[Senate Hearing 112-145]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-145
EMERGING THREATS TO RAIL SECURITY
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HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 14, 2011
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas,
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts Ranking
BARBARA BOXER, California OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri ROY BLUNT, Missouri
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
TOM UDALL, New Mexico PATRICK J. TOOMEY, Pennsylvania
MARK WARNER, Virginia MARCO RUBIO, Florida
MARK BEGICH, Alaska KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
DEAN HELLER, Nevada
Ellen L. Doneski, Staff Director
James Reid, Deputy Staff Director
Bruce H. Andrews, General Counsel
Brian M. Hendricks, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel
Todd Bertoson, Republican Deputy Staff Director
Rebecca Seidel, Republican Chief Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on June 14, 2011.................................... 1
Statement of Senator Lautenberg.................................. 1
Statement of Senator Hutchison................................... 3
Statement of Senator Udall....................................... 3
Statement of Senator Wicker...................................... 24
Statement of Senator Boozman..................................... 28
Statement of Senator Klobuchar................................... 30
Witnesses
Hon. John S. Pistole, Administrator, Transportation Security
Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security........... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Stephen M. Lord, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues,
U.S. Government Accountability Office.......................... 9
Prepared statement........................................... 10
John O'Connor, Vice President and Chief of Police, Amtrak Police
Department, National Railroad Passenger Corporation............ 18
Prepared statement........................................... 19
Appendix
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Kay Bailey
Hutchison to Hon. John S. Pistole.............................. 37
Brian Michael Jenkins, Director, National Transportation Security
Center of Excellence, Mineta Transportation Institute, prepared
statement...................................................... 38
EMERGING THREATS TO RAIL SECURITY
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TUESDAY, JUNE 14, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:53 p.m. in room
SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank R.
Lautenberg, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Lautenberg. My profound apologies. I know each one
of you has worked hard to bring the information that we're
looking for today to the forefront, and so again, my apologies.
And the lack of presence here in no way suggests a lack of
interest, but we did have a fairly difficult discussion that
took place before the vote, so that's why there are some delays
here.
But we're pleased to see you. And I don't think I have to
strike the gavel to get order in the room. It looks like a
pretty orderly group, so it counts.
Anyway, I thank you all for being here.
Six weeks after the American military's courageous and
daring raid on Osama bin Laden's compound, one thing is clear:
the ruthless killer is dead and gone, but al Qaeda, as we know,
remains determined to strike the U.S. again. According to
reports, documents recovered from bin Laden's compound show
that he wanted to mark the 10th anniversary of 9/11 by
attacking trains, surface transportation, in our country.
This discovery sends tremors down our spines, but it
shouldn't surprise us. The choices they make for targets are
those that have lots of people in the area and where they can
inflict damage that will be felt throughout the area,
throughout the country, even though it's in a relatively small
bit of geography.
Terrorists have been focused on trains for years, and we've
seen attacks overseas, including bombings in London, Mumbai,
Madrid, and Moscow. Terrorists have attacked trains and buses
1,700 times--hard to imagine--worldwide since 9/11, and the
attacks unfortunately took 3,700 lives. And trains have been
targeted here in our country. Since 9/11, we've foiled several
planned attacks on our public transportation network, including
one last fall when the FBI arrested a man who was plotting to
blow up four stations in Washington, D.C.'s own Metro system.
We've got to recognize that our surface transportation network
is enormous, heavily traveled, and is therefore an attractive
target.
Americans take more trips on trains than other public
transportation, than they do on commercial airliners. The
public takes 700 million flights a year. But compared to 10
billion trips aboard subways, buses, trains, and other forms of
public transportation, it shows you a relationship that should
not and cannot be ignored.
Consider Amtrak's success. Last year, nearly 29 million
passengers traveled aboard Amtrak, an all-time high, and a
number Amtrak is projected to beat this year, and I can verify
that because I use Amtrak regularly.
I came down yesterday. And forgive the light moment, but
last week, while someone tried to get a couple of bags aboard,
legitimate, the attendant in the train was left standing on the
platform when the train left. So the bags were in, but the
person working in the train, on the train itself was left
behind. So I think there was a little bit of imbalance in terms
of what was required.
Amtrak's passengers travel on 21,000 miles of track through
500 train stations. Our rail network is as vast as it is open,
making trains appealing targets for terrorists.
Simply put, rail offers easy access and a chance to strike
with high casualties. Make no mistake, the threat to America's
rail network is real, and we've got to do whatever we can to
keep it secure. At the federal level, this responsibility
largely rests with TSA, Transportation Security Administration.
When we think of TSA, many only consider its work to secure
aviation. But this vital agency has to protect our entire
transportation system, including trains. Despite this, 98
percent of TSA's budget is dedicated to aviation security,
leaving less than 2 percent for rail security.
So for years, I've been sounding the alarm that our
attention has been too lopsided, too one-sided rather, and that
we can't only focus on aviation security.
The Government Accountability Office agrees and has issued
multiple recommendations in recent years calling on TSA to do
more to safeguard rail and other surface transportation
networks. TSA is taking steps to strengthen rail security, but
the agency and the Department of Homeland Security still
haven't carried out the many requirements outlined in the 9/11
Act, which became law in 2007.
Now, I'm committed to helping these agencies get the
resources they need, but it's no surprise it's an uphill fight
right now. The House majority, the House Republicans, recently
voted to slash Homeland Security grant funding, including
funding for public transportation security grants, in a move
that would seriously undermine our efforts to keep Americans
safe when they travel.
I want to be clear. We're going to do what we can to fight
to defeat those cuts.
But we also need to know what TSA is doing to improve rail
security now, including training employees, improving
technology and infrastructure. So I look forward to hearing
from Amtrak about what they and other train operators are doing
to keep their passengers safe and secure. But I want to be sure
that we cannot stand to take large cuts in resource, reductions
in funding, and tell the American public honestly that we're
doing whatever we can to protect them, and that's a fight that
we all have to be engaged in.
Cuts are interesting. But if they're cuts to your body, to
your basic operations, to the things that you do, they hurt,
and we have to figure out a way not just to do the cuts but to
do more to reduce our deficit and not contribute more to debt.
So it's a subject I take a great deal of interest in, and
I'm going to work to see what we can do about making certain
that we have the resources available to provide the quality and
the kind of security that's necessary, and I know all of you
agree.
So I look forward to hearing, as I said, from what Amtrak
and other operators are going to do to keep passengers, or are
doing presently to keep their passengers safe and secure.
And the timely arrival of our distinguished colleague,
Senator Hutchison, and I would ask, if you have an opening
statement, please offer that now, and we'll continue our
process.
STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
Senator Hutchison. I won't read my whole statement, Mr.
Chairman, except to say that I'm glad that you're having the
hearing. I won't be able to stay for all of it, but I think we
all know that rail transportation has not been in the forefront
of our transportation security efforts. I think aviation
certainly has been dominant, and I do think that we need to see
how we can do that more with the resources that we have, and I
realize that the responsibility for all transportation is
challenging, to say the least.
In addition to aviation, you've got trucks. You've got
rail. You've got freight. So there is a big challenge, which we
understand, but I am very concerned that we not leave it to
chance and certainly that we put the effort into it, and
especially I hope that you will address the issue of the DHS
Inspector General recommending that the surface inspectors
report to an official with surface responsibilities, as opposed
to the aviation person, because there are differences. And I
think with management, we certainly ought to be able to focus
more efforts at the specific needs of surface, particularly in
this case rail.
So thank you for calling the hearing, and I will look
forward to seeing the testimony if I don't get it.
Senator Lautenberg. Senator Udall, your opening statement,
if you'd like to make one.
STATEMENT OF HON. TOM UDALL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO
Senator Udall. We'll put the opening statement in the
record, and let's get to the witnesses.
Senator Lautenberg. That's an uncommon but kind gesture.
And so now I acknowledge the presence of the witnesses,
each one bringing significant expertise to the issue of rail
security.
Mr. John Pistole, Administrator of the TSA, the
Transportation Security Administration, and he will update us
on TSA's rail security efforts.
Mr. Stephen Lord, Director of Homeland Security and Justice
Issues for the GAO, the Government Accountability Office, and
we'll listen with interest to your recommendations.
Mr. O'Connor, John O'Connor, Amtrak's Chief of Police,
Acting Vice President of the Office of Security and Special
Operations. Chief O'Connor will discuss with us the challenges
facing Amtrak and the steps it's taking in light of emerging
threats.
I thank all of you for being here.
Mr. Pistole, if you would, please begin, and we ask you to
try to keep your remarks confined to 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN S. PISTOLE, ADMINISTRATOR,
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Chairman Lautenberg and Ranking
Member Hutchison, Senator Udall. And thank you for your strong
support for not only what TSA does but for our partners as we
try to address the surface transportation issues that we're all
so aware of.
So I'm pleased to appear before the Committee today to
discuss the efforts of TSA in partnership with DHS, FEMA and
Amtrak, and many industry leaders to provide mass transit and
passenger rail security.
Last month the President announced the U.S. operation that
resulted in the death of Osama bin Laden, and this effort
marked an historic counterterrorism success for our country and
for the world, as have the recently announced deaths of Ilyas
Kashmiri in Pakistan and Harun Fazul in Somalia. Of course, we
believe Kashmiri has been responsible for most of the western
operations for al-Qaeda core, and then Harun Fazul, leader of
the 1998 embassy bombings in East Africa and much of the al-
Qaeda in East Africa work.
But our efforts to combat terrorism go well beyond any one
individual, or any one of these three, which is why we remain
focused on our critical mission of protecting the traveling
public and our transportation systems. TSA will continue to
evaluate security protocols based on the latest intelligence,
and will continue to share information with stakeholders to
enable them to enhance protective measures and surge resources,
as appropriate. And, of course, we ask the traveling public to
remain vigilant and report any suspicious activity to the
police.
So, today I'm honored to appear with Chief O'Connor and
Steve Lord to focus on mass transit systems and passenger
railroads, which include subways, bus transit systems, ferries,
Amtrak, commuter railroads, all of which, Mr. Chairman, as you
noted, accounted for more than 10 billion trips for Americans
last year alone. These systems are a critical part of the
transportation network TSA works with our partners to protect.
They also remain a target, as you noted, for terrorist
groups, and have been the subject of numerous plots in the
U.S., unsuccessful, fortunately, as well as the successful
attacks that you noted overseas in Spain, the U.K., India,
Moscow and elsewhere. These systems serve large populations and
major metropolitan areas, and many have substantial underground
infrastructures. Bridges and transportation staging areas are
hubs which can also be attacked. And, of course, the
consequences of an attack on any one of these systems in our
country could be devastating.
A critical component of TSA security efforts for mass
transit and passenger rail is our partnerships with industry
and local and regional stakeholders. DHS' comprehensive Transit
Security Grant Program is currently the primary vehicle
providing funding assistance for security enhancements to
eligible transit agencies, supporting state and local
government initiatives to improve security. TSA works with FEMA
to fund projects that most effectively mitigate risk at the
highest-risk systems.
For example, in 2010 DHS awarded nearly $274 million to the
transit and passenger rail industry, bringing the total since
2006 to nearly $1.6 billion. In addition to grant funding, TSA
supports the security of mass transit and rail systems by
deploying Visible Intermodal Prevention Response teams, or VIPR
teams, to augment local security efforts. And as you know, we
currently have 25 dedicated VIPR teams in operation, and the
fiscal 2012 budget request includes funding for an additional
12 teams.
In addition, TSA performs baseline and collaborative site-
specific risk assessments for mass transit and passenger rail
systems, engaging state and local partners on how to reduce
their individual vulnerabilities, assess risk, and improve
security efforts. These assessments are conducted with emphasis
on the 100 largest mass transit and passenger rail systems in
terms of passenger volume, which collectively account for over
80 percent of all users of public transportation. And, of
course, among these assessments is a Baseline Assessment for
Security Enhancement, or BASE, B-A-S-E, which is a
comprehensive security assessment program designed to evaluate
17 security and emergency management action items that form the
foundation of an effective security program.
We also work with our partners to assess risk and
vulnerabilities in a number of other venues. We also work with
the Federal Transit Authority and the Federal Railroad
Administration, trade groups representing mass transit and
passenger rail interests, and the transit and passenger rail
agencies to improve security.
In closing, I would like to stress again that collaboration
is crucial for the success of mass transit and passenger rail
security operations. TSA will continue to partner with law
enforcement, industry, state, local and tribal officials,
emergency responders and federal agencies to foster regional
security collaboration to integrate resources for enhanced
deterrence and response capabilities.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Hutchison, thanks for the
opportunity to be here today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pistole follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John S. Pistole, Administrator,
Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security
Good afternoon, Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison, and
distinguished members of the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to
appear before you today to discuss the Transportation Security
Administration's (TSA) surface transportation programs.
As you know, TSA's efforts in the surface transportation domain are
undertaken to reduce security vulnerabilities and to strengthen
resilience against terrorist attacks. In this domain, which includes
mass transit systems, ferries, trucking, freight rail, and passenger
rail, we work collaboratively with public and private sector partners
to develop and to implement programs that promote commerce while
enhancing security and mitigating the risk to our nation's
transportation systems. We strive to maximize participation from state,
local, tribal, and industry interests with a common goal of securing
all modes of transportation.
DHS's Mission to Prevent Terrorism and Enhance Security
TSA secures and safeguards mass transit and railroad operations
through a variety of programs. Many of these programs enhance security
by addressing policy gaps, enhancing coordination, and maximizing the
use of partner strengths and capabilities as addressed in the March
2010 Surface Transportation Security Priority Assessment. The primary
mission of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)--Preventing
Terrorism and Enhancing Security--is strongly supported by TSA and is
aligned with DHS's programmatic activities and organizational structure
as found in the 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review and
corresponding Bottom-Up Review Report.
Due to the large populations and substantial infrastructure served
by mass transit and national railroad systems, these networks remain a
target for terrorist groups. Moreover, an open architecture connecting
millions of passengers in major metropolitan areas creates inherent
potential security vulnerabilities. TSA thus employs advanced risk-
based, intelligence-driven techniques to prevent terrorist attacks and
to reduce the vulnerability of the nation's transportation systems to
terrorism.
Recognizing that the risk from terrorism and other hazards to
surface transportation demands a coordinated approach involving all
sector partners and stakeholders, the federal government initiated a
comprehensive review of U.S. surface transportation security efforts
across all modes of surface transportation in 2009. The resulting
Surface Transportation Security Priority Assessment (STSPA), released
in April 2010, identified interagency priorities for the following four
years and provided concrete recommendations on how to enhance security
efforts and maximize the use of partnerships to optimize public safety,
facilitate commerce, and strengthen the resiliency of the country's
surface transportation system.
