[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
NORTH KOREA AFTER KIM JONG-IL:
STILL DANGEROUS AND ERRATIC
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 18, 2012
__________
Serial No. 112-149
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
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http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ELTON GALLEGLY, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey--
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California deceased 3/6/12 deg.
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
RON PAUL, Texas ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
MIKE PENCE, Indiana GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
JOE WILSON, South Carolina RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
CONNIE MACK, Florida ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas DENNIS CARDOZA, California
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
DAVID RIVERA, Florida CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas KAREN BASS, California
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
ROBERT TURNER, New York
Yleem D.S. Poblete, Staff Director
Richard J. Kessler, Democratic Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Mr. Frederick H. Fleitz, Managing Editor, LIGNET.com, Newsmax
Media (former CIA Intelligence Officer and former Chief of
Staff, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International
Security, U.S. Department of State)............................ 8
Michael Green, Ph.D., Senior Advisor and Japan Chair, Center for
Strategic and International Studies............................ 20
Mr. Scott Snyder, Senior Fellow for Korea Studies, Director of
the Program on U.S.-Korea Policy, Council on Foreign Relations. 29
Patrick M. Cronin, Ph.D., Senior Advisor & Senior Director of the
Asia Program, Center for a New American Security............... 38
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Mr. Frederick H. Fleitz: Prepared statement...................... 10
Michael Green, Ph.D.: Prepared statement......................... 22
Mr. Scott Snyder: Prepared statement............................. 31
Patrick M. Cronin, Ph.D.: Prepared statement..................... 40
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 64
Hearing minutes.................................................. 65
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 67
NORTH KOREA AFTER KIM JONG-IL:
STILL DANGEROUS AND ERRATIC
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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 18, 2012
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o'clock a.m.,
in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. The committee will now come to
order. Welcome to my fellow members of the committee, and of
our distinguished panel of witnesses who are joining us today.
After recognizing myself and the ranking member, my good
friend from California, Mr. Berman, for 7 minutes each for our
opening statements, I will recognize the chairman and the
ranking member of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific for
3 minutes, followed by 1-minute statements from each committee
member who wishes to speak.
We will then hear from our witnesses, and I would ask that
you summarize your prepared statements to 5 minutes each before
we move to the questions and answers with members under the 5-
minute rule.
Without objection, the prepared statements of all of our
witnesses will be made a part of the record, and members may
have 5 legislative days in which to insert statements and
questions for the record, subject to the length limitations in
the rules.
The Chair now recognizes herself for 7 minutes.
Today we will examine the tumultuous events that have again
consumed the Korean Peninsula. In a sense, negotiating with
North Korea is similar to the endless repetition presented in
the film Groundhog Day. Withdrawal from negotiations is
followed by provocative action. Next, there is a wooing by the
United States and its allies, with concessions offered. Then, a
so-called breakthrough deal. Finally, another betrayal, often
in the form of a missile launch or the disclosure of a secret
nuclear operation.
It was so with the Clinton administration, with the George
W. Bush administration, and thus it has come to pass, as well,
with the Obama administration. President Clinton's agreed
framework ended with the disclosure of Pyongyang's highly
enriched uranium program. President Bush's attempt at
rapprochement, including the removal of North Korea from the
list of state sponsors of terrorism, which I adamantly opposed,
was met with the construction of a secret nuclear reactor in
Syria, which Israel thankfully destroyed.
And then, yet another betrayal. The Obama administration is
confronted with the abject failure of its Leap Day deal on
February 29th with North Korea, and has refused to send
witnesses who were privy to the Beijing negotiations to testify
today at our hearing.
Old Kim, Kim Jong-Il, had of course responded to President
Obama's inaugural overture of an outstretched hand by
kidnapping two U.S. journalists, firing a missile, setting off
a nuclear weapon, sinking a South Korean naval vessel, and
shelling a South Korean island. His son, Kim Jong-Un, seems
fully intent on fulfilling the old adage that the apple doesn't
fall far from the tree. He has already tried a failed missile
launch, and may be plotting yet a third nuclear test.
The U.N. Security Council issued a presidential statement
condemning the April 13th missile launch as a serious violation
of Security Council Resolutions 1718, and 1874. No real
consequences for North Korea's flagrant violation and action
that threaten global peace and security.
While the missile blew up soon after leaving the launch
pad, as all of us know, it is said that, in international
relations, measuring intent is just as important as measuring
capability. North Korea's rhetoric should have told our
negotiators all they needed to know. The military-first policy
of starving the people to feed the army and supply the
munitions industry remains. The South Korean Defense Ministry
estimated this month that the North Koreans spent $850 million
on the failed missile launch, enough to buy corn to feed the
entire population for an entire year. Politics in North Korea
remains all about the Kim dynasty and its needs, not about
either the concerns of the United States or the welfare of the
Korean people.
A particularly unfortunate result of the Leap Day agreement
was the combining of discussions of nuclear disarmament and
food assistance at the same negotiating table. This was a
departure from the approach of both the Clinton administration
and the Bush administration, which held to the Reagan doctrine
that a hungry child knows no politics. It also led to a highly
embarrassing reversal on the food aid decision following the
missile launch, even as administration officials insisted that
there was no direct linkage between food assistance and the
failed negotiations.
Our distinguished panel of experts can shed light today on
whether succession from the old Kim to the young Kim has really
changed anything in North Korea, or is it merely an old Kim in
a new uniform? Further, there is the pressing issue of how we
should respond to future provocation, including another nuclear
test. We also wish to examine how we should go forward in
addressing the simmering North Korean crisis: A rogue state, in
possession of nuclear weapons, working on delivery capability,
engaged in murky proliferation activities with opponents of the
United States and south Asia.
The young general at Sunday's military parade gave every
indication that trouble lies just ahead with North Korea.
Dressed in a dark Mao suit, he viewed tanks, missiles, and
goose-stepping troops as they paraded through North Korea's
capital in a celebration of the hundredth anniversary of his
grandfather's birth. In his first public remarks since assuming
power, the young Kim bombastically warned that ``the days of
enemies threatening and blackmailing us with nuclear weapons
are forever over.''
The new Kim looks and acts suspiciously very much like the
old Kim. Here is a brief video clip, that will just take us a
few seconds to line up, of the Cold War military parade held on
Sunday in Pyongyang that clearly illustrates the nature and the
priorities of the North Korean regime.
If we could show the clip?
[Whereupon, a video was played.]
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. And now I am
pleased to turn to my good friend, the ranking member of our
committee, Mr. Berman of California, for his opening statement.
Mr. Berman. Well, thank you very much, Madam Chairman, for
calling a very timely hearing. It is interesting to note,
before I begin my opening statement, that the parade that we
just saw that clip from showed a truck carrying a North Korean
missile that looked very much, it is reported, like a similar
Chinese truck. There are U.N. resolutions regarding the exports
of arms to North Korea at this point.
Anyway, Pyongyang's failed missile launch, which is a clear
violation of U.N. Security Council Resolutions, and carried out
in defiance of strong international pressure, demonstrates that
North Korea, under Kim Jong-Un, is essentially the same as when
it was ruled by his father and grandfather.
Indeed, North Korean leaders have shown a remarkable
consistency in reneging on commitments regarding their nuclear
and missile programs, the latest being the February 29 Leap Day
agreement. With the possibility of another nuclear test on the
horizon, Pyongyang has shown its clear preference for
provocative and destabilizing behavior. President Reagan
famously remarked that, when dealing with the Soviet Union, we
should trust but verify. With regard to North Korea, he might
have said, ``Never trust, and never cease to verify.''
The fundamental questions before us today are, how can the
United States and the rest of the world change the North's
behavior? Is change even possible? And if not, then what should
be the appropriate course of action to mitigate the North
Korean threat? Successive Presidents, both Republican and
Democratic, as the chairman pointed out, have pursued a policy
of ``tough engagement,'' with Pyongyang. Given North Korea's
proclivity to break agreements before the ink has dried, does
it make sense to continue this approach? If not, what is the
alternative? Are there additional sanctions we could place on
North Korea that would change their behavior, and does it make
sense to tie food aid to specific actions taken by the North?
At a minimum, I believe the U.S. should do everything
possible to ensure that existing U.N. Security Council
Resolutions on North Korea are fully implemented, and I welcome
the recent Security Council presidential statement, indicating
that additional entities involved in North Korea's
proliferation activities will be sanctioned in the coming days.
We must also continue to coordinate closely with our South
Korean and Japanese allies on how to best address the North
Korean threat, while maintaining a robust U.S. military
presence in those countries.
By virtue of history and geography, China remains one of
the few nations with some leverage over North Korea.
Regrettably, Beijing has been unwilling to use that leverage to
persuade Pyongyang to change course. While China may have
expressed its displeasure with the North's recent missile
launch, the fact remains that Beijing serves as Pyongyang's
economic lifeline, sending food and fuel to prop up the North
Korean regime, and luxury goods to satisfy the North Korean
elite.
