[Senate Hearing 112-67]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-67
ASSESSING U.S. POLICY AND ITS LIMITS IN PAKISTAN
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 5, 2011
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JIM WEBB, Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TOM UDALL, New Mexico MIKE LEE, Utah
Frank G. Lowenstein, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
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C O N T E N T S
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Page
Ahmed, Dr. Samina, South Asia Project Director, International
Crisis Group, Islamabad, Pakistan.............................. 5
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Krepon, Michael, cofounder and senior associate, South Asia,
Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC........................ 13
Prepared statement........................................... 14
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 4
Yusuf, Moeed, South Asia adviser, Center for Conflict Management,
U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, DC........................ 17
Prepared statement........................................... 19
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Casey, Hon. Robert P., Jr., U.S. Senator from Pennsylvania,
prepared statement............................................. 50
DeMint, Jim, U.S. Senator from South Carolina, prepared statement 50
(iii)
ASSESSING U.S. POLICY AND ITS
LIMITS IN PAKISTAN
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THURSDAY, MAY 5, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Kerry, Cardin, Casey, Shaheen, Coons,
Durbin, Udall, Lugar, Corker, Risch, Isakson, and Barrasso.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order.
Thank you all for joining us. I apologize for being a
moment late. I am coming straight from the dentist's chair to a
hearing on Pakistan. Is there a parallel? [Laughter.]
The Chairman. This is the second in our series of hearings
on Afghanistan and Pakistan and I am very pleased to welcome
another distinguished panel to help us explore the difficult
issues that we face.
This is a particularly challenging moment in terms of
American foreign policy. From the rising economic power of
China to the upheaval across the Arab world, to North Korea and
Iran, the Mideast peace process, and of course, Afghanistan and
Pakistan, we face a very complicated and difficult set of
policy decisions, all of which will affect our economy and our
security.
But as we survey this complicated landscape, there are few
countries as important to our national security right now as
Pakistan, and the momentous events of the last week brought
that into very sharp focus. The location and status of Osama
bin Laden's hideout in Abbottabad, a garrison city not far from
Islamabad, perhaps 35 miles as the crow flies, raises real and
serious questions for all of us.
What did Pakistan's military and intelligence services
know?
What is appropriate to think they should have known?
What legitimate due diligence was exercised in order to try
to find out or even to exhaust the possibilities of leads with
respect to Osama bin Laden's whereabouts?
Who did they think was living behind those 15-foot walls?
Was there any level of curiosity?
How could bin Laden have gone undetected living next door
to Pakistan's equivalent of West Point, where just last week
General Kayani gave a speech celebrating the Pakistani military
``breaking the back'' of terrorism?
It is simply honest to say that all Americans and many
other people are troubled by these questions, and Pakistan has
promised an investigation and answers. Like every other
American, the members of this committee wonder whether the
Pakistan military or its intelligence services--or some
components thereof--were somehow either unaware of its infamous
neighbor or were knowingly protecting him.
In the search for our answers, I want to emphasize no
matter what we learn about the events that preceded the killing
of Osama bin Laden, we still have vital national security
interests in this region, and we have worked hard to build a
partnership with Pakistan, fragile and difficult and challenged
as it may be at times. We have worked hard to build a
partnership that allows us to pursue common threats and
interests.
Despite bin Laden's death, the fight against al-Qaeda and
other extremist groups that threaten the United States and our
allies is far from over. Going forward, we have to act
thoughtfully. And no matter what we have to remember the big
picture, the larger strategic interest, and the full nature of
our relationship with Pakistan. We should not rush into a
situation that in fact hurts our own interests.
A legitimate analysis concludes that it is undeniable that
our relationship with Pakistan has helped us pursue our
security goals. More senior al-Qaeda terrorists have been
caught or killed in Pakistan than in any other country, in most
cases as the result of joint operations with Pakistani
authorities. Keeping 100,000 troops in Afghanistan--or even
half or a quarter of that number--depends on an enormous supply
train that requires the daily cooperation of the Pakistani
state. We rely on each other for intelligence, and often we
work together to act on it. And we have some space in Pakistan
to conduct drone strikes which have killed significant
terrorists, significant leaders, perhaps 16 of the 20 top
leaders of
al-Qaeda, all of whom we know were still plotting against the
United States.
So make no mistake. These strikes have relied on an
expenditure of political capital of the Pakistani Government
and they have certainly cost its leaders some of that political
capital with their own population.
The truth is, even before bin Laden's death, our
relationship with Pakistan has been strained recently, even
fragile. The Raymond Davis affair stirred widespread anti-
American sentiment across Pakistan. In the numerous trips that
I have made in my capacity as chairman of this committee, in
the last one, when I was asked to go to help work on the
question of Mr. Davis' release, I will tell you I have never
sensed as intense a level of anti-American feeling broadly felt
across the country because of the way that incident had been
handled. We need to be sensitive to both sides of this story.
Nothing, obviously, would excuse the harboring of the No. 1
criminal in the world, but we need to explore carefully exactly
what the facts are.
I might add that the relationship has been further
diminished and serious questions have been raised as a
consequence of news about a dramatic increase in Pakistan's
nuclear arsenal, and that has raised our concerns, as well as
our allies' concerns, about nuclear proliferation and regional
security. No matter what flows out of this, no matter what the
consequences in the end that alter or improve our relationship,
Pakistan will remain a nuclear state in a tinderbox of a
region. This part of Asia is a dangerous and difficult
neighborhood and two basic facts are central to understanding
the situation and the solution.
First, the real conflict is not between the United States
and Pakistan but within Pakistan itself. The battle is over
what sort of nation Pakistan will become. Will the forces of
violent extremism grow more dominant, eventually overpowering
the moderate majority? If that happens, clearly our relations
will get worse and our interests will be even more threatened.
Or will Pakistanis recommit to the values espoused by the
founder of their country, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, and come
together to build a stable, moderate democracy, an economically
vibrant and socially tolerant nation at peace with itself and
its neighbors? If so, friendship between our nations and the
working partnership can inevitably grow stronger.
Second, while this outcome will be decided by Pakistanis
themselves, the United States and other allies cannot afford to
sit on the sidelines. We can play a role in promoting stability
and prosperity, but we have to, in doing that, appreciate how
deep anti-American sentiments run and the limited space we have
within which to make a difference.
So what does that mean for United States policy toward
Pakistan?
First, we need to continue to make certain we have a
strategy that actually reaches and speaks to the people of
Pakistan. For years, we had a Musharraf-centric policy, not a
Pakistan policy. We knew that that needed to change. Even now
we have to acknowledge that the lion's share of our energy and
attention remains focused on the government and military side
of Pakistan. We began to change that through the efforts of the
Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation which revived a tradition of
United States assistance to Pakistan that goes back to the
1950s when we helped lay the foundation for Pakistan's future
agricultural and industrial growth. We still face the challenge
of demonstrating to the Pakistani people the positive
difference the United States can actually make in their lives.
We also have to understand the impact of the war in
Afghanistan on Pakistan. Too many in Pakistan are convinced
that they will be encircled by India when coalition forces
leave Afghanistan, and too many still speculate about the
impact of a 350,000-person Afghan Army on their interests. As
we discussed on Tuesday, Pakistanis, like too many Afghans, do
not understand what the United States endgame in Afghanistan
actually looks like, and they are hedging their bets in order
to safeguard their perceived interests.
There is a lot to discuss here today, and I look forward to
hearing from our expert witnesses. I want to welcome Dr. Samina
Ahmed who is the South Asia Project Director of the
International Crisis Group based in Islamabad. Moeed Yusuf is
the South Asia adviser at the U.S. Institute of Peace who
focuses on research on his native Pakistan, and Michael Krepon
is the cofounder of the Henry L. Stimson Center and an expert
on nuclear proliferation issues, particularly in South Asia.
Senator Lugar.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
calling this important hearing on Pakistan. I join you in
welcoming our distinguished witnesses. I wanted to take a
personal privilege of mentioning Dr. Samina Ahmed in particular
because she has come from Islamabad to meet with Members of
Congress at the Aspen Institute congressional conferences on
several occasions, and our understanding has been enhanced
substantially by her testimony and her friendship. We are
delighted to have all of our witnesses with us today.
Much of what I have to say this morning tracks very closely
with your analysis, Mr. Chairman. The circumstances surrounding
this week's dramatic killing of Osama bin Laden--who was found
by our forces near Islamabad in a well-populated area close to
Pakistan's military academy--have raised questions about
Pakistan's reliability as an ally. Pakistani officials have
been accused of being complicit or incompetent, but in either
case, some critics say it is time for us to wash our hands of
the whole country.
Even before the discovery of bin Laden's compound, our
relationship with Pakistan had suffered strains. Pakistan's
political institutions are weak and democracy has not developed
deep roots. It is facing an internal extremist insurgency that,
in the view of some U.S. experts, poses a serious threat to the
state. President Zardari himself acknowledged earlier this
week, ``The forces of modernity and moderation remain under
serious threat.''
Lately, terrorists trained in Pakistan have attempted to
carry out attacks in the United States. A grand jury in Chicago
last week indicted two alleged members of Pakistan's
intelligence service for involvement in the 2008 attacks on
Mumbai, India. High-ranking Pakistani officials were reported
last week to have urged Afghan leaders to distance themselves
from the United States and build stronger relations with
Pakistan and China, instead. United States drone strikes on
Pakistani territory anger many in Pakistan, while the Americans
have repeatedly accused elements in Pakistan's Government of
supporting Afghan insurgent groups, charges that have gained
resonance with the bin Laden operation.
Pakistan is not an easy partner. As Dr. Richard Haass
testified before our committee on Tuesday, ``It is hard to
imagine a more complicated bilateral relationship.'' But
distancing ourselves from Pakistan would be unwise and
extremely dangerous. It would weaken our intelligence
gathering, limit our ability to prevent conflict between India
and Pakistan, further complicate military operations in
Afghanistan, end cooperation on finding terrorists, and
eliminate engagement with Islamabad on the security of its
nuclear weapons.
Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state with missiles capable of
delivering nuclear weapons. With more than 180 million people,
it is one of the largest Muslim countries in the world and has
five times the population of Afghanistan. It has a close
working relationship with China, which is seeking to extend its
influence throughout Asia. It frequently has been in conflict
with India, with whom the United States has close relations.
Pakistan is a neighbor of Iran, a terrorist-supporting state
with nuclear ambitions. What happens along the Afghan-Pakistan
border deeply affects the fate of our operations in
Afghanistan. In short, Pakistan is a strategically vital
country with which we must engage for our own national
security.
Acknowledging this fact, Congress supported, on a
bipartisan basis, the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act,
signed into law in 2009. This legislation sponsored by Chairman
Kerry, myself, and Howard Berman in the House, attempts to
expand United States-Pakistani ties beyond military matters and
signals our country's willingness to engage with Pakistan over
the long term.
I would point out, as we have heard, Mr. Chairman, from
testimony from the State Department, despite these good
intentions, maybe only $179 million of the $1.5 billion this
year has been spent on four projects amid enormous controversy
over the monitoring on the part of the United States and
controversy within Pakistan about interference alleged with any
such aid at all.
The United States has made some progress. President Zardari
and other Pakistani leaders have lauded the bin Laden
operation, and John Brennan, President Obama's counterterrorism
adviser, said this week, ``Pakistan has been responsible for
capturing and killing more terrorists inside of Pakistan than
any country.'' Our diplomatic, security, and development ties
are growing despite many difficulties.
We should not distance ourselves from a country that looms
so large in our own strategic calculations. We should be clear-
eyed about the limits of our relationship. All military and
development assistance should be subject to careful review to
make sure that it is serving our national security interests.
I hope our witnesses will offer specific suggestions on
ways to improve the United States-Pakistani relationship, and I
look forward very much to our discussion.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar. Indeed,
we are parallel in our thinking without actually conversing
about it.
We welcome your testimony. Each of you can submit your
testimony in full and it will be placed in the record as if
delivered in full. We would appreciate sort of a summary so we
can--we have a number of Senators here and we would like to try
to have as much of a dialogue as we can.
We will begin, Dr. Ahmed, with you. We will go from your
left to right. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF DR. SAMINA AHMED, SOUTH ASIA PROJECT DIRECTOR,
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN
Dr. Ahmed. Thank you very much, Chairman Kerry, for holding
this important hearing and inviting me to testify on behalf of
the International Crisis Group on an assessment of United
States policy toward Pakistan and the challenges, indeed, in
pursuing a constructive partnership. The killing of Osama bin
Laden does not lessen the challenges but also offers new
options for each side.
We in the Crisis Group--and Senator Lugar has repeatedly
actually read our material and our recommendations. We have
repeatedly emphasized the importance of broadening U.S.
engagement with Pakistan beyond that narrow focus on military
security and military cooperation to a broad-based, long-term
approach, in particular by strengthening democratic
institutions, democratic functioning, and economic development.
It was precisely this core philosophy that we were pleased to
see reflected in the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act,
introduced by the chairman and the ranking member of the
committee and now U.S. law.
The challenges, quite obviously, are multiple, in
particular if we are going to be just narrowly focusing on the
security aspects of the relationship.
We saw Admiral Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, not that long before Osama bin Laden's killing talking
to the Pakistani Government and the security agencies and
asking them, warning them about the danger to U.S. national
security and, indeed, to Pakistan itself from the syndicate of
terror on Pakistani soil. It goes beyond just al-Qaeda. It
includes organizations such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba now renamed
the Jamaat-ud-Dawa which has been responsible for attacks such
as in Mumbai in which American citizens were also killed, which
has global aspirations and shares al-Qaeda's philosophy. It
includes the Haqqani Network responsible for the deaths of many
American soldiers and their allies in Afghanistan.
Pakistan is a young democracy, a nascent democracy. Taking
Pakistan back to its democratic moorings requires, at this
point in time in particular, when there is a certain degree of
concern and impatience about the inability of civilian
institutions to deliver, to even more so strengthen that
democracy because in that lies the answer to Pakistan's
stability and also the promotion of vital U.S. national
security interests.
My testimony has been placed before the house. Let me just
highlight some of our policy recommendations.
And I think particularly in the context of what we have
seen, the killing of Osama bin Laden so close to the main
military academy and in a military cantonment--in a military
town, I think it is absolutely essential now that the
certification requirements included in the Kerry-Lugar-Berman
bill be taken far more seriously than they were in the past.
We would advise and very strongly urge Congress to
condition military assistance on demonstrable steps to combat
violent extremists that go beyond just al-Qaeda, the foreign
al-Qaeda, but also homegrown jihadis, in particular,
organizations such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba. Our concern about
conflict between India and Pakistan is one of the reasons, but
also the fact that this organization lends its support to
violent extremist groups outside the region and within--
targeting U.S. national security and U.S. citizens.
We would urge Congress to continue to insist on a
certification requirement also of the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill
that the security agencies of Pakistan are not materially or
substantively supporting the political and judicial processes
of Pakistan and also to provide strong support--much stronger
support--to civilian law enforcement agencies in combating
jihadi groups.
We would also urge Congress and the Obama administration to
recognize that the Pakistan Government, not just the military
alone, should be considered an essential partner not just in
the context of combating extremism within Pakistan but also in
the context of the ongoing negotiations on the transition plans
for Afghanistan.
South Asia is, as you said, Chairman, a region where you
have multiple challenges and multiple crises, not just the
presence of violent jihadis but also nuclear-armed neighbors
that have fought wars in the past. We would encourage the
United States to play a more active role in supporting the
efforts of the Pakistan and Indian Governments to achieve a
long-term, stable, and sustainable peace.
We would also urge Congress and the Obama administration to
support democratic reform that this elected government in
Pakistan has actually taken--the first steps toward enacting,
in particular, to end that status of a no man's land in FATA in
the tribal belt. There is a political package of reform, agreed
to by all political parties in Pakistan. Support for that
package would advance the interests of the United States and
the Pakistani people by denying sanctuary in this territory to
violent extremist groups.
Finally, I would urge Congress and the Obama administration
to recognize the fact that this is a very young democracy.
Expecting results overnight is unrealistic, but in the long
term, supporting the civilian transition, encouraging the
military to demonstrate better behavior, ensuring that civilian
law enforcement takes the lead in combating violent extremists.
It is absolutely urgent that civilian assistance that has been
pledged by the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill should not become the
casualty of these strains in the relationship. This for the
Pakistani people, and a partnership between the Pakistani
people and the American people would be the best partnership
and the most sustainable partnership in broadening this
relationship.
Finally, as far as security assistance is concerned, quite
obviously, with the war in Afghanistan, you will have to take
in some of the concerns that Chairman Kerry has identified,
including the need for the military's cooperation in terms of
providing supplies to United States forces in Afghanistan, but
remembering that the threat of violent extremists, some of them
jihadi proxies backed by the Pakistani military, remains quite
obviously a major challenge. Certification should not be taken
lightly, but economic assistance should be continued.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Ahmed follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Samina Ahmed
I want to thank Chairman John F. Kerry for holding this important
hearing and inviting me to testify on behalf of the International
Crisis Group on an assessment of U.S. policy toward and challenges in
pursuing a constructive partnership with Pakistan. The killing of Osama
bin Laden does not lessen that challenge but may well offer new options
for each side.
The Crisis Group has been in South Asia since December 2001, and
has published reports on these issues. We have repeatedly emphasized
the importance of broadening U.S. engagement with Pakistan beyond a
narrow focus on counterterrorism and security to a long-term all-
encompassing approach, in particular by strengthening civilian
institutions and democratic functions. Such an approach, we have argued
in our reports, would help to stabilize a fragile state and a volatile,
crisis-prone region critical to U.S. national security interests. It
was precisely that core philosophy that we were pleased to see
reflected in the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act introduced by
the chairman and the ranking member of the committee, and now U.S. law.
By emphasizing political and economic interests, as well as the
security aspects of the relationship, the KLB legislation remains a
welcome step forward. Pakistan-based Islamist militants are threatened
by this policy because it delegitimizes their actions against the
Pakistani state and their efforts to undermine U.S. military efforts to
stabilize neighboring Afghanistan. These homegrown jihadis have
demonstrated an interest--and are gaining capacity to threaten--the
U.S. homeland. They are seeking, along with Pakistani political
opportunists and spoilers, to use American strikes against violent
extremists and intelligence gathering operations to turn Pakistani
public opinion against the United States. Slow and uneven disbursement
of U.S. assistance further undermines efforts to win over an
increasingly skeptical Pakistani public.
However, the U.S. administration and Congress must not construe the
failure to see immediate results on the ground as failure of the
changed approach. Instead, sustaining the broad-based relationship over
the short, medium, and long term, and exercising patience in its
implementation will pay political and security dividends.
Let me summarize some of the key policy options that we believe the
United States should pursue:
Continue to condition military support on demonstrable steps
to combat violent extremists and end the longstanding policy of
support and sanctuary to such elements, Pakistan or foreign.
Continue to require but also provide additional oversight on
the State Department certification of Pakistani cooperation in
dismantling nuclear supplier networks, combating terrorist
groups, and ending support by the military or its intelligence
arms to extremist groups.
Continue to insist that the ``security agencies of Pakistan
are not materially or substantively subverting the political
and judicial processes of Pakistan'' and provide stronger
support for civilian law enforcement agencies in combating
jihadi groups including prosecuting the small percentage of
madrassas that engage in jihadi terrorist training.