DHS has completed risk-based implementation plans for each of the
20 consensus recommendations of the STSPA, further addressing the
potential risks to the surface transportation system and its four
subsectors (mass transit and passenger rail, highways and motor
carriers, freight rail, and pipelines). These plans focus on improving
information sharing, increasing coordination among federal agencies
involved in the transportation sector, and improving the effectiveness
and efficiency of the grants process. As of May 2011, 10
recommendations have been fully implemented and the implementation of
the others is underway.
Collaboration with Federal, State, Local, Tribal, and Private Entities
Over the past several years, DHS has been working to establish a
new architecture in order to better defend against these evolving
terrorist threats. This new architecture includes an emphasis on
collaboration across government as well as in concert with private
industry and the American public.
In 2005, DHS and the Department of Transportation (DOT) signed the
Public Transportation Security Annex to the DHS/DOT Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU). This agreement promotes security collaboration
between federal, state, local, tribal, and private entities. To
implement the Annex, TSA--in collaboration with DOT's Federal Transit
Administration and the Federal Emergency Management Agency's Grant
Programs Directorate--develops a framework to leverage each agency's
unique resources and capabilities. The Annex also identifies specific
areas of coordination among the parties including citizen awareness,
information sharing, security standards, data collection and analysis,
and technical resource documents.
In 2010, in collaboration with the U.S. Department of Justice and
Amtrak, TSA announced a significant step toward enhancing the security
of the nation transportation infrastructure with the implementation of
the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative (NSI)
capability throughout the entire Amtrak rail system. The NSI is a
partnership among federal, state, and local law enforcement to
establish a standard process for law enforcement to identify and report
suspicious incidents or activity and share that information nationally
so it can be analyzed to identify broader trends. Under this
collaborative program, Amtrak officers are also utilizing an upgraded
reporting system--made available by TSA--to refer suspicious activity
reports to DHS and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for
analysis and follow-up.
DHS fosters regional security coordination and to integrate the
spectrum of available resources for enhanced deterrent and response
capabilities while empowering our state and local partners through
training and exercise grant programs like the Department's Transit
Security Grant Program. TSA works to improve security with security
stakeholders outside of the federal government. Key partners include
trade groups representing mass transit and passenger railroad interests
and the mass transit and passenger railroad agencies as well as senior
executives, law enforcement chiefs, and emergency responders. The
sector partnership model under the National Infrastructure Protection
Plan (NIPP) provides a strong framework for TSA to work with other
Federal, state, local, and private sector partners on critical
infrastructure protection and resilience, especially in the area of
surface transportation.
We are also making considerable progress engaging the public in
transportation security. DHS launched the ``If You See Something, Say
Something TM '' campaign last summer to raise public
awareness of indicators of terrorism, crime and other threats, and
emphasize the importance of reporting suspicious activity to law
enforcement authorities. This campaign is being expanded to places
where the NSI is being implemented, to ensure that calls to authorities
will be handled appropriately, in an environment where privacy and
civil liberties protections are in place. The NSI is currently active
in 15 states (California, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin) and 15 major cities (Boston,
Cincinnati, Dallas, District of Columbia, Houston, Kansas City, MO, Las
Vegas, Los Angeles, Miami, Milwaukee, Phoenix, Sacramento, San Diego,
San Francisco, and Seattle).
To protect the public in this effort, TSA promulgated a final rule
that strengthens the process by which individuals can report problems,
deficiencies, or vulnerabilities related to transportation security
including the security of aviation, commercial motor vehicles,
maritime, pipelines, public transportation, and railroad carriers.\1\
The rule establishes a mechanism by which an individual who makes such
a report to the TSA Contact Center will receive either a written
receipt or a call identification number. The receipt mechanism will
allow individuals who spot deficiencies in security measures to have
documentation in case they receive any retaliation for reporting their
concerns to TSA.
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\1\ 76 Fed. Reg. 22625 (April 22, 2011).
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Using Intelligence to Improve Surface Transportation Security
Information sharing is critical to getting resources and
intelligence out of Washington, D.C. and into the hands of state and
local law enforcement, giving those on the frontlines the tools they
need to protect local communities. Timely, accurate intelligence and
security information is provided by TSA to mass transit and passenger
railroad agency officials through joint efforts among DHS Office of
Intelligence and Analysis, TSA Office of Intelligence, and FBI
classified intelligence and analysis briefings. Consumers of such
information include mass transit and passenger railroad security
directors and law enforcement chiefs in major metropolitan areas as
well as Amtrak.
Intelligence products are provided to partners through TSA Mass
Transit Security Awareness Messages as well as through the Joint
Terrorism Task Force network's secure video teleconferencing system.
TSA is constantly working with our partners to enhance the scope,
accuracy, timeliness, and efficiency of information sharing in order to
develop a comprehensive intelligence and security information sharing
platform.
Collaborative Risk Assessment Initiatives
TSA is developing and fielding a risk assessment capability focused
on individual mass transit and passenger railroad agencies, their
regional security partners, and connecting and adjoining transportation
systems. This effort aims to produce several risk and vulnerability
assessment tools integrated into a single platform so that TSA and its
component security partners in DHS can conduct joint assessments of
mass transit and passenger railroad agencies, employing resources more
efficiently and improving the audit process. In addition, structural
vulnerability assessments are currently being conducted on the Nation's
most critical highway, bridge and tunnel infrastructure. These
assessments, performed for TSA by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, are
the most comprehensive assessments that have ever been performed.
By performing baseline and collaborative risk assessments in the
mass transit and passenger railroad domains, TSA is able to engage
state and local partners to identify ways to reduce vulnerabilities,
assess risk, and improve security efforts. These assessments are
conducted with emphasis on the 100 largest mass transit and passenger
railroad systems in terms of passenger volume. This group accounts for
over 80 percent of all users of public transportation.
TSA uses the Transportation Sector Security Risk Assessment (TSSRA)
to evaluate threat, vulnerability, and potential consequences for more
than 200 terrorist attack scenarios for mass transit and passenger
railroads. TSSRAs rate threat capabilities and likelihood of execution
as well as vulnerabilities of rail and bus systems and infrastructure
while considering casualties, property damage, and impacts on the
transportation network. TSA uses the assessments to inform mitigation
priorities, both across the sector and by individual mode, for
collaborative security strategies, program development, and resource
allocations.
The Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement (BASE) is a
comprehensive security assessment program designed to evaluate 17
security and emergency management action items that form the foundation
of an effective security program. BASE is intended to elevate the
security posture and readiness throughout the mass transit and
passenger railroad network by implementing and sustaining baseline
security measures applicable to the operating environment and
characteristics of mass transit systems and passenger railroads. TSA
implements this continuous improvement process through its
Transportation Security Inspectors, who conduct the assessments in
partnership with the mass transit and passenger railroad agencies'
security chiefs and directors. These evaluations have significantly
contributed to an elevation in the mass transit and passenger railroad
security posture.
Promoting Surface Transportation Security
In compliance with federal law, TSA has created the Intermodal
Security Training and Exercise Program (I-STEP). I-STEP enhances the
preparedness of our nation's surface-transportation sector network with
meaningful evaluations of prevention, preparedness, and ability to
respond to terrorist-related incidents. TSA has assembled a team of
federal agencies and commercial vendors to provide planning and
strategic support as well as analytical and technical services for
transportation security training and exercises under the I-STEP
program.
Through outreach, TSA engages all modes of the intermodal
transportation community to continuously improve security readiness. I-
STEP offers an intermodal transportation-security training and exercise
program for our Nation's transportation network communities. The
program improves the transportation industry's ability to prepare for
and respond to a transportation security incident by increasing
awareness, improving processes, creating partnerships, and delivering
transportation network security training and exercises.
In addition to I-STEP, 25 Visible Intermodal Prevention and
Response (VIPR) multi-modal teams are currently being operated by TSA
while the FY 2012 budget request includes funding for 12 additional
VIPR teams. These teams consist of personnel with expertise in
inspection, behavior detection, security screening, and law enforcement
for random, unpredictable deployments throughout the transportation
sector to deter potential terrorist acts. Working alongside local law
enforcement agencies throughout the transportation domain, TSA's VIPR
teams enhance the agency's ability to leverage a variety of resources
quickly in order to increase security in any mode of transportation
anywhere in the country. TSA conducted more than 8,000 VIPR operations
in the past 12 months, including more than 3,700 operations in mass
transit and passenger railroad venues. VIPR operational plans are
developed with a risk-based methodology in conjunction with local
transportation security stakeholders and conducted jointly by TSA,
local law enforcement, and transportation security resources.
TSA and the representatives of the Transit Policing and Security
Peer Advisory Group work together to enhance coordination and deterrent
effects of VIPR team operations. This cooperation has grown since the
mutually agreed upon operating guidelines for ``Effective Employment of
Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response Teams in Mass Transit and
Passenger Rail'' were implemented in October 2007.
Advancing Security Initiatives through Federal Grants
As I previously mentioned, DHS employs a comprehensive
transportation security grant program (TSGP) to provide awards to
eligible transit agencies to assist state and local governments in
devising and implementing initiatives to improve security. The TSGP
promotes a sustainable, risk-based effort to protect critical surface
transportation infrastructure and the traveling public from acts of
terrorism. The program is the primary vehicle providing funding
assistance for security enhancements to eligible domestic mass transit
and passenger railroad agencies and employs risk-based prioritization
for funding decisions.
In 2010, the TSGP provided $273.4 million to the transit and
passenger railroad industry and a total of $1.6 billion since 2006.
Similar, but smaller grant programs have supported overthe-road bus
operations. Approximately $175 million has been awarded through TSGP
for operational deterrence activities, which include public awareness
campaigns, training, drills, and exercises since FY 2006. TSGP funding
also supports non-federal law enforcement positions for anti-terrorism
activities. DHS has awarded $29.9 million since FY 2006 for 60 canine
teams and $93.6 million for 304 officers to create 77 anti-terrorism
teams. These officers enhance security, provide a visible deterrent and
augment our nimble, risk-based approach to provide assistance where it
can best be put to use. Transit, passenger railroad, and law
enforcement agencies have also been provided TSGP funds to hire non-
federal officers to serve as mobile explosives detection screeners. The
officers for each of these teams are employees of the transit system/
passenger railroad/law enforcement agency and are deployed according to
security needs within the local transit or passenger railroad system.
In an effort to further harden critical surface transportation
infrastructure, in 2010, TSA, in coordination with DOT and other DHS
offices, developed and implemented the ``National Strategy for Highway
Bridge Security,'' to conduct the most comprehensive structural
security assessments to date on more than 60 of the Nation's most
significant highway structures, including bridges, tunnels and
terminals. DHS is making strides across the department to improve
critical infrastructure protection activities. Grants have been used to
support intrusion detection, physical hardening, and surveillance
measures for underwater tunnels, bridges, and multi-user high-volume
stations. The TSGP has funded $155.2 million for underwater tunnel
hardening, $168.5 million for critical station physical security
measures, and over $28 million for suspension bridge hardening since FY
2006.
Conclusion
Our goal at all times is to maximize transportation security to
stay ahead of the evolving terrorist threat while protecting
passengers' privacy and facilitating the flow of legitimate commerce.
TSA works collaboratively with industry partners to develop and
implement programs that promote commerce while enhancing security and
mitigating the risk to our Nation's transportation system. I want to
thank the Committee for its continued assistance to TSA and for the
opportunity to discuss the important issues related to surface
transportation security. I am pleased to answer any questions you might
have.
Senator Lautenberg. Thanks very much, Mr. Pistole.
Mr. Lord, your opportunity, please.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN M. LORD, DIRECTOR,
HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES,
U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Lord. Thank you, Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member
Hutchison, and Senator Udall. I'm pleased to be here today to
discuss TSA's efforts to enhance rail security.
This is an important issue given the recent intelligence
recovered from the bin Laden compound and the prior
unsuccessful plots to bomb the New York Transit and D.C. Metro
systems. As you know, these systems are vulnerable to attack
because they rely on the open architecture that is difficult to
monitor and secure.
Today I'd like to discuss three issues: first, the DHS risk
assessment process used to focus its security efforts; second,
the status of TSA's efforts to provide security training for
public transportation and front-line rail employees; and third,
TSA's efforts to streamline the vast amount of security
information it provides to rail stakeholders.
Regarding the first point, as we reported today in our
written statement, TSA has made steady progress in improving
the risk assessments across all modes of transportation,
including rail. For example, last June, in response to a prior
GAO recommendation, TSA completed a comprehensive assessment of
security risk across the entire transportation sector,
including the passenger and freight rail modes. And although
TSA's assessment excluded some important types of threats such
as the threat of the lone wolf attack, this was a good first
step. And TSA will issue an updated assessment later this year
that will reportedly address some of the limitations we noted.
TSA has also expanded efforts to assess the risks of mass
transit, passenger rail, and freight rail systems. For example,
TSA has completed additional assessments of potential security
threats to freight rail bridges and tunnels in response to one
of our prior report recommendations, and as of June 2011, this
month, the agency reported it had completed assessments of 77
bridges and 26 freight rail tunnels. These are positive steps.
I would now like to discuss TSA's efforts to develop
security training programs for public transportation rail
employees. This is an important issue because in 2007 TSA
identified the need for more consistent, systematic security
training of mass transit and passenger rail personnel. The 9/11
Act also mandated that TSA develop regulations for providing
training to public transportation and front-line rail
employees.
During our recent discussions with TSA about actions to
meet the mandate, the agency reported it will issue a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking for public comment by November of this
year, and although that's a positive step, it's also worth
noting this is over 4 years past the original mandated
deadline.
This training is important because it's designed to improve
the consistency of the training and the quality of the training
provided to these personnel, including training in
coordination, communications, and evacuation procedures.
The last issue I'd like to address is information sharing.
Our past work has identified significant streamlining
opportunities in this area. For example, our September 2010
report identified potential overlap among three key federal
mechanisms used to share security information with public
transit agencies. And to help improve information sharing, TSA
and key industry groups have developed the so-called Transit
and Rail Intelligence Awareness Daily, or TRIAD, report. We
think this is a positive development to streamline the exchange
of intelligence and security information.
