[Senate Hearing 112-200]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-200
RESPONDING TO DROUGHT AND FAMINE IN THE HORN OF AFRICA
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
AUGUST 3, 2011
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JIM WEBB, Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TOM UDALL, New Mexico MIKE LEE, Utah
Frank G. Lowenstein, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware, Chairman
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois MIKE LEE, Utah
TOM UDALL, New Mexico BOB CORKER, Tennessee
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Brigety, Dr. Reuben, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau
of Population, Refugees, and Migration, U.S. Department of
State, Washington, DC.......................................... 13
Prepared statement........................................... 15
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Benjamin L. Cardin......................................... 60
Coons, Hon. Christopher A., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Isakson, Hon. Johnny, U.S. Senator from Georgia, opening
statement...................................................... 4
Konyndyk, Jeremy, director of policy and advocacy, Mercy Corps,
Washington, DC................................................. 26
Prepared statement........................................... 28
Lindborg, Hon. Nancy, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for
Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID), Washington, DC.......... 8
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Benjamin L. Cardin......................................... 58
Pham, Dr. J. Peter, director, Michael S. Ansari Africa Center,
Atlantic Council, Washington, DC............................... 35
Prepared statement........................................... 37
Schaap, Wouter, assistant country director, Care International
Somalia, Nairobi, Kenya........................................ 41
Prepared statement........................................... 43
Yamamoto, Hon. Donald, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State, Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 4
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), prepared statement...... 57
(iii)
RESPONDING TO DROUGHT AND FAMINE IN THE HORN OF AFRICA
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WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 3, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on African Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Christopher
A. Coons (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Coons and Isakson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER A. COONS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
Senator Coons. I would like to call to order today's
hearing focusing on one of the most critical issues in the
world today, responding to the drought and famine in the Horn
of Africa.
As always, I'm privileged to serve with my friend, Senator
Isakson, and want to thank him for staying with me here in
Washington after the Senate has adjourned in order to help
convene and preside over today's hearing.
This is a children's crisis. There are hundreds of
thousands of children on the verge of death suffering from
severe malnutrition in the Horn of Africa. And Senator Isakson
and I agreed that this hearing could not wait. So, even while
many of our colleagues have understandably returned to their
home States and districts, we both believed it was crucial that
we go ahead with this hearing today and not let another month
go by.
Senator Isakson has been a true and good partner in
highlighting a range of compelling issues and shared concerns
in Africa, and I greatly appreciate his leadership on this
subcommittee.
As everyone is well aware, the U.S. Congress has been
almost entirely focused on the deficit and debt crisis in
recent weeks, and while that issue was rightfully at the top of
the agenda of the United States, we must also consider global
issues of greater humanitarian concern, especially when
millions of lives are at risk and tens of thousands have
already died.
Today we have displayed in the front of the hearing room
images of the crisis in the Horn of Africa in order to
demonstrate the rising human toll of the drought and famine,
including on children who are facing unspeakable deprivation
and hardship. In today's hearing, we will list numbers that
quantify the impact of the drought, but it is these images that
help convey powerfully the true impact on human lives.
I want to thank at the outset UNICEF for its vital work on
behalf of children worldwide and providing the photographs
we've displayed at today's hearing. UNICEF has also submitted a
statement detailing its efforts in the Horn of Africa that I
will submit for the record.
The crisis in the Horn of Africa has been caused by the
worst drought in the region in more than 60 years, resulting in
severe malnutrition, acute hunger, rising levels of starvation,
and famine in Somalia. It is the most severe humanitarian
crisis in a generation, affecting food security for more than
12 million people across Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti,
and surrounding areas.
According to UNICEF, an estimated 2.3 million children in
the region are acutely malnourished, half a million of whom are
at risk of imminent death. Unfortunately, this crisis is
expected to worsen in the coming months, eclipsing the famine
in Ethiopia in the mid-1980s that elicited first global public
outcry and then a great response, as demonstrated by memorable
events, such as Live Aid. The broad public awareness of that
crisis in the 1980s appears to be absent today, despite a
worsening humanitarian situation and increasing need for aid.
The situation is the most severe in Somalia where rising
food prices and failures of governance and regional security
have exacerbated an already dire situation, given the ongoing
conflict, poor governance, and obstructed humanitarian access
by the group
al-Shabaab.
Aid organizations and U.S. Government officials estimate
more than 1,500 refugees every day are leaving Somalia for
Kenya, flooding the world's largest refugee campaign in Dadaab,
which is well over capacity, nearing half a million refugees,
or a population comparable to Tucson, AZ. Hundreds of Somalis
are also fleeing every day for the Dolo Ado camp and other
camps in Ethiopia, also well over its capacity with more than
100,000 refugees.
The international community and the United States are
working closely with the Governments of Kenya, Ethiopia, and
Djibouti to address this massive transnational influx of
refugees, and I praise their efforts to accommodate these
displaced populations while their own people and their own
countries also face severe challenges from the drought.
The countries impacted by this drought and famine are among
the world's poorest, suffering from high rates of poverty and
unemployment. And while the failure of two consecutive rainy
seasons contributed to the scale of this disaster, the
humanitarian crisis and famine that has resulted highlights
broader capacity, governance, infrastructure, and security
problems and needs in the region.
This drought was not a surprise. USAID, through its famine
early warning system, or FEWS NET, predicted an impending
crisis last year and worked closely with the Kenyan and
Ethiopian Governments as well as our own to enhance their
ability to respond and preposition emergency relief supplies.
As the United States joins with its partners in the
international community to provide emergency assistance, we
must also consider the lessons learned in order to avert the
next famine, to improve food security globally, to build
sustainable capacity, and mitigate the impact of this crisis on
future generations.
In response to the drought, the United States has been the
largest international donor, providing more than $450 million
in food aid, critically needed treatment for malnourished
children, health care, and other assistance. But the
responsibility cannot rest on our shoulders alone. Especially
in difficult budgetary times, the humanitarian response to this
crisis must be a shared transnational obligation.
According to the United Nations, more than $2 billion will
be needed to provide emergency assistance, and only a billion
has so far been committed. The international community must
join the United States and many others in providing this
critical aid in the near term in order to save lives,
especially those of malnourished children and others in
desperate need.
As we consider the international response to this crisis,
we must also examine restrictions on access given the volatile
security environment in Somalia where the United Nations
recently declared a famine in southern areas controlled by al-
Shabaab. Just yesterday the U.S. Government announced an easing
of restrictions on humanitarian organizations operating in
Somalia in order to facilitate the delivery of aid. I look
forward to hearing from today's witnesses about this new
policy, which aims to provide additional guidance and
assurances to U.S. partner organizations' operation in southern
Somalia.
To hear more about the scope, impact, and response to the
crisis, we are privileged to be joined by two distinguished
panels. First, we will hear from Nancy Lindborg, Assistant
Administrator for the Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and
Humanitarian Assistance for USAID, and former president of
Mercy Corps. Ms. Lindborg will also be joined on this panel by
Ambassador Donald Yamamoto, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs, and former Ambassador
to Ethiopia and Djibouti. We will finally hear from Dr. Reuben
Brigety, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Population, Refugees, and Migration, and a former fellow at the
Council on Foreign Relations, who has just returned from a
visit to the region.
On the second panel, we will hear from Mr. Jeremy Konyndyk,
director of policy and advocacy for Mercy Corps, who has led
humanitarian and post-conflict recovery operations throughout
the region. Next will be Dr. Peter Pham, director of the
Michael Ansari Africa Center of the Atlantic Council, and a
former professor of justice studies, political science, and
Africana studies at James Madison University. Finally, we will
hear from Mr. Wouter Schaap, the assistant country director for
CARE International Somalia, who is based in Nairobi and
recently returned from a visit to drought-affected areas of
Somalia.
I am privileged to chair this hearing and highlight the
growing urgency of this grave humanitarian crisis. Americans
have demonstrated great leadership, helping those in need both
domestically and abroad. And I am confident we can continue to
partner with the international community to save lives and
protect future generations in the Horn of Africa.
I appreciate each of our witnesses being here today and
look forward to your testimony.
Senator Isakson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNY ISAKSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA
Senator Isakson. Well, thank you, Chairman Coons, and I
want to welcome all those who will testify today. I want to
particularly thank Wouter Schaap from CARE USA, headquartered
in my hometown of Atlanta, GA, for being here, as well as so
many of the other CARE people that are here.
I have had the privilege of being on site with CARE in
Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and in Darfur in the Sudan, and seen
firsthand what our NGOs do to deliver humanitarian aid, as well
as in the case of CARE, life-sustaining techniques that people
can learn to be self-sustaining amongst themselves, which is so
critical in areas of bad poverty and poor education. So, I
appreciate CARE being here and testifying today. I am always
proud to have my home team here talking about the good things
that they do.
And for Dr. Peter Pham, who is also on the second panel, I
am particularly delighted that he is here because he can
provide insights as an informed observer of the regional
anarchical, political, and security dynamic without the
constraints an NGO must maintain in describing the situation,
given the exposure of the staff. He will be able to examine the
persistent extremist vein that runs through Somalia, and the
perverse impact it has on the region and international donors.
The severity of this crisis and the complexity of the
geopolitical situation in the region, coupled with the U.N. and
the United States own challenging history dealing with hunger
and conflict in Somalia make this a particularly challenging
humanitarian response. It is in such places that the principles
of our policies are tested, both our humanitarian impulse as
well as our hard-nosed realism regarding the purveyors of
violence who impose illegitimate and moral control over the
people and the region.
I am delighted that the chairman called this hearing today.
This is one of the main humanitarian crises before the world
today, and we need to work together to see to it that we bring
humanitarian relief to a people struggling in a terrible part
of the world.
So, Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this hearing today,
and I look forward to hearing the testimony of all our
witnesses.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Senator Isakson.
We will begin with the opening statement of Ambassador
Yamamoto, and then Ms. Nancy Lindborg, and then Dr. Brigety, in
that order, and then we will proceed to questions, if we might.
Ambassador.
STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD YAMAMOTO, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Yamamoto. Thank you very much. I have a longer
version for submission for the record, so I will read a short
version, sir.
Senator Coons. Thank you. I would encourage 5-minute
statements, if that is possible. And without objection, we will
submit your full statements for the record. Thank you.
Ambassador Yamamoto. Chairman Coons, and Ranking Member
Isakson, and members of the committee, the worst humanitarian
crisis in the Horn of Africa in 60 years has its roots in the
brutal force of al-Shabaab, which has until now prevented
humanitarian assistance from reaching those most in need,
persistent instability in Somalia and changing regional climate
pattern that impact vulnerable pastoral populations.
We are working hard with our international and regional
partners to deliver quickly the life-saving, short-term relief
critical to those suffering the effects of this crisis. U.S.
Government and U.S.-funded assistance has prevented the loss of
millions of lives. At the same time, we cannot rely on
emergency assistance alone to resolve the underlying long-term
problems in the region. Therefore, we are working with those
governments in the region to support long-term political and
food security in the region.
Let me be clear. The response to the drought has been
complicated by the continuing instability in Somalia,
especially due to the actions al-Shabaab. Those most seriously
affected by the current famine are the more than the 2 million
Somalis trapped in al-Shabaab-controlled areas in South Central
Somalia.
Since January 2010, al-Shabaab has largely prohibited
international humanitarian workers and organizations from
operating in the areas it controls. Al-Shabaab continues to
refuse to grant humanitarian access, and has prevented the
international community from responding quickly inside Somalia.
As we seek to take advantage of any current openings to
expand aid distribution, we are also working with our partners
in the international community to counter al-Shabaab's ability
to threaten our interests or continue to hold the Somalia
people hostage. At the same time, we are taking the necessary
steps to support the flow of urgently needed humanitarian aid
to those who need it in South Central Somalia, while working to
minimize any risk of diversion to al-Shabaab.
We have worked closely with the Department of Treasury to
ensure that aid workers, who are partnering with the U.S.
Government to help saves lives under difficult and dangerous
conditions, are not in conflict with U.S. laws and regulations.
However, the United States sanctions against al-Shabaab do not
and never have prohibited the delivery of assistance to
Somalia, including to those areas under the de facto control of
Shabaab.
In the long term, regional security in the Horn of Africa
requires political stability in Somalia. The United States
already has placed a long-term process to stabilize Somalia.
Last year, we announced our dual track approach to broaden our
efforts by taking into account the complex nature of Somali
society and politics, as well as to be more flexible and
adaptable to our engagement.
On track one, we continue to support the Djibouti peace
process, the TFG, the transitional government, Amazon, as the
first line of efforts to stabilize Somalia and expel Shabaab
from Mogadishu.
Since 2007, the United States has supported stabilization
efforts by obligating $258 million to support Amazon training,
logistical needs, and approximately $85 million to support and
build capacity to the TFG forces.
On track two, we are deepening our engagement with the
regional government and administrations throughout the Central
and South Somali area, and those who are close to Shabaab, but
who are not affiliated with the TFG. In fiscal year 2011, the
United States plans to provide approximately $21 million to
support development efforts in our dual track policy.
We have further information as we go on to the Q&As, and I
want to leave room for my colleagues to speak. So, thank you
very much, Senator.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Yamamoto follows:]
Prepared Statement of Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Don Yamamoto
Good morning, Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Isakson, and members
of the committee. Thank you for holding this hearing on the drought and
famine in the Horn of Africa. We share your grave concern about the
ongoing humanitarian crisis in the Horn of Africa. The eastern Horn of
Africa is currently experiencing one of the worst droughts since the
1950s. More than 12 million people--mainly in Ethiopia, Kenya, and
Somalia--are severely affected and in need of humanitarian assistance.
In Somalia, drought conditions have exacerbated a complex emergency
that has continued since 1991. The information coming out of the Horn
of Africa, especially the dire situation of refugees from Somalia, is
devastating. In cooperation with our international and regional
partners, we will continue to work to address this humanitarian crisis
while continuing to support long-term political and food security in
the region.
Somalia is at the center of the crisis, but the crisis is affecting
the entire Horn of Africa. Ethiopia has issued an appeal indicating 4.5
million Ethiopians need food assistance. In Kenya, the government and a
consortium of NGOs have placed 10 districts in the north and east under
alert for increased food insecurity and malnutrition. The crisis has
hit hardest in Somalia, where failed or poor rains combined with
conflict have left 3.7 million people in need of immediate, lifesaving
assistance. Two areas of southern Somalia, the Lower Shabelle Region
and areas of the Bakool region, are currently facing famine conditions,
and the remaining regions of southern Somalia are projected to meet the
threshold for famine unless humanitarian assistance is significantly
increased.
The number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs)
across the region has increased the challenges of drought response.
There are approximately 620,000 Somali refugees in the eastern Horn
region, according the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), with
200,000 of these fleeing in the past year alone. Reports from inside
Somalia indicate the combined arrival rate of 2,000 new refugees per
day in Ethiopia and Kenya could rise dramatically as the situation in
Somalia grows increasingly desperate. The current flows threaten to
overwhelm the existing refugee assistance structure in Kenya and
Ethiopia. Moreover, there are reports of over 400,000 IDPs in Mogadishu
alone.
A large-scale multidonor intervention--my colleagues will go into
greater depth on this is underway to prevent the further decline of an
already dire situation, but there will be no quick fix. The United
States is one of the largest donors of emergency assistance to the
region, helping more than 4.5 million of those in need in Ethiopia,
Kenya, Somalia, and Djibouti and providing nearly $459 million in
humanitarian assistance to date. Our assistance includes food,
treatment for severely malnourished people, health care, clean water,
proper sanitation, and hygiene education and supplies. Our assistance
also includes $69 million for refugee assistance in Kenya, Ethiopia,
and Djibouti. The U.S. Government has previously supported the
expansion of the Dadaab camps, and we understand that the Government of
Kenya has agreed to allow new refugees to begin occupying the new
areas. Our Embassy in Nairobi is actively engaged with the Kenyans to
ensure the best possible emergency response. I know my colleagues
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Reuben Brigety and Assistant
Administrator Nancy Lindborg will go into greater detail about these
conditions in their testimony. I would like to turn now to the
political complications of the drought in Somalia.
The response to the drought has been complicated by the continuing
instability in Somalia--especially due to the actions of al-Shabaab.
Those most seriously affected by the current drought are the more than
2 million Somalis trapped in
al-Shabaab-controlled areas in south central Somalia. Since January
2010, al-Shabaab has largely prohibited international humanitarian
workers and organizations from operating in the areas it controls. Al-
Shabaab's continued refusal to grant humanitarian access has prevented
the international community from responding to the drought in south
central Somalia, which precipitated the famine we are seeing now. The
United States is pressing all parties to immediately restore unimpeded
humanitarian access to all parts of Somalia.
During the last week of July, major fighting began again in
Mogadishu between the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces against al-Shabaab and its
affiliates. With more than 400,000 IDPs now residing in and around
Mogadishu, this renewed fighting is an area of concern. We are
confident that AMISOM and the TFG understand the threat this fighting
places on the civilian population and call on all parties to do
everything in their power to protect civilians, particularly those
displaced due to recent famine and drought conditions. We continue to
support AMISOM and the TFG in their efforts to bring stability to
Mogadishu in the face of continuing threats from
al-Shabaab.
Al-Shabaab is a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization and
has also been sanctioned by the United Nations for its role in
threatening the peace, security, and stability of Somalia including
disrupting the Djibouti Peace Process; and for obstructing humanitarian
assistance into Somalia. As we seek to take advantage of any current
openings to expand aid distribution, we are also working with our
partners in the international community to counter al-Shabaab's ability
to threaten our interests or continue to hold the Somali people
hostage. At the same time, we are taking the necessary steps to support
the flow of urgently needed humanitarian aid to those who need it in
south central Somalia while working to minimize any risk of diversion
to al-Shabaab. We have worked closely with the Department of Treasury
to ensure that aid workers who are partnering with the U.S. Government
to help save lives under difficult and dangerous conditions are not in
conflict with U.S. laws and regulations. To be clear, however, the U.S.
sanctions against al-Shabaab do not and never have prohibited the
delivery of assistance to Somalia, including to those areas under the
de facto control of al-Shabaab. The presence of al-Shabaab means that
U.S. persons must adhere to U.S. legal requirements in the course of
providing assistance in Somalia.
In the long term, regional security in the Horn of Africa requires
political stability in Somalia. The United States already has in place
a long-term process to stabilize Somalia. Last year we announced the
Dual Track approach to broaden our efforts by taking into account the
complex nature of Somali society and politics, as well as to be more
flexible and adaptable in our engagement. On Track One, we continue
support for the Djibouti Peace Process, the TFG, and AMISOM as a first
line of effort to stabilize Somalia and expel al-Shabaab from
Mogadishu. Since 2007, the United States has supported stabilization
efforts by obligating approximately $258 million to support AMISOM's
training and logistical needs, as well as approximately $85 million to
support and build the capacity of TFG forces. Recent security advances
by AMISOM and the TFG in Mogadishu have taken back significant portions
of the city from al-Shabaab control.
On Track Two, we are deepening our engagement with the regional
governments of Somaliland and Puntland, as well as with local and
regional administrations throughout south central Somalia who are
opposed to al-Shabaab, but who are not affiliated with the TFG. In
FY11, the United States plans to provide approximately $21 million to
support development efforts in support of the Dual Track policy. We are
reviewing how best to adapt our travel policy for Somalia to execute
our Dual Track approach most effectively without compromising on our
obligation to protect the security of U.S. personnel when they travel
inside Somalia. Our long-term efforts will continue to focus on
security, governance, and humanitarian and development assistance.
In addition to working toward political stability in Somalia, the
U.S. Government is also focusing its efforts to help provide long-term
food security in the eastern Horn of Africa region. We recognize that
emergency assistance alone cannot solve the underlying long-term
problems in the region. That is why President Obama's innovative and
forward-looking Feed the Future initiative is so critical. Feed the
Future is already at work in the region with local, regional, and
multilateral partners improving agricultural production, improving
markets, building infrastructure, bringing innovation, and addressing
the entire value chain from seed to market.
As I noted when I began, we are extremely concerned about the
drought and famine in the Horn of Africa. We are working hard with our
interagency and international partners to deliver quickly the life-
saving short-term relief critical to those suffering its effects. U.S.
Government and U.S.-funded assistance has prevented the loss of
millions of lives. We recognize that both the food security problem in
the region and the political instability problem in Somalia are linked,
and that both demand long-term solutions. Our Dual Track approach to
Somalia provides an effective mechanism for us to grapple with the
challenges of political stability in Somalia. Our Feed the Future
initiative will help create food security in the eastern Horn of Africa
region. The United States will continue to monitor and respond to the
humanitarian crisis and work with host governments on long-term
solutions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome your questions.
Senator Coons. Thank you very much, Ambassador.
Ms. Lindborg.
STATEMENT OF HON. NANCY LINDBORG, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR,
BUREAU FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT, AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE,
U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (USAID), WASHINGTON,
DC
Ms. Lindborg. Thank you, Chairman Coons and Ranking Member
Isakson. I really appreciate your taking this time to hold the
hearing and raise the level of attention. Even as we meet
today, the situation is deteriorating, and I think we all share
significant concern.
As you noted, the Horn of Africa has long been plagued by
cyclical drought, and what we are seeing now is the worst in 60
years. What used to be 10-year drought cycles are now happening
literally every other year, and the current drought is now
affecting 12.4 million people in Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia, and
Djibouti.
The crisis is both a humanitarian and a security one. The
famine, as you noted, has been declared in only the most
difficult to access areas of Somalia. We will hear more from
Dr. Brigety about the refugees who are pouring across the
border into the already drought-stressed areas of Kenya and
Ethiopia.
Internally, more than 1\1/2\ million displaced Somalis are
crowding into the northern cities of Somalia that are ill
equipped to handle this increase in population.
The July 20 U.N. Declaration of Famine in the two regions
of
Somalia was not made lightly, and truly reflects the dire
conditions of the people in Somalia. It is based on nutrition
and mortality surveys, data that has been verified by the CDC.
And on the basis of that, we estimate that in the last 90 days,
29,000 Somali children have died. This is nearly 4 percent of
the children in southern Somalia.
Our fear and the fear of the international community and
the governments in the Horn of Africa is that the famine
conditions in those two regions of Somalia will spread to
encompass the entire eight regions of southern Somalia. The
next rains are September/October, and even if they're good, we
could bear witness to another wave of mortality in the south
due to water borne diseases.
In Ethiopia and in Kenya, the situation is grave, but we do
not expect it to deteriorate into famine or result in the level
of needs as severe as we are witnessing in the south.
