entire security team. These techniques are
welcome by Logan Airport passengers who are reassured by the
proactive and professional approach designed to identify
potential criminals or terrorists without inconveniencing the
tens of thousands of passengers who use Logan Airport each day.
Not only are the officers of Troop F trained to be on the
lookout for items, persons, or behaviors of concern, they are
also trained to receive any and all referrals by airport
employees and members of the public of issues that concern
them.
We coordinate our efforts closely with a variety of law
enforcement and Homeland Security partners, including MassPort,
the TSA, the Federal Air Marshals Service, Customs and Border
Protection, the FBI, Immigrations and Customs Enforcement and
the DEA, just to name a few. The officers assigned here in each
of our security partners understand and accept that we are all
part of a much larger layered security framework at the airport
that includes not only law enforcement, public safety, and
security personnel but also every single one of our 14,000
badged airport employees. The mind-set of every single person
who works at the airport must be and is, ``If you see something
that concerns you, you should say something to the
authorities,'' or in short, ``See something, say something.''
Further, it's often mentioned here that, if you work at
Logan Airport and you can go a day without thinking of 9/11,
you should not work at Logan Airport. This cannot be
overstated. We rely heavily on the eyes and ears of the airport
community, including the airline employees, the airport vendor
employees, the ground transportation team and members of the
traveling public to assist us in securing Logan Airport. We
constantly remind each of these partners of the important role
that they play, and we have programs in place to train these
people, remind these people, and recognize these people for
their contributions.
I'm confident in saying to this committee that the entire
Boston Logan International Airport security team has worked
very hard each day to accomplish these goals, and we have
remained positive and flexible as we've had to adapt to
evolving threats and challenging times. Further, we will
continue to work hard and to be constantly mindful of the
critical need for cooperation, communication, and
collaboration. We have wrestled with many of the issues
affecting airports across the country. But because of the
constant effort to work together, to communicate openly, and to
be mindful that we share a common goal, we have been able to
work these issues to successful resolution.
The advice that we would offer to other airports is this:
Communication serves to establish relationships. Relationships
forge true partnerships. Strong partnerships ensure successful
collaborative outcomes.
Again, I thank the Chairman and Ranking Member, Mr.
Keating, and the committee for the opportunity to appear before
you today and to share my thoughts. I look forward to any
questions that you may have, thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Concannon follows:]
Prepared Statement of Major Michael P. Concannon
September 16, 2011
Good morning Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and Members
of the committee.
My name is Major Michael P. Concannon. I am the Commanding Officer
of Troop F of the Massachusetts State Police; charged with providing
law enforcement and security services here at Boston/Logan
International Airport as well as at other Massachusetts Port Authority
(Massport) properties.
It is my honor and pleasure to speak with this committee regarding
the topic of assessing airport security and preventing a future
terrorist attack. Thank you for this opportunity.
I would first like to acknowledge the tremendous professional
working relationships that exist among the numerous entities that make
up the ``Security Team'' at Logan Airport. It is my sincere belief that
it is because of these incredibly strong partnerships that Logan
Airport has been able to ``get it right'' when it comes to securing a
large Category X international airport in this post-9/11 era.
Those of us who work hard each day to protect the people and the
infrastructure at Logan understand that nothing less than a true team
effort will work. Clearly, there is a sensitivity at Logan Airport, due
to the history at our airport, that drives this high level of
commitment.
The exceptional professional and personal relationships that have
been forged through the years here at BOS have laid the foundation for
any number of historic and ground-breaking security enhancements.
Among these achievements are: An historic Playbook collaborative
effort, an effective and coordinated MSP and TSA K-9 effort, a
comprehensive Advanced Imaging Testing (AIT) resolution protocol, an
effective and efficient coordinated effort to maximize the resources of
the TSA Bomb Appraisal Officers (BAO's), a practical and legally sound
checkpoint response protocol, a unified breach resolution protocol, an
on-airport robust ICE/DEA task force, and a recently established,
first-in-the-Nation on-airport FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force Annex.
These are just some of the advancements that we have been able to
implement here at Logan Airport in recent years and they are an example
of (as well as the fruits of) the solid partnerships in place at Logan
Airport.
We continue to cultivate a very positive culture within the Logan
security team where all of the airport stakeholders, each and every
employee, is expected to understand, appreciate, and perform a security
role.
These efforts were recently recognized at the highest levels of the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) when the newly-appointed
administrator, Mr. John Pistole, on his very first airport visit upon
being appointed administrator, came to Logan Airport. He commented that
the security operation here was ``one of the best/most secure'' of all
the airports in the Nation. We strive to ensure that our efforts are
worthy of such high praise.
In my role as Troop F Commander, I am involved in all security
matters that concern Logan Airport, as well as all other Massport
properties and I work every single day with all of our partners, most
notably the TSA. In addition to being the Troop F Commander, I also
serve as Massport's Director of Aviation Security and I am afforded a
seat at the table for all security-related discussions.
The specific assets that the Massachusetts State Police offer in
protecting these properties are numerous. Troop F consists of several
components, including uniformed Troopers who perform patrol duties,
Troopers in tactical units such as the bomb squad and K-9 unit, as well
as Troopers in investigative units and support units. Each officer
views his/her role as a member of the larger airport community and has
embraced the cooperative and collaborative approach that is so vital to
protecting the airport, its stakeholders, and the travelling public.
