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**THE SECURITY SITUATION ON THE
KOREAN PENINSULA**

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

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THE SECURITY SITUATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 28, 2012.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m. in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. "Buck" McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. "BUCK" MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COM- MITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. Committee will come to order. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

The House Armed Services Committee meets today to receive testimony about the security situation on the Korean Peninsula. Our witnesses are Dr. Peter Lavoy, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia and Pacific Security Affairs, and General James Thurman, Commander, U.S. Forces Korea.

This is our first opportunity to have a dedicated hearing on this topic, but I cannot think of a more opportune time. The President's new defense strategy underscores the importance of the larger Asia-Pacific theater. Northeast Asia is a dynamic region of key strategic importance to the global economy, regional stability, and U.S. national-security interests.

What is more, the coming year will bring a number of regional leadership transitions for North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia. And as some may have forgotten, the Korean war isn't officially over; the peninsula remains divided. It is home to one of our strongest allies and one of the world's most militaristic states.

In fact, although the North Korean regime is willing to starve its own citizens, it maintains the world's fourth-largest army. North Korea has more than 1 million Active Duty personnel and thousands of artillery systems, tanks, armored personnel carriers, aircraft, and surface combatants.

More than 70 percent of North Korea's combat power is positioned within 90 miles of the demilitarized zone. This puts our 280,000 troops and 24 million citizens of Seoul, the world's fourth-largest city, easily within the erratic regime's lethal reach.

Last month, the United States and North Korea announced that the regime would stop uranium enrichment and missile testing and allow international inspectors to return to North Korea's nuclear facility in exchange for nutritional aid.

But 2 weeks ago, North Korea said they would launch a long-range rocket into space in April, a clear violation of their agreement with the Administration. This is typical behavior shown by

the regime; a cycle of provocations and reconciliations designed to get what they want without giving up their nuclear weapons program. It has becoming clear that the same aggressive, reckless cycle will continue under the new North Korean dictator.

Although the Chinese and Russian governments publicly expressed concern about the planned missile launch, they have been unable or unwilling to bring their North Korean ally back to the negotiation table. Meanwhile, there are reports that North Korea and Iran are working together in the production of ballistic missiles.

In contrast, South Korea is a vibrant democratic nation that has one of the world's largest economies and contributes to global security.

Just a few days ago, South Korea hosted the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit. Our troops stationed in South Korea form the backbone of our mutual defense treaty, promote regional stability, and promote and protect U.S. national security and economic interests.

The readiness and posture of U.S. troops on the peninsula are key to stopping a dangerous regime from destabilizing the region with unwarranted attacks.

Dr. Lavoy and General Thurman, we look forward to your testimony shedding light on the range of security matters facing us on the Korean Peninsula, and are glad to have you with us here today.

Ranking Member Smith.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 35.]

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I concur completely in your opening remarks about the importance of the region, the importance of our alliance with South Korea, and the danger and the threat that North Korea poses to security in that region and, indeed, security in the world.

I thank General Thurman for his leadership and for all those who serve under him for their part in protecting South Korea and trying to maintain the peace in that very, very unstable region.

South Korea is an absolutely critical ally and partner in many ways. Our presence there builds and strengthens that relationship. We are, you know, pleased we passed the Korean Free Trade Agreement. My own state of Washington has a very strong Korean-American population that watches closely what goes on on the Korean Peninsula. So we appreciate your leadership and understand the incredible importance of this particular region of the world.

And obviously North Korea is about as unpredictable and dangerous actor as we have to deal with in the world today. So it is a complicated job to make sure that we maintain security there without rising too much to the provocations and without ignoring them at the same time. It is a delicate balance. We appreciate your work and your effort to do that.

I look forward to your testimony, particularly in talking about the proposed missile launch that North Korea is talking about doing in mid-April; how you see that playing out with other part-

ners in the region that we are working with to try to contain it; and in particular what you think about China and they role that they could play in trying to better contain North Korea.

Is that improving? Are they becoming any more cooperative in terms of working with us to try to make sure that North Korea stays under control? And no country in the region has greater power over North Korea than China, given North Korea's dependence upon China's support for energy and other issues. That is a critical part of it as well.

And as the chairman mentioned, the whole region is very important to our national security strategy, and a big piece of making sure that we make clear to those countries in Asia that we are a Pacific power and we will maintain a presence in the region; it is the role we play on the Korean Peninsula.

So I thank you for your leadership and for all you are doing to represent us well in that part of the world, and I look forward to your testimony.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 37.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Dr. Lavoy.

STATEMENT OF DR. PETER LAVOY, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (POLICY) FOR ASIA AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

Dr. LAVOY. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished Members of the committee, thank you for inviting us here today to discuss the security situation on the Korean Peninsula.

General Thurman shortly will provide a detailed assessment of the security landscape on the peninsula, and I will concentrate on our policy priorities relating to North and South Korea.

For over 60 years, the United States has maintained presence on the Korean Peninsula to deter aggression against the Republic of Korea and to fight and win should deterrence fail. We must never forget that more than 36,000 members of the U.S. military gave their lives in support of this mission during the Korean War.

Today the U.S.-Korean alliance continues to be a cornerstone of U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific region and, at its most basic level, the mission of our alliance remains the same today as it was 6 decades ago.

The Department of Defense's rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region, as laid out in the defense strategy guidance, is a reaffirmation of our commitment to our Korean ally and our mission on the Korean Peninsula.

As President Obama stated during a joint press conference with President Lee in Seoul 2 days ago, the United States, as a Pacific nation, will play a larger and long-term role in shaping the region and its future. And the cornerstone of our efforts is our strong alliances, including our alliance with the Republic of Korea.

We will continue to strengthen the U.S.-ROK [Republic of Korea] alliance, make our forces in Korea more efficient and effective, and enhance presence, power projection, and deterrence in the region.

North Korea's provocative behavior, large conventional military, proliferation activities, and pursuit of asymmetric advantages through its ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction program, including uranium enrichment, continue to present a serious threat to the United States, our allies, and the region as a whole.

It was almost 2 years ago that North Korea brazenly sank the ROK naval vessel *Cheonan*. That event, coupled with the unprovoked shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010, provides a reminder that Pyongyang is willing to utilize military capabilities with deadly consequences.

These incidents demonstrate that the United States and the ROK need to take further steps to bolster deterrence and preserve security. We are working closely with our ROK allies and armed forces to ensure that the responses to any future North Korean provocation are effective and appropriate and integrated into alliance plans, and conducted from an alliance perspective.

Furthermore, through our Extended Deterrence Policy Committee, we meet biannually to identify ways in which the full range of alliance capabilities, including conventional forces, missile defense, nuclear capabilities, strategy and doctrine can be leveraged to maximize deterrence.

The potential for a North Korean act of provocation in 2012 remains a major concern. The April 15th centennial celebration commemoration of Kim Il-sung's birth provides a milestone for North Korea to try to show it has become a strong and prosperous nation.

Kim Jong-un, in the process of consolidating power and establishing his legitimacy, perhaps through a provocative act or display of force, is a real possibility. The upcoming ROK parliamentary and presidential elections in April and December, respectively, are opportunities for Pyongyang to disrupt and potentially influence South Korean political outcomes.

Our suspicions about North Korea using its celebrations this year to enhance its missile program were confirmed when North Korea announced on March 16th that it plans to conduct a missile launch between April 12th and 16th.

This planned launch is highly provocative because it manifests North Korea's desire to test and expand its long-range missile capability.

In addition, the launch, if it occurs, would be in direct violation of Pyongyang's international obligations, including U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874, which prohibit North Korea from conducting any launches that use ballistic missile technology.

North Korea's announcement is also troublesome because only 2 weeks prior, in a February 29th statement after three rounds of bilateral talks, North Korea had agreed to implement a moratorium on long-range missile launches. During those discussions, the United States made it very clear that a satellite launch would be a deal-breaker.

Let me turn briefly, just—if you permit me one more minute—to South Korea. Over the last year, the United States and the ROK have sought to transform the alliance so that it remains viable not only for the security of the Korean Peninsula, but also regionally and globally.

We frequently consult and coordinate with our ROK counterparts across a variety of issues, with immediate focus being on preparation for the transfer of wartime operational control and the relocation of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula.

To ensure the alliance remains well positioned to promote peace and stability for decades to come, our two countries have a comprehensive plan under Strategic Alliance 2015 framework to transition wartime operational control from the U.S.–ROK Combined Forces Command to the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff by December 2015. This transition will enable the ROK to take the lead role in the defense of its nation while maintaining an enduring U.S. defense commitment and capability.

As part of that effort—and General Thurman will speak to this with more depth—we are working to consolidate and relocate U.S. forces from the north of Seoul and the Seoul metropolitan area to centralized locations south of Seoul.

The movement of units and facilities to areas south of the Han River improves efficiency, reduces costs, contributes to the political sustainability of our forward presence, and enhances force protection and survivability by placing the majority of personnel and equipment outside the effective range of North Korean artillery.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Lavoy can be found in the Appendix on page 38.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

General Thurman.

**STATEMENT OF GEN JAMES D. THURMAN, USA, COMMANDER,
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND, REPUBLIC OF KOREA—UNITED
STATES COMBINED FORCES COMMAND, AND UNITED
STATES FORCES KOREA**

General THURMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman McKeon, Congressman Smith, and distinguished Members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to update you on United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces Korea.

It is a great honor to lead the soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines serving our country in the Republic of Korea. And I thank the Members of this committee for their support for our warriors.

The relationship with South Korea is the finest military partnership I have experienced in my 37-year career. Together, our militaries deter aggression and maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. U.S. military presence in the Republic of Korea supports U.S. national interests and a key ally in Northeast Asia.

Since the United States and the Republic of Korea forged an alliance in battle over 60 years ago, the Republic of Korea has become a vibrant democracy, economic success and global security partner currently serving beside us in Afghanistan and off the Horn of Africa.

In stark contrast, one of the world's poorest, most closed, and most militarized countries, North Korea, lies less than 20 miles from the northern districts of Seoul, a city of over 24 million people. The change in North Korean leadership has led to a period of increased uncertainty on the Korean Peninsula.

The new leader appears to be following the same pattern of his late father and grandfather. Examples of this are North Korea's recent announcement of their intention to launch a satellite with a ballistic missile and their continued rhetoric denouncing both the Nuclear Security Summit and alliance military exercises. These actions are increasing tensions on the peninsula.

Additionally, North Korea continues to adhere to its military-first policy. They maintain the fourth-largest conventional military force in the world, the world's largest special operating force, and significant long-range artillery capabilities. Over 70 percent of their combat power is arrayed within 90 miles of the demilitarized zone.

North Korea also continues to pursue asymmetric capabilities, especially in the areas of nuclear, missile, and cyber. The development of these asymmetric capabilities and the forward stationing of its conventional forces provide North Korea the ability to attack or provoke the Republic of Korea with little warning.

Kim Jong-un's recent appearances, including a visit to the joint security area, continue to stress his role as military commander and further reinforce the importance North Korea places on its military-first policy. It is undetermined at this time whether or not he will change any North Korean strategies or policies in the future.

An armistice agreement keeps our forces separated from North Korean forces. The 16 sending-state members of the United Nations Command maintain the armistice from the Republic of Korea, promoting stability and investigating any alleged armistice violations. The participation of the sending states in the Republic of Korea demonstrates a commitment of the international community to stability on the Korean Peninsula and enhances our ability to successfully deter aggression.

Our deterrent capability is based on U.S. and ROK military readiness, and this is my primary focus. I have conducted a thorough review, including two combined exercises, and I have determined our forces remain ready to defend the Republic of Korea and the peninsula.

The ROK military is a well-led, modern, well-trained ready force. It is also essential that we maintain U.S. force readiness at its highest level, given our requirement to fight tonight.

Congress asked me to review and assess our normalization and force relocation initiatives at my confirmation hearing. It is my assessment that expanding our normalization beyond our current authorization of 4,645 family members is unaffordable under the current construct.

Our two relocation plans are on track and I intend to execute them. I will continue to review these plans to ensure they place the right capabilities in the right places to meet the operational requirements on the peninsula. The charge to maintain the armistice, deter aggression, defend the Republic of Korea, and take care of our warriors and their families is my primary concern.

Again, I thank you for your support of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and Department of Defense civilians and the families serving in Korea.

Thank you very much, and I now look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Thurman can be found in the Appendix on page 43.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Dr. Lavoy, you commented about a deal-breaker, shooting the rocket. What is our deal? And what happens if they violate it and break the deal?

Dr. LAVOY. Thank you for that question.

We have reached an agreement with the North Koreans that will enable us to provide food assistance to North Korea. And we have been under the—it has been very important to us to de-link humanitarian assistance, including nutritional assistance, and other kinds of activities such as operational remains recovery operations, from politics and from North Korea's provocative behavior. That has been our intent all along.

However, when we recently reached this deal, this did prohibit North Korean missile launches. And we indicated at the time that a satellite missile launch we would interpret as a missile launch because it would use missile technology.

The North Koreans have announced that they will launch a missile. We are working very closely with allies and other partners in the region to try to discourage North Korea from launching this missile as they have intended. But we believe that this reflects their lack of desire to follow through on their international commitments.

And so we have been forced to suspend our activities to provide nutritional assistance to North Korea, largely because we have now no confidence that the monitoring mechanisms to ensure that the food assistance goes to the starving people and not the regime elite; that these monitoring mechanisms—we have no confidence that they would actually abide by the understandings.