China continues to play this role because Beijing fears a
flood of refugees from an unstable North Korea more than a
North Korea armed with ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons.
My guess is that Beijing also likes having a buffer between
itself and South Korea, a strong U.S. ally. But by enabling the
North Korean regime's reckless and aggressive behavior, which
threatens regional stability, China ends up undermining its own
security calculus.
And just what kind of regime is China backing? For the
North Korean people, life under the young Kim is as bleak as
ever, with the average citizen enjoying no real political,
religious, or personal freedoms. Hundreds of thousands of North
Korean political prisoners remain imprisoned in gulags. Others
endeavor to escape by any means possible, even if it means
crossing into China, where many refugees are forced into
prostitution and hard labor.
Despite the North's efforts to appear ``strong and
prosperous'' this year, to celebrate the hundredth birthday of
the country's founder, vast numbers of North Koreans continue
to face starvation. Sadly, the North Korean regime's misguided
priorities, pouring hundreds of millions of dollars into its
so-called space program, its nuclear programs, and its massive
military, only underscore its cold-hearted callousness and
blatant disregard for its own people. Chinese willingness to
support such a wicked regime casts a dark shadow on Beijing's
own international reputation.
I thank the panel of experts for being here this morning,
and look forward to their thoughts on how to make our policy
toward North Korea more effective. I yield back.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Berman. And
taking Mr. Manzullo's spot, we will give 3 minutes to Mr.
Royce, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Mr. Berman was just
talking about the magnitude of the human rights abuses there.
In terms of the numbers, this is the worst human rights abuser
on the planet. And for any of us in these hearings who have
heard the testimony or met up with defectors in China or in
South Korea, it is truly appalling.
Now, when you think about the cost of this launch, at least
a $0.5 billion cost to this launch--I have been in North
Korea--there is no way that regime could squeeze pennies out of
the populace in North Korea. To get this hard currency
requires, for the most part, a funding source outside of the
country. And frankly, if China were bothered by North Korea's
ICBMs, if it were bothered by North Korea's dual-track nuclear
program, it would stop subsidizing them. It would stop funding
these operations.
A policy of tackling North Korea's illicit activities,
which brings money from outside the country, whether it is the
sale of their meth and heroin--they do a lot of that--or it is
the sale of their missile programs, and bringing the hard
currency back from that program, that is the way to weaken the
regime.
And, as we will hear today, until it was dropped in favor
of an alternative course of action in 2006, the Treasury
Department went after North Korea's funds parked in Macau bank,
attacking its counterfeiting, attacking its other illicit
activities through the Proliferation Security Initiative.
If you will recall, on the high seas, many of these ships
were stopped. It cut off the flow of currency into the regime,
and that prevented--for a while--the government from paying its
generals. It prevented for a while--according to the defectors
we talked to, the missile program shut down. They couldn't buy
gyroscopes on the black market for their missiles. I guess
Japan had manufactured some gyroscopes, and you pay a premium
on the black market to get those. They could no longer fund
that, so for 8 months that program was shut down, until we
reversed course and the money began to course back through the
veins, back into the regime.
And this is what their head propagandist who defected to
the United States told us. The number one goal is to get access
to hard currency. For what purpose? To fund their nuclear
program and their ICBM program. So it would require some
energy, it would require some creativity, some focus. And I
would say that that has been disturbingly absent to date in
terms of how we address this problem. But for those of us----
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Mr. Royce [continuing]. That would want to see a long-term
solution to it, I think cut off the flow of illicit activities,
look at what we did with Banco Delta Asia in terms of
reinforcing that type of discipline, cut off the funding, and
begin the process of the right kind of----
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Mr. Royce [continuing]. Broadcasts into North Korea to
begin the process of change internally.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Royce. Mr.
Ackerman is recognized.
Mr. Ackerman. I thank the chair. I think you kids have got
it covered.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Mr. Manzullo is
recognized.
Mr. Manzullo. Thank you, Madam Chair, for calling this
important hearing regarding North Korea and the future of the
Korean Peninsula.
North Korea after Kim Jong-Il will remain just as dangerous
and unstable as it was under his leadership. The glimmer of
hope, no matter how minuscule, that Kim's successor, his son
Kim Jong-Un, would pick a brighter path for his people, faded
with last week's failed missile launch. Denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula remains a goal that the U.S. and the six-party
partners must strive for. However, given North Korea's erratic
behavior recently and over the course of the past several
years, the goal of denuclearization seems further away than
ever before.
I commend the administration for halting assistance to the
North, and I encourage the President and the Secretary of State
to stand firm against any further destabilizing actions.
Furthermore, if North Korea proceeds with testing a nuclear
weapon, as they likely may do if prior behavior is any
indicator, then all members of the six-party talks must
forcefully condemn this behavior.
The future of North Korea is bleak, and it is the people of
North Korea that will bear the unimaginable hardship of Kim
Jong-Un's tyranny. It is my firm belief that North Korea will
never give up its nuclear weapons, because it is the weapons
themselves that the regime is using to maintain its iron grip
there.
I hope our distinguished witnesses today will address the
human rights tragedy, particularly as it relates to any
possible negotiation with North Korea in the future. Madam
Chair, again, thank you for calling this hearing. I look
forward to hearing the testimony of our witnesses.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Manzullo.
Thank you for your attendance, always. Ms. Bass is recognized.
Ms. Bass. Thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen and Ranking
Member Berman, for holding this hearing. Over more than five
decades, the U.S. has strengthened its alliance and bolstered a
lasting relationship with South Korea. Efforts, however, to
achieve peace with North Korea have proven elusive and globally
frustrating. With the passing of one leader and the emergence
of another, now more than ever the United States must hold
North Korea accountable for its actions, which continue to
undercut peace and reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula.
I had the opportunity to go to the demilitarized zone, and
looking at the--I don't know, it seemed almost like a scene out
of history, looking back to the 1950s, at the level of tensions
between the North and the South. And I am looking forward to
comments that the panel might have about the new leader.
The world recently watched as North Korea failed to launch
a rocket that many believe will be used to wage war. Events
like this shed lights on the reality of the North and a society
where many live in fear. Thank you for coming today.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. Mr. Chabot, the
chairman of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia,
is recognized.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you for
calling this timely hearing. Since the Obama administration
came to office, its foreign policy has been characterized by
so-called engagement. The President has defined this policy as
extending an outstretched hand, in the hopes that the mere
gesture would cause some of the world's most brutal dictators
to unclench their fists.
The administration's engagement efforts with Bashar al-
Assad of Syria, the brutal regime in Tehran, for example--those
two are probably the best examples--have been complete
failures. At best, they have not achieved their objectives, and
at worst they have, in the eyes of the people in those
countries, allied us with the regimes that brutalize them.
As Einstein noted, insanity is doing the same thing over
and over again and expecting different results. And yet, that
appears to be precisely what this administration has been doing
in North Korea, as well as in the Mideast. As soon as one
dictator passed, Kim Jong-Il, this administration leapt at the
opportunity to engage with his son, Kim Jong-Un, who appears to
be a chip off the old block. This has not worked, it will not
work, and it should be reversed.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Chabot. And
now I am pleased to recognize and introduce our panelists.
We will first hear from Frederick Fleitz--did I do that,
more or less? Fleitz. He is currently the director of the
Langley Intelligence Group Network. He served as a senior
analyst with the CIA for almost two decades prior, and was
Chief of Staff to John Bolton, then Under Secretary of State
for Arms Control and International Security. To top off his
distinguished career in government service, he became a
professional staff member with the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence in 2006, acting as a senior advisor
to our good friend, Committee Chairman Pete Hoekstra. Welcome
back.
Then I would like to welcome Dr. Michael Green, a senior
advisor and the Japan chair at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies. Dr. Green previously served as Special
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and
Senior Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security
Council in the George W. Bush administration. He originally
joined the NSC in 2001 as Director of Asian Affairs.
I would then welcome Mr. Scott Snyder, thank you, a Senior
Fellow for Korean Studies and Director of the Program for U.S.-
Korea policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. Prior to CFR,
Mr. Snyder was a Senior Associate in the International
Relations Program of the Asia Foundation, where he founded and
directed the Center for U.S.-Korea Policy and served as the
Asia Foundation's representative in Korea from the years 2000
to 2004.
And finally, we welcome Patrick Cronin. He is a Senior
Advisor and Senior Director of the Asia Pacific Security
Program at the Center for a New American Security. Previously,
Dr. Cronin was the Director of the Institute for National
Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, and has
had a 25-year career inside government and academic research
centers.
Thank you. We welcome our panelists today. I ask that our
witnesses please keep your presentation to no more than 5
minutes. And without objection, the witnesses' entire
statements, written statements, will be inserted into the
hearing record.