Troop F is different from other geographic Troops that make up the
Massachusetts State Police, most of which include among their duties
patrols of long stretches of State highways. While Troop F does not
have the traditional ``patrol'' function, we do have the unique
responsibility for maintaining a layered security approach at Logan
Airport, including the waterside and landside perimeters, the terminal
curb area, both the public side of the passenger terminals and the
sterile side of the terminals (post screening), and on the ramp areas
(the aircraft operating area--the AOA).
The focus at Troop F, primarily at Logan Airport, is a blend of a
proactive security strategy coupled with a strong customer service
approach. Our goal is the professional delivery of the highest levels
of police/security services to Massport, through a combination of
vigilance and courtesy.
Not only is the specific mission of Troop F different than the
other State Police Troops, but the approach to fulfilling that mission
is also different. Rather than the traditional ``response'' model,
whereby police officers respond to calls for service (after the fact),
the model at Troop F is ``proactive''.
Every officer at Troop F, regardless of unit assignment, has been
trained in Behavior Pattern Recognition (BPR) and is expected to
utilize these skills on a daily basis, throughout the airport.
Troopers are expected to be alert for anything or anybody who
appears out of the ordinary, whose behavior does not seem to fit in
with normal actions and routines of travelers. When a behavior or
action raises questions, Troopers engage that person in conversation to
further assess the situation. This proactive, preventative approach to
security is certainly different than many of the assignments on the
State Police and this mindset is reiterated and reinforced repeatedly.
Boston/Logan was the first airport in the Nation to deploy this
program, which was modeled after the Israeli airport security program
and has been adapted for a U.S. airport environment by Rafi Ron, an
international aviation security expert hired by Massport immediately
after 9/11. The behavior pattern recognition program contributes to the
creation of an efficient, multi-layered security system for the
airport.
Whenever a new security strategy is introduced, it is vital to
ensure that the security team is on the same page. Beyond that, it is
also critically important that the public supports the effort as well.
The BPR program and its observation and conversation techniques have
been well received at Logan Airport.
These techniques are welcomed by Logan Airport passengers who are
reassured by the proactive and professional approach designed to
identify potential criminals or terrorists without inconveniencing the
tens of thousands of passengers who use Logan each day. They are viewed
as a significant improvement over the random searches that were such a
frustrating intrusion and inconvenience for the vast majority of
passengers in the past. Not only are the officers of Troop F trained to
be on the lookout for items, persons, and behaviors of concern, they
are also trained to receive any and all referrals by airport employees
and members of the public of issues that concern them. We coordinate
our efforts closely with a variety of law enforcement and homeland
security partners, including Massport, the Transportation Safety
Administration (TSA), the Federal Air Marshals Service (FAMS), Customs
and Border Protection (CBP), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) to name a few.
Troop F and the officers assigned here and each of our security
partners understand and accept that we are all part of a much larger
layered security framework at the airport that includes not only the
law enforcement/public safety/security personnel, but every single one
of our 14,000 Secure Identification Display Area (SIDA) badged airport
employees. The mindset of every single person who works at the airport
must be (and is) ``If you see something that concerns you, you should
say something to the authorities. Or, in short, ``See Something, Say
Something''. Further, it is often mentioned that, ``if you work at
Logan Airport and you can go a day without thinking of 9/11, then you
should not work at Logan Airport''.
This cannot be overstated. We rely heavily on the eyes and ears of
the airport community, including the airline employees, the airport
vendor employees, the ground transportation team, and members of the
travelling public to assist us in securing Logan Airport. We constantly
remind each of these partners of the important role that they play and
we have programs in place to train people, remind people, and to
recognize people for their contributions.
I'm confident in saying to this committee that the entire Boston/
Logan International Airport security team has worked very hard each day
to accomplish these goals and we have remained positive and flexible as
we've had to adapt to evolving threats and challenging times. Further,
we will continue to work hard and to be constantly mindful of the
critical need for cooperation, communication, and collaboration.
We have wrestled with many of the same issues affecting airports
across the country, but because of the constant effort to work
together, to communicate openly, and to be mindful that we share a
common goal, we have been able to work these issues to successful
resolution. The advice we would offer to other airports is this:
Communication serves to establish relationships, relationships forge
true partnerships, and strong partnerships ensure successful,
collaborative outcomes.
Again, I thank the Chairman and the committee for the opportunity
to appear before you today and to share my thoughts and I look forward
to any questions that you may have.
Thank you.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Major, and I appreciate your
testimony.
Now, you can't come to this airport without remembering
what happened 10 years ago. You know, it was a bright, sunny
day, a crisp day, not unlike today, that turned into one of the
darkest chapters in American history. To sit here and to think
not too far from where we sit, Mohamed Atta and his band of
hijackers slipped through detection, slipped through our
security and got onto those airplanes and proceeded to kill
3,000 people gives me a tremendous sense of sorrow but also of
obligation to make this place more secure. I will say, I think
you all have done a fantastic job in that effort.
Since that day, we've become accustomed, as a people, to go
through airports. We take our shoes off. We go through
secondary screening. We go through pat-downs. It's just become
a way of life.