However, our ongoing work also indicates that freight rail
agencies still have concerns about federal information-sharing
efforts. Our concerns center around two issues, the analytical
content of reports, and the actionability of the information
provided. For example, security officials at three Class 1
railroads we interviewed recently raised significant concerns
about the actionability of the provided information. TSA
officials agreed that improvements are needed in this area and
are taking steps to address them, and we're going to report,
we're going to issue a report on this issue later this year.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. I look forward
to answering any questions that you or other members of the
Committee may have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lord follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stephen M. Lord, Director, Homeland Security and
Justice Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office
Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison, and members of the
Committee:
I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing to
discuss security issues related to the U.S. rail system, including mass
transit, intercity passenger rail (Amtrak), and freight rail. Rail
systems in the United States have received heightened attention as
several alleged terrorists' plots have been uncovered, including plots
against transit systems in the New York City and Washington, D.C.,
areas. Intelligence recovered from Osama bin Laden's compound indicates
that U.S. rail systems were a suggested target as recently as February
2010, although there has been no indication of a specific or imminent
threat to carry out such an attack. Terrorist attacks on rail systems
around the world--such as the March 2010 Moscow, Russia, subway
bombings, and the May 2010 passenger train derailment near Mumbai,
India, that resulted in approximately 150 fatalities--highlight the
vulnerability of these systems to terrorist attacks. Further, the
Mineta Transportation Institute has reported that terrorists attempted
to derail trains on at least 144 occasions between 1995 and 2010, many
of which were in South Asia and mostly through the use of track
bombs.\1\
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\1\ The Norman Y. Mineta International Institute for Surface
Transportation Policy Studies was established by the Intermodal Surface
Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991. Pub. L. No. 102-240, 6024, 105
Stat. 1914 (1991). The institute's transportation policy work is
centered on, among other things, research into transportation security,
planning, and policy development.
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One of the critical challenges facing rail system operators--and
the federal agencies that regulate and oversee them--is finding ways to
protect rail systems from potential terrorist attacks without
compromising the accessibility and efficiency of rail travel. The
systems are vulnerable to attack in part because they rely on an open
architecture that is difficult to monitor and secure due to its
multiple access points, hubs serving multiple carriers, and, in some
cases, no barriers to access. Further, rail systems' high ridership,
expensive infrastructure, economic importance, and location in large
metropolitan areas or tourist destinations make them attractive targets
for terrorists. In addition, the multiple access points along extended
routes make the costs of securing each location potentially
prohibitive.
My testimony today focuses on the following issues: (1) To what
extent has the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) conducted
comprehensive risk assessments to inform its security efforts across
all modes of transportation, including rail? (2) What technologies are
available to assist rail operators in securing their systems? (3) What
is the status of Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) efforts
regarding security training for frontline rail employees? (4) How
satisfied are rail stakeholders with the quality of security-related
information TSA is providing?
This statement is based on related GAO reports issued from March
2009 through September 2010, including selected updates conducted from
May 2011 through June 2011, on TSA's efforts to implement our prior
recommendations regarding surface transportation security.\2\ In
conducting these updates, we obtained information from TSA regarding
the agency's efforts to develop regulations for security training
programs for rail employees and to enhance its overall risk management
approach to rail security, among other things. Our previous reports
incorporated information we obtained and analyzed from officials from
various components of DHS, the Department of Transportation (DOT),
state and local transportation and law enforcement agencies, and
industry associations, as well as a survey of 96 U.S. public transit
agencies (that represented about 91 percent of total 2008 ridership).
Our previously published products contain additional details on the
scope and methodology, including data reliability, for those reviews.
In addition, this statement includes preliminary observations based on
ongoing work, the results of which will be issued in a report later
this year, assessing the extent to which freight rail carriers that
receive security-related information are satisfied with the products
and mechanisms that TSA uses to disseminate this information, among
other things.\3\ As part of this ongoing work, we surveyed all seven
Class I freight rail carriers.\4\ We also interviewed security
officials from three Class I freight rail carriers selected on the
basis of their location. While the results of our interviews are not
generalizable to all Class I rail carriers, the responses provide
perspectives and examples to expand on survey findings. All of our work
was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. These standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings based on our audit objectives. For new information that
was based on work not previously reported, we obtained TSA views on our
findings and incorporated technical comments where appropriate.
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\2\ Surface transportation security includes the mass transit and
passenger rail, freight rail, highway and commercial vehicle, and
pipeline modes. Please see the list of related products at the end of
this testimony statement.
\3\ This work is being conducted in response to a mandate in the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act (9/11
Commission Act). Pub. L. No. 110-53, 1203(a), 121 Stat. 266, 383
(2007).
\4\ As defined by revenue, for 2009, Class I railroads are freight
rail carriers having annual operating revenues of $379 million or more.
See 49 C.F.R. pt. 1201, General Instructions 1-1. The railroads include
CSX Transportation (CSX), BNSF Railway Company (BNSF), Union Pacific
Railroad Company (Union Pacific), Norfolk Southern, Kansas City
Southern Railway Company, Canadian National Railway, and Canadian
Pacific Railway.
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Background
TSA is the primary federal agency responsible for overseeing the
security of the mass transit, passenger rail, and freight rail systems.
However, several other agencies, including DOT's Federal Transit
Administration (FTA) and Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), also
play a role in helping to oversee these systems. Since it is not
practical or feasible to protect all assets and systems against every
possible terrorist threat, DHS has called for using risk-informed
approaches to prioritize its security-related investments and for
developing plans and allocating resources in a way that balances
security and commerce.\5\
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\5\ A risk management approach entails a continuous process of
managing risk through a series of actions, including setting strategic
goals and objectives, assessing risk, evaluating alternatives,
selecting initiatives to undertake, and implementing and monitoring
those initiatives.
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In June 2006, DHS issued the National Infrastructure Protection
Plan (NIPP), which established a six-step risk management framework to
establish national priorities, goals, and requirements for Critical
Infrastructure and Key Resources protection so that federal funding and
resources are applied in the most cost-effective manner to deter
threats, reduce vulnerabilities, and minimize the consequences of
attacks and other incidents. The NIPP, updated in 2009, defines risk as
a function of three elements:
threat--an indication of the likelihood that a specific type
of attack will be initiated against a specific target or class
of targets;
vulnerability--the probability that a particular attempted
attack will succeed against a particular target or class of
targets; and
consequence--the effect of a successful attack.
In August 2007, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act (9/11 Commission Act) was signed into law, which
included provisions that task DHS with actions related to surface
transportation security.\6\ Among other things, these provisions
include mandates for developing and issuing regulations for
transportation security training programs and ensuring that
transportation modal security plans include threats, vulnerabilities,
and consequences for transportation infrastructure assets including
rail.
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\6\ Pub. L. No. 110-53, 121 Stat. 266 (2007).
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TSA Has Made Progress in Conducting Comprehensive Risk Assessments
Across All Modes of Transportation, Including Rail
In response to our previous recommendations, TSA has taken steps to
conduct comprehensive risk assessments across the transportation sector
and within the passenger and freight rail modes that are based on
assessments of threat, vulnerability, and consequence. In March 2009,
we reported that TSA had taken some actions to implement a risk
management approach but had not conducted comprehensive risk
assessments that integrate threat, vulnerability, and consequence for
each mode or the transportation sector as a whole, as called for by the
NIPP.\7\ We recommended that TSA conduct risk assessments that combine
these three elements to help the agency produce a comparative analysis
of risk across the entire transportation sector, which the agency could
use to inform current and future investment decisions.
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\7\ GAO, Transportation Security: Comprehensive Risk Assessments
and Stronger Internal Controls Needed to Help Inform TSA Resource
Allocation, GAO-09-492 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 27, 2009).
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DHS concurred with this recommendation, and in June 2010 TSA
produced the Transportation Sector Security Risk Assessment (TSSRA),
which assessed risk within and across the various aviation and surface
transportation modes, including rail, and incorporated threat,
vulnerability, and consequence.\8\ A September 2009 letter from the
Director of DHS's Office of Risk Management and Analysis noted that in
developing the TSSRA, TSA was making progress toward developing a
strategic and comprehensive risk management approach that would better
align with DHS's risk management framework and address our
recommendations. However, TSA noted limitations in the June 2010 TSSRA
report that could limit its usefulness in guiding investment decisions
across the transportation sector as a whole. For example, the TSSRA
excluded the maritime sector and certain types of threats, such as from
``lone wolf'' operators. In June 2011, agency officials stated that TSA
is working to address these limitations in the next version, which is
scheduled for completion by the end of calendar year 2011. TSA also
said that it is strengthening and enhancing the TSSRA methodology based
on an ongoing independent verification and validation that is scheduled
for completion later this year. In addition, TSA officials noted that
other DHS components, such as the U.S. Coast Guard, conduct risk
assessments of the maritime sector that complement the TSSRA.\9\
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\8\ According to TSA officials, passenger rail is included with
mass transit in the TSSRA, although Amtrak is not listed in the TSSRA
report as a participant. In June 2011, TSA officials stated that
passenger rail would be more clearly broken out in the next version of
TSSRA.
\9\ We have reviewed the U.S. Coast Guard's risk assessment model
as part of previous work. For example, see GAO, Maritime Security: DHS
Progress and Challenges in Key Areas of Port Security, GAO-10-940T
(Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2010). We are also reviewing it as part of
our current review of integrated port security being conducted for your
committee and expect to issue a report on the results of this effort
later this year.
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With regard to assessments of mass transit and passenger rail
transportation, we reported in June 2009 that although TSA had
contributed to DHS's risk assessment effort, it had not conducted its
own risk assessment of mass transit and passenger rail systems.\10\ We
recommended that TSA conduct a risk assessment that integrates all
three elements of risk. DHS officials concurred with the
recommendation, and in March 2010 said that they had developed a mass
transit risk assessment tool to assess risk to mass transit and
passenger rail systems using threat, vulnerability, and consequence, in
addition to the TSSRA. According to TSA, they have completed pilot
tests of this tool on three transit systems as of June 2011 and
anticipate assessing six additional transit systems by the end of the
calendar year.
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\10\ GAO, Transportation Security: Key Actions Have Been Taken to
Enhance Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Security, but Opportunities
Exist to Strengthen Federal Strategy and Programs, GAO-09-678
(Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2009).
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Similarly, in April 2009, we reported that TSA's efforts to address
freight rail security were limited and did not focus on a range of
threats identified by federal and industry assessments.\11\ TSA's
security efforts focused almost entirely on transportation of Toxic
Inhalation Hazards (TIH); however, other federal and industry
assessments had identified additional potential security threats, such
as risks to bridges and tunnels.\12\ We reported that although TSA's
focus on TIH had been a reasonable initial approach, there are other
security threats for TSA to consider and evaluate, including potential
sabotage to critical infrastructure. We recommended that TSA expand its
efforts to include all security threats in its freight rail security
strategy. TSA concurred and reported that it had developed a Critical
Infrastructure Risk Tool to measure the criticality and vulnerability
of freight railroad bridges. As of June 2011, the agency has used this
tool to assess 77 bridges, some of which transverse either the
Mississippi or Missouri Rivers, and 26 freight rail tunnels.
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\11\ GAO, Freight Rail Security: Actions Have Been Taken to Enhance
Security, but the Federal Strategy Can Be Strengthened and Security
Efforts Better Monitored, GAO-09-243 (Washington, D.C.: April 21,
2009).
\12\ TIH include chlorine and anhydrous ammonia, which can be fatal
if inhaled. Shipments of TIH, especially chlorine, frequently move
through densely populated areas to reach, for example, water treatment
facilities that use these products. We reported that TSA focused on
securing TIH materials for several reasons, including limited resources
and a decision in 2004 to prioritize TIH as a key risk requiring
federal attention. Other federal and industry freight rail stakeholders
agreed that focusing on TIH was a sound initial strategy because it is
a key potential rail security threat and an overall transportation
safety concern.
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Our prior work has also assessed TSA's efforts to incorporate risk
management principles into the grant allocation process, and we
reported that transit grant funding decisions could be improved with
better assessments of vulnerability. For example, we reported in June
2009 that the Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) risk model included
all three elements of risk, but could be strengthened by measuring
variations in vulnerability.\13\ DHS held vulnerability constant in its
assessments, which limits the model's overall ability to assess risk.
We recommended that DHS strengthen its methodology for determining risk
by developing a cost-effective method for incorporating vulnerability
information in its TSGP risk model. DHS concurred with the
recommendation, and in April 2010 TSA stated that it is reevaluating
the risk model for the Fiscal Year 2011 grant cycle. In June 2011, TSA
stated that it is considering asset-specific vulnerability when looking
at risk, although TSA noted that the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) has ownership of the TSGP risk model. TSA provides input
into the model, however. We are currently assessing DHS and FEMA
efforts to improve the TSGP grant-allocation process as part of our
current review of DHS grant programs being conducted for your committee
and expect to issue a report on the results of this effort later this
year.
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\13\ GAO, Transit Security Grant Program: DHS Allocates Grants
Based on Risk, but Its Risk Methodology, Management Controls, and Grant
Oversight Can Be Strengthened, GAO-09-491 (Washington, D.C.: June
2009). The TSGP provides grant funding to the nation's key high-threat
urban areas to enhance security measures for their critical transit
infrastructure, including rail systems.
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Technologies Are Available to Strengthen Rail Security, but Challenges
in the Rail Environment and Low Maturity of Some Technologies
May Limit Implementation
Industry stakeholders have examined and implemented various
technologies to enhance the security of the rail system. For example,
in April 2009, we reported that several freight rail carriers we met
with installed security cameras and monitoring equipment at some of
their key facilities to better monitor the activities in and around
these areas.\14\ We also reported that officials from three railroads
and two chemical companies we met with stated that they had taken steps
to attempt to better track the movements of their TIH rail shipments by
installing Global Positioning System technology on their locomotives
and tank cars. Similarly, in June 2009, we reported that many mass
transit and passenger rail agencies reported making capital
improvements to secure their systems.\15\ For example, 19 of the 30
transit agencies we interviewed had embarked on programs since 2004 to
upgrade their existing security technology, including upgrading closed
circuit television at key station locations with video surveillance
systems that alert personnel to suspicious activities and abandoned
packages and installing chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear,
and explosives detection equipment and laser intrusion detection
systems in critical areas.\16\
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\14\ GAO-09-243.
\15\ GAO-09-678.
\16\ We also reported that TSA collaborates with DHS's Science and
Technology Directorate to research, develop, and test various security
technologies for applicability in mass transit and passenger rail
systems, including explosive trace detection technologies,
infrastructure protection measures, and behavior based and advanced
imaging technologies.
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While industry has taken these steps to implement technology to
enhance rail security, the nature of the rail system has presented
challenges to further implementation. For example, we reported in July
2010 that in commuter or light rail systems, many stations may be
unmanned outdoor platforms without barriers between public areas and
trains.\17\ Stations may also have few natural locations to place
technologies to be able to screen passengers. With limited existing
chokepoints, implementation of certain technologies may require station
infrastructure modifications to aid in funneling passengers for
screening. Similarly, challenges to using technology to secure the
freight rail system include the size and open nature of the system, the
need for railcars to be able to continuously move, and limited
resources.