The CHAIRMAN. So we have suspended, then, nutritional—

Dr. LAVOY. Yes. Yes we have, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. General Thurman, readiness is one of your top priorities, as you have stated. The President's new strategic guidance shifts the focus to Asia, but to date we haven't seen an increase in resources to reflect the pivot. We understand that each of our contingency plans is under review to assess the level of resources required.

Assuming you are engaged in a similar activity, can you tell us how prepared the U.S. forces are to respond to possible aggressive actions by North Korean military? And what are your top three readiness issues for U.S. forces?

General THURMAN. Chairman, first off, I can tell you that we are prepared to defend the peninsula and can do that. And we can repel any type of attack that should the North Koreans decide to do that. So I am confident, based on what I have seen through the exercises, and the fact of the—that with the capabilities we have. And I would be more than happy to go in a closed session and discuss specific readiness concerns that I have, and can go into further detail on that.

In response to overall readiness, I would tell you that on the U.S. side, the U.S. Army has done a very good job of modernizing us with the forces that we have on the peninsula. We have the very best equipment, top-of-the-line equipment, and we have done the

same thing with the United States Air Force and the maritime forces.

So I am confident the capabilities we have there, we can defend the peninsula.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

For the Members, immediately following our questioning here in open session, we will move into a closed session. And it is scheduled for 12 o'clock, but if we finish earlier, we will move into it at that time.

Ranking Member Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Lavoy, could you elaborate a little bit on what you think the consequences you think will be of the missile launch if North Korea goes through with it; and I assume that they will. And they have never been ones to be responsive to any sort of international pressure before; hard to imagine this would be a first time.

How do you see that playing out? How will South Korea, Japan, others in the region respond to that? And what should we do as a result?

Dr. LAVOY. Thank you for that question, Ranking Member Smith.

We are very concerned about the possibility of missile launch that the North Koreans have announced that they would indeed conduct. And as you implied, a number of countries in the area—and a broader area, in fact—are concerned about this.

The North Koreans have indicated that they will launch the missile in a southward direction. And I don't know if we have any confidence on the stability of the missile or where the actual impact will be. A number of countries are potentially affected. The debris could fall on their countries; could cause casualties. This affects South Korea, of course, but also Japan; Okinawa, the island of Japan. And the intended impact is probably somewhere close to the Philippines or maybe Indonesia.

So this is now an issue that not only concerns the South Koreans and, of course, us and the Japanese, but more broadly everybody in Asia-Pacific has become concerned about North Korea's growing missile capability, especially as they are continuing to develop their nuclear-weapons capability.

I can't speculate on specifically what measures would be taken if indeed they conduct a test, but I can assure you that we are consulting with all of the countries affected about measures to be taken.

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Thank you.

General Thurman, you mentioned the great partnership we have with South Korea and particularly the South Korean military. Can you tell us a little bit about the capability of the South Korean military?

It is my understanding that it has improved dramatically over the years—and where they are at, and how that might impact the size of our presence as we partner with them, and we are looking to help them be in the strongest possible position; but as they grow stronger perhaps give us a little bit ability to downsize or reduce what contribution we would make.

How do you see that balance playing out?

General THURMAN. Ranking Member Smith, first off, I do believe the ROK military is a very professional and competent force. They have modernized their ground forces significantly. They have done the same thing with their air forces by adding their F-15Ks fighters and the KF-16s. So they have done very well with that. They have done the same thing as they work with our maritime forces, procured three Aegis cruisers.

And so they are going through that process right now. I think they have made some considerable investments as they continue to look to improve and modernize their force. And we have seen evidence of that.

As far as our forces, we have an agreed number of 28,500 on the peninsula. I would recommend, given the current conditions, as we move toward operational control eventually to—in 2015 to maintain that level of force. But I think it is also prudent to always look at our capabilities and make sure we are capabilities based, as we have to offset some of the capabilities that they do not have currently.

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Forbes.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you.

And Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and the ranking member for having this hearing and for your questions on this.

And General, one of the things that we know is that in early 2011 the Secretary of Defense, then Robert Gates, said that North Korean ballistic missiles could pose a threat to the United States within 5 years.

What, if anything, does North Korea's upcoming launch of the new Unha-3 rocket tell us about its ballistic missile technology advances? And to your knowledge, are we within 4 years of North Korea fielding a functional intercontinental ballistic missile?

General THURMAN. Congressman Forbes, first off, the continued development and willingness of the North Korean regime there to test ballistic missiles—and we have seen that continue for a period of time—is a major concern of ours.

It has the potential to destabilize the region. And, as you point out, left unchecked if their development continues, poses a serious threat to us.

And it is something that I think we have got to maintain close vigilance on and, obviously, work to try to dissuade them from the continued development of that and maybe focus on feeding their people, is what I would say.

And I would be more than happy to go into full details of what we are seeing in a closed session on their full development of what we know.

Mr. FORBES. General, are there any projections on timetable that you could give outside of a classified setting as to what we have heard or seen as far as the projections of when they will be on target for these missiles.

General THURMAN. Congressman, I would not want to go into the exact timetables in here, but it is of concern with their continued willingness to test this capability.

Mr. FORBES. And can I ask one other question? This is kind of along what the ranking member said; when we do know that there is a very good cooperation between the United States military and South Korean military, and that they do a wonderful job there.

But sometimes no good deed goes unpunished, and sometime the people outside of the military are not always as appreciative in some of the areas that we are.

How do you assess the public opinion in South Korea outside of the military-to-military contacts as far as our relationship? Is that better, worse? How do you project that?

General THURMAN. Congressman, I believe the ROK-U.S. alliance is as strong as it has ever been. And public opinion over there welcomes U.S. presence. And we are a stabilizing influence in that region.

And I think it is very important. There is no doubt this alliance was forged on a very bloody battlefield and we learned many lessons. And I think just by having forward presence that is a calming effect. And I have talked to many of the leaders in the ROK Government and the normal ROK people and they welcome our presence there.

Mr. FORBES. Also, last week, the South Korean president announced that he thought South Korea would soon reach an agreement with the United States on extending the missile range, which is currently limited, as I understand it, to 300 kilometers.

Can you tell us what your assessment is about South Korea's missile requirements? And do South Korea's military leaders view the need for such an agreement as urgent? And what is your take on that?

General THURMAN. Congressman, I will defer to Dr. Lavoy, but they have expressed desires to me to have a longer-range missile.

Mr. FORBES. Doctor, what are your thoughts?

Dr. LAVOY. Thank you. I would be happy to add to that.

We and the South Koreans have had very good discussions about dealing with North Korea's growing missile inventory and the threat that that poses. And we have a process that we have in place. There have been numerous meetings. And we have identified a comprehensive array of measures to take to deal with this threat.

And I think this is an area where we really are in sync with the South Koreans. And this process is not concluded, however. And I think we are nearing conclusion of this. In the closed session we could talk to you a little bit more about that.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, thank you. And I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ms. Sanchez.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Can you outline for us the concern of proliferation of WMD [Weapons of Mass Destruction] out there in the peninsula? Can you talk to us about whether our current policies and programs to effectively counter proliferation, in other words, how are the countries around North Korea feeling about their ability to have nuclear arms?

And do you think that that—are they staying close to the whole issue of not proliferating, or do you think that they are getting a little bit antsy because maybe they see that things are moving along faster than we had hoped?

Dr. LAVOY. Representative Sanchez, I think you have put your finger on a very important issue.

The whole region is concerned about the North Korea's missile and nuclear programs. These are disconcerting to everybody because with extended range of missiles potentially North Korea would have the ability to put nuclear warheads on, and that affects not only their neighbor, South Korea, but affects other countries in the broader Asia-Pacific area.

Ms. SANCHEZ. And we have sort of been able to hold them off from really building anything up, most of those countries, saying that we were going to contain this or we were going to be the pushback on that. But how are they feeling now?

Dr. LAVOY. Well, it has been a consistent goal of the United States and other countries in the region to discourage North Korea from proceeding with its WMD programs.

And in fact it is this objective that led us to these talks that we had on the 23rd and 24th of February in Beijing to get the North Koreans to commit, to suspend, put a moratorium on flight tests of long-range missiles, to continue work on missiles.

That is why we and the region are so troubled by this possible missile test going forward.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Turning to another subject, the subject of cyberwarfare. I know that North Korea is increasing its effort in that arena. And I know that we have a very close relationship with South Korea and that we share a lot of information with them.

What is the process or what—are we working hand-in-hand? Are we doing enough with them to ensure that we, again, contain or counterattack what may be coming out of North Korea with respect to cyberwarfare?

General THURMAN. Congresswoman Sanchez, in a closed forum I will be more than happy to go into the details of that. But first I would tell you that we work hand-in-hand with the ROK military on the protection of our networks; and particularly looking at interoperability, I have come to realize that cyber is a key warfighting domain. And it is important as our air, maritime, and ground operations.

And so, yes, we have raised the awareness on that, and it is something that we are looking at on a daily basis with the ROK military.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Chairman, the other questions I might have would probably be a little bit more sensitive and more for a closed session. So I will end right there, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you General for being here; and Secretary.

I have a unique perspective. I was honored to be on a delegation with former Congressman Curt Weldon, where we visited Pyongyang. So I have seen the contrast between the totalitarian state of the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea] and to

see the success of the Republic of Korea. And it is really inspiring as we visit Seoul, we have had to travel by helicopter because of the heavy traffic of brand new SUVs filling up the six- and eight-lane boulevards; quite a contrast from Pyongyang.

But it is really a classic example of the success of free market democracy over totalitarian government. At the same time, it is really led to a concern that I have about the role of China and Russia.

It would seem like it would be in their interest that there be a level of security, economic security, military—to have some reforms in North Korea. But what is the role of China and Russia, and particularly with the transition in government, what have they—how have their actions been matched?

Dr. LAVOY. I could answer that first, Congressman.

China, as the chairman indicated, has a great deal of influence on North Korea; probably more than any other country in the world. And we look to China to use its influence constructively to pressure and cajole the North Koreans to adopt the reforms that you mentioned, which are really critical to meet the needs of the people, which is really a human tragedy that is occurring in North Korea; but also for North Korea to abide by the standards of international conduct and not to pose the threats to the broader Asia-Pacific region that it does.

We have not been entirely satisfied with China's activities in this regard, but I can assure you this is an issue that we do discuss with China regularly. And we hope that China will take a more constructive approach. We also discussed this with Russia, with other countries in the region as well.

Mr. WILSON. And I know that South Korea—actually it is my understanding through investments in China—employs 2 percent of the people of China. That is a lot of people. And it would seem like they would see the benefit of having a more normal regime in Pyongyang, so I appreciate your efforts there.

I also like to know your assessment, each of you in regard to the transition from Kim Jong-il to Kim Jong-un. It is my understanding in the foreign affairs committee that we learned that the new leader recently placed his military on high alert, General; and with the understanding that it was not to prepare for conflict, but to prepare for your surrender.

Could you comment on such bluster?

General THURMAN. Congressman Wilson, we see quite a bit of rhetoric on a daily basis coming out of North Korea. My sense is that this succession has occurred with Kim Jong-un, the young leader.

He has been given one title, as Supreme Commander of the military. I think he is being closely advised by his uncle, Jang Song-thaek, and some of the other old elite advisers that are shepherding him along, in my sense.

It is unclear at this time, as I believe, of what policies he is going to follow. He has been more active, and we have seen him more out. But I could go into specific details in a closed forum on this. But my sense is the policies that they are—have taken with their military first policy is not going to change.

Mr. WILSON. And again, I appreciate your effort so much; and to have to face bluster when in fact indeed North Korea could develop itself into a positive entity.

And a final point I want to make: I had the privilege of visiting with troops from the Republic of Korea in Afghanistan for the provincial reconstruction teams. Indeed, these are professionals; people who reflect well on their country in the values of democracy and freedom.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Larsen.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, back to some of the operational issues in South Korea—probably for General Thurman—but can you talk a little bit about the tour normalization, the decision to delay or to stop the tour normalization; a little bit about the cost estimates that you foresaw, or you foresee, and what that might mean in the future for normalization?

General THURMAN. Well Congressman, first off I was asked to go do a good review of the current policy of tour normalization.

We are authorized 4,645 families, and that was a cap that was put on this last National Defense Authorization Act. What I determined when I got over there, given the cost of bringing additional families—that would be additional requirements and additional costs—I do not think, under the current environment, that that is feasible.

So I am okay with leaving 4,645 families. When we built Camp Humphreys, which is part of the Yongsan Relocation Plan and the Land Partnership Plan, that plan was based on the authorized 4,645 families. So I see staying at that right now is what I would tell you.

The biggest issue that I have is the constant turnover of personnel, primarily Army; because we are on 1-year tours. And you can imagine the turn that is ongoing every day. We typically lose about 600 to 700 soldiers a month that are rotating either in or out, back to the continental United States.

Mr. LARSEN. About every month there is about 600 go home, about 600 hundred who come—

General THURMAN. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.

So I have asked General Odierno and the Army to look at how we can build readiness at best value, and see what we can do. And I am very mindful of the cost. And I don't want to create a requirement that is not operationally focused.

Mr. LARSEN. Good. On the relocation plan, what do you see as anticipated problems? Do you see any more anticipated delays in implementing the relocation plan, either for Yongsan or just the land partnership?

General THURMAN. Congressman, first off, the Land Partnership Program was a U.S. initiative.

Mr. LARSEN. Right.

General THURMAN. That is on track.

I am, in fact, looking at some of those capabilities to make sure the positioning is right on the peninsula, i.e., fires brigade for instance, that I am looking at right now.

The second program, the Yongsan relocation, it was a little behind. We have got that back on track. We will have both of those programs completed by 2016, is what the estimate is right now.

