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HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED
PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
ON
**BUDGET REQUESTS FROM
U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND AND
U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND**

HEARING HELD
MARCH 6, 2012



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[There were no Documents submitted.]

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[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

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FISCAL YEAR 2013 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUESTS FROM U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 6, 2012.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m. in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. "Buck" McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. "BUCK" MCKEON,
A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES**

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Good morning. The committee meets today to receive testimony on the status and posture of both our Southern Command and Northern Command. I am pleased to welcome General Douglas Fraser, Commander of the U.S. Southern Command, and General Charles Jacoby, Commander of U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command.

General Fraser, I understand this will be your last appearance before the committee in this capacity. I see your wife is smiling very, very cheerful there; great support that she has provided for you all these many years. After 37 years in the Air Force, we thank you for your service to your country and wish you all the best in your retirement.

Gentlemen, thank you for your long and distinguished service in your uniforms, for the service to your Nation, and for joining us here today.

Looking at SOUTHCOM [Southern Command], General Fraser, in my mind, the illicit trafficking threat is one of the greatest challenges we face in your geographic area of responsibility. In your statement, you highlight the threat of transnational criminal organizations and their role in SOUTHCOM's area of responsibility.

Growing crime and violence in Central America, as well as the continuing growth of Chinese, Russian, and Iranian influence in the region bring with them opportunities and challenges. China, Russia and Iran have been very active in Latin America through arms sales, personnel exchanges, investments, and trade deals.

In addition, the activities of Hezbollah in the region are very troubling. It is also, I should add, one that requires close collaboration and coordination with your colleague at the table from NORTHCOM [Northern Command], as well as your interagency partners. The committee would benefit from your assessment of

trends in the activities and influence of these actors in the Western Hemisphere.

Regarding NORTHCOM, drug-related violence is a threat directly impacting the U.S. homeland on a daily basis, and we need to treat it as a national security imperative. I laud the heroic efforts of Mexican security service personnel and public officials who, make no mistake, are risking their lives and the lives of their families in a war against these brutal criminal enterprises. We need to support these heroes in their fight, while fully respecting the sovereignty of Mexico.

I look forward to hearing your assessment of the progress being made by Mexican authorities in the NORTHCOM; and what NORTHCOM is doing to support them and build their capacity and capabilities.

Additionally, the committee is concerned about the sufficiency of the fiscal year 2013 budget for the ground-based midcourse defense system which NORTHCOM relies on to protect the U.S. from long-range ballistic missiles.

Homeland defense is supposed to be the first priority for missile defense, but this budget request does not reflect that prioritization. We must be careful not to compromise homeland missile defense for the sake of theater missile defense or budget shortfalls.

In this continually changing budget environment and with the new defense strategy laid out by the President earlier this year, evaluation of each combatant command and their interpretation of missions and goals within the Department becomes vital. With the looming threat of sequestration, we must also understand the consequences of such severe cuts on the effectiveness of your commands.

Gentlemen, thank you again for appearing before us here today.
Ranking Member Smith.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 31.]

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to join your remarks in thanking both General Fraser and General Jacoby for their leadership and service to our country.

And General Fraser, since this will be your last time before our committee in all likelihood, thank you in particular for your service and I hope you and your wife enjoy your retirement. You served your country very well.

And General Jacoby, it is good to see you again. Your leadership out at 1st Corps in Fort Lewis was very much appreciated; an outstanding job out there in the 9th District of the State of Washington. So it is good to see you in this new position as well. Thank you for all of your service to our country.

Securing our hemisphere is absolutely critical to our national security. Obviously, there have been many challenges and threats in other parts of the world, but we all must, you know, stay focused on the fact that securing what is closest to home will continue to be a very, very important part of that job. And in NORTHCOM in

particular, protecting the homeland is job one, but there are many challenges and threats to that.

I agree with the chairman on Mexico being, you know, the top one. The challenges they face down there from the drug cartels are significant, and clearly bleed over to the other side of the border and cause challenges.

I want to thank General Jacoby and the entire NORTHCOM command for their work in building a relationship with Mexico to try to find ways to help them in any way we can to, you know, get back control of their country, quite simply. It is a very devastating situation right now. We need to work with them to try to bring greater security to that region.

I am also very focused on the cyber-security challenge. Everyone throughout DOD [Department of Defense] has to deal with that, but NORTHCOM has the, you know, particular concern again in protecting the homeland. It is a murky and difficult area. Cyber touches absolutely everything and we are all aware of the size of the threat. And so any thoughts that either of you gentlemen have on how best to confront that threat, how best to organize the Department of Defense to be in a position to do that, and what authorities you might need that you don't currently have, we would be interested in hearing.

And then SOUTHCOM, again as the chairman mentioned, the major threat obviously is narco-trafficking. I appreciate your leadership, General Fraser, in trying to confront that. And it becomes all the more critical that we find as many partners and allies as we can in the region.

I think that is an important part of SOUTHCOM's work—is to build those relationships so that we can help confront whatever threats that emerge from there. And again, I agree with the chairman in his assessment both of what those threats are and how important they are to our national security.

I thank both you gentlemen for being here before us today. I look forward to your testimony and your answers to our questions.

And with that, I yield back. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 33.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

General Fraser.

**STATEMENT OF GEN DOUGLAS M. FRASER, USAF,
COMMANDER, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND**

General FRASER. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to represent the outstanding men and women of the United States Southern Command.

As you mentioned, I am joined today by my wife Rena. She is a strong advocate for our military families and their service to our great Nation, and she has helped build enduring relationships with our partners across Latin America.

I am also extremely pleased this morning to join my good friend and counterpart, General Chuck Jacoby. He and I served with one another in a previous assignment and we work closely every day to coordinate our respective activities across the Western Hemi-

sphere. Through routine cooperation and collaboration, relations between our staffs grow closer every day.

With the continued support of Congress and the Members of this committee, United States Southern Command will continue defending the southern approaches to the United States, enhancing regional security, and building enduring partnerships. Mr. Chairman, I have prepared a full statement and respectfully request that it be entered into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered.

General FRASER. I want to briefly discuss two topics with you this morning. One of them you mentioned, countering transnational organized crime. The other is building enduring partnerships.

As I discussed with you in previous testimony, United States Southern Command is increasingly focused on a concern that permeates this region; and that is transnational organized crime. Like Secretary Panetta and Secretary Clinton, I am concerned about the impact of transnational organized crime on citizen safety in Central America, especially in countries like Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, which are facing unprecedented levels of violence.

Transnational criminal networks threaten to overwhelm the law enforcement capacities of some of these Central American countries. And in an effort to reduce violence and halt the spread of criminal groups, some countries have deployed their militaries in support of law-enforcement organizations.

To address this growing threat, last year the President implemented a strategy to combat transnational organized crime. In support of this strategy, United States Southern Command developed and implemented Operation Martillo; a focused plan to disrupt illicit maritime traffic through the departure zones of South America and the arrival zones into Central America.

In Central America, we have helped train our partner militaries to effectively support their law enforcement partners.

Southern Command also supports U.S. interagency and international efforts to provide network analysis of transnational criminal organizations and their operations.

In the Caribbean, under the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, we are developing a regional partner interdiction plan to enhance the capabilities of our Caribbean partners. And in South America, we will sustain our support to Colombia and Peru as they fight narco-terrorist groups in their countries.

Success in combating transnational organized crime is enhanced by fostering enduring partnerships with international and interagency organizations. That is my second topic this morning.

United States Southern Command is working to build such partnerships by enhancing cooperation and promoting information-sharing with regional and interagency organizations. In addition, we are strengthening our partnerships through traditional military engagement programs and activities with our counterparts across Latin America.

We work with them to strengthen humanitarian assistance and disaster relief capacities, and we remain ready to respond should our assistance be requested.

Last year, we conducted hundreds of training and educational events, 12 major multinational exercises with partner nations in the hemisphere, and 56 medical-readiness training exercises in 13 different countries.

The sustained engagement has yielded some important benefits. Last year, for the first time, Colombia assumed the land component commander role during PANAMAX [Panama Canal Exercise], our annual multinational exercise focused on supporting the defense of the Panama Canal; next year, Brazil will assume the maritime component role as well, an important step in strengthening and expanding partnerships in the hemisphere.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank Congress for your years of support to Colombia, and I ask for your continued support to help achieve a lasting peace.

And finally I want to thank you, and for your unwavering support to the men and women of United States Southern Command who diligently work every day to ensure our security. I look forward to our discussion. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of General Fraser can be found in the Appendix on page 34.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

General Jacoby.

STATEMENT OF GEN CHARLES H. JACOBY, JR., USA, COMMANDER, U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND

General JACOBY. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you this morning. It is an honor to be here.

It is a pleasure to be here with my fellow combatant commander and friend, General Doug Fraser and his wife Rena.

Doug, it is a pleasure to be with you.

On behalf of the men and women of U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command, I appreciate this committee's continuing support of our missions of homeland defense, including ballistic missile defense; defense support of civil authorities, for which the highlight last year was the team response to Hurricane Irene; and security cooperation, including our expanding cooperation with the Mexican military as they tackle brutal transnational criminal organizations.

In the case of NORAD [North American Aerospace Defense Command], our assigned missions for the United States and Canada include aerospace warning and control through our safe and successful Operation Noble Eagle; and maritime warning, where we continue to grow capability through improved interagency and international information-sharing.

In addition to cooperative defense with our ally Canada, we are steadily improving our security cooperation with our good friends in Mexico and the Bahamas at a pace determined by mutual agreement and with constant respect for national sovereignty.

Our vision is that with our trusted partners we will defend North America by outpacing all threats, maintaining faith with our citizens, and supporting them in their times of greatest need.

We view our missions as a sacred trust by our governments and our citizens. We appreciate that the American people and their elected representatives in Congress and the White House rightly have high expectations of our ability to defend them here at home.

And consistent with the necessity for collaboration with many other organizations in a wide variety of challenging situations that can threaten the citizens of our great Nation, my priorities are to expand and strengthen our trusted partnerships; to advance and sustain the binational command NORAD; to gain and maintain all domain situational awareness, including air, space, cyberspace, land, maritime, and the unique and fast-changing domain known as the Arctic; to advocate and develop capabilities in our core mission areas to outpace all threat; and to take care of our people. They are our foundation.

And I am tremendously proud of the committed, selfless men and women—military and civilian, Americans and Canadians—that serve our command.

And when appropriate, in accordance with the Stafford Act, the national response framework, and other laws and guidance, such as on the request of a governor and upon direction of the President or Secretary of Defense, U.S. NORTHCOM pulls together unique capabilities and capacities of the Department of Defense to multiply the impact of a primary federal agency, such as FEMA [Federal Emergency Management Agency], in protecting our citizens.

Thanks to Congress and the President, the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act put into law initiatives supported by the Council of Governors and the Secretary of Defense concerning dual-status commanders and the activation of reserves in domestic-disaster response.

I appreciate this committee's support for these two important measures, which will surely help save American lives.

It was my privilege to serve in Afghanistan and Iraq with many superb members of the National Guard and Reserves. I believe that in the crucible of over 10 years of continuous conflict, with the support of Congress, we have developed the finest total force that I have ever seen, and NORAD and NORTHCOM depend on that total force every day.

This past year has been busy. We have synchronized our activities with many partners and we have done our part to realize efficiencies that we have worked through the budget process; for fiscal year 2012 trimming our workforce by 141 full-time equivalents, and for fiscal year 2013 reducing our O&M [Operations and Maintenance] by about 6 percent.

With the resources and authorities at hand, and maintaining our vigilance, we will be able to continue to defend and support the American people.

Thank you for this opportunity to appear today, and I look forward to the discussion.

[The prepared statement of General Jacoby can be found in the Appendix on page 69.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

General Fraser, in your statement you point out the importance and emergence of the transnational criminal organizations. Can

you expound on that a little bit about what their influence is in the region and what we are doing to combat them?

General FRASER. Thank you for that question, Mr. Chairman.

We see that it is a network that extends from the production areas of the northern part of South America, through the transit zone in Central America and Mexico, and into the demand region in the United States and other parts of the region.

We are seeing that now some of that supply of cocaine—and I will talk specifically cocaine—is moving through South America, as well as Central America. But the violence continues to increase in Central America, and that is where and why we are focusing there.

Last year, the U.N. [United Nations] estimated or said that Honduras has the highest violence of any country in the world. And we see that as a direct influence of transnational organized crime, but there are gangs and there are other factors that also enter into that.

We are focused on our maritime mission, which is to support the detection and monitoring of the traffic through the maritime environments of the Caribbean and the Pacific. We started Operation Martillo on the 15th of January as an effort—and a focused effort—to try and disrupt that traffic and see if we can influence how it is impacting in Central America.

We are also working with our interagency partners, as well as our partner militaries, in Central America to build their capacity to support law enforcement as the militaries in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras have been asked by their governments to come in and support law enforcement.

We are working both maritime and land. We haven't taken our eye off the Caribbean, and we are still focused with our partners in South America as well, as well as working with Northern Command as that traffic transits through Central America into Mexico.

The CHAIRMAN. Big job.

General Jacoby, with the release of the 2013 budget your command announced that it will be eliminating the 24-hour alert requirement at 2 of the 18 existing aerospace control alert sites across the Nation. At these sites, North American Aerospace Defense Command has armed aircraft on 24-hour alert to conduct air operations to deter, detect, and if necessary defeat hostile air attacks aimed at the homeland.

How did the command arrive at this decision to eliminate these requirements at Duluth, Minnesota, and Langley, Virginia? And how can you assure the committee that the U.S. is not assuming any additional risk to our national security with these reductions?

General JACOBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

That is correct, and the reduction of 24/7 standing capability at those sites was a very difficult decision.

The Secretary of Defense and the President asked all the COCOMs [combatant commands] to turn over every rock and look at their mission sets and see where we could gain some efficiencies and make some progress in matching ends, ways, means and risk, in that dynamic relationship which is called strategy.

And so in good faith every COCOM did turn over every rocks. And the NORTHCOM and the NORAD mission sets' ACA [Aerospace Control Alert] basings were looked at very vigorously. Really

as a result of the GAO [Government Accountability Office] reports of 2009 and 2011, there was a lot of work done about each of the bases.

And so we dove into it as a team, OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense], NORAD, NORAD/NORTHCOM—and looked for ways to trim and gain efficiencies.

In my view, reducing by two bases after all the analysis and discussion that took place, I believe we can mitigate any additional risk that we assume by reducing the 24/7 presence.

I want to be clear that this does not mean closing down bases. It did not mean removing fighter squadrons. It just meant simply we would not sit alert at those two bases 24/7.

I believe that I have the resources and authorities to respond to any threats or any additional risk that can be accrued by closing down those 24/7 sites.

The CHAIRMAN. It does mean, though, that we are taking on additional risk.

General JACOBY. Chairman, that is correct.

After careful analysis and working with the United States Air Force, the Guard, and working with OSD, I believe I have the authorities and capabilities to mitigate that risk.

For instance, I have the authority to move to another level of alert and go from 14 bases with 28 fighters to 23 bases with 46 fighters in just a matter of 48 hours.

I also have the authority to restore a CAP to restore a presence over each one of those bases in less than an hour.

So I think we have the ability to do it. These were difficult decisions. I agree with the ranking member, the homeland is job one. But I think in this case we did due diligence and made good choices.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you did the best with what you have. I just think it is important that the country understand that with these cuts we are assuming additional risk around the world. This is just the one in your command.

But we don't know, and you don't know, until you look back, if you are able to withstand—if some of these additional risks develop into a tragedy, we don't know. Just like if you go back the last 5 or 10 years where we haven't been attacked, we could have cut down all 18 bases because we, you know, we didn't have that problem.

But you don't know what risks are until after you have—I mean, if the risk is real until somebody exploits it.

But thank you for what you have done and how you have made the best of this situation.

Ranking Member Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Yes, you certainly have a difficult task under the best of circumstances. And I think the thing about risk is there is no way to eliminate it. We could spend another trillion dollars in the defense budget and I am sure a whole lot of people would pour over it and say, "Well, there is risk here. How come you didn't eliminate that?" It is a question of balancing risk.

And as I argued before the committee, resources are always part of the equation in figuring out what your strategy is. We don't have

infinite resources. We have to live within finite means and try to figure out how to make it work best.

Along those lines, the question I want to ask both of you is with the strategic review and the change in approach, tell us a little bit how that change in strategy has changed your particular commands; what you are doing differently.

And you can balance it out. Part of it is, as the chairman has alluded to, you know, what risks are you taking on, but then also perhaps, how did you refigure how you spend things in a way that was more efficient and more effective in terms of meeting your strategic goals? And did those goals themselves change somewhat during the course of this process?

And I will yield to—I guess General Fraser, you go first, and then General Jacoby.

General FRASER. Thank you, Congressman Smith.

From my perspective, we took some very deliberate reductions, our command reduced by about 10 percent. And we took those in areas that I think we could use to mitigate the risk. A lot of it was—some of it is in travel. Some of it was in the number of people we sent to conferences.

We have adjusted the way we approach exercises. And some of that was a fact of life in working with our partners. They were not able to sustain the rate at which we were exercising with their vessels and their aircraft, and we needed to make some adjustments there, as well.

We are working much more—and continuing to work much more deliberately—with our interagency and international partners. And I see growing partnership throughout, especially Central America, but as well as the Caribbean, in our ability to work with one another to share a common understanding of that strategy and build capacity.

Mr. SMITH. And can you on that be specific and say what—I mean, what mission is it that you are better able to serve with those greater partnerships and that interagency—

General FRASER. It is the area that we are focused on the most; a nontraditional area which is that countering transnational organized crime. We are playing our role in that effort. We adjusted our strategy to put a more permanent presence along those departure and arrival zones within Central America, the Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific.

We are working deliberately with each of our interagency partners with the United States as well as our partners within Central America to build a common approach to this effort.

It is a long way to go but we are adjusting our strategy to the reality that none of us have enough resources to compete with the level of these transnational organized crime.

Last year, the estimate is, worldwide, that their profit was \$88 billion. Within Central America it is \$18 billion. These countries don't have that capacity, and so it really is interagency international support to address that problem from our perspective.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

General Jacoby.

General JACOBY. Thank you.

I believe that as we looked across the cuts to NORAD and U.S. Northern Command, the mission of NORAD and Northern Command and the job of defending the homeland was treated appropriately for the gravity of that responsibility.

And so essentially we took a 6 percent cut in our O&M funding as almost all the COCOMs did. We could absorb that. It is operating overhead. It is belt-tightening.

We lost a small amount in our chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear-response capability. That was two CSTs [Civil Support Teams], the State teams that were not mandated in Congress. We kept teams in every State. We just reduced two that were additional ones that States had fielded. And that was on top of the already talked about reduction in 24/7 operations at two sites for our alert fighters.

Those were really the majority of the pressure, budget pressure that we felt. Across the board, I think that the homeland received the attention that it deserved; and in order to meet the high expectations of this committee and the people of the United States for defending the homeland.

I will say that we are entering into a period here—and we are well in that period—where there is such an intimate relationship between the home game and the away game that I spend much of my time worrying about the same threats—the same set of threats that Jim Mattis does; the same set of threats that Bob Willard has done. And so those are reflected back in the homeland.

And so their capacities and capabilities are just as important to me as the ones that are extant in the homeland.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you both very much for your service. We are in your debt.

General Jacoby, North Korea has nuclear weapons. We believe that Iran may be developing them. We keep watching both of those countries to see when they will have a ballistic missile which could reach us.

Sir, I do not believe that this is the nature of the threat. These countries may be evil; they are not idiots. They know that we have space assets that if they launch, we would detect that launch. And if the weapon landed on our soil and detonated, they know that they would be quite immediately vaporized.

I do not believe that they are collectively suicidal, so I do not believe that we have a threat of an intercontinental ballistic missile launched from either North Korea or Iran.

I think the real threat, sir, is for a medium-range missile launched from a ship off our shore. This needn't even be a state actor. A nonstate actor with a tramp steamer, a Scud launcher—which they can buy, I believe, on the open market for about \$100,000—and any crude nuclear weapon detonated above the atmosphere over the Mid-Atlantic.

And, sir, they could miss by 100 miles and it really wouldn't make any difference, would it? And this would create Katrina at least 10 times over with the EMP [electromagnetic pulse] effect.

This would be close to a mortal wound. And if they then sank the ship, there may be little consequence of retaliation because there could be no fingerprints.

What assets do we have, sir, to protect against this kind of attack and to what extent are they in place along our shore?

General JACOBY. Thank you, sir. I appreciate the question, and I agree with you on the importance of considering that type of threat to the country. And you have helped us think our way through many of the steps that we have taken in the recent past.

First of all, it really divides itself into two questions, the EMP question itself and then specifically the scenario you painted as a maritime threat. And we have a responsibility from NORAD for our maritime assessment and warning. So we have got, really, two aspects of that.

First of all, in a maritime issue, we have made big strides over the last 5 years in bringing together all of the stakeholders in maritime domain awareness. We are increasing our capability to understand, to see and advise against maritime threats in a much greater capacity and capability than we have in the past.

Still have work to do; we continue to push the envelope. We have many tests ongoing that we conduct both with Canada and with all of our partner agencies in the United States. But we are getting closer to the kind of maritime domain awareness that the scenario you painted requires us to have.

On EMP itself, it is a challenge. And it could result in very tough effects for any advanced country that relies on its electronic grid and that type of energy support system.

So for that command itself, as you know, my alternate command center in Cheyenne Mountain has EMP protective capability as well as our headquarters at Peterson Air Force Base. So in terms of the command-and-control nodes required to defend this country in times of crisis—we are postured to deal with, at least partially, the EMP threat.

Now, we need to understand more about that. And one of the things we have done—and you have participated in this—is conduct a series of table-top exercises called Secure Grid. We did Secure Grid 11 last year, and it dealt primarily with the cyber threat and the consequences and interdependencies that create vulnerabilities of a cyber-attack.

And next year, NORTHCOM will host the next TTX [table-top exercise] on Secure Grid and it will deal specifically with the challenges and the requirements that are needed as a result of an EMP attack.

So we are paying attention to this. In the final analysis, our best defense is intelligence, interdiction and deterrence so that we prevent such a strike from occurring.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Johnson.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thanks to both of you generals for joining us today.

General, congratulations on your years of service and the prospects as you look forward to your new life. And your wife, I am sure—you know, your partner who has supported you—is also look-

ing forward to a new life, as well. And I am hopeful that everything will work out real well for both of you.

Thank you for your service.

General Jacoby, for what purpose do we currently operate drones in U.S. airspace?

General JACOBY. Thank you for the question.

There are tremendous opportunities and utility in using droned or unmanned aerial systems not just in theater but also in the homeland. In the past it has been pretty difficult. We have a challenging airspace. It is the best regulated, best controlled airspace in the world, and it has been a work in progress in integrating UAS, or unmanned aerial systems, into that airspace.