So we will begin with Mr.----
Mr. Fleitz. Fleitz.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Fleitz. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF MR. FREDERICK H. FLEITZ, MANAGING EDITOR,
LIGNET.COM, NEWSMAX MEDIA (FORMER CIA INTELLIGENCE OFFICER AND
FORMER CHIEF OF STAFF, UNDER SECRETARY FOR ARMS CONTROL AND
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE)
Mr. Fleitz. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Ranking Member
Berman, members of the committee. It is an honor to be here
today. And Mr. Chandler, it is a special honor to be----
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Could you put that microphone a
little closer?
Mr. Fleitz. Sorry. It is a special honor to see you here
today. I enjoyed working with you on the House Intelligence
Committee staff. My name is Fred Fleitz, and I am Managing
Director of the Langley Intelligence Group Network, a
Washington, DC-based global forecasting and intelligence
service, and I formerly worked for the CIA and the State
Department.
My remarks today will focus on North Korea's WMD and rocket
program. Last week's multi-stage rocket launch that North Korea
claims was intended to lift a satellite into orbit but was
probably a test of an ICBM surprised some experts and U.S.
diplomats. However, this launch was consistent with past North
Korean behavior.
Although it may seem counterproductive, coming just weeks
after a food aid deal was reached with the United States, North
Korea has done this before, apparently in the wrongheaded
belief that provocations strengthen its ability to prevail in
future diplomatic talks. There has been a cycle of apparent
North Korean agreements, followed by provocations, cooling-off
periods, and then new agreements. Pyongyang has learned that,
no matter how badly it acts, the United States will eventually
come back to the negotiating table, usually with new
concessions.
It is possible that last week's missile launch was intended
to test American resolve. Since the February 29th food deal
with the United States was quite generous and placed limited
restrictions on the North Korean nuclear program, Pyongyang may
have been tempted to see how far it could push Washington.
North Korea may have believed, with the United States
distracted by Afghanistan and Iran, U.S. officials would be
reluctant to confront Pyongyang over the missile launch.
It is worth noting that international reaction to the
launch was fairly weak. The U.N. Security Council this week was
only able to pass a non-binding Presidential Statement, the
usual response when the United States and its allies cannot get
past Russian and Chinese vetoes. Despite speeches by U.S.
officials condemning the launch, the United States is aware
that the U.N. response was mild, and probably believes U.S.
envoys will ask to meet with it again soon.
North Korea angrily responded to the Security Council's
action and U.S. statements, but we don't yet know whether this
was face-saving bravado or a real effort to ratchet up
tensions. It does seem clear, however, from its recent
statements, that North Korea plans more rocket launches.
Some experts are complaining that past practice in
intelligence suggests North Korea could follow up last week's
rocket launch with a nuclear test. I am reluctant to make such
a prediction for a number of reasons I outline in my prepared
testimony. Despite reports of activity and digging at North
Korea's nuclear site, I should note that such activity is very
common. Given the country's extreme secrecy and good
counterintelligence practices, I doubt very much there would be
any good satellite imagery of a North Korean test preparation
before Pyongyang announced that a test would take place.
Whether or not there is a North Korean nuclear test in the
short term, its WMD programs are extremely dangerous. As I
state in my prepared testimony, LIGNET believes Kim Jong-Un's
hold on power is probably secure. He and his family assumed
power of a state with robust WMD programs, including biological
weapons, chemical weapons, ballistic missiles and nuclear
weapons.
While the U.S. Intelligence Community has publicly stated
that it does not know whether North Korea has nuclear weapons,
it said in February 2009 that the country is capable of
producing them and has enough plutonium for about six nuclear
bombs. I want to point out that, 2 months after the U.S.
Intelligence Community publicly released this figure, North
Korea told the IAEA that it had decided to reactivate all
Yongbyon nuclear facilities and to go ahead with the
reprocessing of spent fuel. As a result, North Korea may have
amassed several more weapons worth of plutonium since April
2009, and it may have yet even more nuclear weapons fuel.
We now know, after years of arguments within the U.S.
Government, North Korea has a uranium enrichment program. This
program was worked on over an extended period, according to the
Director of National Intelligence. This program could be a
source of weapons-grade fuel. The North Korean WMD program is,
of course, also a special concern, as is its reactor that it
helped build in Syria, which we have to think about very
closely right now with the possible breakdown of the Syrian
state.
I finally want to note that I believe North Korea and Iran
closely watch each other's diplomacy with the United States. If
Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu's claim is accurate, that
recent talks on Iran's nuclear program gave Iran a freebie and
a 5-week gift from the world to continue enriching uranium, it
will have a significant effect on North Korea's negotiating
posture when U.S. officials try to resume diplomatic talks. The
reverse is probably true. Too generous or too quick a deal with
Pyongyang after the rocket launch will probably embolden Iran
to drive a hard bargain in multilateral talks.
Thank you, Madam Chairman, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fleitz follows:]
----------
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Dr. Green?
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL GREEN, PH.D., SENIOR ADVISOR AND JAPAN
CHAIR, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Mr. Green. Madam Chairman, members of the committee, thank
you for inviting us to testify today on this important subject.
I have a concern about the human rights situation and
humanitarian food aid issues, but would like to focus on three
issues for now.
First, why did North Korea do this so soon after the Leap
Day agreement? Second, does this mean we now have a breather,
because the ICBM test failed? And third, what should we do?
On the why, I don't think we should be surprised. Late last
year, I wrote a number of public things predicting that the
North Koreans would do a missile or nuclear test in the first
half of this year, because they have been telegraphing this for
some time in their propaganda. This is 2012, the year North
Korea said it would be a full nuclear weapons state.
The pattern is also quite clear. In 2006, in July, they
tested a ballistic missile of a similar type. They were
condemned by the U.N. And then, in October, they tested a
nuclear device. In April 2009, they tested a similar ballistic
missile. They were condemned by the U.N. And then in May they
tested a nuclear device. I think it is not unreasonable to
expect that in the next few months we will see, based on the
historical pattern, a nuclear test.
So the pattern fits. Is this a period now where we can take
a breather, where there is a lull, having expressed our
condemnation through the PRST, or President's Statement in the
Security Council? I don't think so. I think, as the chairwoman
suggested, we are probably looking at increased escalation from
North Korea in the coming months.
If they do a nuclear test, and if it is plutonium-based, we
will learn a lot. The first two tests yielded about one
kiloton, and then about four kilotons. The Nagasaki bomb, by
comparison, was 20. If this is a 10 or 15 kiloton plutonium
test, that is very dangerous. If they have learned to
miniaturize or weaponize, that is dangerous. It could be a test
based on their uranium enrichment program, which we have known
about for years, including when I was in the administration,
but which many commentators said couldn't be real until the
North actually showed experts their centrifuges.
A uranium test would be very, very dangerous, because they
could hide the capability and it would be difficult to detect.
The ballistic missile threat is real: Nodongs, hundreds of
them, aimed at Japan, that have been tested and have a large
payload, and the new Musudan that they have unveiled.
And I would also particularly encourage a focus on the
danger of transfer. In 2003, the North Korean delegation told
the American delegation, of which I was a member, that if we
did not end our hostile policy they would transfer their
nuclear weapons capability to third countries. We took that
threat seriously at the time. We later, the next year, found
uranium hexafluoride traces in the cache turned over by the
Libyans from North Korea. In 2007, the Israeli Air Force bombed
a nuclear reactor complex in Syria built by the North Koreans.
In 2008, we had revelations about discussions between Burma and
North Korea on nuclear issues. And, though there is no smoking
gun, the Iran connection bears careful watching.
So the North is clearly heading toward a nuclear weapons
capability, deliverable through ballistic missiles or through
country transfer, and our efforts to date have slowed, but
hardly deterred them from that path.
What do we do? The President's Statement from the Security
Council had the right tone, had some of the right content. It
was necessary, but far from sufficient. It is said North Korea
will not negotiate under pressure, but the historical pattern
is North Korea will not negotiate unless there is pressure, and
the pressure has been far from sufficient to have an effect on
their behavior.
The Security Council Resolutions and sanctions passed in
the wake of the last two nuclear tests are not being
implemented. Ranking Member Berman pointed out the TEL, the
mobile chassis for their mobile launcher, and that is probably
a Chinese-made system. I have seen Japanese photojournalists'
collections of North Korean trading companies openly operating
in China, that are on the sanctions list. The Sanctions
Committee of the Security Council has not done anything since
it was originally charged to look at this in 2009.
Although the administration effectively mobilized Japanese
and Korean defense cooperation after North Korean attacks on
South Korea in 2010, we have backed off. I also think we have
to consider the signal it sends as we cut defense spending in
the United States, and move away from a capability to manage
two regional conflicts. The Korean People's Army in North Korea
has for years said that our ability to do two-front wars will
be one of their important considerations as they seek to
``liberate'' the South. And as Congressman Royce pointed out,
we have backed off on interdicting illicit transfers from North
Korea.
So I think there is no deep harm in talking to North Korea.
We can learn a lot. It is an important aspect of our diplomacy.
But I think the National Security Council meetings on North
Korea should begin with pressure, coercion, interdiction,
implementation of sanctions, and then, at the end, consider
where the diplomatic and engagement piece fits in. And I think
we have had it backwards for some time. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Green follows:]
----------
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Mr. Snyder?