And I would be more than happy to provide you the cost break-out and I would like to take that for the record if I could.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 65.]

Mr. LARSEN. I would appreciate that. So you say you still anticipate by 2016. Anything in the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program] that causes you concern about meeting that goal?

General THURMAN. The only thing which is not associated with the land partnership program or the Yongsan relocation—there is a requirement in the 2013 budget for a battalion headquarters, for a chemical battalion that is going to be deployed from the states as part of force posture adjustments to the peninsula. And that is an additional requirement.

Mr. LARSEN. So not originally anticipated; so that is added in the 2013; so you have to find some way to accommodate that?

General THURMAN. That is correct, Congressman.

Mr. LARSEN. Yes, good. Thank you. That is all I have.

General THURMAN. Yes sir.

Mr. LARSEN. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Turner.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Lavoy, it is very timely that we are having this hearing.

As we look to the news of what has just been coming out of the talks the President attended. We know that the news also reported on Monday—for example this is a CNN story I am going to be reading from—“Just hours after the United States warned that North Korea would achieve nothing with threats or provocations, Pyongyang moved a long-range rocket it plans to test fire, to a launch pad, Monday.”

Now, North Korea’s threat of a missile launch can only be an effort to test, perhaps, ahead of deployment, an intercontinental ballistic missile that would have capability of reaching the United States.

Secretary Gates said as he was leaving that one of his concerns was the rising threat of North Korea; that it could in fact get to the point where it could threaten mainland United States. We also know of its, of course, nuclear weapons program, which makes their missile program that much more of a concern.

Also Monday, news broke of the President having a conversation with an open mike, where the President says to Medvedev, “On all these issues, but particularly missile defense, this can be solved, but it is important to give me space.” This is the President speaking.

Medvedev says, “Yes, I understand, I understand your message about space; space for you,” meaning our President.

Obama says, “This is my last election. After my election I have more flexibility.”

Medvedev says, “I understand. I will transmit this information to Vladimir.”

Now, obviously, the concern that everyone has is that, as we talk to the issue of North Korea; as we talk to the issue of their missile

program; their nuclear weapons program—Gates indicating that they are a rising threat to mainland United States—it raises the question of what is the President's secret deal to limit our missile defense system?

I mean, the President is talking to another world leader about once he gets through the election, his last election, then unfettered from the electorate, he will be free to have flexibility on our missile defense system. And we are all very, very concerned as to what this secret deal could be as we face the rising threat of North Korea.

Is this limits on the deployment of our missile defense system? Limits on our use of our missile defense system? Limits on our operation of our missile defense system?

I mean, clearly you can understand how everyone would be concerned as we look to the news of the rise of North Korea and the threat that it provides to mainland of our President making any deal, especially a secret deal, that is only to be revealed after the election, that might affect our missile defense system.

Dr. Lavoy, you are the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense Policy for Asia and Pacific Security Affairs.

Dr. Lavoy, what is in this secret deal? Are we to be concerned about the effects of limiting our missile defense system, our only protection that we have with respect to the emerging and rising threat of North Korea to our homeland?

Dr. LAVOY. Congressman, I am not aware of any secret deal. We do take the growth of North Korea's missile capability very seriously. As I indicated, we are working very closely with South Korea operationally and with other countries in the region—

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Lavoy, before the time expires—

Dr. LAVOY. Yes.

Mr. TURNER. Since you said you are not aware of any secret deal, perhaps it is not a secret deal to you. It is a secret to us until it was caught on the microphone with the President, so let me re-ask you the question.

Are you aware of the deal the President has with Medvedev and with Russia that would be revealed to us after the election that perhaps isn't secret to you, that would limit our missile defense capability either in deployment, use, or scope, that of course is a serious concern to this committee as we look to the rise of North Korea?

Are you aware of the subject matter of the President's missile defense deal, secret or not, with the Russians? And if you are not, why are you not?

Dr. LAVOY. No, sir, I am not.

And I can assure you that we do believe that missile defense and our Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense in the Asia-Pacific region is very much alive. It is very much part of our comprehensive approach to deal with the threat posed by the North Koreans. It is something we are committed to.

And in the closed session I would be happy to describe in detail the steps we are taking—

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Lavoy, you are an appointee by the President, are you not?

Dr. LAVOY. Yes, I am, sir.

Mr. TURNER. Okay.

I would greatly appreciate it if you would ask the President what are the details of his deal with the Russians concerning missile defense that cannot be disclosed until after the election; and please report it back to this committee, because we have grave concerns as to a President having any restriction on our defensive systems, especially with, as you have eloquently described, “the rising threat of North Korea.”

I would greatly appreciate that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Reyes.

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you both for being here this morning.

General, it is always good to see you.

I guess one concern that I have and others have had as well has been whether or not there is any intention of drawing down further the presence of U.S. troops in theater.

Is there any plan or are there any contingency plans to do that in light of all of the issues, including sequestration, that would play into that kind of scenario?

General THURMAN. Congressman Reyes, there are no plans that I am aware of that draws down any forces on the peninsula. We are staying at 28,500. There may be some adjustments inside those capabilities. But those adjustments would be to improve our overall force posture. But there are no plans that I am aware of.

Mr. REYES. And in terms of the agreement that we have with the—particularly for the stability of the Korean Peninsula, with the South Koreans—are there any concerns?

And I apologize for not having been able to be here. I had another meeting that I had to be at. But are there any changes that we contemplate based on the new leadership in North Korea, in that partnership with the South Koreans?

General THURMAN. Congressman Reyes, first off, I believe the alliance is as strong as it has ever been, particularly our military partnership.

The concerns that the South Koreans relay to me is obviously they are very concerned about the continued willingness on part of the North Koreans to continue to test ballistic missiles and the pursuance of nuclear capability. That causes great angst and concern.

And I think right now that is probably one of the biggest things. Obviously they have not forgotten the sinking of the *Cheonan* that occurred in March of 2010 and the shelling of the Yeonpyeong Island that occurred in November of 2010. They are very watchful of that and mindful of it. They have put a lot of emphasis on their military for overall readiness, I will tell you that.

Mr. REYES. In terms of the progress that had been made prior to the demise of Kim Jong-il, are there any indications that those kinds of efforts or talks are taking place, in lieu of the concerns that you just expressed of the sinking and the shelling of the—by the North Koreans? Is there any prospect that those talks of economic opportunities being sought out by South Koreans at this point?

General THURMAN. Congressman, I have not seen any great change as a result of the succession with the new leader. I would welcome any discussion, obviously. I think if the parties can discuss their differences; that is always a good thing. But I have not seen any change.

I defer to Dr. Lavoy on any policy issues in regard to that.

Mr. REYES. All right.

Doctor.

Dr. LAVOY. I could add to that, Congressman.

North Korea is an authoritarian regime, of course, and it has—political successions are extraordinarily difficult when you don't have a representative government, which is the case there, of course.

And so what we are seeing now and what we anticipate is provocative behavior because, unfortunately, this seems to be the only way that the North Korean regime can try to demonstrate its bona fides to a population that is suffering terribly. They can't meet the needs of the population, the nutritional or educational or other needs of the population, so they resort to provocative behavior.

And despite efforts to stabilize relations with the North and to de-escalate tensions on the peninsula following these very dangerous activities in the past; now, once again, because of an internal political dynamic on North Korea, it appears that they are once again inclined to take these provocative steps, most specifically the announced long-range missile ballistic test flight.

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Scott.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I was just going back and forth with my aunt, who has got a nephew serving under you over there in Korea, a young man named Jake Butler. So forgive me for tasting, General. But I know you were also the commander of the 3rd I.D. [Infantry Division] in Georgia, and we are very proud of Fort Stewart and what you ladies and gentlemen accomplished over there in representing Georgia well, and the United States well.

I want to speak just very briefly about the JSTARS [Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System] out of Robins Air Force Base that we are very, very proud of. And could you just speak to the JSTARS program and what it means in a potential conflict with North Korea?

General THURMAN. Congressman, first off, in respect to JSTARS, that gives us moving-target capability; without going into the classified portion of it. But, more importantly, what I am looking for as a commander is I have a set of priority intelligence requirements, and I welcome any system that is going to help me answer those requirements.

Mr. SCOTT. Yes, sir.

General THURMAN. And it is an added capability that does help us on the peninsula.

Mr. SCOTT. Well, my cousin is honored to serve under you as a commander. His mom wanted to ask why he was issued live ammunition. I would like to ask why he didn't already have it. But we will answer that behind closed doors.

Thank you, Mr. General.
 I yield the remainder of my time.
 The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
 Mr. Andrews.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize to you and the witnesses for being tardy. I was in a hearing with the Secretary of Education and wanted to hear him.

But no disrespect to you gentlemen—thank you for your service to our country.

Dr. LAVOY, within the confines of this public discussion, I wanted to get the thinking behind the linkage of the missile test that is coming up, presumably next month, and our decision about whether to execute and follow through on the food-aid agreement with North Korea.

I am not sure what I think about that idea, but let me play devil's advocate here. One argument might be that linking the two punishes the North Korean people without having any significant impact on the North Korean leadership; would further intensify anti-U.S. or anti-Western hostility, and therefore strengthen the hand domestically of the North Korean leadership to engage in such extra-legal and unwelcome activities on the international stage.

How would you assess that argument and respond to it?

Dr. LAVOY. Well, I can tell you that it is regrettable that the food aid is not moving forward. The North Korean population really needs nutritional assistance, and we are prepared to provide that to North Korea.

The real motivation and the linkage as you—this is not intended to be linked to anything else; to any movement by the North Koreans. However, the fact that North Korea so brazenly violated commitments that it just so recently agreed to in the discussions in Beijing, and its commitment that it announced on February 29th on Leap Day, indicates that they are not reliable and we cannot expect them to meet other international commitments, including the commitments that they have agreed to that are associated with the provision of nutritional assistance to the needy population in their country.

Mr. ANDREWS. I understand the basis, the rationale that, you know, they dishonored their agreements so they really abandoned their right to claim what they would get under the agreement.

My question really more is whether we think that is going to be effective in altering the behavior of this government, or whether it is going to worsen our position.

You obviously think it is going to be effective, relatively speaking?

Dr. LAVOY. Well, Congressman, we don't believe that nutritional assistance should be a lever to achieve a political outcome. It is a humanitarian effort that we have intended. Again, it is regrettable that this has stopped.

So by the reason, again, why we are not providing that food assistance at this point is because our confidence in their ability to meet their agreements has been diminished. We do not use it as a lever to change their policies.

Mr. ANDREWS. Okay. They might see it differently, but that is okay.

Again, within the confines of this public discussion, if either of you would be pleased to answer it, how do you assess the role of the People's Republic of China in dealing with this outlaw behavior by North Korea? Are they more helpful than not? Are they more harmful than not? Are they neutral?

Put another way: What do you think the optimal behavior of the PRC [People's Republic of China] toward this problem is, and how close are they to obtaining it?

Dr. LAVOY. Congressman, I think, as we have discussed already, China has potentially a great deal of influence, and probably more than any other country, on the regime in North Korea.

So of course, we, for a long time, have been talking to the Chinese, consulting regularly with the Chinese, about how best to influence the North Koreans in a manner to affect reforms at home and to conform their international behavior to acceptable standards.

Objectively, we can see that North Korea continues to behave outside the rules of normal and acceptable international conduct. So that influence has not been as effective to date as we would have liked. We continue to consult with the Chinese and with other countries that have relations with North Korea about North Korea's behavior.

And as our partnership with China deepens, we hope that China will see the interest in the spirit of this partnership and in the interest of—

Mr. ANDREWS. I am really hopeful of that, too. Unless you see everything as a zero-sum game between the U.S. and the PRC, which we certainly don't and I hope they don't, this kind of instability in their own region can't possibly be good for the PRC. And it is certainly not good for the rest of the world.

So, I hope that we would continue those efforts to find common ground that would encourage North Korea to act within the community of nations.

Thank you. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. West.

Mr. WEST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and ranking member, also. *Annyeong haseyo*, and I just want to also say "steadfast and loyal."

General Thurman, great to see you again.

I want to kind of dovetail off of what my colleague, Mr. Andrews, talked about, because I was stationed in Korea in 1995 at Camp Casey up in Tongduchon. And I think that we continue to see this series of saber-rattling and us giving in, and more saber-rattling and us giving in; and no honoring of their commitments and their promises.

So Dr. Lavoy, my simple question is: Do you ever see an end to this Pavlovian experiment of international extortion that is coming out of North Korea?

Dr. LAVOY. Well, we certainly hope to see the end to that, and we are doing everything possible to do this, but it is a very recalcitrant regime.

And as I indicated, because of their own internal compulsions, which are completely dysfunctional and really out of step with the 21st century, that leads them to this provocative international behavior. And probably only when they can reform internally can they get international behavior to align to acceptable standards.

Mr. WEST. But does there come a time when our perceived benevolence, which they translate into weakness, must be ended in order for us to stop this crazy cycle of international extortion; because that is how I see it. I am just a simple guy from the inner city of Atlanta, Georgia, and that is how we call it.

Dr. LAVOY. Well, Congressman, I wouldn't expect you are a simple guy. But let me just say that I wouldn't characterize our approach as benevolent or weak at all.

Mr. WEST. But they perceive it as being weak.

Dr. LAVOY. I am not sure that they do, sir.

Mr. WEST. There are quotes in some of the papers coming out of DPRK that say so.

Second question, and also dovetailing off of my colleague, do you believe that the incredible debt situation where China holds 28 percent to 30 percent of our debt; the trade imbalance situation—I mean, we are almost at an economic disadvantage against China—does that have an adverse effect on our foreign policy in dealing with North Korea?