We have had success in the past with the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration], but there is a long turn to get certificates of waiver in order to operate outside of military-restricted airspace to use unmanned aerial systems.

In that regard, we very much appreciate the legislative initiative that directs figuring out a way to integrate that airspace—UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles] into the airspace—by 2015.

I think there is a tremendous opportunity to use UASs, particularly in my mission, for incident awareness as a result of a natural or manmade disaster. I mean, the ability to see, to understand, to build a common operating picture of a disaster could be greatly enhanced by the use of UASs, and so that would be the first place where I would see great utility in improving our ability to integrate our airspace.

Mr. JOHNSON. Are there any other purposes for which you would use the drones in U.S. airspace?

General JACOBY. What we would do, sir, is provide defense support to another civil authority or a lead federal agency, you know, upon proper request. And so there could be incidents where we were requested and authorized, perhaps, to support a law-enforcement activity, but none of that would obviate the need for us to operate within Posse Comitatus.

Mr. JOHNSON. How can you guarantee that spying on the activities of Americans would not come into play? And how can you ensure that such action does not violate the Posse Comitatus Act?

General JACOBY. It is very important to us, and it is clearly defined for us in law; and we don't do anything that we are not directed by the Secretary of Defense to do.

In my headquarters specifically, I have eight law enforcement organizations that are represented. And so we have careful intelligence oversight of everything that we do within the homeland. And in fact, as I mentioned earlier, our priorities—keeping faith with the American people—is a priority of this command, and it will be done.

Mr. JOHNSON. Is there any congressional meaningful oversight into the use of drones in American airspace?

General JACOBY. Just from a regulatory standpoint, it is very restricted airspace and it is a challenge to use UAVs in that restricted airspace.

As we move through the implementation of this legislation, I am sure there will be careful watch of ensuring safeguards that are in place.

Mr. JOHNSON. So in other words, in restricted airspace only is—are these drones used currently—restricted airspace?

General JACOBY. In either restricted airspace that is under military control of the airspace over a post, camp, or station, for instance, or under the specific direction of the Secretary of Defense in support of another lead federal agency, for instance FEMA, in terms of incident awareness in a natural disaster.

Mr. JOHNSON. So FEMA would be able to request your capabilities?

General JACOBY. That is correct. That is correct.

Mr. JOHNSON. What about the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] or a local police department?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank both of you for your service.

And General, best wishes on your retirement. That happened to me a couple of years ago in the National Guard. There is life after service for you and your family; so best wishes.

I am mighty proud of the success of Plan Colombia. Sadly, when things are really positive, you don't hear about them. But I am really pleased that under the new government of President Juan Manuel Santos, they have recently rolled out a new strategy in the fight against FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia].

What is the new strategy? How does it differ from the prior strategy in Colombia?

General FRASER. Thank you, Congressman.

And from my view, Plan Colombia has been very successful. It is a whole-of-government approach by the Government of Colombia to address the concern with the FARC. They have reduced the FARC from 18,000 down to 9,000, but the FARC are still an element that needs to be addressed.

As a result of continued pressure over 10 years, the FARC have adjusted their strategy. And in conjunction with that, President Santos directed that their strategy change as well. They are working across the government. They have put a deliberate effort into adjusting that strategy. We provided support to them in a meaningful way as we helped them work through that design, and we are continuing to support them as they implement this.

They are going to establish additional joint task forces that include not only military, but law enforcement. And they will have as well task forces in a maritime environment, as well as the air environment, and put a very deliberate focus on reducing the capability of the FARC to continue their efforts.

Mr. WILSON. And I have seen it first-hand. Our family is very active in the Partners of the Americas Program. We have had exchange students from Colombia live with us, and unfortunately they couldn't go home because of the violence, but now they obviously can.

And we have had two sons as exchange students in Cali, Colombia—Colegio Bennett. So it really is a story that the American people need to know because we hear all the time that we just can't make a difference, but we can in a huge country; 40 million people.

On the other hand, there is Venezuela. It has been reported concerning the counter-narco-trafficking activities in the region—what is Venezuela's role? And what has been the conduct of Chavez?

General FRASER. Congressman, Venezuela has reduced its support to a lot of the counter-drug activity over the last 4 or 5 years. They are starting to increase some of that, but we see most of the air traffic that departs South America towards Central America coming from Venezuela.

They continue to conduct some operations in counter—some of those organizations. They just captured one of the leading members that Colombia was interested in getting hold of recently, but their efforts have not been enough; and so they continue to provide a basis on which narco-organizations can continue to operate.

Mr. WILSON. And that is such a threat to the sovereignty of their country. That is really sad.

General JACOBY, I am very proud. I have four sons currently serving under your command, and I am very grateful. I am also a strong supporter of your efforts for the missile defense system. I am concerned with a \$256.8 million reduction for the ground-based midcourse defense program that this program will be at risk.

Can you assure us that it won't?

General JACOBY. Thank you for your question. Thanks for your children's service.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you.

General JACOBY. Ground-based missile defense is perhaps one of our most important missions in defending the Nation. I am very proud that NORTHCOM has that responsibility.

To that end, as the combatant commander, my interest is that when we are threatened, that we understand the threat, we detect the threat. And when we pull the trigger, missile leaves the silo, intercepts, and defeats the threat. And so it is the reliability of that system of systems which I discuss with the whole array of stakeholders in the missile defense world. And we have a lot of tough conversations about this because we have a high standard of expectation.

Despite the cuts, my conversations with General O'Reilly have gratified me in that we are embarked on a realistic testing schedule that takes us through 2017, one test a year. I am very happy about that.

And then, of course, all the work that goes before a test and all the work that goes after a test; all contributing to that reliability. It gives me the assurance as a commander when we pull the trigger, it is going to work.

Mr. WILSON. I think my time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Fraser and General Jacoby, thank you very much for being here and for your extensive service to our Nation.

And congratulations on your retirement, General.

I wonder if you could tell us more about Exercise UNITAS Pacific. And speak to the emphasis on improving maritime interdiction capabilities with regard to the submersibles that are being used by transnational criminal and possibly terrorist organizations.

We are hearing a little bit more about this, originating in the Southern Command's area of responsibility. And I am wondering how mature is this capability and is it used more for the traffic of drugs or people? And what do we have to counteract it?

General FRASER. Congresswoman Davis, thank you very much.

UNITAS is a maritime exercise. It is the oldest maritime exercise in the region, over 52 years now. We run it in two versions, one on the Atlantic, one in the Pacific. It really is a deep-water, a blue-water exercise that involves very traditional military exercises and capabilities. It has been a long-running exercise, very valuable to us on both coasts of South America and we continue to work that and build partnerships with our partner navies.

You brought up the issue of submersibles, essentially submarines, as well as semisubmersibles. We had seen a decline in the number of semisubmersibles. And these are vessels, as you know—100 feet long, a crew of six, very low waterline, very difficult to detect, and can carry up to 10 metric tons of cocaine.

We are also seeing fully submersibles; dimensions very similar, but they can submerge to 60 to 100 feet to avoid detection as they—built in the jungles, primarily of Colombia. They transit from Colombia or the northern part of South America nonstop to Central America. And they are difficult to detect as well.

General FRASER. It is very, very difficult and time-consuming and expensive to try and find them in the open oceans. And so we are working with our interagency partners, as well as our international partners, to see if we can do a better job of finding where they are built, how they are built, who is building them so that we can interdict them on land.

This year was the first year that we had seen semisubmersibles in the Caribbean. So we see an increasing use of those vessels.

Mrs. DAVIS. I know that the LCS [Littoral Combat Ship] is not being deployed in those areas. Where does that fit into this?

General FRASER. Well, ma'am—

Mrs. DAVIS. At all?

General FRASER [continuing]. When the LCS comes on line—and it is still in production right now, so they are beginning production; so it will come on line later in this decade. And that is one of the primary ships that will be of benefit to supporting our counter-trafficking efforts within both the Caribbean and the Pacific.

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay. Thank you.

I just wanted to say as well that I certainly appreciate your focus on the interagency capacity building, but I am also whether you feel that enough people, enough countries and partners have really bought into that. And is there anything that you see coming along that we should really be aware of in terms of whether it is funding; whether it is budget cuts? Because I think that sometimes it is hard for people to see that this provides a multiplier for us in the field.

General FRASER. What I would argue is I see growing relationships within the U.S. interagency to address this effort. And I find us in a supporting role, not a leading role, and that is where we should be.

With our partners around the region we see the same thing across all areas. I see growth in that area as well.

What I would ask for is continued support to the foreign assistance budgets because dealing with law enforcement, judicial systems, underlying causes of this problem are really the solution to the problem.

Mrs. DAVIS. As you depart, any other words of wisdom? You know, what made you crazy throughout your service?

General FRASER. I don't think—

Mrs. DAVIS. As it relates to Congress.

General FRASER. I would say I genuinely appreciate Congress, this committee's as well as the entire Congress' support to our men and women in uniform and our civilians who also support us.

They know you care about them. They know you care about their capabilities and their requirements. And I just ask for you to continue to maintain that faith with our men and women serving and our veterans and their families.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you.

Thank you again for your service, and your family.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. LoBiondo.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General Fraser, General Jacoby, thank you for being here and for your service.

General Jacoby, I know that Chairman McKeon earlier addressed my concerns about assuming additional risk with the proposed ACA wing closures. And having the 177th Fighter Wing in my district, this is a major area of concern for me. And I am looking forward to reviewing the analysis you and your team have done to justify these decisions.

With that said, I have two questions. Could you please confirm whether or not there is funding for the ACA mission across the F-Y-D-P, the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program], in NORTHCOM proposals, to not continue funding? Is it the 2-year increments you did in the past? Is that what we are doing?

General JACOBY. Congressman, thanks for the question.

I believe we are adequately funded, 16 sites up to April 13th. And then beyond that we drop to the 14 sites. And I believe that there is adequate funding. And that funding is across the 5-year defense plan.

Mr. LOBIONDO. 5-year.

And also are you comfortable that with the delay in the F-35 procurement, that the budget submission has sufficient funds to maintain the necessary Strike Fighter inventory to meet national military strategy requirements, especially those that apply to the ACA mission?

General JACOBY. My concerns are specifically the ACA mission, and whether it is F-35s, F-22s, F-15s, F-16s—we have had any number of platforms pull the mission, to include CF-18s from Canada, and pull that mission successfully. And we have a robust inspection program that ensures whatever platform has been provided by the United States Air Force; that it is capable and meets the mission standard.

So, you know, specifically on ACA, at this point in time, I believe that we are, in terms of platforms, adequately supported by the

United States Air Force for that mission, and the Canadian Government.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Okay. Thank you, General.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Reyes.

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, gentlemen, thank you for being here.

NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM share a critical common boundary through which the majority of drug trafficking flows. And not too many years ago Secretary Rumsfeld, he at one point tried to dismantle DOD's counter-narcotics programs; so a couple of questions on that.

First, can you tell the committee how you are cooperating in this critical area? Secondly, I guess the best way to put it is: What percentage would be impacted by the potential sequestration cuts in this vital and important area?

General FRASER. Congressman, let me start, and then I will turn the floor to General Jacoby.

We have a very close relationship between our two commands. Our staffs talk weekly. Our military deputies talk on a monthly basis. And we meet periodically as well to coordinate our strategies, coordinate our efforts as we cross that land boundary, is where I would say primarily.

In the maritime boundary, JIATF-South's [Joint Interagency Task Force South] area of operation already encompasses not only NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM, but portions of AFRICOM [Africa Command], European Command, as well as Pacific Command.

So I see great unity of effort across our combatant command boundaries in both areas, be it land and/or maritime environment; Sequestration, from my standpoint, as you know—we will go at each of our accounts and decrement each of our accounts in some manner.

On a basis I receive that counter-narcotics funding from a central transfer account in the Department of Defense. So it will really be—how the Department of Defense decides to apportion that money, will depend on how much we are affected directly within our operations. But it will impact the maritime environment primarily because that is where a lot of the capability goes; but it will impact also our ability to support and train with our partner militaries throughout the region as well and equip them.

General JACOBY. Thank you, Congressman. I think we have an unprecedented level of cooperation between our two commands, and if we didn't, Grace and Rena would get on us; so we are doing a lot of things to take advantage of some of the lessons we have learned over the last 10 years of warfare. And that is that bad things happen at boundaries; and they are a weakness unless you make them a strength. And Doug and I have decided to make it a strength; where a boundary now is a place where cooperation takes place.

And as I said, in an unprecedented way along the Mexico, Guatemala, Belizean border, where we have real concerns, the cooperation has reached an all-new high, to include the Mexican participation, which is critical. So I am very confident that we are working

that boundary very, very carefully and diligently. And I think we are going to have success there.

In terms of counter-narcotics funding, as General Fraser indicated, it is very difficult to know how the additional cuts would play out. I would of course argue that counter-narcotics funds used by the Department of Defense to support lead agencies in the homeland are your greatest bang for the buck. It is our homeland. And so that is where you would want to start. And so we will make that argument if that comes to pass.

But there are many, many competitors—worthy competitors—for each and every one of those dollars.

I would say in the homeland that when we use counter-narcotics funding to support lead agencies you get a twofer, because our standard is we support our great partners, primarily at DHS [Department of Homeland Security] and primarily within that CBP [Customs and Border Protection]; we get tremendous training value.

And I talk to commanders all the time that have the opportunity to train with our partners on the southwest border, and they absolutely feel it is the best possible training they could get for integrating all their systems, to working in a complex interagency environment against a noncooperative enemy which is a real threat to our country.

So we will watch that very closely. I think it would be a real problem for us if we lost more money due to sequestration.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. KLINE.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here, for your terrific service. Congratulations on retirement. I hope you have got a place on a lake or something; at least a golf course.

It seems to me that over the last decade or so, during a time when the Nation has felt, and correctly so, greatly threatened, and we are in a time of pretty significant buildup—military buildup—in end strength and activities, that we have actually increased the number of COCOMs.

And I am wondering if it isn't perhaps time to take another look at that; sort of a cost-saving rationalization of the geographic combatant commands. And I am looking at your—I am not picking on your two specifically here, but in general, if you look at SOUTHCOM—got a budget of something over \$200 million; about \$50 million for headquarters support. NORTHCOM, similarly, over a couple hundred million dollars, and then some other costs that are taken up in each service as part of that.

NORTHCOM, according to my notes here, has something over 1,500 people; 17 general officers or members of the Senior Executive Service. SOUTHCOM has got 22 generals or SES [Senior Executive Service] and over 3,000 people. No forces committed to either command full-time, but of course you actually have access to them, and we have just heard some testimony here from both of you on that.

Are you aware of any discussions about perhaps looking again at the number and composition of COCOMs? Either one of you? Both of you?

General FRASER. Congressman, this conversation comes up on a recurring basis I think as the Department looks at the Unified Command Plan. And I think that discussion is ongoing.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you.

General Jacoby.

General JACOBY. Congressman, there have been a number of studies in the past that have looked at this. None of them have ever ended up recommending consolidation of those two commands. But I know that the Unified Command Plan will undergo the same scrutiny that all the other functions in the Department of Defense undergo as the Secretary has to turn over every rock.

Mr. KLINE. Right. Well, I appreciate that. Those are, I am sure, exactly accurate answers.

But we are in an extraordinary position right now, as we are reducing end strength. And rapidly in the Army and the Marine Corps particularly, we are looking at budget cuts that are keeping all of us here on this committee awake all the time, and perhaps you as well, and the men and women in your commands.

And so it just seems to me that this would be a good opportunity for us, the people on this committee and folks in the Pentagon, to look again at the composition of the COCOMs and the number and size and missions and see if we can't perhaps achieve some savings there.

General Fraser, I just couldn't help—I was listening to the conversation. Mrs. Davis asked some questions about drug trafficking and you were talking about submarines and semisubmersibles. And I happened to be in Colombia not long ago, a few months ago, and had a chance to look at those things.

And I don't know whether those are the bravest people in the world that would drive those things, or the dumbest. I am not sure. But incredible—if Americans could see the lengths to which the drug traffickers will go with submarines that I wouldn't want to float on the surface in them, much less go underwater with them.

It is extraordinary the lengths to which they are going, and I just wanted to say I very much appreciate the work that you are doing and the Americans are doing, our partners are doing, the Colombians are doing; a heck of a problem.

So again, thank you very much for your service, and Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. West.

Mr. WEST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, General Fraser, and also General Jacoby, for being here.

And congratulations on your retirement; hopefully, you will stay down in south Florida where we have plenty of golf courses for you to enjoy.

Kind of dovetailing off of a theme that we have heard up here in Washington, D.C., for quite some time—you talked about the transnational criminal organizations. But we also have an issue with Iran being down in this SOUTHCOM AOR. And you and I talked about this last week. You know, the fact that we just recently had Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Ecuador, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba; the fact we have a Hezbollah footprint. You

know, we know that Iran was dealing with Mexican drug cartels for the assassination plots against a couple of ambassadors.

So my question is: When you look at this type of activity, how do you assess Iran's involvement in the SOUTHCOM AOR? And also I would like us to continue the conversation, to talk about the battle hand-off TTPs [tactics, techniques, and procedures] that you share, because this is flowing from South America up through Central America and across our borders, especially when you look at that category on the Border Patrol website called OTMs—the other than Mexicans.

So, if you could, address your assessments on Iran's involvement in your respective AORs, and also those TTPs for battle hand-off.

General FRASER. Thank you, Congressman West. And we did have a good conversation on this topic.

As I see, Iran is interested in engaging in building relations with counterparts in Latin America. They have increased their number of embassies in the last 5 years; doubled those. They now have 10 embassies. They have also helped support different cultural centers, in building of cultural centers, throughout the region.

Primarily, I see a diplomatic as well as commercial interests; economic interests. And that is how their relationship has been growing. There is connections, and that is our concern as we watch this—the connections with Hezbollah and Hamas, who have been in the region for a number of years, primarily still focused on conducting illicit activity to provide funding support and logistics support back to parent organizations within the Middle East.

That is still the relationship that I see today. I don't think that President Ahmadinejad had the impact that he was looking for, except with the ability to continue to strengthen his anti-U.S. connections in the region.

General JACOBY. Thank you.

As I mentioned earlier, there is not a threat overseas in the other combatant commander areas of operations that I don't keep an eye on. And I have got both eyes on the Iranian issue.

It is our working assumption that if we had problems with Iran, that it could get reflected back into the homeland. And so we are working closely with all the agencies on a daily basis in our threat working group to make sure that we understand bleed-over of the Middle East threats into the homeland.

To that end, I would also say that our partners in Canada and Mexico are great allies in protecting this continent from the terrorist threat.

Mr. WEST. With that being said, do you feel that you have the requisite allocation of forces to be able to contend with any escalation you may see, or any collusion that intensifies between, you know, Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, and these transnational criminal organizations?

General FRASER. Congressman, we continue, as General Jacoby mentioned, to keep a very close eye. And I agree with him; I keep both eyes on this as well. And I am confident as we work and if we get indications of anything from which I am concerned about, that we can make those requests to the chairman and the Secretary of Defense and we will get direct support.

General JACOBY. In our case in the homeland, and considering potential threats from Iran, I believe it is less an issue of forces and more an issue of intelligence and warning.

We have an extraordinary relationship with law enforcement activities throughout the United States, and with our partners both in SOUTHCOM and in Central Command. And so I feel that we are well postured now to see it coming and I am confident that we will be given resources required to deal with it if that comes to pass.

Mr. WEST. Well, thank you both. And being savvy military commanders, I am sure you know that the enemy always looks for a gap by which he can exploit you. And I hope that we are not showing weakness along our southern border area because we don't need to have a soft underbelly.

So with that being said, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Conaway.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that.

Gentlemen, thanks for being here and your long and distinguished service, et cetera, et cetera. We are proud of you.

And good luck in whatever you decide to do, General Fraser, moving forward.

Real quickly, a little bit of a line of questioning that my colleague, Mr. West, talked about. Hamas and Hezbollah have focused principally on illicit activities. Do we have the kind of insights or tools to understand when they might change that focus, General Fraser, from those activities towards some threats to the homeland?

General FRASER. We are very focused—well, we support the intelligence community that is very focused on this issue, not only within the Central Command region of responsibility, but across the globe. So I am confident we have that insight.

Mr. CONAWAY. General Jacoby, part of what we are doing here is we have the, you know, the Secretary of the Air Force, the chairman of the Air Force come in and talk about reduction in the number of airplanes and those kind of things. We are trying to translate that into what they are doing at Big Blue, versus what you have access to.

Given the reductions in fighters and in other aircraft, how does that affect what you are—when you look at your mission and say, “I need to do these things,” and then you ask for those assets, what has been the impact of these—or will be the impact of these reduced airplanes to defending the homeland?

General JACOBY. Congressman, I am reliant on the United States Air Force and the total Air Force for the accomplishment of our NORAD and NORTHCOM missions.

On the NORAD side of the house, almost all of the alert sites, except for the ones in Alaska, are served by the Air National Guard. So I am very reliant on the Air Guard for the fighter support required for the air-control mission.

In disaster response, defense support to civil authorities, of course, the Air National Guard and the Air Reserve have been critical players in responding effectively and in a timely manner to dis-

aster. In fact, their responsiveness is the key to much of our success.

So I would say that as the combatant commander, for me it is a matter of the United States Air Force meeting requirements, both to defend the homeland and to respond in support of civil authorities.

Mr. CONAWAY. So at this stage, you are not seeing those reductions affect their ability to service what you need done?

General JACOBY. No, I have not. And General Schwartz has had to make some real tough calls here and it will mean priorities will have to be adjusted so we get what we need in time to take care of our responsibilities in the homeland.

And so we trust the Air Force to do that. I know there have been some tough calls. I am a huge admirer and respecter of the Air Guard, and I look to the Air Force to supply the requirements for both those missions.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you.

General Fraser, do you want to talk to us about China and Russia's activities in the SOUTHCOM area? Just because they have got activities, they are not necessarily things that we should be worried about. It may just be commercial competition and/or other things. Could you visit with us about what your perspective is on what they have been doing in South America?

General FRASER. Thank you, Congressman.

I find that China's engagement is very much focused on diplomatic and economic; very engaged in commodities purchases and agreements. But we see them also increasing their engagement militarily. They have offered weapons for sale, primarily some light attack aircraft, as well as air-defense radars and some other equipment. And they do provide military training opportunities for officers from various countries in the region to be educated within region.

I do not see a military threat in the region. I see them very much in the region very much engaged economically and diplomatically with China, like they would with any other key partner.

With Russia, I see their focus primarily on diplomatic engagement as well; a lot from the economic standpoint in a military focus. But we have also seen recent engagement in the counter-drug effort. Their counter-drug czar was just recently in the region making agreements for training and helping equip governments to address that concern also; again, primarily diplomatic, with commercial sales for military weapon.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, gentlemen. Who has responsibility for Gitmo? Either one of you? I should know that.

General FRASER. Sir, I have that.

