[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
INTELLIGENCE SHARING AND TERRORIST TRAVEL: HOW DHS ADDRESSES THE
MISSION OF PROVIDING SECURITY, FACILITATING COMMERCE, AND PROTECTING
PRIVACY FOR PASSENGERS ENGAGED IN INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM
AND INTELLIGENCE
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 5, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-49
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] CONGRESS
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Jackie Speier, California
Joe Walsh, Illinois Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Ben Quayle, Arizona William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Scott Rigell, Virginia Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Billy Long, Missouri Janice Hahn, California
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Robert L. Turner, New York
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania, Chairman
Paul C. Broun, Georgia, Vice Chair Jackie Speier, California
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Loretta Sanchez, California
Joe Walsh, Illinois Brian Higgins, New York
Ben Quayle, Arizona Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Scott Rigell, Virginia Janice Hahn, California
Billy Long, Missouri Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina (Ex Officio)
Peter T. King, New York (Ex
Officio)
Kevin Gundersen, Staff Director
Alan Carroll, Subcommittee Clerk
Hope Goins, Minority Subcommittee Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Patrick Meehan, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence.............................. 1
The Honorable Jackie Speier, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence.............................. 3
Witnesses
Mr. David Heyman, Assistant Secretary for Policy, U.S. Department
of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 7
Ms. Mary Ellen Callahan, Chief Privacy Officer, The Privacy
Office, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 7
Mr. Thomas Bush, Executive Director of Automation and Targeting
Office of Intelligence and Investigative Liaison, Customs and
Border Protection:
Oral Statement................................................. 14
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 7
INTELLIGENCE SHARING AND TERRORIST TRAVEL: HOW DHS ADDRESSES THE
MISSION OF PROVIDING SECURITY, FACILITATING COMMERCE AND PROTECTING
PRIVACY FOR PASSENGERS ENGAGED IN INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL
----------
Wednesday, October 5, 2011
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Patrick Meehan
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Meehan, Long, Speier, Hochul, and
Hahn.
Also present: Representative Jackson Lee.
Mr. Meehan. The Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence will come to
order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony
regarding how the Department of Homeland Security addresses the
mission of providing security, facilitating commerce, and
protecting the privacy of passengers engaged in international
travel.
I would like to welcome everyone to today's subcommittee on
counterterrorism and intelligence hearing. I look forward to
hearing from today's witnesses on the value and efficacy of the
Passenger Name Record program in our on-going mission to
prevent terrorists and other dangerous criminals from entering
the United States.
I further look forward hearing and learning about the
status of on-going negotiations with our partners in the
European Union with regard to the 2007--I am going to refer to
this from this point forward as PNR, the Passenger Name Record,
so we don't have to continue to do it, but the 2007 PNR record
as well as the privacy concerns that David raised.
But before I begin, I think especially on a committee like
this it is so appropriate to take a moment to recognize the
tremendous victory that was achieved by our U.S. military
intelligence communities in locating and killing Anwar Al-
Awlaki last Friday.
Awlaki was one of the worst perpetrators of terrorism and
one of the United States' most real enemies. He was involved in
multiple attacks against the U.S. homeland including the Fort
Dix six plot, which occurred in my backyard; the Fort Hood
attack; the Christmas day 2009 attack over Detroit; and the UPS
cargo bomb which again landed in my airport. Or the airport in
my district, it is not my airport.
The world is a safer place now that Awlaki is no longer a
part of it.
The achievement is a great testament to the U.S.
intelligence capabilities. It will send a clear message to
those who seek to harm us that you won't hide, and you won't
escape justice.
Now today's hearing is aimed at educating our Members, and
I think many at-large, about the ways in which the Department
of Homeland Security collects, protects, and uses personal
information on travelers attempting to come into the United
States.
Given the transnational nature of terrorism, and a desire
of terrorist operatives to enter the United States from abroad,
it is crucial that we act in partnership with other nationals
around the world. We push it out a little bit further and make
sure our skies and our ports are safe and secure from wrongful
entry.
In 2007 the United States and the European Union entered
into an agreement to share with one another intelligence that
would help all parties identify potentially dangerous
individuals before they set foot on an aircraft, thus helping
to disrupt the effort of terrorists and organized crime rings.
Since 2007, the programs resulting from this agreement have
proven to be an indispensible component in our strategy to
thwart terrorists. In fact, in 2008 and 2009, PNR helped the
United States identify individuals with potential ties to
terrorism in more than 3,000 cases.
Among these was the Mumbai attack plotter, David Headley,
who was arrested in Chicago after U.S. authorities accessed his
PNR data from a flight he had booked from the United States to
Germany. Headley since pled guilty to a separate plot to murder
journalists from a Danish newspaper.
PNR data also identified Faisal Shahzad, the perpetrator of
the failed Times Square bombing in May 2010, who was caught
with the help of PNR as he attempted to escape the United
States at JFK Airport.
In 2010, approximately one-quarter of those individuals
denied entry into the United States for having ties with
terrorism, were initially tied through PNR data.
Now in 2009, the European Union member states adopted the
Treaty of Lisbon, and that gave greater power to the European
Parliament. Thereafter, this parliament sought, under its new
authority, to reject this E.U.-U.S. PNR agreement because the
United States had negotiated bilateral memorandums of
understanding rather than establish uniform rules with the
European Union as a representative body.
In addition, some members of the E.U. Parliament have begun
to criticize the agreement for not providing stricter privacy
protections--and I hope that you will go in to the privacy
protections that we have--even though no violation of privacy
rates, or breach of security, had been reported. I hope you
will develop that point as well.
The United States has been absolutely vigilant in assuring
that individual privacy rights under both the U.S. and European
law were respected.
As many know, last month Attorney General Eric Holder
traveled to Brussels to discuss with European lawmakers the
collaborative efforts between the United States and the
European Union to address mutual security concerns. Holder
testified before the parliament's committee on civil liberties
to attempt to assuage their fears.
He argued that the debate over data protection is a purely
academic one. Despite differences between the U.S. and European
legal structures, both protect civil liberties effectively.
Still, DHS and other components have been involved in on-
going negotiations with the European Union to amend the PNR
agreement, and it has been on-going since 2009.
We have been through four rounds of such discussions. In
fact they continue on these terms which were supposed to remain
in effect until 2014.
Our main concern in Congress, and part of the reason we are
holding this hearing today, is to ensure that negotiations with
the United Nations and European Union do not impact the
effectiveness of this agreement. The PNR programs have been
invaluable tool in our gathering of actionable intelligence
over the course of the 4 years. It is a tool we cannot do
without.
The United States was built upon principles of freedom and
civil liberty. This country has always been a leader among
nations of upholding the rights of the individual person, and
it will continue to be. It is for this reason that we must
maintain our ability to prevent those who would seek to take
those freedoms from us from carrying out their plans.
Privacy is a right, but so is security. One relies on the
other.
I look forward to hearing from today's distinguished
witnesses and on these matters.
Now, the Chairman recognizes the Ranking Minority Member of
the subcommittee, the gentlewoman from California, Ms. Speier,
for any statements she may have.
Ms. Speier. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding today's
hearing and having us focus on the PNR issue.
I would like to associate myself with the comments you made
about the successful efforts by the President, the military,
and the CIA in actually putting al-Awlaki to his final demise.
I would also like to welcome the witnesses here, and look
forward to gaining insights into how the Department of Homeland
Security uses the PNR, including how DHS protects travelers'
privacy. It has got to be a key component of the utilization of
this information.
It is, in fact, one of the most powerful tools that we have
to combat terrorist travel. There is obviously a very important
balancing that must go on.
As we know, analyzing PNR can highlight high-risk travel
patterns such as popular routes used by human smugglers and
terrorist facilitators. This may be the only way to flag
potentially unknown suspects who aren't on any of the watch
lists, and who on the surface appear like any other traveler.
PNR can be immensely important in terrorism investigations.
Investigators can use a terrorist suspect's past travel history
to identify travel to terrorist-safe havens as well as co-
travelers who may be associates, which can help to identify and
disrupt the entire terrorism network.
PNR has played a key role in many prominent terror
investigations including that of the 2008 Mumbai attack
plotter, David Headley, and the attempted Times Square bomber,
Faisal Shahzad.
But we almost missed Shahzad when he attempted to leave the
country. So the question that we must ask is: What enhancements
to the system have been put in place to address the
vulnerabilities exposed by that near miss?
Effectively combating terrorist travel hinges on the timely
sharing of information which requires working with the airline
companies to get the PNR data quickly and efficiently. Have
these increased demands for timely information placed an undue
burden on the airline companies or to the traveling public is a
question that must be answered.
Equally important to our cooperation with the airlines is
our relationship with our foreign partners. How can we maintain
lasting and mutually-beneficial agreements with our foreign
partners to ensure the timely sharing of PNR data continues?
One such agreement that has been the subject of public
scrutiny and some controversy is the one we share with the
European Union.
Many European airports serve as the last point of departure
to the United States for many high-risk areas of origin
including the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia. So it is of
the utmost importance that we maintain the robust sharing of
information on travelers flying from Europe to the United
States.
``How will proposed changes to the agreement affect our
screening operations?'' is yet another question we must ask.