Dr. LAVOY. As I indicated just a moment ago, we do have a strong partnership with China. We are consulting with China on a range of issues, particularly on North Korea because China does have so much influence. And we believe that China can be an effective partner and can provide more influence on the North Korean regime than it has been to date, and we are working with them—

Mr. WEST. But do you think that China sees itself as being able to be somewhat belligerent because of the fact they do have this control of 28 percent of our debt and a little bit of a trade imbalance advantage over us? Do you think that that gives them some leverage?

Dr. LAVOY. Congressman, that is not apparent to me. We talk with China about real-world international problems and how to deal with them.

Mr. WEST. And General Thurman, commanders like yourself always taught me two questions that you have to answer when you are briefing a plan. Sir, what do you see as the most dangerous and most likely courses of action coming out of North Korea?

General THURMAN. Thanks, Congressman West.

The first thing I worry about every day is a miscalculation on somebody's part that causes a conflict that we hadn't planned for. That is the first thing.

Secondly, I worry about the asymmetric capabilities that the North Koreans have, whether it be with special operations forces or the introduction of chem-bio and then cyber. Those are some of the things that I worry about. I think we are postured very well to repel an attack. However, they have a considerable number of indirect fire systems. And as expansive as Seoul is, any round coming our direction could potentially do damage.

So I worry about that. So the importance of staying ready and remaining vigilant is very important for both ROK and U.S., and that is 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

Mr. WEST. *Kamsa Hamnida.*

And Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Palazzo.

Mr. PALAZZO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to thank our witnesses for being here this morning and testifying. I had to spend most of my—this committee in another committee where I am Chairman of the [Subcommittee on] Space and Aeronautics, so I haven't been able to follow the entire line of questioning.

But I do want to—well, first of all, I am sure Chairman Wittman talked about his PACOM visit. I was a part of that, when we did that this past August, and it was a wonderful trip. And the Republic of Korea was on there, along with the Philippines and Japan.

And everywhere we went, one of our common denominators of concern was China, and also, "What was our U.S. posture going to be?" And if we moved our posture to where our allies thought that we were maybe retreating or just falling back a little too far for their general welfare, that then they would have to do whatever they have to do to take care of the security and stability of their population.

So, I guess what I am saying is I hope we are focusing on China. I mean, I know the President was talking about it being an emerging threat; that and cybersecurity; the Middle East; you know, making sure that the shipping lanes around the world are continuously open because our economic and national security depends so much on it.

And then next thing you hear, we are talking in another hearing and we hear that, I don't know—this is a separate conversation, actually, that, you know, the Chinese are even building icebreakers to go up into the Arctic so they could begin claiming the North Seas for those resources. So, that causes me some concern, and hopefully we will perhaps continue to focus on their behavior and expose it.

And all the while, you know, they are increasing their spending on their military and we are cutting a half a trillion over the next decade, and we are staring down the barrels of a double-barreled shotgun stuck at our head with the possibility of sequestration. And that scares me.

But I guess I will just switch gears. And from a CPA standpoint, I like to see the cost-benefit. And I know we are doing some realigning from Yongsan, and we are moving further back. I had a chance to visit Yongsan, and I didn't have a chance to visit the new site, I guess, where Camp Humphreys was going to be.

Are we getting the best value for our dollar? I mean, we have kind of kept the peace for them for decades now. And I know typically wherever the U.S. military has been, that footprint is one of the most valuable pieces of property left on that continent or in that country. So are we doing a fair exchange? Are they paying for their fair share? Or are we giving up a nice piece of property just for false appeasement?

General THURMAN. Congressman, thank you for that question.

First thing I would tell you—I think we are getting a very good deal with the ROK Government. The property of Yongsan; we will keep a residual in Yongsan because that is important with our day-to-day business that we do. I interface daily with the ROK chairman of their military, as well as their Ministry of Defense. So we will have a small footprint there.

And, of course, the U.S. embassy will eventually relocate out to Yongsan on some property there.

In regard to the costs, there are shared costs. And I would be more than happy to give you a detailed cost breakout of that so you can see. But I believe we are getting a very good deal. And I believe that the ROK Government welcomes U.S. presence.

You just spoke of China. We are a stabilizing influence as long as we are forward-deployed. And that would be something that needs to be factored in all of these discussions because that is important to maintain stability in that region.

But I think overall the ROK has been more willing—and you can go back to 1991. They have continued to increase their spending to assist U.S. forces that are stationed there.

Mr. PALAZZO. Well, thank you, General.

And I know on our trip over there that they were very receptive and they were very supportive of U.S. troops and ROK.

So keep doing a great job. I enjoyed seeing you. I have already made it aware to Chairman Wittman I would like to go on another PACOM trip, because it is such of grave importance. You know, it is important we gather as much information as possible and we come back better prepared for hearings just like this.

So thank y'all both.

I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ms. HOCHUL.

Ms. HOCHUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, just like my colleague, I am a little disadvantaged. I just came from a markup in Homeland Security, so I don't know what went on before me, although the question I had, I think, has been addressed.

I was concerned about the overall cost of realignment of U.S. forces in South Korea and how much is being funded by the Republic of Korea.

So if we can get that information—is it 20 percent? What are we talking here? I don't need raw numbers today; I would like them in the future. But, you know, what is their shared responsibility for that and what kind of numbers does that equate to?

General THURMAN. Congresswoman, first off, on Yongsan relocation, the ROK Government is paying for that.

Ms. HOCHUL. Okay.

General THURMAN. Now, there will be some ancillary costs associated with our communications and specific requirements and related to our unique requirements for our communications networks. That is a responsibility of ours, as well as some of the O&M requirements and SRM requirements that will be required in the future.

The Land Partnership Program was a U.S. initiative and that was funded by the U.S. primarily. We did use special-measures

funding from the ROK Government to assist in that, but I would be more than happy to give you the detailed cost breakout.

Ms. HOCHUL. Okay, thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mrs. Hartzler.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I was interested in your comments, General, about what keeps you up at night: worrying about the special op forces that North Korea has; their cyber, as well as the weapons of mass destruction capabilities. And those are the things that stood at me as I read your testimony, as well.

I have to admit, I did not realize that North Korea has the world's largest special operations force, over 60,000 trained and loyal soldiers at the President's beck and call at any moment. So that is very concerning.

But I wanted focus in on the other two areas. You say, regarding the cyber, that the newest addition to their arsenal is the growing cyberwarfare capability; that North Korea employs sophisticated computer hackers trained to launch cyberinfiltration and cyberattacks against the ROK and U.S.

Such attacks are ideal for North Korea, providing the regime a means to attack the Republic of Korea and U.S. interests without attribution; and have been increasingly employed against a variety of targets, including military, governmental, educational, and commercial institutions.

So I was wondering what are we doing to help counter this threat?

General THURMAN. Congresswoman, first off, that is correct there what you just read. And it is an area that I have placed greater emphasis on to make sure, first off, our networks are properly protected. And I would be more than happy in a closed session to go into the detailed capabilities of what the threat is that we see in a closed forum.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay.

I especially am concerned to hear that they have already deployed this against our military, so I would like to know more about what actually happened there.

All right; so let me move to the weapons of mass destruction question, saying that—you list that as a significant concern; and that you assess the capability to manufacture, transport and deliver a variety of both persistent and non-persistent chemicals to include nerve, blood, choking, and blister agents; could be delivered through artillery or missile systems; and that if they were to employ them it could use highly pathogenic agents such as anthrax or plagues.

And certainly in dense populations, this would be a tremendous problem.

So I guess my question is: Are our current non-proliferation and counter-proliferation policies and programs effective tools to mitigate these threats? And what more can we do?

And so—General or Secretary.

General THURMAN. Congresswoman, first thing, in regard to our protection of our men and women who are serving on the penin-

sula, I have placed a lot of emphasis on our overall chemical, biological defense training. We train on that on a frequent basis. I am confident we have the right capabilities; that is the first thing.

Secondly, in terms bio-detection, we have placed a lot of emphasis on our installations with our biological-detection capabilities. And so it is important to keep that current. We do work with our ROK forces. They are very good with their chemical capabilities. And we train in those types of environments. So I am confident in regard to that.

I do not see the North Koreans giving up this capability. I think it is something we are going to have to continually deal with given the current set of conditions.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Would you like to add to anything?

Dr. LAVOY. Thank you very much, Congresswoman.

I think what the Department of Defense brings to bear, and particularly what General Thurman and his capability in theater brings to bear, are three very important things; number one, a strong deterrence capability to deter the north from using these horrendous weapons of mass destruction; secondly, as he indicated, a very robust defensive capability. Should these weapons be used, General Thurman and his forces, together with the South Koreans, have a good defensive capability to deal with the consequences if these were to be used.

And to complement both of these and really enhance that deterring capability is this constant operational readiness of our forces in the theater. So this is what the Department of Defense brings to bear against this.

But I have to agree with you, North Korea is an outlier today in the world. The President was just in Seoul over the last couple of days with the Nuclear Security Summit. Over 50 of the world's leaders were there. And everybody is getting aboard to eliminate weapons of mass destruction and decrease that danger. Again, North Korea's an outlier.

So in addition to what we are doing in the Department of Defense, we are also supporting a broader international diplomacy and non-proliferation efforts to try to deal with that threat.

Mrs. HARTZLER. All right; appreciate what you are doing; very, very important. Thank you so much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you both for being here, for your service.

I am sorry I missed the early discussions, but I wanted to ask you—I guess, extend the discussion on the tour normalization and what you are finding in terms of—I think this is morale on those unaccompanied tours; because the turnover, as I understand it, is about 600, 700 service members every month. Is that normal? Is that what we would anticipate? And what kind of resources are there, then? And how is that affecting readiness in any way on the base?

General THURMAN. Yes, ma'am.

Congresswoman Davis, first off, most of the turnover we see that is occurring out of that 600 to 700 are the lower enlisted grades, which are predominantly over there on a 1-year assignment.

As you can imagine, that constant turnover affects the crew's stability inside the 2nd Infantry Division, so that is something that commander has to deal with.

In regard to the number on tour normalization, we have roughly today around 3,800 families that are command-sponsored. There is another 1,700 who are soldiers elected to bring their family members over there that are non-command sponsored. So that is really what we have.

We have not achieved the 4,645 as of yet. So that is why, based on the current fiscal environment, I looked at, number one, could we afford more families over there over and beyond the 4,645? And I determined that that is not feasible at this time.

Mrs. DAVIS. Do you have other concerns that that really are affecting the—you know, basically the quality of life for service members that are there? Well, in fact, you wouldn't necessarily—you don't see those numbers getting to that number getting to that level, do you see major differences in terms of their ability to conduct their mission?

General THURMAN. Ma'am, I do not.

I think what makes Korea unique is we have a threat to the north. We have a well-stated mission. And I have not seen a decline in any morale issues. This requires active leaders, leaders that are sensitive to the needs of their service members. And that is where I put my effort, in making sure that if there is any quality-of-life issues, then we quickly try to resolve that.

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay.

And of the people that are—have been deployed—the service members, are there numbers, I guess, maybe at some of the height of some of the deployments that were actually going into Iraq or Afghanistan?

General THURMAN. Yes, ma'am.

We see a lot of returnees from Iraq and Afghanistan. I mean, we are a combat-seasoned force now. And, frankly, we welcome the combat experience over there as we work with our ROK counterparts because that just helps strengthen our capabilities.

Mrs. DAVIS. Have you been able to strengthen any of your service providers in the medical, mental health areas in order to accommodate some of the needs of returning soldiers?

General THURMAN. Yes, ma'am. I have placed a lot of emphasis on that, particularly in regard to any type of PTSD [Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder]. To make sure that one, we have the capabilities there to treat our service members. We've de-stigmatized that, and we are very active with our chaplain's support programs to make sure we are quickly dealing with any service member that may have a problem.

Mrs. DAVIS. Because in their case they are really not able to go out on to the economy essentially when it comes to service providers, is that correct? I mean they really have to stay in the family—

General THURMAN. The medical community does write consultations that go out if there is some specific need, but so far, our capabilities have been very good on the peninsula to take care of our service members and their families.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you very much. Thanks for your service.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Wittman.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Lavoy and General Thurman, thank you so much for joining us today, and thank you for your service.

General Thurman, I thoroughly enjoyed our visit out there to your command. And South Korea was a great opportunity to go there and understand the challenges that you face. And we wanted to make sure that we understood a little bit more about those today.

You speak in your testimony about the North Korean army, the Korean People's Army, having about 800 surface combatants. Can you tell us what are their capabilities and limitations in relation to our fleet structure, our surface combatants that are currently forward-deployed in Japan, and the Japanese maritime self-defense force ships that are also there in the region?

General THURMAN. Congressman Wittman, thanks.

First off, in regard to maritime, the thing that concerns me most out of the 800 combatants are their submarine forces, that the North Koreans possess; particularly the ones in the West Sea, because that is shallow water out there. And that is of concern; and also on the East Sea, so we watch that very carefully. And I could go in more detail in a closed session on that.

Their other maritime capabilities, I think some of that has atrophied, frankly, from what I can tell. The ROK navy maintains a robust patrol capability every day. And some of the things we look at with them is obviously our interoperability with the U.S. 7th Fleet that supports me out of Japan.

And for the Japanese defense forces, I don't have any purview over those forces other than working through Admiral Scott Swift who is the 7th Fleet Commander, but I know he has got a very good relationship with the Japanese as well as the ROK.

Mr. WITTMAN. General, can you tell us what needs do U.S. and ROK forces have in the area of ground attack and air-assault equipment there to support our men and women who serve there?

