[Senate Hearing 112-361]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-361
NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES IN THE FISCAL YEAR 2012
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS BUDGET
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 2, 2011
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
73-904 PDF WASHINGTON : 2012
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC
area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC
20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JIM WEBB, Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TOM UDALL, New Mexico MIKE LEE, Utah
Frank G. Lowenstein, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Clinton, Hon. Hillary Rodham, Secretary of State, U.S. Department
of State, Washington, DC....................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Responses to questions submitted for the record from the
following:
Senator John F. Kerry.................................... 47
Senator Richard G. Lugar................................. 111
Senator Barbara Boxer.................................... 148
Senator Robert Menendez.................................. 149
Senator James E. Risch................................... 162
Senator Bob Corker....................................... 165
Senator Robert P. Casey, Jr.............................. 175
Senator Mike Lee......................................... 177
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 3
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Hon. Michael S. Lee, U.S. Senator from Utah, prepared statement.. 46
(iii)
NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES IN THE FISCAL YEAR 2012
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS BUDGET
----------
WEDNESDAY. MARCH 2, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m., in
room SD-106, Dirksen Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Kerry, Boxer, Menendez, Cardin, Casey,
Webb, Shaheen, Coons, Durbin, Lugar, Corker, Rubio, DeMint, and
Lee.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
The Chairman. Good morning. This hearing will come to
order.
Madam Secretary, it's wonderful to welcome you here today.
I know you're freshly back from a quick trip and we appreciate
enormously all of your efforts on our behalf. I can't think of
a more relevant moment in many ways for you to appear before
the committee, so we're happy to have you here.
Let me just say up front that we have joined with our
allies and we've heard loudly and clearly from you, Madam
Secretary, that Colonel Qaddafi must go. He has lost all
legitimacy, and I think it's important to be clear that we
can't be halfway committed to that goal.
The people of Libya are not asking for foreign troops on
the ground. They are committed to doing what is necessary. But
they do need the tools to prevent the slaughter of innocents on
Libyan streets. I believe that the global community cannot be
on the sidelines while airplanes are allowed to bomb and
strafe. A no-fly zone is not a long-term proposition, assuming
the outcome is what all desire, and I believe we ought to be
ready to implement it as necessary.
It is clear that we are living through one of the most
important transformations in the history of the modern world.
Some have likened the wave of protests sweeping the Middle East
to the revolutions of 1848, which changed Europe's political
landscape forever. There is no doubt that the events of this
year will be studied for decades to come.
But in this moment, at this time as we gather here and as
the events unfold in the region, the full ramifications of the
upheaval that has happened from Tunis to Tahrir Square, in the
streets of Manama and Sanaa, in Tripoli and beyond, we don't
understand yet exactly how that outcome is going to be defined.
What we do know is that this is a time of great challenge,
particularly for the people there, but also for people in other
countries with interests and with families and connections
there. Events this powerful demand a powerful response. Our
commitment now to the ordinary people who are risking their
lives to win human rights and democracy will be remembered for
generations in the Arab world. We have to get this moment
right.
We are working here in the Senate with colleagues on both
sides of the aisle to create a package of longer term financial
assistance. As contrary as some might think that is in the
context of our budget today, which we will discuss, it is in
fact an imperative, because it is key to helping to turn the
new Arab Awakening into a lasting rebirth.
In the event that our involvement is not about sending
troops or tanks to remake the region in our image, it's about
sending economists and election experts and humanitarian aid to
help a region remake itself. We have not yet worked out any
numbers or details and obviously we'll work with the
administration. But I am convinced that a significant financial
commitment by the United States to assist in this monumental
and uplifting transformation is key to its long-term outcome
and to our relationship to it.
We're being called upon to forge new relationships in a
part of the world that has been and will remain vital to our
national security. We've been given the opportunity to
demonstrate conclusively to the young men and women of the
Muslim world and beyond that al-Qaeda's belief that change
requires violence and radicalization is just plain wrong. In
fact, that is one thing that really stands out in the events of
the last 6 weeks or so. The Arab Awakening is an unambiguous
repudiation of al-Qaeda's poisonous doctrine.
We now have one of history's greatest opportunities to
affirm the universal appeal of democratic values to people
across cultures and across religions, and to encourage an
entire region to move toward reform and away from violence.
Now, as I mentioned--and the Secretary knows this better
than anyone--we all understand we face a budget crisis in our
own country. But we can either pay now to help brave people
build a better democratic future for themselves or we will
certainly pay later, in much higher terms, with increased
threats to our own national security.
The budget that we're here to discuss this morning lays the
foundation for our ability to fulfill our responsibilities to
the American people and our responsibilities on a universal
basis to people that keep faith with our values. The $53
billion in core funding that the President has requested for
international affairs is in fact a very small investment for
the kind of return that we get.
Consider this. We're going to spend certainly $700 billion
plus this year on our military. By contrast, the international
affairs budget is less than one-tenth of what the Pentagon
spends. As Secretary Gates himself pointed out, if you took the
entire Foreign Service roster you could barely staff one
aircraft carrier.
Yet our diplomats are serving on the front lines of
multiple revolutions and wars. They're making vital
contributions in Afghanistan and in Iraq they're planning the
transition from a military mission to a diplomatic one, so that
we can cement the political progress that has cost hundreds of
billions of dollars and thousands of American lives. In Africa
they are helping to midwife the birth of a new nation in South
Sudan, to resolve the situation in Darfur, to forge a new
relationship with the government in Khartoum. They're leading
the fight against global challenges like nuclear proliferation
and climate change, and in countless communities around the
world they are providing essential humanitarian assistance,
preventing the spread of cholera in Haiti, distributing food to
refugees from the conflict in northern Kenya, and providing
shelter to flood victims in Pakistan.
This is simply not the time for America to pull back from
the world. It is time to step forward. Yet, just last week the
House sent us a continuing resolution for fiscal year 2011 that
imposes draconian cuts. The budget would slash our humanitarian
aid by 50 percent, decimating our ability to provide food,
shelter, and medicine after natural disasters, and putting
hundreds of thousands of lives at risk. It would cut nearly
two-thirds of the funds devoted to promoting clean energy and
increasing resilience to climate change in the most vulnerable
regions of the world. It would cut over $1 billion in global
health funding, which means that over 400,000 people who would
have received lifesaving treatment through PEPFAR will now
linger on waiting lists as their HIV diagnosis becomes a death
sentence. And it would slash food and education for the world's
poorest children by 50 percent.
There's something about these cuts that I think does
violence to the Judeo-Christian ethic by which so many people
claim to be guided in their private and their public lives.
These cuts are not abstractions. These are people, and they
also are the values of our country. Cutting these programs will
do almost nothing to rein in our budget deficit, but it will
cost thousands of lives and certainly cost us our reputation
and our commitment in the world. By reducing our diplomatic
capacity around the globe, believe me, we will increase the
threats to our own country.
I know Secretary Clinton feels just as strongly,
powerfully, about these issues and about the necessity of
maintaining our global commitment. She's been an ardent
advocate and tireless practitioner of American diplomacy. So
we're very pleased to have her here today to discuss this
budget with the committee.
Senator Lugar.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I join you in
welcoming Secretary Clinton, as always, to our committee. I
look forward to her thoughts on State Department and foreign
policy priorities for the coming year.
Our hearing today is taking place in the context of deep
economic uncertainty at home, coupled with extraordinary
upheaval overseas. The American people are still suffering from
high unemployment, with 9.5 percent out of work in my home
State. The fiscal year 2010 budget deficit registered about
$1.3 trillion, or 9 percent of GDP.
Under President Obama's proposed budget, the fiscal year
2011 deficit would be at least that high. Our total national
debt has climbed above $14 trillion. Some businesses are
returning to profitability, but long-term economic growth is
threatened by numerous forces, including the skyrocketing
national debt, high energy prices, and increased competition
for export markets.
Now, let me just say, overseas almost 100,000 American
military personnel are fighting a difficult war in Afghanistan.
More than 1,380 of our troops have been killed in Afghanistan
with almost 10,500 wounded. Meanwhile, we are entering our
eighth year in Iraq, a deployment that has cost more than 4,400
American lives and wounded roughly 32,000. We still have more
than 46,000 troops deployed in that country.
As we discussed in our hearing yesterday, tensions on the
Korean Peninsula are extremely high with no resolution to the
problem of North Korea's nuclear program. We continue to pursue
international support for steps that could prevent Iran's
nuclear program from producing a nuclear weapon. We remain
concerned about stability in Pakistan and the security of that
country's nuclear arsenal. We are attempting to counter
terrorist threats emanating from Afghanistan, Pakistan, East
Africa, Yemen, and many other locations.
In recent months, this tenuous security environment has
been further complicated by the mass movements in Tunisia,
Egypt, Libya, and elsewhere that are reshaping the Middle East
with unpredictable results. People who have been alienated from
their governments with no political power are beginning to
believe that they have a personal stake in their country's
direction.
While this comes with high risks, especially in the short
term, we know that the long-term prospects for stability,
prosperity, and moderation are better in a Middle East in which
populations actively participate in their own governance. These
conditions at home and abroad necessitate that all government
agencies, including the State Department, prioritize
initiatives that invigorate and protect the American economy
and fundamental U.S. security. Secretary Clinton and our
diplomats, aid workers, security personel, and others are on
the front lines of these issues. We appreciate very much the
sacrifices that they make and the risks that they take daily on
behalf of the American people.
I would observe that the situation in Libya and the broader
Middle East underscores the importance of three ongoing
objectives of United States foreign policy that extend beyond
management of immediate problems and crises.
First, the State Department and other agencies must be
devoted to U.S. energy security. The disruption of oil from
Libya has impacted world markets causing the price of oil to
spike above $100 a barrel and raising the prices Americans pay
at the pump. Volatile oil prices are a threat to the U.S.
economic recovery, and dependence on foreign oil limits our
foreign policy choices. We are living in an age of extreme
vulnerability to oil supply disruptions from war, instability,
terrorism, or embargo.
To end this dangerous overreliance on oil imports, we must
find more domestic resources, improve, vastly improve, our
efficiency, and improve international cooperation. I believe
the administration should reverse its de facto prohibition on
new offshore oil drilling, develop new forms of liquid fuels
from domestic feedstocks such as biomass and coal, and
dramatically increase the fuel efficiency of our vehicles.
As this occurs, the State Department must work to diversify
supply routes, and boost our energy trade with reliable and
transparent allies such as Canada, in place of shaky and
sometimes hostile suppliers.
Second, although the situation in Libya is extremely
dangerous, we can be thankful that the upheaval is occurring
without a nuclear weapons dimension. The Bush administration
was successful in coaxing Libya to give up its nuclear weapons
program about 8 years ago. The importance of that success has
been magnified by the current crisis. Although the Defense
Department is responsible for a large share of global
nonproliferation and counterproliferation efforts, including
the so-called Nunn-Lugar programs, the State Department also
plays a key role in working with other governments to overcome
the proliferation threat.
As we discussed yesterday in the context of North Korea,
regime instability--wherever it occurs--heightens the chances
that governments or individuals will seek leverage or profit
that might come with transferring weapons of mass destruction
technology. The consequences of even one WMD attack by
terrorists or a rogue state could be devastating for our
economy, our budget, our children, and perhaps our freedoms.
Last fall, I led a United States Government delegation to
East Africa to strengthen Nunn-Lugar outreach to several
governments on improving security related to biological
pathogens. Officials and programs throughout our national
security apparatus must redouble efforts to deal with
proliferation threats wherever they may occur.
Third, food shortages and high prices for commodities have
been issues in almost every Middle Eastern country that has
experienced recent demonstrations. This underscores again the
pivotal position of the United States as the largest and most
diverse grower and exporter of food. This role comes with both
enormous economic opportunities and national security
imperatives.
The world will experience explosive growth in demand for
food as large populations in China, India, and elsewhere become
more affluent. Meanwhile, countries throughout Africa and Asia
suffer from severe hunger and malnutrition. The United States
must give high priority to executing a global food policy that
both creates export opportunities for our farmers and
agricultural businesses and addresses hunger in volatile
regions that could negatively impact our national security. I
am grateful for the Secretary's personal interest in this topic
and encourage her to continue to work with the Congress on this
issue.
We appreciate very much the timely appearance of the
Secretary before us today in the midst of a very demanding
schedule. I admire her stamina and we look forward to our
discussion.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Lugar. Thank you very
much.
Madam Secretary, again we are delighted to have you here.
Thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, SECRETARY OF STATE,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Secretary Clinton. Well, thank you. I want to begin by
thanking you, Chairman Kerry, and you, Ranking Member Lugar,
for not just those two eloquent statements of our priorities
and our needs as a nation, but for your service, your lifetime
of leadership on issues that really do matter to America's
security interests and values. It's an honor to appear before
you.
I recently took part in emergency meetings in Geneva to
discuss the events unfolding in Libya and I'd like to begin by
offering a brief update. As the chairman said, we have joined
the Libyan people in demanding that Colonel Qaddafi must go
now, without further violence and bloodshed. We are working to
translate the world's outrage into action and results. Marathon
diplomacy at the United Nations and with our allies has yielded
quick, aggressive steps to pressure and isolate Libya's
leaders.
We welcome yesterday's decision to suspend Libya from the
Human Rights Council, as I had urged a day earlier. USAID is
focused on Libya's food and medical supplies and is dispatching
two expert humanitarian teams to help those fleeing the
violence into Tunisia and Egypt. Our combatant commands are
positioning assets to prepare to support these critical
civilian missions. And we are taking no option off the table so
long as the Libyan Government continues to turn its guns on its
own people.
As both the chairman and the ranking member have noted, the
region is changing and a strong, strategic American response
will be essential. In the years ahead, for example, Libya could
become a peaceful democracy or it could face protracted civil
war or fall into chaos. The stakes are high.
This is an unfolding example of using the combined assets
of smart power, diplomacy, development, and defense, to protect
our interests and advance our values. This integrated approach
is not just how we must respond to the crisis of the moment. It
is the most effective and most cost effective way to sustain
and advance our security, and it is only possible with a budget
that supports all the tools in our national security arsenal,
which is what I am here today to discuss.
I understand and agree that the American people are rightly
and justifiably concerned about our national debt, about our
economy, and about unemployment. But I think also Americans
understand the need for responsible investments in our security
for the future to make us safer, to keep markets open, to
ensure that we remain the leader in the world.
Just 2 years after President Obama and I first asked you to
renew our investment in development and diplomacy, we are
already seeing tangible returns. In Iraq, almost 100,000 troops
have come home and civilians are poised to keep the peace. In
Afghanistan, integrated military and civilian surges have
helped set the stage for our diplomatic surge to support
Afghan-led reconciliation that can end the conflict and put al-
Qaeda on the run.
We have imposed the toughest sanctions yet to rein in
Iran's nuclear ambitions. We have reengaged as a leader in the
Asia Pacific region and in our own hemisphere. We have signed
trade deals to promote American jobs and nuclear weapons
treaties to protect our people. We worked with northern and
southern Sudanese to achieve a peaceful referendum and prevent
a return to civil war. And we are working to open up political
systems, economies, and societies at this remarkable moment in
history in the Middle East, and to support orderly, peaceful,
irreversible democratic transitions.
Our progress is significant, but our work is ongoing. These
missions are vital to our national security and now would be
absolutely the wrong time to pull back.
The FY 2012 budget we discuss today will allow us to keep
pressing ahead. It is a lean budget for lean times. I launched
the first ever Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review,
the so-called QDDR, to help us maximize the impact of every
dollar we spend. We scrubbed this budget. We made painful but
responsible cuts.
For example, we cut economic assistance to Central and
Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia by 15 percent. We
cut development assistance to over 20 countries by more than
half.
This year for the first time, our request is divided into
two parts. Our core budget request is $47 billion. That
supports programs and partnerships in every country but North
Korea. It is essentially flat from 2010 levels.
The second part of our request funds the extraordinary
temporary portion of our war effort. This is the same way the
Pentagon's request is funded, in a separate overseas
contingency operations account, known as OCO. Instead of
covering our war expenses through supplemental appropriations,
we are now taking a more transparent approach that reflects our
fully integrated civilian-military effort on the ground.
Our share of the President's $126 billion request for these
exceptional wartime costs in front-line states is $8.7 billion.
Let me walk you through a few of the key investments. First,
this budget funds vital civilian missions in Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and Iraq. In Afghanistan and Pakistan, al-Qaeda is
under pressure as never before. Alongside our military
offensive, we are engaged in a major civilian effort to help
build up the governments, economies, and civil societies of
both countries and therefore help undercut the insurgency.
These two surges, the military and civilian, now set the
state for the third surge, a diplomatic push in support of an
Afghan process to split the Taliban from al-Qaeda, bring the
conflict to an end, and help stabilize the entire region.
Our military commanders are emphatic: They cannot succeed
without a strong civilian partner. Retreating from our civilian
surge in Afghanistan with our troops still in the field would
be a grave mistake.
Equally important is our assistance to Pakistan, a nuclear-
armed nation with strong ties and interests in Afghanistan.
This is a complicated and often frustrating relationship, as
the chairman knows very well, and we are grateful to him for
his constant attention and very helpful interventions. We are
working to deepen that partnership and keep it focused on
addressing Pakistan's political and economic challenges as well
as our shared threats.
After so much sacrifice in Iraq, we have a chance to help
the Iraqi people build a stable, democratic country in the
heart of the Middle East. What we are hoping will happen in
Egypt and in Libya and in Tunisia is happening in Iraq, and it
is imperative that as our troops come home our civilians take
the lead, helping Iraqis resolve conflicts peacefully, training
police, and inculcating the habits of the heart that are at the
root of any kind of democratic society.
Shifting responsibilities from soldiers to civilians
actually saves taxpayers a great deal of money. The military's
total OCO request worldwide will drop by $45 billion from 2010,
while our costs in State and USAID will increase by less than
$4 billion for Iraq. Every businessowner I know would gladly
invest $4 to save $45.
Second, even as our civilians help bring today's wars to a
close, we are working to prevent tomorrow's. This budget
devotes over $4 billion in sustaining a strong U.S. presence in
volatile places where our security and interests are at stake.
In Yemen, it provides security, development, and humanitarian
assistance in the midst of the headquarters for al-Qaeda on the
Arabian Peninsula. It focuses on those same goals in Somalia.
It has helped the northern and southern Sudanese chart a
peaceful future and we need to stay on that path. It helps
Haiti rebuild and it proposes a new global security contingency
fund that would pool resources and expertise with the Defense
Department. We are trying to tear down the walls and the
bureaucratic jurisdictional obstacles that too often prevent
the U.S. Government from being as efficient as it can be by
bringing all of our government assets together.
This budget also strengthens allies and partners. It trains
Mexican police to take on violent cartels and secure our
southern border. It provides nearly $3.1 billion for Israel and
supports Jordan and the Palestinians. It does help Egypt and
Tunisia and it supports security assistance to over 130
nations.
Now, over the years these security funds have created
valuable ties with foreign militaries. We saw that in real time
when it came to Egypt. Because the United States military has
trained a generation of Egyptian officers, because that
experience built relationships between American military
leaders and Egyptian military leaders, we saw the Egyptian
military refuse to fire on their own people, and there were
many, many conversations going on between people who weren't
picking up the phone for the first time, but who had trained
together, lived together, worked together.
Across the board, we are trying to ensure that all who
share the benefits of our spending also share the burdens of
addressing common challenges.
Third, we are making targeted investments in human
security. We have focused on hunger, and thank you so much,
Senator Lugar, for your constant, constant pointing out that
this is in America's interest as well as the world's interest.
We have invested in preventing and ameliorating the effects of
disease, climate change, humanitarian emergencies.
These challenges not only threaten the security of
individuals and increasingly in our world individuals here at
home, but they are the seeds of future conflict. If we want to
lighten the burden on future generations, we have to make the
investments that will make our world more secure.
Our largest investment is in global health programs,
including those launched and led by President George W. Bush.
These programs stabilize entire societies that have been
devastated by HIV, malaria, tuberculosis, and other diseases.
They save the lives of mothers and children and they halt the
spread of deadly diseases.
Global food prices are approaching an all-time high. Three
years ago this led to protests and riots in dozens of
countries. Food security is a cornerstone of global stability.
We are helping farmers to grow more food, drive economic
growth, and turn aid recipients into trading partners, and I
look forward to working closely with the Congress as we try to
really sharpen this program.
Now, climate change we know threatens food security, human
security, and national security. Our budget helps to build
resilience against droughts, floods, and other weather
disasters. It promotes clean energy and it preserves tropical
forests. It gives leverage to us to persuade China, India, and
other nations to do their part as well.
Fourth, we are committed to making our foreign policy a
force for domestic economic renewal. We are working
aggressively to promote sustained economic growth, level
playing fields, open markets, and create jobs here at home. And
we are fighting for companies large and small. For example, our
economic officers in the Philippines helped Jarden Zinc win a
$21 million raw materials contract that will create and
preserve jobs throughout Senator Corker's home State of
Tennessee.
Fifth and finally, this budget funds the people and
platforms that make possible everything I've described. It
allows us to sustain diplomatic relations with 190 countries.
It funds political officers who are working to defuse crises
and promote our values, development officers spreading
opportunity and stability, economic officers who wake up every
day thinking about how to put Americans back to work.
Several of you have asked the Department about the safety
of your constituents in the Middle East. Well, this budget also
helps fund the consular officers who evacuated over 2,600
Americans from Egypt and Libya and nearly 17,000 from Haiti.
They issued 14 million passports last year and served as our
first line of defense against would-be terrorists seeking visas
to enter our country.
I'd like to say just a few words about our funding for the
rest of 2011. As I have told Speaker Boehner and Chairman
Rogers and many others, the 16-percent cut for State and USAID
that passed the House last month would be devastating to our
national security. It would force us to scale back dramatically
on critical missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
As Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, and General Petraeus
have all emphasized to the Congress time and again, we need a
fully engaged and fully funded national security team,
including State and USAID. Now, there have always been moments
of temptation in our country to resist obligations beyond our
borders. But each time we have shrunk from global leadership,
events have summoned us back to reality. We saved money in the
short term when we walked away from Afghanistan after the cold
war. But those savings came at an unspeakable cost, one we are
still paying 10 years later in money and lives.
Generations of Americans have grown up successful and safe
because we chose to lead the world in tackling its greatest
challenges. We're the ones who invested the resources to build
up democratic allies and vibrant trading partners in every
region. We did not shy away from defending our values,
promoting our interests, and seizing the opportunities of each
new era.
I believe as I have traveled around the world--and I am now
the most traveled Secretary of State in history--the world has
never been in greater need of the qualities that distinguish us
as Americans--our openness and innovation, our determination,
our devotion to universal values. Everywhere I travel, I see
people looking to us for leadership. This is a source of
strength, a point of pride, and a great opportunity for the
American people. But it is an achievement, not a birthright. It
requires resolve and it requires resources.
So I look forward to working closely together with all of
you to do what is necessary to keep our country safe and
maintain American leadership in a very fast-changing world.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Clinton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton
I want to thank Chairman Kerry, Ranking Member Lugar, and all of
you on this committee for your leadership and your partnership--across
the aisle and with the administration--to meet our most pressing
challenges.
I recently took part in emergency meetings in Geneva to discuss the
events unfolding in Libya. I would like to begin by offering you a
brief update.
We have joined the Libyan people in demanding that Qaddafi must
go--now, without further violence or delay--and we are working to
translate the world's outrage into action and results.
Marathon diplomacy at the U.N. and with our allies has yielded
quick, aggressive steps to pressure and isolate Libya's leaders. We
welcome yesterday's decision to suspend Libya from the Human Rights
Council, as I had urged a day earlier. USAID is focused on Libya's food
and medical supplies and dispatching two expert humanitarian teams to
help those fleeing the violence into Tunisia and Egypt. Our combatant
commands are positioning assets to prepare to support these critical
civilian missions. And we are taking no options off the table so long
as the Libyan Government continues to turn its guns on its own people.
The entire region is changing, and a strong and strategic American
response will be essential. In the years ahead, Libya could become a
peaceful democracy, or it could face protracted civil war. The stakes
are high. And this is an unfolding example of using the combined assets
of diplomacy, development, and defense to protect our interests and
advance our values. This integrated approach is not just how we respond
to the crisis of the moment. It is the most effective and cost-
effective--way to sustain and advance our security across the world.
And it is only possible with a budget that supports all the tools in
our national security arsenal--which is what we are here to discuss.
The American people today are justifiably concerned about our
national debt, but they also want responsible investments in our
future. Just 2 years after President Obama and I first asked you to
renew our investment in development and diplomacy, we are already
seeing tangible returns for our national security.
In Iraq, almost 100,000 troops have come home and civilians are
poised to keep the peace. In Afghanistan, integrated military and
civilian surges have helped set the stage for our diplomatic surge to
support Afghan-led reconciliation that can end the conflict and put al-
Qaeda on the run. We have imposed the toughest sanctions yet to rein in
Iran's nuclear ambitions. We have reengaged as a leader in the Pacific
and in our own hemisphere. We have signed trade deals to promote
American jobs and nuclear weapons treaties to protect our people. We
worked with northern and southern Sudanese to achieve a peaceful
referendum and prevent a return to civil war. And we are working to
open political systems, economies, and societies at a remarkable moment
in the history of the Middle East and to support peaceful, irreversible
democratic transitions in Egypt and Tunisia.
Our progress is significant, but our work is ongoing. These
missions are vital to our national security, and now would be the wrong
time to pull back.
The FY 2012 budget we discuss today will allow us to keep pressing
ahead. It is a lean budget for lean times. I launched the first-ever
Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review to help us maximize the
impact of every dollar we spend. We scrubbed this budget and made
painful but responsible cuts. We cut economic assistance to Central and
Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia by 15 percent, and we cut
development assistance to over 20 countries by more than half.
This year, for the first time, our request is divided in two parts:
Our core budget request of $47 billion, which supports programs and
partnerships in every country but North Korea, is essentially flat from
2010 levels.
The second part of our request funds the extraordinary, temporary
portion of our war effort the same way the Pentagon's request is
funded: in a separate Overseas Contingency Operations account known as
``OCO.'' Instead of covering our war expenses through supplemental
appropriations, we are now taking a more transparent approach that
reflects our fully integrated civilian-military effort on the ground.
Our share of the President's $126 billion request for these exceptional
wartime costs is $8.7 billion.
Let me now walk you through a few of our key investments.
First, this budget funds vital civilian missions in Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and Iraq. In Afghanistan and Pakistan, al-Qaeda is under
pressure as never before. Alongside our military offensive, we are
engaged in a major civilian effort to help build up the governments,
economies, and civil society of both countries and undercut the
insurgency. These two surges set the stage for a third: a diplomatic
push in support of an Afghan process to split the Taliban from al-
Qaeda, bring the conflict to an end, and help to stabilize the entire
region.
Our military commanders are emphatic that they cannot succeed
without a strong civilian partner. Retreating from our civilian surge
in Afghanistan--with our troops still in the field--would be a grave
mistake.
Equally important is our assistance to Pakistan, a nuclear-armed
nation with strong ties and interests in Afghanistan. We are working to
deepen our partnership and keep it focused on addressing Pakistan's
political and economic challenges as well as our shared threats.
After so much sacrifice in Iraq, we have a chance to help the Iraqi
people build a stable, democratic country in the heart of the Middle
East. As troops come home, our civilians are taking the lead, helping
Iraqis resolve conflicts peacefully and training police.
Shifting responsibilities from soldiers to civilians actually saves
taxpayers a great deal of money. The military's total OCO request
worldwide will drop by $45 billion from 2010, while our costs will
increase by less than $4 billion. Every businessowner I know would
gladly invest $4 to save $45.
Second, even as our civilians help bring today's wars to a close,
we are also working to prevent tomorrow's. This budget devotes over $4
billion to sustaining a strong U.S. presence in volatile places where
our security and interests are at stake. In Yemen, it provides
security, development, and humanitarian assistance to deny al-Qaeda a
safe haven and to promote stability and progress. It focuses on those
same goals in Somalia. It helps northern and southern Sudanese chart a
peaceful future. It helps Haiti to rebuild. And it proposes a new
Global Security Contingency Fund that would pool resources and
expertise with the Defense Department to respond quickly as new
challenges emerge.
This budget also strengthens our allies and partners. It trains
Mexican police to take on violent cartels and secure our southern
border. It provides nearly $3.1 billion for Israel and supports Jordan
and the Palestinians. It helps Egypt and Tunisia build stable and
credible democracies. And it supports security assistance to over 130
nations. Over the years, these funds have created valuable ties with
foreign militaries and, for example, trained a generation of Egyptian
officers who refused to fire on their own people. Across the board, we
are working to ensure that all who share the benefits of our spending
also share the burdens of addressing common challenges.
Third, we are making targeted investments in human security. We
have focused on hunger, disease, climate change, and humanitarian
emergencies because these challenges not only threaten the security of
individuals--they are the seeds of future conflict. If we want to
lighten the burden on future generations, then we must make the
investments that will leave them a more secure world.
Our largest investment is in global health programs, including
those launched by President George W. Bush. These programs stabilize
entire societies that have been devastated by HIV, malaria, and other
illnesses. They save the lives of mothers and children and halt the
spread of deadly diseases.
Global food prices are approaching an all-time high. Three years
ago, this led to protests and riots in dozens of countries. Food
security is a cornerstone of global stability, and we are helping
farmers to grow more food, drive economic growth, and turn aid
recipients into trading partners.
Climate change threatens food security, human security, and our
national security. Our budget builds resilience against droughts,
floods, and other weather disasters, promotes clean energy and
preserves tropical forests. And it gives us leverage to persuade China,
India, and other nations to do their essential part to meet this urgent
threat.
Fourth, we are committed to making our foreign policy a force for
domestic economic renewal. We are working aggressively to promote
sustained economic growth, level playing fields, open markets, and
create jobs here at home. And we are fighting for companies large and
small. For example, our economic officers in the Philippines helped
Jarden Zinc win a $21 million raw materials contract that will create
and preserve jobs throughout Senator Corker's home State of Tennessee.
Fifth and finally, this budget funds the people and platforms that
make possible everything I've described. It allows us to sustain
diplomatic relations with 190 countries. It funds political officers
defusing crises and promoting our values; development officers
spreading opportunity and stability; and economic officers who wake up
every day thinking about how to put Americans back to work.
Several of you have asked the Department about the safety of your
constituents in the Middle East. Well, this budget also helps fund the
consular officers who evacuated over 2,600 people from Egypt and
Libya--and nearly 17,000 from Haiti. They issued 14 million passports
last year and served as our first line of defense against would-be
terrorists seeking visas to enter our country.
I'd also like to say just a few words about our funding for the
rest of 2011. As I told Speaker Boehner, Chairman Rogers, and many
others, the 16-percent cut for State and USAID that passed the House
last month would be devastating to our national security. For example,
it would force us to scale back dramatically on critical missions in
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
As Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, and General Petraeus have all
emphasized to you, we need a fully engaged and fully funded national
security team--including State and USAID.
Now, there have always been moments of temptation in our country to
resist obligations beyond our borders. But each time we have shrunk
from global leadership, events summoned us back to reality. We saved
money in the short term when we walked away from Afghanistan after the
cold war. But those savings came at an unspeakable cost--one we are
still paying, 10 years later, in money and lives.
Generations of Americans have grown up successful and safe because
we chose to lead the world in tackling its greatest challenges. We
invested the resources to build up democratic allies and vibrant
trading partners in every region. And we did not shy away from
defending our values, promoting our interests, and seizing the
opportunities of each new era.