Many people, including privacy advocates both here and
abroad, have expressed concern about the privacy implications
that come with obtaining customers' data from the airlines for
counterterrorism purposes.
Although independent reviews of the PNR information-sharing
program have determined that the usage of PNR data by DHS has
never unlawfully violated travelers' privacy, we must be
mindful of these privacy concerns and ensure that DHS continues
to uphold stringent privacy restrictions.
The traveling public has the right to a reasonable degree
of privacy, and they have the right to be concerned. I think we
need to do a better job of explaining to the public the
parameters of the U.S. Government's usage of PNR data--why we
need it, for how long, and how is it applied.
I am eager to learn more about the protections in place.
How exactly do we ensure that a traveler's personal information
is protected? How might further future modifications to the
agreement impact privacy?
So I hope today that we can positively contribute to that
discussion and clear up some misconceptions about how and why
the Government uses PNR data.
I am also looking forward to learning more about how far
DHS has come since 9/11 to effectively analyze data sources
such as PNR to identify and mitigate potential threats.
With the system CBP and DHS has at its disposal now, could
we avoid past failures such as the Christmas day attack?
How important is PNR data to these efforts, and what
challenges remain?
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Ms. Speier.
I want to have the other Members of the committee be
reminded that any statements that they would like to make can
be submitted for the record.
We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses
before us today on this important topic.
Let me first turn to Mr. David Heyman.
He is the assistant secretary for policy at the Department
of Homeland Security. Mr. Heyman is an expert on terrorism,
critical infrastructure protection, bioterrorism, and risk-
based security.
Previously, Mr. Heyman has served as a senior fellow and
director of the CSIS Homeland Security Program where he led the
research and program activities for that section.
Additionally, Mr. Heyman has held a number of Government
positions, including as a senior adviser to the U.S. Secretary
of Energy and at the White House Office of Science and
Technology policy on National security and international
affairs.
Mr. Heyman has testified before several committees in
Congress and authored numerous publications, and appeared in
various media outlets.
I now recognize Secretary Heyman for his testimony, and ask
that you do your best to stay within the 5-minute parameters.
Thank you, Mr. Heyman.
STATEMENT OF DAVID HEYMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR POLICY, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Heyman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, good morning Ranking
Member Speier and distinguished Members of the subcommittee.
We very much appreciate the opportunity to appear before
you today to discuss how the Department of Homeland Security's
prescreening of passengers, and in particular the use of PNR
data, plays an important role in our Nation's work to prevent
and counter terrorist and criminal threats to the homeland.
Preventing terrorists from traveling to or remaining
undetected in the United States remains a top priority of the
Department, and I commend this committee for holding this
hearing and for your support on the on-going efforts to
renegotiate our agreement with Europe on the exchange of PNR
data.
Ten years ago screening passengers coming to the United
States was limited to the Department of State's visa process
and the inspection of a person by an immigration officer at the
port of entry, plus whatever processes were applied at foreign
airports and by foreign governments.
If you were a terrorist seeking to come to the United
States you would for all intents and purposes apply for a visa,
purchase a ticket, and board an aircraft to America.
There would most likely not have been checks to see if you
were a known or suspected terrorist, no checks to see if you
may be a risk to security based upon behavior, no checking to
see if you were traveling on a lost or stolen passport, no
screening of you or your luggage for explosives, little to no
security on-board the aircraft, and no checking to see if you
are even admissible to the United States.
That has obviously all changed in the last 10 years.
Back then provision of advance passenger information was
voluntary, and even when provided by air carriers frequently
contain inaccurate and inconsistent data. There was no
biometric collection of visa applicants beyond photographs, nor
for aliens seeking admission to the United States. There was
very limited pre-departure screening of passengers seeking to
fly to the United States.
Today, a decade later, in response to both 9/11 and
evolving threats and with the help and support of Congress, we
have significantly adapted and enhanced our ability to detect
and interdict travel threats at the earliest opportunity. PNR
plays a central role in all of this.
The term PNR refers to the data an airline receives from a
traveler to book and manage travel plans, and may include the
traveler's itinerary, payment method, and contact information.
Just as fingerprinting was first used and became an
important tool in criminal investigations in the beginning of
the 20th Century, so too at the start of the 21st Century has
PNR analysis become a vital tool for helping to identify
terrorists and criminals.
DHS analyzes PNR provided by the airlines to help identify,
detect, and thwart terrorists and criminals attempting to blend
into the traveling public, and before they commit criminal acts
against innocent peoples.
Our analysis of PNR data helps the U.S. Government to
identify--as the Chairman has noted--over 1,700 unique
suspicious activities or suspicious cases every year, and it
has been vital in almost every high-profile terrorist
investigation since 9/11.
PNR data analysis has been proven to be a critical tool in
identifying nearly every human smuggling case involving air
travel.
My colleague, Tom Bush, executive director for targeting
and analysis for our customs and border patrol, will elaborate
on the use and protection of PNR data international targeting
programs this morning.
In addition to the Department's PNR system being
operationally effective, we also can be proud of our
outstanding record of data privacy protection over the past
decade. To ensure the protection of privacy and civil
liberties, DHS use of PNR data is subject to oversight for
multiple independent bodies including the Department's chief
privacy officer, the DHS inspector general, the GAO, and as
well as the United States Congress.
In addition, periodic joint reviews with E.U. officials
have confirmed the value of PNR data in protecting the
traveling public. These reviews have confirmed our adherence to
the highest data protection and privacy standards.
My colleague, Mary Ellen Callahan, the Department's chief
privacy officer, is here to elaborate further on our protection
and privacy programs.
Let me close by saying, over the past decade the use of PNR
has evolved into a critical tool for ensuring the security of
the traveling public, but also for identifying and prosecuting
terrorists and criminals.
The Department has accomplished all this while also
demonstrating its firm commitment to protecting the privacy of
travelers. Of literally billions of passengers traveling to and
from the United States over the past decade, there has not been
a single breach of use of PNR and violation of established
privacy protections.
In fact, the PNR system we have put in place has become a
model internationally for other countries seeking to implement
similar programs of which there is nearly a dozen now. We are
seeing more and more countries seeking to establish their own
PNR systems, including the European Union who we are in
negotiations with right now.
So let me again, thank the committee for this opportunity
to discuss this matter, and to helping us ensure the commitment
is maintained to achieve a security with the traveling public
in exchange of data to accomplish that.
I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Heyman, Ms. Callahan,
and Mr. Bush follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement of David Heyman, Mary Ellen Callahan, and
Thomas Bush
October 5, 2011
introduction
Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Speier, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today to discuss how the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) works to
prevent individuals that may pose a risk to our National security from
entering the country--all while facilitating legitimate travel and
commerce and protecting the privacy of individuals engaged in
international travel.
Specifically, I want to highlight the Department's pre-screening of
passengers, and in particular, the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR)
data in our work to prevent and counter terrorist and criminal threats
to the Homeland. PNR data and analysis play a unique role in enabling
the U.S. Government to identify both known and unknown threats. Recent
cases underscore the vital benefit of PNR and reflect its value today--
a value that has grown in recent years as the Department has improved
and expanded its data matching and processes. We have been able to
advance the development, implementation, and use of this tool, while
also protecting travelers' data and privacy.
Other countries, recognizing the utility of PNR, have expressed
interest in developing their own PNR systems for screening travelers.
Our on-going negotiation with the European Union over how PNR from
flights with ties to the European Union is handled by DHS is one
manifestation of our ability to advance security, data protection, and
privacy together. I commend the subcommittee for holding this important
hearing on this topic.
Multiple Layers of Defense
Since 9/11, we have learned that the exercise of immigration and
border security authorities can be powerful resources used to identify
and thwart terrorist operations at the earliest opportunity. We have
significantly adapted and enhanced our ability to detect and interdict
threats at the earliest opportunity by instituting a layered aviation
and border security architecture, incorporating both seen and unseen
assets.
Accordingly, we have strengthened our security and screening at
points:
During the travel planning phase, when a traveler seeks a
visa or authorization to travel;
Just prior to travel, when a person seeks to board an
aircraft at a point of departure; and
During travel, when a person seeks to enter the United
States.
PNR is one of five automated systems that assist the Department in
identifying travelers likely to pose a risk. The five reinforcing
systems are: PNR; the visa application process (conducted by the
Department of State and supported by DHS); the Electronic System for
Travel Authorization (ESTA) for travel under the Visa Waiver Program;
the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS), and; Secure Flight.
These are the systems DHS uses to begin conducting screening before an
aircraft's departure and function in conjunction with physical security
procedures such as checkpoint screening.
passenger name record--pnr
The term PNR refers to the data an airline receives from a traveler
to book and manage travel plans, and may include the traveler's
itinerary, payment method, and contact information. In light of the
lessons learned from 9/11 about identifying and preventing terrorists
traveling into and out of the United States, Congress mandated that
carriers make PNR data available to the U.S. Government in the Aviation
and Transportation Security Act of 2001 (ATSA, Pub. L. 107-71).