As a Member of Congress--and I'm sure Mr. Keating as well--
we often hear complaints about, you know, ``Why are you taking
the elderly woman aside and patting her down?'' And ``Why are
you taking the child and patting them down?'' ``Why are you
treating all Americans as an equal threat?''
Should we be more risk-based? Should we be looking more at
the real threat rather than the grandmother? I think that's a
common-sense approach, and I think that's an approach that this
Behavior Detection Program, I think, seeks to do. Looking not
at every individual as an equal threat, but let's look at the
behavior of the individual. Is it suspicious? Let's analyze the
behavior to spot those potential threats.
I've had numerous people say, ``Why aren't we doing what
they do in Israel? That works so well.'' I think that's what
this program, as has been testified to, is really, it's part of
that program. You all looked at what the Israelis have done,
taken that and applied it here at Logan Airport. The first
model, the first pilot program was done here. In my view, it's
been successful, and now it's adopted in 160 airports across
the country. It's resulted in 2,000 arrests in our airports.
Again, I think it's just common sense.
So I just would like, I think it would be interesting to
hear a little bit more about how this program works and how we
can get beyond the day where the grandmother is patted down,
the World War II Veteran is patted down, and the child is
patted down.
Mr. Freni.
Mr. Freni. As we stated, Mr. Chairman, shortly after 9/11,
we had to strategize and make sure that we were doing the right
things that made sense to make sure that this airport was
secure.
Obviously, we thought that it was important that we take a
look at the people that travel through the airport day-in and
day-out. So we had engaged with Rafi Ron, as the Major
mentioned in his remarks, to come in and show us the Israeli
model. We thought that that fit appropriately. We decided, at
that time, that we would train the entire Troop F in those
techniques.
Along with that, we instituted a program called Logan Watch
where the condensed version of that training is now introduced
to all our employees that hold badges. They have to take that
program before they are enabled to get a badge to work here at
the airport. So they have the same knowledge that Mr. Ron had
when he came to the State police group, so that they look to
see if there is anything out of the ordinary on a daily basis.
But we have drilled that into the fabric and imbedded it into
the fabric of the way we do business here.
It's great to see that the TSA has now taken that program
and instituted it with the size of the workforce that George
Naccara has here. So that gives us a whole different group of
people that are in the front lines that can look and pay
attention to the behavior of those who come through our
terminals and get on our airplanes. So the SPOT Program is a
derivative of what we did originally with Rafi Ron.
We welcome the opportunity to test the risk-based
assessment that we have actually started and I'm sure George
will talk about. But we are now exempting the young children
under 12, so hopefully, your young son will be exempt from some
of the scrutiny that some of the young children have had to go
through, and it pains us to see that. Also, with the elderly
group, we hope that it will branch out to that.
But the important thing is that we're watching and paying
attention to the way people behave. We think that with the
institution of the SPOT Program and other risk assessment
programs that we're willing to test here any time at this
airport is the best way to go.
Mr. McCaul. Well, thank you. You did mention my son. This
was yesterday, I'm at Dulles Airport. He broke his finger
playing football, so he had a metal splint, and of course went
through the magnetometer and went through secondary screening,
and he was tested for explosives. I don't know, I don't think
my son is a threat to the National security of the United
States. But in any event, it's good to hear that this airport
is using that common-sense approach where you don't have to pat
down 5-year-old kids.
I think that it will go a long way with the American
people. They can accept having to go through a lot of this
stuff. But when they see the grandmother or the child, I think
they lose their patience with that. I think what you're doing
will take this in the right direction.
You know, in oversight, we're often very critical. This is
one of those days where I have to commend and applaud you for
your efforts. Admiral, I want to applaud you for taking this,
this model approach that the Israelis developed, and applying
it throughout the Nation through the TSA.
Do you have any comments or would you like to explain how
this works and what the training is?
Admiral Naccara. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll defer
some of the explanation to my colleague, Chris McLaughlin, for
the National approach to the risk-based security.
But as far as Logan Airport goes, what Mr. Freni explained
was accurate. That was, we saw great value in what the State
police were doing and what MassPort was doing here, and as an
agency, we were leaning forward and looking for opportunities
to improve security and perhaps to work away from complete
reliance on technology and look into the human interaction and
how that could enhance our processes.
Fortunately, we began with pilot programs here in 2005,
expanded to other airports in the New England area. Then our
headquarters understood and allowed us to begin a formal pilot
program which has led to the Nation-wide SPOT Program that we
have today with nearly 3,000 officers at around 160 airports.
Now, in the evolution of the human interaction and behavior
detection, it's an exciting time. As you suggested, we are
treating everyone the same, and that is not the most effective
use of resources. So we need a method to assess the risk
associated with every passenger and then to manage that risk
appropriately, and that's where we're headed.
Frankly, the Proof of Concept we have in place here is
exciting and very well-embraced by MassPort and the State
police and the carriers, which is critical to our success
certainly, but even to the passengers. We've had this in place
now for nearly 6 weeks. We've spoken to thousands, tens of
thousands of passengers, and generally, the reaction has been
extremely positive. The questions they're being asked are very
similar to those which are asked of international passengers.