STATEMENT OF MR. SCOTT SNYDER, SENIOR FELLOW FOR KOREA STUDIES,
DIRECTOR OF THE PROGRAM ON U.S.-KOREA POLICY, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS
Mr. Snyder. It is a pleasure and an honor to appear before
the committee----
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. If you could punch that little
button and hold it close?
Mr. Snyder. Sorry about that. It is an honor to appear
before the committee. My colleagues have already covered a
number of main points, especially related to the Security
Council statement and North Korean response. I think it is
clear that we are in the middle of a dynamic very similar to
the one that we saw in 2009, where the likelihood of additional
escalation exists. We are facing a defiant, sovereignty-focused
new regime.
I want to address two topics. One is the failings of the
Leap Day agreement, which have already been, I think, pointed
out in the initial statements, namely the concern about the
linkage of food to the negotiations with North Korea, which I
agree was a mistake and should have been dealt with separately.
And I go into that in some detail in my testimony.
And then I think, also, the failure to state in the U.S.
statement very clearly that a satellite test would be
considered as part of a long-range missile, and not acceptable
for North Korea. Clearly, the effort so far that we have seen
has not changed North Korea's behavior. How do we change North
Korea's behavior?
I think that the way to do this is really to focus on
changing the environment for North Korea in a way that
influences its strategic options, rather than trying to
negotiate carrots and sticks directly with North Korea as a
vehicle by which to do that. Change the environment, and then
talk to them to determine whether we are seeing the type of
change that we need to see.
And of course, we have seen in the case of Burma recently a
good example of a situation where the leadership has made a
strategic choice to change, and then the U.S. has found some
traction in terms of responding.
How do we change the environment? One, I think fundamental,
challenge that we have faced in the face of North Korean
provocations has been the failure to hold North Korea
accountable for its actions, and this, I think, is particularly
important in the context of alliance coordination.
Different provocations by North Korea provoke different
levels of response from us and our allies. We saw the case
where a conventional provocation against South Korea evoked a
strong response from South Korea, and the U.S. was focused on
trying to make sure that South Korea didn't respond in a way
that escalated. Likewise, it seems to me that the South Korean
response to the rocket launch, at least in terms of public
response, was not that strong. And so the question of how we,
essentially, show that there is a price for provocation.
Second, I think we need to minimize reliance on China,
while continuing to cooperate with them in a limited way. I
think it is very clear that the Chinese have their own
interests in promotion of North Korean stability and in
gradualism, and that this is creating a gap in terms of
expectations. We shouldn't be relying on China as a way of
trying to pursue our approach to North Korea.
And then the third area I would like to point out is that,
increasingly, this is a regime that is not isolated. It is
partially integrated with the outside world. And so I think
that we need to look carefully at whether or not that need for
external funds that has already been addressed in various ways,
for instance illicit activities, might also provide an
opportunity for us.
The sanctions approach, the sanctions-only approach, means
that the front door has been closed. But as long as China
leaves the back door open, it is not going to work. And so I
think we need to find a way to exploit North Korea's partial
integration with its neighbors as a way of drawing the North
Koreans out.
If the North Korean regime decided to move in the direction
of reform--and it is true that we don't have much evidence that
they have decided to--but the fact of the matter is that they
don't have the technical specialists to be able to do it, even
if they wanted to do it. And so we really need to find ways to
expose North Koreans to long-range educational opportunities
that will socialize them to western ways of thinking, as a way
of inducing internal change in North Korea.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Snyder follows:]
----------
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Thank you to all of our panelists for excellent testimony.
Oh, Dr. Cronin, I am so sorry. I am so used to going that
way, we had you all mixed up, and I apologize. I think we would
like to hear from you, Dr. Cronin.
STATEMENT OF PATRICK M. CRONIN, PH.D., SENIOR ADVISOR & SENIOR
DIRECTOR OF THE ASIA PROGRAM, CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN
SECURITY
Mr. Cronin. Madam Chairman, I appreciate that. And Ranking
Member Berman and other members of the committee, thank you for
this invitation on these timely proceedings. It is my judgment
that the regime in Pyongyang indeed remains armed, dangerous,
and prone to miscalculation. Indeed, the moment we think we
know the next move of Kim Jong-Un is the moment we are going to
be surprised yet again.
We have heard about some of the tactical mistakes of our
recent policy. I want to focus on strategy, in the interests of
time. My main argument is that the United States lacks an
effective long-term strategy for achieving peace on the Korean
Peninsula. Despite a strong alliance with South Korea, we are
gradually losing leverage over an opaque regime in North Korea,
determined to acquire nuclear weapons that are designed to hit
American soil. We lack direct contact with North Korea's
collective leadership. We rely far too much on secondhand
information.
A new strategy is very difficult to put together. I don't
suggest this is easy, and it is the nuance that will matter.
Nonetheless, the new strategy I have proposed looks at five
building blocks that we need to mix together. Those areas are
strengthening defenses; strengthening alliances; creating
crippling new targeted financial measures; but also
establishing direct high-level contact with North Korea's
leaders, if only to facilitate political fissures and better
understand pressure points; and using engagement and
information to dramatically expand the flow of information into
and out of North Korea.
So first, Kim Jong-Un's satellite diplomacy should catalyze
us to bolster our missile defenses. We have no ascent-phase,
boost-phase intercept capacity. This, combined with our mid-
phase and terminal-phase defenses, would help us and our allies
make sure that we could knock this missile down the next time
this happens.
Second, we need to further reinforce the military
capabilities and the interoperability between U.S., South Korea
and Japan, in all three countries. Comprehensive missile
defenses need to be matched with greater integration of command
and control and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
capabilities. Additional steps should be taken to give higher
priority to U.S. forces in Korea, a command that has inevitably
suffered from the decade-long priorities placed on the
conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Third, we need to move beyond ineffective sanctions to find
new means of applying real pain on recalcitrant leaders who
flagrantly put international security at risk. The United
States can use the combined force of government and the private
sector to clamp down on the mostly Chinese banks the North's
leadership relies on to fund critical leaders in the military
party and ruling circles.
We need precision-guided financial measures that go as far
as those attempted nearly several years ago with Banco Delta
Asia, to squeeze key decision makers like Jang Sung-taek. If
they were targeted and maintained over time, this could bring
about change.
Fourth, the United States should seek to use serious
pressure and defense tactics to open up more direct high-level
talks with Kim Jong-Un, Jang Sung-taek, and two or three
generals central to the collective leadership. It is a
political objective, in other words, to our pressure and our
force, and this is it. It is opening up those real talks that
will matter.
Only by winning access to the true inner circle of North
Korea can we hope to determine potential fault lines, pressure
points, and opportunities. Long-term engagement will make us
smarter about what kind of transition that may be possible for
North Korea, while preparing us for a hard landing should the
regime implode.
And fifth and finally, the United States and South Korea
should expand their efforts to dramatically expand the flow of
information into North Korea. North Korea cannot live forever
in a cocoon. China and South Korea are growing so prosperous,
the flow of information can get in. But coupled with
engagement, we can expand that information, and it will start
to change.
So defense, allies, financial measures, information, and
high-level engagement are the building blocks for a potential
new strategic approach. I believe, put together properly,
within the next decade we could move North Korea away from its
regular cycle of provocation and prevarication and human rights
abuses, to something much better.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cronin follows:]
----------
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. I admire your optimism. Thank you.
Thank you, Dr. Cronin, I appreciate it. Now I thank all of the
witnesses, and my apologies to cutting you off.
I wanted to ask about the third nuclear test, about the
influence of China, and the cooperation of North Korea with
Iran. As many of you had said, experts are expecting that North
Korea will, indeed, conduct a third nuclear test, especially
since the young general lost face with this fizzled missile
launch. Do you anticipate that any future weapons tested will
be plutonium-based, as in the past, or will it be triggered by
highly-enriched uranium, demonstrating an alternative nuclear
weapons system for Pyongyang? And what should the U.S. response
be to such a test?
And then, following that, China's influence. As we read in
press reports, China likely provided that mobile long-range
missile launcher which North Korea put on display. This would
obviously be in violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution
1874, and China, as a permanent member of the Security Council,
is obligated to uphold sanctions. How involved is the People's
Liberation Army in the development, in the supply of weapons to
the North Korean military? Do we expect Chinese technical
support for the development of North Korean missile technology?
And lastly, cooperation with Iran. Japanese media had
reported that a 12-member Iranian delegation of missile and
satellite development specialists secretly visited North Korea
recently. The report says that this is by no means a recent
occurrence or an isolated occurrence. What other activities,
such as nuclear weapons design and development, have this
regime collaborated on that we have not seen in public
reporting as of yet?
Mr. Fleitz.
Mr. Fleitz. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I think the issue of
a third nuclear test is sort of the parlor game in Washington
right now, when and if there will be a test. And I have talked
to a number of experts around town, and many of them think
there will be a test. I tend to think the chances are less than
50/50 right now.
