[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
ENSURING THE TRANSPARENCY, EFFICIENCY, AND EFFECTIVENESS OF HOMELAND
SECURITY GRANTS
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE,
AND COMMUNICATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 20 and APRIL 26, 2012
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Serial No. 112-77
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Joe Walsh, Illinois Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Ben Quayle, Arizona Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Scott Rigell, Virginia Janice Hahn, California
Billy Long, Missouri Vacancy
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Robert L. Turner, New York
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida, Chairman
Joe Walsh, Illinois Laura Richardson, California
Scott Rigell, Virginia Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania, Vice Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Chair Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Blake Farenthold, Texas (Ex Officio)
Peter T. King, New York (Ex
Officio)
Kerry A. Kinirons, Staff Director
Natalie Nixon, Deputy Chief Clerk
Curtis Brown, Minority Professional Staff Member
C O N T E N T S
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Page
TUESDAY, MARCH 20, 2012
Statements
The Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency
Preparedness, Response, and Communications..................... 1
The Honorable Laura Richardson, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications........... 7
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 6
Witnesses
Ms. Elizabeth M. Harman, Assistant Administrator, Grant Programs
Directorate, Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 15
Mr. Corey Gruber, Assistant Administrator, National Preparedness
Directorate, Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 22
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 15
Ms. Anne L. Richards, Office of Inspector General, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 24
Prepared Statement............................................. 26
Mr. William O. Jenkins, Jr., Director, Homeland Security and
Justice Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 29
Prepared Statement............................................. 30
Mr. Michael A. Nutter, Mayor of Philadelphia, Testifying on
Behalf of the United States Conference of Mayors:
Oral Statement................................................. 41
Prepared Statement............................................. 43
For the Record
The Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency
Preparedness, Response, and Communications:
Statement of the Florida Emergency Preparedness Association.... 2
Letter......................................................... 4
The Honorable Laura Richardson, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications:
Statement of Kurt J. Nagle, President and CEO, American
Association of Port Authorities.............................. 7
Letter From the American Public Transportation Association..... 10
THURSDAY, APRIL 26, 2012
Statements
The Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency
Preparedness, Response, and Communications..................... 69
The Honorable Laura Richardson, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications........... 70
Witnesses
Panel I
Mr. James H. Davis, Executive Director, Colorado Department of
Public Safety, Testifying on Behalf of the National Governors
Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 72
Prepared Statement............................................. 74
Mr. Bryan Koon, Director, Florida Division of Emergency
Management, Testifying on Behalf of the National Emergency
Management Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 77
Prepared Statement............................................. 78
Ms. Hui-Shan Lin Walker, Emergency Management Coordinator,
Hampton, Virginia, Testifying on Behalf of the International
Association of Emergency Managers:
Oral Statement................................................. 85
Prepared Statement............................................. 86
Mr. Judson M. Freed, Director of Emergency Management and
Homeland Security, Testifying on Behalf of the National
Association of Counties:
Oral Statement................................................. 91
Prepared Statement............................................. 93
Panel II
Mr. Richard Daddario, Deputy Commissioner, Counterterrorism
Bureau, New York City Policy Department:
Oral Statement................................................. 102
Prepared Statement............................................. 104
Mr. Robert M. Maloney, Director, Office of Emergency Management,
Baltimore, Maryland:
Oral Statement................................................. 105
Prepared Statement............................................. 107
Mr. Hank C. Clemmensen, Chief, Palatine Rural Fire Protection
District, Testifying on Behalf of the International Association
of Fire Chiefs:
Oral Statement................................................. 111
Prepared Statement............................................. 113
Mr. Richard A. Wainio, President and CEO, Tampa Port Authority,
Testifying on Behalf of the American Association of Port
Authorities:
Oral Statement................................................. 116
Prepared Statement............................................. 118
Mr. Michael P. Depallo, Director and General Manager, Port
Authority Trans-Hudson (PATH) Corporation, Testifying on Behalf
of the American Public Transportation Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 120
Prepared Statement............................................. 121
Appendix
Questions From Chairman Gus M. Bilirakis for James H. Davis...... 133
Questions From Chairman Gus M. Bilirakis for Bryan Koon.......... 133
Question From Chairman Gus M. Bilirakis for Richard A. Wainio.... 134
Question From Chairman Gus M. Bilirakis for Michael D. DePallo... 134
ENSURING THE TRANSPARENCY, EFFICIENCY, AND EFFECTIVENESS OF HOMELAND
SECURITY GRANTS
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Tuesday, March 20, 2012
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response,
and Communications,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:15 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Gus M. Bilirakis
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Bilirakis, Turner, Richardson,
Clarke of Michigan, and Thompson.
Mr. Bilirakis. Good morning. The Subcommittee on Emergency
Preparedness Response and Communications will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on the
management and administration of homeland security grants. I
now recognize myself for an opening statement.
This morning's hearing is to begin a series of hearings
that the subcommittee will conduct regarding homeland security
grants. Today we will receive testimony from Federal witnesses
on challenges and successes in the management and
administration of these grants.
We will also continue a discussion that was begun last
month with Deputy Administrator Serino on the President's
proposal in fiscal year 2013 budget requests to consolidate a
number of the grant programs into a new National Preparedness
Grant Program. Next month the subcommittee will continue this
examination with a hearing with stakeholders, those directly
impacted by the proposed change.
Today I will once again raise a number of questions that I
raised at the--of course the subcommittee's hearing, the FEMA
budget hearing about the President's requests for grants as I
do not believe, more than a month after the President's budget
was released, we had received sufficient--I do not think we
received sufficient detailed information about the proposed
National Preparedness Grant Program.
These are the questions: How would FEMA factor risk when
allocating funding under this program? Would high-risk urban
areas, port authorities, and transit agencies be able to apply
directly for funding? What is your plan and schedule for
meaningful stakeholder engagement on this proposal?
That is so very important. Allocations under the NPGP would
rely heavily on State's Threat and Hazard Identification and
Risk Assessment, THIRA. Yet nearly a year after the THIRA
concept was first introduced as part of the fiscal year 2011
grant guidance, grantees have yet to receive guidance on how to
conduct the THIRA process.
At our hearing last month Administrator Serino indicated
that the guidance would be released by the end of the month,
which is fast approaching. When can stakeholders expect to get
this information, which is long overdue?
Questions also remain as to how local stakeholders would be
involved in the THIRA process at the State level. As I
discussed with Administrator Serino, it is essential that local
law enforcement, first responders, and emergency managers who
are first on the scene of a terrorist attack, natural disaster,
or other emergency be involved in this process. They know the
threats to their local areas and the capabilities they need to
attain to best address them.
I have received feedback from a number of stakeholder
organizations. I know the Ranking Member has as well. I ask
unanimous consent to insert this feedback and any received by
the Ranking Member that she would like of course, would be
included in the record. Without objection so ordered.
[The information follows:]
Statement of the Florida Emergency Preparedness Association
fepa comments on fema grant reform and 2012 empg guidance
FEPA coordinated two conference calls with a focused group of
members to discuss the recently released DHS/FEMA National Preparedness
Grant Program (NPGP) for the 2013 grant cycle and funding guidance for
the 2012 Federal Emergency Management Performance Grant. The calls were
conducted on Tuesday, February 21, 2012 and Friday, February 24, 2012.
The purpose of the calls was to exchange comments, concerns, and
information regarding the proposals to allow FEPA to be better informed
to provide information to the membership regarding these initiatives.
In addition, FEPA's established relationship with Florida Congressman
Gus Bilirakis provides the Association with a unique opportunity to
submit our thoughts directly to the Congressman for his consideration.
This document represents a summary of the issues and questions
discussed on the calls.
Background.--The NPGP consolidates a variety of current DHS grant
programs (EMPG and Fire Grants will remain independent grants) and
proposes that each State receive a ``base'' amount of funding allocated
by population with the remainder of funds allocated through a National
competitive process. FEPA recognizes any grants process can be improved
and applauds the Federal initiatives to evaluate the grant programs'
effectiveness and seek input on methods to improve funding processes.
FEPA also is encouraged that the grant consolidation appears to
reinforce an ``All Hazards'' approach to emergency management. Without
this, emergency managers are faced with becoming ``competitors'' rather
than ``collaborators'' with other response disciplines for scarce
resources.
questions/comments/concerns
What portion of the overall combined NPGP funding stream is
dedicated to the ``base'' amount versus the ``competitive''
pool of funding?
What is the representation on the National peer review panel
for the competitive process? FEPA strongly suggests the
inclusion of local emergency management practitioners and that
their representation be equally weighted with State and
National interests.
Projects funded in the competitive process are to be tied to
a State's Threat Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment
(THIRA). How will the development of initial THIRAs be funded?
What is the anticipated time line to complete the THIRAs?
Based on anticipated use of THIRA as a tool for
comprehensive capabilities and risk analyses, it appears that
the THIRAs represent a very deliberative and complex process.
Given this, will States have time to develop these assessments
for the 2013 competitive funding cycle? What is FEMA's time
line for completion of its (FEMA) regional THIRAs and how will
FEMA's regional THIRAs influence the individual State THIRA
documents in each FEMA region? Are State THIRAs expected or
required to include locally developed THIRAs or similar
assessments?
Will DHS/FEMA issue detailed guidance information on the
development of State THIRAs so the documents can offer a
consistent perspective for the National competitive project
review? If so, when?
Will States be required to include local projects in their
project submissions under the competitive process?
Will local projects or projects that benefit local
jurisdictions be a required percentage of a State's competitive
project submissions?
Will there be an appeals process to adjudicate the
determinations/outcomes of the competitive process?
The documents refer to ``regional capabilities'' and
``deployable capabilities and assets'' under EMAC. What is the
definition of regional for these grant proposals?
Many States have established regions for operational or
programmatic purposes; but these may not accurately reflect
sociological, demographic, and other characteristics that
affect response capabilities and capacities. Are locally-
trained personnel considered deployable assets under EMAC?
Are preparedness activities such as NIMs-compliant local
planning, training, and exercises still eligible and encouraged
for funding?
Are NIMS training requirements for local personnel still in
place or are they now only required for personnel deployed
under EMAC?
The documents state: ``In addition, competitive applications will
be required to address a capability gap identified in one of the FEMA
Regional THIRAs, identify that the proposed new capability does not
duplicate one that already exists within a reasonable response time and
describe how the capability will be fully established within the 2-year
period of performance.''
As noted above, when will the FEMA Regional THIRAs be
completed and available?
How does FEMA define a ``new capability that does not
duplicate . . . within a reasonable response time''? FEPA
strongly encourages DHS/FEMA to recognize intra-regional
capability gaps where even a robust regional approach results
in underserved areas and populations, particularly for events
that occur with little or no warning.
Will the base and competitive funding process require States
to recognize local emergency management organizations that have
robust programs and can effectively manage grant funds to
encourage distribution and use of the funds at the lowest
effective level of government?
2012 empg funding opportunity announcement
How does the THIRA component of the State Mitigation Plan
that is required to be completed by December 31, 2012 relate to
the THIRA used as the basis for NPGP competitive projects?
As noted above, how can these comprehensive assessments be
completed by December 31, 2012 given the grant project award
start date is June 1, 2012 and grantees have 90 days to accept
or reject an award?
The guidance includes permissive language that a grantee may
sub-grant funds to non-Governmental entities. What is the
purpose of this distinction in the grant guidance? This
provision may promote unintended segregation of these entities
from core emergency management Government functions rather than
promote inclusion. Many of these entities have access to
alternative Federal grant programs for their specific expertise
and missions.
If funded, will these entities be expected to meet the same
program requirements as Governmental entities--i.e. trained
personnel, approved emergency plans and procedures, training,
and exercise plans?
expediting expenditures of dhs/fema grant funds
FEPA would also like to express concern regarding FEMA's recently
released guidance to State Administrative Agencies to expedite
expenditure of certain DHS/FEMA grant funds (Grant Programs Directorate
Information Bulletin Number 379, February, 17, 2012). As noted above,
FEPA recognizes the need for continual review and improvement of grant
processes and the need to expend grant funds within a reasonable period
of performance. However, the bulletin places the burden on grantees and
sub-grantees to request and fully document the need for funding
extensions without recognizing that delays with the FEMA project
obligation, FEMA project review, and FEMA evaluation process are often
the initial cause of the fund expenditure delays. In Florida, this is
particularly true of multiple delays in required FEMA environmental
review of capital projects, such as Emergency Operations Centers. FEMA
should perform an internal review of each local project that is
affected by Information Bulletin 379 that has experienced a delay in a
required Federal review and automatically exempt it from the new
requirements.
______
Letter Submitted For the Record by Chairman Gus M. Bilirakis
March 16, 2012.
The Honorable Peter King, Chairman,
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, Ranking Member,
Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, DC 20515.
The Honorable Gus Bilirakis, Chairman,
The Honorable Laura Richardson, Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications,
Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, DC 20515.
Dear Mr. King, Mr. Thompson, Mr. Bilirakis, and Ms. Richardson: We
are pleased to submit this letter for the record of your March 20,
2012, hearing on Ensuring the Transparency, Efficiency, and
Effectiveness of Homeland Security Grants.
Everyone agrees that we should spend our homeland security dollars
where they are needed most in an efficient and effective manner and
that we need to improve cooperation and communication among the various
agencies and governments involved in making our homeland secure. While
we share the goals of using risk assessments and reducing
administrative burdens, we do not believe that a decade's worth of work
in building the regional governance and collaboration structures of
these programs should be discarded in the wholesale fashion proposed
without full consideration through Congressional reauthorization of the
grant programs. Until the preparedness grant programs are reauthorized
by Congress, the current grant program structure as authorized by law
should be followed.
We, therefore, have serious concerns with FEMA's proposal to
convert the current suite of homeland security grant programs into
State-administered block and competitive grant programs in which
funding decisions are based on State and multi-State threat
assessments. Of course, changes are needed in these programs, but the
outline for the proposed National Preparedness Grant Program (NPGP)
raises serious concerns and questions for those of us at the local
level--the ones charged with providing terrorism prevention,
protection, and first response when an incident occurs. Among our
concerns and questions:
The NPGP proposal moves away from the current regional
governance, assessment, and strategy-based approach to a
competitive and individual project based approach that will pit
cities, counties, and States against each other for funding.
This will generate conflict instead of fostering collaboration
as is currently the case.
The NPGP proposal emphasizes Nationally deployable assets,
thus shifting the emphasis from the full system of prevention,
protection, preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation to
one that appears to focus on response alone.
What role will local Government officials, local emergency
managers, and first responders have in the Threat Hazard
Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) process so that they
can ensure that it includes local concerns? It's important to
note that THIRAs are not homeland security plans. They are risk
assessments that should be used to help develop plans along
with capabilities assessments and gap and sustainment analyses.
Since final guidance on THIRAs has not yet been issued by the
Department, it is difficult to consider major structural
changes to grant programs that would be significantly
influenced by the THlRAs.
Since it is unclear how the funding in the NPGP will be
distributed to local areas, how do we ensure that it is used to
meet local threats and preparedness gaps? How do we ensure that
political considerations do not become the criteria for the
distribution of these funds?
The UASI program ensures that Federal funding is used to
improve preparedness in high-risk areas, as recommended by the
9/11 Commission. How can DHS ensure that the new National
Preparedness Grant program meets this recommendation, if it
solely distributes funding based on THIRA examinations
performed by States?
Finally, we must ask why such major changes are being proposed
without advance consultation with the local governments and full range
of first responders charged with preventing, protecting against, and
responding when incidents --manmade and natural--occur, and why are
they being proposed without consulting with--and in fact in a way that
would bypass--the committees of jurisdiction in Congress which have
worked so hard over the years to craft the current suite of homeland
security and preparedness programs.
Following are principles we would urge you to consider in reforming
any of the grant programs:
Transparency.--How the States are distributing funds, why
they are making these decisions, and where the funds are going
must be clear and understandable.
Local Involvement.--Local government officials, including
emergency managers and emergency response officials, know best
the threats and vulnerabilities in their areas. The THIRA
process must include the input of local elected and emergency
response officials, and FEMA must be able to audit States by
comparing local risk assessments to the State-level THIRA.
Flexibility with Accountability.--Any changes to the
existing Federal grant programs should allow Federal funding to
meet individual local needs, and preparedness gaps as
identified at the local level. Effective but sometimes less
politically popular programs, like mitigation, must still
receive funding. para.
Local Funding.--Since event impact and response are
primarily local in nature, grant funding should support
primarily local prevention and preparedness efforts, as is the
case under the current program structure. It is important that
Federal homeland security grants continue to fund local
prevention and response activities, including local emergency
managers and first responders, and activities that support
their preparedness efforts.
Terrorism Prevention.--We must not lose the current emphasis
on supporting law enforcement's terrorism prevention
activities. The Federal grant funds should not be used to
support larger State bureaucracies at the expense of
operational counter terrorism preparedness, threat analysis,
and information-sharing activities.
Incentives for Regionalization.--FEMA's proposal focuses on
States and multi-State regions (similar to the FEMA regions).
It is important to make sure that the homeland security grants
also support preparedness in metropolitan intra-State and
inter-State regions.
We appreciate the opportunity to submit these comments for the
record and look forward to working with you to ensure the transparency,
efficiency, and effectiveness of homeland security grants. If we can
provide you any further information on this, please contact [The U.S.
Conference of Mayors].
Sincerely,
National Association of Counties,
National League of Cities,
The United States Conference of Mayors,
U.S. Council of the International Association of Emergency
Managers (IAEM-USA),
International Association of Fire Chiefs,
International Association of Fire Fighters,
National Volunteer Fire Council,
Congressional Fire Services Institute,
National Sheriffs' Association,
Major County Sheriffs' Association,
Major Cities Chiefs Association,
National Homeland Security Association.
Mr. Bilirakis. In addition to considering the National
Preparedness Grant Program proposal, I know that all our
Members are interested in FEMA's efforts to develop measures
and metrics for these programs. Pursuant to the Redundancy
Elimination and Enhancement Performance for Preparedness Grants
Act, which was approved by this committee and signed into law
in 2010, FEMA worked with the National Academy of Public
Administration to develop performance measures.
While FEMA's collaboration with NAPA was completed months
ago, this committee has yet to receive the results--the
resulting report. We recognize that this is a complex
undertaking, but FEMA has been attempting to develop these
measurements for years. The time has come to finish the job.
In these difficult budgetary times we must ensure that
vital Homeland Security grants funding is allocated based on
risk and every dollar is leveraged to enhance our preparedness
and response capabilities. There is no room for wasteful
spending on snow cone machines, equipment that does not work or
is incompatible with current systems, or equipment that sits
idle so long that it becomes unusable. When such expenditures
are identified we must take steps to address the problem and
allocate the funding to jurisdictions that will make a better
use of these funds.
With that, I once again welcome our witnesses. I look
forward to your testimony.
The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Member of the full
committee to make a statement.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate the Ranking Member of the subcommittee's
graciousness in allowing me to go.
In fiscal year 2012 the Congress passed a bill mandating
funding cuts in important Homeland Security grant programs. As
part of that reduction in funding, grant programs were merged
and the Secretary was empowered to pick winners and losers.
Transit security, port security, and assistance to firefighters
were cut. Programs like Citizen Corps and the Metropolitan
Medical Response Systems were eliminated.
In March of this year the administration released its
fiscal year 2013 budget request. In that request administration
seeks to codify the grant program consolidation first carried
out in the fiscal year 2012 appropriation. As a Ranking Member
of the authorizing committee for the Department of Homeland
Security, I urge my colleagues to take a serious look at this
effort to authorize a consolidation of needed Homeland Security
grants.
This committee, which possesses both oversight and
authorization responsibility over the Department, has a duty to
fully examine any and every effort to drastically cut and
permanently merge these programs. Before this Government
undertakes such a radical change in funding for these vital
programs, Congress must ask some vital questions.
Members must ask about the wisdom of forcing port and
transit officials to compete for the same grant money. Members
must examine the fact of asking public health providers and
local law enforcement to vie for a shrinking part of grant
money.
State and local officials, first responders, and first
preventers must have an opportunity to tell how they will be
affected by these cuts. We need to hear what projects will be
put on hold and what projects will be abandoned.
Members must ask how these funding decisions will affect
the long-term and short-term security posture of our Nation. In
other words, we need to do oversight. I understand that we are
in austere times and an election year.
I know that for some it is beneficial to be seen as a
Government cost-cutter. But what good is cost-cutting if we
reduce our preparedness and sacrifice our security? I guarantee
you in this game a penny saved is not a penny earned. It could
be a life lost.
Mr. Chairman, these grants are not merely about money.
These grants play a big role in how people out in the rest of
the United States prepare for the unthinkable. We must not be
afraid to ask questions. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, sir. I appreciate it very much.
Now I will recognize the Ranking Member of this committee
for any statement she would like to make.
Ms. Richardson. Good morning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
convening today's hearing; and of course, Ranking Member
Thompson, for all of your support on these important issues.
I also want to welcome our panel today, our witnesses.
Thank you for your testifying, in advance.
Mr. Chairman, before I move forward with my opening
statement, in addition to the letter we received from the 12
vital stakeholders I would like to ask for unanimous consent to
submit two additional letters for the record from critical
stakeholders: the American Association of Port Authorities and
the American Public Transportation Association.
Mr. Bilirakis. Without objection so ordered.
[The information follows:]
Statement of Kurt J. Nagle, President and CEO, American Association of
Port Authorities
March 20, 2012
Thank you for inviting us to submit testimony for the record on
behalf of the American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA). AAPA is
an alliance of the leading public ports in the Western Hemisphere and
our testimony today reflects the views of our U.S. members.
Since 9/11, port security has become a top priority for U.S. ports.
Safe and secure seaport facilities are fundamental to protecting our
borders and moving goods. Protecting the people and freight that move
through seaports and surrounding communities is essential to keeping
seaports safe and open for business. With 99.6 percent (by volume) of
overseas trade flowing through U.S. ports, a terrorist incident at a
port could have a drastic impact on the U.S. economy.
In the decade since 9/11, a key component of our Nation's effort to
harden the security of seaports has been the Port Security Grant
Program, currently managed by FEMA. Port Security Grant funds have
helped port facilities and port areas to strengthen facility security
and work in partnership with other agencies to enhance the security of
the region. Port Security Grant funding has been used to procure
equipment such as vessels and vehicles, install detection systems such
as cameras and sensors, and provide equipment maintenance for the
systems recently installed.
Under the SAFE Port Act, the Port Security Grant program is
authorized at $400 million. Unfortunately, in the last few years, the
funding for this program has decreased, currently standing at a
dangerously low level. The current level of $97.5 million is 75 percent
less than the authorized level, and it is currently at one of the
lowest funding levels ever for this program. As costs of systems,
maintenance, and equipment continue to rise, this level of funding will
bring into question the sustainability of the protection levels we have
worked so hard to build over the last decade.
As you know, for fiscal year 2012, Congress decided to bundle all
FEMA State and Local grant programs, cut the combined programs by 40
percent, and give DHS the authority to determine funding levels for
individual programs. AAPA has long been wary of efforts to bundle
programs, fearing that traditional homeland security grants would be
given a higher priority. DHS was given the authority to make the
funding decisions, and last month, our fears became reality. The fiscal
year 2012 funding level represents a 59 percent cut from the prior year
and 75 percent less than the authorized level. This will harm our
ability to expand protection of our maritime assets, carry out Port-
Wide Risk Management Plans and fund Federal mandates such as
installation of TWIC readers.
In a constantly changing threat environment, this level of funding
will make it difficult to maintain current capabilities, much less meet
new and emerging concerns in such areas as infrastructure protection,
continuity of services such as power and water, protection of our
information technology capabilities and response to the ever-growing
cyber threat. At many ports, Port Security Grant funding has been a
critical component in their efforts to build a resilient port, and we
would hate to see a degradation of these efforts as a result of grant
funding reductions.
There were other adverse changes to the fiscal year 2012 grants as
well. First, the term of performance has been changed from 3 years to 2
years in an effort to get money spent more quickly. Although we
appreciate the need to move projects along, we are concerned that such
a move will shift the focus to buying ``stuff,'' rather than developing
technological solutions, most of which are part of Port-Wide Risk
Management Plans, which have been well-vetted to address current and
future vulnerabilities. Ports, in working closely with each other and
the Department of Homeland Security, have spent a great deal of time to
identify system-wide vulnerabilities and develop holistic solutions.
The past period of performance made it difficult to execute many of
these solutions; the current period may make it nearly impossible.
As your committee knows, there have been challenges in getting
grant money disbursed. This is a complex issue that has been made even
more complex due to an ever-changing grant environment. First, it may
take months to get final approval from FEMA to execute funding, and
once this approval is secured, it is only the start of a complex
process that involves design efforts, which in most cases only begin
when the funding is approved. Once these design efforts are complete,
State, local, and Federal procurement processes come into play. For a
complex system this often requires the issuance of a Request for
Qualifications (RFQ), followed by a Request for Proposals (RFP),
responding to questions by vendors, evaluation of the proposals, and
the contract process. Once a contract is in place, a complex project
may need to get State and local environmental clearances, and
clearances from the Historical Society if a Historical Building or site
may be involved.
Cost-share requirements have also been an obstacle. Although we
appreciate the concept for a grantee to have ``skin in the game,'' it
is often overlooked that the ``skin'' that the port also provides is
the on-going operations and maintenance costs of the system. This is
particularly true with technology solutions where the annual operating
costs can be as high as 10 percent of the cost of the project. At this
rate the port exceeds a 25 percent cost share in current dollars a
little more than 2 years after the completion of the project. In some
major ports where in-house design often occurs, the port's contribution
is larger due to the fact that port personnel costs are not refunded by
the grants.
As indicated above, how projects are funded has some peculiarities
as well. Some ports prefer to use in-house labor, either by choice or
due to labor agreements. Unfortunately, this puts the port at a
financial disadvantage because in-house labor is not reimbursable under
the grants.
A number of challenges exist with respect to grant funding and
administration and there is often not a clear recognition that many
projects may be underway if one views only the total of unspent funds.
Many ports have procurement policies that only allow them to seek
reimbursement after a project is completed, and in many cases billing
is not conducted until the project is complete. It may appear that
nothing has been done on a project when it is actually complete or
nearly complete, and as a result, the financial reporting may not
provide an accurate picture.
FEMA and ports are working hard to resolve this draw-down problem.
Two key things that could speed spending are providing a uniform cost-
share waiver and further streamlining the FEMA Environmental and
Historic Preservation review process. As you know, some years there is
a cost-share requirement, and other years it is waived. For projects
that have a cost-share, grantees decide to go to DHS for a project-
based waiver. This delays the use of funds as some grantees must wait
to see if they can get cost-share-waived funds before undertaking a
project. AAPA strongly endorses a uniform waiver of cost-share for all
past grants to stimulate quicker use of past funds and as a recognition
of the other costs ports incur, as noted earlier.
Another hurdle is the Environmental and Historic Preservation
review within FEMA. While other FEMA programs must go through these
reviews, there isn't the threat of a loss of funds, because there is no
time table associated with these other programs. Therefore, the EHP
reviews are not processed or prioritized in a way to reflect grant time
limitations. Additionally, FEMA EHP reviews could be streamlined by
taking into account similar State and local reviews for a facility.
While EHP has streamlined some of their reviews, this process still is
a major reason why many of the grant projects require an extension.
The fiscal year 2012 grant announcement also includes some
improvements to the program, like expanding the use of funds for
maintenance and allowing limited use of grants for personnel, as
allowed under the authorization legislation. These are changes for
which AAPA has long advocated. AAPA was also pleased to see that
despite the drastic cut in funding, all ports continue to be eligible
for funding. Restricting funding to the highest-risk ports would be bad
public policy because it would leave a soft underbelly of
underprotected ports that terrorists could exploit.
In regard to the future of this program, in February, the FEMA
Grants Directorate released a vision document that outlined its plan to
consolidate 16 separate grant programs into one National Preparedness
Grant program starting in fiscal year 2013 that would send the money to
the States for distribution. AAPA believes this would make port
security programs an even lower priority and strongly urges your
committee to keep the program separate, as you do for Firefighter
Assistance grants.
Port Security Grants are managed quite differently than other
homeland security grants. Priorities are set locally, based on the
risks and vulnerability of the local port area. Other homeland security
grants have a list of core capabilities, which all grantees try to
attain. This capabilities list is based more on movable and shared
assets rather than set facilities. There is no such list of core
capabilities for port security grants and the ones developed for other
grant programs were not developed with ports in mind. Additionally,
ports have certain Federal mandates, such as TWIC readers, that they
must comply with, and the cost of those requirements will not be fully
felt until the Coast Guard issues its final regulations.
Moving the funding to the States is also a big concern for AAPA.
Port security is focused on protecting international borders. This is a
Federal responsibility, not a State responsibility. Many States don't
have the personnel or expertise to evaluate maritime risks or determine
how ports should be prioritized against other homeland security
priorities in the State. The risk evaluations for ports are made at the
Federal level by the Coast Guard and other Federal agencies. We are
also concerned that this would increase the complexity in grant
management and slow a process that is already recognized as cumbersome.
Not only does a second or potentially third pass-through layer (the
State or municipal government, respectively) mandate its own sets of
compliance requirements on top of Code of Federal Regulations and
Office of Management and Budget Circulars, it also creates unnecessary
cogs in the administration that slows down our ability to spend,
execute, and deliver. Moving funds to the States would compromise
program efficiency and effectiveness. If, however, a decision is made
to consolidate the program and move it to the States, AAPA strongly
urges your committee to allocate a set amount of funding for the
program to ensure that funding for port security is not diluted
further.
AAPA appreciates the willingness of DHS to work with the ports on
Port Security Grant issues. We have and will continue to work with them
to improve the program. Positive changes have been made, and we hope
that these changes will continue. We do feel that over time external
pressures and the ``pile-on'' effect of new and continuing requirements
has had a significant negative impact on the program. We also believe
that it is an appropriate time for a DHS/Grant User Group to conduct a
review of the Port Security Grant Program and identify areas of
improvement and recommend changes that will address these areas.
For fiscal year 2013 and beyond, we strongly urge the committee to:
1. Restore port security funding to its earlier level;
2. Keep the funding separate, similar to Firefighter Assistance
Grants;
3. Maintain current Federal control over the program, or if funds
are moved to the States, appropriate a set amount for our
Nation's ports;
4. Provide a uniform cost-share waiver of past grant funds; and
5. Establish a joint DHS/Port group to continually streamline the
process.
In order to continue to be effective, the grant process must evolve
in conjunction with port needs and vulnerabilities. Working with DHS,
efforts have been made to keep pace with this evolution. We fear that
if ports are ``lumped'' into the larger Homeland Security equation,
efforts to date will be marginalized and the focus on ports will be
lost. The separation of Port Security Grant funding served to highlight
the need to focus on a component of the Nation's critical
infrastructure and international border that was largely ignored prior
to the tragic events on 9/11. We have a significant fear that this
focus will be lost if the Port Security Grant Program does not remain
separate and fails to continue to evolve to meet emerging security
needs.
______
Letter From the American Public Transportation Association
March 16, 2012.
Chairman Peter King,
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, H2-176
Ford House Office Building, Washington, DC 20515.
Ranking Member Bennie Thompson,
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, H2-176
Ford House Office Building, Washington, DC 20515.
Dear Chairman King and Ranking Member Thompson: On behalf of the
American Public Transportation Association (APTA), our more than 1,500
member organizations, and the millions of Americans who regularly ride
public transportation, I write to offer APTA's views on the proposed
fiscal year 2012 Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) Guidance and the
fiscal year 2013 National Preparedness Grant Program (NPGP). APTA was
not consulted in the development of this new approach to preparedness
grants that is embodied in both the guidance and the new grant program,
which overemphasizes the value of a consolidated approach to these
grants and unnecessarily eliminates the TSGP as a stand-alone program.
We believe this approach to be inconsistent with the direction set
forth under the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
Act.
APTA recognizes many of the sound goals and positive policy
provisions represented in the new proposal, including:
Peer Review.--APTA and its members already have a system in
place for conducting peer reviews--we look forward to working
with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to develop
such a program.
Multi-year Grant Guidance.--APTA supports the approach of a
multi-year grant guidance--previously, the TSGP guidance
changed nearly every year, and APTA believes this to be one of
the reasons that have contributed to delays in grant
performance and drawdown.
Notwithstanding these positive improvements to the current program,
there are several other program changes that cause us concern and which
we believe could thwart the progress many grantee agencies have made to
improve the security of their systems in recent years.
problematic program changes: fiscal year 2012 tsgp guidance and fiscal
year 2013 npgp
The ``National Preparedness Grant Program'' proposes to consolidate
all grant programs previously categorized as preparedness grants into
one comprehensive grant program. This is a drastic change that
eliminates the stand-alone TSGP--the exclusive pool of funding for our
Nation's public transportation systems. While this new program may be
designed to meet the needs of the emergency management community and to
more closely align with policy represented in the National Preparedness
Goal, emergency preparedness and core capabilities are only subsets of
the policy that the Transit Security Grant Program was intended to
advance. Transit systems and their assets remain high-risk terrorist
targets, and investments in hardening and other capital security
improvements specific to transit agencies do not appropriately fall
within this broader emergency preparedness policy. APTA calls on
Congress to authorize and preserve a sufficiently-funded, segregated
grant program for public transportation security as envisioned in the
9/11 Commission Act.
Of additional concern is the new 24-month period of grant
performance for all projects proposed in the fiscal year 2012 TSGP
Guidance, which is further contained in the proposal for the fiscal
year 2013 NPGP. This is a reduction from the previous 3-5 year
allowable expenditure period. APTA certainly appreciates the concerns
regarding unexpended security grant dollars and is committed to working
with transit agencies to carry out important security projects in a
timely fashion. However, it is important to recognize that capital
projects (security-related or otherwise) require multiple years to
complete, and a reduction in the time allotted to expend funding would
preclude many much-needed capital infrastructure security projects from
being pursued and instead compel most grant recipients to apply for
equipment and operational grants. This is not in the best interest of
fortifying our systems against attacks, as the majority of the security
needs identified in a 2010 survey of APTA's members relate to capital
projects. APTA recommends maintaining the 3-year expenditure window
with the opportunity to receive 6-month extensions up to a maximum of 5
years.
Similarly, the fiscal year 2012 TSGP and fiscal year 2013 NPGP
place a high emphasis on operational activities and Operational
Packages (OPacks). Congress has previously set a clear priority for
transit security capital investments when enacting the ``National
Transit Systems Security Act of 2007'' (Title 14 of the 9/11 Commission
Act). Additionally, the fiscal year 2012 grant guidance states that
this year's funding priorities will be based on a pre-designated ``Top
Transit Asset List'' or TTAL. APTA has testified previously that
security investment decisions should be risk-based, which is the
underlying approach of the TTAL. However, across the entire transit
industry, thousands of assets are not listed on the TTAL and, thus,
would not be eligible to receive funding. While this narrower funding
approach is based on tighter fiscal circumstances and the total Federal
dollars available for security grants, it is also indicative of the
inadequacy of current funding levels. The proposed approach will
preclude important security improvements from receiving funding
consideration. APTA recommends reauthorizing the public transportation
security assistance provisions of the 9/11 Commission Act, and urges
Congress to work to make adequate funding available for the program to
meet National needs.
Finally, under the proposal, while transit agencies would be
eligible for security funding, they would be required to apply for
funding through their State Administrative Agency (SAA), and compete in
this process with other State security priorities. This is a shift from
the current program, where transit agencies are authorized to be direct
recipients of grant funds. We believe that under this new proposal
sufficient funding would not consistently get to transit agencies, and
in many cases the involvement of the SAA has the potential to slow the
already lengthy grant performance process. Congress has repeatedly
endorsed the position that transit agencies should be direct Federal
grant recipients, as they have been through the Federal Transit
Administration, and we urge Congress to continue this policy.
Thank you for your continued commitment to the security needs of
our Nation's public transportation providers and their riders. Should
you have any questions regarding APTA's views on these issues, please
do not hesitate to contact [the APTA staff].
Sincerely yours,
Michael P. Melaniphy,
President & CEO.
Ms. Richardson. Today we will discuss FEMA's full year 2012
preparedness grant allocations and full year 2013 proposed
grant consolidation proposal. For more than a decade since 9/11
attacks, the Department has provided State and local
governments with Homeland Security preparedness grants to
invest in capabilities to strengthen our Nation.
Administrator Fugate has referenced on several occasions
that first responders' ability to successfully respond to
recent disasters on the local level is based upon primarily the
investments made by FEMA's preparedness grants program. I
absolutely concur that we should reaffirm and prioritize
support for first responders on the local level due to the
changing complexities of the terrorism threats and increased
intensity of National disasters.
Likewise, though, I support the efforts to promote
efficiency while maintaining that the American people need the
best prepared, equipped, and trained first responders. In light
of learned disaster preparedness that we have unfortunately
witnessed for several years now, I appreciate the
administration's commitment to fiscal responsibility while
simultaneously strengthening the security of our Nation's full
year 2013 budget.
However, the proposed new grant approach falls short of
immediate approval due to the lack of details, absence of broad
stakeholder outreach and governance structure, which will erode
the good work performed by the Department of Homeland Security
over the last 10 years. I am concerned that these drastic
changes will negatively impact the preparedness capabilities of
our State, territory, Tribal, and local partners. I agree that
the Emergency Management Performance Grants and the Assistance
to Fire Grants should remain independent programs and provide
adequate funding, given our economic climate.
Yet, I am extremely concerned about the impractical
approach to consolidate the remaining 16 vital grant programs
under the National Preparedness Grant Program. For instance,
the Urban Area Security Initiative, UASI grant program, brings
together all of the various first responder disciplines in
order to direct funding to close regional preparedness gaps--
excuse me. To direct funding to close regional preparedness
grants, to sustain capabilities, and to reduce risk in high-
threat areas.
Specifically grant programs that support direct grant
investments to address specific previously documented gaps in
National and local preparedness capabilities should continue.
This is why I am completely opposed to the proposed
consolidation and at a minimum will work with my colleagues to
maintain UASI, the State Homeland Security Program, Port
Security Grant Program, and the Transit Security Grant Program
as independent programs.
Throughout this country there are significant port and
transit networks that serve the entire public and the major
aspects of the economy that require adequate security. To
further add to this point, I am concerned and it is unclear
what justification supports reducing port security funding from
full year 2012 by 59 percent. Now by consolidating it to
further increase the jeopardy of reducing the focus that this
country needs.
The consolidation and reductions to our Nation's port
security and transit security grants are unacceptable and
threaten to undercut our ability to ensure that our seaports
and critical infrastructure are adequately protected, of which
I represent.
I look forward to hearing FEMA's response to these concerns
and efforts to implement performance measures. Specifically, I
welcome Mayor Nutter's testimony that will help illuminate in
real-life scenes the important role of preparedness grant
programs and the success of local Homeland Security
initiatives.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my
time.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much.
Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record. I am pleased to
welcome our distinguished panel of witnesses.
Our first witness is Ms. Elizabeth Harman. Welcome.
Ms. Harman is the assistant administrator of FEMA's Grants
Program Directorate, a position to which she was appointed by
President Obama and confirmed by the United States Senate in
March 2010. Prior to joining FEMA, Administrator Harman served
as the director of the Hazardous Materials and Weapons of Mass
Destruction Training Department at the International
Association of Firefighters.
Ms. Harman has also served as the State administrator for
Exercise and Training for the National Capital Region with the
Maryland Emergency Management Agency, and led Maryland's NIMS
roll-out efforts. Ms. Harman has served as both a volunteer and
career firefighter and holds a degree from George Washington
University.
Following Administrator Harman, we will hear from Mr. Corey
Gruber. Mr. Gruber is the assistant administrator of FEMA's
National Preparedness Directorate. Mr. Gruber previously served
as the acting assistant secretary of grants and training. Prior
to joining the Federal Government in 2001, Mr. Gruber was the
deputy director of the Emergency Management Division for
Research Planning. Mr. Gruber also served in the United States
Army where he was the chief of plans for the Department of
Defense's Directorate of Military Support.
Thank you for your service, sir.
Administrator Gruber received his bachelor's degree from
Penn State University and his master's degree from Chapman
University.
Our next witness is Ms. Anne Richards. Welcome.
Ms. Richards is the assistant inspector general for the
Office of Audits within the Department of Homeland Security's
Office of Inspector General. Prior to joining the OIG in 2007,
Ms. Richards served in the Department of Interior, including as
the assistant--she was the assistant inspector general for
audits.
Ms. Richards has also held a number of positions with the
U.S. Army Audit Agency. Ms. Richards received her bachelor's
degree from Franklin & Marshall College and her masters of
public administration from Troy State University. Ms. Richards
is a CPA in the Commonwealth of Virginia. Welcome.
Next we will receive testimony from Mr. William Jenkins.
Mr. Jenkins is the director of Homeland Security and Justice
Issues at the United States Government Accountability Office, a
position he has held since 2003. In this capacity he has led
and coordinated GAO's work on emergency preparedness response
and recovery.
Mr. Jenkins joined GAO in 1979. He received his bachelor's
degree in political science manga cum laude from Rice
University and his PhD in public law from the University of
Wisconsin.
Finally we will hear from the Honorable Michael A. Nutter.
Mr. Nutter is the 98th mayor of Philadelphia. Mr. Nutter
graduated from Warren School of Business at the University of
Pennsylvania.
Before pursuing his career in public service Mayor Nutter
was an investment manager at a minority-owned investment
banking and brokerage firm. After working on the gubernatorial
campaign of Ed Rendell and campaigns for city council, Mr.
Nutter won an election as a committee person in the 52nd ward
in 1986, 52nd Democratic ward leader in 1990, and for the city
council in 1991.
Welcome, sir.
Your entire written statements will appear in the record. I
ask that you summarize your testimony for 5 minutes. We will
begin with Administrator Harman.
You are recognized.
STATEMENT OF ELIZABETH M. HARMAN, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR,
GRANT PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
Ms. Harman. Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking Member Richardson
and Ranking Member Thompson, Members of the committee; I am
Elizabeth Harman. I am FEMA's assistant administrator for the
Grant Programs Directorate, also known as GPD. On behalf of
Secretary Napolitano and Administrator Fugate, it is my
pleasure to appear before you to discuss Homeland Security
grant programs.
Homeland Security grant programs has significantly
contributed to the security and preparedness of our Nation.
Over the past 10 years the programs have provided more than $35
billion in Federal funds to enhance capabilities to plan,
prepare, prevent, and respond to and recover from natural and
terrorist events. Over the past 10 years we have also made
progress in how these grants are administered.
Since its creation GPD has matured as an organization. In
the past 24 months I have had the opportunity to serve, GPD has
made significant strides and improvements in its operations, in
the development, management, and oversight of these programs.
These include addressing staff vacancies, standardizing formal
internal operating procedures, and relationships with our
external partners.
The ultimate responsibility from management and oversight
of these grants rests with GPD. Working in partnership with a
number of Federal agencies, GPD draws on those agencies'
expertise in the development and administration of individual
grant programs. To clarify roles and responsibilities and
establish a formal relationship, we have established eight
memorandums of understanding with our various partner agencies.
As of fiscal year 2010, GPD was experiencing delays in
processing grant awards and releasing funds to grantees. These
delays slowed grantees' ability to access funds and proceed
with approved projects. GPD identified delays in two principal
areas: Budget approvals and Federal, environmental, and
historic preservation laws.
GPD revised its internal processes and collaborated with
its partners to shorten the review times for both. The entire
budget review now takes less than 30 days and EHP reviews now
take an average of 18 days, a 66 percent improvement.
The development and adoption of standard operating
procedures is critical to our successful long-term operation
and of any organization. Prior to 2011 critical weakness within
GPD was at a lack of SOPs. As of today, substantial progress
has been made in the development and documentation of these,
resulting in uniform and streamlined business practices.
A major challenge that faced GPD and one that has received
on-going attention from Congress is the rate at which Homeland
Security grant funds are spent. This is also known as the
drawdown issue.
As of January 2012 more than $8 billion of the $35 billion
awarded under these grants remained available for expenditure.
It is important to understand that these funds are not idle.
Work is being done, projects are underway, and capabilities are
being built.
Often the spending of grant funds is slow due to factors
beyond the control of the grantee. These include State and
local procurement and contracting rules, the overall nature of
the project, matching requirements, EHP requirements, et
cetera. In an effort to assist grantees and remove impediments
wherever possible, Secretary Napolitano recently issued a
memorandum increasing flexibility in the use of these grant
funds, and where appropriate offer grantees relief from grant
program requirements such as mandatory cost shares.
Historically the $35 billion awarded under our Homeland
Security grant program has been provided through specific grant
programs authorized under the 9/11 Act. In fiscal year 2011, 15
separate grant programs received funding. Each of these
programs supports different recipients.
However, the projects supported by these programs often
overlap in scope and thus efforts may be duplicated. In fiscal
year 2012 Congress provided the Secretary discretion to
allocate approximately $995 million among the 9/11 Act's grant
program. Ultimately eight programs were funded.
This consolidation offers a number of benefits, including
allowing grantees to focus Homeland Security dollars where most
needed while reducing redundancy. With this in mind, and as a
next step in maturation about thinking about preparedness, the
fiscal 2013 budget proposed is a National Preparedness Grant
Program, also known as the NPGP. This builds upon the
consolidated approach taken in the fiscal year 2012 grant
cycle.
The NPGP vision is based on input we have received from
grantees across the country over the last several years,
including most recently through the Presidential Policy
Directive 8 process and the National Preparedness Task Force.
The NPGP will use a competitive risk-based model allocating
funding to sustain core capabilities, address gaps in threat
assessments, and build new capabilities.
FEMA has established a robust outreach effort over the
coming weeks to solicit additional input around this proposal,
and an on-going dialogue with your staff and other Members of
Congress. We have also established a topic on our new FEMA web-
based collaboration site to facilitate continued dialogue.
We believe these programs have benefitted the Nation over
the years. We strive to improve the administration of these
grants and are now proposing a framework of how we can best
maximize grant funding to address the greatest risks to our
country. This new approach has merit and we look forward to
working with Congress and our stakeholders to make it a
reality.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Richardson and Ranking Member
Thompson, and the subcommittee, this concludes my statement. I
am happy to respond to any questions that you may have.
[The joint prepared statement of Ms. Harman and Mr. Gruber
follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement of Elizabeth M. Harman and Corey Gruber
March 20, 2012
Good morning Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking Member Richardson, and
Members of the subcommittee. I am Elizabeth Harman, assistant
administrator for FEMA's Grant Programs Directorate (GPD) and this is
Corey Gruber, assistant administrator for FEMA's National Preparedness
Directorate (NPD). On behalf of Secretary Napolitano and Administrator
Fugate, it is our pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the
present and future of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Homeland Security Grant Programs (HSGP).
As this committee is aware, FEMA's grant programs, collectively
known as the Homeland Security Grant Programs, have contributed
significantly to the overall security and preparedness of the Nation.