Mr. CONAWAY. All right. You don't need to comment, but this recent article about the soccer field and the monies expended there are frustrating, at about \$4,300 per detainee. I am not sure 171 of them can still play soccer. It is troubling; indeed head-scratching. I know it was made back in 2010, but that one is troubling.

Thank you, gentlemen. Appreciate it.

I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you wish to comment on that, General?

General FRASER. Chairman, if I might. Thank you for the opportunity to address that concern.

As I look at Guantanamo, I had four issues that we need to deal with, and that is work the efficiencies and understand as we uncover every rock, how can we operate that encampment more efficiently; comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention; as well as comply with the recommendations from the Walsh Report; and maintain a secure environment for force protection across the camps.

In the consolidation that we worked, and we have been working at consolidation to move detainees from camps one through four, into camps five and six, primarily—in that effort we had a field that was in camp four that was like the one that we just built within Guantanamo, and it provides a very secure environment for our guards, because it reduces their interaction, but provides an outlet, if you will, for the detainees.

And so that really is my focus on the reason for building that field. And as a result of the consolidation, we reduced the guard force by 150 guards and overall by 200 guards. That equates to, conservatively, \$3 million to \$4 million a year in savings.

And so we think that the investment in that field—I think that investment in that field was worth the money.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, General Fraser. There is always another side to the story, and typically it is helpful to get the other side.

The fact that your wife grinned remarkably when I asked the question means that you and she have had this conversation—or you have had this conversation with other folks. So I appreciate that clarification and thank you for that. Again, thanks for your service.

General FRASER. And thank you, Mr. Conaway.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Gibson.

Mr. GIBSON. Well, thanks, Mr. Chairman.

And I had the opportunity to have very extended office calls with both these commanders in the previous week and opportunity to ask them numerous questions.

So actually they have responded to those questions already, so let me just use my time to then publicly state that I can personally attest that both of these commanders are extraordinary leaders.

We are fortunate to have them in uniform. Our thoughts and prayers are with your troopers and your families at this time. And I look forward to continuing to work closely with you going forward as we work through the very difficult issues this year and the years to come.

And particularly for General Jacoby, as you work through the detailed planning process, fleshing out those details for the joint concepts attendant to the review—I look forward to working with you on that.

And again thank you.

Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. That concludes requests I have for questions.

I do have one final question I would like to ask both of you, and that is: How would sequestration affect your ability to fulfill the missions of your commands?

General FRASER. Chairman, it would impact us across the board, because as you well know better than I, it has a targeted reduction in every program element of our commands. And so it would impact our ability to support communications with our military groups and embassies around the region.

It would impact our ability to conduct as well as support our military partners in the effort against transnational organized crime. It will impact our ability to continue to train and build the relationships with our partners. In each case, it will have a deliberate impact.

As well, as you look in Colombia, as our support to the Government of Colombia as they counter the FARC, as well as we are working with Peru to help them counter Sendero Luminoso. Each one of those areas would be decremented.

And the unknown for me is we receive a lot of support from external to the command, so each of the services and the impact on their capabilities is an unknown that I don't have right now; and so I can't give you the full extent of how sequestration would impact the command overall.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

General JACOBY. Chairman, I echo many of General Fraser's concerns. I think the greatest concern we have is unknown, the unknown of it.

I believe in my heart of hearts that it would create a cascading effect of risk, which would jeopardize the defense of the homeland. It would fail to meet the expectations of you, this committee, Congress, and the American people for how we should defend our people.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you for those responses.

I have great concern. I think the cuts that we are going through on the current budget are excessive; the \$487 billion over the next 10 years; and then sequestration of \$500 billion, \$600 billion on top of that in the same budget year, probably when we will be dealing with wrapping up a continuing resolution, because we probably won't finish up a budget this year, given the environment around here.

And then the budget cuts that we are looking at right now, the chiefs have had a lot of time to digest that. The COCOMs have had a lot of time to digest that and to have input and to see results of planning; where sequestration is just an automatic, across-the-board cut on every line item in the budget.

I see total chaos around here in January if we don't fix that before that time. So I am hopeful that it won't—I am hopeful that we are able to fix it so that it doesn't come to pass. When we originally voted for the Deficit Reduction Act we were promised that that was so severe that it never could happen. And I think we all understand that.

It is just how we get from here to there and actually get it fixed. And I know we each have different ideas as to how that happens. But it is something that we really need to address, sooner better than later, I feel.

Does the ranking member have any closing comments?

Thank you very much again for your service.

Rena, thank you for all the support you have given this guy for these many years.

And we really appreciate your service. Pass that on, if you would please, to those who serve under you. We appreciate all their service.

Thank you very much. This hearing stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:20 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MARCH 6, 2012

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 6, 2012

Statement of Hon. Howard P. “Buck” McKeon
Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on
Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization
Budget Requests from U.S. Southern Command
and U.S. Northern Command
March 6, 2012

The committee meets today to receive testimony on the status and posture of both our Southern Command and Northern Command. I am pleased to welcome General Douglas Fraser, commander of U.S. Southern Command; and General Charles Jacoby, commander of U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command. General Fraser, I understand this will be your last appearance before the Committee in this capacity. After 37 years in the Air Force, we thank you for your service to our country and wish you all the best. Gentlemen, thank you for your long and distinguished service to our Nation and thank you for joining us today.

Looking at SOUTHCOM, General Fraser, in my mind, the illicit trafficking threat is the greatest challenge we face in your geographic area of responsibility. In your statement, you highlight the threat of transnational criminal organizations and their role in SOUTHCOM's area of responsibility. Growing crime and violence in Central America as well as the continuing growth of Chinese, Russian, and Iranian influence in the region bring with them opportunities and challenges. China, Russia, and Iran have been very active in Latin America, through arms sales, personnel exchanges, investments, and trade deals. In addition, the activities of Hezbollah in the region are very troubling. It is also—I should add—one that requires close collaboration and coordination with your colleague at the table from NORTHCOM, as well as your interagency partners. The committee would benefit from your assessment of trends in the activities and influence of these actors in the western hemisphere.

Regarding NORTHCOM, drug-related violence is a threat directly impacting the U.S. homeland on a daily basis, and we need to treat it as a national security imperative. I laud the heroic efforts of Mexican security service personnel and public officials, who—make no mistake—are risking their lives and the lives of their families in a war against these brutal criminal enterprises. We need to support these heroes in their fight—while fully respecting the sovereignty of Mexico. I look forward to hearing your as-

assessment of the progress being made by Mexican authorities, and what NORTHCOM is doing to support them and build their capacity and capabilities. Additionally, the committee is concerned about the sufficiency of the FY 2013 budget for the Ground-based Mid-course Defense system, which NORTHCOM relies on to protect the U.S. from long-range ballistic missiles. Homeland defense is supposed to be the first priority for missile defense, but this budget request does not reflect that prioritization. We must be careful not to compromise homeland missile defense for the sake of theater missile defense or budget shortfalls.

In this continually changing budget environment and with the new Defense Strategy laid out by the President earlier this year, evaluation of each combatant command and their interpretation of missions and goals within the Department becomes vital. With the looming threat of sequestration, we must also understand the consequences of such severe cuts on the effectiveness of your commands. Gentlemen, thank you again for appearing before us today.

Statement of Hon. Adam Smith
Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on
Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization
Budget Requests from U.S. Southern Command
and U.S. Northern Command
March 6, 2012

I would like to join Chairman McKeon in welcoming General Fraser, and General Jacoby. We appreciate your time and look forward to hearing your thoughts on the budget requests for your respective commands.

Earlier this year, the President released the findings of a strategic review, which clearly articulated the global threat environment, and presented a broad strategy to address those threats moving forward. This strategic review appropriately places a renewed focus on the critically important Asia-Pacific region, but our regional commands will continue to play a vital role as we work to confront national security threats wherever they arise.

I look forward to hearing from General Fraser regarding your important issues at SOUTHCOM. I want to hear more about your thoughts on the nontraditional threats in the region, the rising violence and instability in Central America, our military-to-military cooperation in the area, and your counternarcotics duties. While SOUTHCOM lacks traditional military threats to the United States, these issues are important to the United States and often require an interagency approach to address them. I hope you can take some time to address how you are working with your interagency partners and where we can make progress in that area.

In regard to NORTHCOM, I look forward to hearing about how we are working with Mexico to address issues on our Southern border. We focus a lot of our attention on the Southern border but I'd also like to hear your views on some of challenges on our Northern land borders. I'd also like to hear your thoughts about what global warming and increased access to the Arctic mean for national security, how NORTHCOM, in partnership with EUCOM [European Command], is addressing this challenge and whether you have the resources you need.

Again, thank you all for your time and I look forward to hearing your testimony.

**POSTURE STATEMENT OF
GENERAL DOUGLAS M. FRASER, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND**

BEFORE THE 112TH CONGRESS

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

6 MARCH 2012



Introduction

Chairman McKeon, Congressman Smith, distinguished members of the Committee: thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to report on the posture, security concerns, and future direction of United States Southern Command. Within the context of modest funding, we continue to accomplish our primary objective of defending the United States while also promoting regional security and enduring partnerships. The key to our defense-in-depth approach to Central America, South America, and the Caribbean has been persistent, sustained engagement, which supports the achievement of U.S. national security objectives by strengthening the security capacities of our partner nations. Militaries in our area of responsibility (AOR) are increasingly capable, professionalized, and rank among the most trusted institutions in many countries in the region.¹

Interagency coordination is the foundation of United States Southern Command's approach. Our relatively lean budget necessitates that we embrace innovative techniques to accomplish our mission; we do so by leveraging the capabilities and resources of our partners within the region, the U.S. government, and our command. Thirty-three interagency representatives and foreign liaison officers from five countries are integrated into our command, allowing us to capitalize on in-house expertise and align our engagement activities within U.S. government frameworks. We are continuing to refine our organizational model, but the guiding principle remains unchanged: we support a comprehensive interagency approach that employs whole-of-government solutions to address the complex challenges in the region.

¹ Aravena, F. *Confianza base para la gobernabilidad y la convivencia democrática en América Latina y el Caribe*, 2010. (*Trust Foundation of Governability and Democratic Coexistence in Latin America and the Caribbean*) Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO).

Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF South), our key component in detection and monitoring of illicit traffic, exemplifies this unity of effort. Considered the linchpin in U.S. counterdrug efforts, JIATF South capitalizes on the unique capabilities, authorities, and strengths of interagency partners such as the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of Homeland Security. In 2011, JIATF South operations resulted in the disruption of 117 metric tons of cocaine, denying illicit traffickers approximately \$3 billion in revenue. Our return on investment is substantial; in 2010, JIATF South supported the interdiction of eight times the amount of cocaine than was interdicted on the Southwest border, at a third of the cost and in an operating area that covers 42 million square miles.²

None of our efforts would have been possible without the continued support of Congress. Almost three decades ago, Congress recognized the important role the Department of Defense could play to counter the threat of drug trafficking, particularly in support of civilian law enforcement efforts. More recently, through the provision of authorities commonly referred to as Sections 1206, 1207, and 1208, we trained and equipped partner nation forces to help the United States combat terrorism and conduct stability operations. Congressional approval to delink the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program from the American Service Members' Protection Act sanctions has allowed us to educate and train hundreds of military personnel in the region, a critical element in strengthening military-to-military relations. We also appreciate the ongoing support Congress provides to the Department of State's regional security initiatives such as the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), the

² In FY2010 the U.S. government expended a combined \$1.8 billion across 11 agencies on interdiction efforts on the 1,969-mile long Southwest border (SWB); FY2010 total operating cost for JIATF South was \$565.5 million. In FY2010, law enforcement agencies seized 19 metric tons of cocaine at the SWB; in comparison, JIATF South operations resulted in the disruption 154 metric tons.

Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI), and the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI), all of which provide direction and support to our engagements in the region.

As we look to the future, we will continue to seek innovative ways to support interagency coordination; streamline programs and initiatives; and replicate the success of our highly effective, small-footprint approach that bolsters the security capacity of regional militaries and ensures the multi-layered defense of the United States. We believe our approach will be increasingly important given constrained resources and the complex challenges we face in our AOR. While we do not see a traditional military threat emanating from the region, nations throughout our hemisphere are contending with an asymmetric threat to national and international security: Transnational Organized Crime (TOC). In addition to this primary concern, United States Southern Command also remains watchful for the potential impact of natural disasters; the activities of violent extremist organizations; and the implications of the activities of nations such as Iran in our area of responsibility.

Strategic Environment

Security Concerns

During the past decade, the international system underwent a profound transformation as globalization irrevocably altered commerce, culture, trade, and technology. With these developments, however, came the parallel globalization of organized crime, violence, murder, and kidnappings related to illicit trafficking. In many parts of our hemisphere—but most acutely in Central America—transnational organized crime has evolved into a volatile and potentially destabilizing threat to both citizen and regional security. Fluid, agile, and complex, these sophisticated networks conduct illicit operations that traverse the boundaries of the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs). Illicit trafficking by transnational criminal organizations is

expanding between our AOR and the AORs of United States Northern Command, United States Africa Command, and United States European Command, underscoring the truly global nature of this networked threat.

Central America has become the key transshipment zone for illicit trafficking in the hemisphere; approximately 90 percent of cocaine destined for the United States now transits the sub-region. Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador are experiencing alarming increases in murders and brutality. The rising wave of violence and illicit trafficking, coupled with the expansive resources of transnational organized crime, is challenging the law enforcement capacities of some Central American governments. Accordingly, these countries view their militaries as the only entities capable of responding to these threats. In 2011, El Salvador extended the 2010 deployment of its military to support domestic law enforcement, while Guatemala and Honduras repeatedly relied on their armed forces to counter the spread of transnational organized crime. Guatemalan law enforcement institutions struggled to bring violence under control in 2011; after the massacre of 27 farm workers in Petén by operatives of the Mexican-based Los Zetas organization, Guatemala declared a 60-day military state-of-siege, the second in less than a year.

To Central America's north, the government of Mexico has fully committed to reducing the power and impunity of transnational organized crime and drug cartels. Events in Mexico and in United States Southern Command's AOR are inherently connected, requiring an integrated effort across law enforcement, military, and civilian agencies. Many countries in Central America face challenges in addressing impunity, porous borders, and large areas of under-governed territory, all of which underscore the imperative of a whole-of-government approach. The emergence of a collective of compromised states in Central America that is unable to

counter transnational threats would have enormous implications for the United States and the hemisphere. The inability of one country to effectively respond to the intertwined threats of transnational organized crime and illicit trafficking is troubling; the inability of an entire sub-region has serious implications for regional stability and the security of the United States.

Profile of transnational criminal organizations

In recent years, transnational criminal organizations have diversified their portfolios

beyond cocaine, trafficking in precursor chemicals from India, China, and Bangladesh; commercial

| CY2011 Documented Cocaine Movement | CY2012 JIATF South Projected Cocaine Movement ³ | Details |
|---|--|--|
| Toward U.S. 1086 MTs | Toward U.S. 775-930 MTs | ~90% moves through Central America via illicit air, maritime, or land routes |
| Non-US (Africa/Europe/Asia) 60 MTs | Non-U.S. (Africa/Europe/Asia) 475-570 MTs | Primarily from Venezuela to Africa via commercial containers or illicit maritime conveyances |

weapons from the United States; people, including the forced trafficking of humans and the smuggling of migrants and special interest aliens; and drug proceeds in the form of bulk cash from the United States. This cash is increasingly entered into the global financial system through countries such as Panama, Guatemala, Argentina, and Venezuela,⁴ often under the guise of legitimate trade. The narcotics business model has also evolved. Many criminal organizations operate with impressive acumen, employing an interconnected network of operational enablers: brokers who negotiate with coca growers in South America; *transportistas* who act as sub-contractors to coordinate cocaine shipments through the transit zone; specialists who construct sophisticated submersible vessels capable of transporting 8-10 metric tons of cocaine in one trip; hitmen or *sicarios* whose violent services ensure compliance and territorial protection through

³ The U.S. interagency flow numbers use Documented Cocaine Movement, which is drawn from analysis of the Consolidated Counterdrug Database (CCDB) and augmented by law enforcement reporting. JIATF South's Projected Cocaine Movement is calculated based on demand-driven methodology to project the amount of cocaine that must be leaving South America to satisfy global demand. JIATF South's methodology attempts to capture the 'unknowns' inherent to cocaine flow figures.

⁴ Department of State, *2011 International Narcotics Strategy and Control Report, vol. II*; Financial Action Task Force (FATF). *List of jurisdictions with AML/CFT deficiencies*, October 28th, 2011.

coercion and intimidation; wholesalers and retailers in the U.S. who distribute illicit products; and attorneys, bankers, and accountants who help launder illicit proceeds that can be used for corruption of police and border officials to ensure freedom of movement.

While Mexican criminal organizations have expanded and consolidated control over key illicit trafficking routes in Central America, they are by no means the only illegal groups operating in the region. Terrorist groups, like the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and Sendero Luminoso in Peru, fund their insurgencies through illicit trafficking. Criminal activities extend into the Venezuelan government; in September 2011, the Department of the Treasury designated four Venezuelan officials under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Act—identical to the 2008 designation of General Henry Rangel Silva, the new Minister of Defense—for supporting the FARC’s narcotics and arms trafficking. The *bandas criminales* (BACRIM) in Colombia are testament to the highly adaptive nature of transnational organized crime; these criminal networks grew from the vestiges of disbanded paramilitary groups and are now focused on illicit profits rather than territorial control. In Brazil, criminal gangs control cocaine trafficking and many of the country’s *favelas*. Transnational gangs like Mara Salvatrucha 13 (MS-13) and Calle 18 (M-18) have a long-established presence in Central America and maintain active ties to U.S.-based affiliates, engaging in extortion, kidnapping, and murder-for-hire in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and the United States. Increasingly, these gangs are collaborating with larger trafficking organizations to provide a range of criminal services.

Transnational criminal organizations possess a critical enabler that many states in Central America lack: enormous financial reserves. The illicit financial flows associated with transnational organized crime are staggering; the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime

| Country | Homicide Rate per 100,000 ⁷ |
|---------------|--|
| Honduras | 82.1 per 100,000 |
| El Salvador | 66.0 per 100,000 |
| Guatemala | 41.4 per 100,000 |
| Belize | 41.7 per 100,000 |
| Panama | 21.6 per 100,000 |
| Costa Rica | 11.3 per 100,000 |
| Mexico | 18.1 per 100,000 |
| United States | 4.6 per 100,000 |

(UNODC) estimates annual global gross profits from cocaine sales at \$84 billion, \$35 billion of which is generated in retail and wholesale profits in

North America alone.⁵ Illicit traffickers in South America, Central America, and the Caribbean pocket an estimated \$18 billion in gross cocaine profits per year.⁶ Lucrative profits enable organized crime to increase operational capacity at a rate that far outpaces that of regional law enforcement and militaries, purchasing sophisticated, military-grade weapons, investing in semi and fully submersible vessels to improve transportation, corrupting and coercing government officials to ensure freedom of movement, and recruiting and bankrolling highly trained specialists, many with military backgrounds.

Threat to Citizen Safety

In support of security initiatives led by the Department of State, we focus our efforts on countering the impact of transnational criminal activity on citizen security, which is currently most threatened in Central America. Lack of rule of law and widespread impunity provide fertile ground for illicit trafficking and unchecked criminal violence. Present-day homicide rates in Central America have reached crisis levels.⁸ Honduras posted a record-setting homicide rate not

⁵ United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC). *Estimating illicit financial flows resulting from drug trafficking and other transnational organized crime*. 2011. Similar estimates are provided by the DEA; according to the *2011 National Drug Control Strategy*, the DEA estimates that Mexican and Colombian drug traffickers generate, remove, and launder between \$18 billion and \$39 billion annually in wholesale drug proceeds, which are largely smuggled in bulk out of the U.S via the Southwest Border.

⁶ UNODC, *op. cit.*

⁷ UNODC. *2011 Global Study on Homicide: Trends, Context, Data*.

⁸ Due to inconsistencies in data collection, it is difficult to ascertain how much of this violence is directly caused by illicit trafficking, organized crime, and gang activity, but the UNODC's *2011 Global Study on Homicide* assesses that between 25 and 40 percent of violence in the Americas is related to organized crime and gangs.

seen in the hemisphere since Colombia in the 1980s; in 2011, San Pedro Sula overtook Ciudad Juarez as the most violent city in the world, with 159 homicides per 100,000 residents.⁹ Although still low by regional standards, Panama's rate represents a 140 percent increase over the past five years. In Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, we have also seen troubling instances of targeted murders of government officials, community activists, journalists, and law enforcement personnel. In 2011, drug traffickers killed and dismembered an auxiliary prosecutor in Cobán, Guatemala, leaving his decapitated body in front of the governor's house. In El Salvador, gangs have repeatedly attacked or murdered local officials, police officers, and soldiers. In Honduras, 23 journalists have been assassinated in the past five years, 10 of whom were specifically targeted for covering illicit trafficking and corruption.

Threat to U.S. National Security

Of particular concern, transnational criminal organizations operating in the region control the smuggling routes that traverse the hemisphere, many of which lead into the United States. These routes represent potential access points that could be leveraged by other groups. South American-based Alien Smuggling Organizations (ASOs) provide a critical link for international trafficking networks and facilitate the illegal movement of Special Interest Aliens (SIAs) through South and Central America for attempted entry into the United States.¹⁰ While we have not yet seen any attempts by international terrorist groups to leverage these smuggling routes, we remain watchful for the potential threat of transnational criminal organizations collaborating to move terrorists through our AOR and into the United States.

⁹ Consejo Ciudadano para la Seguridad, Justicia y Paz Penal A.C. (Citizen Council for Public Security and Criminal Justice), Mexico, 2011

¹⁰ The Department of Homeland Security defines SIAs as individuals from "Special Interest" countries, or countries that have some connection to international terrorism.

Additionally, the global illicit economy is underpinned by vast and intricate money laundering systems that are utilized by both criminals and terrorists alike, albeit to different ends. Understanding the complex financial flows of these networks can help the law enforcement, intelligence, and defense communities focus our efforts on groups engaging in activities that most directly threaten U.S. national security. We do see evidence of international terrorist groups benefitting from the intertwined systems of illicit trafficking and money laundering in our AOR; in South America, funding for Hizballah is raised through licit avenues, such as charitable donations, and illicit means, including trafficking in drugs, counterfeit, and pirated goods. In 2011, the U.S. Treasury Department identified the Lebanese Canadian Bank as a “primary money laundering concern” for its role in facilitating the money laundering activities of Ayman Joumaa and his Lebanon-based drug trafficking network, which also channeled financial support to Hizballah. Joumaa is also accused of smuggling U.S.-bound cocaine through Central America and Mexico and providing money laundering services to Los Zetas and numerous Colombian and Venezuelan suppliers.¹¹

Finally, the pernicious reach of transnational organized crime is exemplified by one word: *transnational*. The National Drug Intelligence Center assesses that Mexican-based transnational criminal organizations and their associates operate in upwards of 1,000 U.S. cities, working with domestic U.S. gangs to distribute and traffic illicit drugs throughout the United States.¹² Additionally, transnational gang activity in the United States is a growing concern for the FBI. MS-13 leaders in El Salvador manage five regional “programs” of cliques in cities such as Boston, Greensboro, Miami, and Dallas, and have authorized retaliatory actions against U.S. law enforcement personnel in the Virginia and Maryland areas, which fortunately did not come

¹¹ *United States of America v. Ayman Joumaa* U.S. District Court for the Eastern Division of Virginia, November 3, 2011.