I think there will be a nuclear test eventually, when North
Korea is technically ready and prepared to endure the enormous
amount of isolation it will endure, more than it already has.
But they have to conduct a nuclear test, because we have to
assume that they are developing the nuclear designs. Their
uranium enrichment program would produce nuclear fuel which has
not been tested yet, and I think eventually there will be a
test of that kind.
I am sort of hoping that the statements before and after
the rocket launch suggest that there may be a line they are not
prepared to cross right now, and they may not currently be
planning to conduct a nuclear test. But frankly, all bets are
off with this country. Anything is possible.
I think missile tests are certain. The missile tests may be
more threatening, because the missile tests could land on
Japan, it could land on Hawaii, the West Coast of the United
States. And it is the delivery system for a nuclear warhead. It
also is something that they are using to advertise their
missile technology to other rogue states, including Iran.
I think it is certain there was an Iranian delegation that
was closely watching this missile test. I believe there
probably has been some type of collaboration between the
Iranians and the North Koreans in the nuclear sphere. I have
also always believed that the al-Kibar reactor in the Syrian
Desert probably had some role from Iran, that maybe this was a
nuclear reactor that was being built so Iran could somehow
acquire plutonium or the technology to make plutonium in an
area that the IAEA could not detect.
So I think this is a very dangerous situation, but
concerning the issue of a third nuclear test, I just think it
is hard to judge.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Do any of the others--
yes, Dr. Green?
Mr. Green. While we don't know, the historical pattern
would suggest they will do a nuclear test. The propaganda of
recent years, declaring 2012 the year North Korea will be a
full nuclear weapons state, the hundredth anniversary of the
birth of Kim Il-Sung, the great leader, would also suggest it.
When Sig Hecker and other experts were shown the uranium
enrichment facility, they saw what they thought was 2,000
centrifuges spinning, and probably the tip of the iceberg. So
technologically, it is, I would say possible or perhaps
probable, they are close to ready to do a uranium test. It
would up the ante on us considerably, and raise the asking
price for any future negotiations.
So if I were betting, I would say they would do it, and
that we may be looking at a uranium test. But we don't know,
particularly with uranium because it is much easier to hide. It
doesn't give a signature in the atmosphere the way plutonium
does.
The PLA, historically, did have an involvement with the
nuclear program in North Korea. It has been some time since
that was the case. Jian Zemin denied that they had anything to
do with it. I think what we saw with that TEL was more a matter
of negligence than malicious support for North Korea, but it is
an area we should be pressing the Chinese quite hard on, in my
opinion.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. And sorry, I am
out of time.
Mr. Berman is recognized.
Mr. Berman. Well, thank you very much, Madam Chairman. And
while each of you emphasized different issues, the panel
doesn't seem like it has a clash of approaches. I actually want
to focus on China, but before I do that, Dr. Green, you had
said something that caught my attention: That there are
sanctioned entities openly doing business in China. Did I hear
that right?
Mr. Green. Yes.
Mr. Berman. And so, if I did, does that say something about
a Presidential Statement which talks about expanding the
sanctions, then, to these, not being worth a lot? Is that the
implication of what you were saying?
Mr. Green. To be exact, I have seen the photos that
Japanese photojournalists have taken of the Tengzhong Trading
Company, the one company on the sanctions companies list, open.
You know, the sign up. The Chinese are not implementing the
sanctions. I don't think the administration would say they are.
And in the Security Council, they are blocking any effort to
add new entities, or do any sort of further steps as----
Mr. Berman. I thought the Presidential Statement----
Mr. Green. The Presidential Statement was interesting,
because China had to clear on it. And it did reference
examining new entities, and that was a positive element. Now,
we have got to follow up on it. And part of the problem Beijing
has is that the Foreign Ministry, which controls that decision,
rarely can implement within China. A lot of it is the
dysfunctionalities in this huge, complex Chinese system. But I
think we could be doing much more, in U.N. Security Council
deliberations, in our discussions with the Chinese, to get
Beijing to do more.
Mr. Berman. All right. Well, let us go to China, then. Is
that little glimmer in the Presidential Statement any real sign
that China is reconsidering its stability-first policy toward
North Korea? In other words, is it a fool's errand to try to
secure stronger cooperation from Beijing on trying to change
Pyongyang's behavior, given that the Chinese security calculus
just seems to be so different than ours, or some of the other
countries in the region?
Any of you?
Mr. Fleitz. I would note, Mr. Berman, that this was a
Presidential Statement, and it is not binding. And this is what
we resort to when we can't get China and Russia to agree to
binding language. This was a fall-back position.
Mr. Berman. Right, I get you. And it is not binding. To the
bigger question, is there any reason to have any hope that
China is going to change its calculus, that a diplomatic push
on China, who is so important to doing some of the things you
suggested need to be done in terms of stopping what North Korea
gets, in order to fund and implement its program. Is there
anything out there that would indicate there is anything about
Chinese behavior that might change, based on this most recent
activity?
Mr. Fleitz. The Chinese have already met with Kim Jong-Un,
and I assume they urged him not to conduct this missile test,
and he ignored them. I think the Chinese would like to restart
multilateral talks under their sponsorship, and they are
probably already working at that. But I don't think China is
going to allow any sanctions from this missile to go forward. I
think they are simply going to put it behind them.
Mr. Berman. Anyone else have any thoughts?
Mr. Snyder. Let me just add that the panel of experts that
is implementing the Security Council Resolution has a Chinese
expert on it, that essentially his job is to keep the committee
from adopting anything that would be critical toward China. And
so there are real limits to the instrument that the
Presidential Statement has identified as the vehicle by which
it is going to strengthen sanctions.
With regard to China's broader strategic orientation, I
think it is very clear that they are focused on stability, and
the reason why the Presidential Statement went as far as it did
was simply because President Hu heard such strong blow-back
when he was in Seoul. But in terms of follow-through, it is
probably not going to be there.
Mr. Green. The Chinese are going to keep their stability-
first policy. You know, the quip for people who work on this is
that PRC stands for ``Please remain calm.'' They will do what
they can to lower actions, by us or North Korea, that get in
the way of a process of talking. I think appealing to China's
self-interest has limited utility. They know their own self-
interest. They have made their calculations.
Part of our strategy has to be, I think, what Scott Snyder
was referring to: Changing the atmosphere. That is why the
trilateral U.S.-Japan-Korea piece, missile defense, are so
important. Beijing needs to see that if they are not willing to
use leverage more effectively on North Korea--and they have a
lot--there is another path we have no choice but to take, which
involves us strengthening our defenses and our relations with
allies, which China, of course, in the long run would rather
not see.
So, if we are not changing their calculations, if we are
just appealing to their self-interest, we are not going to get
much of a change.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Berman. Mr. Royce is recognized.
Mr. Royce. I am going to pass for the moment, Madam Chair.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Okay. Mr. Burton?
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and I am sorry I was
a little late. We had another committee hearing. But this is
most important. That failed rocket launch cost $850 million,
they estimate. And I have before me a report that says that
would have bought 2.5 million tons of corn, 1.4 million tons of
rice, or enough for the North Korean Government to feed
millions of its people.
Why did they launch that, when they knew that that was a
direct violation of the Leap Day agreement? It is like they
said that they were going to have a hiatus on--``They want us
to halt nuclear tests, missile tests, and allow the
International Atomic Energy, IAEA inspectors back into the
country after a 3-year hiatus?'' They did that, and turned
right around and launched a missile. How do you deal with that?
I mean, you folks indicate that we ought to continue to try to
negotiate with them, but every time we negotiate with them,
they turn around and stick us right in the ear.
So that is the first question. The second thing I would
like to ask is, in 2012 we have had both congressional and
Presidential elections in the U.S. In South Korea it is going
to be this year. North Korea is developing into a strong and
prosperous nation. This was supposed to be the year that they
were going to do that, whatever that means. It would appear
that these three elements could form a perfect storm. In other
words, do you expect North Korea to continue to saber-rattle
and provoke further aggressive behavior this year, so as to try
and impact the ongoing election cycle in South Korea?
And then the final question--you can actually answer them
all at once, if you like--I know I am preaching to the choir
when I say that South Korea is one of our closest allies and
friends in the world. We even passed a free trade agreement
this year, and I am glad that the President signed that.
Given the ever-present dangers posed by North Korea and the
regime, what can we do here in Washington, in Congress, to
create a more stable environment over there? And I am not
talking about signing another agreement like the State
Department did, saying that they were going to do certain
things, and they turn right around and violate it.
Mr. Fleitz?
Mr. Fleitz. Thank you, sir. I believe the launch of the
rocket last year is consistent with an historical pattern of
North Korea making agreements, then a provocation, then looking
for concessions, and then they get more agreements. This seems
to be a strategy that they engage in.