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\17\ GAO, Technology Assessment: Explosives Detection Technologies
to Protect Passenger Rail, GAO-10-898 (Washington, D.C.: July 28,
2010).
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We have also reported that several technologies are available to
help address rail security challenges, but they are at varying levels
of maturity and using them involves trade-offs in mobility, cost, and
privacy. For example, in July 2010, we reported that the ability of
explosives detection technologies to help protect the passenger rail
environment depends both upon their detection performance and how
effectively the technologies can be deployed in that environment.\18\
Detection performance of these technologies varies across the different
technologies and additional limitations--such as limited screening
throughput, privacy, openness, physical infrastructure, cost, and
mobility concerns--have restricted their more widespread or more
effective use in passenger rail. More-established explosives detection
technologies--such as handheld explosive trace detection systems, X-
raying imaging systems, and canines--have demonstrated good performance
against many conventional explosives threats but are challenged by
threats from certain explosives.\19\ Newer technologies--such as
Explosive Trace Portals (ETP), standoff detection systems, and Advanced
Imaging Technologies (AIT)--while available, are in various stages of
maturity and more operational experience would be required to determine
whether they can be effectively implemented in a rail environment.\20\
For example, AIT technologies have the ability to detect hidden
objects; however, they are walk-through devices that would require rail
passengers to be funneled through the equipment, limiting passenger
throughput with long screening times. Standoff technology can be used
to detect hidden objects on an individual from a significant distance
and is attractive because it may have less effect on passenger
throughput than other new technologies. However, certain types of
standoff systems, as well as AIT technologies raise privacy concerns
because they create images of individuals underneath their clothing.
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\18\ GAO-10-898.
\19\ DHS considers certain details regarding the ability of
particular technologies to detect explosives and any limitations in
their ability to detect certain types of explosives to be Sensitive
Security Information or classified.
\20\ ETP are used in screening for access to buildings. The
operation of these systems generally involves a screener directing an
individual to the ETP and the ETP sensing his presence and, when ready,
instructing the individual to enter. The portal then blows short puffs
of air onto the individual being screened to help displace particles
and attempts to collect these particles with a vacuum system. The
particle sample is then preconcentrated and fed into the detector for
analysis. Standoff detection systems allow for the screening of rail
passengers from a distance. When applied to passenger rail, their
distinguishing feature is they attempt to screen passengers with
minimal to no effect on normal passenger flow. There is no standard
definition of standoff detection and separation distances can be less
than a meter to tens of meters and beyond. AIT portals are used for
screening people for building access and, to an increasing extent,
airport access. The AIT portal then takes images of the individual,
which are displayed to another officer who inspects the images. The
inspecting officer views the image to determine if there are threats
present.
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In our July 2010 report, we did not make any recommendations
regarding the explosives detection technologies available or in
development that could help secure passenger rail systems, but we
raised various policy considerations. Among other things, we noted that
securing passenger rail involves multiple security measures, with
explosives detection technologies just one of several components that
policymakers can consider as part of the overall security environment.
In determining whether and how to implement these technologies, federal
agencies and rail operators will likely be confronted with challenges
related to the costs versus the benefits of a given technology and the
potential privacy and legal implications of using explosives detection
technologies.
TSA Has Not Issued Rail Security Training Regulations but Has Provided
Funding and Guidance for Training
In 2007, TSA officials identified the need for increased security
training at mass transit and passenger rail systems because the extent
of training provided varied greatly--with a majority providing an
introductory level of safety and security training for new hires, but
not refresher training. In addition, TSA identified security awareness
training and a lack of a robust, standardized corporate security
planning for freight railroads as systematic security gaps. The 9/11
Commission Act mandates TSA to develop and issue regulations for a
public transportation security training program and for a railroad
security training program.\21\ In June 2009, we reported that TSA had
not implemented this requirement or several others related to mass
transit and passenger rail security, and recommended that DHS develop a
plan with milestones for doing so.\22\ DHS concurred with this
recommendation, and in June 2011, TSA stated that it had developed a
plan and milestones for addressing uncompleted 9/11 Commission Act
requirements. TSA also stated that it is finalizing the security
training program regulations and expects to issue a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking for public comment by November 2011.\23\ A TSA official
indicated that the delay was due, in part, to difficulties incurred in
trying to address multiple modes of transportation in one regulation.
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\21\ Pub. L. No. 110-53, 1408, 1517, 121 Stat. 266, 409, 439
(2007).
\22\ GAO-09-678.
\23\ Despite the absence of the TSA security training regulations
required by the 9/11 Commission Act, railroad organizations are subject
to established regulations such as the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration (PHMSA) security training regulations for hazmat
(hazardous materials) employees. Among other things, the PHMSA security
regulations require that hazmat employee training provide an awareness
of security risks associated with hazardous materials transportation
and methods designed to enhance transportation security. The training
must also include a component covering how to recognize and respond to
possible security threats. 49 C.F.R. 172.704. In addition, FRA
regulations require railroads that operate or provide intercity or
commuter passenger train service or that host the operation of that
service to adopt and comply with a written emergency preparedness plan,
which must provide for employee training as well as training of, and
coordination with, emergency responders. 49 C.F.R. 239.101.
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To address identified training deficiencies, TSA supports security
training through its TSGP and voluntary security awareness programs.
TSA established a Mass Transit Security Training program in 2007 to
provide curriculum guidelines for basic and follow-on security training
areas and makes funding available through TSGP.\24\ For example, TSA
offers mass transit and passenger rail agencies the option of using
grant funding to cover costs for training to employees that is supplied
by either: (1) training providers that are federally funded or
sponsored or (2) other training providers.\25\ However, in June 2009 we
reported that opportunities exist for TSA to strengthen its process for
ensuring consistency in the performance of nonfederal training vendors
that mass transit and passenger rail agencies use to obtain training
through the program.\26\ We recommended that to better ensure that DHS
consistently funds sound and valid security training delivery programs
for mass transit and passenger rail employees, TSA should consider
enhancing its criteria for evaluating whether security training vendors
meet the performance standards of federally sponsored training
providers and whether the non-federally sponsored providers could be
used by transit agencies for training under the transit security grant
program. DHS concurred with the recommendation, noting that TSA would
work with the FTA through an existing joint working group to develop
criteria for reviewing new vendor-provided training courses. In
February 2010, TSA stated that it had proposed a joint task group with
the FTA to define evaluation criteria for courses submitted by mass
transit or passenger rail agencies, academic institutions, or other
entities. In June 2011, TSA stated that the joint task group--which is
being led by TSA and will include members from the FTA and industry--is
in the process of organizing its first meeting. According to TSA, the
group will use the criteria it develops to evaluate vendor training
courses by the fall of 2011.
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\24\ DHS also established the Freight Rail Security Grant Program
(FRSGP), which provides funds for training programs, among other
things.
\25\ For 2011, the TSGP prioritizes employee training, drills and
exercises, public awareness, and security planning. Among other things,
Fiscal Year 2011 funds may be used for training activities including
workshops and conferences and employing contractors to support training
related activities.
\26\ GAO-09-678.
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DHS, DOT, and others have also taken steps to enhance rail and
transit security awareness in partnership with the public and private
entities that own and operate the Nation's transit and rail systems
through voluntary security awareness programs. For example, the Transit
Watch Program, co-led by TSA and the FTA, provides a nationwide safety
and security awareness program designed to encourage the active
participation of transit passengers and employees. By means of this
program, the federal government, in collaboration with industry,
created templates for transit agencies to develop or enhance their own
public awareness programs. In July 2010, DHS launched the ``If You See
Something, Say Something,'' campaign as a way to raise public and
frontline employee awareness of indicators of terrorism, crime, and
other threats and emphasize the importance of reporting suspicious
activity to the proper transportation and law enforcement
authorities.\27\
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\27\ The security program was funded, in part, by $13 million from
the TSGP and was originally implemented by the New York Metropolitan
Transportation Authority.
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Opportunities Exist to Streamline Security Information for Transit
Agencies, and Preliminary Results Indicate Some Freight Rail
Agencies Do Not Receive Actionable Information and Analysis
from TSA
While TSA is taking steps to improve information sharing with
freight and passenger rail stakeholders, potential overlap could
complicate stakeholder efforts to discern relevant information and take
appropriate actions to enhance security. In September 2010, we
identified the potential for overlap among three federal information-
sharing mechanisms: the public transit portal on the Homeland Security
Information Network (HSIN-PT), TSA Office of Intelligence's page on
HSIN, and the Public Transit Information Sharing and Analysis Center
(PT-ISAC).\28\ Each of these receives funding from DHS to share
security threats and other types of security-related information with
public transit agencies. We recommended that DHS establish time frames
for a working group of federal and industry officials to assess
opportunities to streamline information-sharing mechanisms to reduce
any unneeded overlap. DHS concurred with this recommendation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ GAO, Public Transit Security Information Sharing: DHS Could
Improve Information Sharing through Streamlining and Increased
Outreach, GAO-10-895 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to our recommendation, DHS and the rail industry have
taken steps to streamline the information distributed to stakeholders.
TSA and key industry groups have developed the Transit and Rail
Intelligence Awareness Daily (TRIAD) Report and associated
Transportation Information Library. The overall intent of TRIAD is to
streamline the analysis, sharing, and exchange of intelligence and
security information that had been disseminated by multiple sources.
TRIAD includes a daily publication to enhance situational awareness, an
alert message to provide immediate awareness of a developing threat or
incident, and a catalogue of supporting reports and related documents.
According to TSA and its industry partners, HSIN-PT will supplement
TRIAD by serving as a reference source to house cross-sector best
practices, additional intelligence, and threat information as well as
transit security standards and all-hazards information. The TSA Office
of Intelligence stated that it will continue to have a portal on HSIN
that supplements the information on the PT-ISAC and HSIN-PT. While the
TRIAD report may reduce the number of security-related e-mails that
transit agencies receive, it does not reduce overlap among the three
information-sharing mechanisms. In June 2011, TSA officials stated that
they are continuing to coordinate with other members of the working
group to identify actions and time frames for addressing our
recommendation.
Our recent work indicates that some rail stakeholders do not
receive security information from TSA. In September 2010, we reported
that less than half of public transit agencies (34 of 77) responding to
our 2010 survey reported that they had log-in access to HSIN, TSA's
primary mechanism for sharing open-source security-related information
with transportation stakeholders, and had not lost or forgotten their
log-in information.\29\ Our survey also identified that, of the 19
transit agencies that did not have HSIN access, 12 had never heard of
the mechanism, and an additional 11 agencies did not know whether they
had access to HSIN. We recommended that TSA establish timeframe for the
transit-sector public-private working group to conduct targeted
outreach efforts to increase awareness of HSIN among agencies that are
not currently using or aware of this system. DHS officials concurred
with this recommendation and in January 2011 provided an implementation
plan with target dates for addressing it. However, the plan was
insufficiently detailed for us to determine whether it fully addresses
the recommendation. For example, the plan stated that TSA officials
created a consolidated ``superlist'' of current PT-ISAC and HSIN-PT
members and transit agencies on a TSA distribution list and intend to
encourage all entities on this superlist to join the PT-ISAC and HSIN-
PT. However, the plan did not indicate how TSA would target its
outreach efforts to those entities not already on one of those lists.
In June 2011, a TSA official stated that the public-private working
group plans to reach out to other transit entities, such as small
agencies, to encourage them to join the PT-ISAC and HSIN-PT. As noted
above, TSA officials stated that they are continuing to coordinate with
other members of the working group to identify actions and time frames
for addressing our recommendation.
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\29\ GAO-10-895.
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Preliminary observations from our ongoing work also indicate that
some freight rail stakeholders would prefer to receive more analysis or
actionable security information from TSA. The federal government's
National Strategy for Information Sharing discusses the need to improve
the two-way sharing of terrorism-related information on incidents,
threats, consequences, and vulnerabilities, including enhancing the
quantity and quality of specific, timely, and actionable information
provided by the federal government to critical infrastructure sectors.
According to three Class I rail stakeholders that we interviewed, TSA
distributes information on rail security that is generally used for
situational awareness. However, rail security stakeholders from three
of the seven Class I railroads that we surveyed indicated that TSA's
security information products lack analysis, such as trend analysis,
that could help predict how certain events may affect freight rail. In
follow-up interviews, security officials at three Class I railroads
stated that security information provided by TSA does not offer
actionable information that could allow them to develop or adjust their
current countermeasures against potential terrorist threats. These
security officials added that they have often received the same
information that TSA provides from the media or other sources before it
is distributed from TSA. For example, two of these officials told us
that they received little or no security-related information from TSA
in the aftermath of Osama bin Laden's death. However, security
officials at two of the three rail carriers that we interviewed stated
that they felt confident that someone from the federal government would
alert them of any direct threat to that carrier. TSA officials agree
that improvements are needed in the products and mechanisms by which
they alert rail agencies of security-related information and
intelligence. For example, a TSA official stated in June 2011 that the
agency is in the process of revising its reports on suspicious
incidents to regionalize the information provided to rail carriers, in
response to feedback from those carriers. We will continue to assess
TSA's efforts related to security information-sharing and will report
the final results later this year.
Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison, and members of the
Committee, this completes my prepared statement. I look forward to
responding to any questions you may have.
Related GAO Products
Public Transit Security Information Sharing: DHS Could Improve
Information Sharing through Streamlining and Increased Outreach. GAO-
10-895. Washington, D.C.: September 22, 2010.
Technology Assessment: Explosives Detection Technologies to Protect
Passenger Rail. GAO-10-898. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2010.
Surface Transportation Security: TSA Has Taken Actions to Manage
Risk, Improve Coordination, and Measure Performance, but Additional
Actions Would Enhance Its Efforts. GAO-10-650T. Washington, D.C.: April
21, 2010.
Transportation Security: Key Actions Have Been Taken to Enhance
Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Security, but Opportunities Exist to
Strengthen Federal Strategy and Programs. GAO-09-678. Washington, D.C.:
June 24, 2009.
Transit Security Grant Program: DHS Allocates Grants Based on Risk,
but Its Risk Methodology, Management Controls, and Grant Oversight Can
Be Strengthened. GAO-09-491. Washington, D.C.: June 8, 2009.
Freight Rail Security: Actions Have Been Taken to Enhance Security,
but the Federal Strategy Can Be Strengthened and Security Efforts
Better Monitored. GAO-09-243. Washington, D.C.: April 21, 2009.
Transportation Security: Comprehensive Risk Assessments and
Stronger Internal Controls Needed to Help Inform TSA Resource
Allocation. GAO-09-492. Washington, D.C.: March 27, 2009.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much, Mr. Lord.
Now we'll hear from Chief O'Connor, please.