By providing funds to support State and local collaboration and the
development of State Homeland Security Strategies, the Homeland
Security Grant Programs have enhanced security and preparedness in
States, territories, Tribal nations, regions, cities, on our borders,
and in our ports and transit systems. As a Nation, we are more secure
and better prepared to prevent, protect, and mitigate the impact of
threats and natural disasters than we have been at any time in our
history.
From the unprecedented attacks of September 11 to the tornados and
storms of the last several weeks, as a Nation, we are much more aware
of the threats and vulnerabilities we face, as well as the capabilities
we have built to address these hazards. With that awareness, we have
raised preparedness and response to new levels of importance. As a
result, we plan better, train better, work together better, and respond
and recover better. With each passing year, our planning, preparations,
and capabilities have matured.
Much of this progress has come directly from the leadership and
capabilities developed at the National, State, and local level. Over
the past 10 years, the homeland security grants have provided State,
territorial, local, and Tribal governments with more than $35 billion
in Federal funds to enhance capabilities to plan, prepare for, prevent,
respond to, and recover from natural disasters and other terrorist
threats. With these funds, grantees have built and enhanced
capabilities by acquiring needed equipment, training personnel,
planning, exercising, and building relationships across city, county,
and State lines.
The Nation has made significant progress and has achieved a high
degree of maturity in several of the core capabilities identified in
the National Preparedness Goal, particularly those that are cross-
cutting and support disaster response. Areas of success include
planning, operational coordination and communication, intelligence and
information sharing, environmental response, health and safety, mass
search and rescue, and public health and medical services. Significant
investments in public health and medical services, operational
communications, and planning capabilities have made substantial
contributions to progress achieved Nationally.
Specific examples of success include the development and maturation
of State and local fusion centers. Fusion centers function as focal
points--information hubs--within State and local jurisdictions to
provide for the gathering, receipt, analysis, and sharing of critical
information and intelligence among Federal, State, and local agencies.
Fusion centers have long been supported under several of the Homeland
Security Grant Programs, specifically the State Homeland Security
Program (SHSP) and the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) Grant
Program, and remain a priority in the fiscal year 2012 grants. As of
February 2012, there are 77 designated State and major urban area
fusion centers across the country, greatly enhancing the Nation's
ability to share critical information among all levels of government.
Additional success areas include improved planning capabilities as
well as improved operational coordination among response agencies. For
example, the Nation has significantly improved the feasibility and
completeness of plans for catastrophic events, due in part to
significant State and local investments in planning activities through
FEMA grant programs. The 2010 Nation-wide Plan Review showed that by
2010, more than 75 percent of States and more than 80 percent of urban
areas were confident that their overall basic emergency operations
plans were well-suited to meet the challenges of a large-scale
catastrophic event. Additionally, both States and urban areas show high
degrees of confidence in functional and hazard-specific planning, with
even higher degrees of confidence for hazards with which they have had
experience, such as flooding or tornadoes. FEMA has included planning
as an allowable grant cost since 2003 and has emphasized planning as a
priority for preparedness funding since 2006.
FEMA preparedness grant programs have also built operational
coordination capabilities, specifically helping to solidify the
National Incident Management System (NIMS) as the common incident
management doctrine for the whole community. Prior to the introduction
of NIMS in 2004, no single, official incident command system existed
for the Nation. Now, nearly 10 million homeland security stakeholders
from across the Nation have successfully completed the FEMA-sponsored
independent study courses on the Incident Command System.
Another achievement in Federal preparedness assistance is the
Nation's highly mature search-and-rescue capability. From fiscal year
2006 through fiscal year 2010, recipients of State and local homeland
security grant funds allocated approximately $158 million in
preparedness assistance to build and maintain US&R capabilities. Today,
the Nation has 300 State and/or local urban search-and-rescue (US&R)
teams, and 97 percent of the Nation's population is within a 4-hour
drive of a US&R team. This National expansion of State and/or local
US&R capabilities is a direct result of Federal funding and training. A
tangible result of this enhanced capability is evidenced by the
aftermath of the April 2011 outbreak of deadly tornadoes in the United
States, when Alabama mobilized State and local US&R teams to support
search-and-rescue operations in Marion, Jefferson, Franklin, and
Tuscaloosa counties rather than request Federal US&R support. This
enhanced local and regional capacity resulted in a more prompt and
immediate response than would otherwise have been possible.
Finally, over the years since its creation, GPD has matured as an
organization. Specifically, over the past 2 years, GPD has made
significant strides and improvements in its operations and in the
development, management, and oversight of the Homeland Security Grant
Programs. These improvements include: Filling staff vacancies;
streamlining internal reviews; standardizing and formalizing internal
operating procedures and GPD's relationships with its external
partners--specifically those Federal agencies that assist GPD in the
development of the various homeland security grant programs; and
enhancing stakeholder involvement with program development and
administration.
staffing
In fiscal year 2010, 20 percent of GPD Headquarters' 180 authorized
positions (37 FTEs) were vacant. This vacancy rate affected both GPD
components, the Preparedness Grant Division and the Grants Operations
Division, impacting program administration, including the ability to
work directly with grantees, respond to grantee requests, and monitor
grantee performance. For Grant Operations, the vacancy rate impacted
financial oversight and monitoring, including the rates at which
grantees spent grant funds.
Adequate staffing is critical to GPD's success. In addition to the
administration of a current fiscal year's grant programs and the
development of the next year's grant program, GPD also manages 21,000
open grants from prior fiscal year grant cycles. Therefore, with the
full support of FEMA's senior leadership, GPD filled 37 full-time
permanent (FTP) positions between August and November 2010. Currently,
GPD's overall vacancy rate is 10 percent and GPD has filled 168 of its
189 \1\ authorized positions. GPD's staffing improvements include
filling several senior leadership positions such as its Deputy
Assistant Administrator, Director for Grant Operations, and Director
for the Preparedness Grant Division.
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\1\ Between fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2012, the number of
authorized positions increased from 180 to 189.
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streamlining internal processes
Due to staffing and other challenges, GPD previously faced
significant delays in processing grant awards and releasing grant funds
to grantees. These delays, in turn, slowed grantees' ability to access
funds and proceed with approved projects. GPD identified delays in two
principal areas. The first was the delays associated with GPD review
and approval of grantees' budgets. The second involved the project
reviews and approvals required under Federal environmental and historic
preservations laws, such as the National Environmental Preservation Act
(NEPA).
In response, GPD undertook several internal reforms which resulted
in major improvements and shortened both environmental and historic
preservation reviews. The most significant of these included:
Adding Environmental and Historic Preservation (EHP) staff
to review EHP applications; creating a new EHP screening form
to better facilitate the application process; developing
Programmatic Environmental Assessments to streamline the review
of certain projects; and implementing a formalized process to
follow up with grantees who need to submit additional
information in order to process their application.
GPD also took major steps to shorten budget reviews. These
included:
Creating the Budget Review Renovation Working Group in the
GPD to improve the budget review process.
Implementing a guidance checklist for grantees with guidance
on what information is needed for a complete and thorough
budget to improve consistency as well as decrease overall
review time. By providing these instructions, grantees were
better informed about what materials were needed and able to
ensure that their budget information was complete, resulting in
faster approval of their budgets.
Today, GPD's budget review period is less than 30 days. Since 2011,
GPD headquarters' staff reduced its EHP review time to an average of 18
days--a 66 percent improvement over 2010. Additionally, from 2010
through 2011, GPD averaged 3,000 EHP reviews per year, 80 percent of
which were completed in less than the 18-day average.
standardizing internal operating procedures
Prior to 2011, GPD lacked standardized operating procedures (SOPs).
To address this, FEMA embarked on an effort to develop standard
operating procedures for all of its grant programs. These SOPs are now
in force and are being utilized on a daily basis by both headquarters
and regional grants staff.
formalizing relationships with federal agency partners
GPD has the ultimate programmatic, administrative and fiduciary
responsibility for the management and oversight of the Homeland
Security Grant Programs. Working in partnership with a number of
Federal agencies, GPD draws on those agencies' expertise and resources
in the development and administration of individual homeland security
grant programs. For example, GPD has partnered with the U.S. Coast
Guard in the development and administration of the Port Security Grant
Program (PSGP). Similarly, it has partnered with the Transportation
Security Administration in the development and administration of the
Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) and with Customs and Border
Protection in the development and administration of the Operation
Stonegarden Grant Program.
Formalizing GPD's relationships with its partner agencies became
critical to the on-going stability and successful operation of the
grant programs. Currently GPD has eight MOUs in place. Within the
Department of Homeland Security, GPD has MOUs with the Office of
Policy, the National Protection and Programs Directorate's Office of
Infrastructure Protection, the Transportation Security Administration,
the Office of Health Affairs, and FEMA's Office of Environmental
Planning and Historic Preservation. GPD also has MOUs in place with the
Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of
Transportation, and the Department of Commerce's National
Telecommunication and Information Administration.
engaging stakeholders
GPD's key partners in the development and administration of the
Homeland Security Grant Programs are the grantees, and more broadly the
stakeholder community, including the Nation's governors, mayors, Tribal
leaders, emergency managers, port and transit administrators, the law
enforcement, fire service, and emergency medical services communities,
and others integral to the Nation's overall preparedness and ability to
respond to threats and hazards.
Recognizing that its success is linked to the success of its
grantees, GPD has prioritized efforts to reach out to the stakeholder
community, listen to their concerns, and be responsive to their needs.
GPD has actively sought opportunities to address and engage
stakeholders including, but not limited to: The National Emergency
Management Association (NEMA), the International Association of
Emergency Managers (IAEM), the United States Conference of Mayors, the
National Association of Counties, the Urban Areas Security Initiative
(UASI) Conference, and the Emergency Communications Planning Consortium
(ECPC). GPD leadership regularly works with State and local leaders
including Governors, mayors, State and local legislatures,
representatives of transit and port systems as well as others from the
emergency response community. In addition, GPD is making use of
emerging technologies and is currently soliciting feedback from the
public and stakeholders regarding the development of the proposed
fiscal year 2013 National Preparedness Grant Program through the new
FEMA collaboration site (http://fema.ideascale.com/). Finally, GPD
program staff interacts directly with grantees on a regular basis and
provides a conduit from the field to GPD leadership.
expediting grant drawdowns
A major challenge facing GPD, and one that has received on-going
attention from the Congress, is the rate at which homeland security
grant funds are spent. This issue, more commonly known as the
``drawdown issue,'' refers to the rate at which GPD's grantees, the
recipients of homeland security funds, spend the monies they receive.
As of January 2012, more than $8 billion of the $35 billion awarded
under the Homeland Security Grant Programs, remained available for
expenditure. It is important to understand that these funds are not
idle. Work is being done, projects are underway, and capabilities are
being built in accordance with the rules and guidelines under which
these grants were awarded. That said, the fact remains that for a
number of reasons--as outlined below--some grant funds are spent at a
slower rate than other grant funds.
The preparedness grant programs award funding with a 3-year period
of performance. However, the programs are authorized to provide up to a
5-year performance period. This has allowed grantees to apply for and
be awarded funding, follow their own internal processes and State/local
laws as they carry out grant-funded projects, and request and receive
an extension that effectively increases the period of performance to
the statutory maximum. Grantees must also comply with a body of Federal
regulations, including rules on the timing and frequency with which
grant dollars can be drawn from the Treasury and pre-disbursement
requirements such as environmental and historic reviews. State laws and
regulations governing the allocation of Federal grant dollars to State
agencies, including those that impact procurement and hiring
activities, may also contribute to delays in spending. Often, agencies
cannot enter into contracts until award or sub-awards are in hand. Once
funds are in hand, contracting processes may take significant time and
are subject to State/local procurement laws or to State and local
officials who approve budgets/projects but who may meet infrequently.
In addition to Federal, State, and local procurement and
contracting rules, the nature of the project also can impact the
spending of grant dollars. This is the case under both the TSGP and the
PSGP where dollars are slated for capital projects that by their nature
are involved, complicated, and long-term.
Finally, as discussed above, in the past several of GPD's internal
business practices, specifically budget reviews and environmental and
historic reviews, impacted a grantee's ability to spend funds, which
have since been addressed.
Given these challenges and in light of direct input from grantees,
the Department evaluated ways to further streamline the grants process,
expedite the spending of grant funds, and put remaining funds to work
now.
In a February 13, 2012 memorandum sent to all State Administrative
Agencies, Secretary Napolitano announced a series of measures that
provide grantees with additional flexibility to accelerate the spending
of remaining fiscal year 2007-fiscal year 2012 grant funds by
addressing immediate needs and building core capabilities that will
support preparedness in the long run, consistent with existing laws,
regulations, and programmatic objectives. This memorandum described
internal measures undertaken by GPD and the Department to expedite the
use of grant funds, as discussed above, and outlined measures to
provide the grantees increased flexibility in the use of grant funds,
and, where appropriate, offered grantees relief from grant program
requirements in order to enable grantees to put these dollars to work
more quickly. These measures, as described below, will enable grantees
to use funding to cover additional personnel costs, maintain previously
purchased equipment and apply grant balances to more urgent
priorities--all based on key priorities of grantees.
Measures announced by the Secretary:
Support Reprioritization
Allow grantees to redirect or reprioritize the use of
currently obligated grant funds to more urgent priorities. This
flexibility allows grantees to re-examine how unspent funds are
currently designated to be spent and shift funds from current
projects to others as needed. There are multiple benefits to
providing this flexibility. Long-term projects, especially in
view of diminishing grant dollars in future years, could be
modified, reduced in scale, and funds could shift from
expansion to sustainment.
Expand allowable expenses under the Port and Transit
Security Grant Program to fund more operational activities, in
accordance the SAFE Port Act and 9/11 Act, respectively.
Allow combating violent extremism activities as defined by
the administration's CVE Strategy to be eligible in all grant
years.
Focus on Core Capabilities
Expand maintenance and sustainment to equipment, training,
and critical resources that have previously been purchased in
order to support existing core capabilities tied to the five
mission areas of the National Preparedness Goal.
Provide Waivers
Waive the 50 percent cap on personnel costs.
Waive the match requirements under fiscal year 2008 and 2009
Port Security Grant for public sector grantees and match
requirements for Nonprofit Security Grant Program, the
Interoperable Emergency Communications Grant Program, and
Regional Catastrophic Planning Grant Program.
These measures were based on a belief that in a period of
diminishing grant dollars, providing grantees the flexibility to
reassess projects and funding options would benefit both the grantees
and the Federal Government by permitting an examination of current
preparedness efforts and plans. At the same time, similar to the recent
administration effort to expedite Recovery Act funding, grantees will
be required to take steps to expend, draw down, and close out
previously awarded grant funding.
a new way forward
Historically, the $35 billion awarded under the Homeland Security
Grant Programs has been through specific grant programs authorized
under the 9/11 Act. In fiscal year 2010, 16 separate homeland security
grant programs were funded. Each of these programs supported different
recipients with varying requirements.
In fiscal year 2012 under the Consolidated Appropriations Act (Pub.
L. 112-74), the Secretary of Homeland Security was provided broad
discretion to allocate approximately $995 million among the various
homeland security grant programs. The discretion included both which
programs to fund, and the levels of funding. Ultimately, eight homeland
security grant programs were selected for funding, reduced from 15 in
fiscal year 2011. Activities supported by programs not selected for
funding largely became allowable under funded programs. For example,
community resiliency activities allowable under the former Citizen
Corps Grant Program are allowable under the SHSP and the UASI Programs.
Efforts to consolidate grants allow many grantees, particularly the
States, territories, and urban areas, to focus their homeland security
dollars while reducing redundancy and simplifying the grant process.
GPD will continue its efforts to make grants more efficient and
adaptable to the evolving homeland security landscape through the
grants vision in the President's fiscal year 2013 budget.
investments for national preparedness
On March 30, 2011, the President issued Presidential Policy
Directive (PPD) 8 ``National Preparedness,'' which provided the
direction and the basis for building and sustaining National
preparedness. In PPD 8, the President directed ``the development of a
National preparedness goal that identifies the core capabilities
necessary for preparedness and a National preparedness system to guide
activities that will enable the Nation to achieve the goal. The system
will allow the Nation to track the progress of our ability to build and
improve the capabilities necessary to prevent, protect against,
mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recover from those threats
that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation.''
The National Preparedness Goal was released in September 2011. The
Goal described the vision of National preparedness contemplated in PPD
8. Based on the National Preparedness Goal and the National
Preparedness System designed to achieve that goal, National
preparedness transcends an individual State, Tribe, city, port, or
transit system. National Preparedness is a collective capability--or
collection of capabilities--that inter-connect across the Nation.
As recognized in the National Preparedness Goal, a secure and
resilient Nation is one with the capabilities required across the whole
community--the whole Nation--to prevent, protect against, mitigate,
respond to, and recover from the threats and hazards that pose the
greatest risk. With this in mind--and as the next step in the
maturation of our approach to building and sustaining preparedness--the
President, as part of the fiscal year 2013 budget request, proposed the
creation of the National Preparedness Grant Program (NPGP). The NPGP
marks a shift from the multiple programs approach of the 9/11 Act, and
in many ways builds upon the consolidated, more comprehensive approach
utilized under the fiscal year 2012 homeland security grant cycle. The
fiscal year 2012 grant cycle begins the transition to the NPGP by
linking investments to the National Preparedness Goal.
Overall, the fiscal year 2013 budget includes $2.9 billion for
State and local grants, $500 million more than appropriated by Congress
in fiscal year 2012. This funding will sustain resources for fire and
emergency management grants while consolidating sixteen other grants
into the new, streamlined NPGP--designed to develop, sustain, and
leverage core capabilities across the country in support of National
preparedness, prevention, and response.
As discussed throughout this testimony, DHS has been supporting
State and local efforts across the homeland security enterprise to
build capabilities for the past 9 years, awarding more than $35 billion
in funding. Through these Federal investments, grantees have developed
significant capabilities at the local level to prevent, protect
against, prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters of all
kinds.
As we look ahead, in order to address evolving threats and make the
most of limited resources, the NPGP will focus on building and
sustaining core capabilities associated with the five mission areas
within the National Preparedness Goal that are both readily deployable
and cross-jurisdictional, helping to elevate Nation-wide preparedness.
Using a competitive, risk-based model, the NPGP will use a
comprehensive process to assess gaps, identify and prioritize
deployable capabilities, limit periods of performance to put funding to
work quickly, and require grantees to regularly report progress in the
acquisition and development of these capabilities.
As described in the fiscal year 2013 budget, the NPGP will base
funding allocations on prioritized core capabilities as well as
comprehensive threat/risk assessments and gap analyses. Each State and
territory will receive a base level of funding allocated in accordance
with a population-driven formula. The remainder of the grant
allocations will be determined competitively, based on the criticality
of the specific capability according to regional threat/risk
assessments and the applicant's ability to complete the project within
the 2-year period of performance. The NPGP will focus on developing and
sustaining core capabilities identified in the National Preparedness
Goal, enhancing terrorism prevention capabilities, and critical
infrastructure/key resource protection.
The NPGP proposal represents a new vision for grants in fiscal year
2013. It reflects the lessons we've learned in grants management and
execution over the past 9 years and is focused on developing and
sustaining National capabilities given the evolving threats we face. It
is not designed as, nor does it represent, detailed grant guidance.
Ultimately, a new grants program in fiscal year 2013 will require
authorizing legislation. The administration looks forward to working
with Congress and stakeholders to ensure NPGP enables all levels of
government to build and sustain, in a collaborative way, the core
capabilities necessary to prepare for incidents that pose the greatest
risk to the security of the Nation.
using the threat and hazard identification and risk assessment (thira)
to determine requirements and fill gaps
The National Preparedness System is the instrument the Nation will
employ to build, sustain, and deliver the core capabilities identified
in the National Preparedness Goal in order to achieve a secure and
resilient Nation. The components of the National Preparedness System
include: Identifying and assessing risk, estimating the level of
capabilities needed to address those risks, building or sustaining the
required levels of capability, developing and implementing plans to
deliver those capabilities, validating and monitoring progress, and
reviewing and updating efforts to promote continuous improvement.
Developing and maintaining an understanding of the variety of risks
faced by communities and the Nation, and how this information can be
used to build and sustain preparedness, are essential components of the
National Preparedness System. Risk varies across the Nation--for
example, a municipal risk assessment will reflect a subset of the
threats and hazards contained in a State or Federal risk assessment.
FEMA has taken critical steps in establishing a preparedness
baseline and the accompanying foundation for assessing preparedness,
including determining how effective grants are in improving
preparedness. FEMA's approach to measuring the effectiveness of
National preparedness grants recognizes that these programs are
designed to support National priorities while allowing grantees the
flexibility to apply funds based on their individual, identified
threats and hazards. Thus, in the fiscal year 2011 Homeland Security
Grant Program guidance, FEMA established the process for using a Threat
and Hazard Identification Risk Assessment (THIRA) as the basis for
determining a jurisdiction's current level of capability for the risks
it faces and identifying goals for improvement, including the resulting
gaps.
The THIRA is an all-hazards assessment tool suited for use by all
jurisdictions. The THIRA guide provides a basic approach for
identifying and assessing risks and associated impacts. It expands on
existing local, Tribal, territorial, and State hazard identification
and risk assessments and other risk methodologies by broadening the
factors considered in the process, incorporating the whole community
from the beginning to the end of the process, and by accounting for
important community-specific factors.
Using the information developed during the THIRA process,
communities will develop strategies to allocate resources--including
Federal grant dollars--effectively, as well as leverage available
assistance to develop capabilities and reduce risk. Building and
sustaining capabilities will include a combination of organizational
resources, planning, equipment, training, and education. Consideration
must be given to finding, connecting to, and strengthening community
resources by integrating the expertise and capacity of individuals,
communities, private and nonprofit sectors, faith-based organizations,
and all levels of government.
The THIRA allows a jurisdiction to understand its threats and
hazards and how these impacts may vary according to time of occurrence,
seasons, locations, and community factors. This knowledge allows a
jurisdiction to establish informed and defensible capability targets
and commit appropriate resources to closing the gap between a target
and a current capability or for sustaining existing capabilities.
If existing capabilities need to be supplemented to reach a
capability target, jurisdictions can build capability or fill gaps by
establishing mutual aid agreements with surrounding jurisdictions. As
mentioned above, there is a Federal requirement for all States to
maintain EMAC membership for grant eligibility. To date, all States are
members. EMAC offers assistance during Governor-declared states of
emergency through a responsive, straightforward system that allows
States to send personnel, equipment, and commodities to help disaster
relief efforts in other States. It is possible that jurisdictions may
require the resources of other levels of government to achieve a target
and will need to collaborate closely with those external sources to
secure the necessary resources. Cities, counties, States and regions
should work collaboratively to build, sustain, or deliver capabilities
to the identified targets.
Finally, a jurisdiction may choose to build and sustain
capabilities through their own resources, the use of available grants,
or other funding and technical assistance. The results of the THIRA
should be used by grantees to make informed decisions about how to
allocate their resources. Using their capability targets as desired
outcomes, a jurisdiction is able to create a defensible rationale for
how limited resources can best be invested to build and sustain
capabilities. Existing reporting mechanisms, such as the State
Preparedness Report (SPR), communicate their progress toward achieving
capability targets and inform the National Preparedness Report.
FEMA will measure and report annually on the percent of State and
territories that have a THIRA consistent with Department guidance.
conclusion
In conclusion, we believe that the Homeland Security Grant Programs
have benefited the Nation and the Nation's overall security and
preparedness. Since the program's beginning, we have strived to improve
how these grants have been administered. We believe we have made
significant improvements over the past few years and will continue to
do so. With the release of the fiscal year 2013 budget and the vision
for the National Preparedness Grant Program, we are proposing the next
evolution of homeland security grant funding. We are happy to respond
to any questions the subcommittee may have.
Mr. Bilirakis. I appreciate it every much.
Now I will recognize Administrator Gruber. You are
recognized, sir, for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF COREY GRUBER, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL
PREPAREDNESS DIRECTORATE, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Gruber. Good morning, Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking
Member Thompson, Ranking Member Richardson, and Members of the
subcommittee. I am Corey Gruber, the assistant administrator
for the National Preparedness Directorate for FEMA. On behalf
of the Secretary and the administrator it is my pleasure to
appear before you today to discuss the DHS grant programs.
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, Congress laid the
foundations for how we conceive and construct National
preparedness and in the Post-Katrina Emergency Management
Reform Act in 2006 codified the key components of National
preparedness. Two administrations have given us direction that
has led us to an evolved understanding of what constitutes
appropriate National goals and how instruments such as grant
programs provide the means to achieve those goals.
To that end, we are implementing Presidential Policy
Directive 8, National Preparedness, which was released in March
2011 and establishes a National Preparedness Goal, which was
released last September; and a National Preparedness System,
which was released in November. The goal is focused on building
partner capability and capacity across the whole community,
reducing impediments to cooperation and defining success in
clear and unambiguous terms.
The National Preparedness System builds interconnected and
complementary systems that ensure essential requirements, what
we refer to as core capabilities, are built, delivered, and
sustained. It provides the means to manage risk and allocate
resources judiciously, and to measure our progress with targets
we jointly set for the core capabilities. In an era of
austerity, the National Preparedness System equips us to find
the balance of means that contribute to achieving the goal of a
secure and resilient Nation.
Achieving a secure and resilient Nation is not done by
Government alone, but through a partnership that embraces
contributions from the whole of our society. We see ready
evidence of the power of a mobilized community in response to
the slate of recent disasters where neighbors aided neighbors;
communities rallied to meet the needs of survivors and
responders operate with self-reliance that comes from strength
in capabilities.
Two examples are particularly noteworthy. Strengthening
operational coordination capabilities has come through the
creation of the National Incident Management System. Prior to
its introduction in 2004 no single official incident command
system existed. By 2011 nearly 10 million stakeholders had
successfully completed FEMA's sponsored training on incident
command.
Another success is the Nation's highly mature search-and-
rescue capability. Today the Nation possess significantly more
urban search-and-rescue teams than it did 10 years ago. A
tangible result of this enhanced capability is that in the
aftermath of the April 2011 outbreak of deadly tornadoes in the
United States, Alabama mobilized State and local USAR teams
rather than requesting Federal support.
In the fiscal year 2011 grant program guidance, FEMA
established a process for using a Threat and Hazard
Identification Risk Assessment as the basis for determining
what a jurisdiction must prepare for. This THIRA will aid
jurisdictions in determining current capability levels against
those threats, identify targets, and then employ grants and
other instruments such as mutual aid to achieve those targets.
FEMA will measure and report annually on the percent of States
and territories that have a THIRA consistent with Department
guidance.
The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act requires a
State preparedness report for any State or territory receiving
preparedness assistance. The SPR submitted annually to my
directorate provides an annual self-assessment on how States
and territories are based on the core capabilities established
in the National Preparedness Goal. We use the SPR data in our
annual National preparedness reporting.
We must be able to more effectively measure our progress
and report the impact of our investments and actions on risk.
FEMA's approach to measuring the effectiveness of grants
recognizes that these programs are designed to support National
priorities while allowing grantees flexibility to apply funds
based on their individual identified threats and hazards.
In conclusion, our success will come from sustaining the
security and resilience gains we have made, from identifying
new capabilities that help us build the coping mechanisms for
the greatest risks that face a Nation, and by strengthening the
alliance of our citizens, households, businesses, nonprofits
and institutions of Government in the mission of security and
resilience. The vision for the National Preparedness Grant
Program will be an important contributor to achieving those
ends.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Richardson, Ranking Member
Thompson, Members of the subcommittee, this concludes my
statement. I look forward to answering any questions you may
have.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Administrator Gruber; appreciate
it very much.
Now we will recognize, yes, Ms. Richards. Ms. Richards, you
are recognized for 5 minutes. Appreciate it.
STATEMENT OF ANNE L. RICHARDS, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Richards. Good morning, Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking
Member Thompson, Ranking Member Richardson, and Members of the
subcommittee. I am Anne Richards, assistant inspector general
for audits of the Department of Homeland Security. Thank you
for inviting me to testify today about the results of our
audits of FEMA's oversight and management of the State Homeland
Security Program and Urban Area Security Initiative grants.
I will address the improvements FEMA can make in three
areas of grants management and briefly discuss a fourth area of
emerging concern, that of sustainability. FEMA needs to make
improvements in the areas of strategic management, performance
measurement, and oversight.
Since 2004 the Department of Homeland Security has awarded
more than $13.7 billion for just the State Homeland Security
Program and Urban Area Security Initiative Grant. We have
completed the audits for 20 individual States and territories,
and have audits underway in an additional 19 States.
FEMA needs to improve its guidance on strategic management
for State homeland security grants. While current guidance for
State strategic plans encourages revisions every 2 years, the
guidance does not require revisions to be made. Some States and
territories do not have up-to-date strategic plans. For
example, Maryland, Minnesota, and the Virgin Islands all have
outdated strategic plans at the time of our audits.
Further, we have identified a number of States that do not
include goals and objectives that are specific, measurable,
achievable, results-oriented and time-limited in their
strategic plans. For example, California, Nevada, New Jersey,
New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas lack these types of goals and
objectives. Nevada, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Texas also
did not develop adequately-defined goals and objectives for
measuring improvements in their preparedness and response
capabilities.
Without some form of measurable goal or objectives, States
cannot accurately determine what value was received for the
investments made, and cannot determine to what extent they are
better prepared. We have found deficiencies in strategic
management in 15 of the 20 State audits completed to date.
In regard to performance measurement FEMA needs to improve
its guidance on establishing metrics and measuring performance.
Our audits show that States continue to lack the proper
guidance and documentation to ensure accuracy of performance
data and to track the achievement of planned milestones. We
have found problems with performance measurement in 19 of 20
State audits completed.
We also found that FEMA needs to improve its oversight of
State grant management to ensure the States are providing
proper oversight to these State activities. In our audits we
have repeatedly found weaknesses in the States' oversight of
grants. These weaknesses include inaccuracies and untimely
submissions of financial status reports, untimely allocation
and obligation of grant funds, and not following Federal
procurement, property, and inventory requirements.
In our audits in fiscal year 2011 and 2012 we have noticed
an emerging trend with the issue of sustainment. States have
not prepared contingency plans addressing potential funding
shortfall in the event DHS grant funding was significantly
reduced or eliminated.
In an era of growing budget constraints, it is important to
use our resources for projects that can be sustained. FEMA has
told us that it is addressing this issue in the fiscal year
2012 grant guidance by focusing on sustainment rather than new
projects.
In conclusion, strategic planning, performance measurement
and oversight to include tracking safe milestones and
accomplishments are important management tools for FEMA to
ensure that the Federal funds are used for their intended
purpose and that enhancements in preparedness capabilities are
being achieved.
Despite the significant issues I have outlined here today,
I do not want to leave the impression that the program has not
made progress. For the past several years our audits have shown
that States have generally been efficiently and effectively
administering grant requirements, distributing grant funds, and
ensuring available funds are used.
The States also continue to use reasonable methodologies to
assess threats, vulnerabilities, capabilities and needs, as
well as allocate funds accordingly. We have also found 11
promising practices in States that we were able to ask FEMA to
share with other States and jurisdictions. FEMA has been
responsive to our recommendations. It has concurred or
concurred in part--concurred with the intent of the majority of
our recommendations and is taking action to implement those
recommendations.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Thompson, Ranking Member
Richardson, and Members of the subcommittee, this concludes my
prepared remarks. I welcome any questions that you or Members
of the subcommittee may have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Richards follows:]
Prepared Statement of Anne L. Richards
March 20, 2012
Good morning Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking Member Richardson, and
Members of the subcommittee: I am Anne Richards, Assistant Inspector
General for Audits of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Thank
you for inviting me to testify today about the result of our audits of
the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) oversight and
management of the Homeland Security Grants.
My testimony today will address the improvements the Federal
Emergency Management Agency can make in three areas to ensure the
grants process is transparent, efficient, and effective and I will
briefly discuss a fourth area of emerging concern. Specifically, FEMA
needs to make improvements in strategic management, performance
measurement, and oversight. Also, our most recent audits have shown
that some States do not have the capacity or even contingency plans to
sustain critical programs that have been funded by the State Homeland
Security Grants and Urban Areas Security Initiative without Federal
funds. Since 2003, the Department of Homeland Security has awarded more
than $16.3 billion for the State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) and
Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) grants.
The information provided in this testimony is contained in our
summary reports issued for fiscal years 2009-11 Annual Report to
Congress on States' and Urban Areas' Management of Homeland Security
Grant Programs (OIG-10-31, OIG-11-20, and OIG-12-22), and individual
audits of States and territories. We have completed the audits for 20
individual States and territories, and have audits underway in an
additional 19 States.
Strategic Management.--FEMA needs to improve its guidance on
strategic management for State Homeland Security Grants. In our most
recent Annual Report to Congress, we summarized where States'
strategies were deficient in matters concerning fully measurable goals
and objectives.
While current guidance for State Homeland Security strategic plans
encourages revisions every 2 years; the language is such that it does
not require revisions to be made--it is just strongly encouraged. For
example, the States of Maryland, Minnesota, and the territory of the
Virgin Islands have outdated strategic plans. Additionally, we have
identified States that do not have Homeland Security strategy plans
with goals and objectives that are specific, measurable, achievable,
results-oriented, and time-limited (SMART objectives).
For example, the Homeland Security Strategies for California,
Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas lacked SMART
goals and objectives applicable to first responder capabilities.
Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas did not develop
adequately-defined goals and objectives to use for measuring
improvements in their preparedness and response capabilities.
Without some form of measurable goal or objective, or a mechanism
to objectively gather results-oriented data, States may have no
assurance of the level of effectiveness of their preparedness and
response capabilities. Also, States are less capable of determining
progress toward goals and objectives when making funding and management
decisions. We have found deficiencies in strategic management in 15 of
the 20 State audits completed to date.
Performance Measurement.--In regard to performance measurement,
FEMA needs to improve its guidance on establishing metrics and
measuring performance. Our audits show that States continue to lack the
proper guidance and documentation to ensure accuracy or track
milestones.
Providing guidance on the appropriate metrics and requiring those
metrics to be documented would provide the States with tools to help
them understand the effectiveness of each grant program; however, FEMA
has not provided sufficient guidance in this area.
In our fiscal year 2010 Annual Report, we reported that the States
of South Carolina, Maryland, and West Virginia did not have mechanisms
to collect performance data, nor any procedures to analyze data and
maintain documentation to support evaluations. Without these tools and
processes, there is no assurance that information is accurate.
For example, South Carolina prepared annual threat and
vulnerability assessments, but did not document and retain supporting
data, like emergency call logs for fire trucks and ambulances. Although
the State did form Counterterrorism Coordinating Councils to develop,
define, and review the State strategy and goals, no mechanisms were
created to collect data, nor procedures to analyze data and maintain
documentation to support evaluations. This weakness prevented auditors,
FEMA, and even the State Administrative Agency from validating
assessments and ensuring consistency of information from year to year.
In another example, Maryland's State Administrative Agency
conducted annual workshops to focus on the needs assessment phase of
the strategic planning process; however, Maryland did not have an
adequate process to conduct a review and update of its Homeland
Security strategy's goals and objectives, or to ensure that local input
was incorporated into the strategy. This needs assessment phase
culminated in what was considered the ``wish list'' for Homeland
Security projects with no regard to budget constraints or regional and
State of Maryland needs.
Additionally, the State of West Virginia did not perform an
analysis of capabilities and performance with respect to equipment
purchased and training obtained. West Virginia also did not have
written policies and procedures that required the analysis of
capabilities and performance, and the documentation of such, in order
to determine improvements in performance and progress toward achieving
program goals.
FEMA also needs to strengthen its guidance on reporting progress in
achieving milestones as part of the States' annual program
justifications. When we reviewed the large investment programs that
continue from year to year for the States of Nevada, New York, and
Texas, we found that the milestones for these States' continuing
investment programs were not comparable to previous years'
applications. Additionally, the status of the previous year milestones
was not included in the application. Because of these weaknesses, FEMA
could not determine, based on the annual application process, if a
capability had been achieved, what progress had been made, or how much
additional funding was needed to complete individually justified
programs. Without this information, FEMA cannot be assured it is making
sound investment decisions.
Because of insufficient information on milestones and program
accomplishments, FEMA has been annually awarding Homeland Security
Grant Program (HSGP) funds to States for on-going programs without
knowing the accomplishments from prior years' funding or the extent to
which additional funds are needed to achieve desired capabilities.
Tracking accomplishments and milestones are critical elements in making
prudent management decisions because of the evolving, dynamic changes
that can occur between years or during a grant's period of performance.
We have found problems with performance measurement in 19 of 20
State audits completed to date.
Oversight.--Focusing now on grants oversight, FEMA needs to improve
its oversight to ensure the States are meeting their reporting
obligations in a timely manner to ensure FEMA has the information it
needs to make program decisions and oversee program achievements.
Further, FEMA needs to improve its oversight to ensure that States are
complying with Federal regulations in regard to procurements and
safeguarding of assets acquired with Federal funds. In our annual
audits of the State Homeland Security Program, we have repeatedly found
weaknesses in the States' oversight of grant activities. Those
weaknesses include inaccuracies and untimely submissions of financial
status reports; untimely allocation and obligation of grant funds; and
not following Federal procurement, property, and inventory
requirements.
For example, the States of Maryland, South Carolina, and West
Virginia did not submit timely financial status reports to FEMA. The
State-prepared quarterly financial status reports are designed to
provide FEMA with financial information about the grant program
expenditures that it can use to monitor grant implementation. The
report is due within 30 days of the end of each calendar quarter (a
change from 45 days in fiscal year 2005).
Delays in the submission of Financial Status Reports may hamper
FEMA's ability to effectively and efficiently monitor program
expenditures and may prevent the State from drawing down funds in a
timely manner, and ultimately affects the functioning of the program.
California, New York, and New Jersey, among other States, did not
allocate grant funds timely. For instance, a California urban area did
not make grant funds available to subrecipients for 15 to 18 months
after the funds were received. As a result, expenditures for approved
programs were delayed, the fiscal years 2006 and 2007 UASI grant
performance periods were extended, and administrative costs increased.
Most important, these delays prevented timely delivery of needed plans,
equipment, exercises, and training to first responders.
New York State obligated grant funds to subgrantees in accordance
with Federal requirements, but the funds were not available for
expenditure for months after the date of obligation because the
subgrantees needed to sign contracts with the State before seeking
reimbursement. The time available for subgrantees to make expenditures
and be reimbursed by the State was significantly reduced and overall
expenditure of grant funds was delayed. As a result, the opportunity
for first responders to be better equipped, trained, and prepared was
delayed because it took 8 to 12 months for subgrantees to receive
signed contracts from the State.
New Jersey did not make funds available to all UASI subgrantees in
accordance with Federal pass-through requirements. This occurred
because of delays by both the UASI Executive Committee and the State
Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness in approving spending
plans. New Jersey subgrantees did not always initiate projects in a
timely manner, and as a result, SHSP and UASI grant funds were not
expended within the grant performance period. Consequently, first
responders were less likely to be as equipped, trained, and prepared as
possible.
Sustainment.--In our audits in fiscal years 2011 and 2012, we have
noticed an emerging trend with issues of sustainment. States did not
prepare contingency plans addressing potential funding shortfalls if
DHS grant funding was significantly reduced or eliminated. We found
this issue in New York, California, Nevada, Florida, and Minnesota. In
an era of growing budget constraints it is important to use budget
resources for projects that can be sustained. FEMA has told us that it
is addressing this issue in fiscal year 2012 grant guidance by focusing
on sustainment rather than new projects.
In conclusion, strategic planning, performance measurement, and
oversight--to include tracking States' milestones and accomplishments
for HSGP-funded programs--are important management controls for FEMA to
ensure that Federal funds are used for their intended purpose and that
enhancements in preparedness capabilities are being achieved.
Despite the significant issues I have outlined here today, I do not
want to leave the impression that the program has not made progress.
For the past several years, States have generally maintained efficiency
and effectiveness in administering grant requirements, distributing
grant funds, and ensuring available funds were used. The States also
continue to use reasonable methodologies to assess threats,
vulnerabilities, capabilities, and needs, as well as allocate funds
accordingly.
Further, our audits have identified several effective tools and
practices of some States that can be of benefit to all States that FEMA
and the individual States have willingly shared. FEMA has been
responsive to our recommendations. In 2010, it concurred with all our
recommendations to address areas of improvement in strategic planning
and oversight, and it concurred, or concurred with the intent of 70
recommendations we made for fiscal year 2011 and is taking action to
implement those recommendations.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. I welcome any
questions that you or the Members of the subcommittee may have.
Ms. Richardson. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Bilirakis. I now recognize Mr. Jenkins--yes?
Ms. Richardson. I have a question on process.
Mr. Bilirakis. Yes?
Ms. Richardson. It has been brought to this committee's
attention that Mr. Nutter has another commitment within the
time frame. When Mr. Nutter completes his testimony, will all
Members, is the question, will all Members be allowed to ask
Mr. Nutter if they have any questions so then he can depart
prior to us having the ability to ask the rest of the panel?
Mr. Bilirakis. Sir--Mr. Mayor, do you have a sufficient
time to answer the questions? What time do you think you have
to leave? Because we do want to accommodate you, sir.
Mr. Nutter. Mr. Chairman, I do appreciate that, and Ranking
Member. I am going to do my best to be as flexible as possible.
I have a train--I have declined to look at my Blackberry so I
actually do not know what time it is, Mr. Chairman. But I think
I should be okay. I will give short answers.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay.
Ms. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, the question is real simple
and it is very specific. When Mr. Nutter completes his
testimony the question is: Can any Member who has a question
for Mr. Nutter ask it at that time and then you go through your
normal----
Mr. Bilirakis. Yes. I have----
Ms. Richardson. I have----
Mr. Bilirakis. I have no problem--no objection to that.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Nutter. Thank you.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. Now we have Mr. Jenkins. You are
recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM O. JENKINS, JR., DIRECTOR, HOMELAND
SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE
Mr. Jenkins. Thank you. Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking Member
Thompson, Ranking Member Richardson, and Members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity today to discuss our
work on Homeland Security grants for disaster prevention and
preparedness. As requested, my written statement today focuses
on our work over the past decade on DHS and FEMA grant
management and efforts to develop a means of reliably majoring
disaster preparedness.
From fiscal years 2002 through 2011 Congress appropriated
over $35 billion to a variety of DHS Homeland Security grant
programs. Their purpose was to enhance the capabilities of
State, local, and Tribal governments to prevent, protect
against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks and
other disasters of all types.
About half of this total, more than $20 billion was
allocated through four of the largest grant programs, State
homeland security, urban area security, port security, and
transit security. Today we are releasing our report on the
management of these four programs and the potential for
duplication among them.
Basically, preparedness grant allocation and evaluation
should largely rest on two principal analyses. First, an
assessment of risk in both nature and acts of man; and second,
an assessment of the critical gaps that exist in our ability to
mitigate those risks and their potential consequences through
investments in prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery
capabilities. This second step requires both a definition of
the desired goals and a means of majoring the extent to which
those goals have been met with both Federal and non-Federal and
private resources.
Because perceived needs will almost always exceed available
funds, it is important that the grants are used not only
effectively, but efficiently without unnecessary duplication.
Since 2007 when FEMA became responsible for grant management,
the grants program director responded to our recommendations to
improve the management of the grants and made other
improvements.
For example, they streamlined the application and award
process, enhanced the use of risk assessment principles in
grant programs, including developing majors of varying
vulnerability in assessing risk, and taking steps to shorten
grant application reviews by such things as requiring ports to
submit specific project proposals with their grant
applications.
However, FEMA has not had similar levels of project
visibility for each grant, thus making it harder for them to
identify a potential duplication among grant projects. Nor has
FEMA had coordinated review of the projects funded by the four
large grant programs we reviewed.
For fiscal year 2003 [sic] FEMA has proposed fundamentally
altering its process for grant awards by consolidating all but
two grants into a single grant program. The purpose is to focus
on developing and sustaining the core capabilities identified
in the National Preparedness Goal. Allocations under this new
approach would rely heavily on a State's Threat and Hazard
Identification and Risk Assessment or THIRA.
However, nearly a year after the concept was introduced in
the 2011 grant guidance; FEMA has not yet provided more
detailed guidance on how to conduct the THIRA assessments. The
role of various stakeholders in this process is also not yet
clear. GPD has established a website to solicit stakeholder
input on the process.
Although the National Preparedness Goal defines core
capabilities, there is still no established metrics for
assessing progress and developing and sustaining those metrics.
Over the--of those capabilities. Over the years FEMA has begun
a number of efforts to establish metrics for preparedness
capabilities as required by the Post-Katrina Act and now PPD-8.
But none have resulted in metrics on which stakeholders agree.
The core capabilities are the latest evolution of the
target capabilities, a concept first introduced in 2004. We
believe it is important that FEMA take a holistic approach to
grant awards management and assessment.
FEMA appropriately proposes focusing on leveraging the
efforts of States, localities, Tribes, territories, and others
to develop and sustain a National set of core capabilities that
can enable the Nation to effectively respond and recover from a
catastrophic disaster. There are still many issues and details
that must be addressed for FEMA's proposed system to work
effectively, not the least of which is developing useful and
meaningfully reliable means of measuring progress toward
achieving those core capabilities.
That concludes my oral statement. I would be pleased to
respond to any questions Members of the subcommittee may have.
[The statement of Mr. Jenkins follows:]
Prepared Statement of William O. Jenkins, Jr.
March 20, 2012
gao highlights
Highlights of GAO-12-526T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications, Committee on
Homeland Security, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study
From fiscal years 2002 through 2011, the Federal Government
appropriated over $37 billion to the Department of Homeland Security's
(DHS) preparedness grant programs to enhance the capabilities of State
and local governments to prevent, protect against, respond to, and
recover from terrorist attacks. DHS allocated $20.3 billion of this
funding to grant recipients through four of the largest preparedness
grant programs--the State Homeland Security Program, the Urban Areas
Security Initiative, the Port Security Grant Program, and the Transit
Security Grant Program. The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform
Act of 2006 requires the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to
develop a National preparedness system and assess preparedness
capabilities--capabilities needed to respond effectively to disasters.
FEMA could then use such a system to help it prioritize grant funding.
This testimony addresses the extent to which DHS and FEMA have made
progress in managing preparedness grants and measuring preparedness by
assessing capabilities and addressing related challenges. GAO's
comments are based on products issued from April 2002 through February
2012 and selected updates conducted in March 2012.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made recommendations to DHS and FEMA in prior reports to
strengthen their management of preparedness grants and enhance their
assessment of National preparedness capabilities. DHS and FEMA
concurred and have actions underway to address them.
federal emergency management agency.--continuing challenges impede
progress in managing preparedness grants and assessing national
capabilities
What GAO Found
DHS and FEMA have taken actions with the goal of enhancing
management of preparedness grants, but better project information and
coordination could help FEMA identify and mitigate the risk of
unnecessary duplication among grant applications. Specifically, DHS and
FEMA have taken actions to streamline the application and award
processes and have enhanced their use of risk management for allocating
grants. For example, in November 2011, GAO reported that DHS modified
its risk assessment model for the Port Security Grant Program by
recognizing that different ports have different vulnerability levels.