And also, where are we in relation to manning requirements training and equipment requirements there in the region? And especially looking of there being a cap 28,500 U.S. forces there in the Republic of South Korea, where does that, in relation to our needs—and especially in the area of aviation? I wanted to get your thought on where we are there with those equipment needs, and where we may be adequate or where we may be falling short.

General THURMAN. Congressman Wittman, first off, in regard to aviation forces, we do not have a full combat aviation brigade there. I have asked the Department, as well as the Department of the Army, and back through the PACOM and the joint staff, to look at adding that battalion back that was repositioned out of there to meet requirements for the war in Iraq and Afghanistan.

So I have asked that be relooked; so I would welcome that requirement. And that would help with our helicopter fleet there.

In regard to our overall equipping posture, I feel we are equipped very well. We are getting many of the new pieces of equipment. We just modernized the 2nd Infantry Division with new tanks. We got the best tank this Nation can provide, as well as new Bradley

Fighting Vehicles. The preposition stocks are in good shape; we just issued some of that out as we have Exercise Foal Eagle going on.

So I am confident, in regard to ground capabilities, we are in pretty good shape. I can talk in closed session about precision munitions, and would be more than happy to talk about that and some of the other capability gaps we have.

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Let me ask one final question.

We talk about conventional capabilities, talk about missile threats, let me ask about this: We made a significant investment in special operations forces and also asymmetric warfare capability. Let me ask you: Are we properly positioned from a resources standpoint in that region with our special operations forces and asymmetric warfare capability?

And if not, what do we need to do? And what do you see as the major threats from the special operations and asymmetric side?

General THURMAN. First off, in regard to the special operation forces we have SOCKOR [Special Operations Command Korea] Korea, which is the special operations command there that works side-by-side with the ROK special operating forces. The ROKs have a very good force; we are working with them to continue to improve that. So if we go to war tonight, that is what I have, in addition to what would be flown in from USSOCOM [United States Special Operations Command].

So we are working with the Department on those unique capabilities in regard to U.S. capabilities for soft platforms, as an example. And that is one of the things that, as I did my assessment, that I looked at that I think we need to improve on.

Secondly, in regard to the North Korean asymmetric problems, they have the capabilities to infiltrate. And that is probably one of the biggest worries that I see with what they have with their forces. And they could do that very quickly, whether it be through sleeper cells or whatever. And we can also go into that in more detail in a closed forum.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. BARTLETT. If North Korea were to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile that could carry a nuclear weapon, and was capable of reaching our shores, and they launched it toward our Nation, what would our response be?

Dr. LAVOY. Well sir, I can't speculate on that hypothetical situation. We do not assess that North Korea has that capability today, but we are aware that North Korea is developing both its long-range ballistic-missile capabilities and it has continued to work on its nuclear weapons capabilities.

So it is a future threat we are very concerned about. And the Department is considering the best responses to this.

Mr. BARTLETT. What do you think North Korea expects our response to that would be?

General THURMAN. Congressman, the way I look at this: North Korea uses a coercive strategy, and they use that strategy to get concessions. First off, they will not, I don't believe, give up their capabilities in regard to ballistic missiles because they see that as a means to protect the regime.

In regard to the coercive strategy, we have seen this cycle, where they demand concessions; they don't get what they want, or they get what they want; they antagonize; they provoke; and then they go back into an appease mode. We have watched that on a continuous basis. So my sense is they are going to continue to use that as long as they follow their military-first policy, which I believe goes to protect the Kim family and the whole Communist party there.

Mr. BARTLETT. Isn't there a general perception in this country, in their country, and any other country watching our two nations, that if they launched a ballistic-missile nuclear-armed toward our shores that we would respond in kind?

Is that not a general perception?

General THURMAN. I would just say to you: I don't know what our responses would be right now on that.

Mr. BARTLETT. I am not asking you that, I was asking you what you thought the general perception was among observers of this process between our two countries.

General THURMAN. I can't—

Mr. BARTLETT. Isn't there a general perception that if they launched a nuclear-tipped weapon toward our shores that we would most likely respond in kind?

General THURMAN. I mean, my sense, Congressman, is that is what fuels the anxiety and the concern over the North Koreans having that capability. And it has got to be dealt with in some manner.

Dr. LAVOY. Could I add to that, Congressman Bartlett?

Mr. BARTLETT. Yes.

Dr. LAVOY. I think we have a robust deterrent capability. And we have national capabilities as well as capabilities in the theater that General Thurman commands. And again, it is our policy to deter that kind of behavior that you are talking about.

And while we don't assess that they have the capability that you outline today, which I think you agree with, it is the development of capabilities in this regard is something we are very concerned about.

We maintain a robust deterrent capability to deter that kind of action.

Mr. BARTLETT. And they are aware of that robust deterrent capability. I think that it is very unlikely that even if they had a nuclear weapon capable of reaching our shores that they would launch it towards—why would they need to do that if they could simply put a medium-range missile on a ship and launch from that ship anywhere on our West Coast or our East Coast against which we have little defense, and for which we have little capability of determining for certain who was responsible for it?

Why isn't that the most likely mode of attack from North Korea; if in fact they are interested in attacking us?

Dr. LAVOY. Well Congressman, I think we have to be aware of a whole range of possible attacks or provocative actions that the North Koreans could take.

And over the course of decades of history, they have pursued many different kinds of asymmetric means to provoke the South

and us. So we have to be alive to the full array of threats including the ones you outlined.

Mr. BARTLETT. They are certainly evil, I am not sure they are idiots. Nor do I think that they are collectively suicidal. I think the major threat is the possibility of a launch, which they could do tomorrow, with a tramp steamer, and even a Scud launcher, which they could buy for \$100,000 in the open market.

And any crude nuclear weapon could take out our whole mid-Atlantic area with an EMP, could it not?

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, gentlemen.

The committee will now stand in recess as we move to closed session; and we will reconvene there.

Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 11:37 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MARCH 28, 2012

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 28, 2012

Statement of Hon. Howard P. “Buck” McKeon
Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on
The Security Situation on the Korean Peninsula
March 28, 2012

The House Armed Services Committee meets today to receive testimony about the security situation on the Korean Peninsula. Our witnesses are Dr. Peter Lavoy, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia and Pacific Security Affairs, and General James Thurman, Commander of U.S. Forces Korea.

This is our first opportunity to have a dedicated hearing on this topic, but I cannot think of a more opportune time. The President’s new defense strategy underscores the importance of the larger Asia-Pacific theater. Northeast Asia is a dynamic region of key strategic importance to the global economy, regional stability, and U.S. national security interests. What’s more, the coming year will bring a number of regional leadership transitions—for North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia. And as some may have forgotten, the Korean War isn’t officially over—the peninsula remains divided. It’s home to one of our strongest allies and one of the world’s most militaristic states.

In fact, although the North Korean regime is willing to starve its own citizens, it maintains the world’s fourth largest army. North Korea has more than 1 million active duty personnel and thousands of artillery systems, tanks, armored personnel carriers, aircraft, and surface combatant. More than 70% of North Korea’s combat power is positioned within 90 miles of the Demilitarized Zone. This puts our 28,000 troops and the 24 million citizens of Seoul, the world’s fourth largest city, easily within the erratic regime’s lethal reach.

Last month, the United States and North Korea announced that the regime would stop uranium enrichment and missile testing, and allow international inspectors to return to North Korea’s nuclear facility, in exchange for nutritional aid. But 2 weeks ago, North Korea said they would launch a long-range rocket into space in April—a clear violation of their agreement with the Administration. This is typical behavior shown by the regime—a cycle of provocations and reconciliations designed to get what they want without giving up their nuclear weapons program. It’s becoming clear that the same aggressive, reckless cycle will continue under the new North Korean dictator.

Although the Chinese and Russian governments publicly expressed concerns about the planned missile launch, they have been unable or unwilling to bring their North Korean ally back to the

negotiating table. Meanwhile, there are reports that North Korea and Iran are working together in the production of ballistic missiles.

In contrast, South Korea is a vibrant democratic nation that is one of the world's largest economies and contributes to global security. Just a few days ago, South Korea hosted the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit. Our troops stationed in South Korea form the backbone of our mutual defense treaty, promote regional stability, and protect U.S. national security and economic interests. The readiness and posture of U.S. troops on the peninsula are key to stopping a dangerous regime from destabilizing the region with unwarranted attacks. Dr. Lavoy and General Thurman, we look forward to your testimony shedding light on the range of security matters facing us on the Korean Peninsula.

Statement of Hon. Adam Smith
Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on
The Security Situation on the Korean Peninsula
March 28, 2012

I would like to welcome each of our witnesses and to thank them for appearing before us this morning. General Thurman, Doctor Lavoy, we value your assessments of the security situation on the Korean Peninsula, and I look forward to your testimony.

I also wish to commend those service men and women, whose daily efforts help to maintain the truce on the Korean Peninsula. Their courage and commitment contribute greatly to stability and peaceful progress in the region.

The United States will continue to offer security assurances through its forward military presence in East Asia and the Western Pacific. To that effect, the Department of Defense's new strategic guidance, which highlights a rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region, emphasizes: maintaining existing alliances, expanding cooperative international networks, and cultivating long-term strategic partnerships. Our deep, historic relationships with the Republic of Korea and other regional partners are fundamental to fulfilling each of these strategic priorities. Our relationship with South Korea is also instrumental to promoting mutual prosperity and to realizing the immense potential for growth in the region.

Unfortunately, the North Korean regime continues to defy the international community and to present a serious threat to its neighbors as well as its own long-suffering populace. North Korea's recent pledge to suspend uranium enrichment and its nuclear weapons and long-range missile testing is welcome. However, North Korea's history of rescinding similar promises and resorting to bellicosity, brinkmanship, and open hostility requires that we proceed with caution.

The President has made it clear that North Korea's nuclear weapons aspirations are unacceptable, as is North Korea's proven preference for provocation. The President has also plainly stated that the United States is firmly committed to peace and that it is prepared to improve relations with North Korea. I am hopeful that the new North Korean leadership will take this opportunity to pave a path to lasting peace on the peninsula.

Maintaining our strong and enduring alliance with the Republic of Korea is a national security priority. Together, our two countries are committed to peacefully improving the security situation on the Korean Peninsula. We must provide U.S. Forces Korea with the support it needs to uphold its part of this shared commitment.

I look forward to continuing our dialogue on these and other important issues. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

EMBARGOED UNTIL DELIVERY

Testimony of

**Dr. Peter Lavoy
Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense
Asia and Pacific Security Affairs
Department of Defense**

On

The Security Situation on the Korean Peninsula

Before the

House Armed Services Committee

Wednesday, March 28, 2012

EMBARGOED UNTIL DELIVERY

EMBARGOED UNTIL DELIVERY

Statement for the Record by Peter R. Lavoy
Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense, Asian & Pacific Security Affairs
Department of Defense

Submitted to the
House Armed Services Committee
Wednesday, March 28, 2012, 10:00, 2118 Rayburn HOB

Introduction

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for inviting us here today to discuss the security situation on the Korean Peninsula. General Thurman will provide a detailed assessment of the security landscape on the Peninsula, and I will concentrate on our policy priorities relating to North and South Korea.

For over sixty years, the United States has maintained a presence on the Korean peninsula to deter aggression against the Republic of Korea (ROK) and to fight and win should deterrence fail. More than 36,000 members of the U.S. military gave their lives in support of this mission during the Korean War. Today, the U.S.-ROK Alliance continues to be a cornerstone of U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific region and, at its most basic level, the mission of our Alliance remains the same today as it did six decades ago.

DoD's rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region, as laid out in the Defense Strategic Guidance, is a reaffirmation of our commitment to our ROK ally and our mission on the Korean Peninsula. As President Obama stated during a joint press conference with President Lee in Seoul two days ago, "the United States as a Pacific nation will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its future . . . and the cornerstone of our efforts is our strong alliances, including our alliance with the Republic of Korea." We will continue to strengthen the U.S.-ROK alliance, make our forces in Korea more efficient and effective, and enhance presence, power projection, and deterrence in the region.

North Korea

North Korea's provocative behavior, large conventional military, proliferation activities, and pursuit of asymmetric advantages through its ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction program, including uranium enrichment, continue to present a serious threat to the United States, our Allies, and the region.

It was almost two years ago that North Korea brazenly sank the ROK naval vessel *Cheonan*. That event, coupled with the unprovoked shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010, provides a reminder that Pyongyang is willing to utilize military capabilities with deadly consequences. These incidents demonstrated that the United States and the ROK need to take further steps to bolster deterrence and preserve security.

We are working closely with the ROK Government and armed forces to ensure that responses to any future North Korean provocations are effective, appropriate, integrated into Alliance plans,

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and conducted from an Alliance perspective. Furthermore, through our Extended Deterrence Policy Committee, we meet bi-annually to identify ways in which the full range of Alliance capabilities—including conventional forces, missile defense, nuclear capabilities, strategy, and doctrine—can be leveraged to maximize deterrence.

The potential for a North Korean act of provocation in 2012 remains a major concern. The April 15 centennial commemoration of Kim Il Sung's birth provides a milestone for North Korea to try to show that it has become a so-called "strong and prosperous nation." Similarly, the new leader, Kim Jong Un, is in the process of consolidating power and establishing his legitimacy, perhaps through a provocative act or display of force. The upcoming ROK parliamentary and presidential elections, in April and December, respectively, are opportunities for Pyongyang to disrupt and potentially influence South Korean political outcomes.