Anyone who has traveled around the world has also been exposed
to those types of questions. We're looking for the reactions,
the behaviors, and we're also looking for inconsistencies in
their story. That is refining our process so that we will treat
people differently.
There are a number of elements to the overall program of
risk-based security, and one of them addresses the issue of
your child. Again, I'll allow Chris to talk about that. But
that was a program that was piloted here and at five other
airports around the country beginning about 6 weeks ago. There
is some relaxation of the standards for children who appear to
be 12 and under, and it's working very well.
Our goal, of course, is to minimize the pat-downs that are
conducted on a child 12 and under. As you suggested, they are
considered a much lower risk. We are adapting our systems. The
World War II veterans you've suggested also, we've modified the
processes for them as well. That's certainly deserved, and it's
appropriate respect for them.
Mr. McCaul. That's right.
Admiral Naccara. It's an exciting time for all of us, and
you'll see many changes. They won't come too quickly, but on
the other hand, the process has begun, and I'll defer to Chris
on that.
Mr. McCaul. Let me just say that 10 years after the tragic
events, this is certainly, in my judgment, a good news story.
Mr. McLaughlin, do you have any comments?
Mr. McLaughlin. Thank you, sir.
Coming up here from the District of Columbia, I mean, the
first thing that I would like to do is truly recognize the
local team here. They truly embody what we're looking for
across the Nation in terms of a real partnership to securing
our aviation process. So I'm honored to be here with them.
From literally his first day or first few days on the job,
our administrator, John Pistole, has been talking actively
about moving away from a one-size-fits-all security model to a
risk-based approach. To that end, TSA has been working
diligently on a number of different initiatives within the
portfolio of risk-based security to try to do three things;
improve security, do it more efficiently, and frankly, do it in
a way that also improves the overall customer experience. We
believe, truly, that we can accomplish those three things by
taking a smart approach.
We learned from the support and the recommendations of the
GAO with the variety of things that we roll out, we apply some
of those pieces into the work we're doing, and we pilot them in
places like Logan. At the end of the day, we are confident that
things like the Assessor Proof of Concept, as we've shown
recently with the pilots with children under 12 and have now
rolled out nationally, there are ways that we can look at an
individual based on what we know about them in advance of their
arrival to the airport, what we learn about them while they're
at the airport, and then we can apply appropriate screening
measures to them based on what we found out through that
process.
So we agree wholeheartedly that there is a better, smarter,
more effective, and more efficient way to doing this.
Mr. McCaul. Well, I look forward to getting updates on the
successes. I know you've had 2,000 arrests. Fortunately, none
of those were terrorist-related, although some involved, I
think, counterfeit documents which could have been related to
terrorism. But certainly, that's 2,000 criminals off the
street.
So Major, as you had mentioned, I was a Federal prosecutor.
I used to work with the JTTF, Joint Terrorism Task Force. It's
a valuable model approach. You say that you are now very
coordinated with their efforts here at the airport?
Mr. Concannon. Yes, we are, sir.
Mr. McCaul. Could you elaborate on that?
Mr. Concannon. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
We have a sergeant, one of our troopers, assigned full-time
with the JTTF working closely with that team. The JTTF Annex
here at the airport obviously has a close relationship with the
Boston JTTF Annex downtown. They work closely on any issues
that arise here at the airport. Our sergeant who is assigned
there is able to bring back information to share with the
troops. That can help with either an on-going investigation or
certainly intelligence updates, things to be on the lookout
for. We found it very productive. We think it's a great idea,
and we'd like to see it expanded throughout the country.
Mr. McCaul. That's very good.
Mr. Lord, the 9/11 Commission's Tenth Anniversary Report
Card had some criticism. We're still vulnerable to aviation
security threats, in their opinion, and specifically talk about
the need to improve screening at checkpoints using biometrics
and standardized identification documents.
What are your thoughts on that?
Mr. Lord. Well, first of all, we've done a large body of
work on, not only the screening process, but the technologies
that's utilized to implement some of the processes. We found
some problem areas in deploying effective technology, but also
in using biometrics.
We did a very detailed assessment--it's not in the aviation
sector, mind you, it's in the maritime--on the so-called TWIC
biometric card. It's a Transportation Worker ID card. At one
time, that was envisioned as the model. It was going to be
rolled out across all modes of transportation. But they had
some difficulties designing the card, implementing it, doing
effective background checks. It proved to be a little more
difficult than I think people originally envisioned.
Also, it's just being used a visual flash pass now. So
we've had some covert investigators visit various ports, and
they were able to obtain access to most of the facilities they
entered. So our point was, well, until they're used with
readers, it's really not going to be an effective deterrent.
You need to, you know, make sure all industry stakeholders are
on board before rolling out these types of programs.
Mr. McCaul. Go ahead.
Mr. Lord. Also, one additional point about the Israeli
model. I probably get that question more than anything,
regarding our work on behavior detection. I salute TSA's
efforts to make the program more conversational. I think that
has the potential to make it more effective.
But I think that it's important to also note that in
Israel, they have a very small-scale size operation. So you
have to be careful about inferring everything is readily
transferrable to the U.S. model. Also in Israel, you can
profile people, you know, on the basis of race, sex, and
national origin. Obviously, that's a major difference between
their system and our system which makes it, you know, less
comparable.