However, in February 2012, GAO reported that FEMA made award decisions
for four of its grant programs--the State Homeland Security Grant
Program, the Urban Area Security Initiative, the Port Security Grant
Program, and the Transit Security Grant Program--with differing levels
of information, which contributed to the risk of funding unnecessarily
duplicative projects. GAO also reported that FEMA did not have a
process to coordinate application reviews across the four grant
programs. Rather, grant applications were reviewed separately by
program and were not compared across each other to determine where
possible unnecessary duplication may occur. Thus, GAO recommended that:
(1) FEMA collect project information with the level of detail needed to
better position the agency to identify any potential unnecessary
duplication within and across the four grant programs, weighing any
additional costs of collecting this data, and (2) explore opportunities
to enhance FEMA's internal coordination and administration of the
programs to identify and mitigate the potential for any unnecessary
duplication. DHS agreed and identified planned actions to improve
visibility and coordination across programs and projects. FEMA has
proposed consolidating the majority of its various preparedness grant
programs into a single, comprehensive preparedness grant program called
the National Preparedness Grant Program (NPGP) in fiscal year 2013;
however, this may create new challenges. For example, allocations under
the NPGP would rely heavily on a State's risk assessment, but grantees
have not yet received guidance on how to conduct the risk assessment
process. FEMA has established a website to solicit input from
stakeholders on how best to implement the program.
DHS and FEMA have had difficulty implementing long-standing plans
and overcoming challenges in assessing capabilities, such as
determining how to validate and aggregate data from Federal, State,
local, and Tribal governments. For example, DHS first developed plans
in 2004 to measure preparedness by assessing capabilities, but these
efforts have been repeatedly delayed. In March 2011, GAO reported that
FEMA's efforts to develop and implement a comprehensive, measurable,
National preparedness assessment of capability and gaps were not yet
complete and suggested that Congress consider limiting preparedness
grant funding until FEMA completes a National preparedness assessment
of capability gaps based on tiered, capability-specific performance
objectives to enable prioritization of grant funding. In April 2011,
Congress passed the fiscal year 2011 appropriations act for DHS that
reduced funding for FEMA preparedness grants by $875 million from the
amount requested in the President's fiscal year 2011 budget. For fiscal
year 2012, Congress appropriated $1.28 billion less than requested in
the President's budget.
Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking Member Richardson, and Members of the
subcommittee: I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's
hearing and to discuss the efforts of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA)--a component of the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS)--to manage preparedness grants and measure and assess National
capabilities to respond to a major disaster. From fiscal years 2002
through 2011, the Federal Government appropriated over $37 billion to a
variety of DHS homeland security preparedness grant programs to enhance
the capabilities of State, territory, local, and Tribal governments to
prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist
attacks and other disasters.\1\ DHS allocated more than half of this
total--$20.3 billion--to grant recipients through four of the largest
preparedness programs--the State Homeland Security Program, the Urban
Areas Security Initiative, the Port Security Grant Program, and the
Transit Security Grant Program.
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\1\ This total is based on Congressional Research Service data and
GAO analysis, and includes firefighter assistance grants and emergency
management performance grants. See Congressional Research Service,
Department of Homeland Security Assistance to States and Localities: A
Summary of Issues for the 111th Congress, R40246 (Washington, DC: Apr.
30, 2010).
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Congress enacted the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act
of 2006 (Post-Katrina Act) in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.\2\ In
response to the Act, DHS centralized most of its preparedness programs
under FEMA's Grant Programs Directorate to better integrate and
coordinate grant management. The Act also requires that FEMA develop a
National preparedness system and assess preparedness capabilities--
capabilities needed to respond effectively to disasters--to determine
the Nation's preparedness capability levels and the resources needed to
achieve desired levels of capability.\3\
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\2\ The Post-Katrina Act was enacted as Title VI of the Department
of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120
Stat. 1355 (2006). The provisions of the Post-Katrina Act became
effective upon enactment, October 4, 2006, with the exception of
certain organizational changes related to FEMA, most of which took
effect on March 31, 2007.
\3\ 6 U.S.C. 744, 749.
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Over the last decade, we identified and reported on issues related
to DHS's and FEMA's management of four of the largest preparedness
grants and the challenges associated with assessing National
preparedness capabilities. In April 2002, shortly after the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, we identified the need for goals and
performance indicators to guide the Nation's preparedness efforts and
help to objectively assess the results of Federal investments.\4\ After
DHS began operations in March 2003, and leading up to catastrophic
damage caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in August and September
2005, our reports focused on challenges in managing preparedness grant
funds to States and urban areas and minimizing the time it takes to
distribute grant funds and associated efforts to streamline the process
while ensuring appropriate planning and accountability for effective
use of the funds.\5\ After the renewed focus on all-hazards
preparedness prompted by the 2005 hurricanes, we reported in 2007 and
2008 on the extent to which DHS was using a risk-based approach in its
grants distribution methodology for States and urban areas.\6\ Our
reports in 2009, 2010, and 2011 analyzed the use of risk assessment in
the management of transit and port security grants \7\ and the impact
of preparedness grants in building National capabilities. During that
same period, we reported on FEMA's limited progress in assessing
National preparedness.\8\ Our most recent report, which we issued in
February 2012 and are releasing today, addresses FEMA's management of
four of the largest preparedness grant programs--the State Homeland
Security Program, the Urban Areas Security Initiative, the Port
Security Grant Program, and the Transit Security Grant Program.\9\
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\4\ GAO, National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State,
Local, and Private Sector Efforts Is Critical to an Effective National
Strategy for Homeland Security, GAO-02-621T (Washington, DC: Apr. 11,
2002).
\5\ GAO, Emergency Preparedness: Federal Funds for First
Responders, GAO-04-788T (Washington, DC: May 13, 2004); Homeland
Security: Management of First Responder Grant Programs Has Improved,
but Challenges Remain, GAO-05-121 (Washington, DC: Feb. 2, 2005);
Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grant Programs and
Efforts to Improve Accountability Continue to Evolve, GAO-05-530T
(Washington, DC: Apr. 12, 2005); and Homeland Security: DHS's Efforts
to Enhance First Responders' All-Hazards Capabilities Continue to
Evolve, GAO-05-652 (Washington, DC; July 11, 2005).
\6\ GAO, Homeland Security Grants: Observations on Process DHS Used
to Allocate Funds to Selected Urban Areas GAO-07-381R (Washington, DC;
Feb 7, 2007); Homeland Security: DHS Improved its Risk-Based Grant
Programs' Allocation and Management Methods, But Measuring Programs'
Impact on National Capabilities Remains a Challenge, GAO-08-488T,
(Washington, DC; Mar 11, 2008); and Homeland Security: DHS Risk-Based
Grant Methodology Is Reasonable, But Current Version's Measure of
Vulnerability is Limited, GAO-08-852, (Washington, DC; June 27, 2008).
\7\ GAO, Transit Security Grant Program: DHS Allocates Grants Based
on Risk, but Its Risk Methodology, Management Controls, and Grant
Oversight Can Be Strengthened, GAO-09-491 (Washington, DC: July 8,
2009); Surface Transportation Security: TSA Has Taken Actions to Manage
Risk, Improve Coordination, and Measure Performance, but Additional
Actions Would Enhance Its Efforts, GAO-10-650T (Washington, DC: Apr.
21, 2010); Port Security Grant Program: Risk Model, Grant Management,
and Effectiveness Measures Could Be Strengthened, GAO-12-47
(Washington, DC: Nov. 17, 2011).
\8\ GAO, National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress, but Needs
to Complete and Integrate Planning, Exercise, and Assessment Efforts,
GAO-09-369 (Washington, DC; Apr. 30, 2009); Urban Area Security
Initiative: FEMA Lacks Measures to Assess How Regional Collaboration
Efforts Build Preparedness Capabilities, GAO-09-651 (Washington, DC;
July 2, 2009); FEMA Has Made Limited Progress in Efforts to Develop and
Implement a System to Assess National Preparedness Capabilities, GAO-
11-51R (Washington, DC: Oct. 29, 2010); Opportunities to Reduce
Potential Duplication in Government Programs, Save Tax Dollars, and
Enhance Revenue, GAO-11-318SP (Washington, DC; Mar. 1, 2011).
\9\ GAO, Homeland Security: DHS Needs Better Project Information
and Coordination Among Four Overlapping Grant Programs, GAO-12-303
(Washington, DC: Feb. 28, 2012).
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My remarks today are based on our work issued in the 10-year period
from April 2002 through February 2012 on the efforts of both DHS and,
more recently, FEMA, to manage preparedness grants; develop National
preparedness capabilities; implement a National framework for assessing
preparedness capabilities at the Federal, State, and local levels;
identify capability gaps; and prioritize future National preparedness
investments to fill the most critical gaps. These remarks are also
based on selected updates conducted in March 2012 on FEMA's proposal
for consolidating its various grant programs.
As requested, my testimony today focuses on the extent to which DHS
and FEMA have made progress in managing preparedness grants and
measuring National preparedness by assessing capabilities and
addressing related challenges. To conduct our work, we analyzed
documentation, such as DHS's National Preparedness Goal and Core
Capabilities (the latest evolution of the Target Capabilities
List),\10\ and interviewed relevant DHS, FEMA, State, and local
officials. More detailed information on our scope and methodology
appears in our published products. In addition, we conducted updates to
our work in March 2012 by analyzing FEMA's guidance and policies.
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\10\ The Target Capabilities List is a list of 37 capabilities that
Federal, State, and local stakeholders need to possess to respond to
natural or man-made disasters; we first reported on DHS's efforts to
develop the List in July 2005.
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We conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted
Government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide
a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives
fema has taken actions to address grant management concerns but needs
better coordination
DHS and FEMA have streamlined application and award processes,
enhanced the use of risk management principles in its grant programs,
and proposed consolidation of its various grant programs to address
grant management concerns. In February 2012, we reported that better
coordination and improved data collection could help FEMA identify and
mitigate potential unnecessary duplication among four overlapping grant
programs--the Homeland Security Grant Program, the Urban Areas Security
Initiative, the Port Security Grant Program, and the Transit Security
Grant Program. FEMA has proposed changes to enhance preparedness grant
management, but these changes may create new challenges.
FEMA Has Streamlined Application and Award Processes and Enhanced Use
of Risk Management Principles
Since its creation in April 2007, FEMA's Grant Programs Directorate
(GPD) has been responsible for the program management of DHS's
preparedness grants.\11\ GPD consolidated the grant business
operations, systems, training, policy, and oversight of all FEMA grants
and the program management of preparedness grants into a single entity.
GPD works closely with other DHS entities to manage grants, as needed,
through the grant life cycle, shown in figure 1. For example, GPD works
with the U.S. Coast Guard for the Port Security Grant Program and the
Transportation Security Administration for the Transit Security Grant
Program.
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\11\ The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act transferred
most of the Preparedness Directorate to FEMA, effective on March 31,
2007. Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1355, 1394 (2006).
Since 2006, DHS has taken a number of actions to improve its risk-
based grant allocation methodology.
Specifically, in March 2008, we reported that DHS had
adopted a more sophisticated risk-based grant allocation
approach for the Urban Areas Security Initiative to: (1)
Determine both States' and urban areas' potential risk relative
to other areas that included empirical analytical methods and
policy judgments, and (2) assess and score the effectiveness of
the proposed investments submitted by the eligible applicants
and determine the final amount of funds awarded.\12\
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\12\ GAO-08-488T.
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We also reported that DHS's risk model for the Urban Areas
Security Initiative could be strengthened by measuring
variations in vulnerability.\13\ Specifically, we reported that
DHS had held vulnerability constant, which limited the model's
overall ability to assess risk and more precisely allocate
funds. Accordingly, we recommended that DHS and FEMA formulate
a method to measure vulnerability in a way that captures
variations in vulnerability, and apply this vulnerability
measure in future iterations of this risk-based grant
allocation model. DHS concurred with our recommendations and
FEMA took actions to enhance its approaches for assessing and
incorporating vulnerability into risk assessment methodologies
for this program. Specifically, FEMA created a risk assessment
that places greater weight on threat and calculates the
contribution of vulnerability and consequence separately.\14\
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\13\ GAO-08-852.
\14\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Fiscal Year 2011
Homeland Security Grant Program Guidance and Application Kit
(Washington, DC, May 2011).
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In June 2009, we reported that DHS used a risk analysis
model to allocate Transit Security Grant Program funding and
awarded grants to higher-risk transit agencies using all three
elements of risk--threat, vulnerability, and consequence.\15\
Accordingly, we recommended that DHS formulate a method to
measure vulnerability in a way that captures variations in
vulnerability, and apply this vulnerability measure in future
iterations of this risk-based grant allocation model. DHS
concurred with our recommendations and FEMA took actions to
enhance its approach for assessing and incorporating
vulnerability into risk assessment methodologies for this
program.
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\15\ GAO-09-491.
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In November 2011, we reported that DHS had made
modifications to enhance the Port Security Grant Program's risk
assessment model's vulnerability element for fiscal year
2011.\16\ Specifically, DHS modified the vulnerability equation
to recognize that different ports have different vulnerability
levels. We also reported that FEMA had taken actions to
streamline the Port Security Grant Program's management
efforts. For example, FEMA shortened application time frames by
requiring port areas to submit specific project proposals at
the time of grant application. According to FEMA officials,
this change was intended to expedite the grant distribution
process. Further, we reported that to speed the process, DHS
took actions to reduce delays in environmental reviews,
increased the number of GPD staff working on the Port Security
Grants, revised and streamlined grant application forms, and
developed time frames for review of project documentation.\17\
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\16\ GAO-12-47.
\17\ GAO-12-47.
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FEMA Needs Better Coordination and Improved Data Collection to Reduce
Risk of Unnecessary Duplication
Despite these continuing efforts to enhance preparedness grant
management, we identified multiple factors in our February 2012 report
that contributed to the risk of FEMA potentially funding unnecessarily
duplicative projects across the four grant programs we reviewed--the
Homeland Security Grant Program, the Urban Areas Security Initiative,
the Port Security Grant Program, and the Transit Security Grant
Program.\18\ These factors include overlap among grant recipients,
goals, and geographic locations, combined with differing levels of
information that FEMA had available regarding grant projects and
recipients. We also reported that FEMA lacked a process to coordinate
application reviews across the four grant programs.
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\18\ GAO-12-303.
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Overlap among grant recipients, goals, and geographic locations
exist.--The four grant programs we reviewed have similar goals and fund
similar activities, such as equipment and training in overlapping
jurisdictions, which increases the risk of unnecessary duplication
among the programs. For instance, each State and eligible territory
receives a legislatively-mandated minimum amount of State Homeland
Security Program funding to help ensure that geographic areas develop a
basic level of preparedness, while the Urban Areas Security Initiative
grants explicitly target urban areas most at risk of terrorist attack.
However, many jurisdictions within designated Urban Areas Security
Initiative regions also apply for and receive State Homeland Security
Program funding. Similarly, port stakeholders in urban areas could
receive funding for equipment such as patrol boats through both the
Port Security Grant Program and the Urban Areas Security Initiative,
and a transit agency could purchase surveillance equipment with Transit
Security Grant Program or Urban Areas Security Initiative funding.
While we understand that some overlap may be desirable to provide
multiple sources of funding, a lack of visibility over grant award
details around these programs increases the risk of unintended and
unnecessary duplication.
FEMA made award decisions for all four grant programs with
differing levels of information.--In February 2012, we reported that
FEMA's ability to track which projects receive funding among the four
grant programs varied because the project information FEMA had
available to make award decisions--including grant funding amounts,
grant recipients, and grant funding purposes--also varied by program
due to differences in the grant programs' administrative processes. For
example, FEMA delegated some administrative duties to stakeholders for
the State Homeland Security Program and the Urban Areas Security
Initiative, thereby reducing its administrative burden. However, this
delegation also contributed to FEMA having less visibility over some
grant applications. FEMA recognized the trade-off between decreased
visibility over grant funding in exchange for its reduced
administrative burden.
Differences in information requirements also affected the level of
information that FEMA had available for making grant award decisions.
For example, for the State Homeland Security Program and Urban Areas
Security Initiative, States and eligible urban areas submit investment
justifications for each program with up to 15 distinct investment
descriptions that describe general proposals in wide-ranging areas such
as ``critical infrastructure protection.''\19\ Each investment
justification encompasses multiple specific projects to different
jurisdictions or entities, but project-level information, such as a
detailed listing of subrecipients or equipment costs, is not required
by FEMA. In contrast, Port Security and Transit Security Grant Program
applications require specific information on individual projects such
as detailed budget summaries. As a result, FEMA has a much clearer
understanding of what is being requested and what is being funded by
these programs.
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\19\ Investment justifications are one component of the State
Homeland Security Grant Program, the Urban Areas Security Initiative,
the Port Security Grant Program, and the Transit Security Grant Program
applications for grant funding. They provide narrative information on
proposed activities (investments) that are to be accomplished with the
grant funds. The investment justifications must demonstrate how
proposed investments address gaps and deficiencies in current
capabilities, and also demonstrate adherence to program guidance.
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FEMA has studied the potential utilization of more specific
project-level data for making grant award decisions, especially for the
State Homeland Security Program and Urban Areas Security
Initiative.\20\ However, while our analysis of selected grant projects
determined that this additional information was sufficient for
identifying potentially unnecessary duplication for nearly all of the
projects it reviewed, the information did not always provide FEMA with
sufficient detail to identify and prevent the risk of unnecessary
duplication. While utilizing more specific project-level data would be
a step in the right direction, at the time of our February 2012 report,
FEMA had not determined the specifics of future data requirements.
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\20\ In August 2009, FEMA established the Reporting Requirements
Working Group to compile a list of select grant reporting activities,
collect grant stakeholder feedback, and make recommendations regarding
future data collection policies. FEMA utilized the working group's
analysis and recommendations in a May 2011 Report to Congress.
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FEMA lacked a process to coordinate application reviews across the
four grant programs.--In February 2012, we reported that grant
applications were reviewed separately by program and were not compared
across each other to determine where possible unnecessary duplication
may occur. Specifically, FEMA's Homeland Security Grant Program branch
administered the Urban Areas Security Initiative and State Homeland
Security Program while the Transportation Infrastructure Security
branch administered the Port Security Grant Program and Transit
Security Grant Program. We and the DHS Inspector General concluded that
coordinating the review of grant projects internally would give FEMA
more complete information about applications across the four grant
programs, which could help FEMA identify and mitigate the risk of
unnecessary duplication across grant applications.\21\
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\21\ GAO, More Efficient and Effective Government: Opportunities to
Reduce Duplication, Overlap and Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and
Enhance Revenue, GAO-12-449T (Washington, DC; Feb. 28, 2012); and
Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, Efficiency
of DHS Grant Programs, OIG-1069 (Washington, DC: Mar. 22, 2010).
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In our February 2012 report, we note that one of FEMA's section
chiefs said that the primary reasons for the current lack of
coordination across programs are the sheer volume of grant applications
that need to be reviewed and FEMA's lack of resources to coordinate the
grant review process. She added that FEMA reminds grantees not to
duplicate grant projects; however, due to volume and the number of
activities associated with grant application reviews, FEMA lacks the
capabilities to cross-check for unnecessary duplication. We recognize
the challenges associated with reviewing a large volume of grant
applications, but to help reduce the risk of funding duplicative
projects, FEMA could benefit from exploring opportunities to enhance
its coordination of project reviews while also taking into account the
large volume of grant applications it must process.
Thus, we recommended that FEMA take actions to identify and
mitigate any unnecessary duplication in these programs, such as
collecting more complete project information as well as exploring
opportunities to enhance FEMA's internal coordination and
administration of the programs. In commenting on the report, DHS agreed
and identified planned actions to improve visibility and coordination
across programs and projects. We also suggested that Congress consider
requiring DHS to report on the results of its efforts to identify and
prevent duplication within and across the four grant programs, and
consider these results when making future funding decisions for these
programs.
FEMA Has Proposed Changes to Enhance Preparedness Grant Management, but
These Changes May Create Challenges
In the President's fiscal year 2013 budget request to Congress,
FEMA has proposed consolidating its various preparedness grant
programs--with the exception of the Emergency Management Performance
Grants and Assistance to Fire Fighters Grants--into a single,
comprehensive preparedness grant program called the National
Preparedness Grant Program (NPGP) in fiscal year 2013. FEMA also plans
to enhance its preparedness grants management through a variety of
proposed initiatives to implement the new consolidated program.
According to FEMA, the new NPGP will require grantees to develop
and sustain core capabilities outlined in the National Preparedness
Goal rather than work to meet mandates within individual, and often
disconnected, grant programs.\22\ NPGP is intended to focus on creating
a robust National response capacity based on cross-jurisdictional and
readily deployable State and local assets. According to FEMA's policy
announcement, consolidating the preparedness grant programs will
support the recommendations of the Redundancy Elimination and Enhanced
Performance for Preparedness Grants Act, and will streamline the grant
application process. This will, in turn, enable grantees to focus on
how Federal funds can add value to their jurisdiction's unique
preparedness needs while contributing to National response
capabilities. To further increase the efficiency of the new grant
program, FEMA plans to issue multi-year guidelines, enabling the agency
to focus its efforts on measuring progress towards building and
sustaining National capabilities. The intent of this consolidation is
to eliminate administration redundancies and ensure that all
preparedness grants are contributing to the National Preparedness Goal.
For fiscal year 2013, FEMA believes that the reorganization of
preparedness grants will allow for a more targeted grants approach
where States build upon the capabilities established with previous
grant money and has requested $1.54 billion for the National
Preparedness Grant Program.
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\22\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness
Goal, (Washington, DC, Sept. 2011).
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FEMA's Fiscal Year 2013 Grants Drawdown Budget in Brief also
proposes additional measures to enhance preparedness grant management
efforts and expedite prior years' grant expenditures. For example, to
support reprioritization of unobligated prior year funds and focus on
building core capabilities, FEMA plans to:
allow grantees to apply prior years' grant balances towards
more urgent priorities, promising an expedited project approval
by FEMA's Grant Programs Directorate;
expand allowable expenses under the Port Security Grant
Program and Transit Security Grant Program, for example, by
allowing maintenance and sustainment expenses for equipment,
training, and critical resources that have previously been
purchased with either Federal grants or any other source of
funding to support existing core capabilities tied to the five
mission areas contained within the National Preparedness Goal.
The changes FEMA has proposed for its fiscal year 2013 National
Preparedness Grants program may create new management challenges. As
noted by Chairman Bilirakis in last month's hearing by the House
Homeland Security Committee's Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
Response, and Communications, allocations under the new grant program
would rely heavily on a State's Threat and Hazard Identification and
Risk Assessment (THIRA).\23\ However, nearly a year after the THIRA
concept was first introduced as part of the fiscal year 2011 grant
guidance, grantees have yet to receive guidance on how to conduct the
THIRA process. As we reported in February 2012, questions also remain
as to how local stakeholders would be involved in the THIRA process at
the State level. In March 2012, FEMA's GPD announced that FEMA has
established a website to solicit input from stakeholders on how best to
implement the new program. According to Chairman Bilirakis, it is
essential that the local law enforcement, first responders, and
emergency managers who are first on the scene of a terrorist attack,
natural disaster, or other emergency be involved in the THIRA process.
They know the threats to their local areas and the capabilities needed
to address them. Finally, according to FEMA's plans, the new National
Preparedness Grant Program will require grantees to develop and sustain
core capabilities; however, the framework for assessing capabilities
and prioritizing National preparedness grant investments is still not
complete. As we noted in our February 2012 report, FEMA'S efforts to
measure the collective effectiveness of its grants programs are recent
and on-going and thus it is too soon to evaluate the extent to which
these initiatives will provide FEMA with the information it needs to
determine whether these grant programs are effectively improving the
Nation's security.\24\
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\23\ Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessments (THIRA)
are intended to be tools that allow organizations at all levels of
government to identify, assess, and prioritize their natural and man-
made risks to facilitate the identification of capability and resource
gaps, and allow organizations to track their year-to-year progress to
address those gaps.
\24\ GAO-12-303.
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fema has not yet completed national preparedness assessment efforts to
address long-standing concerns
DHS and FEMA have had difficulty in implementing long-standing
plans to develop and implement a system for assessing National
preparedness capabilities. For example, DHS first developed plans in
2004 to measure preparedness by assessing capabilities,\25\ but these
efforts have been repeatedly delayed and are not yet complete. FEMA's
proposed revisions to the new NPGP may help the agency overcome these
continuing challenges to developing and implementing a National
preparedness assessment.
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\25\ GAO, Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grants
in the National Capital Region Reflects the Need for Coordinated
Planning and Performance Goals, GAO-04-433 (Washington, DC: May 28,
2004).
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DHS and FEMA's Long-standing Plans to Develop and Implement a National
Assessment of Preparedness Have Not Been Fulfilled
Since 2004, DHS and FEMA have initiated a variety of efforts to
develop a system of measuring preparedness. From 2005 until September
2011, much of FEMA's efforts focused on developing and operationalizing
a list of target capabilities that would define desired capabilities
and could be used in a tiered framework to measure their attainment. In
July 2005, we reported that DHS had established a draft Target
Capabilities List that provides guidance on the specific capabilities
and levels of capability at various levels of government that FEMA
would expect Federal, State, local, and Tribal first responders to
develop and maintain.\26\ DHS planned to organize classes of
jurisdictions that share similar characteristics--such as total
population, population density, and critical infrastructure--into tiers
to account for reasonable differences in capability levels among groups
of jurisdictions and to appropriately apportion responsibility for
development and maintenance of capabilities among levels of government
and across these jurisdictional tiers. According to DHS's Assessment
and Reporting Implementation Plan, DHS intended to implement a
capability assessment and reporting system based on target capabilities
that would allow first responders to assess their preparedness by
identifying gaps, excesses, or deficiencies in their existing
capabilities or capabilities they will be expected to access through
mutual aid. In addition, this information could be used to: (1) Measure
the readiness of Federal civil response assets, (2) measure the use of
Federal assistance at the State and local levels, and (3) assess how
Federal assistance programs are supporting National preparedness.
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\26\ An example of a desired outcome for the target capability of
mass prophylaxis--prevention of or protective treatment for disease--
was to effectively reach an entire affected population in time to
prevent loss of life and injury. GAO-05-852.
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DHS's efforts to implement these plans were interrupted by the 2005
hurricane season. In August 2005, Hurricane Katrina--the worst natural
disaster in our Nation's history--made final landfall in coastal
Louisiana and Mississippi, and its destructive force extended to the
western Alabama coast. Hurricane Katrina and the following Hurricanes
Rita and Wilma--also among the most powerful hurricanes in the Nation's
history--graphically illustrated the limitations at that time of the
Nation's readiness and ability to respond effectively to a catastrophic
disaster; that is, a disaster whose effects almost immediately
overwhelm the response capabilities of affected State and local first
responders and require outside action and support from the Federal
Government and other entities. In June 2006, DHS concluded that target
capabilities and associated performance measures should serve as the
common reference system for preparedness planning.
In September 2006, we reported that numerous reports and our work
suggested that the substantial resources and capabilities marshaled by
Federal, State, and local governments and nongovernmental organizations
were insufficient to meet the immediate challenges posed by the
unprecedented degree of damage and the resulting number of hurricane
victims caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.\27\ We also reported
that developing the capabilities needed for catastrophic disasters
should be part of an overall National preparedness effort that is
designed to integrate and define what needs to be done, where it needs
to be done, how it should be done, how well it should be done, and
based on what standards.\28\
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\27\ GAO, Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership,
Capabilities, and Accountability Controls Will Improve the
Effectiveness of the Nation's Preparedness, Response, and Recovery
System, GAO-06-618 (Washington, DC, Sept. 6, 2006.)
\28\ GAO-06-618.
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FEMA's National Preparedness Directorate within its Protection and
National Preparedness organization was established in April 2007 and is
responsible for developing and implementing a system for measuring and
assessing National preparedness capabilities. Figure 2 provides an
illustration of how Federal, State, and local resources provide
capabilities for different levels of ``incident effect'' (i.e., the
extent of damage caused by a natural or manmade disaster).
In October 2006, Congress passed the Post-Katrina Act that required
FEMA, in developing guidelines to define target capabilities, to ensure
that such guidelines are specific, flexible, and measurable.\29\ In
addition, the Post-Katrina Act calls for FEMA to ensure that each
component of the National preparedness system, which includes the
target capabilities, is developed, revised, and updated with clear and
quantifiable performance metrics, measures, and outcomes.\30\ We
recommended in September 2006, among other things, that DHS apply an
all-hazards, risk management approach in deciding whether and how to
invest in specific capabilities for a catastrophic disaster.\31\ DHS
concurred with this recommendation and FEMA said it planned to use the
Target Capabilities List to assess capabilities to address all hazards.
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\29\ 6 U.S.C. 746.
\30\ 6 U.S.C. 749(b).
\31\ GAO-06-618.
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In September 2007, FEMA issued an updated version of the Target
Capabilities List to provide a common perspective in conducting
assessments that determine levels of readiness to perform critical
tasks and identify and address any gaps or deficiencies. According to
FEMA, policymakers need regular reports on the status of capabilities
for which they have responsibility to help them make better resource
and investment decisions and to establish priorities.
In April 2009, we reported that establishing quantifiable metrics
for target capabilities was a prerequisite to developing assessment
data that can be compared across all levels of government.\32\ At the
time of our review, FEMA was in the process of refining the target
capabilities to make them more measurable and to provide State and
local jurisdictions with additional guidance on the levels of
capability they need. Specifically, FEMA planned to develop
quantifiable metrics--or performance objectives--for each of the 37
target capabilities that are to outline specific capability targets
that jurisdictions (such as cities) of varying size should strive to
meet, recognizing that there is not a ``one size fits all'' approach to
preparedness.
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\32\ GAO-09-369.
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In October 2009, in responding to Congressional questions regarding
FEMA's plan and time line for reviewing and revising the 37 target
capabilities, FEMA officials said they planned to conduct extensive
coordination through stakeholder workshops in all 10 FEMA regions and
with all Federal agencies with lead and supporting responsibility for
emergency support-function activities associated with each of the 37
target capabilities. The workshops were intended to define the risk
factors, critical target outcomes, and resource elements for each
capability. The response stated that FEMA planned to create a Task
Force comprised of Federal, State, local, and Tribal stakeholders to
examine all aspects of preparedness grants, including benchmarking
efforts such as the Target Capabilities List. FEMA officials have
described their goals for updating the list to include establishing
measurable target outcomes, providing an objective means to justify
investments and priorities, and promoting mutual aid and resource
sharing.
In November 2009, FEMA issued a Target Capabilities List
Implementation Guide that described the function of the list as a
planning tool and not a set of standards or requirements. Finally, in
2011, FEMA announced that the Target Capabilities List would be
replaced by a new set of National Core Capabilities. However, it is not
clear how the new approach will help FEMA overcome on-going challenges
to assessing National preparedness capabilities discussed below.
FEMA Has Not Yet Fully Addressed On-going Challenges to Assessing
National Preparedness Capabilities
FEMA has not yet fully addressed on-going challenges in developing
and implementing a system for assessing National preparedness
capabilities. For example, we reported in July 2005 that DHS had
identified potential challenges in gathering the information needed to
assess capabilities, including determining how to aggregate data from
Federal, State, local, and Tribal governments and others and
integrating self-assessment and external assessment approaches.\33\ In
analyzing FEMA's efforts to assess capabilities, we further reported in
April 2009 that FEMA faced methodological challenges with regard to:
(1) Differences in data available, (2) variations in reporting
structures across States, and (3) variations in the level of detail
within data sources requiring subjective interpretation. As noted
above, FEMA was in the process of refining the target capabilities at
the time of our review to make them more measurable and to provide
State and local jurisdictions with additional guidance on the levels of
capability they need. We recommended that FEMA enhance its project
management plan to include milestone dates, among other things, a
recommendation to which DHS concurred. In October 2010, we reported
that FEMA had enhanced its project management plan by providing
milestone dates and identifying key assessment points throughout the
project to determine whether project changes are necessary.\34\
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\33\ GAO-05-652.
\34\ GAO-11-51R.
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Nonetheless, DHS and FEMA have had difficulty overcoming the
challenges we reported in July 2005 and April 2009 in establishing a
system of metrics to assess National preparedness capabilities.\35\ As
we reported in October 2010, FEMA officials said that, generally,
evaluation efforts they used to collect data on National preparedness
capabilities were useful for their respective purposes but that the
data collected were limited by data reliability and measurement issues
related to the lack of standardization in the collection of data.
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\35\ GAO-05-652 and GAO-09-369.
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FEMA officials reported that one of its evaluation efforts, the
State Preparedness Report, has enabled FEMA to gather data on the
progress, capabilities, and accomplishments of the preparedness program
of a State, the District of Columbia, or a territory. However, they
also said that these reports included self-reported data that may be
subject to interpretation by the reporting organizations in each State
and not be readily comparable to other States' data. The officials also
stated that they have taken actions to address these limitations by,
for example, creating a web-based survey tool to provide a more
standardized way of collecting State preparedness information that will
help FEMA officials validate the information by comparing it across
States.
We reported in October 2010 that FEMA had an on-going effort to
develop measures for target capabilities that would serve as planning
guidance, not requirements, to assist in State and local capability
assessments. FEMA officials had not yet determined how they planned to
revise the Target Capabilities List and said they were awaiting the
completed revision of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, which
was to address National preparedness. That directive, called
Presidential Policy Directive 8 on National Preparedness (PPD-8), was
issued on March 30, 2011.
In March 2011, we reported that FEMA's efforts to develop and
implement a comprehensive, measurable, National preparedness assessment
of capability and gaps were not yet complete and suggested that
Congress consider limiting preparedness grant funding until FEMA
completes a National preparedness assessment of capability gaps at each
level based on tiered, capability-specific performance objectives to
enable prioritization of grant funding.\36\ In April 2011, Congress
passed the fiscal year 2011 appropriations act for DHS, which reduced
funding for FEMA preparedness grants by $875 million from the amount
requested in the President's fiscal year 2011 budget.\37\ The
consolidated appropriations act for fiscal year 2012 appropriated $1.7
billion for FEMA Preparedness grants, $1.28 billion less than
requested.\38\ The House committee report accompanying the DHS
appropriations bill for fiscal year 2012 stated that FEMA could not
demonstrate how the use of the grants had enhanced disaster
preparedness.\39\
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\36\ GAO-11-318SP.
\37\ Pub. L. No. 112-10, 1632, 125 Stat. 38, 143 (2011).
\38\ Pub. L. No. 112-74, 125 Stat. 786, 960 (2011). This total
includes all grant programs in the State and local programs account and
the Emergency Management Performance Grant program but does not include
funding appropriated for firefighter assistance grant programs.
\39\ H.R. Rep. No. 112-91, at 106-08 (2011).
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According to FEMA's testimony in a hearing on the President's
fiscal year 2013 budget request before the House Committee on Homeland
Security's Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and
Communications, FEMA became the Federal lead for the implementation of
PPD-8 in 2011. The new Presidential policy directive calls for the
development of both a National Preparedness Goal and a National
Preparedness System (both of which were required by the Post-Katrina
Act in 2006). FEMA issued the National Preparedness Goal in September
2011, which establishes core capabilities for prevention, protection,
response, recovery, and mitigation that are to serve as the basis for
preparedness activities within FEMA, throughout the Federal Government,
and at the State and local levels. These new core capabilities are the
latest evolution of the Target Capabilities List. According to FEMA
officials, they plan to continue to organize the implementation of the
National Preparedness System and will be working with partners across
the emergency management community to integrate activities into a
comprehensive campaign to build and sustain preparedness. According to
FEMA, many of the programs and processes that support the components of
the National Preparedness System exist and are currently in use, while
others will need to be updated or developed.
For example, FEMA has not yet developed National preparedness
capability requirements based on established metrics for the core
capabilities to provide a framework for National preparedness
assessments. As I testified last year, until such a framework is in
place, FEMA will not have a basis to operationalize and implement its
conceptual approach for assessing Federal, State, and local
preparedness capabilities against capability requirements to identify
capability gaps for prioritizing investments in National preparedness.
Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking Member Richardson, and Members of the
committee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to
respond to any questions that you may have at this time.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much.
Now I will recognize the mayor from Philadelphia, Mr.
Nutter. You are recognized, sir, for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL A. NUTTER, MAYOR OF PHILADELPHIA,
TESTIFYING ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS
Mr. Nutter. Thank you, Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking Member
Richardson, Ranking Member Thompson, all the Members of the
committee. Let me just also recognize Congressman Pat Meehan
who was just here a few minutes ago, our friend and neighbor
from the county next door in Delaware County.
I am Michael Nutter, mayor of the city of Philadelphia, and
vice president of the U.S. Conference of Mayors. I appreciate
the opportunity to testify before you today on FEMA's proposal
to change the Homeland Security grant programs. I also want to
thank DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano for our conference call
just yesterday, along with Mayors Parker and Mayor Smith, and
her openness to listening to our concerns and ideas in this
regard.
My basic message is that mayors and other local officials
across the Nation have serious concerns about this proposal.
Ranking Member Richardson made reference to a letter signed by
12 National organizations raising their concerns as well.
We strongly support the existing menu of Homeland Security
programs. Although we recognize that they may not be perfect,
they are the product of years of work by Congress, the
administration, State and local governments, and first
responders. Frankly, we cannot understand why FEMA proposes to
throw away programs that work in such a wholesale manner. Let
me first note some areas of agreement with FEMA.
Everyone agrees that we should spend our Homeland Security
dollars where they are most needed. Everyone understands that
unspent funds remain in the pipeline and that we all need to do
a better job of getting these funds out the door. Everyone
shares the goal of basing funding decisions on threat
assessments and reducing administrative burdens. Everyone
agrees that we need to improve cooperation among the various
agencies and governments involved in making our homeland
secure.
What we do not understand is why anyone believes that those
goals require this proposed radical and rapid change. FEMA's
proposal would essentially convert the current Homeland
Security grant programs into a State-administered block grant
program in which funding decisions are based on State and
multi-State threat assessments.
There would be no more separate--program, nor would there
be separate transit or port security programs. These are
programs which provide funding to the areas and facilities
considered to be at greatest risk.
The outline of the proposed National Preparedness Grant
Program, NPGP, raises serious concerns and questions for those
of us at the local level. We are the ones charged with trying
to prevent incidents from occurring in the first place, and
providing the critical first response when they do occur.
Among our concerns and questions are the following. The
NPGP proposal moves away from the current regional and
strategy-based approach to a competitive and project-based
approach, which literally pits cities, counties, and States
against each other for funding.
The role of local Government officials, local emergency
managers, and first responders in the Threat Hazard
Identification and Risk Assessment process is not clear. How
can we ensure that it includes local concerns?
How will funding in the NPGP be distributed to local areas?
How do we ensure that it is used to meet local threats in
preparedness gaps?
Let me mention for a moment my own city. Homeland Security
funds are distributed to Philadelphia on a regional basis. Over
the last 10 years we have worked with the four surrounding
counties, including those represented by Congressman Meehan to
support strong Homeland Security capabilities such as
specialized law enforcement response teams, urban search-and-
rescue capabilities, and enhanced medical response teams. More
specifically, the city's response to Hurricane Irene and
Tropical Storm Lee was aided tremendously by numerous resources
acquired using UASI funding.
For example, UASI funding allowed us to utilize enhanced
technology in the city's Emergency Operations Center, the
city's Emergency Public Notification System, emergency
communications equipment used by first responders, cots and
animal supplies used at emergency shelters, variable message
board signs used to direct citizens out of hazardous areas, and
the salaries of full-time emergency managers to develop the
plans that were implemented during those storms.
We are also concerned about the increased role which States
will play in determining where and how funds will be spent. For
instance, Pennsylvania already has a track record of
redistributing funding away from urban areas. For example, in
fiscal year 2011, FEMA, our State management organization
reallocated the State Homeland Security Grant Program funding
away from the Philadelphia urban area to other task forces
within the commonwealth. We were cut by 85 percent, the largest
cut in the State.
Let me show you one more example of the value of the
funding we received in human terms. This photo is of a tactical
helmet and another of a vest. These were worn by Philadelphia
police officers, one shot in the head, the other in the chest.
Both are alive today because this equipment was purchased with
UASI funding. Those officers' lives are at stake. Sometimes our
walk does not match our talk. This is one of those moments in
Philadelphia.
Finally----
Mr. Bilirakis. Excuse me, Mayor. Would you like to submit
those for the record?
Mr. Nutter. Mr. Chairman, I have a full package.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. Very good. Without objection then.
Mr. Nutter. Members of the committee, I appreciate the
opportunity to testify before you today on this issue of vital
importance to my city and to all local officials and first
responders across the United States. Mayors and local officials
look forward to working with you to ensure that we maintain
effective Homeland Security programs.
Let us be honest. You have seen a result of what happened
with ARRA funding that mostly went to States rather than
cities. It did not work out as well as many of us would have
liked. Please do not take the same steps with emergency
preparedness funding as lives are at stake in this one. Thank
you very much.
[The statement of Mr. Nutter follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael A. Nutter
March 20, 2012
Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking Member Richardson, and--I have to
acknowledge Congressman Meehan, who is our good neighbor--Members of
the committee, I am Michael A. Nutter, mayor of Philadelphia and vice
president of The United States Conference of Mayors. I appreciate the
opportunity to testify before you on FEMA's proposal to change the
Homeland Security grant programs. My basic message is that mayors and
other local officials across the Nation have serious concerns about
this proposal.
We strongly support the existing menu of homeland security programs
and, although we recognize that they may not be perfect, they are the
product of years of work by Congress, the administration, State and
local governments, and first responders. Frankly we cannot understand
why FEMA proposes to throw away that work in such a wholesale fashion
and to do it through the appropriations process, rather than the
authorization process.
Everyone agrees that we should spend our homeland security dollars
where they are needed most in as efficient and effective manner as
possible.
Everyone understands that unspent funds remain in the pipeline and
that everyone needs to do a better job of getting these out the door.
Everyone shares the goals of basing funding decisions on threat
assessments and reducing administrative burdens.
Everyone agrees that we need to improve cooperation and
communication among the various agencies and governments involved in
making our homeland secure.
What we don't understand is why anyone believes that this radical
and rapid change is needed in order to achieve those goals.
FEMA's proposal would convert the current Homeland Security grant
programs into a State-administered block grant program and a State-
centric competitive grant programs in which funding decisions are based
on State and multi-State threat assessments. There would be no more
separate UASI program; there would be no more separate transit or port
security programs. These are programs which provide funding to areas
and facilities considered to be at greatest risk.
The outline for the proposed National Preparedness Grant Program
(NPGP) raises serious concerns and questions for those of us at the
local level--and we are the ones charged with trying to prevent
incidents from occurring in the first place and providing that critical
first response when they do occur. Among our concerns and questions are
the following:
The NPGP proposal moves away from the current regional
governance, assessment, and strategy-based approach to a
competitive and individual project-based approach that will pit
cities, counties, and States against each other for funding.
This will generate conflict instead of fostering collaboration
as is currently the case.
The NPGP proposal emphasizes Nationally deployable assets,
thus shifting the emphasis from the full system of prevention,
protection, preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation to
one that appears to focus on response alone.
What role will local Government officials, local emergency
managers, and first responders have in the Threat Hazard
Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) process so that we
can ensure that it includes local concerns? It's important to
note that THIRAs are not homeland security plans. They are risk
assessments that should be used to help develop plans along
with capabilities assessments and gap and sustainment analyses.
It is unclear how the funding in the NPGP will be
distributed to local areas; so how do we ensure that it is used
to meet local threats and preparedness gaps? How do we ensure,
for example, that political considerations do not become the
criterion for the distribution of these funds?
The UASI program ensures that Federal funding is used to
improve preparedness in high-risk areas, as recommended by the
9/11 Commission. How can FEMA ensure that the new NPGP meets
this recommendation, if it distributes funding solely based on
THIRA examinations performed by States?
Why are such major changes being proposed without advance
consultation with the local governments and first responders
charged with preventing and responding to incidents? Why are
they being proposed without consulting in advance with the
committees of jurisdiction in Congress which have worked so
hard over the years to craft the current suite of homeland
security and preparedness programs? And why are they being
proposed to be accomplished through the appropriations rather
than the authorization process?
the philadelphia region
Let me discuss my own region. Homeland security funds are
distributed to Philadelphia on a regional basis. Over the last 10
years, we have worked with the four surrounding counties--including
those represented by Congressman Meehan--to develop strong homeland
security capabilities, such as specialized law enforcement response
teams, urban search and rescue capabilities, and enhanced medical
response teams. More specifically, the city's response to Hurricane
Irene and Tropical Storm Lee was aided tremendously by numerous
resources acquired using UASI funding. For example, UASI funds allowed
us to utilize enhanced technology utilized in the city's Emergency
Operations Center, the city's Emergency Public Notification System,
emergency communications equipment used by first responders, cots, and
animal supplies used at emergency shelters, variable message board
signs used to direct citizens out of hazardous areas, and the salaries
of full time emergency managers responsible for developing the plans
that were implemented during the storms.
At current fiscal year 2012 funding levels, the Southeastern
Pennsylvania region has just enough funding to sustain the prevention,
preparedness, response, and recovery capabilities it has worked so hard
to develop over the past 10 years. A further reduction in funding would
not only prohibit us from expanding upon those capabilities, but would
also require the region to reduce those capabilities through the
elimination of critical programs. FEMA's proposal provides no assurance
that we would continue to receive these funds which are so critical to
our region's security and to our ability to prevent and respond to,
mitigate, and recover from any incidents which do occur.
We are very concerned about the increased role which States will
play in determining where and how funds would be spent:
With increased authority, the Commonwealth will likely
augment the already bureaucratic processes required to purchase
equipment. Even now, prior to increased oversight and
authority, the Commonwealth has added additional layers to the
equipment acquisition process thus limiting the ability of
local jurisdictions to spend down their grant funds and obtain
much-needed equipment.
Further, the Commonwealth already has a track record of re-
distributing funding away from urban areas and re-allocating
that funding to other areas of the Commonwealth. For example,
in fiscal year 2011, PEMA reallocated the State Homeland
Security Grant Program (SHSGP) funding away from the
Philadelphia Urban Area to other Task Forces within the
Commonwealth. The SHSGP distribution is historically based on
population index, economic index, and critical infrastructure
points. Based on this formula alone, the Philadelphia Urban
Area was slated to receive the largest award amount. While we
were bracing for a 50 percent cut due to an overall decrease in
funding, we actually received an 85.46 percent reduction in the
SHSGP grant. There are nine Task Forces in the Commonwealth.
One received a 50 percent SHSGP cut and the others received 25
percent reductions. This demonstrates a disproportionate impact
on Philadelphia that does not align with the historical grant
allocation guidelines.