STATEMENT OF JOHN O'CONNOR, VICE PRESIDENT
AND CHIEF OF POLICE, AMTRAK POLICE DEPARTMENT,
NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION
Mr. O'Connor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Hutchison, Senator Udall, Senator Wicker.
My testimony today is in response to the emerging threat to
rail in this country that was recently highlighted by
information obtained from the Osama bin Laden compound. During
a prior appearance before this committee, I testified that the
threat against rail was very real, and I described the manner
in which Amtrak had responded by focusing on threats related to
improvised explosive devices in stations, on board a train, or
by an active shooter scenario.
The recent events after the death of bin Laden serve as a
stark reminder that these threats continue to be viable and
that a new twist was added, that terrorists are considering
derailing trains. This is of particular concern to Amtrak, who
operates high-speed rail trains where catastrophic losses could
occur. This begs the question: Are we doing enough to detect
and deter terrorist acts on surface transportation, and can we
do more to prevent a terrorist rail tragedy from happening?
Upon receipt of the intelligence information from the UBL
compound, a meeting was held with TSA officials to discuss what
was uncovered and to evaluate how to proceed regarding the
threats to the right-of-way and the derailment of trains.
Amtrak also collaborated with other Federal, state and local
agencies and initiated a response that addressed right-of-way
threats.
These steps included increasing right-of-way patrols,
focusing on bridge and tunnel infrastructure; shifting the
strategy of Operation RAIL SAFE, or ``Regional Alliance
Including Local, State and Federal Efforts,'' to include right-
of-way patrols; requesting law enforcement air and marine
support for critical infrastructure; ensuring current capital
security planning included right-of-way risk assessments;
deploying Special Operations personnel to the right-of-way and
coordinating with other Amtrak departments; last, alerting
employees and reinforcing security programs and vigilance
messages.
While Amtrak was undertaking these counter-measures, it
still remained committed to existing programs such as our
Explosive Canine Detection Program. We currently have 46
explosive teams that last year did more than 11,000 train rides
and 25 weekly surges across the nation.
Our Security Inspection Program. We conducted more than
3,000 random passenger baggage screening operations.
Active Shooter Training. All APD sworn personnel have been
trained in active shooter training, and we also trained more
than 45 agencies in SWAT tactics in responding to the rail
environment.
Corporate security. Amtrak has leveraged grant funding to
improve protection for passengers, employees, and critical
infrastructure, including CCTV, fencing and other security
improvements, mostly with grant funding from the TSA.
Amtrak continues to work closely with the TSA. We've
conducted more than 800 VIPR programs, the Visual Intermodal
Protection and Response deployments. We've also conducted joint
screening operations, continued improvement of security efforts
through the Suspicious Activity Reporting Program and the
Baseline Assessment Security Enhancement program.
In the Northeast Corridor, we continue to work with major
law enforcement and DHS officials from the Northeast Corridor
in a collaborative way to enhance public safety on surface
transportation. I mentioned RAIL SAFE before. This effort is a
grassroots effort that has now included hundreds of agencies
across the country helping to protect rail. Our last major
operation on May 19, where more than 155 U.S. agencies, as well
as several Canadian agencies, across 34 states and more than
1,000 law enforcement personnel deployed to over 200 rail
stations.
A key to our security is front-line employee training.
Amtrak has been active in providing security training for
front-line employees, and in 2011, 8,300 front-line
transportation employees are receiving classroom training by
way of an interactive simulated course, including an active
shooter situation.
Technology is also a big part of our efforts.
In conclusion, we are very concerned about the recent
events, and we will continue to work with the federal
government to do all that we can to protect America's rails.
We will work with DHS, TSA, and the Committee to identify
funding sources for additional front-line employee training and
advanced technology to address these threats.
The security of our system is our top priority, and I look
forward to working with the Committee in the coming months to
make sure that we have the people, the training, technology,
and the intelligence we need to keep our system safe and
secure. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. O'Connor follows:]
Prepared Statement of John O'Connor, Vice President and Chief of
Police, Amtrak Police Department, National Railroad Passenger
Corporation
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and thank you very much for the
opportunity to testify. My name is John O'Connor, and I am currently
Vice President and Chief of the Amtrak Police Department (APD). The
Department's strength is more than 500 sworn and civilian personnel at
more than 30 locations spread across the 46 states in which Amtrak
operates the passenger rail system. I speak to you as someone who has
more than 38 years police experience in the passenger rail and mass
transit environment. My testimony today is in response to the emerging
threat to rail in this country that was recently highlighted by
information obtained from the UBL compound.
During a prior appearance before this Committee, I testified that
the threat against rail was very real and I described the manner in
which Amtrak had responded by focusing on threats related to the use of
IEDs in a station or on a train or by an active shooter scenario. The
recent events after the death of bin Laden serve as a stark reminder
that these threats continue to be viable and that a new twist was
added--that terrorists are considering derailing trains. This is of
particular concern to Amtrak who operates high speed rail trains where
catastrophic losses could occur. This begs the question--are we doing
enough to detect and deter terrorist acts on surface transportation,
and can we do more to try to prevent a terrorist rail tragedy from
happening?
Upon receipt of the intelligence information from the UBL compound,
a meeting was held with TSA officials where discussion took place
regarding what was uncovered, and evaluated how to proceed and address
threats regarding the right of way and derailment of trains. Amtrak
also collaborated with other Federal, state and local agencies and
initiated a response that addressed right of way threats. These steps
included:
Increasing right of way patrols focusing on bridge and
tunnel infrastructure and to report such checks.
Shifting Operation Regional Alliance Including Local, State
and Federal Efforts (RAIL SAFE) strategy to include right of
way patrols.
Requesting law enforcement air and marine support for
critical infrastructure and right of way patrols when possible.
Reviewing our current Capital Security Plan to ensure our
right of way risks are being adequately addressed.
Deploying special operations personnel to right of way
coverage in conjunction with uniform patrol.
Coordinating with other Amtrak departments (Engineering, and
Mechanical) to ensure employee reporting of unusual occurrences
and to ensure gates are locked, buildings secured, liaison with
bridge tenders etc.
Alerting employees and reinforcing security programs and
vigilance messages.
While Amtrak was undertaking these new countermeasures, it still
remained committed to existing programs, such as:
Explosive Canine Detection Program
Amtrak now has 47 bomb-detecting canine teams. Included in this
group are specially trained ``vapor wake'' canine teams that can
actually detect the presence of fumes left after someone passes through
with an explosive device. Amtrak has moved to the forefront of the
field with use of this unique canine application and continues to work
to build this counter-terror capability and has about one third of the
canine teams vapor wake trained. In Fiscal Year 2010, Amtrak canine
teams performed over 11,000 train rides in protection of the traveling
public. These activities were in addition to the 34,000 train rides and
over a 100,000 gate/platform checks performed by APD patrol officers.
Canine teams also conducted 25 coordinated surge operations where
groups of bomb-detecting canine teams unpredictably appeared at various
locations throughout the entire Amtrak system to show increased
security and a law enforcement presence.
Security Inspection Program
In 2008, Amtrak began a random baggage screening program similar to
one pioneered by the NYPD. Using technology, screening teams deploy in
an unpredictable fashion designed to make it harder for a terrorist to
predict the level of security. In 2010, APD's Special Operations Unit
performed over 3,000 passenger baggage screening operations in which
thousands of trains were screened, resulting in tens of thousands of
passengers being randomly selected for screening. Through an American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act/Transportation Security Grant program
(ARRA/TSGP) Amtrak expanded this screening program by adding two
additional screening teams in the Northeast Corridor.
Active Shooter Training
The APD has performed SWAT-type training in the rail environment
with over 45 agencies since 2008 and has expanded the program to
include a Passenger Rail Tactical Training component in order to
increase state and local law enforcement personnel's awareness and
ability to respond and deploy in a rail station or on a passenger rail
train car and in extremis responses.
All APD sworn personnel are receiving training on active shooter
type incidents.
Corporate Security
Amtrak has leveraged the Transit Security Grant and American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) grant programs to improve
protection for passengers, employees, and critical infrastructure.
We will never stop assessing Amtrak's vulnerabilities. Many of the
projects have built upon earlier risk assessments performed for Amtrak
and will be closely focused on addressing these individual
vulnerabilities. Use of grant funds to install fences, closed circuit
TV and other security improvements is directly tied to Amtrak's
commitment to let our risk assessments drive security investment.
The security program is managed in part by Station Action Team
personnel. They work closely with the Operations Department to ensure
Amtrak security and emergency response policies are followed and
coordinated as part of a larger risk reduction strategy that
incorporates recovery, continuity of operations processes and drills
and exercises. These Station Action Teams along with Regional Security
Coordinating Committees have involved our station staffs in the
security planning process. This integration has improved coordination
and raised employee awareness of potential security threats.
Collaboration with TSA
Amtrak has had a very good relationship with TSA and appreciates
the support and assistance it has received over the years from this
agency.
Since 2007, Amtrak and TSA started joint deployments with TSA's
``Visible Intermodal Protection and Response'' (VIPR) team program,
which was developed to augment the integral security operations of
various transportation modes, such as the Amtrak Police or transit
security. These provide a visible uniformed presence and can help
dedicated law enforcement to deter or detect suspicious activity, and
they provide the traveling public with a reassuring police presence.
These operations have basically involved the unannounced ``surge'' of
TSA personnel onto Amtrak trains and stations at various points, and
are designed to test the ability of TSA to flex support to surface
transportation. A total of 858 VIPR operations have been held since
inception.
Amtrak leveraged the success of VIPR operations in 2009 and
collaborated with TSA to expand their presence by conducting joint
passenger screening operations, using additional TSA assets, including
Bomb Appraisal Officers, Behavior Screening Officers and Surface
Transportation Security Inspectors to augment Amtrak screening forces.
We have continued to positively develop this relationship by
coordinating the Suspicious Activity Reporting Program (SAR) to help
identify potential emerging terrorist trends or activities and are
presently going through the Baseline Assessment for Security
Enhancement (BASE) process with TSA Surface Transportation Inspection
Officials.
Northeast Corridor (NEC) Coalition
Amtrak continues to work with major law enforcement and DHS
officials from Delaware, New Jersey, New York, Maryland, Pennsylvania,
and Washington, D.C. to work in a collaborative way to enhance public
safety on surface transportation, particularly for communities on
Amtrak's NEC. A meeting was held at the request of NYPD Commissioner
Kelly to coordinate and reinforce efforts to protect the public using
surface transportation after notification of intelligence information
received from the UBL raid.
Operation RAIL SAFE (Regional Alliance Including Local, State and
Federal
Efforts)
This program, developed in partnership with Amtrak, NYPD and TSA,
involves the coordinated efforts of multiple jurisdictions to heighten
station patrols, increase police presence on trains, by deploying
assets in both uniform and undercover capacity. These operations allow
for Federal, state and local agencies to exercise counter-terrorism and
incident response capabilities.
For example, on May 19, 2011, a RAILSAFE Operation was conducted
that involved 155 agencies, 34 states, including Washington, D.C.,
Canadian cities Vancouver and Montreal and 1,035 law enforcement
personnel at 204 stations (107 Amtrak). This was aligned in Europe
through RAILPOL with their 24 BLUE European Rail Operation.
Front-line Employee Training
Amtrak has been actively focusing on providing security training to
our frontline employees recognizing that they are the eyes and ears of
the railroad.
Amtrak employees will continue to be a key piece of our security
strategy. They are valuable sources of information that can ``cue'' the
law enforcement system. Amtrak benefits from the services and
operational knowledge of upwards of 19,000 people who work on the
railroad. They are reminded daily of the importance of their diligence
and alertness to suspicious activity, how to recognize suspicious
activity and who to report to by way of Daily Crime tips. An Employee
Security Handbook and Employee Security Updates are additional
resources that outline awareness information.
In 2007, approximately 14,000 frontline employees received
classroom training.
In 2009, refresh classroom security training which included
civilian version of BASS training was provided to 7,700 Transportation
frontline employees. During this year, 2011, about 8,300 frontline
Transportation employees are receiving classroom training by way of an
interactive simulated course. Along with refresh training on
recognizing and reporting suspicious activity, the 2011 training
includes a first-time presented scenario on an active shooter incident.
An updated strategic Employee Security Training Plan is being
developed which will outline the way forward for security training for
all employees, to include a robust multi-year exercise program against
a broad spectrum of threats.
Technology
Amtrak has a range of mitigation strategies and solutions in place
and planned for the future. Various types of remediation are
implemented based upon risk and vulnerability assessments and best
practices. Amtrak has focused on a range of strategies including target
hardening (high security fencing, bollards, blast curtain/Mylar
protection, access control, etc.) and has most recently implemented
more technologically driven initiatives. These initiatives have
historically been applied to stations, bridges and tunnels however, in
light of recent events, Amtrak is exploring expanding these strategies
to include right-of-way protection.
Amtrak used the following technologies to prevent, detect and deter
terrorist acts:
Blast/Mitigation Studies
Engineering assessments of structural designs of critical
infrastructure (bridges, tunnels, stations and facilities)
Focus on chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear,
explosives (CBRNE) threats and asymmetric modes of attack
Advanced simulation and modeling techniques to identify
exploitable single/multi points of failure and reduce/eliminate
the risk of catastrophic consequences, such as loss of life or
operational functionality, from an attack
Smart ID Cards (HSPD12--Homeland Security Presidential Directive #12)
Implementation of HSPD12 compatible employee identification
cards to reduce unauthorized access to restricted areas
The computer chip on the card can be used for security
enhancements (e.g., digital signing of e-mails and data)
Smart ID program has enabled Amtrak to enhance security
through identifying and remedying security gaps, and has
provided an opportunity to enforce existing access control and
employee identification polices
CCTV
Several CCTV systems are in place throughout the rail
network
CCTV enhances APD's situational awareness and communication
capabilities
Amtrak is looking to augment its CCTV capabilities by
utilizing integrated advanced technology (cameras, sensors,
fencing, and access control instruments) to protect critical
infrastructure
Potential technology will result in an automated state-of-
the-art remote surveillance and intuitive, user-friendly 3-D
Graphical User Interface (GUI)
The systems will be designed using proprietary algorithms
and will be ruled based driven to detect anomalies in the
camera view
Access Control
Several access control systems are in place throughout the
rail network and APD expects to expand upon current solutions
as advancements in access control and intrusion detection when
they become available
Radiological Pagers
Portable trace detector that can detect explosives, chemical
warfare agents, toxic industrial chemicals and can do so in
approximately 20 seconds
APD sworn personnel are equipped with radiological pagers
while on patrol
Amtrak is developing the following technologies to improve upon
existing security strategy and operations, enhance interagency
information sharing and local agency response to Amtrak incidents:
iCOP--Integrated Communication and Operations Program
GIS based incident and response planning tool to enhance
situational awareness
Visually displays integrated data on an interactive multi-
user touch screen or desktop system including when officers are
on patrol near the right of way
Utilizes critical infrastructure, homeland security, law
enforcement, and Amtrak data for simulations, modeling, alerts
and analysis
Makes crucial data available simultaneously, in real-time,
to multiple key decisionmakers to plan appropriate response
scenarios and implement operating procedures
Capabilities include train and officer tracking, access to
CCTV feeds, response plans, public safety and law enforcement
alerts, floor plans, access control integration, etc.