Recognize that the Pakistani Government, not the military
alone by any means, are critical interlocutors in the ongoing
process of advancing a transition in Afghanistan, including an
end game that includes political negotiations, while
maintaining certain redlines which include breaking ties with
al-Qaeda as well as Pakistani al-Qaeda linked extremist groups.
The United States must play a more active role in supporting
the efforts of the Pakistani and Indian Governments to achieve
long-term stability and peace in South Asia.
Support the civilian government and the combined political
party reform effort to end the second class status of the FATA
and provide its citizens both the full rights and civilian law
enforcement protection of the Pakistani Constitution.
BACKDROP
The U.S. administration is understandably concerned about Pakistan,
a country of some 170 million people with perhaps more than 100 nuclear
weapons. Al-Qaeda and affiliated Afghan insurgent groups such as the
Haqqani network have an established presence on Pakistani territory.
Over time, links between al-Qaeda, Pakistani jihadi groups and their
Afghan counterparts have expanded and consolidated to create a nexus of
terror threatening American security and interests at home, in the
region, and globally.
After September 11, the U.S. relationship with Pakistan was
adversarial at first, with Washington, DC, warning General Pervez
Musharraf's regime--partnered with the Afghan Taliban and oblivious to
al-Qaeda's presence on its territory--that Pakistan was either with or
against the United States. As Musharraf's regime started countering al-
Qaeda's presence, and scores of al-Qaeda leaders were killed, detained,
or extradited to the United States, the United States decided to back
Musharraf and his military in the misguided belief that they alone
could deliver the counterterrorism goods. But in propping up
Musharraf's military regime, the United States alienated its natural
partners, Pakistan's moderate majority. Regaining the trust of the
people of Pakistan has not been an easy task.
As the movement for democracy in Pakistan gained strength, the
United States did attempt to make amends. Reaching out to the country's
political leadership--particularly former Prime Minister Benazir
Bhutto--the United States also pressured Musharraf to step down and
thus influenced the Pakistani generals' decision to distance themselves
from their army chief. The United States can therefore claim some
credit for Musharraf's decision to hold elections and transfer power to
civilian hands.
With the Pakistani people winning their fight for democracy and
elections resulting in the formal transfer of power to an elected
civilian government, the U.S. Congress wisely decided it was in
America's interest to support democracy and economic development in
Pakistan through a multiyear partnership. The Enhanced Partnership with
Pakistan Act, signed into law by President Obama in October 2009,
redefined U.S. priorities in Pakistan, including by making security-
related assistance--including arms transfers--contingent on the
security forces respecting political and judicial democratic processes.
Three years later, many in Pakistan appear skeptical about U.S.
support for Pakistan's democracy; just as many in U.S. policy circles
appear skeptical about the ability of Pakistan's civilian institutions
to stabilize the Pakistani polity and prevent the spread of violent
extremism. Undoubtedly the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP)-led government
has failed thus far to curb violent extremism and civilian institutions
have yet to meet the needs of an increasingly impatient public.
However, the Obama administration and Congress must not expect a
transitional democracy to deliver miracles overnight. Instead, the
effectiveness of U.S policy toward Pakistan must be assessed in the
context of a young democracy that needs time to mature and stabilize,
with incremental civilian control over national security policy taking
Pakistan back to its moderate mooring.
UNDERSTANDING THE CHALLENGE
For some observers, Pakistan stands at the edge of an abyss beset
with internal turmoil, with a deadly countrywide militant presence and
a floundering economy that undermines the state's ability to deliver
basic services to its citizens. Violent extremism, a rapidly expanding
nuclear arsenal and a history of war with neighbors is more than
sufficient reason to worry about the country's future. The answer, some
Pakistani watchers believe, lies in ensuring that security takes
precedence over governance. In their thinking, the Pakistani military
might not respect human rights and promote fundamental freedoms, but it
is the only institution that is organized, capable, and strong enough
to hold the country together. Yet the answer for Pakistan's ills does
not lie in its praetorian past.
The military's repeated interventions have only widened internal
fissures, straining a fragile federation almost to breaking point. The
denial of democratic rights and freedoms by successive military rulers
resulted in the dismemberment of the state in 1971. The social contract
with the citizenry was painfully rebuilt by civilian rulers, with the
basic law of the land--the 1973 constitution--helping to restore trust
in the state. However, successive direct or indirect military
interventions--the latest by General Musharraf--weakened the civilian
edifice and the ability of civilian institutions to deliver good
governance and development that is so badly needed today.
The military's perception of national interest has also starved the
state of resources it requires for development. Instead, already
inadequate fiscal resources have been diverted to sustain the eighth
largest army in the world, one that boasts a massive array of
conventional and nuclear weapons, primarily aimed at confronting India.
By cultivating jihadi proxies to weaken India and to dominate
Afghanistan, Pakistan's military is also responsible for a countrywide
jihadi blowback that could, if not countered now, become more and more
difficult to contain. These military-backed homegrown extremists have
also forged links with transnational terrorist groups--including al-
Qaeda--and with regional insurgents such as the Haqqani network. The
resultant terror nexus is linked to terror plots aimed at the United
States and bears direct responsibility for the deaths of U.S. soldiers
and American allies in Afghanistan. Finding Osama bin Laden behind a
200-foot-long walled compound very close to the Pakistan military
academy also should raise additional questions about the Pakistan
military's quite differentiated policy of counterterrorism.
Pakistan's democratic transition faces many challenges but it also
offers the United States important opportunities to craft policies that
advance U.S. goals in a sustainable and strategic manner. Rather than
reverting to another exclusive and short-sighted partnership with
Pakistan's military establishment, the Enhanced Partnership with
Pakistan Act's strategically comprehensive approach must continue to
guide U.S. policy.
OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS
With the right policy choices, the United States could play a major
role in helping stabilize Pakistan's democratic transition which would
in turn help to stabilize the volatile region in which it is situated.
In making these policy choices, the U.S. administration must bear in
mind that the democratic transition is still in its nascent stages, and
will, at least in the near future, also place limitations on the
pursuance of policies and strategies that would advance U.S. goals.
Soon after the PPP-led government was formed under Asif Ali
Zardari's leadership following the 18 February 2008 elections, domestic
and international observers believed that it would be short-lived.
Although the government has stumbled from crisis to crisis, it has
survived against all odds, and is now in its fourth year in office.
With the support of its parliamentary opposition, the ruling party has
also spearheaded reforms that have set Pakistan back on the democratic
path. Key among these is the 18th constitutional amendment, passed
unanimously in Parliament and signed by the President into law on 18
April 2010. A landmark bill, which restores parliamentary supremacy by
removing the constitutional distortions of military rule, the amendment
also strengthens federal democracy by meeting longstanding demands for
the devolution of power from the center to the federal units. Other
major democratic reforms include the passage of the National Finance
Commission award on redistributing financial resources by the
federation to the provinces, the first such award agreed upon by all
stakeholders since 1997.
For the ruling party, one of the greatest challenges to enacting
democratic reforms lies in its dependence on an unwieldy coalition.
With a slim majority in Parliament, it has been forced to include some
unreliable partners in the federal and provincial governments,
including the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), a former member of
Musharraf's military regime. This lack of a stable parliamentary
majority, combined with resistance to economic reform from coalition
partners and the parliamentary opposition alike, has resulted in the
failure thus far to gain legislative approval for enacting many
pressing reforms. Under IMF pressure, the government is reducing
subsidies (e.g., on energy consumption), fuelling domestic discontent.
As the 2011-12 budget approaches, the government will be between a rock
and a hard place: pressured by the IFI's to enact pressing economic
reforms and pressured by the opposition to make concessions that could
further weaken a fragile economy.
The United States should continue to urge the Government of
Pakistan on economic reforms but the United States should not make
economic support contingent on such measures. Indeed, strings related
to transparency and efficacy should be attached to U.S. assistance, to
ensure that taxpayers' money is well spent and accounted for. However,
the Obama administration must also step up the disbursement of
congressionally appropriated funds provided for by the KLB law to help
to shore up a young democracy by supporting economic freedom and
development.
Currently, the pace of disbursing the $7.5 billion over a 5-year
period has fallen far behind schedule. The Pakistani Finance Minister
recently disclosed that Pakistan had not even received $300 million of
the $1.514 billion allocated for FY 2010. The multiagency quarterly and
oversight report of the civilian assistance program (December 2010)
identified ongoing security threats as impediments to monitoring and
implementation--while substantive sums were reallocated to target flood
recovery and assistance. Yet USAID must push the pace, understanding
that the failure to meet raised expectations only benefits spoilers. At
the same time, the generous funds allocated for Pakistan's conflict-hit
tribal agencies--such as for the South Waziristan or Malakand Agency's
quick impact programs--is money ill-spent. USAID-funded programs in the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) work through an
unaccountable military and civil bureaucracy and local elites, severely
limiting aid effectiveness. Rather than encourage, this assistance
impedes democratization by empowering the very forces opposed to the
extension of full constitutional and political rights to FATA.
The absence of state institutions and the Frontier Crimes
Regulations 1901 (FCR), a colonial-era law, has isolated the region
from the rest of the country, giving it an ambiguous constitutional
status, denying political freedoms and opportunities to the population,
and allowing militants to exploit the resultant vacuum to gain
significant power. On 14 August 2009, President Zardari announced a
FATA reform package, which would have lifted restrictions on political
party activity, curtailed arbitrary detention and arrests under FCR and
audited funds for FATA. This first basic step to bring FATA into the
mainstream was stymied by the military. One of the clearest signs of a
policy that supports civilian democratic institutions would be for the
United States to endorse the combined political party reform measure
that would end the colonial status of FATA, providing its citizens with
all the rights of constitutional protection, with civilian law
enforcement agencies allowed to protect those citizens and to confront
the full range of domestic and international jihadi forces which still
find sanctuary in North Waziristan.
The military has also undermined the government's reconciliation
efforts in Balochistan, bordering on southern Afghanistan, where
grievances against the center's exploitation of provincial resources
and indiscriminate use of force have resulted in a provincewide
insurgency. Instead, continued military operations--including targeted
killings and disappearances of political dissidents--have further
alienated the secular and moderate Baloch, who could play an invaluable
role in helping to counter the extremist forces that are bent on
destabilizing the state. Should the democratic transition stabilize,
there is real potential to bring the Baloch back into the political
fold and to enact meaningful democratic reform in FATA, thereby
strengthening the federation and marginalizing extremists.
Should the democratic transition stabilize, democratically elected
civilian governments could also assert greater control over national
security and defense policy. The two largest political parties, the PPP
and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), support peace with India
and Afghanistan. At present, however, Pakistan's generals exercise
considerable control over all sensitive areas of policy, which is
shaped in accordance with the military's perceptions of national
interest. Therefore the military continues to back Islamist proxies to
undermine Indian security and to promote perceived interests in
Afghanistan. That still raises the most serious threat for generating a
full-scale war in South Asia.
The United States is concerned about the safety and security of
Pakistan's nuclear arsenal but there is a far greater risk in a
conventional conflict between India and Pakistan escalating to the
nuclear level. When Pakistan-based jihadis attacked Mumbai in 2008,
India exercised considerable restraint. However, New Delhi could opt
for a far more robust military response should another such attack
occur, a likely prospect because of the Pakistani high command's
continued support for
al-Qaeda-linked groups such as the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, renamed Jamaat-
ud-Dawa (LeT/JD), and the Jaish-e-Mohammad, the former supported by the
Pakistan military and the latter actually formed by that military
through its intelligence arm, the ISI. It is unlikely that Osama bin
Laden's death will affect those ties since these organizations share
al-Qaeda's international goals.
Army chief Ashfaq Parvez Kayani claims that his military is
committed to eliminating violent extremists and has broken their
backbone. But Admiral Mullen's recent publicly stated concerns are
accurate and well-founded; Pakistan's continuing terror attacks, which
claimed more than 2,500 Pakistani lives in some 67 suicide attacks in
2010, show that militant organizations continue to flourish. Nor is
there any proof that the tribal borderlands are now firmly under the
state's control. On the contrary, ongoing operations in FATA agencies
against some tribal militants have been accompanied by peace deals with
equally violent extremist groups such at the Pakistani Taliban's Gul
Bahadur group in North and the Maulvi Nazir group in South Waziristan
agencies. Linked to the Haqqani network, these Pakistani militants are
actively involved in attacks against American troops in Afghanistan as
indeed are the Punjab-based al-Qaeda affiliates.
India-oriented jihadi organizations in Pakistan's heartland,
particularly the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, now have global ambitions and an
increasing global reach, posing a direct threat to the U.S. homeland.
Despite billions of dollars of U.S. security assistance, the Pakistan
high command still sees the LeT/JD as an asset in its proxy war with
India. The controversy over a CIA contractor killing two Pakistanis,
reportedly low level operatives of the military's intelligence arm, the
Inter-Services Intelligence Directive (ISI) in Lahore, stemmed in large
part from the military's sensitivity about U.S. intelligence activities
in the Pakistani heartland, where the LeT/JD and other al-Qaeda linked
India-oriented jihadis are based.
Despite a partnership with the United States, of which the
military, since September 11, has been the main financial and political
beneficiary, the Pakistani generals appear willing to use elements of
the media to whip up anti-U.S. sentiment. The military high command is
also strongly critical of U.S. drone attacks when its tribal allies are
the targets. On 27 March, for instance, Army Chief Kayani, for the very
first time publicly condemned a U.S. drone attack, most likely because
it targeted the military-backed Haqqani-linked Gul Bahadur group.
This shaping of anti-American sentiment through public
pronouncements or the media, especially influential broadcast media, is
part of the military's strategy to redraw redlines in the relationship.
Drone attacks, in short, are acceptable but not when jihadi proxies
such as the LeT or chosen Pakistani or Afghan Taliban allies are
targeted.
The United States has belatedly drawn its own redlines. Admiral
Robert Willard, for instance, expressed concern about the Lashkar-e-
Tayyaba's expanding reach and ambitions in testimony before the
Senate's Armed Services Committee. The White House Quarterly report on
Afghanistan and Pakistan in April assessed: ``there remains no clear
path toward defeating the insurgency in Pakistan.'' In a far more
explicit and for the very first time public criticism of the Pakistan
military's support for homegrown and Afghan jihadi proxies, Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen called for an end for
Pakistani backing of the Haqqani network and its local allies. Drawing
Pakistan's attention, though media interviews, to the presence of al-
Qaeda's leadership in the borderlands and Haqqani's continued presence
on Pakistani soil, Admiral Mullen stressed that the two countries must
work together to eliminate this threat by sharing intelligence. He
pointed out that the syndicate of terror on Pakistan soil, including
the Haqqani network, al-Qaeda, the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and the Pakistani
Taliban threatened U.S. national security and the lives of U.S.
citizens.
The Pakistani military leadership has pushed back strongly, with
Kayani rejecting, in the words of his spokesperson, U.S. ``negative
propaganda.'' Reiterating opposition to drone strikes and U.S.
intelligence operations within Pakistan, using the media to propagate
anti-American sentiment, the high command appears to believe that the
United States will back down, particularly since it needs the
military's cooperation to stabilize Afghanistan militarily and
politically. To change the military's behavior and to protect U.S
national security interests, and indeed those of the Pakistani people
who are victims of extremist violence, the United States must follow
its advice to Pakistan with action.
U.S. POLICY OPTIONS: LOOKING AHEAD
To continue security-related assistance, the KLB Act requires the
Secretary of State to certify Pakistani cooperation in dismantling
nuclear supplier networks, combating terrorist groups, and ending
support by the military or its intelligence arms to extremist groups.
Rather than give in to the high command's pressure tactics, the United
States should condition military support on demonstrable steps to
combat violent extremists and end the longstanding policy of support
and sanctuary to such elements, Pakistan or foreign.
The Act also requires certification that the ``security agencies of
Pakistan are not materially or substantively subverting the political
and judicial processes of Pakistan.'' The military should be reminded
that future security assistance would also depend on such
certification, particularly since the threat of another covert
intervention cannot be ruled out.
President Zardari's personal differences with the army chief aside,
the military's opposition to the PPP is rooted in a long history of
distrust and discord, with a former Prime Minister, Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto, executed by a military dictator and Benazir Bhutto's government
twice ousted through military-devised interventions during the 1990s.
The current government too could be dismissed through a military-
manipulated intervention. The MQM, a former coalition partner of
Musharraf's military government, could be persuaded to quit the PPP-led
coalition, thus depriving the government of a stable parliamentary
majority; and/or encouraging the PML-N to support a vote of no
confidence in Parliament. The superior court's ongoing tussle with the
executive could also provide the military the lever it needs to remove
the government, replacing it with a puppet regime, which would allow it
to rule from behind the scenes.
Signals from Washington, DC, will play a major role in the
military's cost-benefit analysis of intervening. The United States must
resist the temptation of reverting to a reliance on quick fixes which
would amount to falling back on a failed policy of engaging with the
Pakistani military at the cost of Pakistan's young democracy. A
sustained democratic transition will go a long way in stabilizing
Pakistan though meaningful political, economic, and security-sector
reform. The assertion of civilian authority over security policy will
also result in a reassessment of the domestic costs of supporting
jihadi proxies and a realignment of domestic priorities from military
to human security. By strengthening the new civilian order, both the
United States and Pakistan stand to gain.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Dr. Ahmed.
Mr. Krepon.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL KREPON, COFOUNDER AND SENIOR ASSOCIATE,
SOUTH ASIA, HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Krepon. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the
committee, the United States-Pakistan relationship could not
have survived this long without the presence of vital common
interests. But we are now very close to another divorce. It
would be a serious error in judgment in my view to conclude
that this relationship cannot be salvaged. Pakistanis have
great resilience and their military leaders are capable of
making good as well as bad decisions. This relationship will
not be salvaged unless Pakistan gets its house in order and
unless we are clearer amongst ourselves about what we can and
cannot expect from Pakistan.
Pakistan is a weak country with strong powers to resist
United States pressures. Our reliance on Pakistan for
logistical support for our many troops in Afghanistan is a
great source of friction. We argue over compensation. We argue
over the extent of the United States presence in Pakistan, and
we argue over the ground rules under which we operate there.
United States and Pakistani interests diverge on nuclear,
on India, and on Afghanistan. Pakistan's sense of insecurity is
growing, which translates into increased reliance on nuclear
weapons and continued links to the groups that Samina has
mentioned; groups that carry out deadly attacks in Afghanistan
and in India.
On Afghanistan, we both seek a negotiated settlement, but
we are backing different horses. Our military forces in
Afghanistan--God bless them--are performing in an exceptional
manner, but every one of us knows that their sacrifices will be
in vain unless tactical gains can be handed off to competent
Afghan authorities. If a lasting political settlement can be
found in Afghanistan, it will require extraordinarily difficult
internal and regional dealmaking. I doubt whether this heroic
undertaking is worthy of an annual U.S. military commitment in
excess of $100 billion. Dealmaking will continue within
Afghanistan and with Afghanistan's neighbors at a fraction of
this cost and sacrifice. The results may well be modest or
ephemeral no matter how much we spend there.