Ethiopia and Kenya have large areas of arid lands,
populated primarily by pastoralists. In partnership with local
governments and international donors, USAID has worked
extensively in both countries to increase the resilience and
the food security of these communities in drought affected
areas. We have strengthened early warning systems. We have
supported an ongoing safety net and community protection
programs, and have increased productivity in arid lands.
And just in--for example, in partnership with the Ethiopian
Government, with the World Bank and other donors, the United
States Government has supported the Ethiopia Productive Safety
Net Program. As a result, 7.6 million people have been removed
from the emergency case load.
In the drought of 2002-03, the Government of Ethiopia
stated that 13.2 million people in Ethiopia were drought
affected. By contrast, today only 4.8 million are stated to be
in need.
The needs in Ethiopia and Kenya are serious. They will
require sustained focus and attention. But the results of our
preparedness and development programs are paying off. We are
seeing results.
As you noted, Senator Coons, the FEWS NET famine early
warning system alerted us in August that a drought was on the
horizon. At that time, we began prepositioning food stocks,
food aid, stockpiling food in Djibouti, Kenya, and South
Africa. We have since, just for this fiscal year, provided $459
million of aid in the Horn. This includes food assistance,
treatment for malnourished children, water sanitation, hygiene
education, and assistance in the refugee camps.
We are now focused aggressively on working to abate the
potential for mass starvation in southern Somalia. We learned
in the drought of 1992 in Somalia that the leading cause of
death for children under 5 was disease. We are focusing on
three key areas therefore--first, the availability of food,
including those therapeutic foods so essential for children
under 5, access to food, and integrated health programs.
In terms of key challenges, we identify three. First, time;
it is not on our side. We have a small window to reach those in
need or risk the additional deaths of several hundred thousand.
We are looking at about a 6-to-8-week window.
Access. Access in the worst affected areas of south Somalia
remain the primary obstacle to relief efforts. As you noted,
the World Food Programme and most international organizations
suspended operations in early 2010. And since 2008, WFP has
lost 14 staff members. Until now, al-Shabaab has restricted
access, and they have given mixed signals on whether it will
lift its ban.
We, along with the international community, are working to
explore all avenues to safely provide assistance where there is
access. In the face of these extreme needs, we have issued new
guidance on the provision of assistance to allow more
flexibility to a wider range of aid to those areas in need. And
we have clarified that aid workers who are partnering with the
U.S. Government to help save lives are not in conflict.
The third challenge is scale. The emergency will outstrip
the resources currently available in the international
community, in the traditional donor community. So, we are
working aggressively to encourage all donors, all nations, to
step forward with assistance.
I will conclude by saying we cannot stop drought from
happening, specifically in this region, but what we can do is
strengthen communities and their ability to withstand these
natural calamities.
President Obama's Feed the Future initiative is focused
precisely on addressing these root causes of hunger and
undernutrition and working to strengthen the resilience of
communities. It shores up the ability of these populations to
withstand drought through commercial availability, access of
staple foods, reducing the trade and transport barriers that
impede the movement and sale of livestock, and harnessing
science and technology.
We are seeing right now how these investments in the future
can make a critical difference.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator Isakson. And I
would like this testimony to signal to the people of the Horn,
as well as the Somali-Americans I recently met in Minnesota and
Ohio, that the American people are very much with them in this
time of need. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Lindborg follows:]
Prepared Statement of Assistant Administrator Nancy E. Lindborg
Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Isakson, and distinguished members
of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to testify before you
today on the humanitarian crisis in the Horn of Africa. Your attention
and concern is critical, as the situation continues to deteriorate
daily, with millions of individuals affected.
In scale and severity, the current drought in the Horn of Africa is
the worst in 60 years and, according to the U.N. Office of the
Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs, it is now affecting an estimated
12.4 million people in Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti. It is
both a humanitarian and a security crisis, as famine has been declared
in the difficult to access areas of Somalia and refugees are pouring
across the borders into already drought-stressed areas of Kenya and
Ethiopia.
I will discuss today the current situation, our immediate response,
the challenges we face, and our long-term plans to address the chronic
food insecurity in the Horn of Africa.
current situation
The Horn of Africa is experiencing the lowest rains in 60 years, in
a region long plagued by cyclical drought. However, what used to be a
10-year drought cycle is now occurring every other year and is combined
with rising food prices and a 20-year conflict in Somalia.
Twenty five years ago, USAID invested in the Famine Early Warning
System, or FEWSNET, precisely because of the recurring droughts in the
region. FEWSNET, along with the U.N. Food and Agriculture
Organization's Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU),
maintains a strong presence in the Horn and enables the humanitarian
community to identify conditions based on an extensive analysis of
historical and current rainfall, cropping patterns, livestock health,
market prices and malnutrition rates. USAID is the largest supporter of
these vital early warning systems, and the entire international
humanitarian and donor community relies on their information to provide
appropriate assistance to those who need it most and to target
assistance that might be needed in the future.
In Ethiopia and Kenya, the situation is grave but we do not expect
it to deteriorate into famine. Both countries have large areas of arid
lands populated primarily by pastoralists. Ethiopia has declared 4.8
million in need of urgent assistance, and in Kenya, 3.7 million are at
risk. USAID has worked extensively in both countries, in partnership
with international donors and local governments; to increase the
resilience and food security of communities in these drought-affected
areas. We have focused better on early warning systems, ongoing safety-
net and community protection programs, and increased productivity in
arid lands and pastoralist livelihoods.
For example, in partnership with the Ethiopian Government, the
World Bank and other donors, the United States supported the Ethiopian
Productive Safety Net program, which has effectively removed
approximately 7.6 million people from the emergency caseload. In the
drought of 2002-3, the Government of Ethiopia stated that 13.2 million
people in Ethiopia were drought-affected and in need of emergency
assistance. By contrast, that number to date is 4.8 million. The needs
in these countries are still serious and require sustained focus and
attention, but the results of preparedness and development investments
are having a positive impact.
In Somalia, however, the situation is stark. Consecutive seasons of
failed or poor rainfall, coupled with two decades of conflict and lack
of governance, have resulted in rising food prices, livestock
mortality, crop failure, denial of reliable humanitarian access by al-
Shabaab, and consequent severe malnutrition and massive population
displacement. The U.N. estimates that a total of 3.2 million people in
Somalia now require immediate, life-saving humanitarian assistance. Of
those in urgent need, 2.8 million people reside in southern Somalia. On
July 20, the U.N. declared a famine in two regions of Somalia: Lower
Shabelle Region and areas of Bakool Region in southern Somalia. A
famine determination is never made lightly and reflects the truly dire
circumstances facing the people of southern Somalia. Based on nutrition
and mortality surveys verified by the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), we estimate that more than 29,000 children under 5--
nearly 4 percent of children--have died in the last 90 days in southern
Somalia.
Somalis are leaving the south in great numbers, either for the more
stable areas in the north or into neighboring countries--in all cases
adding great strain to already drought-stressed environments. More
specifically, 1.5 million internally displaced Somalis are concentrated
in Mogadishu and the regions of Lower Shabelle and Galgaduud, with
increasing numbers in Puntland and Somaliland. In May, I traveled to
Hargeysa, in the semiautonomous region of Somaliland, where I met with
President Sulanyo, as well as U.N. and local and international
nongovernmental organizations. They noted rising concerns about the
numbers of internally displaced persons who are now arriving in their
cities, ill-equipped to meet the needs of a rising population. Farmers
and pastoralists, with no remaining assets, are swelling the outskirts
of cities throughout northern Somalia, including many youth with no
evident future.
The refugees who cross into Ethiopia and Kenya describe a grueling
trip, often on foot for 3 to 4 or more weeks. My colleague, Deputy
Assistant Secretary Reuben Brigety, will describe in more detail the
deeply distressing stories of families arriving in refugee camps in
near-death shape. Tragically, we also know that in these crisis
situations, those who leave are the ones with the strength and
resources to do so. The weakest and most vulnerable are often left
behind.
current u.s. government assistance to the horn drought and famine
FEWSNET warned us of the increased probabilities of drought in
August 2010. Because of these early warnings, USAID began
prepositioning additional emergency relief supplies and food aid in the
region last fall, stockpiling food aid supplies in Djibouti, South
Africa, and Kenya. As a result, the U.S. Government was able to help
jump-start relief efforts and is now reaching more than 4.6 million in
need throughout the Horn and providing approximately $459 million in
humanitarian assistance to date (in FY 2011). U.S. assistance provides
critically needed food aid, treatment for severely malnourished
children, health care, clean water, proper sanitation, and hygiene
education and supplies. The United States is providing approximately
$217 million in Ethiopia, $156 million in Kenya, $80 million in
Somalia, and $6 million in Djibouti. Since the drought began, for
example, USAID assisted the Government of Ethiopia to vaccinate nearly
300,000 livestock, critical for the survival of 25,000 households.
Our strategy is focused on providing emergency assistance for those
most at-risk, while also continuing to build greater food security and
resilience in the drought-affected communities of Kenya, Ethiopia, and
northern parts of Somalia so they can better withstand future droughts
and shocks.
We have been responding since last fall with prepositioning of
supplies and increasing programs. Last spring, we created a Horn of
Africa Drought Task Force in Nairobi, and on July 6, USAID activated a
regional Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) in Nairobi, Kenya,
and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to monitor regional drought conditions,
identify anticipated response needs, and coordinate response activities
with other donors. USAID also stood up a Response Management Team in
Washington, DC, to support the DART and coordinate U.S. Government
humanitarian efforts. The DART continues to conduct assessments in the
field to evaluate ongoing humanitarian needs and coordinates daily with
other major donors to ensure a multilateral response.
In FY 2011 to date, USAID has provided more than 360,200 metric
tons (MT) of Title II food relief and emergency food assistance through
the U.N. World Food Programme (WFP) and nongovernmental organizations
for drought- and conflict-affected populations in Djibouti, Ethiopia,
Kenya, and Somalia--supporting approximately 10.7 million people.
Given the urgency of reaching the people in southern Somalia, we
have a special focus on aggressively working to abate the potential for
mass starvation. We have learned from the Somalia drought of 1992 that
disease was a leading cause of death for children under 5, so we are
stressing a multisector response with a focus on three key areas:
availability of food, access to food, and integrated public health
interventions--including therapeutic feeding focused on the children
under 5, vaccinations, and access to clean water and sanitation.
Based on FEWSNET data, we do not expect a significant harvest in
the south for another 6 months. The next potential rains are in
September or October in the south, and even if there are good rains, we
could experience another wave of mortality due to water-borne disease
and livestock death.
We are working closely with other donors and U.N. and NGO partners
to mount an effective response to save lives. We have three key
challenges: time, access, and scale. As noted earlier, time is not on
our side. Unfortunately, the situation is going to worsen before it
gets better. However, we know we have a small window over the next 6
weeks in which to provide life-saving assistance to prevent additional
and potential significant deaths from occurring. The fear is that
without immediate and significant assistance, famine conditions will
spread from the two regions in southern Somalia to encompass the entire
eight regions of the south with several hundred thousand additional
deaths.
Access remains difficult in the worst affected areas of southern
Somalia. The World Food Programme and most international NGOs had
suspended operations in the south due to deteriorating security and
bans imposed by al-Shabaab. Since 2008, WFP has lost 14 staff members
in attacks. However, we are in lockstep with other donors and the
humanitarian community in our determination to test aggressively all
options for delivering assistance in previously inaccessible areas to
the people in southern Somalia.
Finally, the scale of this emergency outstrips the resources
currently offered by the international community to meet the needs. We
are working to encourage the broader international community to step
forward with additional assistance as we seek to address this sobering
challenge.
looking ahead: feed the future
We can't stop drought from happening, but we can strengthen
communities and their ability to prepare for and withstand these kinds
of natural calamities. President Obama's Feed the Future initiative
(FTF) is focused precisely on addressing these root causes of hunger
and under nutrition. It seeks to increase longer term resilience among
vulnerable populations by increasing the commercial availability and
accessibility of staple foods, reducing trade and transport barriers
that impede the movement and sale of livestock and staple foods,
harnessing science and technology to assist populations in increasing
crop yields, and supporting national and regional efforts to reduce
years of marginalization of certain populations. USAID is focusing its
investments, both geographically and programmatically, to have the
greatest sustainable impacts on reducing hunger and poverty. By linking
vulnerable populations to market opportunities in more productive
areas, our efforts are helping increase labor opportunities and
strengthen value chains.
In the Somali, Oromiya and Afar National regional States of
Ethiopia for example, FTF investments are helping vulnerable
pastoralists and ex-pastoralists and Afar to improve their incomes and
increase their ability to survive climate and economic shocks. USAID is
helping these pastoralists to improve the health of their animals
through strengthening community veterinary services and accessing
affordable vaccinations and other medicine. In addition, we are working
to help pastoralists earn more money from their animals by linking them
to markets where they can sell their animals for a significant profit.
We help producers organize into marketing cooperatives and access much-
needed credit, improve their business skills and provide them access to
market information. Stronger linkages between traders, feed lot
operator, processors and exporters also help to expand livestock trade
and provide better access to lucrative markets in the region.
We are seeing with this drought the critical and positive impact of
investing in the future. When countries have the governance structures,
the policies and productive capacity to withstand drought and when
communities have the resilience to withstand the inevitable shocks of
droughts and crisis, the need for large-scale international emergency
assistance is diminished. Even as we focus on the heart-breaking
tragedy of Somalia, we are also committed to helping to build
sustainable futures where communities feed themselves.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Ms. Lindborg.
Dr. Brigety.
STATEMENT OF DR. REUBEN BRIGETY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE, BUREAU OF POPULATION, REFUGEES, AND MIGRATION,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Brigety. Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Isakson, good
morning, and thank you very much for this opportunity to
testify before you today on the humanitarian crisis in the Horn
of Africa.
Let me also say that we appreciate the support and
attention that Congress has given to this crisis in the midst
of so many other issues that you have been grappling with this
summer.
I will discuss today the current situation facing refugees,
our immediate response, the challenges we face in meeting their
needs as more famine survivors reach the borders of Kenya,
Ethiopia, and Djibouti, and our plans to work with the world
community to meet those challenges and save as many lives as we
possibly can in the coming months ahead.
I traveled to Ethiopia in Kenya in July to evaluate the
emerging refugee crisis in the region where hundreds of
thousands of Somalis have fled drought and famine in Somalia.
During my trip, I visited refugee camps in each country, along
with representatives from donor countries. I met with senior
government officials, I talked with officials from U.N.
agencies and nongovernmental organizations, and I also spoke
obviously with many refugees.
It was clear that this situation is developing into the
worst
humanitarian emergency the region has seen in a generation, at
least since the great famine of 1991 and 1992.
We now must confront a refugee emergency within a
protracted refugee situation. Years of hard work by the host
governments and their international partners to address just
the basic needs within established camps quickly are being
overshadowed by the need to add new border-crossing facilities,
new camps, and additional emergency services.
Both Ethiopia and Kenya are receiving record inflows of
refugees from Somalia, and in both countries, refugees are
arriving in appalling physical health. Every refugee family
with whom I spoke in both Ethiopia and Kenya said that they had
walked for days from Somalia with virtually no food and no
water. Brief visits to the health clinics in the refugee camps
revealed dozens of malnourished children, so emaciated and so
weak that, to the untrained eye, they appeared close to death.
Among new arrivals in the refugee camps in Ethiopia, we are
seeing up to 50 percent global acute malnutrition, reflecting
the even more grim state of affairs for children inside
Somalia. Camps in Ethiopia and Kenya are strained far beyond
their capacity in every way with regard to space, staff, food,
and essential services, as they try to cope with the record
influx of refugees which continues unabated.
Somalis represent the largest refugee population in all of
Africa. According to UNHCR, Somalis neighbors in the eastern
Horn of Africa now host more than 620,000 Somalia refugees.
Some 159,000 Somalis have sought refuge in Ethiopia, with over
75,000 arriving just since January of this year. Kenya hosts
more than 448,000 Somali refugees, with nearly 100,000 arriving
since the
beginning of this year. Even Djibouti has seen an almost 20-
percent increase in the number of refugees since the beginning
of 2011.
We commend the Governments of Kenya, Djibouti, and Ethiopia
for their generous support for refugee populations in the
region, even as they themselves are currently struggling with
the drought that, as you say, may be the worst in some 60
years.
While the current crisis is taxing an already stressed
system, I am confident that the Governments of Kenya, Ethiopia,
Djibouti, and their international partners, to include the
United States, have the ability to confront this crisis head
on, and will be able to find new solutions to address the
needs, not only within the camps, but also for those within
Somalia.
Let me give you just two examples of what I saw during my
trip and how we are responding to those in need.
First, the United States and our regional and international
partners have helped ramp up emergency assistance. I traveled
to the refugee camp complex in Dolo Ado on the Ethiopian/Somali
border, accompanied by U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia, Donald
Booth, USAID Deputy Administrator Don Steinberg, Ethiopian
Government officials, UNHCR's Ethiopia country representatives,
and senior representatives from several donor embassies.
As we wandered through the refugee camp talking with people
who had been there for several days or who had only just
arrived hours earlier, we heard versions of the same story over
and over again.
One man I met had come all the way from Mogadishu,
traveling 9 days with his wife and six children with very
little to eat along the way. I talked with him as he sat on the
hospital cot with his youngest child, a 3-year-old girl whom I
shall call Aisha. As we spoke, Aisha never stopped moaning. She
could not get comfortable amidst the heat and the flies as her
tiny bones threatened to pierce her paper-thin skin.
We saw many families in the same desperate situation during
a separate visit to Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya. In Dadaab, I
spoke to one mother who had carried her polio stricken 7-year-
old daughter on her back for 9 days with little food and water
as her other six children trailed behind.
It was clear that a number of recent interventions, such as
the provision of hot meals at the transit center, are vital
steps needed beyond just basic camp services to assist those
making this heartbreaking journey. I commend Antonio Guterres,
the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, for finding ways to
add these additional programs around Dolo Ado after he visited
the area just a few days before I had.
Still, we know that more must be done.
The second example is how the United States has increased
overall refugee assistance throughout the region. The United
States has long been a partner to governments and people in the
Horn of Africa as they host hundreds of thousands of Somalia
refugees, providing approximately $459 million in humanitarian
assistance just this fiscal year to those in need. This funding
supports refugees, internally displaced persons, and other
drought-affected populations.
Out of this overall funding, the United States is providing
approximately $69 million specifically to refugees through the
State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and
Migration.
Maintaining access to first asylum for Somalis in
neighboring countries is critical to savings lives. The United
States has previously supported the expansion of the Dadaab
camps, and UNHCR is now moving refugees into the new space
following the Government of Kenya's agreement to allow the
opening of a new site. We are also urging Kenya to open quickly
more reception center capacities so that incoming refugees can
be properly screened and registered.
We will continue to support the Horn countries' efforts to
provide asylum to vulnerable Somalis, including through our
support to the office UNHCR, the World Food Programme, and
other international organizations and NGOs in the region.
Representatives from other donor countries who accompanied
me were also moved by the gravity of the situation, and they
said that they would work with their own governments to support
the efforts of aid groups. Rigorous and sustained diplomacy
will be required, both in the region and with other donor
capitals to ensure that the international community and host
countries take necessary measures to save lives in the coming
months.
We are also committed to addressing the humanitarian needs
inside Somalia as my colleagues, Ms. Lindborg, spoke. There is
an immediate need to reach vulnerable populations inside
Somalia so that they don't have to travel long distances to
save lives.
Let me also say that unless we find ways to provide
assistance to people inside Somalia, we will continue to see
refugees arrive in appalling states of health in Kenya and
Ethiopia, and we will continue to see mortality rates in the
refugee camps rise unabated.
And this brings us to the security situation. Al-Shabaab
activities have clearly made the current situation worse, as
Ambassador Yamamoto noted. We expect the situation in Somalia
to continue to decline, especially in southern Somalia, where
the U.N. has declared famine in two regions to date and where
conditions continue to worsen.
There is not a single solution to this regional crisis. We
are working to tackle it through a variety of means and
mechanisms,
including addressing underlying causes as addressed by my
colleague, Assistant Administrator Lindborg.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, thank you very much for
your time and attention. I look forward to any questions you
may have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Brigety follows:]
Prepared Statement of Deputy Assistant Secretary Reuben E. Brigety II
Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Isakson, and distinguished members
of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to testify before you
today on the humanitarian crisis in the Horn of Africa. We appreciate
the support and attention Congress has given to this crisis in the
midst of so many other issues you have been grappling with this summer.
I will discuss today the current situation facing refugees, our
immediate response, the challenges we face in meeting their needs as
more famine survivors reach the borders of Kenya, Ethiopia, and
Djibouti, and our plans to work with the world community to meet those
challenges and save as many lives as we possibly can in the coming
months ahead.
refugee overview
I traveled to Ethiopia and Kenya in July to evaluate the emerging
refugee crisis in the region where hundreds of thousands of Somalis
have fled drought and famine in Somalia. During my trip, I visited
refugee camps in each country along with representatives from donor
countries, met with senior government officials, talked with officials
from U.N. agencies and nongovernmental organizations, and spoke with
refugees. It was clear that this is developing into the worst
humanitarian emergency that the region has seen in a generation, at
least since the great famine of 1991-1992. We now must confront a
refugee emergency within a protracted refugee situation. Years of hard
work by the host governments and their international partners to
address just the basic needs within established camps quickly are being
overshadowed by the need to add new border-crossing facilities, new
camps, and emergency services.
Both Ethiopia and Kenya are receiving record inflows of refugees
from Somalia, and in both countries refugees are arriving in appalling
physical health. Every refugee family with whom I spoke in both
Ethiopia and Kenya said that they had walked for days from Somalia with
virtually no food and water. Brief visits to the health clinics in the
refugee camps revealed dozens of malnourished children, so emaciated
and weak that they appeared to the untrained eye to be close to death.
Among new arrivals in the refugee camps in Ethiopia, we are seeing up
to 50 percent global acute malnutrition--reflecting the even more grim
state of affairs for children inside Somalia. Camps in Ethiopia and
Kenya are strained far beyond capacity in every way--with regard to
space, staff, food, and essential services--trying to cope with the
record influx of refugees, which continues unabated.
Somalis represent the largest refugee population in Africa.
According to UNHCR, Somalia's neighbors in the eastern Horn of Africa
now host more than 620,000 Somali refugees. Some 159,000 Somalis have
sought refuge in Ethiopia; over 75,000 have arrived just since January
2011. Kenya hosts more than 448,000 Somali refugees with nearly 100,000
since the beginning of the year. Even Djibouti has seen an almost 20
percent increase in the number of refugees since the beginning of the
year. We commend the Governments of Kenya, Djibouti, and Ethiopia for
their generous support for refugee populations in the region, even as
they themselves are currently struggling with a drought that may be the
worst in 60 years.