Similar to systems recently launched at the Department of
Defense--Knowledge Display and Aggregation System (KDAS) and
FEMA--Integrated Situational Awareness Visualization
Environment (iSAVE)
ROMAN--Risk Operating Management Analysis Network (Secure Network)
APD's Secure Network is nearing end of development and will
provide support for security related technology projects (i.e.,
iCOP, CCTV, Access Control, etc.)
Robust and redundant network backbone
Provides a platform for secure communications & information
sharing
Support CCTV and Video command centers aggregating and
displaying internal and external information
Federalized and centrally managed system
Right-of-Way (ROW)
Amtrak is currently working with TSA to examine potential
technology based ROW intrusion detection solutions
Solutions would include integrated sensor technology with
cameras to monitor for intrusion along the ROW
In conclusion, we are very concerned about recent events and we
will continue to work with the federal government to do all that we can
to protect America's rails. We will work with DHS, TSA and the
Committee to identify funding sources for additional frontline employee
training and advanced technology to address threats. The security of
our system is our top priority, and I look forward to working with the
Committee in coming months to make sure that we have the people, the
training, the technology and the intelligence we need to keep our
system safe and secure.
I appreciate this opportunity to discuss security at Amtrak and I
look forward to any questions.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much.
I would note now that we're joined by Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker is not new to the Surface Transportation
Subcommittee, but he is now the Ranking Member of this
subcommittee. I welcome him and I look forward to working with
him on the Subcommittee.
What we'll do, Senator Wicker, if you have something very
short, you can do it now. Otherwise, use the time when the
questions are----
STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER F. WICKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSISSIPPI
Senator Wicker. I would prefer the latter. Thank you very
much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much.
Senator Wicker. I'm glad to be joining you in that position
on the Subcommittee.
Senator Lautenberg. We look forward to working with you. We
know you have a serious interest in rail safety, and we want to
pursue that interest with you.
I just got a news report that came out today, and it talks
about tampering on the rail system in Iowa. It says that on a
recent Sunday morning, an observant Iowa Interstate Railroad
crew member on a westbound train spotted something that didn't
look right at a switch just west of a town called Menlo, and
they immediately stopped traffic there and were able to deal
with the problem as they saw it.
It was designed to be an attack, and it was interrupted by
the heightened interest of a rail employee, and it was turned
over to the federal authorities to pursue what was intended
there and helped us in registering more concern, more interest
in these kinds of things, even as we talk to them this very
day.
So I start by asking Administrator Pistole, the TSA budget
request continues to designate 98 percent of the funds to
aviation, and we want that care to continue. But it leaves a
relatively small percentage of the funds for surface
transportation security. And as I mentioned in my commentary,
700 million passengers fly on airlines each year, compared to
the 10 billion who use public transportation. And news reports
indicate that al-Qaeda has been plotting an attack on a U.S.
rail line.
So how does the TSA budget request reflect our concern and
our actions against rail system attack, Mr. Pistole?
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Obviously, we would
be very much interested in applying more resources to surface
transportation and rail transportation, in particular to the
security aspects. We try to be risk-based and intelligence-
driven in our process of recognizing both al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula's interest in particular as to aviation,
and the catastrophic effects as we saw from both the attempted
bombing on Christmas Day, 2009, and then the cargo plots that
we saw only cost al-Qaeda $4,200 for those two toner cartridge
printer devices and the shipping of those two packages. And we
saw bin Laden's statements about that and al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula's statements about the economic impact, and
recognizing that at least two of bin Laden's fatwas prior to
his death concerned the economic impact. That's not to say that
there's not an economic impact if a train is derailed or
anything along those lines.
But what we try to do is recognize the exceptional efforts
of both the Amtrak Police and then those in state and local law
enforcement and in the rail industry that have taken efforts
and measures on their own simply in terms of risk mitigation to
do those things that they know are prudent in terms of whether
it is the additional police officers or canines, such as what
Chief O'Connor testified to; whether it is augmenting with
transportation security grant funds, which I mentioned, that we
try to do in terms of operational deterrence; training; and
then other things such as the VIPR programs that we mentioned.
So we try to do all those things, recognizing that we can't
be all places, all people, all times. So how can we leverage
federal government resources with state and local and Amtrak to
provide the best possible security posture?
Senator Lautenberg. Well, the question is, as raised
further, in the past year law enforcement has uncovered plots
against both the New York City subway and the D.C. Metro, and
yet what the House sent over, recommends funding that's
carelessly established to support the public transportation
security grants by 55 percent below this year's recommended
levels.
Now, what would an impact like that do to transportation
security grants that we have to have for the safety and
security of the traveling public?
Mr. Pistole. Mr. Chairman, it would have a serious and
significant impact if that were to go forward in several areas.
One would be the training, which we would be unable to do. For
example, we recently had a conference call with the chiefs of
police from many of the metro police departments. We call it
the Policy Advisory Group, including Chief O'Connor. And one of
the things they requested as a result of the bin Laden raid was
some video training, basically a videotape that could be
provided, that we could produce and provide to, for example,
the engineers, those who work on the lines, that deals with
sabotage, and particularly what can be done in terms of trying
to take preventive steps to prevent sabotage; and in the event
there is, then what steps can be taken to avoid the impact of
that. So that would be one area.
The operational deterrence, another area. The critical
infrastructure would be another area. As you know, some of the
PATH, the Port Authority Trans-Hudson lines between New Jersey
and New York have some issues that we have talked about
previously. Some of that funding may adversely affect some of
the continued risk mitigation efforts being done in those
areas. And then there may be reduced funding for, for example,
the operational efforts that Amtrak and others would have with
additional canine teams or uniformed officers that can do the
random, unpredictable patrols.
Senator Lautenberg. Yes. I'm extending the time that I have
for asking questions. I'm going to come back to you, Mr.
Pistole, because what I hear you saying is that there are many
things that we could do, and the question is what is missing
from the application of these ideas that leaves us with more
risk than I think we ought to be accepting.
With that, I ask Senator Hutchison to take----
Senator Hutchison. Well, thank you.
We understand the stretch that you have across all the
transportation modes. So I'm not going to rail on you about how
much of your budget you are allocating to rail, but I am going
to rail on you to this extent. And that is what, for instance,
are you doing about hiring the inspectors that you do have in
this area with some mass transit or rail experience which had
not been done as of April of 2010 when we had a hearing like
this?
Second, what about the 400 FRA inspectors? They're doing
safety, but what about adding security to their portfolio and
coordinating with the Federal Rail Administration?
And last, I would just ask this of you, Mr. Pistole. What
is the association and cooperation between TSA and DOT? How
would you rate that, and can you do more with what you have
that would help this situation?
And I'm glad you all mentioned about Osama bin Laden's
information on his computers that we found, because clearly
they saw that there was a void of interest in this area, so now
we are forewarned.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator. In terms of your first
question on the transportation security inspectors, obviously
we are looking for the best qualified, and I think there are
things we can do and are doing to always recruit and then
retain those with exceptional backgrounds and experience. And
so there's more we can do in terms of specializing, I think to
your point, that will address some of those issues that perhaps
have been raised in the past. I wasn't present for that April
2010 hearing, but I understand some of the issues that were
raised.
Senator Hutchison. But do you think we are doing that?
Mr. Pistole. I think we are, but we can do more, yes.
On your second point in terms of the FRA, the 400
inspectors, I'll take that back. I don't see any reason why we
can't add that training that we are providing, whether it is
for Amtrak or other rail, passenger and freight rail providers,
to add the security aspect to their safety issues. But I'll
take that back and look at that.
And then on the last issue, I didn't write that one down. I
apologize.
Senator Hutchison. The cooperation----
Mr. Pistole. Oh, yes, with the DOT, right. I think it's
good. Secretary Napolitano and Chief O'Connor and I had a
meeting with Secretary LaHood, last month I guess it was, to
talk about some of the issues involving particularly passenger
rail. I think there are a lot of things that we are doing well.
I think we could probably streamline and leverage some of those
relationships in a more effective way, so that's something I'm
interested in looking at, basically to get the best return on
our U.S. taxpayers' investment in freight and passenger rail
security.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lautenberg. Thanks.
Senator Wicker?
Senator Wicker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your service and for your
testimony. Let me ask you about the incident that happened
yesterday here in the Washington area, and I would reference a
story in the Washington Post. It has been on the television and
radio also in the last 24 hours.
A 51-year-old McLean woman is being held at an undisclosed
mental health facility after she allegedly made bomb threats on
a Red Line train Monday morning. Passengers fled the train.
Some riders evacuated on the track bed, according to eye-
witnesses. The Rockville station was closed for about 2 hours
while K9 units searched. No explosives were found, and
apparently this woman was more of an emotional case than a
terrorist threat.
But she reportedly got down on her knees, said you killed
my family, now I'm going to kill you all, and a melee ensued.
Passengers pressed the call button, one rider called the
transit police, and a number of people just jumped off and ran
at a place that was not a station. Panicked passengers used
emergency release levers to open train doors manually, jumped
on the track and began walking toward the nearest station.
Have any of you looked at this? Do you have an opinion
about what worked well and what didn't work well, and can the
Committee learn any lessons from the incident that occurred
yesterday?
Mr. O'Connor. Senator, I am familiar with the incident. I
haven't seen the official reports, but what is described there
does not surprise me. In a previous career, my department dealt
with an incident with a gunman on board a train, Colin Ferguson
on the Long Island Rail Road back in 1993, who actually killed
the husband of a Member of Congress. And the response by the
passengers on board the train was certainly very similar to
what you're describing now.
It appears that the woman was very credible, very
believable, and those people truly believed that their lives
were imminently in danger, and they took what action they
thought was literally going to save their lives.
One of the things we do at Amtrak is actually try to teach
passengers evacuation plans, both in the stations and on board
the trains. I think probably all agencies should take a look at
their programs and see whether or not we need to reinforce that
and put additional training out there for the passengers. In
today's world we have active shooter situations, we have
situations that require rapid responses on the part of the
public, and they need to be part of the solution, and we need
to provide the training for them.
Senator Wicker. Mr. Lord?
Mr. Lord. Yes, I would agree with Mr. O'Connor. I think the
entire incident underscores the importance of providing
additional training on emergency response and evacuation
procedures. A lot of the time and attention is focused on
deterring an attack, preventing an attack. But once an attack
happens or it appears imminent, I think there needs to be
increased focus in that area. In my statement today, that was
one of the issues we highlighted, the TSA's efforts to
introduce new regulations that would set up programs for the
training of front-line rail employees. We think that's
important, because the program requirements stipulate various
requirements, one of which is training and evacuation
procedures.
Senator Wicker. Do either of you have an opinion as to what
would have been the best response of alarmed passengers at this
incident? Did they endanger themselves? Did they risk
electrocution by jumping off at that particular spot?
Mr. O'Connor. They did, yes.
Senator Wicker. What would you have liked for them to have
done?
Mr. O'Connor. It would have been preferable if they could
escape to the platform if that were possible. But when there's
a mad dash to the door, sometimes that's not possible. Clearly,
in a panic situation like that, you want to try to do whatever
you can to quell the panic and direct people to a safe
evacuation.
Senator Wicker. Well, thank you. I think I'll take another
round later on, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate that.
Senator Lautenberg. Senator Boozman, welcome. And please
take your opportunity to ask any questions that you have.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN BOOZMAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ARKANSAS
Senator Boozman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Pistole, I'd like to follow up just a little bit on
what Senator Hutchison asked in terms of the responsibilities
of TSA versus others. I know there has been some statements
that TSA has stated that they're not the lead and it's others'
responsibility. We all understand that. Are we clear on those
lines of who does what?
And then the other thing is you mentioned a few minutes ago
in response to your question that you saw some areas where we
could do a better job. Could you elaborate on that and perhaps
tell us a little bit more?
Mr. Pistole. Sure, Senator. So I think there's clear
understanding of those in the government and industry in terms
of TSA's responsibility as it relates to security; and then,
for example, DOT's responsibilities in the areas of safety,
similar to what FAA has on the aviation side on safety and TSA
has for security. So I think there's clear understanding in
most respects.
Part of what I was referring to on some of the streamlining
is just, for example, the training facilities that DOT has. For
example, there's an outstanding training facility for rail
safety and security in response to, for example, a freight rail
with toxic inhalation hazard, a derailment, which is located in
Pueblo, Colorado. There are other locations. There's one that
the National Guard runs in Harpers Ferry, West Virginia that
there may be some efficiencies achieved by doing some things.
In fact, I'm visiting that with OMB on Friday to look at that.
So that's one thing on the training side.
Senator Boozman. Can I ask about that, then? If you
establish that that were the case, is that something that you
all could work out, or would you need our help in fixing that,
or is that an administrative thing?
Mr. Pistole. No. I think that would be worked out within
the Administration just to say, OK, here's--the question is are
we providing services to different audiences? So it's one more
focus. I visited Pueblo. I have not visited the West Virginia
one, so I just don't have all that information right now.
Senator Boozman. OK. Very good.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lautenberg. Thanks, Senator Boozman.
I want to ask a question of Mr. O'Connor, as well as Mr.
Lord. One of the primary benefits of rail travel is the ability
to move easily, efficiently, get on the train, get moving to
your destination. How is it going to be as efficient, as rapid
for us to be able to balance the security needs with a more
detailed review of who is boarding the trains?
Mr. Lord or Mr. O'Connor, let me ask you first because
you've got the force out there.
Mr. O'Connor. Sure, Senator. It's critical that our systems
remain open and free. It's part of who we are as Americans.
That being said, there are layers of security that can be
applied in the transit environment that reduce the
vulnerability, and we're doing that by training our police
officers in behavioral assessment, by training our employees in
how to spot suspicious behavior and activity, and also layering
in random screening of bags, K9s both in the stations and on
board the trains, as well as the use of technology, and
technology is improving all the time, and we're working with
the TSA on new technology.
So I think it's important that we keep the system open and
free but layer in these random, unpredictable security
activities as to disrupt anybody who might be planning
something untoward.
Senator Lautenberg. Mr. Lord, I may be stretching your
responsibility here, but do we know enough about the systems?
If you're not familiar with this, please feel free to say so.