Presently, all carriers flying to and from the United States provide
DHS with PNR pursuant to ATSA and DHS implementing regulations. DHS
analyzes PNR provided by the airlines to identify terrorists and
criminals attempting to blend into the traveling public before
committing criminal acts against innocent people. Our analysis of PNR
data, reinforced through cooperation with Federal partners, has helped
to identify approximately 1,750 unique suspicious cases every year, and
has been vital in many of the United States' most well-known terrorism
investigations since 9/11.
To ensure the protection of privacy and civil liberties, DHS' use
of PNR data is subject to oversight from multiple independent bodies,
including the Department's Chief Privacy Officer, the DHS Inspector
General, and the Government Accountability Office, as well as the U.S.
Congress. In addition, periodic joint reviews with E.U. officials have
confirmed the value of PNR data and our adherence to the highest data
protection and privacy standards. The findings of these joint reviews
are available on-line on the DHS and E.U. websites. Over the last
decade, the Department has demonstrated its firm commitment to
protecting the privacy of travelers. Of the literally billions of
passengers traveling to and from the United States during the past 10
years, there has not been a single data breach or privacy violation of
the PNR data.
continued threat/risk of terrorist travel
This year witnessed the deaths of both Osama bin Laden and Anwar
al-Awlaki, as well as the 10-year anniversary of the deadly terrorist
attacks of 9/11. As we reflect on the past decade, it is important to
remain cognizant of the continued, evolving threat of terrorism to the
traveling public. Since 9/11, the threat has changed to include not
only large-scale attacks but also smaller operations with potentially
catastrophic effects, including the continued targeting of the aviation
sector. One of the most important responsibilities of government is the
protection of its citizens, a duty this Department well recognizes and
takes seriously. Passengers have a right to privacy and protection of
their civil liberties and personal information, but also have a right
to know that their government is doing everything it can to ensure
their safety and security when they board an airplane. It is necessary,
therefore, to ensure the continued use of proven and effective security
measures. PNR is a proven asset in the fight against terrorism and
other transnational crimes.
evolution of u.s. prescreening efforts since 9/11
Ten years ago, screening of passengers coming to the United States
was limited to the Department of State visa process, if applicable; the
inspection of a person by an immigration officer at the port of entry;
and any processes applied at foreign airports by foreign governments.
Provision of advance passenger information was voluntary. There was
very limited pre-departure screening of passengers seeking to fly to
the United States, and there was virtually no screening of any kind for
domestic flights beyond airport checkpoints.
Today, in response to both 9/11 and evolving threats, and with the
help and support of Congress, DHS has significantly adapted and
enhanced its ability to detect and interdict threats at the earliest
opportunity, including through the access to and analysis of PNR data
as mandated by Congress. PNR data are analyzed in conjunction with
other screening tools such as visa applications, the Advance Passenger
Information System, and the Electronic System for Travel Authorization
(ESTA). DHS analysis of PNR data is an indispensable layer in a
comprehensive approach to security. Each tool plays a unique role in
the screening process. ESTA and the visa issuance process (depending on
the country and traveler) allow us to prevent a known criminal or
terrorist from preparing to travel. Secure Flight and APIS help DHS
decide how the carriers and CBP officers, respectively, should handle
travelers as they prepare to board. PNR data further enable this
decision with additional and earlier information. APIS and PNR then
help DHS decide who warrants a secondary examination upon arrival. In
all cases, trained DHS personnel review and analyze the results of
these automated systems.
As the 9/11 Commission pointed out, targeting terrorist travel is
one of the most powerful weapons this country has to counter terrorist
operations. Terrorists travel in order to: Identify and engage in
surveillance of potential targets; plan attacks; receive training on
tactics and operations; collect and transfer funds and documents; and
communicate with other operatives. Every step along this pathway
presents a vulnerability for would-be attackers, who must come out of
the shadows and interact with the traveling public, the travel
industry, and immigration and border security officials. At some point
along the travel pathway, for example, many terrorists cross
international borders--a step that often necessitates submitting
advance passenger information, using a passport, and undergoing
screening by immigration and border officials while at ports of entry.
the role of pnr data within that system
PNR data analysis can help identify individuals up to 72 hours
prior to departure, including watch-listed individuals, non-watch-
listed co-travelers, and terrorists or criminals adopting known illicit
travel patterns. DHS is able to link previously unknown terrorists and
criminals to known terrorists or criminals by matching contact
information, flight patterns, and other data. After this analysis is
complete, DHS works with foreign and industry partners to interdict
illicit travelers prior to boarding or prioritizes resources for their
inspection at U.S. ports of entry. PNR data collection and analysis
also support terrorist and criminal investigations, including the three
most prominent U.S. terrorist investigations in 2009 and 2010. Further,
PNR served as a critical tool in supporting United States Government
efforts to investigate 9/11 threats over the tenth anniversary weekend.
The retention of PNR data after a flight allows DHS to unravel more
complex plots by looking at travel practices over time. Data that does
not appear to be relevant at the time of travel can be critically
important when tied to a specific case later. Remember that the 9/11
plot was originally conceived in the early 1990s; an attempt on the
World Trade Center occurred in 1993, and the actual 9/11 plot planning
and execution began in earnest in 1996. This included numerous dry runs
and practice flights, as well as travel for recruitment and planning.
Retained travel data was important in securing convictions by the
Department of Justice in a number of recent counter-terrorism cases,
including the conviction of Mumbai plotter David Headley.
Identifying Unknowns
Following 9/11, the United States Government collected intelligence
on al-Qaeda and its affiliate networks and established the FBI's
consolidated Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) of known or suspected
terrorists. Today, we check travelers to the United States against the
TSDB, no matter what mode of transportation they plan to use to come to
the United States.
As DHS has seen in recent cases, however, intelligence and law
enforcement agencies may have limited or no derogatory information
about individuals who pose a real risk to the United States. In fact,
we know that some terrorist groups are deliberately looking to recruit
individuals who are specifically unknown and can remain undetected by
heightened security measures. Fortunately, PNR data analysis,
particularly of historic records, allows us to help identify
individuals who may be unknown to us as terrorists or criminals, but
exhibit a pattern of behavior that is consistent with known or
suspected terrorist or transnational criminal behavior. For example, a
few years ago, two organized crime syndicates in Latin America devised
a simple and effective way to smuggle kidnapped children into the
United States for sale. They would pay women to fly to the United
States with their own children's legitimate passports but with
kidnapped babies. The women would then return alone. By looking for
such a pattern in PNR records over a number of years DHS arrested 11
smugglers, removed 10 criminals and identified 37 victims. The same
technique of analyzing travel patterns has proven effective against a
myriad of crimes and terrorism.
At the same time, DHS realizes that sometimes innocent travelers
may adopt what may appear to be suspicious patterns. As a result, DHS
has established automated procedures so if a traveler is repeatedly
flagged for further inspection and found not to pose a risk, DHS will
automatically ``de-flag'' the traveler in the future. Further, all
pattern-based rules are evaluated quarterly by the DHS Chief Privacy
and Civil Liberties Officers for effectiveness and appropriateness. A
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officer, however, may still
determine that a closer inspection is warranted, depending on the
individual circumstances and travel.
Early Identification--Activation of IAP Teams
CBP stations Immigration Advisory Program (IAP) officers at certain
foreign airports to work with airlines and foreign officials to
identify high-risk and improperly documented travelers before they
board aircraft bound for the United States. At the invitation of
foreign partners, IAP officers make ``no-board'' recommendations to
airlines on the basis of passenger data analysis and a review of
individual travel documents. To be most effective, several hours before
a flight is scheduled to depart, an IAP officer must know who will
likely be on a flight and whether they warrant further exam prior to
departure. Frequently, PNR data analysis is the first information IAP
officers receive to assist in making these determinations. CBP's
National Targeting Center--Passenger (NTC-P) analyzes PNR data received
up to 72 hours prior to departure and provides recommendations to the
IAP officers. NTC-P later validates this analysis with APIS closer to
departure. IAP officers are currently posted at 10 airports in 8
countries, and have recommended, in part based upon PNR data, a total
of 2,875 no-boards in fiscal year 2011, including 9 No-Fly hits, 74
confirmed Terrorist Screening Database matches, and 109 cases of
fraudulent document use.
examples of pnr effectiveness
Headley, Zazi, Shahzad
I would like to take a little time to discuss some of the high-
profile cases where PNR data analysis has been instrumental in critical
National security investigations and prosecutions. As background, I
mentioned earlier that analysis of PNR data have proven to be the
critical tool for annually identifying around 1,750 suspicious cases.
PNR data have also aided nearly every high-profile terrorist
investigation, including: David Headley, who pled guilty for his role
in the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks; Najibullah Zazi, who pled guilty
to plotting to bomb New York City subways; and Faisal Shahzad, who pled
guilty to attempting to detonate a car bomb in New York's Times Square.
Just as fingerprinting was first used and became an important tool in
criminal investigations in the beginning of the 20th Century, so too at
the start of the 21st Century has PNR analysis become a vital tool in
terrorist and transnational criminal investigations. DHS has also
relied on PNR data analysis in nearly every human smuggling case
involving air travel.