While the current crisis is taxing an already stressed system, I am
confident Governments of Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and their
international partners, including the United States, have the ability
to confront this crisis head on and will be able to find new solutions
to address the needs not only within the camps but also for those
within Somalia. Let me give you just two examples of what I saw during
my trip and how we are responding to those in need.
the long journey of the survivors
First, the United States and our regional and international
partners have helped ramp up emergency assistance. I traveled to the
refugee camp complex at Dolo Ado on the Ethiopian-Somali border
accompanied by U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia Donald Booth, USAID Deputy
Administrator Don Steinberg, Ethiopian Government officials, UNHCR's
Ethiopia Country Representative, and senior representatives from
several embassies, including Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada,
Sweden, and the European Union. As we wandered through the refugee
camp, talking with people who had been there for several days or who
had just crossed the border a few hours earlier, we heard versions of
the same story over and over again.
One man I met had come all the way from Mogadishu, traveling for 9
days with his wife and six children with very little to eat along the
way. I talked with him as he sat on the hospital cot of his youngest
child--a three-year-old girl I'll call Aisha. As we spoke, Aisha never
stopped moaning. She could not get comfortable amidst the heat and
flies as her tiny bones threatened to pierce her paper-thin skin. We
saw many families in the same desperate situation during a separate
visit to Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya. In Dadaab, I spoke to one mother
who had carried her polio-stricken 7-year-old daughter on her back for
9 days with little food and water as her other six children trailed
behind.
It was clear that a number of recent interventions--such as the
provision of hot meals at the transit center or the establishment of
blanket feeding programs--are vital steps needed beyond just basic camp
services to assist those making this heartbreaking journey. I commend
Antonio Guterres, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, for finding
ways to add these additional programs around Dolo Ado after he himself
visited the area and found ways to move resources and personnel into
place more quickly. Still more is needed and we in the international
community cannot slacken our efforts.
current u.s. government assistance to refugees
Second, the United States has increased overall refugee assistance
throughout the region. The United States has long been a partner to the
governments and people of the Horn of Africa as they host hundreds of
thousands of Somali refugees, providing approximately $459 million in
humanitarian assistance this fiscal year to help those in need. This
funding supports refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and
other drought-affected populations, and helps build resiliency and food
security beyond the immediate crisis. Out of this overall funding, the
United States is providing approximately $69 million, specifically for
refugee assistance in the region through the Department of State's
Population, Refugees, and Migration Bureau.
Maintaining access to safe asylum for Somalis in neighboring
countries is critical to saving lives. The United States has previously
supported the expansion of the Dadaab camps and UNHCR is now moving
refugees into the new space following the Government of Kenya's
agreement to allow the opening of the new site. We are also urging
Kenya to quickly open more reception center capacity so that incoming
refugees can be properly screened and registered. We will continue to
support the Horn countries' efforts to provide asylum to vulnerable
Somalis, including through our support for the Office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees, the World Food Programme, and other
international organizations and NGOs working in the region.
Representatives from other donor countries who accompanied me were
moved by the gravity of the situation and said they would work with
their governments to support the efforts of aid groups. Rigorous and
sustained diplomacy will be required both in the region and with other
donor capitals to ensure that the international community and host
countries take necessary measures to save lives in the coming months.
We need to ensure that insecurity from Somalia does not spill over into
the neighboring countries.
We are also committed to addressing the humanitarian needs inside
Somalia so that lives are saved and fewer people need to flee to the
neighboring countries. There is an immediate need to reach vulnerable
populations inside Somalia who may be unable to travel long distances
to seek life-saving assistance. Ideally drought victims would not have
to leave their homes in order to receive life-saving assistance, but in
conflicted Somalia, that is not currently possible in all instances.
That brings us to the security situation. Al-Shabaab's activities
have clearly made the current situation much worse. We expect the
situation in Somalia to continue to decline, especially in southern
Somalia where the U.N. has declared famine in two regions to date and
where conditions continue to worsen. The international community is
calling on al-Shabaab to allow unimpeded assistance in these areas of
Somalia, including allowing aid groups access to the direst areas to
directly assist those in greatest need.
There is not a single solution--to this regional crisis. We are
working to tackle it through a variety of mechanisms and responses,
including addressing the underlying causes, as noted by my colleague,
Assistant Administrator Lindborg.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Dr. Brigety.
Ambassador Yamamoto, if I might pick up where Dr. Brigety's
testimony left off, clearly being able to deliver humanitarian
assistance within Somalia, particularly southern Somalia, is
vital to preventing refugees from having to make day-long or
week-long treks across the desert that are so difficult and so
stressful on them and their children.
My understanding is in the past day the administration has
eased restrictions on humanitarian groups providing assistance
in southern Somalia. Could you just explain in a little more
detail the modified policy, the extent to which it will
increase the flow of aid? And do you have confidence that there
is enough time left for humanitarian assistance to be provided
in southern Somalia, given the famine?
Ambassador Yamamoto. That's really a kind of multifaceted
answer, and I will also refer to Dr. Lindborg for a
comprehensive answer.
But, you know, 60 percent of those in need are in Shabaab-
held territory. And the question comes in is whether or not
this U.S. policy or not has prevented, and the answer is, no,
it has not. The issue is that it has been extremely difficult--
impossible--to deliver food into these Shabaab-held
territories.
What the United States has taken has been to ease the OFAC
licenses on NGO groups. They are required--a heightened due
diligence procedures to avoid the diversion. But essentially it
is to allow NGO groups and deliverers to enter al-Shabaab-held
areas if they can, even if it means paying--what was it--fees
or convoy fees or what have you, as long as they have done the
due diligence, if there is no other alternative.
But the bottom line is, even with these measures and the
easing of the licensings and procedures, is really, is Shabaab
going to allow the deliveries? Right now, as an example, if you
see the internally displaced people right now, you are having
about 100,000 or so south of Mogadishu. You are having, at a
rate of 1,000 a day going into those areas. You have Shabaab
troops and shooters going into the areas and targeting refugees
and making it more difficult. Amazon has done a preemptive
measure to try to keep the quarters of feeding open to these
IDPs.
So, the question comes in, is how are we going to stabilize
the area? How are we going to allow free flow of food into
these areas? And I guess I would refer to Dr. Lindborg for more
information.
Senator Coons. Please, if you would like to expand, Ms.
Lindborg.
Ms. Lindborg. Yes, thanks. You know, I think time and
access are the two critical challenges that we face. And we are
working closely with the international community to explore a
number of options that test the possibility of having greater
access.
There are air lifts bringing food into Mogadishu. We are
hopeful that there will be an opportunity to move more
vigorously into areas where there is a willingness by al-
Shabaab and others to let assistance in.
I think that the new guidance that was issued just over the
last few days creates greater assurance and greater
flexibility, but fundamentally this is a tough area to operate.
It is probably one of the toughest operating environments
globally right now. And it will take very seasoned humanitarian
workers to be able to navigate through that environment.
Senator Coons. Ambassador, how would you assess the
international community's response to this crisis compared to
the United States? And what are we doing, and how successful
are we being to encourage engagement by the African Union, the
EU, the GCC, the Arab League, and other multilateral entities
and groups that might be engaged?
Ambassador Yamamoto. Let me answer in two ways. First is
that the response by the United States has always been there.
It is not something that we have suddenly responded because of
the effects of the famine.
As you know, for the last several years, the United States
is the primary food supplier to the region. In fact, the Horn
of Africa is probably our No. 1 region for food recipients
around the world, and Ethiopia is our No. 1 country for the
last several years.
The issue comes in is--another example, too, is--just to
kind of give you the breadth or the depth of the problems, you
know, on a good in Ethiopia you have something like 300 kids
under the age of 5 dying each and every day from preventable
diseases. And under this situation, the rates are much higher.
And so, the response has been how to get, A, the more food
into the pipeline, ensure deliveries. More important is working
with Ethiopia and Kenya to, A, get better access, expand
refugee camps. And then number three is to work with the Amazon
forces up in Mogadishu to ensure that there's more feeding
capability to those IDPs, and also easing up procedures to make
it easier for NGO groups to operate. And finally is really to
confront the Shabaab and how they can, you know, either we can
contain them or open up more corridors for feeding.
Senator Coons. I would be interested--and, Ms. Lindborg,
you mentioned in your testimony the important role of
harnessing science and technology, the role that Feed the
Future has played. I, in doing the background reading on this,
was struck at the effectiveness of ready to use therapeutic
foods, like plumpy nut and others, that are being deployed and
have revolutionized our ability to revive children who have
come to the very edge of starvation, and also the investments
USAID has made on water drilling in Ethiopia and how it has
allowed pastoralists to sustain their lifestyle, but still
provided them with more reliable water supplies.
Any brief comments you would like to add about how our
strategic investments in advance of this particular crisis have
changed the ground and made this different than previous
drought cycles?
Ms. Lindborg. Yes, thank you. You know, I think the most
striking is what I cited in my testimony in that because of our
work with the World Bank and other donors and the Ethiopian
Government on the community safety net, we have enabled 7.5
million Ethiopians to not go into a state of urgent need. And
in addition, there has been significant work on increasing the
ability of pastoralists to weather these kinds of serious
droughts through improving the health of their livestock,
improving their ability to trade.
As we look ahead to the Feed the Future initiative, that is
really I think at the heart of President Obama's vision for how
to truly enable us to not have to mobilize large emergency
responses every time there is a drought. We want to couple that
with the kind of trade reforms and policies that can enable
vulnerable populations to have greater protection, for there to
be greater productive capacity, and to use science and
technology on issues like drought resistant seeds, or better
productive techniques or livestock approaches.
Senator Coons. Thank you.
Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to all of
you for testifying.
Ambassador Yamamoto, you said, and I think I got this
right, that sanctions do not inhibit delivery of humanitarian
aid. And I think you were referring to Somalia and al-Shabaab.
What do our sanctions say regarding humanitarian aid?
Ambassador Yamamoto. You mean that this is the OFAC
licensing?
Senator Isakson. Yes.
Ambassador Yamamoto. When we debated the issue on
deliveries into Shabaab-held territories, the debate was
centered on the payment of convey fees to the Shabaabs in order
to allow feeding into those areas.
The second thing is, when was the Shabaab using those money
and funding for? And so, that became a major concern is, is
through this effort of feeding are we also contributing to
greater instability? And so, that became a great debate.
The problems comes in right now is that with the famine or
the severe, acute malnutrition, is how do you liberalize and
open up the capabilities of NGOs and explore opportunities to
allow them procedurally to get into those areas faster, quicker
and food deliveries?
But the problem remains is that, even with all the
procedural openness, is that will the Shabaabs allow them to
enter? Now, as you know, Ethiopia and Kenya have tried to open
corridors for feeding, or they pushed into Somalia. But even
those are not sufficient enough given that those are still
remain insecure areas and dangerous. And so, it becomes a big
problem of how do you engage or how do you open corridors? How
do you begin to feed in those areas where really 60 percent of
those in need are in Shabaab-held territories? That becomes a
real problem.
Senator Isakson. So, the problem is the corruption at the
checkpoints that the al-Shabaab would issue. They have payoff
fees for safe passage, and they use those to help finance their
organization. Is that what you are referring to?
Ambassador Yamamoto. Yes, sir.
Senator Isakson. And so, the question is, is it--are we
telling them--are we telling NGOs that are willing to travel
and deliver humanitarian aid that it is OK to pay those fees?
Ambassador Yamamoto. No. We are requiring through
procedures that they do the due diligence to find any way
possible to be able to feed and provide food to needed areas
without paying those fees. But if it becomes necessary,
obviously.
Senator Isakson. Is there any security for NGOs provided
either U.N.-wise or by the African Union in terms of getting
the material into Somalia?
Ambassador Yamamoto. Well, actually I will refer to you.
Senator Isakson. Ms. Lindborg.
Ms. Lindborg. Well, I know you have an NGO panel following
us, so I would--I know they will have much to say on this. But,
you know, I think most groups operating have a very principled
approach to not paying taxes or tolls. And many are able to
accomplish this.
The easing of the legal restrictions simply removes any
concern that an accidental or incidental payment will not
jeopardize them with any legal action. And so, it is creating a
greater sense of comfort with the partners that that is not a
barrier to effective assistance delivery.
Senator Isakson. In Somalia, after that issue, it is still
a pretty dangerous place, and al-Shabaab has used violence and
intimidation to carry out its intent. Do these NGOs have any
degree of protection other than their own provided protection?
Ms. Lindborg. I believe most of them choose not to have any
other protection other than the protection of the communities
welcoming them in and hosting them in the provision of
assistance.
Ultimately, we all need the kind of access that comes from
the communities wanting and understanding the importance of the
international effort to help them at this critical hour.
Senator Isakson. Well, I wanted to make a point. Chairman
Coons and I have traveled to Africa together and seen the
scourge that corruption causes throughout the continent. And
this is not related to this issue, but the work that the United
States is doing to get democratic institutions to tackle
corruption in return for MCC compacts and other things of that
nature, is changing Africa. This region struggles, and not
necessarily only because of
al-Shabaab and some of the other organizations that are there,
but that is the single biggest inhibitor I see to U.S.
investment in businesses, as well as U.S. foreign aid going
there through NGOs.
Dr. Brigety, let me ask you about the Dadaab for a second.
I was in Kenya 2 years ago, and at that time the Kenyans were
expressing their frustration with the pressure being applied to
them in Dadaab with the number of refugees they had then. Your
flyer says they're getting 1,295 new ones a day, and they have
expanded that camp, and the camp has almost a half a million
people in it now. Is that correct? Other than providing the
additional land for the expansion, what pressure is being put
on the Kenyans by this number of people to provide help, at
what cost, and how is that cost being borne?
Dr. Brigety. Thank you very much, Senator. You are correct
that the Dadaab refugee camp is the largest in the world. It
has been there since 1991.
The issue of refugees inside Kenya frankly is a very
sensitive one politically for them. They have been very patient
in dealing with this refugee crisis for two decades now.
Just to give you sort of a sense of an order of magnitude,
earlier this year in January, Dadaab was getting about 1,200
new arrivals a week. It is now about 1,200, 1,300 a day. The
international community has long asked them to open an
additional camp. The three major camps there are Ifo, Hagadera,
and Dagahaley. There was an expansion to Ifo called Ifo Two,
which we have long asked them to expand.
When I was in Dadaab 3 weeks ago, I was there on the ground
with Prime Minister Odinga, who had a public press conference
with the international media. And at that press conference he
gave his word that the Government of Kenya would allow the Ifo
expansion to be opened. And UNHCR has begun to move refugees
there, and we look forward to the continued commitment of the
Government of Kenya to support that.
The cost for the camp is largely borne by the international
community. The U.N. high commissioner for refugees is
responsible for camp management and the World Food Programme,
which is supported by USAID. It is responsible for feeding
those refugees.
The Government of Kenya obviously provides some financial
support for the guard through the provision of security forces
around the borders, but the United States has long been the
leader in terms of supporting UNHCR. We work with our other
international partners to do so.
Senator Isakson. The reason I brought it up, is I think it
is--when we talk about tragedies like what is going on with the
famine on the Horn, we also ought to give kudos to those
countries who are trying to help. And the Kenyan Government and
the Kenyan people have been supportive, as you said, for two
decades and are bearing a tremendous amount of the burden now.
And the cost of that security alone around Dadaab is a
significant contribution by Kenya. So, we need to acknowledge
and appreciate what they have done in that case.
Dr. Brigety. Yes, sir. You are correct. And we do
regularly.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Senator.
If I could just follow up, the other largest refugee camp
that is receiving Somalis is Dolo Ado in Ethiopia. My
understanding was there were nearly 2,000 Somali refugees
arriving a day up until a few week ago, but that has recently
dropped significantly. Do you have a sense of the cause of
that, and how do you assess the Ethiopian Government's
increased willingness or capacity to provide support, and what
the ongoing issues are at that camp?
Dr. Brigety. Thank you for the question, Senator. You are
correct. When I was in Dolo about 3 weeks ago, the arrival rate
was about 2,000 a day; it has now dropped to about 250 a day.
We frankly do not have a good answer for why that number has
decreased by an order of magnitude, but we are continuing to
work with our partners to try to understand what the nature of
that dynamic is.
When I was first in Dolo in February this year, the two
major camps there had about--Bocamaya and Mokadida had about
50,000 refugees combined. That number has now doubled, as you
say, to about 100,000.
At the rates that we were seeing in mid-July, it is
conceivable that rate could double again by the end of the
year. The Government of Ethiopia frankly has been a very, very
good partner in terms of supporting this refugee population,
particularly since the odds out of the current drought crisis
earlier this summer. They have responded with alacrity in terms
of providing additional staff from their refugee agency to
deploy there to Dolo Ado. They have allowed NGOs to operate at
the transit center near there. We engage regularly and
repeatedly with the Government of Ethiopia both in their
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and also their refugee agency to
ensure they know we are effective partners with them, and we
are very pleased with the extent to which they have extended
their hospitality to these people in need.
Senator Coons. What is the medical situation in these two
camps? It is hard for a Senator from a State the size of
Delaware to grasp a camp of half a million people. That is the
size of Kansas City. That would be five times larger than the
largest city in my State. How are they managing the health
pressures, the health concerns, and ensuring that we do not
have, as Ms. Lindborg mentioned, with the onset of September
rains, a follow-on humanitarian crisis from a rapid spread of
disease?
Dr. Brigety. Well, Senator, that is a very good question.
To be frank, in Dadaab, which is not yet at 500,000, but
certainly could be by the end of the year at current rates, the
health pressures are enormous. Dadaab refugee camp complex,
just the camp, is now the fourth-largest population center in
Kenya beyond Mombassa, beyond Nairobi and others.
Now having said that, there are a number of partners which
help provide health services inside the camps. Doctors Without
Borders is one of the more important. But frankly, with the new
refugees that are arriving, there are about 44,000 refugees
that are simply on the outskirts of Ifo Two because they were
not allowed to settle in the Ifo camp expansion, and the other
three camps were full.
So, those that are settling on the outskirts where there
were no services to speak of, there were no significant health
services or others, were clearly suffering additional rates of
all sorts of basic preventable diseases, to include, frankly,
respiratory diseases, because these are very hot, dusty
conditions. You are out without shelter, and it is very easy to
develop those sort of problems.
So, we are hoping that the addition of the opening of this
Ifo camp expansion will give people shelter, will give them
access to establish health clinics and other facilities, which,
frankly, are already built, but simply have needed the
permission of the Government of Ethiopia to support. And we
will continue to support both UNHCR and these NGOs to providing
these essential medical services, especially to treat these
horrible rates of malnutrition amongst children under 5 years
old that we are seeing.
Senator Coons. A question for Ms. Lindborg, if I might. We
were talking about science and technology earlier. These two
nations, Ethiopia and Kenya, are bearing an enormous burden in
terms of the refugee demand. Much of Kenya's power is delivered
by hydroelectric power, which, due to the record drought, has
dropped by more than half.
What is USAID doing to help deploy alternative power,
whether solar or geothermal or other sources of power, that
might help provide electricity, either in Ethiopia or Kenya, to
these camps, or that might help reduce the strain on the rest
of these host nations in terms of their electricity grid? And
is there anything we are doing to sort of streamline or
expedite the process of deploying alternative sources of power
that are not so reliant on water?
Ms. Lindborg. Senator, I would like to get back to you with
the specifics on that answer. I know that there are a number of
conversations with both Kenya and Ethiopia about ways in which
we can work closely with them to mitigate the impact of future
drought. And so, there are conversations underway, and we would
be delighted to get back to you with details.
Senator Coons. Thank you.
Let me ask just a final question, any member of the panel
wants to speak to. What are we doing to avoid the significant
security challenges facing Somalia spilling over into Kenya and
Ethiopia? Both of these nations have supported and sustained
very large refugee populations from Somalia for a long time,
and would have understandable concerns about the possibility of
it destabilizing
either of their nations.
And then, last, is the investment that is being made
sufficient from the United States, from the international
community? And what additional resources might be needed, and
how might we be more effective in engaging the NGO community
and the international community on top of the commitments
already made by the United States?
Ambassador.
Ambassador Yamamoto. Answer quickly. You know, the Somalia
and that whole region is just so complex. I mean, for example,
if you think about it, one out of every six Somali is an
Ethiopian living in the Ogaden area. And then the refugee
flows, and, of course, the IDPs within Somalia.
The issue comes in is on security and stability. For
Ethiopia and Kenya, Somalia is a strategic interest because of
security concerns. During the time when I was there, for
instance, in 1 year's time we had 12 terrorist bombings in 1
year, and from groups emanating out of Somalia into Ethiopia.
So, if it is a concern for the Ethiopians, just as it is a
concern for Kenya, then it is a concern for us in the regional
states.
And so, how do you ease security concerns? And I think the
dual track approach is one approach that we have worked not
just with the regional states, but also with the transitional
government, to stabilize that region. And that really is one
area that to look at the security by the Somalis themselves
addressing the Somali problems. And then, the Amazon troops
from Uganda and Burundi have done a great job in taking back a
lot of parts of Mogadishu.
But, again, the bottom-line problem is that security is
going to be a long-term problem. Do we have enough finances?
No. But it is an issue that is going to be in partnership with
the regional states and also the Somalis themselves.
Dr. Brigety. Senator, if I may add one concrete example on
the security aspect. One of the principal crossing points from
Somalia into Kenya is a place called Lavoie, where the United
States has long encouraged the Government of Kenya to open a
screening center.
As you know, the Government of Kenya has officially closed
their border from Kenya and Ethiopia--Kenya to Somalia has for
some years. We have encouraged the Government of Kenya to
reopen the screening center at Lavoie, and we have committed
some funds--some considerable funds to help them pay for that
opening. And that will be a means for them to help them know
who is actually coming into their country.
In addition, it would be a means to actually providing
assistance to refugees at the first point of crossing before
they have to make the additional 80 kilometer trek to Dadaab.
So, we hope the Government of Kenya will continue to consider
this favorably and will open the screening center in short
order.
Ms. Lindborg. Well, I will just wrap that up by saying, we
are very focused on ensuring that the host communities around
the vicinities of the camps also receive assistance. There are
large drought affected areas, as we have discussed, in both
Ethiopia and Kenya, and it is important that we work to meet
those very grave needs as well.
On the awareness issue, it is critically important, I
think, that we mobilize the resources of very generous private
citizens as well as donors, including nontraditional donors.
And there is a significant effort underway to do exactly that.
Senator Coons. Great. Thank you very much.
Senator.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just one
question, and I guess, Ambassador, this might be directed to
you, but, Ms. Lindborg, you might have something on it too.