The world has never been in greater need of the qualities that
distinguish us--our openness and innovation, our determination, our
devotion to universal values. Everywhere I travel, I see people looking
to us for leadership. This is a source of strength, a point of pride,
and a great opportunity for the American people. But it is an
achievement, not a birthright. It requires resolve--and it requires
resources.
I look forward to working closely together with you to do what is
necessary to keep our country safe and maintain American leadership in
a changing world.
The Chairman. Well, thank you, Madam Secretary. I think
that was a terrific, important statement and overview of the
issues that are at stake here and we really thank you for it.
Let me just ask you quickly if I can and perhaps you might
comment. We received the unsettling and sad news that Minister
Shahbaz Bhatti, the Minister of Minorities, was assassinated
this morning in Islamabad, Pakistan. He was the only Christian
member of the Cabinet. I wonder if you would comment on the
implications of that and where we find ourselves at this moment
with respect to that relationship.
Secretary Clinton. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, because,
like you, I was shocked and outraged by the assassination,
reportedly by al-Qaeda-linked terrorists, of Pakistan's Federal
Minister for Minorities Affairs, Shahbaz Bhatti. I think this
was an attack not only on one man, but on the values of
tolerance and respect for people of all faiths and backgrounds
that had been championed by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of
Pakistan.
I recently had the opportunity to meet with Minister
Bhatti. He was a very impressive, courageous man. He was a
patriot. He was a man of great conviction. He cared deeply for
Pakistan and he had dedicated his life to helping the least
among us.
When I spoke with him, he was well aware of the drumbeat of
threats against him. Despite those threats, when the Pakistan
Government was recently reshuffled and the Cabinet shrunk, he
agreed to continue his work as the Minister for Minorities
Affairs. On behalf of the United States, I extend our deepest
condolences to his family, his friends, and his colleagues.
I have to say, Mr. Chairman, as I spoke yesterday before
the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the intolerance toward
minorities, particularly religious minorities, that we are
seeing, not only in Pakistan, but elsewhere in the region, the
attack on Christians in Iraq, the attack on the Copts in Egypt,
the attack on minority Islam sects in Pakistan and elsewhere,
is a matter of deep distress to me personally and to our
government. It runs against all of our values and we are going
to be doing all we can to support the freedom of religion, the
freedom of conscience, and to work with governments everywhere
so that they uphold universal values.
The Chairman. Well, thank you. That's a strong and
appropriate response, and I think all the members of the
committee associate themselves with your comments, and we thank
you for them.
You gave a very comprehensive and I think important
overview of the implications of the budget cuts with respect to
our foreign policy interests. I wonder if you'd simplify it and
personalize it in some ways for the average person as these
choices come before the Congress. As you know, Madam Secretary,
there's a huge misconception out there across the country. I
had a town meeting recently, and I'm sure others have done
this, and you ask people how much foreign aid do we give. It's
just stunning. People think it's a huge amount, and they're
shocked when they hear that it's just over 1 percent. It's
variant. It's about 1.5 to 1.6 of our total budget, which is so
minuscule.
Can you give just a simple grassroots kind of explanation?
What's at stake here for Americans? What do we risk losing with
this kind of a reduction at this moment of transformation in
the world?
Secretary Clinton. Well, first let me speak about a lot of
the specifics. You included a number of those in your opening
statement, Mr. Chairman. We will be cutting back on our support
for global health, in particular, support through the PEPFAR
Project, which was started by President Bush, which has been
continued and very strongly supported by President Obama.
Hundreds of thousands of people will be cut off of their life-
sustaining drugs. Others will never have access to them.
We will see a decrease in the number of people who are
treated for other diseases, including malaria and tuberculosis.
We will see, unfortunately, a stop in the outreach for women
and children. A woman dies of pregnancy-related complications
every minute in the
world. We had made maternal and child health one of our
priorities.
We are certainly backing off from the commitments to food
security, the Feed the Future initiative that Senator Lugar
referred to. We really worked hard to get the inputs right
because what we had done over the last 20 years was move away
from working with farmers in their own countries so that they
would better produce for themselves and then the United States
would be providing expertise and technology and certainly we
would create healthier societies where our own exports would
increase. Instead, what we had been doing was just providing
emergency food relief, which was not teaching anybody how to
fish or anybody how to farm.
We began to reverse that, and that would be severely
impacted, in fact zeroed out, in the CR or the budget that was
passed.
We have also seen a complete dismissal of the work on
climate change and energy security, which I think is a grave
mistake. I'll give you just a quick example. We have a lot of
support in the Pacific Ocean region. A lot of those small
countries have voted with us in the United Nations. They are
stalwart American allies. They embrace our values. And they
believe, contrary to what some might think, that they are
sinking, and they have a lot of evidence that they are sinking,
and that the oceans are rising.
All they've asked for us is some recognition, some help
with their efforts to be more resilient when it comes to the
effects of climate change. We had a small amount of $21 million
that we were going to spread across many of these island
countries. Obviously, that would not be possible.
We are in a competition for influence with China. Let's put
aside the moral, humanitarian, do-good side of what we believe
in and let's just talk straight realpolitik. We are in a
competition with China. Take Papua-New Guinea. A huge energy
find, to go to one of Senator Lugar's very strong points. Exxon
Mobil is producing it. China is in there every day in every way
trying to figure out how it's going to come in behind us, come
in under us. They're supporting the dictatorial regime that
unfortunately is now in charge of Fiji. They have brought all
of the leaders of these small Pacific nations to Beijing, wined
them and dined them.
If anybody thinks that our retreating on these issues is
somehow going to be irrelevant to the maintenance of our
leadership in a world where we are competing with China, where
we are competing with Iran, that is a mistaken notion.
So I would strongly support this on humanitarian, moral,
values-based grounds, that we do the right thing, we get credit
for it. But I also look at this from a strategic perspective
and it is essential.
The Chairman. Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Madam Secretary, you have called for the
reprogramming of $150 million of our existing assistance funds
to Egypt. There has been some skepticism about our advocacy and
it's not clear precisely what these programs are intended to
do. Worse still is the question of who supervises the
expenditure of the money, and who spends it in the country.
That is, in the case of the Egyptians, who would we deal with
currently who has a governance function in Egypt? Or, for that
matter, in Pakistan, who are we dealing with with regard to the
$1.5 billion or so that has been authorized?
Now, a large portion of these funds pertaining to Pakistan
obviously has not been spent and is not being spent, although
it is of importance diplomatically, and you've had to face
public meetings in Pakistan explaining all of this, during
which you finally asked on one occasion whether they wanted the
money or not, as I recall.
But could you try to trace through with us how you are
attempting to bring closer objectives and supervision so that
the implementation of these programs can be more transparent to
the American people, as well as to the Egyptians and the
Pakistanis? I ask this because I think that a confidence level
is critical in terms of furthering these programs.
Secretary Clinton. Well, thank you. I agree with that
completely, Senator Lugar. Let me start with Egypt. We plan to
use those funds to support an array of efforts that are under
way by Egyptians themselves to prepare for constitutional
amendments, for free and fair elections, for setting up
political parties, to support civil society groups that are
working toward those ends.
We are certainly looking for ways to support the economic
conditions in Egypt because there have been a lot of economic
consequences of what has been happening. Their tourist
industry, which is a major part of the economy, employs a lot
of Egyptians, has dried up. Other parts of the economy are
under stress.
So we intend to use some of that to help support the
economic recovery in Egypt. We're looking at creative ways of
doing that.
We started on this before Tahrir Square occurred with an
entrepreneurial program that we use to reach out to primarily
young people in Muslim majority countries, including Egypt. We
set up a Web site through which they could obtain business
advice and mentoring. We'd like to link what we're doing in
economic aid with university sites, where we can continue to
help young people become entrepreneurs. You know, there are so
many university graduates the economy cannot absorb them. We
want to look for ways to help them understand how to support
and start their own businesses.
We're looking to identify local businesses that we think
have greater capacity. We'd like to look at partnering for some
job training skills with some of the unions that have arisen,
because they've been a leader for secular change in the
economic arena.
So I think there's a lot that we have on the drawing boards
that is promising. The Egyptian Government right now, which is
run by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, is very
cautious about taking outside help of any sort except economic
help. That's a message they've given to us, they've given to
the Europeans, they've given to everyone who has approached
them.
I sent Under Secretary Bill Burns to Cairo. He had a number
of meetings with people in and outside of the government,
particularly the opposition and civil society, and there is a
wariness across the Egyptian society about not looking like
they are being influenced by or directed by any outside force.
So we are working to be as careful and as sensitive to
those needs while being effective, so that whatever money we
put in we can trace and point to.
In Pakistan, when I was here the first time testifying 2
years ago, at that time there was no doubt that the Taliban was
in--had the momentum, that the extremists in Pakistan were in
the driver's seat. As you recall, the government had made a
deal to permit their own extremists, Pakistani Taliban, in
Bunir and Swat and other places to basically govern. I said at
that time that was a terrible mistake for them. Thankfully,
they began to reverse that policy of appeasement. They began to
go after the extremists.
If you look, 2 years is a lot of time to us because we're
an impatient people. Two years in Pakistani terms is not much
at all, and from their perspective they've moved troops off the
Indian border, they've gone into Waziristan, they have targeted
extremists, they have worked with us to target the guys who are
our adversaries and the Afghans' adversaries. So they have
moved on the military front.
Now, economically and politically it's a much more complex
story. They have made some decisions that we support and the
Kerry-Lugar-Berman was intended to encourage, but they've also
run into a lot of political difficulties, because this is a
political system that is dominated by the rich. They don't want
to pay a penny in taxes, if that sounds familiar. They want to
keep their big landed estates, don't want anybody asking them
to support education, support health, to support anything for
their people. As a result, those powerful interests dominate
the politics of Pakistan.
So we have been working with those ministries that we
believe are on the right track for reform. We've been working
with NGOs, both Pakistani, American, and international, that we
think can support those kinds of changes. And the floods came
along and just up-ended everything, because they were so
devastating and they cost so much money.
But I would say that on balance, despite how challenging
the relationship is and how much internal pressure their
government faces every day, we're in a better position than we
were 2 years ago in actually confronting the real problems.
We're not papering over them, we're not pretending that they
can somehow be ignored.
Senator Lugar. I thank you for that answer. Let me just add
one thought. You've spoken eloquently about our international
broadcasting efforts and the Broadcasting Board of Governors,
and I think Walter Isakson taking hold of that is a
constructive thing. I would hope that we would be more
successful in moving more money toward communication with China
and, as we heard with our North Korean hearing yesterday, more
complex as to how you get the message out. But this is still a
great force of diplomacy, to get our message into distant and
difficult places.
We're doing better in Iran. We're doing better in the
Middle East, as we saw in Tunisia, Egypt, and so forth. But I'm
hopeful you can bring us good news about more aggressive
policies with regard to the BBG and others.
Secretary Clinton. Senator, I want to thank you for the
report that you did on the Broadcasting Board of Governors and
all of the problems that it has experienced. I agree with you,
Walter Isakson is an excellent choice. The board is a very
invigorated group of Republicans and Democrats. They understand
we are engaged in an information war. During the cold war we
did a great job in getting America's message out. After the
Berlin Wall fell we said, OK, fine, enough of that, we've done
it, we're done. And unfortunately, we are paying a big price
for it.
Our private media cannot fill that gap. In fact, our
private media, particularly cultural programming, often works
at counterpurposes to what we truly are as Americans and what
our values are. I remember having an Afghan general tell me
that the only thing he thought about Americans is that all the
men wrestled and the women walked around in bikinis, because
the only TV he ever saw was Bay Watch and Worldwide Wrestling.
So we are in an information war. And we are losing that
war. I'll be very blunt in my assessment. Al-Jazeera is
winning. The Chinese have opened up a global English language
and multilanguage television network. The Russians have opened
up an English language network. I've seen it in a few countries
and it's quite instructive.
We are cutting back. The BBC is cutting back. So here's
what we are trying to do. In the State Department, we have
pushed very hard on new media. So we have an Arabic Twitter
feed, we have a Farsi Twitter feed. I have this group of young
techno experts who are out there engaging on Web sites, and
we're putting all of our young Arabic-speaking diplomats out so
that they are talking about our values.
Walter is working hard with his board to try to transform
the broadcasting efforts, because most people still get their
news from TV and radio. So even though we're pushing on line,
we can't forget TV and radio.
So I would look very much toward your cooperation to try to
figure out how we can get back in the game on this, because I
hate ceding what we are most expert in to anybody else.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar.
Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Clinton, we welcome you. You are working so hard
and you're doing a tremendous job at advancing U.S. interests
at a time when there's just change, it seems like, every hour
on the hour.
Your response to Senator Kerry's question on why the 1.6
percent of the budget you're responsible for is important--I
just thought it was on the mark. I can't even do it justice by
trying to summarize it. I'd like to put it up on my Web site.
Is it OK with you?
Secretary Clinton. Of course, and I can give you more
information as well, especially on women and girls. I know
that's one of your highest priorities, Senator.
Senator Boxer. I just feel when Senator Kerry asked you to
speak to the grassroots folks out there, you did that. I
wouldn't change a thing about it. I'd just like to put it up,
because I would like every American to read it.
It seems like there's more change sweeping the world at
this very moment than at any time in recent memory. We all have
our theories on why. People are crying out for freedom because
they know more about it. Some are looking to us, some are
looking to other parts of the world, and some are looking
inside. It's a delicate issue and it's different in every
country. In the meantime, we're winding down our war in Iraq
that is entering its eighth year and has cost the United States
more than $750 billion. You know, when we look at the fact that
it has cost $750 billion. It has also cost more than 4,400
American lives.
President Obama states his intention to begin the
withdrawal of combat forces from Afghanistan this July, a war
in its nineth year that has cost the United States more than
$336 billion and nearly 1,500 American lives. Both the
administration and Congress have worked tirelessly to enact the
toughest sanctions to date in Iran, but Iran is continuing its
reckless pursuit of nuclear weapons, and we all know we can't
rest until we see an abandonment of that program.
Despite repeated attempts by the United States to bring
lasting peace to the Korean Peninsula, Korea seems to be doing
everything to encourage conflict.
In Egypt, prominent opposition leader Mohamed ElBaradei
just last week voiced concern about a 6-month election time
line which was put forward by the military, saying, ``If we go
too fast, if we organize elections in 4 or 5 months, it will be
all over for the revolution. The old regime will perpetuate
itself in another guise.''
Secretary Clinton, do you share Mr. ElBaradei's concern
about the proposed time line for transition to a new civilian
government which was announced by the Egyptian military?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, we are trying very hard
to support the Egyptians in what they are doing, because
obviously this was Egyptian-instigated and it is Egyptian-led
and it should be, and we are mindful of that. I do think that
being prepared for elections, doing the constitutional changes
that are necessary, the legislative changes that are necessary,
setting up the apparatus, being prepared to actually implement
an election, is quite an undertaking.
There are many, not just the United States, but the United
Nations, other nations, who are engaging with their Egyptian
counterparts to go through what it will take to launch an
election that has a fighting chance of producing a democratic
outcome.
We've also made clear that one election is not enough. A
lot of regimes have one election, then they declare that that's
enough of that, they're just going to stay in power. Or
somebody hijacks the election. So there are many yellow
blinking caution lights that I think Egyptians themselves are
raising, and the United States, as always, stands ready to
assist.
Senator Boxer. Thank you. I'll take that as an answer that
essentially says we hear the concerns and it's up to the people
there to make the decision.
In a much-quoted comment, Secretary of Defense Gates said:
``Any future Defense Secretary who advises the President to
again send a big American land army into Asia or into the
Middle East or Africa should have his head examined.''
Secretary Gates has also said that, although he initially
opposed publicly committing to the July 2011 withdrawal
deadline, he was ``ultimately convinced,'' because he believed
it would pressure Afghan President Karzai to take
responsibility for the war.
My question is this. In your opinion, has President Karzai
taken more responsibility for the future of Afghanistan since
President Obama's announcement and commitment to begin the
redeployment of American troops out of there in July 2011?
Secretary Clinton. Yes; I believe that is a fair
conclusion. I agree with Secretary Gates. I think starting the
transition in July 2011 put the Afghans on notice. It also has
contributed to the improvement in the training, retention, and
performance of the Afghan Security Forces.
Senator Boxer. Madam Secretary, I introduced legislation
with several other Senators that would require the
administration to submit to Congress a plan for redeployment
that includes an end date for the withdrawal of combat forces
from Afghanistan. I'm not going to ask you your opinion of
that, but on an intellectual level I would ask you this. If, in
fact, telling President Karzai that we're going to begin
redeployment, which Secretary Gates' supports and has stated
was a signal to President Karzai that he should take
responsibility for the defense of his own country, wouldn't
setting an end date, even with benchmarks on it, continue to
move President Karzai in the right direction?
Secretary Clinton. I agree with that, Senator, and we have
said, and it was adopted by our NATO ISAF allies at Lisbon,
that the withdrawing of combat troops under this mission will
be completed in 2014.
Senator Boxer. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Boxer.
Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Madam Secretary. As always, it's a pleasure to
have you here. We thank you for the great work you are doing. I
want to thank you personally for the way that you work with our
office, you and your staff. I know you're working hard, have
got a lot of complex issues. Again, we thank you for that.
I know the chairman mentioned early on how some of the
things that are happening offend Judeo-Christian principles. I
don't normally like for those kind of things to enter into our
discussions as it relates to this, but the fact is we do have
this rub. One of the principles we're violating just of common
decency right now as a country is spending $3.7 trillion when
we're taking in $2.2 trillion.
So obviously as a country we cannot, we cannot do what
we're doing any longer to future generations. I think all of us
believe that's morally reprehensible.
So what's really happening right now is, because we've
chosen so far not to really deal with those issues of
entitlements, trying to sustain them for the future, all of
those things, if you will, being off the table has put intense
pressure on discretionary spending. So you're in here today,
you're in here today really fighting for your programs, as one
would expect you to do. But the reason there's so much pressure
on your programs is our inability as a Congress thus far--I
have hope we're going to deal with this over the next 3 or 4
months; there are a certain number of people here at the dais
that are working on that. So far we haven't shown the knowledge
or the courage to deal with all of those other issues, which
basically are crowding out your programs.
Would you agree that that's a problem?
Secretary Clinton. Well, I think that, Senator, plus the
idea that only defense spending is national security, so that
when we talk about cuts they often are phrased in nondefense
discretionary spending.
Senator Corker. So as long as we lack the will to deal
intelligently with our fiscal issues, you're going to be under
incredible pressure. My guess is there will be cuts in State
Department spending and I think you know that. And they're
going to be disproportionate to the overall budget because we
don't have the courage, the knowledge, something, to deal
appropriately with our spending issues. It's my hope that we'll
do that.
But I just want to point that out, that this pressure is
because of our inability to deal with all the real spending
that is really creating the unsustainable situation which deals
with entitlements and putting them on a longer term path.
So with that, let me move on to--and I think the
administration, not your pay grade, is missing a tremendous
opportunity to lead on this issue, and I think the country has
recognized that. My hope is that the President will come to the
table and with all of us together solve this problem, which is
the only way we can do it. Divided government, as you well know
due to the 1990s, is a great opportunity for us to solve these
problems.
So with that, Afghanistan. I was just there and also in
Pakistan. I think the administration generally speaking has
done a good job in communicating, and I'm willing to--I want to
support this fighting season in Afghanistan, when we finally
have everything on the ground, both civilian and military. That
fighting season will end in October and hopefully there will be
great gains.
But one area where I think the administration has not
communicated clearly with the American people is the amount of
state-building and nation-building that's taking place. This is
far from a narrowed mission. We are engaged in all-out state
and nation-building.
I know you referred to while we have troops in the field we
need to have civilian efforts. Secretary Gates has talked about
our ticket out of Afghanistan being when we turn it over to the
Afghan forces. I am very concerned that we are going to be
there for a long, long time doing things--we've raised the
expectations beyond what is sustainable in Afghanistan. Even
tribal elders believe we're going to be there for generations.
I'd like for you--are we going to move out quickly, as soon
as our troops move out, with the nation-building efforts that
are under way there now?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, I think that I would
characterize what we are doing in Afghanistan as capacity-
building. It may have been 10 years ago an idea in the minds of
decisionmakers on both sides of the aisle, in both
administrations, that we could nation-build or state-build. I
think that our assessment now is that we have to get to a level
of stability where al-Qaeda is degraded and hopefully defeated,
unable to operate out of the tribal border areas, that the
Taliban is not able to bring down the Government of
Afghanistan, take over population centers, including Kabul, and
that there is enough of a governing stability--now, we're not
talking about France or Germany or the United States, but
enough of a governing stability to maintain its independence
and its sovereignty against continuing threats.
So what we are doing is aimed at trying to help it get its
finances straight, trying to help it get basic services and
governance operating. After 2014 NATO, including the United
States, has said there will be some kind of a continuing
relationship with Afghanistan, in a supportive role, to make
sure that these goals for them are achievable and sustainable.
What that's going to look like we are just beginning the
conversation about. Not so dissimilarly from what the Bush
administration concluded was necessary in Iraq--you know, the
status of forces agreement, which President Obama sped up and
without any loss of our ability to maintain stability. But then
the strategic partnership agreement, which talks about an
enduring relationship with Iraq.
So in both Iraq and Afghanistan, that's what we're working
on and trying to get the inputs right to figure out what the
end state is that we can support.
Senator Corker. My time is up, unfortunately. I won't ask a
long question. I'll just make a statement. I think the people
on the ground in Kabul and throughout the country that we have
that are doing great work, I think that we need to move quickly
to change the expectations of what we're going to be doing in
Afghanistan.
We are paying cash--we have cash for work programs, where
we're paying the Taliban to work in vineyards instead of take
up arms. The security forces on the ground, their security
forces, are over $7 billion a year in expenditures. They only
have a $1.3 billion budget. So when we talk about contingency
operations, these are not contingency. They're going on for a
long, long time.
I really do believe that we have given expectations to the
Afghan people that are way beyond what we're going to be able
to sustain as a country. I hope that we'll move quickly to
recalibrate that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for your service.
Secretary Clinton. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. I look forward to having a good
discussion with my colleague about how the ethic applies to the
debate on the budget. I think it's an important one to have,
but probably not here at this particular instant.
Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, I want to congratulate you for your
statement yesterday that the United States is considering
seeking the prosecution of Muammar Qaddafi for the 1988 Pan Am
103 bombing that killed 189 Americans, including 33 of my
fellow New Jerseyans. That comes on the heels of reports by the
ex-justice minister of Libya that Qaddafi personally ordered
the attack.
I hope that as events progress you'll give us a sense of
how we're going to verify this information. Hopefully we will
gain access to the justice minister soon, and decide on whether
we will seek to prosecute Qaddafi for that heinous crime.
Also, you know that I and several colleagues, one of whom
sits on this committee, issued a report on the release of the
convicted Pan Am 103 bomber, al-Megrahi, who we believe was
released from a Scottish prison on false pretenses. I want to
urge you to consider requesting of any potential new Libyan
Government that may come out as a result of what is going on in
Libya--I know it's a little premature to say that, but I want
to put it on your radar screen--the extradition of al-Megrahi
to finish serving his sentence, instead of sitting in the lap
of luxury.
Secretary Clinton. Well, first, Senator, thank you for your
continuing focus on this terrible crime. I represented New York
and of course many of the victims were from Syracuse
University. I have met, like you, many times with family
members, and it is just a heartbreaking experience. And justice
must be served.
So what we are doing is reaching out, based on these recent
reports, to the FBI and the Justice Department, which have the
jurisdiction over any continuing prosecution, to ask that they
immediately try to take whatever actions are possible. I was
given a letter yesterday by two of the family members in the
House hearing which outlines a number of ways that we could
proceed, and I have sent that over to Justice and the FBI.
I don't think it's only Qaddafi. I think that there may be
others as well who were involved in some way. Like you, I would
like the families to have whatever information they can finally
get, and then whatever legal action we can take.
Senator Menendez. If we have a new Libyan Government, we
must consider that if we send a message that you can kill
Americans and ultimately walk away from jail, then we send a
message that is horribly wrong in our global fight against
terrorism.
I want to change to Iran. I am concerned that in light of
what is happening in Egypt and across North Africa and the
Middle East, the world's attention will be diverted from the
dangers of Iran's nuclear programs. I am worried that Iran will
use this opportunity to speed up its nuclear program and crack
down on opposition and human rights activists. And I am
concerned, as someone who is supportive generally of the
administration's budget for this Department, to find that we
have not even sanctioned one non-Iranian foreign company for
its investments in Iran's energy sector.
You know, the administration has yet to sanction a non-
Iranian bank, despite the reports that several Turkish, South
Korean, Ukrainian, Chinese banks continue to deal with Iran's
financial institutions in violation of the law. And I know,
based upon previous testimony here by former Under Secretary
Burns, that there were a series of violations appearing to be
going on.
I'm wondering the status of those violations. There's a
180-day clock. How many investigations are currently open and
when will we see sanctioning of some of these companies that
are clearly in violation of the law?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, first, as you know, I
became the first Secretary of State to impose any sanctions.
And you're right, it was on a Swiss-based Iranian-owned firm.
But we are moving as expeditiously as we can to review any
cases.
We have also used SOSADA, the sanctions that you passed
last year, to convince a number of companies, including Shell,
ENI, Total, Enpex, and others, to withdraw from Iran and not do
further business. We have also monitored a lot of activity and
as a result we are seeing some decisions made by companies. A
number of shipping companies have discontinued services to
Iran. Several maritime shipping insurers have said they will no
longer provide coverage for Iran-bound vessels from wherever.
Major energy traders have discontinued sales of refined
products to Iran.
As a result, we have seen Iran have to take steps that we
think is adding to their economic mismanagement and
instability. Now, we will continue to gather information, work
with our allies and partners on this matter. Since we are the
first administration to ever rigorously enforce any sanctions
against Iran, we have a lot of catchup to do. There are cases
that are still in the review process and we are using, as
Deputy Secretary Steinberg said last September, we are using
the information we have to have opened investigations in
several cases. We've been engaged with a lot of those companies
to try to get them to discourage further investments or
withdraw. Last week I made a certification as to how we were
going to treat a couple of companies. That is classified, which
of course we can brief you on.
So we are moving, but here is the challenge. We have the
United Nations sanctions, which we've been more successful than
many thought we could be in getting the world to enforce. We
have additional sanctions. The European Union has additional
sanctions. Other countries like Japan, Korea, et cetera, have
added on sanctions. Trying to get some of our partners to
follow sanctions that are not U.N. sanctions has been
challenging, but we literally are at it every single day and
we're going to keep it up. There will be more to report to you
in the near future.
Senator Menendez. Well, I thank you for that. I hope you
will submit subsequently for the record how many are under
review and what the 180-day tolling period is looking like as
it relates to those reviews.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The answer supplied for the record to the requested
information follows:]
We have met with family members of the victims and understand their
anguish over this heinous act of terrorism. We shared their outrage at
the release of Megrahi to Libya. We are also committed to seeing that
justice is served. We have seen the recent public statements from a
former Libyan official concerning Qadhafi's responsibility for the
bombing. The investigation into the Pan Am 103 bombing remains open and
we are committed to assisting law enforcement efforts in obtaining and
evaluating any new information relating it. We are coordinating closely
with the Department of Justice on this sensitive law enforcement matter
and are committed to assisting with any appropriate approaches to
relevant Libyan officials. As this is an ongoing investigative matter,
please refer to the Department of Justice for any further details.
Additional information in response to this question will be made
available in a classified response.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Menendez.
Senator DeMint--oh, excuse me. Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, Madam Secretary.
Secretary Clinton. Good morning.
Senator Rubio. I have a couple of quick questions. I want
to talk to you briefly about the national debt in light of
Admiral Mullen's recent statement that it was a major issue
with regards to national security. I was hoping you would share
some of your views on the impact that the national debt and its
unsustainable nature is having on our foreign policy, in
particular our ability to impact events around the world.
Secretary Clinton. Senator, I have spoken out about that as
well, and I think it's an incredibly important issue. I clearly
agree that the United States must be strong at home in order to
maintain our strength abroad, and at the core of our strength
is our economic strength. So I'm well aware, having sat where
you are now sitting for 8 years, of the necessity for us to
take action to begin to rein in our debt, and particularly our
indebtedness to foreign countries, the top of the list being
China.
I also know quite a bit about how challenging it is because
it was at the end of the 1990s in my husband's administration
that a bipartisan deal was struck that put us on a path where
we had a balanced budget, where we had decreasing deficits. We
were on a glide path for actually, as hard as it is to believe,
ending our national debt.
I sat on the Budget Committee of the Senate in early 2001
and I believe that we made decisions starting in 2001 that
undermined our capacity to actually do what I think both of us
agree must be done. So I hope there is an appetite for a
bipartisan agreement that will deal with our debt without
undermining our strength, which is so needed in the world
today. That's the balancing act and it's a tough one, but
certainly I support efforts to do that.
Senator Rubio. Just I think to summarize, what we're both
saying is it's your belief that the United States could
establish a plan to deal with our debt, to begin to make it
manageable again, that that would help us carry out foreign
policy, it would strengthen our hand in the world.
Secretary Clinton. Yes. It won't surprise you to know that
I think some things have to be done on the revenue side as
well. You know, I go to a lot of countries where rich people
will not pay a penny to support the services of their
government, where they are at, in my view, a mistaken belief
that somehow people in the 21st century are not going to demand
more. I think there has to be a compromise on a bipartisan
basis, like we did in the late 1990s, where we put spending and
revenues and entitlements on the table.
Senator Rubio. Briefly, if I could turn your attention to
the Western Hemisphere for a moment. In the hemisphere, it
appears that basically countries are heading in one of two
directions. There's the rise of these autocratic type
situations that we see in Nicaragua and Bolivia and Venezuela.
Of course, they're joining Cuba on that list. On the other
hand, there's the promising development in places like Brazil,
Chile, and Colombia.
All of this I think is kind of colored by a growing loss of
influence in the region by the United States vis-a-vis other
nations stepping up. Earlier I think you used the phrase we're
in a competition of influence with China. I think that's
especially true in the Western Hemisphere. Even Iran has tried
to play in some of these countries.
I was hoping you could outline some of the steps that we're
taking to reengage the region, in particular encouraging
nations to follow the route of Brazil, Chile, and Colombia, and
in particular the free trade agreement with Colombia, which I
know has languished for some time and hope we can get some
update on where that is and exactly what are we waiting for to
consummate that.
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, thank you for turning our
attention to the Western Hemisphere, which often does not get
the attention it deserves. The countries in our hemisphere are
our biggest trading partners, our biggest energy suppliers.
They have, with notable exceptions like Cuba and a few others
like Venezuela and Nicaragua, they have moved into an era of
sustainable democracy and economic growth. So there's a lot for
the United States to be very proud and grateful for.
But again, I underscore your point. There are other nations
that are competing with us. Take Colombia, for example. This
Congress and previous administrations invested a lot of money
in the effort to support Colombia in the fight against the FARC
and the drug traffickers, and by and large that has been a
successful American partnership. Yet we're watching Colombia
sign free trade deals with Canada, with the European Union. I
think they're either in negotiation or about to be with China.
And we have a free trade agreement that we are still not able
to act on.
So certainly this administration is moving as rapidly as
possible to resolve outstanding issues. I want to get that up
this year. I think it is definitely in American business
economic interests. I feel the same way about Panama. Those are
tangible signs that the United States is really engaged with
our friends in the region.