¹² National Drug Intelligence Center, *2011 National Drug Threat Assessment*

to fruition. The deepening linkages between illicit trafficking inside the United States and transnational organized crime in our AOR are representative of the wide-reaching impact of this networked threat.

Regional Stability

In addition to the threat posed by transnational organized crime, the region is also vulnerable to humanitarian crises, mass migrations, and natural disasters. United States Southern Command remains a committed and responsive partner in foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts. To enhance partner nation preparedness, we strengthen the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) capacities of regional militaries through our multinational training exercises and security cooperation activities. Our efforts are yielding long-term dividends while also promoting the shared responsibility and costs of regional leadership in responding to catastrophes. Countries such as Guatemala, El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Colombia have demonstrated an increased capacity to respond to natural disasters without asking for U.S. or international aid, a testament in part to the effectiveness of our programs.

United States Southern Command is also watchful for potential geopolitical turbulence that could impact U.S. citizens and military personnel in the region, particularly in Cuba, Haiti, Bolivia, and Venezuela. Fidel Castro's leadership transition to his brother Raul is complete, but the long-term effects of the government's market reforms remain to be seen. Haiti, while making slow but steady progress, remains vulnerable to natural disasters and economic hardship. Public demonstrations in Bolivia related to wages, food prices, and energy shortages are likely to continue until the government addresses the underlying causes of social turmoil. In Venezuela,

uncertainties about President Chavez's health, continued economic instability, and escalating levels of violence are placing increasing demands on the Venezuelan government.

Violent Extremist Organizations and Influence of Iran

In addition to Hizballah supporters throughout South America, the region is home to a small number of violent extremist organizations. We remain vigilant for the potential radicalization of homegrown extremists. Sunni extremists, while small in number, are actively involved in the radicalization of converts and other Muslims; these efforts can be seen through the influence of public personalities like Jamaica's Shaykh Abdullah al-Faisal, who was convicted in the United Kingdom for inciting terrorism. Current Al-Qaeda senior operative Adnan el-Shukrijumah has held valid passports for the U.S. as well as Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago, where he has family and associates. Despite the recent convictions in the 2007 plot to attack the John F. Kennedy International Airport, one alleged co-conspirator remains at large in Guyana.

In an attempt to circumvent international sanctions, Iran continues its overtures to the region and has succeeded in establishing modest economic, cultural, and security ties, mostly with nations aligned with the Bolivarian Alliance for the People of our Americas (ALBA), such as Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Cuba. Iran also propagates its agenda through its thirty-six Shi'a cultural centers. The *Fundación Cultural Oriente*—an Iranian outreach center dedicated to strengthening Iranian ties to Latin America—is run by the radical cleric Moshen Rabbani, currently on the Interpol Red List for involvement in the 1994 bombings of a Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires. Rabbani oversees several media outlets and has recruited students from the region to study in Iran. We take Iranian activity in the hemisphere seriously

and we monitor its activities closely. The U.S. government's successful detection and thwarting of the plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States reinforces the importance of that monitoring and the effectiveness of U.S. countermeasures.

Russia and China in the Region

Russia and China also factor into the strategic environment in the region. Russia's outreach to the region is centered primarily on arms sales and expanding military ties. Russian weapons provide a low-cost alternative that is appealing to many nations in the region; in 2011, Venezuela became the largest importer of Russian arms in the world.¹³ Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru all have engaged in arms transfer agreements with Russia over the past few years, and the Latin American market represents a large and growing segment of global arms sales by Russia. Historically, Russia's strongest partnerships have been with Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua, but its engagement efforts are expanding.

China's strategy vis-à-vis the region is based on expansion of trade and investment in commodities. Beijing has also increased its engagements in the military realm; Chinese arms sales to regional militaries have more than quadrupled in the past five years, while the frequency of high-level Chinese visits has also increased substantially. Currently, 18 countries in Central America, South America, and the Caribbean receive military training from China. In September 2011, the Chinese hospital ship "Peace Ark" embarked on its first-ever humanitarian mission to the Western Hemisphere, visiting Cuba, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Costa Rica and provided bilateral medical exchanges and assistance in each port visit. This type of endeavor is

¹³According to the Center for Analysis of World Arms Trade, in 2011 Venezuela purchased an unspecified number of T-72B1 tanks, BMP-3M infantry fighting vehicles, BTR-80A armored personnel carriers, Msta-S 152-mm self-propelled howitzers, Nona-SVK 120-mm self-propelled mortars, Grad multiple rocket launchers, and an assortment of other weaponry. In 2012, the country will begin production of AK-103 assault rifles.

consistent with China's declared intent to expand diplomatic, economic, and military relations in the region.¹⁴

United States Southern Command will continue to maintain and deepen our existing partnerships, while exploring avenues for future cooperation with key nations in the region. Throughout the world, U.S. military and defense partnerships are essential to ensuring national security, but nowhere more so than within our own hemisphere, which is comprised of nations that share the same interest in promoting regional and global stability, freedom, and prosperity. United States Southern Command is committed to being the security partner of choice for these nations. We demonstrate this commitment through our multinational training exercises, security cooperation activities, humanitarian assistance programs, and military-to-military engagements, all of which build strong security partnerships that help every nation meet the challenges of an uncertain and complex security environment.

Strategic Approach

Strengthening Our Partnerships

Building partnerships is the cornerstone of our strategic approach, ensuring the forward defense of the U.S. by promoting capable regional militaries that share in the responsibility of hemispheric security and stability. Our efforts are designed to strengthen and enhance the capacities of partner nations to respond to domestic and regional threats, both individually and collectively. We envision a hemisphere characterized by nations working together to address the emerging security challenges of the coming decade. United States Southern Command's modest budget and small footprint have encouraged us to embrace innovative, low-cost approaches to achieving our security objectives; annual exercises, rotational presence, and advisory roles are

¹⁴*China's Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean, 2008.*

integral to our engagement with the region. Through our component commands, our efforts focus on strengthening the security capacity of regional militaries in support of civilian government-led efforts to counter transnational organized crime and illicit trafficking; respond effectively to natural and humanitarian disasters; contribute to global stability operations; and assist in our efforts to ensure a safe, secure, and stable region.

Countering Transnational Organized Crime (C-TOC)

Within our authorities, United States Southern Command is supporting the efforts of militaries throughout Central America that have been tasked by their civilian governments to assist in countering transnational organized crime. Our component command 12th Air Force (U.S. Air Forces Southern) began implementation of its successful Sovereign Skies Expansion Program (SSEP) with Air Forces in Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. Working closely with United States Northern Command, the State Department, and the U.S. Embassies in Guatemala, Belize, and Mexico, we supported full implementation of our Border Security Initiative, providing targeted counter-narcotics training, equipment, and infrastructure to all three countries. Under this initiative, we facilitated the establishment of an Interagency Border Security Unit in Tecún Umán and a border checkpoint at El Carmen to increase land interdiction capabilities along the Guatemala-Mexico border. Further south on the Central American isthmus, we worked with the U.S. Embassy in San Jose to conduct training and checkpoint infrastructure improvements in Costa Rica to help address the flow of illicit traffic along the Pan-American Highway.

Executed by our component command U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command, our multinational naval training exercise Southern Seas continues to yield positive results in

increased maritime domain surveillance and interdiction capabilities throughout our AOR. The 2011 Southern Seas included two multinational exercises conducted off the eastern and western coasts of South America. UNITAS Atlantic and UNITAS Pacific provided training on multinational naval interoperability, maritime interdiction operations, and naval special warfare. Over 4,000 participants from navies in the region participated in the 2011 UNITAS exercises in Brazil and Chile. Thanks in part to participation in our security cooperation activities, the Nicaraguan, Honduran, Salvadoran, Panamanian, and Colombian navies are contributing important interdiction capacities to JIATF South's ongoing operations. Capable militaries and security forces that help counter illicit trafficking act as force multipliers to regional efforts and are indicative of the long-term dividends of our training and exercise programs. Cocaine seizures in Colombia, particularly by the Colombian Navy, are among the highest in our AOR, while Brazil seized a record 115 tons of illegal drugs on their borders this year.

Our annual multinational exercises are also designed to improve interoperability and promote collaboration among participants, skills that can be employed at the regional level and in multinational operations. Held in El Salvador and executed by our component Special Operations Command South, this year's FUERZAS COMANDO helped improve the training, readiness, and capability of 250 Special Operations Force (SOF) soldiers and special police units. During the 2011 Southern Partnership Station exercise, U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command deployed a High Speed Vessel (HSV) SWIFT team, which conducted engagements in five partner nations centered on medical, Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), and Maritime Civil Affairs (MCAST) discussions with partner nation counterparts.

Although we are focusing our current efforts in Central America, we recognize the interconnectedness and adaptability of transnational threats throughout the hemisphere.

Colombia and Peru remain top priorities; both countries are engaged in definitive campaigns to defeat the weakened terrorist threats within their borders. U.S. support to both nations remains important at this critical juncture. Due to its proximity to the United States and former role as the primary transit zone, the Caribbean remains vulnerable to exploitation by transnational organized crime. In support of the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI), programs like Secure Seas and our multinational training exercises are improving maritime interdiction in the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and throughout the Eastern Caribbean, providing an important preventative capacity each nation can use to enhance their security. Led by our component U.S. Marine Corps Forces South, over 1,000 military personnel from the Caribbean and the United States participated in our 2011 TRADEWINDS exercise, which focused on improving maritime interdiction and ground security skills at the tactical and operational levels.

Promoting Regional Stability and HA/DR Capacity

As demonstrated by our support to the U.S. response effort after the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, United States Southern Command possesses unique capabilities to respond to natural disasters. These capabilities provide critical support to lead federal agencies in disaster response efforts and ensure that we remain prepared to conduct non-combatant evacuation operations for American citizens in Central America, South America, and the Caribbean, if necessary. We also stand ready to bolster the efforts of regional militaries to provide support to civilian authorities in foreign HA/DR events. During 2011, we made significant progress advancing a framework for military support to civilian-led disaster relief operations, using the computer-networking tool *All Partners Access Network* (APAN) as a potential standardized technology platform to facilitate collaboration among regional militaries during disaster response efforts. We also continued development on our Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) initiative,

promoting increased disaster resilience and response capability in the eighteen Caribbean Community (CARICOM) nations.

In 2011, United States Southern Command also engaged with our partners through several complementary activities: our Humanitarian Assistance Program (HAP), disaster preparedness projects, and annual humanitarian assistance exercises. This past year we completed 255 HAP projects in 28 countries in our AOR, constructing disaster response warehouses, wells, potable water systems, and emergency operations centers. We also executed 22 low-cost projects designed to increase disaster preparedness in Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, Colombia, Dominica, Haiti, St. Kitts, and Suriname. In conjunction with these projects, we provided training to first responders and disaster response managers, imparting a critical skill that can be employed long after our forces have left the country. Held in Trinidad and Tobago and Guatemala and led by our component U.S. Army South, the 2011 FUERZAS ALIADAS HUMANITARIAS exercise brought together more than 480 participants from regional militaries, civilian disaster management agencies, and first responders to provide field training in disaster relief and recovery efforts. Of note, our cost-effective HAP program has attracted funding from the international community; the Inter-American Development Bank has pledged to incorporate the sustainment of eight HAP schools being built in 2012 into its \$50 million grant package that supports public and primary education in Haiti.

Our Continuing Promise humanitarian mission continues to foster goodwill and demonstrate core U.S. values. In 2011, the USNS Comfort visited nine countries in the region, providing invaluable training to U.S. service men and women and partner nation personnel while also providing free medical care and civic assistance to communities throughout our AOR. During the 2011 mission, the 850-person crew—comprised of U.S. service members, civilians,

volunteers from non-governmental organizations, and members of partner nation militaries—treated approximately 70,000 patients, performed more than 1,000 surgeries, and conducted 16 engineering projects in Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Peru, and Haiti.

Our component U.S. Army South led the 2011 humanitarian civic assistance exercises BEYOND THE HORIZON and NEW HORIZONS in El Salvador, the Dominican Republic and Haiti, while 12th Air Force (U.S. Air Forces South) executed the 2011 NEW HORIZONS in Suriname. An integral part of these missions, our medical readiness training exercises (MEDRETEs) resulted in the treatment of 85,364 patients and provided training opportunities to more than 6,000 U.S. Reserve Component and active forces and 250 partner nation personnel, while also bolstering partner nation state presence in rural, often under-governed areas. As our only forward operating location, Joint Task Force Bravo (JTF-B) supports immediate response to HA/DR events and DEA-led counter-drug operations. In 2011, U.S. medical forces stationed at JTF-Bravo treated 20,257 patients throughout Central America and assisted with transporting food and supplies to local schools and orphanages in Honduras. Although small in force size, JTF-Bravo serves as a tangible representation of U.S. values and of our steadfast commitment to the region.

Promoting Shared Responsibility

Our security cooperation activities and military-to-military engagements by United States Southern Command and our components have helped increase security across the entire region and helped promote shared responsibility for hemispheric security. For example, during the Sovereign Skies program, our component 12th Air Force (U.S. Air Forces Southern) provided

training and conducted interoperability exercises with the Dominican Republic Air Force to increase illicit air interdiction capacity in the Caribbean. This training—in conjunction with the country’s purchase of Brazilian A-29 Super Tucano aircraft and Italian radars—helped reduce illicit air tracks into the Dominican Republic from over one hundred per year to almost zero. Led by U.S. Army South, PANAMAX focuses on the cooperative defense of the Panama Canal. PANAMAX is one of our oldest multinational exercises, growing from two participating nations in 2003 to over seventeen this year. Colombia’s participation culminated by leading the Combined Forces Land Component Command in 2011. This remarkable achievement is a testament to Colombia’s success in regaining security and the importance of ongoing U.S. engagement with Colombia, which is yielding enormous dividends in other areas. Colombia is now a leading provider of bilateral security assistance and a regional partner in security operations throughout Central America, South America, and the Caribbean.

Our engagement with regional militaries also includes training for peacekeeping operations in support of multinational peace and stability efforts. We execute the Department of State’s Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) to build the peacekeeping capacity of 11 participating partners. In support of this objective, our components U.S. Marine Corps Forces South and U.S. Army South conduct two annual training exercises, PARTNERSHIP OF THE AMERICAS and PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AMERICAS (PKO-A). The GPOI program and our exercises provide the opportunity for our partners to sustain capacity to support United Nations peace support operations. Countries in our AOR contribute nearly 8,000 personnel to peace support and stability operations throughout the world, including critical and ongoing support to the U.N. Missions in Haiti, Lebanon, and the Sudan. We are also seeing GPOI-funded countries exporting their peace support training; in 2011, a GPOI-funded Peruvian Military

Mobile Training Team provided training to the El Salvadoran military in support of its deployment to the U.N. Mission in Lebanon.

We engage with regional militaries through our educational and academic institutes: the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC), the Inter-American Defense College (IADC), the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS). We also utilize the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program to achieve our objectives for regional military engagement. I want to thank Congress for its continued support for these important programs, which build enduring relationships between future military leaders in the region and the United States and promote positive relations between partner nations. We further expand on these relationships through our engagements with senior defense leaders throughout our AOR. Our component command U.S. Army South supported the 2011 Central American Regional Army Leaders Conference, bringing the Guatemalan, Honduran, Salvadoran, and Nicaraguan Army Commanders together for the first time to discuss shared security concerns related to transnational organized crime. U.S. Marine Corps Forces South's 2011 Marine Leaders and Senior Enlisted Leaders Conferences helped enhance relations between the Marine Corps and Naval Infantry in North, Central, and South America, while 12th Air Force's (U.S. Air Forces Southern) support to the 2011 System of Cooperation Among the American Air Forces (SICOFAA) brought together representatives from 13 member nation Air Forces in the Western Hemisphere to discuss opportunities for mutual cooperation.

As we look to future engagements, United States Southern Command is working with the armed forces of other willing nations, such as Colombia, Chile, and Brazil, to enhance security throughout the Western Hemisphere. Colombia is providing training to military personnel in its

Regional Training Center¹⁵ and to over 2,000 police officers in Central America. In 2011, the Colombian Air Force began working with its Honduran counterparts to interdict illicit air traffic and expand intelligence sharing. In support of the 2011 Central American Integration Secretariat's (SICA) Donors Conference, Chile offered to share its naval expertise in securing its maritime domain with Central American militaries and security forces. In 2011, Brazil played a pivotal role in facilitating improved trilateral counterdrug efforts with Bolivia and the United States, and we hope to expand and deepen this kind of cooperation in the coming year.

Our engagement efforts also extend to the private sector and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Many NGOs have their own active programs in the region and can lend unique capabilities and expanded resources to complement our engagement initiatives. United States Southern Command championed public-private cooperation during Operation Unified Response (OUR), and this type of collaboration can yield enormous benefits for U.S. departments and interagency, and our partner nations. In 2011 our business engagement team facilitated support from a multinational corporation to a local U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) project in Honduras and coordinated the donation of \$20 million worth of pharmaceuticals from NGOs to clinics and hospitals in Honduras, Guatemala, Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago, and Guyana, helping strengthen partner nation state presence in under-governed areas. The cumulative result of this type of engagement—along with our ongoing exercises and security cooperation activities—is a region comprised of nations, militaries, and citizens that are willing and able to share in the responsibility of ensuring hemispheric security and stability.

¹⁵ Under the U.S. OH-58 helicopter initiative, the Rotary Wing Entry Training Center in Melgar, Colombia is currently training 24 Mexican pilots per year, enhancing efforts in the AORs of both United States Southern Command and United States Northern Command.

Ensuring the Safe, Humane, and Transparent Care and Custody of Detainees

As part of our strategic objective to defend the United States, United States Southern Command also remains committed to providing a safe, humane, and transparent detention center at U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for detainees and prisoners in U.S. military custody there. In accordance with guidance from the Secretary of Defense, United States Southern Command will continue operations at Joint Task Force-Guantanamo until such time as directed otherwise. We will also continue to support the transfer of those detainees who are approved for transfer to their country of origin for repatriation or third-countries for resettlement, consistent with applicable U.S. laws and reporting requirements. Joint Task Force-Guantanamo and United States Southern Command routinely meet with International Committee of the Red Cross representatives to discuss their observations following regular visits to the detention facilities. Additionally, coverage of the 2011 arraignment of Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri was broadcast via closed circuit television in selected sites in Norfolk and the Washington DC areas, enhancing the transparency of military commission proceedings at Joint Task Force-Guantanamo.

Looking to the Future*Strategic Priorities*

In the immediate future, we will focus our efforts on strengthening the security capacities of our partners in Central America. As the lead U.S. agency responsible for directing illicit trafficking detection and monitoring activities, we are undertaking operational and tactical activity in support of whole-of-government efforts to counter transnational organized crime in the maritime approaches to Central America. On January 15th, within our existing resources, we

began OPERATION MARTILLO, a joint, interagency, and combined operation led by United States Southern Command and JIATF South and coordinated with partner nation assets on patrol or alert. This persistent operation aims to disrupt maritime illicit trafficking along the Central American littorals. We recognize that the effects of OPERATION MARTILLO can be amplified by aligning our air and maritime focus with complementary land law enforcement activities conducted by partner nations; as such, we have coordinated our activities with the Central American governments and international donors to maximize all possible means for supporting this effort.

While we work to achieve our strategic objectives in the long-term, the challenge for United States Southern Command is to find creative ways to enhance interagency, public-private, and partner nation cooperation as we plan, train, and operate with regional militaries to address the predominant security concerns in the region. The intricately networked, globalized nature of transnational organized crime signifies that no one country or agency can solve this problem alone; collaboration with partner nations and across the U.S. government will be essential to successfully mitigate this threat. Our goal is to support partner nation and U.S. government efforts to improve citizen safety by reducing the threat of transnational organized crime from a national and regional security threat to a public safety problem.

We expect militaries in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador will continue to be called upon to play an important role in domestic security matters in the coming years, given the increasing threat to citizen security and the numerous challenges facing regional law enforcement institutions, which are under-resourced, poorly trained and equipped, and prone to corruption. While we recognize this is a necessary initial step to help curb the rising tide of violence, we also recognize that this approach is unsustainable in the long term; strengthening

civilian law enforcement institutions is critical, and we will support the Department of State as the lead agency in this endeavor. As militaries continue to take on internal security responsibilities, our Human Rights Initiative will remain a critical mission set. Through this program, we will continue to support partner nation military and security forces in instituting human rights training; revising policies and regulations to include human rights principles; strengthening internal control mechanisms; and improving cooperation with civilian authorities and civil society.

To address the growing threat of transnational organized crime, United States Southern Command has shifted its approach towards a more holistic strategy that will help us prioritize programs, streamline activities, and integrate our efforts across the U.S. interagency. While our primary focus will remain strengthening partnerships to enable effective regional security, we will also support and contribute to the disruption of illicit trafficking; the dismantling of transnational organized crime networks; and the fostering of alternatives to criminal influence in under-governed areas. Our efforts complement both the *National Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime* and the citizen safety goals of CARSI and CBSI. The key concept in our strategy is *support*. With the exception of fulfilling our statutory responsibility as the lead agency for detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs, the Department of Defense plays a supporting role in all counter-narcotics and related efforts.

Enhanced support is only one part of our refined approach; we are also examining how to use our capacities in network analysis and operational planning to maximize U.S. government and partner nation efforts throughout the region. We are working with the U.S. interagency to support a more effective integration of effort, improving the alignment of our operations, exercises, and initiatives with those of United States Northern Command, the Department of

State, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Department of Homeland Security, USAID, and others. United States Southern Command will continue to support the Department of State as it leads the effort to integrate U.S. security initiatives with SICA's regional security strategy, which incorporates assistance offered by donor nations like Canada, Spain, and Chile and organizations like the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and the World Bank. We will also sustain our support to Colombia and Peru, countries that are fighting narco-terrorist groups whose illicit trafficking activities extend throughout the hemisphere. Finally, in close coordination with the Regional Security System (RSS), CARICOM, and Caribbean nations, we will continue to play an active role in developing a regional maritime interdiction plan in the Caribbean.

Resources and Requirements

We recognize difficult adjustments will be required as we enter into an era of fiscal austerity. The emerging security threats in our AOR, however, necessitate that we remain engaged with militaries in the region. Historical events in our AOR have demonstrated that investing in early and routine engagement activities can avoid exponentially larger expenditures in the future. We firmly believe that building, maintaining, and sustaining capable security partners is a wise investment to hedge against future security challenges and guarantee the long-term stability of the Western Hemisphere. The new *Defense Strategic Guidance* recognizes our approach as the model for the future. As the Department of Defense prioritizes resources across the Joint Forces, we will look to share the "best practices" of our agile, small-footprint approach to building partner capacity and promoting the layered defense of the United States.