In our briefing memo from the committee, there is a
reference to ethnic Somalis living in Ethiopia, and access
given to NGOs to be able to provide with them food and
humanitarian assistance, the inference being it was somewhat
restricted. What is the case with ethnic Somalis in Ethiopia,
and is there a restriction in getting food and aid to those
Somalis?
Ambassador Yamamoto. I think during the time that I was the
Ambassador there, I spent most of my time traveling into the
Ogaden/Somalia area to ensure that the U.S. food assistance was
getting to the right people. And one of our problems--I will
give you an example.
Right now, during the last year that I was there, we had
something like $600 million or 800,000 metric tons of food to
deliver to the people, mostly into the Ogaden area. And we were
able to verify through WFP and other NGO groups about a 70-
percent accuracy rate of getting the food to distribution
points.
The problem was getting the distribution points to the
beneficiaries, and we were only able to confirm about 20
percent. The reason is because of not only insecurity, but also
the problems of delivery of food into areas of insecurity and
conflict.
So, we have been working very closely with the Ethiopians
to open up access and also allow our NGO groups to go into
areas to ensure that the food was getting to the right,
appropriate people. And so, those are some of the, you know,
essential problems.
Senator Isakson. But there is still some difficulty of
getting it there.
Ambassador Yamamoto. Yes. Yes, sir, it is.
Senator Isakson. Thank you very much.
Senator Coons. We would like to thank all members of this
panel, and thank you for your testimony, thank you for your
service, and thank you for your work on this very important
issue. We appreciate your testimony today.
We now would like to turn to our second panel. We will take
a moment here while they join us.
We would like to welcome Mr. Konyndyk, Dr. Pham, and Mr.
Schaap. And I encourage all three of you to correct my
pronunciation of your name. We are grateful for your taking
time out of your important work to join us here today and to
add your testimony to the record, and to the attention that is
being paid by the Senate and the international community to
this concerning challenge in the Horn of Africa.
Mr. Konyndyk, I would invite you to give an opening
statement. And, again, I would encourage each of you to try and
contain your comments to about five minutes, and we will submit
for the record any additional statement that you might have.
Please, sir.
STATEMENT OF JEREMY KONYNDYK, DIRECTOR OF POLICY AND ADVOCACY,
MERCY CORPS, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Konyndyk. Thank you, Chairman Coons, thank you, Senator
Isakson, for the opportunity to testify before you today. It is
an incredibly important issue, and we really appreciate the
focus that you and the subcommittee are dedicating to this. It
is very timely and very urgent.
My name is Jeremy Konyndyk. I am director of policy and
advocacy with Mercy Corps. I am here today representing a
relief and development organization that works in over 40
countries, but particularly for today's purposes, in three of
the most affected countries in the region, Kenya, Ethiopia, and
Somalia, where we are currently providing urgently needed
drought relief throughout that region.
I think that everyone has been shocked by some of the
photos that have been coming out of the region, but
particularly out of Dadaab and Mogadishu. In recent days, there
was a very striking and shocking photo in yesterday's New York
Times, of an emaciated child. As horrific as some of these
images are, I think it is important that we also recognize that
for every image of a child who, however unfortunate, has at
least made it to a treatment center in Mogadishu or Dadaab,
there are many, many more children, and adults as well, who
have not made it that far. And that is a growing tragedy.
It is also critical to remember that even as much of the
attention so far has focused on Somalia, the situation in
Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti is desperate as well. Our teams
are doing assessments right now throughout Kenya and Ethiopia
and initiating programs, and they are finding vast swathes of
Ethiopia and Kenya that are in a state of extreme humanitarian
emergency. Our teams are seeing landscapes full of dead and
dying livestock, which normally would form the basis of the
ability of people living there to feed themselves and support
their families. They are seeing villages completely emptied by
the drought because people simply cannot get water, and they
have had to go elsewhere. They are seeing families and meeting
families who are struggling to eat even one meal a day. It is a
truly desperate situation.
The superlatives that are now being used to describe the
crisis in the Horn are not hyperbole. This does threaten to
become one of the worst, perhaps the worst, humanitarian crisis
that we have seen in a generation.
The good news, if there is any, is that the aid community
has a pretty good understanding of how to fight a crisis like
this. We have learned a great deal since the famines of the
1980s and 1990s about how to respond effectively to hunger
crises, and I have described this in much more detail in my
written remarks that I have submitted for the record.
The big question at this point is whether aid groups will
actually have the opportunity to apply that understanding that
we have developed. Our entire sector is facing a massive
shortfall in funding for the response. The United States in
particular has been very generous so far. The rest of the world
has also, with some variance, put up a good amount of money.
But it still falls far short of what we saw even a few years
ago when a drought hit the region in 2008.
There does not seem to be yet a global recognition of how
severe this crisis is. We are seeing just a fraction of the
engagement and the level of resources that we saw after the
Haiti earthquake, for example, despite the fact that the number
of people at risk across the Horn now exceeds the total
population of Haiti, much less the population that was affected
by the earthquake there.
The U.S. Government is working very, very hard to respond
and to mobilize resources, and we are deeply appreciative of
that. The teams that are working this issue at USAID and in the
State Department's Refugee Bureau really are the best in the
business. And we deeply appreciate their commitment, their
expertise, and their professionalism.
But they need resources in order to combat this crisis. So
far this year, the U.S. contribution, while extremely generous
and we recognize it as such, remains under half of what the
Bush administration contributed in 2008 to the last major
drought in the region. And we are very concerned as we look at
the upcoming fiscal year budget debate that there are proposals
on the other side of the Hill to slash the very accounts that
are providing the assistance that the U.S. Government is using
for the response to this crisis, specifically the International
Disaster Assistance Account, Migration and Refugee Assistance
Account, and Food for Peace. Particularly Food for Peace should
be highlighted here because that is our food aid account, and
that has been--there is a proposed cut of 30 percent of that
budget over fiscal year 2011 levels. That would be a 50-percent
cut over what we had in 2008 during the last major crisis. So,
that is a real concern.
The other challenge to the USG response has been the legal
restrictions, which were discussed a bit on the earlier panel.
It does now appear that the U.S. Government has waived or is
moving to waive these. That is a very positive step. We
recognize it, and we commend the administration for taking it.
We do, nonetheless, have some remaining concerns about how
this will be implemented. I would be happy to address those in
more detail during questioning. But even as we hopefully move
past this impasse, it is important to recognize that the fact
that the administration issued this license only several weeks
after a famine was declared and several months after we knew
that something very, very bad was coming, represents a real
systemic problem.
I do not think it makes sense to point at any particular
part of the administration as bearing responsibility for this.
I think that they were struggling to hash these things out the
best that they could. But there is a systemic issue here that I
think bears further exploration in terms of the interaction
between some of our legal restrictions and our humanitarian
priorities.
Very quickly to the question of whether we can get into the
south and how that is going to work, I would say we do not know
yet. We are going to--the waiving of the legal restrictions
takes an obstacle out of the way. But there are a lot of
questions about what can be achieved in the south, what kind of
access we are going to see. I think Dr. Pham can talk a little
bit more about the regional politics there.
I think there are reason for optimism in terms of UNICEF
and the Red Cross' success so far in getting some aid shipments
in without interference. That gives us hope, so we have, I
think, a posture of hope and cautious optimism, but not naivete
about that at this point. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Konyndyk follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jeremy Konyndyk
Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Isakson, thank you for inviting me
to testify before the subcommittee today on the critically important
issue of drought and famine in the Horn of Africa. I am here today in
my capacity as Director of Policy and Advocacy for Mercy Corps, a
global relief and development organization that responds to disasters
and supports community development in more than 40 countries around the
world. Mercy Corps has worked in the Horn for many years, and we
currently manage relief and development programs in the three countries
most affected by the drought: Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia. In these
countries we have hundreds of staff providing assistance to 900,000
drought victims. We are working in many of the areas most affected by
the drought: North and Central Somalia, Eastern Ethiopia, and
Northeastern Kenya. In these regions we are pursuing a range of
drought-focused interventions, including providing access to water;
supporting livelihoods so that people can afford to feed themselves and
protect their livestock; aiding communities to better manage the scarce
water resources that they have; and providing supplemental nutrition to
at-risk children and mothers. We are undertaking these programs with
the generous support of public and private donors, including the
important contributions of the U.S. Agency for International
Development.
With 12.4 million people across the Horn in already in a state of
humanitarian crisis--a figure that has increased by $3 million in just
the past month--this emergency threatens to become the worst
humanitarian catastrophe of the past several decades. While most
attention has focused on Somalia, this is truly a regional emergency:
people in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti all face major shortfalls in
access to food and water as well. The situation within southern Somalia
is catastrophic, with death rates in the worst-affected regions,
particularly among children, up to triple the threshold for declaring a
famine and levels of malnutrition that are also well beyond the famine
threshold.\1\ The situation in the rest of the region is less
catastrophic, but still extremely dire. Across Kenya, Ethiopia, and
central Somalia, Mercy Corps teams are seeing people's livelihoods
collapse in real time, pushing the affected populations closer and
closer to calamity. The situation, while already desperate, promises to
worsen in coming months as remaining water and food stocks are further
depleted. The international response, though it has accelerated in
recent weeks, remains inadequate. In the hardest-hit region, southern
Somalia, security obstacles continue to impede the delivery of
assistance and international legal restrictions have further compounded
the challenges of operating there. Without swift action on all fronts,
the drought will have devastating human and regional impacts that will
be impossible to roll back.
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\1\ FEWSNET/FSNAU: Evidence for a Famine Declaration (July 19,
2011).
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how is this crisis different?
While drought is common in the Horn of Africa, the current
situation is far graver than the normal cycles of drought that
occasionally hit the region. Several factors contribute to this. First
is the rainfall over the past year, which in most areas is among the
lowest ever recorded. The region has two main rainy seasons per year,
one in the fall and one in the late spring to early summer. Over the
past year, both largely failed, leaving the driest conditions that most
parts of the Horn have seen in 60 years. Seven districts across swaths
of northeastern Kenya and southern Ethiopia have recorded the driest
season since 1950.\2\ The broad area across which the rains failed is
also unique: a typical drought in the region would be less uniform,
enabling people to temporarily relocate to other areas to find water.
This time, the broad coverage of the drought has meant that people's
normal ``backup'' locations are themselves in a state of drought.
Finally, this drought comes on the heels of another serious regional
drought in 2008 which, though less severe than the current situation,
left elevated vulnerability across the region.
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\2\ USAID FEWS-NET: East Africa: Past year one of the driest on
record in the eastern Horn (June 14, 2011).
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The result has been a progressive erosion of the capacity of people
in the region to cope with economic and climatic shocks. Most rural and
nomadic populations in the Horn depend on livestock herding or small-
scale agriculture to support themselves. Both forms of livelihood are
heavily dependent on water and vulnerable to drought. In a milder
drought, people would rely on a variety of ``coping mechanisms'' to see
themselves through: shifting herds to different areas in search of
alternate water sources; selling off land holdings or parts of their
herds to generate extra income; substituting for less expensive foods;
reducing meals; and cutting back on household expenses.
The severity of the current drought, coming on the heels of the
2008 drought, has exhausted these coping mechanisms and left people
with no income and few options. The failure of the rains across the
region has meant that there are few areas where livestock can be
shifted to find alternate water sources. Those that exist are quickly
depleted by the increased pressure. Selling livestock at market
generates little to no income because the condition of most livestock
is so poor that they can fetch little money. Livestock are a form of
both income and savings for people in the region; as huge numbers of
livestock have died off they have wiped out the savings and income
potential of innumerable families. The poor rains have led to
widespread crop failures across the region, greatly reducing the local
supply of food both at a household level and in regional markets. The
prices of locally produced staples accordingly reached record highs in
June in most markets throughout the eastern Horn.\3\ In some parts of
Somalia, prices of staple cereals like white maize have increased by as
much as 350 percent above last year.\4\ This massive inflation has
quickly wiped out what scant savings people may have. These factors,
taken together, can quickly lead to a complete collapse in peoples'
ability to feed themselves. With their livestock assets depleted or
deceased, no yield from their own agriculture, their savings spent,
their land sold, and food in the market priced beyond reach, people
find themselves without options. Aid or migration become their only
possibilities for survival.
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\3\ USAID FEWS-NET: East Africa Food Security Outlook Update (July
2011).
\4\ FSNAU, FEWS-NET: Somalia Dekadal Food Security and Nutrition
Monitoring (July 25, 2011).
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In southern Somalia, as we are now vividly seeing, this process has
fully run its course. The result is some of the most devastating human
suffering that aid professionals have ever seen. The desperation and
destitution of those who have fled to Kenya, central Somalia, and
Ethiopia has been well-documented: ``roads of death'' on which mothers
are forced to leave behind the children who die en route; cases of
advanced malnutrition so severe that those lucky enough to obtain
treatment still have only a 40-percent chance of survival \5\; a
torrent of refugees and internally displaced persons so large that
camps and reception centers have been quickly overwhelmed. As
disturbing as the refugee situation is, there are many more within
Somalia who are too poor or too weak to even make the journey out. The
slowdown in refugee arrival numbers in Ethiopia and Kenya over the past
week may indicate, ominously, that the bulk of those who were capable
of leaving have now done so. The numbers from FEWSNET suggest that
those who remain in the south are now dying in astronomically large
numbers. Child mortality in every district of southern Somalia now
surpasses famine levels. In the worst-hit areas, children under 5 are
dying at a rate five times the famine threshold.\6\ At this rate more
than a tenth of the under-5 population in these areas is being wiped
out every 2 months. Tens of thousands of people are estimated to have
already died, a number that could reach into the hundreds of thousands
if the situation continues to deteriorate as expected.
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\5\ Voice of America: African Refugee Children at High Risk for
Kalaazar Malaria Viral Infections (July 27, 2011).
\6\ FEWSNET/FSNAU: Evidence for a Famine Declaration (July 19,
2011).
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In Kenya, central Somalia, and Ethiopia, the wider availability of
aid and the existence of government safety net programs have slowed the
process of livelihood collapse. But existing aid flows are not keeping
up with the growing challenges, and safety net programs are not built
to handle such massive levels of need. UNICEF estimates that over a
quarter of the more than 2 million acutely malnourished children across
the drought-affected Horn are at risk of death.\7\ The humanitarian
needs in Kenya and Ethiopia are important to address in their own
right, but they have added significance given the growing refugee
populations in both countries. It is well-established that provision of
aid to refugees can provoke resentment and backlash from host
communities, ultimately endangering the refugees, if the needs of those
host communities are not also met.
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\7\ UNICEF ESARO: Horn of Africa Crisis: Situation Report #2 (July
28, 2011).
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Mercy Corps teams in Ethiopia and Kenya report mounting needs that
are approaching critical levels in many areas. In Kenya, while most
international attention has focused on the Dadaab refugee camp, the
Kenyan population in the northeast of the country is entering a
critical phase. The current dry spell is expected to last through at
least October and food insecurity will get worse over the next few
months.\8\ Livestock are dying in large numbers due to lack of water,
and this crop cycle will be a near-total failure in many parts of the
country due to the drought.\9\ The situation is so desperate that our
assessments have found instances of herders braving security challenges
to take their remaining livestock into riverine parts of Somalia to
attempt to water them there. This has led to a phenomenon of ``drought
widows''--women whose husbands have left to seek water for their
livestock, leaving their families behind indefinitely. Malnutrition
rates have been rising, and an estimated 40 percent of farming
households in some districts are now skipping meals.\10\ Our teams
expect to begin seeing elevated mortality rates in the very near future
if swift action is not taken. In Ethiopia we are seeing a parallel
situation. Recently completed assessments by Mercy Corps in eastern
Ethiopia revealed that the drought is already having a massive impact
on the population. In some areas that we visited, entire villages were
empty--their inhabitants forced to move as the drought devastated their
ability to support and feed themselves. Dead cattle litter the
landscape, and along one 40-kilometer stretch of road we visited not a
single bit of foliage was visible. Many families have been reduced to
eating one meal per day. Ethiopian colleagues who have been living and
working in the region for decades have told us that they have never
before seen anything like this.
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\8\ UNOCHA: Humanitarian Requirements for the Horn of Africa
Drought (July 28, 2011).
\9\ USAID FEWS-NET: Kenya Enhanced Food Security Monitoring (July
22, 2011).
\10\ USAID, WFP, FEWS-NET Special Report: Kenya Food Security (June
2011).
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scaling up the response
The international community's response to the drought has been
substantial, but nowhere near adequate. The United Nations estimates
that nearly $2.5 billion will be required to meet the region's needs
this year.\11\ International contributions for humanitarian response,
currently around $1.3 billion, are well below this target, and indeed
are running well behind the levels contributed just 3 years ago, when a
lesser drought gripped the region. Compared to other major disaster
such as the Haiti earthquake or the Indian Ocean Tsunami, the drought
crisis in the Horn is receiving a fraction of the attention and support
that was committed to those emergencies. This reflects the paradox that
aid agencies often face with slow-onset disasters: compared to more-
telegenic natural disasters, in which most of the death and injury
occur instantaneously, in slow onset disasters we can potentially save
far, far more of the threatened lives. Yet we typically have a much
harder time mobilizing the resources required to do so. We are working
hard to convey to the public in the United States and other donor
states that their support is badly needed. However, private
contributions for this emergency are many times lower than the generous
levels contributed after other major disasters.
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\11\ UNOCHA: Humanitarian Requirements for the Horn of Africa
Drought (July 28, 2011).
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On the U.S. side, the work of the government's emergency responders
in USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and Office of
Food for Peace (FFP), as well as the State Department's Bureau of
Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) has been exemplary. These
offices possess a high level of expertise and professionalism, and they
have focused on this crisis with great seriousness and energy. Their
response is to be commended. But they will need ample resources well
into the next fiscal year if they are to sustain an aggressive response
to this emergency.
U.S. contributions to the Horn of Africa are down significantly
relative to 2008. The Bush administration's humanitarian contributions
that year topped $1 billion regionwide, while this year the United
States has contributed less than half that amount.\12\ To put this in
perspective, the U.S. contribution toward the drought this year amounts
to roughly one-sixth of the amount that Congress appropriated for the
Haiti response in the 2010 supplemental; this despite the fact that the
population at risk in the Horn is greater than the entire population of
Haiti. U.S. support to this drought also lags far behind U.S.
contributions to other major crises, as the chart below demonstrates.
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\12\ UNOCHA Financial Tracking System: Somalia Emergencies for
2008--Total Humanitarian Funding per Donor; UNOCHA Financial Tracking
System: Somalia Emergencies for 2011--Total Humanitarian Funding per
Donor.
Sources: GAO: USAID Tsunami Signature Reconstruction Efforts in
Indonesia and Sri Lanka Exceed Initial Cost and Schedule Estimates,
Face Further Risk (February 2007); GAO: Haiti Reconstruction--U.S.
Efforts Have Begun. Expanded Oversight Still to be Implemented (May
2011); USAID Fact. Sheet #10: Horn of Africa Complex Emergency (October
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31, 2008); USAID Fact Sheet #4: Horn of Africa Drought (July 28, 2011).
In Somalia specifically, U.S. support dropped off drastically from
2008 to 2010, falling by 88 percent. While recent contributions have
started to reverse this trend, the United States contribution to
humanitarian response in Somalia still stands at only 15 percent of the
international total, compared against a U.S. share of 40 percent to 50
percent in the rest of the region. The United States is the largest
global donor to humanitarian relief, and other donors often follow our
lead. If the United States steps up its assistance to the region,
particularly to Somalia, this could have a powerful multiplier effect
by influencing the behavior of other donors.
challenges to the response
There are several important reasons why the impact of the drought
is proving so much more severe in southern Somalia than elsewhere in
the region. The first is the long history of insecurity in the south,
which has impeded aid actors and prevented development investments.
Even before the southern militias imposed restrictions on aid access,
the history of insecurity in the area prevented the sort of sustained
food security and development programming that has been common in Kenya
and Ethiopia. These programs build resiliency, improve natural resource
management, and help people to mitigate the challenges posed by
cyclical droughts. Southern Somalia has not benefited from this kind of
aid, and has been left less resilient to drought than its neighbors.
The next factor, as has been widely reported, is the restrictions
on aid access by southern militias, and accompanying security risks to
aid groups. The challenges to aid groups in the south have been well
documented, including in the recent report by the U.N.'s Monitoring
Group for Somalia.\13\ The report describes how aid groups were able to
operate relatively freely in the south until 2010, when the operating
environment deteriorated significantly as the militias began to impose
unacceptable conditions on aid groups. Those conditions, which were
inconsistent with core humanitarian principles, contributed to
decisions by many aid groups to scale back their work. By the time that
Mercy Corps and other aid groups were formally expelled from the south
in September 2010, we had few operations left there in any case because
of the deteriorating operating environment. It is important to note
here that we and other groups have continued to operate in the northern
and central regions of the country.
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\13\ UN: Monitoring Group Report on Somalia and Eritrea (July 18,
2011).
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The final obstacle has been U.S. legal restrictions on aid funding
to Somalia, which predate the expulsion of aid groups by the militias.
Reviewing the background of these restrictions is important not because
I believe them to have been the principal obstacle to aiding southern
Somalia--they were not. But these restrictions have been the only such
obstacle that the U.S. Government could unilaterally take out of the
way. We are encouraged by the recent indications from the
administration that these restrictions have now been modified to allow
greater support to relief efforts in the south. We have some remaining
concerns about how the new arrangement will be implemented,
particularly the fact that it only applies to programs that are wholly
or partly funded by the U.S. Government. This provides no protection to
interventions implemented by U.S. organization with funding from
private foundations or European donors, for example. We hope to address
those issues swiftly, but nonetheless the administration should be
commended for its willingness to alter the overall restrictions in
light of the ongoing emergency. With this issue hopefully moving in a
positive direction, I do not wish to dwell overly long on the past. But
it is important, even as we look forward, to take stock of what we have
until now been unable to do, and draw lessons from that.
The challenges that have arisen from the legal restrictions on aid
to Somalia over the past several years are fundamentally systemic.
Despite the best efforts of the professionals at USAID, the
restrictions have several times caused serious delays in the efforts of
USAID and U.S. relief groups, to provide aid to Somalia. USAID, for its
part, has faced a thicket of legal and political obstacles but has
consistently done its utmost to deal with those in a way that enables
responsible aid to continue. Throughout our deliberations over the past
several years, USAID's professionals have been collaborative and
constructive. The blame for the delays and obstacles ultimately lies
with the nature of the restrictions themselves. They are overly broad,
allowing automatic humanitarian exemptions only for medical supplies
and religious materials. Obtaining humanitarian exemptions for anything
outside of those two categories typically requires a license that is
only approved after a cumbersome and lengthy interagency process. This
is a system that cries out for serious review, as I believe the last 2
years have demonstrated.