With the systems that are available, the technology that's
around, how do you apply that to the millions of people who
daily get on a train in a very short period of time? As the day
moves across the country, the load stays about the same. You're
talking about millions of people moving each day. So I'd love
to have an answer that Mr. O'Connor suggested can be
applicable, but you do have the time factor on the other side.
Mr. Lord. Given the multiple access points and open
architecture of the system, it would be extremely difficult to
screen all passengers against--I believe you're referring to a
terrorism watch list, something analogous to what's being done
on the aviation side of the House.
Senator Lautenberg. Even more than that. But now we find
this erratic person who challenged the system just the other
day. How do you prevent people who would bring harm from being
able to get into the train, get on the train, and cause the
mayhem?
Mr. Pistole, is there anything that you see that wouldn't
violate the security obligations that we all have here that can
so rapidly discern problems when you've got millions of people
moving that would enable you to provide the kind of risk
aversion that we'd like to see?
Mr. Pistole. Well, the short answer is, as you know, it's
very difficult. It's problematic. What we do try to focus on
are those areas, those points of vulnerability and, as Chief
O'Connor mentioned, using canines, random unpredictable
patrols, the undercover officers who may be looking for
suspicious activity, and then recognizing that, at least from
the TSA perspective, part of our job is to promote the free
movement of goods and people with the best possible security.
So it's a balance between that commerce moving, people moving,
with security.
So the idea, and we talked about this last year in your
office, about trying to do individual screening just does not
make sense from our perspective on the rails.
Senator Lautenberg. Yes, and you have to walk away with one
conclusion that I think is fairly obvious, and that is the
presence of a security apparatus, including people, has to be
obvious. They have to know that there are people who are
watching, whether it's the K9 or their presence. I love seeing
them. The problem I found out is that the dogs get more tired
than the officers who are handling them. You've got a problem.
I see a dog stretched out there, and the poor dog, I want to
pick him up and give him a little hug and a little water to get
him going again.
But the fact of the matter is I think it has to be obvious
that there is a presence. The TSA has a program, ``See
Something, Say Something,'' but there have to be reminders that
there are people who are looking out for our interests, and the
fact that it's randomized I think has a value of its own. So,
thanks.
Senator Wicker?
Senator Wicker. It is--I would yield to Ms. Klobuchar for
questions if she has questions.
Senator Lautenberg. That's very kind of you.
STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Klobuchar. OK. Thank you very much.
Senator Lautenberg. I would have had I had the time, too.
Senator Klobuchar. That's very good. Thank you.
Senator Lautenberg. Senator Klobuchar.
Senator Klobuchar. I really appreciate that.
Thank you, all of you, for being here for this important
hearing. And thank you, Chair, for having this hearing. I think
it's incredibly important. We are very focused obviously on air
safety, but I think as the Chairman knows, we have to always be
very diligent with our rail system. It's so critical with goods
and the flow of people across our nation, and an attack could
cause not only high casualties but also severe disruption to
interstate commerce. So I appreciate hearing from you on this
today.
I have a question. First of all, I used to be a prosecutor,
Director Pistole, so I'm very focused on coordination with
local law enforcement. And I know you discussed several of the
initiatives that TSA has undertaken to streamline coordination
with local law enforcement. And could you expand on that and
discuss them more in detail? And to what extent does TSA not
just direct local law enforcement but also integrate their
expertise into its own oversight and assistance programs?
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar. I would describe
it in three ways. One is on information sharing. What can we
provide on a timely basis to state and local law enforcement,
and obviously rail security police, such as we did on Monday,
the day literally within 12 hours of President Obama's
announcement about the killing of bin Laden? And so we convened
a conference call with all the major stakeholders in local law
enforcement and the Metro police, transit police, to say here's
what happened, be aware of possible retaliatory actions that
may take place, no specific intelligence about that. And then
on Wednesday of that week, when we received the information
about the plot on the 10th anniversary of 9/11 to derail a
train, we provided that information. So that's one area,
information sharing.
The second is in training, recognizing that state and
locals, as in your experience as a prosecutor, my experience as
an FBI agent, state and locals usually have the best resources
locally and the best information, intelligence in connection
with the community that they can do the best possible job if we
in the federal government can enable them, whether it is
through grants such as the Transit Security Grant Program, or
with specific training they can augment, or it might be through
the VIPR teams where we can engage with state and local law
enforcement to say, OK, here's some operational deterrence
things that we can do.
The last is in--the third area is in the critical
infrastructure improvement. So if there are critical
infrastructures in the particular locale, how can we be
informed by state and local police and transit authorities to
say here's what they assess as being the vulnerable points? How
can we work collectively to shore up those vulnerabilities?
Senator Klobuchar. And also I know that TSA works with the
rail stakeholders in the private sector, and according to the
GAO, many stakeholders don't have the computer access they need
to receive TSA security updates, and they don't quite know what
to do with them. Can you discuss your understanding on the
current state with those stakeholders?
I just remember from the aviation issues, working with
Delta, which has a hub in Minnesota, when things came up at the
beginning about the change in the aviation security standards,
that there were some issues there. So if you could comment with
rail.
Mr. Pistole. We have taken a number of steps, and GAO
identified some of those areas that we could improve upon over
the last several years, and I think we've made some good
improvement, recognizing that we can do better. But there is an
interdependency, as you note, with the stakeholders on their
ability to receive the information, especially if there's
classified information which we want to provide.
But it really comes down to several things. I actually
brought a folder of intelligence bulletins that we share with
both stakeholders and state and local and transit police;
different bulletins, whether it's about, for example, the
Mumbai attack, the active shooter scenario, or the Moscow
attack, both the subway attack and at the airport. We have a
bulletin which Steve Lord mentioned, TRIAD. It's a daily intel
report that we are developing.
But what we're really looking for is input from industry
and the stakeholders as to that actual intelligence, what they
are really looking for, and recognizing that there's very
little actionable intelligence. Mostly the strategic
intelligence about, OK, al-Qaeda wants to hurt us, al-Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula particularly. Here are things they've
done in the past. Here's what they may do. But other than the
10th anniversary of 9/11, that's the really only actionable
intelligence as to a specific plot, other than those that the
Chairman mentioned earlier about Zazi in New York City or the
individual here in D.C. for the Metro, which is really an
aspirational plot as opposed to something that was operational.
Senator Klobuchar. Just one last question. I know during
your nomination hearing you and I talked in my office, as well
as at the hearing, about worker morale with TSA. And I have to
tell you, we talked about this before but I've seen some
improvement, just talking to people, and it's just anecdotal,
that work at the airports. Some of it has to do with when you
stood and defended their honor during the whole pat-down
controversy, when they were just doing their jobs. But I
wondered about morale among rail security TSA workers and if
you have any thoughts on that.
Mr. Pistole. Well, I have the perspective only from the
Transportation Security Inspectors, those TSA employees who
work with industry. I would defer to Chief O'Connor and Steve
Lord in terms of what they have received. But I believe overall
that morale is improving within TSA. There are a number of
initiatives that we have going, and I think we have a lot of
good things that people are proud of doing. I'm glad to hear
your anecdotal information. That's even with your particular
situation and----
Senator Klobuchar. You mean the fact that my hip is checked
all the time?
Mr. Pistole. I was not going to raise that, Senator, but,
yes----
Senator Klobuchar. It's a chronic sort of----
Mr. Pistole. I'm glad to know----
Senator Klobuchar. It sounded sort of--``your particular
situation'' sounded----
Mr. Pistole. I'm glad to know that there have been some
positive encounters there, Senator. Thank you.
Senator Klobuchar. Chief?
Mr. O'Connor. Yes. Every day the TSA sends us screeners to
work with our officers in multiple cities across the nation,
and the screeners that come are well trained, and they actually
enjoy the break from the airports, working with us. So they get
a little bit closer and a little bit more interactive. They
don't have to go through the whole pat-down routine, but they
do help us with explosive detection, as well as behavioral
detection, and they work very good in the rail environment.
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much, Senator Klobuchar.
Senator Wicker?
Senator Wicker. Thank you. Mr. Pistole, did I understand
you to say that the Zazi plot in New York City was more
aspirational than real?
Mr. Pistole. No. I'm sorry, Senator. That was a very real
plot. The one that was disrupted here locally in Washington,
D.C., the Metro last fall----
Senator Wicker. That was Farooq Ahmed.
Mr. Pistole. Yes. And I say aspirational only from the
standpoint of he was interested in doing something, but he was
doing it with an undercover FBI agent, and he did not have the
means of doing it, whereas Zazi clearly had the means, the
motive, the opportunity. But because of good information and
intelligence sharing, that plot was disrupted.
Senator Wicker. Yes, sir. Zazi had homemade bombs,
materials, with an intent to detonate them right there in
Manhattan. What can you tell us in a public hearing about how
we detected these two plots, speaking in general terms?
Mr. Pistole. I can say that it was because of very good
intelligence sharing in the Zazi case. Of course, I was with
the FBI at the time and helped to oversee that investigation,
and it was very collaborative work between the Joint Terrorism
Task Force in Denver. Of course, Zazi was in Aurora, Colorado.
There, he and relatives had been buying ammonium peroxide from
several beauty supply stores, and so there were actually some
trip wires in place to have that identified if somebody was
buying suspicious amounts of peroxide, for example.
That did not work as effectively as it should have, but
then because of the information sharing with state police and
actually tracking him as he drove through the night from
Colorado to New York City, and then working with NYPD, there
were some issues that could have been improved in that regard
in terms of how that was all actioned.
But the bottom line was he and his two co-conspirators were
tracked and were disrupted before they were able to carry out
their plots with the backpacks. There were nine backpacks found
in the apartment they were staying in, and we believe they were
going to put those, the devices, the peroxide-based bombs in
those backpacks and go in the New York City subways.
Senator Wicker. Do you view that as an attack that actually
could have been brought to fruition----
Mr. Pistole. Absolutely.
Senator Wicker.--had authorities not intervened?
Mr. Pistole. Absolutely. He was clearly intent on doing
that. He had built a device at a hotel in the Denver suburbs,
and he was prepared to go about doing that. He had been trained
back in Afghanistan. So, yes, he was ready to go. Pakistan; I'm
sorry.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much. Let me just shift in
the remaining moments to requirements contained in the
implementing recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of
2007.
Am I informed correctly that mandated security training
requirements are still not final, and that background and
immigration checks of front-line public transportation rail
employees are still not finalized? Am I correct in that
information?
Mr. Pistole. You are.
Senator Wicker. Why is it taking so long? 2007, and here it
is 2011, and the training requirements are not in place, and
the background and immigration checks are not in place.
Mr. Pistole. So for some context, Senator, out of the 118
provisions of the 9/11 Act, 74 have been complete, 14 are
overdue, and you've mentioned 2 of those. The training has
actually taken place, but the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
which was mentioned earlier has taken much longer, in my mind,
than it should have, and that is in process.
So the substance has actually taken place, but the process
for the NPRM has not been finalized, and so that's still in
progress. As you know, that is a several-year process.
The other one, we should have that out by December, by the
end of this year, is what I understand. But again, I agree, it
has taken too long. We did focus on the top-tier priorities,
and those have been addressed and successfully completed.
Training is a top priority, but it just was not done on as
timely a basis as it should have.
Senator Wicker. Do I understand the rulemaking process for
something of a national security issue such as this is really
the same as the process for the implementation of a rule
involving a labor law or an environmental law? It's the same
process?
Mr. Pistole. It can--yes, it's generally the same process.
Yes.
Senator Wicker. Do you--would you advocate, in cases of
national security legislation, would you advocate a streamlined
rulemaking process----
Mr. Pistole. Absolutely.
Senator Wicker.--for that?
Mr. Pistole. Absolutely, and I would appreciate support on
that.
Senator Wicker. Are you aware of any proposal coming from
the administration in that regard?
Mr. Pistole. Not off the top of my head. I could look at
that and get back with you, Senator.
Senator Wicker. Well, Mr. Chairman, it just seems to me,
when we have our allies suffering from attacks in London and
Madrid, when we see 40-plus fatalities in Moscow, 200-plus
fatalities in India, and there's a national security issue, it
seems that the rulemaking should be different than the
rulemaking with regard to the construction of toys or a new way
of looking at labor laws.
But in conclusion, let me just observe, Mr. Chairman, that
somebody must be doing something right in the fact that we've
not had these incidents I mentioned as in the other four
locations. It's something to be proud of. That's not to say
that something won't happen this afternoon or tomorrow, because
the threat is ongoing. But I think we are very fortunate in
that we have escaped this type of attack for as long as we
have. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lautenberg. Thanks very much. I think it's fair to
say that we have been diligent, that we've intercepted many
plans for people who wanted to bring destruction to the system,
and I congratulate all branches of the area that are concerned,
whether it's GAO or the Amtrak police, Mr. Pistole and the TSA.
Your people are hard at work, that I genuinely believe, and we
urge you to keep on the diligence.
Something happened in the last couple of--things happened
in the last couple of weeks which are distressful, and I
address this to Mr. O'Connor, about the walk-through from New
York to New Jersey through the PATH train tunnel without being
detected by security. Others came, were walking through secure
passageways.
I don't know what measures Amtrak has in place to prevent
something similar from happening in its rail tunnels, but
obviously it has got to be there. We need to know that these
access ways are secure and that we're not going to have people
just wandering through there and doing whatever they want, as
well as bringing terrible risk to the passengers or the system
itself, that we are not missing the evidence that we've seen in
front of us and not curbing it before it takes place.
Mr. O'Connor. I agree, Senator. Funding that has been
provided by DHS TSA to New Jersey Transit, as well as to Amtrak
has been used to put some systems, some surveillance systems in
that have been helpful to us in protecting those entrances to
those tunnels. But given the recent information coming out of
the bin Laden compound, we're looking to do even more, and
we've been in discussion with the TSA in terms of
operationalizing some of the grant funding to put additional
security personnel out at critical infrastructure until we can
target-harden some more bridges and tunnels that we're
concerned about.
So in short order, there will be, besides the additional
patrols we're doing, there will be some additional fixed
security areas that will help further protect critical
infrastructure.
Senator Lautenberg. Because I think it's obvious that
fairly simple technology is available to provide the camera
views of these access points, and somebody sitting in a
facility, an office, can maintain watch on lots of these places
without a lot of trouble. So I would urge that.
Before I came to the Senate I was a commissioner of the
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, and I'm not sure
what prompted me as I look back because this was some years
ago, 1978 specifically. I decided that I would walk through the
tunnel, not unescorted, and I did, through the PATH train, New
York and New Jersey, as you mentioned, and I found some
distressing things. Emergency doors were locked, fire exits
locked, electric light systems that were antiquated and
resulted in lots of lights going out. If one of them went out,
it was the whole system not in use anymore, but at that point
in time it was.