The case of Faisal Shahzad clearly demonstrates the effectiveness
of DHS's prescreening programs. Early in this investigation, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) learned of Shahzad's cell phone
number, but had little additional information. Through good interagency
cooperation, the FBI asked DHS if it had encountered any individual who
reported this phone number during border crossings. DHS searched its
PNR database for the phone number, identified Shahzad, and learned
other information he had provided to DHS. DHS then provided the
additional data to the FBI. Later, Shahzad attempted to flee the United
States, but DHS's analysis of departing passenger data identified him
before departure and DHS removed him from the aircraft.
strong record of privacy protection
DHS provides robust privacy protections and strict safeguards over
PNR data. Through a combination of law, policy, and oversight, DHS
ensures its compliance with stringent standards of privacy and security
in the collection and use of PNR data. DHS applies fair information
practice principles to its collection and use of PNR, including data
integrity, data security, purpose specification, auditing and
accountability, individual access, and redress. Moreover, the
Department is firmly committed to transparency when it comes to
informing our partners and the public about its mission, including how
we use and safeguard personally identifiable information such as PNR
data.
By leveraging the Congressionally-mandated authorities of the DHS
Chief Privacy Officer, DHS is working diligently to assure all U.S. and
international travelers that the highest standards are being applied to
the protection of their personal information. The Chief Privacy Officer
has managed two internal audits of DHS's use of PNR data and
coordinated two joint reviews with the European Union since 2004. When
preparing for the joint review that took place in February 2010, the
DHS Privacy Office spent approximately 10 weeks of employee time
analyzing and assessing DHS collection and use of PNR data and
published two public reports related to that assessment. The reports
from these audits are publicly available on the websites of the DHS
Privacy Office and the European Union. The DHS Privacy Office found,
and the European Union acknowledged, that there has not been a single
incident involving the unauthorized use of PNR data.
Individual travelers have many opportunities to learn how DHS
handles PNR data. The PNR data rule, System of Records Notice, and
Privacy Impact Assessment are all available for public review and
comment. In addition, individuals, both U.S. and non-U.S. citizens,
have multiple opportunities for access and redress. The U.S. Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) applies equally to U.S. citizens and non-U.S.
citizens. Anyone can request his or her PNR data directly from DHS; DHS
receives and answers these types of requests routinely. If the traveler
seeks to change or delete information contained in his/her PNR, he or
she can submit a request to DHS and changes deemed appropriate will be
made. U.S. and non-U.S. citizens alike also have access to the DHS
Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP) to correct or amend
records. More information on these programs can be found at
www.dhs.gov/privacy.
u.s.-e.u. pnr agreements
Despite this operational and privacy success, last year, the
European Union sought to re-negotiate our bilateral PNR Agreement to
obtain further reassurance that data with ties to Europe is being
handled properly by the United States. To protect U.S. industry
partners from unreasonable lawsuits, as well as to reassure our allies,
DHS has entered into these negotiations.
The Agreement currently in force provisionally, negotiated in 2007,
is not scheduled to sunset until 2014. The Agreement is operationally
sound, but it is subject to ratification by the European Parliament,
which instead directed the European Commission to renegotiate the
Agreement. As a matter of good faith and out of respect for our E.U.
partners and their evolving political structures following enactment of
the Lisbon Treaty, Secretary Napolitano subsequently agreed to
negotiate a new agreement only if the new text would not degrade the
operational effectiveness of the 2007 Agreement and would permit
additional security enhancements where necessary. We commenced the
latest negotiations on December 4, 2010. As such, the United States is
currently in its fourth negotiation over PNR with the European Union in
9 years--effectively a decade of negotiation.
The Department is committed to concluding a new PNR agreement,
first and foremost a security agreement, which upholds vital public
interests in both security and privacy. We reached agreement with the
European Commission for such a text on May 16, 2011. The text is an
improvement over the 2007 Agreement, it protects both security and
privacy and U.S. and European interests, it provides all relevant
parties with legal certainty, and it is a reliable framework for an
enduring deal.
U.S. and E.U. negotiators worked to respond to the European
Parliament's criticism of the 2007 Agreement, to improve passenger
security and to provide air carriers a legally certain operating
environment. To build support for this approach, DHS has met repeatedly
with not only the European Commission, which negotiates on behalf of
the European Union, but also with key Committees and Members of the
European Parliament and representatives of individual Member States.
The new agreement is clear, detailed, and transparent--in ways that
some critics in Europe felt the previous Agreement was not. The text of
the draft agreement defines key terms such as ``terrorism,'' and
``transnational crime'' consistently with United States, European
Union, and international norms. A data retention period acceptable for
U.S. security purposes is maintained, with additional safeguards to
ensure privacy and data protection. The new agreement will require
travel information to be transmitted to DHS with greater lead time than
provided for in the 2007 Agreement, and thus will provide for greater
analysis earlier in the passenger travel life-cycle. It also provides
for a new method of data transmission (``real-time'' push). By
restricting data transmission to the minimum necessary while ensuring
data accuracy, the real-time push method of sharing data will enhance
security and privacy protection at the same time. Lastly, the new
agreement will expand opportunities for police and judicial cooperation
between the U.S. and E.U. authorities.
I want to thank this committee for its interest and support in our
negotiations with the European Union. With the conclusion of PNR
negotiations with the European Commission and, we hope, forthcoming
signature and then support from the European Parliament, the United
States and European Union will have made progress in strengthening the
previous PNR Agreement from a privacy and security perspective. Success
will be the result of 9 months of intense negotiations and build off 9
years of dialogue on how best to facilitate safe transatlantic travel
and protect individual privacy.
By all accounts, the new text is stronger than the 2007 Agreement;
it addresses all E.U. concerns raised with the U.S. negotiating team,
while also preserving and in some cases improving critical U.S.
operational interests. We must build on our historic relationship,
values, and interests, as we seek action by the European Commission,
the European Council, and the European Parliament to finally conclude
this PNR Agreement, which is without a doubt better for enhanced
security, as well as for improved data and privacy protections.
conclusion
Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Speier, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee, we look forward to working with you as we explore
opportunities to advance our cooperation with our European partners to
counter terrorism and transnational crime. Thank you again for this
opportunity to testify. My colleagues and I are happy to answer your
questions.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Mr. Heyman, for your testimony and
for your good work and service in your current position.
Next, the Chairman would like to recognize Ms. Mary Ellen
Callahan, who was appointed the chief privacy officer and chief
freedom of information officer by DHS Secretary Napolitano in
March 2009.
In her role as chief privacy officer, Ms. Callahan is
responsible for evaluating Department-wide programs, systems,
technologies, and rulemakings for potential privacy impacts,
and for providing mitigation strategies to reduce any privacy
impact.
She and her staff have extensive expertise in privacy laws
both domestic and international that help inform privacy policy
development both within the Department and in collaboration
with the rest of the Federal Government.
Prior to joining DHS, Ms. Callahan was a partner with the
law firm of Hogan & Hartson where she specialized in privacy
and data security law.
In 2011, Ms. Callahan received the Federal 100 award which
recognizes individuals in Government and industry that make
significant contributions to the Federal I.T. community.
I now recognize Ms. Callahan to testify for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MARY ELLEN CALLAHAN, CHIEF PRIVACY OFFICER, THE
PRIVACY OFFICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Callahan. Thank you very much.
Good morning, Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Speier, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee.
My name is Mary Ellen Callahan. I am the chief privacy
officer at the Department of Homeland Security.
As the Chairman acknowledged in his introduction, I am
responsible for evaluating Department-wide programs, systems,
and technology for potential privacy impacts including the
Department's use of passenger name records--and I will take
your cue and call it PNR--through Customs and Border
Protection's Automated Targeting System. I will also refer to
this as ATS.
DHS provides privacy protections and strict safeguards over
PNR data. DHS ensures its compliance with stringent standards
of privacy and security in the collection of use of PNR.
DHS applies fair information practice principles to its
collection and use of PNR including data integrity, data
security, purpose specification, auditing and accountability,
individual access, and redress--the principles which I will
detail in my testimony this morning.
Moreover, the Department is firmly committed to
transparency when it comes to informing our partners and the
public about its mission, including how we use and safeguard
personally identifiable information such as PNR data.
My office has managed three internal audits of DHS' use of
PNR data and coordinated two joint reviews with the European
Union since 2004. For example, when preparing for the joint
review that took place in February 2010, the DHS privacy office
spent approximately 10 weeks of employee time analyzing and
assessing DHS collection and use of PNR data, and published two
reports totaling 65 pages related to that assessment.
My staff conducted multiple interviews, reviewed the PNR
data use in sharing audit trails, and SOPs for ATS.
We also reviewed the logs in ATS associated with whether
sensitive data had ever been accessed by DHS. It had never been
accessed.
Through these two joint PNR reviews, the DHS privacy office
found, and the European Union acknowledged, that there has not
been a single privacy incident or data breach involving the
unauthorized use of PNR data.
These public compliance reviews conducted by my office
confirm the original intent of the data collection, and provide
public assurance that the information is being used for the
purposes for which it had been collected. The pattern-based
rules that are referred to in our written testimony, that DHS
employees are also subject to my review, as well as that of the
officer for civil rights and civil liberties, and the Office of
General Counsel.
On a quarterly basis, we review these pattern-based rules,
the underlying intelligence that supports the rules, and the
impact effectiveness and efficacy of the rules themselves.