The future of Pakistan matters a whole lot more than the
future of Afghanistan. Pakistan, unlike Afghanistan, is a hinge
state in the Islamic world. United States military and
diplomatic investments do not remotely correspond to the
relative importance of Afghanistan and Pakistan to vital United
States national security interests. And some of our policies
are increasing stress fractures within Pakistan.
It will require, in my judgment, a four-cornered bank shot
to leave Afghanistan as a reasonably functioning country.
Pakistan may also become lost to its own pathologies regardless
of what we do there. But it would be immensely tragic if the
loss of United States blood and treasure in this theater
results in little better than the usual state of affairs in
Afghanistan, alongside far greater deterioration within
Pakistan and in United States-Pakistan relations.
At best, we will continue to have a checkered track record
with Pakistan. Its security apparatus will continue to seek to
influence Afghanistan's future no matter what carrots and
sticks we apply. Pakistan is not going to give up nuclear
weapons, but we can actually work with them, I believe, to
increase nuclear risk reduction in the region.
United States ties with India are going to continue to get
better, as they should, and Pakistan's national security
establishment is going to feel more insecure as a result. We
cannot convince Pakistan's military to befriend India. We can
work with them to have a more normal relationship with India,
especially in the areas of trade and regional development.
The biggest challenge facing Pakistan's national security
establishment is to recognize how growing links to extremist
groups mortgage that country's future. The ISI still does not
get this. Outfits like Lashkar-e-Taiba are the leading edge of
Pakistan's national demise. If Pakistan's military leaders
cannot rethink the fundamentals of their anti-India policy and
their increased reliance on nuclear weapons, they will never
know true security. I do not expect a change in Pakistan's ties
to the Afghan Taliban, but this would be a very good time for
Pakistan's military leaders to rethink any lingering ties they
may have to the remnants of al-Qaeda within their country. A
rethink of their ties to the LeT, Lashkar, would also be
helpful.
We might also reconsider our present course. In my view,
our Afghan policies hurt rather than help Pakistan to find its
own balance. If authorities in Afghanistan are unable to
safeguard our military's hard-won games, we are obligated to
ask how much more blood and treasure ought to be devoted to
this cause. I acknowledge that there are risks in accelerating
reductions in the United States level of effort in Afghanistan.
In my view, there are greater risks and costs by remaining on
our current glide path.
I, therefore, respectfully suggest that this committee
consider accelerating efforts to secure a political settlement
in Afghanistan alongside steeper reductions in our level of
military effort there.
Thank you so much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Krepon follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael Krepon
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for inviting me
to testify about Pakistan. I have been working on national security
issues relating to Pakistan at the Stimson Center for almost 20 years.
Pakistan is a very confusing place, but one thing is unmistakably
clear: there are no simple solutions to what ails Pakistan or United
States-Pakistan relations.
Osama bin Laden's death is a landmark in U.S. counterterrorism
efforts. The failure of this operation would likely have had horrific
consequences for United States-Pakistan relations. Instead, its success
will result in an even more trying bilateral relationship, but not a
divorce.
Pakistan's leaders had little choice but to put a positive gloss on
bin Laden's death, as Washington had put them on notice many times that
military action would result if we had strong intelligence of his
whereabouts. That Pakistan's security apparatus was kept in the dark
about this operation speaks volumes about the growing difficulties of
this partnership.
Less than 2 weeks ago, the Pakistani chief of army staff, Gen.
Ashfaq Kayani, visited Pakistan's premier military academy to
congratulate the cadets. General Kayani claimed that Pakistani security
forces ``have broken the back of terrorists'' and that the Pakistan
Army ``was completely aware of internal and external threats to the
country.'' Osama bin Laden's compound was a mile away from the parade
ground where Kayani spoke.
General Kayani and the director general of interservices
intelligence, Gen. Ahmad Shuja Pasha, were rewarded with term
extensions by the current Pakistani Government because of their
competence in dealing Pakistan's profound internal and external
threats. The presence of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan reflects very
poorly on both of these officers. The No. 2 ranking al-Qaeda figure,
Ayman al-Zawahiri and the worst offenders of the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan are also widely believed to be on Pakistani territory.
Hard times lie ahead for United States-Pakistan relations. The
interests of our two countries in Afghanistan diverge as well as
converge. Groups that engage in violent acts against U.S. and allied
forces in Afghanistan and against targets in India are based, trained,
and equipped on Pakistani soil, without serious interference by
Pakistan's security apparatus.
Osama bin Laden's violent demise comes at a time when U.S.
expenditures in Afghanistan are reaching the half-trillion dollar mark.
It is far from clear that the hard-earned tactical achievements of U.S.
forces there can result in long-lasting gains. It is even more apparent
that Pakistan can only lose by being a safe haven for violent
extremists. Bin Laden's death provides an opportunity for Pakistani and
U.S. authorities to reconsider our complicated and unsatisfactory
relationship.
Pakistan is a weak country with strong powers to resist U.S.
pressures. Pakistani leaders usually do not ``just say no'' to
Washington. Instead, they often use circumlocution, delay, and work-
arounds when they believe that U.S. demands are inimical to Pakistani
national security and domestic political interests.
The very large U.S. military presence in Afghanistan which is
dependent on Pakistani logistical support is a great source of friction
between our two countries. We argue over compensation, the extent of
the U.S. presence on Pakistani soil and the ground rules under which
U.S. personnel operate. U.S. reliance on Pakistan for logistical
support provides Rawalpindi with unusually strong leverage to resist
U.S. demands. But even if the United States greatly reduces our
footprint in Afghanistan, Pakistani military leaders would still be
able to deflect our demands when they run counter to their perceived
interests.
One area of divergence relates to Afghanistan. We both seek a
negotiated settlement there, but we are backing different horses.
Pakistan's security establishment seeks an outcome that maximizes its
influence in Kabul as well as in Afghan provinces adjacent to Pakistan
against hostile influences, primarily from India. This helps to explain
why Pakistan's security apparatus retains close links to the Afghan
Taliban.
The United States-Pakistan relationship could not have survived
this long without the presence of vital common interests. Foremost
among them is our common goal of a stable Pakistan that is at peace
with itself. With U.S. support, Pakistan's Armed Forces are engaged in
selective efforts to increase domestic security, at significant cost.
Washington has helped Pakistan increase the security of its nuclear
assets. We also serve as an essential crisis manager and as a promoter
of more normal ties with India.
It would be a serious error, in my judgment, to conclude that this
relationship cannot be salvaged. Pakistanis have great resilience, and
their military leaders are capable of good as well as bad decisions. In
order to salvage this relationship, Pakistan needs to get its house in
order, and we need to be clearer about what we can and cannot expect
from Pakistan.
U.S. and Pakistani interests diverge on nuclear issues, India, and
Afghanistan. Pakistan's sense of insecurity is growing, which
translates into increased reliance on nuclear weapons and continued
links to groups that carry out deadly attacks across its borders.
Pakistan's national security managers have ``just said no'' with
respect to the initiation of negotiations on a treaty to stop producing
fissile material for weapons--one indicator of their sense of
insecurity and anger at the United States--India civil nuclear deal.
The Punjab-based Lashkar-e-Toiba, which has carried out mass casualty
attacks in Kashmir, New Delhi, Mumbai, and elsewhere, is not greatly
inconvenienced by Pakistan's security apparatus. The Haqqani network,
which carries out cross-border attacks against U.S. and NATO forces in
Afghanistan, seems to have few constraints on its operations. This
track record reflects Rawalpindi's perceived interests to counter
India's growing conventional military capabilities and to secure
Pakistan's interests in Afghanistan.
The United States has given Pakistan economic and military
assistance, assuming that Pakistan would pay greater heed to U.S.
interests. This transactional relationship has been unsatisfactory to
both parties. First, as noted above, U.S. and Pakistani security
objectives are not always in alignment. Second, Pakistan's security
culture has been deeply wedded to poor decisions. There is positive
movement on some fronts--for example, since 2002, Kashmir has not been
a ``flashpoint'' between Pakistan and India--but even when there is
private acknowledgment of unwise choices, it's very hard for Pakistani
authorities to change course. Third, U.S. economic assistance remains
quite modest compared to Pakistan's budget outlays and domestic needs.
Fourth, U.S. military assistance to India is growing far more in
qualitative and quantitative terms than is U.S. assistance to Pakistan.
Consequently, Pakistani grievances with whatever level of military
support we provide will also grow.
Sometimes Washington can quietly encourage helpful changes at the
margins of Pakistani policies. Over time, course corrections can become
increasingly significant with quiet U.S. encouragement and Pakistani
recognition of unwise policies. But this ongoing process is
frustrating, time consuming, and becoming more difficult as our
estrangement grows.
The enlarged U.S. military commitment to facilitate a political
settlement in Afghanistan greatly increases friction with Pakistan. I
have reluctantly concluded that greater U.S. efforts in Afghanistan are
unlikely to result in long-lasting gains. Our military forces in
Afghanistan--God bless them--are performing in an exceptional manner.
But we all know that their sacrifices will be in vain unless tactical
gains can be handed over to competent Afghan political leaders and
military units.
If a lasting political settlement can be found in Afghanistan, it
will require extraordinarily difficult internal and regional deal
making. I doubt whether this heroic undertaking is worthy of an annual
U.S. military commitment in excess of $100 billion. Deal making will
continue to be pursued at a fraction of this cost and sacrifice. The
results may well be modest or ephemeral, no matter how much we spend
there.
The future of Pakistan matters far more than the future of
Afghanistan. For the foreseeable future, militant groups with global
reach are likely to reside in far greater number in Pakistan than in
Afghanistan. Pakistan has a growing nuclear arsenal and production
capacity for weapons-grade fissile material. Pakistan, unlike
Afghanistan, is a hinge state in the muslim world. U.S. military and
diplomatic investments do not remotely correspond to the relative
importance of Afghanistan and Pakistan to vital U.S. national security
interests. Some U.S. policies are also increasing stress fractures in
Pakistani society.
Take, for example, the highly emotive issue of U.S. drone strikes
on Pakistani soil. I am obviously not privy to the profiles of those
targeted. According to what limited information is publicly available,
most of the targets of U.S. drone attacks are apparently not big
difference makers in the region's strategic calculus. I trust that
these attacks offer tactical gains, but they have very significant
downside costs.
That Pakistani authorities have reportedly consented privately in
the past to some attacks under some criteria is not particularly
reassuring, since these practices have served to distance Pakistani
citizens from their government as well as from the United States. It is
particularly upsetting for most Pakistanis to bear witness to aerial
attacks on their sovereign territory, whether by the Soviet Union
during the 1980s or by the United States a quarter-century later.
To my way of thinking, the targets for these attacks need to matter
a great deal in order to merit the adverse consequences they engender.
I would not underestimate the resulting damage to United States-
Pakistan relations from U.S. drone strikes--damage far greater than the
tactical gains we seek along the Afghan border.
It will require a four-cornered bank shot to leave Afghanistan as a
reasonably functioning country. Assuming this is possible, is this
effort worth the hollowing out of United States-Pakistan relations?
Granted, there are many reasons beside Afghanistan for Pakistan's
current trajectory. And Pakistan may become lost to its own pathologies
regardless of U.S. efforts there or in Afghanistan. But it would be
immensely tragic if the loss of U.S. blood and treasure in this theater
results in little better than the usual state of affairs in Afghanistan
alongside far greater deterioration within Pakistan and in United
States-Pakistan relations.
I realize how hard it is to get U.S. policies toward Pakistan and
Afghanistan ``right.'' Indeed, one message that I have tried to convey
in my testimony that it may well be impossible to get things anywhere
near ``right'' in this part of the world. Even if the United States
greatly reduces our level of effort in Afghanistan and removes Afghan
war-related sources of friction with Pakistan, I do not expect
significant dividends in United States-Pakistan relations. There will
be other important matters on which we will continue to disagree.
Nonetheless, the removal of some sources of friction in bilateral
relations remains a worthy objective, especially when friction widens
and accelerates Pakistan's domestic fissures. The removal of tactical
irritants in the pursuit of improbable objectives in Afghanistan could
also facilitate constructive changes at the margins of Pakistan's
national security policies. With patient and persistent engagement, we
can help Rawalpindi reconsider policies that have manifestly weakened
Pakistan. Our focus on Afghanistan is crowding out these important
agenda items.
At best, we will have a checkered track record with Pakistan.
Pakistan's security apparatus will seek to increase its chances to
influence Afghanstan's future dispensation no matter what carrots or
sticks Washington chooses. We can also forget about convincing Pakistan
to give up its nuclear weapons, but we may be able to persuade
Rawalpindi that Pakistani security can be enhanced with more nuclear
risk-reduction measures. U.S. ties with India will continue to improve,
reflecting our substantial and growing common interests. Pakistan's
national security establishment will feel more insecure as a result.
Washington can't convince Pakistan's military leaders to befriend
India, but we can promote more normal ties between Pakistan and India,
especially in the areas of trade and regional development.
The biggest challenge facing Pakistan's national security
establishment is to recognize how continuing links to extremist groups
mortgage Pakistan's future. Outfits like Lashkar-e-Toiba, which some
view as a strategic reserve in the event of another war against India,
are instead the leading edge of Pakistan's strategic demise. Every mass
casualty attack that Lashka- e-Toiba carries out on Indian soil brands
Pakistan as an exporter of terrorism. India rebounds from extremist
attacks; Pakistan's economy and social cohesion do not rebound. If
Pakistan's national security establishment cannot rethink the
fundamentals of its anti-India policy and its increasing reliance on
nuclear weapons, it will never know true security.
As for Afghanistan, the sooner we and Pakistan revisit painful
questions, the better. Pakistan cannot break damning links with the
past as long as senior leaders of al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban find
safe havens there. I do not expect a change in Pakistan's ties to the
Afghan Taliban, but Rawalpindi may now wish to rethink its passive
relationship to what may remain of al-Qaeda's leadership within the
country.
We might also reconsider our present course. Our Afghan policies
hurt, rather than help, Pakistan to find its balance. If authorities in
Afghanistan are unable to safeguard our military's hard-won gains, we
need to ask how much more blood and treasure ought to be devoted to
this cause. I acknowledge that there are risks in accelerating
reductions in the U.S. level of effort in Afghanistan. In my view,
greater risks and costs are incurred by remaining on our current glide
path. I therefore suggest that this committee consider accelerating
efforts to secure a political settlement in Afghanistan alongside
reductions in our level of military effort there.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Krepon.
Mr. Yusuf.
STATEMENT OF MOEED YUSUF, SOUTH ASIA ADVISER, CENTER FOR
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Yusuf. Chairman Kerry, Ranking Member Lugar, members of
the committee, thank you very much for this opportunity to
speak to you today about United States policy toward Pakistan.
These views are my own but are influenced and informed by
my work at the U.S. Institute of Peace where I am based. USIP
not only conducts research and analysis on Pakistan but we have
a sizable programmatic presence in the country, which takes me
back to Pakistan on a very regular basis.
Osama bin Laden's presence and comfortable existence in a
Pakistani garrison town was shocking, to say the least. In the
wake of bin Laden's killing, many have understandably called
for a reevaluation of the bilateral relationship with Pakistan.
I would, however, submit, Mr. Chairman, that retreating
from a promise of long-term holistic support to Pakistan will
be a grave error on the part of United States decisionmakers.
The relations with Pakistan will never be good, but they are
still necessary. With 180 million people, the world's fifth-
largest nuclear arsenal, a global hub for Islamic militants,
and recent evidence of fast-growing extremism in Pakistani
society, a further destabilization of Pakistan would be nothing
short of catastrophic in my view.
The decision by the U.S. Congress to allow a more broad-
based relationship capable of reaching out to the Pakistani
people, crystallized as it was through the Enhanced Partnership
with Pakistan Act, was refreshing precisely because it
understood the importance of a stable Pakistan for the United
States. The beauty of that was that for once we were now
thinking of Pakistan for Pakistan's sake.
We must be clear that the ultimate U.S. national security
interest in Pakistan will be served only by ensuring stability
of this country and nothing less. Afghanistan is a critical
element of that but only one of them. Therefore, the tendency
to tie this relationship's future solely to Afghanistan, in my
view, is a flawed approach.
Taking a long-term view of the partnership, my written
testimony, which has been submitted, provides a number of
specific measures regarding America's security, economic, and
political engagement that would help further this United States
interest of assisting Pakistan become stable.
Very briefly on Afghanistan, which of course is the most
urgent of our security interests, recent research that we have
conducted at USIP suggests a much greater possibility of
convergence between United States and Pakistani positions than
is generally believed. The prerequisite to benefiting from this
convergence, however, is a clearly laid-out reconciliation plan
from the United States, followed by frank and specific
discussions with Pakistan on the positive role they would be
able to play as we try to reach out for a negotiated settlement
in Afghanistan. I think it should be fairly clear that there is
no military solution possible, and a Pakistani role in the
reconciliation phase remains indispensable to us.
Let me say a word about economic assistance. The irony here
is that while continued economic assistance cannot guarantee
success, withdrawing it at this moment would be tantamount to
giving up on Pakistan. To optimize gains, economic assistance
must be tailored to ensure maximum development benefits. There
is a need to reconsider use of aid for short-term stabilization
objectives, as I increasingly see being the case in Pakistan,
because what this does is it risks diluting development gains
while proving to be ineffective on the security front as well.
I would, however, recommend making civilian economic
assistance conditional upon the Pakistani Government's ability
to undertake structural tax reforms, which there is now a
consensus both in Pakistan and outside is critical for
Pakistan's fiscal revival.
Then, Mr. Chairman, there are things that money cannot buy,
and in Pakistan's case it is their strategic mindset. Having
worked on this issue very closely, I am convinced that no
amount of United States aid will be able to deliver on that
front. India-Pakistan normalization is critical for Pakistan,
but it is not our aid that is going to do the trick. It would,
therefore, be best to use America's economic leverage to ensure
better development outcomes, and returns on the
counterterrorism front should be linked only to security
assistance.
I would add here, though, that the conditionalities,
whatever they are, must be ones which can be proven and which
are tangible. When there is such an acute trust deficit, it is
very difficult to prove conditionalities which really go with
one's word against the other, which has been the case so far in
my view. We also need to keep in mind the Pakistan military's
capacity constraints when we decide what conditionalities are
going to be applied.
In terms of America's political engagement, the dilemma of
who to work with in Pakistan will remain a real one for the
foreseeable future. The temptation to waiver toward the
relatively more organized and efficient military will be strong
from time to time. However, we must not repeat the mistakes of
the past. Political engagement with Pakistan should have one
overriding objective. Whatever change occurs, it would have to
come about democratically and constitutionally for it to be
acceptable to Washington.
Let me close by reiterating that Pakistan's stability as a
state is a critical U.S. national security interest, if not for
any other reason than, unfortunately, purely for the country's
destructive potential: one of the largest youth bulges,
extremism, terrorism, nuclear weapons, and inability to hold
India's, and indeed South Asia's, progress back. America's
focus must remain on the long-term vision that I believe can
still turn Pakistan around to help it become a moderate Muslim
country with a middle-sized economy. There is still enough in
the society which is pushing back against this onslaught of
extremism. Failure, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
is simply not an option when it comes to Pakistan.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Yusuf follows:]
Prepared Statement of Moeed Yusuf
Chairman Kerry, Ranking Member Lugar, and members of the committee,
it is an honor to appear before you today to present my views on U.S.
policy toward Pakistan. Thank you for this opportunity.