The restrictions first became an obstacle in Somalia in April 2009,
when USAID raised concerns that some U.S. resources might be diverted
in violation of U.S. Government prohibitions on material support to
groups designated by the United States as terrorists. It was reported
at the time that USAID was seeking an OFAC license for its work in
Somalia, but that the Treasury Department was reluctant to grant this.
Over the summer of 2009, USAID stopped processing new humanitarian
response grants to U.N. agencies and NGOs while deliberations over a
path forward dragged on.\14\ In the midst of a serious humanitarian
crisis in much of the country, numerous U.S.-funded humanitarian
response programs were suspended as grant agreements expired and could
not be renewed. An agreement was finally struck in late October of that
year--nearly 7 months after the issue first arose--to allow funding to
move forward in FY2010.\15\
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\14\ New York Times: U.S. Delays Somalia Aid, Fearing it is Feeding
Terrorists (October 1, 2009).
\15\ IRIN: U.S. Government to Set New Aid Terms (October 6, 2009).
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However, when the FY 2010 grants began to expire in early FY 2011,
USAID again suspended grant processing. By this point, most U.N. and
NGO partners were no longer operating in southern Somalia, and the
grant requests that were held up were instead for northern and central
regions of Somalia, which are not under the control of U.S.-designated
militant groups. By the time the FY 2010 grants began expiring, the
fall 2010 rainy season in Somalia had failed and it was clear that a
dire humanitarian situation would arise in the coming months. Several
months passed as the administration sought a way out of the impasse. In
late spring, U.N. and NGO partners entered into negotiations with USAID
over whether to resume funding. An agreement to allow USAID to resume
humanitarian funding to northern and central Somalia was finally struck
in May of this year--nearly 8 months into FY 2011.
The 8 months that were lost were a period in which the humanitarian
community was well aware of the prospect of severe drought and famine.
This was the very period when the U.S. Government's U.N. and NGO
partners could have been working full-tilt to prepare for the coming
calamity. While the south was not accessible to us at that point, a
great deal could have been done to preposition, prepare communities in
accessible regions of the country, and assist the already-large flows
of internally displaced people. Yet the bureaucratic tie-up over U.S.
legal restrictions left U.N. and NGO partners unable to obtain USG
resources that would have enabled a much more robust response in the
northern and central regions. This has been particularly damaging in
central Somalia, which has been afflicted with drought every bit as
severe as the southern areas, and also hosts tens of thousands of
displaced southerners in desperate conditions.
the road ahead
The situation across the Horn of Africa is likely to worsen in the
coming months as water sources dwindle and people's stocks of food and
money are depleted. In southern Somalia--assuming that the
administration's moves to relax the legal restrictions will enable aid
groups to resume programs there--many agencies will be eager to move
ahead with relief efforts. The NGO community is strongly committed to
ensuring that aid is not diverted away from those who need it most. I
would emphasize that we do not know exactly what to expect in terms of
access and security, and we do not discount the very real challenges
that remain. But there are some reasons for cautious optimism,
including the recent success of United Nations agencies and the
International Committee of the Red Cross in making initial aid
distributions freely and without interference.\16\
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\16\ Devex: Aid Reaches Famine-Hit Region in Southern Somalia (July
27, 2011).
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The recent report of the U.N.'s Somalia Monitoring Group described
how access for aid groups often varies considerably in different
regions of the south, depending on local political and clan dynamics
and their interplay with higher level political factors. That dynamic
will largely shape the opportunities for response in southern Somalia,
and provides further grounds for cautious optimism over what may be
achievable. Regardless of the high-level political movements--positive
or negative--aid groups will ultimately have to negotiate terms of safe
and effective access with local leaders in communities across the
south. Many aid groups will choose to work with or support local Somali
civil society organizations, which have capacity and long experience
working on humanitarian response. This will result in a sort of
``patchwork quilt'' approach to assistance provision, with different
agencies providing aid in whichever communities they are able to safely
access. These arrangements are likely to remain highly fluid, and aid
groups will have to show extreme flexibility and responsiveness to
seize new opportunities quickly.
Beyond southern Somalia, there is a great deal that can be done to
prevent the rest of the region from descending into famine conditions.
The humanitarian community has learned a great deal over the past few
decades about how to deal more effectively with food crises. No longer
does the international response to famine and drought center mainly on
camps and food distribution. Instead, we follow several ``best
practices'' learned from past disasters:
Work with markets, not against them: Mass food distribution
is not always the best way to deal with a food crisis; it can
sometimes distort and undermine local markets, put merchants
out of business, and degrade important market supply links.
Mass hunger is not a result simply of inadequate local food
production, but rather of inadequate resources amongst the
population to access food through their normal means. This
remains the case in the Horn, even in much of southern Somalia:
food can be found in the markets, but it is priced well beyond
the means of those who need it. This means that food voucher
and cash-based interventions, which enable people to afford
food, will be an important tool for combating hunger. These
interventions can also be more efficient than distributing food
aid, since they do not require the transport and importation of
food nor complicated distribution networks. In-kind food aid
will likely be needed to supplement what is available in
markets, but should not be the automatic first resort.
Preserve livelihoods, not just lives: Interventions that
seek to support the livelihoods of at-risk populations, as well
as save lives, will bear helpful dividends. The most effective
way to mitigate long-term impacts of the drought is to provide
assistance that protects the remnants of people's livelihoods
in the near term and helps them to rebuild their livelihoods
quickly in the medium term. This means interventions to protect
remaining animal stocks, like veterinary services and water
trucking; and agricultural support to ensure that farmers need
not miss the next planting season due to depleted seed stocks.
These sorts of livelihood-focused activities will reduce the
need for prolonged humanitarian support.\17\
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\17\ ALNAP: Slow-onset Disasters--Drought and Food and Livelihoods
Insecurity (2007).
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Pay attention to health: In the 1991-92 famine in Somalia,
the return of rain ironically posed major health challenges
because the drought-weakened population was extra-vulnerable to
water-borne diseases. Food aid and livelihoods support is not
enough to save lives in this kind of situation--aggressive
health care and emergency nutrition interventions are also
necessary. Opportunistic diseases that prey on a weakened
population will otherwise claim many lives.
Help people where they are: Aid programs that assist people
where they are, rather than inducing them to displace to other
areas, are both more efficient and more humane than camp-based
interventions. Preventing displacement minimizes social and
economic disruptions, enables continuation of livelihood
activities, and avoids the arduous and dangerous process of
abrupt relocation. It also avoids creation of semipermanent
refugee and displacement camps, which are expensive to maintain
and often hard to close down once a crisis ends.
Invest in long-term resiliency: Even as we focus on the
immediate crisis, the aid community and aid donors should be
thinking hard about how to build better resiliency to this type
of crisis. While this drought is extremely severe, lesser
droughts have become a common occurrence in the Horn in recent
years and are becoming a permanent fixture. Avoiding future
humanitarian crises will require that we seek to work with
governments and community leaders to help at-risk populations
to better manage their natural resources and develop successful
coping mechanisms. This must be a long-term investment and will
need to be sustained by donors even after the energy around the
current crisis has waned. Fortunately, sustaining longer term
investments in resiliency will save money over the long term by
mitigating the impact of recurring droughts on the population,
thus reducing the need for frequent humanitarian assistance.
We know what we must do; what remains in question is whether we
will be able to do it. This rests on two important unknowns. The first
is whether the region at large--Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti--
will receive sufficient resources to enable humanitarian agencies and
regional governments to respond aggressively to mounting needs. The
second is whether obstacles to humanitarian access in southern
Somalia--principally the local restrictions and security threats, but
also legal restrictions amongst donor states--will be removed in order
to enable a response to scale up in that region. With these unknowns in
mind, I would like to leave the committee with several recommendations:
1. Ensure a robust U.S. Government response: As noted above, the
U.S. response this year stands at less than half of what the Bush
administration contributed to the region's drought response in 2008.
While the U.S. and global contributions this year are generous, they do
not approach the level that will be required to avoid a large-scale
catastrophe--as Secretary Clinton herself acknowledged on July 20.\18\
USAID did a good job of regional prepositioning, and has been rapidly
churning out new grants over the past month as the full scope of the
disaster has emerged. But real questions remain about whether the
United States will be able to step up like it did in 2008. The FY 2012
outlook is not encouraging, with the House of Representative proposing
to slash the very accounts that are financing the U.S. Government
response: Food for Peace (a 30-percent proposed cut below FY11 levels,
and 50 percent below FY08 levels); International Disaster Assistance (a
12-percent proposed cut below FY11 levels); and Migration and Refugee
Assistance (an 11-percent proposed cut below FY11 levels). Enacting
such cuts in the face of the worst famine the world has seen in several
decades would be disastrous, and I would urge the Senate to ensure that
these accounts are protected in the FY 2012 budget deliberations. But I
suspect that even more must be done. In years past, a disaster of this
magnitude would have been cause for a supplemental--like the $3 billion
supplemental that was passed last year to support the Haiti response. I
would urge the Congress to consider a supplemental budget appropriation
to address this crisis.
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\18\ Secretary Clinton: U.S. Response to Declaration of Famine in
Somalia and Drought in the Horn of Africa (July 20, 2011).
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2. Engage the American public: Despite the severity of this crisis,
there has been relatively little of the sort of active public
engagement that we saw following the recent disasters in Haiti and
Japan. This is troubling, because the ability of American aid
organizations to respond robustly to a humanitarian disaster tends to
track closely with the level of American popular engagement in the
crisis. I would encourage all Members of Congress, as they head back to
their districts for the August recess, to alert their constituents to
the severity of what is now taking place in the Horn of Africa. I would
also urge the White House to be much more vocal about this crisis. As
we saw after the Haiti earthquake, calls by the President and First
Lady for generosity can have a tremendous galvanizing impact on the
American public. The ideal scenario might involve joint appeals by
administration and congressional leaders to demonstrate that responding
to human suffering on such a massive scale transcends political
boundaries.
3. Reform legal restrictions on U.S. response: As I noted earlier,
the legal restrictions imposed under the Patriot Act and related law
have thrown up significant roadblocks to the humanitarian response and
impeded preparedness. The safety valve provided by OFAC licensing is
useful and we hope that the administration's recent announcement will
be implemented in a way that truly enables us to provide relief without
fear of legal exposure. As a general rule of thumb, we would ask that
the protections now extended to USAID through their OFAC license be
extended in full to USAID's partners as well. But this development
notwithstanding, we have seen over the past 2 years that obtaining an
OFAC license if often politically difficult and massively time-
consuming. The fact that OFAC restrictions harmed U.S. capacity to
prepare for and respond to a famine that was anticipated months in
advance should give Congress pause. I suspect that those who wrote the
laws did not have this sort of outcome in mind. I would strongly advise
that Congress reexamine the interplay between OFAC restrictions and
humanitarian aid, and explore whether a more streamlined and responsive
approach can be found. A good place to start would be by expanding the
list of exempted categories beyond medical supplies and religious
materials, to also include assistance related to food, water, and
shelter needs.
I wish to sincerely thank the subcommittee for its focus on this
tremendously important issue, and for extending me the privilege of
testifying today.
Senator Coons. Thank you very much.
Dr. Pham.
STATEMENT OF DR. J. PETER PHAM, DIRECTOR, MICHAEL S. ANSARI
AFRICA CENTER, ATLANTIC COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Pham. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Isakson, I want to
thank you for this opportunity to testify today on a very
important issue.
As we meet, the situation, as the other panelists have
already stated, is especially grave. The U.N. refugee agency
describes it as the worst humanitarian disaster in the world,
with nearly half the Somali population facing starvation, while
at least another 11 million men, women, and children across the
Horn of Africa are at risk.
Given this grim reality, the first concern of the
international community is understandably focused where it
should be: getting relief to the victims. However, in
addressing immediate needs, attention should also be paid to
the broader geopolitical context, as well as the long-term
implications of the challenges before us.
Since other witnesses testifying today are better
positioned individually or institutionally to address the
technical questions relating to the humanitarian crisis, its
impact on vulnerable populations, and the logistics of getting
assistance to them, I will concentrate on four key points which
I believe policymakers in the United States and other
responsible international actors should bear in mind in
assessing the current situation, in determining adequate
responses to it, as well as in planning longer term engagement
with this region.
First, al-Shabaab has a responsibility for exacerbating the
crisis. While the group cannot be blamed for desertification
trends, climate change, or meteorological conditions, the
violent conflict it has engaged in, the economic and political
policies it has pursued, have certainly worsened an already bad
situation.
Although in the past al-Shabaab has profited either by
diversion or taxation of humanitarian aid, the amounts
represented at most a small fraction of its broader revenue
stream. Consequently, it is heartening to hear that the
administration is working to clarify and, where necessary, ease
the relevant restrictions in order to facilitate the work of
humanitarian organizations. However, allow me to cite just one
example of where the major funding al-Shabaab directly impact
the current humanitarian crisis.
For example, the industrial production for export of
charcoal. It is estimated that somewhere around two-thirds of a
forest which used to cover 15 percent of Somali territory have
been reduced to chunks of ``black gold'' packed into 25-
kilogram bags and shipped to countries in the Persian Gulf. One
cannot underestimate the negative environmental impact of all
this, which earned al-Shabaab millions in profit, which is
recycled into violence and terrorism.
And if this were all not bad enough, once the famine set
in,
al-Shabaab leaders have alternated between denying the crisis
and preventing effective people from moving in search of food.
Whether or not it is a formal policy of the group, I have
reports from sources on the ground in the last 24 hours of at
least three ``holding areas'' in lower Shabelle where al-
Shabaab forces are either using force or the threat thereof to
keep displaced people from leaving the territory and finding
help. And we can get into why they might be doing that.
Second, far from being part of the solution, Somalia's
Transitional Federal Government, the TFG, is part of the
problem; in fact, a not insignificant cause of the ongoing
crisis. The regime's unelected officials may be preferable to
al-Shabaab insurgents, but they represent at best the choice of
the lesser of two evils.
Hobbled by corruption, weakness, and infighting, the TFG is
of limited helpfulness in the face of the present humanitarian
emergency. TFG leaders are likelier to see the crisis as yet
another opportunity to capture rents, especially since their
already extended mandate expires in 2 weeks, and it is for want
of a ready-made plan B that the international community is not
taking issue with the TFG leaders' arbitrary extension of their
terms of office by another year. No wonder the official
position of the Government of the United States,
notwithstanding its engagement with the regime, is not to
recognize the TFG or any other entity as the
legal sovereign of Somalia.
We need to pursue a permanent resolution to the ongoing
crisis of state failure in Somalia if we want to avoid
humanitarian emergencies in the future.
Third, the sheer number of people moving in and from Somali
territory will have an enormous and possibly permanent
consequences for the region. The potential population shifts
threaten to upend delicate political balances, as we well as
present new security challenges for the Horn of Africa and
beyond. If they are not to cause, however unintentionally,
greater harm, responses to this mass migration need to be
factored into these considerations.
Finally, amid the crisis, there is nonetheless an
opportunity to promote stability and security in Somalia. In
fact, there is a narrow window of opportunity during which it
might be possible to seriously weaken and possibly even finish
al-Shabaab as a force in Somali politics once and for all. The
disaster has exposed divisions within the movement, with some
of its local councils and militias expressing a willingness to
accept help, even as the leadership continues to spurn it.
The disaster has exposed divisions with some of the groups
within it and factions, and there are ways the international
community can get assistance to drought-affected populations
and so where they are rather than requiring of these poor
people displace themselves and create additional challenges
that will be dealt with down the road.
I want to underscore that there are local NGOs with a
proven ability to both deliver aid in hard-to-reach areas, all
the while avoiding diversion of aid to al-Shabaab and other
problematic entities.
Again, thank you for attention. I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Pham follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. J. Peter Pham
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member lsakson, distinguished members of the
subcommittee, I would like to thank you very much for the opportunity
to testify today on the drought and famine conditions in the Horn of
Africa in general and in Somalia in particular, as well as on the
response of the United States and other members of the international
community to this growing crisis.
As we meet, the situation especially critical--the head of the
United Nations refugee agency describes it as the ``worst humanitarian
disaster'' in the world today--with nearly half of the Somali
population, some 3.7 million people, facing starvation while at least
another 11 million men, women, and children across the Horn of Africa
are thought to be at risk.
Given this grim reality, the first concern of the international
community is, understandably, focused where it should be anyway:
getting relief to the victims. However, in addressing immediate needs,
attention should also be paid to the broader geopolitical context as
well as the long-term implications of the challenges before us. Since
other witnesses testifying today are better positioned, individually
and institutionally, to address the technical questions relating to the
scope of the crisis, its impact on vulnerable populations, and the
logistics of getting assistance to them, I will concentrate on four key
points which I believe the United States and other responsible
international actors should bear in mind in assessing the current
situation and determining adequate responses to it, as well as planning
longer term engagement with this region:
1. Al-Shabaab's responsibility in exacerbating the crisis. While
the group cannot be blamed for the desertification trends, climate
change, and meteorological conditions, the violent conflict it has
engaged in and the economic and political policies it has pursued have
certainly worsened a bad situation.
2. Far from being a part of the solution, Somalia's ``Transitional
Federal Government'' (TFG) is part of the problem--in fact, a not
insignificant cause of the ongoing crisis. The regime's unelected
officials may be preferable to the insurgents seeking to overthrow
them, but they represent, at best, the international community's choice
for the lesser of two evils.
3. The sheer number of people on the move in and from Somali
territory will have enormous and possibly permanent consequences for
the region. The potential population shifts threaten to upend delicate
political balances as well as present new security challenges for the
Horn of Africa and beyond.
4. Amid the crisis, there is, nonetheless, an opportunity to
promote stability and security within Somalia, if not across the Horn
of Africa. In fact, there is a narrow window of opportunity during
which it might be possible to seriously weaken and possibly even finish
al-Shabaab as a major force in Somali politics once and for all.
al-shabaab's role in the crisis
Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (``Movement of Warrior Youth,''
al-Shabaab) is not only linked ideologically with the global jihadist
ideology of al-Qaeda and, increasingly, operationally with Yemen-based
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), it is also an entity that
richly deserves to opprobrium for its singular role in making what in
any event would have been a very bad situation far, far worse.
There is no doubt that the insecurity it has caused since it began
its violent insurgency 4 years ago added greatly to the sufferings of
the Somali people. Moreover, while al-Shabaab is far from a monolithic
organization, its leadership does have a history of denying access to
the areas under its control to U.N. relief agencies like UNICEF and the
World Food. For their part, as is now well known, last year the
international agencies as well as several nongovernmental organizations
pulled out of several areas under the control of al-Shabaab after
several aid workers were killed and the group began imposing strict
conditions on their remaining colleagues, extorting ``security fees''
and ``taxes.'' Moreover, because al-Shabaab has been designated as an
international terrorist organization by the United States and a number
of other countries, NGOs have avoided working in areas it controls for
fear of running afoul of laws against providing material support to
terrorist groups.
As a matter of fact--one which a number of analysts, including
myself, have noted for some time and which was confirmed by the annual
report to the U.N. Security Council by its Sanctions Monitoring Group
for Somalia and Eritrea, a document released just last week--although
al-Shabaab has profited, either by diversion or ``taxation,'' from
humanitarian aid, the amounts represented at most a small fraction of
its overall revenue stream. Consequently, it heartening to see that the
administration is working to clarify and, where necessary, ease the
relevant restrictions in order to facilitate the work of humanitarian
organizations.
A far more important source of income for the group is, in fact,
more directly related to the humanitarian crisis: the industrial
production for export of charcoal. While people living between the Juba
and Shabelle rivers in southern Somalia have gathered charcoal for
their own use from the region's acacia forests from time immemorial, it
is only in the last few years that the production has reached its
present unsustainable levels. It is estimated that somewhere around
two-thirds of the forests which used to cover some 15 percent of Somali
territory has been reduced to chunks of ``black gold,'' packed into 25-
kilogram bags, and shipped to countries in the Persian Gulf which have
themselves banned the domestic production of charcoal. The U.N.
Monitoring Group conservatively estimates that up to 4.5 million of
these sacks are exported each year, primarily through the port of
Kismayo, which has been controlled by al-Shabaab or other forces allied
to its cause since September 2008, earning the group millions of
dollars in profits. Meanwhile, where once there were the old-growth
acacia stands, thorn bushes now proliferate, rendering the areas
useless to the Somali people, whether they be pastoralists or
agriculturalists (the former graze their livestock in the grass that
flourishes where the root systems of acacia groves hold in ground water
and prevent erosion, while the latter grow staple crops in neighboring
lands so long as there are tree stands holding in top soil), and
contributing further to the desertification that is always a persistent
threat in a land as arid or semiarid as Somalia. Thus, it was both
simultaneously tragic and ironic that, when a heavy rain came briefly
this past weekend to what was formerly the country's breadbasket, the
result was not deliverance, but disaster as, absent any foliage to help
absorb the precipitation, flash floods compounded the misery in several
places.
Al-Shabaab also operates a complex system of taxation on residents
within areas it controls and imposes levies not just on aid groups, but
also businesses, sales transactions, and land. The tax on arable land
in particular has had the effect of changing the political economy of
farming communities which previously eked out a living just above
subsistence. For example, in Bakool and Lower Shabelle--precisely the
two areas at the epicenter of the famine--communities used to grow
their own food and, whenever possible, stored any surplus sorghum or
maize against times of hardship. However, when al-Shabaab imposed a
monetary levy on acreage, farmers were pushed into growing cash crops
like sesame which could be sold to traders connected with the Islamist
movement's leadership for export in order to obtain the funds to pay
the obligatory ``jihad war contributions.'' However rich in
antioxidants sesame seeds may be, they are of rather limited value for
purposes of food security.
If all this were not bad enough, once the famine set in, al-Shabaab
leaders have alternated between denying the crisis--arguing instead
that accounts of hunger were being ``exaggerated'' in order to
undermine their hold over the populace--and preventing affected people
from moving in search of food. Whether or not it is a formal policy of
the group or not, there are credible reports from sources on the ground
of at least several ``holding areas'' in Lower Shabelle where al-
Shabaab forces are using force or the threat thereof to prevent
displaced people from leaving its territory to find help.
somalia's dysfunctional tfg
In congressional testimony 2 years ago, I noted that the TFG was
``not a government by any common-sense definition of the term: it is
entirely dependent on foreign troops . . . to protect its small enclave
in Mogadishu, but otherwise administers no territory; even within this
restricted zone, it has shown no functional capacity to govern, much
less provide even minimal services to its citizens.'' And that was
before the famine.