Mr. McCaul. Of course, my opinion is the hijackers came
from a certain part of the world, and our intelligence assets
overseas are in those areas. I think that certainly, in my
view, should be a factor.
But having said that, I do know that when I asked the
Secretary why we're not using this approach, the Israeli
approach, she said that it would take too long to process with,
you know, millions of passengers. The good news, from what I
understand through this program, it has not slowed down the
process in any way, shape, or form.
Is that correct, Admiral?
Admiral Naccara. Yes, sir.
As a matter of fact, we are testing various options. We
call it a Proof of Concept. That allows us to explore different
manipulations in this system. We're looking at the outcome, and
one of those considerations in the outcome would be the
through-put. So we've tried two different models, and in each
case, we have seen virtually no difference in the overall
screening process out in front. These are exciting times. We'll
continue to test other models as well.
As Chris has pointed out, we have to be aware of different
circumstances and different airports, certainly even in
different checkpoints, and we have different levels of
staffing. So those factors have to all be considered as we
assess the data that comes in, and then we make some decisions
as to where we go in the future. But this is very preliminary.
Mr. McCaul. I just want to follow up on the 9/11 Commission
again, Mr. Lord.
When you say ``readers,'' you're talking about, these are
identification documents that can be falsified or used by
another person to gain access to the airport, and you're
talking about biometric?
Mr. Lord. Yes. These are biometric card readers.
Mr. McCaul. So it's the individual. You know that's the
individual with the card.
Mr. Lord. Yes.
Everybody gets a card thing. Then to make it effective, you
have to swipe the card to get access. In the TWIC program
anyway, they've given everybody a card, but the readers aren't
installed yet, so.
Mr. McCaul. Last question. I want to give my Ranking Member
some time, and I appreciate your generosity.
I just want to end with a general question, and that is,
you know, I was Chief of Counterterrorism at Justice for a
while. I remember in 1993, Ramzi Yousef, World Trade Center
bomber, escaped and went to Islamabad. I know the FBI agent who
arrested him. When they knocked his door down, it was sort of
eerie. He had baby dolls in his apartment, and they were
stuffed with chemical explosives. His intention of the plot was
to carry those baby dolls on multiple airlines and blow up
simultaneously these airplanes. I know that his uncle, Khalid
Sheikh Mohammed, had talked about flying airplanes into
buildings in the mid-1990s.
The threat of chemical explosives is still an issue today.
In fact, you know, just recently, the Christmas bomber, we know
out of Yemen, the Clerk Yemen is still looking at ways to use
chemical explosives on aviation to bring down airplanes. I
think since that time, we've had another type of screening
device.
So where are we with detecting chemical explosives, and
what is the threat today from that, I guess, part of the
question for the TSA?
Mr. McLaughlin. I'll take that question.
I have to confess that that's a bit beyond my scope of
expertise in terms of the overall chemical threat in terms of
the composition. What I will tell you is that threat does still
exist, as you've pointed out, and really what you're talking
about is the complexity of our issues.
So we're doing everything that we can to minimize intrusive
techniques for the majority of customers, but we have to be
cognizant of things like what you just described with baby
dolls. So whether that's liquids, gels, or children's toys, we
still have to make sure that every change that we make in a
risk-based posture doesn't ignore the real threat that is very
much there today. We're charged with defending against that.
Mr. McCaul. All right.
Mr. McLaughlin. So that the short answer is that we analyze
each of our pieces as we roll in changes to our system to make
sure that we're not missing something like a current and active
threat.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you.
Admiral, do you have any comments on that?
Admiral Naccara. We also have deployed certain pieces of
technology at our checkpoints and in our baggage rooms to help
us detect additional chemicals or explosives, what would be
indicators of explosives. We're always improving that.
With each year, I think we've rolled out some new
technologies that give us more capabilities. So as Chris
suggests, it's a continuing process, and it's a challenge to
keep up with the bad guys, frankly. But we have been attempting
that. You'll see new pieces of equipment, periodically, at the
checkpoint and in the baggage rooms.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you. I want to thank the Ranking Member
for his patience. I hope I didn't ask every question that you
were going to ask.
Mr. Keating. No, thank you.
Mr. McCaul. With that, I recognize my good friend and
colleague, Mr. Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You know, Logan's perimeter security is unique, because
there are so much water boundaries that are there, water-based
boundaries. But there are airports in urban areas, airports in
rural areas. So many airports have a different, you know, set
of logistics attached to it.
One of the things cited in the 9/11 Commission report
review touches on an area of concern that I have on--getting
back to the Charlotte Douglas example with Delvonte Tisdale--
you know, the issue they brought forward is the unity of
command and who is in charge and making sure those lines are
clear. The aviation director from Charlotte Douglas Airport
where it was believed Mr. Tisdale breached perimeter security
recently provided written testimony to Congress. He stated in
that testimony, ``When there is a threat on board an aircraft,
the FBI responds and investigates. When a pilot makes an error
on the aircraft, the FAA responds and investigates. And when
there is an airplane crash, the NTSB responds and
investigates.''
If it's believed there is a security breach at a major U.S.
airport, why shouldn't TSA respond and investigate first? Why,
in that instance, was it first handed over to local police
authorities to look at this? Shouldn't there be that same chain
of command immediately where there is one Federal agency that
just initiates and takes charge of that rather than turning to
a local police authority?