Our suspicions about North Korea using its celebrations this year to enhance its strategic weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs were confirmed when North Korea announced on March 16 that it plans to conduct a missile launch between April 12-16. This planned launch is highly provocative because it manifests North Korea's desire to test and expand its long-range missile capability. In addition, the launch, if it occurs, would be in direct violation of Pyongyang's international obligations, including UN Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874, which clearly and unequivocally prohibit North Korea from conducting any launches that use ballistic missile technology.

North Korea's announcement is also troublesome because only two weeks prior, in a February 29 statement after three rounds of bilateral talks, North Korea had agreed to implement a moratorium on long-range missile launches. During those discussions, the United States made it very clear that a satellite launch would be a deal-breaker.

South Korea

Let me now turn to South Korea. Over the last year, the United States and the ROK have sought to transform the Alliance so that it remains a viable and appropriate framework for ensuring security not only on the Korean Peninsula, but also regionally and globally. We frequently consult and coordinate with our ROK counterparts across a variety of issues, with the immediate focus being the preparation for the transfer of wartime operational control and the relocation [within the ROK] of U.S. forces.

To ensure the Alliance remains well-positioned to promote peace and stability for decades to come, our two countries have a comprehensive plan under the Strategic Alliance 2015 framework to transition wartime operational control from the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command to the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff by December 2015. This transition will enable the ROK to take the lead role in the defense of its nation, while maintaining an enduring U.S. defense commitment and capability in support of the ROK.

As part of that effort, and General Thurman will speak to this with more depth, we are working to consolidate and relocate U.S. forces from north of Seoul and the Seoul metropolitan area to centralized locations south of Seoul. The movement of units and facilities to areas south of the

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Han River improves efficiency, reduces costs, contributes to the political sustainability of our forward presence, and enhances force protection and survivability by placing the majority of personnel and equipment outside of the effective range of North Korean artillery.

Although protracted discussions on certain building designs and cost estimates are causing delays on some project components, we are, by and large, on track to complete the realignment and transformation process in a timely fashion.

To address the impending North Korean missile launch—and just as we did last December during the sudden change in North Korean leadership—we are consulting closely with our Allies and partners on responses and next steps, from both the policy and operational perspectives. Although I cannot discuss in detail our military operations, plans or intelligence, I want to emphasize that the two countries are working closely together to monitor threats to international security, and we are ready to respond and defend our mutual interests.

It is important to note that trilateral cooperation among the United States, South Korea, and Japan has emerged as an increasingly important avenue for strengthening security in the Asia-Pacific region. Our trilateral defense relationship is marked by regular high-level policy coordination dialogues and increasing cooperation in the field, such as trilateral maritime exercises and information sharing to strengthen multilateral counter-proliferation, disaster relief, and maritime security initiatives.

Conclusion

North Korea's provocations and disregard of its international commitments are serious matters of strategic concern for us, and we must take appropriate measures to protect ourselves and our Allies. At the same time, the United States and our Allies will not allow North Korea to intimidate us, and we will not provide the regime with the attention it seeks.

Just yesterday, in the midst of all the tension emanating from the North, the ROK successfully concluded the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, which President Obama and over 50 other world leaders attended. In addition to hosting the Summit, the ROK is actively cooperating with efforts related to the Proliferation Security Initiative. Despite the immediate threat that the ROK faces, it is stepping up and demonstrating leadership on a regional and global level.

As the Defense Strategic Guidance states, "we will maintain peace on the Korean peninsula by effectively working with allies and other regional states to deter and defend against provocation from North Korea." We will continue to demonstrate to North Korea that it can serve its people best by ending its isolation and its nuclear weapons program and working towards a constructive framework of relations with its neighbors and the rest of the world.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Smith, and distinguished members of the Committee. I look forward to your questions and hearing your comments or concerns.

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Dr. Peter R. Lavoy

**Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian
and Pacific Security Affairs**



Dr. Peter R. Lavoy is Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs (APSA) and serves concurrently as Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for APSA. He is the principal advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense on international security strategy and policy that relate to the nations and international organizations of Asia and the Pacific, their governments and defense establishments, and for oversight of security cooperation programs, including Foreign Military Sales, in the region.

Previously, he served in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), where he was Director for Analysis from August 2010 through August 2011, Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis from December 2008 through August 2010, Chairman of the National Intelligence Council from December 2008 through July 2009, and National Intelligence Officer for South Asia from October 2007 to November 2008. Prior to joining the ODNI, Dr. Lavoy directed the Center for Contemporary Conflict and taught in the National Security Affairs Department of the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.



Dr. Lavoy has edited several books and written numerous journal articles and book chapters on a wide array of subjects related to South Asian security and weapons proliferation. His edited books are *Over the Horizon Proliferation Threats* (Stanford University Press, forthcoming 2011), *Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict* (Cambridge University Press, 2009), *Terrorism, War, or Disease?: Unraveling the Use of Biological Weapons* (Stanford University Press, 2008), *Nuclear Weapons Proliferation in the Next Decade* (Routledge, 2008), and *Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons* (Cornell University Press, 2000).

Dr. Lavoy served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense in 2000 as Principal Director for Requirements, Plans, and Counterproliferation Policy, and from 1998 to 2000 as Director for Counterproliferation Policy. He received an M.A. and Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley and a B.A. in Government from Oberlin College. He has traveled extensively throughout South Asia and speaks Hindi, Urdu, and French.

STATEMENT OF
GENERAL JAMES D. THURMAN
COMMANDER, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND;
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES-REPUBLIC OF KOREA COMBINED FORCES
COMMAND;
AND COMMANDER, UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA
BEFORE THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
28 MARCH 2012



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I. INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee, it is an honor to provide this statement to you. As the Commander of United Nations Command, United States (U.S.) – Republic of Korea Combined Forces Command (CFC), and United States Forces Korea (USFK), it is a privilege to represent the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Department of Defense Civilians, and their Families, who serve our great nation in the Republic of Korea (ROK). On behalf of these outstanding men and women, I want to thank the Committee for the support it has provided to American forces stationed in the ROK.

The Korean Peninsula is at the nexus of U.S. interests in Northeast Asia. Northeast Asia is host to four of the world's six largest militaries, a quarter of the world's population, and the fastest growing segment of the global economy. U.S. trade with the region exceeds \$750 billion annually, and U.S. direct investment amounts to over \$270 billion. As China rises in importance in diplomatic, informational, military, and economic spheres, it maintains an ambiguous relationship with an isolated North Korean regime in pursuit of a robust nuclear program. Our allies in the region look to the U.S. as the key partner to maintain regional stability and prosperity while upholding international norms and a commitment to democratic values.

Significant leadership change is underway in Northeast Asia this year. This change includes the transition of power to Kim Jong-un in North Korea, recently completed elections in Taiwan, Russia, Japan, and upcoming elections in the ROK as well as expected leadership changes in the People's Republic of China later this year. The uncertainty associated with these changes, compounded by lingering historical animosities, territorial disputes, and competition over access to resources, places us in a dangerously uncertain period as we maintain the 1953

Armistice and remain prepared to defend the ROK, as well as the United States, from North Korean aggression.

The defense of South Korea is enabled by a strong U.S.-ROK Alliance. Born on Korean War battlefields 60 years ago, the Alliance is as solid as ever, serving as the foundation for today's combined military readiness. Combined readiness requires mutual trust, transparency, and close working and training relationships at every level of our military organizations. My former deputy at CFC is now the Chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff. My new deputy commander was the former J3 Operations Officer for the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff. These two men are among the most capable military leaders I have had the honor to serve with. Together, we are guiding U.S. and ROK military leaders and units to work and train closely with one another on a daily basis, and that effort builds combined strength, faith and trust – qualities that are essential for us to successfully accomplish our mission in Korea.

This Alliance commitment to security has been rewarded by sustained economic growth and the opportunity to enhance capabilities for the combined defense of the Korean Peninsula as the ROK increases its regional and international role. Examples of the increased role of the ROK – part of President Lee Myung-bak's *Global Korea* vision – include hosting the 2010 G20 Summit, hosting the Nuclear Security Summit, and providing growing levels of foreign developmental assistance. At the same time, the ROK is challenged by a declining birth rate that puts pressure on its ability to sustain a manpower-intensive conscripted military. For both demographic and economic reasons, and in response to North Korean violent provocations in 2010, the ROK military is proposing fundamental military reforms. These reforms are being discussed within the ROK government and will likely be acted on in the coming year.

As the ROK wrestles with these challenges, and against a backdrop of political change and economic uncertainty, it is imperative we remain steady in our commitment to regional stability through vigilant maintenance of the Armistice and unquestioned military readiness. Our combined, joint team provides the trained, ready, and disciplined forces that are prepared to fight and win on the Korean Peninsula, providing a strong deterrent to North Korean aggression.

II. NORTH KOREA

I believe we are in a very uncertain period on the Korean Peninsula with the possibility of unexpected events leading to miscalculation. North Korea remains the greatest threat to stability in Northeast Asia. Upon the death of Kim Jong-il in December 2011, power transferred to his youngest son, Kim Jong-un, who is believed to be 28 years old. North Korea is economically backward, unwilling to operate as part of the global community, and led by an unpredictable regime that controls a large conventional force and a lethal arsenal of asymmetric capabilities, including weapons of mass destruction.

LEADERSHIP TRANSITION

North Korea is currently undergoing its first leadership transition in 17 years and only the second leadership change in its history. We are watching this transition closely. Two to three years prior to Kim Jong-il's death, Kim Jong-un began a grooming process that included naming him to important posts, giving him the rank of general in the Korean People's Army (KPA), and transferring responsibility to him for management of the country. This transition was cut short by the sudden death of Kim Jong-il. However, prior to his death, the elder Kim had assigned senior members of the KPA and the Korean Workers' Party to Kim Jong-un's inner circle. This group, consisting mostly of regime elites in their 70s and 80s, represents earlier generations of leadership with firm commitments to the state's basic ideology and loyalty to the Kim family.

Having these key figures positioned within Kim Jong-un's inner circle strengthens the new ruler's hand and serves to ease his succession to the regime's top leadership role.

It also appears that the regime is making a concerted effort to capitalize on Kim Jong-un's remarkable resemblance to his late grandfather, Kim Il-sung, North Korea's revered ruler from the post-World War Two era until his death in 1994. State-controlled media images have shown Kim Jong-un with swept-back hair and dressed in Maoist suits very similar to those popularized by Kim Il-sung—a carefully stage-managed effort to help the relatively inexperienced Kim Jong-un garner the same adulation the populace had bestowed upon his grandfather.

To date, the leadership transition appears to be proceeding without discernible internal challenges and with significant Chinese political and economic support. With the Kim Jong-un regime focused on continuity and consolidation of power, there are no indications the regime will depart significantly from Kim Jong-il's policies. In particular, the leadership remains committed to continuing its "military first" policy, which places the country's military in the premier position for resources and maintains its status as the world's most militaristic state. North Korea continues to maintain robust conventional forces vastly disproportionate to its population and defensive security requirements. Even in the face of enormous economic hardship, the regime maintains the fourth largest army in the world. The KPA is over one million strong, with over 13,000 artillery systems, over 4,000 tanks, 2,000 armored personnel carriers, 1,700 aircraft, and 800 surface combatants. More than 70% of its combat power is arrayed within 90 miles of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).

North Korea continues improving its ability to attack the ROK's center of gravity, the capital city of Seoul, the world's 4th largest city with 24 million residents in the greater

metropolitan area accounting for roughly half the population of the country. This is a population larger than New York City living and working within artillery range of North Korea – including approximately 50,000 private U.S. citizens. North Korea threatens Seoul with a mix of conventional artillery, multiple rocket launchers, and ballistic missiles, a significant percentage of which are positioned in protected positions dispersed across the western half of the peninsula. These systems are capable of ranging Seoul without moving, and can deliver both high explosive and chemical munitions with little or no warning. If employed in a provocation, even a limited attack with these systems could cripple the ROK's economy and panic the populace. These same forces threaten outposts along the DMZ and the Northwest Islands. A North Korean attack on these targets, especially if civilian casualties occur, could lead to an escalating series of North Korean and ROK actions and reactions with the potential to lead to broader conflict. North Korea is quick to capitalize on this concern by frequently threatening to launch such attacks.

MILITARY CAPABILITIES

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, North Korean forces have been in relative decline compared to ROK and U.S. forces in the south. The economic and demographic breakdown accompanying the severe famine of the 1990s, particularly the rapid decline in the number of healthy military-age males, has made it difficult to maintain the personnel and equipment readiness of the North's large ground forces. To compensate for this decline and continued improvements in alliance capabilities, North Korea is investing heavily in asymmetric capabilities such as cyber-attack, ballistic missiles, and special operations forces that actively train to infiltrate into the ROK to attack civilian and military targets.

North Korea continues to improve the capabilities of the world's largest special operations force, which includes 60,000 soldiers trained in a variety of infiltration methods such

as overland, undersea, and airborne entry into the ROK. Well trained, well resourced, and extremely loyal to the Kim regime, these forces could cause significant disruptions to ROK governance, utilities distribution, infrastructure operations, and mobilization. North Korea's willingness to employ these forces is well documented, with examples of their use dating as far back as the 1960s and as recently as 2011. Last year's attempted infiltration of an assassination team into the ROK highlights the nature of this threat and North Korea's willingness to use it.

The newest addition to the North Korean asymmetric arsenal is a growing cyber warfare capability. North Korea employs sophisticated computer hackers trained to launch cyber-infiltration and cyber-attacks against the ROK and U.S. Such attacks are ideal for North Korea, providing the regime a means to attack ROK and U.S. interests without attribution, and have been increasingly employed against a variety of targets including military, governmental, educational, and commercial institutions.