Despite the fact that, at not inconsiderable sacrifice, the African
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeeping force protecting the
regime has managed to extend its operational reach to now be present in
13 of Mogadishu's 16 districts--although the force commander, Ugandan
Major General Nathan Mugisha, acknowledges that his troops ``dominate''
in just ``more than half of these''--the TFG remains hobbled by
corruption and infighting. Quite frankly, the so-called ``government''
lead by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed is little better than a criminal
enterprise--one that its own auditors reported stole more than 96
percent of the bilateral assistance it received in the years 2009 and
2010. The findings contained in the U.N. Monitoring Group report were
perhaps even more damning: ``Diversion of arms and ammunition from the
Transitional Federal Government and its affiliated militias has been
another significant source of supply to arms dealers in Mogadishu, and
by extension to al-Shabaab.'' The investigators even highlighted case
where an RPG launcher and associated munitions, purchased for the
regime under a U.S. State Department contract, found their way into a
stronghold of al-Shabaab that AMISOM captured earlier this year.
It should thus come as no surprise that such ``leaders'' are of
limited helpfulness in the face of the present humanitarian emergency.
They are likely to see it as yet another opportunity to capture rents,
especially since their already extended mandate expires in 2 weeks and
it is for want of a ready-made ``Plan B'' that the international
community is not taking issue with the TFG's leaders arbitrarily
proroguing their terms of office by another year--although on what
legal grounds is anyone's guess. (No wonder the official position of
the Government of the United States, expressed in a brief filed before
the U.S. Supreme Court last year by then-Solicitor-General Elena Kagan
as well as the Legal Advisor of the Department of State, is that since
the fall of the dictator Muhammad Siyad Barre in 1991, ``the United
States has not recognized any entity as the government of Somalia'' and
that federal courts should ``not attach significance to statements of
the TFG'' absent specific guidance from the executive branch.)
mass migration
Given this context, it should come as no surprise that Somalis are
on the move. The Dabaab refugee camp in northeastern Kenya, which was
built in 1992 during the last great Somali famine to temporarily house
90,000 people, nowadays hosts more than 400,000, with more than 1,000
additional persons arriving each day. Another 112,000 refugees have
found shelter in the Dollo Ado area of Ethiopia. And these are the
lucky ones: it is estimated that there are possibly 1.5 million Somalis
internally displaced within their own country, with some unfortunates
even literally caught in the no man's land at outskirts of Mogadishu
between the frontline positions of the insurgents and AMISOM troops.
And, it needs to be emphasized that all of this is before the coming
months when conditions are expected to be even worse.
Given the parlous conditions prevalent across the territory of the
former Somali state (outside of Somaliland in the northwest, Puntland
in the northeast, and possibly a few other places), it is virtually
assured that any Somali who crosses the border into Kenya or Ethiopia
is likely to become ipso facto a permanent emigrant (after all,
Somalia's contemporary economy, it should not be forgotten, has been
transformed into one built upon remittances from the diaspora). In any
event, since there has been no rush of third countries offering
resettlement to the preexistent Somali refugee population before the
famine, there is no reason to think that things will be different with
the influx of new arrivals. Kenya and Ethiopia, however, are beset with
complicated issues with their own ethnic Somali minorities; neither
country is in much of a position to absorb hundreds of thousands, if
not millions, of itinerant Somalis.
Consequently a population shift such as what we are witnessing in
the Horn of Africa--a literal exodus of Biblical proportions--threatens
to upend delicate political balances as well as present a host of new
security challenges. In fact, concerns over security and the adequate
screening (or lack thereof) of Somalis entering their country have
already exposed one rift within Kenya's national unity government
between Prime Minister Raila Odinga, who opened the border as a
humanitarian gesture, and some of his ministers who oppose the move. A
quick perusal of Kenyan newspapers is enough to confirm that this
question will undoubtedly enjoy a high profile as the East African
country enters its electoral season next year.
Thus, if they are not to cause, however unintentionally, even
greater harm, responses to the mass migration set in motion first by
the prolonged Somali crisis and now the famine need to take factor in
these realities.
a chance for stability and security
If one dares contemplate a silver lining to the current crisis--
although it comes at a terrible price--it is that it has apparently
caught al-Shabaab off guard.
For a long time, despite the extremist ideology espoused by its
foreign-influenced leaders which set them outside the mainstream of
Somali culture and society,
al-Shabaab could present itself as being better (even if harsher)
rulers than the corrupt denizens of the TFG. The brutal hudud
punishments its tribunals meted out, for example, may have been utterly
alien from the Somali experience, but it was a rough justice
nonetheless and better than the chaos and lawlessness that was the
experience of many Somalis in the 1990s. Moreover, the group managed to
wrap itself up in the mantle of Somali nationalism by portraying the
African Union peacekeepers as foreign occupiers, although the fact that
AMISOM troops are propping up the despised TFG and, in the process,
cause civilian casualties, made this narrative all the more credible.
Within the last year, however, AMISOM has improved its capabilities
and managed to lower civilian casualties even as it pushed al-Shabaab
forces back within Mogadishu. In addition, the famine and al-Shabaab's
clumsy response to it have thoroughly dispelled any delusions about the
``good governance'' capabilities by the movement. Now the effects of
famine are not only exacerbated by al-Shabaab, but the disaster has
exposed divisions within the movement with some of its local councils
and militias expressing a willingness to accept help even as the
leadership continues to spurn it. Moreover, actions like the blocking
of people trying to escape the famine will sap al-Shabaab of what
remains of its popular legitimacy. (Of course, if one is seeking to use
this opportunity to undermine al-Shabaab, it would be helpful if a
prospect more attractive than domination by the venal TFG was offered
to communities just freed from the militants' yoke.)
While there is undoubtedly some risk in sending aid areas where al-
Shabaab operates, it is more probable that whatever negative effects
the assistance will have will fall largely on the group, either as some
of its local leaders defect or populations are weaned from their
reliance on them. And there are organizations--not all of them
necessarily international--with a track record of delivering
assistance, even within al-Shabaab held areas, without allowing
resources to be diverted. One that comes to mind is SAACID, the
extraordinary nongovernmental organization founded and directed by
Somali women, which is engaged in conflict transformation, women's
empowerment, education, health care, emergency relief, employment
schemes, and development. SAACID's modus operandi is a model for
others. SAACID gets food from, among other partners, the World Food
Programme--when, that is, the latter agency has any. By working closely
with clan elders and community members, it embeds itself in its
immediate surroundings and thus can carry on in areas where, for
example, the WFP can no longer go because the presence of al-Shabaab.
Thus, during the height of the fighting in Mogadishu in recent years,
SAACID was literally the only entity that was present in all 16 of the
capital's districts, providing some 80,000 2,000-calorie meals daily to
some of the most vulnerable residents.
Such a model is one way the international community can get
assistance to drought-affected populations and do so where they are,
rather than requiring that these poor people displace themselves and,
consequently, create additional challenges which will have to be dealt
with further down the road after the initial emergency has passed.
And it goes without saying that should security be improved in
Somalia and the mass emigration halted, if not reversed, the prospects
for the increasingly important subregion at the crossroads of the
Africa and the Middle East will brighten immensely.
conclusion
Confronted with the dreadful specter of mass starvation on a scale
not seen in more than half a century, the priority most assuredly is to
get life-giving assistance to those most at risk and to do so in the
most timely, efficient, and effective manner possible. However, urgency
is no dispensation from the ethical and political responsibility both
to understand to what caused or heightened the emergency and to
consider the possible consequences of any proposed responses to it.
Increased material resources are clearly needed, but even more, what is
required is sustained engagement and not a little bit of strategic
vision.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Doctor.
Mr. Schaap.
STATEMENT OF WOUTER SCHAAP, ASSISTANT COUNTRY DIRECTOR, CARE
INTERNATIONAL SOMALIA, NAIROBI, KENYA
Mr. Schaap. Mr. Chairman, Senator Isakson, thank you very
much for this opportunity you have given us to testify today on
this horrible situation that we are facing in the Horn of
Africa.
I speak today on behalf of CARE, a leading international
humanitarian organization fighting global poverty. And we have
six decades of experience in helping to prepare for and respond
to natural disasters, providing life-saving assistance in
crises, and helping communities recover after an emergency.
We place special focus on women and children, and yet again
in this crisis, they bear the brunt of what is happening.
Myself as assistant country director for programs for CARE
in Somalia, I see firsthand in my work the consequences that
tens of thousands of people are facing today. I have worked in
the Horn for 7 years now, traveling extensively within Somalia,
both in the north and in the south. I recently returned from a
trip to IDP camps in drought-affected areas in the north, and
what we see there is probably less dramatic than what we see in
some parts of the south, yet the stories we hear are horrible.
A woman that I met in one of the IDP camps in Gardho, with
a severely malnourished child on her arm, explained to me she
did not have any money to go to the health clinic to seek
assistance for her child, and that assistance was not available
there. You could see in her eyes she was severely traumatized
by the experiences in the south and the things that she had
seen there.
I met a father in the Sanaag region who had recently lost
his wife. And he was there nursing his five remaining cows. The
cows were bleeding from their noses, and he was trying to do
something about it, but not really knowing what to do. And our
staff said, well, this is a lost cause.
These kind of experiences my staff see on a very regular
basis, and they are stories that remain with you for the rest
of your life.
Our response to the emergency in the Horn began to scale up
in 2011--the beginning of 2011--when the early signs were clear
that this was going to be a major crisis. Today we are helping
more than 1 million people in Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya with
life-saving food, water, nutrition, and other life-saving
emergency assistance. CARE, for instance, is one of the largest
agencies working in Dadaab. We also support longer term
activities that help people become more resilient to drought.
The severity of the situation is extremely worrying, and
other speakers have spoken at length about that, so I will keep
my remarks on that quite short. But the worry is that the
situation is not at its worst yet. The deepest part of a
drought is normally the month before the rains come, and then
people are weakened. And so, by September, we are going to see
a significantly increased number of deaths due to diseases that
affect this already weakened population.
So, as my colleagues have said, agencies know now how to
deal with this kind of situation, that we need to focus on a
broad range of services--of water sanitation, health,
nutrition, food--and address those multiple causes of deaths in
a famine crisis.
However, unfortunately there is still a major funding gap
in the region of $1.4 billion U.S. dollars for the consolidated
appeal of the U.N. This is really a worry, notwithstanding all
the generous contributions from various donors. And we really
appreciate the support from the U.S. Government for our work in
the three countries where we have been supported by BPRN, OFTA,
and others. And we really appreciate that. However, it is not
enough. The crisis is so massive it needs additional support.
The access issues have been discussed at length. The
ongoing conflict in the south is making it much more difficult
to get access to the south. And what we are seeing is that
agencies already present there, local NGOs, other international
NGOs that work there have an ability to negotiate some level of
access, but it is limited.
And unfortunately, aid is at risk of becoming very
politicized in this environment. It is very important for all
sides to this conflict to let humanitarian principles--
neutrality and impartiality--guide all of our discussions on
humanitarian assistance. And we are determined to provide only
assistance to those people that are most in need, and
assistance in place to ensure that only those people get it.
We are urging local authorities in southern Somalia to
grant an uninhibited and unconditional access. But the crisis
is happening now, and it needs a concerted, thoughtful, careful
diplomatic work of U.N. donors and NGOs to get aid to the
victims of famine wherever they are. And now is really the time
to have space and reach out to all parties of the conflict and
work to save the lives of tens of thousands of people, and to
avoid politicization of the issues.
We have been speaking with colleagues from the U.S.
Government about the legal issues that have concerned us. And
we really appreciate the recent steps taken by the U.S.
Government, specifically for programs funded by USAID and the
Department of State. Questions, however, remain on the ability
of the U.S. NGOs to program funding from non-U.S. Government
donors, for instance, the U.S. public. NGOs get large sums of
money from the U.S. public, but this funding does not fall
under the OFAC licensing that is now being put in place for
NGOs. That would only be covered if you have funding from the
U.S. Government for south central Somalia. Other funding, like
ECO, DFID, that would not be covered for U.S.-based NGOs, and
those are major sources of funding for U.S.-based NGOs.
The long-term implications--we need to start thinking about
those as well now. And I am sorry I am running a little bit
over time.
These are very marginalized populations, and they are among
the most vulnerable to the impact of changes in the weather
patterns. When I started working on Somalia, we would see a
drought every 5 years. Now, it is just a continuous cycle of
mist seasons, and things are really changing. People are
finding it very difficult to adjust to these changes, but we
know that there are things that we can do to help that, and we
need to invest in that in the years to come.
Our recommendations, I just would just sum up. The
expansion and the speed of funding for the crisis is really
important. The urgency is there, but we are seeing that major
donors take quite a substantial time for funding to become
available on the ground to support our work. And we urge donors
to be faster in their processes and move things forward.
We need to start planning for increased long-term support
for resilience in these areas. And we need concerted,
thoughtful, and careful diplomatic work of United Nations
donors and NGOs to negotiate access on the ground and help to
support a public climate in which those efforts can actually
take place by the agencies working there.
And the efforts by the U.S. Government to ease legal
restrictions for U.S. Government-funded work is really
appreciated, but it is not enough, because we are at risk when
we use other governments' funding and U.S. public funding, for
instance.
So, on that last item, we really need some very urgent
action forward. The NGO community is ready to engage the
appropriate U.S. Government agencies' developed, constructive
options to alleviate the effects of famine, while controlling
the risk of diversion. And there are precedents for this in
Burma and Iran and more recently in Gaza, and that could be
achieved in two different ways. First, issuance of a general
license from OFAC that would reduce the risk of prosecution due
to transactions that may be incidental to the famine response.
And, second, favorable and very expeditious processing of
specific license requests to OFAC from U.S.-based NGOs. Those
things would really help agencies place themselves in a
position where they can start negotiating for access on the
ground.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schaap follows:]
Prepared Statement of Wouter Schaap
Mr. Chairman, Senator Isakson, members of the subcommittee, thank
you for the opportunity to testify today and join with you in this
critically important and timely hearing on the crisis in the Horn of
Africa.
I speak today of behalf of CARE, a leading international
humanitarian organization fighting global poverty. CARE has more than
six decades of experience in helping people prepare and respond to
natural disasters, providing lifesaving assistance when a crisis hits,
and helping communities recover after the emergency. CARE places a
special focus on women and children, who are often disproportionately
affected by disasters, as is the case in the Horn of Africa Crisis with
the majority of those fleeing Somalia to refugee camps in Ethiopia and
Kenya women and children.
As Assistant Country Director for Programs for CARE Somalia, I have
seen first-hand, the dire circumstances tens of thousands of
individuals in the region face. I have worked in the Horn of Africa for
over 7 years, traveling extensively within Somalia, both in the North
and South. I recently returned from visits to IDP camps and drought
affected areas in the North. I will never forget some of the
individuals I met there: the mother in a camp in Gardho town in
Puntland with her sick malnourished child on her arm who had fled the
conflict in the South, or the pastoralist man up in Sanaag region in
Somaliland desperately trying to save his remaining three cows in front
of his rural homestead and many others.
East Africa is currently in the grips of the worst drought in 60
years, affecting an estimated 12 million people in Somalia, Ethiopia,
and Kenya at risk of hunger, starvation, and other ills related to the
drought. This is the most severe food crisis in the world today, with a
desperate need of humanitarian aid in the region. The situation in the
Horn of Africa is so dire that on July 20, the U.N. declared a famine
in the Lower Shabelle and Bakool regions of southern Somalia. It is
feared that all southern and central regions will be in a similar
situation in the coming weeks and months if immediate measures are not
taken to provide emergency relief. The situation in Kenya, Ethiopia,
northern Somalia, and Djibouti is also dire, with not only large
refugee and IDP populations to take care of, but also very large
drought affected populations that are in need of immediate assistance.
Huge swaths of these countries are already characterized as ``emergency
phase,'' the level immediately before famine. Overall in the Horn of
Africa region, the U.N. says that $2.5 billion is needed for the
humanitarian response. While $1.1 billion has been pledged, it is
estimated that an additional $1.4 billion is urgently needed. The
United States should play a leading role in ensuring that this
requirement is met.
CARE's emergency response to the drought in the Horn began to scale
up at the beginning of 2011 when the beginnings of the crisis first
became apparent. Today, we are helping more than 1 million people in
Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya with lifesaving food, cash, water,
destocking and other emergency assistance, but also drought resilience
activities such as livestock health activities, natural resource
management, vocational training, and savings groups that help people
diversify livelihoods, save their assets, and buy food for their
families. In our work we pay special attention to the vulnerable women
and girls, who are especially at risk to the current crisis.
Somalia faces the highest malnutrition rates in the world.
Consecutive seasons of poor rainfall have created serious food crisis
and extensive displacement in southern Somalia. The crisis is only
expected to get worse in the next few months as the next regular rainy
season is in October. Famine may spread to other regions. The drought
has caused a devastatingly high mortality rate of animals, with levels
as high as 40-60 percent, especially for cattle and sheep. UNHCR
reports that more than 85,000 Somalis have sought refuge in Kenya since
January, 2011, with daily arrivals now exceeding 1,500. The rate of
Somali refugees arriving in southern Ethiopia has also jumped from
5,000 per month to more than 30,000 per month in the June.
care in the horn of africa (kenya, ethiopia, and somalia)
CARE's emergency interventions in the Horn of Africa are driven by
the humanitarian imperatives of saving lives, reducing suffering,
restoring dignity and rebuilding livelihoods. Our work is guided by
humanitarian principles of neutrality and independence.
In Dadaab, the largest refugee camp in the world, CARE is the lead
implementing agency for water and hygiene, food distribution, and
education, providing support for the more than 390,000 refugees in the
camp. CARE in Kenya has worked in the refugee camps around Dadaab since
1992. CARE provides food and water for each of the three main camps,
currently with a population of over 393,000 refugees. As part of this
latest influx of refugees CARE is working with our partners in the U.N.
and other INGOs to provide immediate food, shelter materials, and
support to victims of sexual and gender based violence. CARE is
extending our water delivery system within the camps to the temporary
areas where new arrivals wait for allocation to a space within the
camps.
In Dadaab, we are experiencing an influx of over 1,500 new refugees
arriving every day, many of them severely malnourished. This has put
enormous pressure on already overstretched resources in the refugee
camps. While CARE immediately scaled up its capacity and initiated
emergency response to the situation, no organization could have
prepared for the dramatic influx of new refugees. CARE is working
alongside UNHCR and the World Food Programme to ensure refugees in the
camps are receiving live-saving support they desperately need. The
State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration
provides support to this vital emergency programming in Dadaab.
Apart from this work with the refugees arriving from Somalia, CARE
also works with the Kenyan communities of the northeast to rehabilitate
water facilities, to provide cash through relief work programs, and to
partner with the Government of Kenya in disease surveillance and
vaccination of the remaining animals that these pastoralist communities
rely upon. Our approach is strongly focused on building the capacity of
communities to manage their own water resources, rangelands and
environment as the changing climate will bring more erratic rainfall
and drought years in the future. It is essential that the assistance
provided by the international community and the Government of Kenya
emphasizes that the humanitarian response can help to increase
resilience, instead of increasing the vulnerability and dependence on
external support that can result from such interventions.
CARE has a longstanding presence in Ethiopia, working in the
country for over 25 years. Because CARE has ongoing long-term
programming in Borena zone of southern Ethiopia, most of which focuses
on helping communities to build resiliency to climactic shocks, we
began raising the likelihood of La Nina drought almost exactly a year
ago. As that unfortunate projection has become reality, CARE has been
able to scale up its response interventions in close collaboration with
local communities and government. To date, CARE's emergency response
activities in Ethiopia have reached a quarter of a million people,
providing them with food, water and sanitation, nutritional support and
livelihoods assistance. Some of these interventions are literally and
immediately life-saving, while others are aimed at saving lives in the
months ahead. For example, by slaughtering cattle no longer fit for the
market--with small cash payment to owners and meat distributed amongst
the neediest--families receive some much-needed cash to meet immediate
needs and the burden on dwindling pasture and water resources reduced,
improving survival rates of the culled herds and reducing the burden on
the environment. Although the situation is already quite dire
throughout much of southern Ethiopia, even if the next rains are better
than projected they will not arrive for several weeks. In anticipation
of a worsening drought, therefore, CARE is increasing the intensity of
its efforts, especially in the rehabilitation of water points and
provision of nutritional support.
CARE's interventions in Somalia are also aimed at addressing the
long-term underlying causes of the problems as well as responding to
the immediate crises caused by drought and conflict. Many parts of
Somalia have experienced several cycles of drought, which has affected
the coping capacity of communities. It takes a goat or sheep 5 months
to reproduce, and with the successive cycles of drought, we have seen a
major erosion of people's asset base, with many people having lost
hundreds of sheep or goats and dozens of camels and cattle. In drought-
affected areas of North Somalia we support a large-scale cash relief
program, doing both cash for work as well as immediate cash handouts to
the most vulnerable within the community. Other emergency work
comprises of supplementary feeding, provision of water and sanitation
and nonfood items for IDPs. In some cases our staff does direct
programming, and in some cases we work through partners. In all cases
we have rigorous processes in place to verify quality and quantity of
the works, and ensure that money ends up with the right people. The
situation on the ground is extremely complex. Even in the remote parts
of the North control by regional governments is at times limited and
needs strong community involvement to help ensure disputes are resolved
and access is maintained.
The majority of the refugees displaced or fleeing Somalia are women
and children. Since January, 2011, approximately 70 percent of those
arriving at the camps in Dadaab are women-headed households. To support
the newly arriving refugees, CARE has increased its capacity to
respond, particularly for vulnerable women and girls. In addition to
severe malnutrition, the deep psychological affects that drought and
subsequent movement can have on the women refugees are immense. We have
witnessed high levels of anxiety, panic, and trauma due to loss of
family members along the way, what U.N. World Food Programme Executive
Director, Josette Sheeran, aptly referred to as ``roads of death.''
These women are sharing with our staff stories of rape, violence, and
hunger. Compounding the problems for the thousands of female refugees
fleeing conflict and hunger in the Horn of Africa is the threat of rape
and sexual violence. According to recent UNHCR reports, the number of
sexual and gender-based violence cases has quadrupled: 358 incidents
reported from January-June 2011 in comparison with 75 during the same
period in 2010. At CARE's reception center screening tents in two of
the refugee camp numbers have more than doubled.
famine in somalia
On July 20, the U.N. declared famine in two regions of southern
Somalia: Bakol and Lower Shabelle. The daily death toll due to
malnutrition in these regions has surpassed 2 per 10,000 people, while
around 40 percent of children are acutely malnourished. In some regions
the mortality rate is now 6 per 10,000 people per day. It is feared
that all southern and central regions will be in a similar famine
situation within the next 6-8 weeks if immediate measures are not taken
to provide emergency relief. Overall, there are more than 3.7 million
Somalis that need urgent lifesaving assistance. Tens of thousands of
people have died, and tens of thousands more will die if aid is not
scaled up. The current dry season extends to September, and even after
that it will take people months to recover. The crisis is therefore
expected to last at least until the end of the year.