Mr. McLaughlin. So I'll use Charlotte as the example, but
I'll speak in more broad terms.
As I believe I stated earlier, TSA's role in airport
security is to regulate a process. Each individual airport is
required to write and operate in accordance with a local
airport security program that TSA approves. The actual day-to-
day oversight of the security operation in that airport does
fall back to the airport authority.
What TSA does, and in this example, we use a finding from a
breach such as happened in Charlotte. As an example, as a
result of that, we conducted a National special emphasis
inspection of all airports, from Cat X all of the way through
Cat 4s. As I said, we'll be done with that analysis at the end
of this fiscal year so that we can ensure that, once we've
identified a problem, it doesn't happen again.
At the local level, we conduct annual and comprehensive
inspections of the airports to ensure that they're in
compliance with their plan. As we stated, we do perform joint
vulnerability assessments at the required 34 airports a year,
plus an additional between 10 and 15, depending on our
resources. While that doesn't cover every airport, it certainly
covers more than 75 percent of the traveling public that
originate from those largest airports.
Mr. Keating. I just think that, you know, there has been
two repeated--well, there has been repeated breaches since then
at that same airport and perimeter security.
Someone was breaching security stealing, from my
understanding, diesel fuel out of the place, and that was
happening, and someone else just was able to hop a fence. This
is a tremendous weakness. I'll direct this to Mr. Lord, and if
any of the other panelists, although the other three are
dealing with Logan here, it's a little different. But this is a
tremendous, tremendous weakness we have.
When we had testimony in Homeland Security as the major
committee looking back at the Commission reports, we had former
Secretary Tom Ridge, and we had the vice chair of that
committee, Lee Hamilton, both say that there is a real problem
with perimeter security. If we're trying to create uniform
standards of security, if we leave that to each local police,
when some of these are rural and don't have the resources, you
know, with all of the great efforts that you've done here at
Logan, if there is a breach in the network, people from here
aren't safe.
So my thinking, Mr. Lord, is just it's beyond me not to
understand why there isn't some Federal uniform authority over
those jurisdictions. Should we be doing that as Congress? I
mean, something should be done so that TSA's hands aren't tied,
if that's what happened here.
Mr. Lord. Well, actually, I thought Mr. McLaughlin gave a
very nice description of the overall who has oversight.
Essentially, it's a shared responsibility. Under this current
system, a lot of different stakeholders have a role in helping
ensure security. I probably know that that doesn't satisfy your
question.
But at least, when we looked at this in our perimeter
security report, we noticed, first of all, breaches occur on a
regular basis. I think there was an average of over 2,000
breaches across the National system on an annual basis. We
thought it was important given that the TSA conduct a
comprehensive risk assessment to obtain, you know, and to
identify vulnerabilities across the Nation and to use that
information to better decide what to focus on.
I think the special emphasis reviews Mr. McLaughlin
mentioned, that's a good step. That's going to allow them to
see, is this a problem on a broader scale or is it unique to
Charlotte? So I think they're doing--they're taking the right
actions at the moment. I look forward to seeing what the
special emphasis review concludes.
But again, you just can't do it on an airport-by-airport
basis. You have to do these assessments more broadly. Given the
current jurisdiction, everybody seems to have a piece of it, I
think that's a good way to proceed. You have to come up with a
better visibility on what the problem is on a National scale
before attacking the problem.
Mr. Keating. You know, well, I think the problem is pretty
obvious. I think if you are having an investigation on
commercial aircraft that are flying all over the country,
leaving it to a local police force isn't going to cut it. It
just isn't going to cut it. It's an area that we should look
at, in my opinion, more strongly.
You know, the whole area of jurisdiction is a problem. As
Congress, I must say, at a public hearing just like this, we
have our own weaknesses. Because the jurisdiction of homeland
security is a patchwork quilt. We're doing our best. I know the
Chairman shares my concern as well. We've got to clean up our
own jurisdictional problems, you know, for homeland.
But when you're dealing with this and the investigative
primary responsibility is in a local airport where, I believe,
in that instance--and you're familiar, Mr. McLaughlin--there
were suggestions that were a few years old that they just
ignored. So you have a situation like this. The locals are in
charge, and they're ignoring the Federal Government and their
recommendations. So the oversight is important, but it's just
not good enough, frankly.
If anyone else wanted to comment on this, I'd welcome any
comments.
Mr. McLaughlin. If I could follow up on that, sir. I would
say that, in the Charlotte case, specifically, we do, TSA does
have a regulatory authority, and we are able to take certain
and significant steps, when necessary. We do still have some
open investigations with regard to this case.
But I would point out two specific things, significant
things that Charlotte has done in the interim to improve their
perimeter securement. No. 1 is, they've increased their police
force at the airport by some 21 officers; and No. 2, they've
increased their testing, their own internal testing from twice
a day to three times a day. So they are taking some significant
steps. They've proposed, in addition to that, several changes
to their ASP that we currently have for review within TSA and
will be responding in the near future on that.