Mr. Burton. But why do we keep caving in like that? I don't
understand that. You know, I understand we want to be
humanitarian and help the people up there, but when the food
goes there, we don't know that it is going to get out to the
people who are really starving out there. So we are giving food
through the government, not through PVAs. And they take that
money that they would use for food if they were going to do it,
and they launch another missile. Eight hundred and fifty
million bucks.
Mr. Fleitz. I think that is right, sir. I would say that--
--
Mr. Burton. I mean, it just seems like our Government, not
just under Democrats but Republicans as well--we have reached
out, trying to negotiate with these guys. And I don't see where
we have gained a thing.
Mr. Fleitz. I think that that is--it was a mistake to link
the nuclear issues to the food deal. But I also----
Mr. Burton. Wait a minute. Why?
Mr. Fleitz. I don't think the North Korean people should
suffer from the country's proliferation. However, I----
Mr. Burton. Well, wait a minute. Does the government
distribute the food that we give to them?
Mr. Fleitz. Well, that is the point I was going to make.
Mr. Burton. Okay, but the point is, you say we shouldn't
tie the two together. Why even give the food to them, if they
use it for their purposes and then launch a missile?
Mr. Fleitz. They shouldn't get food unless there are
verification provisions to make sure it gets to the North
Korean----
Mr. Burton. Well, they are not going to agree to that. Are
they?
Mr. Fleitz. Well, then, there shouldn't be a deal.
Mr. Burton. That is the point. That is great.
Mr. Fleitz. And I would say, sir, there are two things I
think Congress could do. First of all, that is one provision.
And second of all, we have to honor our friends, the Japanese.
A provision of the six-party talks is the Japanese abductees,
people kidnapped by the North Korean Government, maybe hundreds
of them. This was supposed to be part of the six-party talks.
It has been put off by two successive administrations. It is a
matter of principle for the United States----
Mr. Burton. It is terrible that those people are held.
Mr. Fleitz. And----
Mr. Burton. But to negotiate based on fear, and that they
might do this or that, is a sign of weakness. It is a sign of
weakness. And I can't understand why our Government, whether
Republican or Democrat, why we continue to negotiate with
terrorists, terrorist organizations, and countries that
continue to say they are going to do one thing and then violate
the other while we are giving them billions of dollars of food
aid and other things.
I mean, all the way back to the Clinton administration and
before, I remember when we negotiated for that reactor over
there, the--what was it? The light water reactor. And they
violated that.
Mr. Fleitz. We offered them two light water reactors.
Mr. Burton. I know. And I just don't understand the
mentality. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Very good points. Thank you very
much, Mr. Burton. Mr. Connolly is recognized.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And Mr. Snyder,
picking up from the last point my colleague, Mr. Burton, just
made, perhaps making a Devil's advocate argument about it,
though, the idea of ``Why would we negotiate with or be engaged
with a criminal regime?''
Some might observe that, in the very early weeks of the new
then-George W. Bush administration, President Bush actually
publicly overruled his own incoming Secretary of State, Powell,
who had said, ``We are going to continue the policy of
engagement and negotiations of the Clinton administration.''
And President Bush said ``No, we are not.'' And what followed
from that was a much more aggressive North Korean pursuit of
its nuclear program. Would that be a fair statement?
Mr. Snyder. Yes, I think that that is an accurate
characterization of what happened.
Mr. Connolly. So while one can understand the concerns
raised by my colleague, and I share them, on the other hand the
idea of ``let us not engage, let us in fact have a policy of
implacable hostility,'' has consequences, given, frankly, the
ability of North Korea to pursue inimical aims, including its
nuclear program. Would that be a fair statement?
Mr. Snyder. I think that there needs to be some kind of
communication with North Korea in order to be able to manage
and handle miscalculation.
Mr. Connolly. Okay. Let me ask--Mr. Green, you wanted to
comment?
Mr. Green. If you will indulge me, I was in the White House
at that time. And I think a more accurate description would be
that Kim Dae-jung came in March to President Bush, before most
of his officials were in place, and said, ``You should continue
what President Clinton was thinking of doing, which is to go to
North Korea.''
And the White House position was ``we need to review our
policy,'' which we did, and in June 2001 put out a statement
from the White House saying, ``We will continue the agreed
framework if North Korea honors it, and we will engage with
North Korea.'' So it was, I don't think, a rejection of
engagement. It was a request for a time to get the
administration's strategy in place, because there had been so
many problems in the past, over several administrations, with
North Korea.
Mr. Connolly. Fair point. I do, however, remember with some
surprise, Secretary Powell at the time having his wings clipped
a little bit, because he had gone out front, maybe before that
assessment, which maybe also inadvertently sent a signal that
had some consequences. I don't know.
I kind of think we are between a rock and a hard place,
because I am not convinced about the efficacy, sometimes, of
that engagement. And I share Mr. Burton's concern--and heck,
let me ask you, Dr. Green or Mr. Fleitz, the issue for me,
here, and I think for Mr. Burton and others, is efficacy. Right
after we provided some food aid to North Korea recently, they
announced their intention to test a new rocket, or the existing
rocket.
How do we handle this issue of efficacy? We don't want
millions of people to starve, but on the other hand, that kind
of engagement, in terms of the provision of assistance, seems
to have very limited payoff if your hope is to moderate
behavior.
Your comment?
Mr. Fleitz. Sir, I don't think we should tie the regime's
WMD programs to food, but as I said earlier, if food aid is
provided to North Korea, there has to be strings attached.
There has to be verification that the food will reach the
people, and not be sold or given to their military. If they
won't agree to those things, we shouldn't make an agreement.
Mr. Connolly. And Dr. Green?
Mr. Green. Congressman Burton asked, ``Why do we go into
this cycle?'' And we do, over several administrations. And the
difference between us and North Korea is they are consistent
and we are not. And every administration gets in a mode, after
a particular provocation, of sanctions and pressure, and it is
very hard for us, or Japan or South Korea, to continue that. It
stresses us. We have Iran, we have domestic politics in these
countries.
We, in 2010, were in that mode, putting pressure on the
North. The Chinese felt the pressure. The North Koreans felt
the pressure. We stood with South Korea, who had been attacked.
By July of last year, we were shifting, in the United States,
toward trying to engage, and putting pressure on South Korea to
back off on their demands of the North. The North Koreans knew
that.
So even though they lost the food aid, which was small, and
Kim Jong-Un was not invested in it, they got points on the
scoreboard by marginalizing Lee Myung-bak, our ally. And I
don't think that was the administration's intention, but that
is what happened.
Mr. Connolly. If I had more time--I only have 13 seconds--I
would ask you, this panel, to comment a little bit on the
consolidation by the new leader in North Korea, and how real he
is as a leader, versus maybe sort of a tool of the military.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. And that question hangs. Thank you,
Mr. Connolly. And Mr. Royce is ready now.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Madam Chair. Since food aid is being
discussed, I will just mention the Tom Lantos Human Rights
Commission hearing that was held on this subject, where we
heard testimony of sacks being delivered, actually, in a
village, villagers being told, ``Don't touch those,'' and the
trucks coming back and picking up the sacks.
And so one of the questions here is, ``What do they do with
that?'' Well, a French NGO, at another hearing, explained how
it had tracked this and the food was being sold on the food
exchange, in the capital of the country, in order to get hard
currency for the regime. This is, perhaps, the greatest
problem. Because, as we look at these interviews, debriefings
done with defectors, they say, ``Food does not go in the no-go
areas anyway,'' right? The no-go areas are no-go areas, and
food does not get out there.
So for the record, I had an amendment, the Royce amendment,
here last year, that would have prohibited food aid from going
to North Korea under these circumstances. That was watered down
in the Senate, by the way. But I share the gentleman from
Indiana's concerns about control of that food, and it
indirectly propping up the regime, either by going to the
military or being sold for hard currency.
A couple of points I wanted to just make here, and ask you
questions about, was to go back to Mr. Berman's point about
elevating the discussion of human rights in this whole
dialogue. Do you think it would be helpful if that became sort
of a strategic imperative? Because nowhere on the planet are
people as ground down, from what I saw. And if you read the
reports out of the--let us call them work camps, or
concentration camps, in terms of the people being worked to
death there, really I think it would be beneficial if there was
greater understanding on that front.
And second, we now have broadcasting into North Korea. How
about a little bit more robust Radio Free Asia broadcasting on
what is actually going on in the country. For example, and the
last question I will ask you here to comment on, is this
admission on the part of the North Korean regime that the
launch was a bust. And that is the first time, to my knowledge,
that you had an official mention of that.
How about broadcasting out the cost of the launch, you
know? Three quarters of a billion or more. The cost of that
launch, and then the privations that people face, the
conditions in North Korea, and make the connections for people.
Because increasingly, as people are leaving the country,
they are saying--close to 40 percent are now saying they are
listening to the broadcasts, they are getting access to these
cheap radios that come over the border from China and they are
listening to the broadcasts. How about--let me ask you your
thoughts on those subjects.