My views are my own. They are informed by my work at the U.S.
Institute of Peace (USIP) which provides analysis, training and tools
to help prevent, manage, and end violent international conflicts,
promote stability, and professionalize the field of peacebuilding.
USIP's work in Pakistan encompasses three interrelated areas: improving
mutual understanding between United States and Pakistan; strengthening
capacity to mitigate conflict; and promoting peacebuilding through
education and civil society initiatives. Over several years, USIP has
been involved in training conflict resolution facilitators, promoting
peace education in Islamic seminaries, and conducting research and
analysis on the ground in Pakistan. I travel frequently to Pakistan and
have a broad network of contacts across the country.
Mr. Chairman, you could hardly have selected a more pressing moment
to reflect upon the state of the Pakistan-United States relationship.
Just 5 days ago, the world's most wanted man, Osama Bin Laden was
killed inside Pakistan. There are multiple ways to absorb and analyze
this development. The most obvious reaction, as we have witnessed in
the wake of bin Laden's killing, is to question Pakistan's commitment
as a partner in the fight against terrorism given that he was found
living comfortably in a Pakistani garrison town. Understandably, many
have suggested that Pakistan is not sincere, and thus Washington should
contemplate breaking off ties.
I, however, believe the United States should see this extremely
difficult moment as an opportunity to strengthen the bilateral
relationship. America has tried the ``walk away'' route before; it is
primarily the reason for our presence in Afghanistan today. But this
time, the outcome of a ruptured relationship with Pakistan is certain
to be even more detrimental as its multiple faultlines have rendered
the country much weaker and fragile than it was at the end of the
Afghan Jihad.
While Pakistan has provided ample reasons for the United States to
consider it untrustworthy, Pakistan's No. 1 complaint vis-a-vis the
United States has always been, and is, that Washington has proven to be
an undependable partner. It was not long after the news of bin Laden's
death flashed across TV screens in Pakistan that commentators were
asking if the United States would consider this as ``mission
accomplished'' and abandon its partnership with Pakistan. Indeed, we
have known for a long time that Islamabad is not convinced of U.S.
promises to stick with Pakistan over the long haul. I believe that bin
Laden's death provides an opportunity to convince them otherwise. A
demonstration of U.S. resolve to persist with Pakistan even after al-
Qaeda's leader and mastermind is gone will send an extremely positive
message to the average Pakistani.
Let me return to the bin Laden episode later and instead focus on
the United States-Pakistan relationship in a broader framework.
The bilateral relationship dates back to Pakistan's creation but
never have the stakes been higher than over the last decade. Since 9/
11, the relationship has had a discernible schizophrenic element to it.
It has been both, good and bad; encouraging as well as frustrating;
invaluable, and yet, at times counterproductive.
The oscillatory nature of the engagement has left few comfortable
for too long. Even today, there is a heated debate among the policy and
academic community on whether the United States-Pakistan engagement has
been a net positive or negative from an American perspective.
Increasingly, I find myself being asked the question: will the United
States be able to achieve its objectives in Pakistan? And if not, why
should Washington commit so much money and effort to a country that is
unwilling or unable to deliver?
I want to take this opportunity to highlight why retreating from a
promise of long-term, holistic support to Pakistan will be a grave
error on the part of U.S. decisionmakers. I will also highlight
specific measures with regard to the monetary, security, and political
aspects of the engagement that would further what I consider to be a
fundamental U.S. interest: assisting Pakistan in its quest for
stability. In doing so, I will provide an assessment of U.S. policy and
its limits in Pakistan--which is what I was asked to focus on today.
U.S. OBJECTIVES IN PAKISTAN
Recalling Charles Dodgson's 1865 novel, ``Alice's Adventures in
Wonderland,'' ``if you don't know where you are going, any road will
take you there.'' This is not an entirely unfair characterization of
U.S. policy toward Pakistan or, for that matter, Islamabad's outlook on
Washington. The two countries have been partners for over a decade but
the answer to ``what they are ultimately after'' remains ambiguous.
For the first 6-plus years of the post-9/11 relationship, Pakistan
was viewed squarely through the Afghanistan prism. The relationship was
transactional and was tied to America's engagement in Afghanistan and
Pakistan's counterterrorism cooperation. The revision toward a more
broad-based partnership capable of reaching out to the Pakistani
people, crystallized through the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan
Act, was a welcome one.
The Act, as I interpreted it, contained the necessary ingredients
to make the Pakistan-United States relationship a lasting one. It was
realistic in what it thought the much-enhanced civilian assistance
could get Washington in return. No one claimed that the fresh
assistance alone would be able to transform Pakistan or would be able
to alter Pakistan's India-centric strategic paradigm. But it would, one
hoped, contribute to economic stability, improved governance, and
strengthened civilian institutions. It was to begin to convey the
message that the American Government and people care about the well-
being of the ordinary Pakistani. The beauty of this vision was that it
was clear that the United States had begun to think about Pakistan for
Pakistan's sake.
Unfortunately, the vision has been overwhelmed by an urge to
retreat to the old model, a model which saw Pakistan from a purely
security lens and in relation to the mission in Afghanistan. The
discourse on Pakistan has, once again, shifted to tying U.S. assistance
to results on the security front. This view has also filtered into
decisions on the use of U.S. assistance in Pakistan. The USAID mission
in Pakistan, much like in Afghanistan, is being asked to view aid as a
stabilization tool, with short-term interests and politicized
objectives which too often trump an effective, long-term development
approach. Geographical and project priorities as well as the
implementation models are often influenced by the need to generate
security dividends rather than simply approaching development for the
sake of development--the only tested way of creating stability and
turning young minds to constructive endeavors over the long run. There
is also an active effort to try and win the ``hearts and minds'' of
Pakistanis, which again is, an overly ambitious goal with unclear
utility.
I do not need to inform this committee that these returns have not
been forthcoming from the Pakistani side. Pakistan has not eliminated
the militant sanctuaries; nor has there been any notable decrease in
the anti-American sentiment in Pakistan. But what I do want to stress
is that none of the strategic results mentioned above are likely to
come at all--not in the timeframe that is in any way relevant to the
mission in Afghanistan. If the benchmark to evaluate the efficacy of
the broadened relationship, and indeed of the United States-Pakistan
partnership overall, is Islamabad's behavior between now and 2014, I am
afraid, the conclusion is foreknown.
But viewing the relationship through such a short-term prism is
fraught with danger. It is this very desire to see ambitious
expectations fulfilled quickly that sets one up for disappointment and
which in turn feeds resentment toward Pakistan. And ultimately, one
comes back full circle to the question: Why should we support a country
that is not delivering? The conclusion, for many among the policy
circles is already that we should not; that U.S. requires a ``Plan B''
which is stern and more aggressive--which seeks to ``get the job
done.'' Unfortunately, such a ``Plan B'' is not possible; at least
there is none that can produce the desired results without leaving
Pakistan in more dire straits.
In Pakistan, this sentiment is interpreted as proof of the
momentary nature of the partnership. Those Pakistanis who support a
deeper and a more sincere engagement with the United States quickly
lose out in favor of those who prefer that Pakistan work to extract
maximum benefits from Washington before relations turn sour again--
which they believe to be inevitable.
PAKISTAN'S IMPORTANCE
The impulse to keep Pakistani unwillingness to tackle militant
sanctuaries in Pakistan at the forefront of the relationship is
understandable when American troops are engaged in Afghanistan.
However, this is only productive if the ``end games'' in Afghanistan
and Pakistan are seen synonymously. It ignores the reality--which
incidentally was behind the decision to broaden the relationship with
Pakistan--that while Afghanistan may be the primary concern
momentarily, it is Pakistan that holds far greater importance for
future U.S. security, and its interests in the South Asian region.
There is hardly any other country whose failure could have as serious
and lasting repercussions for the world as Pakistan. And yet, a stable
and prosperous Pakistan is the only hope for a peaceful South Asia and
an ultimate defeat of terrorist forces in the region.
Pakistan is a country with 180 million people, a figure that will
have surpassed 300 million by the middle of the century. Over 100
million of the current population is under the age of 24. It is a
country which is believed to possess the fifth-largest nuclear arsenal
in the world. It is now also the global magnet for Islamist militants.
Moreover, recent events including street support for coldblooded
murders and sloganeering against the United States for killing bin
Laden show just how quickly extremism and intolerance is growing in
Pakistani society. Were Pakistan to destabilize further over the next
decade or so, its demographic dividend will transform into a timebomb;
the state may begin to lose even more space to the extremist right;
there would then be more opportunities for terrorists to operate and
plot attacks against the West, India, and elsewhere; and ultimately,
the concern about safety and security of nuclear weapons, to this point
exaggerated, may become real. Should it come about, such a Pakistan
would be a direct threat to the United States in multiple ways.
Pakistan simply cannot be cut loose without immensely hurting long-
term American security interests. There is therefore an urgent need to
pursue the spirit of the decision to broaden the bilateral
relationship; to resist the temptation to view Pakistan on 2-to-3-year
timelines; to want to achieve too much too soon. If the United States
is truly interested in a stable Pakistan, it needs to approach the
relationship through a long-term vision and determine priorities
accordingly. This is not to say that immediate interests such as
Afghanistan should be ignored. Of course not--but they should not be
presented as the sum total of the relationship. It is the urge to seek
quick quid pro quos that highlights the transactional nature of ties
and prompts Pakistani decisionmakers to view U.S. commitment as
momentary. It also leads them to make choices which are often directly
opposed to U.S. interests but which they feel compelled to pursue
because they lack confidence in U.S. support.
Let me now turn to policy options across the three main aspects of
the relationship: (i) monetary assistance; (ii) security; and (iii)
political developments.
U.S. ASSISTANCE
The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act is perhaps the first
time that the United States has expressed an explicit interest to work
through a democratically elected government in Pakistan for the
betterment of the Pakistani people. Yet, the irony is that while U.S.
civilian economic assistance may be critical to keep Pakistan from
buckling under, it cannot, by itself, fix Pakistan's development and
security problems. Moreover, while continued economic assistance cannot
guarantee success, withdrawing assistance would be tantamount to
failure.
The civilian assistance promised to Pakistan is a substantial sum
in absolute terms but remains only a portion when it comes to
Pakistan's requirements. This is not to say of course that $1.5 billion
per year cannot, if spent efficiently and smartly, make a noticeable
contribution to Pakistan's development and capacity uplift. Also, U.S.
assistance amounts to more than what it seems on paper. It is an
important signal for multilateral and other bilateral donors. U.S.
assistance reflects Washington's determination to continue supporting
Pakistan, and in turn allows other donors to remain buoyant. Private
sector investors depend heavily on investment ratings which are
directly affected by the donor outlook.
Moreover, at present, Pakistan's economy, with a ballooning fiscal
deficit and poor prospects for the immediate future, remains externally
dependent. Lack of support from the United StatesUnited States and
other major donors at this point can quickly unravel the already-
tenuous economy. This will, in turn, further discredit the state in the
eyes of the Pakistani people and weaken its ability to control events
to an even greater degree. Down the line, the downward spiral links up
to frustration among the youth and generates greater susceptibility to
militant recruitment.
Going forward, the following deserve attention:
The task of spending $1.5 billion a year efficiently is not
an easy one. Foremost, there is a need to reconsider the belief
that development aid and security benefits are tied through a
linear relationship. Most literature points to the contrary:
using aid for short-term stabilization objectives risks
diluting development gains while proving to be ineffective on
the security front.\1\ Such outcomes will also keep Pakistanis
unconvinced about U.S. interest in their long-term welfare. My
frequent visits to Pakistan, and a forthcoming report by the
Center for Global Development's study group on U.S. development
strategy in Pakistan, of which I am a member, reflect a sense
from the ground that this dynamic has already set in.\2\
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\1\ Andrew Wilder, ``Aid and Stability in Pakistan: Lessons from
the 2005 Earthquake Response,'' Disasters, 34 (S3), 2010.
\2\ Nancy Birdsall, Wren Elhai, and Molly Kinder, ``A Report of the
Center for Global Development's Study Group on a U.S. Development
Strategy in Pakistan,'' Center for Global Development (forthcoming,
2011).
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As much as possible, the primary focus of the civilian
assistance should be sustainable development and capacity-
building of the civilian sector over the long run. This is best
managed by aligning programmatic and development assistance
with the overall priorities of the Government of Pakistan. The
U.S. Government should be receptive to new ideas originating
from Pakistani planners. The Planning Commission of Pakistan
has produced a new growth strategy for the country, which
focuses on entrepreneurship and innovation among the private
sector as the engine for growth, and in turn, job creation. If
this translates into employment for the over 100 million youth
of the country, the attendant benefits in terms of luring them
away from crime and extremism will be forthcoming.
Civilian assistance should be made conditional upon the
Pakistani Government's ability to undertake domestic reforms
needed to complement external support. Pakistan's perennial
problem of a single digit tax-to-GDP ratio is well known. Their
official reasoning aside, the fact is that the Pakistani state
apparatus is captured by a small number of power-wielding elite
that has stalled reform for personal gains. Yet, there is a
virtual consensus that Pakistan's fiscal revival is tied to
structural tax reform. Washington should use its economic
leverage and declare tax reform a non-negotiable agenda point.
More action is required on the ``trade not aid'' front. This
involves addressing the U.S. reluctance to allow key Pakistani
exports, particularly textiles, greater market access. U.S.
legislators must comprehend the multiplier effect such an
opening would have; that too, without having any structural
impact on the U.S. textiles industry.
The quest for winning hearts and minds is overly ambitious.
Unfortunately, America may have set itself up for a failure of
expectations in Pakistan. As explained, the development
benefits from U.S. aid will be real if assistance is spent on
key development priorities but they will not be able to
transform the lives of ordinary Pakistanis across the board.
Yet, the hype created around the U.S. assistance package has
raised tremendous expectations in Pakistan. Aid should be
accompanied not by promises of major transformation but by
increased transparency on where, how, and why, aid is being
spent. Moreover, the onus of responsibility of aid utilization
needs to be transferred to the Pakistani Government. At least
for all aid flowing through the government, the United States,
through its public messaging should make clear to the Pakistani
people that any success or failure is the home government's
responsibility, not that of the United States. The Congress
should continue to insist on accountability and transparency,
but it should not allow a model that brings Washington blame
for Pakistani mistakes.
There are things money cannot buy. In Pakistan's case, it is
their strategic mindset. For years, Pakistani leaders, civilian
and military, have pretended that U.S. economic assistance and
political support is the key to obtaining strategic
deliverables. Washington has seemed too eager to go along.
Every time, the outcome has been unsatisfactory. Indeed,
expecting monetary assistance to alter Pakistan's strategic
paradigm reflects a lack of understanding of just how deep
rooted are Pakistan's concerns about India and an insecure
neighborhood to its west.
Finally, military aid is important in its own right and the
desire to continue support at the present level is a positive
one. Given the multitude of militant threats and the dwindling
economy, the Pakistan military would require continued
assistance from the United States just to keep up with its
current challenges. However, the relationship should be
transformed into a broad-based military-to-military partnership
that seeks to build capacity and supports the needs of the
Pakistani military in its counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency operations. The quasi-rentier arrangement
under the Coalition Support Fund harkens back to the
transactional prism and needs to be discontinued in favor of an
upgraded assistance package.
SECURITY RELATIONSHIP
Osama Bin Laden's presence in Abbottabad deep inside Pakistan was
shocking to say the least. It raises questions about the competence, or
worse yet, intentions of the Pakistani ISI. Not enough facts are
available yet to decipher where the reality lies. On the one hand, one
is hard pressed to find a rationale for the Pakistani state to harbor
bin Laden. It defies all logic. After all, Pakistan and the United
States have collaborated in previous operations/strikes against senior
al-Qaeda leaders inside Pakistan. Indeed, President Obama's
conciliatory mention of Pakistan in his speech on Sunday night and the
Secretary of State's subsequent remarks in the same vain suggest a
certain degree of confidence that the Pakistani state was not
complicit. On the other hand, Pakistani security establishment's
propensity for risk-taking is well known and this may just have been a
major gamble gone wrong. At this stage, there are numerous questions
with few answers. This chapter can surely not be closed on this note.
Candid discussions need to take place with the Pakistani intelligence
to determine the precise facts. Did the Pakistani security
establishment help, remain irrelevant, or hinder? Were individuals from
the ISI involved in harboring bin Laden, or was it a case of sheer
incompetence on the part of Pakistan's spy agency?
Regardless, while bin Laden's killing will likely dent al-Qaeda
globally, it neither reduces Pakistan's internal security challenges,
nor completes the mission in Afghanistan.
The episode, itself, is a reminder that Pakistan has truly become
the global hub for Islamist terrorists. The Pakistani state is
challenged by multiple militant outfits with different agendas and
capacities. This is a result of three decades of misplaced policies
which saw militants as tools of foreign policy.
Broadly, four types of militant groups are situated on Pakistani
soil: anti-Pakistan state; anti-U.S./NATO presence in Afghanistan;
anti-India; and sectarian. While the groups do not lend themselves to
neat distinctions, and members frequently overlap, the Pakistani state
has tended to see them in silos. The military has chosen a graduated
response, going wholeheartedly only after the principal anti-Pakistan
group, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and some of the sectarian
outfits. Against others, the state has employed a variety of law
enforcement, coercion, appeasement, outsourcing, and ignoring tactics.
The military remains concerned about spreading itself too thin by
opening multiple fronts simultaneously. Even in areas like Swat and
Buner where the military has scored impressive victories, the
transition to civilian governance structures is missing and the
military is forced to continue holding areas indefinitely.
Pakistan's graduated response may make sense at one level but it
reflects a fundamental disconnect between Pakistani and U.S. strategic
interests. Pakistan's refusal to target Afghan insurgent sanctuaries
inside its territory, explained partly by capacity constraints and
partly by its concerns about an antagonistic Kabul, is actively raising
Western costs in Afghanistan. To date, Pakistan has been, in order of
importance, both an invaluable lifeline and a hindrance to the U.S.
mission in Afghanistan. However, as the U.S. strategy moves toward the
negotiations phase, Pakistani and U.S. strategic interests are likely
to converge on the question of reconciliation.
At the U.S. Institute of Peace, we recently undertook a project,
``The End Game in Afghanistan: View from Pakistan'' aimed at better
understanding Pakistani perceptions about the ``end game'' in
Afghanistan.\3\ We involved over 50 Pakistani opinionmakers, analysts,
political leaders, and officials in a series of round tables to draw
out Pakistani views on U.S. strategy and how Pakistan plans to pursue
its interests. The results provide important lessons on the way forward
for the United States-Pakistan engagement on Afghanistan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Moeed Yusuf, Huma Yusuf, and Salman Zaidi, ``The End Game in
Afghanistan: View from Pakistan,'' United States Institute of Peace and
Jinnah Institute (forthcoming, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We were encouraged to find that Pakistani opinion seems
unequivocally opposed to prolonged instability in Afghanistan. It also
no longer favors a Taliban-led Afghanistan. Moreover, there is support
for convincing the Taliban to divorce ties with al-Qaeda. Incidentally,
this task will become easier after bin Laden's death. For some time
now, I have been of the view that the best case scenario for
Afghanistan entails a negotiated settlement in which all Afghan groups
guarantee a clean break from al-Qaeda and agree to return within the
Afghan constitutional framework. Bin Laden's death is likely to make
the Taliban leadership more amenable to this demand.