This periodic oversight and review allows DHS to perform
its border security task in a privacy-protective way.
In addition to my statutory authorities related to privacy
compliance, the DHS privacy office is involved in data
governance and information sharing in the Department through
the chief information officer and his counsels, departmental
compliance with FISMA, I.T. budget review, and the information
sharing and governance board.
This type of integrated, ex-anti and ex-post assessment and
review by the DHS privacy office is one of the virtues of the
senior position my office has within the Department, with
visibility and oversight through the data life-cycles of DHS
programs, systems, and technologies.
As the committee knows, I have had the pleasure of serving
as the Department's chief FOIA officer as well. One of the ways
the Department supports the privacy fair information practice
of individual participation is to provide travelers with
multiple opportunities for access and redress.
FOIA applies equally to U.S. citizens and non-U.S.
citizens. Anyone can request their PNR directly from DHS. DHS
receives and answers these types of requests routinely. Based
on a recommendation by the European Commission in the 2010
review, we now track that number discretely.
Since April 2011, DHS has received approximately 220,000
FOIA requests from around the world. In that same time period,
we have received 69 FOIA requests from travelers seeking their
PNR records.
If a traveler seeks to change or delete information
contained in his or her PNR, they can submit a request to DHS
and changes deemed appropriate will be made. The administrative
appeals through my office are also available.
This existing opportunity was strengthened through the
Department record amendment policy that was released earlier
this year.
Furthermore, U.S. citizens and non-U.S. citizens alike have
access to the DHS traveler redress inquiry program to resolve
travel-related inquiries such as the use of PNR.
In sum, the DHS' collection and use of PNR, and my office's
involvement throughout the PNR life-cycle, demonstrates the
Department's commitment to embedding privacy principles within
the Department's operations.
I look forward to your questions, sir.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Ms. Callahan.
Last, let me turn to Mr. Thomas Bush, the executive
director of automation and targeting for the Customs and Border
Protection Office of Intelligence and Investigative Liaison.
Mr. Bush and his staff are responsible for assessing and
reporting the threats that the United States Customs and Border
Patrol faces through research, evaluation, and dissemination of
trend analysis, intelligence alerts, and assessments.
Mr. Bush began his career as a program analyst for the
Department of Defense strategic defense initiative and entered
the United States customs service in 1994.
In 2006 Mr. Bush joined the Office of Antiterrorism where
he acted as executive director prior to the establishment of
the Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination in 2007.
His numerous honors include the 1998 Commissioner's Unit
Citation Award and the 2003 Commissioner's Annual Award for
Innovation, and the 2008 Secretary's Award for Excellence.
I now recognize Mr. Bush to testify for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bush.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS BUSH, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF AUTOMATION AND
TARGETING OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATIVE LIAISON,
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION
Mr. Bush. Good morning Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member
Speier, distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank you
for this opportunity to provide background on PNR today.
PNR is the data that an airline receives from travelers to
book and manage their reservations. This can include the
traveler's itinerary, payment method, and contact information.
It is one of our most important tools in the on-going fight
against terrorism, as well as narcotics smuggling, human
trafficking, and other transnational crime.
I will address how we get this data, how we use it, and how
it has helped us in the past.
CBPs predecessors, the U.S. Customs Service and the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, began receiving PNR
data from commercial airlines on a voluntary basis in the early
1990s. The carriers recognize that working closely with U.S.
law enforcement to intercept high-risk travelers would in turn
yield benefit for enhanced security on their flights.
Shortly after September 11, 2001, Congress began mandating
that the airlines provide PNR to U.S. Customs Service, now CBP.
Since then, CBP has had electronic access to the PNR data of
every airline with an electronic reservation system operating
international flights to and from the United States.
I would also like to add that CBP works closely with our
partners in the Department of Homeland Security's oversight
offices, the chief privacy officer, and the civil rights and
civil liberties officer to ensure transparency in how we use
PNR at CBP.
We also have established clear guidelines for our officers
and what they can and cannot do with the data. Not every
employee in CBP needs to have access to PNR, but those that do
respect PNR as a powerful tool in their decision-making
process.
CBP maintains PNR in our automated targeting system or ATS.
The system parses the data into discrete elements, analyzing it
in conjunction with other DHS traveler holdings. This allows
CBP officers and analysts to use a variety of information, to
identify those travelers posing the highest risk before they
board airplanes overseas.
CBP officers and analysts use PNR in conjunction with other
data and law enforcement intelligence information to establish
risk-based scenarios for the interception of previously unknown
high-risk subjects--in other words, those not on the watch
list. These scenarios, or pattern-based rules, allow officers
to make faster and better-informed decisions about which
travelers to interview and secondary examination.
PNR data is also useful to trend analysis. It is unique and
it allows CBP to see a traveler's full itinerary and contact
information such as phone numbers and e-mail address. This can
be very powerful in establishing connections with other
travelers who may arrive from different locations or different
times, and who may appear to be otherwise unconnected.
I will cover a few of our success stories.
One important example of it is the case of Najibullah Zazi.
You may recall Zazi as the al-Qaeda-trained operative who
planned to explode improvised explosive devices in New York
City's subway system.
Using PNR data, DHS and CBP worked closely with the FBI to
cross-check the names of his co-travelers against open
counterterrorism cases inside the United States, and determined
his co-travelers were being trained during the same trips to
Pakistan in the same training camps.
Zazi was arrested on September 19, 2009 and the information
from his PNR records were used in his questioning and his
indictment. Zazi pled guilty in February 2010.
Another example of CBP's ability to fully leverage PNR
holdings--specifically about those we have very little
information or those we call the unknowns.
Law enforcement intelligence information implicated a
specific person in the plotting of the 2008 Mumbai attacks as
well as the possible attacks against a Danish newspaper office.
Starting with the very common first name, David, a partial
travel itinerary, and a very vague travel time frame, CBP was
able to review its PNR data in connection with other DHS
databases.
Within 24 hours CBP was able to provide the FBI with the
person's full name, address, passport number, travel history,
and other information useful to law enforcement pursuing him.
You may know that person as David Headley who pled guilty in
March 2010.
A third example of how CBP's use of PNR and has been
successful also demonstrates when we receive the data.
In the case of Faisal Shahzad, who attempted to use the car
bomb in Times Square in May 2010, CBP used PNR in the first
place to target him on his flight returning from Pakistan. It
was also used to intercept him when he tried to flee the plot
after it was unsuccessful.
After a stay in Pakistan, in which was later determined
Shahzad underwent terrorist training, Shahzad arrived in the
United States and was flagged for screening based on
information in his PNR. CBP conducted an examination and
released him after finding no reason to further detain him.
After the failed attack, the FBI, in coordination with DHS,
learned of Shahzad's identity from a phone number in his
attempt to purchase the car that was linked to the PNR data,
and our reporting on that examination.
Based on previous information, CBP created travel lookouts
on Shahzad which enabled us to intercept him before he
hurriedly booked his PNR in an attempt to leave the United
States on a flight out of JFK.
Shahzad confessed and was sentenced to life prison in June
2010.
Two other examples that are in human smuggling are cases in
Korea of sex trade--they also were connected to Sri Lanka. PNR
was used for us to target the travel routes and the travel
agencies used by those perpetrators in November 2009.
A separate human smuggling case working with Interpol, we
were able to use PNR data to detect payment address information
and e-mail information that connected to Eastern European human
smuggling cases. This was in August 2009.
PNR uniquely and solely provides CBP with the ability to
identify the true point of origin for travel. Without it CBP
often mistakes the origin of travel at that last point of
departure to the United States--take an example for Heathrow
versus an originating travel in Pakistan.
PNR also allows CBP to see all the stops along the way.
PNR also affords CBP the opportunity to determine
suspicious booking and payment methods such as last-minute
ticket purchase, cash tickets, or one-way tickets.
Mr. Meehan. Mr. Bush, can I ask you--these are all good
things and perhaps these are some of the things you can develop
for us in your testimony.
Do you have a closing observation for your direct
testimony?
Mr. Bush. Other than I just noticed I was over. I
apologize.
Mr. Meehan. I can see you----
Mr. Bush. Part of the excitement.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Meehan. It does. It is interesting stuff.
Particularly, you are getting a chance to layout your
trophy case and I think it is a significant record.
I want to thank each of you for your testimony here.
First, how inherently important it is because the record
demonstrates the things that have been accomplished by virtue
of the work that has been done with PNR.
Second as you have testified here today, each of you in
different parts there is a lot of work that has gone into
protecting the integrity of this information, and the audits
have shown that we haven't had violations.
With that premise, we really do want to find the balance of
assuring privacy while protecting the safety of Americans
traveling.
So, Mr. Heyman, let me start with you because this is the
kind of a thing that if you aren't close to it and you drill
down to it, you know, just the terminology can overwhelm you.
Effectively, what kind of information are we using when we
are engaged with PNR?
Isn't it in many ways the kind of information that the
people should have an expectation that they are already
currently sharing? It is just using that information in a more
effective manner than we have in the past.
Mr. Heyman. Thank you, Chairman.
You are absolutely right. The balancing act that we have
sought to accomplish, and I think frankly effectively have, is
the balance that says passengers have a right to privacy and
protection of their civil liberties and personal information.