You talk about Brazil. One of the things that Brazil did--
and I don't want to sound like a broken record--they have the
highest tax to GDP ratio in the hemisphere, and they've used
that money to invest in social inclusion, to improve their
education and health care systems. And Brazil is booming and we
view it now as a real success story.
Other nations, like Chile, which you point to, have
similarly had good leadership, good investments, and Chile
makes a free trade agreement with everybody they can, including
us, and it benefits them and it benefits us, and it provides an
economic base of stability that allows democracy to flourish.
So we are looking at how we can enhance security assistance
to our friends in Central America. We're using the Merida
Initiative to work with Mexico. President Calderon will be here
tomorrow. Let's not forget our friends in the Caribbean,
because a lot of those small nations are struggling against
crime, drug trafficking influence.
So there's a big agenda for us to do and I'm very pleased
that President Obama will go to Brazil, Chile, and El Salvador
this month, but we have to do even more to tighten the bonds of
friendship and partnership.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Rubio.
Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Clinton, thank you very much for your incredible
service to our country. I share your view about global
development policies being one of national security, and that
it is important that we have adequate resources. I think it
also speaks to our values, as you pointed out. And it's also
cost-effective. We'd much rather use development assistance
than have to use our military. So I think that from every point
of view you're absolutely correct that this needs to be part of
our discussions about national security, and which we need to
make sure that we have adequate resources, and the amount of
money that we're spending on our international development
programs are relatively small. So I hear that.
I want to, though, move to a second part of this equation
that you and I have talked about before. In this Congress I'm
going to be chairing the subcommittee here that deals with
international development assistance. I want to know a little
bit more about accountability. We've talked about this several
times, that our involvement in other countries needs to advance
gender equity, needs to make sure that we're not participating
in corruption so the money ends up in the pockets of some
despot rather than going to the development of the nation.
Can you share with us ways in which you can engage this
committee to make sure that we get the proper return in regards
to American values as we participate in other countries?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, thank you, and thanks for
your long-term attention to this issue. In the first ever
Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, the QDDR, we set
forth a number of recommendations, many of which are already
under way, to improve how we deliberate, how we hold it
accountable, how we vet partners, how we move contract
functions inside and thereby save money.
The USAID forward agenda that Raj Shah is implementing is a
result of the work that went into the analysis. We're seeing
some results. We're seeing procurement changes. We are seeing
those who had gotten contracts held responsible, some of them
prohibited from further contracts because of their financial
irregularities. We are looking to streamline aid delivery so
that we're not duplicating throughout the U.S. Government. That
was one of the goals behind our efforts to have a whole of
government approach with our ambassadors, our chiefs of
mission, responsible for everyone, so that if we have aid going
in through Justice or Agriculture or Commerce it's not off in a
separate direction, that we try to focus it and better organize
it.
We are doing that as well in the State Department, where we
are vetting a lot of our programs, trying to better organize
them, making progress, but not yet enough.
Senator Cardin. Let me mention part of the jurisdiction of
this committee, which is international investment, protection
of intellectual property and technology transfer. I mention
that because I think you mentioned trade agreements, which
obviously can be very beneficial to America. But we don't have
a level playing field on protection of intellectual property
and it's costing us jobs, thousands of jobs, if not more, in
this country.
So I just want to put that on your radar screen as you have
your discussions internationally to make sure that we make that
a priority also.
Secretary Clinton. I agree completely. I think there's a
grand bargain to be had here on trade. In addition to the free
trade agreements with Korea, Panama, Colombia, we have trade
adjustment assistance. We have the Andean preferences. We have
the Generalized System of Preferences. All of that should be
looked at as our comprehensive trade policy. Embedded in those
are and should be protections for intellectual property rights.
We worked hard with the Chinese to begin to get more protection
and frankly, to make the case that as China develops they're
going to want intellectual property protection, which up until
now they haven't seen as in their interest. So there's a lot of
work on that front going on.
Senator Cardin. I could point out that China is very
efficient at stopping information getting to its citizens when
it wants to, but seems to be very lax when it comes to stopping
piracy, which is thievery against American interests.
Secretary Clinton. Absolutely. I've been jammed by the
Chinese several times, starting in 1995 and most recently with
my Internet speech. So they are quite efficient and I
understand that completely.
But in all of our dealings with them and other of our
trading partners we are making this case, because you're right,
our intellectual property is the lifeblood of American
innovation and it is jobs, it is economic opportunity, and it
is the leading edge of where we go in the 21st century. We've
got to do a better job of protecting it.
Senator Cardin. I also want to thank you for your attention
to the Iraqi refugee issue. I think we have made some progress,
but we still are not there yet. Obviously, as our role is
changing in Iraq I think it's important that we continue to
point out to the Iraqis the refugee problems as it relates to
Iraqi refugees being in Syria and Jordan and other neighboring
countries. But I do appreciate the attention that you've given.
I want to ask you one last question, and that deals with
the circumstances in Libya. Each of the countries are different
and you point out the Egyptians, and rightly so, do not want to
see outside forces dictating how their governments are going to
be formed. In Libya those who are standing up to Qaddafi are
asking for international assistance. Can you tell us what role
the United States or the international community can play in
regards to Libya?
Secretary Clinton. First, Senator, we are sending
humanitarian teams to both the Tunisian and Egyptian borders
with Libya. We are working with the United Nations to stand up
humanitarian operations. We've done a survey of medical
supplies and food supplies that are in the region that we can
quickly move to assist the people in Libya.
The tough issues about how and whether there would be any
intervention to assist those who are opposing Libya is very
controversial within Libya and within the Arab community. The
Arab League just issued a statement today, early today, saying
that they disapproved and rejected any foreign interference
within Libya on behalf of the opposition, even though they have
called for Qaddafi to leave.
So we're working closely with our partners and allies to
try to see what we can do, and we are engaged in very active
consideration of all the different options that are available.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Let me just say we have a vote. Senator Lugar's going over
to vote. We want to try to keep everything going--I don't know,
Senator Shaheen or Webb, you may want to vote and then come
back quickly, and then we'll keep--we can probably get two
question rounds in between that.
Senator DeMint.
Senator DeMint. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, thank you for being here. It's been very
informative.
The chairman as well as you have mentioned the apparently
growing problem with religiously motivated violence in
different places in the world. I know those of us who live in
freedom understand that there is a strong link between
political, economic, and religious freedom. As we look at
countries where we're shedding blood and treasure, in Iraq and
Afghanistan, obviously very concerning when apparently the
governments we support appear to be at least complicit, in
Afghanistan where someone converted to Christianity is
threatened with execution. Even allies, democratic allies like
India, where we see religious violence, the government has
resisted visas for congressional delegations to come in and try
to observe what's happening.
The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom in
2010 reports that, just on Afghanistan, Afghanistan's on a
watch list, and they concluded that, ``The U.S. policy has not
sufficiently prioritized human rights, including religious
freedom, in Afghanistan. Promoting respect for freedom of
religion or belief must be an integral part of U.S. strategy,
particularly as the Government of Afghanistan pursues a peace
or reconciliation process with antigovernment insurgents.''
So my question to you is, while we hear these reports and
the media seems to informally document them, is the State
Department actually trying to track and quantify these crimes
in Afghanistan and other countries where we support with
foreign aid? What are we doing, what can we do, to stop it, to
express our concern?
Secretary Clinton. Senator, thank you for raising that, and
I know this is an issue of great importance to you, as it is to
me. We are tracking it. We are trying to make it a major part
of our human rights reporting. We are trying to increase our
attention paid to it and speaking out forcefully against it and
engaging with governments.
It's a foreign concept, unfortunately, to many people
around the world. We are trying to work with a lot of our
fellow nations in crafting a proposal that says we support
religious freedom and we support freedom of expression, because
there's been a move to try to criminalize what is called
defamation, leading, as you say, all the way up to execution in
some places.
We've worked steadily on this for 2 years. We're slowly I
think making some progress. But it has been a very hard
discussion, because a lot of other cultures just--their idea of
religious freedom is you get to be our religion, that's
religious freedom. And the idea that we enshrine in our
Constitution and that we respect here at home is a hard one for
many to accept.
So this is certainly on the top of my personal list and I
would welcome any suggestions you would have, because we're
going the do everything we can to raise the alarm where
necessary and keep the conversation going.
Senator DeMint. Well, I hope a lot of our aid and
assistance in the future to countries will be conditional on an
understanding that these principles of freedom--that while we
do have different cultures that we certainly have to respect,
that when our soldiers are dying the idea that they couldn't
practice the faith that they believe in these countries they're
dying for is a concern to many. As we look ahead, and I'm sure
you know how complex the situation in the Middle East is
getting, and Northern Africa and with what's happening in
Egypt, organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood--there have
been mixed signals from the administration on whether they're
secular or not. The record seems to show that they are much
less than secular.
But as you look at Egypt and how we're going to deal with
that, I know you can't give a clear answer and we're certainly
not in control of what happens, but how do we deal as a nation
and hopefully as an ally with groups like the Muslim
Brotherhood? What signals do you plan to send to them as far as
the U.S. support of Egypt in the future?
Secretary Clinton. Well, we've been consistently saying
that any political party that participates in an electoral
process must respect democratic institutions, the rights of
minorities, including religious minorities, has to be
supportive of independent judiciary, independent media, cannot
have an armed wing or a militia associated with it.
You know, it's been interesting because we've been getting
a lot of reporting back, not just from our diplomats, but from
European and others who have gone into Egypt. They've been
meeting with a lot of the opposition groups, including young
members of the Muslim Brotherhood. And I think they are in an
internal debate about exactly how they're going to participate
in a democracy.
So we want to encourage what we would view as answers that
would protect the inclusive nature of Muslims and Coptic
Christians living peacefully together in Egypt, that would
recognize a political process in a democracy. You have to be
able to get along with people who have differing opinions,
different religious beliefs.
Again, this is going to be an ongoing effort. One thing,
Senator, is we could use help in confirming our Ambassador for
religious freedom. I know you've raised some questions. Part of
the reason why the administration and I personally support
Reverend Cook is because she's got a personality, she's got an
ability to connect with people. Sending her into places where
she would be listening and talking I think would give us a face
for religious freedom that isn't necessarily expected and
could, based on what I know of her and her work and how she's
been accepted as a woman preacher by her male counterparts and
broken new ground in so many areas in New York, in the Baptist
Convention, et cetera, she would be somebody who I think would
be especially well suited to dealing with a lot of these issues
now--not in a threatening way, but in a persuasive way that
would build upon personal relationships.
Senator DeMint. Thank you, Senator.
Absent a chairman, I will yield to the Senator from
Pennsylvania.
Senator Casey [presiding]. Thank you, Senator DeMint.
Secretary Clinton, thank you for your testimony today and
for your great work here and around the world. It's a
remarkable schedule you keep and we're grateful for your time
here.
I was especially grateful for what you said at the
beginning of your testimony regarding Minister Bhatti, someone
I have met on two different occasions, and just demonstrated--I
don't know how you say it--uncommon, remarkable courage in the
face of a threat and seemed to have--when I spoke to him a
number of weeks ago--seemed to have been at peace with that,
that he knew he was under threat and was not going to allow
that threat to prevent him from doing the good work he did.
So we're grateful for your recognition of that and your
work to advance the same causes and the same goals that he--the
same values, I should say, that he espoused.
I wanted to ask you about maybe two or three areas, one,
first and foremost, on ammonium nitrate. You and the Department
and the late Richard Holbrooke and others have worked long and
hard on this issue. For those who haven't paid close attention
to it, it's really just the main ingredient in improvised
explosive devices. It's outlawed in Afghanistan, but
unfortunately not in Pakistan, and it's coming over the borders
in kind of--almost like a rushing current of ammonium nitrate
coming from Pakistan, as well as other places, into
Afghanistan.
I guess I wanted to ask you about two areas. One is if you
could tell us a little about and also maybe if after the
hearing you could provide a report, your team can provide a
report on it, in terms of our own work and progress report; and
then second, on the legislative efforts within the Government
of Pakistan to not just impose statutory remedies, but also to
better regulate it.
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, thank you for your
leadership on this important issue, because this is a direct
deadly threat to our troops and also to the people of
Afghanistan and Pakistan.
In November 2010 the United States launched what we're
calling Operation Global Shield, and it is a multinational law
enforcement effort involving 60 countries and international
organizations aimed at stemming the flow of IED components,
including ammonium nitrate. Sixty countries are participating,
including the U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime and the World
Customs Organization and Interpol.
Since its inception, approximately 68,000 kilograms of
explosive precursors have been seized. Now, in addition we are
increasing our intelligence sharing on ammonium nitrate and
other deadly ingredients. We continue to work with the
Governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan to get them to take
more concrete actions to disrupt the flow of these chemicals.
We're working with them. Pakistan established last November a
counter-IED forum to bring a whole of government approach.
We've pressed them to do more on the regulatory and
legislative framework. Because ammonium nitrate even in our
country is a legal substance, we have to figure out how to stop
its flow but not cut it off from construction and agriculture.
That's obviously much harder in a country like Pakistan that
doesn't have a regulatory framework really, where a lot of this
could already be housed.
But we remain absolutely committed to this. We're going to
do everything we can, and we welcome your leadership and any
other suggestions that you have as to how we can be more
effective.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much.
I know we have limited time because of the vote, and it may
allow you to have a little bit of a break, I hope. Maybe just
one more question. We'll have a few others we'll submit for the
record. But I wanted to ask you about Lebanon. When I was there
in July for the first time, I was stunned by--and maybe I
shouldn't have been--but stunned by the overarching and
dominant presence that Hezbollah has in that country. Of
course, the world has changed. Now you've got a Prime Minister
moved out in essence because of the strength of Hezbollah.
I wanted to get a sense of your--because I know your
Department has statutory obligations based upon the 2009
Supplemental Appropriations Act, where I guess you're directed
to report on the procedures in place--and I'm reading here--
``to enforce that no funds are provided to any individuals or
organizations that have any known links to terrorist
organizations, including Hezbollah.''
I just want to get a sense of that in light of the change
there and what you can tell us about that?
Secretary Clinton. Senator, as you know, the government is
not yet formed and we are waiting so that once it is we will
review its composition, its policies, and its behavior to
determine the extent of Hezbollah's political influence over
it. It is important that we continue planning so that we'd be
ready if there is an opportunity to work with this new
government.
I believe still at this point we should continue supporting
the Lebanese Armed Forces. I know that's been a subject of some
debate here in the Congress. It is considered a nonsectarian
institution that is national in scope. It has the respect of
the Lebanese people from all sects. It continues to state its
support for Security Council Resolution 1701, which is our
primary security-related goal in Lebanon. It cooperates with
the United Nations mission in the south to try to keep the
peace there.
We worry that if the United States does not continue
supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces its capabilities will
rapidly deteriorate, security in the south and along the border
with Israel will be at risk. We do have a good relationship.
Our military-to-military ties with the Lebanese Armed Forces is
strong. That's served us well with the Egyptian military. So I
hope as the Congress is looking at the budget we will think
seriously about continuing our support for the Lebanese Armed
Forces.
Senator Casey. Thank you.
The Chairman [presiding]. Senator Casey, thank you.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Clinton, I'm sorry I missed the exchange because
I had to vote, so I hope I don't ask you anything that's
redundant of what you've already said.
First let me, as I've said many times, express my
admiration for the intellect you have brought to your job and
for the energy that you put into it. You really have given
great service to our country.
There was an exchange earlier with Senator Rubio about the
free trade agreements in this hemisphere, and then you briefly
mentioned afterward, the Korean Free Trade Agreement. Just as a
comment, I have two questions in a very short period of time. I
can't overstate my hopes that we can get this Korean Free Trade
Agreement in place for strategic as well as economic reasons.
The Northeast Asia area is the only place in the world where
the interests of China, Russia, Japan, and the United States
directly intersect, and right in the middle of that is the
bulls eye of a divided Korean Peninsula.
We have every reason for the economic well-being of the
country, but also for the strategic interests in that region,
to move forward on that agreement with all due haste.
There was a comment by Senator Boxer about the situation
with ending our involvement in Iraq. I would like to echo my
concerns about that issue. We tend to focus on the crisis of
the moment, as we are doing now with these other issues in that
region, rather than on conclusively ending ongoing commitments
that were not intended to be permanent. We've been in Iraq for
8 years. The war as a war, meaning ending Saddam Hussein's
regime, was over in a matter of weeks. We have been involved in
a very costly occupation since that period.
I've read the Strategic Framework Agreement and also the
Status of Forces Agreement and it's clear that we should be out
by the end of 2011, but there is also language in there that
allows an extension. I would like to hear from you whether you
believe there are any circumstances that should compel us to
stay longer?
Secretary Clinton. First, Senator, I agree completely with
you about the Korean Free Trade Agreement and I think it is
very much in America's strategic and economic interests, and I
hope that that agreement will be submitted soon and acted on
soon by the Congress.
I think with respect to Iraq there are no plans that I'm
aware of. But you're right that the Iraqi Government does have
certainly the opportunity to request additional assistance on
the military side. We have committed to civilian assistance,
which I think is appropriate. At this point I do not have any
insight into whether or not the Iraqis have any interest in
making such a request. They seem to have their hands full
getting their government set up, which they haven't yet
accomplished.
The only point I would make--and it is not in any way meant
as a statement of approval or disapproval--is, you know, we
made long-term commitments to a country like Korea, for
example. We were there while they had a less than perfect
democracy, with coups and assassinations and corruption of the
most egregious kind. And would we say that 50-plus, I guess 60,
years of expenditure was worth it or not? Well, I think many
people would argue that it probably was. Could it have been cut
short? Probably, under certain circumstances. Is it still one
of the most dangerous places in the world? Absolutely.
So I think each of these situations has to be looked at and
evaluated independently. I think Iraq is a very important piece
of the puzzle about what happens in the Middle East, because we
are all asking ourselves, can Egypt and Tunisia become
democracies? Well, an equally important question is, Can Iraq
remain a democracy and move to improve that democracy? Can it
withstand pressures from Iran? I don't know the answers to
those questions.
So as we move forward with Iraq, I do think we have to
factor in any kind of ongoing involvement in what is in our
strategic interest as well.
Senator Webb. Well, I would just like to reiterate my long-
held view that there are completely different strategic reasons
when we look at the Korean Peninsula versus that part of the
world. I believe it's a negative for us to be an occupying
power in that part of the world, whereas if you look at, again,
Northeast Asia, the volatility of that part of the world over
history has been because of the interactions of China, Russia,
and Japan. The presence of the United States since World War II
has largely given us a stability that they have not seen
previously.
I only have 1\1/2\ minutes. I want to make sure I ask you
this other question because it regards the comments that have
been made regarding the potential use of military force in
Libya. We can all agree on the negative characteristics of the
current regime. I found your comment earlier regarding the
statement from the Arab League warning about an American
military involvement. I'm also very conscious of the
unpredictability of history in this part of the world when it
comes to situations after these opposition movements run their
course. Iran is the classic example where we traded the Shah of
Iran for the Ayatollah Khomeini.
What I'm really concerned about is hearing what are the
characteristics of the rebel forces, for lack of a better term,
in Libya that would commend them to our government to the level
that we would actually consider military intervention in
cooperation with them?
Secretary Clinton. Senator, that's the key question, and I
think it is fair to say, as you probably heard from Secretary
Gates and Admiral Mullen yesterday, there is a great deal of
caution that is being exercised with respect to any actions
that we might take other than in support of humanitarian
missions.
There may well be a role for military assets to support
getting equipment and supplies into areas that have need of
them and where we are welcome. But I think that it is a big
reminder to us that we don't know the outcome of this. We don't
know these players. We just opened an Embassy for the first
time in years in 2009. We were just getting to know a lot of
these people. We are not as aware even of what went on in Egypt
and Tunisia, and I have to admit to a certain level of opacity
about both of those circumstances.
So I take your caution, and certainly our military
leadership does as well. The only point that I would make is,
we faced a similar situation in the Balkans, where there were
many, many reasons why it was not viewed with favor that we
would set up a no-fly zone for a lot of similar reasons--the
difficulty of it, the maintenance of it, the appearance of it.
And eventually it was determined that it was in the interests
of the peace and stability of the region, et cetera.
I think that we are a long way from making that decision. I
believe that your statement is certainly very much in the minds
of those in our government who have to make this decision.
But I wanted to just end on something about Iraq, because I
value your opinion greatly. As I say, I'm not advocating this.
I just think we need to have a debate about it. Our troops will
leave. Our troops are leaving. They will be gone. That is in
accordance with the status of forces agreement. We will not be
an occupying country any longer in Iraq.
Now, if the Iraqi Government comes to the United States
Government and says, you know, we have no air defenses, we have
no air force, we have no intelligence abilities, we have no
surveillance abilities, we've got this hungry big neighbor on
our border and we don't want to be taken over by them any more
than they're already influencing us, can you stay in some
capacity at our invitation, I think that's a debate we need to
have, because at that point you could take the position it's
not in our national interest, it is not a strategic region,
although I would disagree with that, and that what we are now
facing in the environment with Iran is as much a competition
for our future positioning as what we faced in the past with
China and Russia.
So I just think that this is a debate. We're nowhere near
it because nobody's asked us for anything and they may never
because of their own internal politics.
Senator Webb. That's a debate for another time, and as long
as I'm in the Senate I would be happy to participate in it.
Thank you very much for your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Webb.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you, Secretary Clinton, for being here today and for
the face that you represent for America around the world. We
are all very grateful.
I would be remiss if I didn't at the outset of my time
comment on the back and forth we heard from some of our
colleagues about the debt and the importance of addressing the
debt. I think all of us here recognize how critical an issue
that is for the country. But I think, as Senator Corker so
rightly pointed out, trying to address dealing with the debt on
the 12 percent of the budget that is nondefense discretionary
spending I don't think makes sense. I very much appreciated and
am in agreement with your comments, that not only do we have to
look at the spending side of our budget, and entitlements and
defense are a big piece of that, but we also need to look at
revenues and tax reform.
We are not going to get where we need to go unless we
address that as well. So thank you for making that point and
for pointing out the history of how we got here.
I want to go back to Afghanistan, because yesterday we
heard at Armed Services from General Mattis, the CENTCOM
commander, that we're looking at actually increasing the
numbers of Afghan security forces above the original or the
recent target of 305,000. I think there is an acknowledgment
that the cost of sustaining this kind of a force would be over
$10 billion a year, while the government takes in about a
billion dollars in revenue a year.
I know that the point has been made by a number of people
that it's cheaper for the Afghans to be fighting this battle
than for us to be paying for American soldiers to fight it. But
that still doesn't address the long-term costs of developing
and maintaining this kind of a security force. So as we look
into the future and think about how the forces continue to be
paid for, what do we think is going to happen here?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, first thank you for your
opening comments about the need to put everything on the table
as we try to deal with our deficit and most particularly our
debt.
With respect to the Afghan National Security Forces, there
is an ongoing analysis--you heard from General Mattis--about
what it would take for Afghanistan after 2014 to be able to
defend itself. And that is not only their military, but their
police forces, and then however you factor in the local village
protective forces that they are creating.
I think that one of the ways we are trying to address this
is by working with the Afghan Government to help them increase
their revenues. There has been a lot of work done about the
resources that Afghanistan has, its mineral resources in
particular. If those are managed correctly--and that's a big
if, but if they are managed correctly, there would be a steady
stream of increasing revenues for the Afghan Government, which
would give it the capacity it needs to take on greater and
greater responsibility for defending itself in the future.
Senator Shaheen. Are we talking to our allies on the ground
there about potentially helping to pick up the costs for a
longer period of time as well?
Secretary Clinton. Well, at the NATO summit in Lisbon at
the end of last year, there was a position adopted that NATO
would have a continuing relationship with Afghanistan after
2014. The content of that is in process, being developed by
Secretary General Rasmussen and our NATO allies. So we are all
looking toward 2015 when we want to see Afghanistan defending
itself, but I think it is fair to say that there will have to
be continuing support from the United States, from other
nations, and from NATO.
Senator Shaheen. As we're looking at the civilian efforts
on the ground in Afghanistan, I was pleased to see the creation
of the Senior Civilian Coordinator and I'm pleased to see the
appointment of the new Ambassador Simon Gast, but concerned
that the coordinator still lacks the authority to really
provide the overall coordination that was envisioned when this
position was created. I wonder if you could speak to that and
whether we think there needs to be more authority given to this
position and how to accomplish that if so?
Secretary Clinton. I think there will be increasing
authority and the exercise of it by the civilian coordinator
over the next years. Really, we just got the inputs on the
military surge right for the first time about 6 months ago. I
think it is fair to say that when President Obama came into
office he inherited a deteriorating military situation in
Afghanistan. The Taliban had the momentum. There wasn't any
doubt of that. Sitting on his desk waiting for him was a
request for additional troops that had not been acted on by the
prior administration.
So we believe that the military surge is finally operating
as it was intended to. The civilian is getting up to speed and
I think you'll see with the civilian coordinator more of an
effort to be sure that we are doing all we can to maximize the
international civilian presence.
Senator Shaheen. President Karzai has made a number of
statements in the last month or so that have raised questions
in my mind about how he envisions reintegration and
reconciliation efforts. I wonder if you could speak to whether
we are actually on the same page with President Karzai or if we
think there are better ways to address this piece?
Secretary Clinton. I think we are on the same page, but
there are many pages to go in trying to figure out how to bring
about an end to the conflict in a way that does not undermine
any future stability in Afghanistan. Clearly we want this to be
Afghan-led, but the United States has to play a major role.
Our new special representative for Afghanistan and
Pakistan, Ambassador Mark Grossman, is in consultations as we
speak, met with Karzai I think yesterday, where Karzai was in
London, is meeting with the contact group of about 47 nations,
including 13 Muslim nations, hosted by the Organization of the
Islamic Conference in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia. So there are many
voices that are involved in trying to organize and move forward
with this process, and we are conscious of the need for Afghan-
led, but it can't be only Afghans involved because it has
regional implications, and we're very much aware of that and
working to try to help facilitate it.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Coons.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the Secretary for your leadership in
focusing on the critical nexus between development, diplomacy,
and defense. I just returned from a week-long trip to
Afghanistan and Pakistan, Israel, and Jordan. Senator Corker
was one of the two other Senators with me. I saw firsthand the
critical and essential partnership between our military and
civilian missions in all four of those countries.
In Afghanistan, I would agree with your characterization.
Our troops are making remarkable and steady progress in
degrading the strength of the Taliban and in standing up an
Afghan National Security Force and local police forces. Our
troop morale is good. The Afghans we met with were grateful for
our commitment and sacrifice, which I considered significant.
But the progress in Afghanistan in my view was matched with
a lack of real sustained progress in Pakistan. I had some real
concerns about their either unwillingness or disinclination to
go after extremists and to essentially close this deal and give
us a sustainable opportunity for success.
My first question for you, Madam Secretary, is what are we
doing as a nation to ensure that the very extremists who
slipped through our fingers in Afghanistan and crossed over to
Pakistan are not already able to find promising second fronts
to move to in Yemen, in Somalia, and in other states? There
were disturbing developments even today in Yemen. What are we
doing, given the huge scale of our investment in Afghanistan,
to ensure that we're paying sufficient attention to sub-Saharan
Africa, to the Horn of Africa, to the Maghreb, to make sure
that we are partnering military and civilian to prevent their
moving into a whole other base of operations?
Secretary Clinton. Senator, that's a really critical
question, made more so by the events of the last weeks. We are
working on counterterrorism efforts in all the places that you
have mentioned. We are supporting the African Union in support
of the transitional federal government in Somalia against the
al-Shabaab group that is allied with al-Qaeda. We have
alliances with a number of North African and sub-Saharan
African countries against al-Qaeda and related groups that are
part of a syndicate of terrorists.
It is a very big order indeed. There is a lot that we are
trying to do in order to degrade and defeat al-Qaeda and
undermine all of its related organizations. We have made
progress against core
al-Qaeda. Core al-Qaeda does not have the reach or the
capacity. It still serves as a financing mechanism, as an
inspirational focal point for a lot of jihadists around the
world. But it doesn't have quite the impact.
However, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Qaeda in the
Maghreb, al-Qaeda here, al-Qaeda there, particularly in Iraq,
where we think we still have about a thousand al-Qaeda
sympathizers or members, which is another reason why we have to
keep our eye on Iraq, it is the highest priority of this
government, of this administration. It is a whole of government
effort, and we are literally working as hard as we can every
single day, because there's no doubt that al-Qaeda and its
affiliates continue to plot against us, plot against our
European allies, plot against many other countries.
One of our biggest concerns is Libya descending into chaos
and becoming a giant Somalia. It's right now not something that
we see in the offing, but many of the al-Qaeda activists in
Afghanistan and later in Iraq came from Libya and came from
eastern Libya, which is now the so-called free area of Libya.
So there is a lot of moving parts to this that are very
difficult to put in neat little boxes and stack up somewhere.
So your question goes to the heart of what we're doing in
Afghanistan and Pakistan and many other places, and that is
trying to go after those who attacked us and put them out of
business.
Senator Coons. As you have assembled your budget for this
year, I and many on this committee respect the fact that we're
under significant spending pressures. We have to make cuts, we
have to trim and eliminate and focus our spending. But in sub-
Saharan Africa there were 19 countries that face significant
cuts or complete elimination of United States aid. How do you
strike the priorities? How do you strike the balance in
deciding which countries in such a fluid environment should
continue to receive U.S. assistance and where we simply say we
can no longer afford it?
Secretary Clinton. Well, it's a multipronged analysis. I
doubt that we have zeroed out any country in sub-Saharan
Africa, because there are other funding streams that go into
those countries and other programs that are present. But these
are really hard choices. You know, what we always are trying to
balance is what is the right amount of American presence
diplomatically, developmentally, defensively, in order to
protect our security, advance our interests, and further our
values.
You know, it's as much an art as a science, and we are
constantly calibrating it. But one thing I know for sure is
where we are no longer present, others will be. We just had
Senegal expel the Iranian Ambassador and diplomats because they
found them selling arms to people, not only through Senegal,
but within Senegal. Iran is very active in Africa.
You know China is extremely active diplomatically and
commercially. There are many different forces at work. I wish
we were back--some days, I believe it would have been a lot
nicer being Secretary of State during the cold war. We had a
really clear view. You were with us or you were against us, and
here's how we calculated. It's much more complicated right now.
Therefore, I don't want us to lose ground, even while we
work on trying to get our budget. Our Africa budget, I was just
handed by my very able staff, it grows by 10 percent over FY
2010. That's because we think we've got to stay very active and
involved in Africa.
Senator Coons. One more question, Mr. Chairman? I also was
very encouraged by what I saw in Jordan and in the Palestinian
Authority in terms of progress around security, around
improvement in the economy, and in particular the training
center at JBTC, to see how U.S. and allied trainers are
delivering sustained high-quality training that's helping the
Palestinian Authority to deliver more security on the ground.
That particular program is one that really is a joint
Defense and State program, where it's under State leadership
but they are Defense-affiliated folks in leadership. I had
dinner with General Muller there.
Can you give me some other examples of some encouraging
exemplars of how the military and civilian or diplomatic-led
missions are collaborating effectively, given that I think
we're going to see more and more need for this in these sorts
of fluid environments going forward?
Secretary Clinton. Well, that is certainly the case in
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. It is the case in the Horn of
Africa. It is the case in many parts of Latin America. It is
the case in our efforts in certain parts of Asia, where we're
cooperating.
So really it is most visible in the front-line states of
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, but the example you're giving
of our joint training for the Palestinian security forces along
with a partner like Jordan is what we're going to have to do
more of. It is my goal that we better integrate our civilian
and military capacities, which is why I'm so adamant that you
can't talk about national security and leave out the State
Department and USAID.