In terms of the problem areas, our research clearly indicates that
Pakistanis do not see an interest in targeting the Afghan Taliban. The
primary reason, however, is not an active collusion to undermine U.S.
efforts--although, as mentioned, de facto the policy does raise U.S.
costs substantially; rather, it is a function of the lack of confidence
in the current U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. The predominant view in
Pakistan, and indeed around the region, holds that the military surge
will only have a marginally positive impact but that the absence of a
clear American political strategy will undermine the military gains.
Indeed, much has been said about the diplomatic surge and the plan for
reconciliation talks in Washington but there is little evidence of a
well thought-out plan.
Prompting Pakistan to change its mind about leaving the militant
sanctuaries untargeted requires no less than a total military victory
in Afghanistan. Short of that, no Pakistani expert or decisionmaker--
largely deriving their view from the history of the region--believes
that the United States will be able to decimate the opposition. The
other option, a direct U.S. action inside Pakistan to target the
sanctuaries will be detrimental, not only because it will rupture ties
and unite Pakistani Islamists under an anti-U.S. platform, but also
because tactically, little can be achieved without full Pakistani
support.
Moving forward, I offer these recommendations:
U.S. policymakers must lay out a clear plan for the
reconciliation phase in Afghanistan. Incidentally, this is a
desire shared not only by Pakistan but also by the Afghan
Government, the relevant Central Asian Republics, Russia, and
Iran. The clarity required is not necessarily about the end
state since that will be an outcome of the process; it is about
where Washington wants to start and how it foresees the process
moving forward.
There is little doubt that a positive Pakistani role in the
reconciliation phase is all but necessary for a sustainable
outcome. Therefore, in anticipation of the reconciliation
talks, a frank and candid dialogue needs to be initiated with
Pakistan's security establishment to decipher what role they
are able and willing to play. Just what exactly will Pakistan
be able to offer in terms of negotiating with the Taliban? A
simultaneous broader dialogue focusing on more strategic
questions is also required: issues that are often brought up in
Pakistan--U.S. military bases, future of the Afghan National
Security Forces, guarantees of noninterference by India, and
from U.S. perspective, guarantees of noninterference from
Pakistan in a post-settlement phase--need to be part of the
dialogue. It is surprising how little of this has happened to
date; there have been plenty of discussions, but no serious
structured negotiations that I am aware of, largely because of
lack of clarity on how reconciliation will proceed.
The most obvious stumbling block from Pakistan's perspective
is Indian presence in Afghanistan. Ideally, the United States
should nudge both sides to initiate a dialogue specifically on
Afghanistan. Two parallel tracks ought to be facilitated: (i)
intelligence-to-intelligence dialogue to satisfy Pakistan's
concerns about Indian activities in Afghanistan; and (ii)
development-focused dialogue to chart out sectors/projects
where Pakistan and India could work jointly.
THE SILVER BULLET: INDIA-PAKISTAN NORMALIZATION
If one were asked to identify the top two or three developments
that could sow the seeds for sustained stability in Pakistan, and
indeed peace in South Asia, all of them would be directly or indirectly
linked to India-Pakistan normalization. Despite what has happened in
Afghanistan since 9/11, including the backlash within Pakistan, it is
my considered view that the road to a stable Pakistan, ultimately
travels through New Delhi. There was even a prolonged window after 9/11
when reassuring Pakistan vis-a-vis India, especially its presence in
Afghanistan, could have reflected in more conciliatory Pakistani
policies in Afghanistan. That window is closed now.
Nonetheless, a proactive U.S. stance in nudging the two sides
toward normalization is advisable, not only for Pakistan's stability
but also for the sake of optimizing the Indo-U.S. alliance. Till India
and Pakistan are at daggers drawn, India's ascendance to the global
stage will remain constrained.
Washington finds itself in an extremely awkward situation as a
third party. In Islamabad, the United States is now popularly viewed as
having shifted camps, leaning toward India as a long-term partner and
maintaining tactical ties with Pakistan for the time being. While
Washington always reacts to this sentiment by negating this structural
shift, the fact is that the shift is real and a positive one from an
American point of view. Rather than being defensive, this fact should
be acknowledged and instead, Washington's leverage with both South
Asian countries ought to be used to keep the two sides at the
negotiating table.
Three avenues for U.S. facilitation stand out:
Terrorism from Pakistan-based militants has become the
single most important sticking point in bilateral ties. Anti-
India militant organizations no longer require active Pakistani
state support to operate but matters are made worse by the
state's seeming indifference, as is reflected in its handling
of the Mumbai attack suspects. While pushing Pakistan to launch
a forceful offensive against Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) in the
Pakistani heartland of Punjab can backfire, Pakistan will have
to show extreme political will and sincerity in its law
enforcement measures against groups like LeT to make its
efforts credible. Simultaneously, the two sides will have to
show resolve to work together in defeating this menace. The
existing ``joint terrorism mechanism'' provides the most
obvious mechanism to do so.
Kashmir still remains the ultimate game changer. The
motivations for anti-India terrorism, all directly or
indirectly link up with Kashmir. There was unprecedented
progress on the issue during the India-Pakistan peace process
between 2003-07; both sides had, at the time, a fair
understanding of the broad contours of the solution. Political
hurdles in both countries aside, the leaderships have
repeatedly expressed their desire to move forward on Kashmir.
If it cannot actively facilitate, the United States can
certainly ensure that bilateral negotiations on the issue do
not break down. One could point to a number of moments in the
past where a more proactive U.S. role could have been pivotal.
The most recent example is 2007-08 when after making
substantial progress, the dialogue on Kashmir hit a roadblock.
Had Washington been more involved all along, it may well have
been able to step in and prevent the process from being
derailed completely. As the bilateral dialogue resumes, U.S.
vigilance would be advisable.
Facilitating a fundamentally transformed economic
relationship is another hitherto ignored avenue. Pakistan's
traditional stance that trade and investment will follow the
resolution of the Kashmir issue has been inherently
counterproductive and has stifled regional development. Should
a freer trade and investment regime be instituted between the
two countries, the extent of economic and human interdependence
it is expected to create will by itself make the security-
dominated narrative in Pakistan difficult to uphold. Washington
could use its diplomatic offices to nudge both sides toward
greater liberalization and, to overcome Pakistani hesitance,
consider monetary incentives to Pakistan to offset some of the
initial losses due to the inflow of Indian goods. It could also
contemplate industrial investment packages to help expand and
upgrade specific Pakistani industries capable of exporting to
India. Some of the funding authorized under the Enhanced
Partnership with Pakistan Act can be used for this purpose.
Finally, the United States should also be cognizant of the
unintended consequences of its regional policies. Dehyphenation
of the India-Pakistan relationship along with a civil nuclear
deal to India created a sense of discrimination--of being boxed
in--in Pakistan. Pakistan went on a nuclear buildup spree and
viewed this as the only long-term guarantee against growing
Indian might. The Indo-U.S. deal also pushed Pakistan to seek a
deal from China. The dynamic of Indian military modernization,
periodic terrorist attacks from Pakistan, and Pakistan's
nuclear buildup will also make escalation control in South
Asian crises a much greater challenge. Again, reassuring
Pakistan by setting preconditions for initiation of talks on a
nuclear deal and finding ways to bring Pakistan and India into
the legal ambit of the nonproliferation regime, with all its
responsibilities, may be beneficial in this regard.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
Throughout the history of the United States-Pakistan relationship,
Washington has faced the dilemma of who to deal with in Pakistan. The
anomalous civil-military relations have meant that the Pakistani
civilians have often been subordinated by the military, and despite the
obvious consequences for democracy in Pakistan, Washington has worked
directly with the military. Today is no different, except in one
regard: the military is in charge of the security policy but it is more
a case of the civilians having abdicated this responsibility than the
military having usurped the space.
In February 2008, when the present Pakistan People's Party (PPP)-
led coalition took over, Pakistan had a great opportunity to rebalance
the civil-military equation. The PPP government was riding on a
sympathy wave after the assassination of its leader, Benazir Bhutto,
the two largest political parties were in a coalition, the Army was
both tied up in the antiterrorism effort and discredited after General
Musharraf's prolonged rule, and the new Army Chief seemed committed to
pulling the Army back into the barracks. However, gradually, the
military's footprint has enlarged again, with a number of instances in
the last 3 years suggesting an overreach into civilian affairs.
At present, the United States has little choice but to work within
the framework offered by Pakistan. The Pakistan military therefore is
likely to remain the point of contact on Afghanistan. On nonsecurity
cooperation, the U.S. Government is already making a commendable effort
to prop up the civilian set up which must be continued over the long
run.
The toughest test in terms of persisting with support for democracy
in the country however is likely to come over the next few years.
Politically, Pakistan is moving toward a phase where coalitions are
likely to replace hegemonic parties. As coalition politics becomes the
norm, it will bring with it all the messiness, uncertainty, and
superficiality inherent in it. Pakistan will see repeated political
tensions: coalition partners will switch sides regularly to up the
ante; oppositions will support the ruling alliance in times of distress
and create hurdles on other occasions; smaller parties will piggyback
on the larger ones at times and oppose the same when they see fit, etc.
Even coalition governments may form and break relatively frequently.
It is only by going through repeated iterations of such politicking
that the political elite may develop a spirit of ``consociationalism'':
indigenous mechanisms that will allow them to coexist; to bargain
keeping the country's long-term interests in mind even as they protect
their own short-term gains; and ultimately to arrive at a consensus on
certain national issues that they deem too important to hold hostage to
political expediency. At this point, Pakistani politics will resemble
that in India today. Individual politicians would not have changed
(although some new, dynamic ones would have arrived on the scene), nor
would their desire for short-term gains have disappeared. But they
would have forged a grand, elite consensus around certain national
interests they agree must not be undermined at any cost.
The interim however will be inefficient, tense, and relatively
unstable. The United States will have to show patience with the
civilian set ups; it may have to continue support despite inefficiency,
lack of accountability, inability to deliver on promises, and similar
shortcomings. The temptation to waver toward the more organized,
relatively efficient military will be strong, especially as security
concerns are set to remain prominent. However, it is imperative that
U.S. policy continue to work within the system--and not repeat the
mistakes of the past.
Political engagement with Pakistan should have one overriding
objective: change must come about democratically and constitutionally.
There is nothing sacrosanct about a 5-year term for a government in a
parliamentary system. But any premature change must come from within
the parliamentary structure. Moreover, at this point, there is no
danger of Islamist parties gaining power through the ballot. However, a
perception of constant U.S. involvement and interference in political
developments in Pakistan may well, in a decade's time, allow them to
ride on an anti-American wave to stake a claim from within the system.
There is a need for a lower American profile in political outreach
along with greater transparency on the purpose of frequent meetings
between U.S. officials and Pakistani politicians.
CONCLUSION
Pakistan's stability as a state is a critical U.S. national
security interest. I will be the first one to admit that this message
runs contrary to the natural impulse, especially at a time when
questions continue to be raised about Pakistan's sincerity in the wake
of Osama Bin Laden's killing inside the country.
Indeed, the relationship will continue to give ample opportunities
for finger pointing; tempers will run high; and often, frustrations
with Pakistan may boil over. The Pakistani leadership will also remain
inefficient and U.S. aid will seldom get the short-term returns that
lawmakers desire. And yet, losing Pakistan and letting it destabilize
will have systemic implications, if not for any other reason, then
purely for its destructive potential: one of the largest youth bulges;
extremism; terrorism; and nuclear weapons.
On the other hand, well-crafted U.S. policies with a long-term
vision can still turn Pakistan around and help it become a moderate
Muslim country with a middle-sized economy. The silver lining is that
much of the present strategic divergence of interest between the two
sides is Afghanistan-specific. Should Pakistan and the United States
manage to work together and find a mutually acceptable negotiated
settlement in Afghanistan, a sustained relationship beyond that would
by definition be for Pakistan's sake alone. The basis for Pakistani
perceptions about fickleness of the U.S. partnership, transactional
nature of the relationship, and even anti-American sentiment would have
disappeared. Presuming that the flow of economic and security
assistance is uninterrupted throughout and that Pakistan's democratic
process has not been disrupted, the returns on U.S. investment will be
greater and swifter beyond that point.
The Chairman. Well, thank you all for a very effective
framing of the issues. There are so many issues, obviously the
issues of India and Pakistan, United States-Pakistan, internal
strife, the attitudes that are conditioning their strategic
perceptions particularly with respect to Afghanistan.
Let me just begin by saying I have had this conversation
with General Kayani, with Prime Minister Gilani, with President
Zardari, with General Pasha, and others. The Pakistani
strategic view and posture vis-a-vis India, at least in this
Senator's judgment, and I think for many people who talk about
it, is absurd in this modern context: both nuclear nations,
both with much bigger interests that would take them under good
reasoning to a very different conclusion. But there just seems
to be a kind of automatic historical/cultural desire to keep
focusing on India, and it is depleting their ability to focus
on their own economy, on their own needs. To learn that they
have increased their nuclear arsenal when by most people's
judgment they already had a bigger one than India and an
absolutely adequate capacity to deter as well as to destroy
within the region simply does not make sense. So we have to
measure the strategic capacity of Pakistan to understand its
real interests correctly.
And I particularly was struck, Mr. Krepon, by your comment
that our Afghan policies in fact hurt the Pakistani ability to
reach equilibrium and to move in the right direction. So could
you respond both to this problem of Pakistani perception of
India and misallocation of resources and effort, and also to
the ways in which Afghanistan and our policies there now may be
complicating and reducing the ability of Pakistanis to see
things differently?
Mr. Krepon. When I visit Pakistan, I get the sense that the
Pakistani business community, the political classes get it,
that they have no future if they are at constant war mentally
with India. I think a lot of people get it now. But the
national security establishment, which is a rather important
part of Pakistan, still does not get it.
The Chairman. Well, can I be blunt about that? Do they not
get it because they have so many business interests that are
actually dependent on the continuation of tensions with India
and the flow of money that comes with that? And recognizing the
importance of the military as an institution in Pakistan, does
that frame their needs?
Mr. Krepon. The tack I am taking when I am there is
actually to flip it. Because the Pakistan Army is such a big
player in the economy of that country, perhaps regrettably so,
but they have an interest also in growing their economy, and
there are ways to do this particularly across the Punjab
Divide. If we can grow trade and help foster trade and
development projects across the border--Punjab was divided
during the birthing process of India and Pakistan--then I think
that could unlock a lot. But it is a strategic mindset that
Moeed was talking about that is very hard to shift. I think
economics can be the way to shift it.
The Chairman. Do you believe that this crisis over the
question of Osama bin Laden's hideaway, so to speak, in
Abbottabad--does that present perhaps the possibility for the
pushing of a reset button and for some new calculation which
could actually expand the better side of the relationship
rather than diminish it?
Mr. Krepon. Well, I will say clearly what I hinted at in my
testimony, and that is the No. 2 al-Qaeda guy may well still be
in Pakistan. And I think this is a real good opportunity for
Pakistan's security apparatus to be of assistance in this
regard.
The Chairman. What about the Afghan piece of this that you
mentioned. You said our Afghan's policies affect the Pakistani
judgment. Now, we all know that they do not love the idea of a
350,000-person army on their border. They do not like the idea
of India using Afghanistan to ``encircle them within that
larger context of their India fears.'' Are there things that we
are doing or could be doing with respect to Afghanistan that
might help change those calculations?
Mr. Krepon. Well, I am going to talk about the drone
attacks, and I know this a very emotive subject. I have
struggled with this myself because there are so many
particulars that I do not know. But my understanding is that
almost all of these attacks on Pakistani soil are not directed
against big difference makers. And the political fallout within
Pakistan of these attacks is very significant. It is
manipulated for sure by the security apparatus, but the
security apparatus has a lot to work with, with public opinion
because folks in Pakistan do not like breaches of their
sovereign territory.
The Chairman. I would like to ask this of any of you. Why
does the ISI not get the internal threat?
Mr. Yusuf. I think increasingly and much too slowly they
are getting the fact that this is a Frankenstein that has
gotten out of hand. The problem, of course, is that they are
trying to balance the old strategic mindset with this new
perception that they have to do something internally. And the
approach they have taken is basically a graduated approach. We
will go after those who are targeting us and then we will look
at others who are not.
Now, you are really playing with fire. On the other hand,
it is also true that the capacity constraints of the Pakistani
military are real.
And what I have seen of the Pakistani establishment over
the past 3 or 4 years, which I had never before, is that this
is really a petrified state, and every decision they take, they
first calculate whether things may go worse if they do
something.
The Chairman. Petrified in terms of fear?
Mr. Yusuf. In terms of fear of actually making more
enemies. The problem, of course, is that even those who do not
pretend to be enemies are helping those who are actually
attacking the state. So I think it is a very difficult
conundrum on that side as well.
But from what I can see, it is a very sequential approach.
They want to go after the main groups first and then go to the
others.
The Chairman. Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. All of you, in one form or another, have
indicated that development aid provided by the United States is
essential and that the realization of stability in Pakistan is
a major objective of this aid. And as a matter of fact, you
assert that if stability is not ultimately realized, the
destructive consequences of the disintegration of the Pakistani
state entail all sorts of ominous difficulties not only with
regard to India, Afghanistan, Iran, or China, but also the 180
million people residing in Pakistan itself.
At the same time, even though you have testified that
stability is essential and that our development aid would help
to engender that, Mr. Krepon, you have indicated that we cannot
ultimately affect Pakistan's strategic outlook and that
whatever we may be doing in terms of development aid is an
attempt to prevent the disintegration of the Pakistani state,
which in itself is a valuable objective. That is an interesting
question to begin with. As Americans look at this, we would say
it is very important to us that we do affect the strategic
outlook of Pakistan, and we are not certain that second prize,
namely that we somehow keep Pakistan from disintegrating, is
enough.
But even if we took the position that second prize here is
adequate, officials from our own Government have testified
repeatedly that the delivery of this assistance has been
extremely difficult. As a matter of fact, it is not really
clear to me to this day who in our Government is actually
ultimately responsible for doing all of this in any concerted
way. It is unclear to me where in the world decisions are made.
The late Dick Holbrooke testified from time to time and claimed
some of the responsibility and noted that of USAID, but not
very much is getting done. Plans change, priorities shift, and
both Pakistani and American officials bemoan the other's
ambivalence.
And I remember Secretary Hillary Clinton testifying that
she was involved in a community meeting in Pakistan with
Pakistani citizens who were berating her about perceived
interference that the distribution of this aid might entail.
And finally, perhaps in exasperation, she asked whether they
wanted the money or not. By and large, that group wanted the
money.
This all brings to light the importance of the question of
how we organize our own governmental apparatus and find common
objectives. This question is extremely relevant even when we
have the best intentions. Pakistanis who have come to coffee
meetings given by the Foreign Relations Committee have
suggested they are really interested in large infrastructure
projects, as opposed to what they feel are more intrusive
projects dealing with education, students, the building of
democratic institutions, or initiatives that have to do with
facilitating the growth of private enterprise or the
constructing of a market economy, which we here in the United
States think would be very helpful for the future and the
stability of the Pakistani people.