So surveillance of those facilities has to be there, and as
inviting as they might be for the curious, they're even more
inviting for those who would bring terror or mayhem to our
public.
I thank you all for your participation today, and we're to
make an announcement that we'll keep the record open for a
couple of weeks. We'd ask that any questions you get, please
respond to them as promptly as you can.
With that, this hearing is adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 4:04 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison to
Hon. John S. Pistole
Question 1. Under TSA's current command structure, Transportation
Security Inspectors report to a Federal Security Director (FSD) at a
nearby airport. In the past, the Inspector General has recommended that
TSA place surface inspectors under the authority of a TSA headquarters
official responsible for surface transportation. TSA has rejected this
recommendation every time. Can you assure us that surface
transportation security remains a priority despite this aviation-
centered structure?
Answer. Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Federal
Security Directors (FSD) deploy Transportation Security Inspectors--
Surface through a risk-based approach and ensure coverage of key
passenger rail and mass transit facilities in their regions. FSDs and
Assistant Federal Security Directors-Inspection (AFSD-I) undergo
surface transportation-related training, such as Rail Road 101, Highway
Motor Carrier Safety, and Visible Inter-modal Prevention and Response,
at the Transportation Technology Center in Pueblo, Colorado.
Additionally, FSDs participate in various workshops and conferences
focusing on surface transportation security issues, roles,
responsibilities, and the agencies' regulatory authority. Surface
Regional Security Inspectors monitor and report local FSD/AFSD-I
activity to ensure it meets TSA's oversight requirements in the surface
mode. TSA's cadres of inspectors assess compliance, national program
delivery, and provide outreach on security assets in the surface
transportation system. TSA headquarters provides program oversight to
ensure work products at each location meet the frequency and quality
mandated in the Regulatory Activities Plan.
TSA remains committed to prioritizing the functions of inspectors
in surface transportation under the oversight of its FSDs and in line
with the latest Transportation Sector Security Risk Assessment. This
effort is further solidified through the deployment of six Regional
Security Inspectors for Surface Transportation (RSIs-S) who report to
TSA headquarters. RSIs average more than 33 years of surface
transportation experience and are recognized by the Association of
American Railroads (AAR) as the surface security subject matter experts
in the field. The team of RSIs, including an RSI dedicated to Amtrak
and an RSI Coordinator, provides day-to-day support to field Area
Directors (AD), with the Office of Compliance Programs at TSA
headquarters providing overall program strategy and supervision. TSIs
are responsible for all surface-related inspection, compliance, and
enforcement activity within the areas of responsibility of the FSD
offices. RSIs are responsible for strategy across the country and have
direct corporate interactions with TSA's major stakeholders. Their
positioning throughout the country provides active oversight of surface
transportation security enhancement activities. One of the ongoing
goals of TSA's Surface program is to continue an enhanced relationship
with mass transit entities to identify effective practices that will
lead to improving security in the midst of an evolving and changing
adversary and threat stream.
Question 2. At a hearing in April of 2010 I expressed concerns
about TSA's hiring of inspectors with no rail or mass transit
experience. Assistant Secretary Heyman assured me that TSA was making
an effort to focus more on surface transportation experience when
hiring inspectors. Has any progress been made in this area over the
past year?
Answer. Yes, employment eligibility now requires certification of
surface transportation experience at each level with more substantial
experience required for the higher pay bands. The employment of all
TSIs, regardless of the transportation mode, is now processed at the
airport through the Assistant Federal Security Director-Inspection
(AFSD-I), who is the first-line supervisor and the recommending
official for selections and at some locations the selecting official.
At airports where an AFSD-I is not physically located the Federal
Security Director (FSD) makes the selection.
Question 3. The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) has about 400
inspectors around the country. Would it be possible for these
inspectors to be trained to handle some of the responsibilities of TSA
inspectors to improve efficiency and lower the cost of inspections to
the taxpayers?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is the
Sector-Specific Agency within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
responsible for the security of the nation's transportation systems.
DHS and TSA have engaged the Department of Transportation (DOT) and the
FRA in several memoranda of understanding (MOU) and memoranda of
agreement (MOA) which include roles, duties and responsibilities of the
inspector workforce, and the sharing of information between the two
agencies. TSA inspectors have worked with FRA inspectors in the past in
an effort to minimize the number of inspections for a specific
stakeholder/location. In the event a possible safety violation is
identified, TSA security inspectors notify FRA safety inspectors, and
vice versa, with regard to possible security violations. Regional
Security Inspectors for Surface Transportation (RSIs-S) attend the
regional FRA Safety Conferences, where they provide an overview of the
TSA inspector's roles and responsibilities. RSIs continue to share
information at the appropriate level in the field at every opportunity.
Both TSA and FRA use data-driven models to assign inspection resources
to areas with higher risks with respect to security for TSA inspectors
and safety for FRA inspectors; assigning FRA's inspectors additional
security duties would dilute the ability to focus on both types of
risks. While responsibilities regarding safety and security remain
separate, both the TSA and FRA continue to work in leveraging their
respective workforces.
______
Prepared Statement of Brian Michael Jenkins, Director, National
Transportation Security Center of Excellence, Mineta Transportation
Institute
Public surface transportation--trains, buses, stations, even groups
of people waiting at bus stops--offers terrorists an attractive target:
easy access and easy escape; concentrations of people that enable
attackers to achieve high body counts; confined environments that
enhance the effects of explosives and unconventional weapons;
opportunities to cause great disruption.\1\
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\1\ This testimony draws on research sponsored by the Department of
Homeland Security, the Office of University Programs, and the
Department of Transportation's Research and Innovative Technology
Administration.
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The terrorist threat to public surface transportation is real.
Since September 11, 2001, terrorists have carried out 75 attacks on
airliners and airports worldwide causing 157 deaths. During the same
period, terrorists (as of May 22, 2011) carried out 1,804 attacks
against bus and train targets, killing more than 3,900 people.
Terrorist attacks on surface transportation have increased in
volume and in lethality. While terrorists remain obsessed with
attacking aviation targets, the number of terrorist hijackings and
sabotage attempts has declined. At the same time, however, terrorist
attacks on trains and buses have increased. Counting only incidents
with fatalities to avoid increases due solely to better reporting,
terrorists carried out a total of just 15 attacks with fatalities
between 1970 and 1979. The number grew to 43 attacks with fatalities in
the 1980s, 281 in the 1990s, and 465 between 2000 and 2009.
Terrorists see surface transportation as a killing field. Eleven of
the attacks since 9/11 resulted in 50 or more deaths and three of the
attacks killed nearly 200 people. The total number of fatalities in
these 14 attacks is the approximate equivalent of seven airline
crashes.
The West is not immune. Most of the attacks and the more lethal
attacks have occurred in the developing countries like India and
Pakistan, but there have been significant terrorist attacks on trains
in Spain, the United Kingdom, Russia and Japan. Further terrorist
attacks have failed in the United Kingdom and Germany and serious
terrorist plots have been uncovered in several countries.
It can happen here. Since 9/11, there have been seven reported
terrorist plots involving attacks on trains in the United States.
The Mineta Transportation Institute's database shows that:
Bombs were used in 74 percent of all attacks.
There were more attacks against bus targets than train
targets (49 versus 26 percent) but attacks on trains are on
average more lethal with 5 fatalities per attack versus 3
fatalities per attack for buses.
Suicide attacks are less lethal than concealed bombs left
behind in passenger compartments, which are the most lethal
form of attack. (This has important security consequences.)
Jihadist terrorist attacks on surface transportation are
most lethal. More of their attacks involve fatalities; and
nearly 9 percent of these involve more than 25 fatalities each.
We should not fixate on suicide bombers. Obviously, not all
security measures work against suicide bombers, but recruiting suicide
bombers is difficult and significantly raises the threshold for
attackers. Only two of all of the jihadist terrorist plots in the
United States involved suicide attacks. And the deadliest terrorist
attacks on trains in Madrid and Mumbai involved bombs concealed in
abandoned backpacks and suitcases.
Employee and passenger awareness counts: 16 percent of bomb attacks
have been stopped prior to their detonation because of an aware public.
More can be done here.
High-Speed Rail--Tomorrow's Terrorist Target?
Terrorist attacks on high-speed rail systems have occurred in
France, Germany, Japan, Russia, Spain and Switzerland. In Europe, Asia
and North America, high-speed rail trains are seen as icons of a
country's identity and economic power, and typically they serve a
customer base that represents the country's government and business
elite.
When terrorists attack high-speed rail systems, they seem to prefer
to derail trains. When they go after non-high-speed rail systems, they
more often try to detonate bombs in passenger compartment. Most attacks
on high-speed rail systems target the tracks (66 percent) versus the
passenger compartment (17 percent). More attacks on non-high-speed rail
systems target the passenger compartment than the tracks.
Terrorists choose between volume and velocity. Passenger loads on
high-speed rail trains, per-car and per-train are less than slower-
speed commuter or regional trains. This explains why high lethality
with bombs detonated in passenger compartments is more achievable on a
non-high-speed train. On the other hand, train velocity is obviously
much greater on high-speed trains, making collisions or derailments a
more attractive and effective choice of attack method.
Was Osama bin Laden on the right track? Based on a statistical
review of outcomes from accidents on high-speed rail systems, the
ultimate tactical goal for terrorists most likely would be to focus on
a derailment that forces the train to either collide at high speed with
another train, bridge abutment or wall, or go off a bridge or
embankment into a body of water or fall/roll down a significant
elevation.
Bombs placed on the tracks are on average twice as lethal for high-
speed rail than those placed in the passenger compartments. For non-
high-speed rail, bombs in passenger compartments have proved to be more
lethal than bombs on the tracks.
Overall, derailments involving mechanical means of sabotage have
proved that they can be more lethal than bombs on the tracks.
Technology, particularly on high-speed rail systems, will cause train
operations to cease if a bomb detonates and causes catastrophic
destruction prior to train arrival. Effective use of explosives, as in
the Russian Nevsky Express attack in 2009, requires the detonation to
be timed perfectly with a train's passage. Even in this attack, more
casualties were crush and impact injuries and fatalities, occurring in
the derailing rear cars (numbers 12, 13, and 14) of the train than
those caused by the explosion under the 9th car.
High-speed rail track and equipment safety enhancements have made
accidental derailments less lethal. High-speed train sets are designed
with relatively rigid, semi-permanent connections while slower-speed
trains rely on traditional ``knuckle'' couplers. These more rigid
connections greatly reduce the probability of a train ``jackknifing,''
or of partially or completely rolling over. Non-high-speed passenger
trains tend to jackknife or flip over, causing a significantly high
number of injuries and fatalities. Track designs have incorporated
enhancements to guide and guard rails which keep a derailed train
moving upright, along the right of way, keeping it from going off
bridges, down hills, and away from trains on other tracks or bridge
abutments and walls. Brackets have been added to high-speed train wheel
sets in Japan to keep a derailed train on the track, reducing the
probability significant casualties in an accidental or intentional
derailment.
Causing a derailment and/or collision by compromising the track
structure or signal system might be an effective attack to execute.
This could be done through mechanical sabotage or cyber attacks on the
controlling computer systems.
The most catastrophic accident outcomes have been due to higher
speed (80 to 100 mph+) collisions with other trains or fixed objects.
While it hasn't been used as an attack method to date, moving a
locomotive or a string of cars into the path of an oncoming high-speed
train is a tactic that should be considered and prevented. In the 2010
derailment of the Bengal Express, which killed 148 people, moments
after the passenger train derailed, a freight train going in the
opposite direction plowed into the derailed passenger coaches. It is
not certain if the saboteurs intended this to happen.
A Realistic Approach
With federal assistance, transportation security clearly has
improved during the last 10 years. More can be done, of course, but
security proposals must be realistic.
Security for surface transportation must comprise the entire
spectrum of measures from deterrence and detection to mitigation and
emergency response. Aviation security is ``front-loaded,'' that is, it
aims at prevention. There are few opportunities to save lives after a
plane crashes. Surface transportation security cannot be front-loaded,
but there is much that can be done to mitigate casualties and to save
lives after an attack, as well as minimizing damage and expediting
recovery process.
Protecting public places that, by their very nature, require easy
access is difficult and costly. To be worthwhile, security must provide
a net security benefit. The result cannot be a mere diversion of the
attack to another accessible public place where the attacker can
achieve the same results in casualties.
Security must take into account economic realities. Federal
resources will be limited. Many local governments are broke.
Transportation systems' operators are hard pressed to keep costs down.
We need not just more, but smarter security. We need low-cost
solutions.
Security must be sustainable. We cannot look forward to the end of
terrorism when the security structures erected over the past several
decades can be dismantled. Security measures put into place today are
likely to become a permanent feature of the landscape. Therefore, they
must be sustainable in terms of public acceptance, disruption, and
costs for operation, maintenance, upgrades, evaluation, and
replacement.
The aviation security model will not work for surface
transportation. Surface transportation systems are too diverse.
Screening of all passengers would be nearly impossible. Train stations
have too many access points. The volumes of passengers are too great.
The number of screeners required would run to the hundreds of
thousands. The costs would be prohibitive, the delays intolerable.
There is no near-term technological solution. New explosives
detection technologies are being developed, but their probability of
detection with acceptable false alarm and throughput rates in a real
operating environment are not clear. In addition, their deployment will
require thorough application evaluation, new policies, and training.
What do we do when ``Stand-off'' detection identifies a possible
suicide bomber in a corridor packed with passengers?
Americans must be realistic about security. One hundred percent
security in surface transportation is not possible. Some risk is
unavoidable, just as when we drive our automobiles, but the risk to
individual citizens from terrorism is minuscule.
Some Easy Gains
The role of the federal government will be to lead in research,
develop and test new security technology, evaluate security policies
and practices, disseminate information pertaining to the threat and
best security practices, and assist local governments in acquisition
and training. Canines specifically trained in explosive vapor wake
detection are a new and important development.
More resources are required at the local level for security
enhancements and training. In today's environment, these will
necessarily be limited.
Initial and ongoing security training is required for frontline
transportation employees--train drivers, conductors, station personnel,
not just managers, as well as emergency responders. But providing it
raises cost and logistical issues.
Passengers can be enlisted as partners in their own security.
Current ``see something, say something'' campaigns are a first step.
They need to be evaluated to see if the message is getting through and
how better to engage the public. Communications have to be facilitated.
Procedures have to be established to ensure rapid diagnosis and
response. Callers need to be acknowledged, for their efforts, even when
it turns out to be a false alarm. Disruptions must be minimized.
Synergies between safety and security measures as well as between
crime prevention and counter-terrorism efforts need to be identified
and exploited to increase efficiencies in resource deployment and
allocation.