But when they get on the airplane they also have a right to
know their Government is doing everything they can to make sure
that that flight is going to be safe. We do that through a
number of different things that I have outlined, but included
and most important, the PNR record.
The PNR record is basically the information that you
provide an air carrier when you book a travel plan. So it is
your seat number. It is your destination. It is your routing.
It is perhaps how you purchased the ticket. There are about
19 types of fields that are included and include personal
information such as your name and----
Mr. Meehan. But not inherently private information per se,
right?
Mr. Heyman. Well, I will let my privacy officer speak to
the specifics about how privacy is accounted for. But it is
information that you share with the airlines and then they
share it with the Government for the purposes of the evaluation
about whether an individual presents a risk getting on that
aircraft.
We take that responsibility quite seriously. We have data
protection for ensuring that only the information of those 19
fields are preserved.
The specifics about sensitive information that people are
concerned about, we do not use that. It is our policy not to
use sensitive information----
Mr. Meehan. Well, let me drill down to that for a moment
because that is the essence of what we are really talking
about, I think.
We have demonstrated over a course of period of time the
effectiveness of PNR and the importance that it plays. You have
also been able to create a record in which it has withstood
scrutiny up to this point in time.
So what is really at play here with the European Union now
coming back and challenging what has been a program which I am
presuming has not only worked effectively, but my assumption is
you developed more fields of information that its effectiveness
only grows?
Mr. Heyman. Well, that is a great question.
What is at play? There is a lot of play here, some of it
having to do with institutional reform in Europe post-Lisbon
where the parliament now has a responsibility for approving
agreement.
Previously the pathway to an agreement with the United
States would be the commission negotiates an agreement and
member states sign off on it. Now, the parliament also must
vote on it. Seven-hundred-plus members of the European
parliament will vote thumbs up or thumbs down.
Parliament for the last decade or so has made past
resolutions in Europe requesting and urging the commission to
provide more for data protection on these types of information-
sharing agreements.
Now that they have an opportunity to vote up or down in
this past year, they requested that the commission come back to
the United States and seek a renegotiation of the----
Mr. Meehan. The point of it is, individually many of these
member nations have not only appreciated the significance of
the protections afforded to safety, but they have agreed and
participated with you in the zones of information that should
be shared. Is that right?
Mr. Heyman. In fact, yes. I believe it is 23 or 24 of the
27 member states ratified the 2007 or re-passed the 2007
agreement.
Mr. Meehan. Do we share information with them in a return
capacity because there are people that fly through airlines
that either go through the United States or from the United
States to their countries?
Mr. Heyman. Yes. We may on a case-by-case basis share
information. At this point the Europeans as a group don't have
a PNR system. They proposed one which may take several years to
stand up. Some member states--the Brits in particular--have
begun to stand up their own PNR system in which case we would
have that type of exchange.
Mr. Meehan. Well----
Mr. Heyman. Protected also--protected with the same data
protection and privacy protections that we seek in our own
agreements.
Mr. Meehan. My time has expired for now. But I know that
there is an interest in the broad spectrum that all of us
will--have to share.
So I turn it over to the Ranking Member, Ms. Speier.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
So let me follow up on the Chairman's questioning.
Does the 2007 agreement stay in place pending the
negotiations on the 2011 agreement?
Mr. Heyman. Yes, it is provisionally in effect.
Ms. Speier. All right. We prefer the 2007 agreement to the
2011 agreement?
Mr. Heyman. Well, let me just give a little background on--
Secretary Napolitano, when she agreed to renegotiate the
agreement, agreed with two fundamental principles that we must
adhere to. The members here are part of the negotiating team
here--your witnesses.
So No. 1, she directed us that we have to maintain the same
operational effectiveness as 2007. So there is no degradation
in existing operational capabilities. The 2007 agreement
provides us with exceptional operational capability.
No. 2, that a new text must permit additional security
enhancements where necessary or appropriate, so we have been
given guidelines or direction that we will have no degradation
and operational----
Ms. Speier. Mr. Heyman, excuse me for interrupting.
I am trying to get to what the crux of the issue is with
the 2011 agreement.
Would you say that the expectation of the European Union to
have greater privacy protections is what is stalling the
negotiations?
Mr. Heyman. The Europeans seek--what has stalled--the
negotiations have proceeded as directly as we can. We concluded
what we believe is a good text in May this past year.
They have a number of institutional hoops that they must go
through. The commission must now get the member states onboard.
The member states then pass it, and they have to give it to the
parliament. There are some institutional things that must get
accomplished.
But as far as we are concerned with perhaps a couple of
other discussions, we are pretty much satisfied with the text
as created in May 2011.
Ms. Speier. So there are no disputes pending?
Mr. Heyman. The Europeans have to go through their own
institutional requirements, and so there is still discussions
going on.
Ms. Speier. Okay. Can you just tell me if there is anything
outstanding?
Mr. Heyman. From the European side there are, yes.
Ms. Speier. Okay. What are they?
Mr. Heyman. The Europeans have a legal opinion that has
been put forward by the commission that says that the May text
that was leaked to the public is not proportionate, which is a
standard by which data protection and data use must be adhered
to.
So, they are working through that challenge right now. We
are open to hearing their proposals for how to fix that
problem.
But it is on the European side.
Ms. Speier. What do you mean by proportional?
Mr. Heyman. So--why don't you----
Ms. Callahan. The proportionality is a concept that is in
the European law particularly vis-a-vis the member states to
the European Union. It is one that has been incorporated into
the data protection or privacy directive of 1995.
Proportionality is actually a concept that has multiple
meanings within Europe. One meaning is you should only take the
information that you need in order to do your job. So the
number of fields that you collect from the airline, the 19
fields that Mr. Heyman spoke about.
Another concept of proportionality that we have heard
discussed is that you only collect information from the people
that you need to collect the information from. From, for
example, the bad guys, from the criminals.
Now that of course, as Mr. Bush elaborated on we don't know
who all the bad guys are. We have unknown terrorists out there,
and so that is not necessarily possible.
Then there is proportionality in terms of the scope of the
enforcement and the application.
Each time we talk about proportionality, we hear a
different definition. So the definition in European Union law
is quite broad, which is why to say that the, ``agreement'' is
not proportionate is difficult to pin down in terms of how to--
--
Ms. Speier. Okay.
What are the 19 fields? Can someone just rattle those off
for us?
Ms. Callahan. Mr. Bush.
Mr. Bush. I can try to do most of them, ma'am, and get
you----
Ms. Speier. All right. I have got 30 seconds so----
Mr. Bush. Travel itinerary, which covers a few of the 19
fields: Name, date of birth, payment information, e-mail
address, phone number. If you have associates, co-travelers on
your ticket, you are sharing, travel agency, travel agency
address.
Ms. Callahan. Co-chair.
Mr. Bush. Co-chair if it splits. So if United needs to
share with another airline as an example. I think that covers--
bags and seat assignment.
Ms. Speier. All right, thank you.
Mr. Bush. We can get you the full details.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Ms. Speier.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentlelady from California,
Ms. Hahn.
Ms. Hahn. Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Speier, this has
been a very interesting hearing. Thank you for your testimony.
It is certainly--and, you know, I have a statement that I
can enter into the record. I won't give it now.
But clearly PNR is an important tool that I think we use in
this country to clearly, as was stated, to connect the dots. I
guess the key is making sure we have the right dots, and then
the real work begins on connecting those dots.
But we have certainly had some pretty impressive success
stories to tell which I think is important.
You know, reading some of the background materials, I think
the real problem is parliament. You know, when you read some of
the quotes from the members of parliament, they are the ones
that look like they could very well veto this or block it.
It doesn't seem like there is some real instances of abuse
that they can point to after we have collected this
information. But it is just a basic overall belief that data
collection has sort of gotten to an extreme, and privacy, just
on that basis, for them it sounds like to be violated.
So I think that is going to be the real issue--is their
parliament.
You know, one of the things--you know, my district in
California borders Los Angeles International Airport. It also
borders the Port of Los Angeles.
Now, I am wondering--you know, the airport police in many
of our airports in this country, certainly are sort of a
separate law enforcement agency. I am wondering how this
information is communicated to our airport police and vice
versa--our airport police, agencies across this country in an
information-sharing loop with the Department?
The other thing I was certainly wondering, it is always my
concern is I think our real vulnerable points of entry into
this country are our sea ports.
Wondering, does this also include--does the PNR also
include passengers who would be coming into this country
through cruise ships, for instance? Is that an area of concern?
Because it is for me, and wondering where we are in really
looking at information for those who come into this country on,
you know, some major cruise ships certainly from Europe--so
just kind of two questions.
Mr. Heyman. Thank you, Congresswoman.
Let me say that first of all in the broader context, also
to the Ranking Member's question, that we are satisfied with
the text as we have negotiated and look forward to the
commission advancing that to the council for approval. We look
forward to the council approving it and giving it to the
parliament and voting positively on that.
In terms of a law enforcement cooperation, we have added
into the new text some ability to facilitate greater
cooperation in law enforcement. But as it pertains to U.S. law
enforcement, the provisions that would be most important really
apply to our Federal law officials.