What is needed is food and/or cash assistance, nutritional support
to malnourished children, water, sanitation and health services. In the
1992 famine a large proportion of deaths were due to preventable
diseases impacting on a severely weakened population. With the rainy
season approaching and the large numbers of IDPs in Somalia, this is a
major concern for humanitarian workers.
Somalia is a complex emergency as both drought and conflict
continue to take human lives and are forcing people to migrate to other
areas in search for food and shelter. The situation has gradually
deteriorated over the course of a number of years, eroding people's
coping capacity. Tens of thousands of people who have lost everything
they owned due to the drought are on the move, both inside and outside
Somalia. This is true both in the south of Somalia, as well as in the
north of the country, over the last 2 years, we have seen a gradual
increase in numbers of people moving from rural areas to towns and
cities after losing all their livestock. Many people from the south are
moving to the camps in Kenya and Ethiopia, whilst other are moving to
camps in the north of the country. Furthermore, despite being the site
of active conflict, UNHCR reports that over 100,000 IDPs have moved to
the city of Mogadishu.
CARE's interventions in Somalia aim to both address the long term
underlying causes of the recurring drought crises as well as respond to
the immediate humanitarian needs caused by drought and conflict. Our
emergency work comprises of supplementary feeding, cash relief, water
and sanitation, and nonfood items for IDPs, including basic survival
items, such as plastic sheeting for shelter, buckets for gathering
water, and utensils for cooking. The unfolding catastrophe in Somalia
has spilled over into other countries of the region. The best way to
minimize the impact of the famine and to support affected communities
is to provide aid directly to communities where they live rather than
people having to become refugees and IDPs in order to access
humanitarian assistance.
Humanitarian agencies are trying in very difficult circumstances to
ensure that desperately needed aid can reach the most vulnerable people
within the region, the majority of them women and children. All of us
are very aware that delays are costing lives. However, the ongoing
conflict in the south means that it is much more difficult to get aid
to this part of the country. A number of agencies have started scaling
up their activities in south central, but it will still come too late
for tens of thousands of Somalis living in this area, with women and
children expected to suffer the most. Agencies with an established
presence in the south are likely be able to respond more effectively to
the needs of communities in these areas than new agencies or agencies
that have left the south. While CARE does not currently have an
operational presence in the south, we are doing what we can to support
others that do.
Compounding the problem is that aid is at risk of becoming
politicized in this environment, and it is important for all sides to
the conflict to let common humanitarian principles of neutrality and
impartiality guide any of the discussions on humanitarian assistance.
We urge governments around the world, including the U.S. Government, to
avoid strong political statements that have the potential to enflame
local sensitivities and thereby further reduce humanitarian access. The
crisis is happening now, and it needs concerted, thoughtful, careful
diplomatic work of U.N., donors and NGOs to get aid to the victims of
famine where ever they are. Now is the time to ensure there is space to
reach out to all parties of the conflict and work to save the lives of
tens of thousands of Somalis. At the same time we urge all local
authorities in southern Somalia to grant uninhibited and unconditional
access to the people affected by the drought.
CARE urges all donors, including, the United States, to review and
ease legal hurdles impeding provision of emergency assistance in
Somalia. We anticipate that the legal restrictions are most acute in
those areas controlled by armed opposition groups. Increased
flexibility will ensure that organizations can more easily program
funding in areas that otherwise might not be reached, therefore fully
leveraging the generosity of our donors. We understand and highly value
the need for accountability of aid; aid agencies are therefore doing
their utmost to ensure aid reaches beneficiaries and no aid is diverted
to armed groups on either side of the conflict. We also understand and
take seriously our compliance responsibilities under U.S. law. We
anticipate, however, that the ability of humanitarian actors to adhere
to these compliance responsibilities will likely to be tested in areas
firmly controlled by prohibited entities.
We applaud the recent steps taken by the U.S. Government to loosen
legal restrictions relating to programs funded by USAID and the
Department of State. However, questions remain as to the ability of
U.S. organizations to program funding from non-U.S. Government donors
such as the Humanitarian Aid Department of the European Commission
(ECHO), the Department for International Development (DfID), and
others, as well as private U.S. donors including foundations and
corporations. We anticipate that funding from such donors will be
significant. We therefore urge the U.S. Government to take additional
steps to provide relief from certain legal risks for U.S. organizations
providing famine relief in areas controlled by prohibited entities,
such as the issuance of a General License from the Office of Foreign
Asset Controls (OFAC) allowing U.S. persons to engage in certain
transactions that may be incidental to the delivery of humanitarian
relief in Somalia. Historical and illustrative precedent for this
practice exists, including the earthquake response in Bam, Iran in
2004, and more recently in Gaza. Additionally, we request expedited
processing and favorable consideration of any specific licenses that
U.S. organizations may seek with respect to their work in Somalia, as
well as guidance that will allow organizations to fully understand OFAC
licensing policy.
long-term needs
While focusing in the immediate term on the acute needs of the
populations in the Horn of Africa, we also must look at building longer
term resilience among poor, vulnerable populations throughout
developing countries.
We must work to address the underlying causes of hunger and
poverty. Within our programs in the Horn of Africa, CARE continuously
emphasizes the need to tackle the long-term, underlying causes of
poverty. We are helping to break the cycle of hunger and to adapt to
the changing climate and reoccurring draughts. In Kenya, for example,
CARE focuses on disaster risk reduction measures lead by local
communities to create resilience. This includes natural resource
management, livestock marketing, as well as activities to improve
community capacity in business management and marketing skills. CARE
works with communities to diversify their livelihood sources, such as
milk marketing, beekeeping and fodder production, and protect assets to
reduce the longer term debilitating impacts of crisis and shock.
CARE strongly supports the Obama administration's Feed the Future
Initiative to reduce global hunger and poverty though a comprehensive
whole-of-government approach to increase global agriculture sector
growth and improve nutritional status, especially women and children.
CARE supported legislation introduced in the last Congress by the
ranking member of the full committee, Senator Lugar, with support from
others on the committee, including Chairman Kerry--the Global Food
Security Act, which passed this committee, but unfortunately that is as
far as it got. One of the lessons learned in the current crisis in the
Horn is evident in Ethiopia, where CARE, USAID, and other partners have
been working in partnership with the Government of Ethiopia on a
Productive Safety Net Program launched in 2005--the Household Income
Building and Rural Empowerment for Transformation (HIBRET) program.
This program is aimed at protecting resource poor households while
preventing asset depletion at the household level. Programs like this
have helped to increase community resilience in Ethiopia and reduced
the number of Ethiopians requiring humanitarian assistance during this
drought compared to the last serious drought in 2002-2003. Investing in
social safety net programs those in Ethiopia is critical to alleviating
chronic hunger and poverty.
Research indicates that climate change will lead to more frequent,
severe, and intense extreme weather events--like droughts as well as
floods and storms. What we also know from what communities are telling
us on the ground is that weather patterns in the Horn of Africa have
significantly changed over the last 10 years, with rains less
predictable now than they were before. The world's poor and
marginalized populations are among the most vulnerable to the impacts
of climate change. They live on the edge of crisis already, and climate
change threatens to push them off that edge. Women are often among the
most vulnerable within communities and households because they are
often tasked with collecting food and water--climate sensitive tasks
that (as we can see in the Horn of Africa) become much more difficult
in the face of extreme climate conditions.
It is critical to build the resilience of these populations to
climate impacts and shocks. Building resilience among vulnerable
populations is about increasing their ability to be flexible in the
face of uncertainty and to access the resources and opportunities they
need to adapt. At the same time, we must also tackle the underlying
causes of their vulnerability. These efforts include: supporting
livelihood diversification, promoting savings and insurance schemes to
provide a safety net for vulnerable populations, community and
government led early warning systems and other drought preparedness
measures. We need to support men and women to access the resources,
rights and opportunities they need to adapt to their changing
environment, their ability to access land and water, and women's
ability to expand their control over household income, by supporting
education work and activities that address women's ability to shape
their own destiny inside and outside the household.
And while some will disagree on the cause of drought, the reality
on the ground in the Horn is that the weather patterns have changed--be
it through climate change or other causes--and we must provide adequate
resources for the mitigation and adaptation to our changing climate.
recommendations
Given the gravity of the situation we suggest a number of
recommendations to be implemented urgently:
1. While efforts to date by the USG to ease legal restrictions
applicable to U.S. Government-funded programs in areas controlled by
prohibited entities are commendable, we implore the USG to extend the
relaxation of these restrictions to all possible funding sources
available to U.S. organizations. This may be achieved in two ways:
first, the issuance of a General License from OFAC allowing U.S.
persons to engage in certain transactions that may be incidental to the
famine response; and second, the favorable and expeditious processing
of specific license requests from U.S. organizations. The NGO community
stands ready to engage the appropriate USG agencies to develop these
constructive options to alleviate the effects of famine.
2. Expanded and speed up funding for the crisis in Somalia to match
the needs, but also to match the urgency of the response. The crisis is
happening now, and we need to ensure that funding is available for
spending within the next few weeks--not in several months down the
line. Hence we need urgent support from donor agencies within the U.S.
Government to reduce the lead-time for funding and reduce the
turnaround time on proposals.
3. Invest in the long-term resiliency and livelihood protections.
While we must address the immediate humanitarian crisis at hand in the
Horn of Africa, we should also take a long-term approach to addressing
the underlying cause of hunger and mitigate future impacts of
disasters. Investments in programs that support livelihoods and
resiliency of at-risk populations are critical to both saving lives and
saving money, by reducing the far more expensive response necessary to
address future crisis.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to answering any questions,
you and members of the committee have.
Senator Coons. Thank you very much, Mr. Schaap.
I hear a common theme. Obviously there are both naturally
caused or occurring climate-driven causes for this regional
drought and famine, but also those that arise directly from al-
Shabaab and its control of a significant area. There are some
real concerns both about the security and logistics of getting
into the area, but in a more pressing way about the United
States and the interaction between several of our agencies and
departments. The opportunity now through OFAC now to get a
license.
Mr. Konyndyk, you also had raised some concerns or
questions about the implementation of the new OFAC license
opportunity Mr. Schaap also reflected on. We are grateful for
the role that CARE and Mercy Corps and others play.
Mr. Schaap raised an issue about how NGOs who receive
funding other than directly from the United States Government
would operate, some unresolved questions about the license.
Would you expand a little bit, as you suggested in your
statement you would like to, concerns about implementation and
clarity about the necessary path forward for us to deliver
assistance appropriately and in a multilateral way?
Mr. Konyndyk. I am sorry. I would associate myself with Mr.
Schaap's comments. As we understand it, and we were only
briefed on this yesterday afternoon, so we are still digesting
it, and we all have armies of lawyers who are reviewing this
and whatnot. Our understanding at this point is that the
license that has been issued would only apply to programs that
are wholly or partly funded by the U.S. Government. And so, if
our agencies are working there doing discrete programs that do
not receive U.S. Government funding or wishing to do that, that
would not be covered by the license that was issued apparently
last Friday.
Senator Coons. So, your concern, if I understand correctly,
from both of you on behalf of your organizations, is that
relief efforts that are not directly funded by the U.S.
Government may still put your organizations at some legal
risk----
Mr. Konyndyk. That is correct.
Senator Coons [continuing]. If they are operating within
south Somalia.
Mr. Konyndyk. That is correct. And then the other----
Senator Coons. And then the other hope that can be resolved
promptly.
Mr. Konyndyk. Yes, we hope so as well. The other concern on
the implementation is just that at this point per our
understanding, USAID has all the authorities and clearances
that it needs, and it is going to be a matter of how they then
translate that in terms of what applies to their partners. And
that will be a discussion that we will be having with them in
the coming days.
Senator Coons. And all three of you and the previous panel
emphasized the time is of the essence, that there are literally
tens of thousands of children who are starving, and hundreds of
thousands who are at risk of or are on the verge of starvation.
Would further bureaucratic delay in resolving these issues
strike you as cruel and inappropriate?
Mr. Konyndyk. Your words, not mine, Senator. I certainly
think that the administration is moving now with great urgency
to try and clear these things out of the way. I think that what
we were told yesterday is an important step forward and a sign
of sincere good faith on the part of the administration in
resolving these things. I hope that we are now to a point of
detailed negotiations rather than kind of big picture political
will, and I do think that is the case.
But as I said in my remarks, and as I expand on them in my
written testimony, I do think there is a larger issue here that
bears exploration going forward by the Congress and the
administration of why it even got to this point. I mean, can we
find some ways of reviewing the law on this so that we do not
have to go through this long, drawn-out bureaucratic process in
order to do what generally everyone agrees should be done in
the first place.
Senator Coons. Doctor, let us turn to the question of al-
Shabaab. Understandably, they are subject to sanctions by the
United States. We have done everything we can to restrict their
opportunity to gain funding for their terrorist activities.
You referenced both in your written testimony and the
testimony you just gave to us that there is real opportunity
here because of some tensions within the organization. Speak,
if you would, just a little bit further about whether it is
appropriate for us to be issuing broad licenses and allowing
humanitarian assistance in, if it might further strengthen this
terrorist organization.
Dr. Pham. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, the question of al-
Shabaab really is to understand that it is not a monolithic
organization.
Senator Coons. Right.
Dr. Pham. At its core is a very radicalized, extremist
leadership with very close connections to some very dangerous
people in other parts of the world, and we need to be seriously
concerned. They have operational reach and have shown
themselves capable of carrying out its acts in neighboring
countries as well.
That being said, however, the organization itself is broken
up. It is a marriage of convenience. Some of the factions that
are now in al-Shabaab, a year ago were possibly with the
government; next year--these are clan factions and militias.
And this is an opportunity. Some of them in places I can name--
Harardhere, for example--have stated, ``Bring us aid. We are
willing to switch allegiances.'' So, there is an opportunity.
And this is why the secondary track, the track two policy
that Assistant Secretary Carson announced last year, is
important. We need to get that going. It was announced a year
ago, but we still have not really developed it. This is the
type of program that would allow us to have the information and
the partners on the ground who can distinguish where are the
areas we can work in.
Right now, it is a theory--it is a concept, a very valid
one, but we really have not worked it out as well as we should
have.
Senator Coons. So, if I understand you correctly, like most
groups, it is made up of a variety of different splinter
groups, some that are hardcore jihadists bent on international
terror, others that, frankly, are local either clan or tribal
groups that are aligned with al-Shabaab sort out of
convenience.
You mentioned in your testimony before there is reason to
believe that they may be holding by force or threat of force
thousands of potential refugees who could find assistance
elsewhere in Kenya or Ethiopia. Why would you think they might
be doing that?
Dr. Pham. Several reasons. First, because there have been
several districts actually in lower and middle Shabelle where
they did not exercise that type of control, and now they rule
literally a desert. A 100 percent of the people are gone, 100
percent of the livestock is dead. They have a desert to
themselves. They can enjoy it. So, quite pragmatically, if you
are trying to seek control of territory, you want a population.
Second, and this gets into some of the quandaries of aid
delivery, I think they have gambled as well that eventually aid
is going to flow, and this is where we have to be careful how
we allow that to flow. And, therefore, the more--and we have
had this experience in Somalia; I was in there in the 1990s
when it happened--the more refugees you have, the more
displaced persons, the more resources will flow to your area,
not necessarily to those people, but resources you can divert.
So, some of them may very well be simply holding people so
they can increase head count and rent seeking behavior.
Senator Coons. One other country in the region we have not
referenced at all today is Eritrea, one of the most
totalitarian regimes in the world, that there is really very
little information about the conditions on the ground, about
the humanitarian needs, if I understand that correctly. As I
was looking at maps, it was literally blank in terms of data.
Any insight from any members of the panel on the likely
humanitarian situation in Eritrea, also a country where the
tension between the security situation, the governance
situation, and the humanitarian situation is unresolved and
with an unclear path?
Dr. Pham. If I may begin, Senator, just to give one index
of how bad the situation probably is in Eritrea, somewhere
around slightly under 50,000 people have crossed the border
into Ethiopia. It is a mine laden trap, and these people have
risked everything, not just to walk across the desert, but a
minefield, to get over the border--these are the survivors. And
so, that just says something about the level of desperation.
I have met people who have made that passage, who have
become refugees. I have spoken with them, and the situation is
pretty dire.
Senator Coons. Thank you. I have further questions, but I
will yield to Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. Mr. Konyndyk, I want to ask you a specific
question regarding what you referred to as a systemic problem
in the administration regarding licensing. Is the systemic
problem too much bureaucracy?
Mr. Konyndyk. I do not know if I would say there is too
much bureaucracy. I mean, I think that, you know, what we
have--there are different agencies that have different
priorities and different angles on some of these issues. And
the setup we have right now in terms of the legal restrictions,
the OFAC restrictions, what is prohibited in terms of what is
considered to be material support, makes it, I think, very
difficult for those different agencies that all have a stake in
this to resolve this sort of thing quickly.
Our suggestion would be to look at, maybe as a first step,
to our understanding, the Patriot Act exempts medical supplies
and religious materials from the definition of what would
constitute material support. We would be interested in
exploring whether that carve-out could be broadened to include
other sorts of urgent humanitarian assistance in situations
like this so that it would not require a long, drawn-out
bureaucratic process to enable aid agencies to have the legal
permissions they need to respond in this kind of situation.
Senator Isakson. On that point, Dr. Pham, it is my
understanding, well, I know, in fact, in your testimony you
said that in many cases local NGOs are better equipped to
deliver aid than might be a nonresident NGO. And SAACID, I
think, is a group of Somali women that deliver support within
Somalia, but would probably be prohibited from having assets
because of this restriction that it only be United States
delivered funds. Is that correct?
Dr. Pham. Well, Senator, SAACID--to cite that specific NGO,
one of their problems was that they were falsely accused about
a year and a half ago in a U.N. report of having made payoffs
to
al-Shabaab. They were exonerated in the subsequent U.N.
followup report, but that meant 18 months where they were cut
off from the international funding. And those were 18 months
they lost.
But they work very effectively by partnering with
traditional clan elders, local community members, and that is
their protection. During the period of fighting in Mogadishu,
they were only entity, governmental or not, that had operations
in all 16 districts of the city. It is a tremendous
organization today. And the scale of what they are delivering
is amazing, so I want to pay tribute to them.
If I can turn back--I know my two colleagues are somewhat
constrained by relationships to comment on the----
Senator Isakson. That is why I asked you----
Dr. Pham. Yes. We focus a lot, and we are Americans--we
focus a lot on perhaps obstacles in our own processes. I think
we also--in fairness also look at obstacles at the
international level. The World Food Programme works on a 3-
month delivery cycle. How is it--and I ask myself, how is that
knowing that this was coming down the line, although they are a
major resource in the region, they did not put more food in the
region? Over the weekend, they had two flights that for all
intents and purposes to Badoa and Mogadishu were for show. They
took 4 tons of Plumpy to Badoa, about 14 tons, I understand, to
Mogadishu.
SAACID is the NGO we spoke on earlier, in a month goes
through 65 tons just in Mogadishu alone. So, 4 tons is helpful,
but it really was more for the cameras than anything else
frankly.
Senator Isakson. Well, I wanted to be quite clear. I
understand that it is important that the administration and our
country do everything they can to prohibit U.S. aid getting
into terrorist hands, and that is one of the reasons for some
of the restrictions. But when you do reach a crisis point in a
humanitarian problem like this, it seems like there ought to be
expedited procedures, or else the people you are trying to help
are going to be dead. And that is the comment that I was trying
to get to, because there is no question these organizations in
Africa operate on cash flow from corruption. And many of them
are organizations that are affiliated with al-Qaeda or with
other nefarious groups around the world. But it is important
with this many people at threat of losing their lives that we
have an expedited procedure to the maximum extent possible.
I noted that Bob Laprade was supposed to testify today, but
you are in his place. That causes me to make an observation for
the people here today. Mr. Laprade, who is with CARE
International, could not be here today because he is suffering
from malaria. That reminded me that my first trip with CARE to
Ethiopia, in Awaze Ethiopia, the CARE representative that I
worked with also had malaria. And so, I want to thank you for
the risk that you take in very dangerous parts of the world to
deliver humanitarian aid and hope. People do not, I think,
sometimes equate the risk and the exposure of their own health
that CARE and many other NGOs like it put themselves in to help
other people. So, thank you for doing that.
One last question for Dr. Pham. You talked in your remarks
about al-Shabaab keeping people from getting help. They are
actually stopping refugees from leaving the country to get
help. Is that correct?
Dr. Pham. From sources on the ground that I have spoken
with in the last 24 hours, there appear in lower Shabelle to be
three different areas. One appears to be a camp of sorts where
they are actually holding people. Two are just areas where they
have created enough violence around them more or less to corral
them in, so it is not a guarded situation, but it is a
threatening one. And they are preventing people in, it appears
in two of those cases, from heading to Mogadishu, crossing the
line over to the area controlled by the African Union
peacekeepers where aid can get to them. A hundred thousand
people have already crossed, and they're preventing more from
going. The other area seems to be to prevent people from
heading south toward Kenya.
Senator Isakson. And the goal is to just strike fear in the
population, or what?
Dr. Pham. I think it is several fold, and I think it is
hard to disaggregate. One, to keep people that they can still
rule. They aspire to rule and ruling on empty land is not what
they were planning to do. And, two, I think some of it might be
local interests of local al-Shabaab commanders to have people
as resources, because people will attract aid, which they hope
they will be able to tax, divert, or otherwise tap into.
Senator Isakson. Last quick question. One of the big
problems in Africa is in a lot of cases, organizations will use
rape and violence against women as a tool of accomplishing
their end goal. Do your people on the ground give you any
indication that al-Shabaab is using that as a tool?
Dr. Pham. I am not getting reports of anything. There are
cases of violence against women very clearly, and some of those
are being documented, but not as a systematic attempt to exert
control or terror, unlike other tragic cases in Africa.
Mr. Schaap. May I----
Senator Isakson. Yes.
Mr. Schaap [continuing]. Add a point on that? In various
camps in the region, sexual violence against women is a serious
problem, and not just within in Somalia, but also outside.
Senator Isakson. Thank you very much for testifying today,
all of you.
Mr. Chairman.
Senator Coons. I would like to follow up, if I could, Mr.
Schaap, on a comment you made earlier in response to the
earthquake that was in Iran. I think 2003 that there was an
exception to the licensing procedure by OFAC that was granted
more broadly that might be a useful example here. Could you
elaborate on that?