Mr. Cronin. Mr. Royce, thank you very much. When I was a
third-ranking official at USAID in the George W. Bush
administration, I worked every day on the North Korean food aid
problem. We were trying to negotiate strict criteria for
delivery. That is the key test. It should be based on the
humanitarian criterion of making sure that our assistance gets
to the people in need, not as a lever over a nuclear weapons
program that North Korea doesn't want to negotiate away.
It is not really leverage. That is why, I think, Mr. Fleitz
was saying this is not really the lever for negotiations over
nuclear weapons. It should be based on humanitarian criteria.
If we can't get it to the people in need, then you are right,
we shouldn't deliver it. The North----
Mr. Royce. Then let us go back to better deploying RFA and
VOA, because I think we have got a consensus on that.
Mr. Cronin. Information is very important, sir, and that is
why I am suggesting an information campaign like we have not
seen before. But that has to be partly based on engagement.
Because if you consider the 50,000 North Korean workers who are
working in South Korea's one economic zone at Kaesing, that has
been an intelligence mine for us. We can't go into this in open
session, but I can tell you in general that those people have
had an eye-opening effect, by seeing South Korean prosperity.
They also get it across the Chinese border. We can both
document human rights abuses in North Korea, and highlight
the----
Mr. Royce. I understand all of this. But to the extent that
we have got hard currency going into the regime, this is a
regime that built a reactor for Syria.
Mr. Cronin. Yes, sir.
Mr. Royce. That built a nuclear weapons program for Syria,
and did it while we were under, supposedly, an agreement where
they weren't going to proliferate. They were proliferating
beyond anything we could have imagined, while doing a two-track
nuclear program, and they are selling it who knows where. So at
some point, we have got to figure out how to cut off the hard
currency and accelerate the change inside. And giving them more
access to it, I am not sure is the answer.
Mr. Cronin. Targeting Chinese banks is the way to go after
the people who are in charge.
Mr. Royce. Thank you. Good point.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. Thank you. Mr.
Rohrabacher is recognized.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. First
of all, let me just note that, years ago, I can remember major
debates in the House of Representatives over whether or not we
should have a missile defense system. Thank God those of us who
supported missile defense won that debate. And every loony
regime that tries to get its hands on nuclear weapons and tries
to launch a rocket reinforces the importance of having a
missile defense system, because that is, perhaps, one of the
only things that gives us leverage here, is that we can defend
ourselves.
Also, I have been privy, as a member of this committee, to
the debates over the years on food aid to North Korea. When did
the United States assume the responsibility for the nutrition
of the North Korean people? I mean, this is a loony policy on
our side. Shall we just say that any dictatorship around the
world that decides that they want to spend their money on
weapons production, that they are going to automatically
qualify for nutritional aid for their people from the United
States, and that we are going to have expressions of sole
concern that the food aid that we are giving them goes directly
to their people?
What dictatorships are we leaving out of that equation?
Does every dictator in the world that wants to spend more money
on weapons just do it, and then we will give them food aid? Or
is it just North Korea? I mean, this is an insane policy that I
remember debating this 20 years ago. And it has happened now,
and it hasn't done any good. Giving them all this money has
provided them the resources they need to spend $850 million on
a rocket launch. This is something that we need, again, to have
reality checks when we go into debates on such policies as
these.
I would like to ask about the Chinese, here. Do any of you
have evidence that that rocket that was going up had important
Chinese components on that rocket? And in their nuclear system
that they have been building, their weapons system, are there
not Chinese components to that that are vital to the success of
those projects?
Whoever knows anything about it.
Mr. Green. Several of us have had clearances over the
years, and there is only so much we know and only so much we
can say. But we do know, and I think it is a matter of public
record, that the North Koreans have put together their missile
program, their uranium enrichment program, their reprocessing,
by purchasing chemical precursors, highly refined uranium,
dual-use materials, all over the world, in particular using the
A.Q. Khan network. A lot of it----
Mr. Rohrabacher. How about their hardware?
Mr. Green. A lot of it comes through China. Yes, a lot of
it comes through China. So that is why Beijing following the
letter of the sanctions resolution is hardly enough.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So is it not possible, when we see this
impoverished regime in North Korea that can't even feed its own
people, a regime that counts its power on the number of people
marching down the streets doing the goose-step, that this is
the regime that actually is responsible for building these
nuclear reactors and this technology?
Are we not dealing with Beijing? Is Beijing not using North
Korea as a proxy? ``Please stay calm. You know, forget what I
am doing, stay calm, go and blame the other guy over there.''
Mr. Fleitz. I tend to think that China is not behind North
Korea's nuclear program. I think China likes having North Korea
as a buffer between it and South Korea. But from what I have
seen in my career, China has never been terribly happy about
North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. I have got 15 seconds left on my
time, and I am just going to suggest that China is the big
player here. And just like we don't want to face reality that
we shouldn't be giving food aid to a dictatorship like this or
that we need a missile defense system, we just don't want to
face reality of the downside of China. And for whatever reason,
this has been going on for 20 years to America's detriment, and
nowhere is that more clear than our policies with Korea.
Thank you.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr.
Rohrabacher. Mr. Smith is recognized--no, sorry, Doctor Poe,
Judge Poe, the vice chair of the Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations. Just the way it is.
Mr. Poe. It seems to me that Kim Jong-Un is just like his
daddy. He follows in the footsteps of his daddy. He is trying
to make a name for himself, makes a bunch of promises to the
west. And like daddy and granddaddy, he lies. He breaks his
word. Shock.
You know, where I come from, if a man breaks his word, you
probably shouldn't trust him the next time he gives his word,
not to do something or to do something. But it seems to me,
here we are over here, the United States: ``Okay, we will try
it again in a few years, a few months. We will promise you the
same thing if you just hold off on,'' in this case, ``your
nuclear capability.''
It seems to me that just doesn't work for North Korea. It
doesn't work for Iran. And we are pushing a decision to really
do something, we just push it off to the next administration.
And I know we have heard from the other side about ``well, this
is Bush's fault, it is Clinton's fault.'' It doesn't make any
difference.
Right now, we are in a situation where North Korea is going
to be a threat, and my first question is, what is the policy of
the United States, overall, in dealing with the nuclear
capability of North Korea? Are we just going to keep making
promises, keep trying to give them food, help the people? What
is our policy toward North Korea? Dr. Fleitz?
Mr. Fleitz. Well, part of the problem in dealing with both
North Korea and Iran is that we are recognizing their right to
nuclear technology. I was at the State Department, I remember
when President Bush reaffirmed Iran's right to nuclear
technology. And many of us had argued that if you pursue
nuclear weapons secretly, or nuclear technology in violation of
the IAEA, you aren't entitled to nuclear technology. And
unfortunately, both administrations endorsed that. That may be
something Congress could look into. States----
Mr. Poe. What do you recommend?
Mr. Fleitz. I think that states that cheat on their IAEA
obligations----
Mr. Poe. No kidding.
Mr. Fleitz [continuing]. Have no right to peaceful nuclear
technology, period. All right, the treaty says differently? We
change the period. And I think that was one of the biggest
mistakes of the Bush administration. We are seeing that in the
negotiation with Iran. We have to make it clear that North
Korea is not entitled to nuclear technology, because it will
use it to make nuclear weapons.
The agreed framework was going to give North Korea two
additional nuclear reactors. Now, they were proliferation-
resistant, but they could still be used, under the right
conditions, to make nuclear weapons fuel. That was a foolish
agreement, and I think that--I guess if I were to find the
biggest problem with our policy, that is it, and that is
something we should work on.
Mr. Poe. Dr. Green, briefly?
Mr. Green. I do not think any administration is going to
offer North Korea light water reactors. I think that is now off
the table. So de facto, I think Mr. Fleitz's policy is our
policy toward North Korea. Iran is another story, and I agree
completely on that front. And I think there is an assumption
that, if we can contain the North Korean nuclear problem, if we
can cut a deal and basically rent the program, and pay them
off, we can manage it until the regime collapses.
Mr. Poe. Extortion.
Mr. Green. The problem with that theory is, as I mentioned
earlier, the North Koreans are not going to sit still. They are
going to use these time-outs to increase their nuclear weapons
capability, to threaten transfer, and to continue raising the
asking price. So we need a strategy that focuses increasingly
on rollback. Missile defense, alliance cooperation,
interdiction, enforcement of sanctions. If we can't do it with
China, then we do it without China.
I would still maintain a diplomatic element. I think you do
need some channel for communication for a variety of reasons,
but I think we have had it backwards for many years, which is
that we have made the negotiations the center stage, and all
the other pieces the sort of secondary considerations.
Mr. Poe. It seems to me that the North Koreans don't take
us seriously. Would you agree with that or not, Dr. Green?
Mr. Green. Well, they take us very seriously in one sense.
I mean, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kim Il-Sung's
strategy was to develop a relationship with the U.S., to
marginalize the South.
Mr. Poe. I am talking about with sanctions or consequences.
Mr. Green. I suspect the North Koreans have gotten used to
a pattern where we have a very hard time, in democratic
societies, maintaining pressure on them.