As a result of the proposed changes, possible specific cuts could
include these items:
Elimination of essential full-time emergency management
planning positions. UASI funds currently subsidize the salaries
of over 50 percent of the Philadelphia Office of Emergency
Management staff (14) as well as the salaries of numerous
regional emergency planners. A reduction in funding could leave
the city and region without the professionals required to
develop and maintain comprehensive contingency plans that
address the consequences of terrorism, natural disasters, and
man-made events.
Downsizing or eliminating the Southeastern Communications
Network (SECOM), a four-State, 12-county dedicated, secure
microwave system that provides connectivity between Delaware
Valley 9-1-1 Operations Centers and Emergency Operations
Centers and provides voice radio connectivity for emergency
responders in over 300 jurisdictions.
Significant cuts in training, exercises, equipment, and
resources currently directed to specialized operations teams
including Special Weapons and Tactics Teams (SWAT), Regional
Bomb Squads, Major Incident Response Teams, Terrorism Response
Teams, Urban Search & Rescue, Swift Water Rescue, and a variety
of other teams that protect the citizens of the Southeast
Region.
Elimination of the Southeastern Pennsylvania Surge Medical
Assistance Response Team (SMRT)--a skilled group of volunteers
organized to provide medical surge capacity to meet regional
needs generated by an emergency. SEPA SMART responds to
community needs caused by natural or human-caused disasters by
augmenting existing health care staff and/or deploying a
temporary hospital unit. They deploy to increase the surge
capacity of a hospital facility, a community-based alternate
care site, or a disaster site.
Reduced information-sharing capabilities at the recently-
opened Delaware Valley Intelligence Center (DVIC), the 72nd
Federally-certified fusion center in the country, serving a
four-State, 12-county customer base and designed truly to be an
all-hazards, all-crime fusion center.
A significant reduction in training available to first
responders, Government employees, volunteers, critical
infrastructure stakeholders, and others who play a critical
role in prevention, preparedness, and response.
Inability to replace first responder materials, equipment,
vehicles, supplies, and medications at the end of their useful
life, including radios, tactical equipment, personal protective
equipment, detection equipment, pharmaceutical stockpiles, etc.
Elimination of the Law Enforcement Justice Information
System (LEJIS) which connects existing local police Records
Management Systems (RMS) together in real time so incident data
can be shared throughout Pennsylvania. LEJIS saves lives and
protects property by giving officers in the field real-time
access to incident data from surrounding police departments;
LEJIS currently connects nearly 250 police departments
throughout Pennsylvania, including the City of Philadelphia
Police Department.
A reduction in the region's capacity to provide mass care
and sheltering to those directly impacted by disasters.
Let me share with you the value of the funding we have received in
human terms: I have two photos of a tactical helmet and vest, each worn
by separate Philadelphia Police Department SWAT officers during a
standoff last year. Each officer was shot (one in the torso, the other
in the temple), and the protective equipment purchased using UASI funds
literally saved their lives.
principles for program improvement
The Conference of Mayors is working closely with other National
organizations representing local governments, local emergency managers,
and first responders on ways to improve the suite of homeland grant
programs. We offer you some principles on which we all agree, and which
may be helpful to the committee:
Transparency.--The methodology needs to be clear--that is,
how the States are distributing funds, why they are making
these decisions, and where the funds are going must be
transparent and understandable.
Local Involvement.--Local government officials, including
emergency managers and emergency response officials, know best
the threats and vulnerabilities in their areas. The THIRA
process must include the input of local elected and emergency
response officials, and FEMA must be able to audit States by
comparing local risk assessments to the State-level THIRA.
Flexibility with Accountability.--Any changes to the
existing Federal grant programs should allow Federal funding to
meet individual local needs and fill preparedness gaps
identified at the local level. Effective but sometimes less
politically popular programs, like mitigation, must still
receive funding.
Local Funding.--Since event impact and response are
primarily local in nature, grant funding should support
primarily local prevention and preparedness efforts, as is the
case under the current program structure. It is important that
Federal homeland security grants continue to fund local
prevention and response activities, including local emergency
managers and first responders, and activities that support
their preparedness efforts.
Terrorism Prevention.--We must not lose the current emphasis
on supporting law enforcement's terrorist prevention
activities. The Federal grant funds should not be used to
support larger State bureaucracies in place of counter
terrorism preparedness.
Incentives for Regionalization.--FEMA's proposal focuses on
States and multi-State regions, similar to the FEMA regions. It
is important to make sure that the homeland security grants
also support preparedness in metropolitan intra-State and
inter-State regions.
I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today on this
issue of vital importance to me and my city and to all local officials,
emergency managers, and first responders across the Nation. Mayors and
local officials look forward to working with you to ensure the
transparency, efficiency, and effectiveness of homeland security
grants.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mayor. I appreciate it. Now we
will begin the questioning with you, Mayor. I will start.
Mayor, we have been concerned about the lack of stakeholder
engagement in the development of the National Preparedness
Grant Program proposal. Have you been able to share your
concerns with FEMA? I know you talked to Secretary Napolitano.
But have you been able to share your concerns with FEMA since
the budget release through the on-line system? Do you believe
that this system is enough to provide the level of discussion
necessary for a proposal of this magnitude?
Mr. Nutter. Mr. Chairman, I have not had direct contact
myself with FEMA. I know that our Office of Emergency
Preparedness has shared some concerns. But the issue that you
raise with regard to that system, I found yesterday's phone
call with the Secretary very helpful. I like personal contact
myself. It is a lot easier to explain what is going on the
ground when we engage at that level. I think more opportunities
for local officials to talk directly with FEMA on these issues.
We are the first ones who show up in every incident that
happens. I am not saying anything about anyone else. I just
know that the Philadelphia police officer or someone from our
emergency management operation is about 99.9 percent more
likely to be the first one on the scene for anything that
happens in our city, our transit system, our port, or anywhere
else.
This is a--as I mentioned in my testimony, this is a very
drastic change and it comes in a very rapid fashion. We need
much more time to go through the details on this one given the
magnitude of what we are talking about. The seriousness of the
funding and the flexibility that we have with targeted programs
and targeted areas that ensure the attention that we need.
You have heard the testimony of the inspector general.
Unfortunately I heard Pennsylvania's name at least twice,
possibly three times. We have serious concerns about a State-
centric funding formula that may not, as we have already seen.
We have taken cuts in urban Philadelphia. Some of the
priorities across the State may not exactly match up with the
priorities of the largest city in the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, which is a city and county, the only one.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much, Mayor.
I will go ahead and recognize our Ranking Member, Ms.
Richardson, for questions directly to the mayor.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will just have
one question so we can all get through.
Given the current fiscal difficulties that so many State
and local communities have faced, and you have alluded to some
of them. The Department's decision to consolidate the 16
distinct grants such as UASI has tremendous challenges.
Specifically you mentioned the State-centric funding pool.
Could you describe for us to what degree you are involved
in a State-centric decision similar to this? Are you brought to
the table? Are you able to participate and weigh in why your
particular area needs assistance? Or is that pretty much done
within the Department, which is hence why this idea of the way
we would do this program is not effective?
Mr. Nutter. Ranking Member Richardson, I think the short
answer to that is no. The 85 percent cut that we took, I could
not explain to you today why that happened. There was no
explanation for that. We have, you know, some ideas back home.
But this is not a--in my view at least, a full
participatory process. When we have the opportunity to work
with these individual grants we are much more hands-on, and it
is a much greater collaborative process. As I mentioned in my
testimony, Philadelphia, Bucks, Chester, Delaware, and
Montgomery Counties, specifically southeastern Pennsylvania
work very, very well together.
Certainly the regional kind of partnership and
relationship, and we could certainly enhance that literally
across three bridges into New Jersey. We can do a better job.
But certainly southeastern Pennsylvania, we are tremendously
reliant on each other, but also much more coordinated than some
of the activities that take place at the State level.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, sir.
I yield back.
Mr. Bilirakis. Now I will recognize the gentleman from New
York, Mr. Turner, for questions for the mayor directly. Thank
you. You are recognized, sir.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank you, Mr. Mayor.
Mr. Nutter. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Turner. I am stunned at an 85 percent cut in the
funding for the Philadelphia area. Philadelphia has many of the
risk assessments as New York: Port security, symbolic and
strategic sites. Why would you be more comfortable with a
Federal slicing of this pie than the States? Your State would--
should be the first to recognize this. This to me seems
stunning.
Mr. Nutter. Congressman, all I can say is that I mean to
some extent their actions have spoken louder than their words.
We do not know why we were cut, but we were cut. You know this
is a situation where it is a big State. It is the largest State
in the United States of America, so it gets spread.
I think that Philadelphia, because we are the largest city
and we are the only city and county in the commonwealth we
received you know I believe proportionately a fair share of
dollars. But it may dwarf some other areas. So when cuts
happen--I mean we understand that we might get hit, but an 85
percent cut is, No. 1, too much for us to bear; No. 2, they may
have felt because they did not explain it to us that we have
other access to dollars or we will just figure it out or we
will absorb it or what.
But as you point out, we have a port, we have an airport,
we have massive rail systems, we have a road network, I-95 goes
right through the city of Philadelphia. We do have a few
historic sites: Independence Hall, the Liberty Bell. I mean, a
few things happened in Philadelphia a couple hundred years ago.
We are strategically located between New York and
Washington, DC. We are all on the same path. I came down on the
Amtrak. I mean, it makes no sense.
But I--if there is a funding formula, if we can deal
direct, quite honestly, Congressman, with the Federal
Government in this way on a regional basis I would feel much
more secure than being reliant on the State. Sometimes it just
does not work out for big cities in States where there might be
that kind of conflict.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Mayor, would you suggest that on a State-
wide basis many of these grants are seen more as political talk
than meeting our strategic and security needs in their
allocation? Is that why we----
Mr. Nutter. Congressman, I try my best not to get into
motives or intentions. I just look at results. The result is
that I got an 85 percent cut. Whatever the motive was, it still
hurts.
Mr. Turner. All right. Do you have a solution?
Mr. Nutter. We have a program that works. I am not sure
what problem we are trying to solve.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Mayor. You say it well.
Mr. Nutter. Thank you, Congressman.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you. You yield back. Yes, thank you.
I now recognize the Ranking Member of the full committee,
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mayor, are you aware of any stakeholder involvement in
this process other than the phone call you were on yesterday
relative to the consolidation of the programs, its impact, and
other things?
Mr. Nutter. Certainly through the U.S. Conference of Mayors
we have been monitoring this situation. My director of Federal
relations Terry Gilliam has stayed on top of this. But I have
to say, Ranking Member Thompson, that this comes upon us in a
rather rapid fashion. You know we are trying to do our best to
make a case, certainly on behalf of Philadelphia and for the
entire conference.
But I do not necessarily know that there has been
tremendous amount of activity or engagement. My understanding
is that there will be much more. I believe--and I am aware that
there is a full-blown outreach effort that will be engaged. But
we are very, very concerned, given some of the other budgetary
complexities going on and some of the activities in Washington
about this particular proposal and how we fit in, in the
conversation.
Mr. Thompson. What I think Mr. Turner's comments and some
of the Chairman also is I do not think any of what we should do
should be to have the result of being punitive. I think the
application ought to be across the board so that if a cut is
there, it is tied to risk and some other things and not just a
cut.
So, I am concerned that a city like yours would be so
impacted that it potentially could put your city at risk. So
going forward I would say that you need to use the bully pulpit
of the mayor's office as well as the U.S. Conference of Mayors
to highlight what is happening.
The other question is: To what degree from a sustainability
point of view would cuts like that will you be able to maintain
any reasonable capacities?
Mr. Nutter. Well, two things, Congressman. First of all, we
did not suddenly become 85 percent more safe in recent times.
So, I do not know what process anybody went through to make a
determination that somehow Philadelphia should get an 85
percent cut.
Again from the conversation yesterday and even this
morning, if the primary focus is on maintaining capability, we
have the threat assessment that we have I mean whatever it is.
Philadelphia is Philadelphia is Philadelphia. New York is New
York is New York.
I mean, so continued cuts will negatively impact our
ability to maintain the kind of safety and preparedness that we
are supposed to maintain. I mean, at some point--I mean I
understand the idea of doing a little more with less. But there
becomes a point where you do risk your share capacity. You can
only stretch that dollar so far.
Mr. Thompson. For my own information, when the cuts came to
the 85 percent level did you reach out to the State and ask
them for some reason as to why the cuts came like they did?
Mr. Nutter. We did have some engagement. We have not
received an answer that we can understand.
Mr. Thompson. Well, I think it would be incumbent upon our
committee from an oversight standpoint to see whether or not
the intent of Congress is being met with cuts like this. I am--
I think that--I do not think any of us would want a community
to be at risk because of policies that we are doing. It appears
that some unintended consequences are coming up because of
that.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I believe Hansen, would you like--Mr. Clarke, you do not
have any questions for the Mayor. Is that correct? Okay. Very
good. Thank you.
Well, before I actually--I want to thank you very much for
testifying and answering our questions. I have a very serious
question for you. Have you been down to Clearwater to spring
training, the Phillies spring training? Have you been down
there? The Phillies look pretty good. I was there the other
day.
Mr. Nutter. Mr. Chairman, I thought that I would just wait
for them to come home to----
Mr. Bilirakis. Well, if you ever decide to come down, give
me a call.
Mr. Nutter. I will be glad to.
Mr. Bilirakis. I tell you, you would be very impressed with
Bright House. Thank you very much.
Mr. Nutter. I think a trip around a business-related
activity and maybe slip in a ballgame.
Mr. Bilirakis. Sounds good.
Mr. Nutter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
Yes, this is the end of round one, but we are going to go
to round two.
You are dismissed, sir. If you would like to hang around
that would be fine too.
Mr. Nutter. Thank you.
Mr. Bilirakis. So, thank you so much for being so patient.
I will recognize myself for 5 minutes for questioning the rest
of the panel.
Okay. Question for Administrator Harman. The GAO has noted
that FEMA lacks necessary detail on individual projects and the
Office of Inspector General has identified questionable
expenditures in a number of its reviews of SHSGP in particular,
and also UASI, such as the review of Project Shield in
Illinois.
When questionable expenditures are uncovered through GAO,
OIG, or FEMA reviews, what is the process for reprogramming the
funding to another allowable activity or providing the funding
to another jurisdiction that would make better use of that
funding? That question is for Administrator Harman.
Ms. Harman. Thank you.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you. You are recognized.
Ms. Harman. Thank you very much. With regard to
reprogramming, as you are aware the dollars that are
appropriated for these grants are traditionally what we
consider 1-year money, with the exception of our fire grant
money, with AFG, SAFER, Fire Prevention and Safety. That is a
very large program; 20,000 applications which appreciate the 2-
year ability to get that money out the door.
With the traditional 9/11 Act funding as well as EMPG
dollars, that is considered 1-year money. So, as soon as we
obligate that to the State they then further sub that down. We
do not have the ability to retract that money unless there is
some form of gross negligence. Of course we will sit down with
our counsel and figure that part out.
But with regards to us, the Federal Government taking it
back from a sub grantee within the State and reallocating that,
we currently I do not believe have the authority to do that. We
do have some States that will do that, not necessarily for
misspending money or of that nature.
We do have some States that have very good practices with
regard to subbing money down in a shorter period of performance
than is currently offered by FEMA so that they can drive
performance. Those sub grantees have maybe let us say 18 months
as opposed to 36 months to complete those projects, and if they
cannot get it done the State will then pull that back and re-
sub it out.
But traditionally once we obligate that funding to the
State we do not take it back. We do not have the ability to
take it back and give it to someone else. It is traditionally
handled within the State in their period of performance that we
give them.
Mr. Bilirakis. As a follow-up: When the ND Grants system is
fully up and running will we be able to provide a greater
visibility into the grant expenditures?
Ms. Harman. That is our hope. Right now we currently
operate off 13 different systems to manage all of our grants.
When you think about how the Grant Programs Directorate was
formed many years ago, we came from the Department of Justice,
we came parts from DHS, we came part from FEMA. With that came
the people, the business processes, and the system.
ND Grants was very thankful with a planned endeavor back in
2006. There were some budget constraints. So, it was--we had a
lot of help and assistance in turning that light switch on, if
you will, for fiscal year 2011 to get it up and running. It is
a multi-year phased-in approach. It is a very large system
which will be expanded and usable; hopefully for the DHS
community and others should they need it.
So, we have a multi-year process for that and we--our
intent is to have a level of more granularity than we currently
do. We do not have exact visibility currently with the sub
grantees that we should. We need to have that.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you. Thank you.
As noted in my opening statement, Administrator Gruber,
nearly a year after the THIRA concept was included in the
fiscal year 2011 grant guidance States still have not received
guidance on how to conduct the THIRA. What is the status of the
THIRA guidance?
Are you on track to release it by the end of the month as
Administrator Serino testified at the last hearing? She
indicated that in the budget hearing. What do you think, by the
end of the month?
Mr. Gruber. Yes, sir. The THIRA guidance is in final review
with the administrator, Deputy Administrator Serino and Deputy
Administrator Manning. It will be published as a comprehensive
preparedness guideline. Our intention is to meet that deadline.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you. How will FEMA work to ensure that
localities are included in the process as States develop their
THIRAs so we have a complete picture of an area's risk?
Mr. Gruber. Yes, sir. The THIRA process is a five-step
process. It is articulated in this comprehensive preparedness
guideline.
It requires the inclusion--we like to use the term whole
community, which is representative not just of responders but
also to make sure we have nonprofit organizations, faith-based
organizations, our retail partners, all the contributors that
could contribute capability to either prevention, protection,
response, recovery, or mitigation would all be a part of that
five-step process that is outlined in that guideline.
Mr. Bilirakis. Administrator Harman, I appreciate the steps
that FEMA has taken to streamline and expedite the
environmental and historical preservation reviews. GAO has
acknowledged this progress in their reviews. Despite this
grantees still cite EHP reviews as a major obstacle to the
spend rate for grants and a reason why many of the grant
programs or the projects require and extension. Is there a way
to further refine this process?
Ms. Harman. That is a great question. We are very thankful
for the new, what we call, the categorical exclusion that
looked at many of the different projects our sub grantees and
grantees request. We are actually able to now clear those
within our office as opposed to going through a full EHP
review, which did take a very long time.
There are some complicating factors when you look at EHP.
Certainly amongst the ports, amongst the transit agencies we
get into large sort of capital projects, brick and mortar.
Those do require fairly lengthy reviews, and that is the
environmental and historic preservation laws as they stand
today. So, we want to be sure to be compliant with those.
But some of the smaller projects, installing cameras on
historic buildings, replacing sense lines within the existing
footprint. Some of these things we can clear because of the
categorical exclusion that just passed last year. So, that
helped us get over a huge workload and clear that backlog. But
we still will have to go through full reviews for large capital
digging in the dirt type of projects.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
Ms. Richards, you have mentioned--yes, I know I am over my
time, but just one more question. You mentioned finding some of
the best practices during audits. Would you please elaborate on
some of them? If you could do so I would appreciate that.
Ms. Richards. I would be happy to, sir. As I said, our
audits have identified 11 innovative or best practices in seven
States that could be considered for use by other jurisdictions;
three aimed at preparedness and the rest grants management.
For example, New Jersey has a grant tracking system that
captures and tracks progress on each sub grantee's projects, as
well as required documentation such as invoices. Copies of the
documentation are uploaded into the system, permitting timely
review and allowing the termination of progress toward
completing the given grant cycle.
In California two innovative practices were designed to
assist grant managers in executing their responsibilities. A
technology clearinghouse in the San Diego UASI has been
designed to evaluate new technologies and provide other local
jurisdictions with detailed independent assessments of the
equipment and systems being considered by first responders so
that each jurisdiction does not have to do that assessment. The
clearinghouse assists law enforcement officers, firefighters,
or emergency managers by conducting comparisons of detailed
specifications, claim benefits, warrantees, et cetera.
Another UASI, Los Angeles-Long Beach, developed an on-line
invoice tracking system that allows program teams to digitally
record and store all essential program documentation. This
documentation is then available for UASI managers and their
accounting departments, streamlining their processes
significantly.
In Florida one UASI, Jacksonville, measures improvement in
preparedness by evaluating its capabilities through annual gap
analysis that are based on measured outcomes and an assessment
of future needs. The gap analysis process uses readiness
indicators and quantifiable data to identify these gaps.
The Urban Area Working Group prioritizes these results
using a tier system based on risk and then incorporates the
results in the project worksheets for the next grant cycle
processes. I do not have the details of the other innovative
processes with me, but I would be happy to provide them.
Mr. Bilirakis. Please do. Thank you very much.
Now I will recognize Ranking Member Ms. Richardson for 5
minutes.
Ms. Richardson. I will defer to the Ranking Member of the
full committee.
Mr. Bilirakis. You are recognized, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much.
Ms. Harman, you heard Mayor Nutter talk about the
importance of stakeholder involvement. Can you share with this
committee, now that you hear that there is some question as to
whether or not that process has been as robust as it should.
What are you prepared to do?
Ms. Harman. Thank you. That is an excellent question.
The Preparedness Task Force that was requested by Congress
for us to put together distributed a report September 2010, so
almost 18 months ago. Part of that report was looking at
measurements and preparedness. Other parts of it had to do with
grant management. A lot of what you see in the vision document
and in the President's proposal in fiscal year 2013 for the
National Preparedness Grant Program was actually conceived as
part of that task force.
There are recommendations from partners within PPD-8 that
have worked on the Presidential Policy Directive. We had 50
different organizations participate and contribute to the
Preparedness Task Force report that actually did include
representatives from Philadelphia at the time who we are very
thankful to steal Marianne Tierney from unfortunately the
mayor's office who is now one of our regional administrators.
But had an opportunity to contribute to: Where do we need to go
from here with regard to grants?
The Preparedness Task Force, or I am sorry, PPD group
consist of over 450 different participants. So, while there has
not been a sole focus group on the National Preparedness Grant
Program yet, there has been significant contributions and input
received from a variety of different of methods to get us to
what we are proposing now.
We did put up on our website an opportunity for feedback.
We do have a plan, which frankly has already started. We have
been engaging with law enforcement community. We met with the
Fire Service yesterday. We will be working with the Conference
of Mayors as we go forward to figure out: What does this mean?
There is a fear, of course, with this grant program. The
fear is that I am not getting my check. Where is my money
coming from? The culture that we need to change in going
forward is No. 1, a recognition that we do not have a $4
billion budget anymore with regards to preparedness grant
dollars. The Secretary was given less than $1 billion this year
to distribute at her discretion to those programs that she
thought of utmost importance and at highest risk, which is what
she did.
In the vision document it is fairly broad, but it does
build off existing feedback that we have. We have a lot more
engagement to do to get the devil in the details. Some of the
importance will be the governance structure.
What does that mean? How does the local government, how do
we prevent cities like Philadelphia from losing those big
chunks of money? The State itself was cut almost 50 percent in
their Homeland Security dollars this year. The UASI for
Philadelphia was cut almost 39 percent this year.
There are cuts across the board. It makes it very difficult
to manage and plan ahead. So, as we move forward with
engagement, we do have an outreach strategy. We will be meeting
with individual groups, be working with our Tribal leaders as
well.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you. But what I would like for the
Chair to do is provide the letters from those 12 organizations
who expressed concern, and will request that you do a special
outreach since they went through the trouble of letting us know
about that.
Ms. Richards, in light of what you are hearing from
officials like Mayor Nutter, one of those areas you had concern
talked about sustainability. Do you have an opinion about
sustainability given the cuts? Or you just want to leave it out
there?
Ms. Richards. Certainly we are very concerned when we do
our audit work and we find that individual States do not have
sustainability plans for projects that have received a great
deal of investment. The budget constraints that we are all
facing are very serious. We have urged FEMA and FEMA has
responded by telling us that they are arduously working on
putting out guidance in 2012 to ensure that projects in this
cycle focus on the sustainability issue rather than on new
projects or new equipment.
Unfortunately, I cannot opine at the moment as to how that
is going to work out because it is in the future. But it is a
significant concern.
Mr. Thompson. Ms. Harman, you want to talk about that?
Ms. Harman. Sure. Our focus right now with 2012 guidance
that came out and in moving forward to 2013 is the maintenance
and sustainment of existing capabilities that has been built.
We are building off a $35 billion base across this Nation,
across our territories and our Tribes. This is a significant
investment that has been made and I can tell you even in
contributing to the President's budget and part of the vision
for going forward in 2013 I can tell you no one wants to see a
loss in any of the capabilities that we have currently built.
That is why the proposal for fiscal year 2013 does include
a baseline level of funding across the board to ensure that
there is sufficient funding there for the maintenance and
sustainment of capabilities, not just equipment but the
capability that includes the people, the training, the turnover
if there may be and handling all of that. So, that is key.
I want to make sure that is across the board. Then part of
the 2013 vision is above and beyond that. Let us just say
hypothetically a State has allocated $10 million but they do
not feel that that is enough in their baseline level, the
funding. That they really need to sustain something else within
there and they need more money.
There will be a competitive aspect to that program, which
will be reviewed on a regional basis. We do not have, as I
mentioned earlier, $4 billion a year. We have less than a
billion dollars a year to deal with. We need to be really smart
about how we are spending our dollars.
The Chairman mentioned snow cones. You know Administrator
Fugate mentioned that also in his budget hearing as well. We
have folks buying things that are great, but what does that
mean for National preparedness? What does that mean and how
does that feed into the National Preparedness Goal of where we
need to be as a Nation? That needs to be our focus going
forward so maintenance is sustained and is key.
Mr. Thompson. I appreciate the indulgence of the Chairman.
The only thing I would say is you talked about additional
monies being available for competitive grants. If you do that I
think you create another problem so that only those areas that
are mature enough to compete and write good applications get
funded. That may or may not be the area of greatest risk.
So, I would caution that in the pursuit of trying to level
the resources I think the whole issue of capacity has to come
into question. Some communities are not quite there.
Ms. Harman. Sure. Agreed.
Mr. Thompson. Yield back.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you. Appreciate it.
Mr. Turner, you are recognized for 5 minutes, sir.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
A question for Ms. Harman, with the way the risk assessment
State funds are apparently ranked. Could you fill us in a
little bit on the formulas, both for preventive security, and
then if we fail, there is a responsiveness as well?
New York City has--the police department has thwarted 12
terrorist attacks in the past 10 years, very important. I think
it is sad, but if any of these had succeeded the formula would
be very different. But maybe you could tell us what the process
is in this current budget.
Ms. Harman. The formula as it exists now for the allocation
of the homeland security dollars, again, with the exception of
EMPG and AFG; those are separate. The formula itself is driven
from the 9/11 Act. We look at threat. We look at consequences,
and we look at vulnerability.
Last year that formula was revised as we had some criticism
that the vulnerability aspect was not really as strong as it
should be. So, we enhanced that and this year we also included
a domestic threat component to that, whereas in the past the
definition of terrorism had always been thought to be an
internationally-inspired terrorism.
So, working with our partners under the DHS umbrella in
infrastructure protection as well as in intelligence and
analysis we now incorporate a domestic threat and look at some
of the violent extremism that we are seeing. Unfortunately that
is becoming now sort of the homegrown nature. That is now
calculated into the risk formula itself.
Each year all of the States, all of the urban areas per the
9/11 Act are racked and stacked, if you will, using that
formula. The States and territories go 1 to 56. The urban areas
go 1 down to 100. From there we enter into discussions with the
Secretary with regards to the spreading of the peanut butter,
if you will. It has been very difficult these past few years
with the cuts that we have seen and there are significant
policy decisions that are made by the Secretary to ensure that
those dollars are going to areas of highest risk.
As you know, New York City for the urban area this year was
held at a consistent level with last year's funding levels.
Additionally the other three top what they call threat Tier 1
cities remained at a very minimal cut, around 12 percent to 13
percent. Then from there, there was significant funding
decreases sort of going incrementally down the list. The list
was maintained at 31 cities this year, consistent with last
year.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Bilirakis. You yield back. Thank you.
I recognize the Ranking Member of the subcommittee, Ms.
Richardson for 5 minutes.
Ms. Richardson. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all let me start with Mr. Jenkins. In testimony
FEMA points to the enactment of the redundancy elimination and
enhanced performance for preparedness grants as the
justification for consideration of consolidating grant programs
into a single overarching grant.
This reasoning seems unclear to me because both in the
legislative text and in the report language the intent of the
law is not--is to identify and eliminate the redundancy of
reporting requirements, but not specifically referencing
individual grants. Can you provide your opinion on the matter
of which FEMA is implying the interpretation of this law? Do
you think it is correct?
Mr. Jenkins. I cannot say necessarily. I have not looked at
the--I mean, talked to our lawyers about the interpretation of
the law.
I do think the issue here, you are right; as I understood
it was with regard to reporting requirements, with having to
report the same thing under different grants or to different
people and so forth. The idea was to try to eliminate that and
to try to streamline the reporting requirements for sites.
There was a good deal of concern about that in the
Preparedness--State and Local Preparedness Task Force Ms.
Harman referred to.
I think we do believe that it is--and from the very
beginning when FEMA got these grants that it was useful to take
a holistic approach. That is, try to look at how the grants
relate to one another and how they can be used collectively to
be able to do what FEMA is trying to do, which is develop a
National capability to prevent and prepare for and respond to a
catastrophic disaster.
But it does not--I mean, it does not necessarily require
the current approach. There are other approaches that you could
take. The question is--is, again, how do you do it in terms of
doing that?
The report that we released today focus on the fact that
the one thing is to try to look at the projects and what
projects--what goals the projects support and how they relate
to one another. How does a project that is funded by UASI
relate to a project funded by the Port Security, et cetera? But
it does not necessarily require you consolidate the grants to
do that. Although it does not--you know, that is one way to do
it.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you.
Ms. Harman, thank you for being with us here today and of
course congratulations of your assignment. We are particularly
excited of you being a former firefighter. I think you
understand all too well of the importance of these grants.
I just wanted to ask, what was your thought of what Mr.
Nutter said? Because I came from local government and I can
tell you that if honestly the Department thinks that you
referenced well 50 organizations are involved. Well, if you
know how many cities, major cities if for example just in the
State of California alone?
So, I can tell you that on our State level, San Diego is
not coming in. They may ask us to submit an application, but
San Diego is not coming in. Long Beach is not coming in. Los
Angeles is not coming in. Anaheim where we have Disneyland is
not coming in. Pasadena, who has the Rose Bowl, is not coming
in.
I mean, clearly I think there seems to be a disconnect of
understanding this kind of pie-in-the-sky idea that just
because you have a few organizations involved that that means
that that is going to validate the local involvement in this
process. So, is there--are we getting through today of
understanding the problems of this assumption?
Ms. Harman. Oh, yes. Understood. Thank you.
No, there are a lot of organizations out there that have
contributed to the vision in where we are going and there are
many more that need to. That is one of the reasons the vision
itself is very broad. There is a rationale there that we did
not put a lot of details in it because we do need to hear what
that feedback is.
It is very concerning to hear Philadelphia get--receive an
85 percent cut. As you know, part of the 9/11 Act now under the
current construct of the grant requires an 80 percent pass-
through from the States down to the local level. But how that
is done in each State is very, very different.
Sometimes it is--if there are 26 jurisdictions in the State
they may divide it up by 26 and hand it out. They may go into
more of a regional level. But moving forward with the National
Preparedness Grant Program, we do need to get away from that
mindset.
As an example, coming from Maryland Emergency Management
Agency, we had 26 jurisdictions within the State. Maryland
received roughly $4.4 million this last year, a 50 percent cut
from what they received the year prior. If they were to take
those dollars and divvy it up equally that is roughly $136,000
per jurisdiction.
One of those jurisdictions being Prince Georges County
where I was born and raised, which borders the District of
Columbia right here. I am not really sure what Prince George's
County itself could do to maintain with $136,000.
What we are proposing in fiscal year 2013 and going forward
is that we are wise about the level of maintenance of
sustainment that we have and we encourage more of a
collaborative effort through mutual aid. Not every jurisdiction
needs to have every single tool and capability that they are
going to need in the time that they need it. They are going to
have to reach out for mutual aid.
I did the same thing as a first responder, as a firefighter
and a paramedic in Fairfax City. We did not have a HAZMAT unit.
Ms. Richardson. But, Ms. Harman, the question is, is
whether the State is the appropriate agency to do so. The
question is: Given that we just went through this with the
stimulus and it was admittedly not as successful as we would
have liked, meaning the funds getting to all of the localities
that it should have, have you--or what do you plan on doing to
incorporate that to better apply this program?
Ms. Harman. Right. I think as of right now the vision is
that money will continue to go through the State, the States
and territories to the applicants. Of course there will be a
Tribal piece as well. But the importance is: How does that
work? What does that mean at the local level? How do they get
their piece of pie, their dollars? How do they ensure that
the--their capabilities that they have built? There has got to
be a governance structure there.
I was on the phone yesterday with the Secretary and the
Conference of Mayors, and we did, we solicited their input.
Please, give us an example of what would work for you? What
sort of governance structure?
There have been concerns that the proposal for 2013 is that
of a block grant. By definition a block grant is here you go,
State, here is your money, figure it out and each State does it
differently. We are not proposing that. We are proposing a much
more structured, focused view when it comes to spending those
dollars.
But I would like to hear from the Conference of Mayors and
other organizations to find out what would work for them? How
do we ensure that there is coordination and collaboration?
I know Administrator Fugate mentioned in his hearing you
know, and as did Deputy Administrator Serino about seeing sort
of a disjointedness. We have had ports. We have had transits.
We have had UASI all doing really good work, building off of
this $35 billion base, but at times not coordinating. Yet in
times of major disaster we rely on them to coordinate and
respond effectively. We are trying to fix that going into 2013.
So, it is not that programs will be gone. It is more of a
changing the culture to that of more collaboration that is
there. But I would like to hear from more of the stakeholders,
specifically what would make this work for them.
Ms. Richardson. I yield back.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
Now I will recognize Mr. Clarke for 5 minutes.
Mr. Clarke of Michigan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have got
some initial questions to representatives of the Department and
then also of Ms. Richards and Mr. Jenkins on how the risk
assessment of high-risk urban areas could be improved if you
had any type of analysis or critique of that.
I represent Metropolitan Detroit. It is a high-risk region.
We already had a terrorist attempt to blow up a plane headed
for our international airport. It was unsuccessful. I have
grave concerns that someone will likely try again.
I appreciate the Department considering the threat of
domestic terrorism because as we are well aware, if someone
wants to become a terrorist they do not need to go overseas to
get training. They can get radicalized right on the internet
here in the United States.
Detroit has other assets that makes it vulnerable and
increases the economic impact in case of an attack. We have the
busiest international border crossing in all of North America.
We have a very large regional drinking and wastewater system.
We have the world headquarters of General Motors on our
riverfront. We have international border crossing as well.
Nearby we have nuclear plant facilities. We have a major
oil refinery. All of these are assets that could be targets and
could have devastating consequences to our region and to our
country if they were attacked.
Detroit is not 45 percent safer this year than it was last
year, to use the analogy raised by the mayor of Philadelphia.
Yet our funding under the Department's risk assessment was cut
by 45 percent. That is because of the Department's discretion
that Congress gave the Department.
How can we make sure that the Department would not again
make a disproportionate cut to a high-risk area like
Metropolitan Detroit under the new National Preparedness Grant
system for next year? That could be anyone from the Department
that could answer. Then after if Ms. Richards or Mr. Jenkins
would like to comment on their analysis of the risk assessment
that the Department conducts to determine whether an urban area
is high-risk.
Ms. Harman. Sure. I can answer some of that for you.
With regards to Detroit, and frankly any other city across
this Nation, I think the Department recognizes that risk is
everywhere. There are areas that are of higher risk than
others, which is why we do our risk analysis.
There have not been significant shifts in sort of the
racking and stacking, if you will. We do not see significant
movement in what we have seen. I think the system and the
formula have been strengthened over the years. It is a very
mature system. So, we have a pretty good idea where the risk
is. The key is how do we apply the funding there to ensure that
you have the capabilities that you need when you need them?
Moving into fiscal year 2013 the vision document currently
describes the method of allocation to be that of population,
which right now for you in Detroit would most likely be very
difficult looking at the population of that compared to some of
the other cities on the list. So, that may or may not be the
way to go. But it is a risk-based approach moving forward.
Some would say areas of high population equal areas of
high-risk. We do not know that to be the case. So, moving
forward in fiscal year 2013 without any legislative changes
there, of course we would still abide by the 9/11 Act using the
existing formula. However, there is a desire to move to an all-
hazards type approach to make sure that we are really fully
covering all of that.
Do you want to add to it as well?
Mr. Gruber. Sure. I will simply add that in the THIRA I
alluded before to the Threat and Hazardous Identification Risk
Assessment. The factors that you identified would be taken into
account in the process of identifying threats and hazards,
putting those in context. Coastlines, river ways, presence of
critical infrastructure would all be part of the determination.
Then would look at the capabilities that you needed; what
you had on hand, the targets you set and the capabilities you
needed, which would help to contribute to how we allocate
resources. But we know we are in an economic framework that
requires prioritization and choice. I think most of the easy
choices have been made already and they get more difficult as
time transpires.
Mr. Clarke of Michigan. You know my one point is that even
though we are in a tough economic time right now the funding in
New York City was not cut at all. Detroit was cut by 45
percent. That seems disproportionate to me.
Mr. Gruber. Well, I know you wanted to have Ms. Richards
and Mr. Jenkins reply to that, but I think again the
application--the grant program in context with the Threat and
Hazardous Identification Risk Assessment process is going to
help us to capture, as Elizabeth said, where is the risk; where
do we apportion resources appropriately to do that? I think we
have been doing that relying on a formula now. Now what we are
going to do is have a bottoms-up process that is going to help
give us both perspectives on risk, both the strategic National
and the locally-generated risk requirements.
Ms. Richards. We concentrated our audit work on the uses of
the money at the States and territorial and UASI levels. We
have not completed an analysis of the risk model that FEMA has
been using.
Mr. Clarke of Michigan. All right.
Mr. Chairman, if there is time I would like to ask one more
question.
Mr. Bilirakis. Actually we are going to have one more
round.
Mr. Clarke of Michigan. All right.
Mr. Bilirakis. All right?
Mr. Clarke of Michigan. Sure.
Mr. Bilirakis. I thank the gentleman. Yield back?
Mr. Clarke of Michigan. I yield back my time.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. I--we are going to go one more round
if that is okay. Thank you so much for your patience today.
I have a question for Mr. Jenkins. Please elaborate further
of the management challenges that may result from the proposed
National Preparedness Grant Program.
Mr. Jenkins. You mean the fiscal year 2013 proposal?
Mr. Bilirakis. Yes. Yes, exactly. Yes, some of the
management challenges.
Mr. Jenkins. Right. There are a number of management
challenges, not the least of which is just simply what the--Ms.
Harman also referred to earlier, which is the data that are
available to FEMA in terms of managing the grants, knowing
exactly what projects the grants are being spent on and what
capabilities they contribute to. Because in the end you are
spending these monies in order to develop certain capabilities
that you think are critical and particularly important to
either preventing or responding and recovering from a disaster.
So, there have been issues over the years with regard to
the data that is available. For the data that are reported by
the States in the past, States have not consistently reported
data that as they used different assumptions and different
definitions. So it is very difficult to aggregate.
So, if you--under this proposal you know you need to be
able to compare. I know that is part of the intent of the THIRA
is that you have people doing this risk assessment with a
common methodology and therefore you can compare and
consolidate the results of that.
But that is why the guidance is so important so that people
are doing this in a common way so that everybody understands. I
am from Pennsylvania and I look at the THIRA for Illinois I
understand that they did it the way they did and I can sort of
make a comparison and say, oh here is where they are different
from me; here is where they are the same from me, et cetera.
The other issue still is that if you are doing these and
you are trying to put these monies to the best possible use,
then you do need some means of assessing where am I relative to
where I want to be? Right now that is--and it has been since
2004 the Achilles heel of any methodology that one uses in
terms of distributing the grants is that you do not have a
common way of looking across the States in terms of what the
capabilities are.
The capabilities are not just what the States themselves
have done because in certain instances the capabilities are
going to come from Federal agencies. For example with regard to
radiological and biological attacks, a lot of the resources are
going to come from the Department of Defense.
So you need to know what the collective capabilities are
and where the State capabilities and the capabilities that are
being built with these grants fit into that totality, and that
is not an easy process but that is fundamental. It does not
matter really what the process that you use to allocate these
grants. If you cannot assess where I am relative to where I
want to be and need to go then you are sort of operating in a
fog.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much.
Okay. One last question for Administrator Gruber; FEMA has
been working for years to develop measures and metrics to
determine the effectiveness of these grant programs but we have
seen little results so far. What is the status of the
development of these metrics? When will this committee receive
the report on the results of the work FEMA conducted with the
National Academy of Public Administration?
Mr. Gruber. Yes, sir. Thank you.
Well, I was privileged to participate in that process with
a great group of stakeholders and was very encouraged by the
work that was generated in the study. Again how it in many
instances confirmed the direction we were headed and the
measures that we had developed internally. The report is in a
final review process.
We have as great an interest as you in delivering it
promptly to you. But again, I thought that was an exceptionally
beneficial process because it made us drill down very
deliberately over an extended period of time with the right
group of stakeholders to determine what are the most effective
measures, and in some cases confirm what we were doing and in
some cases gave us new perceptions about what we need to do.
Mr. Bilirakis. When do you feel we will get it? When will
we receive it? So, you can give me a time frame.
Mr. Gruber. Sir, I would appreciate it if I could get back
to you. It is in the final clearance and review process, and I
would certainly be happy to provide a time frame to you, but we
will make sure it is as expeditious as humanly possible.
Mr. Bilirakis. Please do. Thank you.
Now I will recognize our Ranking Member, Ms. Richardson for
5 minutes.
Ms. Richardson. Mr. Gruber, what portion of the overall
combined NPGP funding stream is dedicated to the base amount
versus the competitive pooling of funding?
Mr. Gruber. Ma'am, I think perhaps since Administrator
Harman might be better equipped to answer that question than I
since she administers those programs, if you would not mind.
Ms. Richardson. Sure.
Ms. Harman. That is a great question, and that is an answer
that we are working on as we speak. As we start to get a little
bit more of the details, as we have been coordinating with some
of the stakeholders to find out what is that.
I think if you ask some States how much do you need right
now to maintain and sustain what they have and the capabilities
they have built there is some difficulty trying to answer that
question. We have some States that have done a really good job
managing their grants, knowing what they have built. We have
others that are a little bit more disjointed.
I think moving forward with--and the completion of the
Threat Hazard Identification Risk Assessment, that will sort of
give us a better idea. But moving forward what we will have to
take a best guess estimate based off of the data that we have
readily available on what States have already spent, what we
are seeing and reporting to figure out what is that baseline
and what should be included in that baseline?
Ms. Richardson. So, what is your estimate?
Ms. Harman. I do not have a dollar figure to give to you
now. But I would kind of assure you that the baseline funding
will include the maintenance and sustainment of capabilities
that have already been built. If there is anything needed above
and beyond that, that is the concept for the competitive
portion of that.
Ms. Richardson. So, the risk assessment, the base amount we
have talked about several things today. When do you expect to
have all this information? Because I am sure you can understand
we as Members of Congress are going to have to vote on this. So
it is only fair that we would have information to vote
appropriately.
Ms. Harman. Absolutely. We will be ready by obviously the
beginning of the fiscal year as we hope to get a budget, an on-
time budget for October 1 of all the details. Which means the
stakeholder feedback and coordination and collaboration should
be done by then.
What we are trying to do right now is based off the
feedback we have received thus far since the release of the
President's budget and the fiscal year 2013 document and plan
for NPGP is hearing what we are hearing, getting more of a
baseline, a little bit more details to begin to engage in some
more formal types of outreach efforts. I would like to have
that done by June, a lot more details than what we have now.
Ms. Richardson. Will you keep this committee informed as
you process? Because some of your later time frames may be--
prove difficult as we approve a budget.
Ms. Harman. Yes, absolutely. I have appreciated the
conversations that we have had with your staff thus far and as
well as some of the other Members of Congress here because this
will be a joint effort.
We see it as a joint effort. We are not trying to force any
sort of vision. That is not going to work. So, we do want it to
be successful and be collaborative. I appreciate the
willingness of your staff to work with us on that.
Ms. Richardson. Which organizations and stakeholders have
contributed to this process? If you do not have the list
available, can you provide it to the committee?
Ms. Harman. Yes. I can provide you the list of all the
members that have participated with the task force as well as
the PPD-8 process, and then the stakeholder engagement that has
occurred since the release of the President's budget.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. The National Preparedness Goal in the
full year 2013 intends to help States, regions, and locals to
build readily deployable assets. How will FEMA manage the
cataloguing of the readily deployable assets and ensuring they
are used in catastrophic disasters? Would that be you, Mr.
Gruber?
Mr. Gruber. Yes, ma'am, that would. We have identified, as
you know, in the National Preparedness Goal, a series of core
capabilities. One of the most important aspects of building and
developing, sustaining, and delivering those core capabilities
is to do that within the framework of the National Incident
Management System.
In the National Incident Management System there is a
process called resource where you would take like assets and
resources and type them so that when a jurisdiction is building
those they are comparable to what another jurisdiction has. It
makes the process much easier when you are unified in a
response or when you are sharing assets through mutual aid.
So, building those capabilities we--and again, we have that
in the guidance that we are getting ready to issue. We
encourage the use of those NIMS resource-type assets to make
sure that we have a framework that is sharable across all
communities.
Ms. Richardson. Okay.
Ms. Harman, currently does the State THIRA, are they
required to include locally-developed THIRAs or similar
assessment?
Ms. Harman. I will actually defer that to Mr. Gruber. We
are partners here.
Ms. Richardson. Okay.
Mr. Gruber. Yes, ma'am. We have identified--of course if
you will recall in the 2011 grant guidance that went out where
we first identified the requirement to do a Threat and Hazard
Identification Risk Assessment we capitalized on existing
processes that are already being done. But we required in there
that when the States completed that, that they also included
urban areas and others as a part of their submissions.
Ms. Richardson. Can you provide to the committee
specifically what your direction is going to be to the State of
who they are including and to what extent?
Mr. Gruber. Yes, ma'am. That is, as I said before, embedded
in our guidance. Our intent is to have that completed by the
end of this month and to share that with you.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. We are looking for specifics.
Mr. Gruber. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Richardson. Okay.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Clarke, you are recognized.
Mr. Clarke of Michigan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My question is: How can we get more money under the new
National Preparedness Grant Program to those high-risk urban
areas that really need the resources than they may be currently
receiving under the Urban Area Security Initiatives grant?
Again, let me give Metropolitan Detroit as an example. Even
though the city of Detroit has lost population over the last 10
years it still has high-risk assets: The border crossing, the
refinery, the buildings. It has the critical infrastructure
that could be a target: The drinking water system, the 70-story
tower that is a target, unfortunately.