We have a tradition where foreign military financing goes
to the State Department for a reason. We want to build broader
relationships with militaries that give them some sense of why
it's important that there be civilian control of a military.
There's just reason after reason why what we do really
requires a whole of government approach. By cutting us, we are
also diminishing that message and those values, which are
really important to the final outcome.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Madam Secretary. Thank you for
your answers.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Coons.
Madam Secretary, we're almost at the end here. I just
wanted to follow up with a couple quick questions if we can.
First of all, if you were to list a priority of some of the
cuts that have been made in terms of restoration, where would
you begin?
Secretary Clinton. Well, one thing I'm really worried
about----
The Chairman. What's the most damaging?
Secretary Clinton. What I'm worried about, Senator, is that
with this very large cut coming out of the House, there will be
pressure for us to try to meet as much of our mission in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan to the detriment of the entire rest
of the budget. We will see a very serious impact on all of the
initiatives--global health, Feed the Future, climate change,
clean energy technology. Those were specifically zeroed out in
the House.
We will also see a great decrease in our ability to fulfill
our commercial and economic missions. We will have to close aid
programs in a number of countries where we think it will be to
our disadvantage to do so.
We have, unfortunately, a combination of threats here with
such a large cut coming out of the House that will severely
undercut our ability to really meet any of our requirements.
The idea of cooperating with the military, which I think is one
of the real advances we've made over the last 2 years, the
military will probably go and get that money. You know, they'll
say, OK, well, you know, the poor old State Department budget
couldn't get the money, but give us the money. And then they'll
be doing functions that should much more be done, not with a
military American face, but a civilian American face.
So I think on specifics as well as on the general needs, it
would have a very serious impact on us.
The Chairman. I know when you came in initially one of your
goals was to expand language capacity and representation
itself. Have you been able to do that? Is this now going to
mean we're going backward from the advances we've made?
Secretary Clinton. Well, we will go backward in the numbers
of personnel that we have. We will go backward in the talents
and the skills that we are training them to have. One of my
goals has been to save money by better integrating State and
USAID training, so we now have a lot of the AID development
experts getting language skills out at the Foreign Service
Institute.
We had been woefully underresourced and, thanks to your
support and Senator Lugar's support, we were beginning to build
up our capacity again. But it will be very difficult for us to
put people where we need them.
As you know, we tripled the number of civilians going to
Afghanistan. When I got there there were about 300 and they had
6-month rotations. So they weren't even in the country long
enough to figure out what it is they were supposed to do. We
now have about 1,100. They have full-term deployments. They are
full partners with the military. We're going to have to make
cuts all over the place in order to try to meet budgetary
restraints, and we're going to lose a lot by doing that.
The Chairman. Now, I want to ask you again--we touched on
it before and you gave a terrific answer and Senator Boxer
referred to it. But I want to kind of bear down just for a
moment if I can. You're at a town meeting anywhere in American
and somebody says to you: Well, you know, that's all well and
good, Senator; it's nice to be able to save a life there; but
I've got some people here who need a better school; I've got
some people here who are having a hard time putting food on the
table, and so forth.
Balance for them what the cost is to them by not doing
this, that in fact they're not getting out from under
something. In your role you have a lot of examples of that, and
I think it would be good to share a couple.
Secretary Clinton. Well, first I would say what you have
said in your townhalls: The foreign aid, diplomacy budget of
the United States of America is approximately 1 percent if you
look at the State and USAID. If you add Treasury, the Peace
Corps, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, it's maybe 1.5
percent.
So it's not the 10 or 20 percent.
The Chairman. Raw budget.
Secretary Clinton. Yes, raw budget. It's not the 10 or 20
percent that most Americans think it is. So let's start with
some kind of factual base about what we're talking about.
That it is a leverage with our military; that cuts of the
level that are being discussed would profoundly compromise our
national security. First, half of the State-USAID budget
increase from the FY 2008 base has funded our military to
civilian efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, which we
knew we had to fund if we weren't going to see a deterioration
in security in both of those--in all three of those countries.
In the Middle East, proposed cuts would force us to scale
back our help and undercut our influence at the very time when
the United States needs to step up and try to influence the
course of events in the Middle East. We would sacrifice
economic opportunities for American businesses. We work every
day on trying to bring jobs and create economic growth in the
United States. We would sacrifice American safety
opportunities. We would no longer have as many consular
officers doing that first line of defense against those
requesting visas and making sure that they weren't coming here
for bad purposes.
We would be cutting back our peacekeeping efforts. You
know, we get a considerable advantage by working with the
international community, making our contribution, in Darfur,
the Congo, and elsewhere.
We would weaken our efforts to prevent disease and prevent
it from being essentially exported to the United States. We
would dramatically cut our efforts to combat climate change, to
help lead the world to a clean energy future. We would cut back
really severely on what we were doing for children and women
around the world and denying them treatment. We would walk away
from our humanitarian aid and food security efforts.
There is something in all of this for nearly everybody. If
you think that American should be standing up for our national
security, which I think is our primary priority, we're going to
be undermining that. If you think we should be looking to open
up markets and create jobs for Americans, we're going to be
undermining that. If you think we have a humanitarian moral
mission in the world, we're going to be walking away from 5
million children and family members who we will not treat for
malaria. We're going to be walking away from 3,500 mothers and
more than 40,000 children under 5 who die because they don't
get an effective child survival intervention. And we're going
to be turning away people from programs like PEPFAR and HIV-
AIDS, or 16 million people will be denied treatment for
debilitating tropical diseases.
So people in America are very generous and we respond to
disasters, and we often say, why isn't our government doing
more on X, Y, or Z. And unfortunately, I think we were making
progress in delivering aid and having a diplomatic presence in
a more cost-effective way, and we will be undermining a lot of
that work.
The Chairman. I'm sorry I caught you unprepared for that.
[Laughter.]
Secretary Clinton. I could go on and on, but the time is
running, I see.
The Chairman. That was a superb answer and I'm glad I asked
the question and appreciate the answer very, very much.
Secretary Clinton. Could I add one more thing, because I
think this really does go to the heart of it? We will also cut
back on--we'll have 18.8 million fewer polio vaccinations and
26.3 million fewer measles vaccinations. Yesterday on the news
there was an announcement here in Washington about some visitor
from somewhere who had measles. This person had been seen on
this bus and this person had been seen in this restaurant, so
if you were there between the hours of 3 and 5 o'clock or you
were on the bus between 6 and 7 o'clock you need to be checked.
This all comes home. We don't live in a world any longer
where we are effectively protected by these two great oceans on
each side of us. We are now fully integrated and
interdependent, and if we don't lead on these issues I don't
know what will happen.
The Chairman. I'm not going to ask my--I had a couple other
questions. I'm going to reserve those for the next hearing. We
do want to get a date if we can, Madam Secretary, pinned down
for you and Secretary Gates on Afghanistan. We can talk about
that maybe afterward.
Secretary Clinton. OK.
The Chairman. Are there any other questions? Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. I don't want to preempt the thought the
chairman just mentioned about having a hearing with you and
Secretary Gates on Afghanistan. But let me ask this question.
Our foreign policy in recent times has been characterized by
the fact that we were attacked by al-Qaeda and therefore we
responded by going into Afghanistan. President Bush
subsequently sent United States troops into Iraq, either
because there was a belief that Iraq had nuclear weapons or
even, if they didn't, that we really needed to have a nation-
building exercise in Iraq so that there would be another state
in the Middle East that shared our values and could possibly
influence its neighbors. We then increased our commitments in
Afghanistan because, al-Qaeda or not, the instability
of the country was apparent from the actions of the Taliban and
the problems across the border in Pakistan, which invited our
attention.
President Obama, when he met with congressional leaders
after he came into office, indicated we would take the
necessary measures to leave Iraq at a time fairly consistent
with the timetable that is currently being implemented. One
year or so later--and I'm sure you were engaged in this
frequently--he had meetings with congressional leaders in which
he talked about a time of departure from Afghanistan and 2011
was mentioned.
There was great pushback from many people, who said you're
simply signaling to the enemy that you're going to leave, this
is totally unacceptable. I wouldn't say the President changed
his mind, but on the other hand he said: Well, this is sort of
the beginning of the process. And then, after conferring with
our allies, the administration indicated that we would
implement a plan in which responsibilities are to be gradually
transitioned to Afghan authorities beginning in July of this
year and ending in 2014.
Now, at some point there appeared to be a promise of some
type of evaluation by the President, Secretary Gates, and
yourself, perhaps all of you together, of what the course of
activity in Afghanistan is to be. Given the fact we have a
significant number of troops there and considerable resources
flowing there now, where are we headed?
Anecdotally, press accounts province by province are not
very promising on some occasions. At other times, there is
testimony by our military officers that they've made a great
deal of headway. Members of Congress, including recently
Senator Corker, have assessed the situation on the ground in
person. He can speak for himself. But others returning find
very disturbing their conversations with President Karzai about
what his course of action is and what he's about, quite apart
from the perspective of others in the country.
So in short, there is unease as to where our strategy will
take us and how long it will take to get there. And in the
midst of this, all of the rest of what's occurring in the
Middle East has come along, quite apart from our problems with
Iran, North Korea, and the rest. So, what I think this
committee needs from you from time to time, are some sort of
summary judgments, as opposed to there being a sense of either
policy drift or an inability to take decisive action. This is
compounded, simply, either because our military is suffering
losses, or the losses with regard to our budget and so forth.
So it does lead, as you point out, to the type of problem
we have with this hearing this morning. Here the State
Department budget is being compressed some more. That trend has
been evident in this committee for at least a decade, if not
longer. The thought was that diplomats just simply don't get
it, but that you need hard military force, and this is where
you put your money, and there are other things that might be
done in a humanitarian way. But the thought that Secretary
Gates has expressed, that there are many things State
Department should be doing better, is almost compelling them to
try to push money out the door that we've been appropriating to
that office to get over here, and that really needs to be
discussed very candidly.
We're not going to be able to resolve all these problems
this morning. But I would just simply say that I sense a drift
with regard to the Afghanistan situation, with regard to
Pakistan. I don't know what will happen in Iraq, but even after
all of our nation-building the Pew polls and others of the
Iraqi people indicate a very great deal of unhappiness with the
United States.
On the one hand, the leaders are afraid we will leave,
while a good number of their people say: You better get out;
we're tired of you. And the American people say: After all we
put into this; rebuilt your country, tried to do the
infrastructure, and on and on and on, this is just not working
well, what are we doing?
So I throw this out maybe for our next time together,
either in a public conference or in private meetings, because I
think these are basic issues that merit further discussion.
Absent that, I think we're going to have some very strange
votes in the Senate and the House, and they will be reflected
sometimes in budget items simply because people don't know
where to strike and make their voices heard, as opposed to a
rational discussion of where the country is going and where
we've been.
Secretary Clinton. Senator, I really appreciate your
putting into words what I think are the concerns and feelings
of many in this body and even outside. I do think we need both
the hearings that Chairman Kerry has referred to and maybe some
private discussions.
But very briefly, let me say that, you know, the strategy
that President Obama adopted after very serious consideration--
and I can guarantee you that when he came into office the last
thing in the world he wanted was to be faced with having to
increase our military and civilian resources and assets in
Afghanistan. But he concluded, and I agreed with that
conclusion, that we were in kind of a never-never land. We were
not succeeding, we were not failing. We were just marking time,
and it was not a good position to find the United States of
America in.
As a result, the President made what I think were very
difficult choices, and then had to make some additional
difficult choices, removing commanders and saying very clearly
to our allies, who had the same kinds of concerns that you're
expressing.
Where are we today? Well, I do believe that the military
inputs are right, the civilian inputs are far closer to right
than they were. We not only believe that ourselves, but we have
convinced our NATO allies, who have also very questioning
publics, to put in a lot more troops and a lot more civilian
assets. We now have a total of 150,000 troops, 100,000
Americans, 50,000 NATO ISAF. We have convinced 13 Muslim
majority countries to participate, because they now see this
more in line with their interests than they ever did before.
That is not in any way to discount the difficulty of the
road ahead, because there is no doubt that it is. But we are in
a much better position to achieve our goal of transitioning out
by the end of 2014 with some confidence that what we are going
to be leaving behind has got a fighting chance for success.
Now, you reference Iraq. You know, certainly no point in
going back and reliving the history of how we got there and
what we did, but as American troops withdraw you don't see
Americans fighting over it. There is a recognition and an
acceptance that we've done whatever we could do, at great cost
in life and treasure. We are leaving. We're leaving them a
fighting chance for a democratic future, which is not bred in
the bone at all, but which they're going to have to figure out
how to do.
The significance of having a Shiite majority country that
is trying to be a democracy, trying to balance the Sunni, the
Kurd, and the other interests, is being looked at and followed
very closely.
So I think in Afghanistan we want to position ourselves to
be in a similar place in the next 3 years. I'm well aware of
all the pressures, the budgetary pressures, the public
questioning, just as I lived through what we did in Iraq, and
am well aware of how difficult in many ways that was.
So I think your cautions, your questions, are incredibly
timely and well do our best to try to answer them.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Mr. Chairman, thank you and thanks for your
patience.
Also to you, Madam Secretary. I just want to add on a
little bit more to what Senator Lugar was talking about and in
my earlier round of questioning. It feels we went into
Afghanistan early on probably with not enough troops. Things
happened. I agree with your assessment that when the President
came in we were in a place that was sort of twixt and twoe; I
agree with that. As I mentioned earlier, certainly I support
this fighting season, to see them with all the resources in
place.
Here's what I'm concerned about, though. I don't think that
we have articulated yet and pressured down the things we're
going to need to pressure down, regardless of whether we have
budgetary constraints or not. We've been there a long time. We
have to deal with the partners we have. None of them are ever
perfect. Let's face it, the President there is a great
politician and plays both sides against the middle, and that's
what he's doing right now. We all understand that and
understand, by the way, why he does that.
But I do think I just want to reemphasize, we have got to
put downward pressure on our effort. I think we had mission
creep. We went from a place of not knowing exactly what we were
going to do to all of a sudden this overpowering effort on both
sides. Again, I understand why, but that downward trajectory on
the building side, the development side, to me has to accompany
the troop withdrawal process, too. I think we need to be honest
with ourselves about the budgetary support that's going to be
necessary just to maintain their security forces. I mean, they
couldn't pay one-seventh of their security forces with their
own, with their own budget.
So I do hope we'll have some hearings and we'll talk about
that more clearly.
Just to emphasize one other, Pakistan. In order to maintain
appropriate relations, I will not publicly articulate my
feelings after meeting with the leadership there.
Secretary Clinton. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Corker. But it has to----
The Chairman. That's well said, Senator. I think we can
move on from there.
Senator Corker. It is the most disheartening place in the
world to be when you're talking about the type of relationship
we have. These again are editorial comments. I understand that
we wanted to show that we were partners, that our relationship
was not transactional. But it is kind of transactional.
In every place--Kandahar, Helmand province, Kabul--every
place that we meet with our military, they're fighting
criminality. Really, they're fighting criminality in
Afghanistan. You go to a prison there, we have 80 people there
that are probably zealots and the rest of the 1,500 folks there
are just criminals.
So our forces, this huge footprint that we have, is
basically fighting criminality in Afghanistan, because all of
the command and control is taking place in Pakistan. It's
just--you want to pull your hair out. They want to pull their
hair out. And I know they're watching to see what kind of
success we're going to have. I understand that.
But there's been some discussions about additional funding
to Pakistan, and I understand the country is a mess in many
ways regardless of our relationships. I just want to tell you
as one Senator, I supported the Kerry-Lugar efforts and I thank
the two leaders for taking--making the strides they did. I will
be very, very slow, because it is transactional and our side of
the transaction is the only side that to me is being fulfilled.
I think that in many ways we get played like a piece of
music sometimes. Bad actors end up getting--not that the
leadership is--bad actions, let me put it that way, end up
getting more U.S. money.
I just want to say again, I think in private conversations
and other places I hope we'll talk a little bit more about this
situation and be very, very slow to talk about additional
funding until we see a different behavior pattern. And I know
we've created our own problems. We've got a decade of generals
coming behind Kayani that don't have relationships with
America. The unintended consequences of previous legislation
has left us with a major problem there, I understand. And I'm
not criticizing you.
I'm just saying it is hugely disheartening to see what
we're doing in Afghanistan taking place, knowing that the
center of all of it is really in Pakistan and there's no real
effort to deal with it on their part.
Secretary Clinton. I look forward to our discussions both
in a hearing setting and privately. And I very much appreciate
the seriousness of the comments that you've made, Senator.
The Chairman. Madam Secretary, thank you.
Senator, let me just say very quickly that I also
appreciate the seriousness of the comments. As the Secretary
knows, we are engaged in a lot of that conversation right now
with the folks in Pakistan. I do think, in fairness--and the
Secretary alluded to this earlier--they have also made a lot of
choices that one didn't expect. The IMF and other things have
forced some very difficult political decisions.
They've raised prices and they've done a lot of other
things in terms of their economy that create problems for them
internally. They've done without a huge amount of assistance
because the Kerry-Lugar money only really began to flow in this
last year. They have put 147,000 troops in the western part of
their country and taken a lot of casualties, which nobody fully
thought would necessarily happen.
So there's a balance here and it is a very complicated
place, with some extraordinary down sides to some of the
options. So I think we do have to have a very serious
conversation about the choices that we face with respect to it.
I look forward to having those with you. I know you always
approach this very seriously and listen carefully and work at
it hard. So I think we can all do this in a very thoughtful
way.
But your message is an important one today and I'm
confident the Secretary welcomes it as I do in terms of what
we're trying to work through here.
That said, Madam Secretary, if we could spend a minute
maybe back aft here. And we appreciate again, let me say it
publicly. I think you've done a superb job today and certainly
made it clear to the Senate what is at stake here. We're going
to have an interesting budget debate and you've helped us to
frame that. So I thank you very much.
Secretary Clinton. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. With that, we stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Hon. Michael S. Lee, U.S. Senator From Utah
As a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, I take seriously
our responsibility of shaping U.S. foreign policy. In my opinion, our
top priority in shaping foreign policy must be our national security,
and I will always support necessary funding for our military operations
and national security interests abroad.
At the same time, I agree with Admiral Mike Mullen, who recently
said at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on the defense
budget, ``I believe that our debt is the greatest threat to our
national security.''
U.S. security abroad is increasingly related to investment in
antiterrorism measures in the Middle East and our allies in the Middle
East, Asia, and elsewhere. I am concerned, and will be ever vigilant in
ensuring that the spending in which we engage today does not impede our
ability to secure our nation tomorrow.
Although the requested International Affairs budget represents
``only'' 1.7 percent of the total FY 2012 budget, we have the
responsibility to examine each funding stream and trim or cut those
programs that are inefficient, overfunded, or have little connection to
our national security interests.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton to Questions
Submitted by Senator John F. Kerry
Question #1. Overseas Contingency Operations: Why did the
administration decide to present a portion of the FY 2012 request as
overseas contingency funding that is distinct from the core State
Department and USAID budget?
Answer. The Department and USAID FY 2012 request of $8.7 billion in
the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget reflects the
exceptional, extraordinary costs incurred in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
Pakistan to achieve our high-priority national security objectives in
these states. This approach, similar to the Department of Defense's OCO
requests in these three countries, achieves several goals. First, by
separating our OCO budget from the Department's base request, we
provide greater transparency about the significantly higher costs
encountered by our operations and foreign assistance programs as a
result of the high-risk security environment in such ``Front-Line
States.'' Second, we emphasize that these extraordinary costs are
temporary and can be phased out over time as our resource needs change.
Finally, our OCO budget presents a more whole-of-government approach,
better aligning our costs with those of DOD while highlighting savings
across the U.S. Government that occur as we shift from military to
civilian-led missions.
Question #2 & #3. Why is all funding for Afghanistan, Iraq, and
Pakistan not included under the OCO budget? (3) How was it determined
which activities in these countries were considered OCO and which are
core functions?
Answer. Your second and third questions are very closely related
and I would like to answer them together as they are mutually
reinforcing. By requesting $8.7 billion in an Overseas Contingency
Operations (OCO) budget, the Department of State and USAID strive to be
as transparent as possible about the extraordinary and temporary
resource demands we face due to operating in frontline states (Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan)--treating these exceptional requirements as
the Department of Defense (DOD) has been treating them for several
years. At the same time, we must recognize that there will continue to
be enduring diplomatic presences and base assistance programs in all
three states, consistent with our past relations, and to ensure that
the gains made by the Department of State and the DOD are not reversed
as we foster long-term strategic partnerships. These expenses are
included in the FY 2012 core budget request of $5.3 billion for the
frontline states.
Our efforts to stabilize the frontline states and transition from
military-to-civilian led missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, has led the
Department and USAID to take on extraordinary roles and costs, that are
greater than our operations and assistance programs in other regions of
the world. We anticipate that as these missions mature and the
political, economic, and security fortunes of these countries change,
these resource demands will ebb.
Specifically, the OCO costs for the Department and USAID include
higher personnel expenses, enhanced security to operate in a high-
threat environment, new facilities to support expanded operations, and
the greater logistical demands such as fuel costs and transportation of
personnel. In Iraq, foreign assistance OCO costs are specifically
related to the transition of police training and military assistance
from the DOD to the Department of State. In Pakistan and Afghanistan,
OCO directly supports civilian-led counterinsurgency efforts--the
Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund and economic and development
programs tied to counterinsurgency efforts. Specific criteria are
detailed below:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number Description
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1......................................... Temporary in nature.
2......................................... Particular to the unique
operational hazards in a
frontline state such as
security to cover
transition activities, life
support and vehicle/
aviation recovery,
acquisition of aviation and/
or secure vehicles for
transition activities.
3......................................... Specific to supporting
counterinsurgency
operations and provincial
stability, such as PRT
funding in Afghanistan and
the EBOs in Iraq.
4......................................... Transitioning programs from
military-to-civilian
responsibility, such as the
police training and
military assistance
programs in Iraq.
5......................................... Extraordinary in terms of
scale required to meet
political imperatives such
as infrastructure programs
in Afghanistan and the
interagency civilian
uplift.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The core components of the request are those programs with the
primary objective of promoting sustainable solutions in Afghanistan,
beyond our stabilization objectives. These programs primarily focus on
longer term capacity-building and sustainable solutions that will help
ensure the irreversibility of transition from international to Afghan
lead. The rule of law and governance programs, for example, are
critical to building Afghan institutions that are responsive to
citizen's needs after military-led efforts have scaled down. Under
infrastructure, the physical construction of projects is considered OCO
because of the extraordinary size of the near-term investment. But the
sustainability components of the project that focus on
commercialization of electricity delivery and the capacity-building
within the government to manage these programs are part of the core
program. Health and education fall under the core program because they
are cornerstone investments that will ensure a stable and productive
society, but also build the capacity of the Afghan Government to
provide these services independently.
Similar considerations were used in developing the State Operations
requests. The enduring program component covers the anticipated longer
term platform that resembles our presence in comparable posts the
region. For example, while the static guard force in Iraq is made up
largely of third-country nationals (TCNs) that require sustainment, the
longer term force is anticipated to consist of local guards, as is the
case at other posts. The extraordinary costs associated with the
contracts to provide the TCNs and their sustainment is considered to be
in OCO, while the component of the current contracts that are estimated
to cover the cost of a future local guard program in Iraq is part of
the enduring portion of the request. In Afghanistan and Pakistan, the
enduring request supports long-term programs, permanent facilities, and
staffing at the level prior to the civilian uplift. The enduring
funding level was initially based on post requirements and staffing at
FY 2007 levels, with adjustments for the operating costs of new
consulates and other permanent facilities. The extraordinary costs
above and beyond the enduring presence would be considered OCO. The
enduring and OCO split will be continuously reviewed as policy
decisions dictate what the future enduring presence will be.
Question #4. House of Representatives Continuing Resolution (H.R.
1). The House FY 2011 Continuing Resolution severely cuts funding for
the Department of State and USAID. It funds Department of State,
Foreign Operations, and Related Programs at $44.95 billion, which is a
cut of $9.99 billion (18 percent) below FY10 levels, $11.7 billion (21
percent) below President Obama's FY11 Request, and $5.8 billion (12
percent) below the current CR level. Can you comment on what effect
these cuts, if enacted, would have on State and USAID's ability to
deliver key diplomatic, development and humanitarian programs?
Answer. The House for Representatives Continuing Resolution (H.R.
1) would have dire consequences for the Department of State and the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and their programs.
The $43.2 billion provided in H.R. 1 for State/USAID is nearly a 20-
percent cut from the FY 2011 President's request, and over 15 percent
below FY 2010 enacted levels. This deep reduction would put at risk
major national security priorities, including stabilization efforts in
the frontline states, keeping Americans safe at home and abroad, and
responding to the transformational changes taking place throughout the
Middle East.
Some specific impacts of these funding levels on State/USAID
programs are identified below:
Economic Support Fund (ESF): The House CR cuts ESF by $2.1 billion
(27 percent) from the FY 2011 President's Request. At this level, if
the Department/USAID chose to fully fund the vital war needs for ESF
for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, there would barely be enough
resources left to meet bilateral commitments to Egypt and Jordan; and
economic assistance programs worldwide, including those in Mexico,
Yemen, the West Bank, Sudan, and Liberia, would be shuttered.
Initiatives, such as Feed the Future--a program funded through ESF and
Development Assistance (DA)--would be curtailed, hampering the
Department's efforts to promote food security, drive economic growth,
turn aid recipients into trading partners, and mitigate destabilizing
trends such as escalating food prices.
Humanitarian Assistance: At a time when the United States is
responding to three new, urgent humanitarian crises in Libya/Tunisia,
Japan, and Cote D'Ivoire/Liberia, the House CR would cut Humanitarian
Assistance by 40 percent from the FY 2011 President's Request. This
level would severely curtail our ability to maintain required levels of
assistance to address ongoing disasters and respond to large
emergencies. For example, this level would force us to withhold life-
saving food assistance from up to 15 million people; jeopardize U.S.
support for 1.6 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan and 100,000 Afghan
refugees returning to Afghanistan this year alone; and endanger
security in the Horn of Africa by curtailing assistance to Somalis
fleeing to Kenya and Darfuris in Sudan and Chad. This level would
severely constrain our ability to react to future unforeseen
emergencies with the timeliness and strength of our response in Haiti
this past year.
Global Health: The House CR cuts the Global Health Initiative by
$1.5 billion (18 percent) from the FY 2011 President's Request. If
enacted, this funding level would force the Department to make deep
reductions to a bipartisan program that has helped to: save and improve
the lives of millions of people worldwide; stabilize societies that
have been devastated by HIV, malaria, tuberculosis, malnutrition, and
other diseases; and limit the global spread of diseases that might
otherwise reach Americans, such as pandemic influenza, HIV, and
tuberculosis. A cut of this magnitude would lead the United States to
turn away at least 400,000 people from HIV/AIDS treatment under PEPFAR;
deny malaria treatment and preventive interventions to 5 million
children and family members; and deprive more than 500,000 children of
highly effective nutrition interventions.
Diplomatic and Consular Program: Diplomatic and Consular Programs
is the backbone of the Department of State operational programs,
supporting Foreign Service and Civil Service workers and diplomatic
missions in almost every country. The proposed House funding level is
19 percent below the President's request of $10.33 billion. This would
significantly weaken this key foundation for the Department. We would
be forced to cut necessary infrastructure and security from the Iraq
transition plan from a military to civilian-led mission; new Foreign
Service and Civil Service hiring would not be possible; and we would
fail to keep up with Foreign Service attrition, creating nearly 400 new
vacancies.
Overseas Building Operations: Overseas Building Operations
maintains over $47 billion in U.S. infrastructure assets and ensures
that U.S. diplomats and other government officials abroad are housed in
a safe and secure work environment. The largest cut in the House bill
for this account is in Worldwide Security Upgrades, which would incur a
$50.8 million reduction from FY 2010 and a $137 million reduction from
the FY 2011 request. The House bill would also cause the Department to
fall short of its capital security cost-sharing contribution and fund
one fewer new embassy construction. Facility management, repair, and
improvement would also be curtailed.
International Organizations: Under the proposed House FY 2011
budget, the Department would be forced to breach its commitments to
many of the more than 40 international organizations it belongs to. The
lower levels would require the administration to renege on its treaty
obligations and financial obligations for membership to these
organizations and force FY 2011 arrears of more than $100 million even
after available credits are exhausted.
Education and Cultural Exchange Programs (ECE): Education and
cultural exchanges are a principal way the nation engages with the rest
of the world. The proposed House CR represents a 21-percent cut from
the President's Request of $633.2 million. These cuts would force the
Department to scale back the scope of many of these programs at a time
when the United States cannot afford to pull back from a rapidly
changing world. The reductions would cut 18,000 participants from the
57,000 that took part in ECE programs in FY 2010; cut by 72 percent the
number of English Access Micro-scholarships for teaching English
abroad; and eliminate 1,000 Gilman scholarships for undergraduate
overseas study.
Question #5. What are the national security implications of these
potential cuts?
Answer. The proposed cuts for the Department and USAID outlined in
the House Continuing Resolution (H.R. 1) would seriously hamper our
national security mission.
Along with Defense Secretary Gates and Chairman of the Joints
Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen, I have tried to emphasize that we need
a fully engaged and fully funded national security team--one that
includes State and USAID as full partners. We can only be successful in
meeting our national security objectives through the combined power of
defense, diplomacy, and development.
The proposed funding levels would put at risk the integrated
civilian-military approach needed to meet our national security
priorities, including stabilization efforts in the frontline states of
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. It would harm our efforts to keep
Americans safe at home and abroad, and our ability to respond to the
transformational changes taking place throughout the Middle East. Our
critical work securing our borders and protecting against those who
would harm us at home could be weakened. Reductions in food security
assistance, economic aid, and health programs could lead to further
instability in developing countries, presenting potential national
security challenges in the future.
I fully recognize the extraordinary fiscal challenges we face as a
country. Elected Members of the Congress, representing American people,
have to make tough budget decisions. However, we must resist the
temptation to reduce funding for critical elements our national
security agenda. This means focusing on the full scope of national
security, including development and diplomacy.
The current funding levels for State Department and USAID programs
in the Continuing Resolution (H.R. 1) do not support this approach.
Question #6. Winners & Losers. The administration requested
significant new resources for several accounts, including global health
($9.8 billion: 11 percent increase), development assistance ($2.9
billion: 16 percent increase), food security ($1.41 billion: 42 percent
increase), and climate change ($1.33 billion: 30 percent increase).
Concurrently, a number of accounts face significant cuts: assistance
for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia ($626.7 million: 15 percent
decrease), international organizations--voluntary ($348.7 million: 11
percent decrease), and foundations (National Endowment for Democracy,
independent exchange programs--$131.5 million: 19 percent decrease).
Please comment on how the administration determined which
programs to plus up and which to decrease.
Answer. We recognize that that we are in an exceptionally tight
budget environment. With the resources outlined in this budget, the
State Department and USAID can continue to make the American people
safer, promote economic growth at home and abroad, and project our
interests and values. National security is a fundamental objective of
development and diplomacy. By protecting our interests and promoting
security and prosperity abroad, we shape the world in a way that
ensures the security and prosperity of Americans at home.