Mr. Poe. Credibility?
Mr. Green. That we will back off, and we will move on to
other things. Even our approach in the Security Council is
designed to save our ammo, our diplomatic ammo, to get China
and Russia on board for Iran and Syria. And they know that.
Mr. Poe. One last question, because I am out of time. Long-
term, what are North Korea's intentions? What do you speculate?
Somebody needs to answer before my time is up.
Mr. Fleitz. I think long-term is that this corrupt regime
wants to stay in power. That is the purpose of this corrupt
group of people behind Kim Jong-Un and his family. That is all
they are interested in.
Mr. Poe. You think we should have removed them from the
foreign terrorist list?
Mr. Fleitz. No.
Mr. Green. Absolutely not.
Mr. Poe. All right. I yield back.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Thank you very much. You
got a lot in in those 11 seconds, Judge Poe. And Chris Smith is
recognized. He is the chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa,
Global Health, and Human Rights.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Thank you for
calling this very important and timely hearing. Madam Chair, at
a hearing that I chaired in my subcommittee last September on
human rights in North Korea, the witnesses made the following
two important points. Many, but these are the two that I would
like to bring up today: That any attempts to address the
nuclear weapons issue while sidelining, or ignoring, or
deprioritizing the human rights issue was doomed to fail. And
second, it is imperative to provide the North Korean people
with current, accurate information, so that they understand
that there are alternatives to the repression under which they
are suffering.
I also chaired a hearing on China's forced repatriation of
North Korean refugees with the Congressional-Executive
Commission on China on March 5th, which pointed out China's
violation of its solemn obligations under the Refugee
Convention. And some of our witnesses there also made those
points that were made in September.
Some of our witnesses today, Madam Chair, have agreed, at
least in their written testimony--I am sorry I missed your oral
presentations--with many of the points raised at those
hearings. Dr. Green, you indicate that ``we need a human rights
policy that is unflinching in our condemnation of abuses in
North Korea, and our efforts to muster international support to
prevent actions, such as those by China, to return refugees to
North Korea against their will.
``Humanitarian and human rights policies toward North
Korea,'' you went on to say, ``deserve prioritization in their
own merits, and should not be linked to the up and down tactics
of negotiations.''
Mr. Snyder, you indicate that providing information to
North Koreans may be one of the most ``effective options for
influencing North Korea's internal choices.'' And Dr. Cronin,
you recommended that the U.S. and South Korea expand our
efforts to ``dramatically expand the flow of information into
North Korea.''
VOA Korea and Radio Free Asia services broadcast 5 hours a
day, 7 days a week, and seem to be having a positive impact in
the country. One doctor who does humanitarian work in North
Korea wrote to VOA Korean service that according to my friend,
who was still in Pyongyang, you are not only the voice of
America, but also the voice of victims of the North Korean
dictatorship. RFA programming includes commentaries, as we all
know, by North Korean defectors, to help North Koreans
understand the broader world and how North Korea appears from
the outside.
Could any or all of you comment on the role that you think
human rights has played in this administration's policies
toward North Korea, and what it should play, and further
elaborate on the means of communication and the kind of
information to all sectors of North Korean society that you
think we should be promoting?
Mr. Green. Well, the administration's appointment of Robert
King as the Ambassador for Human Rights was a good move. He
comes from this committee, as I understand it, and is a good
man doing a good job. I think we should be moving up to a
higher level, though. In particular, I think we need a more
robust multilateral strategy on human rights.
For us in the Bush administration, it was hard. We had a
progressive left government in Seoul that didn't want to play
on this, and then we had in Europe, in France and Germany,
countries that preferred to point the human rights finger at
the U.S.
We now have a very different lineup in Seoul and in Europe,
and in Japan. And I think we could, with more effort, create
more of a multilateral fund, pressing China on refoulement, the
forced repatriation of refugees. And we know that North Korea
is not going to fundamentally change its policy in the short
term, but I think there is evidence that they are sensitive,
particularly when there is a broad, multilateral indictment of
their regime. So that is where I would encourage Ambassador
King and his colleagues to bring it up to the next level.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Mr. Fleitz. I think human rights have basically been
lacking from our talks with North Korea, and that is a big
problem. We have focused on a handful of issues, trying to
strike agreements on nuclear issues that were fairly weak, and
we have put other issues, such as human rights and the
abduction of Japanese citizens, to the side, because they were
a distraction.
I think that has been a mistake, and we have to hold to our
principles and fight for everything we believe in when we
engage the North Koreans, not just the issues that they are
interested in talking about. We have to talk about what we need
to talk about.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Mr. Cronin. And the million cell phones in North Korea
today, even though North Koreans can only call other North
Koreans, it means that information can now flow from one part
of North Korea, where you cannot move around easily, to another
part. So the more information we can pour into North Korea, it
can seep in, and it is starting to.
And China is richer than it used to be, so it is no longer
a bad example. It is the example that North Korea really is
falling behind, because it is trying to prop up a military that
is gobbling up more than a quarter of its weak GDP. A $27-
billion gross domestic product, more than $5 billion is now
coming in from China. China is the number one patron. We have
got to expose this, and get information flowing in. We do need
our South Korean ally, and there is an election coming up this
December in South Korea.
Mr. Snyder. Well, I just want to flag the fact that the
North Korean Human Rights Act has been a major contribution
from the U.S. Congress, the strong support for funding for
information flows targeted at North Korea. We still need to
work very hard on highlighting China's really terrible policy
of repatriation of North Korean refugees, and I know you have
been doing a lot of work to try to highlight that.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much. And thank you, Madam Chair.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. And although we
would normally conclude at this time, Mr. Connolly has an issue
so pressing, so urgent, that I told him he could have a few
minutes to ask it and bring it up, so as not to cause extreme
stress, acid reflux, coronary disease, and any other medical
complications that could ensue.
So Mr. Connolly is recognized.
Mr. Connolly. Why do I have the feeling, Madam Chairman,
that this is going to cost me a lot of chocolate? [Laughter.]
I wanted to give the panel the opportunity to answer that
question that I put out there earlier. It seems to me an odd
thing that we would have a hearing on North Korea and not talk
about the change in leadership, and I think we would benefit
from each of your observations, remembering we have to be
succinct.
Who is this new leader, and what is our understanding of
consolidation of power, and who really holds the power in the
North, and what it might mean moving forward for the
discussions we have had this morning?
Mr. Snyder?
Mr. Snyder. Well, so far, I think that what we have seen on
the surface is continuity. But as could be seen from the video,
there is something odd, hard to accept in the west, about a 30-
year-old kid running a country surrounded by 60-year-old
generals. So we don't know what is happening under the surface.
And we are watching it through a TV screen. The Chinese
actually have better direct access. What we really need is to
see how the leader is interacting with those around him
directly, in order to make a clear determination.
Mr. Green. So far, he is following a clear game plan. They
are making him up to look like his grandfather, the Great
Leader. He is appearing more in public for on-the-spot guidance
than people expected. Normally, there is a hundred day mourning
period after the death of the father. But basically, he is
following a game plan. I think that the missile and nuclear
program is largely in place in terms of that plan, and that Kim
Jong-Il, he called audibles. He made judgment calls about how
to respond to western pressure and so forth.
The interesting and troubling thing about this young
successor is, how will he handle the audibles? How will he
handle when things start getting rough, after a future nuclear
test, after future provocations? How will he handle that in the
margins? And that is where the unpredictable factor comes in,
and where we may see tensions emerging between him and the
military or other leadership figures.
Mr. Fleitz. I think Kim Jong-Un is probably secure, because
Kim Jong-Il's ill health was known for some time. I think they
did have a transition in place before he died. Whether Kim
Jong-Un is really running the country, or whether Kim Jong-Il's
powerful brother-in-law and his wife are part of a triumvirate,
we don't know yet. But we will be watching this, just like we
used to watch the Soviet generals on May Day, to see who is
behind whom and what is really going on in the country.
But I just tend to think that the military is not going to
challenge him, that the generals who might have long ago were
purged, and they are all part of a regime that wants to stay in
power.
Mr. Cronin. The fact that Kim Jong-Un went ahead with the
Leap Day deal, which had been negotiated last October in
outline in Geneva, suggests that he did indeed want continuity,
or that he could not overcome the military-first structure that
he was inheriting. We don't know, is the key point, though. And
I have done many television interviews about Kim Jong-Un, and
this thing that they don't put on the television is the point
that the U.S. Government, the South Korean Government, do not
really know, because we don't have direct access to the
dynamics of the leadership and how they make decisions.
We need to get much closer to this problem to have a better
understanding, no matter which policy we go with, and then we
need a long-term hard strategy, and we need to stick to it over
time, because this is a long game.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you. And Madam Chairman, thank you so
much.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. Mr. Berman
and I thank the witnesses. Thank you for your excellent
testimony. Sorry about messing up the order and totally dissing
Dr. Cronin there at the end. My apologies. Thank you very much,
ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for joining us. And the
committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:34 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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