When somebody gets off an airplane from another country
they go through customs and borders. So the information PNR
records are evaluated in advance of arrival, as is other
information so that if there is additional screening that is
required, our customs officials take that into account.
Then the third point, on sea ports, we do look at PNR for
people coming in to our ports.
Ms. Hahn. Is it as extensive as--are we connecting the dots
as much in that area, do you believe?
Mr. Bush. PNR as an industry tool is not as well-developed
in the sea environment, but we do have the same ability to
connect the dots and do run the same pattern-based rules and
use the automated targeting system on cruise ships.
Ms. Hahn. I just want to go on record to say, again, my
concern will always be on this committee as well as Homeland
Security Committee--I mean, on the subcommittee, is that our
sea ports, I believe are still an extremely vulnerable entry
way into this country, both with cargo and with passengers.
I just want to go on record saying that.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Ms. Hahn.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentlelady from New York,
Ms. Hochul.
Ms. Hochul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member.
My district is on the border of Canada. What standards are
in place with respect to airlines that come in from Europe,
stop in Toronto and continue to the United States?
We have a different set of standards for Canadian and
Mexican-originated flights versus what is considered at the
European Union or identical standards.
You can just enlighten me a little bit on that before I ask
my next question.
Mr. Heyman. We have the same standards and requirements for
all of those flights. The secure flight program that the
Department of Homeland Security put in place also requires
information are provided for all the flights.
So, if a flight were to go to Canada but not to the United
States, we would still be able to do the risk assessment for
U.S. security.
Ms. Hochul. Have any of our other partner nations outside
the European Union raised any privacy concerns or any issues or
is this it?
Ms. Callahan. With regard to privacy concerns and the use
of passenger name records, it has exclusively been a
conversation with the European Union.
Mr. Heyman. Let me elaborate.
Actually, there are 250 some-odd last points of departure
where we require, because of Congressional law, passenger name
records to be provided in advance of a flight.
Some of those are in Europe, but the bulk of them are
outside of Europe. The European agreement is the only one that
we have for that.
Ms. Hochul. If we are not successful in negotiating this
agreement with the European Union, what is the effect?
The 2007 agreement stays in effect until 2014? Is that how
it is?
Okay. So we are not bumping up against a wall just yet. You
are just having these negotiations at the stage that we are not
under the gun. We are not going to have this program suspended
any time soon, correct?
Mr. Heyman. That is correct. The Europeans have said that
the agreement is provisionally in effect until negotiations are
concluded.
Ms. Hochul. I know that some have suggested that we suspend
the visa waiver program for European countries if we are unable
to negotiate, that. Given that about 16 million people come in
from Europe to our country, do you think you could handle that
additional workload if that would be the case?
Yes. I didn't think so.
[Laughter.]
Ms. Hochul. What would be the effect?
Would that compromise the program we have in place with the
additional workload? What is your opinion?
Mr. Heyman. Actually, first of all it would be terrific if
we were to expand our trade-travel opportunity for people who
come to the United States. I think it would be a good
investment in America. So I think it is a positive step in the
right direction.
I don't have the technical specifications in terms of our
data analysis capabilities. That is why I was looking over to
Tom.
But I suspect first of all this would be ramped up over a
period of time, and so we would in fact be able to match the
increase if there was a need.
But right now, I think we have the capacity for additional
expansions. Is that right?
Ms. Hochul. I am very pleased with how this program is
working. But how often do you get the situation where you do
get someone who is innocent or has the same name, who has to go
through additional scrutiny.
Are you able to quickly correct those?
I know you talked about the people who can file the FOIA
request and they can correct their record. Early stories were
not that simple.
I mean people from my district, it took a long time to get
themselves off the list just because I have a community--the
Yemenites in my community, others were getting more trouble.
Again, I am supporting what you do. I don't want to
compromise the heart of your program.
But I just want to make sure--you said you have made
progress in having people removed from that list who have the
same name, but have no other reason to be tracking them or
giving them additional secondary or additional screening.
Ms. Callahan. DHS takes the issue of providing people
appropriate redress and opportunities. The traveler redress
inquiry program, I mentioned briefly in my oral statement, has
really helped to assist to have a Department-wide process.
For example, you may think that you had a problem at the
border because it was a passenger name record issue. But indeed
it was something unrelated, therefore they transitioned it.
That has shown great improvement in that we do think that
is effective in getting innocent people to have appropriate
redress.
Ms. Hochul. Okay. Thank you very much.
I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Speier. Mr. Chairman, I would like to request unanimous
consent that the gentlewoman from Texas, the Ranking Member on
the subcommittee on transportation security, Congresswoman
Jackson Lee, be allowed to participate in this hearing.
Mr. Meehan. Without objection, so ordered.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentlelady from Texas, Ms.
Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. First order of business is to thank you
for your courtesies and to acknowledge the importance of this
hearing to the Ranking Member and Chairman, and express my
interest because of the subcommittee that I have been involved
in as it relates to this important issue.
So, I would like to just--well, first of all welcome the
witnesses and ask maybe a question that has already been asked.
We know that--though may not be directly related but we
know that travel has generated, by a number of culprits,
incidences that have harmed the homeland, from the shoe bomber
to the trial that is going on in Detroit as we speak that was a
traveler and decided to use methods that we had not confronted
in the past.
So I guess I am going to ask this general question in
helping us in transportation security--since we deal with the
international travel as well. Focusing mainly on passenger
travel--is the kind of framework that we see going forward in
the 21st Century, and the climate that we are in, and where we
are seeing individual actors--I consider terrorism now a
franchise.
There is no battalion that shows up at your doorstep, maybe
just an individual.
How do we pierce that?
Do we pierce that veil with the human resource intelligence
or do we need more armor?
Do we need more armor and intelligence at the gateway? In
this instance, I am talking about planes, though I know that
trains are in the eye of the storm too. But is it more of a
focus on human resource or human intelligence rather?
If I could get that answer from all three of the witnesses,
please.
Mr. Heyman. Thank you, Congresswoman. That is really one of
the most important questions, is: How do we look forward in the
21st Century to securing air travel and travel in general?
The Department of Homeland Security takes this issue very
seriously. We have put in place over the last decade, I think,
an approach which attempts to achieve exactly what you have set
forth.
No. 1, we have to have multiple layers from the
authorization of travel visas, ESTAs, Advanced Electronics
Travel Authorization. That needs to be scrutinized.
From the decision to book travel, PNR records and the other
pre-travel engagement that a traveler makes, we can do scrutiny
there.
Checkpoints at the airports is another layer. When a person
gets on an aircraft we have security on planes. Then before
they get to the United States there is additional scrutiny.
So we have a number of layers of defense that we have put
in place to ensure that we prohibit, and prevent, and detect
those who seek to do harm from even getting on a plane to begin
with. That is with a system that Congress has helped put
together through a number of laws and appropriations over the
last decade.
I think the PNR system that we have now have been
discussing today plays a central role in that.
It allows for us to do not just detection of those who are
known or suspected terrorists by going up against the--matching
against the watch list that we have, the terrorist database.
But allows through certain analysis to detect those who may be
unknown to us, but exhibit certain behavior that can allow us
to then prevent them from getting on a plane or doing
additional screening at a time, so a number of different
layers.
Information sharing is critical to that and so that is why
we are having the negotiations and having relationships with
third parties and other countries to ensure that we have that
information exchanged.
Ms. Jackson Lee. There is only a little bit more time.
Maybe in your answer you would also include whether we are
invading a person's privacy on the behavioral aspect, but I
think you are talking about utilizing as well.
Ms. Callahan. So, I can take that one up, ma'am.
With regard to information sharing, with regard to
screening at the border, I think that we have done--the
developments in the past decade have been extraordinary.
But at the same time what has been important is the
Department has included privacy protections as they develop
these programs. I think that that is crucial for going forward.
Mr. Bush. Yes, ma'am. I think you hit it on--right away the
difference between the intelligence and information sharing and
the need for the armor. I think both have to come in.
Obviously with the increasing attempted acts of terror by
those not on the watch list really stresses the need for the
intelligence information sharing within the Federal Government,
but also with our foreign partners.
But once we identified a likely suspect, how can we then
detect if they have something on them or attempting to get on a
plane are two equally challenging areas.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Ms. Jackson Lee.
I have a couple of follow-up questions. I will certainly
open the courtesy to the other Members of the committee who are
here today if they would so like.
But may I ask--well first, I want to follow up with what
the gentlelady just said. The two important points, that
aviation continues to be an area that is targeted to be sure,
and the, you know, the concern we have that individuals will
try to exploit that.
But, Ms. Callahan, there has already been a great deal of
work that has been done in terms of protecting the privacy of
information as we move along. This has been part of the DHS
mission. We constantly move forward and seek information.
Oftentimes there is not enough attention paid to what we
are doing with that information behind us or assuring that
there are protections that are done. I think simply the fact
that we are having this hearing identifies Congress'
appreciation and desire to participate in this.
As I have researched this and looked at this particular
issue, there is something called fair information practice
principles and other standards that are in place.
Could you explain to us just what they are and how they
help to secure the privacy of individuals both within the
United States and outside?
Ms. Callahan. Absolutely.