As we look to the future, United States Southern Command is exploring ways to improve our flexibility to address the problems facing Central America, including an examination of the authorities available to the Department of Defense; how we can better support the U.S. interagency; and our engagement with the Guatemalan military, which remains limited by restrictions on U.S. security assistance. In 2011, Guatemala took important steps to address past human rights violations through release of key documents pertaining to the country's civil conflict and continues to make progress on enforcing the rule of law and respecting human rights. United States Southern Command supports efforts by the Department of State and Congress to find a constructive way forward to improve the human rights situation in Guatemala and address the existing restrictions that prevent full support to the Guatemalan military.

Budget Considerations

In 2011, United States Southern Command took proactive steps to identify and enact cost-saving measures. Having improved the command's organizational structure during our 2010 reorganization, this year we conducted a manpower analysis to further align resources and functions. As directed by the Secretary of Defense, United States Southern Command eliminated the Standing Joint Force Headquarters and froze Department of Defense civilian senior executives, general, and flag officer positions at 2010 levels. We also applied reductions in areas such as: reduction of support to Operation Southern Voice; reduction or adjustments to annual foreign military interaction exercises; and reduction in discretionary travel. We have also reduced activities in certain lower-priority portfolios and revamped our internal business practices to better manage resources.

While we are committed to enacting cost-saving mechanisms, reducing duplication, and improving the accountability and cost-effectiveness of our programs, we remain committed to

our most important resource: our people. As a joint command, United States Southern Command supports the needs of our Army, Marine, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard service members, their families, as well as our civilians. In 2011, we took measures to extend our survivor outreach program to the families of the more than 100 service members from South Florida who have died in the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Many of these survivors live hundreds of miles away from the nearest long-term survivor program for their particular supporting Service. United States Southern Command is working with the Service Casualty Chiefs to establish an agreement to allow our survivor outreach coordinator to offer long-term support to all the families of fallen heroes in South Florida, regardless of Service affiliation. I am proud of this effort and I believe it embodies the truly joint nature of our command.

Conclusion

This will very likely be my last opportunity to testify before you in my current capacity. Over the last three years, it has been my great honor to serve with the men and women of United States Southern Command. It has also been a distinct privilege to serve with the dedicated and capable leaders of Central and South America and the Caribbean. My time at United States Southern Command brought me back to the region I left almost 41 years ago. Returning reinforced my belief in the importance of the region: the role it plays for the security of the United States and the critical need to remain engaged with our military partners. I also believe strongly in the importance of expanding interagency, regional, and multilateral efforts to address transnational security concerns, and in the value of being prepared to support disaster relief efforts.

As I finish my tenure at United States Southern Command, I want to thank the Congress and the distinguished members of this committee, especially Congressmen McKeon and Smith,

for your continued support to our men and women in uniform. Our armed forces remain strong and capable because of your leadership, your focus, and your commitment to ensuring they remain the best armed forces in the world. My parting request to the members of Congress is to sustain the unmatched capability of our armed forces, continue to support the incredibly dedicated, imaginative, flexible, and wonderful men and women in our armed forces, and keep faith with our veterans and their families. Thank you.

2011 Component Accomplishments (Annex)

**U.S. Army South
Headquarters: San Antonio, Texas
Major 2011 Accomplishments**

- **U.S. Army South** conducted 128 security cooperation events in 17 countries in United States Southern Command's AOR.
- **Central American Regional Army Leaders Conference:** In March 2011, U.S. Army South executed the Central American Regional Army Leaders Conference bringing together the senior Army commanders from Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua to discuss emerging threats in the sub-region.
- **PANAMAX 2011:** a joint and combined operational exercise focused on defending the Panama Canal and Central America by a multi-national joint task force, as well as building disaster and pandemic outbreak response capabilities of 17 participating partner nations.
- **FUERZAS ALIADAS HUMANITARIAS:** regionally-oriented humanitarian assistance/foreign disaster relief (HA/FDR) exercise that brings together partner nation and U.S. military units, civilian disaster management agencies, and local first responder. This year's exercise was held in Trinidad and Tobago, with 640 participants from 27 nations.
- **PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AMERICAS:** PKO-A provides training in international stability and peace operations, in support of the United Nations and the Conference of the American Armies doctrine and procedures. This year's exercise was held in Brazil and Chile, with 244 participants from 16 nations.

**U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command
Headquarters: Mayport, Florida
Major 2011 Accomplishments**

- **Continuing Promise 2011:** USNS COMFORT (T-AH 20) brought medical, dental, veterinary, engineering and civic action programs to nine partner nations during the annual deployment designed to promote partnerships and goodwill. The COMFORT Team treated 67,897 patients and performed 1,130 surgeries.
- **Southern Partnership Station 2011:** Southern Partnership Station (SPS) is a series of Navy deployments focused on Theater Security Cooperation (TSC), specifically subject matter expert exchanges with partner nation militaries and civilian security forces.
 - **HSV SWIFT Southern Partnership Station 2011:** The High Speed Vessel (HSV) SWIFT (HSV 2) deployed to United States Southern Command's AOR during Southern Partnership Station 2011. During HSV SPS 2011, the SWIFT Team conducted engagements in five partner nations, and included medical, Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), Maritime Civil Affairs (MCAST), and U.S. Marines expert exchanges with partner nation counterparts. SWIFT Seabees completed small-scale construction/refurbishment projects. The SWIFT

Team also delivered Project Handclasp Gifts-in-Kind during COMREL Projects, and made a special delivery of relief materials to Port Au Prince, Haiti.

- **Amphibious Southern Partnership Station 2011:** USS GUNSTON HALL (LSD 44) conducted AMPHIB SPS 2011 from January to March 2011. USS GUNSTON HALL's deployment featured an embarked U.S. Marine Corps Security Cooperation Task Force that completed afloat and ashore engagements in three partner nations.
- **Southern Seas 2011:** This year's Southern Seas included the following exercises: UNITAS ATLANTIC and UNITAS PACIFIC. USS THACH (FFG 43) and USS BOONE (FFG 28) circumnavigated the South American continent to conduct a variety of exercises and multinational exchanges to enhance interoperability, increase regional stability, and build and maintain regional relationships with partner nations.

**Marine Corps Forces South
Headquarters: Doral, Florida
Major 2011 Accomplishments**

- **Marine Corps Forces South** conducted 65 Security Cooperation events in 19 countries in United States Southern Command's AOR.
- **TRADEWINDS:** exercise designed to improve coordination and interoperability of participating Caribbean nations to respond to transnational threats, emphasizing maritime interdiction and ground security skills at the tactical and operational levels. Held in Antigua and Barbuda, with 1,000 participants from 19 countries.
- **PARTNERSHIP OF THE AMERICAS:** table-top exercise conducted in Miami with 8 partner nations, focusing on interoperability and collaboration in peace support operations.
- **CD/CN Mobile Training Team Deployments:** provided training throughout the AOR to partner nation counterdrug and counter narco-terrorism forces to increase interdiction capacities.
- **USMC SPMAGTF:** supported the 2011 CONTINUING PROMISE mission aboard the USS IWO JIMA, demonstrating U.S. commitment and values to the region and providing unique seas based capabilities.
- **MARINE LEADERS OF THE AMERICAS CONFERENCE (MLAC):** The Commandant, USMC and the Commandant, Peruvian Fuerzas Infaterias de Marina co-hosted this year's MLAC in Miraflores, Lima, Peru. 15 partner nations attended the conference, which focused on the role of regional Marine Corps/Naval Infantry in confronting shared security challenges in the region.

12th Air Force (Air Forces Southern)
Headquarters: Tucson, Arizona
Major 2011 Accomplishments

- **PANAMAX 2011:** Successfully trained/integrated partner nation air planners into division processes and pushed 9 ATOs/ACOs with a total of 1,166 missions (1,462 sorties). During PANAMAX 2011, 12th Air Force integrated the first-ever Dynamic Targeting Cell, prosecuting 8 time-sensitive targets and providing collateral damage estimate calls and weaponeering solutions.
- **ISR Missions:** Provided C2 for 900+ ISR missions in support of United States Southern Command's priorities; over 7,000 images, 800+ hours of signals intelligence. As a result, over 126,000 lbs (\$1 billion worth) of drugs and weapons were seized, and two high-value narco-terrorists killed in action.
- **Airlift Missions:** Executed 116 theater airlift missions moving 4,489 passengers and 730 tons of cargo throughout United States Southern Command's AOR.
- **Medical Deployments:** 12th Air Force planned and executed 12 Medical Deployment for Training Exercises in United States Southern Command's AOR in 2011, treating 51,495 patients. All provided increased readiness of U.S Forces and improved the capability of regional partners to conduct combined operations.
- **UNITAS PACIFIC:** Through its MEDRETEs during the 2011 UNITAS PAC, 12th Air Force helped strengthen ties with the Peru Ministry of Health, the Peruvian Navy, and Ministry of Defense, as well as with the local communities of the Alto Amazonas region. 12th Air Force medical teams treated 4,303 patients during this exercise.
- **NEW HORIZONS:** A field training exercise that trained 550 participating U.S. Active Duty, Guard, and Reserve military engineer, medical, and support forces. This year's exercise provided humanitarian and civic assistance to rural areas in Suriname, resulting in the construction of schools and medical clinics.
- **Sovereign Skies Expansion Program:** 12th Air Force applied to successful lessons learned from Dominican Republic and Colombia programs to develop air force capabilities, such as helicopter maintenance and operations, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, in Belize, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. 12th Air Force also conducted an integrated air sovereignty study of these four countries and sent the Mobility Support Advisory Squadron (MSAS) to Honduras for a proof of concept activity.
- **Air Mobility Support:** Air Mobility Command stood up the 571st Mobility Support Advisor Squadron, consisting of 4 teams and 25 specialties, to address air mobility and airfield support needs, and to facilitate the training and interface with the 6SOS for spin-up training.

**U.S. Special Operations Command South
Headquarters: Homestead, Florida
Major 2011 Accomplishments**

- **FUERZAS COMMANDO:** a multinational exercise designed to improve the training, readiness, interoperability and capability of regional Special Operations Forces (SOF) in the tactics, techniques, and procedures used to prosecute Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). This year's FUERZAS COMANDO was held in El Salvador, with 250 participants from 19 partner nations.
- **FUSED RESPONSE 2011:** Exercise validating existing crisis response capabilities and helped reveal areas requiring further improvement. This year's FUSED RESPONSE was held in the Dominican Republic.
- **Logistics Training and Advisory Team (LTAT):** U.S. Special Operations Command South synchronized efforts with U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, and U.S. Army South to increase Partner Nation Special Forces' logistics capacity, with the goal of continued sustainment.
- **Intelligence analytical support to U.S. Country Teams:** U.S. Special Operations Command South analysts supported 7 US Country Teams focusing on terrorism, human smuggling networks, and transnational organized crime. The unclassified results culminated with three Pakistani citizens pleaded guilty in the District of Columbia to conspiracy to provide material support to the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP); -one Colombian hostage rescued; and transnational criminal organizations exploited.

**Joint Interagency Task Force South
Headquarters: Key West, Florida
Major 2011 Accomplishments**

- **Seizures / Disruptions (CY2011)—119 MT of Cocaine:** Facing the consistently mounting challenge of operating in an austere asset environment, JIATF South supported the disruption of 119MTs of cocaine resulting in the arrest of 355 traffickers and the seizure of 70 aircraft and vessels. This amount of cocaine represents \$7.1 billion in gross profit denied to transnational criminal organizations operating in the JIATF South Joint Operating Area. Stated another way, in CY2011, JIATFS supported the disruption of nearly twelve lethal doses of cocaine for every high-schooled aged American child.
- **Operation Martillo:** JIATF South planned, coordinated and synchronized the major elements of Operation Martillo. The operation is currently being executed under JIATF South leadership and supports a whole-of-government approach to countering the spread of transnational organized crime in Central America by denying the use of the Central American littorals as transshipment routes for illicit drugs, weapons, people and bulk cash. The operation is designed to foster capacity building to enable partner nation successes within their own sovereign responsibilities. The desired strategic effects are to enhance regional stability and to reduce the flow of cocaine ultimately destined for the United States.
- **Command and Control:** Under JIATF South Tactical Control, 17,710 aircraft flight hours and 2,548 ship days were executed without mishap. While this is a significant decrease in asset support from previous years, effective and efficient planning resulted in

the successes shown above. This year saw first ever deployments of the JSTARS aircraft to the JIATF South Joint Operating Area, which proved to be a “game changer” with respect to achieving Maritime and Air Domain Awareness.

Joint Task Force Bravo
Headquarters: Soto Cano Air Base, Honduras
Major 2011 Accomplishments

- Conducted 15 MEDRETEs, resulting in the treatment of 20,257 patients throughout Central America.
- JTF-Bravo received 7,000+ pounds of food and supplies on military aircraft cargo under the Denton Program, which was made available to NGOs for delivery to local families.
- JTF-Bravo received food, shoes and clothing on military aircraft cargo under the Denton Program, which was made available to NGOs for donation to approximately 800 children in five orphanages near Soto Cano Air Base.
- JTF-Bravo received 70,000 pounds of cargo, to include 460 wheelchairs and \$9,000 in equipment on military aircraft cargo under the Denton Program, which was made available to NGOs for donation to remote locations.
- JTF-Bravo received 5,000 backpacks on military aircraft cargo under the Denton Program, which was made available to NGOs for delivery to children from Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Honduras.

Joint Task Force Guantanamo
Headquarters: Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
Major 2011 Accomplishments

- **Safe and Humane Care and Custody:** Most detainees have been moved from expeditionary camps to more modern Camps V and VI. Detainees in camp VI are allowed communal living arrangements, improving social interaction and overall well-being. Outdoor recreation areas have been expanded, and library holdings increased to 25,000 items. Educational course offerings have been broadened in scope and frequency, and videophone conferences have been made available to the detainees.
- **Legal and Transparent Operations:** Continued quarterly assessments by the International Committee of the Red Cross, who have verified compliance with international standards of custody as specified in the Geneva Convention. Detainees are granted routine visits by legal representatives, having received more than 4,500 Commissions and Habeas attorney visits since 2007. A dedicated effort is ongoing to increase visibility of the conduct of Guantanamo Bay detention operations, by having hosted more than 1,166 visitors and 100 media representatives from 70 domestic and international news organizations over the past year.
- **Military Commissions:** In March 2011, the Obama administration announced that military commissions would resume at Guantanamo Bay. Military commission proceedings are open to observation from the media, non-governmental organizations, and victim family members.



General Douglas Fraser
Commander, U.S. Southern Command



General Douglas Fraser comes to U.S. Southern Command from U.S. Pacific Command, where he served as the Deputy Commander from 2008-2009. He is a 1975 graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy and a native of Colorado. He spent three years of high school in Bogota, Colombia, graduating from Colegio Nueva Granada in 1971.

General Fraser has commanded operational units across the U.S. Air Force, including the 12th Fighter Squadron at Kadena Air Base, Japan, the 366th Operations Group at Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho and the 3rd Wing at Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska from 2000-2002.

Following his time at the 3rd Wing, he commanded the Space Warfare Center at Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado and four distinct commands while serving his second time in Alaska, including Alaskan Command, the Alaskan North American Defense Region, Joint Task Force Alaska, and Eleventh Air Force at Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska.

General Fraser's staff assignments include Aide to the 12th Air Force Commander, action officer for Air Force's Directorate of Programs and Resources, the Air Force Chief of Staff's Action Group, and analysis assistant in the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Requirements. He also served as the Director of the Chief of Staff's Air Force Operations Group from 1996-1997, as the Executive Assistant to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command from 1999-2000, and was the Director of Air and Space Operations for Air Force Space Command from 2003-2005.

General Fraser's operational flying assignments include Bitburg Air Base, Germany; Luke Air Force Base, Arizona; Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico; Kadena Air Base, Japan; Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho; and Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska. He is a command pilot with more than 2,800 flying hours, primarily in the F-15A/B/C/D, the F-15E and the F-16.

General Fraser graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1975 with a Bachelor of Science degree in Political Science. He earned a Masters Degree in Political Science from Auburn University in 1987. He is also a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, National War College, and the Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course.

His decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters and the Legion of Merit.



HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF
GENERAL CHARLES H. JACOBY, JR., UNITED STATES ARMY
COMMANDER
UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND
AND
NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND
BEFORE THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
6 MARCH 2012

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

Chairman McKeon, Congressman Smith, distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate this opportunity to report on the posture of U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). The men and women of USNORTHCOM and NORAD are dedicated to defending the United States and Canadian homelands. We accept the obligation to defend the homelands as the most fundamental and enduring of our responsibilities. Consistent with the Department of Defense's *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, January 2012, as directed by the President, our nations depend on the might of our militaries and the security of our homeland to project and sustain military power, ensure our economic vitality, and safeguard our people and their will. This source of strength and resiliency must be carefully guarded. As we rebalance our military to deal with the challenges of the 21st century, we recognize that the security of our citizens cannot be compromised. Earning and keeping the trust of the American people drives our motto, "We have the watch."

I am honored to lead this exceptional command team made up of 1,725 full-time U.S. military and DoD civilians assigned to the command's headquarters, including nearly 80 National Guardsmen from 33 states, augmented by an additional 237 part-time Reserve Component personnel. In addition, 114 Canadian military members are fully integrated into our NORAD headquarters and two Mexican liaison officers work alongside our USNORTHCOM staff. Rounding out our team are representatives from over 60 federal mission partner organizations.

USNORTHCOM and NORAD are two separate commands that are inextricably linked. Neither command is subordinate to, nor a part of the other, but most elements of our

headquarters staffs are combined and we all work very closely together. We hold the missions of USNORTHCOM and NORAD as a sacred trust.

- **USNORTHCOM Mission:** United States Northern Command partners to conduct homeland defense, civil support, and security cooperation to defend and secure the United States and its interests.
- **NORAD Mission:** North American Aerospace Defense Command conducts aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning in the defense of North America.

Our commands' missions are not only complementary, they are also inseparable, as the missions of aerospace warning and control, maritime warning, homeland defense, and civil support are more aligned than ever. To ensure that USNORTHCOM and NORAD are strong and ready, we balance the day-to-day missions and operational concerns of the two commands with planning and preparing for an uncertain future. In support of these goals, these are my priorities:

- **Expand and strengthen our trusted partnerships**—The strength of USNORTHCOM and NORAD is found in the partnerships that we create and sustain across joint, interagency, and multinational organizations. Accordingly, in the months ahead, we will continue our efforts to integrate across and develop trust among capable mission partners.
- **Advance and sustain the binational military command**—Over the last half-century, NORAD has been a mechanism for collaboration between the United States and Canada in the interest of security. As we look ahead to the next half-century of this partnership, NORAD will remain a model for international cooperation in defense planning, execution, training, information management, and technological innovation.

- **Gain and maintain all-domain situational awareness**—Ensuring global reach and projection is a function of a secure homeland. Our global reach is being challenged by both symmetric and asymmetric threats in and across space, cyberspace, land, sea, and air. Combining appropriate whole-of-government and whole-of-society efforts, we will keep our homelands safe by giving priority to technologies and collaborative interagency processes for anti-access/area denial against potential adversaries, including those who attack from the inside.
- **Advocate and develop capabilities in our core mission areas to outpace threats**—There is no doubt that both long-understood threats and future asymmetric threats will look to exploit seams and vulnerabilities in our technologies and procedures. As Commander of USNORTHCOM and NORAD, I help mission partners advocate for capabilities to close any seams, mitigate any vulnerabilities, and enhance security to meet the evolving challenges of an interconnected world.
- **Take care of people; they are our foundation**—We will always remember that the success of USNORTHCOM and NORAD is due to the professionalism, commitment, and tireless service of our people. As we do our part during the next few years to reset the force in the drawdown from two wars, we will do everything we can to ensure our men and women in uniform have the tools they need to keep our nations safe and free.

With these priorities as our focus, we will continue to improve our homeland defense, civil support, and security cooperation capabilities. It is my privilege today to report on the actions we are taking in each of these mission areas.

Homeland Defense—A Sacred Trust

North America faces an ever-changing world that presents many challenges. Violent extremists, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, rogue states, traditional competitor states, transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), insecurity in various domains, economic distress, and the effects of climate change continually reshape our strategic environment. Each of these challenges poses a potential threat to the United States, Canada, and our regional partners, and each is pertinent to the missions of USNORTHCOM and NORAD. Continued successful defense and security of the continent require flexible, multi-domain, whole-of-government, multinational, and combined arms approaches from our commands.

As such, the commands are integral parts of an active, layered defense of the homelands. We work closely with our interagency, private sector, and international mission partners to sustain continuous situational awareness and readiness to deter, prevent, and defeat a range of threats in all domains when directed at our homelands across the spectrum of missions assigned to the commands.

Missile Defense. The American people have a deservedly high expectation of success in our homeland defense efforts. Every nation should pursue the right to protect its population and critical infrastructure from the terror of ballistic missiles. Accordingly, no homeland task is more important than protecting the United States from a limited ICBM attack. USNORTHCOM is responsible for directing missile defense operations to protect the homeland from hostile acts while assisting the Missile Defense Agency in developing improved capability. We work to balance development, testing, training, and daily readiness for this complex mission. Indicative of the success of the Total Force concept, the Army National Guard provides all of the manning (over 300 people) at our Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) sites in support of missile defense. It

is due to the professionalism of these dedicated warriors, coupled with the current capability of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS), that I am confident of USNORTHCOM's ability to successfully defend the homeland from the current set of limited long-range ballistic missile threats. However, because of the uncertainty of threat intentions and capabilities, we must remain vigilant and continue to develop, refine, and adapt the system.

The Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, which is part of the BMDS, was fielded using a spiral development acquisition approach and, as system updates are delivered and new elements added to the architecture, we continue to assess and refine our operational procedures to maximize the effectiveness of the GMD system. As the nation develops and fields more robust regional BMDS capabilities using the Phased Adaptive Approach, we will reevaluate our procedures and adjust if needed to ensure synchronization of the entire missile defense enterprise. The GMD system stands ready to defend against limited ballistic missile threats to the homeland; however, we are continually monitoring the development and progress of regional ballistic missile programs to ensure we stay ahead of any advances in threat capability. We must not allow regional actors, such as North Korea, to hold U.S. policy hostage by making our citizens vulnerable to a nuclear ICBM attack. I cannot overemphasize the importance of executing a robust testing program to validate current and future capabilities that comprise the GMD system. I strongly support the Missile Defense Agency's test cadence of conducting at least one GMD flight test annually. We are making great strides to improve system capability in partnership with the Missile Defense Agency. The Missile Defense Agency completed major construction on Missile Field 2 at Fort Greely, Alaska, this past year. This new missile field will provide important flexibility to increase capability in the future, if needed. The Missile Defense Agency is fielding new kill vehicle software this fiscal year, which will improve

not only the accuracy, but also the reliability of our GBI fleet. The Missile Defense Agency will soon test the fix for the problem that caused the failure of the last GMD flight test and is well on its way to return to flight testing and production of an improved kill vehicle.