North Korea's chemical and biological weapons program is a cause for significant concern. We assess North Korea maintains the capability to manufacture, transport, and deliver a variety of both persistent and non-persistent chemicals, to include nerve, blood, choking, and blister agents. Delivery systems include virtually all North Korean artillery and missile systems. If North Korea employs biological weapons, it could use highly pathogenic agents such as anthrax or plague. In the densely populated urban terrain of the ROK, this represents a tremendous psychological weapon.

NUCLEAR PROGRAM

North Korea continues to expend significant resources in its pursuit of a robust nuclear strike capability despite opposition from the international community. The regime believes nuclear weapons would provide legitimacy, power, and prestige, and we assess the regime will

strongly resist efforts to curtail its nuclear weapons and associated delivery platforms. Coupled with a reliable delivery platform, nuclear weapons would enable the Kim regime to hold South Korean, Japanese, and US interests at risk. In addition, such a capability likely would embolden the regime to act more aggressively with its conventional and asymmetric capabilities. Emboldened by its nuclear program, North Korea has already demonstrated its willingness to conduct lethal provocations using conventional capabilities, such as the 2010 sinking of the ROK naval ship Cheonan that resulted in the deaths of 46 ROK Navy sailors, as well as the shelling of Yeongpyong Island (Y-P Do) that killed two ROK Marines and two ROK civilians in November 2010.

North Korea continues to invest heavily in enhancing its already-robust ballistic missile forces, which represent a growing threat and provide a potential delivery capability for nuclear weapons. North Korea's missiles can strike the ROK and Japan, making the deployment of reinforcements and supplies for U.S. forces difficult in the event of hostilities. North Korea remains focused on enhancing these capabilities, as demonstrated by the 2009 launch of a multi-stage rocket and continuing research and development of systems with increased range and lethality.

For the foreseeable future, we expect North Korea to remain an isolated and dangerous nation, with a large conventional force and significant asymmetric capabilities. North Korea threatens the stability and security of the region and U.S. interests in other parts of the world. Although North Korea is currently focused on efforts to engage the ROK and the U.S., history tells us Pyongyang will shift from diplomatic to provocative behavior when conventional diplomacy has run its course and the North Korean leadership perceives coercive diplomacy offers a better chance to realize its objectives. Currently, the greatest threat remains instability in

North Korea or a provocation that culminates in a broader conflict which could, at its extreme, result in the use of weapons of mass destruction.

III. MY PRIORITIES

The Command mission is to deter external aggression against the ROK and U.S.-ROK Alliance and to promote stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. If deterrence fails, we will decisively defeat external aggression and restore stability on terms favorable to the Alliance. The Command vision is to maintain trained and ready U.S. joint and Alliance combined forces, strengthen the U.S.-ROK Alliance, and provide an operational focus in order to maintain the Armistice in Korea and support the transition to a ROK-led combined defense on the Korean Peninsula in accordance with the Strategic Alliance 2015 plan.

READINESS

Readiness is a key factor in deterring aggression by North Korea and defending the ROK. Trained, ready, and disciplined U.S. joint and Alliance combined commands must be prepared to fight and win, if required to do so. U.S. and ROK forces must be prepared to counter provocations, defeat a North Korean attack on Seoul and the ROK, conduct humanitarian assistance operations, and do so under threat of weapons of mass destruction.

Combined Forces Command and USFK have developed and continue to refine contingency plans that guide the conduct of tough, realistic, combined, and interagency exercises and training. The CFC and ROK military conduct several major exercises every year. The CFC has also added considerable training into its exercise scenarios to improve our ability to defend against North Korean weapons of mass destruction. The CFC and ROK also train to counter North Korean provocations.

Three annual joint and combined exercises warrant special mention: ULCHI FREEDOM GUARDIAN, KEY RESOLVE, and FOAL EAGLE. ULCHI FREEDOM GUARDIAN and KEY RESOLVE are computer-simulated, theater command post exercises conducted by CFC that focus on ensuring readiness for response to provocations, attacks, and instability on the Korean Peninsula. As we approach 2015 and the transition to ROK-led defense of South Korea, these exercises will train the new command and control structure. FOAL EAGLE consists of a series of joint and combined unit tactical level field training events that exercise ground maneuver, air, naval, expeditionary, and special operations capabilities. These events are conducted throughout the Korean Peninsula by off-peninsula units deploying to Korea in order to train with ROK forces.

Force readiness has been strengthened through a significant upgrade to land combat vehicles. New M1A2 Abrams Main Battle Tanks and M2A3 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles now equip the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division and replaced older systems. While this equipment rotation did not increase the number of U.S. combat vehicles on the Korean Peninsula, it did significantly upgrade the combat capability of systems used by the Division. The new vehicles are fitted with improved tracking and fire control systems as well as enhanced armor protection.

The ROK military's posture and capabilities are another key component of readiness that supports the Command's deter and defend mission. Numbering over 600,000 active duty personnel and a large reserve force, it is a modern, capable force that fields an array of advanced weapon systems. The ROK military is led by a professional officer corps and has gained valuable operational experience through deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan, the Gulf of Aden, Lebanon, and participation in a host of United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations. ROK leaders understand the requirements for military readiness. The ROK military

also conducts a realistic and tough exercise program that includes the annual TAEGEUK, HWARANG, and HOGUK exercises.

STRENGTHENING THE U.S.-ROK ALLIANCE

A strong U.S.-ROK Alliance is essential for maintaining combined readiness and warfighting capabilities. As stated in the January 2012 Department of Defense Strategic Guidance document, American relationships with Asian allies and key partners are critical to the future stability and growth of the region. A strong U.S.-ROK Alliance helps ensure a peaceful, secure, and prosperous future for the Korean Peninsula and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Creating and maintaining a strong Alliance comes from building teamwork, mutual trust and confidence. A key element for building teamwork in the Alliance and shaping its future development is the Strategic Alliance 2015 plan.

At the U.S.-ROK Foreign and Defense Minister's Meeting in July 2010, agreement was reached to transition to a ROK-led Alliance defense of the Korean Peninsula. Called Strategic Alliance 2015, the plan synchronizes multiple U.S. and ROK transformation efforts that are designed to build adaptive and flexible capabilities to deter aggression against the ROK and to defeat aggression should it occur. Key elements of the plan include: refining and improving combined defense plans; defining and developing the new organizational structures required for ROK lead during war time; conducting realistic exercises based on the North Korean threat; transition to ROK-led alliance defense on the Korean Peninsula under the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff in December 2015; and repositioning and consolidating U.S. military forces in the ROK under the Land Partnership Plan and Yongsan Relocation Plan.

As agreed to in Strategic Alliance 2015, the Commander of CFC will transfer wartime operational control to the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CFC will be disestablished in

December 2015. The U.S. and ROK will activate complementary commands where the U.S. is in a supporting role to the ROK military. During the transformation process, the U.S. will provide bridging capabilities until they can be replaced by the ROK as it transforms its military from a large, ground-centric conscripted force to a leaner and more advanced and professional force with enhanced capability for operations in Korea and globally. U.S. bridging capabilities are vital to enabling the success of this transformation as the ROK accommodates a declining birthrate that puts pressure on sustaining a manpower-intensive conscripted military. The U.S. will also provide enduring capabilities to the Alliance for key mission areas that include extended deterrence, intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance, precision strike, space operations, and combating weapons of mass destruction.

Existing Alliance structures that ensure unity of effort and planning should be maintained and strengthened as we transition to a ROK-led Alliance defense. Key among these structures is the Military Committee Meeting and Security Consultative Meeting processes that inform and provide guidance to U.S. and ROK warfighting commanders.¹ Similarly, we need to sustain existing Alliance maintenance structures, including the Korea Integrated Defense Dialogue (KIDD) and ROK-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement Joint Committee and associated subcommittees. These Alliance structures provide a whole-of-government approach to addressing Alliance issues.

The ROK continues to provide financial and in-kind support to help offset the cost of stationing U.S. military forces on its territory.² Known as burden sharing contributions, the

¹ Formal members of the Military Committee include the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ROK Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Pacific Command Commander, ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff J5, and the Combined Forces Command Commander. Participation in the Security Consultative Meeting includes the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the ROK Minister of National Defense.

² USFK manages the receipt and expenditure of burden sharing contributions according to provisions established in 10 U.S.C. 2350(g), 10 U.S.C. 2350(j), the Special Measures Agreement, and the Special Measures Agreement Implementation Arrangement.

annual value of these contributions is dictated by terms established in a five-year (2009-2013) Special Measures Agreement (SMA) currently in effect. During calendar year 2012 the ROK will provide USFK with 836 billion won (\$765 million) of support under the SMA. This support will be distributed between three categories: labor (\$307 million; pays salaries and benefits of USFK's Korean national employees); logistics (\$119 million; covers supplies and services); and ROK Funded Construction (\$339 million; used for USFK's military building design and requirements). Contributions help to ensure the Command maintains readiness to deter North Korean aggression. These contributions also build and maintain the infrastructure needed for the long-term U.S. military force presence in the ROK. Burden sharing expenditures also stimulate the ROK economy through the payment of wages to Korean national workers, Korean supply and service contracts, and Korean construction contracts, serving as a source of economic growth for communities that host USFK facilities.

OPERATIONAL FOCUS

Due to the change occurring in Northeast Asia, U.S. military forces located in the ROK must be adaptive, agile, well trained, and ready to satisfy multiple operational demands. USFK is transforming its posture on the Korean Peninsula to maintain a capability optimized and mission focused force. The transformation process is centered on enhancing readiness to successfully accomplish the mission. Our plan is designed to enhance force capability at best value and within cost constraints while simultaneously adhering to existing agreements with the ROK. Further, the plan maintains appropriate quality of life for service members, Department of Defense civilians, and their families stationed in the ROK. During my confirmation hearing last year, I was asked to report back to the Congress on two key Command initiatives: force repositioning and service member tour lengths in Korea.

Repositioning of U.S. Forces in the ROK

Congress expressly asked for my assessment of the two major USFK repositioning plans underway. These plans are the Land Partnership Plan (LPP) and the Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP) which are designed to provide improved readiness at best value to the Alliance. The relocation decision by both the U.S. and ROK governments was prompted by several factors, the foremost of which was better posturing U.S. forces on peninsula. This re-posturing will help accomplish our warfighting mission by improving facilities and consolidating U.S. forces that were previously spread across camps and bases occupied since the Korean War. The plans strengthen mutual trust within the U.S.-ROK Alliance by signaling enduring American commitment. U.S. consolidation of bases contributes to enhanced force protection, survivability, and lower cost for overall force maintenance in Korea as USFK transitions from camps and bases in 107 locations to ultimately less than 50. Upon completion of YRP and LPP, the annual cost for sustainment of U.S. forces in Korea will be reduced from our Fiscal Year 2011 baseline costs. Lastly, and important to our ROK allies, these initiatives will return scarce land, particularly in the city of Seoul, back to the Korean people.

The Land Partnership Plan consolidates most U.S. forces currently in locations north of Seoul to areas south of the capital city and expands infrastructure at Osan Air Base and Camp Mujuk on the East Coast. U.S. Army forces will be concentrated at U.S. Army Garrison (USAG) Humphreys and garrisons in Daegu. Costs associated with the LPP are being shared between the U.S. and ROK.

The Yongsan Relocation Plan will move most forces currently stationed in and around Seoul and Headquarters United Nations Command activities to USAG Humphreys (about 40 miles south of Seoul). Under the YRP, a forward Command element remains in Seoul to

maintain necessary and habitual relationships with the ROK government, U.S. Embassy, and other key organizations and leaders in the capital area. The composition of this command element is under study. This relocation plan was initiated by request of the ROK Government and, as such, the majority of costs associated with this relocation plan are being paid by the ROK. My intent is to posture U.S. forces in a way that ensures the optimal defense of the ROK. I continue to assess the LPP and YRP programs and will carefully coordinate any changes with all stakeholders.

Tour Lengths in Korea

At my confirmation hearing, I was asked to report on my assessment of Tour Normalization in Korea. The Department is not able to afford Tour Normalization at this time and I am content to remain at the currently authorized 4,645 Command Sponsored Families. I am convinced, however, that a change in personnel policies will improve the readiness of USFK by reducing turbulence. We are working with the Department of Defense to examine how individual tour length extensions and unit rotations could help address this readiness issue.

IV. UNITED NATIONS COMMAND

This year marks the 59th year of a continuing cease fire under the Armistice Agreement in Korea. United Nations Command's (UNC) Armistice enforcement responsibilities, authorities, and ties to 16 UNC Member Nations greatly enhance regional stability and security on the Korean Peninsula.

As commander of UNC, I have significant authorities and responsibilities to maintain the Armistice. I am responsible under the Armistice Agreement for determining all access to, and authorizing the activities within, the UNC controlled southern side of the demilitarized zone between the North and South Korea. One example of this is the direct review, authorization, and

supervision, by a multinational UNC team, of the hundreds of personnel and vehicles crossing the DMZ each day between the ROK North-South Transit Office and the Kaesong Industrial Complex in North Korea.

I also institute regulations and procedures as UNC commander that maintain separation of opposing forces to ensure Armistice compliance. Further, I establish uniform Armistice Rules of Engagement applicable to all forces on our side that define the use of force when required. These rules of engagement preserve the inherent right of self-defense while preventing escalation and ensure a rapid return to armistice conditions.

In addition to overseeing DMZ Guard Post inspections, as the UNC commander I also direct special investigations of all suspected Armistice violations, provide UNC observers for ROK live fire exercises on the Northwest Islands, and enforce Armistice compliance and adherence to international standards of conduct. To ensure international transparency and credibility I also invite Swiss, Swedish and Polish observers from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to observe and report their findings on these same Armistice maintenance activities.