Mr. Keating. What penalties can you invoke, if they
ignore--and I'm not picking on Charlotte. I don't think they're
alone. It would be just counterintuitive that this is the only
airport that there are problems like this. But you know, this
affects all of the folks here, and all of the things we've
heard here are undercut when we don't have a uniform, seamless
approach to this.
Mr. McLaughlin. Civil penalties, we would use that
mechanism to hold the airports accountable, if they wouldn't
comply with our requirements.
Mr. Keating. Is that fines?
Mr. McLaughlin. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keating. Anything else? Do you have the ability to shut
down that airport until they get it right?
Mr. McLaughlin. I would have to get back with you on that
answer.
Mr. Keating. It's an area that I'm going to be looking at
myself, because I think we need stronger penalties. They're
just ignoring those things, and we cannot have that kind of
network across the country.
If I could move a little further, just jumping around. On
the SPOT Program and the behavior observation program, I really
commend the people here in looking at it and analyzing it.
Could you go into depths about how that analysis is going
to occur, and if Mr. Lord or Mr. McLaughlin also have ideas
about what should be considered, what kind of metrics are used
to evaluate how effective it is and also to make sure, as Mr.
Lord said, you know, we can't racially profile people in the
United States and we shouldn't.
But when you are doing the analysis, what kind of metrics
and safeguards go into making sure that that's not occurring?
Mr. McLaughlin. I'll take that because it's a National
program being conducted here locally.
As I said earlier, the GAO made some strong recommendations
with regard to the SPOT Program overall. Many of those have
been incorporated into the assessor or the behavior detection
pilot that we're running here in Boston. So we're looking at a
broad spectrum of effectiveness, first and foremost security
effectiveness. We want to ensure that this is actual working,
that it's helping us to mitigate the threat further than what
we're doing today.
But second to that, we're looking at the overall impact
from an efficiency perspective. So are we ensuring that we're
doing this within the constraints of budget and other concerns
that we have today. Then finally, we're truly looking at the
customer impact. If you have an opportunity to observe that
pilot, I would suggest that, in many ways, this enhances the
customer experience because it puts TSA in a place where we're
having a very human, personal, casual conversation with each
customer that approaches us.
So we started the process with baseline data. We had data
collectors in Logan evaluating a number of different metrics.
Now in the pilot phase, we're evaluating how we're performing
against those baseline metrics. Again, they touched the
spectrum from effectiveness to efficiency to customer
experience. I would be more than happy to set up a briefing
where we can go into more detail about what they are
specifically.
Mr. Keating. Thank you.
We're here at the site of the international terminal. I'm
curious, in terms of resources, money, and how difficult this
is, how do you deal with the foreign language issues when
you're having a chat-down? Do you have those resources?
Mr. Freni. I could speak for Logan Airport. We have many
employees, multilingual, that we hire in our public relations
and TSR program, public service. Many times, we're called upon
to assist with the law enforcement and the TSA to interpret.
Mr. Keating. One of the things--and you know when we have
these hearings, we have to be careful we don't breach any
security or give anyone information that we don't want them to
have--but one of the things that I'm very curious about, to the
extent that you can talk about it, with the new optics program
that you are having with MIT and Lincoln Laboratories and
Pacific Northwest, with that camera system, it truly is
amazing. This is the pilot project that is here, you know, to
be tried out here before the rest of the country.
I have an understanding that sometimes, when you look at
behavior, sometimes people's actions in a crowd and other
things can trigger a computer program where they can zero in on
points. That, to me, offers a lot of promise in trying to see,
you know, trying to pick out behavior just from an optical
standpoint, you know, mechanically.
Is there something that you can, without breaching too much
security, is there something that you can inform us about that?
Admiral Naccara. I can address that. Actually, we
considered that, but it's not being deployed at this time.
There are a number of problems with that, sir.
No. 1, the angle would be from the ceiling, so you may not
have a very good perspective of a person's face. Also, very
difficult to read that, and the software has not been proven
that good to effectively identify those behaviors in that
method.
So at this point, the camera is being used periodically
because it requires so much data space just to view the
complete terminal, in this case. It's got tremendous acuity and
can view numbers on my badge, for example, at the far end of
the terminal. It can be programmed to identify or to alarm for
certain colors or certain actions. But we do not have the
software, at this point, to identify behaviors.
To their credit, MIT is looking at the next iteration of
that camera system as well in which they will use many more
lenses knitted together to give a 360-degree perspective in a
larger area.
Mr. Keating. Another one of the--oh, I'm sorry. Go ahead,
Mr. Lord.
Mr. Lord. I just wanted to note that one of the
recommendations in our SPOT report was to better utilize
available closed-circuit TVs to refine the program and to help,
you know, judge whether you are honing in on the right types of
behaviors. So it's good to hear that the TSA is already moving
on that.
Mr. Keating. Did you do any work, Mr. Lord, to see how
realistic that might be someday?
Mr. Lord. I know other airports are using more, you know,
for lack of better word, hi-def systems. I guess, we were
somewhat surprised that every airport has a slightly different
approach on the system. We encourage TSA to ensure, you know,
that you have a more effective system across all airports. We
don't think there should just be this lack of uniformity, which
they readily agree with.