In the last year's funding allocation under UASI the State
of Michigan received approximately $9 million. Of that $9
million the city of Detroit received $800,000. Currently the
State can take 20 percent of the funding off the top, as you
indicated. Similarly, the State has a great deal of discretion
in determining what the urban area is.
Now, the threat to Metropolitan Detroit is regional. There
are risks in Oakland County, Macomb, Monroe where we have
nuclear facilities.
However, my concern that the urban area may have been
defined to include other areas that really may not be high-
risk, like agricultural areas and fields where certain urban
areas should have received the money, especially where there is
the financial need because of the housing crisis and other
economic issues. Many of our urban areas that are high-risk had
the least amount of local revenue available to prepare their
first responders to respond or to protect the people in case of
an emergency.
If you have any thoughts on how the new program could get
more of the existing money to the high-risk areas. Again, we
all want more money. That is not my question. How can we use
our money most effectively to protect the areas that are really
at high-risk?
Mr. Jenkins, had any review of how States use that 20
percent. If there has been transparency in that and how that
money could be used better to protect urban areas I would
welcome that as well.
Just so you know that is a leading question. I have heard
concerns that some of the States have not been as transparent
on how they use their up to 20 percent allocation, and that
that money may not have gone all the back to protect urban
areas from attack. Thank you.
I yield back my time after the questions are responded to.
Ms. Harman. That is of grave concern. I know I may not have
a very popular answer for you with regards to funding because
everyone seems to be very focused on the funding. But I
encourage you to begin thinking about the capabilities that
Detroit is going to need should the largest and most
unpredictable event occur.
You have some of those capabilities. Others you will be
reliant upon your region within the State. Then you are going
to be reliant on those within our FEMA regions and the States
that surround you. So, there is a focus there to ensure that
the capabilities you have currently built remain there and are
maintained and sustained. But we want to ensure that we are
taking more of a regional and a collaborative effort.
The UASI area is defined. That urban area, that
metropolitan statistical area is defined by OMB and where the
funding should go. Within that urban area is an urban area
working group, which may over time further evolve to expanding
outside of their urban areas.
I realize that down in Atlanta the Atlanta urban area did
that as they were very focused on mission and the capabilities
that they need. They actually voluntarily expanded their urban
area to include surrounding areas to ensure that capabilities
were there and they could take advantage of those mutual aid
partnerships.
So, there is also with regards to funding and spending it
wisely, as I mentioned, there is $8 billion there. I know that
Congress has been very concerned about of the $35 billion that
has been obligated, $8 billion sort of sitting on the books.
Those dollars are in the process of being spent. What the
Secretary has recently done is allow greater expansion and
flexibility of that.
So, we have been encouraging both our States as well as all
of our UASIs and territories and Tribes to say you know what,
if you really thought that your level of funding was going to
be much higher than it is, and we have all seen very
significant cuts across the board with these dollars upwards of
50 percent. Rethink what you are going to do with these
dollars. If you thought you were going to have long-term
projects you may need to re-scope and reduce some of that to
really focus on the maintenance and sustainment of where you
need to go.
So, I can certainly work with you; work with your State
looking at the available dollars that are there, looking at the
structure of your urban area, too, if they need some guidance
on how to do that. But moving forward, the focus really needs
to be on the capabilities and how you are going to handle the
response and recovery from those major disasters that may
occur.
Mr. Clarke of Michigan. Thank you for that offer of
support, Administrator Harman. We will follow up with you on
that too.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much. That concludes our
hearing.
I thank the witnesses, of course, for their valuable
testimony but also for their patience. I thank the Members for
their questions. The Members of the subcommittee have some
additional questions for you, and we ask that you respond in
writing. The hearing record will be open for 10 days.
Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
Thanks so much.
[Whereupon, at 11:49 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
ENSURING THE TRANSPARENCY, EFFICIENCY, AND EFFECTIVENESS OF HOMELAND
SECURITY GRANTS (PART II): STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVES
----------
Thursday, April 26, 2012
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response,
and Communications,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:34 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Gus M. Bilirakis
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Bilirakis, Turner, Richardson, and
Clarke.
Mr. Bilirakis. The Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
Response, and Communications will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to receive stakeholder
perspectives on the Homeland Security grants administered by
FEMA and particularly on the President's proposed budget for
fiscal year 2013, his request to consolidate a number of grant
programs into a National Preparedness Grant Program.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement. I
apologize for the voice, but I think we can get through this
very important hearing.
This hearing is the second in a series considering Homeland
Security grants. Last month, the subcommittee received
testimony from Federal witnesses on the management and
administration of these grants, a very productive hearing.
Today, we will receive vital information from the stakeholders
who rely on these grants to enhance their security operations.
I am pleased that we have participation from such a broad
range of stakeholders today. Thank you so very much for
attending. Your input is invaluable to this subcommittee as we
consider proposals for grant reform.
In particular, I would like to hear your perspectives on
the National Preparedness Grant Program proposal. I must say
that I find it particularly troubling that it has been more
than 2 months after the President's budget, since it has been
released, and the subcommittee still has not received
sufficient detail on this proposal, which is why it is so
important that we hear from you today.
Again, how has FEMA engaged with you since the proposal has
been released to listen to and include your perspectives on
this proposal? What portions of the proposal do you like, and
what portions of the proposal concern you? Are there reforms
that could be made to the existing programs that would enhance
them and make them more efficient?
I am also interested in your perspective on the THIRA
guidance that was recently released by FEMA. Does the guidance
provide you with the information and tools you need to conduct
this assessment and obtain a true understanding of the threats
impacting your areas and infrastructures?
Finally, of course, I would like to--fiscal year 2012 has
seen many, many changes in the Homeland Security grant
programs, including a reduction in the period of performance. I
am interested in hearing about how you believe this reduction
and other changes will impact your programs. Will it, as FEMA
suggests, assist you in your efforts to more expeditiously
expend your grant funds?
Once again, I greatly appreciate your participation here
today. I look forward to your thoughts on these and other
issues and concerns related to grants.
I would like to submit for the record--I ask unanimous
consent to submit this letter into the record. I ask unanimous
consent to insert into the record a letter to Secretary
Napolitano and Administrator Fugate from a coalition of local
stakeholders, some of whom are represented here today,
regarding the proposed National Preparedness Grant Program.
Without objection, so ordered.*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* This document is included as an attachment to the Walker
testimony.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thank you very much.
I now recognize the Ranking Member, Ms. Richardson from
California, for any statement she may have.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good afternoon to all of our guests here today. I am
looking forward to today's hearing regarding FEMA's grant
programs and the full year 2013 budget proposal. I also want to
welcome both of our panels today, the witnesses, and really
extend our appreciation for you coming all the way that you
have to testify.
Today we will hear from some of our vital State and local
stakeholders about FEMA's portfolio of preparedness grants and
the impact of the cuts on emergency preparedness and response
efforts. In particular, we will hear concerns related to the
Department's full year 2013 budget proposal, which one of my
primary concerns is the effort to consolidate 16 separate,
fully functioning, vital grant programs under the NPGP, which
is the National Preparedness Grant Program.
Last month, the subcommittee received testimony from FEMA
regarding the consolidation proposal. As the Chairman has
stated, we still have not received some of the clarifications
that we require in order to make these effective decisions. But
in today's hearing we hope that we will hear more from you. It
will be an informative session, and you will be able to share
with us what is essential and how we might assist you in
achieving the goals that you do on all of our behalf.
The Nation's ability to respond effectively to man-made and
natural disasters requires State and local first responders to
be adequately equipped and trained. Administrator Fugate has
stated on several occasions that the capabilities built by
FEMA's suite of preparedness grants have helped with recent
emergency responses and has enhanced our capacity for
catastrophic disasters.
We must not abandon, though, however, all of the progress
that we have made over these last 10 years. In last month's
hearing, Mayor Nutter gave a persuasive testimony about the ill
effects of the Department's decision to consolidate vital
independent grants such as the UASI, the Port Security Grant
Program, and the Transit Security Grant Program.
It is unfortunate that the Department has felt compelled to
put forward this consolidation proposal without conducting
probably a necessary background and implications from many of
the local folks who have to implement the program.
Unfortunately, cuts often lead to--which we have had over the
last 2 years in this Congress--there are consequences. With
those consequences, oftentimes forces consolidations. As I have
stated previously, cuts to Homeland Security grant programs are
shortsighted, and it fails to take into account the need to
preserve hard-earned capabilities.
As I close, when we consider in my district--it is a very
transportation-infrastructure-intensive district, with ports,
transportation hubs, urban areas, we must continue to protect
these areas in order to provide the safe environment which will
also spur the economic growth we desperately need. In doing so,
we must continue to rely upon many of you in the audience
today, the regional governance structures, the local risk-
driven identification sectors that have the ability to protect
us in these vital times.
When we consider the work that you have done, we believe
that your presentation today will help us to best identify
steps that we should take going forward. I look forward to
hearing your views on the full year 2013 proposal; as the
Chairman said, the recently released THIRA guidance; and the
establishment of the proposed performance measures.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my
time.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much.
Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
I am pleased to welcome our first panel of witnesses.
Our first witness is Mr. James Davis. Mr. Davis is
executive director of the Colorado Department of Public Safety,
a position he has held since February 2011. In this capacity,
Mr. Davis also serves as Colorado's homeland security advisor
and is the vice chairman of the National Governors Association,
Governors Homeland Security Advisory Council. Prior to his
current position, Mr. Davis was the special agent in charge of
the FBI's Denver division. Mr. Davis served in the FBI for more
than 25 years. Mr. Davis earned his degree in accounting from
Michigan State University.
Following Mr. Davis, we will receive testimony from Mr.
Bryan Koon. Mr. Koon is the director of the Florida Division of
Emergency Management. Prior to assuming this position, Mr. Koon
was the director of emergency management at Walmart. He has
previously served in the United States Navy and at the White
House Military Office. Mr. Koon has a B.S. in natural resources
from Cornell University and an MBA and graduate certificate in
emergency crisis management from George Washington University.
Next, we will receive testimony from Ms. Hui-Shan Walker.
Ms. Walker is the emergency management coordinator for the city
of Hampton, Virginia, a position she has held since December
2011. Ms. Walker is also the president of the U.S. Council of
the International Association of Emergency Managers. Prior to
her current position in the city of Hampton, Virginia, Ms.
Walker was the deputy coordinator of emergency management for
the city of Chesapeake. Ms. Walker received her bachelor's
degree from Emory University and her master's of public
administration from Old Dominion University.
Following Ms. Walker, we will receive testimony from Mr.
Judson Freed. Mr. Freed is the director of emergency management
and homeland security for Ramsey County, Minnesota, a position
he has held since May 2011. Prior to his current position, Mr.
Freed spent nearly 16 years with the University of Minnesota's
Department of Emergency Management. Mr. Freed is a graduate of
the University of Minnesota and is currently completing his
master's in homeland defense and security studies at the Naval
Postgraduate School. Mr. Freed is a member of the National
Association of Counties' Justice and Public Safety Steering
Committee.
I want to welcome all our witnesses. Your entire written
statements will appear in the record. I ask that you each
summarize your testimony for 5 minutes.
We will begin with Mr. Davis. Welcome, and you are
recognized, sir.
STATEMENT OF JAMES H. DAVIS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, COLORADO
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, TESTIFYING ON BEHALF OF THE
NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Member Richardson, Congressmen. Thank you very much for giving
me this opportunity to appear before you today to talk about
the very important issue of ensuring the effective use of
Homeland Security grants.
As you mentioned, I am the executive director of the
Colorado Department of Public Safety. In that position, I am
responsible for the Colorado State Patrol, the Colorado Bureau
of Investigation, Colorado's Division of Criminal Justice, the
Division of Homeland Security, and the Division of Fire Safety.
I come to this position from the FBI, which I think gives me
kind of a unique perspective on the use of Homeland Security
funding and on, kind of, the interrelationship between States,
local agencies, and the Federal Government.
I am here today representing the National Governors
Association and the Governors Homeland Security Advisors
Council, on which I serve as vice chair. The GHSAC, the
Governors Homeland Security Advisors Council, is a body of the
56 homeland security advisors from around the country, and it
is a forum that is provided by NGA for us to get together and
talk about issues affecting homeland security in the various
States.
You know, I will really dispense with talking about the
impact of the cuts in grant funding because I am sure you guys
are very aware of the impact of those on State and local
governments. I have heard it said that the average is about 50
percent in cuts over the last 2 years. I can say that in
Colorado we have taken about a 75 percent cut.
From the State's perspective, you know, that is--our 20
percent that we take for really running the homeland security
program for the entire State of Colorado, that 20 percent that
we get has been cut by 75 percent, which really negatively
impacts our ability to sustain the things that we have set up.
You know, as the State, we are responsible for developing the
State-wide homeland security plan, we are responsible for
administering the grants, doing State-wide training, and then,
most importantly I think, we are responsible for running the
State's fusion center.
The State fusion center, I think certainly in Colorado, is
one of the most important things that we have developed since
9/11 with Homeland Security funding. In the FBI, I had a lot of
interaction with the State fusion center, and I can tell you
that it was very important to us in the job that we were doing.
Specifically, I was the special agent in charge in Denver when
we had the Najibullah Zazi investigation, and the State fusion
center played a very, very important role in that. I think as
we look at the things we have spent money on since 9/11, State
fusion centers are really one of the shining examples of good
that has come from Homeland Security funding.
With regard to FEMA's proposal, NGA and the GHSAC are still
looking at the proposal and do not yet have an opinion on the
proposal as a whole. But I can say that one thing that we are
very appreciative of is FEMA's recognition that the State has a
role in the coordination of grant funding for the State. I
think that it is important, particularly as dollars are
decreased, that we have a central entity--and I think the best
entity would be the State--for ensuring that the limited
dollars we have are adequately spent and that there is some
thought to the interplay between different agencies within a
State. I am very concerned that if we leave those funding
decisions to individual cities that they will be looking at
responding to all emergencies from within their city as opposed
to taking the opportunity to use resources that may be in
neighboring jurisdictions.
I think that in addition to that, I would say that because
there is a responsibility for the State to respond to
emergencies, the Governors' responsibilities with regard to the
National Guard, et cetera, I think that it is important the
State be very cognizant and have good visibility on what local
capabilities are throughout the State. The best way, I think,
to do that is through the State support or coordination of
those grants.
With that, sir, I will wrap up. I look forward to answering
questions, and we look forward to the opportunity to work with
you all and with FEMA on developing the guidance as it goes
forward.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Davis follows:]
Prepared Statement of James H. Davis
April 26, 2012
Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking Member Richardson, distinguished
Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify
before you today on the important issue of ensuring that homeland
security grants are used effectively.
As executive director of the Department of Public Safety for the
State of Colorado, I oversee the Colorado Bureau of Investigation, the
State Patrol, and the Divisions of Criminal Justice, Homeland Security,
and Fire Safety. I also serve as the Homeland Security Advisor to
Governor John Hickenlooper.
I appear before you today on behalf of the National Governors
Association (NGA) in my role as vice chair of the Governors Homeland
Security Advisors Council (GHSAC).
My testimony will focus on three areas: (1) The State role in
managing current grant programs; (2) the need for grant reform; and (3)
the path forward.
state role in homeland security grants
Federal funds provide critical support to State and local efforts
to prevent, prepare for, and respond to terrorist attacks, natural
disasters, and man-made events. States play an important role in
building, coordinating, managing, and assessing the use of such funds
to support homeland security capabilities throughout the State and
across State borders.
States employ a variety of mechanisms to develop and implement
homeland security strategies and plans on an on-going basis. Integral
to all State efforts is the involvement of a multitude of State, local,
and Tribal stakeholders throughout the process. Most States have
regional councils or committees that are used to ensure coordination
with local officials, including police, fire, emergency management,
emergency medical services, public health, county and city management
officials, non-profit organizations and the private sector. These
regional committees provide for a transparent process that fosters
collaboration and partnership, and aids in the distribution of the
required 80 percent of funds to localities.
By serving as the central point of coordination among multiple
jurisdictions and functional areas, States play a key role in ensuring
that scarce resources are used effectively to meet identified National
priorities that are tailored for regional needs. States have used
homeland security grant funds to develop and sustain critical
capabilities such as intelligence fusion centers, State-wide
interoperable emergency communications, and specialized regional
response teams.
For example, fusion centers form an important part of the Nation's
information-sharing network that helps to identify and investigate
potential threats. These centers collect, analyze, and file suspicious
activity reports as part of the Nation-wide Suspicious Activity
Reporting Initiative based upon information gathered by officers in the
field. These centers include many public safety partners and
incorporate emergency operations centers and the public health
community.
In my home State of Colorado, we have used grant funds to support
our State fusion center, the Colorado Information Analysis Center
(CIAC). The CIAC employs an all-crimes, all-hazards approach to
intelligence and information sharing that has proven valuable in a
number of instances. After a failed bombing attempt at a Borders
Bookstore, we used the CIAC to distribute information about the
attempted bombing to law enforcement officers throughout the State. By
the end of the day, we had a suspect in custody. The CIAC has also been
credited with significantly reducing auto theft throughout the State.
Because auto theft is a transitional crime, where stolen cars are
subsequently used in a myriad of offenses, the sharp reduction in auto
theft is having cascading effects on other more serious crimes.
A number of States have also used grant funds to coordinate not
only State-wide but multi-State interoperable communications systems.
In one State, homeland security grant funds have helped replace or re-
program 30,000 first-responder radios and provided over 90 percent of
responders with access to common radio channels that can be used to
communicate during a large incident.
The development and implementation of State-wide Communications
Interoperability Plans (SCIPs) has significantly improved crisis-level
communications capabilities and helped avoid the purchase of
proprietary, non-interoperable equipment across county and State lines.
These plans were largely developed using Federal grant funds. The SCIPS
and the coordination mechanisms used to develop them will be
instrumental as the Nation begins development of the Nation-wide public
safety broadband network in the next several years.
States have also used grant funds to develop a variety of special
response teams ranging from bomb squads to weapon of mass destruction
(WMD) and hazardous materials (HAZMAT) teams to veterinary rapid
response teams and agricultural warning systems. Grant funds have
helped provide standardized training for mass casualty incidents,
further the adoption of the National Incident Management System, and
support citizen and community preparedness initiatives.
the need for reform
Federal funding for homeland security grant programs has been
reduced by more than 50 percent over the last 2 fiscal years. The
impact of this reduction, combined with on-going State and local fiscal
challenges, warrants reconsideration of the current grant structure to
ensure funds can continue to be used as effectively as possible.
The decrease in funding has placed an administrative burden on
grantees and has made it more difficult to achieve State-wide and
regional strategic goals. For instance, in some States, the fusion
center has been supported in large part through the State's 20 percent
share of State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP) funds. As those
funds decrease, it is no longer possible to continue to operate the
fusion center while also providing for management and administration of
the entire SHSGP award or addressing other identified capability gaps.
As another example, the activities of many State-wide
Interoperability Coordinators (SWICs), who serve as a single point of
contact to ensure coordination for first responder radio
communications, are supported by grant funds. Without an increase in
overall funding or the ability to use more than the State's 20 percent
share, many of these positions may be eliminated. The work of the SWICs
has helped streamline communications systems, saving not only money but
also improving first responders' ability to save lives and protect
property. While the interoperability of radio communications systems
has greatly improved, more work remains to be done. The incorporation
of broadband technologies to provide data and video services for first
responders will also require continued State leadership to maintain the
progress made to date.
As a reflection of this new challenge, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) recently proposed to consolidate 16 grant
programs into a new National Preparedness Grant Program. While the
details of how this proposal would work need to be developed, States
believe any reform should provide greater flexibility in the use of
funds while ensuring transparency, accountability, and collaboration.
In order to facilitate State input into grant reform, the NGA
Special Committee on Homeland Security and Public Safety has developed
a set of Governors' principles for homeland security grant reform.
These are broad principles intended to articulate State priorities and
concerns. A copy of the principles is attached.
As you'll see, these principles address key issues such as the need
to continue to allocate funds based on risk while ensuring that each
State and territory receive funds to maintain critical homeland
security and emergency response capabilities. The principles also
discuss the need to focus the use of funds on developing and sustaining
common core capabilities; the need for the Federal Government to work
with States and territories to develop methods to measure performance;
and the need for clear and timely guidance from the Federal Government
for conducting threat assessments.
As Congress and the Federal Government have reviewed current grant
programs, there has been a great deal of attention recently on the
approximately $8 billion in previously appropriated grant funds that
have not been drawn down. Some have argued that States have caused this
delay in the use of funds and, therefore, a greater proportion of funds
should be awarded directly to local entities. States disagree with this
assertion and point out that it is often the funds that have been
dedicated to localities or port and transit authorities that remain
unspent. Part of the delay may stem from Federal requirements for
environmental and historic preservation reviews or of the need to
obtain necessary local approvals before proceeding with a project.
Regardless of the cause, many States are trying to work with FEMA and
their local organizations to identify ways to address this issue.
Several States employ a rigorous oversight process that provides
advanced notice of when funds may not be used and allows them to
reallocate those funds to other local high-priority projects.
States employ a variety of structures to administer and manage the
grant programs; however, all agree that coordination among all levels
of government is a critical factor. They also believe that States are
best positioned to oversee and coordinate all homeland security and
emergency preparedness activities within their boundaries. Currently,
States have no role in the use of port and transit security grants.
These funds could be used by a local area to implement proprietary
communications systems that are not interoperable with surrounding
areas or the State-wide system.
Ensuring a strong State role in all grant programs will help
achieve economies of scale, avoid duplication of effort, leverage
available assets and avoid gaps in critical capabilities. It would also
recognize Governors' Constitutional emergency authorities. Governors
have unique emergency authorities, including the ability to deploy the
National Guard. To properly utilize these authorities to save lives and
protect property, Governors and their homeland security advisors,
emergency management directors and Adjutants General, must have
knowledge of capabilities, assets, and resources throughout the State.
the path forward
NGA and the GHSAC welcome the opportunity to work with this
committee as you assess the current grant programs and consider various
reforms. We also look forward to working with FEMA to help identify and
address key questions and concerns regarding their proposal to
consolidate and restructure the grant programs.
Governors and their Homeland Security Advisors believe very
strongly in the need to preserve a strong State role in the management
of grant funds in order to ensure transparency and coordination and
facilitate efficiency and effectiveness. The grant process, including
reform efforts, must include input from a variety of stakeholders, and
we are committed to working with our partners in local and Tribal
governments as well as the first responder community.
To this end, States encourage Congress and the Federal Government
to examine other related grant programs that could be better
coordinated to achieve desired outcomes, including grants administered
by the Department of Justice and the Department of Health and Human
Services.
Chairman Bilirakis and Ranking Member Richardson, thank you for the
opportunity to testify on this important topic. I'm happy to answer any
questions you or other Members of the subcommittee may have.
Attachment A.--Governors' Principles for Homeland Security Grant Reform
The Department of Homeland Security provides State and local
governments with preparedness grant funding that provides support for
developing and maintaining critical homeland security and emergency
management capabilities. Over the last several years, these grant funds
have been significantly reduced. With decreased funding expected for
the foreseeable future, Congress and the administration are reexamining
the grant programs in order to make them more flexible and effective.
Currently, there are 18 major preparedness grant programs
administered by the Department of Homeland Security. Many of these
programs often overlap with others, creating unintended inefficiencies
and unnecessary administrative burdens. In addition, changing program
requirements often makes the current structure complex and burdensome
to States.
Governors are supportive of efforts to reform these programs. As
reform proposals are considered by Congress and the administration,
Governors offer the following principles:
Principles:
Grants should be risk-based but continue to provide each
State and territory funding to support critical homeland
security and emergency management capabilities, including
personnel costs and the sustainment of investments.
Funding should focus on developing, enhancing, and
sustaining common core capabilities.
The Federal Government should work with States and
territories to develop consistent methods to measure or assess
progress in achieving common core capabilities.
Grant funding should be distributed through States and
territories to enhance regional response capabilities, avoid
duplication of effort, and ensure awareness of gaps in
capabilities.
Consistent with current law, States should be permitted to
use a portion of the grant funds for management and
administration in order to coordinate the efficient and
effective use of grant funds, provide necessary oversight and
comply with Federal reporting requirements.
Any reform to the current grant programs should provide
States with flexibility to determine which priorities should be
funded and where investments should be made within their
borders.
Any grant program should allow flexibility for any State
cost-share requirements.
The Federal Government should provide clear, timely, and
explicit guidelines for conducting threat assessments and how
those assessments will be used to determine base-level funding.
The Federal Government should be more transparent with
States in sharing the data used to populate the funding
formula/algorithm. States should be provided with a centralized
point of contact and reasonable time to review and inform the
data.
The Federal Government should ensure that reforms eliminate
inefficiencies, do not duplicate efforts, and do not place
additional administrative burdens on States.
Grants should allow for multi-year strategic planning by
States and local jurisdictions.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much.
Now I will recognize Mr. Koon for 5 minutes. Welcome, sir.
STATEMENT OF BRYAN KOON, DIRECTOR, FLORIDA DIVISION OF
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, TESTIFYING ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
Mr. Koon. Thank you, Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking Member
Richardson, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, for
the opportunity to testify today.
In the 10 years since September 11, we have done much to
improve our safety and security, but work remains to be done.
As the Nation determines the best road forward, our thoughts
may differ but our ultimate goal remains the same.
There are two fundamental questions regarding grant reform:
How, and why?
Imagine that if instead of funding homeland security needs,
we were using these programs to host a cookout in Florida. DHS
would allocate a certain amount of money for hamburgers, a
different amount of money for buns, and other individual pots
of money for coleslaw, potato salad, napkins, lemonade, et
cetera. Suppose now that I just learned that my vegetarian
brother-in-law was coming for a visit and I needed to pick up a
soy burger for him. Under the current system, that wouldn't fit
in the strict definition of any of the available categories,
and, as a result, I would end up with extra hamburgers and a
hungry guest. In other words, we are not allowing our
stakeholders the flexibility to meet their individual needs.
Recent and drastic funding cuts have highlighted that we
are working within a flawed system. We are forced to piece
together multiple Federal grant programs with singular
missions. This patchwork of well-intended programs challenges
our efforts to enhance preparedness and to effectively manage
programs.
We have attempted to address the highly complex problem of
homeland security by reducing it to constituent components. We
compartmentalize hazards and separate the remedies to mitigate
consequences. This creates a disconnected system that acts on
the components rather than the system and forces competition
rather than collaboration.
How do we make a system conducive to these budget realities
while simultaneously continuing to achieve expected levels of
preparedness? NEMA has said a few key pieces are necessary to
enable a truly cross-cutting preparedness grant system:
An accurate and usable assessment of the threat and risk
picture must be completed, which involves all stakeholders,
including the private sector.
Planning must be improved to advance from the spending
plans of today to a truly strategic vision of preparedness
needs.
A skilled cadre, including emergency management and
homeland security personnel at all levels of government, is
imperative. Without people, we are only buying things.
A majority of the grant funds should go toward investment
grants still made through a single allocation to the State and
should be project-based. UASI cities traditionally classified
as Tier 1 should continue to be directly funded. Overall,
offering direct funding without any requirement to work with or
support an overall State strategy puts the State in an
untenable position. It continues to reward geographic
stovepipes and uncoordinated programs. It would be no different
if you were to provide funding to the State with no requirement
to work toward National strategies.
We must have the ability to conduct multi-year planning
and, more importantly, the ability to complete complex
projects, achieve ambitious objectives, track core
capabilities, and measure performance over time.
Our Nation faces enduring hazards, pervasive threats, and
ever-changing risks, but our current system lacks the agility
to adapt swiftly or convert ideas consistently into action. We
need the National will to unite in a common vision of National
preparedness, resilience, and self-reliance.
We must find a way to enable States, Tribes, territories,
and local governments to leverage their own resources with
Federal investments to build this vision and be accountable. We
need all levels of government, supported by all professions and
disciplines, to unite in a way forward to ensure the safety and
security of this Nation.
Again, I thank you for the opportunity to testify today and
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Koon follows:]
Prepared Statement of Bryan Koon
April 26, 2012
introduction
Chairman Bilirakis, Representative Richardson, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee: Thank you for the opportunity to present
testimony today on behalf of the National Emergency Management
Association (NEMA). NEMA represents the State emergency management
directors of all 50 States, the District of Columbia, and the U.S.
Territories.
Since the inception of the State Homeland Security Grant Program
(SHSGP), NEMA has maintained support of these grants as critical
resources to help State and local governments build and sustain
capabilities to address the various threats and hazards they face.
Also, the Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG) has long been
the backbone of the emergency management system, and we continue to
appreciate your support for this critical program. On March 7, NEMA
released a second annual report on the return on investment in EMPG. We
hope you will find the report as informative as you did last year since
it helps justify the necessity of this program.
During the fiscal year 2012 budget discussions of last summer, NEMA
leadership began exploring a possible new approach to the full suite of
grants within the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Congress had repeatedly
expressed the need for answers to lingering questions about the
effectiveness and performance of the suite of FEMA grant programs.
Therefore, we decided the time had come to develop an innovative
approach to grants that goes beyond simply requesting additional
funding.
the process
The effort to develop NEMA's Proposal for a Comprehensive
Preparedness Grants Structure began over the summer of 2011 and
produced more than 20 drafts of concepts. From the beginning, we wanted
to address your long-standing concerns with these programs without
repeating the assumptions of the past. We also wanted to take into
account current initiatives within FEMA. We assembled a group of
homeland security and emergency management professionals from across
the country including State emergency management directors, Governors'
homeland security advisors, and those with both responsibilities. An
important detail to remember is that many of the authors come from a
range of backgrounds including the military, emergency medicine, law
enforcement, fire, and emergency management.
We were not trying to reinvent the grant programs from scratch, but
rather take 10 years of experience to create the next logical iteration
of these programs. The NEMA membership approved this document at our
annual conference in October 2011. The final product is not meant to be
legislative language or grant guidance, but rather one focusing on
principles and values with a suggested concept for reorganization
providing grantees increased flexibility and more comprehensive
accountability to Congress.
Perhaps the least difficult aspect of the proposal to develop was
the principles and values. As we have discussed our plan with others,
few seem to disagree with the tenets of supporting PPD-8; building a
culture of collaboration; the ability to be agile and adaptive to
confront changing hazards; building and sustaining capabilities;
encouraging innovation; providing full visibility to all stakeholders;
and recognizing the interdependencies of our National systems. The
importance of these principles and values highlight a critical point in
any retrospective on homeland security grants. Regardless of our
country's fiscal situation, physical security and economic security are
not mutually exclusive and can be achieved with a more streamlined
grant structure.
the proposal
Under the proposal, States would be awarded three allocations from
DHS including EMPG, a new homeland security cadre grant, and a project-
based investment and innovation grant. These three grants would replace
the myriad grants within the suite of homeland security grants as well
as the Predisaster Mitigation Grant Program. The important point to
remember throughout this entire discussion is that everyone who
currently receives grant funding continues to be eligible under this
proposed system.
The full 4-page proposal is included with this statement to be
submitted to the record, but there are five basic components:
1. The THIRA.--Regardless of a grant reform initiative, FEMA is
instituting the requirement under PPD-8 for each State to
conduct and maintain a comprehensive Threat Hazard
Identification Risk Assessment (THIRA) in partnership with the
DHS and State officials. In our view, this process will have
limited effectiveness if implemented in the current grant
system due to shortcomings in the planning process. The
information gathered through the THIRA, however, is paramount
to supporting a comprehensive planning system.
2. Comprehensive Planning.--Current planning efforts are fiscally-
centric and focus on capabilities based on expected funding.
This approach impedes the effectiveness of the THIRA process.
It also limits our ability to measure progress and
capabilities. NEMA proposes the follow-up action to the THIRA
be a comprehensive preparedness plan which examines the full
range of needs, capabilities, and requirements to help buy-down
risk. As funding is allocated against long-range priorities,
the delta between ``need'' and ``capability'' will become
measurable over time. This analysis will aid Congress in
determining how much funding is needed to buy down the desired
amount of risk and a more detailed accounting of ``what we are
getting for the money?''
3. Skilled Cadre.--A skilled cadre including homeland security and
emergency management personnel is imperative within any
comprehensive preparedness system. Responsibilities for this
cadre would include maintaining all-hazard planning efforts,
remaining current with appropriate levels of training and
exercises, supporting National priorities as outlined in PPD-8,
conducting public education, and grants management. The cadre-
based grants will also support both the comprehensive THIRA in
coordination with DHS and the comprehensive preparedness
strategy to assess current capabilities and determine future
requirements.
4. Investment Grants.--A majority of the funding through this new
system would go toward investment grants still made through a
single allocation to the State. Unlike the current system, the
proposed system would be project-based. The State
Administrative Agency (SAA) and local governments (as well as
combinations of grantees) would apply for funding based off
their completed THIRA and comprehensive preparedness strategy.
These applications are reviewed by a multi-disciplinary and
multi-jurisdictional advisory committee, and the SAA makes
awards as appropriate. This construct especially provides
stability for jurisdictions currently operating in the Urban
Area Security Initiative (UASI), ensuring a city can never
again ``fall off the list.'' Due to their significant security
issues, Tier 1 UASI's should continue to be funded directly.
This will ensure every urban area will be part of the THIRA and
application process and no one is left out.
By realizing these economies of scale, several advantages are
revealed:
All current grant applicants remain eligible to receive
funding including local jurisdictions, ports, modes of
transportation, and urban areas.
This new system ensures all grantees are integrated within
the State and local THIRA process as well as National
priorities. HSAs, SAAs, and emergency management directors have
far more visibility on allocation of funds within the State and
how projects and jurisdictions are working together for maximum
efficiency of the taxpayer dollars.
The comprehensive preparedness strategy demonstrates to
Congress and the administration where funding is utilized and
how it is leveraged against existing gaps.
This proposal allows the grant system to align with the new
PPD-8 environment.
the president's budget
NEMA was pleased to see the administration also contribute to the
positive dialogue of grant reform through their fiscal year 2013 budget
proposal. While we were encouraged in seeing the administration echo
many of our recommendations, as we have stated all along, a continued
dialogue would be necessary.
The administration's grant reform proposal appears based on many of
the principles and values outlined by the NEMA proposal including
support of the five mission areas of PPD-8; a culture of collaboration;
agility and adaptability of the funds against threats and hazards; a
strong and robust cadre of emergency management and homeland security
personnel; recognition of the interdependencies of our National
systems; increased accountability; and, flexibility at all levels of
government. We would suggest there remain several aspects of the
President's budget proposal which requires additional clarity:
Pursuant to these principles and values, we would suggest several
aspects of the President's budget proposal require additional clarity
and further analysis:
The current planning process must be upgraded to reflect the
maturation of our preparedness efforts in the past 10 years. A
truly comprehensive system must allow for each State and
locality to determine core capabilities, set priorities in a
flexible manner, and measure performance and effectiveness
regardless of available Federal funds.
Those cities traditionally categorized as ``Tier 1'' in the
Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) program should be
directly funded provided they also participate in the THIRA
process and comprehensive planning process. Furthermore, a
process by which other units of government such as transit and
port authorities or self-organized regions of governments such
as other current UASI participants can apply for funding should
be outlined. Giving direct funding without any requirement to
work with or support an overall State strategy, however, puts
the State in an untenable position as it continues to reward
geographic stovepipes and uncoordinated programs.
The THIRA process must focus on State and local governments
and include consequences of loss in the analysis and provide
the analytical rigor for understanding and problem solving for
complex issues. The system must also include the full range of
stakeholders including health, law enforcement, public works,
fire, land use, transportation, and the private sector. This
includes collaboration on planning, analysis, project
development, application review, and development of core
capabilities.
The administration's definition of ``regionalization'' in
terms of application review requires additional clarification.
Such peer review is best handled at the State level and should
focus on setting priorities for projects. Any National review
should be on the State priorities overall and not a micro-
review of individual projects. Also, coordination of
development of specific National capabilities such as urban
search and rescue teams is necessary. NEMA addresses this issue
through the recommendation of a multi-disciplinary and multi-
jurisdictional committee comprised of stakeholders across the
State to review all grant applications.
The review committee of State-wide stakeholders is critical to the
development of a governance structure which ensures all
partners and grantees to maintain a voice through a project-
based grants process. The committee would also be responsible
for enabling the range of threats and hazards to be considered
across the full spectrum of State and local activities. Such a
committee promotes fairness, reduces the politicization of
grants, and allows a voice for every constituency.
Priorities and select projects for local governments, ports,
and other entities, or for those entities to work with each
other within each State and among the States on the highest-
value projects cannot be dictated by Washington. The allocation
systems of the past pitted city against city and port against
port with very little consideration of the complex
relationships of our economic system. The NEMA proposal
recognizes and values these relationships. There must be a
marketplace of ideas where value is determined by collaboration
between applicants rather than cut-throat competition between
them with winners and losers.
NEMA suggests only a small amount of the total grant funding
be held by DHS for competitive pilot projects to spark
innovation. Competition at the project level cannot be
calculated by separate groups or reduced to subjective grading.
Up to 5 percent of the funding should be utilized to support
innovative projects. The remainder of the funding from the
investment grant can then be devoted to project-based
applications by State and local grantees. This varies from the
administration's recommendation which continues to address
grant funding through stove-piped programs. By reducing layers
of review that impede the flexibility of the funding, an
efficient and effective flow of funding can be realized for
State and local projects.
Working with you and our stakeholder partners, we remain confident
a prudent approach forward can be found. Earlier this month, we
submitted a letter to FEMA Assistant Administrator Elizabeth Harman
outlining these differences and offering constructive solutions.
As these critical issues to the safety and security of our Nation
are being discussed, we hope you have been contacted by other
associations and stakeholders providing innovative ideas. NEMA has been
relentless in these past months working to develop a truly National
approach while conducting a productive and forward-thinking dialogue.
We feel strongly that the emergency management and homeland security
community and representatives of all levels of government and
disciplines must come together with National leaders to promote
effective change and improve efficiencies in our preparedness system.
conclusion
We greatly appreciate the opportunity to come before this committee
and begin the discussion of comprehensive grant reform in an open and
honest forum. We remain confident in the process we undertook and feel
the final product is a good first step toward true reform and
efficiencies. This Nation deserves security, but we also deserve
solvency; and in these budget-constrained times, NEMA remains committed
to working with you in achieving both of these goals.
Proposal for a Comprehensive Preparedness Grants Structure
December 2011
background
This Nation has made great strides in improving our safety and
security. We have more comprehensive interoperable communications
systems, regional response assets, a National system of intelligence
fusion centers, and an unprecedented level of collaboration and
teamwork among State and local responders.
Such programs as the Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG)
Program and the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) have done much
to help public safety, law enforcement, emergency management, and a
myriad of other professionals conduct a broad range of preparedness
functions. From our neighborhood communities through all levels of
government, we have acquired resources, achieved collaboration, and
built systems to mitigate, prevent, prepare for, and respond to natural
hazards and terrorist threats.
The current grants structure is complex and often contradictory.
This creates unintended inefficiencies in investments and duplication
of efforts. The current and continuing fiscal condition of our Nation
requires us to invest every dollar more wisely than ever before. We
want to gain efficiencies in our grants so that we can increase the
effectiveness of our mission.
We cannot continue to segregate our efforts just because we did so
in the past. We must integrate our efforts so that we are agile in
confronting any threat to the homeland, whether it is natural,
technological, or human-caused. We must build strengths and
capabilities that are effective against many threats, reduce the
consequences of many hazards, and thus reduce the risks to our Nation.
We, therefore, require a comprehensive preparedness grants system to
fulfill the requirements of those professionals with critical homeland
security and emergency management responsibilities.
principles & values
This Nation--its people and their vital interests--deserves and
expects an effective and efficient National preparedness system
providing safety and security. Therefore, this system must:
Support and enable the five mission areas of Presidential
Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8).--Prevention, protection, response,
recovery, and mitigation.
Build a culture of collaboration enabling a posture of
preparedness for all hazards from nature, terrorists, or
technology--capable of disrupting the social and economic
equilibrium of our Nation.
Be agile and adaptive to confront changing hazards, emerging
threats, and increasing risks.
Be unified on goals, objectives, and strategy among Federal,
State, Tribal, local, and territorial partners and with the
private sector, non-governmental organizations, and the public
at large.
Build and sustain a skilled cadre across the Nation that is
well-organized, rigorously trained, vigorously exercised,
properly equipped, prepared for all hazards, focused on core
capabilities, and resourced for both the most serious and most
likely threats and hazards. This cadre will be an asset to the
Nation through mutual aid, other assistance between States and
regions, or for National teams.
Build, enhance, and sustain capabilities, self-reliance of
the public, and resilience of our communities and Nation.
Reflect the fiscal responsibilities and limitations of the
present and the future. This Nation deserves safety and
security, but it also deserves solvency. A State and local
grant system must enable investments in capabilities that are
of value to communities, regions, States, and the Nation.
Continually encourage innovation and ceaselessly weed out
waste and inefficiencies.
Encourage States and communities to self-organize with their
neighbors to protect vital supply lines and assets and
infrastructure of mutual value and to enable swift, coordinated
response.
Recognize that States, Tribes, territories, and local
communities know their jurisdictions best.--They must have
flexibility to set priorities, design solutions, and adapt to
rapidly changing conditions. This must be done with full
accountability.
Provide full visibility to States, Tribes, territories, and
local communities of all Federal homeland security and
emergency management activities, investments, and programs
within their jurisdictions. This disclosure is essential for
full understanding of capabilities to address threats, hazards,
and risks.
Reinforce the value of leveraging Federal investments with
contributions from States, Tribes, territories, and local
governments and demonstrate the day-to-day value to
jurisdictions.
Continue to encourage and enable wide participation in
review of projects and investments.
Recognize the complex interdependencies of our National
systems, particularly the movement of goods, services, and
people. The vulnerabilities of a jurisdiction often lie outside
its borders and outside its ability to address them.
purpose
We call upon Congress and the President to consider this proposal
to reform State and local grants for the safety and security of our
Nation. To this end, we seek to:
Encourage States, Tribes, territories, and local governments
to prepare and adopt comprehensive plans based upon their
evaluation of threats, hazards, risks, and vulnerabilities
facing them;
Outline a program of grants to States, Tribes, territories,
and local governments or combinations of governments improving
and strengthening the Nation's homeland security and emergency
management capabilities; and
Encourage research, development, competition, and innovation
enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of emergency
management and homeland security and the development of new
methods for the prevention, preparedness, response, recovery,
and mitigation of natural disasters and acts of terrorism.
This proposal presents a system enabling greater effectiveness in
the mission with greater efficiency of resources. Over the past decade
States, Tribes, territories, and local governments have created new
organizational structures, gained invaluable experience, and increased
our capacity to manage multiple threats and hazards.
The high incidence of natural disasters and terrorist threats in
the United States challenges the peace, security, and general welfare
of the Nation and its citizens. To ensure the greater safety of the
people, homeland security and emergency management efforts must work
together with shared responsibilities, supporting capabilities, and
measurable progress towards a National goal. This unity of effort is
essential to achieve the vital objectives of PPD-8 and success of the
National Preparedness System.
This proposal outlines a system in which preparedness is a
deterrent, prevention is achieved through collaboration, mitigation is
a National value, and response and recovery encompass the ``whole of
community.'' But the system works only where the principles guide the
plans and where ideas lead to action. This reformed grant system shares
control with those on the front line, enables flexibility while
strengthening accountability, and ensures fiscal sustainability. State
and local governments cannot do this alone.
a comprehensive preparedness grants system
A truly comprehensive preparedness grants system must allow for
each State to determine core capabilities, set priorities in a flexible
manner, and measure performance and effectiveness. This proposal
recommends the creation or continuation of grants to coordinate
planning, measure effectiveness, develop and sustain a skilled cadre,
and invest in effective and efficient projects.
Planning
Conduct and maintain within each State a comprehensive
Threat Hazard Identification Risk Assessment (THIRA) in concert
with Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and State officials.
Develop a comprehensive preparedness strategy to assess
current capabilities, determine future requirements, and
evaluate recent progress and initiatives.
The strategy will focus on identified gaps and contain goals
and objectives to fill those gaps. The objectives will be
prioritized and funds will be prioritized to fill the most
important gaps accordingly. Identifying existing additional
capability that is owned and maintained by other jurisdictions
and readily available for response through mutual aid should be
an important planning activity.
A Skilled Cadre
A skilled cadre is imperative within any comprehensive preparedness
system and should be supported through a grants program. This skilled
cadre includes emergency management and homeland security personnel.
Since such expertise remains the backbone of any system, their
responsibilities would include (but not be limited to):
Build and support State-wide emergency management and
homeland security all-hazards planning.
Provide comprehensive and appropriate levels of training and
conduct exercises for State and local personnel across the full
spectrum of emergency management and homeland security
responsibilities.
Support the National priorities outlined in PPD-8 and the
National Preparedness Goal.
Conduct public education and outreach to further whole of
community preparedness.
Within the skilled cadre grant, the existing EMPG would continue in
its present form, including allocation method, match requirement,
eligibility, management, appropriate funding, and flexibility. The
existing policy continues that allows emergency management to
administer EMPG if not the State Administering Agency (SAA).
A similar grant program will be established for State homeland
security professionals affording the same opportunity to build and
sustain a skilled cadre of personnel. This grant would be modeled after
EMPG which has been proven highly effective due to the flexibility it
provides along with accountability. EMPG currently maintains a 50/50
match requirement. Any match on the cadre-based grant for homeland
security professionals should be instituted with a soft match option,
and done so gradually over time in consultation with the States and
professions involved.
Investments and Innovation
Many capabilities identified in the comprehensive planning system
will require investment in longer-term projects and procurement to
achieve needed levels of effectiveness. An investment grant program
will enable decisions on priorities across the broad range of emergency
management and homeland security functions. This also enables swift
adjustments in priorities in light of changing threats or increasing
risks.
Unlike the homeland security cadre-based grant in which the SAA
determines the allocation of funds to State and local jurisdictions,
the investment grant focuses on sub-grantee applications for projects
and other investments based on similarly comprehensive planning efforts
at the local or regional level. States should establish and maintain a
multi-disciplinary review committee that advises on investments and
projects.
Eligible applicants to the investment grant include all currently
eligible grant recipients under HSGP, local governments or combinations
of governments, urban areas, regions, or other State-level agencies
conducting appropriate preparedness activities. States with urban areas
currently classified as ``Tier 1'' by DHS will continue to receive
funding specifically for those areas, upon completion of a
comprehensive preparedness strategy that has been approved by the
State. Funding that would have been allocated to other participants in
the current UASI program should be placed into the investment grant.