Another important role of the UNC Commander is to lead, maintain, and strengthen participation of the 16 Member Nations that make up the UNC. This multinational coalition, established under a United Nations Security Council mandate, continues to provide international legitimacy and transparency to the U.S.-led UNC activities that preserve stability in Korea. In addition, the UNC (Rear) Headquarters in Japan oversees seven UNC-flagged bases in Japan for the transit of UNC aircraft, vessels, equipment, and forces upon notification to the Japanese government. During 2011, Headquarters, UNC (Rear) played a key role in contingency

operations, including Operation TOMODACHI, the disaster relief operation that followed the March 2011 earthquake and ensuing tsunami disaster in Japan.

V. SUMMARY

The Korean Peninsula is a keystone in Northeast Asia, a dynamic region whose global influence is growing and where significant U.S. national interests lie. Uncertainties surrounding leadership changes throughout the region in 2012, and North Korea's nuclear and missile programs, accentuate the security challenges in this region. By maintaining ready U.S. military forces in the ROK, strengthening the U.S.-ROK Alliance, and improving operational focus, the UNC, CFC, and U.S. Forces Korea commands provide a stabilizing presence, promoting stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia as a whole. I am extremely proud of the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Department of Defense Civilians, and their Families serving our great nation in the ROK. Your support for them and the U.S.-ROK Alliance is both critical and greatly appreciated. I look forward to continuing to work with the Congress to address the security issues we face on the Korean Peninsula. Thank you.

Commander UNC/CFC/USFK

General James D. Thurman



A native of Marietta, Oklahoma, General Thurman earned his commission through ROTC at East Central Oklahoma University in 1975. His first three commands were in Germany where he led a troop in the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, the 2nd Squadron, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment; followed by the 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment, 3rd Infantry Division. He then commanded 2nd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division at Fort Stewart, Georgia. His next assignment was as the Commander, Operations Group at the National Training Center and later as the Commanding General. He then commanded 4th Infantry Division at Fort Hood, Texas and Baghdad, Iraq. He also commanded V Corps in Germany. He most recently served as Commander, United States Army Forces Command.

General Thurman has significant Army and Joint staff experience, including Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Plans and Policy (J5), Allied Forces Southern Europe, Regional Command South in Italy; Director of Training, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, Headquarters, Department of the Army; Chief, Operations, Coalition Forces Land Component Command, C3, in Kuwait; Director, Army Aviation Task Force, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, Headquarters, Department of the Army; and Deputy Chief of Staff, G3/5/7, Headquarters, Department of the Army.

He has extensive operational combat experience. His combat assignments were as a battalion executive officer in the 1st Cavalry Division during Desert Shield/Storm from 1990-91; the Chief of the Plans and Policy Division for Allied Forces Southern Europe in Kosovo from 1999-2000; the Chief of Operations, C3, for the Coalition Forces Land Component Command during the invasion of Iraq from 2002-03; and the Multi-National Division Commander responsible for all coalition operations in Baghdad in 2006.

General Thurman holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in History from East Central Oklahoma University and a Master of Arts in Management from Webster University. He has attended numerous military schools and is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College and the Army War College.

His military awards and decorations include the Distinguished Service Medal (two oak leaf clusters), the Defense Superior Service Medal (one oak leaf cluster), the Legion of Merit (three oak leaf clusters), the Bronze Star Medal (one oak leaf cluster), the Meritorious Service Medal (five oak leaf clusters), the Army Commendation Medal and the Army Achievement medal (three oak leaf clusters). General Thurman is a Senior Aviator and has earned the Combat Action Badge, the Parachutist Badge, the Army Staff Identification Badge and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge.

General Thurman assumed command of United Nations Command, Republic of Korea – United States Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces Korea on July 14, 2011.

**WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING**

MARCH 28, 2012

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN

General THURMAN. The total estimated cost for the Yongsan Relocation Program is \$7 billion. The total estimated cost for the Land Partnership Plan is \$3.7 billion. [See page 14.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

MARCH 28, 2012

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

Mr. LANGEVIN. How are cyber operations and cybersecurity factored into USFK's Theater Security Cooperation Plans?

Dr. LAVOY. USFK and the Department's Chief Information Officer have been working with the Republic of Korea to strengthen military-to-military cooperation on cybersecurity and information assurance. In conjunction with our Cyber Policy office, they have met with ROK officials in recent months to advance cyber cooperation and to ensure that these issues are discussed at senior bilateral forums.

Mr. LANGEVIN. I am very concerned about the capabilities of our bases on the peninsula to withstand a cyberattack directed against outside supporting infrastructure, such as the electrical grid. I have had conversations with Secretary Panetta, General Dempsey, and others before this committee about our resilience in the face of such a threat. Have you examined the ability of our bases in Korea to operate and recover in the event of such an attack?

General THURMAN. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. LANGEVIN. The cyber landscape is a dynamic one that continues to evolve at an alarming rate. Can you describe the cyberthreat landscape within USFK? What cybertrends are you seeing and which of these trends keep you up at night?

General THURMAN. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER

Mr. TURNER. What will the reaction of the United States be to North Korea illegally—per UN Security Council resolutions—launching this missile? Will the U.S. take steps to intercept it, as Japan has indicated it may do? Or will the Administration lead from behind and merely watch it fly by?

Dr. LAVOY. The United States had assets in place to track the missile launch; at no time was it oriented to threaten the U.S. homeland. Following this launch, which was in violation of UN Security Council resolutions, the United States has responded firmly by obtaining a swift and strong condemnation from the UN Security Council reflected in a Security Council Presidential Statement, and by the Security Council directing that existing sanctions be strengthened through specific actions to be taken to adjust the measures imposed by the UN Security Council resolutions 1718 and 1874. We have made clear to the new regime in North Korea that further provocations will lead to further actions by the United States and the international community.

Mr. TURNER. Have you had any discussions with your South Korean counterparts concerning South Korean Government scientists reporting that North Korea may have conducted two clandestine nuclear weapons tests in 2010? What do you make of their reports? Have you been briefed by the U.S. Intelligence Community on these tests? I am concerned because, after almost 3 years, we still can only identify North Korea's 2009 nuclear test as a "probable nuclear test" suggesting we have not been able to secure sufficient evidence to conclusively identify it as a nuclear weapons test. This seems to be a critical capability to understand the state of North Korea's nuclear weapons development, including its ability to miniaturize a weapon and mount it on a ballistic missile.

Dr. LAVOY. I have extensive conversations with the Intelligence Community and place full faith in their judgments regarding North Korean nuclear testing. I am confident that North Korea did not conduct a nuclear test in 2010. I will continue to ensure that the Department of Defense is well-positioned to monitor, collect, and analyze any future North Korean nuclear events.

Mr. TURNER. What will the reaction of the United States be to North Korea illegally—per UN Security Council resolutions—launching this missile? Will the U.S. take steps to intercept it, as Japan has indicated it may do? Or will the Administration lead from behind and merely watch it fly by?

General THURMAN. The 13 April 2012 North Korean missile launch failed, dropping debris throughout the seas west of the Korean Peninsula and causing no harm to people or property.

With consideration of our capabilities, United States Forces Korea (USFK)—along with our Korean allies—are prepared to defend the Republic of Korea (ROK) against an errant launch or any other concurrent or subsequent provocation. In preparing for the 13 April 2012 North Korean missile launch, USFK primarily supported the U.S. response via intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.

Actions taken against future missile launches will depend on our capabilities and guidance from national leadership. A key factor will be the level of threat posed by the North Korean missile launch to U.S. territory and our allies.

Mr. TURNER. Have you had any discussions with your South Korean counterparts concerning South Korean Government scientists reporting that North Korea may have conducted two clandestine nuclear weapons tests in 2010? What do you make of their reports? Have you been briefed by the U.S. Intelligence Community on these tests? I am concerned because, after almost 3 years, we still can only identify North Korea's 2009 nuclear test as a "probable nuclear test" suggesting we have not been able to secure sufficient evidence to conclusively identify it as a nuclear weapons test. This seems to be a critical capability to understand the state of North Korea's nuclear weapons development, including its ability to miniaturize a weapon and mount it on a ballistic missile.

General THURMAN. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO

Ms. BORDALLO. As the U.S. enhances its military presence in the Asia-Pacific region and Guam prepares to receive the Marine Corps Forces from Okinawa, how important is Guam's role in assisting the USFK in fulfilling their mission in the Korean Peninsula? How does the overall realignment of forces in the Asia-Pacific region enhance our ability to respond to contingencies on the Korean Peninsula?

Dr. LAVOY. The Department is committed to establishing Guam as a strategic hub in the Asia-Pacific region, including an operational, deployable Marine Corps presence there. Guam, as the western-most U.S. territory, will enable power projection across a range of platforms, ensuring efficient response options across a wide range of scenarios. This presence is consistent with our strategy to have an operationally resilient, geographically distributed, and politically sustainable force posture throughout the region and will enhance our ability to meet our treaty commitments and respond effectively to the entire range of contingencies.

Ms. BORDALLO. With Kim Jong-un now in power, can you expound on the progress we made, if any, in reference to the six-nation denuclearization talks?

Dr. LAVOY. Our exploratory talks with North Korea were designed to probe the intentions of its new leadership. The President has been clear that he is prepared to engage constructively with North Korea. However, he has also insisted that North Korea live up to its own commitments, adhere to its international obligations, and deal peacefully with its neighbors. North Korea's decision to launch a ballistic missile violates the moratorium agreement announced on February 29, 2012, and violates UN Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874.

Ms. BORDALLO. With a young dictator in power in North Korea, what impact, if any, may this cause in South Korea assuming wartime operational controls of the ROK forces by 2015? What challenges remain in achieving this goal?

General THURMAN. The recent transition of power in North Korea will not impact Republic of Korea (ROK)—U.S. agreements to transfer wartime operational control in 2015. The bilaterally agreed upon Strategic Alliance 2015 Plan carefully lays out a plan that ensures adequate capabilities on the part of the ROK to lead the warfight, including a U.S. agreement to bridge any shortfalls (U.S. Bridging Capabilities) pending full acquisition of that capability by the ROK. Additionally, the U.S. has agreed to provide specific capabilities (U.S. Enduring Capabilities) that will contribute to the support of the defense of Korea for the duration of Alliance. While not yet complete, the critical steps needed to be taken to achieve the goal of South Korea assuming wartime operational control of the ROK forces by 2015 are well under way.

Ms. BORDALLO. As the U.S. enhances its military presence in the Asia-Pacific region and Guam prepares to receive the Marine Corps Forces from Okinawa, how important is Guam's role in assisting the USFK in fulfilling their mission in the Korean Peninsula? How does the overall realignment of forces in the Asia-Pacific region enhance our ability to respond to contingencies on the Korean Peninsula?

General THURMAN. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS

Mr. FRANKS. DIA Director LTG Ronald Burgess has warned us that North Korea may already have plutonium-based nuclear warheads that can be delivered by ICBM. Other experts have noted that nuclear tests carried out in 2009 by North Korea are consistent with development of a low-yield “super-EMP”, or electromagnetic pulse, device. What is your current assessment of their development of plutonium weapons including a super-EMP device and related launch delivery technology?

General THURMAN. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. FRANKS. The FY12 NDAA requires the Department of Defense to submit by November 1, 2012, a report on current and future military and security developments in North Korea. The report should address, among other things, the current and probable future course of military-technological development of the North Korean military. Can you provide assurances that an assessment of North Korea’s EMP-producing capabilities will be included in this report?

General THURMAN. Efforts are currently under way in the Department of Defense to develop this report, in coordination with the United States Pacific Command, United States Forces Korea, and the Intelligence Community. I will have to defer to the Department of Defense over the specific contents of the report and whether North Korea’s EMP capability will be addressed in the final report or not.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY

Mr. CONAWAY. Can you expound on any proliferation of technology from North Korea to countries in the Middle East?

Dr. LAVOY. North Korea has a record of global proliferation, including to countries in the Middle East. International enforcement of UN Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874, and counterproliferation capacity building through the Proliferation Security Initiative, have improved our ability to impede North Korea’s proliferation activities.

Mr. CONAWAY. Potential miscommunication between North Korean actions and South Korean or U.S. actions can pose a very real threat of action. In these cases, clear, concise communication between nations can play a key role in averting or diffusing any impending disaster. What are you doing at your level to make certain North Korea doesn’t take irreversible military action based on incorrect conclusions surrounding U.S. or South Korean activities on or around the peninsula?

General THURMAN. United States Forces Korea works very closely with the Republic of Korea to enhance deterrence and reduce the prospects for miscalculation. My command engages in a concerted strategic communications effort designed to enhance transparency and minimize miscalculation. We do this via multiple means including the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission and Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom.

Mr. CONAWAY. Based on history and your experience with North Korea, can you draw any parallels between present-day North Korea and a nuclear Iran, should Iran succeed in obtaining the nuclear capability that they are pursuing?

General THURMAN. Both North Korea and Iran are pursuing nuclear weapons as a means to safeguard the existing regimes from overthrow by external means. The possession of a nuclear capability will also provide each regime with a tool of extortion to use against its adversaries. However, while Iran is pursuing a nuclear capability from a position of strength, North Korea is pursuing this capability from a position of weakness. Nuclear weapons would solidify Iran’s position as the dominant regional military power in the Middle East. For North Korea, nuclear weapons would not change the fact that its relative position against China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States is weak, although it does provide North Korea with another tool with which to extort aid from the international community. Regardless of similarities or differences, having either country achieve a viable nuclear weapons capability is not in the best interest of the United States.