In addition, we must be better prepared to respond to threats that give us little to no advance warning, which places a tremendous burden on the low-density, high-demand sensors we have available today to detect these threats and places a greater emphasis on our requirements for tracking through all phases of flight. This requires pursuing future sensor capability, such as the space-based Precision Tracking Space System, ensuring we have the highest level of GMD for the homeland.

Aerospace Control Alert. Our nation continues to face threats from the air because our adversaries still view aircraft as potent weapons and a means to covertly gain access to our homeland. As a nation, with all our partners, we have made it hard for air attacks to be successful and we must continue to do so by improving our air domain awareness and addressing gaps.

An effective air defense and a strong air sovereignty capability are critical components of homeland defense. Since the 9/11 attacks, NORAD has defended the airspace of the United States and Canada through airspace surveillance, a ready alert force, air patrols, and the National Capital Region Integrated Air Defense System. This mission was previously known as Air Sovereignty Alert. In 2011, we expanded the term to Aerospace Control Alert because it captures the totality of this mission, which includes the air defense mission, as well as the air sovereignty mission.

For the air defense mission, armed fighters are positioned across the United States and Canada on alert to intercept and identify suspect aircraft, which allows NORAD to be postured to

defend against strategic airborne threats to the United States and Canada. Thanks to our Total Force partners, the Air National Guard provides the majority of NORAD's operational force for Aerospace Control Alert missions, while the Army National Guard provides ground-based air defense capabilities protecting our nation's capital.

Providing our National Guard partners with capable equipment is key to Aerospace Control Alert, which requires the modernization of NORAD airframes. Legacy fighters are aging, but will be able to perform their mission through the 2013-2025 time frame. However, recapitalizing our fighter, tanker, and airborne early warning aircraft will remain a requirement. Another capability we are actively pursuing is our ability to respond to low, slow airborne threats. We have submitted this capability into the joint requirements process and have begun work on an Analysis of Alternatives. Based on our initial timelines, we anticipate having a way ahead by late summer.

The second part of the Aerospace Control Alert mission is air sovereignty operations. NORAD safeguards the sovereign airspace of the United States and Canada by responding to unknown, unwanted, and unauthorized air activity approaching or operating within either country's airspace. NORAD conducts Northern Sovereignty Operations to detect and respond to long-range aviation conducted by the Russian military in the vicinity of U.S. and Canadian airspace. This includes monitoring all northern approaches to U.S. and Canadian airspace and identifying all aircraft approaching it. In addition, we remain vigilant and ready to conduct Southern Sovereignty Operations in the event that North American air sovereignty is challenged by foreign aircraft operating in the southern portion of our area of operations.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia conducted military long-range aviation flights on a very limited basis; however, in the summer of 2007, Russian officials publicly announced their

intent to resume a more robust schedule of long-range aviation activity. Since then, Russian bomber aircraft have conducted northern patrols and training activities on a regular basis. These flights are flown both northwest of Russia, prompting responses from European nations, and northeast of Russia approaching the United States and Canada. These flights routinely enter the U.S. and/or Canadian Air Defense Identification Zones.

If Russian aircraft have not provided prior notice via a flight plan, or do not respond to air traffic control instructions, they are detected and labeled as unknown aircraft. It is the responsibility of NORAD to respond appropriately to any unknown aircraft. Our actions demonstrate not just to Russia, but to all, our capability and intention to defend North American air sovereignty.

This does not mean we view Russia as an enemy. In fact, in an effort to increase cooperation with the Russian military, NORAD and the Russian Federation Air Force conducted the second VIGILANT EAGLE exercise in August 2011, where each side practiced tracking, intercepting, and passing control for monitoring and escorting a live-fly, simulated hijacked aircraft into the other's airspace. The benefits we realize from this type of exercise are invaluable as they are by nature complicated and require high levels of synchronization between NORAD and the Russian Federation Air Force. As a result, this process by itself opens up new avenues for discussion and cooperation, establishes long-term contacts, and fosters better understanding among our governments, and especially among our militaries. These open lines of communication help our respective militaries avoid misunderstandings that could result in heightened tensions and unintended consequences.

VIGILANT EAGLE is a symbol of what can be achieved using an incremental, stepping-stone process—each event building on the success of the prior year’s effort—which we hope over time will lead to even greater levels of openness and cooperation among our nations.

Maritime Domain. While most American and Canadian citizens are familiar with our air defense capabilities, our less-publicized maritime operations remain a strong deterrent capability for our nations. USNORTHCOM and NORAD partner with geographic combatant commanders, U.S. and Canadian Government agencies, allied nations, and the commercial/private sector to maximize maritime warning and maritime domain awareness for North America through information sharing, plan development, and cooperative training. Sixteen stakeholders now contribute to the common operating picture with NORAD, to include the U.S. Coast Guard, the other combatant commands, Fleet Forces Command, and Canada Command. NORAD processes, assesses, and disseminates intelligence and information related to the respective maritime areas and internal waterways of, and the maritime approaches to, the United States and Canada. We leverage maritime domain awareness to develop a comprehensive shared understanding of the maritime operating environment and to issue binational warnings of maritime threats or attacks against North America.

As we look to the future, USNORTHCOM and NORAD continue to refine and report requirements, efficiencies, and deficiencies to the Joint Staff and via the annual Maritime Domain Awareness Plan submission to the Secretary of the Navy in his capacity as DOD Executive Agent for Maritime Domain Awareness.

Cyber Events. Cyber security is a growing critical mission. Since USNORTHCOM and NORAD rely on data systems, the Internet, and inter-networked commercial and military infrastructure, cyber attacks pose potentially grave risks to our ability to accomplish our

missions. To improve our capability to fight in a degraded cyber environment, we are working within the DOD to establish responsive policies, authorities, and technologies and to develop a skilled cyber workforce to enhance mission assurance and resiliency.

Outside of the DOD, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in partnership with other Federal Departments and Agencies; State, local, tribal and territorial governments; the private sector; and international partners, is improving its capability for a fully-coordinated response to a significant cyber incident to minimize impact, restore operations, and reduce the risk of a future occurrence. Given that much of the critical infrastructure that the DOD and civil authorities use is owned by the private sector, the continued development of these partnerships, information sharing, and advancement of defensive measures is an imperative. Therefore, USNORTHCOM continues its good relationships with DHS and U.S. Cyber Command to coordinate and collaborate on cyber situational awareness, and to effectively provide “response and recovery” support to civil authorities when requested in the event of a serious domestic cyber attack with second- and third-order physical effects.

Anti-Terrorism and Force Protection. Fundamental to homeland defense is the protection of our service members to ensure full mission capability. In executing our Force Protection mission, USNORTHCOM continues to improve information sharing with our interagency partners and to streamline reporting within the DOD to proactively detect emerging threats directed against our nation, our military personnel, and our critical capabilities. The Intelligence Community and other interagency representatives in USNORTHCOM, including Federal and Service law enforcement investigative agencies, meet on a daily basis with USNORTHCOM Anti-Terrorism and Force Protection experts to examine threat information and to implement mitigation measures to achieve the best possible protective posture in the most

economical way. USNORTHCOM also participates in the Fort Hood Senior Steering Group and attendant sub-working groups to conduct a comprehensive review of lessons learned, and to implement processes and procedures that facilitate synchronization of our defensive strategy to warn against and mitigate threats across geographic regions, jurisdictions, and operational chains of command. We have had significant success in this area and our partnership with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in this endeavor is a model for interagency coordination.

Civil Support—Responding to our Nation’s Needs

USNORTHCOM stands ready to support primary agencies in responding quickly to natural and manmade disasters and to the effects of terrorist attacks. The DOD has a long history of supporting civil authorities with specialized skills, capabilities, and capacities that can rapidly stabilize and improve the situation in the wake of catastrophic events. All requested DOD support is provided at the direction of the President or Secretary of Defense and in accordance with the National Response Framework and applicable laws, including the Stafford Act and the Economy Act.

In coordination with our DOD and interagency partners, USNORTHCOM has made significant improvements in Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) and, therefore, our ability to respond quickly and more effectively to manmade or natural disasters. These improvements include: (1) implementation of a Dual-Status Commander Concept of Operations through which we are able to achieve greater unity of effort between Federal and State military forces during contingencies; and (2) implementation of a new Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Response Enterprise that is able to deliver more lifesaving capability faster than ever before.

In accordance with the Joint Action Plan, which was a collaborative effort of designated representatives of the Council of Governors, the DOD, the DHS, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), USNORTHCOM led the development and implementation of the Dual-Status Commander Concept of Operations. This has allowed the DOD and the State governors to jointly pre-identify, train, and certify senior military officers to perform simultaneously as commanders of both National Guard forces in State status and Federal military forces in Title 10 status. Prior to Hurricane Irene in 2011, the DOD employed Dual-Status Commanders only for selected pre-planned events. Now that all States have designated Dual-Status Commanders, this joint initiative postures the DOD and the States to employ these officers for short- or no-notice events such as earthquakes, hurricanes, or other natural disasters.

Reserve Mobilization Authority. Since access to trained forces is vital to successful civil support operations, we appreciate the Committee's action to include a provision in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 2012, supported by the Council of Governors, to authorize the Secretary of Defense to order Army, Air Force, Navy, and the Marine Corps Reserves involuntarily to active duty for a major disaster or emergency. This new authority makes the significant capabilities of the Army Reserve, Air Force Reserve, Navy Reserve, and Marine Corps Reserve forces all available to assist civil authorities in responses to major disasters and emergencies, thus enabling a truly Total Force approach to DOD disaster response.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response. As an important subset of DSCA, managing the aftermath of a CBRN event will be exceptionally challenging due to the potential scope of the event, the specialized skills and equipment required to respond, and a general lack of knowledge among our nation's population of the hazards associated with such

events. USNORTHCOM has a key leadership role in ensuring that our Government is prepared to succeed in this important mission area.

Over the past 18 months, the DOD has taken significant steps to improve its ability to support civil authorities in responding to catastrophic incidents in major metropolitan areas, particularly weapons of mass destruction attacks and major industrial accidents. The CBRN Response Enterprise includes National Guard, Reserve, and Active Component forces prepared to rapidly respond to a CBRN incident within the homeland. Having already achieved initial operational capability, the CBRN Response Enterprise will reach full operational capability on 1 October 2012 with over 18,000 Active Component, Reserve Component, and National Guard service members dedicated to this vital mission. These forces are focused on lifesaving and are trained and equipped to provide critical search and rescue, decontamination, emergency medical care, and medical evacuation in support of the Primary Federal Agency, the affected regions and States, and local incident commanders. Ever vigilant, these forces maintain a graduated response posture and are prepared to deploy within hours after an incident in order to save lives and minimize human suffering within the critical first 72 hours.

Hurricane Response Operations. We continue to stand ready to provide robust military support during hurricane response operations. We have incorporated lessons learned into our operational planning, and we have conducted rigorous exercises to hone our capabilities. These activities ensured that we were prepared, in August 2011, when USNORTHCOM coordinated support to the FEMA, State and local response efforts throughout the Hurricane Irene experience. In anticipation of the storm, the command quickly deployed nine of our ten Defense Coordinating Elements, each led by a Defense Coordinating Officer, to join with FEMA Incident Management Teams across the northeastern United States. In all, more than 6,500 active duty

service members were ready to assist States affected by Hurricane Irene. In New Jersey, nearly 100 troops provided command and control for military forces supporting efforts in the northeast.

Hurricane Irene response activities marked the first time that Dual-Status Commanders were in position for an unplanned event to provide command and control over both active duty and Reserve Component (National Guard and Army Reserve) forces. Indicative of the success of the program and continuing collaboration between USNORTHCOM and the States, Dual-Status Commanders for the response missions were appointed in New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, and Rhode Island.

National Security Implications from Arctic Change. The progressive opening of the Arctic represents both challenges and opportunities. Climate change in the Arctic is impacting the land and seascape, creating opportunity for increased human activity and presenting a new set of regional vulnerabilities and potential resource competitions. Emerging Arctic challenges require deliberate preparation to ensure economic access and freedom of maneuver, and to prevent irresponsible actions. As the Arctic opens, there will be a marked increase in human activity in a push for resources (e.g., fish, diamonds, natural gas) and eco-tourism. Special capabilities will be required to operate successfully in the Arctic. For instance, icebreakers are an essential capability for the United States to exercise our responsibilities. I believe the nation should continue to exercise freedom of navigation to assure access to this new dimension of the maritime domain.

Regardless, the Arctic will remain an austere and formidable environment that requires unique capabilities and skills. We are looking ahead at how best to fulfill our responsibilities for DOD military operations within the Arctic portion of our area of responsibility to advocate for DOD capabilities in the Arctic region.

As Arctic nations, the United States and Canada have broad and fundamental interests in the Arctic region where we seek to sustain our national security equities, protect the environment, manage resources responsibly, advance the social and economic development of indigenous communities, support scientific research, and strengthen international cooperation. In support of these interests, NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and Canada Command are working toward a Tri-Command Framework for Arctic Cooperation, which synchronizes planning, operations, domain awareness, information sharing, exercises, and capability development among the commands in the Arctic region.

In addition to our partnership with Canada, USNORTHCOM is also committed to developing “whole-of-nation” solutions to Arctic challenges through collaboration with our DOD, interagency, and industry partners to address gaps in Arctic communications, domain awareness, mass rescue, disaster response, and weather forecasting capabilities.

Later this month, USNORTHCOM will host an Arctic Collaborative Workshop at the National Defense University in conjunction with these partners to validate our near-term operating concepts and capability development. The Workshop will also inform our series of exercises to be conducted in the Arctic this summer. Lessons learned from these events will drive our Theater Campaign Plan’s evolution to better support our partners in promoting security, safety, stability, and economic growth in the region.

The foundation of our future success in the Arctic must be built upon the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, the seminal agreement that provides the international legal framework for use of the world’s seas and oceans, including the Arctic Ocean. I believe that joining the Convention would protect and advance a broad range of U.S. interests, including navigational mobility and offshore resources. In short, joining the Convention would bolster our national

security, secure U.S. rights over extensive marine areas, and formalize the United States' standing where our vital interests are at stake.

Exercise and Training. The Combatant Commander's Exercise Engagement Program (CE2) supports all aspects of the mission-critical NORAD and USNORTHCOM Exercise and Engagement program. This CE2 program helps us build partner capacity and readiness across 54 states and territories, Canada, Mexico and the Bahamas. We appreciate the Committee's support of this critical program that directly supports our readiness to defend the homeland and save lives during domestic crises.

Security Cooperation—Cooperative Defense through Enduring Partnerships

USNORTHCOM and NORAD do not meet today's complex challenges alone, and as such our allies and partner nations actively contribute to the cooperative defense of North America. We support and enable other agencies, advocate for complementary resources, and work toward common objectives to improve interagency planning and coordination that synchronize U.S. support for building our partners' capacities. These partnerships allow us to defend the nation in depth.

Countering Transnational Criminal Organizations. There has been a continued steady increase in the number of deaths as a result of this ongoing conflict since 2006, although the rate of increase slowed in 2011. TCOs represent a globally-networked national security threat. This sophisticated network of networks includes criminal organizations and street gangs, frequently serving as enforcers and drug distributors for TCOs. The criminal organizations have global reach that spans a diverse set of illicit activities that includes, but is not limited to drug trafficking, kidnapping, human trafficking, and extortion. According to the *Department of Justice National Drug Intelligence Center's 2011 National Drug Threat Assessment*, TCOs have

links in over 1000 U.S. cities. According to the *2009 National Drug Threat Assessment*, our nation's demand for illegal drugs results in wholesale proceeds of up to \$39 billion annually from illicit drug trafficking via the Southwest Border. This transnational problem needs to be approached in a holistic, interagency manner.

In support of the *President's Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime*, USNORTHCOM coordinates with Mexico, Canada, The Bahamas, U.S. Southern Command, and our other partners in the Caribbean, to enhance mutual trust, increase collaboration, improve capacity against TCOs and their activities, and to contribute to a cooperative defense of North America. USNORTHCOM is just one supporting organization in a much larger interagency and international law enforcement effort to counter the TCOs operating worldwide.

As requested by Mexico, USNORTHCOM cooperates with the Mexican military in support of their efforts to build capabilities and capacities to employ against TCOs. Above all, we will continue to respect Mexico's sovereignty and we stand ready to increase coordination and collaboration to the extent that Mexico desires and in accordance with U.S. Government policies. Under the courageous leadership of Mexican civil authorities, the Mexican military is making progress against TCO activity. At the invitation of our Mexican partner, USNORTHCOM provided assistance in several key areas.

In support of the Mérida Initiative, we will improve our collaboration with international and interagency partners to disrupt and reduce transnational threats to North America and provide regional security through a whole-of-government approach. We will encounter both challenges and opportunities as our partners develop and improve their capacities.

An important element of our efforts to combat TCOs is the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC). Late last year, I participated in a WHINSEC Board of

Visitors curriculum review at Fort Benning, Georgia. This organization provides an effective mechanism to build relationships with militaries throughout the hemisphere and to influence a positive trajectory on human rights.

Security Cooperation with Mexico. The military-to-military relationship between the United States and Mexico has advanced to unprecedented levels of coordination. Today, Mexico and the United States are strategic partners, respecting the laws and sovereignty of our individual nations, and at the same time facing shared challenges and applying lessons learned. While our Mexican colleagues share information about fighting TCOs, as well as their expertise in providing humanitarian assistance and disaster response, we share our experiences in asymmetric conflict, to include intelligence-driven operations, law of land warfare, whole-of-government solutions and rule of law challenges. In addition, we have shared mutual perspectives on how to incorporate a whole-of-nation approach.

We work closely with the Mexican military to enhance planning, tactical skills, communication capabilities, and incorporation of human rights principles, and meet frequently to build personal relationships and coordination. As an example, we conduct combined planning and exercises such as QUICKDRAW, a tactical-level exercise that tests the capability of U.S., Canadian, and Mexican maritime forces in a joint response against illicit activity threatening North American Maritime Security. We have also incorporated bilateral and multilateral arrangements such as the North American Maritime Security Initiative (an information-sharing and cooperation arrangement among USNORTHCOM, Canada Command, the Mexican Navy and the United States Coast Guard), and have conducted Subject Matter Expert Knowledge Exchanges, which allow us to learn military best practices from each other. We conduct bilateral and multilateral conferences for broader coordination in dealing with issues such as natural

disasters, pandemics, and search and rescue. The United States also shares information in resource management and logistics, operations development, and aviation training with the Mexican military.

Additionally, for the past few years, USNORTHCOM has had resident Mexican Foreign Liaison Officers from both SEMAR (Mexican Navy and Marines) and SEDENA (Mexican Army and Air Force) in our Headquarters, which has helped tremendously to improve cooperation. And for the first time, in May 2012, USNORTHCOM and the Mexican military will conduct ARDENT SENTRY 12, a combined Defense Support of Civil Authorities exercise designed around mutually-agreed objectives.

We are partnering with U.S. Southern Command and working with security forces from Mexico, Guatemala, and Belize to strengthen ties and promote a coordinated approach to enhancing security along the Mexico-Guatemala-Belize border region. With our assistance, our southern neighbors are fortifying this porous border region and slowing the flow of illicit trafficking northward.

Support to Law Enforcement Agencies. DOD support to U.S. law enforcement agencies (LEAs) and the Mexican military ultimately contributes to a safe and more secure border and supports the broader Counter-TCO fight. This is one fight against a common enemy for the Mexican military and our Federal agency partners. USNORTHCOM's role in the border security mission is to provide DOD support to U.S. and foreign law enforcement agencies. Through our subordinate unit, Joint Task Force North (JTF-North), we provide mutually-beneficial DOD support in a broad range of unique military categories.

Our vision is for JTF-N to be the most effective integrator of DOD support to LEAs. Fostering our important relationships with LEAs, State National Guard counterdrug task forces,

and the Mexican military is vital to securing our nation's borders against drug traffickers and their associated criminal activities.

In coordination with our DOD and interagency partners, USNORTHCOM is developing systematic improvements in our ability to provide more effective and efficient LEA support. One improvement, coordinated by JTF-North with our LEA partners, is the new DHS comprehensive campaign planning process. This new planning cycle helps support the development of DHS and Department of Justice (DOJ) strategic guidance, increases interagency planner cooperation, and ultimately improves unity of effort and synchronization of resources for countering illegal drugs and other transnational threats.

A second improvement is the military intelligence training support provided to the DHS-led Border Intelligence Fusion Section within the DOJ-led El Paso Intelligence Center. The Border Intelligence Fusion Section, comprising of military intelligence analysts supporting training and intelligence fusion, develops operational intelligence products that we share with our interagency partners for their use in early cueing, warning, and interdiction operations.

Operational support to LEA partners includes detection and monitoring missions using a variety of multi-domain sensors and platforms that are unique to the DOD, in order to improve a supported LEA's ability to interdict transnational threats. Together we are exploring our spectrum of authorities to determine where modifications could enhance our ability to support our U.S. Government partners, better defend our homeland in depth, and enhance cooperation with our Mexican partners.

In sum, I believe DOD support to law enforcement is a "win-win" cooperation effort for our nation's homeland security and defense missions. DOD units are afforded the opportunity to

conduct operational training in an interagency environment, and our LEA partners are provided support through unique DOD capabilities to counter an adaptive threat to our nation.

Partnership with Canada. Canada is a trusted partner with whom we share the defense of the continent. The military-to-military relationship between USNORTHCOM and Canada Command is strong, and has progressed to unprecedented levels of cooperation. At the Permanent Joint Board on Defence this past January, Lieutenant-General Walter Semianiw, Commander of Canada Command, and I signed the *Civil Assistance Plan* and the *Combined Defence Plan* to codify cooperative efforts among NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and Canada Command to advance continental security, safety, and stability.

Canada and the United States are allies and strategic partners in the security cooperation arena, with USNORTHCOM and Canada Command working together as never before on emerging regional engagements such as the North American Maritime Security Initiative.

Meanwhile, Canada Command is developing a plan for complementary regional engagements along Mexico's southern border with Guatemala and Belize, supporting the fight against TCOs as well as providing expertise and training to the Mexican military and civil authorities as they transition their legal system to a model better able to prosecute, convict, and incarcerate TCO members.

USNORTHCOM and Canada Command also closely coordinate security cooperation activities with other partner nations, as well as refine a common exercise schedule, to ensure that all activities provide the most value for their cost and that no time is wasted on duplicating efforts.

Additionally, for the past few years USNORTHCOM has had a resident Liaison Officer at Canada Command Headquarters, and Canada Command now has a resident Liaison Officer at

USNORTHCOM and NORAD Headquarters, further improving the already excellent coordination between our commands and nations.