Eligible expenditures for investment grants should encompass all
functions of the currently separate programs and the priorities of PPD-
8, including equipment purchase and transfer, construction of emergency
operation centers or similar facilities, special response units,
critical infrastructure and key resource protection, medical surge,
protection and resilience, information sharing and intelligence, and
grant management and administrative costs. Pre-disaster mitigation
should be an eligible project under investment grants and due
consideration given to disaster loss reduction and resilience
initiatives. Substantial data exists to justify continued pre-disaster
mitigation programs in determining any set of priorities, and the
disaster mitigation community's interests groups must be intimately
engaged in the grant prioritization process. Flood mitigation
assistance and repetitive loss grants are not included as they are
funded through the National Flood Insurance Program by insurance
proceeds paid by policy holders. Furthermore, to continue supporting a
culture of innovation, up to 5 percent of the total investment grant
award may be distributed by DHS to unique and innovative programs
across the Nation to encourage best practices.
an overview of the system
Each State conducts and maintains a comprehensive Threat
Hazard Identification Risk Assessment (THIRA) in concert with
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and State officials.
A comprehensive preparedness strategy is developed to assess
current capabilities, determine future requirements, and
evaluate recent progress and initiatives.
The State is awarded three allocations from DHS, including
one for EMPG, one for the new homeland security cadre grant,
and one for the new investment and innovation grant.
Applicants will apply for funds from the investment grant
based upon completed preparedness strategies. Applications are
reviewed by a multi-disciplinary advisory committee, and the
SAA makes awards as appropriate.
conclusion
Our Nation faces enduring hazards, pervasive threats, and ever-
changing risks. Our current system lacks the agility to adapt swiftly
or convert ideas into action. We need the Nation to unite in a common
vision of National preparedness, resilience, and self-reliance. This
proposal enables States, Tribes, territories, and local government to
leverage their own resources with the Federal investment to build this
vision and be accountable for achieving it. We need all levels of
government, supported by all professions and disciplines, to unite in
this innovative National preparedness system.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much. We appreciate it.
Ms. Walker, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF HUI-SHAN LIN WALKER, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
COORDINATOR, HAMPTON, VIRGINIA, TESTIFYING ON BEHALF OF THE
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF EMERGENCY MANAGERS
Ms. Walker. Thank you, Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking Member
Richardson, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee.
I am Hui-Shan Walker, the emergency management coordinator
of Hampton, Virginia, which is part of the Hampton Roads
region. Our region is home to the largest naval base in the
world and has facilities housing all branches of the armed
services, with a population of around 1.6 million. As president
of the U.S. Council of the International Association of
Emergency Managers, I appreciate this opportunity to testify
before you today.
Efforts to secure the homeland for all hazards, including
terrorism, must be collaborative, with participants from all
levels and many disciplines. However, the proposed National
Preparedness Grant Program, NPGP, included in the fiscal year
2012 budget request, was developed and presented without
consulting Congressional authorization committees or inclusion
of key local stakeholders--local elected officials, first
responders, and emergency managers.
There is no disagreement at the local level that Homeland
Security dollars should be spent where they are most needed in
a transparent, efficient, and effective manner. There is also
no question that, with diminishing Federal grant funding, that
the current Homeland Security grant programs should be
reassessed to ensure what funds are available, continue to
support the capabilities, and to develop the capacities that
are critical to our Nation.
However, we are very concerned that the NPGP is a vision
with very few details on how the process work and what the
impacts would be. The limited additional information from FEMA
leads to more questions than answers.
This proposal collapses 16 Homeland Security grant programs
into a State-centric block and competitive grant program. It is
not clear if locals, who know best the threats and
vulnerabilities in their area, will have the opportunity to
meaningfully participate in the State-centric funding decision
process being proposed. Local stakeholder input is vitally
important to ensure that identified gaps at the local level
continue to be met in a strategic and targeted methodology that
ensures continuity of past efforts.
NPGP requires that all projects funded must be based on
capability gaps identified by Threat and Hazard Identification
and Risk Assessment, the THIRA. The State-centric approach does
not clearly explain how local government officials, local
emergency managers, and first responders will meaningfully
participate in the THIRA process. In addition, for example,
will a designated UASI still be able to spend allotted funding
on the needs it had determined as most critical and which met
FEMA requirements and guidance, or could the funding be
reallocated at the State level to State-identified priorities
in the State THIRA?
I would also like to point out that there are advantages to
having multiple grant programs which address specific needs.
Some essential programs have lower profiles and may not compete
well in a consolidated grant program.
This week is the anniversary of the swarm of deadly
tornados in Alabama that killed 241 and injured many more. The
medical response capability built by 14 Alabama counties with
direct funding from the Metropolitan Medical Response System
saved the lives of many of the injured. This group of locals
analyzed their needs, planned, and exercised to respond to
mass-casualty events. Likewise, earlier this month, when a Navy
F/A-18 jet crashed into an apartment complex in Virginia Beach
this month, the Hampton Roads Metropolitan Medical Strike Team,
funded by MMRS, was prepared to respond should there have been
mass casualties, if needed.
Hampton Roads was eliminated from the UASI funding despite
its large military community and vulnerability to hurricanes.
However, it is a good example of a successful governance
structure that has been built at the local level through
regional collaboration. An urban area working group was formed
with representation from the various disciplines involved in
homeland security, including port authority and transit
agencies, along with representatives from critical
infrastructures, such as water utilities. The decisions for
funding and implementation of projects have been made jointly
to ensure that the region addresses its threats and gaps and
leverages various Homeland Security grant programs to fill
gaps.
These are just a few of the examples across the country
that show the local steering groups comprised of multi-
disciplinary, multi-jurisdictional leaders are able to
determine the best way to allocate Homeland Security grant
funds to meet gaps in their identified areas.
In conclusion, the details matter, and there are still too
many unanswered questions on how the NPGP would actually work.
We have great concerns about a State-centric program. We do
believe the path forward should be a collaborative effort of
all the relevant stakeholders at all levels. We look forward to
participating further in this important conversation.
As you consider grant reform, we would urge you to consider
the set of core principles developed by the 12 National
organizations of locals, including elected officials, first
responders, and emergency managers, which we have included in
our statement.
I, again, appreciate you holding the hearing and giving us
the opportunity to participate. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Walker follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hui-Shan Lin Walker
April 26, 2012
Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking Member Richardson, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee, I am Hui-Shan Lin Walker, the emergency
management coordinator for Hampton, Virginia. I have been a local
government emergency manager for 12 years and before that worked for 5
years in a local chapter's American Red Cross Disaster Services as an
assistant director and director. I have also served as president of the
Virginia Emergency Management Association. Currently, I serve as the
president of the U.S. Council of the International Association of
Emergency Managers (IAEM-USA).
I appreciate this opportunity to testify before you on behalf of
IAEM-USA. IAEM is our Nation's largest association of emergency
management professionals, with 5,000 members including emergency
managers at the State and local government levels, Tribal nations, the
military, colleges and universities, private business, and the non-
profit section. Most of our members are U.S. city and county emergency
managers who perform the crucial function of coordinating and
integrating the efforts at the local level to prepare for, mitigate the
effects of, respond to, and recover from all types of disasters
including terrorist attacks.
Efforts to secure the homeland for all hazards including terrorism
must be collaborative. However, the proposed National Preparedness
Grant Program (NPGP) was developed and presented as part of the fiscal
year 2012 budget without consulting with Congressional authorization
committees or inclusion of key local stakeholders--local elected
officials, first responders, and emergency managers. The budget
proposal for the NPGP is a vision with very few details.
On March 30, FEMA provided a 2-page fact sheet about the program,
then on April 16 held a stakeholders forum to have dialogue about the
NPGP. Although we appreciated the opportunity to participate in the
forum where additional information was shared, we consider it a
beginning not an end of a collaborative effort with stakeholders to
assess the programs, answer the multitude of outstanding process
questions and help develop improvements.
At the local level, there is agreement that homeland security
dollars should be spent where they are most needed in a transparent,
efficient, and effective manner. These grant programs were established
and have been administered under the principle of a collaborative
balance between Federal, State, and local discretion in how the funding
would be used to address preparedness issues. This balanced ``whole
community'' system allows local leaders to determine the best way to
provide emergency services to their citizens. Local steering groups
comprised of multi-disciplinary, multi-jurisdictional leaders were able
to determine the best way to provide vital emergency services to their
citizens. Therefore, we have serious concerns about the FEMA fiscal
year 2013 budget proposal to collapse 16 homeland security grant
programs into a State-centric block and competitive grant program. This
proposed consolidation will impact the greatest part of the ``whole
community'', the local community, as it will be severely challenged to
maintain and sustain their current response capabilities.
The primary reason for this concern is that each one of the current
grant programs was initiated and funded by Congress to address a
specific need. The blending of grant money into a single program would
cause the eventual lack of identity and those specific needs may go
unaddressed. There are advantages to having multiple grant programs
which serve different purposes. Some programs are essential but have
lower profiles and may not compete well in a consolidated grant
program. There is no question that with diminishing Federal grant
funding that the current homeland security grant programs should be
reassessed to ensure that what funds are available continue to support
the capabilities and to develop capacities that are critical to our
Nation. There has not been enough specificity in the proposed vision to
address how the consolidation process would work and the impacts to the
current grant programs as they are today.
examples of capabilities built
At this time I would like to share examples of some capabilities
that have been built efficiently and effectively over the past decade
with homeland security funds that have had different recipients with
varying requirements to address specific needs. As a local emergency
manger from Hampton, VA, I am part of the Virginia Beach-Norfolk-
Newport News, VA-NC Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) which is the
fourth-largest metropolitan area in the southeastern United States, and
the largest between Washington, DC and Atlanta. The 2000 Census
estimated that 1.6 million residents live in Hampton Roads and ranked
the region as the 31st-largest MSA in the country. Furthermore unlike
many of the metropolitan areas across the country, Hampton Roads'
population is not centered in one city, but spread broadly throughout
the region.
First, the Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) funding was
made available to 124 jurisdictions in 43 States to build local
capacity for mass casualty events. It has been considered by many
locals to be the cornerstone of their medical and responder team
building across multiple agencies and disciplines. It was a small
program which has great value but was cut in the fiscal year 2012
budget. MMRS funding was direct to local jurisdictions to build the
capacity they needed for man-made and natural disasters; particularly
to build the capacity they needed in the critical 24-48 hours. The
program guidance required a steering committee of multi-disciplinary,
multi-jurisdictional leaders that were tasked to assess the specific
medical response needs of the community. It was considered easier to
use than some funds; the decision-making was at the local level and was
flexible and adaptable to meet the local needs.
On April 6, a Navy F/A-18D jet crashed into an apartment complex in
Virginia Beach, VA. The first responders and emergency managers in the
region had been training for years with the military for such an event
and the results were seen in the efficient and effective response. This
incident could have been much worse and had casualties other than the
seven injured. In the event of a significant mass casualty, Hampton
Roads has a 470-member (207 member on-call group) Hampton Roads
Metropolitan Medical Strike Team (HRMMST) that provides on-scene
expertise and resources to the Incident Commander during a disaster.
They were on standby during this incident. The HRMMST is a chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives (CBRNE) trained
medical emergency response team that maintains a redundant response
capability of personnel, trucks, trailers, equipment, supplies, and
communications. This capability was built and funded with MMRS grant
funds.
Hampton Roads was designated an Urban Area Security Initiative
(UASI) region from 2007-2011. The funding for UASI programs also
allowed for capabilities such as utilization of radio caches and WebEOC
for situational awareness and communication between the military, local
first responders, and local and State emergency managers during the
recent jet crash incident. Military communities have been mentioned as
the most at-risk for terrorism by Secretary Napolitano and in a special
report by Congressman Peter King. Hampton Roads has the largest Naval
base in the world and has facilities housing all the branches of the
armed services. As was seen during this recent incident, the military
relies on the abilities of the local first responders. Unfortunately,
the Hampton Roads region was eliminated from the fiscal year 2012 UASI
funding despite its large military community and vulnerability to
hurricanes.
Another example of the effectiveness of the MMRS program can be
seen in the response to the swarm of devastating tornadoes that hit
Alabama and killed 241 people April 27 last year. Huntsville/Madison
County, Alabama used MMRS funds to develop plans and build medical
response capability in 14 counties. Responders and medical teams
trained as part of MMRS and the equipment and supplies which were
purchased were deployed and used in the impacted areas including the
most rural counties. Rough terrain vehicles which had been equipped
with stretchers were used to bring victims from the debris fields to
waiting ambulances. Each county has a cache of trauma and triage
equipment that was used during the response. Patients were efficiently
triaged and transported saving many lives.
Second, the Hampton Roads UASI has promoted regional collaboration
through its governance structure. The HR Urban Area Working Group
(UAWG) has representation from the various disciplines involved in
homeland security including the Port Authority and Transit agencies
along with representatives from critical infrastructures such as water
utilities. The decisions for funding and implementation of projects
have been made jointly to ensure that the region addresses its threats
and gaps that have been identified through gap analyses conducted over
the last couple of years. As a region through our collaboration, we
have been able to leverage various homeland security grant programs
with different recipients and requirements to fill gaps. An example is
that UASI funds were used to train and equip 75 members of an All
Hazards Incident Management Team (AHIMT) and Port Security funds were
utilized to fund the mobile command unit to support the AHIMT. This
resource is a deployable regional asset that through collaboration was
funded even as grant funds were diminishing because as a region it was
identified as a gap that needed to be filled. The proposed FEMA NPGP
would negatively affect this regional collaboration by not leveraging
the current effective governance structure established by UASI. Instead
the new approach would authorize a competitive grant program that could
pit homeland security partners against one another. There are many more
examples of how homeland security funds have been used to address gaps
in our local capabilities across the Nation to better respond to man-
made and natural hazards, but I just wanted to highlight a few where a
difference was made to our local communities.
concerns and unanswered questions on npgp proposal
There are still many unanswered questions and concerns regarding
the NPGP that need to be addressed. A few that I would like to
highlight are as follows:
A significant change is that projects must be based on
capability gaps identified by in a Threat and Hazard
Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA). The State-centric
approach does not clearly explain how local government
officials, local emergency managers, and first responders will
participate effectively and efficiently in the THIRA process in
order to address capability gaps at the local level. The local
assessment of capability gaps is based on the needs of real
responders who are best suited to make those decisions. In
addition, there has been a lot of homeland security funds
already dedicated to performing gap analyses for local regions
over the past decade to assist in prioritizing where funds were
dedicated to guide investments. How are those assessments that
focused on Target Capabilities and Core Capabilities going to
transition to the THIRA?
Furthermore, with the competitive funding pool also based on
the regional THIRAs at the Federal level, how do State and
locals address their capability gaps in the event that their
THIRA identifies conflicting priority gaps? Which THIRA will
take precedence for funding and/or what is the process to
resolve the differences?
The current law requires that 80% of the State Homeland
Security Grant program funds support local identified gaps in
capabilities. How will this be ensured through the wholesale
consolidation of the current 16 separate homeland security
grant programs into one which seems to ignore the requirements
of the 9/11 Act? Local stakeholder input is vitally important
to ensure that identified gaps at the local level continue to
be met in a strategic and targeted methodology that ensures
continuity of past efforts.
Will the funding support building all-hazards capabilities?
Again, there is no clear guidance, just a vision without local
stakeholder input. The NPGP emphasizes Nationally deployable
assets, which seems to focus just on response alone, but there
is an emergency management system that includes prevention,
protection, preparedness, recovery, and mitigation with gaps
that also need to be addressed. We should not forget the
lessons of Hurricane Katrina.
How will the process work for the Urban Area Security
Initiative (UASI)? We understand that a selected number of UASI
jurisdictions would receive a designated amount of funding from
FEMA through the SAA as is current practice. The UASI would
prepare an investment justification (IJ) and provide it to FEMA
though the SAA as is current practice. However, under the NPGP
would the UASI be able to spend the funding on the needs it had
designated as most critical and which met FEMA requirements and
guidance through previous risk assessments and gap analyses or
would the funding be reallocated at the State level to
identified priorities in the State THIRA?
principles for program improvement
In response to the proposed NPGP, 12 National organizations of
locals including elected officials, first responders, and emergency
managers have developed a set of core principles to guide grant program
reform--principles which we would urge you to consider as you evaluate
reform proposals.
Increased Transparency.--It must be clear and understandable
to the Federal Government and the public how the States are
distributing funds, why they are making these decisions, and
where the funds are going.
Greater Local Involvement.--Local government officials,
including emergency managers and emergency response officials,
know best the threats and vulnerabilities in their areas. The
THIRA process must include the input of local elected and
emergency response officials, and FEMA must be able to audit
States by comparing local risk assessments to the State-level
THIRA. Further, local governments should have the opportunity
to challenge a State THIRA that inadequately reflects their
needs or input.
Flexibility with Accountability.--Any changes to the
existing Federal grant programs should allow Federal funding to
meet individual local needs, and preparedness gaps as
identified at the local level. Effective but sometimes less
politically popular programs, like mitigation, must still
receive funding.
Protect Local Funding.--Since event impact and response are
primarily local in nature, grant funding should support
primarily local prevention and preparedness efforts, as is the
case under the current program structure. It is important that
the vast majority of Federal homeland security grants continue
to fund local prevention and response activities, including
local emergency managers and first responders, and activities
that support their preparedness efforts.
Sustain Terrorism Prevention.--The current emphasis on
supporting law enforcement's terrorism prevention activities
must be maintained. The Federal grant funds should not be used
to support larger State bureaucracies at the expense of
operational counter-terrorism preparedness, threat analysis,
and information-sharing activities.
Incentives for Innate Regionalization.--FEMA's proposal
focuses on States and multi-State regions (similar to the FEMA
regions). The homeland security grants must also support
preparedness in metropolitan intra-State and inter-State
regions.
the path forward
The details matter and there are still too many unanswered
questions on how the NPGP would actually work. A policy shift toward
developing only those capabilities applicable to a National level event
will greatly diminish the ability of local first responders to provide
emergency services during the first critical hours or days of such an
event.
We recommend that the dialogue continue with DHS/FEMA, the
Congress, and all relevant State and local stakeholders. On April 24, a
letter was sent by twelve National organizations of locals to Secretary
Napolitano and Administrator Fugate suggesting that the Department not
rush to make major changes this year, but let the changes being
implemented in the fiscal year 2012 budget play out and be evaluated.
This would give time for the Department to work with key local and
State stakeholders in a collaborative way to develop reforms which
incorporate the successful elements of the homeland security programs
and identify changes which need to be made. We have attached this
letter and would appreciate it being part of the hearing record.
I appreciate the opportunity to testify on this important topic and
would be happy to answer any questions you may have.
______
Attachment.--Letter to Secretary Napolitano and Administrator Fugate
April 24, 2012.
The Honorable Janet Napolitano,
Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 3801 Nebraska Ave NW,
Washington, DC 20528.
The Honorable Craig Fugate,
Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, 500 C Street SW, Washington, DC 20472.
Dear Secretary Napolitano and Administrator Fugate: Our
organizations were very pleased to be able to have had an opportunity
to participate in the April 16 stakeholders' forum on the National
Preparedness Grant Program proposal. As was discussed during the
session, it was an excellent beginning for what we hope will be a
collaborative process to assess the Department's current suite of
homeland security programs and craft needed improvements in them. We
particularly appreciate the inclusive and thoughtful way in which FEMA
Deputy Administrator for Protection and National Preparedness Tim
Manning conducted the session.
We suggest that the Department not rush to make major changes this
year. You are currently implementing the changes Congress made through
the fiscal year 2012 appropriations bill--changes which gave the
Department greater flexibility to focus grant programs on what it
considers to be the highest priorities, while protecting program
funding to the highest-risk urban areas and port and transportation
infrastructure. We would suggest that you give this approach at least a
year to play out and evaluate it before moving ahead with the
significant changes proposed in the National Preparedness Grant
Program.
We also suggest that you wait at least a year because it was clear
from the April 16 meeting that many details relating to the NPGP have
yet to be worked out and that we cannot expect they can be in a manner
that will work for all parties in the time available this year. At this
point we seem to have more questions than answers.
This will also provide time for your Department to work with our
organizations and other stakeholders to develop reforms which
incorporate the successful elements of past and current programs and
identify new approaches which can have broad support.
Our organizations have developed a set of core principles to guide
program reform--principles which we would hope you can support as well:
Increased Transparency.--It must be clear and understandable
to the Federal Government and the public how the States are
distributing funds, why they are making these decisions, and
where the funds are going.
Greater Local Involvement.--Local government officials,
including emergency managers and emergency response officials,
know best the threats and vulnerabilities in their areas. The
THIRA process must include the input of local elected and
emergency response officials, and FEMA must be able to audit
States by comparing local risk assessments to the State-level
THIRA. Further, local governments should have the opportunity
to challenge a State THIRA that inadequately reflects their
needs or input.
Flexibility with Accountability.--Any changes to the
existing Federal grant programs should allow Federal funding to
meet individual local needs, and preparedness gaps as
identified at the local level. Effective but sometimes less
politically popular programs, like mitigation, must still
receive funding.
Protect Local Funding.--Since event impact and response are
primarily local in nature, grant funding should support
primarily local prevention and preparedness efforts, as is the
case under the current program structure. It is important that
the vast majority of Federal homeland security grants continue
to fund local prevention and response activities, including
local emergency managers and first responders, and activities
that support their preparedness efforts.
Sustain Terrorism Prevention.--The current emphasis on
supporting law enforcement's terrorism prevention activities
must be maintained. The Federal grant funds should not be used
to support larger State bureaucracies at the expense of
operational counter terrorism preparedness, threat analysis,
and information-sharing activities.
Incentives for Innate Regionalization.--FEMA's proposal
focuses on States and multi-State regions (similar to the FEMA
regions). The homeland security grants must also support
preparedness in metropolitan intra-State and inter-State
regions.
We hope that you will give serious consideration to our suggestions
to move in a deliberate manner, to take time to evaluate how the
current year's funding system is working, and to work with a broad
group of stakeholders to develop proposals for the future based on a
set of principles upon which many of these stakeholders have already
agreed. If we can provide you any further information on this, please
contact Mitchel Herckis, Principal Associate for Federal Relations, the
National League of Cities[.]
National Association of Counties,
National League of Cities,
The United States Conference of Mayors,
U.S. Council of the International Association of Emergency
Managers (IAEM-USA),
International Association of Fire Chiefs,
International Association of Fire Fighters,
National Volunteer Fire Council,
Congressional Fire Services Institute,
National Sheriffs' Association,
Major County Sheriffs' Association,
Major Cities Chiefs Association,
National Homeland Security Association.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much for testifying. I
appreciate it.
Mr. Freed, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF JUDSON M. FREED, DIRECTOR OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
AND HOMELAND SECURITY, TESTIFYING ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES
Mr. Freed. Thank you, Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking Member
Richardson, distinguished Members of the subcommittee.
I am Jud Freed. I am director of emergency management and
homeland security for Ramsey County, Minnesota. I am chair of
the Twin Cities Urban Area Security Initiative and vice chair
of the Subcommittee on Homeland Security and Emergency
Management at the National Association of Counties, or NACo. It
is in that capacity that I appear here today, representing the
elected and appointed officials of America's 3,068 counties. I
can't express to you how honored I am to be here and have a
chance to summarize my written statement.
America's counties echo the concerns voiced here last month
by Mayor Nutter that the NPGP, as currently proposed, has not
been adequately constructed and was developed without adequate
input from local stakeholders. If realized as currently
designed, it will generate even more conflict between the local
and State governments at the expense of the strategic
partnerships built at the cost of more than 10 years of work
and $35 billion in taxpayer funds.
While proposing that the NPGP be a new block grant may be a
worthwhile concept and certainly deserves consideration, it
must not be implemented at the cost of dismantling what has
already been built and consigning local risk to a minor role.
In fact, the history of the States' use of block grants
intended to support public safety has been mixed at best. As an
example, the Emergency Management Performance Grant, or EMPG,
is the only all-hazards program focused on capacity building at
the local level. Despite the fact that it is vital to the basic
emergency management fabric of the Nation, like the new
proposal, EMPG has no requirements on the amount of assistance
that States must disburse. As a result, of the 48 States with
county government structures, the States keep more than half
the funds, on average, and some States keep more than 60
percent of that money for State operations.
Fortunately, in my home State of Minnesota, our State has
chosen to share a great deal more of the EMPG funds with locals
than is the average. However, States like Minnesota, which
might also pass through more than average in the NPGP, may find
themselves at a disadvantage in capability building within
their own organization, and this itself is a disincentive to
further collaboration.
The new NPGP exacerbates this disincentive by adding both
competitiveness, which is adjudicated as the individual States
see fit, and the lack of passthrough requirements. So local
governments must continue to have a significant role in this
process, and Federal aid must be sustained.
It is aid that we ask for. We don't ask for full payment.
Financially, we already pay for the vast majority of the
mission, and we already own most of the equipment that is used
Nation-wide in responses to all hazards. It is our local
firefighters, our local law enforcement, our local EMTs and
paramedics, our local public health, our local medical and
public works personnel who are first on the scene and manage
the long-term recovery. It is our local personnel who staff
those State fusion centers and provide the information and the
personnel needed for the large State teams that respond in a
time of National need.
Now, fittingly, there is some reimbursement for local
expenses during those brief deployments, but we locals pay for
their training and everything else for the other 50 weeks out
of every year. We build the public safety agencies at home that
are robust enough to allow us to send our local personnel out
to someone else at the time of need.
Now, if our mission is public safety merely at the local
level, we can do that, but at the expense of being able to aid
the rest of the country, and that is not what the Nation
requires. It is for that reason, the ability of locals to
collaborate and assist across our State and across the Nation,
that we ask for the continuance of aid in general.
Now, as for the THIRA, it is a good concept, but it must be
given some time to be developed, grow, and be implemented. Can
we really believe that the various THIRA data that is going to
be gathered over the next year will be adequate or accurate,
given the short notice for compliance with these new rules? Any
THIRA must include the input of local elected and emergency
response officials, and FEMA should be able to audit States by
comparing local risk assessment to the State risk assessment.
Local governments should have the opportunity to challenge the
State THIRA that inadequately reflects their needs and input.
What else would NACo and other stakeholders propose? Well,
first, NACo acknowledges that during the almost 2 months that
we have known about this proposal we have yet to solve a
problem that has been 10 years in the making. Every year since
the inception of the Homeland Security grants, the emphasis,
guidance, and the methods for measurement have changed. Now,
DHS says that with the new NPGP, that will put an end to these
frequent changes. However, we assert that it will only stop the
changes at the Federal level. So, instead of one constantly
changing guideline in America, we will now have 50 of them, and
we will still be unable to give you measurement.
So America's 3,068 counties ask that you maintain, for now,
the current suite of grants and emphasize maintenance of the
capabilities we have already built over the past 10 years as we
work with all of our stakeholders to develop program reforms
and new approaches and work with our States to develop a THIRA
that is actually of value. Then we can all make informed
decisions as to what we should emphasize and how. We also ask
that you maintain the core principles for developing new
programs that we outlined in my written statement submitted to
you earlier.
In closing, I again thank you for the invitation to speak
here today. NACo looks forward to working with this
subcommittee, with Members of Congress in general, and with our
colleagues and other stakeholders to build an effective and
measurable homeland security enterprise in the United States.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Freed follows:]
Prepared Statement of Judson M. Freed
April 26, 2012
Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking Member Richardson, distinguished
Members of the subcommittee, I am Judson Freed, director of the Office
of Emergency Management and Homeland Security for Ramsey County,
Minnesota; chair of the Twin Cities Urban Area Security Initiative,
Government Affairs chair for the Association of Minnesota Emergency
Managers; and vice chair of the Subcommittee on Homeland Security and
Emergency Management at the National Association of Counties (NACo). It
is in this later capacity that I appear here today--representing the
elected and appointed county officials in our Nation's 3,068 counties.
I cannot express to you how much I appreciate the chance to speak with
you today, and how honored I am to be here.
America's 3,068 counties echo the concerns so eloquently presented
to you last month by Mayor Michael Nutter of Philadelphia and the
United States Conference of Mayors (USCM). Specifically, that the
National Preparedness Grant Program (or NPGP) as currently proposed has
not been adequately constructed, and was developed without adequate
input from local stakeholders. As Mayor Nutter pointed out, if the NPGP
is realized as currently designed, it will generate even more conflict
between the local and State governments at the expense of the strategic
partnerships built at the cost of more than 10 years and $35 billion
dollars of taxpayer funds.
On behalf of NACo, I make this assertion based on the information
released by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) about the NPGP, and after reading
FEMA's Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 201 or guidance for the
development of the Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment
(THIRA) for Preparedness Grants released just a few short weeks ago.
The formulas, distribution, and intent of funding is more unclear than
ever. The level of input of local stakeholders in constructing the
program and in the allocation of funds under the program as currently
designed is limited at best and equally non-transparent.
While proposing that the NPGP be a new block grant administered by
States may be a worthwhile concept and deserves consideration, it must
not be implemented at the risk of dismantling what has been built and
consigning local risk to a minor role--second to the needs of a State
or region. The history of the States' use of block grants intended for
support to local public safety has been mixed and tangled at best.
For instance, the Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG) is
arguably the most effective all-hazard program focused on capacity
building for all-hazards preparedness, response, recovery, and
mitigation at the State and local levels.
As a State-administered block grant, EMPG is intended to be a pass-
through to locals, and requires a 50% financial match by locals.
However, despite the fact that it is vital to the basic Emergency
Management structure of the Nation, the program has no requirements on
the amount of assistance that States must disperse to support local
emergency managers. As a result, in the 48 States with county
government structures, there is a range of some States keeping more
than 70% of the funds and some States holding on to only 30% of funds
over the past 4 years--and on average, States retain 52%. And even so,
counties across the Nation can demonstrate to you the capabilities
being developed.
Fortunately, in my home State of Minnesota, the State has sub-
allocated to local emergency managers much more of EMPG than in many
other States. However, States like Minnesota, which do pass through
much more than average, may find themselves at a disadvantage in
capability building within their own organization. This alone is a
disincentive to collaboration.
Let me further explain. Across all States, more than 2,000 State
full-time employees are paid for in whole or part by EMPG funds (some
40 per State), compared to funding just 4,300 mostly part-time local
personnel across more than 4,000 local jurisdictions (3,068 counties
and a thousand-plus municipalities). While Minnesota counties have been
fortunate that both Republican and Democrat Governors and State
Directors of Emergency Management and Homeland Security are willing and
politically able to resist the National trend and support us at
something close to the 50/50 match--what if they are forced out of that
political ability?
The new NPGP structure will encourage that disparity, and by adding
both competitiveness (adjudicated as the individual States see fit) and
lack of requirements (allowing self-interest and political pressure to
trump risk and need) to the concept of the block grant, less will be
done at the local level. As proposed, the NPGP will exacerbate the
problems and competition, rather than solve the issues this
subcommittee so rightly sees as needing attention.
That is the reason we are here today. Congress is unwilling to
appropriate sustained funding to the suite of homeland security grants,
and sending less to States. The States then pass through less and the
locals get less. This is not to say that States do not do good work
with their agencies or work with many local stakeholders. But it is to
say that when money gets tight and there is no firm mandate to work
cooperatively, less will be shared and our resilience may be
compromised.
So, local governments must continue to have a significant role in
the process, and Federal aid must be sustained. And it is aid we ask
for, not full payment. Financially we pay for the vast majority of the
mission, and we have virtually all of the assets in preparing,
preventing, responding, and recovering from all emergency events, no
matter the cause. OUR firefighters, OUR law enforcement officers, OUR
emergency mangers, OUR EMT's and medics, OUR public health, medical,
and public works personnel are the first on the scene and manage the
long-term recovery. And it is our personnel who go out other
jurisdictions across the country in time of National need.
State fusion centers? Who is staffing them? Mostly OUR local
people. U.S. Disaster Medical Assistance Teams, Disaster Mortuary
Operational Response Teams, Search and Rescue teams, Emergency Medical
Service Strike Forces? Those are OUR folks deployed to safeguard other
communities. As one example, Minnesota's Incident Management Team
members were local emergency managers deployed to New York and Boston
after Hurricane Irene in 2011. As another example, Ramsey County sent
deputies, police officers, firefighters, and public health
professionals to areas affected by Katrina in 2005--as did many local
governments. Fittingly, there was some reimbursement for local expenses
during those deployments, but local agencies pay for the other 50 weeks
in any given year. We also train them, and we work to build public
safety agencies at home that are robust enough to allow us to send help
to others in times of great need.
If our mission is public safety merely at the local level, we can
do that at the expense of providing aid Nationally. But that is not
what our Nation requires. It is our job to take care of local needs;
the States' jobs to support State-wide needs; and the Federal
Government's job to support Nation-wide need and provide incentives for
collaboration. It is for that reason--the ability of locals to
collaborate and assist across the State and across the Nation--that we
ask for Federal aid, and that is why it must be sustained.
How do we measure National need when it is always changing, and
what is the solution? We too want to ensure that we build National
capacity, but measurements must be flexible as no States, regions, or
communities have uniform and identical risk and need.
What risks should we address? The THIRA for Preparedness Grants
concept is an enhancement of old assessments, but must be given some
time to be developed, grow, and be implemented in States, regions, and
communities across the Nation. Can we really believe that the various
THIRA data will be accurate given the short notice for compliance with
new rules? Also, do local governments have the personnel capacity to
produce an accurate THIRA? Not currently and this, too, will take time
to build!
Again, the THIRA can be a great idea given time, but the proposed
guidance is only close to real risk assessment in concept. Any THIRA
must include the input of local elected and emergency response
officials, and FEMA must be able to audit States by comparing local
risk assessments to the State-level THIRA. Further, local governments
should have the opportunity to challenge a State THIRA that
inadequately reflects their needs or input.
So what else would NACo and other stakeholders propose?
First, we must acknowledge that during the roughly 2 months we have
known about this new proposal, we have not yet solved an issue that was
10 years in the making. Every year, since the inception of the suite of
homeland security grants, the emphasis of the awards, the guidance for
expenditures, and the methods for measuring success at the local,
State, and Federal level have changed.
According to the DHS' proposal--the NPGP will stop these frequent
changes; however, we assert that they will only stop the changes at the
Federal level. So, instead of one constantly-changing guideline in
America, there will now be 50 of them. As we see in EMPG, each State
and region will administer the NPGP differently. Further, as the NPGP
is not solely based on allocation, risk, and need, its competitive
component will pit States--and even regions within States--against each
other for funds. And as we cannot ensure the level of transparency of
the program in all States, we will still be unable to measure success.
We do know that when the assistance goes to local units of
government, to fund State and Federal mandates as in the EMPG program,
we can show effectiveness. In 2011, look at Missouri; look at
Minneapolis; look at numerous other local responses to destructive
tornados in communities last year. Look at the Twin Cities Urban Area
Security Initiative response to the I-35 bridge collapse. The systems
built over the years since 9/11 worked. Numbers? No. Measurable? Yes.
Progress.
Therefore, America's 3,068 counties ask that you maintain, for now,
the current suite of grants and emphasize maintenance of the
capabilities we have built over the past 10 years as we work with all
stakeholders to develop program reforms which incorporate the
successful elements of past and current programs and identify new
approaches. In the interim, that will give us more time to produce an
effective THIRA.
Thereafter, we can provide Congress, DHS, and our communities with
a realistic assessment of what the risks, capabilities, and gaps really
are. Then, Congress and DHS can make an informed decision as to what
should be emphasized and how.
Cooperative agreements are not bad, but they must be cooperative.
Join local governments and a full range of first responders charged
with preventing, protecting against, and responding when incidents--
man-made and natural--occur, to craft a real solution even though it
will take time. We need to identify, working with the States and with
you here, what we mean by Homeland Security. Is it just terrorism? Then
what about hurricanes, tornadoes, tsunamis, earthquakes, and other
disasters?
Also, we ask you to maintain the following core principles to guide
reform of the suite of homeland security grant programs:
Increased Transparency.--The programs must be clear and
understandable to the Federal Government and the public as to
how the States are distributing funds, why they are making
these decisions, and where the funds are going.
Greater Local Involvement.--Local government officials,
including emergency managers and emergency response officials,
know best the threats and vulnerabilities in their areas. The
THIRA process must include the input of local elected and
emergency response officials, and FEMA must be able to audit
States by comparing local risk assessments to the State-level
THIRA. Further, local governments should have the opportunity
to challenge a State THIRA that inadequately reflects their
needs or input.
Flexibility with Accountability.--Any changes to the
existing Federal grant programs should allow Federal funding to
meet individual local needs and preparedness gaps as identified
at the local level. Effective but sometimes less politically
popular programs, like mitigation, must still receive funding.
Protect Local Funding.--Since event impact and response are
primarily local in nature, grant funding should primarily
support local prevention and preparedness efforts, as is the
case under the current program structure. It is important that
the vast majority of Federal homeland security grants continue
to fund local prevention and response activities, including
local emergency managers and first responders, and activities
that support their preparedness efforts.
Sustain Terrorism Prevention.--The current emphasis on
supporting law enforcement's terrorism prevention activities
must be maintained. The Federal grant funds should not be used
to support larger State bureaucracies at the expense of
operational counterterrorism preparedness, threat analysis, and
information-sharing activities.
Incentives for Innate Regionalization.--FEMA's proposal
focuses on States and multi-State regions (similar to the FEMA
regions). The homeland security grants must also support
preparedness in metropolitan intra-State and inter-State
regions.
In closing, I again thank you for the invitation to speak today,
and NACo looks forward to continuing to work with Congress, Members of
this committee, and our colleagues and other stakeholders to build a
realistic, effective, and measurable Homeland Security enterprise in
America.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you so very much.
Thanks to all of you for being here. It is very important
for us to hear from you before we make our decisions.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes. My first question is
for Mr. Davis.
Mr. Davis, you mentioned the draw-down issue in your
statement. Knowing that the States are trying to work with FEMA
to spend down these previously appropriated funds, FEMA issued
guidelines earlier this year in an effort to provide
flexibility to grantees and assist in the draw-down effort.
Has this been helpful to you? First question. Next, what is
your view of the reduction of the period of performance? Will
you be able to complete projects within the reduced time line,
especially considering the limited opportunity for extensions?
So I would like to ask you, Mr. Davis. Maybe Mr. Koon might
want to comment on that question, as well. You are recognized.
Mr. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
If I could start with the second question first, because I
think that it is a very important question. I think that, you
know, the reduction in time for the performance of the grants,
because we are reducing the amount of money we have to spend, I
don't think that it is going have that significant of an impact
on it us.
I mean, the reality is, when we look at, say, the State of
Colorado, we are talking about a total of $5 million in grants.
Two-and-a-half million of that is going to a UASI in Denver.
So, really, we are talking about some significantly reduced
grant funding, and we can use that funding to sustain the
things that we have established. I think that we will be able
to comply with those shortened performance periods without a
problem. I don't see that being a problem in Colorado.
With regard to your first question, I think that FEMA
giving us additional latitude in how we spend the money is
always a good thing. I think that we are--you know, the closer
you get to the ground, the better able you are to see what the
problems are and address them. Again, as I mentioned in my
opening comments, I think that the State is in a position to
see where that money should best be spent around the State.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Bilirakis. Mr. Koon, do you wish to comment?
Mr. Koon. Yes, sir, Congressman Bilirakis. The flexibility
that FEMA granted in the spending of those has been moderately
helpful. There are still certain requirements in there that are
keeping them within the lanes that I alluded to earlier.
Fortunately, when Florida allocates these dollars, we also
allocate projects that are not funded. So for those projects
that we will not be able to complete in time, we are able to go
further down on the list and be able to execute some of those.
Still, however, based on the shortened time frame, there
will be some projects that we will not be able to complete in
time. Therefore, we will likely leave some dollars unspent as a
result of the shortened time frame.
Mr. Bilirakis. All right.
Next question for Ms. Walker, Mr. Freed. From a local
perspective, will the reduction in the period of performance
impact your ability to complete certain projects?
Ms. Walker first, please. You are recognized.
Ms. Walker. The time line, the reduction in force, our time
line in expending the funding, we feel that we need to focus on
the projects of where the money is spent, not how fast we spend
it, but, you know, on the quality and the specific projects. We
can always spend money on equipment very quickly, but at the
same time there are some projects that are a little bit more
complex that would take a little bit more time. The shortened
time frame----
Mr. Bilirakis. Why don't you give me a specific example of
that?
Ms. Walker. For example, you can buy equipment, personal
protection, PPEs, you can buy radio equipment very quickly,
expend funding, but there are some infrastructure projects that
may take a little longer. By the time the funding gets to the
local level, it takes a little longer to implement those,
especially if you are putting in communications capabilities
that usually take a little longer. They are multi-year
projects, and they are being phased in.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
Mr. Freed.
Mr. Freed. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. The other part that
plays into all this are the legal delays that are introduced,
as well. For instance, if you want to mount a videoconferencing
monitor in your EOC to be able to talk to the other emergency
operations centers, you need, in part, to do an environmental
impact study, get all that approved by the various lawyers.
So when we start restricting down to 2 years or even less--
because within, for instance, our State, in addition to
whatever the Federal requirement is, the State has to close out
their paperwork even before that--it makes it very, very
difficult to do any real planning for the money. We end up then
buying big bulk things that we know we can get done right away,
rather than perhaps a slightly longer project.
Certainly, you can't extend projects above grant deadlines
as they are now. It make it very difficult to plan further than
this grant cycle to get anything actually accomplished. So it
is a problem for us, sir.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much.
Now I would like to recognize Ranking Member Richardson for
5 minutes.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, thank you all for being here.
I want to talk a little bit about THIRA. Earlier this
month, FEMA released the guidance for the Threat and Hazard
Identification and Risk Assessment. Does this guidance provide
the necessary information you need to conduct a comprehensive,
accurate assessment? Do you believe that THIRA will provide
sufficient information to the States to implement your
strategic plans and allocate based upon the limited resources
that you have been provided?
Why don't we start with you, sir?
Mr. Davis. Thank you, ma'am.
I think that THIRA is a good start. You know, it provides
an algorithm that allows us to try and quantify the risk. What
concerns me, though, is that it is--you know, as long as we
have it entirely a numerical formula, it doesn't take into
consideration certain other things.
For example, if we--part of that algorithm is the number
of, say, for example, terrorist screening center hits, you
know, we need to look at what the nature of those hits are. In
Colorado, we have a lot of TSC hits because Denver is a port of
entry at DIA. So if people are coming into DIA and then moving
on to another city, really is that something that is adequately
assigned to Denver?
I think that we have to make sure that we have an
opportunity to have some human review of the numbers that we
come up with in the THIRA in determining how we best allocate
funding in Homeland Security grants.
Ms. Richardson. Have you shared those concerns yet with the
Department?
Mr. Davis. We have had the opportunity to talk about that
through the GHSAC, and they were receptive, although, you know,
this is--I mean, I think that this is something they are still
working on.
Ms. Richardson. Would anyone else like to speak to that
question?
Mr. Koon. Yes, ma'am, Representative Richardson. In Florida
and from my colleagues at NEMA, we absolutely believe that
conducting THIRA is the right way to move forward. It will help
us ascertain what we have accomplished in the last 10 years and
also analyze and understand where our gaps are so that we can
better spend our dollars in the years ahead and make sure that
we close that gap and achieve measurable results so that we can
prove to the taxpayers that our dollars are being spent
appropriately to achieve the National security that we are
looking for.
We also believe that this has to be driven from the local
level. I concur with what my colleagues said, that a THIRA
needs to take into consideration from the local level up to the
State level so that we can truly understand what the needs of
the State are across the State and that it should be used,
therefore, to drive the projects that you are funding in the
years forward.
As to the guidance that has been provided by FEMA thus far,
we are still analyzing that and trying to determine whether it,
in fact, is going to be enough guidance for us to accomplish
that by the end of the year.
Ms. Richardson. Do you have a means to communicate with the
Department?
Mr. Koon. Yes, ma'am, at NEMA we have frequent and on-going
conversations with our colleagues at FEMA. They have been
receptive on hearing our concerns.
Ms. Richardson. Okay.
Ms. Walker.
Ms. Walker. Yes, Ms. Richardson, thank you. The guidance
that has been released, we still at the local level have great
concerns that there is not enough guidance out there of how
locals will get involved with the State THIRA. There has been a
lot of assessments that have already been done in the past.
Coming from a UASI region, we have done gap analysis, threat
assessments to the target capability list and the core
capabilities that have been out the last few years that we have
been working toward. So what is the transition toward the
THIRA, and how does that transition work so that all the work
that has been done is actually seamless? That hasn't been
cleared up.
Then some States are still, like Mr. Koon was saying,
working through and analyzing the guidance from the THIRA. But
right now there is no clear definitive that locals will be
allowed to engage with the States; there is no requirement.
Ms. Richardson. Have you shared that feedback with the
Department?
Ms. Walker. Yes. We have been working with FEMA on that and
providing that feedback and having that dialogue, yes, ma'am.
Ms. Richardson. Okay.
And you, sir?
Mr. Freed. Representative Richardson, the THIRA concept
actually is--we believe it is a pretty good concept. What I am
worried about in general is the time line for this initial go-
through. With the short time that we have to produce the THIRA,
particularly since none of us have ever done it this way
before, what I am worried about is that the information that we
generate will be somewhat less than accurate as we all sort of
struggle with this new thing.
It would be a much better tack, I believe, if this was
extended out for 1 more year and we didn't make it on this
very, very short time line. There is just too much unknown
about it to guarantee to you or to the Department of Homeland
Security that everything that we are going to give them is
really accurate as opposed to best guess or simple guess.
Ms. Richardson. Have you had an opportunity to share this
feedback?
Mr. Freed. We have begun the sharing of that feedback with
our colleagues, yes.
Ms. Richardson. Okay.
Mr. Chairman, could I ask one last question of this panel?
Mr. Bilirakis. Absolutely.
Ms. Richardson. Ms. Walker, Mr. Davis made his position
clear in terms of the State-centric approach, for obvious
reasons given his role. But I think it is important also for
the committee if you could share why State-centric is sometimes
problematic from a local level, just so we have both sides that
have weighed in with their position.
Ms. Walker. Sure, Ms. Richardson.
We believe that States are--they have been partners, we
have been very good partners over the years, and that we need
to continue that. But at the same time, with new guidance and
the information that is coming out with the NPGP, it just makes
it a little bit more challenging in the lack of clear guidance
on how we can continue to work together. Some of the thoughts
that we may have is that, you know, from a local perspective,
which priority takes precedence? Can we come to an agreement on
funding, and how do we support the priorities that might come
out?
But as a local, we still continue to work with the States
and also work with our Federal partners. I think the
conversation needs to continue, to work out the details.
Ms. Richardson. Mayor Nutter had testified that they were
not as involved in the ultimate process on the front end. Would
you find that to be the case?
Ms. Walker. Yes. At this time, with this guidance that has
come out, we want to be more engaged. The guidance came out
prior to engaging locals.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
I now recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. Turner,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just have a question for Mr. Koon.
You mentioned Tier 1 cities should be funded directly;
also, transit and port authorities that cross over State lines
should be able to apply directly to the NPGP. Can you explain
why you think this is necessary? What would the mechanics be
from where we are now?
Mr. Koon. Yes, sir. Thank you, Representative.