Mr. Schaap. I do not have the technical details as such,
but we can get back to you on that.
Senator Coons. I mean, certainly from all of our witnesses
today, we are looking for a responsible, swift, and appropriate
path forward. I understand that--just by my comment earlier--I
understand that different entities within the United States
Government are charged with enforcing different legal
obligations, and that sometimes the desire for prompt and
effective humanitarian assistance runs up against the barriers
that we put in place in order to prevent assistance from being
provided, wittingly or unwittingly, to those who are also
enemies of the United States and pose a real threat to the
international order.
I would be interested in your input, if I could--it is for
my three questions here--first, about future planning, about
how the United States can better assist the countries in the
region, particularly here in the Horn of Africa, where the
climactic conditions seem to be worsening. How do we help them
build resilience, sustainable capacity, to deal with these
crises so that we do not face them periodically?
Second, several of you have referenced threatened cuts to
U.S. aid. The House has taken up the relevant budget and has
proposed--I think Mr. Konyndyk suggested it was a 30-percent
cut over last year, 50 percent over the year 2008 funding
levels. How do you see our efforts to sustain American
engagement with development, with assistance, playing out, and
what suggestions might you have for us on how to help the
average American understand why there is value in doing this,
not just from a humanitarian perspective, but a strategic
perspective?
Mr. Schaap. I think the need for recovery and resilience
programming is extremely high, and I think it is important to
get the planning for that started now even while we are in such
crisis.
There are other things that NGOs and others are doing in
these areas around ensuring livestock health, ensuring
improvement of natural resource management, vocational training
to diversify the income streams that people have. CARE does a
little work on savings groups to help ensure asset
diversification so people have some liquid assets during a
drought.
So, there are a lot of things that can be done, and this
needs to be scaled up in response to the drought because people
have lost all of their assets. And we want to avoid a situation
where after this drought and after this massive crisis, because
it is going to be massive, people are left for a long period of
time while agencies are planning for recovery and resiliency
programming afterward.
If I may add a point on your earlier comment on
bureaucratic obstacles and aid delivery coming through quickly,
this is a serious concern. We are looking at a 2- or 3-month
window of opportunity in which we can still save lives. The
pace we have seen, not just with U.S. Government donors, but
other donors as well, it take multiple, multiple months to get
through the process. And the added complications of U.S.
antiterrorist regulations have added significant periods of
time. And that's really worrying also going forward now that we
have a short timeframe to prevent more deaths.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Schaap.
Mr. Konyndyk.
Mr. Konyndyk. Yes, I would, again, fully endorse what Mr.
Schaap has said about the need to build resiliency. The sorts
of programs that the U.S. Government has funded many of its
partners to do in Ethiopia, in Kenya, are a really important
reason why the impact of the drought there is not as severe as
what we are seeing in southern Somalia.
I mean, it is important to note that regardless of the
political and security factors, the lack of sustained
development programming going back years in southern Somalia,
far before the current political configuration was in place, is
a significant factor in why it is so much worse there.
And looking forward, we need to invest in a response right
now that is not thinking just about the next 3 months but about
the next 5 to 10 years, and trying to rebuild people's
resiliency and livelihoods as quickly as possible.
In terms of the U.S. Government's support, the specific
USAID budgets and engaging the American public, we have been
very concerned so far that this situation does not seem to have
really broken through yet in terms of the American
consciousness in a way that the recent crises in Haiti and
Japan did. I think that--there is a very clear link between the
level of American public engagement in a crisis and the level
of private donations and private support that the public
provides, but also then the level of support that the U.S.
Government is motivated to provide.
And so, I think that obviously we strongly support the
accounts that I mentioned earlier, and we think that protecting
those is critical. But it is also really important for U.S.
political leaders to, I think, to signal to the American people
just how serious this situation is. After the crisis in Haiti,
the President and the First Lady were very vocal about the
needs there, about the importance of providing aid there. We
have not seen that level of engagement out of the White House
yet, and I think that that would be really important and really
helpful. I understand the President has been dealing with some
other issues lately, but hopefully in the coming month we can
see more engagement on that.
And I think as well, you know, for Members of Congress, all
of them are going back to their districts now for recess. I
think this is an important to discuss with your constituents.
And we would love to see, you know, joint calls from the
Congress and the administration for greater American
engagement. Thank you.
Senator Coons. Thank you.
Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. Following up, Mr. Konyndyk, what guarantee
or assurance does Mercy Corps give that the funds made
available to it actually get to the needy communities?
Mr. Konyndyk. Well, we have a range of measures in place
for that. As with any private American charity, there are laws
and procedures that are in place. We get audited every year and
we make those audit findings public. Those audits are very,
very intensive, and they are every year.
We also are part of and collaborate with various
accountability networks within our sector. There is a group
called Interaction, which is sort of the umbrella organization
for all American international charities, which has member
standards that we adhere to that get to exactly that. And then
also, as a partner of the U.S. Government, there are very, very
rigorous standards that we have to adhere to in order to
qualify for U.S. Government funding.
So, there are a lot of kind of overlapping accountability
standards and audits, and all of those things which help to
hold us to account.
Senator Isakson. In those standards, or in your own
internally controlled standards, is there an acceptable amount
of--I understand we are dealing in very difficult areas of the
world and very difficult circumstances is there an acceptable
level of leakage and then one upon which there is no tolerance?
Mr. Konyndyk. There is no--you never want to say ``here is
our acceptable level of leakage,'' because then you will be
sure to get that level of leakage.
Senator Isakson. Right. I understand that is how things get
worse.
Mr. Konyndyk. So, I mean, our priority is absolutely to
ensure that the aid gets where it is supposed to go. I think
that we have a very low tolerance for leakage. It is always on
a case-by-case basis. Looking at Somalia specifically, and as I
written in earlier articles on this, one of the factors that
caused us to scale back our operations in the south back in
2010 even before we were formally expelled, was that we were
seeing unacceptable levels of interference. And so, no level of
leakage is really tolerable, and I think that what we are
willing to work with is minimal, but it cannot be defined
except on a case-by-case basis.
Senator Isakson. Mr. Schaap is nodding his head in
agreement with that answer I think, but I want to be sure and
give you a chance to express yourself.
Mr. Schaap. Yes. I just want to add to that is that there
is also in Nairobi with agencies working in Somalia a constant
dialogue about what mechanisms we have in place to severely
limit the ability of diversion to happen. And there is the
leadership of the U.N., the humanitarian coordinator on this
has been quite strong in the last couple of months to really
push back on those initiatives that have been pushing for
taxation, et cetera, et cetera on the ground. And our systems
internally are very tight to make sure that whatever we pledge
to provide to beneficiaries are actually going to beneficiaries
and not anywhere else.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Coons. Senator Isakson, thank you very much for
joining me. I would like to thank Mr. Konyndyk, Dr. Pham, and
Mr. Schaap for your personal service, for the risks you've
taken, in order to deliver relief, for the leadership role that
your organizations have taken, and for the insight you have
given us and the world as folks have deliberated over this
humanitarian crisis.
As you have helped make clear today, this is the gravest
humanitarian crisis facing the world today. It was foreseeable.
It was one for which preparations were made and where there is
investment that has made it less severe than it otherwise might
have been. But it is one that can be expected to occur again
because of the combination of governance, climactic, regional,
economic, and social factors in the Horn of Africa.
And so, it is my hope that we will be working together, the
people of the United States, the nonprofit community, have
private citizens to heighten public concern, to strengthen
international engagement, to not just respond to this immediate
and very real crisis that will likely take tens of thousands if
not hundreds of thousands of lives, but to lay the groundwork
for preventing a recurrence of this crisis, those parts of it
that were entirely preventable.
Senator Isakson and I share a view that Africa is a
continent of enormous promise, and it is tragic to have this
particular crisis be what most Americans will be seeing about
Africa in the month ahead. It is my hope that they will be
seeing more of it, and I am grateful for your role in
highlighting and addressing this very serious humanitarian
crisis.
Thank you for your testimony. I will keep the record open
for the Senators who were not able to join us today to submit
statements until the close of business, Friday, August 5.
Senator Coons. And this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:52 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)
Chairman Coons, Senator Isakson, members of the subcommittee, thank
you for focusing attention on the unfolding tragedy in the Horn of
Africa, and for providing UNICEF with this opportunity to share our
perspective on this devastating situation.
This is a children's crisis. The haunting images we have seen and
the facts of this emergency speak for themselves.
Across Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya, an estimated 2.3 million
children are acutely malnourished. These are already among the world's
most disadvantaged children, living on the brink and becoming more
vulnerable by the day, deprived of virtually every human need. More
than a half million severely malnourished children are at risk of
imminent death. Those children who do survive face huge threats to
their physical and mental development.
While the situation is most dire for those inside Somalia and the
refugees arriving in Kenya and Ethiopia, a large number of people
affected by the drought live outside the camps, in communities across
the region. The impact of the drought is threatening people's
livelihood and, for the large nomadic population, their way of life.
This is important to consider when we look beyond immediate life-saving
needs, and focus on building resilience to avoid this situation in the
future.
UNICEF has worked in Somalia for decades. We are currently one of
the few agencies operating in southern Somalia. We are gearing up to
increase delivery of critical supplies to some of the hardest hit areas
there. Over the next 2 months, we expect to expand blanket
supplementary feeding to reach 150,000 families, including 180,000
children under the age of 5 in Somalia.
We are also planning to more than double the capacity for treatment
of severe malnutrition in Somalia, increasing coverage from the current
7,500 children per month to at least 17,000 children per month through
a network of over 200 outpatient therapeutic feeding facilities in
southern Somalia.
But food alone is not enough. For children, an effective response
requires much more. To save their lives and safeguard their futures, we
need an integrated response that includes miracle foods like Plumpy-Nut
and therapeutic milk; breastfeeding support; clean water and proper
sanitation; basic immunizations against killers like measles and polio;
and child protection programs to keep children safe. In fact, in many
instances it is diseases like these that kill children who are too weak
from lack of food to fight infection.
With our partner U.N. agencies, including the World Food Programme
and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, UNICEF is doing everything
we can to provide this critical support. This includes: supplying
health clinics and outposts that serve an estimated 2.5 million women
and children with sufficient essential drugs, vaccines, basic equipment
and training; reaching millions of children with measles vaccinations,
Vitamin A supplementation, and deworming. At the same time, we are
working to expand access to education to hundreds of thousands of
primary school-age children, and we are working to establish 343 new
Child Friendly Spaces to provide psychosocial support, recreational
materials, food, education activities, health and hygiene education,
and clean water for an additional 30,000 children.
UNICEF is also scaling up our response in Kenya and Ethiopia in
health, nutrition, water, sanitation, and hygiene promotion. In Kenya,
an emergency measles vaccination campaign is underway for more than
230,000 children in Dadaab camp and neighboring host communities. We
are leveraging this campaign to provide other emergency health
interventions such as polio vaccinations, Vitamin A supplements, and
deworming.
In Ethiopia, we are expanding our response to measles outbreaks in
drought-affected areas for more than 650,000 children, and working with
UNHCR for the vaccination of refugee children upon arrival as part of
the routine screening.
The need for all of us--U.N. agencies, NGOs like those represented
at this hearing and others--to expand these efforts is urgent, and
securing immediate funding is crucial. We at UNICEF greatly appreciate
the generosity of the donor community, including the U.S. Government.
And for the U.N. as a whole, public and private donors have committed
more than US$1 billion this year to help respond to humanitarian needs
in the Horn of Africa. But there is a significant shortfall in funding.
To reach the greatest number of children possible, we must close this
gap as quickly as possible.
As we noted at the outset, this is a children's crisis. The
magnitude of suffering and loss is tremendous, and the stakes have
never been higher. With no significant harvest in sight for the next 6
months, this crisis may well deepen. But we must not despair. For we
have the obligation, and potentially the means, to save literally
hundreds of thousands of children's lives--if we act now.
Once again, we thank the subcommittee for its leadership in
addressing this humanitarian catastrophe.
______
Responses of Assistant Administrator Nancy Lindborg to Questions
Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
long-term agricultural investment
Question. With over 12 million people in the Horn that currently
need life-saving assistance and access to food, water, and sanitation,
this crisis clearly requires a response now. However, it also points us
back to the need for continued investment in long-term agricultural and
food security programs. In order to put an end to the cycle of
recurring crises and vulnerability in the Horn, we must continue to
invest money in programs abroad that support infrastructure development
such as roads and irrigation systems, value chain development, and
environmentally sustainable agricultural practices. We need to expand
economic opportunity for women, through strengthening their access to
markets and decisionmaking power and help them to sustain economic
livelihoods that can be resilient in the face of crisis. How can the
U.S. Government and its partners ensure that they are not only
responding to the current crisis but also working to lay the foundation
for stronger, more sustainable local and regional food systems that can
withstand crises and better respond to emergencies in the future?
Answer. This question is at the heart of our drought response as we
see the positive impact of programs that have built resilience and the
critical challenges of building longer term sustainability even as we
meet emergency needs.
In countries prone to cyclical droughts and floods, reducing social
and economic vulnerability is a necessary step toward sustainable (and
equitable) food security. The primary responsibility for this rests
with government, which means that the prospects for reducing
vulnerability in Somalia are unlikely to improve until a legitimate
form of governance is in place. Even in Kenya and Ethiopia, despite
good policy frameworks, governance issues contribute significantly to
chronic vulnerability and food insecurity. However, both governments
have publically committed to increasing their investment in these
previously marginalized areas, and the U.S. Government is well
positioned to work with other donors and development partners to align
resources and programs in support of these efforts.
The Senator's question raises an issue that is at the heart of the
Presidential Initiative, Feed the Future (FTF). While the bulk of
resources provided directly through FTF tend to be focused on achieving
broad-based agriculture growth, the initiative provides a framework for
the integration of a wide range of program approaches necessary for
increasing the resilience of households and communities to the impacts
of repeated climatic shocks, including community management of acute
malnutrition, disaster risk reduction, productive safety nets,
livelihood diversification--all supported by food and other disaster
relief programming. These are activities on which development
programming can build, as long as appropriate levels of investment in
those areas and commodities most likely to trigger and drive
sustainable long-term economic growth can be maintained. This approach
recognizes that in several of our Feed the Future focus countries--most
notably Kenya and Ethiopia--a ``comprehensive'' approach to food
security will require a deliberate focus on reducing chronic
vulnerability as well as stimulating economic growth.
The current crisis has underscored the need for a mechanism to
increase coordination and resource integration. The Administrator has
established a ``Joint Planning Cell'' (JPC) comprising humanitarian and
development experts from the Kenya, Ethiopia, and Regional missions,
and the Bureaus for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance;
Food Security; Africa; Global Health; and Economic Growth, Agriculture,
and Trade.
Externally, we are working with the Africa Union, government
counterparts, regional authorities, other donors, and development
partners to ensure that emergency efforts are sustained while a process
for coordinated action and investment in medium to longer term
development in the region's arid and semiarid lands--those areas most
vulnerable to climatic shocks and chronic food insecurity--is
established.
Momentum is building, and a series of high-level events in East
Africa, the United Nations General Assembly, and the World Bank fall
meetings, are being used to build an international coalition focused on
this effort. The U.S. Government is increasingly looked to for
leadership in the areas of early warning, nutrition, and climate-
sensitive agricultural research and development--the key components of
sustainable global food security. We are in the position to leverage
significant foreign and domestic development resources, however, we
must continue to demonstrate a sustained level of commitment--of both
humanitarian and development resources--something that is increasingly
being challenged in FY 2012 budget negotiations.
consultation/engagement with women
Question. As in almost all crisis situations, women have been
disproportionately impacted by the drought and famine in the Horn.
Women and children have been identified as most vulnerable to
malnutrition, communicable disease, and ultimately, death. Recently,
Deputy Administrator Don Steinberg insists that women be front and
center in the response to the crisis, not just as victims but as a key
part of the solution. How are the U.S. Government and its partners
involving women and women's civil society organizations in the planning
and execution of its programs and working to ensure that women are
active participants in the response efforts?
Answer. The U.S. Government's humanitarian assistance partners in
the eastern Horn of Africa are taking steps to ensure that the most
vulnerable community members, including women and children, are both
targeted by the assistance and are able to participate in the response.
From August 11 to 15, 2011, the USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team
(DART) visited and conducted a focus group with Masai pastoralist women
and girls in drought-affected Kajiado County, Kenya. USAID/DART
members, including a gender specialist, also conducted an assessment in
Oromiya and Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples (SNNP) regions
to assess protection and gender mainstreaming in ongoing nutrition and
water, sanitation, and hygiene programs. The assessment in both Kenya
and Ethiopia found that relief agencies have put in place careful
targeting procedures that involve community-wide consultation to ensure
that the most vulnerable community members, including women and girls,
are included in beneficiary lists. Additionally, agencies have put in
place complaints procedures that enable community members to notify the
relief agency if, for any reason, they do not receive assistance that
was targeted for them.
Relief agencies also design assistance to ensure that women and
girls can participate in the response intervention. For example,
agencies implementing cash-for-work programs design work activities
that are physically feasible and culturally appropriate for women, and
enable women to work on a flexible schedule, which allows them to both
participate in income-generating opportunities and to attend to
household responsibilities. USAID implementing partners also rely
heavily on female health extension workers to implement health and
nutrition programs in health posts and stabilization centers that
target vulnerable women and children. The programs use gender-balanced
teams and predominantly rely on female staff to attend to female
patients. These health extension workers also make referrals in the
communities they work in for the transport of women and children to
stabilization centers, minimizing dangers they would face during long
distance travel.
gender-based violence
Question. Violence against women and girls is often severe in
situations of crisis and natural disasters and the current famine in
the Horn of Africa is no exception. Women and girls are facing rape and
sexual violence as they travel to and live in refugee camps. Reports of
sexual violence for the month of June alone are four times the amount
from January through May. Women just arriving to camps, who are living
in tents and makeshift shelters, consistently report sexual violence as
a threat to fuel collection and access to basic services such as water
and food. How are USAID and the Department of State working with
humanitarian organizations and U.N. agencies to prevent and respond to
this violence?
Answer. USAID strongly encourages its humanitarian partners to
incorporate protection measures into all humanitarian assistance
activities through protection mainstreaming. Protection mainstreaming
seeks to minimize risks for harm, exploitation, and abuse for disaster-
affected populations--including gender-based violence. Women and girls
are particularly vulnerable to harm, exploitation, and exclusion, and
many protection mainstreaming efforts are designed to ensure their
inclusion, participation, and safety in accessing relief activities.
There are a variety of ways in which USAID-funded relief programs
in the Horn response are mainstreaming protection; for example, NGOs
implementing cash-for-work and cash grant activities consult with all
community members, including women and other potentially marginalized
groups, to target the most vulnerable households. Additionally, relief
agencies design cash-for-work activities and schedules that enable
women to participate, by offering work activities that are culturally
appropriate and safe for women, and by allowing a flexible schedule
that enables women to manage both household responsibilities and
income-generating activities.
USAID's implementing partners also consult with women and girls
about the placement of water points, latrines, and distribution sites,
to ensure that they are safely accessible for women and girls. To limit
the risk for domestic violence when women are targeted with food
assistance, humanitarian agencies may conduct awareness-raising within
communities to explain to men and boys the reasons for providing
assistance to the women, and pointing out to benefits to the entire
household. In addition, USAID's gender and protection advisors
routinely review all NGO funding proposals to encourage potential
partners to incorporate protection and gender mainstreaming efforts in
their proposed activities.
USAID also works closely with the State Department's Bureau of
Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) to ensure a coordinated USG
response supporting refugee, host-community, and internally displaced
populations. USAID is currently exploring opportunities with PRM to
coordinate support for the provision of fuel efficient stoves with the
multiple goals of preventing GBV during wood collection as well as
mitigating tension between refugee and host community populations while
reducing impact on the environment.
______
Response of Deputy Assistant Secretary Reuben Brigety to Question
Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Question. Violence against women and girls is often severe in
situations of crisis and natural disasters and the current famine in
the Horn of Africa is no exception. Women and girls are facing rape and
sexual violence as they travel to and live in refugee camps. Reports of
sexual violence for the month of June alone are four times the amount
from January through May. Women just arriving to camps, who are living
in tents and makeshift shelters, consistently report sexual violence as
a threat to fuel collection and access to basic services such as water
and food.
How are USAID and the Department of State working with
humanitarian organizations and U.N. agencies to prevent and
respond to this violence?
Answer. The State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and
Migration (PRM) prioritizes the protection of refugee women and girls,
including prevention and response to gender based violence (GBV), in
all displacement crises, and has supported GBV interventions for
refugees in the Horn of Africa and beyond for many years. Despite
significant gains on this issue, the recent influx of new refugees is
posing new challenges that require additional resources. Refugees are
at particularly high risk during flight and upon arrival at camps where
humanitarians are struggling to ramp up to keep pace with the rate of
new arrivals (1,500 a day to Kenya and 100-300 a day to Ethiopia).
Women and girls are particularly vulnerable.
PRM is working with our main partner, the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and nongovernmental
organization (NGO) partners and has provided emergency funding to
ensure that efforts to prevent and respond to GBV are scaled up. UNHCR
has completed a rapid GBV assessment to identify priority interventions
and also increased its registration capacity--a critical step in
accessing services. UNHCR has also deployed protection and community
services officers to both Kenya and Ethiopia and stood up protection
teams to increase protection monitoring, systematically interview new
arrivals and conduct border monitoring. It is also training
implementing partners on vulnerability screening in order to fast track
those with special needs through the registration process.
PRM emergency funding to UNHCR, the International Organization for
Migration (IOM), and NGO partners is supporting a number of activities
including: (1) expansion of transportation for refugees from borders to
camps to mitigate the risk of attack in transit, (2) awareness raising
campaigns, particularly for new arrivals who may not know of services
available, (3) referral pathways which inform humanitarian staff,
survivors and communities about response procedures, (4) safe havens
for survivors, (5) emergency medical interventions, (6) mental health
services, (7) shelter, and (8) hygiene. PRM has also deployed staff to
monitor the refugee response in Dadaab, Kenya, and in Ethiopia.
While PRM is focused mainly on the refugee situation, we are
working closely with colleagues at USAID to ensure a coordinated and
thorough response as refugee-hosting communities are also very
vulnerable and disputes over limited resources often incite GBV.
USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) has provided
nearly $80 million in support to drought-affected populations and
USAID's Office of Food for Peace has contributed nearly $400 million in
food aid toward the crisis in the Horn, a portion of which goes to
refugees but also to the drought-affected host communities. We are
exploring with OFDA opportunities to support provision of fuel
efficient stoves with the multiple goals of preventing GBV during wood
collection as well as mitigating tension with host communities and
reducing impact on the environment.