Theater Security Cooperation with the Bahamas. The United States and the Bahamas share a strong bilateral relationship built on bolstering citizen security and promoting trade and cultural exchange. These shared interests, including a common belief in the rule of law and democratic values, and The Bahamas geographic proximity to the United States, are the foundation upon which we have built a long-standing partnership. The Bahamian government is committed to close cooperation with the United States on law enforcement and maritime security concerns, as well as on counterdrug efforts. This strong security cooperation relationship is highlighted by Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos, which is a trilateral counternarcotics effort conducted by personnel of the Royal Bahamas Police Force, Royal Bahamian Defense Force, and the Turks and Caicos Islands police with counterparts from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the U.S. Coast Guard.

One of the key focus areas in The Bahamas is the Hawk's Nest Forward Operating Base, a staging location for counterdrug operations. Hawk's Nest is a centrally-located facility on Great Exuma used by Bahamian and interagency counternarcotics partners. We are supporting the U.S. Embassy-Nassau, in their effort to develop a cost-sharing agreement with the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, DEA, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Federal Aviation Administration, all of which have equities in either operating from Hawk's Nest or retaining radars and other equipment located at the site. The proximity of The Bahamas to the United States means that relatively small sites like Hawk's Nest have strategic importance for the Counter-TCO and Cooperative Defense mission areas.

The National Guard—Our Vital Partner

USNORTHCOM and NORAD rely on the support of National Guard soldiers and airmen who work each day at the headquarters and within the NORAD Regions and USNORTHCOM's Service components and joint subordinate commands. This includes one three-star, two two-star, and three one-star National Guard officers who serve as my USNORTHCOM Deputy Commander, subordinate commanders, and direct advisors. I believe this allows the commands to leverage National Guard expertise and experience bringing the best mix of DOD assets to bear in executing the full spectrum of homeland defense and civil support missions. The commands also benefit from their understanding of National Guard policies and programs to ensure the commands' planning and collaboration with the National Guard are informed and effective. Through the National Guard Bureau, USNORTHCOM and NORAD coordinate with each State's Joint Force Headquarters for planning purposes and to maintain situational awareness of National Guard actions and commitments. I believe that no force is better suited to help deter, prevent, and defeat many of the threats we face than today's National Guard. Simply put, the National Guard is a natural partner in all we do.

Future Capabilities

As we investigate existing technologies and capabilities for innovative uses, we are also focusing on emerging technologies to meet our requirements.

Aerospace Threats. One of the more pressing challenges that USNORTHCOM and NORAD will face in defense of the homeland in the near future is from emerging air threats, to include low, slow-flying General Aviation aircraft, cruise missiles, unmanned aerial systems, and short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. Our nation is developing a more responsive, tailorable integrated air and missile defense capability to defend against these threats. In the past

year, USNORTHCOM and NORAD have made significant strides toward protecting the homeland against these threats through exercises, experiments, and tests with other organizations within the DOD. As the threat of terrorism looms and the proliferation of advanced asymmetric capabilities grows, it becomes increasingly important to improve existing air and missile defense systems-of-systems tailored to meet the unique needs of the homeland.

Smart Power Infrastructure Demonstration for Energy Reliability and Security. We are also investigating ways to reduce the risk of our military's dependence on commercial power grids. We are currently partnering with U.S. Pacific Command, the Department of Energy, DHS, and five of the national labs (Sandia National Laboratories, Idaho National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and National Renewable Energy Laboratory) on a Joint Capabilities Technology Demonstration known as Smart Power Infrastructure Demonstration for Energy Reliability and Security (SPIDERS). With SPIDERS, we hope to create a cyber-secure smart microgrid that not only will augment existing power sources, but will also enable a military installation to remain operational when the commercial power grid is disrupted. We are currently working with our partners to test an energy control system at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam in Hawaii this summer. Later this year, we will begin work to demonstrate a cyber-secure microgrid at Fort Carson, Colorado that will leverage previous electrical upgrades, a 2-megawatt solar array, electric vehicle-to-grid energy storage, and distributed backup generators to provide emergency power to a portion of this Army post. In 2014, we expect to demonstrate the first operational end-to-end SPIDERS cyber-secure microgrid at Camp Smith, Hawaii.

Final Thoughts

We are grateful for everything the members of this committee have done to ensure our ability to defend the homeland. We appreciate your support to Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and to their families for their efforts to defend our nation at home and abroad. With your help, North America will be even safer tomorrow than it is today. I am honored to appear before you, and look forward to your questions.

“WE HAVE THE WATCH”

**NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND
and UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND
Biography**



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General Charles H. Jacoby, Jr.
UNITED STATES ARMY



General Charles H. Jacoby, Jr. is the Commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command and United States Northern Command, headquartered at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado.

General Jacoby hails from Detroit, MI and was commissioned a second lieutenant upon graduation from the United States Military Academy in 1978. His military education includes the Infantry Basic and Advanced courses, the Command and General Staff College, the School of Advanced Military Studies, and the National War College. He holds a master's degree in History from the University of Michigan.

His command experience includes Commander, A Company, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 325th Infantry, 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina and Operation URGENT FURY, Grenada; Commander, 1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Commander, Joint Task Force-Bravo, United States Southern Command, Honduras and Operation FUERTE APOYO (Strong Support), Hurricane Mitch; and Commanding General, United States Army Alaska and

Deputy Commander, United States Alaskan Command; Commanding General, 1 Corps, including a combat tour in Iraq serving as the Commanding General, Multi-National Corps-Iraq. He most recently completed his tour as Director, Strategic Plans and Policy (J5); Senior Member, U.S. Delegation to the United Nations Military Staff Committee, The Joint Staff.

Additional assignments include Rifle Platoon Leader, C Company, and later Scout Platoon Leader, then S-3 (Air), 1st Battalion (Airborne) 325th Infantry, 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Aide-de-Camp to the Commanding General, Joint Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Instructor, later Assistant Professor, Department of History, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York; Chief, G-3 (Operations), 25th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; S-3 (Operations), 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; Chief, G-3 (External Evaluation Branch), 25th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; Staff Action Officer, Congressional Activities Division, Management Directorate, Office of the Chief of Staff, United States Army, Washington, D.C.; Deputy Chief of Staff, later Executive Officer to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Southern Command, Miami, Florida; Deputy Director for Global/Multilateral Issues/International-American Affairs, J-5, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC; and Assistant Division Commander (Operations), later Assistant Division

Commander (Support), 25th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, to include duty as Deputy Commanding General, Combined Joint Task Force-76 and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan.

General Jacoby's awards and decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters), Legion of Merit, Bronze Star Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster), Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal (with Five Oak Leaf Clusters), Joint Service Commendation Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster), Army Commendation Medal (with Four Oak Leaf Clusters), Army Achievement Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters), Combat Infantryman Badge, Expert Infantryman Badge, Master Parachutist Badge, Air Assault Badge, Ranger Tab, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge.

(Current as of August 2011)

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

MARCH 6, 2012

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER

Mr. TURNER. Last week, a ship dropped anchor off of Mombasa, Kenya, and cut the Indian Ocean East Africa Marine Systems (TEAMS) cable which connects to East Africa. This TEAMS cable was carrying redirected traffic from the earlier cutting of three other cables in the Red Sea. Kenya's Ministry of Information and Communications says that the cost of the Internet outage could reach \$500 million by the time repairs are finished. In 2008 there were a number of submarine cable disruptions. The first incident caused damage to up to five high-speed Internet submarine communications cables in the Mediterranean Sea and Middle East causing major Internet disruptions and slowdown for users in the Middle East and India. This incident called into doubt the safety of the undersea portion of the Internet cable system. In late February, there was another outage affecting a fiber optic connection between Singapore and Jakarta. On December 19, 2008, FLAG FEA, GO-1, SEA-ME-WE 3 and SEA-ME-WE 4 were all cut. While there was considerable discussion from a number of COCOM posture hearings on the aspect of cybersecurity, it would appear as though most have approached the issue from the perspective of cybersecurity from a software perspective. In consideration of these Internet disruptions due to damage to submarine and fiber optic cables, what alternative architecture has NORTHCOM designed to account for these possible disruptions? On the design of these alternative architectures, what is the current status? Is NORTHCOM able to fulfill its mission should cables running to/from the U.S. be cut?

General JACOBY. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. TURNER. Please describe, in detail, what metrics you will use to agree to reduce the shot doctrine for protection of CONUS against long-range missile threats. Are you now ready to endorse the MDA plan to reduce shot doctrine by 2018-2020?

When was the last drill or exercise conducted by NORTHCOM against a theoretical or hypothetical unauthorized or accidental launch by a Russian or Chinese ICBM directed at CONUS?

Is NORTHCOM comfortable that there will not be an intercept test of the GMD [Ground-based Midcourse Defense] system involving an ICBM target until 2015, yet a mobile ICBM threat against CONUS may develop sooner than that?

What were the findings of the NORTHCOM GBI study conducted before the 2010 BMDR?

Please describe whether and why COBRA DANE is an important capability for CONUS defense.

How does the decision to remove the SBX radar from day-to-day operational readiness affect the capability of the GMD system? How much warning time is necessary to make SBX operational, in the event of a threat to the United States?

How much lead time would NORTHCOM need to ensure all available GBI silos would be outfitted with available GBIs? What is the maximum number of GBIs the U.S. could deploy each year through 2024 (and please detail availability of GBI silos and GBIs).

If there were 10 ICBMs deployed by North Korea by the end of 2012, would we have enough GBIs to defend CONUS under current shot doctrine? How about by 10 DPRK ICBMs by 2020? How about 20 North Korean ICBMs by 2020, under current and the proposed MDA shot doctrine in 2020?

What are the plans to deploy SM-3 IIB by 2020 to defend CONUS from North Korean ICBMs? How many IIB missiles will be available for the protection of CONUS from North Korea? Are there any plans for land-based IIB missiles for the protection of CONUS from North Korea? Would NORTHCOM be concerned if the IIB was not able to be deployed on Aegis BMD ships at IOC in 2020?

General JACOBY. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO

Ms. BORDALLO. General Fraser, in your prepared statement, you indicated that SOUTHCOM had conducted a manpower analysis to align resources and functions. Can you please share the results of that analysis? To what extent did the Department's policies on workforce mix and cost factor into that analysis. Please support your response with workforce and cost data as required by statutes and policies.

General FRASER. Between October and December 2011, U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) conducted a comprehensive manpower review to examine how our resources are aligned against Command priorities. Certain facts and assumptions guided our study: 1. The potential for further Efficiencies-driven cuts exists. 2. Diminishing funding for Reserve augmentation. 3. Given the current zero-growth environment, no new authorizations will become available.

As a result, SOUTHCOM looked to posture its permanent and nonpermanent resources in the most efficient manner possible. For our manpower analysis, Military, Civilian and Contractor Full Time Equivalents (FTEs) were arrayed against two measurements: the current list of prioritized Intermediate Military Objectives (IMOs) from our Theater Campaign Plan, and our Joint Mission Essential Task List, which are derived from Presidential and Secretary level guidance. More than 1,300 requirements were individually examined, and the results compiled to provide a picture of headquarters and individual directorate manpower. Our analysis showed that more than 50 percent of our manpower is aligned against our top five IMOs, 20 percent against the remaining eight IMOs, and slightly more than 20 percent against HQ mission support, which is typical of a large headquarters. Our analysis indicated that our manpower is properly aligned with our requirements.

The scope of the study strictly focused on the workforce mix of existing manpower resources as arrayed against command missions and functions, per DOD Instructions. A detailed cost analysis was outside the scope of this study.

Ms. BORDALLO. President Obama has made reducing reliance on contractors and rebalancing the workforce a major management initiative of his Administration. In your opinion, given the restrictions on the size of your civilian workforce imposed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, does the current SOUTHCOM workforce construct reflect an appropriately balanced workforce between civilian, military and contract support across all major capabilities, functional areas, and requirements? Please support your response with workforce and cost data as required by statutes and policies.

General FRASER. In light of the Secretary of Defense-imposed fiscal year 2010 cap on authorized manpower, and as part of Department of Defense efficiencies efforts, we examined our mission areas and prioritized them according to our Theater Campaign Plan-based Intermediate Military Objectives (IMOs). Our manpower mix (48 percent Military, 41 percent Civilian, and 11 percent Contractor, is appropriate for our mission set. SOUTHCOM has sought no corresponding increase in contracted manpower.

Ms. BORDALLO. Did SOUTHCOM seek relief from DOD mandated civilian personnel levels in order to in-source contracted work more cost-effectively performed by civilians?

General FRASER. HQ SOUTHCOM has not sought any increases in DOD-mandated civilian personnel levels and has no further insourcing initiatives. Contractors are only used to source highly technical positions and capabilities not found in U.S. Government personnel.

Ms. BORDALLO. To what extent has SOUTHCOM used insourcing to reduce reliance on contractors, rebalance its workforce, and generate efficiencies?

General FRASER. In keeping with 2009 Secretary of Defense and Presidential guidance to reduce reliance on contractors and to maximize value to the U.S. taxpayer, HQ SOUTHCOM has an established insourcing record, which began in 2007 with our Contractor-to-Civilian-Conversion (CTCC) project. Under this initiative, HQ SOUTHCOM converted 55 contractor requirements to civil service positions with a 33 percent savings. SOUTHCOM contractors are directed primarily against highly technical requirements, or those not found in U.S. Government personnel.

Ms. BORDALLO. Are you comfortable that all contracted services currently supporting SOUTHCOM are the most cost-effective and risk-averse source of labor?

General FRASER. We have a responsible and efficient policy on the use of contractors. Contractors are only used to source highly technical positions and capabilities not found in military or federal civilian personnel.

Ms. BORDALLO. What processes are in place within SOUTHCOM to ensure the workload associated with reductions being made in the civilian workforce is in fact ceasing, as opposed to being absorbed by other labor sources such as contractors or military personnel?

General FRASER. SOUTHCOM expects no reductions in our current civilian workforce and has sought no increase in contracted manpower.

Ms. BORDALLO. In the SOUTHCOM plan for the inventory of contracted services in accordance with section 8108(c) of last year's appropriations act, signed by your Chief of Staff on September 30, 2011, and submitted to the congressional defense committees as part of the consolidated DOD plan, SOUTHCOM planned to begin modifying statements of work beginning October 1, 2011. How many contract actions have been executed with the new requirements since October 1, 2011?

General FRASER. Since October 2011, all new requirements, including options, processed by a contracting office for award have included the Contractor Manpower Reporting (CMR) requirements. New actions consist of 57 requirements and 3 options exercised.

Ms. BORDALLO. There was a lot of discussion last year about the "exceptions" to the FY10 civilian levels Secretary Gates mandated. Please provide a detailed list of all exceptions SOUTHCOM has had approved to date and the reason for those exceptions, as well as any exceptions that were requested but not approved, and the justification for such.

General FRASER. In July 2011, SOUTHCOM sought, and ultimately had approved, a technical correction to our FY10 baseline as reflected by the Office of the Secretary of Defense Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (OSD CAPE). Our previous baseline did not include 55 Contractor-to-Civilian-Conversion (CTCC) positions approved in 2008. The correction was supported by both the Department of the Army and The Joint Staff.

Ms. BORDALLO. As efficiencies are being executed across SOUTHCOM, are the workload and functions associated with those being tracked as eliminated or divested through the annual inventory of functions?

General FRASER. All Combatant Commands were directed to divest our Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) functions and therefore eliminated our SJFHQ billets. For SOUTHCOM, that meant the loss of 50 military and 4 civilian billets. The functions performed by the SJFHQ were also eliminated. These were the only billets eliminated as part of the recent efficiencies activities. We have gained additional efficiencies by streamlining operations and consolidating functions.

Ms. BORDALLO. You stated you reduced your workforce by 141 full-time equivalents. Where those reductions based on mandated civilian levels or directly correlated to workload and mission requirements? What have you done to ensure the workload associated with those is not being inappropriately performed by contractors in lieu of civilian staffing?

General JACOBY. The net loss of 141 full-time equivalents impacted all three categories of personnel (military, civilian and contractor) who support the NORAD and USNORTHCOM mission set. The majority of the net loss is due to the mandate to reduce by 10 percent per year for the period of FY2011-2013 funding for service support contracts. The workload associated with this reduction shifted from our contract workforce to our Government (military and civilian) workforce.

Ms. BORDALLO. President Obama has made reducing reliance on contractors and rebalancing the workforce a major management initiative of his Administration. In your opinion, given the restrictions on the size of your civilian workforce imposed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, does the current NORTHCOM workforce construct reflect an appropriately balanced workforce between civilian, military, and contract support across all major capabilities, functional areas, and requirements? Please support your response with workforce and cost data as required by statutes and policies.

General JACOBY. In light of the Secretary of Defense-imposed fiscal year 2010 cap on authorized manpower, and as part of Department of Defense efficiencies efforts, we examined our mission areas and prioritized them according to our Theater Campaign Plan-based Intermediate Military Objectives (IMOs). Our manpower mix (48 percent Military, 41 percent Civilian, and 11 percent Contractor, is appropriate for our mission set. SOUTHCOM has sought no corresponding increase in contracted manpower.

Ms. BORDALLO. Did NORTHCOM seek relief from DOD mandated civilian personnel levels in order to insource contracted work more cost-effectively performed by civilians?

General JACOBY. Yes, USNORTHCOM sought relief from DOD for mandated civilian personnel levels in order to in-source contracted work that was more cost effective if performed by civilians. Prior to the announcement to freeze the number of civilian personnel at the FY10 level, USNORTHCOM intended to in-source 90 contract full-time equivalent (FTE) positions in FY11. As DOD assessed the impact of this mandate, USNORTHCOM requested relief in order to continue our FY11 in-

sourcing plan. DOD granted this request for FY12 and approved a level of civilians which included the original 90 FTE positions that were planned for in-sourcing in FY11.

Ms. BORDALLO. To what extent has NORTHCOM used insourcing to reduce reliance on contractors, rebalance its workforce, and generate efficiencies?

General JACOBY. In FY10, NORAD and USNORTHCOM in-sourced 198 positions. In FY12, USNORTHCOM in-sourced 90 positions. These actions reduced NORAD and USNORTHCOM's reliance on contractors, rebalanced our workforce, and generated efficiencies.

Ms. BORDALLO. Are you comfortable that all contracted services currently supporting NORTHCOM are the most cost-effective and risk-averse source of labor?

General JACOBY. Yes. We have a rigorous corporate process that includes a variety of mechanisms to ensure the right labor mix is used to perform our missions. Once a determination has been made that contracted services are appropriate, contracted services will be acquired via a competitive acquisition in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation.

Ms. BORDALLO. What processes are in place within NORTHCOM to ensure the workload associated with reductions being made in the civilian workforce is in fact ceasing, as opposed to being absorbed by other labor sources such as contractors or military personnel?

General JACOBY. The NORTHCOM organizational construct made a substantive shift from overhead support to mission-focused support. This organizational adjustment, in conjunction with the consolidation of like functions and the impact of reductions across all labor sources, has mitigated the need to establish processes that oversee potential workload transfers.

Ms. BORDALLO. In the NORTHCOM plan for the inventory of contracts for services in accordance with section 8108(c) of last year's appropriations act, signed by on October 3, 2011, and submitted to the congressional defense committees as part of the consolidated DOD plan, NORTHCOM planned to begin modifying statements of work beginning October 1, 2011. How many contract actions have been executed with the new requirements since October 1, 2011?

General JACOBY. We have modified one solicitation to include the reporting requirement. In addition, on 14 Mar 12, we completed a comprehensive inventory of the 36 service contracts that were in place last year in order to determine which ones must be modified. Our initial analysis shows that nine of the 36 contracts will not be modified to include the reporting requirement as they expired at the end of 2011 and six will expire in 2012. The remaining 21 contracts will be addressed and the reporting requirements added to any new contracts awarded in FY12.

Ms. BORDALLO. There was a lot of discussion last year about the "exceptions" to the FY10 civilian levels Secretary Gates mandated. Please provide a detailed list of all exceptions NORTHCOM has had approved to date and the reason for those exceptions, as well as any exceptions that were requested but not approved, and the justification for such.

General JACOBY. NORTHCOM has had the following "exceptions" to FY10 civilian levels approved. There were no disapproved NORTHCOM exception requests.

- Four civilian positions for NORAD Maritime Warning
 - These positions fulfill the United States' responsibilities outlined in the binational treaty with Canada
- Six positions for NORTHCOM Maritime Homeland Defense
 - These positions execute NORTHCOM's Maritime Homeland Defense mission by developing operational concepts, identifying required capabilities, managing the maritime experimentation program and sustaining the maritime exercise program
- Six civilian positions for NORAD and USNORTHCOM Global Force Management
 - Three positions were established in each command to implement their portion of the NORAD and NORTHCOM's Global Force Management Process as outlined in the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance signed by the Secretary of Defense on 7 Jan 2010
- 10 civilian positions for Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS)
 - These positions perform a variety of functions within JTF-CS to anticipate, plan, and integrate NORTHCOM chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear response operations
- Nine civilian positions for Operation Clear Voice
 - These positions execute OSD-funded operations for all geographic combatant commands to conduct foreign focused strategic communication activities to counter violent extremist organizations, drug trafficking and trans-national criminal network activities

- 90 civilian positions for in-sourced contract work that was closely related to inherently governmental workload and more cost effective when performed by Government civilians

Ms. BORDALLO. As efficiencies are being executed across NORTHCOM, are the workload and functions associated with those being tracked as eliminated or divested through the annual inventory of functions?

General JACOBY. The NORTHCOM organizational and management construct enables a complete understanding of priorities of functions and missions across our enterprise. Based on this understanding, our leadership can prioritize workload to accomplish the highest priority missions and functions on a daily basis. In addition, when the workforce is again adjusted, the Command has an understanding of the lowest priority work for reduction.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS

Mr. FRANKS. In recent years Iran has been rapidly perfecting its uranium enrichment and launch vehicle technologies. In February, Iran used an improved Safir-class launch vehicle to place a 50 kilogram satellite into an orbit about 200 miles above the earth. Its orbital path brings it over the continental U.S. on a recurring basis. Although that is a modest size and weight for an orbital payload, we know Iran is preparing to use a more powerful Simorgh-class launch vehicle to place a much heavier satellite into orbit. The Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, told this committee that the Simorgh “could be used for an ICBM-class vehicle.” One could see Iran perfecting these technologies and merging them to place a nuclear warhead or device into low earth orbit and detonating it over the United States to create an electromagnetic pulse that would take out or significantly degrade the civilian power grid, possibly for weeks, months, or possibly even years. There are some who discount the possibility because they believe it would be an irrational act by Iran. However, the decisionmaking processes behind the last two major attacks against the United States, Pearl Harbor and 9/11, were hardly rational either. Moreover, the sun is now entering a period of solar maximum when severe space weather could cripple the civilian power grid for an extended period of time. If either event were to happen—EMP whether manmade or natural—what would be its impact on the ability of NORTHCOM to carry out its mission? Is NORTHCOM prepared today to respond to the loss or significant degradation of the civilian power grid for weeks, months, or years? If it is not, how long would it take to become prepared and what resources would it need?