With regards to UASI funding, NEMA's proposal recommends
that we continue to fund the Tier 1 UASI cities. We recognize
the unique challenge that those largest cities provide with
regards to securing them against threats to the homeland. We
also recognize the fact that they play a vital role in
America's economy and America's way of life. So we believe it
is incumbent that we retain Federal funding, Federal-level
funding, for those cities.
I say that as the emergency manager for a State that does
not have a Tier 1 city, because we recognize that anything that
happens to New York City, to Boston, to Chicago, to Los
Angeles, would have economic ramifications across the country
and would impact Florida's economy. So we believe that we
should continue to fund Tier 1 cities separately from the NPGP
projects.
With regard to the port and transit systems, in Florida our
ports are directly adjacent to the surrounding communities;
they are next to the retail infrastructure, to the housing
infrastructure, to everything else that goes on there. So we
believe that they should be considered as part of that overall
system.
Rather than creating them as a walled fortress, they need
to take into account the fact that the power comes from outside
that port. The infrastructure that supports the communication,
the labor pool, the roads, other infrastructure that supports
that is a regionally-based system. We believe that that
infrastructure can best be protected by considering that as an
entire system as opposed to an individual entity within that
system.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much.
I appreciate it. This has been very informative, a great
discussion. Thank you very much for your testimony. I will go
ahead and dismiss the first panel. Thank you.
I would like to welcome our second panel. Thank you again
for your attendance.
Our first witness is Commissioner Richard Daddario. I hope
I pronounced that right. Commissioner Daddario is the deputy
commissioner for counterterrorism with the New York City Police
Department. Welcome, sir. Prior to assuming this position,
Commissioner Daddario served as the U.S. Department of
Justice's attache in Moscow and as an assistant U.S. attorney
for the Southern District of New York. Commissioner Daddario
received his undergraduate degree and law degree from
Georgetown University.
Following Commissioner Daddario, we will receive testimony
from Mr. Robert Maloney. Mr. Maloney is the director of the
Baltimore Office of Emergency Management. Before joining
Baltimore OEM, Mr. Maloney served as the chief of staff of the
Baltimore City Fire Department, an emergency medical services
lieutenant, and a firefighter/paramedic. Mr. Maloney has served
in the United States Naval Reserve, and thank you very much for
your service, sir. Mr. Maloney is a graduate of Towson
University and the Johns Hopkins University master's in public
safety leadership program.
Next, we will receive testimony from Chief Hank Clemmensen.
Mr. Clemmensen is the chief of the Palatine Rural Fire
Protection District, a position he has held since 2001. Chief
Clemmensen is also vice president of the International
Association of Fire Chiefs. Chief Clemmensen has a bachelor's
of science from Northern Illinois University and has completed
graduate studies in public administration through Northern
Illinois University.
Following Chief Clemmensen, we will receive testimony from
Mr. Richard Wainio. Mr. Wainio is the Tampa Port director and
chief executive officer, a position he has held since 2005. Mr.
Wainio has worked in the maritime industry for nearly 35 years,
including 23 years employed at the Panama Canal, and serving as
the organization's senior economist, director of economic
research and market development, and director of executive
planning. Mr. Wainio earned his bachelor's degree from Davidson
College and his master's in international management from the
Thunderbird School of Global Management.
Finally, we will receive testimony from Mr. Michael
DePallo. Mr. DePallo is the director and general manager of the
Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation, a position he has held
since April 1996. Mr. DePallo has also worked at Bay Area Rapid
Transit District, the Massachusetts Bay Transportation
Authority, and the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation
Authority. Mr. DePallo served as the chair of the American
Public Transportation Association's Security Affairs Steering
Committee and chair of the Mass Transit Sector Coordinating
Council. Mr. DePallo earned a master of city planning degree,
specializing in public transportation, from the University of
Pennsylvania.
I would like to welcome all of our witnesses. We look
forward to your testimony. Your entire written statements will
be entered into the record, and I ask you to summarize your
testimony for 5 minutes.
Why don't we start with Commissioner Daddario? Welcome,
sir. You are recognized.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD DADDARIO, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
COUNTERTERRORISM BUREAU, NEW YORK CITY POLICY DEPARTMENT
Mr. Daddario. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Richardson, Congressman Turner. Thank you for this opportunity
to represent the New York City Police Department today before
this subcommittee. My prepared remarks address this committee's
interest in the proposal in the President's fiscal year 2013
budget request to consolidate grant programs into a new
National Preparedness Grant Program.
As you know, New York City is committed to the fight
against terrorism and commits enormous resources toward
security. Twice attacked, often threatened, we cannot do
otherwise, but we cannot go it alone; we need Federal
assistance. The NYPD relies heavily on DHS Federal support,
critical for its counterterrorism programs, terrorism
investigations, and high-visibility operational deployments.
DHS grant funding has played a crucial in helping the NYPD
carry out its mission and keeping New York City and the New
York City metropolitan area and the region safe. For this
reason, any time significant changes in the FEMA grant process
are proposed we want to be part of the discussion.
Today I will touch on a few concerns we have about the
President's fiscal year 2013 budget request and the vision for
this new program.
First, it is important that a clear line be drawn between
funding to address terrorism and funding related to other
risks, which are commonly referred to as ``all hazards.'' On
this issue, we think the focus for the city of New York must
remain on terrorism rather than other hazards.
Given the threats New York City and the rest of the country
continues to face, it is necessary to provide high-risk
municipalities with targeted counterterrorism dollars. For this
reason, it is absolutely essential that the newly-formed DHS
grant program remain aligned with the 9/11 Act's objective of
providing Federal grant funds to prevent, protect against,
mitigate, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism.
Having said that, you will understand why we urge you to
maintain the Urban Areas Security Initiative, the UASI program.
It is necessary to have a stand-alone program that provides the
highest-risk urban areas with targeted funding, and that is
what UASI does. It directs limited Homeland Security grant
funds available to the programs that are most effective in the
cities that are at most risk. Moreover, the existing UASI
governance framework works well and already reflects the
principles of the Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk
Assessment. The UASI framework builds and sustains region-wide
capabilities. The framework assures that capabilities are
cross-jurisdictional, readily deployable, and multipurpose.
Now I will shift now to a couple of process issues,
beginning with grant periods, where a rigid 24-month period is
under consideration. Grant periods must balance the goal of
efficiency with the need for flexibility. Building and
sustaining capabilities involve long-term commitments. Grant
cycles of 2 years with limited to no extensions are not
realistic. They will prevent jurisdictions from undertaking
innovative multi-year projects.
It is important to note that, in many instances, municipal
procurement rules, for example, require the agency to have the
funding in hand before they can even begin the contracting
process. Procurement processes can take up to a year to
complete. Moreover, a 24-month period will encourage
municipalities to pay vendors the full value of any contract up
front. They will not allow agencies to responsibly manage their
vendors and contracts. For these reasons, it is imperative that
the grant period remain at 36 months, with extensions provided
as necessary and justified.
The next process issue relates to bureaucratic delay.
Congress should seek to minimize the layers of bureaucracy
involved in administering DHS grant programs. These layers of
bureaucracy can create unnecessary cost and delay. For example,
today the NYPD must go through two intermediaries before
investment justifications for key security projects even get to
FEMA. FEMA's responses have to go through the same layers.
These layers can result in months and months' worth of delay on
some of the most straightforward issues.
Finally, I want to make a pitch for operational programs.
To the extent that Congress chooses to continue to set aside
funding specific to port and transit asset protection, it is
essential that these dollars not be limited to capital programs
but include operational programs as well. I will give you an
example. For example, the NYPD has been responsible for
security of the subway for nearly 2 decades, but it is the MTA,
not the NYPD, which is the direct grantee. That simply does not
make sense.
Thank you. I will end here, and I will do my best to answer
any questions you may have. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Daddario follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard Daddario
April 26, 2012
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Richardson, and Members
of the subcommittee. Thank you for this opportunity to represent the
New York City Police Department before the Subcommittee on Emergency
Preparedness, Response, and Communications. For the record, my name is
Richard Daddario. I am the deputy commissioner of counterterrorism in
the New York City Police Department.
My prepared remarks address this committee's interest in the
proposal in the President's fiscal year 2013 budget request to
consolidate grant programs into a new National Preparedness Grant
Program. As you know, New York City is committed to the fight against
terrorism and commits enormous resources towards security. Twice
attacked, often threatened, we could not do otherwise, but we cannot go
it alone. The NYPD relies heavily on DHS Federal grants to support
critical counterterrorism programs, terrorism investigations, and high-
visibility operational deployments.
DHS grant funding has played a crucial role in helping the NYPD
carry out its mission of keeping New York City safe. For this reason,
any time significant changes to the FEMA grant process are proposed, we
at the NYPD want to be a part of the discussion.
Today, I will touch on a few concerns we have about the President's
fiscal year 2013 budget request and the vision for the National
Preparedness Grant Program (NPGP).
First, it is important that a clear line be drawn between funding
to address terrorism and funding related to other risks, which are
commonly referred to as all-hazards. On this issue, we think the focus
must remain on terrorism, rather than other hazards. Given the threats
New York City and the rest of the country continue to face, it is
necessary to provide high-risk municipalities with targeted
counterterrorism dollars. For this reason, it is absolutely essential
that the newly-formed DHS grant program remain aligned with the 9/11
Act's objective of providing Federal grant funds to prevent, protect
against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism.
Having said that, you will understand why we urge you to maintain
the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI). It is necessary to have a
stand-alone program that provides the highest-risk urban areas with
targeted funding. That is what UASI does. It directs the limited
homeland security grant funds available to the programs that are most
effective; and the cities that are most at risk.
Moreover, the existing UASI governance framework works well and
already reflects the principles of the Threat and Hazard Identification
and Risk Assessment. The UASI framework builds and sustains region-wide
capabilities: The framework ensures that capabilities are cross-
jurisdictional, readily deployable, and multi-purpose.
I will shift now to a couple of process issues, beginning with
grant periods where a rigid 24-month period is under consideration.
Grant periods must balance the goal of efficiency with the need for
flexibility. Building and sustaining capabilities involves long-term
commitments. Grant cycles of 2 years with limited to no extensions are
not realistic. They will prevent jurisdictions from undertaking
innovative, multi-year projects.
It is important to note that in many instances, municipal
procurement rules require the agency to have the funding in-hand before
they can even begin the contracting process. And, procurement processes
can take up to a year to complete. Moreover, a 24-month period will
encourage municipalities to pay vendors the full value of any contract
up-front. This will not allow agencies to responsibly manage their
vendors and contracts. For these reasons, it is imperative that the
grant period remain at 36 months, with extensions provided as necessary
and justified.
The next process issue relates to bureaucratic delay. Congress
should seek to minimize the layers of bureaucracy involved in
administering DHS grant programs. These layers of bureaucracy create
unnecessary costs and delay. For example, today, the NYPD must go
through two intermediaries before investment justifications for key
security projects even get to FEMA. And FEMA's responses must go
through the same burdensome channels before they reach the NYPD. These
layers can result in months and months' worth of delay on some of the
most straightforward issues.
Finally, I want to make a pitch for operational programs. To the
extent that Congress chooses to continue to set aside funding specific
to port and transit asset protection, it is essential that these
dollars not be limited to capital programs, but include operational
programs as well.
Often, the agency charged with providing for safety and security of
a transit or port asset is not the agency responsible for the capital
projects associated with it. Take for example the New York City subway
system. The NYPD has been responsible for safety and security of
subways for nearly 2 decades. Yet it is the MTA, not the NYPD, which
owns and oversees capital programs associated with MTA facilities.
Thank you. I would be happy to answer any of your questions.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, sir. Appreciate it.
I now recognize Mr. Maloney for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. MALONEY, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT, BALTIMORE, MARYLAND
Mr. Maloney. Good afternoon, Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking
Member Richardson, and Members of the subcommittee.
I am Robert Maloney, the director of the Baltimore City
Mayor's Office of Emergency Management and chairman of the
Urban Area Work Group for the Central Maryland Region. I have
the humbling responsibility of coordinating and administering
both local and regional Federal preparedness grant funds. On
behalf of Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake, it is my pleasure to
appear before you today to discuss proposed changes to the
Department of Homeland Security grant structure.
We are fortunate in Maryland. Governor O'Malley and
Baltimore Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake believe in homeland
security as a National priority. The Baltimore Urban Area
Security Initiative represents the geographic areas of the
Central Maryland Region. DHS places Baltimore in the top 25
percent of urban areas with respect to asset-based risk.
Each month, the emergency managers and public safety
leaders in the seven jurisdictions of the Baltimore UASI come
together to discuss regional public safety and homeland
security issues. Together, we have made significant investments
in equipment, trained our personnel, enhanced our technology,
and upgraded our emergency operations centers.
But, more importantly, we have utilized these grants as the
impetus to organize the appropriate stakeholders around one of
the most important issues our Nation faces: Its homeland
security. The value of the relationships fostered as a result
of the infrastructure developed around UASI funds is
inestimable. Our UASI has been able to unite public safety
leaders across city and county borders. Other UASI groups have
even crossed State lines.
The new proposed grant consolidation does not take into
account the inter-jurisdictional and inter-State achievements
made. Discarding the individual grant programs means discarding
the infrastructure built around them and threatens the
relationship cultivated around our collaborative commitment to
National homeland security. Instead of fostering collaboration
to build capabilities, the proposed consolidation will promote
competition by having local jurisdictions compete within their
own State to win funds.
Over the past several years, DHS has administered grants to
my locality and region to build our capabilities. Over the past
2 years, Homeland Security grant programs have taken drastic
cuts. In fiscal year 2011, the funds were cut by 50 percent. In
2012, the Department of Homeland Security eliminated seven
grant programs for fiscal year 2011 to adjust for additional
decreases in overall funding. On top of these cuts, DHS has now
proposed to consolidate the eight remaining grant programs into
a single grant program known as the National Preparedness Grant
Program.
State and local jurisdictions were forced to shift
capabilities developed or maintained under eliminated funding
streams to other programs. Before we have the chance to make
sense of the impact of these cuts in a system of grants with
limited flexibility, we are being asked to undergo an overhaul
of the system with little State and local input.
We do not have evidence to indicate that consolidation is a
necessary or appropriate step. In the current fiscal climate,
these cuts have hit all of us very hard. We are now focusing on
sustaining the capabilities that we have developed through
these grant programs.
Despite the decrease in funding, it is imperative that all
stakeholders understand the mandate for preparedness at the
local level has not decreased. Since our mayor took office in
2010, Baltimore city alone has experienced a major blizzard, a
tornado, several flooding events, Hurricane Irene, Tropical
Storm Lee, and an earthquake. Now more than ever we need to
make sure our investments are well-informed. Consolidation
after a series of consecutive funding cuts is too much too
soon.
We also have concerns about how the Threat Hazard
Identification and Risk Assessment will inform local-level
capability investments and how the State administrative
agencies will develop additional grant writing and
administrating capabilities in the next year. Again, little
local or State input was requested to develop the process.
As a city, a region, and a Nation, we have worked very hard
and utilized DHS grant funds to close many capability gaps over
the past several years. Some of these investments include cell
phone tracking, a State-wide interoperable radio system, a
regional radio communications center, and training for our
primary adult resource center, Maryland Shock Trauma.
Is there still a need for Federal Homeland Security funding
to State and local jurisdictions? Yes. In fact, the need is
increasing. Local jurisdictions are struggling to maintain
basic services in Baltimore. We struggle simply to keep
firehouses opening. This funding is critical now more than ever
to maintain the long-term viability of our investments.
Is revamping the entire grant structure going to eliminate
redundancy and ensure significant value attributable to all
investments? Absolutely not.
Our systems reflect that we are more prepared, but we need
to figure out what is working best and what is not working
before we throw everything together and hope for the best.
Our Federal partners should know that the local
jurisdictions do not have contingency plans or alternate source
of funding. There is no money. Local and State officials need
to be involved with figuring out how we assess our preparedness
and develop cost-effective solutions. With a little bit of
time, science, and ingenuity, together we will be able to say
with confidence what the next best step is. Until then, I
implore you to prevent an ill-informed and hasty decision. We
must continue to invest in preparedness, and discontinue cuts
in funding critical to the development and sustaining our
capabilities. I hope that you will continue to fund our
programs, that we reconsider additional funding in the future,
and delay the proposed consolidation until we have the
appropriate evidence to inform such a major change.
Thank you for allowing me to appear before you today. I
welcome any questions from the committee.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Maloney follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert M. Maloney
April 26, 2012
Good afternoon Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking Member Richardson, and
Members of the subcommittee. I am Robert Maloney, the director of the
Baltimore City Mayor's Office of Emergency Management and chairman of
the Urban Area Workgroup for the Central Maryland Region. I have the
humbling responsibility of coordinating and administering both local
and regional Federal preparedness grant funds. I am a veteran of the
United States Navy. I served 8 years in the reserves as a corpsman for
the United States Marines Corps and was deployed to Fallujah, Iraq in
2005. On behalf of Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake, it is my pleasure to
appear before you today to discuss proposed changes to the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) grant program structure. We are fortunate in
Maryland. Governor Martin O'Malley and Baltimore Mayor Stephanie
Rawlings-Blake believe in homeland security as a National priority.
They work in concert to make certain all stakeholders spend homeland
security grant program funding as efficiently and effectively as
possible, utilizing a systematic and risk-based approach.
The Baltimore Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) represents the
geographic area of the Central Maryland Region, and consists of the
city of Baltimore, the State Capital, and five of the six most
populated counties in the State that reside outside of the National
Capitol Region (NCR). The region has over 3 million residents and is
the 19th-largest metropolitan statistical area (MSA) in the Nation.
There are significant important Federal Government assets in the
region, including the Aberdeen Proving Ground, Fort Meade, the National
Security Agency (NSA), the United States Naval Academy, and the
headquarters of the Social Security Administration and the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services. Baltimore is the home of 18th-ranked
port in total cargo tonnage in the United States. DHS places Baltimore
in the top 25% of urban areas with respect to asset-based risk.
Additionally, its location on the Eastern Seaboard creates significant
risk for hurricanes, storm surge, and flooding.
Each month, the emergency managers and public safety leaders in the
seven jurisdictions of the Baltimore UASI come together to discuss
regional public safety and homeland security issues. Under this work
group, there are several functional subcommittees. These subcommittees
include health and medical, law enforcement, emergency planners, urban
search and rescue (USAR), communications, technology, and hazardous
materials. Committee members develop projects to improve our safety,
but more importantly, they work together as a region.
Because of the Baltimore UASI and the Urban Area Work Group, no
jurisdiction in Central Maryland is preparing for or responding to an
incident alone. The UASI grant program has promoted regional
collaboration. Groups of stakeholders within Maryland have organized
around the established funding streams. Their dedication to coordinated
planning and response has served us well. We have worked to break down
silos so that the appropriate people are in the room at all times. We
have made significant investments in equipment, trained our personnel,
enhanced our technology and upgraded our emergency operations centers.
But more importantly, we have utilized these grant programs as the
impetus to organize the appropriate stakeholders around one of the most
important issues our Nation faces: Its homeland security. The value of
the relationships fostered as a result of the infrastructure developed
around UASI funds is inestimable. During an emergency, I can pick up
the phone and call my neighbor. I can ask for help, resources, or just
advice. My staff members can do the same with their counterparts. In
the Baltimore Urban Area we've been able to provide funds to our
private-sector partners for preparedness over and above any Federal or
State mandate through our continued partnership philosophy. As a result
of engaging the appropriate stakeholders in the whole community, the
hospital emergency managers, the leaders of functional and access needs
communities, law enforcement leaders, and hazmat technicians can do the
same. We are no longer just the city of Baltimore. We are a regional
force ready to combat any threat or hazard that comes our way.
Our UASI has been able to unite public safety leaders across city
and county borders; other UASI groups have even crossed State lines.
They have done this only by organizing around these funding streams
aimed at building regional preparedness. The new proposed grant
consolidation does not take into account the inter-jurisdictional and
inter-State achievements made. Instead of fostering collaboration to
build capabilities, the proposed consolidation will promote competition
by having local jurisdictions compete within their own State to win
funds. A competitive process has the potential to incentivize
localities to try to outdo one another, rather than work together.
Grant programs should be used to encourage regional collaboration and
build relationships between jurisdictions, not create a wedge between
them. Discarding the individual grant programs means discarding the
infrastructure built around them, and threatens the relationships
cultivated around our collaborative commitment to National homeland
security.
Over the past several years, DHS has administered grants to my
locality and region to build our capabilities to prepare for, protect
against, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recover from an
emergency or disaster event. Previously, DHS administered 15 grant
programs for different sectors, threats, and purposes. These grant
programs, including the State Homeland Security Grant Program, the Port
Security Grant Program, and the Urban Area Security Initiative Grant,
have been critical in the development of our local level capabilities
in a variety of functional areas, including health and medical, law
enforcement, urban search and rescue, and interoperable communications.
Over the past 2 years, homeland security grant programs have taken
drastic cuts. In fiscal year 2011, the Homeland Security Grant Program
funds were cut by 50%. These funding cuts hit the State Homeland
Security Grant Program and Tier II Urban Area Security Initiative
Grants the hardest.
In fiscal year 2012, the Department of Homeland Security eliminated
seven grant programs from fiscal year 2011 to adjust for additional
decreases in overall funding. The eliminated grant programs included
the Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS), Citizen Corps Program
(CCP), Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program (RCPSP),
Emergency Operations Center Grant Program (EOCGP), Driver's License
Security Grant Program (DLSGP), Freight Rail Security Grant Program
(FRSGP), and Intercity Bus Security Grant Program (IBSGP). These cuts
have caused limited resources to be spread incredibly thin. For
example, the Port of Baltimore, one of the largest on the East Coast,
is now competing for funds out of a pool of only approximately $30
million, and still has to find a 25 percent match. On top of these
cuts, DHS has now proposed to consolidate the eight remaining grants
into a single grant program known as the ``National Preparedness Grant
Program.''
States and local jurisdictions were forced to shift capabilities
developed or maintained under eliminated funding steams to other
programs. Before we have the chance to make sense of the impact of
these cuts and shifts in our capabilities in a system of grants with
limited flexibility, we are being asked to undergo an overhaul of the
system. It seems the proposed overhaul, the National Preparedness Grant
Program, was developed without robust local input or boots-on-the-
ground expertise. While I appreciate the challenges for FEMA of
managing different grants on multiple systems that originated from
multiple agencies, I am here today to tell you we are worried that we
do not have the evidence to indicate that consolidation is a necessary
or appropriate next step.
In the current fiscal climate, these cuts have hit all of us very
hard. Instead of taking steps to make improvements or close existing
capability gaps, we are now focusing on sustaining the capabilities
that we have developed through these grant programs. It is imperative
that all stakeholders understand the mandate for preparedness at the
local level has not decreased. Since our Mayor took office in early
2010, Baltimore city alone has experienced a major winter storm, a
tornado, nursing home and downtown hotel evacuations, several flooding
events, Hurricane Irene, Tropical Storm Lee, and an earthquake. We are
not alone. Over the past 59 years, the Nation has averaged 35 major
disaster declarations per year. However, in 2011 the United States
experienced 99 major disaster declarations, up from 81 major disaster
declarations in 2010. The threat of a major emergency or disaster event
in the United States is increasing, but our funding level is
decreasing. Now, more than ever, we need to make sure our investments
are well informed. Before you take additional measures to cut costs, we
need to be aware of the impact of the measures already taken.
Consolidation after a series of consecutive funding cuts is too much,
too soon.
We also have concerns about how the Threat Hazard Identification
and Risk Assessment (THIRA) will inform local-level capability
investments. THIRA is a tool that was introduced by FEMA this year to
assess various threats and hazards, and the vulnerability of and
consequences to communities to those hazards. The results of the THIRA
process are supposed to establish an informed foundation for planning
and preparedness activities. Since THIRAs are required at the State
level, locals may have less of a voice to express what is really needed
on the ground. The lack of clarity regarding the implications of THIRA
on Federal funding allocation decisions is also disconcerting. For
example, if a particular region is in need of an asset and two
neighboring States both want to develop the asset, who is going to
decide which State is awarded the funds necessary for development? The
use of THIRA needs to be informed by State and local input prior to its
use in funding allocation decisions.
Moreover, grant consolidation shifts most of the burden of grant
administration to the State level. The proposed consolidation includes
both a baseline State allocation and competitive allocation. States
will be required to apply for funds, decide how to disperse funds, and
manage these dispersements. Additional State-level capabilities in
grant writing and administration will need to be developed to manage
this workload. Concerns about the capacity of State Administrative
Agencies to build these capabilities over the next year are widespread
among my peers at the local level. Again, little local or State input
was requested to develop the process, making concerns about the utility
of implementation paramount.
As a city, a region, and a Nation, we have worked very hard and
utilized DHS grant funds to close many capability gaps over the past
several years. We have developed cell-phone-tracking capabilities
allowing law enforcement the ability to pinpoint the location of a
specific cell phone, enhancing efforts to locate an individual. We have
implemented LINX, a shared database tool that crosses jurisdictional,
regional, and State lines, to allow law enforcement to have the same
data on individuals when working long-term and immediate cases.
During the 1990s and the early part of the 21st Century, provisions
for interoperable communications between jurisdictions that did not
share a geographic boundary were limited. The need for interoperable
communications was a core lesson learned from the response to the
terrorist attacks of September 11. Since then, Maryland has invested
$48 million of its own funds to support the development and
implementation of an interoperable State-wide radio system. DHS funds
have supported the Central Maryland Area Radio Communications (CMARC)
Project Team to enhance this city and State capability priority
regionally. The original goal of CMARC was to develop a regional radio
system for interoperability that would leverage existing
infrastructure, improve coverage and supplement the capacity of
existing ``operable'' radio systems under the control of local
jurisdictions. CMARC has since added several State agencies, including
the Maryland Transit Administration (MTA), Maryland Institute for
Emergency Medical Services Systems (MIEMSS), and Maryland Department of
Natural Resources (DNR) as interoperability partners. An upgrade to the
Network Management System (NMS), scheduled for completion by the end of
the 2012 calendar year, is being made possible by grant funds. This
upgrade will provide IP based voting capabilities region-wide and allow
control of all CMARC local jurisdiction radio resources from the
regional back-up 9-1-1 Center in Central Baltimore County. The Maryland
Institute for Emergency Medical Services Systems (MIEMSS), the State
agency charged with oversight of emergency medical services, will be
equipped with a Radio Gateway Unit. Additionally, on-street portable
radio coverage will become available for critical infrastructure such
as BWI-Marshall Airport, Fort Meade, NSA, the I-95 corridor in Howard
County and the Amtrak Northeast train corridor in Anne Arundel County.
Implementation and sustainment of the system is made possible by DHS
grant funds. While Maryland has plans to continue to invest in this
system, it has not been developed Nation-wide. We have not yet closed
this capability gap, but grants are being slashed. Continued funding
cuts threaten the investments we have already made, and have the
potential to prevent the realization of a Nation-wide interoperable
communications system.
The Central Maryland Region has also utilized DHS funds to create
robust capabilities in the health and medical functional area. Prior,
the Baltimore Urban Area had few resources to deal with mass casualty
events beyond ordinary day-to-day capabilities. Such an event would
overwhelm the region's hospital systems. There were no standard
interagency standard operating procedures (SOPs) within metro Baltimore
to pre-identify staff, hospital beds, or other resources that can be
deployed following a catastrophic event. The establishment of an
alternate care site (ACS) post-disaster would be ad hoc and
undersupplied. Recognizing this capability gap, the Baltimore UASI
utilized grant funds to convert an old gymnasium building scheduled for
demolition into a ``Turn Key'' Surge Center. Regional hospital
emergency managers and emergency medical services leaders worked with
academic experts to develop SOPs and guidelines to allow for seamless
activation and operation of the facility across multiple partners. In
tandem, common equipment was procured and pre-deployed to the ACS
facility for eventual use in an emergency. Work surrounding the ACS
continues. Current objectives include arrangement of pre-designation
and pre-approval of the facility as an ACS by the Maryland Office of
Health Care Quality, development of MOUs with public and private
partners for critical elements of site operation such as security and
mortuary services, and development of protocols for triggering direct
EMS transport during a public health emergency. DHS grant funds
continue to support the development of additional ACS sites, as well as
sustainment and environmental maintenance of existing facilities. A
loss of funds could result in the loss, or deterioration, of this
regional institution that has demonstrated to close a capability gap.
The Central Maryland Region also was without sufficient ability to
track patients during a major incident. The need for a family
reunification and patient location system became evident after a series
of incidents involving over 20 patients separated from family members.
In addition to family reunification, such a system was also necessary
for law enforcement to locate individuals during an investigation and
for public health officials to document patients who were in direct
contact with an infected individual, as well as track clients and
medications at the points of distribution. Previously, Maryland
conducted patient tracking by hand on paper. This system was not
sufficient for a surge of hundreds, or even thousands, of patients. To
close this capability gap, the Baltimore metropolitan area utilized DHS
grant funds to procure an Electronic Patient Tracking System (EPTS) for
use by Fire/EMS, Hospitals, Health Departments, Emergency Management,
and State Agencies. The system allows for patients to be tracked from
the scene of an incident to the hospital, and assists in patient
reunification following a mass-casualty incident. Additionally,
hospitals are able to access information on patients during transport.
The result is unprecedented improvements in health care asset
utilization, patient treatment, response time, and event documentation.
Loss of funds will mean the loss of ability to sustain this important
capability.
The combined utility of these investments have come to light in the
UASI-funded Maryland Shock Trauma Project. Maryland Shock Trauma is
located in Baltimore City, and is the only facility in the State of
Maryland designated as a Primary Adult Resource Center (PARC). As such,
it provides the highest level of trauma care, treating over 7,500
critically-injured patients each year with a 97% survival rate. The
Baltimore UASI grant-funded a project designed to expand regional
collaboration for medical surge. The project utilizes high-fidelity
emergency medical services exercise and training simulations, coupled
with an enhanced exercise and training platform that will maximize
current Baltimore UASI-funded projects related to patient tracking,
voice, and interoperable radio communications systems, and data
communications. Upon completion this project will facilitate real-time
enhanced on scene and transport patient care over current and planned
video and data networks. The entire State of Maryland, as well as
anyone who accesses our system through mutual aid, will benefit from
the patient care enhancements related to the increased medical surge,
exercise, and training capacities.
Could some of these investments be redundant? Perhaps.
Have all of our investments provided tremendous added value to
overall National security? Maybe not, but most definitely have.
Is there still a need for Federal homeland security funding to
States and local jurisdictions? Yes, in fact, the need is increasing.
Local jurisdictions are struggling to maintain basic services. In
Baltimore, we struggle simply to keep firehouses open. This funding is
critical, now more than ever, to maintain the long-term viability of
our investments.
Is revamping the entire grant structure going to answer these
questions, eliminate redundancy, and ensure significant value
attributable to all investments? Absolutely not.
As I have already discussed, there is evidence that our capability
gaps have become smaller. Our systems reflect that we are more
prepared. However, we do not know the magnitude of this preparation,
the root cause of our successes and of failures, or the best way to
move forward. I cannot stand here and tell you that we are more
prepared because of one grant or another, or because of one purchase or
another. DHS grant applications require applicants to discuss
capability gaps; however, DHS has never provided a standardized,
evidence-based tool to help local jurisdictions to analyze these gaps
systematically. In result, we have limited data to show the impact,
successes, or failures of our programs. Additionally, FEMA has recently
begun the development of State Preparedness Reports in an effort to
assess National preparedness. However, the format of these State
preparedness reports has changed over the past 2 years, with another
proposed change in the data requested for this coming year. If we
cannot even figure out how to assess our own preparedness, how can we
attribute any one success or failure to any specific grant program? We
need to figure out what is working and what is not working before we
throw everything together and ``hope for the best.'' What I can stand
here and tell you is that throwing all of these grant programs away,
and the infrastructure and partnerships developed around them, is going
to make things worse, not better.
We often throw around the word ``homeland security,'' with little
regard to what ``homeland'' really means. Our homeland is comprised of
a conglomerate of counties, parishes, and cities, in our UASIs, States,
Tribal lands, and territories. It is made up of American citizens who
live in these counties, parishes, and cities. Every day, something
threatens their safety. Whether from a natural disaster, a terrorist
threat, a criminal, or a simple personal health event, when these
citizens, who are at the heart of our homeland, need protection they
call 9-1-1 to activate their local first response system. This system
is operated at the local level. Its utility is a product of the
capabilities which that local government has developed. It is only as
good as the training and motivation of the personnel and the quality of
resources within it.
Our Federal partners should know that local jurisdictions do not
have contingency plans or alternative funding sources to maintain
capabilities should Federal funds be discontinued or rescinded. There
is no money. Our Federal partners must realize that local level
personnel are providing National-level homeland security. States and
locals use DHS funding to develop National assets. For example, during
Hurricane Katrina, we were able to send a UASI-funded USAR team and
decontamination truck to the Gulf Coast. While this asset was developed
and maintained in the Baltimore region, we were able to ensure that it
contributed to the capabilities critical to our overall National
emergency response mission when it was needed most. We rely on Federal
funds to ensure provision of a service that benefits the whole of our
Nation; the everyday protection of and rapid response to the needs of
its citizens.
I hope that you will help us to maintain the capabilities we have
developed, and help us to continue identifying and closing gaps. We are
happy to participate in an evaluation of our programs and assessment of
our preparedness. Only then will we know what programs are working, and
what grants those programs are funded by. We will have a better
understanding of the impact of our investments and the changes already
made to our funding streams. Local and State officials, who are at the
heart of the implementation of these grant programs, need to be
partners in the development of assessment and evaluation methods. As we
are the ones who will experience the impact, we need to be in the room
to develop the solution. With a little bit of time, science, and
ingenuity, together, we will be able to say with confidence what the
next best step is. Until then, I implore you to prevent an ill-informed
and hasty decision. We must continue to invest in preparedness, and
discontinue cuts in funding critical to the development and sustainment
of our capabilities. Grant guidance should have the flexibility to
allow States and locals to maintain capabilities. I hope that you will
continue to fund our programs, and delay the proposed consolidation
until we have the appropriate evidence to inform such a major change.
Thank you for allowing me to appear before you today. I welcome any
questions from the committee.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Maloney.
Now I recognize Chief Clemmensen for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF HANK C. CLEMMENSEN, CHIEF, PALATINE RURAL FIRE
PROTECTION DISTRICT, TESTIFYING ON BEHALF OF THE INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF FIRE CHIEFS
Chief Clemmensen. Good afternoon, Chairman Bilirakis----
Mr. Bilirakis. Good afternoon.
Chief Clemmensen [continuing]. Ranking Member Richardson,
and Members of the subcommittee. I am Chief Hank Clemmensen of
the Palatine Rural Fire Protection District located in
Inverness, Illinois, and the first vice president of the
International Association of Fire Chiefs, the IAFC. I thank the
committee today for the opportunity to present the views of the
local firefighters and EMS responders in discussion about grant
programs at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
Both the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina
revealed the important role that local first responders play in
National catastrophes. Local fire, law enforcement, and others
were the first on scene and the last to leave. In addition, the
Nation relied upon the local first responders from across the
Nation to aid in the response to these catastrophes.
Congress realized the importance of ensuring that local
first responders are adequately staffed, trained, and equipped
for the future incidents of National significance. So with the
leadership of this committee, it has created grant programs at
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to assist the State
and local governments in preparing for the next terrorist
attack.
Over the past 10 years, Congress has provided over $35
billion in grant funds to help State, territorial, Tribal, and
local governments. The IFC believes that these grant programs
have played a critical role in protecting American public. For
example, the State Homeland Security Program helps a State-wide
mutual aid system in Illinois that is activated almost 800
times a year. Tucson, Arizona, used the funds from the
Metropolitan Medical Response System, MMRS, for the planning,
equipment, and training needed for a multidisciplinary response
to a mass-casualty event. This preparation played a major role
in the effective response to the tragic January 8, 2011,
shooting of Representative Giffords and 19 others.
The great success of the Federal Homeland Security Grant
Program is that they provide an incentive for local fire
chiefs, police chiefs, emergency managers, public health
officials, and State and Federal officials to plan, train, and
exercise together. This preplanning in coordination prevents
confusion and saves lives.
In its 2013 budget request, the administration proposed
consolidating the 16 Homeland Security grant programs into a
new National Preparedness Grant Program, NPGP. The IFC was not
consulted on this proposal. We have not seen enough details
about the NPGP to present a thorough analysis to the committee;
however, we would like to recommend seven principles for your
consideration.
The reform of DHS grant programs must sustain existing
emergency response capabilities. Taxpayer funding has created a
robust National preparedness system. In light of declining
Federal, State, and local budgets, we must put a priority on
sustaining the system.
A reformed DHS grant program should support the principles
of the regionalization and mutual aid between States, regions,
and localities. Many local jurisdictions depend on mutual aid
agreements to protect their citizens. DHS programs like UASI
and MMRS reinforce the emphasis on mutual aid and cooperation
between the local, State, and Federal officials.
Three, a reformed DHS program must encourage local
stakeholders. Local governments know the risks, the
vulnerabilities, and the capabilities of their communities.
Their input is critical for determining the gaps in the
preparedness system, allocating resources to build them.
Four, a reformed DHS program must allow flexibility with
accountability. Different local jurisdictions have risk--know
the different risks. They should have--or they should be
allowed to use their funding in an accountable manner to
protect their citizens.
Five, a reformed DHS grant program must protect local
funding. Local funding--or local jurisdictions expect to
respond to an incident in their communities and be self-
sustaining for 72 hours before Federal help arrives. At least
80 percent of DHS grant funding should be used to equip, train,
staff all local law enforcement, fire, and EMS management.
Six, a reformed DHS grant program should increase
transparency.
Finally, a reformed DHS grant program must continue to
support terrorism prevention. DHS grants should continue to
support vital terrorism prevention and information activities.
In conclusion, the IFC looks forward to being a
constructive participant in the discussion about the funding of
DHS grants; however, we currently do not have enough details
about the NPGP. We urge Congress to delay consideration of the
NPGP for a year. Instead, Congress should direct DHS and FEMA
to work with all State and local stakeholders to develop a
detailed plan.
For 2013, we urge Congress to appropriate specific funding
levels as authorized by law for UASI, MMRS, the State Homeland
Security Program, and other suite of homeland security grants.
On behalf of America's fire and EMS chiefs, I would like to
thank you for holding this hearing and look forward to
answering any questions that you may have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Chief Clemmensen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hank C. Clemmensen
April 26, 2012
Good afternoon, Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking Member Richardson, and
Members of the subcommittee. I am Chief Hank C. Clemmensen, of the
Palatine Rural Fire Protection District located in Inverness, Illinois,
and the first vice president of the International Association of Fire
Chiefs (IAFC). The International Association of Fire Chiefs represents
the leadership of the Nation's fire, rescue, and emergency medical
services (EMS), including rural volunteer fire departments, suburban
combination departments, and metropolitan career departments. I thank
the committee today for the opportunity to represent the views of local
firefighters and EMS responders in the discussion about the grant
programs at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
the effectiveness of homeland security grants
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 revealed major weaknesses in the
Nation's prevention, preparedness, and response system. Many of these
weaknesses were confirmed by the catastrophic nature of Hurricane
Katrina in 2005. In both cases, local fire, police, and EMS departments
were the first on-scene at the event. To reinforce them, the Nation
mobilized local resources from other States. Congress realized that an
effective National response system depended on having local first
responders adequately trained and equipped to respond to all hazards.
Through the passage of legislation, Congress authorized grant programs
at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to help the Nation's
fire, law enforcement, and EMS personnel prepare for any future threat,
either natural or man-made.
Over the past 10 years, the DHS has provided over $35 billion in
Federal grant funds to help State, territorial, Tribal, and local
governments improve their planning, mitigation, preparedness,
prevention, response, and recovery capabilities. On behalf of the
Nation's fire chiefs, I would like to assure the subcommittee that
these efforts have improved the Nation's emergency response
capabilities.
Consider the following examples:
In Illinois, funding from the State Homeland Security
Program (SHSP) has helped Illinois strengthen its Mutual Aid
Box Alarm System (MABAS), one of the Nation's premier mutual
aid systems. The system is composed of over 1,100 fire agencies
and can mobilize approximately 38,000 firefighters and
paramedics to respond to an event in the State of Illinois.
Approximately 800 times per year, the MABAS is activated to
help jurisdictions respond in their areas. In addition, the
MABAS has been used to deploy resources to inter-State
disasters, such as Hurricanes Katrina, Gustav, and Ike and last
year's river flooding in Missouri and Illinois.
Because of the support of the DHS grant programs, there are
now 300 State and local teams with technical rescue capability.
After the April 2011 deadly tornadoes, Alabama was able to rely
on State and local resources for search and rescue operations,
instead of requesting Federal urban search and rescue support.
In Arizona, the Tucson area has received funding from the
Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) since 1999. This
funding paid for planning, equipment, and training to help
first responders, public health, private health, law
enforcement, and emergency managers across Southern Arizona
prepare for a mass-casualty event. The training, equipment, and
exercises funded by the MMRS program played a major role in the
effective interdisciplinary response to the January 8, 2011
shooting of Representative Gabrielle Giffords and 19 others.
The great success of the Federal homeland security grant programs
is that they provide an incentive for Federal, Tribal, State,
territorial, and local jurisdictions to work together. By planning,
training, and conducting exercises together, local fire chiefs, police
chiefs, sheriffs, public health officials, emergency managers, and
State and Federal officials are able and ready to work together when an
incident happens. This pre-planning and coordination prevents
confusion, and directly saves lives.
The Nation's fire service realizes that spending cuts will be
required to reduce the Federal deficit. Already we have seen the
virtual elimination of the MMRS and Interoperable Emergency
Communications Grant programs. While there is a temptation to cut the
grants to State and local programs, we ask that Congress fully consider
the effects of these cuts. In many cases, State and local jurisdictions
do not have the funding to make up for cuts to these Federal programs.
For example, the elimination of the MMRS program means that Tucson will
no longer have a full-time MMRS coordinator, which will directly reduce
the region's ability to respond to a future mass casualty event. Cuts
to the State Homeland Security Grant Program will affect Illinois'
ability to respond to tornadoes and flooding, and prepare for future
events such as the May 2012 NATO summit. As Congress considers the
future of the homeland security grant programs, there should be a focus
on sustaining the Nation's emergency response capabilities.
the national preparedness grant program proposal
As part of its fiscal year 2013 budget proposal, the administration
proposes consolidating the 16 homeland security grant programs into one
program: The National Preparedness Grant Program (NPGP). The IAFC
understands the administration's interest in ensuring that homeland
security grants are distributed in an efficient and effective manner,
and that taxpayer funds are used responsibly. Like many stakeholders
that represent local governments and first responders, we were not
consulted about this proposal before it was released as part of the
fiscal year 2013 budget request. While we have received an overview of
the program, it is clear that the DHS must still develop many details
for the program, including how it will affect the Urban Areas Security
Initiative (UASI) grants that assist many metropolitan fire
departments.
Based on the information we have, it is hard for me to provide a
detailed analysis of the NPGP proposal. However, I would like to
recommend a few principles for the committee's consideration as it
reviews the administration's proposal:
(1) A reformed DHS grant program must sustain existing emergency
response capabilities.--America's taxpayers have spent over $35
billion to improve the Nation's ability to respond to any
future terrorist attack, hurricane, tornado, or other event.
This funding has created a robust National preparedness system
that is based on the capability to mobilize local first
responders and deploy them to an affected area. Any reforms to
the DHS grants programs should put a priority on sustaining
this system.
(2) A reformed DHS grant program should support the principles of
regionalization and mutual aid between States, regions, and
localities.--Many jurisdictions around the Nation do not have
the resources to single-handedly respond to a major
catastrophe. For many years, fire and EMS departments have used
mutual aid agreements to address this problem. By working
together, fire departments can pool resources and protect their
communities. In addition, the planning required for mutual aid
agreements promotes coordination between jurisdictions and a
wiser allocation of taxpayer-funded resources. In partnership
with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the IAFC
has reached out to all 50 States and the U.S. territories to
develop State-wide mutual aid systems that are similar to the
MABAS in Illinois. Twenty-four States have completed the
process and are capable of deploying without assistance. In
addition, 18 States are capable of deploying with assistance
and are in the process of working to be deployable without
assistance. We are encouraged by the focus on mutual aid
discussed in the NPGP. However, DHS also must recognize that
regional planning can take place at all levels: Between local
jurisdictions; between areas within a State; between two or
three States; or at the level of a FEMA region.
(3) A reformed DHS grant program must engage local stakeholders.--
As fire chief of my community, I know that I can work with my
counterparts in law enforcement, emergency management, and
public health to determine the capabilities, risks, and
vulnerabilities in my jurisdiction. The DHS' newly announced
Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THlRA)
process will help us with this task. However, I am concerned
that the local THIRA that we complete will not be included in
the State THIRA, which is required by December 31, 2012. We are
concerned that State officials are not as informed about local
threats, risks, capabilities, and vulnerabilities as the local
officials that have the duty of protecting their communities.
The DHS must clarify that State officials must include the
information from local THIRAs in their submission. In addition,
localities must have the ability to challenge a State THIRA, if
it does not reflect the local communities' capabilities,
vulnerabilities, and gaps accurately.
(4) A reformed DHS grant program must allow flexibility with
accountability.--Because local jurisdictions are aware of the
gaps in their preparedness system, they should be allowed to
allocate grant funds to fill these gaps. Some jurisdictions may
need to use grants to mitigate flood or wildland fire hazards.
Other localities may need to prepare for a mass-casualty event,
or enhance their terrorism prevention or information-sharing
capabilities. However, public funds are scarce in this
budgetary environment and should be used wisely. Greater
multidisciplinary and regional planning, as both the VASI and
MMRS programs encourage, will ensure a more accountable use of
Federal grant funds.
(5) A reformed DHS grant program must protect local funding.--Local
jurisdictions will be the first on-scene and expect to have to
wait 72 hours for Federal assistance. So, they must have the
necessary staffing, equipment, planning, and training to
respond to any threat in their area for at least this time
period. We are concerned that the DHS has not made it clear
that at least 80 percent of the NPGP funds will be allocated to
local communities, including law enforcement, fire and EMS, and
emergency management. The American taxpayers' funds should be
spent protecting their communities, not promoting larger State
bureaucracies.
(6) A reformed DHS grant program should increase transparency.--
Because the NPGP proposal seems to give a larger authority to
the State Administrative Agencies, there must be a transparent
and credible process for allocating funds. In order to ensure
effective use of the DHS grants, Congress, the administration,
and the American taxpayer must be able to see how, where, and
why these grants are being spent. In addition, the DHS should
provide more detail about how the competitive portion of the
NPGP will work, who is eligible for it, and what criteria will
be used for allocating the Federal grants.
(7) A reformed DHS grant program must continue to support terrorism
prevention.--Currently, the DHS grants support intelligence
fusion centers; information-sharing between Federal, State, and
local officials; and increased law enforcement activities to
prevent and deter terrorists. Any changes to the current DHS
grant programs must continue to support these vital activities.