Absolutely, sir, thank you for that question.
The fair information practice principles are core elements
of essentially all privacy laws throughout the world that has
privacy laws. A basis of it was originally in the Privacy Act
of 1974 which was the first National privacy act in the world.
It is also embedded in the OECD Privacy Principles of 1980
which, of course, is the genesis for both the European privacy
law as well as the U.S. law.
The Department of Homeland Security embeds the Fair
Information Practice Principles, or the FIPPs within each of
its activities associated with programs, technologies, systems,
and information sharing. That is what my office does.
The Fair Information Practice Principles include
transparency, individual participation, purpose limitation,
data security, data usage, access auditing and accountability,
and redress.
All of those elements are important cornerstones that I
tried to address in my oral testimony to explain how PNR is an
example of the Fair Information Practice Principles as
implemented.
Mr. Meehan. Can you give me an example of one of those and
how that serves as a check against the abuse of that
information?
Ms. Callahan. Well, one of the points that the Ranking
Member had said is wanting to be more clear with what we are
doing with information.
We have tried to be very transparent with the passenger
name records and what we are doing. I look forward to any other
opportunities to discuss it in order to do that.
In addition, for example, the purpose limitation, to make
sure that we are using passenger name records for terrorism,
transnational serious crimes, as well as to identify
individuals with whom we may want to have more border security
to not have the potential for mission creep for example.
Those are important elements and that is what my three
audits that are available in my website all show that we are
indeed adhering to the principles that we said we would when we
first set up the program. That is a very important part of the
Department.
Mr. Meehan. One of the principles you identified was
redress which allows an individual to challenge the information
that is in there. So there is already, as I understand it under
the FOIA, of the ability to obtain your own record and to
request that there be changes in inaccurate information with
respect to your own record.
Did I understand your testimony correctly that there are
some 220,000 foreign requests for FOIA?
Ms. Callahan. Let me clarify. Two hundred and twenty
thousand FOIA requests that we received from across the world.
Of those we received them from 100-plus countries. But in terms
of proportion, I can't tell you the proportion whether they are
U.S. citizens here in the United States or also overseas.
Mr. Meehan. Oh, but that may include U.S. citizens----
Ms. Callahan. It absolutely does include U.S. citizens.
Mr. Meehan. But that would be an important thing. I mean, I
don't know that I need you to do this just to do it.
But if there is some way to analyze and identify the
breakdown that may be relevant to this question, I would like
to know if we are seeing a disproportionate amount of requests
from foreign nations.
Ms. Callahan. The majority--about 75 percent of the FOIAs
that we receive actually go to citizenship and immigration
services associated with alien files, with their immigration
records to obtain information about that.
Mr. Meehan. That may be relevant to their interest in
trying to obtain citizenship or other kinds of benefits.
Ms. Callahan. Exactly.
So I can tell you that that is where the majority of the
requests come in. But a lot of those people are also
naturalized U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents who are
seeking their information.
With regard to PNR, I can give you the breakdown for the
69----
Mr. Meehan. I just wanted to see if there was a dramatic
imbalance for some particular reason.
This last issue----
Ms. Callahan. There doesn't appear to be----
Mr. Meehan. But the redress is sufficient. Or I am seeing
some concerns that somehow we should open up the courts for
further redress in some--what is your position on that?
Ms. Callahan. As I mentioned earlier, the traveler redress
inquiry program that DHS has stood up is designed to be a one-
stop shop available on-line to multiple individuals regardless
of where you are and for free.
I think it is a very efficient and effective process that
140,000 people have already sought redress through.
With that said, the European standard thinks that a
judicial redress opportunity would be one that would be better.
If you go through a TRIP, you actually have the opportunity
to go to court to challenge it. So therefore, I think that to
request judicial redress, particularly with the use of PNR, it
is probably not necessary because it already is available in
the U.S. system.
Mr. Meehan. Right.
Well, thank you. My time has expired.
I will now turn it over to the Ranking Member for any
further questions she may have.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Along those same lines, Ms. Callahan, of the 69 requests
that you have had for redress, could you make the specifics of
those cases or a handful of those cases available to the
Chairman and the committee so that we can see what it is they
are objecting--I would like to get a better sense of what the
concern is.
Because based on the 19 fields that you just listed--and I
am a privacy queen. I mean, I have spent a good part of my
career trying to protect people's privacy.
I am not seeing where there is a potential even for abuse
based on the information that is being shared.
So, either you are taking this information and using it
with other information you get from other sources, which if you
are you need to explain that to us, or I am missing something.
Ms. Callahan. If I could clarify what the 69 requests were.
They are the request for FOIAs, so just to receive access
to their information. Of those 69 FOIA requests--so we don't
know if there is a redress problem with it per se.
Of those 69 requests, about half of them come from American
citizens who were seeking their own access. About a quarter of
them come from the European Union, Canada, and Mexico, and a
quarter come from the rest of the world. So it is just an
interesting breakdown to see how it evolved.
It originally was more heavily weighted towards Europeans,
but now we are getting more from the rest of the world.
With regard to the use and with regard to the access, as
Mr. Heyman and Mr. Bush noted, the fields that are being
provided are the fields that are being provided to an airline,
and therefore they don't inherently have sensitive information
in it.
With that said, it is commercial data that the United
States is acquiring as part of this Federal border security. So
I do think it is important to note that when the U.S.
Government acquires commercial information, we need to treat it
very carefully.
I think that that may be some of the reservations that
people think because it was originally a commercial
information, that that is the problem with it.
With that said, the protections that we had put in place, I
think, are very robust, very sufficient, and helped to
ameliorate that concern, but also help us protect our borders
in the ways that Mr. Bush described.
Ms. Speier. But do you take that information and overlay it
with other information you have within a database you have
internally?
Ms. Callahan. We do compare passenger name records with
other datasets that Mr. Heyman talked about including ESTA,
APIS--which is the Advanced Passenger Information System, the
terrorist screening database, and a few other data fields--and
criminal records as well. That is all disclosed in all of our
public documents.
Ms. Speier. A FOIA request by an individual would be able
to access that information that you have?
Ms. Callahan. If they asked for their passenger name
records, it would not have that because the information is
overlaid, compared, and then they go back to their separate
databases.
It is not stored in a unique setting. So it is not a
Federal record under FOIA.
With that that said they could ask for the information that
Customs and Border Protection utilizes in order to make the
border decisions. That is a way of having a broader aperture on
the FOIA.
Ms. Speier. Now, let us go back to the Shahzad case.
He went through a series of screenings, still got on the
plane. It was about to leave before he was apprehended.
So where were the failings in the existing system? What
kinds of changes have been made to make sure that doesn't
happen again?
Mr. Bush. I think the first improvement, ma'am, was the
increased watch list service out of the Terrorism Screening
Center.
It had previously taken up to 24 hours to get someone
watch-listed. That has now been streamlined and is real-time.
So the soonest he would have checked in his name would hit on
the watch list and I think it would have stopped there.
The second thing is the time of which PNR is being
submitted to the United States has intervals. It is not real-
time every time someone books a ticket or makes some changes.
You had asked earlier, I believe--I apologize, if it wasn't
you ma'am--the differences between this agreement and the
previous ones.
That is an example of an improvement. We are trying to get
any change to the PNR in real time. We are trying to explain
the value of that to the Europeans.
Ms. Speier. So does the European Union object to that?
Mr. Bush. I don't think they understand it yet to object to
it. I think they are still trying to understand does that mean
more data being provided, when we were saying if you originally
purchased your ticket and you only change it one time, well
then we don't need to have continual submissions of the same
PNR.
They are trying to understand that. I shouldn't say it is
an objection at this point, but I can defer.
Mr. Heyman. They are not objecting to it. I think they are
just trying to understand it.
It is a new concept, the idea of having real-time data. It
is--for data minimization, so it is good for privacy. It is
real-time accuracy, so it is good for data security--for
National security.
Ms. Speier. You know, for those in the European parliament
that appear to be objecting to this negotiated agreement, I
would argue that they are better served by this agreement than
by the agreement that we are operating under, which to your
perspective is broader and has less privacy protection.
So I am kind of mystified by their logic. But, I will leave
it at that.
I yield back.
Mr. Meehan. Mr. Heyman is not taking the bait.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Meehan. Ms. Hahn, do you have any follow-up questions?
All right, well, I want to express my deep appreciation. It
is a remarkable topic.
I don't think most of America woke up this morning thinking
that PNR was the first thing that was on their mind, but a few
of us did. It does show the importance. You have identified the
key role that this plays.
I also really appreciate the interest of the committee in
looking to assure that we are protecting the privacy interests
as well. I think that is similarly a mission for this
committee.
I thank you for the work that you are doing on both.
Just one following comment. Mr. Bush, we didn't get into
the work that you are doing not just with terrorism, but I am
impressed by the work that is done with human smuggling and
other kinds of things looking at the pattern activity, and do
believe that that is an area that we ought to keep working on.
So I want to thank the witnesses for their valuable
testimony, and the Members for their questions.
The Members of the committee might have some additional
questions for the witnesses, and we will ask that you respond
to those in writing. The hearing record will be open for 10
days.
So without objection, the committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]