So do any of you have comments on these general questions?
First of all, what should we be trying to do with the 5-year
assistance program which the Congress has agreed to? I would
note that this initiative was at first welcomed in Pakistan
because of the important long-term commitment that it
represented. But having said that, almost every aspect of this
has been bitterly fought over with very little occurring. So
what are steps that we ought to be taking in the United States
to make any difference with regard to the broader situation
that has been described?
Dr. Ahmed. Senator, you are absolutely right. What happened
with the decision on the part of Congress to provide this long-
term 5-year assistance was expectations were certainly raised
on the ground, but those expectations have yet to be met in
terms of aid delivery.
There are a number of factors that U.S. agencies emphasize
in what the problems that they see as effective aid delivery.
They talk about the security environment. They talk about the
difficulties of monitoring.
But part of the problem is how the U.S. agencies
responsible for disbursing this aid also failed to put together
a cohesive plan of delivery. First, identification of projects.
You had plan after plan changed midway, abandoned, restarted
from something that would aid democratization, health,
education, all the good things that we expect today to deliver.
We have got to have American visibility. We have got to be able
to show the Pakistani people that we are delivering this
assistance to high-profile, high-visibility projects.
It is problematic when plans are changed halfway. It is
also problematic when assistance is provided in areas where
there, indeed, cannot be any monitoring, but also not just the
lack of monitoring.
And I have said this in my testimony as well. We are deeply
concerned about the kind of assistance provided to FATA, to the
Federally Administered Tribal Agencies. You cannot provide aid
effectively in FATA without political reform. As long as you
use the structures that exist, which is an unaccountable
bureaucracy, civil and military, and local elites that have
their own interests, the people of FATA will not see the
results of that assistance. And because of insecurity in those
areas, there cannot be any monitoring of that assistance.
Considering that FATA is a tiny little sliver of territory
and should not even have been the focus of stabilization
efforts, stabilization, even if we are talking specifically in
terms of national security, needs to be the in Pakistani
heartland, not in areas--and we have the Afghanistan example as
well--not in areas where you cannot deliver assistance and
where you know where it is going to go missing.
I will say this I do not agree with my colleague's comment
that tax reform should be conditional on economic assistance
provided to Pakistan. What you have at this point in time, as I
said, a fragile coalition. The government, despite all its
problems, is trying to push for an economic reform agenda, but
in weak coalitions--it is very, very difficult to actually
enact pressing and large-scale economic reform.
I will say this that there have been hard choices made and
not happy choices for a young democracy, as well for a
democratically elected government. Removal of subsidies, for
example, has increased popular discontent against the
government but it was needed. It had to be done. So tax reform
comes down the road. American conditionalities--you need to do
A, B, and C--is not, I think, necessarily helpful.
What is helpful is identifying the most appropriate
projects and then following through, not changing midcourse. We
have seen this happen again and again since the Kerry-Lugar-
Berman funds were actually appropriated.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me thank
you for holding this hearing and thank you for the panel that
we have before us.
As has been pointed out, all of you agree that we need to
continue our engagement in Pakistan. You also indicate that the
conditionality of aid needs to be strengthened and we need to
have better oversight and enforcement on those
conditionalities. Under those circumstances, we have to be
prepared to cut off aid or at least to suspend aid if in fact
the conditionalities are not being met.
And we have a responsibility to the taxpayers of this
country. We have to make some tough decisions in our budget,
and quite frankly, there is concern as to whether the value is
being properly used as it relates to Pakistan. Of course, the
bin Laden issue just puts a big spotlight on that.
I want to cover one point of this in relationship to bin
Laden because it may give us a chance on a restart in Pakistan
with the popularity of the people. You all talk about the
sovereignty of Pakistan and we all know the political risks
that we run when we do military missions within Pakistan
because of the sovereignty concerns of the populace in a
democratic state.
But recent reports show that the population of Pakistan
might be equally concerned about the sovereignty of its country
as a result of the terrorists using Pakistan as a safe haven.
Do we have an opportunity as a result of bin Laden being so
visible within the country and such a disappointment that the
leadership was unable to discover his location? Does that give
us an opportunity perhaps to have more popular support with the
people of Pakistan as to
the United States involvement to rid Pakistan of its extreme
elements, particularly the terrorists who have used it as a
safe-haven country?
Dr. Ahmed. 2010--67 suicide attacks, more than 2,500
civilians killed. There is good reason why in poll after poll
Pakistani citizens say the greatest threat to their security
comes from violent extremists. So there is, indeed, an
opportunity to forge that partnership because there is a common
understanding of the threats. There is a common understanding
of the challenges and the opportunities.
The problem lies--and I think Michael phrased it out very
well--until and unless the leaders of national security policy
are with those democratically elected institutions that
represent the Pakistani people and unless and until the
military and the security agencies understand the risks that
they face, it is going to be a difficult task to implement
policy in a way that will change perceptions, which is why it
is important to take certification requirements seriously,
whether it is a suspension or benchmarks that are identified.
I will give you one benchmark, for example. Lashkar-e-
Taiba,
al-Qaeda-linked, a threat to U.S. national security, a threat
to India, and indeed a threat to Pakistan. Making sure that
there is action taken against this group which is banned, which
is on the U.N. Security Council's list of banned organizations,
to make sure that the security agencies end their support for
it, but also to allow the civilian law enforcement agencies to
take action against these groups. It does not necessarily have
to be a cutoff of aid, but this is certainly an opportunity to
press in that direction for action in terms of certification,
not just certification given automatically.
Senator Cardin. I think that is an excellent point.
I guess my main point here is that it is at least apparent
to us that we have more understanding with the military as to
the actions we need to take in order to deal with the terrorist
activities, but we are confronted with the reality that there
is a political issue whenever there is an incursion within
Pakistan by the United States. And that is mainly because of
the populace reaction more so than the military's understanding
of what the United States needs to do in order to help
Pakistan.
My point is, is there some way we can use the location of
bin Laden as a way to get more understanding among the
Pakistanis and their political establishment then responding to
it that would allow us to have a better relationship on
military maneuvers within the Pakistani territories?
Mr. Yusuf. I think the point is well taken. I mean, this is
certainly an opportunity, and this is what I say in my
testimony as well.
The onus of changing the narrative in Pakistan on extremism
lies with the Pakistanis. We can only help, but it is them who
have to do this.
The problem in some ways now has become that the popular
sentiment is so charged and so anti-American, unfortunately,
that it becomes very difficult politically for a weak
government to come out and make this case. So while I
completely agree with you I think there is an opportunity, we
should be careful not to expect too much out of it either. But
certainly this is something that is worth trying.
Dr. Ahmed. Could I actually just go back to the point that
you have raised--public opinion? Public opinion is shaped, and
sometimes public opinion unfortunately is shaped quite
deliberately to depict America as the enemy, in particular,
through elements of the broadcast media. It has been done quite
deliberately. This is not public opinion being shaped as such.
We know very little about the impact of these drone attacks
in the territories where they are taking place because these
are not accessible either to the Pakistani population at large
or, indeed, to the Pakistani media. So information is fed out
of these areas is problematic in itself. So we have to be a
little careful when we say Pakistani public opinion is enraged
by the drone attacks. In actual fact, the Pakistani public at
large does not know what happens in these areas where the drone
attacks are----
Senator Cardin. But we do know that there is anti-American
sentiment in Pakistan. And the point that was raised by Senator
Lugar and Senator Kerry about the refocusing of our economic
assistance specifically so that we get not only the results
within country, which are important for Pakistan's development,
but also that the view of the United States is more favorably
perceived within Pakistan, I think, are very important points.
And yes, we have to have a game plan and stick to it, and yes,
it is very important that the institutional changes be made
within the country because if you do not have the institutional
changes, you will not have the long-term stability and
reliability that we need. But we also need to make sure that
the type of projects are signature enough that the United
States is recognized as being a partner with the Pakistani
people for their economic future, and I do not think we have
done that as effectively as we need to.
Mr. Yusuf. Could I just lend a word of caution here? I
think the problem perhaps is that good development and winning
hearts and minds do not always go together. So the decisions
and the actions--I for one have a lot of sympathy for the U.S.
organizations who are actually implementing this aid package.
And the problem sometimes becomes that their focus is too short
term, too stabilization dependent, rather than looking at
development for the sake of development.
I think the hearts and minds argument perhaps is not going
to be won by development in the next 3 or 4 years. This is a
long-term process. But what we can do is perhaps bring much
more transparency into this relationship, and I think both
sides need to do that. If there is an understanding on drones,
I think the Pakistani Government should be pushed to own up to
it.
A lot of times what happens is that U.S. aid goes there.
The money leaks because of problems on the Pakistani side, and
then the United States is blamed for it. I think more
transparency there.
But then also I think transparency on our side. Certain
things which we may be dealing with the government on which
either we should bring out in public or perhaps think not to do
them if people are not going to accept that.
I will just add one other thing. I think there is a
paradigm shift in Pakistan. The old paradigm was public opinion
was always shaped. Now I would say much of it is actually
coming out of the people and only some of it is shaped.
Mr. Krepon. Two things.
The targets of drone attacks ought to be worthy of the
negative consequences they have for United States-Pakistan
relations. That is No. 1.
With respect to aid, water, electricity, agriculture. These
are the three keys. Pakistan's needs are so great in these
areas. The delivery, if it is done well, is direct and has a
humane impact.
My understanding is that $50 million of the Kerry-Lugar-
Berman money was redirected--$50 million--to provide seeds for
farmers whose land was inundated by those terrible floods.
Somebody must have stamped a classification on the delivery of
those seeds and the expenditure of those funds. It seems to be
a secret.
The Chairman. Yes. Let me, as I pass the baton here to
Senator Corker, just make two quick comments. We have raised
this issue forcefully with the Embassy and with the State
Department and others. There needs to be a much more effective
communications strategy. It is just not happening sufficiently.
And this is something I think a lot of people are well aware of
now and hopefully that will change.
Second, I think, Mr. Krepon, you may have mentioned this in
your comments, but something I have talked about with General
Kayani and others--there is a powerful sense in Pakistan among
many of the leaders of the complete discrepancy between
allocation of resources and interests. And I share it, may I
say. One hundred and twenty billion dollars is the budget for
Afghanistan. But we have got a pittance going into Pakistan
which, by all of our judgments, is infinitely more
strategically important in terms of the nuclear weapons, the
center of terror, and other things. And if we are going to make
a difference to the people of Pakistan, in terms of their needs
for energy, power, for the economy to turn around, to deal with
their larger economic practices, we ought to try to put that
into some better balance. And that is all I would say.
Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have really
enjoyed today's hearing, and I thank each of you for your
testimony.
Mr. Yusuf, I am one of those folks who thinks we need to
alter our bilateral relationship, but not from the standpoint
of just ending aid and that kind of thing. And by the way, I
felt that for some time.
If you want to paraphrase what Senator Kerry said--he is
not doing this. I am--basically Pakistan acts very irrational.
I mean, I leave there almost feeling like I have had a Rodney
Dangerfield moment whenever I am there. And so they do not act
rationally as it relates to their own strategic interests. And
so for some time, I have felt that we should alter and really
focus this aid in a very different way. I really have. So I
look at this as an opportunity.
For a long time, we have known they have not worked with us
in a very cooperative way. I mean, we know of fertilizer plants
that are not being used to make fertilizer. They are being used
to kill our soldiers. We know they know that. We know that
probably some of our resources are helping build their nuclear
arsenal.
So I think this is an opportunity. I think this is a great
opportunity. As has been said, either they are in cahoots or
incompetent, but this gives us an opportunity now to sort of
rearrange that relationship.
So talking about Afghanistan--and that is where I think the
central issue in our relationship today is. We do have longer
term issues there. And I agree that some of these energy
issues, ag issues, water issues are far more important--far
more important--than much of what we are doing there.
But at the end of the day, Afghanistan. We know that when
we leave Afghanistan, we are going to make an accommodation
with the Taliban. Everybody knows that. That is what is going
to happen. Pakistan wants to make an accommodation. They are
making an accommodation right now with the Taliban. So while it
is hard to understand what the endgame is, we know that that is
going to be an element of it. There is no question.
So the central relationship issue today is what is
happening in the FATA areas. And, Mr. Krepon, I loved your
testimony. And the fact is all we are doing is irritating
people there. It is like we got a BB gun. We are just
irritating people. And so the question is, can we use this
opportunity that has come about--and I think the President
showed great leadership. Our Navy SEALs showed great
leadership--you know, outstanding opportunity now to actually
fight the war where our enemy is. I mean, the most frustrating
thing to our military leaders in Helmand and Kandahar and every
place else, they are fighting a war where our enemies are not.
Our enemies exist in FATA and Balochistan and the former
Northwest areas.
So is there something about what has just happened to allow
us to focus our efforts where our efforts need to be focused in
a very different way? To me that is the central issue and that
is hopefully an outcome that we can achieve. I would love to
have any comments from you all.
Dr. Ahmed. I think one of the things we need to recognize
is the relationship between the insurgent groups in Afghanistan
with the jihadi groups in Pakistan. It is not as simple as
making accommodation with the Taliban alone because the Taliban
is shorthand for many, many, many groups. Amongst the insurgent
groups, we have the three which is the Hezb-e-Islami, Taliban,
and the Haqqani Network. And one of the problems that we are
going to face both sides of the border as we are going into
transition mode in Afghanistan is how will this nexus, this
relationship, this network affect United States national
security interests and regional stability. I think it is
important right now for us to understand who is it that we are
going to negotiate with, how are we going to negotiate with
them, and what are the redlines in negotiation, in particular--
--
Senator Corker. If I could, that is not the point of my
question. Is there something about what just happened in the
last several days that will absolutely change the dynamic so we
will focus on our enemies in FATA? I do not want to hear about
negotiation. I am talking about the military piece of it where
we can actually route out the folks that are directing the
killing of American soldiers and move our soldiers from
fighting criminality, which is what we are doing in
Afghanistan--we are fighting criminality--when our real enemy
is in Pakistan. That is my question. I am not focused on
negotiations. I am focused on routing out the remnants of al-
Qaeda and these other terrorist groups.
Dr. Ahmed. Let me say this again and perhaps slightly
differently. What you are absolutely fighting is an enemy but
the enemy has a presence both sides of the border. The enemy is
not necessarily linked or based only in the tribal borderlands.
The enemy is based in the Pakistani heartland. So it goes a
little beyond warfighting. You need strong diplomacy and strong
signals sent. We will not tolerate an organization which is
linked to
al-Qaeda that is killing American soldiers across the border in
Afghanistan, that is posing threats to United States national
security interests in the homeland. We will not allow you to
continue to support this organization. So I think we are going
a little beyond the tribal borderlands.
Senator Corker. Mr. Krepon.
Mr. Krepon. I think there are some strategic issues where
we can shape and even over time change Pakistan's perception of
its national security. I will give you one example, and then I
will get to where you want to go.
Senator Corker. I cannot get any of you to go where I want
to go for some reason. [Laughter.]
Mr. Krepon. But for the longest time in Pakistan, people
were talking about Kashmir as a nuclear flashpoint and it was
the heart of every conversation. No more. So there has been a
shift on Kashmir.
Will there be a shift with respect to what Pakistan's
security establishment believes to be its strategic reserves
for Afghanistan? I do not think so. I do not think so. I know
you do not like this answer, but it is my analytical conclusion
that Pakistan's security apparatus will do whatever it takes to
increase the likelihood that the outcome, however ephemeral it
is, in Afghanistan serves their interests. They do not want an
Afghanistan that is unfriendly to its interests in Kabul and
certainly along the provinces adjacent to FATA and even more so
Balochistan. Balochistan is where they get half their natural
gas. It is where their mineral deposits are. It is where their
nuclear test site is. It has a restive population. It is also
along the Iranian border. And Pakistan does not want India to
do to it in Balochistan what it did to India in Kashmir.
So I do not see big adjustments over time in Pakistan's
perceived interests in an Afghan settlement. So we are backing
different horses here. It is going to take amazing diplomacy to
make this work and to make this last, and the more level of
effort our military applies to the heart of the problem, as you
see it, I do not see that as making a big difference in
outcomes. I do see----
Senator Corker. Play that last three sentences again
please. [Laughter.]
Mr. Krepon. Pakistani security forces know what they want
in Afghanistan. It is going to be really hard to budge them
from that, what they think they need in Afghanistan.
Senator Corker. Which is?
Mr. Krepon. Which is a country that has got all kinds of
fissures and divisions, but whose political leaders and whose
provincial authorities are not antagonistic to Pakistan. And
they have a lot to be antagonistic about. I do not see Pakistan
and Afghanistan having a smooth relationship in the future. But
Pakistan does not want folks in charge of these provinces and
in Kabul that make their life more insecure. We cannot change
that. And I do not think a greater level of military effort in
FATA or in Afghanistan itself will make a large difference in
political outcomes.
Senator Corker. So if I could just say this, I am very
concerned about a military effort in Afghanistan too, and I am
willing to allow this fighting season to go on because we have
been asked to have patience. But I have the same concerns you
have.
I will say that our reason for being in Afghanistan changes
about every 6 months. I have been here 4 years. I do not know
how many reasons we have had for being there. One of those,
though, the most recent, was having a stabilized Afghanistan is
good for Pakistan. And it is fascinating me to hear you saying
today that Pakistan actually wants an unstable Afghanistan. So
it seems to me our most recent reason for being there may be at
odds with the very country we are there for.
And I just think, Mr. Chairman, I would say on the support,
I think somehow or another Afghanistan and what is happening in
the FATA areas has got to be a central element of why we are
having foreign aid there. And I think all of us need to talk
about that and look at that because it seems to me having those
divergent views and us providing $22 billion in aid since 2002
do not add up in the right way.
But I really thank you for this testimony and for this
hearing. I appreciate it.
The Chairman. Well, thank you, Senator Corker. I think you
are putting your finger on some very important questions and
contradictions, and we have got to work through them.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all
very much for being here.
You are here at what we all know is a very critical time. I
know there have been a lot of references today to the questions
that we have and the public has about how much Pakistanis and
the government knew about where Osama bin Laden was and how he
could have been living for so long within such close proximity
to so much of their military establishment. So I believe that
we should continue to ask those questions in the coming months
and hopefully we will have some answers and they will be
answers that will help address the public concerns here.
I appreciate what you are all saying about the need to
continue our relationship with Pakistan and how important that
is. So I do not think a knee-jerk reaction to what Pakistan
knew or did not know is an appropriate response, but I do think
it is important for us to get some of those questions answered.
I am going to try and ask the question that I think Senator
Corker was alluding to in a little different way, and that is:
Do you think that bin Laden's death affects the strategic
calculation of Pakistan's military with respect to where the
real threats or where there are internal threats to the
country? And do you think they will reevaluate that or that
this will have any impact on how they view those internal
threats?
Mr. Krepon. I think it will have or it can have an impact
on the security establishment's view of the remnants of al-
Qaeda within the country. I have testified that I do not think
it will have a big impact on their view about their proxies
along the Afghan border.
Senator Shaheen. Can I just get you to explain a little
more clearly what you mean by that?