The FY 2012 budget is a lean budget for lean times. We launched the
first-ever Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) to
maximize the impact of every dollar we spend. We scrubbed this budget
and made painful but responsible cuts. We cut economic assistance to
Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia by 15 percent, and we cut foreign
assistance to over 20 countries by more than half. These are important
relationships but we are reorienting our resources toward more volatile
regions. As part of our top-to-bottom commitment to finding
efficiencies and making better use of every dollar in our budget, we
have committed to reduce our reports to Congress to save tens of
thousands of person-hours while still meeting our legal obligations.
We built our budget through heavy input from every level of the
Department of State and USAID using guidance from missions worldwide.
We considered our budget using the Presidential Policy Directive on
Development and our QDDR to help focus and concentrate our resources
where they would be most effective and efficient.
Generations of Americans have grown up successful and safe because
we chose to lead the world in tackling its greatest challenges. We
invested the resources to build up democratic allies and vibrant
trading partners in every region. Whether negotiating arms treaties,
brokering talks with belligerent states, fostering stability through
development projects, helping to rebuild countries shattered by war,
countering nuclear proliferation, enhancing economic opportunity for
U.S. businesses abroad in order to create jobs here at home, protecting
our Nation's borders and Americans abroad, or serving as the platform
from which the entire U.S. Government operates overseas, our diplomatic
and development work is dedicated to strengthening national security.
The FY 2012 budget request for the Department of State and USAID
clearly reflects this essential mission. Our work in Iraq, Afghanistan,
and Pakistan is focused on promoting stability in these three nations,
to keep them from becoming havens for extremists who threaten the
United States. The request promotes conflict prevention and crisis
response in other fragile states, from helping Haiti stabilize after a
devastating earthquake to civilian and military efforts to strengthen
governance and security capacity in places battling terrorist groups.
Human security is a major goal of our budget and a critical part of
supporting global productivity and prosperity, supporting programs that
promote health, education, and nutrition and counteract infectious
diseases, like pandemic flu, tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS, which directly
threaten America. By funding new technologies and research, we increase
agricultural productivity and promote food security with the goal of
preventing economic and political crises that can arise from food
shortages and price spikes. Finally, we help nations adapt to the
effects of climate change, efforts meant to ensure that these shifts do
not disrupt vital trade and economies.
These goals represent a wise investment for the American taxpayers.
By supporting diplomacy and development, the Nation is able to respond
to problems before they escalate into crises that require a more
significant, and usually much more expensive, response. It costs far
less to deploy a diplomat or development expert than a military
division. And by using a preventive approach to global issues, we are
able to stave off potential threats before they become major risks to
our national security.
Assistance that addresses global climate change, food security, and
health challenges helps to create the conditions in developing
countries for the growth of democracy, economic expansion, and
ultimately, increased stability. If we want to lighten the burden on
future generations, we have to make the investments that will make our
world more secure.
As you note, we are in a tight, austere budget climate this year
and our budget reflects this. In order to target specific increases for
key national security priorities that I have highlighted above, we had
to make some tough tradeoffs. Cutting across all of our endeavors is a
serious and sustained focus on reform, efficiency, and savings to the
American taxpayer. We are serious about making tough tradeoffs to
sustain the programs and operations that are most vital.
Question #7. Has top-level corruption in Afghanistan increased,
decreased, or remained unchanged since November 2009?
Answer. Corruption in Afghanistan remains a serious concern for the
United States and Afghan Governments, as well as for the broader
international donor community. It is difficult to measure
quantitatively whether top-level corruption has increased, decreased,
or remained unchanged since November 2009 in Afghanistan. According to
the Asia Foundation survey conducted in 2010, the number of Afghans who
reported that corruption exists in Afghanistan as a whole remained
unchanged from 2009 to 2010, but the number of Afghans who felt that
corruption exists in their provincial governments increased by 5
percent from 2009 to 2010.
At the same time, the increased capacity of Afghan law enforcement
investigators working on anticorruption cases has also revealed more
accounts and allegations of official corruption that were not easy to
detect before this capacity was developed. U.S. officials at all levels
continue to raise this issue with Afghan officials, and we maintain a
high level of vigilance in oversight over U.S. taxpayer dollars.
Kabul Bank, the largest bank in Afghanistan, recently suffered a
run due to concerns of fraud and mismanagement at the bank. These
fraudulent practices resulted in enormous losses which the IMF
estimates to be at least $500 million and perhaps as much as $900
million. Additionally, there is evidence that Kabul Bank paid bribes to
Da Afghanistan Bank (Afghan Central Bank) regulators and other
government officials to secure favorable treatment. The Central Bank
has placed the bank into conservatorship and is working to fully
uncover the role corruption played in this financial crisis. The United
States has no plans to bail out Kabul Bank. Furthermore, all U.S. funds
that have passed through the bank to pay for civilian and military
salary payments can be accounted for.
Question #8. Has corruption at the provincial and local level
increased, decreased, or remained unchanged since November 2009?
Answer. We are not able to measure local and provincial corruption
quantitatively. However, the perception of corruption at the provincial
level has increased among the local population since November 2009.
According to the Asia Foundation survey of the Afghan population in
2010, the percentage of people who viewed corruption as a problem in
Afghanistan as a whole stayed the same in 2010 as 2009, while the
number of Afghans who viewed corruption as a problem in their
provincial governments increased by 5 percent in 2010 from 2009.
Corruption at both the national and local levels negatively impacts our
counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts. The perception that the government is
not working in the best interests of its people undermines trust in
local and national-level government officials and structures and
ultimately helps the Taliban exploit these grievances to recruit from
the local population.
Question #9. In which provinces has it increased, and in which has
it decreased? [Referring to Corruption in Afghanistan]
Answer. We do not have data on which provinces have experienced an
increase or decrease in corruption, particularly because of the
difficulty that exists in measuring corruption quantitatively in each
province. However, according to the Asia Foundation survey in 2010 of
the Afghan population, the number of people who viewed corruption as a
problem in Afghanistan stayed the same in 2010 as 2009. According to
the same survey, the number of Afghans who viewed corruption as a
problem in their provincial governments increased by 5 percent in 2010
from 2009.
Embassy reporting indicates that the provincial leadership in
Khost, Kunar, Herat, Kandahar, and Helmand have taken steps address
``predatory'' corruption, which alienates many local residents and
denies them from receiving support from the government. These Governors
highlighted the useful role of the Afghan Social Outreach Program
(ASOP) that reestablished district councils and gave the area
leadership a role in addressing corruption at the local level. Poor
provincial leadership in Uruzgan and Kapisa were noted by the Embassy
as a key reason why corruption in those areas has not been addressed
and local and national power brokers faced no serious challenge from
the government structure.
Question #10. What are the most significant specific, concrete
actions taken by the Government of Afghanistan to combat corruption
since November 2009?
Answer. The Afghan Government has taken some steps to remove
corrupt or ineffective government officials, and we continue to press
for full accountability and further action. For example:
In mid-December 2010, President Karzai relieved the Afghan
National Army Surgeon General, the National Military Hospital
(NMH) Commander, the Deputy Commander, and 19 other senior
staff officers, after he was briefed on corruption problems at
the NMH. In Kandahar province, the provincial chief of police
fired the chief of police of an Internally Displaced Persons
camp, and the Minister of Finance terminated the head of
customs at Kandahar airport. In Helmand province, the district
governor of Kajaki was removed. Taken together, these decisions
may indicate increased Afghan Government awareness of the risk
posed by ineffective or corrupt officials.
In November 2010, the Afghan Attorney General announced
investigations of at least 20 senior officials, including two
sitting members of the Cabinet. The Afghan Government has not
requested international assistance with these investigations
and few additional details have been provided since the
November 2010 announcement.
The Afghan Interior Ministry has dissolved seven private
security companies connected to Afghan officials, citing its
``commitment to transparency and the rule of law.'' The
ministry also disclosed the names of 45 other companies that
will remain open for another year, but will then be replaced by
Afghan public protection forces.
With regard to Kabul Bank, the Central Bank has removed the
former chairman and president of the bank, established
conservatorship over the bank, and the Attorney General
launched an investigation into corruption at the bank. There
have been no prosecutions thus far, but select individuals have
been barred from leaving the country during the investigation.
The USG continues to convey the message to Afghan authorities
that they must take aggressive, concrete steps to address Kabul
Bank issues, strengthen the Afghan financial sector, and
qualify for a strong IMF program. We have been encouraging the
Afghan authorities to take prompt action and we are working
with international donors to speak with one voice regarding the
need for Afghan action on Kabul Bank.
The Afghan Government is making progress toward improving
fiscal transparency. The Ministry of Finance drafted a Public
Financial Framework in July 2010 to strengthen budget execution
and fiduciary controls. Budget execution rates continue to be a
concern, due largely to weak capacity in line ministries and
security. The Ministry of Finance continues to post annual
Afghan Government budgets online, as it has since 2004, in
addition to mid-year reviews of the national budget. The Afghan
Government's execution and disbursement reports are also
available online.
The Afghan National Police commander for Kandahar was
convicted on charges related to having hundreds of ghost
officers on the books and embezzling public funds.
The Ministry of the Hajj's treasurer was prosecuted for
misuse of Ministry funds.
In March 2011, the Attorney General's Office arrested the
former Minister of Transportation and Aviation Enayatollah
Qasimi on charges of misusing public funds in a corruption case
that cost the Afghan Government more than $9 million.
Seven security companies connected to Afghan officials were
dissolved by the Afghan Interior Ministry, citing its
``commitment to transparency and the rule of law.'' This is the
latest in a series of moves by President Karzai to curb the use
of private security companies and transition, as possible, to
Afghan forces.
Since its establishment, the Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU) has
submitted 416 cases to the courts, including 149 cases of
misuse of power and 71 cases of bribery. Eight warrants have
been issued for high level officials to prevent them from
leaving the country. In February 2011, Major Crimes Task Force
(MCTF) investigators initiated a preliminary inquiry on a
district police chief in Herat and presented enough evidence to
prosecutors for them to issue an arrest warrant for the Afghan
Border Police Commander in charge of all the eastern provinces.
Question #11. If the level of corruption and government
effectiveness in Afghanistan remain relatively stable over the next 2
years, what impact, if any, would this have on the ability of the U.S.
Government to ensure that development and reconstruction assistance is
responsibly spent?
Answer. Over the next 3 years, Afghanistan will be undertaking a
well-publicized transition process ending in Afghan security lead. In
parallel, enhanced and targeted U.S. Government efforts will continue
to have an impact in combating corruption, improving governance, and
ensuring that U.S. taxpayer funds are effectively tracked, spent, and
accounted.
U.S. Government development and reconstruction assistance addresses
needs across a range of sectors. Despite substantial challenges, many
successes have been secured over the course of our involvement in
Afghanistan, from large increases in children in school to significant
improvements in health indices. At any given time, some sectors may be
more impacted than others by corruption and other governance
deficiencies. While the current state of corruption and government
effectiveness in Afghanistan presents serious challenges which must be
addressed, progress in many sectors continued during this same period.
USAID operates multiple oversight systems to ensure U.S. taxpayer
money is spent properly. These include: pre-award conferences (to set
oversight and reporting standards); regular monitoring and evaluation
actions (to track expenses against work plans and services delivered);
site visits; and reviews of payment claims (which require invoices for
work completed).
We have seen positive results from having more civilian personnel
in ministries and PRTs, whether they are auditors, technical advisors,
or Foreign Service officers. They can identify and report on specific
allegations of corruption for further investigation.
We also support a robust role for the Special Inspector General for
Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR) and the USAID Inspector General in
Afghanistan to investigate vigorously any allegations of diversion of
U.S. taxpayer funds from our programs. SIGAR's role in evaluating
internal controls and implementation of assistance programs, and the
State OIG Regional Inspector General's expanded role in shaping program
design and implementation, have helped us reduce fraud and improve
accountability.
We are also closely scrutinizing the process by which we award
contracts to local entities. This is at the Afghan Government's
request. Our goal is to ensure that our contracting procedures
reinforce our support for the Afghan Government and do not
inadvertently distort local economic and political circumstances by
disproportionately benefiting one party.
A substantial portion of our funding and programs are designed to
address the very issues of corruption and diversion of assistance that
you have highlighted. For example, we have introduced performance-based
implementation mechanisms and significantly decreased the overall
percentage of multiyear contracts to U.S. entities.
Question #12. How much of FY 2009 and FY 2010 funds have we already
disbursed in Afghanistan?
Answer. USAID obligated $2,095,601,081 and disbursed $1,066,484,881
of the FY 2009 Economic Support Fund and Global Health and Child
Survival funding as of December 31, 2010. Of FY 2010 base funds, USAID
obligated $1,810,791,190 and disbursed $286,510,285 as of December 31,
2010. This does not include USAID funds transferred to other U.S.
Agencies.
An additional $1.3 billion of FY 2010 funds became available for
obligation on December 27, 2010. Of this, approximately $951.36 million
is unavailable for obligation pending resolution of the reporting
requirements within the FY 2010 supplemental.
INL obligated $483,876,000 and disbursed $142,494,000 of FY 2009
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds as of
February 24, 2011. Of the FY 2010 base funds, INL obligated
$290,269,000 and disbursed $31,871,000.
Seventy million dollars of the FY 2010 funds and $169,000,000 of FY
2010 supplemental funds are pending the completion of legislative
reporting requirements and are not available for obligation.
Question #13. What percentage of FY 2009 and FY 2010 funds was
direct assistance (on budget) to the Government of Afghanistan?
Answer. For FY 2009, approximately $347 million--21 percent of
USAID's development budget in Afghanistan--went to on-budget
assistance, including major initiatives such as the World Bank-managed
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) and the National
Solidarity Program (NSP). In FY 2010, approximately 35 percent of
USAID's development assistance, distinct from stabilization programs,
was planned for on-budget assistance. Additionally, 16 percent of INL's
FY 2010 assistance was planned for direct assistance activities. State
and USAID funds for direct assistance were contingent upon several
factors, including the growth of existing on-budget mechanisms, the
creation of new on-budget mechanisms, the completion of Ministry
assessments, and the prioritization of new on-budget programs in
cooperation with the Government of Afghanistan.
Question #14. What percentage of FY 2011 and FY 2012 funds is
estimated to be provided as direct assistance (on budget) to the
Government of Afghanistan?
Answer. For FY 2011, we estimate that between 37-45 percent of
State and USAID development assistance, distinct from stabilization
programs, will be on-budget, based on our FY 2011 base appropriation
request level. In 2012, State and USAID aim to meet the London
Conference goal of channeling at least 50 percent of development aid
through the Afghan Government's core budget. The 50-percent goal is a
shared responsibility, however, in that it requires the Government of
Afghanistan to take critical steps to ensure its ministries and
agencies are prepared to effectively and accountably implement
assistance.
Question #15. Which Afghan Government ministries and entities
currently receive funding from the United States?
Answer. The following Ministries and Agencies receive direct
assistance from the Department of State and USAID:
USAID Supported Ministries and Agencies:\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Please see responses to QFR #20 for an overview of the process,
criteria, and methods by which these entities receive U.S. funding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MoCIT)
Ministry of Public Health
USAID Salary Sup Special Posts
Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL)
Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG)
Ministry of Finance & World Bank
Ministry of Education
Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation
INL Supported Ministries and Agencies:\1\
Ministry of Counter Narcotics
Ministry of Women's Affairs
Ministry of Justice
Attorney General's Office
Ministry of Interior
Question #16. How much funding do [the Ministries/entities] receive
and for what purposes?
Answer. As of December 2010, USAID/Afghanistan's on-budget
assistance activities with the Government of Afghanistan included:
[U.S. dollars in millions]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total
Ministry/Agency On-budget assistance--current Start End est. Obligated
status program title date date funding to date
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ministry of Finance...................... Civilian Technical Assistance 2009 2011 $30.0 $5.5
Program (CTAP).
Ministry of Communications and The Policy Capacity Initiative 2009 2010 1.0 1.0
Information Technology (MoCIT). Activity and Information
Technology.
Ministry of Public Health................ Provision of Health Services... 2008 2013 236.5 56.0
USAID Salary Sup Special Posts........... Salary Support to GIRoA........ 2010 2011 2.0 1.0
Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Agriculture Development Fund 2010 2014 85.0 0.0
Livestock (MAIL). (ADF).
Independent Directorate of Local District Delivery Program (DDP) 2010 2011 38.2 0.0
Governance (IDLG).
Ministry of Finance & World Bank......... Afghanistan Reconstruction 2002 2011 2,079.5 972.0
Trust Fund (ARTF).
Ministry of Education.................... Text Book Printing (DANIDA)*... 2005 2012 25.0 23.8
Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation. Regional Airport Construction.. 2010 2011 6.0 6.0
---------------------
Totals................... ...... ...... $2,503.2 $1,089.8
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Assistance to the Ministry of Education to print textbooks is provided through the Danish Development Agency,
which has a Limited Scope Grant Agreement with USAID.
Question #17. What is the current budget execution rate for the
Afghan Government?
Answer. Recently, Embassy Kabul initiated a review of the Afghan
Government's budget execution rate. A final determination is not yet
complete, but early analysis shows that ``Execution Rate'' as a measure
of funds utilization effectiveness is an inaccurate indicator. The
Execution Rate is a ratio of actual disbursements against budgeted
project funds. This measurement does not account for funds being
committed or obligated to a project. Funds that are committed to a
project are not reflected as a reduction in the budget balance because
of the cash accounting system used by the Government of Afghanistan. An
accrual system would permit accounting for anticipated disbursements.
In addition, some budgeted projects are based on donor pledges, though
no actual funds are ever received from the donor. Recently the Afghan
Ministry of Finance presented a restatement of their most recent year's
execution rate, discounting several of the factors above, and indicated
that their core development rate could be as high as 65 percent.
Additionally, carry over cash balances in the government's budget
are overstated, as projects run from year to year and do not go through
a validation process. For example, a prior year project may be
reflected in the budget supported by a donor pledge. However, no funds
have been provided by the donor and the donor may never follow through
on the pledge. Rather than being dropped from the rolls, the project
remains on the rolls, and leads to an inaccurate budget balance.
It is worth noting that, according to the World Bank, domestic
revenue collection in Afghanistan reached $1.65 billion in 2010/2011--
double the 2007/2008 rate--as a result of significant efforts by the
Ministry of Finance. Afghanistan's core budget, a combination of
domestic revenue and off-budget expenditures, in this period was $4.6
billion, and its external budget (donor-financed off-budget
expenditures) was reported by the Ministry of Finance to be $6 billion,
though the actual amount may be as high as $16 billion.
Question #18. Which Afghan Government ministries and entities have
been certified to receive U.S. funding?
Answer. To date, $307 million has been transferred and the
capacities of the Ministries of Finance, Communications, and Public
Health confirmed for specific projects. The U.S. Government is the
largest contributor to the World Bank-administered Afghanistan
Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), which overseas important and
successful on-budget programs such as the National Solidarity Program
(NSP).
Question #19. Which Afghan Government ministries and entities are
being considered to receive U.S. funding?
Answer. There are three Afghan Government ministries currently
being considered: Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock
(MAIL), the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD),
and the Ministry of Education (MOE).
A new water program will provide $50 million to MAIL and MRRD for
watershed rehabilitation design and implementation, forestry, sediment
control structures, on-farm water management, and agriculture
technology.
Direct USAID funding of MOE programs will strengthen its capacity
to develop and oversee education services, improve education sector
governance and accountability, and improve the quality of education
services that are valued and increasingly demanded by the Afghan
public. Possible areas of support include teacher training; community-
based education; literacy training and productive skills training for
youth; and capacity-development within the education sector.
Question #20. What are the criteria for being certified?
Answer. Ministry certification is for specific activities, not an
overall certification. USAID's assessments and certifications are valid
only for USAID funding.
Assessment is the first step. USAID examines a given Ministry's
capability, capacity, and integrity to account for USAID funds and to
carry out a given program from beginning to end. Assessments examine
six variables:
Whether the organizational structure of the Ministry is
adequate for the purpose of managing USAID direct grants;
Whether the Ministry's operating systems, accounting and
recording policies and procedures are adequate to account for
USAID assistance;
Whether internal controls are in place to provide reasonable
assurance that USAID funds are protected from unauthorized use,
abuse, and loss;
Whether the Ministry has procurement systems and procedures
that meet the procurement standards of USAID;
Whether the Ministry's policies allow USAID access to its
books and records in accordance with USAID's audit
requirements; and
Whether the Ministry is capable of advancing 30-day cash
disbursement needs of a project from internally generated
resources.
Certification for a given activity, the second step, only takes
place if the Ministry conducts procurements with U.S. foreign
assistance. Based on the assessment, USAID certifies whether the
Ministry has the capability and integrity to carry out the specific
activity financed by USAID. It is important to reiterate that a
certification is for a specific activity, not a general certification
of a Ministry overall.
Monitoring & Implementation is the third step, which includes site
visits, progress reviews by COTRs and periodic Financial Reviews.
USAID has third party auditing rights for all direct assistance
arrangements. For ARTF funding USAID does not have authority to
directly audit ARTF and its programs, but this is mitigated by overall
World Bank supervision of the fund and USAID's ability to audit line
ministries receiving ARFT funding.
Question #21. Please break down FY 2009 and FY 2010 spending by
province in Afghanistan.
Answer. Please see the following table for an estimate breakdown of
USAID funding by province in Afghanistan for FY 2009-10:
INL's current contracts with its implementers are designed to
deliver assistance on a nationwide scale, and reporting is not
currently broken out by province or district. INL is working to change
this mechanism so more discrete reporting data can be made available in
the future.
In June 2009, USAID developed an interagency system to track
foreign assistance and CERP implemented in Afghanistan. USAID worked
with ISAF, the Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance, and the
Coordinating Director for Development and Economic Assistance (CDDEA)
to develop such an interagency system. USAID formally launched the
system, known as Afghan Info, in November 2009. The purpose of Afghan
Info is to provide a comprehensive and transparent interagency picture
of how implementers (i.e., USG partners) use foreign assistance
resources to support United States foreign assistance objectives in
Afghanistan. Afghan Info includes implementer budget and programmatic
summaries that describe the use of foreign assistance resources. The
Afghan Info system addresses the following questions:
1. How do assistance activities support foreign policy and
assistance objectives in Afghanistan?
2. Where are assistance programs located in Afghanistan?
3. How much assistance is implemented in each region? What are the
expected results of these activities?
With support from CDDEA, Afghan Info will include all Embassy
resources. CDDEA has also reached out to the Military Knowledge
Management community to get information on CERP funded projects, which
will also be included in Afghan Info.
Question #22. Please estimate FY 2011 and FY 2012 spending by
province in Afghanistan.
Answer. Please see the following table for an estimate breakdown of
USAID funding by province in Afghanistan for FY 2011. Projections for
FY 2012 have not yet been established.
Question #23. What percentage of FY 2009 and FY 2010 funds have
been audited by the State Inspector General, USAID Inspector General,
and/or the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan?
Answer. The Middle East Regional Office for the U.S. Department of
State's Office of Inspector General (MERO) has reviewed FY 2009 funding
valued at approximately $559 million, and plans to review an additional
$210 million. This totals more than 82 percent of all FY 2009 funding
the Department received under the 150 account. MERO has also reviewed
FY 2010 funding valued at more than $567 million, and plans to review
an additional $588 million. This totals approximately 76 percent of all
FY 2010 funding received under the 150 account. In addition, MERO has
reviewed more than $267 million of FY 2009 and FY 2010 funds
transferred from the Department of Defense to the Department of State
in support of training for the Afghan National Police and the Major
Crimes Task Force at Camp Falcon.
Question #24. What percentage of FY 2011 and FY 2012 funds are
estimated to be audited by the State Inspector General, USAID Inspector
General, and/or the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan?
Answer. The Middle East Regional Office for the U.S. Department of
State's Office of Inspector General (MERO) has currently completed no
evaluations of FY 2011 or FY 2012 funding. MERO plans to evaluate the
Worldwide Protective Services (WPS) task order for Kabul and the Kabul
Embassy Security Force task order once they are awarded and the funding
is obligated. Based on past task orders, we anticipate these combined
obligations would be approximately $500 million, or about 45 percent of
the 150 account requested for FY 2011. In FY 2011 and FY 2012, MERO
also plans to begin new evaluations of the Correction System Support
Program, as well as evaluations of internal management controls of
funds provided to Embassy Kabul, the Antiterrorism Training Assistance
program for Afghanistan, anticorruption training provided to
Afghanistan, and the WPS task orders for consulate security in Mazar-i-
Sharif and Heart. The amount of funding for these programs has not yet
been determined.
In FY 2011, the Office of Audits audited $323.8 million in
interagency cost transfers and payroll costs relating to the
Implementation and Sustainability of the U.S. Civilian Uplift in
Afghanistan. This was a joint audit with Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction. These audited funds derive from FY 2009-
2011. The Office of Audits also has a joint audit underway with DOD IG
regarding the Afghan National Police Training Program. However, program
funding is not from the Function 150 Account.
Question #25. How much of FY 2009 and FY 2010 funds were spent on
capacity-building in Afghanistan?
Answer. Capacity-building is a key component, if not the primary
objective, of almost every assistance project of the USG in
Afghanistan. Because capacity-building is incorporated into almost all
of the work we do, it is not possible to break out to the exact dollar
how much funding is spent on capacity-building in a given year. Some
projects like the Civilian Technical Assistance Project, which helps
train civil servants and place them in key bureaucratic positions
throughout the national and subnational government, is exclusively
capacity-building. Many demining programs that we do, on the other
hand, have a primary objective of clearing areas of explosive remnants
of war, but a focus of the projects is also to build the capacity of
local entities to carry on this work and take over responsibility for
it in certain areas as early as FY 2013. Similarly, INL's Drug Demand
Reduction program builds the capacity and human capital of Afghan NGOs
to deliver drug treatment services within their provinces and
communities, using an Islamic-based model developed in partnership with
Afghan specialists. The program builds capacity to curtail addiction
rates and to disseminate information on drug use and addiction on a
broad, nationwide scale.
In order to derive an estimate of the level of funding going toward
capacity-building, we reviewed the project descriptions for 156
projects planned for FY 2010. Of these projects, approximately 143 (92
percent) included capacity building among their primary or secondary
objectives. While it is impossible to break out exactly what proportion
of the budget goes specifically toward capacity-building, these 143
projects represent approximately $2.47 billion (94 percent) of the
$2.62 billion appropriated in the FY 2010 base. Projects that had no
capacity-building objectives were largely projects that purchased
commodities, such as USAID's Central Contraceptive Procurement project,
or provided some sort of support to ongoing projects such as INL's
aviation program that provides air support to USG efforts in
Afghanistan. Although exact allocations to programs will not be
available for FY 2011 and FY 2012 until funds are appropriated, it is
expected that similar trends for capacity-building as a core part of
almost every project will continue.
Question #26. How much of FY 2011 and FY 2012 funds are estimated
to be spent on capacity-building in Afghanistan?
Answer. Please see answer to question #25. Although exact
allocations to programs will not be available for FY 2011 and FY 2012
until funds are appropriated, it is expected that similar trends for
capacity-building as a core part of almost every project will continue.
Question #27. Which Afghan Government ministries and entities
receive funds for capacity-building, and how much does each receive?
Answer. A central objective of all of State and USAID's on-budget
assistance programs is to build and strengthen capacity within the
Government of Afghanistan so that the Afghan Government can assume
increasing leadership for ongoing assistance. USAID currently has nine
on-budget programs. Longstanding partnerships include the Afghanistan
Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) and our host country contract with the
Ministry of Public Health (MoPH); newer ones include the Civilian
Technical Assistance Plan (CTAP) and the Agriculture Development Fund
(ADF), which is administered by the Ministry of Agriculture,
Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL). State/INL is in the process of
formalizing assistance with the ministries of Counter Narcotics (MCN),
Interior (MOI), Women's Affairs (MoWA), Justice (MOJ), and the Attorney
General's Office (AGO).
Over the next several years, State and USAID seek to expand
existing on-budget programs and create new ministry partnerships.
Embassy Kabul and the Ministry of Finance are working to ensure that
on-budget programs are pursued with the ministries most committed to
achieving defined performance goals and with the understanding that
Afghan Government partners must achieve the necessary reforms to
strengthen their public financial management systems, reduce
corruption, improve budget execution, and increase revenue collection
to finance key National Priority Programs.
Question #28. Are funds distributed to governors pursuant to the
Performance Governors program being increased, and if so, please
explain the changes being made to the program.
Answer. Yes, the Performance-Based Governors' Fund (PBGF) is being
expanded. This is being done in line with (1) Embassy Kabul's strong
belief in the importance of empowering Provincial Governors and
strengthening provincial administrations more broadly (to include the
provincial departments of line ministries, Provincial Councils and
Provincial Development Committees) in advance of Transition; (2) the
USG's subnational governance orientation; and (3) our direct assistance
commitments.
The PBGF is expected to strengthen subnational governance via the
development of provincial institutions and enhanced local
decisionmaking and financial transparency. This effort will provide a
critical tool and incentive in the transition toward full Afghan
sovereignty and away from ``parallel institutions.'' PBGF is being
expanded to provide development funding to Provincial Development
Committees and Provincial Councils, in addition to the current program
which provides operational funding to Provincial Governors' Offices.
Total monthly funding levels available per province would increase from
$25,000 to $106,500.
The extended and expanded PBGF is currently in procurement and is
with USAID's Office of Acquisition and Assistance. Provided requisite
approvals in Kabul and Washington are granted, we expect this to be
active around April 20, 2011.
Question #29. What steps are being taken to improve oversight over
the disbursement of ARTF funds?
Answer. To ensure transparency, the World Bank provides quarterly
and annual reports to donors, including detailed disbursement
information. The United States and other donors have increasingly
earmarked ARTF funds for specific programs (``preferenced funds'') in
an effort to improve donor oversight over disbursement.
A number of mechanisms are already in place to ensure that funds
disbursed from the ARTF are properly used. ARTF expenditures can be
found eligible only if they are included in the Afghan Government's
budget. ARTF's share of financing for the yearly budget is approved by
the ARTF Management Committee (MC). All goods and services must be
procured and accounted for in accordance with Afghan Government law and
regulations, and noncompliance with Afghan government regulations
results in ineligibility for financing by the ARTF.
The ARTF MC consists of the World Bank, the Islamic Development
Bank (IDB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the U.N. (UNAMA and
UNDP). The MC meets regularly in Kabul, with the Ministry of Finance as
an observer, to carry out the day-to-day business of the fund. Once a
quarter, ARTF Donors meet to discuss broader strategy with the
government and ARTF management.
Question #30. Has the Afghan Government met the ARTF benchmark that
requires it to enact an Audit Law that complies with international best
practices?
Answer. At the Kabul Conference in July 2010 the Afghan Government
pledged to, among other steps, submit an audit law within 6 months to
ensure the strengthening and the independence of the Control and Audit
Office (CAO), Afghanistan's supreme audit institution, which has audit
authority over state and donor funds.
An external audit law has been drafted and approved by the Afghan
Cabinet, though it has not yet passed into law; the Afghan Government
has invited the donor community to provide comments before it is
enacted. The U.S. Government and donor community alike are currently
analyzing the law to determine if it meets the ARTF benchmark.
Question #31. If not (referring to question 30), what will be the
result of failure to meet that benchmark?
Answer. Failure to fully meet the Audit Law benchmark may result in
the eventual forfeiture by the Afghan Government of $17.5 million (25
percent) from the Incentive Program window of the ARTF. The U.S.
Government and donor community are currently analyzing the draft law to
determine if it meets the ARTF benchmark. Overall, the Incentive
Program totals $70 million and is contingent on the Afghan Government's
meeting a number of benchmarks and having an IMF Country Program in
place.