The IAFC believes that these principles serve as fair guidelines
with which to evaluate the NPGP or any future grant reform proposal.
The current DHS suite of grants, including the SHSP, the VASI, and the
MMRS, are authorized in existing legislation, including the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (Pub.
L. 110-53) and the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006
(Pub. L. 109-295). As the authorizing committee that wrote these laws,
we believe that the House Homeland Security Committee should be an
active participant in any reform effort. The IAFC would like to be a
constructive participant in this process.
conclusion
The current NPGP proposal does not provide enough detail, and it is
hard to determine how it would measure up against the principles that I
have described. Because the House and Senate Appropriations Committees
are moving quickly this year to pass the fiscal year 2013
appropriations bills, we urge Congress to delay consideration of the
NPGP proposal for a year. Instead, Congress should instruct the DHS to
work with the State and local stakeholders, including fire, EMS, law
enforcement, and other first responders, to develop a detailed plan for
reforming the homeland security grant programs. In addition, we would
recommend that Congress clearly appropriate specific funding levels for
each of these programs, including the SHSP, the UASI, and the MMRS, in
the fiscal year 2013 Department of Homeland Security Appropriation Act
to ensure that each program is adequately funded.
On behalf of the leadership of America's fire and EMS departments,
I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify at today's
hearing. The IAFC is committed to making sure that America's first
responders have the equipment, staffing, and training that they need to
protect their communities. We look forward to working with Congress,
the administration and other State and local stakeholders to develop an
accountable and effective grant program to meet this requirement. I
look forward to answering any questions that you may have.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Chief. I appreciate it very much.
Mr. Wainio, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD A. WAINIO, PRESIDENT AND CEO, TAMPA PORT
AUTHORITY, TESTIFYING ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF
PORT AUTHORITIES
Mr. Wainio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the
honor of providing testimony to the subcommittee at today's
hearing. We certainly appreciate your long-term support of the
Port of Tampa and the maritime industry.
I am pleased to be providing this testimony today on behalf
of the American Association of Port Authorities and the Port of
Tampa. The Port of Tampa is the largest port in Florida, both
in terms of cargo tonnage and in terms of land area, as the
port covers over 5,000 acres of the maritime activity.
The security issues faced by the port since September 11,
2001, have presented as daunting a challenge as this port has
ever faced. We have gone to extraordinary lengths to implement
a layered security approach that provides efficient and
effective port security in a manner that is also as cost-
effective as possible. That layered approach involves
contracting with the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office for
24/7 patrols of the port, as well as augmenting the port
authority's own security department with private security
services.
Since September 11, 2001, the Tampa Port Authority has
spent approximately $86 million for security infrastructure and
operating costs. Although State and Federal funding help to
defer some of these costs, the majority of this total has been
borne by the Tampa Port Authority.
I will say that the partnerships we have with Federal
agencies such as the U.S. Customs and Border Protection and in
particular the U.S. Coast Guard have been absolutely
indispensable in our ability to address the security needs of
our port. That security protocol must be flexible enough not to
choke off the very business it is designed to protect. So far
we have been successful in that regard in not implementing
measures that bottleneck the commerce of the port. This is
important as the Port of Tampa is west central Florida's
largest economic engine, contributing almost $8 billion in
annual economic benefit to the region, and supporting in some
fashion almost 100,000 jobs.
Port security grants are an essential component in
assisting ports to meet important mandates under Federal law.
These mandates assure a safe, secure environment required of
the modern and ever-changing intermodal transportation system.
These grants also support terminal operators and local first
responders in their mission to work in partnership with ports
to assure safe and secure port operations.
Many systems employed to support efficiently-operated
secure port operations are expensive to procure and maintain.
With this in mind the trend of reducing port grant allocations
is troubling and counterproductive. It should be noted that
much of this money also goes to projects that directly or
indirectly support parallel Federal enforcement issues, such as
cruise terminal security and the monitoring of high-value
cargo.
Shortening the grant-procurement process by requiring ports
to spend money at a more rapid pace will only contribute to the
waste of precious dollars. Many delays in the procurement
process are the result of mandates imposed by the program, such
as environmental assessments that are time-consuming. While
certain restrictions are important, they add to the time it
takes to vet and procure important equipment for projects. Each
port authority is also subject to purchasing guidelines that
are necessary to prevent waste and corruption, but are also
time-consuming.
There is a great debate about cost shares with many pros
and cons. The reality is that many port authorities already
spend a significant portion of their operating budgets on
security-related expenses. In the case of the Tampa Port
Authority, security expenses often exceed 30 percent of our
annual operating budget. In tight budget times these cost
shares may make the difference in a decision to procure
necessary equipment and security infrastructure.
The plan to consolidate the Port Security Grant Program
into one National Preparedness Grant Program ultimately
administered by each individual State is extremely
counterproductive. History has proven that interaction and
oversight by the local U.S. Coast Guard captain of the port
assured that funds were being distributed in a manner that best
benefited each geographic area. The U.S. Coast Guard has the
training, expertise, and the systems in place to assess risk,
threat, and vulnerability and apply this information to grant
submissions. Through no fault of their own, most States do not
possess this capability. Further, as State homeland grant
funding diminishes, States might be tempted stretch the intent
of the port security grants to meet needs that may not be the
most productive use of funds targeting the safety and security
of the maritime transportation system.
While we understand that DHS has developed some
improvements to their original grants model for the National
Preparedness Grant Program, we believe Congress should
determine the funding level for the Port Security Grant Program
rather than DHS. This year Congress allowed DHS to allocate the
funds, and the Port Security Grant Program was decreased by 59
percent to one of the lowest funding levels on record, $97.5
million. These international maritime borders need to be a high
priority. We are also concerned that Secretary Napolitano will
only fund the highest-risk ports. We must provide protection
for all ports in order to avoid a soft underbelly of
underprotected ports that terrorists could target.
In Florida we are fortunate to have a robust and well-
organized regional structure to address terrorism and other
issues known as the Regional Domestic Security Task Force. I am
privileged to represent Florida ports as a member of the
Domestic Security Oversight Council, which provides guidance
and facilitates coordination to the RDSTF program. The DSOC
also forwards funding recommendations to the Governor and
legislature regarding the use of State Homeland Security
grants. In this capacity I am aware of the diverse variety of
disciplines and organizations that make these funding decisions
resulting in local and State-wide impact. Because we currently
have a separate funding source, the Florida ports are able to
allow other well-deserving entities an opportunity for funding
that is not related to maritime transportation, thus further
defining the most important projects for consideration.
Unless port security grant funds are segregated by law, I
fear that we will simply create a large pot of money at the
State level being divided among a much larger group of
disciplines, which will only serve to create a less-efficient
and less-focused approach to funding necessary projects.
Ports represent a very unique and vital asset to the
communities they serve, but they are also very complex with
issues not often shared or understood by other Government
agencies that compete for limited resources. I urge you to
consider these important facts as you make decisions that could
change a system that for the most part has provided
considerable value to our ports and to our Nation.
Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Wainio follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard A. Wainio
April 26, 2012
Mr. Chairman, I am Richard Wainio, port director and CEO of the
Tampa Port Authority. I want to thank you for the honor of providing
testimony to the subcommittee at today's hearing. We certainly
appreciate your long-time support of the Port of Tampa and the maritime
industry. I am pleased to be providing this testimony today on behalf
of the American Association of Port Authorities.
The Port of Tampa is the largest port in Florida, both in terms of
cargo tonnage and in terms of land area, as the port covers about 5,000
acres throughout our county. The security issues faced by the port
since September 11, 2001 have presented as daunting a challenge as this
port has ever faced. We have gone to extraordinary lengths to implement
a layered security approach that provides efficient and effective port
security in a manner that is also as cost-effective as possible. That
layered approach involves contracting with the Hillsborough County
Sheriff's Office for
24/7 patrols of the port, as well as augmenting the Port Authority's
own security department with private security services. Since September
11, 2001, the Tampa Port Authority has spent approximately $86 million
for security infrastructure and operating costs. Although State and
Federal funding helped to defer some of these costs, the majority of
this total has been borne by the Tampa Port Authority. I will say that
the partnerships we have with Federal agencies such as U.S. Customs and
Border Protection and in particular the U.S. Coast Guard have been
absolutely indispensable in our ability to address the security needs
of our port. That security protocol must be flexible enough to not
choke off the very business it is designed to protect. So far we have
been successful in that regard in not implementing measures that
bottleneck the commerce of the port. This is important, as the Port of
Tampa is west central Florida's largest economic engine, contributing
almost $8 billion in annual economic benefit to the region and
supporting in some fashion almost 100,000 jobs.
Port Security grants are an essential component in assisting ports
to meet important mandates under Federal law. These mandates assure a
safe/secure environment required of the modern, and ever-changing,
intermodal transportation system. These grants also support terminal
operators and local first responders in their mission to work in
partnership with ports to assure safe and secure port operations.
Many systems employed to support efficiently-operated secure port
operations are expensive to procure and maintain. With this in mind,
the trend of reducing port grant allocations is troubling and
counterproductive. It should be noted that much of this money also goes
to projects that directly, or indirectly, support parallel Federal
enforcement issues, such as cruise terminal security and monitoring of
high-value cargo.
Shortening the grant procurement process by requiring ports to
spend money at a more rapid pace will only contribute to waste of
precious dollars. Many delays in the procurement process are the result
of mandates imposed by the program, such as environmental assessments
that are time-consuming. While certain restrictions are important, they
add to the time it takes to vet and procure important equipment for
projects. Each port authority is also subject to purchasing guidelines
that are necessary to prevent waste and corruption, but are also time-
consuming.
There is great debate about cost shares, with many pros and cons.
The reality is that many port authorities already spend a significant
portion of operating budgets on security-related expenses. In the case
of the Tampa Port Authority, security expenses often exceed 30% of our
annual operating budget. In tight budget times, these cost shares may
make the difference in a decision to procure necessary equipment.
The plan to consolidate the Port Security Grant Program into one
National Preparedness Grant Program ultimately administered by each
individual State is extremely counterproductive. History has proven
that interaction and oversight by the local U.S. Coast Guard Captain of
the Port assured that funds were being distributed in a manner that
best benefitted each geographic area. The U.S. Coast Guard has the
training, expertise, and systems in place to assess risk, threat, and
vulnerability; and apply this information to grant submissions. Through
no fault of their own, most States do not possess this capability.
Further, as State homeland grant funding diminishes, States might be
tempted to stretch the intent of the port security grants to meet needs
that may not be the most productive use of funds targeting the safety
and security of the maritime transportation system.
While we understand that DHS has developed some improvements to
their original grants model for the National Preparedness Grant
program, we believe Congress should determine the funding level for the
Port Security Grant program, rather than DHS. This year, Congress
allowed DHS to allocate the funds and the Port Security Grant program
was decreased by 59% to one of the lowest funding levels on record
($97.5 million). These international maritime borders need to be a high
priority. We are also concerned that Secretary Napolitano will only
fund the highest-risk ports. We must provide protection for all ports
in order to avoid a soft underbelly of under-protected ports that
terrorists could target.
In Florida we are fortunate to have a robust and well-organized
regional structure to address terrorism and other issues known as the
Regional Domestic Security Task Force (RDSTF). I am privileged to
represent Florida ports as a member of the Domestic Security Oversight
Council (DSOC), which provides guidance, and facilitates coordination,
to the RDSTF program. The DSOC also forwards funding recommendations to
the Governor and Legislature regarding the use of State Homeland
Security grants. In this capacity, I am aware of the diverse variety of
disciplines and organizations that make these funding decisions,
resulting in local and State-wide impact. Because we currently have a
separate funding source, the Florida ports are able to allow other
well-deserving entities an opportunity for funding that is not related
to maritime transportation, thus further defining the most important
projects for consideration. Unless port security grant funds are
segregated by law, I fear that we will simply create a large ``pot of
money'' at the State level, being divided among a much larger group of
disciplines, which will only serve to create a less efficient and less-
focused approach to funding necessary projects.
Ports represent a very unique and vital asset to the communities
they serve, but they are also very complex, with issues not often
shared or understood by other Government agencies that compete for
limited resources. I urge you to consider these important facts as you
make decisions that could change a system that for the most part has
provided considerable value to our ports and to our Nation. Thank you.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Wainio. I appreciate it.
Mr. DePallo, you are recognized, sir.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL P. DE PALLO, DIRECTOR AND GENERAL MANAGER,
PORT AUTHORITY TRANS-HUDSON (PATH) CORPORATION, TESTIFYING ON
BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION ASSOCIATION
Mr. DePallo. Yes. Good afternoon, Chairman--excuse me, I
have a problem with my throat too. Excuse me. Good afternoon,
Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking Member Richardson, and Members of
the subcommittee. My name is Michael DePallo, and I thank you
for the opportunity to offer testimony. I am the director and
general manager of the Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation,
or PATH, a subsidiary of the Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey. Today I am testifying as the chairman of the Security
Affairs Steering Committee of the American Public
Transportation Association.
Mr. Chairman, according to the Mineta Transportation
Institute, since 1970, more than 2,000 separate attacks have
occurred worldwide on surface transportation, causing over
6,000 deaths and approximately 19,000 injuries.
The Government Accountability Office along with various
Government agencies have reported on or testified to Congress
that public transportation in America remains vulnerable to
terrorist attack, and al-Qaeda remains interested in targeting
the transit sector, and that more needs to be done to prevent
and prepare for such potential attack.
While we have been very fortunate to date in not having a
direct terrorist attack carried out in our transit systems, we
have indeed foiled plots and arrested individuals who intended
to attack our systems.
Let me especially note that PATH has experienced a
tremendous devastation of a terrorist attack as a result of the
horrific attacks on the World Trade Center in 1993 and in 2001.
For this and many other reasons, I feel strongly that the
Federal commitment to fortifying our systems must match the
recognized risks and threats.
There is a tremendous need for security grants to secure
and fortify our transit systems across the country. In 2010, an
APTA survey of its members found security investment needs in
excess of $6.4 billion Nation-wide. This stated need contrasts
with the recent trend in cuts to transit security grant
programs, including the fiscal year 2012 allocation of $87
million for transit security.
On behalf of APTA, I recently urged the Appropriations
Committee to restore appropriations for the Transit Security
Grant Program in the fiscal year 2013 and subsequent
appropriation bills. APTA urges authorizing committees to
reauthorize the rail and public transportation provisions of
the 9/11 Commission Act in order to reemphasize the policy
goals and reverse the declining security investment trend.
While there is good policy represented in the 2012 grant
guidance and the fiscal year 2013 National Preparedness Grant
Program, we do have some thoughts about elements of both.
Specifically, we are concerned with the new 24-month grant
period of performance for all projects, a reduction from the
previous 3- to 5-year allowable expenditure period. We are also
concerned with the elimination of the TSGP from the National
Preparedness Grant Program, and we call for sufficiently
funded, segregated grant program for public transportation
security as envisioned in the 9/11 Commission Act.
Also, while some PATH assets are included in the Top
Transit Asset List, and I would welcome this risk based on a
funding approach, an approach that APTA agrees with, but
speaking on behalf of a larger industry, including thousands of
assets not listed on the TPAL, this narrow funding approach
could preclude other important security improvements from
receiving funding consideration with such limited transit
security dollars available.
Apart from being a primary target for terrorism, transit
systems must also stand ready and available to support our
Nation's resilience in times of natural disasters as well. I
therefore urge Congress to establish policies that would direct
funds in transit systems to strengthen our ability to respond
to such emergencies.
Finally, APTA supports the approach that Congress has
consistently endorsed in legislation that allows grants to be
provided directly to transit agencies as opposed to requiring
that applications be made through their State administrative
agency.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, sir. Are you----
Mr. DePallo. In conclusion----
Mr. Bilirakis. Have you concluded?
Mr. DePallo. No, I haven't.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. That is okay.
Mr. DePallo. As I conclude, let me thank you for the
opportunity to testify on these critical homeland security
issues. There is no greater priority for public transportation
systems than the safety and security of our passenger and
workers. I urge you not to wait for the wake-up call of an
attack on our system to provide us the support and program
structure we need.
Transit systems across the country continue to stand ready,
committed, and vigilant in utilizing available resources
efficiently to protect our systems and our riders. We urge you
to sustain the critical partnership between transit agencies,
Congress, and the Department of Homeland Security. It helps to
keep our Nation safe and moving towards economic prosperity. I
welcome any questions you may have.
Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. DePallo follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael P. DePallo
April 26, 2012
Good morning Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking Member Richardson, and
Members of the subcommittee. My name is Michael DePallo and I thank you
for the opportunity to offer my testimony. I am the Director and
General Manager of the Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation, or
PATH, which is a subsidiary of The Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey. PATH is the seventh-largest heavy rail operator in the Nation,
providing 76 million passenger trips per year. It is the primary
transit link between Manhattan, the hub of the world financial market,
and neighboring New Jersey urban and suburban communities. Today I am
testifying as a representative of public transportation systems across
our country as I have the privilege of serving as the Chairman of the
Security Affairs Steering Committee of the American Public
Transportation Association (APTA) as well as Chair of the Mass Transit
Sector Security Coordinating Council (SCC). The committee and Council
include representatives from a number of high-risk, Tier I transit
agencies from across the country which collectively inform and guide
our views. In accordance with the National Infrastructure Protection
Plan, APTA has been tasked by Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to
administer the on-going activities of the Mass Transit Sector
Coordinating Council (SCC). I am honored to lead such groups.
about apta
APTA is a nonprofit international association of nearly 1,500
public and private member organizations, including transit systems and
commuter, intercity, and high-speed rail operators; planning, design,
construction, and finance firms; product and service providers;
academic institutions; transit associations and State departments of
transportation. APTA members serve the public interest by providing
safe, efficient, and economical public transportation services and
products. More than 90 percent of the people using public
transportation in the United States and Canada are served by APTA
member systems.
need for continued partnership
Let me start by clearly stating that the safety and security of our
public transportation systems depends on a mutual commitment of
Congress, our Federal agency partners and public transportation
providers to work together in a strong and effective collaborative
relationship. As partners, we must work together but also operate
efficiently and strategically in our respective roles.
Congress
The transit industry asks that you carefully consider the
significant security investment needs that persist for our agencies,
our employees, and the riders we serve. We are very concerned about the
recent decline in transit security funding where, presently in fiscal
year 2012, we see an allocation of less than $90 million for transit
security. This level is woefully short of the industry's capital needs,
and not enough to just address needs at my own agency. As recently as
fiscal year 2009, Federal funding for transit security was set at
nearly $400 million. In 2010, an APTA survey of its members found
security investment needs in excess of $6.4 billion Nation-wide. These
are funds that our agencies simply do not have, as overall funding
constraints have led to service cuts, personnel layoffs, and fare
increases. While there is no indication that our collective security
concerns have diminished and the backlog of needed projects continues
to grow, Federal security grant funds have declined precipitously.
Many have researched, written, and even offered testimony before
this subcommittee on the history of terrorist attacks, most notably the
work of the Federally funded and chartered, independent Mineta
Transportation Institute (MTI), which has documented more than 2,000
separate attacks on surface transportation--1,223 involving bombs and
incendiaries--since 1970. These attacks caused 6,190 deaths and
approximately 19,000 injuries.
Additionally, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), along
with the TSA Office of Intelligence, the TSA Office of the Inspector
General and the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)
have reported on or testified to Congress that public transportation in
America remains vulnerable to terrorist attack, that al-Qaeda remains
interested in targeting the sector, and that more needs to be done to
prevent and prepare for such a potential attack. Late last year the
NCTC testified that the ``al-Qaeda core believed targets worthy of the
group's focus included prominent transportation, infrastructure,
economic, and political targets.'' There is wide agreement that public
transportation systems continue to be desired terrorists targets. While
we have been very fortunate to date in not having a terrorist attack
carried out in our transit systems, we have indeed foiled recent plots
and arrested individuals who intended to attack our systems. We believe
it is appropriate that the funding commitment to fortifying our systems
match the recognized risks and threats.
Department of Homeland Security
To our agency partners within DHS, I am pleased that many working
relations between transit agencies and DHS divisions have improved.
Open lines of communication must continue and Federal agency funding
priorities, instruction, and expectations of grant performance must be
clear and consistent. These directives should also reflect the stated
concerns, desires, and challenges of the industry; however, I would
respectfully suggest this is not the case in regards to various
elements of the fiscal year 2012 TSGP Guidance. For example, the
guidance institutes a new 24-month grant period of performance for all
projects. This is a reduction from the previous 3-5 year allowable
expenditure period. I certainly appreciate the concerns regarding
unexpended TSGP dollars as we all desire that security projects be
implemented in a timely fashion in order to provide the protections
they are designed for. However, immediately reducing the time allotted
to expend funding without fully addressing widespread agency
administrative and grantee implementation hurdles seems
counterproductive to efforts to expedite project completion. Also, as
many security enhancement capital projects require multiple years to
complete, a reduction in the time allotted to expend funding would also
compel many grant recipients to shift funding to operational expenses
versus capital infrastructure security projects. This would not be in
the best interest of fortifying our systems against attacks, as the
majority of the security needs identified in APTA's survey relate to
capital projects.
Additionally, the fiscal year 2012 grant guidance states that this
year's funding priorities will be based on a pre-designated ``Top
Transit Asset List'' or TTAL. Some PATH assets are included on the TTAL
and I would welcome this added benefit for funding consideration from
this risk-based approach. APTA has testified previously that security
investment decisions should be risk-based. However, speaking on behalf
of the larger industry, including thousands of assets not listed on the
TTAL, I recognize that this narrower funding approach could preclude
other important security improvements from receiving funding
consideration with such limited transit security dollars available.
This underscores the need for increased funding. We must continue to
work together to ensure that DHS has the resources to meet the
extensive needs of systems across the country.
Transit Agencies
Threats against public transportation are growing in number,
complexity, and scale. To prevent and combat these threats, we must
continue to employ cutting-edge technology and processes to maintain
and operate our security resources and assets. Equally as important, we
must also establish and sustain sound, efficient administrative,
planning, and management practices. Many may not see the operational-
administrative connection in securing our transit systems, but the
deployment of well-trained and equipped law enforcement officers or K-9
units, or operation of high-tech surveillance equipment, or the
construction of a large-scale infrastructure fortification projects
come only after months and months of planning, development, and
administrative work. Planning, procurement, and project management are
all precursors to successful security projects as well as sound
evaluation and grant management systems. Public transportation systems
are committed to effective and well-planned implementation of security
initiatives and to serve as good partners in our National fight against
terrorism with the Federal Government and Congress.
key implications of the new national preparedness grant program
As you know, the Department of Homeland Security has proposed to
implement a new National Preparedness Grant Program (NPGP) along with
several other programmatic changes to the current TSGP. The new program
and proposed changes have raised concern within the industry. The most
drastic change is the elimination the TSGP--the exclusive pool of
funding for our Nation's public transportation systems which, we all
agree, are highly-desired terrorist targets. Additionally, under the
proposal, while transit agencies would be eligible for security
funding, they would have to apply for funding through their State
Administrative Agency (SAA), and compete in this process with other
State security priorities. This is a radical shift from the current
program, where transit agencies are authorized to apply directly to
DHS. We believe, under the proposed approach, that sufficient funding
would not consistently reach transit agencies and severely dilute their
security programs. As the leader of a multi-State agency, I also
foresee a challenge coordinating with SAA's when an individual system's
operations span multiple States, as is the case with many of large
transit properties. This administrative change could actually add to
delays in project implementation. We strongly urge DHS to reconsider
this proposal and maintain a sufficiently-funded, segregated grant
program for surface transportation security where transit agencies may
prioritize their needs and directly apply for Federal funding.
The stated concept in making these changes through the new NPGP is
``to develop, sustain, and leverage core capabilities across the
country in support of National preparedness, prevention, and
response.'' The transit industry stands ready and willing to coordinate
with our partners in the emergency management and preparedness
communities in planning appropriate responses to our Nation's natural
and man-made emergencies. However, this was not the primary purpose
behind Title 14 of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act (or the ``National Transit Systems Security Act of
2007''). That title of the 9/11 Commission Act was enacted with the
purpose of improving Federal investment in transit security and the
TSGP was created with the principal purpose of directing and increasing
capital investments to fulfill the requirements of the security plans
and risk assessments developed under the authority of the Act.
Emergency preparedness planning, exercises, training, and equipment
were all eligible uses of the funds authorized under the Act. However,
they were subsets of a larger list of eligible uses principally focused
on enhancing the security of the high-risk transit sector. APTA and its
members urge this committee and the Congress to preserve the unique
focus that the prior legislation placed on public transportation
security investments by reauthorizing the transit and rail security
provisions of the 9/11 Commission Act.
As DHS and many others in the homeland security policy arena
discuss issues of resiliency and ``all hazards'' approaches to security
and emergency management policy, transit agencies are increasingly
looked to as instruments for disaster response and evacuation, and as
such have repeatedly responded to major incidents ranging from 9/11 to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Congress and the administration should
pursue policies which recognize the role of public transportation
agencies (and their potential needs) in ``all-hazards'' response to the
resiliency question, but do not minimize the other important needs that
are specific and unique to our critical infrastructure.
conclusion
As I conclude, let me thank you all for the opportunity to testify
on these critical homeland security issues. There is no greater
priority for public transportation systems than the safety and security
of our passengers and workers. I urge you not to wait for the ``wake-
up'' call of an attack on our systems to provide us the support we
need. Transit systems across the country continue to stand ready,
committed, and vigilant in utilizing available resources efficiently to
protect our systems and our riders. We urge you to sustain the critical
partnership between transit agencies, Congress, and the Department of
Homeland Security that helps to keep our Nation safe and moving toward
economic prosperity.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, sir. I appreciate it.
Okay, I will recognize myself. Thank you, first of all, for
your testimony. It is very valuable testimony, great input. I
will recognize myself for 5 minutes, and my first question is
directed to Mr. Wainio.
Mr. Wainio, last month at our grants hearing with Federal
officials, Administrator Harmon and I discussed the delays
caused by the EHP, the Environmental and Historic Preservation
reviews, and that while FEMA has taken steps to improve the
process, EHP reviews remain an obstacle. I wanted to see if you
agree with that.
Ms. Harmon stated, on average EHP reviews have been reduced
to 18 days. Has this been your experience? Has the time line
for these reviews been expedited sufficiently? I would like to
have your opinion on that, sir.
Mr. Wainio. The short answer to that, Mr. Chairman, is no,
that has not been our experience at all. We continue to
experience very long delays; many, many, many months to have
EHP reviews conducted and completed.
Mr. Bilirakis. So you say many, many months. How many
months? How many days on the average?
Mr. Wainio. One example.
Mr. Bilirakis. Give me an example.
Mr. Wainio. We have a major construction project, and those
are the types of projects that typically require these reviews.
It is referred to as the SOC Storm Hardening Project. It was
funded in 2009. It is still pending an EHP review.
Mr. Bilirakis. Unbelievable.
Mr. Wainio. That also moves right into this issue of
shortening the time frame to get projects completed. Obviously,
if we shortened it from 3 years to 2 years, this project would
be dead already without an extension.
So, you know, we continue to see significant delays
occurring, and that is after FEMA actually requires the EHP
study. Once that requirement is relayed by FEMA, you know, it
can take months before the study actually takes place and gets
completed. In some cases, with this particular project, we have
been waiting for several years.
Mr. Bilirakis. In your opinion, how long should it take?
Mr. Wainio. That is hard for me to say. It depends on the
project, obviously----
Mr. Bilirakis. Sure, sure.
Mr. Wainio [continuing]. And the complexity of the project.
But, you know, certainly, I don't think it ought to take 2
years or more. We should be talking about something that can
take--you know, can begin fairly quickly and be conducted in a
period of a few months.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
Mr. DePallo, you want to weigh in on that?
Mr. DePallo. Well, we really haven't had that much
experience in this as well, but I know in some of our projects,
the time frame, I think 2 years is--would really create real
serious problem in completing any types of projects.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. Next question is for Mr. DePallo and
Mr. Wainio, but also, Mr. Daddario, I think you mentioned this
also in your testimony, so you might want to comment as well.
But the two of you expressed concern in your statement about
the reduction in the period of performance in fiscal year 2012
and in the NPGP proposal. Can you please elaborate on some of
the roadblocks to spending the funds, and then what impact will
this reduction have on your ability to compete for these
certain grants at these projects?
Mr. DePallo. Well, first of all, the 2-year time limit will
create significant problems. For example, we have a tunnel-
hardening project that requires a great deal of planning,
design, equipment procurement, and construction. We operate the
transit system that operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and
we carry hundreds of thousands of passenger each day. To try
and do that in 2 years would be completely impossible. The 2-
year limit will give us an opportunity just for operating funds
only, only operating projects, and it will eliminate any
significant capital projects.
Mr. Bilirakis. What other options might prove more
effective than actually reducing the period of performance as a
means to rapidly draw down the previous funding, the
appropriate funding? What are other options are there out
there, anybody?
Mr. DePallo. Yeah, well, I think eliminating the red tape
and getting the funds to the organizations would do a great
deal. In many cases it takes--it takes a great deal of time
before we actually get the funds, so we are not able to draw
down within a reasonable time period. So that also delays
projects.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
Mr. Wainio.
Mr. Wainio. Yeah, well, I would second that last comment
from Mr. DePallo. In our case, and I assume in the case of many
others, you know, the funds are shifted from one Government
agency to another, and the process of getting those funds
actually to the grantee takes a good deal of time, and very
little work, obviously, can go forward until we actually
receive the grant awards.
You know, we--you know, once we receive those grant awards,
you know, projects then start to be designed, specifications
established, and the procurement process gets under way. If in
the mean time it is a project that requires environmental
assessments, you know, that then can take--you know, that EHP
review, as I said, can take many months or longer.
You know, we have our own procurement processes that we
have to follow. That takes us several months at least before we
can actually make an award, once we are able to go forward.
There is a lot of market forces that are beyond our control.
So, again, the entire process is long by its very nature,
and 3 years is, in my view, for many of these complex projects,
is a minimum time that you would need to get some of them done.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Daddario, did you want to comment on that?
Mr. Daddario. The question I have is why--what objective is
being served by a 24-month period? I think the concern is that
you don't want money sitting out there without having any
progress made toward the purpose of the grant. There are ways
of measuring or assessing whether the recipient of the grant
money is, in fact, making progress short of setting a 24-month
period to spend it all, to put it all out the door.
So I just don't know if the 24--what really the purpose of
it is, or whether this is the right remedy for the problem that
somebody has identified in the grant program.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. Thank you very much.
What I will do now is yield to the Ranking Member, and if
time permits, we would like to have a second round. So you are
recognized for 5 minutes. Thank you.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
For all of the panelists here to testify, I just would like
to go down the road, if you could say yes or no. If you could
say for us whether you were provided the opportunity to give
the Department of Homeland Security any of your thoughts on
these proposed changes to the State and local grant programs.
Mr. Daddario. Yes.
Mr. Maloney. No.
Chief Clemmensen. Yes. Just as recently as last week we
started to have some discussions.
Ms. Richardson. But not prior to them putting the idea
forth?
Chief Clemmensen. No.
Mr. Wainio. No.
Mr. DePallo. No.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. Thank you.
Were you allowed to interact prior to the release of the
idea?
Mr. Daddario. We tried to maintain a regular contact or a
dialogue so that we could be heard. I think we need much more
of a dialogue going forward so that we can get a sense of the
details here.
Ms. Richardson. But my question is you said you were able
to provide feedback. Were you able to give that feedback prior
to the Department announcing its changes to----
Mr. Daddario. It is after the change. It is after the
program is designed or at least proposed, and then at that
point we have an opportunity to weigh in and to let them know
what we are thinking.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. Thank you.
Also, Mr. Commissioner, there has been discussion here
about the fusion centers and them possibly being modified. My
question is: Do you find that the critical intelligence is
being shared in an organized and timely fashion? Is there
anything else that you would recommend to us regarding that?
Mr. Daddario. We don't have a fusion center in place for
the New York City region. We work--my Bureau is responsible for
the Federal relationship with the FBI, so I have 120 or so
detectives and other senior officers at the JTTF. We also have
some people embedded with the FBI and other Federal agencies in
Washington, and it is through those relationships that we get
the intelligence that we need. We think we are getting all of
the--really all of the information that we need to design our
security and counterterrorism programs at the moment.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. For the other of you gentlemen, do
you have fusion centers in your area, and if so, do you find
them to be providing the information in a timely and organized
fashion?
Mr. Maloney. I would say the answer to that is yes. It is
much more efficient than it was, you know, years ago. We
receive informational bulletins from the various stakeholders
at the Federal and State level that can pass it down to the
local. So I would say most definitely there has been major
improvements without exchange of information.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you.
Chief Clemmensen. In the State of Illinois, we have a State
fusion center that the fire service has a seat on, and it has
been a very positive change over the last 5 or 6 years, and we
are getting more and more information.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. You two gentlemen?
Mr. Wainio. In the case of the Port of Tampa, we are not
involved in that.
Ms. Richardson. Okay.
Mr. DePallo. PATH is located in the New York region, so we
don't have a fusion center.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. Then my next question is, Mr.
Wainio----
Mr. Wainio. Wainio.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. I will let you do it for me.
You gave an excellent description of the potential impact
of cuts to UASI and port security, excellent, and I hope to use
that and possibly work with the Chairman as we try to help in
this area.
I wanted to afford Mr. DePallo the same opportunity, since
you do work with the port authority, to specifically say if
cuts--if further cuts were to occur to UASI and port security
grants, how could that negatively impact your ability to
sustain security?
Mr. DePallo. Well, we have a very significant security
enhancement program. The goals are to deter, detect, and
mitigate, and we receive extensive funding from the security
grant program. To eliminate that funding will eliminate a lot
of the current programs that we have.
We are currently working on programs to--mitigation
programs for our underwater tunnels, which include interior and
exterior hardening of the tunnel areas, floodgates. We also
have an extensive program for closed-circuit television and
access programs that include items, technology, such as video
analytics and laser intrusion detection. All of these programs
will go away. We will not be able to complete these programs
without this funding.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Chairman, could I ask one last question? I am now being
called to the floor because I have an amendment coming up.
Mr. Bilirakis. Yes, absolutely.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Commissioner, you have received grant funding from the
Department for Terrorism Prevention Training. How do you ensure
that your terrorism prevention training and programs are
Constitutionally sound? Specifically, I am referring to the
recent reports of potential civil rights violations in New York
regarding surveillance activities.
Mr. Daddario. The question you are asking, I assume, refers
to certain news articles that have raised questions about some
of the programs that the police department has in place.
Ms. Richardson. Yes.
Mr. Daddario. The programs--the officers that we have in my
Bureau--as I said, I work with the Joint Terrorism Task Force.
The department also has officers that work for other parts of
the department on intelligence gathering. All of their
activities are conducted in accordance with departmental rules
that I can tell you, based on my own experience, are based--are
drawn and based on the Attorney General guidelines and are
consistent with, comparable to, the very same rules that the
Federal Government applies for their work and the rules that
our officers at the FBI apply in their work.
So all our officers are instructed with what their
obligations are under the Constitution. We all take an oath to
abide by the Constitution. I think all of our officers are
certainly trained to do that. I think that by their natures,
that is what they do, it is the job that they value. When we
provide training, I know the training programs that we give out
through the Bureau are almost entirely DHS certified, reviewed,
and are in accordance with Federal guidelines. I have looked at
many, almost all of them, and I have seen nothing at all that
would indicate in any way that there is anything in any of
those programs that would encourage or suggest to any officer
that they do anything that would violate anyone's
Constitutional rights.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you.
Mr. Bilirakis. Sure. My pleasure.
Now I will recognize the gentleman from New York Mr. Turner
for 5 minutes or so, sir, because I am going to ask some
questions after you. So take as much time as you would like
within reason. You are recognized.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Just a little more on Deputy Commissioner Daddario's
response. To date, I don't think there is a single instance of
civil rights violation by the NYPD. I think Commissioner Ray
Kelly has done an outstanding job in setting out the right
guidelines and protocols. They are published. He has recently
put them in a very good speech at Fordham University Law
School, and I would suggest that people read that before they
are flying off with these accusations of civil rights
violations. I think the NYPD should be commended for a fine
effort.
That being said, Deputy Commissioner, you addressed the
need to distinguish between counterterrorism security funding
and all-hazard preparedness funding. You know, we can be
reminded that homeland security and all else began September 11
in 2001 with that horrific attack. Is there a muddling of these
terms? Is there a competition for funds? Could you elaborate on
why the distinction is important?
Mr. Daddario. Yeah. We think it is important to have a
category of money that is set aside solely for counterterrorism
purposes, because if you blend it together, there is the danger
that money that we think should be devoted to protection of
cities like New York, other high-risk areas like New York, to
counterterrorism, that some of that money may be diverted off
through the competitive political process to other communities
for all-hazard-type matters. So we think there should be--that
is, to us, a possibility. To guard against it, we just think
that it makes sense to have a certain block of money set aside
solely to deal with the terrorism risk. It is not any more
complicated than that, Congressman.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
A question for Mr. Maloney. You registered a concern that
the Department of Homeland Security was doing the cuts and the
proportion of cuts, and perhaps the allocation should be done
by Congress. My only thought is if you think Homeland Security
is bad, I don't think you want to go there. But if you have a
suggestion on a better method for the distribution of grant
funds to high-threat urban areas, I would be happy to hear it.
Mr. Maloney. Well, Baltimore is very fortunate that we have
survived and receive a set level of funding to fill the gaps
that we have identified and reduce our risk. Many urban areas
that were previously established are no longer established.
I am a firm believer in the UASI program. It unites areas
around big cities. It increases stakeholder interaction and
cooperation. It reduces redundant purchases and, I believe,
puts the major urban areas in the best situation to play our
role in National homeland security and our protection of our
country, and also, you know, the homeland security.
When you asked the question about muddling, it is very
interesting. There was a time when the preparedness dollars
were geared towards terrorism activities, in my opinion, and
when Katrina hit, there was a sense that they were preparedness
dollars. There was a time when we were allowed to use Urban
Area Security Initiative funds for Tamiflu purposes during
H1N1. Now it seems we are taking the priority off of terrorism
again, although it doesn't seem like the threat has been
reduced, and going back to more of an all-hazards approach. So
I would just add that as well to the question you asked the
Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, sir.
I have a couple of questions. The first question is for the
chief. In your testimony you noted a number of successes across
the country that resulted from grant expenditures, including
through the MMRS funding. We have heard about the impact of
MMRS from numerous stakeholders. Are you concerned that the
medical preparedness activities previously funded under MMRS
will not continue to receive the funding now that FEMA has
consolidated MMRS into a larger grant program?
Chief Clemmensen. Yes, that is always a concern. The MMRS
provides the equipment, the training, and exercise moneys that
allow us to do the training that is necessary to prepare us for
the catastrophes and things--incidents that happen around the
country. Any time you start to take that money away, it creates
consternation for us, because we have all of these tools, these
assets, and we have to continue to feed those assets, and we
have to continue to train with those assets. So it is a
concern.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
For Commissioner Daddario, while the NPGP proposal does
include a focus on prevention activities, it does not mention a
specific percentage of funding for these activities. Under the
current State and urban area programs, not less than 25 percent
of the funding must be used for law enforcement terrorism-
prevention activities. Should such a set-aside be included in
any new reform proposals, in your opinion?
Mr. Daddario. We think yes.
Mr. Bilirakis. Can you elaborate a little bit?
Mr. Daddario. For the reasons that I tried to set out for
Congressman Turner, and I don't think it is that complicated in
terms of what the concern is. If the money is not a set-aside
for that purpose, we think there is a danger that it will ebb
away, flow away for other purposes, and that the money that we
need to protect cities like New York, Baltimore, other high-
risk areas will be diluted, our security will be degraded, and
that is something which we think Congress should be very, very
wary of.
The threat posture today is as great as it has ever been.
You know, you may hear about al-Qaeda being--you know, the al-
Qaeda core being whittled away, but the fact is that al-Qaeda
is expanding its territory. There are more safe havens
developing in the world from east to west all the way to
Western Africa. So this is not the time to be thinking about
setting money--taking money away from security against the
terrorism threat. I think setting 25 percent aside for that
purpose at a minimum makes a lot of sense. I think we should
continue doing that for the foreseeable future.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
My last question for all of the witnesses. Many of you
expressed concern about the ability for local involvement in
the THIRA process. Now that the guidance has been released,
have you received information from your States on how this
process will be completed and how local--we had some discussion
with the first panel--but how local input will be incorporated?
Have you received this information, any information, from your
States? What procedures would you like to see in place to
ensure local threats and hazards are considered?
I will start with you, Chief--I mean, excuse me,
Commissioner, if you like.
Mr. Daddario. Yeah. I think the current system doesn't
involve a process where the localities have a say in
identifying threats and risks, as I understand that process,
and I think that works.
We are concerned, and I think I have to get a better
understanding of what FEMA has in mind going forward. I am
concerned having the areas that are viewed as risks being
defined from the Federal Government or by the State without
adequate input from the city of New York and all of the
constituent, you know, agencies that really are the best ones
to know what they need to protect and where their assets are
most at risk. So we want to assure that that local input is
maintained, and I am simply not sure what they have in mind
going forward.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
Mr. Maloney.
Mr. Maloney. I would--I agree with his comments. I would
also add, if the THIRA is required at the State level, we are
going to have a difficult time as locals. I believe will have
less of a voice to express what is really needed on the ground.
There is a lack of clarity on the implications of THIRA on
the Federal funding allocation decisions. For example, if a
particular region is in need of an asset, and two neighboring
States both want to develop that asset, who is going to decide
which State is awarded the funds necessary for development? The
use of THIRA needs to be informed by State and local input
prior to its use in funding allocations.
I think with any risk assessment, it is another tool in our
toolbox, but there are various risk assessments that we use,
and this would be one more. To kind of label this as the end-
all, be-all now, without the local input in the development,
and without some very robust guidance documents that have not
been produced yet, I think it is way too early to do that, and
we should--we should be prudent and wait.
Mr. Bilirakis. Chief.
Chief Clemmensen. I think the theme of my colleagues on the
right are that it is a little unknown yet how this is all going
to work together. However, it is the local jurisdictions that
really understand their local risk, and there is no ability or
accountability for the States to ensure that these local
viewpoints or threats are going to be included in the State
THIRA, and that creates a lot of issues at the local level for
us. It is just too--it is unclear yet what we are going to do.
Mr. Bilirakis. Mr. Wainio.
Mr. Wainio. The system you are talking about does not
impact the ports. We are continuing to do our risk, threat, and
vulnerability assessments with the U.S. Coast Guard.
If I could just sum up once again, Mr. Chairman, that in a
nutshell what we would like to see here from the port
perspective is that Congress determines the funding levels, and
that those funds are then allocated to the proper projects
through the U.S. Coast Guard and FEMA working directly with the
ports. We think that that process that basically has been in
place now for the last decade has worked well, and we would
like to see it continue.
It can be improved on in terms of processes. We can work
with FEMA and the Coast Guard and others to speed things up
perhaps a little bit, get things done more efficiently, but the
process itself, as it now stands, works well. It has served us
well. We would like to see it essentially continue.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
Mr. DePallo.
Mr. DePallo. Yeah. Most transit agencies throughout the
United States, larger transit agencies anyway, have very
sophisticated risk-assessment processes in place already.
As far as THIRA, we need to be able to get a handle on what
they are really looking for. We haven't been able to do that
yet. What we are going to be doing in the mass--as far as in
mass transit, we are going to take this back to the Mass
Transit Sector Coordinating Council, and pass the information
as we get it through them, and come up with recommendations.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much.
I would like to thank the witnesses, of course, for their
valuable testimony and the Members for their questions. The
Members of the subcommittee may have some additional questions
for you, and we ask that you respond in writing. The hearing
record will be open for 10 days.
I really appreciate your testimony today and all of your
input. Please don't hesitate to contact us. These are important
decisions.
Thank you very much. Without objection, the subcommittee
stands adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 4:23 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Questions From Chairman Gus M. Bilirakis for James H. Davis
Question 1a. Secretary Napolitano has stressed the importance of
having a National network of fusion centers and, starting with the
fiscal year 2011 grant guidance, has required States and high-risk
urban areas to submit at least one investment justification related to
the area's primary fusion center. In your statement you noted that in
Colorado you have used grant funding to support the Colorado
Information Analysis Center.
While the grant guidance requires some level of investment in
fusion centers, there is not a specific funding level required. Are you
aware of the level of investment your fellow States are making in their
fusion centers with grant funding?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1b. Would you recommend that any grant reform proposal
include the requirement to maintain and sustain a State's primary
fusion center?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2a. You indicated that States would like to play a greater
role and have increased visibility in the administration of grant
funds, particularly when it comes to the Port Security Grant Program
and Transit Security Grant Program.
Do States currently have the capacity to administer additional
grant programs?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2b. Would additional funding for management and
administration, above the current allowable 5 percent, be required
under the National Preparedness Grant Program proposal?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2c. Absent enactment of the National Preparedness Grant
Program proposal, do you have recommendations for greater collaboration
between SAAs and port authorities and transit agencies under the
current structure?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Chairman Gus M. Bilirakis for Bryan Koon
Question 1a. In your written statement, you indicated NEMA's belief
that the THIRA process will have ``limited effectiveness if implemented
in the current grant system due to shortcomings in the planning
process.''
Would you please elaborate on that?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1b. What are the deficiencies in the planning process
under the current programs?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2a. You indicated that States would like to play a greater
role and have increased visibility in the administration of grant
funds, particularly when it comes to the Port Security Grant Program
and Transit Security Grant Program.
Do States currently have the capacity to administer additional
grant programs?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2b. Would additional funding for management and
administration, above the current allowable 5 percent, be required
under the National Preparedness Grant Program proposal?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2c. Absent enactment of the National Preparedness Grant
Program proposal, do you have recommendations for greater collaboration
between SAAs and port authorities and transit agencies under the
current structure?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question From Chairman Gus M. Bilirakis for Richard A. Wainio
Question. States have expressed concern over the lack of visibility
into expenditures under the Port Security Grant Program and Transit
Security Grant Program and would prefer that funding to flow through
the States to avoid duplication or systems that do not work together.
You, however, have expressed your concern about what that would mean
for port and transit project and would prefer to remain as direct
grantees.
Is there a way to foster greater coordination between port
authorities, transit agencies, and States to address these concerns
without changing the current structure that provides funding to you as
direct grantees?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question From Chairman Gus M. Bilirakis for Michael D. DePallo
Question. States have expressed concern over the lack of visibility
into expenditures under the Port Security Grant Program and Transit
Security Grant Program and would prefer that funding to flow through
the States to avoid duplication or systems that do not work together.
You, however, have expressed your concern about what that would mean
for port and transit project and would prefer to remain as direct
grantees.
Is there a way to foster greater coordination between port
authorities, transit agencies, and States to address these concerns
without changing the current structure that provides funding to you as
direct grantees?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.