Mr. Keating. I want to give everyone the opportunity to
jump in with another issue. But one thing I'll pick up that,
again, it's a good opportunity, frankly, to recognize all of
the work that the family members of the victims have put into
making sure that other people aren't harmed and the work they
did with the 9/11 Commission. Certainly, we all feel an
obligation as we walk in here every day and remember 9/11 to
those family members that we follow through on the hard work of
the Commission.
But one of the areas--if I can get some input, it's a great
group to ask this question to, I think--one of the weaknesses
and the deficiencies that are still there that are identified
include the nature of identifications and how they vary from
State to State and how they're different.
One of the recommendations that they had is that the
Federal Government should set standards for the issuance of
birth certificates, you know, birth certificates and all kinds
of other sources of identification to make sure that's, well,
now you are a major hub, and you are getting people from all
States and all countries.
So how can the Federal Government be helpful in setting
some kind of uniformity of those identifications?
Mr. McLaughlin. One thing that we can do and that we're in
the process of doing at TSA is developing and deploying
software that can read multiple forms of identifications and
will apply that against the boarding pass. So that's a new tool
that we'll be deploying in the near future that will help us
ensure that a proper ID is matched up with a proper boarding
pass before we allow access through the checkpoint. I'll defer
to others here.
Mr. Freni. The comment that I'd have from the airline side
of the business is that that really needs to be done when the
record is developed. Hopefully, there will be some kind of
software development where you can pick up on the
identification of that person when they make their reservation
so it doesn't have to come to the airport to do that.
So hopefully, you know, we can tie that in when someone
either goes on-line and makes a reservation and ties it into
what we call a P&R system where you'd recognize the
identification without any problem and then it avoids the
waiting until they get here with their boarding pass.
Mr. Keating. I'm just probing on areas where we can make
changes that have to be made. One of them I think is shameful
that hasn't been made by us in Congress and elsewhere is that
you meet 8:30 every morning and share information. But when a
crisis occurs, that information sharing has to be immediate and
it has to be seamless.
Could you tell us, from your vantage point, the importance
of having that public safety radio band available, the 10
megahertz that's necessary, so that Nation-wide through all
different public safety agencies, you can communicate
immediately when something occurs? The fact that that hasn't
been done, again, is something I'm just lost at.
I mean, you know, I know there is controversy about, you
know, that band. But I honestly feel that's something that
should have been done immediately after 9/11. But from your,
you know, with boots on the ground, how important it is to have
that band, can anyone?
Mr. Concannon. I can tell you, sir, that we actually had
this conversation yesterday at State police headquarters. There
is a strong interest, for obvious reasons. Colonel McGovern,
superintendent of the State police, understands the issue.
She's been speaking with State officials about the need to have
a dedicated band and to have a dedicated interoperability, not
just in moments of crisis, but on a daily basis. So it's
definitely an interest, significant concern to the State
police.
Mr. Keating. I know, you know, that some of the reviews of
9/11 taught us that so many lives would have been saved had
that been in place. Here we are 10 years later, and it's still
not in place. So we've got our work cut out for us as well.
People are going to wonder about this--and I'll leave this
as a final question that could help us going forward--you know,
you've done so much here and you've had innovative programs.
They're costly.
Could you comment on some of the means that you use to fund
some of the things you've done and some of the needs you have
going forward? I'll throw that open to anyone that wants to.
Mr. Freni. Over the years since 9/11, all of the programs
that I outlined in my comments have cost a significant amount
of money. We meet with our stakeholders, our airlines, and in
some cases, we have to recover those costs through our rates
and charges. We do that, and that's the cost of doing business
here at Logan Airport.
We've also been very fortunate with our Federal partners to
be reimbursed for a good portion of some of the initiatives
that we've taken on. One example of that is the inline baggage
screening system that we were able to fund and move forward on
without Federal funding. We were able to capture a good
percentage of that money after we completed it. So we've taken
the risk to fund these projects on our own and have tried to
find ways through our partners and our users to be able to pay
for those initiatives.
Admiral Naccara. Speaking from the Federal perspective to
what Mr. Freni just described, they have been opportunistic at
MassPort by being so focused for 10 years, and I'm appreciative
of sharing in that embodiment of spirit here.
When they see an opportunity for improvement, they're
always leaning forward. When they see that potential, they're
exceptionally well-prepared. They will come forward with a very
well-justified product, and it's a very compelling argument.
When others are still debating whether the concept is fine or
should we put money towards that, MassPort will step forward
with a quality product that makes it very easy for the Federal
Government to say that this is justified. This is the place we
should provide some funding. Then everyone benefits in the end.
Mr. Keating. With the nature of airports, small rural
airports, they have unique challenges. I think it's an area
where we should continue. Because as I said, one weak link
endangers everyone's safety.
So I thank you. I'll yield back my time with that, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Bill, for that questioning.
I want to thank the witnesses for being here today. This
has been a very productive hearing. I also want to thank all of
the personnel at Logan Airport that made this hearing possible
and the Massachusetts Port Authority and the Massachusetts
State Police who are here today for allowing us to host this
and for welcoming a Texan to Massachusetts. It's a real honor
to be here, and again, thank you for your service. It's been a
great hearing.
So I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and
the Members for their questions.
The Members of the committee may have some additional
questions for the witnesses, and we will ask you to respond to
these in writing. The hearing record will be held open for 10
days.
Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:17 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]