Question #32. Please describe steps the Department and USAID are
taking to better communicate how U.S. funds are being spent in
Afghanistan. Please include a timeline for implementation of these
steps as well.
Answer. Over the past year Embassy Kabul and USAID have instituted
measures to better oversee and provide information on the status of
U.S. assistance programs and funds:
The Embassy has established a Program Analysis and
Evaluation Unit (PA&E) to monitor and provide information on
USG assistance activities in Afghanistan.
The Embassy has established a structure to coordinate USG
gender activities in Afghanistan.
The Embassy is partnering with the International Security
Assistance Forces (ISAF), the Department of Defense (DOD), and
other State implementers (INL and USAID) to develop a structure
for oversight of USG contracting to ensure program efficiency.
Within the office of the Coordinator Director for
Development and Economic Affairs, a position to enhance the
Embassy's donor coordination efforts has been created and
filled.
The Embassy recently initiated an effort to bring together
USG-funded technical advisors who work in Afghan Government
ministries and agencies on a regular basis to share lessons
learned and coordinate activities.
The Embassy's Executive Working Group (EWG) has been
reinvigorated. This group is cochaired by the CDDEA Ambassador
and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Stability Operations at ISAF.
The EWG plays a key role, under the Principals group, in
overseeing civilian-military cooperation, including issues
identified by the 15 National Level Working Groups which serve
under it.
A single Embassy section has been designated to respond to
all SIGAR, OIG, GAO Audits.
State and USAID are in the process of making the information
collected through the Afghan Info system available to the
public. Project information is currently available at http://
afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/projects. This Web site will expand to
include the location of assistance activities, the level of
effort directed to each district and province, the number of
people benefiting from assistance activities, and performance
indicators that measure project performance (including progress
against set targets). Displaying the information geographically
and providing public access to the information will increase
transparency of assistance programs and enhance communication
and coordination with GIRoA and other donor governments.
USAID and the Department of State recently launched the
Foreign Assistance Dashboard (www.foreignassistance.gov), which
was created in response to the principles of the Paris
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and President Obama's Open
Government Initiative. Its goal is to enable a wide variety of
stakeholders, including U.S. citizens, civil society
organizations, the Congress, U.S. Government (USG) agencies,
donors, and partner country governments, the ability to
examine, research, and track USG foreign assistance investments
in an accessible and easy-to-understand format. The Dashboard
is still in its early stages of development. Future versions
will incorporate budget, financial, program, and performance
data in a standard form from all USG agencies receiving or
implementing foreign assistance, humanitarian, and/or
development funds. The Dashboard currently contains Department
of State and USAID budget and appropriation data.
Question #33. The following questions refer to the Kabul
International Conference on Afghanistan Communique from July 20, 2010:
Please describe the steps the Afghan Government has taken to
successfully achieve the necessary reforms to strengthen its
public financial management systems, reduce corruption, improve
budget execution, and increase revenue collection to finance
key National Priority Programs as listed below:
8. To implement these principles of effective partnership,
international Participants:
-- In line with the London Conference Communique, restated
their strong support for channeling at least 50% of development
aid through the Afghan Government's core budget within two
years while, as committed at the London Conference, the Afghan
Government achieves the necessary reforms to strengthen its
public financial management systems, reduce corruption, improve
budget execution, and increase revenue collection to finance
key National Priority Programmes;
Answer. While considerable steps still need to be taken by the
Afghan Government to strengthen its public financial management
systems, reduce corruption, improve budget execution, and increase
revenue collection, there have been indicators of progress.
The Afghan Government is making progress toward improving fiscal
transparency. The Ministry of Finance drafted a Public Financial
Framework in July 2010 to strengthen budget execution and fiduciary
controls. Budget execution rates continue to be a concern, due largely
to weak capacity in line ministries and security. The Ministry of
Finance continues to post annual Afghan Government budgets online, as
it has since 2004, in addition to mid-year reviews of the national
budget. The Afghan Government's execution and disbursement reports are
also available online.
In terms of revenue collection, the Ministry of Finance has
established regional Taxpayer Offices and other initiatives to increase
collection rates in the districts. Nonetheless, the Afghan national
budget is growing at a faster rate than revenue collection, leaving a
deficit which is paid for by donors. This remains a major concern.
Question #34. Given the Kabul Bank crisis, low budget execution
rates, and other indications of financial incompetence or malfeasance
within the Afghan Government, is delaying the commitment to increase
on-budget funding to up to 50 percent under consideration?
Answer. The United States and other major donors continue to make
it clear to the Afghan Government that in order to meet the 50 percent
mark for assistance to Afghanistan's core budget by 2013, as defined at
the Kabul Conference, the Afghan Government needs to make significant
additional progress toward instituting public sector financial reform,
addressing anticorruption, ensuring better budget execution, and
increasing revenue collection. This means continued improvements in
capacity not only at the Ministry of Finance, but other line
ministries, as well as at the Provincial and District levels.
The U.S. Government continues to support the IMF in its
negotiations with the Afghan Government. We believe that an IMF country
program is essential to ensuring that the mechanisms of the Afghan
economy function properly. U.S. officials, other donor nations, and the
United Nations have made it clear that the absence of a country program
jeopardizes aid disbursement.
Question #35. Please explain the current approach to this issue
(referring to question 34).
Answer. We continue to convey the message to Afghan authorities
that they must take aggressive, concrete steps to address Kabul Bank-
related issues, strengthen the Afghan financial sector, and qualify for
a strong IMF program. We are working with international donors to
ensure that we are all speaking with one voice on these issues.
The IMF has identified a number of important steps that the Afghan
authorities should take in order to address the problems at Kabul Bank
and to strengthen the financial sector more broadly. These steps are
currently preconditions for a new IMF Country Program, and would help
restore Afghanistan's credibility with the international community.
Credible law enforcement action on the part of the Afghan Government
against those responsible for the crisis at Kabul Bank is one of the
preconditions set out by the IMF for a program.
The United States has been working with the Afghan Central Bank to
address fraud and mismanagement at Kabul Bank, and to enhance the
Central Bank's ability to supervise the Afghan financial sector more
broadly. However, the United States did not, and indeed should not,
have an operational role in supervising Afghan banks. U.S. efforts are
appropriately focused on capacity-building, particularly with regard to
strengthening those supervisory authorities responsible for
safeguarding the integrity of the financial system.
Question #36. Please assess how successfully the Government of
Afghanistan has implemented its Kabul commitments by providing specific
examples of steps it has taken or not taken regarding sections in the
communique that cover ``Principles of Effective Partnership,''
``Governance, Rule of Law, and Human Rights,'' and ``Economic and
Social Development.''
Answer. The Afghan Government's fulfillment of its Kabul Conference
commitments is an ongoing process, as the timeline for commitments
varies. Since the July 2010 Kabul Conference, the Afghan Government has
made progress in undertaking a series of reforms to improve governance,
promote economic and social development, and strengthen Afghan security
capacities. The next Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB)
meeting (date to be determined) will provide an opportunity for the
donor community and the Afghan Government to jointly assess progress on
the London and Kabul Conference benchmarks.
With regard to ``Principles of Effective Partnership,'' the Afghan
Government has made strides in implementing ambitious public financial
management reforms, but needs to take steps to further strengthen this
area. In particular, the Afghan Government must improve budget planning
and execution in order to effectively use domestic and international
resources to implement its National Priority Programs. Strengthened
internal and external audits, and other anticorruption measures, will
also enhance the government's credibility. However, there has been
progress. Over the past 3 years, domestic revenues grew on average 20
percent per year, and Afghanistan's rating in the Open Budget Index
improved to 21 percent in the most recently released index in December
2010.
With respect to ``Governance, Rule of Law, and Human Rights,'' the
Afghan Government has made some progress on its Kabul Conference
commitments, but we are concerned about slow progress on some key
actions in anticorruption and rule of law. The Government of
Afghanistan has established the statutory basis of the Major Crimes
Task Force (MCTF) and the Anti-Corruption Tribunal (ACT) through
decrees. A committee has been formed to finalize the draft of the law,
which we would like to see improved in the areas of function and
status. The Afghan Government continues to struggle with existing
criminal and civil legal codes to bring them in line with the country's
international commitments on freedom of religion and broader human
rights.
With respect to the Afghan Government's commitment to improve
audits of ministries and subnational government offices, an external
audit law has been drafted and approved by the Afghan Cabinet. The U.S.
Government and donor community alike are currently analyzing the law to
determine if it meets international standards. The Afghan Government
also committed to augmenting the number of ministries using transparent
and merit-based appointment processes, and has begun to use such
procedures for selection at the district governor level and recently
for some deputy provincial governor positions. With regard to the
commitment to provide budgetary support to the Afghan Independent Human
Rights Commission (AIHRC), the Council of Ministers has approved AIHRC
inclusion in the state budget, though not as a permanent budget unit
and with a very modest amount of support ($500,000).
An important commitment that still needs to be met is the
initiation of a strategy for long-term electoral reform by the Afghan
Government, particularly addressing the sustainability of the election
process, which has not been completed. With respect to the London
Conference commitment to work closely with the U.N. to build on lessons
learned from the 2009 elections to deliver improvements to the
electoral process in 2010 and beyond, the Independent Election
Commission (IEC) drew on a number of lessons learned from 2009 to
improve technical aspects of the 2010 election process. The IEC and the
Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) conducted lessons learned
workshops in January 2011, which could feed into technical electoral
reform efforts and a broader electoral reform debate.
Under ``Economic and Social Development,'' the Afghan Government
committed to further the framework of the government's National
Priority Programs (NPPs) by October 2010, including implementation and
costing plans. A robust consultation process on the NPPs, and on 100-
day progress reports to demonstrate accountability, is ongoing among
the donors and government. The NPPs focus on six areas: Governance,
Human Resources Development, Agriculture and Rural Development,
Infrastructure Development, Private Sector Development, and Security.
The Afghan Government is making progress toward improving fiscal
transparency. To meet its commitment, the Ministry of Finance published
a Public Financial Management Roadmap in July 2010. This document laid
out a comprehensive plan to strengthen the Afghan Government's capacity
to improve planning and prioritization, increase budget execution, and
to increase its Open Budget Index rating. The Ministry of Finance
continues to post annual Afghan Government budgets online, as it has
since 2004, in addition to mid-year reviews of the national budget. The
Afghan Government's execution and disbursement reports are also
available online. Budget execution rates continue to be a concern, due
largely to weak capacity in line ministries, security concerns, and
donor practices that create an uncertain budgetary environment for the
Afghan Government.
Question #37. Please describe steps our Embassy in Kabul is taking
to coordinate regional policy issues such as water, trade, and security
with our Embassies in Central Asia.
Answer. Cooperation and coordination between our Embassies in the
region happens routinely, at both working and senior levels. Inter-
Embassy coordination and cooperation occurs primarily between our
Border Coordination, Economic, Political, Political-Military and INL
sections. In 2010, Embassy Kabul expanded the role of the Afghanistan-
Pakistan border coordinator to Regional Coordinator, and this person is
tasked with increasing cooperation and coordination between Embassy
Kabul and our Embassies in Central Asia. The Regional Coordinator
participated in the U.S.-Kazakhstan Annual Bilateral Consultation
meeting in Astana March 17-18. In addition, we hold monthly regional
economic cooperation calls between Washington, Kabul, and Central Asian
countries to coordinate our cross-border and regional economic efforts.
The Regional Coordinator has also developed a virtual regional
border coordination network to coordinate current and future cross-
border and regional initiatives. The Coordinator also is working
closely with the international community in Kabul to promote productive
dialogue on cross-border issues with Afghanistan's neighbors to the
north.
In recent months, the State Department, in conjunction with the
Department of Defense, has undertaken high-level consultations on
Afghanistan with the governments in Central Asia. In January, an
interagency delegation that included CENTCOM's General Mattis, Bureau
of South and Central Asian Affairs Deputy Assistant Secretary Susan
Elliot, Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy Deputy Assistant
Secretary David Sedney, and Embassy Kabul's Regional Coordinator
traveled to all five Central Asian countries to brief on U.S. policy in
Afghanistan.
We are actively engaging Central Asian countries to consider
joining the Afghanistan Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA), which
was ratified in January 2011, and is currently being implemented.
Afghanistan's northern neighbors have expressed interest in signing
similar agreements, most recently Turkmenistan.
We also continue to encourage progress on the TAPI pipeline, which
would bring natural gas from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to
markets in Pakistan and India. Officials from the four countries signed
an MOU regarding the 1,200-mile pipeline, and the countries are
aggressively engaged to further define the project.
The U.S. Embassy in Kabul, the Bureau of South and Central Asian
Affairs, and the Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan
and Pakistan are currently planning a conference for U.S. Ambassadors
in Central Asia to meet in Kabul in June for further coordination on
regional policy issues.
Question #38. Who at Embassy Kabul is responsible for day-to-day
coordination with our Embassies in Central Asia?
Answer. The Regional Coordinator is responsible for day-to-day
coordination between Embassy Kabul and our Embassies in Central Asia.
In 2010, Embassy Kabul expanded the role of the Afghanistan-Pakistan
Border Coordinator to Regional Coordinator and this person is now
tasked with increasing cooperation and coordination between Embassy
Kabul and our Embassies in Central Asia. In addition, there are monthly
regional economic cooperation calls between Washington, Kabul, and
Central Asian Embassies to coordinate our cross-border and regional
economic efforts.
The U.S. Embassy in Kabul, the Bureau of South and Central Asian
Affairs, and the Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan
and Pakistan are currently planning a conference for U.S. Ambassadors
in Central Asia to meet in Kabul in June for further coordination on
regional policy issues.
Question #39. What was the cost of operating the Embassy in 2010,
including the cost of security, danger pay, and other benefits for
State Department personnel, housing (including the cost of expanding
housing), 3,161 contractors, armored vehicles, and all other expenses
necessary to maintain the current diplomatic effort in the country?
Answer. The cost of the Afghanistan operations for nonsecurity
requirements in FY 2010 totaled $475 million. This included personnel
salaries and allowances, infrastructure and life support, equipment and
vehicles, Afghanistan consulates fit-out costs, personnel costs, and
support funding transferred by the Department of State to other USG
civilian agencies for the Afghanistan civilian uplift, air mobility
costs, and public diplomacy/strategic communications programs.
The total security cost to support the Diplomatic Mission in
Afghanistan for FY 2010 was $347.3 million. This includes the Kabul
Embassy Security Force guard contract for Afghanistan in FY 2010 which
totaled $120.6 million. The total security cost also includes housing,
armored vehicles and equipment costs for the guard force in Kabul and
security contract for Camp Sullivan.
Question #40. What is the projected cost for 2011?
Answer. The projected cost for the FY 2011 for Afghanistan
nonsecurity requirements is between $550 million and $650 million. The
total cost will be dependent on a number of potentially significant
costs, including the continuing increase in civilian personnel being
deployed this year (including other USG agencies' personnel), the
resources that could be required for diplomatic activities in a
transition phase of reduced U.S. military operations/support, and
additional infrastructure, life support, and air mobility requirements.
The projected total security costs to support the Diplomatic
Mission in Afghanistan for FY 2011 are estimated to be $344 million.
This includes the Kabul Embassy Security Force guard contract for
Afghanistan in FY 2011 which is estimated to cost $118 million. This
total includes housing, armored vehicles, and equipment costs for the
guard force in Kabul.
Question #41. What are the three most important policy goals for
the United States-India relationship for the medium term (3-5 years),
and what specific, concrete deliverables can serve as benchmarks for
progress in achieving these goals?
Answer. The historic visit to India of President Obama in November
2010 reaffirmed our shared values and increasing convergence of
interests. We are off to a fast start in implementing many of the
decisions and agreements outlined in the Joint Statement of the
President and Prime Minister Singh. Looking ahead over the medium term,
our primary objective is to continue to develop our strategic
partnership to, among other things, ensure the security and openness of
shared domains, such as space, maritime and cyber; to promote closer
consultation and greater convergence in regional and multilateral
policy, and cooperate in third countries on democracy and development
initiatives. Increasing defense trade (the United States is presently
India's third-largest defense supplier, after Russia and Israel),
exchanges and joint exercises will underpin our strategic partnership,
with the added benefit of bolstering our high technology and commercial
relationship, driving U.S. exports and growing both economies. We also
seek to elevate our government-to-government economic partnership to be
commensurate with our global strategic partnership.
Our Top Three Medium-term Goals and our Benchmarks of Progress:
1. Build a Truly Global Strategic Partnership. Benchmarks
include U.S.-India development projects in regions beyond South
Asia, such as Africa, greater convergence on multilateral
policy, engagement on Asia Pacific issues, climate change
coordination, and continued nonproliferation dialogue and
cooperation.
2. Deepen our Defense Trade and Cooperation. Benchmarks
include increased defense sales, joint production and research,
broadened joint exercises, and expanded maritime security
cooperation.
3. Energize our Trade and Economic Relationship. Benchmarks
include continued expansion of U.S. exports, greater Indian
investment in the United States, partnerships in the expansion
of clean and conventional energy, and commercial space
cooperation.
Question #42. Do any of these goals require specific action from
Congress?
Answer. Yes, in a few cases. A bilateral investment treaty (BIT),
for example, would require Senate advice and consent in order to enter
into force.
In addition, the United States has committed at least $50 million
over 5 years to the Partnership to Advance Clean Energy (PACE);
continued congressional support of international climate cooperation
funding will be instrumental to continuing our joint work on PACE--our
signature initiative to advance clean energy research and deployment.
More generally, we depend on sustained and concerted congressional
advocacy to help us advance many of our top priorities with India, as
well as our overarching goal of continuing to grow our robust people-
to-people ties. To that end, we continue to welcome congressional and
staff travel to India and encourage engagement with visiting Indian
officials, business executives, and civil society representatives.
Question #43. The attempt to sell advanced fighter aircraft to
India (whether F-18s or F-16s) is regarded by many as a key goal for
the administration. This goal, however, appears to be at odds with the
administration's attempt to persuade Pakistan to shift more of its own
military resources from the Indian border and Line of Control to the
western theater of operations in the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas. What are the administration's plans for reconciling these
apparently contradictory imperatives?
Answer. We do not agree that these goals are contradictory. Our
security relationships with India and Pakistan are both significant,
but substantively different. This is reflected in our bilateral
engagement. We do not view these relationships in zero-sum terms and
support broad engagement with all countries in South Asia, including
India and Pakistan. Military sales to India buttress the U.S.-India
Strategic Partnership and support our desire to foster a deeper
security relationship with India that complements India's expanding
global influence. They do not alter the prevailing military balance in
the region. At the same time, the United States is investing in
programs such as the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, which
has helped Pakistan to focus on the counterinsurgency raging on its
western border. Pakistan has demonstrated an understanding of this
threat by increasing the number of troops engaged in counterinsurgency
operations along its border with Afghanistan from 80,000 (2001-03) to
148,000 in (2009-10).
Question #44. A key Indian request of the United States has been
prioritization of counterterrorism efforts aimed at groups
(particularly Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, and to a lesser extend Jaish-e-
Muhammad) with a history of anti-India attacks. To what extent has this
goal moved higher on our priority list in discussions with Pakistan
since the 2008 Mumbai attacks?
Answer. Regional South Asian extremists groups remain a key issue
in our security discussions with the Government of Pakistan (GoP) and
other South Asian governments. Many of these groups, including Lashkar-
e-Tayyiba (LeT), pose a serious risk to regional stability and also
cite American interests as targets. Since the 2008 Mumbai attacks, we
have consistently highlighted to our Pakistani partners the dangers
posed by regional extremists. Through several bilateral channels,
including the U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue, we clearly stress to
the GoP that these groups are a direct threat to American lives,
regional neighbors and, increasingly, Pakistan itself. We also
encourage all South Asian partners to take aggressive, coordinated
action against these extremists, including LeT.
Question #45. What has had to move lower on the list in response?
Answer. We have no such rankings or a priority list. As threats
continue to evolve, we must focus on the muliple dangers we face. While
we have increased focus on South Asia's regional extremists since the
2008 Mumbai attacks, we added them to our ongoing discussions of other
terrorist groups with the Government of Pakistan (GoP). In these
discussions, we cite the dangerous potential of these regional groups
and their ability to syndicate with other high-priority threats, such
as al-Qaeda.
Question #46. The Senate recently passed a resolution calling on
the administration ``to develop a comprehensive policy toward Sri Lanka
that reflects United States interests, including respect for human
rights, democracy and the rule of law, economic interests, and security
interests.''
Does the administration plan to develop such a policy, and
is there a specific timeline for doing so?
Answer. The State Department has developed and implemented a policy
toward Sri Lanka that centers on supporting a peaceful, united, and
democratic Sri Lanka. To this end, the United States Government engages
the Sri Lanka Government, civil society, and diaspora to improve human
rights, to strengthen democratic institutions, to develop a political
framework that respects the rights of all Sri Lankans, and to address
the root causes of the conflict, including a full accountability into
allegations of violations of human rights law and international
humanitarian law that may have occurred during the war. As the
situation in Sri Lanka is dynamic, aspects of our policy are
continually under review but our overall goal remains.
Key to our strategy is maintaining channels of dialogue and
cooperation with the Sri Lankans to advocate these objectives. Our
engagement extends to all levels of society, inside and outside the
government. For example, we have provided nearly $62 million in food
aid to the Sri Lankan people over the last 2\1/2\ years and $11 million
for support, training, and equipment for the demining efforts of the
government and its NGO partners,
Earlier this year we opened a new American Corner in Jaffna, a
place where Sri Lankans can meet and share ideas, and help connect
Jaffna with the rest of Sri Lanka, the United States and the world. We
have provided more than $4 million in immediate assistance for victims
of recent floods in northern and eastern Sri Lanka.
With respect to security, we work with the Government of Sri Lanka
to identify sources of terrorist financing to ensure that no terrorist
organization uses our financial systems. Broadly speaking, the ability
of the United States Government to advance our interests, including
respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law, economic
interests, and security interests, depends on our success in supporting
a peaceful, united and democratic Sri Lanka while maintaining these
channels of dialogue and cooperation.
Question #47. The same resolution called on the Sri Lankan
Government, the U.N. and the international community to establish an
independent international accountability mechanism. What has been the
Sri Lankan Government response, if any?
Answer. The Sri Lankan Government is aware of the recent Senate
resolution. The Sri Lankan Government maintains that it has in place a
suitable mechanism for addressing matters related to post-conflict
reconciliation, including accountability, in the Lessons Learnt and
Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) established in May 2010. The Sri
Lankan Government views attempts to establish an international
commission as premature, as the LLRC has not yet completed its work and
issued its report to President Rajapaksa.
Question #48. What further measures is the U.S. Government prepared
to take to ensure that the Sri Lankan Government is committed to the
peace process?
Answer. We are continuously and closely engaged with the Government
of Sri Lanka (GSL) both in Colombo and in Washington. In addition to
our discussions with the GSL on issues of accountability for alleged
violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law--
which we believe is essential to lasting peace--we also strongly
encourage the GSL to move forward in talks with the Tamil National
Alliance on political reconciliation with concrete measures to devolve
power and provide the Tamil people with a greater voice in matters that
pertain to them. Our private efforts include meetings between our
Ambassador and the Sri Lankan President, Foreign Minister, and others.
Our public efforts include Assistant Secretary Blake's February 2011
interview with an international media outlet in which he outlined the
U.S. view on areas in which the GSL has made progress and ways in which
we feel much more must be done, particularly with respect to
accountability. Assistant Secretary Blake also stressed accountability
and reconciliation in a March 14 panel at the Asia Society in New York
with Sri Lanka's Permanent Representative to the U.N. Ambassador
Butenis has also emphasized these points in media interviews. We
support a range of programs through our NGO partners on livelihood
development, legal aid clinics, peace education, human rights, and
national reconciliation.
Question #49. The Constituent Assembly in Nepal is scheduled to
draft and ratify a new constitution by May 2011. News reports suggest
that the country is unlikely to meet this deadline and Maoist leader
Pushpa Kamal Dahal (also known as ``Prachanda'') is reportedly
advocating for an extension of the Constitutional Assembly's term. What
assistance has the United States provided to help the constitution
drafting and peace process?
Answer. The United States has provided extensive support to the
Constituent Assembly, the body charged with drafting the new
constitution by May 2011. The Department of State, USAID and their
partners have supported projects that provided legal expertise and
constitutional drafting training. Constituent Assembly members,
government officials, civil society organizations, and community
leaders have participated in our assistance programs. In addition, the
U.S. Government has funded trainings and facilitated dialogue for key
political party leaders, including through The Asia Foundation (TAF)
and Karuna Center for Peacebuilding, to facilitate discussions and
build consensus on the outstanding constitutional and security issues.
We will continue to assist Nepal as it works toward completing the
constitution and fulfilling all elements of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement.
Question #50. What is the basis for continuing to keep the
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) on the Specially Designated Terrorist
Groups list after the organization has joined the political process and
won a plurality of votes in the subsequent election?
Answer. The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) remains a designated
Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Executive Order 13224 and
is included on the Terrorism Exclusion List, pursuant to the
Immigration and Nationality Act. We view their participation in the
electoral process as a positive step that we would weigh in any
consideration to remove them from these lists, but we continue to have
areas of concern. We share these concerns with Maoist leaders through
our Ambassador who has been engaged in an active ongoing dialogue in
Kathmandu. Primarily, we remain troubled by the failure of the Maoists
to complete the peace process and give up the substantive control they
have over their approximately 19,000 former fighters in cantonments
across Nepal and of the weapons that remain under their control. During
discussions, we have told Maoist leaders that it is difficult for us to
accept their assertions of a commitment to multiparty democracy and the
peaceful resolution of political differences as long as they retain
what is, in essence, a private army under their control. We also
continue to call on the Maoist leadership to act on their promised
reforms to their youth wing, the Young Communist League (YCL), and to
formally renounce violence as a political tool.
We believe that the Maoists have made some progress on the path to
transforming themselves into a democratic political party, and we urge
them to continue to work with the other parties on the drafting and
implementation of a democratic constitution. Until the issues related
to their former fighters and their militant youth wing are addressed,
however, we believe it would be premature for us to pronounce the
transformation from terrorist organization to democratic political
actors to be complete.
Question #51. What actions, if any, has the Communist Party of
Nepal (Maoist) taken since joining the political process in 2006 that
can be fairly described as terrorist actions?
Answer. Following the signing a Comprehensive Peace Agreement with
the government in 2006, the level of Maoist violence has decreased
significantly. Nonetheless, there is evidence that extortion,
abduction, and intimidation by the Maoist party or Maoist-affiliated
organizations continue in some regions of the country. Political party
representatives, police, nongovernmental organization (NGO) workers,
and journalists have reported threats and intimidation by Maoists and
Maoist-affiliated organizations.
Question #52. A recent event at the United States Institute of
Peace highlighted the difficulties of reintegration of Maoist ex-
combatants--particularly women ex-combatants--back into civilian life.
How does the Nepalese Government plan to ensure that ex-combatants are
successfully integrated?
Answer. The Government of Nepal currently lacks a comprehensive
plan for reintegrating ex-combatants into civilian life. The 19,600
Maoist ex-combatants remain in camps at seven sites around the country,
as they have for more than 4 years. However, we have seen some progress
on the integration and rehabilitation process in recent months,
including in January the handing over of control of the ex-combatants
to the Special Committee on the Integration and Reintegration of Maoist
Combatants. Discussions between the key parties continue, and the
Special Committee's Secretariat is working with the U.N. and other
partners to build capacity and prepare for reintegration.
On women ex-combatants, the Government of Nepal (GON) recently
approved a Plan of Action (Plan NAP) on the implementation of U.N.
Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820, which provides
encouragement both for the specific challenges of reintegration of
female ex-combatants as well as an archetype for how the GON should
approach the reintegration of all ex-combatants. Plan NAP is built on
five pillars: (1) participation; (2) protection and prevention; (3)
promotion; (4) relief and recovery and resource management and
monitoring; and (5) evaluation. Plan NAP seeks to increase the
participation and leadership of women at all levels of decisionmaking,
conflict transformation and peace processes, including taking measures
to address specific needs of women and girls in the design and
implementation of relief and recovery programs.
Question #53. What type of support is the United States providing
and does it address the specific challenges faced by women ex-
combatants?
Answer. Because the demobilization and reintegration process for
the 19,600 Maoist ex-combatants is stalled at the encampment phase,
U.S. support has been mostly limited to engagement with key political
contacts with a view to influencing, through technical advice, future
plans and implementation of the reintegration process. Embassy Nepal
engaged a USAID Civilian Response Corps-Active specialist in
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) to strengthen
Embassy Nepal's operational contacts with key national actors as well
as the international donor community. Direct support at this stage has
been limited to increasing public dialogue about the demobilization and
reintegration process in Nepal through support to national and
community radio programs on the peace process, as well as new linkages
between existing USAID programs in education and vocational training
with current and future plans by the U.N. and other donors to support
similar efforts for ex-combatants. USAID programming for community
based reintegration, which is the most effective method to address
challenges faced by female ex-combatants as well as other, often
marginalized conflict-affected populations, is contingent on an
official demobilization process for some or all of the 19,600 Maoist
ex-combatants, as well as the availability of fresh funds.
Question #54. During his visit to Indonesia in November 2010,
President Obama identified education as a key focus of our bilateral
relationship for the near future. How is this priority reflected in the
2012 budget request?
Answer. Close cooperation in education is a fundamental element of
our Comprehensive Partnership with Indonesia. In addition to support
for basic education, in 2010 President Obama announced a Higher
Education Partnership in which the United States will invest $165
million over 5 years to help build Indonesian capacity to provide
world-class university education and to help significantly increase the
number of American and Indonesian students who study in each other's
country.
The FY 2012 budget request includes $35.5 million toward this 5-
year commitment, including $15.5 million for exchange programs managed
by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, and $20 million
managed by USAID to improve the quality of higher education in
Indonesia, including through partnerships with U.S. universities.
In addition, the FY 2012 request includes $32.177 million for basic
education programs managed by USAID to support improvements in
institutional autonomy, academic quality, private sector engagement,
and science and technology advancement.
Question #55. What specific programs does the administration plan
to expand or initiate?
Answer. Under the Higher Education Partnership, the State
Department's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) manages
the Fulbright Indonesia Research, Science and Technology (FIRST)
Program. The FIRST program is a 5-year, $15 million initiative that
provides scholarships for Indonesians to study in the United States and
conduct research in priority science and technology fields. It also
allows Americans to study, teach, and conduct research in Indonesia in
similar areas. The FIRST program expands the overall U.S. contribution
to the Fulbright program in Indonesia to $8.5 million in FY 2012,
making it one of the largest Fulbright programs in the world. In fall
2010, the first 10 American and Indonesian Fulbright students and
scholars began studies under FIRST.
A second important effort is the Community College Initiative,
which provides $2.5 million in funding per year for scholarships for
approximately 50 Indonesian students to study in the United States in
1-year certificate programs. The initiative also funds professional
development for approximately 15 Indonesian faculty and administrators
at U.S. community colleges. In 2010, the first expanded cohort of 50
young Indonesians began their studies at U.S. community colleges
through this initiative.
To encourage Indonesian students and American students to study in
each other's country, ECA increased funding in FY 2012 to $4.5 million
for English-language training, student advising services, and other
exchanges. In 2010-11, the number of English Access Microscholarships
awarded doubled, to more than 400, for after-school English classes for
disadvantaged 14-18-year-olds. In 2010, the first cohort of 17
Americans studied Indonesian in intensive summer institutes in Malang,
strengthening their language skills while deepening their understanding
and respect for Indonesian society and culture.