Mr. Krepon. Yes. Al-Qaeda is now utterly peripheral to
Pakistan's interests. They accepted fleeing al-Qaeda leadership
in 2001, and it might have served some purpose at the time. It
no longer serves any purpose, so I think they can give these
folks up.
But the Afghan Taliban, the folks who will, they believe,
serve their interests in an Afghanistan after we leave, are a
different category. There are links, but I think they will
continue to be viewed as an essential part of Pakistan's
national security.
Now, there is this third group of people. It is a very
complicated people. A lot of folks have guns and shoot at one
another. But Samina has mentioned this Punjabi-based set of
groups, and the most important one is the one we call Laskhar-
e-Taiba. These are the guys that are trained, equipped, and
based in Pakistan, and every once in a while, they blow
something up that is really important in India and create a big
crisis, and we are the crisis manager. And these are the guys,
in my judgment, who pose the biggest of all threats, bigger
than al-Qaeda--what is left of al-Qaeda--and even bigger than
these outfits we do not like along the Afghan border because
these guys, the Punjabi-based extremist groups, can spark a
big, ugly, uncontrolled conflict between India and Pakistan.
Senator Shaheen. Can I just ask Mr. Yusuf and Dr. Ahmed? Do
you both agree with that assessment?
Dr. Ahmed. I would say that I not only agree with this
assessment but I think one needs to also remember that even as
we are talking about the insurgency across the border, the
network, the nexus that we are talking about are the Punjab-
based jihadi groups, plus al-Qaeda or the remnants of al-Qaeda,
what is left of it--and let us not forget there are many types
of groups within
al-Qaeda, and we see a lot of them passing through Pakistani
territory--and the Haqqani Network. We are not just talking
about one entity which is based on the tribal borderlands, and
I think this is where the danger lies. We see too much of an
emphasis in forming U.S. national security policies to look at
FATA as the problem when you really need to be looking at the
terror threats that have been posed to the security of the
homeland. They do not come from the Pakistani Taliban or the
Afghan Taliban. They are coming from groups such as the
Lashkar-e-Taiba. Taking these groups with far greater
seriousness is not just a matter of a threat in the region or
even a possible attack that could lead to a confrontation
between two nuclear-armed neighbors. I am talking about the
potential, the real risk. And this, by the way, has been raised
again and again now at levels of the U.S. Government, including
in the national intelligence estimates, of the threat that this
particular group and others linked to it pose to the U.S.
heartland.
And to answer your question, let me also say this. It is
absolutely essential to acknowledge that there is not one
government in Pakistan. It is a democratic transition. As far
as the arms of a democratic government are concerned, we are
forgetting in all this discussion the legislature, the
Pakistani Parliament. There is talk now amongst Pakistan
parliamentarians about an inquiry. How did this happen? Who was
responsible? Why did it happen? What are the implications for
our national security? And there are deep concerns being
voiced. And I think this is an opportunity again for the U.S.
Congress to also reach out to those committees in the Pakistani
Parliament that have expressed deep concern about this incident
and about the threats and the real threats that it poses to
United States and Pakistani national security interests.
Mr. Yusuf. Thank you, Senator.
Let me first agree on the bin Laden issue. Al-Qaeda had
become peripheral to Pakistan's Afghanistan calculus a long
time back. And if bin Laden would have died, say, in 2001, the
Afghan calculus would not have changed much. In fact, I think
it is a bit of a worry for the Pakistanis to see that so many
al-Qaeda remnants are still around.
As far as the question of extremists goes, I am convinced
that this idea of good versus bad extremists is a very
dangerous one. Ultimately every type of extremists and
terrorists in Pakistan has to be dealt with. The real question
to my mind is how do you do it. And there are two issues here.
The first issue is a capacity issue, and I do not think we
have a clear answer on this. There is a debate on whether the
Pakistani security establishment, civilian and military, have
the capacity to open up any more military fronts at this
moment. So that is one because it is very easy for things to
backfire.
Second, I think there is an issue of the reasons why these
groups continue to exist, and I think one has to be blunt about
this. Pakistan used these proxies for a long, long time.
And if I were to look from the U.S. Congress' perspective,
I would say capacity is one issue. Pushing them to change the
strategic mindset, of course, is the other one. And the third
is to see where these problems actually lie and perhaps be a
bit more proactive to go out and look at it in a regional
perspective to try and hit the very basis of why this is
happening.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, let me say that I think all three of you have
made reference to the fact that the incursions by the United
States into Pakistani sovereign territory enrages the Pakistani
people. And I think that that is understandable.
The question I have for you--and I would like this in
executive summary, if you would, in a couple or few sentences
please. Many elements of the U.S. Government, including myself,
were surprised, even shocked by the lack of reaction by the
Pakistani people to what we did on sovereign Pakistani
territory in the middle of the night on May 1 within very short
distance of the Pakistani capital, indeed in the heartland. And
I have to say that I fully expected to pick up the paper and
see the fires and the burnings and the protests and what have
you the next day, and it did not happen. I have heard lots of
theories. I have not reached a conclusion myself, and I do not
know that there is even a consensus yet as to why that is. But
I would like all three of your thoughts on that in a very
summary fashion, if you would.
Mr. Krepon. Senator, my answer is because the operation
succeeded. Had the operation failed, the consequences you
envision I believe would have happened.
Senator Risch. Failed because he was not there or failed
because it fell apart?
Mr. Krepon. The security apparatus has been saying over and
over again this guy is not here, and we made it clear that if
he was and we had actionable intelligence, we would have acted
on it regardless. We had actionable intelligence. The mission
was a success. The cover story of the Pakistani security
apparatus was clearly false. Therefore, the results were as you
saw.
Senator Risch. That is a legitimate theory. The only
difficulty I see with that is, yes, we did say if we had
actionable intelligence, we would act on it. And that may very
well be a really good answer for ISI. I do not think that is a
really good answer for the Pakistani people. I know it would
not be here in this country.
So, anyway, you are next.
Dr. Ahmed. I think there is way too much made about
Pakistani public opinion being so anti-American. You know, when
the Raymond Davis affair happened and everybody was predicting
if he is freed, there will be demonstrations in the streets of
Pakistan, the average Pakistani is concerned with a job, with
making sure that he gets health services for his family. He is
making sure that his government is capable of delivering basic
services. And yes, you have the media and elements of the media
whipping up public sentiment or attempting to, in particular,
through the broadcast media. There is absolutely no doubt about
it that there are attempts made to shape elite opinion in
particular, which is what you will hear a lot more, but at the
level of the Pakistani public, yes. Well, America is out there.
We hear all these bad things about it through our journalists,
but how does it affect me? Are they going to go out in the
streets in absolute anger because a terrorist was killed? They
were just surprised. How was----
Senator Risch. Except this was not just a terrorist.
Dr. Ahmed. Absolutely, but in their perceptions, Osama bin
Laden in Pakistan? What is he doing here? It would have been
far more that reaction.
Senator Risch. We have the same question.
Dr. Ahmed. Exactly.
Senator Risch. Mr. Yusuf, your turn.
Mr. Yusuf. So let me say I think we do not give enough
credit to the Pakistani people. Osama bin Laden found in
Pakistan, one, a surprise, and second, I think the reaction I
saw was good riddance. Thank God this is over.
Even when you have seen the Pakistani street come out in
support--you know, there was a politician's murder where people
came out in support. Quite frankly, that is the street value
these people have. If you really go back and look how many
Pakistanis were protesting and coming out, it is a minuscule
number given the size of the country. So I am not surprised at
all this did not happen.
I will not, though, downplay the anti-American sentiment.
It is very much there. But bin Laden certainly did not feature
in that sort of category where they should have come out and
done something like that.
Senator Risch. Thank you very much.
Going down another street and just very briefly, I guess I
come at the financial issues and the aid a little different
than other people do here. And this is probably above your pay
grade, but in the very near future, there are going to be
massive cuts in spending by the U.S. Government. We are
borrowing 40 cents out of every dollar we spend. We are
borrowing about $40 billion-$50 billion a day in order to go in
debt another $4 billion to $5 billion a day and refinance debt
that we cannot pay. And things are going to change and they are
going to change dramatically.
I have to tell you that my feeling is the American people
are not stupid and they are not too red hot about doling out
money to people who, No. 1, do not want it and are not
particularly appreciative of it. They understand that every
dollar that they spend in Pakistan--building a bridge, for
instance, in the Swat Valley or anywhere where there were
floods over there--is strapping their children and
grandchildren with a horrendous debt when we need bridges right
here at home.
So this is, like I say, probably a little beyond your pay
grade, but you might start thinking about it because in the
future there is going to be massive cuts in Federal spending,
and I suspect this is one area that is going to get looked at
pretty closely. You do not need to respond to that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Coons.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
convening this very constructive series of hearings, and thank
you to the panel for your input.
I joined Senator Corker in a visit to Pakistan and
Afghanistan a number of months ago and was really challenged by
what we heard and what we saw, in particular, the enormous
amount of investment and sacrifice we are making in Afghanistan
and then its uneven impact on Pakistan and our relationship
there. The comment that we heard from one analyst that has
really hung with me is that Pakistan in many ways is both fire
fighter and arsonist in our efforts to try and tackle extremism
and terrorism.
Obviously, these events that we have all been speaking
about have raised some real troubling questions for the folks
who represent. At best, the ISI was unable to detect bin
Laden's presence; at worst, was complicit in providing him a
safe haven probably for 6 years. And in either way, it then
challenges us to recalibrate our relationship.
So let me start with a few questions, if I might.
I also have Senator Corker's concern that the justification
for the scale of our presence in Afghanistan, the analysis of
its likely outcome seems to change every 6 months, and you have
given a number of challenging points to that.
One of the reasons I have been given all along for this
very large presence in Afghanistan and the need for us to
continue significant investment in our relationship with
Pakistan is because it is a nuclear-armed nation. It is a
Muslim nation that is at a critical juncture point.
What does Pakistan's inability, just taking it at face
value, to detect Osama bin Laden within Pakistan say about the
security of its nuclear arsenal? It is one of the fastest-
growing nuclear arsenals in the world. There is a widespread
presumption that the Pakistani military is stable and capable
of controlling its nuclear arsenal, but this raises some real
concerns for me, just accepting for the moment at face value,
if you would, the idea that they had absolutely no idea that
bin Laden was, I believe, less than a mile from their
equivalent of West Point, I mean, not in some obscure cave in
the FATA but right in the very center of the military
establishment. A brief response to that, if you would.
Mr. Krepon. Senator, on October 10, 2009, 8 to 10 gunmen
attacked army headquarters in Rawalpindi. They had automatic
weapons. They seemed to have had some insider knowledge of the
facility. It took 18 hours to subdue them. And I think you know
where I am going.
The security of Pakistan's nuclear facilities has greatly
improved. There was a time, believe it or not, when A.Q. Khan
was in charge of security of Kahuta. And that changed. And
there is now an outfit at joint staff headquarters that is
responsible for security. And it is really no secret that this
is one area where the United States and Pakistan have actually
worked together to improve security. And there is now a very
large security force that is devoted to this task, and the
number that is thrown around is around 10,000 guards, plain-
clothes as well as in uniform.
Senator Coons. Given my limited time, let me move to the
main question I would really like to focus on.
United States aid to Pakistan takes two different basic
forms, development and military. And, Dr. Yusuf, you made a
comment about the winning of hearts and minds for, in some
ways, strategic or diplomatic or military purposes is quite
different from fundamental development. And one of the best
things I think about the Kerry-Lugar-Berman assistance was an
attempt to move from assistance government to government to
assistance directly affects the Pakistani people.
One of my concerns is that I did not see that we were
getting enough visibility or credit for what assistance we are
providing. One of my concerns is that the timeline on which we
operate as a nation does not necessarily lend itself toward
long-term strategic development aid.
If we are going to get the Pakistani regime and
intelligence and security apparatus to rethink their
relationship vis-a-vis India, what advice would the three of
you have about any conditioning of assistance. You suggested
conditioning it on aggressive action against LeT. You have
suggested conditioning it on real tax reform internally. How
can we use our assistance to Pakistan most effectively to
achieve both our long-term development interests and our
shorter term strategic and military interests? Please.
Mr. Yusuf. I would say I would look at these in two
different baskets. I think when I mentioned the tax reform,
that is something Pakistanis have a consensus on. It is just
that the vested interests are not allowing it to move forward.
I think the aid has to be looked at as a development tool,
and I do not believe that any amount of money is going to
change the India mindset. But there is something we can do to
change the India mindset, and my written testimony talks about
that and that does not have to do with money. But there are
three things.
Both sides were fairly close to an understanding on a
Kashmir solution themselves. I think we dropped the ball by not
pushing them hard enough to keep sitting on the table when they
pulled back in 2007.
Second, terrorism is a serious issue, and I think Pakistan
needs to be pushed as much as it can. There is a joint
terrorism mechanism which we need to continue, both sides have
agreed, but we want to make sure they do not pull out.
And third, I think equally important and overlooked is the
economic relationship. If the United States can help Pakistan
and India, once they open up trade, there will be an initial
backlash. There will be vested interests. Maybe some of the
money going toward industrial packaging, some incentive so that
the backlash in Pakistan economically is assuaged in the
beginning. But once you open up the economy and keep these two
sides sitting on the table, I would argue for the next 5 years
no more. You will see some change on the India front. But money
may not do it.
Dr. Ahmed. I would just say this. I think Michael raised
this issue and I think we did not follow that through. In
actual fact, there is a consensus in Pakistan on peace with
India and peace with Afghanistan, a consensus amongst the major
political parties, a consensus in civil society--and it is a
vibrant civil society, by the way--a consensus amongst elected
representatives. So in actual fact, here you have the entire
civilian face of the government believing that crises in the
region have undermined Pakistan's stability and security and
development. And the only way forward is peace with their
neighbors, peace with Kabul, peace with Delhi. The two major
parties believe it. The smaller parties believe it, and indeed,
civil society supports it, as do all the business houses. Talk
to the business communities both sides of the border. Where do
we see the problem?
And we need to be tackling the problem, as well as using
the opportunities. We tend to look very narrowly only at
tackling the problem, which is the military's perceptions of
national security. How will they change? They are not going to
change overnight. I agree they will not change overnight. But
here is the thing. Pakistan has changed. It is, after all, a
country--right now if you were to have a poll on peace with
India in the holistic sense, you would get huge approval
ratings for it.
It is a democracy, and this is one of the things we are
not--the opportunity that we are not exploiting as fully as we
should be, exploiting the fact that there are democratic
institutions and a democratic people who want peace with their
neighbors. You have a security establishment that has still got
a mindset of the 1950s who wants a cold war with its neighbors
or a hard war if need be. If you are going to factor in U.S.
policy, just think of the opportunities that you have. You even
have those opportunities in the budding movements for democracy
in the Middle East that you have in Pakistan right now.
Mr. Yusuf. If I may just add one line, which is that the
three ideas that I have put on the table must be worked through
the democratic process. There is no doubt about that.
Senator Coons. Thank you all very much.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Durbin.
Senator Durbin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this timely
hearing and thank you to this panel.
I have three questions which I will try to ask and give you
opportunities to answer.
I was struck by the letter from--pardon me--the column that
came from President Zardari and appeared in the Washington Post
earlier this week right after the capture and killing of Osama
bin Laden. And it was rather straightforward in which he said
that Pakistan joins the other targets of al-Qaeda in our
satisfaction that the greatest evil of the new millennium has
been silenced. He acknowledged it was not a joint operation but
went on to say he thought that Pakistan had been helpful in
what had occurred and then told the very personal story about
the assassination of his wife by similar extremists.
Was this published in Pakistan?
Dr. Ahmed. The Washington Post and the New York Times are
now carried in a newspaper in Pakistan which is called the
Express Tribune. So, yes, it would have been published.
Senator Durbin. So the point I am getting to is whether or
not his expression of sentiment is one that he is publicly
expressing in his own country.
Mr. Krepon. Senator Durbin, after this momentous event, the
Prime Minister of Pakistan got on a plane and went to Paris.
And after this momentous event, the President wrote an op-ed in
the Washington Post. Samina talks about Pakistan being a
fledgling democracy with lots of deficits. Neither one of these
political leaders addressed the people directly after this
momentous event. It is stunning to me.
Senator Durbin. It is to me as well.
Second question. I have been the easiest vote for
development aid in the history of the U.S. Congress.
[Laughter.]
I really have been. I believe in it. I think it is the
right thing to do. But I would raise a question about, Mr.
Krepon, your statements and yours too as well, Mr. Yusuf,
because putting this in perspective, I remember a trip to South
America where I went to a developing country, a very poor
country, and said to their leaders, what is the evidence of
foreign aid in your country? Well, the Cubans have sent in
hundreds of doctors that opened clinics. And of course, Chavez
has sent in hundreds, if not thousands, of teachers to go to
village schools. And I said, what have we done? Oh, the United
States has engaged in this massive infrastructure investment.
We have built this fantastic road that is going to transform
the economy of the region. And I said, how do the people know?
And they said, there is a sign next to the road. In winning the
hearts and minds, my guess is that the Cubans and the
Venezuelans are going to have the upper hand.
Now let us look at Pakistan. A billion dollars in aid,
which I know is off to a rocky start, but certainly has the
best of intentions and some good goals to it. How likely is it
that this billion dollars will translate into any credit for
the United States in what we are trying to do? Does virtue have
to be its own reward when it comes to development aid?
Mr. Krepon. One idea that I have been promoting that to my
knowledge is not now part of the package is to create a
Pakistani-American service corps that includes doctors,
optometrists, health care providers. It could be heavily
recruited. I think there would be volunteers in the Chicago
area and elsewhere to go over there and be very visible symbols
of our country's commitment to Pakistani well-being.
Senator Durbin. But you mentioned water, electricity, and
agriculture. And all of those I have to say are not easily
identifiable as to the source. We should do it because it is
the right thing, but whether it is a politically effective
thing is the question I am raising.
Third point. Zardari's column in the Washington Post said
Pakistan has never been and never will be the hotbed of
fanaticism often described by the media. Radical religious
parties have never received more than 11 percent of the vote.
Can you comment on that statement by Zardari in light of the
reaction by the public as well as by the government leaders to
the assassinations of Salman Taseer and Shahbaz Bhatti?
Dr. Ahmed. Senator, could I just say this? When Zardari is
actually talking about the 11-percent support in elections for
the religious parties, it is actually the peak. That was in a
rigged election, rigged by Musharraf. It normally is around 4
to 5 percent of the vote.
If you are talking about the reaction, the knee-jerk
reaction to Salman Taseer's assassination, there was a
pervasive atmosphere of fear, and this is what terrorism does
to you--one high-profile attack.
After that and including Shahbaz Bhatti, you actually saw
people saying, you know what? We are not going to be scared of
the monsters that are keeping us in chains. And people came out
in the streets. They risked their lives. They came out and
demonstrated and supported the moderate voices that had been
silenced by this atmosphere of fear.
Let me say, to answer your question about will the United
States get credit for development, it depends on how you do it.
It is as simple as that. Making a dam is not the same thing as
providing a small hydroelectric plant. If you bring in the
communities that are the recipients into the process, if you
bring in the stakeholders who are the elected representatives,
if you shape it in a way that goes beyond just the capital--we
made the mistake in Afghanistan as well--beyond the capital
into the provinces and into the districts, do you think people
will not appreciate United States assistance? Most children in
Pakistan under the age of 5 who die, die because of the lack of
clean drinking water. Those families would appreciate it.