General JACOBY. A large megaton EMP burst from a high altitude nuclear device would impact USNORTHCOM operations by disrupting our communications and electrical power supplies. Today, we are prepared to continue our warfighting missions in the wake of an EMP event. We are constantly working with our mission partners to refine plans to carry out systematic recovery of key infrastructures, improve protection and monitoring of the conditions of critical components, conduct research regarding EMP effects, and develop cost-effective solutions to manage such effects. To this end, USNORTHCOM continues a very aggressive funding line to ensure our systems have the appropriate EMP protection. The Secure Grid Table Top Exercise Series is an example of our commitment to work with various DOD organizations, the Department of Homeland Security and its subordinates, the Department of Energy, and private industry to better understand the effects of an EMP attack and solar weather, as well as prepare for such events.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY

Mr. CONAWAY. As you know, the USAF has decided to eliminate 133 mobility aircraft and 123 fighter aircraft from its inventory, along with 11 RC-26s. How will this reduction in available aircraft affect NORTHCOM’s missions in JTF-North and JTF-Civil Support? As the supported command, what input did you give to the Air Force regarding their decision to cut such a large number of aircraft?

General JACOBY. While the Air National Guard provides reliable, capable, and responsive air support across all of our mission sets, USNORTHCOM leverages the entire inventory of air assets available to USTRANSCOM through our supported/supporting relationship. Given this robust pool of assets, combined with the extensive surface transportation infrastructure available within our Area of Responsibility, we do not foresee these force structure changes significantly impacting the USNORTHCOM mission, to include JTF-N or JTF-CS. We were fully aware of and tracked Air Force aircraft reduction decisions throughout the duration of the budget

process. If there had been any impact to our missions, we would have provided input to the Air Force.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER

Mr. HUNTER. Despite recent efforts, drug trafficking and other illicit trade has continued and violence has increased—as indicated by the alarmingly high homicide rates in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. While additional joint task forces to improve the military and police forces in these countries will help with targeting transnational criminal organizations, the current approach fails to address the root of the problem: military and police corruption. Given the situation, what measures are you taking to combat police and military corruption in the Central American countries experiencing increased violence?

General FRASER. The significant levels of violence in Central America are related not only to corrupt officials, but to a myriad of challenges that include rampant poverty, unequal distribution of wealth, high unemployment rates, gang proliferation and undergoverned spaces. SOUTHCOM works primarily with the militaries of Honduras and El Salvador. Human rights concerns and U.S. legislation precludes direct training with some Guatemalan military units, although Special Operations Forces (GIER) can be trained. Most of the militaries in Central America enjoy much higher public confidence and lack the endemic corruption of the police forces. More and more, militaries are being directed by their governments to perform an internal security role. While this is not the preferred method of establishing internal public security, in the near term, it remains the only viable method for some countries to address the growing violence. All U.S. military training provided to Central American countries contains specific instruction focused on human rights and civilian control of the military, and only vetted units can be trained. SOUTHCOM will continue to focus on professionalizing Central American militaries in order to contribute to internal security.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCHILLING

Mr. SCHILLING. You have stated the way in which SOUTHCOM works with agencies and departments both in the U.S. and with other governments has been successful in monitoring transnational criminal organization usage of smuggling routes. Have you been able to improve these relationships to better address these smuggling routes? What can Congress do to make sure that you get the support you need to make sure these routes are not used by terrorist organizations? Have you been successful in impeding the money laundering system that these transnational criminal organizations have been using?

General FRASER. USSOUTHCOM has been working with the interagency and their liaison officers (LNO's) working at HQ USSOUTHCOM to develop and refine our Common Intelligence Picture (CIP) of smuggling routes and other illicit activities. We leverage our partners in the intelligence community for resources and analysis, and we have increased information sharing throughout the intelligence community. We support the Department of Treasury through intelligence analysis to identify interconnected criminal and terrorist finance networks.

We ask that Congress look at this problem set as the complex challenge it is. It requires the cooperation and capabilities of a broad range of Government agencies, not just the Department of Defense. Agencies like the Department of State, Drug Enforcement Agency, and the Intelligence Community play major roles, and we ask that Congress continue to support them, especially the security cooperation activities funded by the State Department.

Mr. SCHILLING. You have stated that partnering with countries in the area and early investing best serve the regional stability. Can you expand on the long-term dividends, including the money and manpower these programs provide to the U.S.?

General FRASER. United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) security assistance activities encompass a wide array of programs that support the achievement of our theater strategic end states which include combating illicit trafficking, countering violent extremism, assisting partner nations in controlling their sovereign territories, building the capacity of partner nations to support humanitarian assistance/disaster relief and peace keeping operations, and ensuring the unimpeded flow of legal commerce. Quantitative assessments to determine the long-term dividends, including the money and manpower these programs provide the U.S., is not a data set that the SOUTHCOM staff maintains, nor is the staff resourced to undertake such a study; however, conclusions can be drawn from anecdotal evidence that provides indications of the benefits and the effectiveness of the SOUTHCOM invest-

ments in the Caribbean Basin and Central and South America. SOUTHCOM security cooperation programs are executed to prepare our partner nations to shoulder more of the burden of regional security. The following are tangible successes of SOUTHCOM security cooperation activities over recent years:

Counter Illicit Trafficking—Colombian military Joint Task Forces supported with DOD funded communications network, intelligence data management systems, rotary wing aircraft, and training continue to eliminate drug trafficking organizations as part of their ongoing efforts to defeat the FARC, a terrorist organization operating in our hemisphere. Maritime interdiction capabilities fielded in Central America (boats, communications, and training) since 2009 have substantially complemented U.S. illicit trafficking detection and monitoring operation. Panama has seized more drugs in the past three years than the ten prior years combined. Nicaragua's Navy has become a major deterrent to illicit maritime trafficking due to their fierce reputation of pursuing 24/7. In June 2012, a week after receiving new boats, the Costa Rican Coast Guard interdicted a go-fast carrying 1.1 tons of cocaine.

Deter and Disrupt Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) and Defeat VEO—After many years of U.S. assistance, Colombia has developed robust train the trainer programs and provides counter-terrorist training to countries across the globe.

Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response—SOUTHCOM has witnessed a decrease in requests for USSOUTHCOM support of disaster response operations in Central America as the capabilities of our Partner Nations increases. From 2007–2009, our Central American Partner Nations' capacity to respond to flooding events within their borders was frequently overwhelmed, resulting in several requests for DOD support in the form of logistics (rotary airlift support), medical, and engineering. From 2007 to 2009, USSOUTHCOM expended \$4.6M conducting disaster response operations in Nicaragua, Panama, and Costa Rica. In 2010 and 2011, USSOUTHCOM expended \$2.1M in disaster response operations in El Salvador and Guatemala.

Global Peace Operations—SOUTHCOM's Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) Program builds peacekeeping capacity in 11 select Partner Nations allowing them to initiate participation in United Nations Peace Support Operations (PSOs), increase troop contributions to existing missions, or enhance the capability provided to a specific PSO mission. Development of national PK capability results in tangential benefits such as: (1) access to militaries that are more challenging to deal with through traditional Security Assistance and mil-to-mil initiatives, (2) significant skill set overlap between PK and other military mission sets such as HA/DR, and (3) professionalization of the Armed Forces to include respect for human rights, protection of civilians (noncombatants), and civilian control of the military.

Mr. SCHILLING. You mention the fact that Iran is becoming increasingly involved in South and Central America. Have Iran sanctions helped slow their progress in these areas?

General FRASER. Sanctions on Iran may have helped slow Tehran's progress in developing relations in the region. In large measure, South and Central American governments hesitate to further develop ties with Iran due to concern over punishment for breaking the sanctions. Sanctions restrain Iran from complying with its side of most economic deals, souring many governments from pursuing growing economic ties. For example, in early February 2012, Venezuelan President Chavez said sanctions impede joint ventures with Iran.

Mr. SCHILLING. Can you speak to the positive outcomes of maintaining our presence and capabilities at U.S. Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba?

General FRASER. Absent a detention facility and even following the eventual demise of the Castro regime, the strategic capability provided by U.S. Naval Station Guantanamo Bay (NAVSTA GTMO) remains essential for executing national priorities throughout the Caribbean, Latin America and South America which also fall under the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR).

- NAVSTA GTMO is a strategic U.S. base for the Caribbean and the entire SOUTHCOM AOR. It provides a forward location that enhances regional stability and essential logistics and potential forward operating base for SOUTHCOM, Joint Interagency Task Force South, Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard, and Drug Enforcement Agency operations.
- NAVSTA GTMO's organic logistics capabilities enable U.S. forces to maintain better operational security and tactical advantage when operating in this region. The Panama Canal expansion will increase the amount of shipping transiting the Caribbean enroute to ports in the U.S. and Europe. NAVSTA GTMO will help the U.S. maintain the security of these maritime routes. NAVSTA GTMO is essential for possible migrant interdiction operations. Be-

cause of its location, the provisions of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Act do not apply to persons detained at this base. This provides the U.S. Government with a neutral, humane, and safe location for processing migrants and other detainees awaiting their final disposition. The Migrant Operations Center (MOC) and Non-Domestic Migrant Processing Center at NAVSTA GTMO are indispensable resources for any future mass migration events.

Mr. SCHILLING. You talk about the civil support and homeland defense cooperation work that you do throughout the country, but I did not see specific information about the Civil Air Patrol. How do you see the inclusion of the Civil Air Patrol in your missions at NORTHCOM especially with the great capabilities they have during natural disasters?

General JACOBY. The Civil Air Patrol (CAP), in its status as the Air Force Auxiliary, directly supports my missions in the NORTHCOM Area of Responsibility, and I consciously integrate them early and often in all phases of planning and response to contingencies. My air component, Air Forces Northern, has specific approval authorities, as delegated from Secretary of the Air Force, to employ CAP in the CONUS, which has been completely responsive to my needs. A portion of the situational awareness that I receive comes from the CAP in the form of disaster imagery. This helps me plan what next steps to take with any arriving Title 10 DOD forces, or to help scale the response appropriately. In addition, the CAP continues to provide support to search and rescue organizations throughout our country and I would certainly leverage this expertise in any large scale disaster.

Mr. SCHILLING. Because of your homeland security missions you point out your partnership with the National Guard. How is this continued partnership for the Aerospace Control Alert possible with the reductions of aircrafts that the Air Force has proposed?

General JACOBY. Our partnership with the National Guard is paramount to homeland defense. The Air Force has provided me, through the Air National Guard, sufficient assets to conduct our Aerospace Control Alert mission. Despite the proposed cuts, I have the authority to quickly increase NORAD's force posture to counter any threat that may emerge. This is only possible in light of the complete confidence we have in our National Guard partners.

Mr. SCHILLING. In your testimony you touch on aerospace threats and specifically point to the fact that a terrorist threat still looms and proliferation of advanced asymmetric capabilities is growing. Are there specific ways or programs that Congress needs to examine to make sure our airspace is not used to harm us again like we experienced on 9/11?

General JACOBY. NORAD and USNORTHCOM continue to work many programs and capabilities to deter, detect, and if necessary, defeat current and emerging aerospace threats to the homeland. One of our biggest concerns is our ability to detect and track potential threats at low altitude with very small radar cross-sections, and much of our focus is centered on these types of threats. To address these considerations, we continue to collaborate with industry, Service and national laboratories, and academia to evaluate a wide spectrum of surveillance and both lethal and non-lethal engagement options. We will look to the Department and Congress at the appropriate time in our analysis to seek suitable levels of support through the President's Budget.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. How would you assess the performance of the E-8C JSTARS to date in SOUTHCOM's AOR? Do your requirements for these platforms outpace the number of planes available?

General FRASER. The performance of the E-8C JSTARS is outstanding and provides an unmatched and available capability that supports Joint Interagency Task Force South's (JIATF South) detection and monitoring (D&M) wide area surveillance requirements to counter the illicit trafficking in the SOUTHCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). No other asset currently can provide similar extended duration and as expansive radar coverage. The E-8C JSTARS is uniquely equipped to provide wide area surveillance (changing search time from hours to minutes) against the flow of illicit maritime trafficking which comprises 89% of the total flow of drugs into Mexico and the U.S. The E-8C JSTARS is a key enabler that ensures effective and efficient utilization of JIATF South's other limited allocation of air and maritime assets. Understanding the global requirements on this low density airframe, JIATF South and Air Combat Command support employing the E-8C JSTARS using CONUS-based E-8C JSTARS aircraft that are designated for flying training sorties two times a month on a not to interfere basis, and provide 4-5 hours of sta-

tion time on each flight. This mutually beneficial relationship provides wide area maritime surveillance MTI (Moving Target Indicator) capability for the AOR and needed training opportunity for the JSTARS crewmembers to hone their skill sets. During a recent two week deployment based out of Curacao, the E-8C JSTARS provided millions of square miles of maritime D&M support and led to the disruption of \$3.6 million dollars of cocaine. Deploying the E-8C JSTARS in the SOUTHCOM AOR supports DOD's ability to fulfill its statutory D&M mission and to achieve the Office of National Drug Control Policy stated cocaine removal goal for the transit zone.

It is our understanding that there are 17 JSTARS aircraft in the inventory, and a number of those are in depot-level maintenance or deployed to other combatant commands, which is why we make use of training sorties in the SOUTHCOM AOR. The E-8C Joint STARS is the only wide area maritime surveillance with MTI capability integrated in the SOUTHCOM AOR and is considered a game-changing capability.

Mr. SCOTT. What is the role of the U.S. Coast Guard within SOUTHCOM in building partnerships?

General FRASER. The U.S. Coast Guard provides forces to USSOUTHCOM through its Districts Seven and Eleven to support to counter transnational organized crime (air and surface) operations. The Coast Guard also maintains bi-lateral agreements with most of the 33 countries in SOUTHCOM's area of responsibility in support of the counternarcotics mission and the mission to counter transnational organized crime. They also work with Partner Nations as they conduct bi-annual port safety security visits and host Partner Nations for specialized training in the U.S. Coast Guard personnel are embedded in the SOUTHCOM Headquarters staff, as well as in the Security Cooperation Organizations in Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, Haiti, and Costa Rica, actively participating in SOUTHCOM activities, operations, and exercises.

Mr. SCOTT. What is the role of military bands within SOUTHCOM and are they a cost-effective way of bringing people together and fostering greater understanding?

General FRASER. The military services oversee U.S. military bands and establish the criteria for their support of official military functions and community relations programs. They support official ceremonies and functions sponsored and conducted by federal, state, county and municipal governments. Within USSOUTHCOM's area of responsibility, U.S. military bands help enhance the image of the U.S. and the U.S. military during humanitarian missions like to SOUTHCOM-sponsored Continuing Promise. Along with providing significant medical care to disadvantaged people living in austere parts of the region, the bands bring people together and foster greater understanding of the U.S. and our intent. The military bands complement other activities that support those objectives.

Mr. SCOTT. The hospital ships *Comfort* and *Mercy* are high-demand, low-density platforms. If the United States had a larger fleet of hospital ships, what roles and missions could they perform within SOUTHCOM's AOR?

General FRASER. USNS COMFORT deployments provide medical, dental and veterinary care, and conduct Humanitarian Civic Action engineering projects in austere locations in support of CONTINUING PROMISE mission objectives:

- Train U.S. personnel and build local capacity in cooperation with Partner Nation, Inter-Agency, Non-Governmental and Private Volunteer Organizations, to conduct Civil-Military Operations, including Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief.
- Send a strong message of U.S. commitment and partnership with the people of the Caribbean and Latin America.
- Improve their preparedness to provide initial Foreign Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (FHA/DR) support in response to a crisis in the SOUTHCOM AOR. Over the past five years, CONTINUING PROMISE has conducted more than 50 visits to 15 countries in the region, providing treatment to over 500,000 patients and training more than 100,000 FHA/DR responders.

Mr. SCOTT. Are U.S. flag and general officers banned from visiting any countries within SOUTHCOM's AOR? If so, which countries?

General FRASER. U.S. flag and general officers are not banned by law from visiting any countries in the SOUTHCOM AOR. However, there are policy guidelines that establish the requirement for U.S. flag and general officers to obtain higher level approval prior to travelling to some countries within SOUTHCOM's AOR. For Example, as a matter of policy, the State Department generally opposes travel to Cuba (not Guantanamo Bay) by U.S. Government officials who are at/above the rank of office director, GS-15, or O-6.

Mr. SCOTT. What is Hezbollah's center of gravity in Latin America?

General FRASER. Lebanese Hezbollah's center of gravity in Latin America and the Caribbean is the clan-based, financial networks generating tens of millions of dollars, primarily using the Free Trade Zones (FTZs) in the region.

Lebanese Hezbollah support networks involved in licit and illicit activities take advantage of relaxed oversight and the lack of transparency in FTZs to launder the proceeds of crime both for personal and Hezbollah organizational profit. Familial ties strengthen networks integrating businessmen, shop attendants, couriers, local financial specialists, and leaders worldwide.

Mr. SCOTT. What were the accomplishments of the U.S. Coast Guard in 2011?

General FRASER. The U.S. Coast Guard provided NORAD and USNORTHCOM with excellent support in 2011. The "Blackjack" H-65 support in the National Capital Region (NCR) and selected residential visits outside the NCR was absolutely top notch as part of our integrated homeland defense efforts. Furthermore, the U.S. Coast Guard provided security and force protection for vessels engaged in the Military Outload mission, ensuring critical logistics support for our troops overseas. The U.S. Coast Guard also supported our top-tier exercises, VIGILANT SHIELD and ARDENT SENTRY, incorporating their unique authorities, key insights and experience as we exercised our homeland defense and civil support plans. In addition, we collaborated with the U.S. Coast Guard to develop a joint assessment of needed Arctic capabilities through the DOD/Department of Homeland Security Capabilities Assessment Working Group. Finally, the U.S. Coast Guard lent its extensive expertise to our Theater Security Cooperation efforts through a series of Mobile Training Team events with our international partners in Canada, Mexico and The Bahamas.

Mr. SCOTT. Has SOUTHCOM ever considered creating a Coast Guard subordinate command? If not, why not?

General FRASER. Service Component Commands are established by the assignment of forces to a Combatant Commander in the "Forces for Unified Commands" memorandum signed by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef). The force assignment process is governed by 10 U.S.C. § 162 which is a directive for the military departments. Although the Coast Guard is an Armed Service under 10 U.S.C. § 101, the Department of Homeland Security is not a military department, and the SecDef cannot assign Coast Guard forces under 10 U.S.C. § 162 while the Coast Guard is operating as an Armed Service under DHS.

The Coast Guard allocates forces to SOUTHCOM and other combatant commanders for specific mission requirements through the Global Force Management (GFM) force allocation process. The GFM allocation process provides appropriate mechanisms for mission validation and prioritization to ensure that the Coast Guard is able to balance their Title 14 and Title 10 mission responsibilities. Assignment of Coast Guard forces under a Service Component Command could preclude their availability for Title 14 missions.

Mr. SCOTT. According to a February 24, 2011, webmemo by Dr. James Carafano and James Dean of The Heritage Foundation, "America's capacity to exercise its sovereignty, protect its interests, and participate in global scientific research and commerce, however, is collapsing." Do you agree or disagree with this assessment?

General JACOBY. I disagree. USNORTHCOM supports policy direction of the President in the peaceful development of resources and scientific research in the Arctic. To this end, on 13 March 2012, U.S. Coast Guard Commandant ADM Papp and I signed the Arctic Capabilities Assessment Group White Paper, which identifies near-, mid- and far-term shared capability gaps and provides near-term investment recommendations for the Arctic. Key enabling capabilities in the Arctic will center on improved communications, domain awareness, smart infrastructure investments, and leveraging training/exercising opportunities.

Mr. SCOTT. The U.S. had eight polar ice-breakers in 1970. Today, the U.S. Coast Guard has three. Does the United States have the most advanced and robust ice-breaker fleet in the world today? What is the minimum number of ice-breakers required to maintain a U.S. presence in the Arctic?

General JACOBY. According to the U.S. Coast Guard, two polar ice-breakers are needed to meet minimum near-term requirements. In addition, the U.S. Coast Guard's High Latitude Study identified a long-term requirement of three heavy and three medium ice-breakers to fulfill all statutory missions.

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Mr. SCOTT. What impact did the Coast Guard's antiquated fleet of cutters and aircraft have on its ability to operate within your respective AORs?

General JACOBY. There are several impacts in my AOR. The Coast Guard's aging surface fleet, in particular major cutters, continues to be challenged by unplanned maintenance resulting in a loss of operational days at sea. The average age of the Medium Endurance Cutter fleet is approaching 40 years and they are scheduled to be replaced by Offshore Patrol Cutters. For example, within the Coast Guard's Atlantic Area, the major cutter fleet (medium endurance cutters and high endurance cutters) was underway for only 3,135 of the 3,669 days originally planned for all missions in FY2011. Furthermore, USCG Atlantic Area major cutters met 1,175 of the 1,446 days originally planned in support of JIATF-South, a loss of 271 planned major cutter days for the Drug Interdiction mission carried out collaboratively by USSOUTHCOM and USNORTHCOM via JIATF-South's law enforcement efforts. In addition, the availability of C-130H aircraft continues to decline and depot-level maintenance time and costs continue to grow, which reduces operational hours for aircraft in my AOR.

Mr. SCOTT. Has NORTHCOM ever considered creating a Coast Guard subordinate command? If not, why not?

General JACOBY. Yes, in 2007, USNORTHCOM conducted an organizational mission analysis that considered a U.S. Coast Guard subordinate command in regard to command and control in Alaska. Ultimately, the current Memoranda of Agreement between DOD and DHS were deemed sufficient to allow mutual support for homeland defense and homeland security events, as they facilitate the rapid transfer of forces between the Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard. Additionally, the relationship between operational levels of the U.S. Coast Guard and USNORTHCOM has grown much closer. For example, the Coast Guard Area Commander now briefs me during biweekly Component Commander's Cross Talk, and I have recently selected a Coastguardsman to serve as my Staff Judge Advocate.

Mr. SCOTT. What homeland security missions could be performed by E-8C JSTARS aircraft?

General JACOBY. JSTARS can enhance law enforcement agencies' ability to counter transnational criminal organization (TCO) activities through the use of JSTARS Moving Target Indicator and Synthetic Aperture Radar detection and monitoring systems. JSTARS can communicate with Department of Homeland Security (DHS) interdiction platforms to support ground agents in the detection of illicit TCO activity. JSTARS can also provide analysis of terrain and traffic patterns; geo-locate TCO staging areas close to the border; confirm/deny TCO maritime movement routes; link to other DOD operational and intelligence assets; complement DHS Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance capabilities; conduct search and rescue; and nest with other agencies' sensors in securing and defending of the homeland. Currently, JSTARS provides support through Joint Task Force North to DHS counterdrug missions primarily along the southern border and associated maritime domain approaches.