USAID's FY 2012 request of $20 million will fund the Higher
Education University Partnership, the Higher Education Leadership
Management Program, and several other programs outlined below.
First, USAID's FY 2012 request of $8.2 million for the
Higher Education University Partnership program will support
collaboration between U.S. and Indonesian higher education
institutions by enabling selected institutions to improve the
quality of teaching, research, and community service. In 2010,
USAID awarded four of 25 planned university partnerships, in
areas including marine biodiversity, tropical plant curriculum
development, child protection, and training in public health
and applied research.
Second, USAID's FY 2012 request of $8.7 million will support
the Higher Education Leadership, Management, and Policy
program. This program will assist the Indonesian Ministry of
Education in introducing quality assurance systems into the
organizational structure of the higher education system, raise
overall quality, introduce fiscal sustainability, and enhance
the efficiency of the system's use of resources.
Third, the FY 2012 request of $3.1 million will support
USAID's New Higher Education Initiative, the Aceh Polytechnic
program, the Innovation Fund, the Participant Training Project,
and program support.
Finally, USAID's FY 2012 request of $32.177 million for basic
education programming will support greater institutional autonomy,
academic quality, private sector engagement, and science and technology
advancement. The largest component of the request ($28.4 million) will
assist the Indonesian Government in replicating Decentralized Basic
Education (DBE) modules and methodologies in targeted regions.
Additional basic education programs will focus on helping Indonesian
youth complete primary and secondary school, and include $3.8 million
in funding to support opportunities for vulnerable children,
innovation, participant training, and program support.
Question #56. Another key focus of the U.S.-Indonesia engagement is
climate change. How does the 2012 budget request deal with this
priority, with specific reference to the REDD program, the Coral
Triangle Initiative, and other programs tightly linked to Indonesia?
Answer. U.S. foreign assistance plays a critical role in the
implementation of the U.S.-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership, which
includes combating and adapting to climate change as one of its key
focus areas. In addition to potential resources provided by the
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and other U.S. Government
agencies, the President's FY 2012 budget request includes $28 million
in Development Assistance funds for the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) to strengthen the capacity of the
Government of Indonesia to manage Indonesia's diverse terrestrial and
marine resources sustainably and to catalyze its clean-energy
development potential. All of USAID's activities support Indonesia's
national strategies, including the national Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) efforts and other national
climate change initiatives.
U.S. assistance supported by funding in the FY12 proposed budget
request will be designed to foster sustainable forest management,
reduce carbon emissions, support community livelihoods, and promote
low-carbon economic development. USAID programs will be implemented in
partnership with national and local governments, NGOs, the private
sector, and communities who are dependent upon forest resources.
Assistance will focus on reducing environmental threats, improving
governance, developing sustainable land and resource use, and
increasing access to markets and financing for sustainably managed
natural resource products. USAID programs will strengthen community
resilience to the effects of climate change while reducing the risks
associated with disasters in highly vulnerable areas. Priority areas
will include high conservation value landscapes and seascapes,
orangutan habitats, and primary lowland forests.
USAID forestry projects will support Indonesia's national REDD+
strategy by implementing changes in land use and improved forest
management. Forestry and climate change activities support U.S.
commitments made at Copenhagen, and they will also support the
implementation of Low Emissions Development Strategies (LEDS) for
Indonesia. Projects will also extend work already started with previous
years' funding that supports the Indonesian Climate Change Center to
bring science and objective analysis to the policy decisionmaking
process.
Indonesia, as well as other countries, will also benefit from
separately budgeted Asia regional programs totaling $32.95 million for
clean energy, REDD+, and biodiversity implemented by USAID's Regional
Development Mission-Asia (RDMA). RDMA will also continue to strengthen
capacity in managing coastal and marine resources, including through
support of the Coral Triangle Initiative (CTI).
Question #57. The insurgency in the southern Thai provinces of
Narathiwat, Pattani, and Yala (along with parts of Songkhla) has taken
several thousand lives since 2004, but to date does not appear to have
an international agenda or focus. It often falls between the
bureaucratic cracks: Thai experts are unfamiliar with the Malay
language and culture (the language and culture of the insurgents),
Malaysia experts see it as a Thailand issue, and counterterrorism
officials see it as a local rather than a transnational phenomenon.
Within the State Department, which Bureau or Office has the lead on
tracking this insurgency?
Answer. The State Department remains deeply concerned about
violence in southern Thailand that has claimed thousands of lives over
the past 7 years. We closely monitor the human rights environment in
southern Thailand and report on it in the annual human rights report.
We support the Royal Thai Government's efforts to counter separatist
violence in southern Thailand, and we encourage the investigation and
prosecution of those responsible for violent acts. The Bureau of East
Asian and Pacific Affairs is the lead Bureau for tracking developments
in southern Thailand, working in concert with other Offices and
Agencies. Embassy Bangkok is also actively engaged on this issue.
Question #'s 58-61. Under Section 203 subsection (a) of the
Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, it states ``no
security-related assistance may be provided to Pakistan in a fiscal
year until the Secretary of State, under the direction of the
President, makes the certification required under subsection (c) for
such fiscal year.''
Has the Secretary of State made such a certification for FY
2011?
If so, on what date?
Has any security-related assistance been provided to
Pakistan in FY 2011?
If so, on what date?
Answer. The Secretary made this certification for FY 2011 on March
18 and delivered the certification package to Congress on March 30. In
accordance with Section 203, no security-related assistance (defined as
FMF in the legislation) has been provided to Pakistan in FY 2011. The
administration has requested $296 million in FY 2011 FMF funding for
Pakistan.
Question #62. The following questions refer to U.S. assistance from
the Function 150 Account. Answers should reflect funding streams from
both the State Department (i.e., INL) and USAID.
Answer. As Congress weighs appropriation of the administration's
request for Kerry-Lugar-Berman funds for FY 2012, it will be very
helpful to understand how the funds already appropriated have been
spent. How much of the funds authorized by the Enhanced Partnership
with Pakistan Act of 2009 have been spent on following line-items (for
expenditures over $10 million, please provide the specific project,
amount, and date of completion):
Energy
Bridges
Roads
Medical clinics
Schools
Dams/Irrigation
Other agricultural programs
Flood reconstruction (apart from items listed in categories
above)
Answer. It is important to note that the Enhanced Partnership with
Pakistan Act of 2009 authorizes FY 2010-FY 2014 funding for Pakistan.
The United States disbursed about $1.7 billion for Pakistan from
October 2009 (when the legislation was passed) through December 2010,
including over $1.1 billion in bilateral civilian assistance for
Pakistan. However, most of the funds disbursed in that timeframe were
FY 2009 and prior year funding. Below is what was disbursed from FY
2010 funds as of March 2010, authorized under the Enhanced Partnership
with Pakistan Act:
Energy/Dams: $37.5 million (includes Gomal Zam Dam, $26.4
million, completion estimated June 2013);
Schools: $45 million for the Higher Education Commission and
$19.5 million for Fulbright exchanges;
Other Agricultural Programs: $31.2 million (for seeds,
agricultural inputs, flood-related cash-for-work programming in
Sindh and KP);
Flood Reconstruction (apart from items listed above): $30.8
million (includes $20 million for health services provided
through Agha Khan University, WHO, UNICEF, and UNFPA); and
Social Sector Support: $75 million for the Benazir Bhutto
Income Support Program (BISP).
Question #63. How much of FY 2009 and FY 2010 funds have we already
obligated in Pakistan?
Answer. As of December 31, 2010, USAID had obligated approximately
$2.23 billion of FY 2009 and FY 2010 civilian assistance appropriations
in Pakistan. INL has obligated $253.7 million of FY 2009 and FY 2010
funding.
Question #64. How much of FY 2009 and FY 2010 funds have we already
disbursed in Pakistan?
Answer. The USG has disbursed about $1.7 billion of civilian
assistance since the October 2009 passage of Kerry-Lugar-Berman (KLB)
legislation, including funding in accounts covered by the KLB
legislation and about $550 million in emergency humanitarian response
funds for flood relief.
Recent developments include:
$19.6 million disbursed toward signature initiatives
throughout Pakistan, many of which the Secretary announced in
past visits: Gomal Zam Dam, Tubewell Efficiency Improvement
Program, Satpara Dam, Tarbela Dam, and Muzzaffargarh and
Jamshoro Thermal Power Stations.
$8.0 million disbursed to the FATA Secretariat for
construction of roads in South Waziristan that contribute to
stabilization and security by linking the remote region with
outside markets.
As of March 2011, INL and USAID had disbursed $585 million of FY
2009 and $221 million of FY 2010 nonemergency civilian assistance to
Pakistan, as well as a considerable amount of prior-year funds. We
anticipate additional disbursements in the relative near term,
including implementation of flood reconstruction activities and
disbursement of $190 million for the Citizens' Damage Compensation
Fund, once all accountability measures are in place.
Question #65. What percentage of FY 2009 and FY 2010 funds will go
toward direct assistance to the Government of Pakistan?
Answer. We are committed to building Pakistani capacity to address
Pakistan's most critical needs, and this includes coordinating closely
with the Government of Pakistan and implementing programs when possible
through Pakistani mechanisms.
We expect that about 48 percent of FY 2009 Pakistan civilian
assistance funds (Economic Support Funds or ESF) will be implemented
with direct assistance through Pakistani Government agencies, whether
federal or provincial. In FY 2010, under current planning we anticipate
that roughly 50 percent of Kerry-Lugar-Berman civilian assistance to
Pakistan will be implemented through direct assistance to the
government.
Question #66. What percentage of FY 2011 and FY 2012 funds is
estimated to be provided as direct assistance to the Government of
Pakistan?
Answer. As we do not yet have a year-long appropriation for FY 2011
and FY 2012, we have not yet determined the percentage of civilian
assistance funds that would be implemented through the Government of
Pakistan. However, the United States remains committed to providing a
substantial portion of its assistance through Pakistani entities. We
anticipate that the general trends would be in line with our current
practices in Pakistan, with roughly half of civilian assistance being
implemented through Pakistani Government institutions, whether federal
or provincial.
Question #67. What percentage of FY 2009 and FY 2010 funds will go
to Pakistani entities outside of the Government of Pakistan?
Answer. The United States has made a deliberate effort to change
its model for assistance to Pakistan, toward implementing a greater
portion of U.S. civilian assistance through Pakistani institutions.
This is critical to strengthening our partnership with Pakistan and
building the long-term capacity of Pakistani organizations. As of
December 31, 2010, USAID has made 64 awards to Pakistani
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), totaling approximately $260
million, which is approximately 12 percent of USAID's FY 2009 and FY
2010 civilian assistance funding for Pakistan. For assistance to
Pakistan managed by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement, $2 million of FY 2009 and FY 2010 funding will go to
Pakistani NGOs, for narcotics demand reduction programs.
Question #68. What percentage of FY 2011 and FY 2012 funds is
estimated to be provided to Pakistani entities outside of the
Government of Pakistan?
Answer. As we do not yet have a year-long appropriation for FY 2011
and FY 2012, we have not yet determined the percentage of civilian
assistance funds that would be provided to Pakistani entities outside
the Government of Pakistan. However, we would expect to maintain or
increase from FY 2010 levels, given our positive experience with
Pakistani NGOs and the importance of aligning our assistance
implementation with our strategic goals of building Pakistan civil
society.
Question #69. How much of FY 2009 and FY 2010 funds will go toward
flood assistance?
Answer. As of March 2010, the United States had provided a total of
$690.8 million for flood assistance using both emergency and bilateral
assistance funds in the International Disaster Assistance (IDA), PL-480
food assistance, Economic Support Funds (ESF), Migration and Refugee
Assistance (MRA), U.S. Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund
(ERMA), International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE),
and Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Action (OHDACA) accounts.
Funding from FY 2009 and FY 2010 amounted to $30.8 million and $559.5
million, respectively, in emergency and bilateral assistance accounts.
In line with the public pledge of November 2010, in addition to
emergency humanitarian assistance, $500 million of FY 2010 bilateral
assistance funds to Pakistan will be redirected or reprogrammed for
flood reconstruction and recovery.
Question #70. Why has only $23.3 million been disbursed for flood
assistance so far from Kerry-Lugar-Berman funds?
Answer. The initial U.S. response to the flooding was to bring to
bear the full panoply of emergency humanitarian assistance available,
and indeed the U.S. was ``the first with the most'' among donor
response to the floods. The USG interagency, including State, USAID,
DOD, and USDA teamed up and coordinated the delivery of over $550
million in emergency relief assistance.
In addition, we have enhanced the effectiveness of the flood
assistance by working to meet priorities identified by the Pakistani
Government (GOP). When Richard Holbrooke announced in November 2010
that the U.S. would redirect $500 million of FY 2010 Kerry-Lugar-Berman
(KLB) funding for flood reconstruction priorities identified by the
GOP, this required a reorientation of our assistance to find funding
for this effort. By December 31, 2010, only 1 month later, $23 million
was reoriented and disbursed, meeting the critical needs outlined by
the Pakistani Government. We expect substantial disbursements in
calendar year 2011, based on discussions with our Pakistani
counterparts. As of April 2010, USAID has disbursed $64.3 million of FY
2010 KLB (bilateral) funds for flood assistance. USAID has also
disbursed $30.8 million of FY 2009 funds for flood assistance.
Question #71. How long will it take for this [KLB flood] money to
be disbursed?
Answer. We are moving to disburse flood reconstruction funding as
activities are in place, and notifications/certifications are processed
as required. Even as flood reconstruction is a time-sensitive response,
it is a separate and distinct effort from emergency flood relief, where
absorptive capacity and consultations with the Pakistani Government are
important considerations. We expect substantial disbursements of KLB
flood money in calendar year 2011. However, we anticipate that it may
take 24 months from the onset of the floods until all flood assistance
funds are expended, with projects such as road and school
reconstruction spanning multiple years. We have already disbursed over
$62 million (in FY 2010 and prior year bilateral funds) for agriculture
recovery, providing seeds and agricultural inputs to farmers devastated
by flooding in Sindh, Baluchistan, Punjab, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
provinces. This has in many places increased wheat crop yields by 60-70
percent. We envisage disbursing the $190 million U.S. contribution to
the Citizen's Damage Compensation Fund by mid-2011. However, our
contributions to school, irrigation, and road reconstruction, requiring
reorientation of our programming, renotification, and working with
Pakistan's provinces, may take somewhat longer.
Question #72. How much of FY 2011 and FY 2012 funds is estimated to
go toward flood assistance?
Answer. At this time, $96 million in FY 2011 of emergency food aid
(IDA) and Food for Peace (P.L. 480) have been obligated for flood
assistance in Pakistan. As $500 million of FY 2009 and FY 2010 funds
are expected to be directed to go toward flood reconstruction, we have
not planned for the use of any FY 2011 or FY 2012 funds authorized
under the Enhanced Partnership for Pakistan Act for flood assistance at
this time.
Question #73. Please describe plans for how the Department will
apply operations research as defined in the Enhanced Partnership with
Pakistan Act of 2009 as ``the application of social science research
methods, statistical analysis, and other appropriate scientific methods
to judge, compare, and improve policies and program outcomes, from the
earliest stages of defining and designing programs through their
development and implementation, with the objective of the rapid
dissemination of conclusions and concrete impact on programming'' to
funds spent in Pakistan.
Answer. The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 has been
critical both in articulating a multiyear vision of U.S. civilian
assistance to Pakistan in support of a long-term strategic partnership,
and in encouraging best practices for assistance. Here are a few
examples of how the United States uses such ``operations research''
analysis to improve program effectiveness.
USAID guidelines require all programs to utilize a variety of types
of analyses, including quantitative studies or other types of social
science methods, during the design stage. Before committing any money
to a project, USAID conducts environmental assessments that take into
consideration the environmental, social, and economic background of the
intended beneficiaries and geographic locations and how the project in
consideration could impact their lives and their communities. A special
focus is placed on gender and how the project may impact women of the
community. In addition, the U.S. Government carefully researches the
various ways to disburse funding to determine the most appropriate
benchmarks to use in order to achieve the intended results of the
project under consideration. For example, before committing to support
the Citizens' Damage Compensation Fund, U.S. Embassy Islamabad embedded
an officer with the World Bank Assessment team to assess the program
and its social, economic, and environmental impact, as well as the
accountability and transparency of the delivery methods. Only when we
were satisfied with the results of the assessment did we consider
obligating funds towards the activity, pending certification.
Question #74. Please describe the communications strategy for how
the Department is communicating and will communicate our intent with
respect to Kerry-Lugar-Berman funds in Pakistan.
Answer. The United States seeks to maintain and deepen its long-
term bilateral strategic partnership with Pakistan. That partnership is
advanced by addressing Pakistan's economic and social challenges,
particularly with civilian assistance.
Under the direction of the Mission Director of Communications in
Islamabad, State and USAID communications teams work together to
amplify the impact of civilian assistance in Pakistan and reinforce the
U.S. message about its commitment to a long-term partnership with
Pakistan. A number of engagements--the U.S.-Pakistan Strategic
Dialogue, Secretary Clinton and Administrator Shah's visits, renewed
branding of U.S. assistance, high-level leaders discussing the
importance of economic assistance--have helped increase the Pakistani
public's confidence and trust in the United States.
In communications about the Kerry-Lugar-Berman (KLB) authorization
and civilian assistance, the objective is not simply to promote the
size and dollar value of our civilian assistance program, but to show
how it is improving the lives of average Pakistanis. For example,
reducing energy outages across the country is essential for both
society and industry in Pakistan to prosper. Last year, Secretary
Clinton announced funding for the Gomal Zam dam, a hydroelectric dam
that will serve 250,000 people in Waziristan. For projects that are
still ``in the pipeline,'' efforts will be made to highlight progress
throughout the development timetable--from announcement of the
commitment through groundbreaking and production, as well as connecting
back to the local populace to highlight results that are evident on the
ground.
Media engagement on KLB includes outreach across multiple mediums
in English and the local language (Urdu, Sindhi, and Pashto), including
robust engagement with the DC-based press corps and facilitating
reporter access to project development sites across the country. We
have undertaken substantial outreach on U.S. civilian assistance,
including:
Print Media: We have proactively built relationships with
journalists from local language publications, facilitated
exchanges and project access for Pakistani journalists to see
progress firsthand, and provided interviews with experts who
can discuss assistance programs in the local language.
Radio: USAID coordinates a biweekly 30-minute live radio
talk show, ``Aap Hum Aur Behtar Zindagi'' (``Together, for a
better future--from the American people''). On this Urdu
language program, U.S. Government officials serve as technical
experts to explain how our projects benefit ordinary
Pakistanis. The Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation, which
reaches more than 80 stations around the country, regularly
hosts roundtables with visiting U.S. officials that include
call-ins from local residents.
Television: Visits by principals to Pakistan are amplified
through television roundtables. We have coordinated with a
speakers' bureau to facilitate U.S. Government and third party
surrogates in the United States to speak on television stations
in Pakistan via satellite and in the local languages. USAID has
also begun filming project implementation across the country,
with footage available for use by Pakistani television stations
and produced into short films.
Internet: The State Department has an active presence on
Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and other social media outlets
dedicated to informing communities in both countries about
developments in the United States-Pakistan relationship. USAID
is creating a series of web pages to show how funds authorized
under KLB legislation are being used.
Diaspora Outreach: State and USAID have regularly organized
speaking engagements with think tanks, held a series of seven
Pakistan Open Houses nationwide that attracted hundreds of
Pakistani Americans, and attended community events and
conferences. In the wake of the 2010 floods in Pakistan, the
Department led weekly conference calls with the Pakistani-
American diaspora community. Sometimes including several
hundred participants, these calls were a critical channel for
exchange of information.
Question #75. Please describe steps the Department and USAID are
taking to improve their Web sites in English and Urdu to better
communicate how Kerry-Lugar-Berman funds are being spent in Pakistan.
Answer. U.S. Embassy Islamabad has recently hired a staff member in
Islamabad who will focus on improving Web presence and USAID is in the
process of hiring a Web editor to focus on this as well. In addition to
increasing staff capacity, USAID is coordinating an effort to create
Web pages dedicated to projects authorized under the Enhanced
Partnership for Pakistan Act, and to have those cross-posted throughout
the interagency network of Pakistan pages. These new pages aim to
provide answers and information on a variety of frequently asked
questions, such as the legislation text, how the money is being used,
its benefits and how it is distributed, how to apply for grants and
contracts, and where to report concerns about funds being spent.
Question #76. Please include a timeline for implementation of these
steps as well.
Answer. We intend to have the beta Web site live by the end of
April for comment and suggestions.
Question #77 & #78. Legislation to reauthorize the State Department
for FY 2012-2013 and strengthen U.S. diplomatic capabilities would
authorize funds for the state operations account, include important
increases to our diplomatic corps, provide vital funds and resources to
international organizations, address critical pay equity issues for
Foreign Service officers, and enhance our public diplomacy and consular
efforts.
How big a priority is passing State Department authorization
legislation to you?
Answer. In any budget discussion the State Department's
authorization and appropriation is a priority for both our national
security and our national well-being. In our current fiscal
environment, the Department's budget becomes an imperative. I have
noted often that American leadership in the world is more essential
than ever. From the rise of emerging powers and transformations of the
Arab Awakening to global challenges like proliferation and climate
change, we are witnessing dramatic developments that demand America's
engagement. Such challenges--and the notable opportunities that they
present--make us an indispensible partner with many countries for
resolving such issues.
How will this legislation support the Department's broader
foreign policy goals?
Answer. The activities and programs of the Department of State and
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) play an
especially vital role in driving America's leadership and protecting
our well-being at home. We are managing America's response to the Arab
Awakening. We are working to secure America's preeminent role as a
power in the Asia-Pacific, the most consequential region of the 21st
century, while upholding our strategic commitments elsewhere. We are
elevating the role of economics in foreign policy and empowering women
and girls around the world.
The work of State and USAID makes Americans safer and more
prosperous. We help build the peace that underwrites global economic
growth. At our Embassies and Consulates from Beijing to Bogota, we
engage with friends and adversaries, reducing the risk of conflict; we
help American businesses find new markets and lay the conditions for
creating jobs at home; we provide training to allies and partners to
improve our collective security; and we promote effective, democratic
governance around the world. Continued investment in long-term global
stability is more important than ever.
In such a difficult, demanding context, our budget must reflect our
unique role in protecting our Nation's security. Our budget is
constructed to allow us--in a time of constraint--to continue building
the relationships and investing in the programs necessary to protect
our country.
Question #79. Please explain what Overseas Comparability Pay is,
and what the base salary difference is currently between a diplomat
serving in Washington and a diplomat serving overseas.
Answer. The State Department has implemented ``overseas
comparability pay'' to address pay inequities that resulted from the
exclusion of U.S. Government employees serving abroad from locality
pay. The current locality pay system for all U.S. Government employees
was implemented in 1994. Locality pay is intended to recognize the
differences in the cost of labor, not the cost of living, in various
cities in the United States where the U.S. Government competes with
private industry to recruit and retain employees. The system excludes
most civilian employees overseas, including members of the Foreign
Service, in effect creating two different basic pay rates: one for
employees assigned domestically and one for those assigned overseas.
The State Department has worked since early 2000 to resolve this
disparity in pay for our Foreign Service employees when stationed
abroad. The Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Pub. Law 111-32)
included a temporary authority to make overseas comparability payments,
up to the locality pay rate for Washington, DC, to Foreign Service
generalists and specialists at grade FS-01 and below who are assigned
overseas. Subsequent appropriations acts have extended the authority
and provided funding to implement the first phase of the Department's
planned three-phase implementation schedule, despite opposition from
Members of Congress who believed that these employees already received
adequate compensation for overseas service through various allowances
and differentials.
Before the introduction of overseas comparability pay in 2009, an
entry- or mid-level Foreign Service employee transferring abroad
experienced a significant cut in basic pay as a result of the exclusion
of these positions from locality pay. For example, a Foreign Service
employee serving in Washington, DC, made more that employees in serving
in many hardship posts. In 2009, the reduction due to the loss of
locality pay was 23.10 percent of base salary. Since 2009, we have
closed the gap between rates of basic pay in Washington, DC, and abroad
by nearly 70 percent. Entry and mid-level Foreign Service employees
serving in Washington, like most other Federal employees working in
Washington, earn their base salary plus 24.22 percent locality pay.
Their counterparts overseas currently earn base salary plus 16.52
percent comparability pay. The Department has worked to close this gap
in phases, the third and final of which was scheduled to be implemented
this August and would have increased comparability pay to the
Washington, DC, locality pay rate.
The pay disparity does not just result in a short-term reduction in
pay for Foreign Service employees serving abroad; rather, the effects
are long-lasting and compound over the course of an employee's career.
Retirement contributions to the Federal Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) are
based on an employee's basic pay, which includes locality pay. This
means that without overseas comparability pay, Foreign Service
employees who spend large portions of their careers representing and
protecting their country's interests abroad, would receive smaller
employer contributions than their colleagues who remained in
Washington.
Overseas comparability pay is not a pay raise, nor is it an
additional allowance or benefit. It corrects a 17 year-old unintended
inequity in the worldwide Foreign Service pay schedule. Without
overseas comparability pay, the disparity in basic pay between overseas
and domestic assignments would continue to grow once annual locality
adjustments are reinstituted after the current Federal pay freeze, and
would increasingly undermine existing incentives to serve overseas.
Question #80. Please explain what Overseas Comparability Pay is,
and what the base salary difference is currently between a diplomat
serving in Washington and a diplomat serving overseas.
Answer. The State Department has implemented ``overseas
comparability pay'' to address pay inequities that resulted from the
exclusion of U.S. Government employees serving abroad from locality
pay. The current locality pay system for all U.S. Government employees
was implemented in 1994. Locality pay is intended to recognize the
differences in the cost of labor, not the cost of living, in various
cities in the United States where the U.S. Government competes with
private industry to recruit and retain employees. The system excludes
most civilian employees overseas, including members of the Foreign
Service, in effect creating two different basic pay rates: one for
employees assigned domestically and one for those assigned overseas.
The State Department has worked since early 2000 to resolve this
disparity in pay for our Foreign Service employees when stationed
abroad. The Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Pub. Law 111-32)
included a temporary authority to make overseas comparability payments,
up to the locality pay rate for Washington, DC, to Foreign Service
generalists and specialists at grade FS-01 and below who are assigned
overseas. Subsequent appropriations acts have extended the authority
and provided funding to implement the first phase of the Department's
planned three-phase implementation schedule, despite opposition from
Members of Congress who believed that these employees already received
adequate compensation for overseas service through various allowances
and differentials.
Before the introduction of overseas comparability pay in 2009, an
entry- or mid-level Foreign Service employee transferring abroad
experienced a significant cut in basic pay as a result of the exclusion
of these positions from locality pay. For example, a Foreign Service
employee serving in Washington, DC, made more that employees in serving
in many hardship posts. In 2009, the reduction due to the loss of
locality pay was 23.10 percent of base salary. Since 2009, we have
closed the gap between rates of basic pay in Washington, DC, and abroad
by nearly 70 percent. Entry- and mid-level Foreign Service employees
serving in Washington, like most other Federal employees working in
Washington, earn their base salary plus 24.22 percent locality pay.
Their counterparts overseas currently earn base salary plus 16.52
percent comparability pay. The Department has worked to close this gap
in phases, the third and final of which was scheduled to be implemented
this August and would have increased comparability pay to the
Washington, DC, locality pay rate.
The pay disparity does not just result in a short-term reduction in
pay for Foreign Service employees serving abroad; rather, the effects
are long-lasting and compound over the course of an employee's career.
Retirement contributions to the Federal Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) are
based on an employee's basic pay, which includes locality pay. This
means that without overseas comparability pay, Foreign Service
employees who spend large portions of their careers representing and
protecting their country's interests abroad, would receive smaller
employer contributions than their colleagues who remained in
Washington.
Overseas comparability pay is not a pay raise, nor is it an
additional allowance or benefit. It corrects a 17-year-old unintended
inequity in the worldwide Foreign Service pay schedule. Without
overseas comparability pay, the disparity in basic pay between overseas
and domestic assignments would continue to grow once annual locality
adjustments are reinstituted after the current Federal pay freeze, and
would increasingly undermine existing incentives to serve overseas.
Question #81. Explain what that cut would mean to the diplomats
serving in places like Egypt, Libya, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
Answer. Foreign Service employees serving overseas generally
receive certain allowances and differentials that are not part of basic
pay but are intended to offset the higher costs and different and
dangerous living conditions that exist overseas. Before the
implementation of overseas comparability pay, a Foreign Service
employee serving in Washington, DC, made more than employees serving in
many hardship posts. This created a significant financial disincentive
to overseas service--a disincentive not ameliorated, as critics argue,
by existing incentives and allowances. Hardship differential and danger
pay are designed to compensate employees for extraordinarily difficult
living conditions and for the threat of physical harm in specific
circumstances; they are not intended to serve the same purpose as
locality pay. But, for the sake of comparison, even the 25 percent
combined hardship differential allowance and danger pay of posts such
as Egypt would barely surpass Washington, DC's 24.22 percent locality
pay.
While the existing hardship differentials and danger pay for
service in our most difficult overseas posts would remain if overseas
comparability pay is reduced, their value as incentives to overseas
service and compensation for hardships endured would diminish. Most
allowances and differentials provided at overseas posts are calculated
based on an employee's rate of basic pay (including any applicable
comparability pay). Accordingly, if a cut to Foreign Service basic pay
is made, the value of hardship and danger pay differentials in
Afghanistan or Iraq will be significantly diminished from their current
levels, and, as in the case of Egypt, cease to be the incentives they
were designed to be for those undertaking the hardship and risk of
these posts relative to Washington.
Like all of their colleagues serving overseas, our entry- and mid-
level diplomats serving in these arduous assignments would suffer
reductions in their basic pay and in applicable hardship differentials
and danger pay. At a time when we are asking these employees to do more
on the front line to advance our Nation's interests, we would be
damaging their--and their families'--financial well-being.
Question #'s 82-84. On December 16, after a 17-month review, the
Department released the long-awaited Quadrennial Diplomacy and
Development Review (QDDR), which provides a broad assessment of how
State and USAID can become more efficient, accountable, and effective
in a world in which rising powers, growing instability, and
technological transformation create new challenges and opportunities.
It specifically focuses in four areas: (1) Build America's civilian
power by bringing together unique contributions of civilians across the
Federal Government to advance U.S. interests, (2) elevate and transform
development by focusing on results, targeting investments, and
supporting innovation, (3) build civilian capacity to prevent and
respond to crisis and conflict, (4) change the current business model
by seeking efficiencies, planning and budgeting to accomplish our
priorities, and measuring results of U.S. investments.
Can you please describe efforts at the State Department and
USAID to implement the recommendations in the QDDR? Is there a
timeline? What are the next steps in the process?
Answer. Implementing the QDDR's many recommendations, given the
breadth and depth of culture change much of this effort compels, will
be challenging. Elevating the role of civilian power in our national
security efforts and reinvigorating the responsibility and
accountability of State and USAID will require more than just moving
boxes on an organizational chart.
The Department of State and USAID are approaching implementation in
a structured, phased manner, the goal of which is to fully
institutionalize our efforts within the next year. At State, QDDR
working groups identified 19 objectives that we plan to implement.
USAID working groups identified 24, several of which fall under USAID
Forward, an institutional renewal effort which was an early outcome of
the QDDR process. Multiple QDDR objectives share equities between
agencies, so joint consultation and collaboration efforts have and will
continue to take place. I will continue to call on senior officials
from throughout both agencies to lead and deliver these reforms and
results. In January, I convened the first-ever worldwide Chiefs of
Mission Conference in order to specifically target the views and
insights of these CEOs of diplomacy and development.