Senator Durbin. And this great committee, before I was
fortunate enough to become a part of it, has passed the Paul
Simon Water for the World Program, and I hope we will do it
again. It did not pass in the House of Representatives. They
stopped it. We passed it on the floor, and I hope, following
your example, that we will try again.
Thank you very much for your testimony.
The Chairman. Senator Durbin, thank you, and I hope we will
likewise pass it, though obviously the House will remain
difficult, but we have to do our part and we certainly will.
We are going to try and wrap up quickly here because I know
we have some competing things. But I just want to ask you a
couple things, if I can, and Senator Lugar may or may not have
a couple questions.
What are we to make of the reports on Prime Minister
Gilani's discussions in Afghanistan suggesting that they should
pull away from the United States?
Mr. Krepon. My understanding is that Prime Minister Gilani
works from talking points, and these talking points--parts of
them ring true to me. Some of the tonality might have been
different in the room, but Pakistan's security establishment is
looking ahead to a time when the United States presence in
Afghanistan is quite--our footprint is way smaller, and they
are trying to maximize their positioning in the country. The
notion of bringing China in seems to me to be pretty fanciful.
China has got commercial interests which they will pursue, but
to think of China as being part of a security troika for
Afghanistan is completely fanciful.
The Chairman. What, do you believe--all of you--is the
general Pakistani strategic view with respect to the FATA and
Balochistan and Waziristan, the western part of the country,
the Pashtun-populated part of the country? I have heard them,
obviously, express a desire to have the Pashtun of Pakistan
look toward Islamabad and folks talk fancifully about the
Pashtun of Afghanistan looking toward Kabul. It seems like the
Pashtun of both places want to look where they want to look,
which is pretty much where they have looked for centuries. How
is that really going to work out in this context?
Mr. Yusuf. Let me, Senator, first just mention--I mentioned
this research project we have done at USIP, and we went across
the board on opinionmakers and officials. I do not think there
is anybody who seriously believes in Pakistan that any solution
in Afghanistan can leave the United States out. So I have my
doubts about this report.
They are certainly looking to expand the regional
framework.
And the other thing I never found was this Chinese angle.
They know exactly where the limits lie. So I am not sure what
to make of this report.
As far as the Pashtun aspect is concerned, what we also
found during this research was that the Pakistani establishment
and the civilian government to my mind are overly worried about
their Pashtuns being comfortable with whatever solution comes
about in Afghanistan. They fear that if that is not the case,
there will be a backlash within Pakistan. My view on this is
that as long as the Afghans agree to whatever solution there
is, I do not think there will be much of a problem, although I
think the state is worried about that. They keep on talking
about the Pashtun element on both sides being OK.
The Chairman. Dr. Ahmed.
Dr. Ahmed. I would disagree with that statement. I think
that the Pashtun boogey is used quite deliberately. The
military has had no compunction in changing its allies. There
always have been Pashtuns, but it has moved from the Hezb-e-
Islami to the Taliban to the Haqqani Network. It is a useful
way of trying to gain--by saying the Pashtuns in Afghanistan
are alienated and so because there is not a Pashtun presence,
well, perhaps that was true 2002, 2003, but after that even the
security organs of the state are now predominantly in
Afghanistan under Pashtun control. It is not a matter of the
Pashtuns. It is our Pashtuns, and this is the challenge you are
going to face.
The Chairman. And to what degree do any of you believe that
the Pakistanis have an ability to play a significant role in
motivating a resolution among the Taliban with respect to
either reintegration, reconciliation, or peace?
Mr. Yusuf. I think Pakistan will not be able to guarantee
success. We need to be very clear about that. This idea that
they can go and tell who to do what is no longer true. But at
the same time, they perhaps are in the best position to try and
bring these people on the table for a solution. Let me add,
though, that while I think they are indispensable in trying to
get this negotiation going, the spoiling power is even more,
and so somehow this has to be balanced. But the Taliban are no
longer the tools where the state can go----
The Chairman. Given the fairly significant description here
of the diverging interests, Mr. Krepon has articulated we
diverge on India, we diverge on nuclear, we diverge on
Afghanistan itself. What motivation then do they actually have
to engage constructively in making that happen? It seems to me
all of those other interests are assisted by not, in fact,
acting.
Mr. Yusuf. There were three things we came out with from
what we learnt.
One, the Pakistanis are no longer looking for a complete
Afghan Taliban domination in Afghanistan. They want a broad-
based government. When they say ``broad-based,'' it really
means Pashtun-heavy but not the old school.
Second, they are very worried about a civil war in
Afghanistan, again going back to the 1990s, because they think
they will not be able to manage the spillover.
These are two converging points, and that is why I said in
my remarks--and it is in my written testimony--that as we move
to reconciliation, which I think we should immediately as much
as we can, we will find much more convergence than we think.
This does not mean that the divergence is still not there, but
I think there is a lot to work with.
The Chairman. Are there any signs that there is anybody who
really wants to reconcile?
Mr. Yusuf. You know, nobody has really seen the Afghan
Taliban as a group for 10 years, and so this is a question we
will only have an answer to once this moves forward. What I do
know is I think there is an opportunity with bin Laden's death
because the idea of divorcing the Taliban links with al-Qaeda
to my mind becomes easier now, and that is something that
Pakistan will also want. They do not have an interest in these
Taliban going back to what they were doing----
The Chairman. Dr. Ahmed, I saw you smile on that.
Dr. Ahmed. Let me put it this way. We keep on using the
Taliban as shorthand for the Afghan insurgents, and that is a
dangerous thing to do to begin with because it is not just
Mullah Omar's Shura. There are many commanders within
Afghanistan, as well as the Peshawar Shura, as well as, of
course, the Haqqani Network. In some ways what we are talking
about is can we bring Mullah Omar Shura into the process and
then make sure that we can possibly either deal with the other
groups militarily or otherwise? Can the Pakistanis deliver
Mullah Omar Shura in short? If need be, they can but they want
to make sure that the deal serves their interests in Kabul.
My concern about it? Fine, even if they manage to deliver
Mullah Omar Shura, what does it matter? Because in Kabul right
now, because I also cover Afghanistan--I have an office in
Kabul--there is huge concern and anger that a deal is being cut
possibly with folks who might undermine our national security,
the security of our communities, and the security of the
institutions that we have helped build. Remember that these
were people who gave up the gun, joined the political process,
and as a result, are now the voices also of the Afghan people.
So the real challenge is going to be how do you bring the
Pakistani military in--let us be very clear about it, we are
talking about the Pakistani military--into a process in which
they are willing to agree on a settlement that will favor their
people but which will be acceptable to the political opposition
of President Karzai as well.
The Chairman. I think that hits the nail on the head. In my
judgment, the key question coming out of this incident, this
episode with the Osama bin Laden, is whether or not, Mr.
Krepon, your pessimism about the capacity for a changed
calculation can, in fact, be achieved. I do not think we know
the answer to that, and I do not think anybody can. It is
speculative. You have made powerful reasons for why you do not
think it can be.
You know, it is interesting. The Pakistani press is
displaying a very significant amount of public questioning and
criticism of the military and the intelligence for the first
time. That is unusual. And I think it is possible that out of
this may come a recalibration of some of those interests, that
they might be willing to engage in a different kind of
discussion about the kind of settlement in Afghanistan which
may have different equities than it did before this. So we do
not know the answer to that. That is part of this potential for
something good to come out of it and for a change. And we have
to explore that, which is another reason why I think it is so
important--and I think you all agree--that we do not go off in
a knee-jerk way that simply shatters any capacity to try to
test that or achieve it. And so that will be the test in the
next days.
Senator Lugar, do you have additional comments, questions?
Senator Lugar. I have just one question. In the aftermath
of the death of Osama bin Laden, I have read at least two
scholars indicating that although there do not appear to be
many al-Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan and the movement's
members are at this point scattered in several nations, those
in al-Qaeda who followed the guidance of Osama bin Laden saw
the Taliban as a very special asset for several reasons,
including their emphasis on Sharia law. There was a perceived
element of purity with regard to the Taliban's governance.
While al-Qaeda members were never interested in participating
in the official structure of goverance, the Taliban were
perceived as a very useful instrument of doing that which, at
least in terms of their theological emphasis, was very
important to al-Qaeda.
Now, I raise this because from time to time there may be
superficial comments about some type of truce between the
United States and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Additionally,
some will say, well, there are different kinds of Taliban, some
of which may adhere to Sharia law or affiliate themselves with
al-Qaeda more stringently than others. You cannot really throw
the whole group into one lump.
But I simply raise these thoughts in order to ask you as
close observers of the region how serious of a problem is it to
have peace with the Taliban if that means, in fact, potentially
infecting the institutions of governance in Afghanistan with
the legacy of Osama bin Laden?
The Chairman. Before you answer, I need to excuse myself
because I have another meeting. Senator Lugar will close out
the hearing.
I want to thank you all for being here. Thank you very
much.
Dr. Ahmed. Senator, it is so very important that in any
negotiations, even in the earliest stages of that negotiation,
there are certain redlines drawn, and we really do not see that
happen. One of those redlines has to be--and I know this is now
being seen as the end result of negotiations and not a redline
at the start of negotiations--the protection of the fundamental
freedoms that are provided by even an imperfect Afghan
Constitution so that you do not have a return to Taliban rule.
To assume that the Taliban have changed, well, whether they
have or not, let us at least try and ensure that what was
created and which is supported by the Afghan people in terms of
democratic freedoms is not lost because of political or
military expediency.
Mr. Yusuf. Senator, I would say that it is a huge problem.
To me, this is one of the biggest problems. Under ideal
circumstances, one would never want to do this. And I think
there is a duplicity in the Pakistani position here even with
the people. Well, the Taliban are great for Afghanistan. By the
way, we do not want them here. And I think that has been there
from day one, and that is a problem.
And I would completely agree. I think the redlines have to
be there for the people of the region because we also need to
remember that if Afghanistan goes back to the 1990s, it will
engulf Pakistan in no time. This is not a Pakistan which will
be able to handle that spillover anymore. So I think it is a
very, very important point and one of the most difficult ones,
I believe, to negotiate when the reconciliation process goes
on.
Senator Lugar [presiding]. Thank you. Well, I thank you on
behalf of the committee again and the chairman who has just
mentioned our appreciation to all three of you for your
leadership for many, many years and the specific wisdom you
have given today in this public testimony.
Having said this, the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:14 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Hon. Robert P. Casey, Jr.,
U.S. Senator From Pennsylvania
Uzbekistan is an important partner in the Northern Distribution
Network, which is a major strategic priority for the U.S. war in
Afghanistan. The Navoi airbase in Uzbekistan provides a vital supply
route for U.S. and NATO efforts to defeat
al-Qaeda and its allies in Afghanistan and western Pakistan. The Uzbek
Government also cooperates with U.S. security forces on
counterterrorism and drug trafficking, two serious transnational
threats.
The United States, however, must balance our strategic interests in
Uzbekistan with the need to hold the government accountable for serious
human rights abuses, including the use of force to oppress its own
citizens, as demonstrated by the massacre in Andijon in 2005. According
to the State Department's 2010 Human Rights Report, the Uzbek
Government continues to commit serious human rights violations,
including arbitrary arrest and detention, restrictions on freedom of
speech and assembly, and forced child labor in the cotton industry. I
would like to especially acknowledge Senator Harkin's efforts to expose
child labor in Uzbekistan, which remains of critical concern. I look
forward to hearing how George Krol will encourage the Uzbek Government
to abide by its international human rights commitments while
maintaining our important security cooperation.
Ambassador Krol is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
South and Central Asian Affairs. He served as U.S. Ambassador to
Belarus from 2003-06, and has served in several other challenging posts
in Poland, India, Russia, and Ukraine. I am confident that his broad
knowledge and experience working in the former Soviet Union will serve
him well in this post if confirmed.
Algeria is an important strategic partner of the United States in
the fight against al-Qaeda-linked groups in North Africa, most notably
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The Algerian Government has
taken an active leadership role in the African Union's effort to combat
terrorism, and the recently announced U.S. and Algeria bilateral
counterterrorism contact group will help to expand on our existing
cooperation to ensure greater security, peace, and development in the
region.
Algeria's protest movement has remained limited compared to other
countries in the region, but economic factors and longstanding
political grievances have contributed to a series of strikes and
demonstrations. Algeria's decision in February to lift the 1992 state
of emergency law was a welcome step, but more needs to be done to
address human rights concerns such as freedom of assembly and
association, prisoner abuse and violence against women. I look forward
to hearing from Henry Ensher about how the United States can work with
the Algerian Government to promote further democratic reforms while
also strengthening our security relationship.
Mr. Ensher is currently serving as Advisor in the Office of
Afghanistan Affairs. He recently returned from southern Afghanistan,
where he served as the Senior U.S. Civilian Representative. He has also
served in our Embassies in Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Syria, Israel,
and Iraq and was the Director of Political Affairs for Iraq in the
StateDepartment's Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs in 2006. I would also
like to welcome Mr. Ensher's wife, Mona, and two sons, Henry and Tariq,
who are here with us today.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Jim DeMint, U.S. Senator From South Carolina
Since the late-breaking announcement on Sunday evening that Osama
bin Laden had been killed, the Nation has been riveted by the valor and
courage displayed by our troops that led to his demise.
It took years of painstaking work to create the pivotal moments
when U.S. forces descended upon bin Laden's compound and flawlessly
executed their mission making the world a much safer place. In the
aftermath, the public has learned how the fateful raid was made
possible as the intelligence community has disclosed what clues allowed
them to find bin Laden. Now is an appropriate time to review how that
information was obtained in order to evaluate how the United States can
continue to prevent terrorist attacks.
One thing is clear: Central Intelligence Agency interrogators used
secret prisons, that have since been dismantled, and enhanced
interrogation techniques, that are now prohibited, to glean information
from detained terrorists that was used, in part, to find bin Laden.
According to U.S. officials, the path that ultimately led to bin
Laden's door began with the nom de guerre Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti that was
revealed by detainees to CIA interrogators in secret prisons sometime
after the deadly 9/11 attacks. After
al-Qaeda's No. 3 leader and 9/11 mastermind, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed,
was captured, he was subjected to enhanced interrogation methods,
including waterboarding, by CIA interrogators. Former CIA Director Mike
Hayden has explained that these enhanced techniques are ``designed to
create a state of cooperation.'' This certainly seems to be the case
with KSM, who following the use of enhanced interrogations, reportedly
confirmed to the CIA that he knew the courier al-Kuwaiti that other
detainees had discussed with the CIA--a sign this person had access to
al-Qaeda's inner circle.
This was only a small piece of all the information KSM provided.
After being subjected to the enhanced interrogation techniques, KSM
disclosed information about a ``second wave'' plot using an East Asian
al-Qaeda group known as the Guraba cell to hijack and crash an airliner
into the Library Tower in Los Angeles. KSM also gave interrogators
information that led to the capture of Riduan bin Isomuddin, known as
Hambali and leader of the Indonesian terrorist organization Jemaah
Islamiyah.
KSM eventually became compliant, and conducted what U.S.
intelligence officers called ``terrorist tutorials'' for U.S.
officials, instructing them about the inner workings of al-Qaeda.
Enhanced interrogation methods were used on other top CIA terrorist
detainees with success, including Abu Zubaydah and Abd Al-Rahim Al-
Nishiri, the alleged mastermind of the October 2000 suicide bombing of
the USS Cole in Yemen. Interrogations of Zubaydah, who was captured
before KSM, identified KSM as the coordinator of the 9/11 attacks and
assisted the intelligence community in finding KSM.
Those techniques, however, are no longer allowed to be used. In
2009, President Obama signed an executive order to shut down CIA
detention centers and restrict all U.S. interrogators, across all
agencies, to only 19 interrogation techniques contained in the Army
Field Manual, all of which are available online.
Yet, there is no question the enhanced interrogation methods
prohibited and the detainee centers shuttered under that executive
order were effective.
Reflecting upon the use of enhanced interrogation techniques that
were used on terrorist detainees who provided information about bin
Laden's whereabouts current CIA Director Leon Panetta has said,
``Obviously, there was some valuable information that were derived
through those kinds of techniques.''
This is consistent with the CIA's previous statements under the
Bush administration. A May 30, 2005, Justice Department memo said: ``In
particular, the CIA believes that it would have been unable to obtain
critical information from numerous detainees, including KSM and Abu
Zubaydah, without these enhanced techniques . . . Indeed, before the
CIA used enhanced techniques in its interrogation of KSM, KSM resisted
giving any answers to questions about future attacks, simply noting,
`Soon, you will know.' ''
The Justice memo continued, ``As Zubaydah himself explained with
respect to these enhanced techniques `brothers who are captured and
interrogated are permitted by Allah to provide information when they
believe they have reached
the limit of their ability to withhold it in the face of psychological
and physical hardships.' ''
In 2005, KSM's successor, Abu Faraj al-Libi, was captured. The CIA
again used the information that was obtained from the detainees in
secret prisons. Al-Libi gave the CIA indications the courier al-Kuwaiti
was an important figure.
Tracking down the courier was the key to finding bin Laden.
Sometime last year the courier talked on the phone with a person who
was being monitored by U.S. intelligence. From there, the United States
was able to follow the courier to bin Laden's lair in Abbottabad,
Pakistan.
There is no question the CIA's secret prisons and successful
interrogation methods played a crucial role in finding bin Laden.
Neither of those programs, however, is utilized today.
In fact, Attorney General Eric Holder is considering prosecuting
the men and women of the CIA who produced this information from
detainees.
Now is the time to honor the CIA's work. As we praise the courage
and bravery of those who killed bin Laden and give thanks to the
thousands of men and women who serve in our Armed Forces, we should
also applaud members of the intelligence community who have done so
much, under incredible political pressure, to keep the country safe.
While Americans can find relief in the fact that bin Laden is dead,
we must remain vigilant. Our homeland continues to be threatened by
radical Islamist terrorists intent upon killing Americans at home and
abroad. Richard Reid's shoe bombing plot, Jose Padilla's planned use of
a dirty bomb against America, the Lackawanna Six, the Virginia Jihad
Network, the 2007 Fort Dix conspiracy, the attempted Christmas Day
bombing plot in 2009, the attack at Fort Hood in 2009, and the failed
Times Square bombing plan are haunting reminders of this.
Many others have been arrested for plotting to bomb shopping malls,
subway stations and train tunnels, domestic oil and gas refineries,
conspiring to target the Capitol and World Bank, as well as making
plans to blow up the Brooklyn Bridge, the Sears Tower, and fuel tanks
and pipelines at JFK International Airport. Twenty-four men were
arrested in 2006 that sought to detonate liquid explosives on U.S.-
bound commercial airlines. At least 30 planned terrorist attacks have
been stopped since September 11. U.S. authorities stopped six in 2009
alone.
Thankfully, dedicated and relentless U.S. security forces averted
all of those attacks.
Our Nation is fortunate to have so many men and women who volunteer
to protect America. Although the United States made a great advance in
winning the war on terror by killing Osama bin Laden, it is not over.
Unfortunately, one of our most productive programs is now gone. Given
its proven success, President Obama should consider restarting the
program.