Question #85. HAITI: The runoff election for the Haitian Presidency
is scheduled to be held on March 20, 2011. Are you confident that the
sweeping allegations of fraud that marred the first round of elections
will not occur for the March runoff?
Answer. Initial assessments suggest that the March 20 elections
took into consideration some of the lessons learned from the November
28 elections and were largely peaceful. While there were limited
problems with voting supplies in a number of polling stations in Port-
au-Prince, most of them appeared to have been corrected in a timely
fashion and hours extended at those locations to accommodate all
voters. There have been allegations of fraud, though fewer than in the
last round, and observer groups and we are still evaluating the extent
of any wrongdoing.
The OAS electoral observation mission believes turnout may have
been slightly higher than November 28.
Haiti's Provisional Electoral Council (CEP), with assistance from
major electoral donors including the United States, implemented a
series of measures to tackle some of the major problems encountered
during the first round. These included improving the accuracy of the
voter lists, expanding voter outreach activities and services to ensure
that voters know ``where'' and ``how'' to vote, dismissing poll workers
implicated in malfeasance during the first round, and implementing a
number of the Organization of American State (OAS) recommendations
regarding streamlining and institutionalizing processes in the vote
tabulation center (CTV).
For its part, the USG focused its on-the-ground capacity on
minimizing voter disenfranchisement by supporting activities which
helped voters locate their names on voter lists, and find their polling
stations; improved organization and transparency at the polling
stations with the aim of increasing the credibility of the electoral
results; and promoted transparency and credibility of the tabulation
process. Some of our specific areas of support included the expansion
and the launch of the CEP call center, and support for a UNDP and CEP
led ``SMS push'' to send texts to thousands of voters via their cell
phones inviting them to text back their ID card numbers, free of
charge, to receive their polling station location information. These
efforts yielded positive results as reflected by the success of the CEP
call center, which fielded over 247,000 calls between its February 21
launch and March 18, and the fact that over 1 million voters, out of an
estimated 4 million total, received their voting center information
thanks to the SMS messaging campaign. As a result of these efforts,
observers noted much less confusion over the location of polling places
compared to the first round.
Question #86. What impact might the election of either Manigat or
Martelly have on relations with the United States and on reconstruction
and humanitarian assistance efforts?
Answer. The United States looks forward to a timely, peaceful
transition from one democratically elected President of Haiti to the
next. We are confident that both Madame Manigat and Mr. Martelly will
want to continue Haiti's solid partnership with the United States in
post-earthquake recovery efforts. A government that enjoys public
support and legitimacy will be crucial in order to make the difficult
decisions necessary for Haiti's reconstruction.
Question #87. Is it fair to hope that the pace of reconstruction
programs will pick up?
Answer. As President Obama has made clear, the United States
commitment to Haiti will be sustained. We and our international
partners have made progress, and will make more. It often takes 18
months or more for a foreign assistance to hit its stride, particularly
in an environment with as many challenges as Haiti faces.
We know progress in Haiti's recovery is not always obvious, and we
understand people's frustration, but it is nevertheless there. Thanks
in part to efforts of the United States, the Haitian Government led a
proactive preparation and response to Hurricane Tomas, and the Ministry
of Public Health, including its National Laboratory, identified cholera
as soon as it appeared and since then has been coordinating the
international response to the outbreak. We have employed over 350,000
people through temporary employment programs, which have injected
needed cash into the economy. Our agricultural programs have increased
crop yields by up to 75 percent among participants. For several months
after the earthquake, the U.S. Government, working with the U.N. World
Food Programme and other partners, provided food for over 4 million
people--the largest emergency urban food distribution in history--and
continue to provide 1.9 million Haitians with targeted food assistance.
The U.S. Government and international partners provided basic
shelter materials to 1.5 million people before the start of the rainy
season in May. Since the earthquake, the U.S. Government has supported
the immunization of more than 1 million Haitians against highly
communicable disease including polio and diphtheria.
The unprecedented collaboration between governments, multilateral
organizations, and the private sector to marry development dollars and
private investment to create permanent jobs likewise takes place out of
the spotlight. The Department of State signed two Memoranda of
Understanding with the Government of Haiti, the Inter-American
Development Bank and two of the world's largest garment manufacturers
from Korea. These MOUs laid the groundwork for an industrial park that
will provide tens of thousands of permanent jobs, permanent housing for
thousands of Haitians, and a significant economic bump for the nation.
There is still much to do. The best chance Haitians have of
transforming their country and embarking on a path toward economic
opportunity is now. To support this path, we are planning and
implementing our assistance in such a way that it empowers the
Government of Haiti and strengthens its core institutions of
governance, while ensuring accountability to the Haitian people. One of
our most valuable assets in this effort will be a democratically
elected government that enjoys public confidence and can therefore make
difficult decisions. As that next government gains experience, the pace
of Haiti's recovery should increase.
Question #'s 88-90. Global Security Contingency Fund.--For fiscal
year 2012, the administration is proposing a ``Global Security
Contingency Fund'' that would provide very broad authority for the
Departments of State and Defense to pool up to $500 million per year to
train and equip foreign military, internal security, and--in some
cases--law enforcement forces.
Can you cite specific examples from your time as Secretary
where the United States missed an opportunity to shape events
in a particular crisis because it did not have the authority
you are proposing?
Answer. There have been several occasions in the past when this
fund would have been useful. For example, in Yemen, counterterrorism
(CT) responsibility lies with multiple organizations including some
that do not report to the Ministry of Defense (MOD). To be effective,
assistance programs must also target these non-MOD civilian security
providers as well, not just the military. State accounts like FMF could
accomplish this but did not have sufficient funding. DOD's 1206 account
had sufficient funding, but lacked the authority to provide assistance
to non-MOD CT forces in Yemen. Consequently, the administration had to
seek a new authority for DOD to provide assistance to non-MOD CT forces
in Yemen, thereby delaying the provision of assistance. The Global
Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) would have allowed us both to engage
earlier and to avoid seeking additional niche assistance authorities.
We envision specific uses of the GSCF in the future will vary
depending on the emergent threat or opportunity and operating
environment. Current events in the Middle East suggest increased
flexibility and agility in U.S. Government responses within the budget
cycle will certainly be necessary to respond to rapidly changing
circumstances in regions critical to U.S. interests. We believe that
the GSCF would enable the U.S. Government to respond more rapidly and
more comprehensively to emergent requirements through programs that
provide assistance to both security forces and the governmental bodies
responsible for such forces. We envision that such assistance would
often include instruction on accountability, human rights, and resource
management to help develop responsible security forces.
Many times last year during the New START debate we used
that old phrase from nuclear arms control, ``trust but
verify.'' If Congress trusts the executive branch with this
flexible authority to equip foreign military and internal
security forces, how should we go about verifying that this and
future administrations will use this authority effectively and
will at the same time uphold other key values and principles,
such as human rights, controls over sensitive military
technologies, and preventing a destabilizing proliferation of
small arms and light weapons?
Answer. We will continue to collaborate with Congress as this fund
is established and put to use. In a manner similar to that of the
Complex Crisis Fund, we expect to conduct regular consultations with
Congress on the use of the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF). We
will report to Congress on the use of GSCF funds on a quarterly basis
so that you can indeed verify that our use of the authority provided in
the GSCF is both prudent and effective. We have drafted this initiative
as a pilot program in order for both the administration and Congress to
evaluate its use and confirm its utility before extending the duration
of the authority. We believe these steps are in keeping with a ``trust
but verify'' approach.
Why do you see a need to insulate this proposed account from
limits on support to gross violators of human rights, state
sponsors of terrorism, or military coups that overthrow duly
elected governments?
Answer. The Global Security Contingency Fund is not being
insulated. We are requesting, as we do for all funds related to crises,
urgent circumstances, or emergent needs, special flexible authority
(e.g., ``notwithstanding'' authority). Such flexibility does not mean
that the fund would be isolated from existing limits; rather, it
provides us the ability to overcome such limits should the need arise.
Question #91. Separate from this pooled resources proposal, what
other steps are the Departments of State and Defense taking to improve
their ability to work together in response to complex security
situations?
Answer. A strong partnership between the State Department and the
Department of Defense (DOD) is critical to address the serious
international challenges that the United States faces today. Whether it
is referred to as Smart Power, the three-legged stool of diplomacy,
development, and defense (3D), or simply interagency collaboration, the
goal is the same: to fully use the talents of all our people and our
resources in the most effective and efficient way possible in pursuing
U.S. national interests.
When most people think of State and DOD coordination, they focus on
what occurs in Washington, but it is also important to appreciate what
has long been the case outside the Beltway, in the field. Country Teams
at each of our embassies reflect close, productive State-DOD
collaboration. Interagency cooperation takes place very effectively
under the leadership of our Chiefs of Mission around the globe.
Our partnership with the Department of Defense spans the full
spectrum of regional and functional diplomacy at the Department of
State. On a daily basis State and DOD collaborate on issues ranging
from global defense posture to energy security and from partner
capacity-building to countering weapons of mass destruction.
Counterterrorism, counterpiracy, counternarcotics, counterproliferation
and countertrafficking are just some of the areas where we work
together to address threats to our national interests. Our
collaboration and cooperation occurs daily and crosses the full
spectrum of activities from contingency planning to humanitarian
relief, and from coordinating strategic, diplomatic messages to
evacuating our citizens in danger overseas. In the broad area of
foreign policy in the security sector, it is impossible to find an
instance where State-DOD dialogue is not occurring.
Our partnerships with DOD's Combatant Commands (COCOMs) are a key
component of a seamless, whole-of-government approach to national
security. We partner with COCOMs to achieve the peaceful resolution of
conflict, promote democracy and good governance, and address
transnational challenges worldwide. We work diligently to provide State
Department personnel to all COCOMs. We have COCOM personnel working
inside U.S. embassies and State Department employees working at COCOM
headquarters to coordinate programs and improve partner nations'
security capacity. We detail personnel to those commands through a
robust and growing State-Defense exchange program and through our
Foreign Policy Advisor (POLAD) program so commanders can be better
informed by foreign policy as they pursue military or civilian-military
activities, often in support of State-led activities. The commanders of
U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Africa Command, and U.S. European Command
have gone so far as to empower three Ambassadors as Deputies to the
Commander, giving them unprecedented oversight responsibilities. U.S.
Southern Command tells us that having our POLAD serve as a civilian
Deputy to the Commander helped them coordinate a fast and effective
response to the heartbreaking earthquake in Haiti.
Back at the State Department our Bureaus benefit from having
military advisors on our staff and we coordinate with DOD in a number
of ways, not least of which is State participation in DOD planning here
in Washington--a means to ensure DOD plans, force posture, and
operations are fully informed by foreign policy considerations.
True interagency coordination cannot be realized if two of the legs
in the 3-D stool are perennially short and unstable. We have had no
greater champion than Secretary Gates in stressing the need for this
balance and support, especially when thinking about efficiency and
long-term effectiveness. Given the range of dynamic national security
challenges facing our country and the budget constraints we all face,
there is no alternative for the State Department and the Defense
Department, but to continually work to improve interagency coordination
every day and at every level. We owe the American people--and our
talented, hard-working, and dedicated professionals, whether soldiers,
diplomats, or development experts--nothing less.
Question #92. When you visited Ecuador last year, you stressed the
Andean countries' political progress and economic growth, much of which
was enabled by ATPDEA. The program expired on February 12. Do you
support a renewal of ATPDEA, and do you agree that a longer extension
would better support U.S. foreign policy priorities than a short one?
Answer. We urge the Congress to reauthorize the Andean Trade
Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA), as well as the Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP), at the earliest opportunity, and for the
longest period possible. These programs support U.S. jobs, promote
economic development overseas, and provide greater certainty for
American businesses and investors. The lapse in GSP and ATPDEA
authorization has already cost U.S. businesses millions of dollars in
additional import duties, has increased costs to American manufacturers
and consumers, and has undercut efforts by Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador
to grow their economies and fight poverty. If the programs are not
reauthorized soon, many U.S. importers may be forced to find other
sources for their GSP and ATPDEA imports, raising costs for all, and
undermining the development objectives of the programs. Failure to
renew the ATPDEA program has already adversely affected a number of
Ecuadorian exporters through lost sales and damaged business
relationships as U.S. importers have sought alternate suppliers.
Ecuador is a significant transit country for cocaine and heroin
with a final destination in the United States. Counternarcotics
cooperation with Ecuador in recent years has led to numerous multi-ton
interdictions and other successes, such as the seizure of the world's
first fully submersible submarine used for drug trafficking. Losing
ATPDEA could potentially reduce the Government of Ecuador's willingness
to cooperate with the United States on counternarcotics.
Question #93. Peru has an FTA, and the administration has declared
a commitment to secure an FTA for Colombia. Looking down the road, what
are the implications of those FTAs for Ecuador and others in the region
that do not have FTAs with the United States?
Answer. The administration is committed to working with our
partners around the world and in the region to foster a trade-based
prosperity that is more widely shared. Increased trade holds the
promise of boosting economic development and improving lives in poor
and developing countries around the world. The Andean Trade Promotion
and Drug Enforcement Act (ATPDEA) would give Ecuador limited
preferential access to the U.S. market and is therefore vital to
Ecuador's ability to remain competitive in the U.S. market, as the
United States trade promotion agreement with Peru and our pending
agreement with Colombia give those countries much broader opportunities
for growth and development. Failure to renew and extend ATPDEA has put
in jeopardy the economic development efforts of Colombia and Ecuador,
and has negatively affected U.S. businesses and consumers. Therefore,
we urge Congress to reauthorize ATPDEA, as well as the Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP), at the earliest opportunity, and for the
longest period possible.
Question #94. In the absence of ATPDEA, what other mechanisms of
trade engagement is the administration considering?
Answer. The United States continues to engage Ecuador on trade
matters through the U.S.-Ecuador Bilateral Dialogue. This dialogue
covers a range of topics of common interest under four broad themes--
security, migration, trade, and issues involving investments,
cooperation, and technical assistance. The range of issues highlights
the depth and breadth of bilateral relations between the United States
and Ecuador. A more focused discussion of trade issues is also
conducted within the U.S.-Ecuador Trade and Investment Council process
managed by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. The next
Bilateral Dialogue and Trade and Investment Council meetings are
presently scheduled for June 2011 in Quito.
Question #95. What will the money be spent on?
Answer. The focus of our assistance programs in Cuba remains on
providing humanitarian assistance to political prisoners and their
families, strengthening Cuban civil society and encouraging civic
participation, and promoting fundamental freedoms and basic human
rights, including free expression.
We continue to stress the importance of access to information and
the free circulation of information to, from, and within the island. To
improve human rights conditions on the island, our programs will
increase the capacity and professionalism of civil society groups to
monitor and document human rights abuses. Programs also provide for
dissemination of information about market economies. All such programs
will be designed to reach a broad range of Cuban society.
Question #96. What lessons have been learned from the case of USAID
contractor Alan Gross?
Answer. As you know, program implementation in Cuba presents unique
challenges. After the detention of Mr. Gross, USAID and Department of
State developed and formalized guidelines designed to improve
implementation of the programs. In addition, collaboration between U.S.
foreign assistance agencies has also substantively improved,
particularly in terms of communication about grantee relationships and
information-sharing. We are confident that these programs are receiving
proper oversight and are meeting their key objective of supporting the
Cuban people's desire to freely determine their own future.
Question #97. Kyrgyzstan has experienced tremendous upheaval over
the past year. Following the ouster of President Kurmanbek Bakiyev last
April, violence erupted between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities.
Over 400,000 people were displaced from their homes, many of whom took
refuge in neighboring Uzbekistan, and more than 400 were killed. The
situation has stabilized but remains precarious.
What is the status of plans to assist with reconciliation
efforts in Kyrgyzstan?
Answer. The United States is working with the people of the Kyrgyz
Republic through a broad spectrum of engagement and assistance
programming to build democracy and promote peace and reconciliation.
Following the June 2010 violence, the United States directed
significant emergency resources to address humanitarian needs and begin
the process of reconciliation. Shortly after the conflict, USAID's
Office of Transition Initiatives began a $20 million community-level
stabilization project which is working to relieve tension between
ethnic communities through local-level economic development. In
addition, $15.88 million of Section 1207 FY 2010 funding will be used
to address underlying causes of instability, support local sources of
resilience, and develop the capabilities of Kyrgyz security and
governance institutions in southern Kyrgyzstan to respond accountably
and effectively to conflict. Two million dollars in DRL funding for
FY09 and FY10 are targeted to increase discussion of human rights
issues and ease access to independent sources of information.
Many portions of the funding requested for FY 2012 will assist in
the reconciliation process, including approximately $2 million for a
USAID Youth Empowerment Program aimed at reducing the potential for
conflict and addressing reconciliation and a significant portion of the
expected $750,000 budget for Embassy-sponsored small grants. In
addition, $3.8 million will be used to facilitate reform of security
forces including the goals of improving police respect for human
rights, and greater representation of ethnic minorities in police
forces. The USG will also use $2.2 million to support reform and
training for prosecutors and judges to improve professionalism and
reduce the occurrence of ethnically motivated prosecutions. Programs
focused on the educational sector will use $2.3 million to ensure
universal access to primary and secondary education for children in
conflict affected areas of southern Kyrgyzstan. In addition, the $10.6
million food security and agricultural improvement project will include
activities focused on conflict affected areas to ensure equitable
access to water for irrigation and agribusiness partnerships between
Uzbeks and Kyrgyz to increase farmer incomes in all communities.
Question #98. Kyrgyzstan has experienced tremendous upheaval over
the past year. Following the ouster of President Kurmanbek Bakiyev last
April, violence erupted between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities.
Over 400,000 people were displaced from their homes, many of whom took
refuge in neighboring Uzbekistan, and more than 400 were killed. The
situation has stabilized but remains precarious.
In particular, what measures are we considering to bolster
economic cooperation between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbek
communities?
Answer. Shortly after the June 2010 violence, the United States
directed emergency resources to initiate the process of reconciliation
and facilitate economic recovery in the most violence-prone areas of
southern Kyrgyzstan. USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI)
established a $20 million community-level stabilization project known
as the Kyrgyzstan Confidence Building Initiative , which seeks to
relieve tension between ethnic communities through local-level economic
development. This effort provides small grants to civil society, local
government, and private sector partners to facilitate reconciliation
and stability. The project supports community-defined, high-impact,
short-term activities in volatile communities to enhance public
services, engage youth and other potentially restive populations, and
provide an injection of income and employment into marginalized
communities. To date, the OTI has completed or initiated a total of 103
activities totaling $5.5 million.
One focus of the program is to build or emphasize economic links
between Kyrgyz and Uzbek businesses to increase connections between the
two communities. Recent projects have helped to mitigate conflict
through increased access to irrigation water in Tashbulak; engaged at-
risk youth during the April 2010 anniversary; brought together Kyrgyz
and Uzbek entrepreneurs and government representatives for a 2-day
economic recovery roundtable in Osh; improved street lights to restore
citizens' confidence in Jalalabad city; and built community cohesion by
rehabilitating Osh's Kelechek Youth Center.
Question #99. On February 8, 2011, the United States and Kyrgyzstan
signed an amendment to the Manas Transit Center's (MTC) leasing
agreement that will allow a Kyrgyz state-owned enterprise, the Manas
Refueling Complex, to supply up to 50 percent of the fuel consumed at
MTC. Can you update the committee on these negotiations and the steps
the United States is taking to encourage the Kyrgyz Government to
handle fuel payments in a transparent and accountable manner?
Answer. The agreement signed on February 8, 2011, is a new
bilateral agreement which will allow the United States to contract with
a Kyrgyz Government-designated entity or entities to supply a portion
of the fuel requirements of the Manas Transit Center (MTC). The
February 2011 agreement awaits ratification by Kyrgyzstan's Parliament
and has not yet entered into force. The Defense Logistics Agency
altered the most recent fuel solicitation, which was awarded
competitively in November 2010, to allow for a second organization to
supply 20-50 percent of the fuel requirement.
A Defense Logistics Agency team recently traveled to Bishkek to
advise Kyrgyzstani officials on how to meet technical requirements for
fuel supply to the Transit Center. After the agreement enters into
force, we will expeditiously seek to conclude a commercial contract
with a Kyrgyz Government-designated entity to supply fuel.
The United States is working with the Government of Kyrgyzstan to
provide maximum transparency in all aspects of the bilateral
relationship with special emphasis on fuel contracts for the Manas
Transit Center. The United States has published details of the impact
of the MTC on the Kyrgyz economy, including all quarterly access
payments made to the Government of Kyrgyzstan since fiscal year 2008 on
the MTC and U.S. Embassy Web sites. Similarly, both the U.S. Embassy
and MTC Web sites now publish current data on the volume, price,
quantity, and vendor for fuel shipments to the MTC. The United States
also encourages the Government of Kyrgyzstan to publish detailed data
on its budget and budget adoption process to give citizens of
Kyrgyzstan a better understanding of their country's fiscal situation.
These and other enhanced transparency measures are an essential first
step toward eliminating public corruption and waste. The United States
has encouraged the Government of Kyrgyzstan for its initial steps and
will continue to look for other opportunities to promote transparency
in our relations.
Question #100. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
estimates that the extent of drug trafficking in Central Asia is
``significantly higher than the volume seized and increasing
annually.'' Could you highlight for the committee what steps are being
taken to reverse these trends?
Answer. We have also noted with concern that seizure rates in
Central Asia are not very high considering the extent of the traffic
through that region. There have been increases in some countries but
they have been offset by decreases in others. In particular, the change
in government and subsequent interethnic violence in southern
Kyrgyzstan, the locus of most trafficking in that country, has had a
serious negative impact on seizure rates. However, while seizures are
important, they are only one tool toward addressing the problem of
narcotics trafficking. Even in developed countries, including the
United States, only a small portion of illicitly trafficked drugs are
seized. More effective is targeting and breaking up the organized
criminal rings that oversee the trafficking. We therefore work to
promote intelligence collection and sharing, and counternarcotics
vetted units in our assistance to governments in the region. The aim is
to use intelligence collection and analysis, and effective
investigative teams, including police, prosecutors and judges, to
target organized traffickers, seizing and confiscating their assets and
bringing them to justice. We will further our goals by employing
lessons learned and successful strategies from our counternarcotics
program in Afghanistan, and will work with international institutions
including the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime and the Central Asian
Regional Information and Coordination Center. In addition to promoting
the development of counternarcotics intelligence-sharing and vetted
units, we also work to build the political will of governments to
support such activities.
Question #101. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
estimates that the extent of drug trafficking in Central Asia is
``significantly higher than the volume seized and increasing annually.
How do we translate the Paris Pact Initiative into
sustainable action on the ground?
Answer. Under the Paris Pact umbrella, the U.N. Office on Drugs and
Crime (UNODC) operates three major tools for participants: a 56-member
consultative mechanism to define regional policy priorities and develop
expert-level recommendations for combating the drug trade; an online
database, called the Automated Donor Assistance Mechanism (ADAM),
through which U.N. Member States and other international organizations
exchange information on bilateral and multilateral capacity-building
programs; and a network of research analysts that work with major
transit and destination countries to improve data collection and
information-sharing on the drug trade.
Since 2003, the Paris Pact has helped consolidate regional
political agreement regarding the primary causes and effects of the
Afghan drug trade, and has guided donor support to Afghanistan and
other countries affected by Afghan narcotics. Over the past 2 years,
the United States has worked with the UNODC Secretariat and other Paris
Pact members to focus expert-level working groups on emerging, critical
issues that can only be addressed via a regional response. Several
examples include combating the diversion of heroin precursor chemicals
from neighboring states into Afghanistan; examining the domestic and
international legal framework for engaging in controlled deliveries
between Afghanistan and its neighbors; and recommending improvements to
joint cross-border law enforcement operations in the region.
The United States continues to view the Paris Pact as a mechanism
to bridge political differences surrounding the Afghan drug trade and
to engage in collaborative responses to this transnational challenge.
Based on guidance and feedback from Paris Pact members in 2008, UNODC
produced a series of thematic strategy papers--on precursor chemical
control, border management, illicit crop eradication, drug demand
reduction, and other relevant issues--called the Rainbow Strategy,
which generally form the basis for UNODC-led programmatic responses to
the Afghan drug trade today. While not all of these papers have been
implemented as originally envisioned, concrete examples of progress to
date include three iterations of a regional law enforcement operation
to seize heroin precursor chemicals under the Targeted Anti-Trafficking
Regional Communication, Expertise and Training (TARCET) initiative; the
development of a highly successful Container Control Program to
strengthen law enforcement capacity at major commercial ports in
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia; and the establishment of the
innovative Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Center
(CARICC), an intelligence hub that promotes information-sharing and
joint operations between Central Asian law enforcement and drug control
agencies. The Paris Pact has also supported the Triangular Initiative's
efforts to build political will and technical capacity for Iran,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan to engage in cross-border counternarcotics
activities to combat the estimated 255 Metric Tons of opiates that exit
Afghanistan via Pakistan and Iran.
On March 17, the Paris Pact's Policy Consultative Group approved a
proposal by the Russian Federation for UNODC to host a Third
Ministerial Meeting of the Paris Pact in late 2011. The United States
joined consensus during these deliberations, and on March 25,
cosponsored a resolution at the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs
endorsing the Paris Pact's decision to convene Foreign Ministers.
Question #102. Given the complicated relationship with Pakistan,
alternate supply routes into Afghanistan are critical to our national
security interests. How are we balancing the need for reliable access
to such routes with our responsibility to protect the fundamental
rights and freedoms of the people of Central Asia and of Uzbekistan in
particular?
Answer. We highly value the contributions that Central Asian
countries have made toward our goals in Afghanistan, including
providing critical transit routes for non-lethal cargo and
reconstruction efforts. At the same time, we continue to urge the
governments in the region to create more space for freedom of the
press, civil society, freedom of religion, and independent political
parties. In 2009, the United States began holding annual bilateral
consultations (ABCs) with each of the Central Asian countries to
broaden and deepen our cooperation across the full range of bilateral
issues, including in the areas of security and human rights. Senior
representatives from the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor
and the Helsinki Commission participated in the February 17-18 ABCs in
Tashkent . The United States has also spoken out on human rights issues
in multilateral fora such as the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe. Senior U.S. Government visitors to the region
make it a point to meet with representatives from civil society and the
independent media and also have frequent wide-ranging and detailed
discussions on human rights with the senior Central Asian government
leaders.
In addition to meetings and consultations, the State Department
issues annual reports on human rights, religious freedom, and
trafficking in persons that identify shortcomings and note progress.
U.S. assistance programs in the region include significant support for
democracy, rule of law, antitrafficking, and human rights along with
strengthening border controls and security cooperation. In the case of
Uzbekistan, the United States is pursuing cooperation through
independent NGOs and the government to realize President Karimov's
stated desire, expressed in his November 2010 speech, to strengthen
civil society, the media, and the rule of law in Uzbekistan.
Question #103. According to Reporters without Borders' 2010 Press
Freedom Index, the countries of Central Asia have seen a net decline in
press freedom over the past year. Do you agree with their conclusions?
Answer. Yes. In recent years, the general trend across Central Asia
has seen media freedom increasingly restricted, though there have been
limited exceptions, such as in Kyrgyzstan.
A free media is a vital cornerstone of modern democratic society, a
benchmark for respect of freedom of expression, including the reporting
of news and competing views on policy options. Free and independent
media enables consumers of news to know their rights, to be informed,
and thus to be able to effectively exercise their rights. Wherever
independent media are under threat, accountable governance and human
freedom tend to be undermined.
For the last 35 years, the United States has produced the ``Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices,'' providing the most comprehensive
record available of the condition of human rights around the world.
Each country-specific report includes a robust section on freedom of
speech, including for the press and on the Internet. For the most
detailed assessment of these freedoms, I encourage you to consult the
forthcoming 2010 Country Reports.
Question #104. What steps can we take to reverse the negative trend
lines? [Of press freedom as reported by Reporters without Borders' 2010
Press Freedom Index]
Answer. One mechanism we use to strengthen our engagement and to
promote dialogue on human rights such as freedom of expression and
independent media is the Annual Bilateral Consultations (ABCs) that we
instituted in 2009 with each Central Asian country. Each ABC consists
of a face-to-face structured dialogue between our governments, led on
the U.S. side by Assistant Secretary Blake and including senior
representatives from the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor
and other Department of State bureaus as well as other government
departments.
The United States has repeatedly urged the repeal of laws
criminalizing defamation and other expressions of opinion in
multilateral fora such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe as well as in the ABCs and other bilateral venues. We appeal
to the governments not to apply excessive civil penalties or criminal
statutes that cripple media outlets, threaten journalists directly and
limit freedom of speech indirectly through self-censorship.
In addition to government-to-government interactions, our embassies
regularly engage with nongovernmental organizations, civil society, and
media outlets to discuss human rights concerns.
Through a variety of public diplomacy and foreign assistance
programming, the United States provides funding and programming to help
reverse these negative trends in media freedom. Specifically, we
provide opportunities for foreign journalists and aspiring journalists
to undertake formal and informal study in the United States; arrange
dialogues between U.S. media experts and foreign journalists--both in
person and through the Internet; provide capacity-building training for
journalists, bloggers, and human rights advocates; and support numerous
NGOs dedicated to the advancement of human rights and democratic values
though small grants.
We view our assistance funding to the region as a critical tool in
accomplishing our policy goals.
At the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),
the United States is one of the leading voices on behalf of media
freedom, and works closely with the OSCE Representative on Freedom of
the Media, Ms. Dunja Mijatovic. At the OSCE Permanent Council, we
frequently raise cases of states that have failed to implement their
media freedom commitments fully, especially in Central Asia. We also
fund two annual conferences hosted by the OSCE Representative on
Freedom of the Media, including one in Central Asia.
Question #105. Please provide the committee with the latest
interagency strategy on Central Asia.
Answer. Since the early 1990s, the primary U.S. policy goal in
Central Asia has been to ensure that the countries remain sovereign and
independent, and help them develop toward stable, market-oriented
democracies. The events of September 11, 2001, made clear our common
security concerns and led to a significant broadening of the
relationship. We also believe that developing a more substantive,
consistent relationship with these countries in areas of mutual
interest will open room for progress on democracy and human rights.
Our Central Asia strategy includes integrated priorities: we seek
to expand cooperation with the Central Asian states to support efforts
in Afghanistan; we seek to promote development and diversification of
the region's energy resources; we encourage greater political
liberalization and respect for human rights; we aim to help develop
competitive market economies and promote economic reforms; and we seek
to address problems of poverty and food security. These issues are
interconnected, and progress in one area can help reinforce progress in
another area.
Last fall the National Security Council initiated an interagency
review of U.S. strategy in Central Asia which is ongoing but we believe
the basic priorities of our approach are sound.
Question #106. During the hearing, you noted the progress made by
other nations, such as China, in expanding their government-sponsored
international broadcast activities. As these broadcasters expand their
reach to U.S. audiences, it is still the case that China and other
closed societies severely limit the ability of U.S. international
broadcasting to report on and broadcast to these markets. For example:
China jams BBG radio and Web content; limits the number of visas it
will provide to BBG reporters to work in and report on China; and does
not allow U.S.-sponsored programming to be broadcast on local media,
cable networks, and the Internet.
In the meantime, reporters from Chinese and other national
broadcasters have free and open access to travel in the United States,
can be posted to the United States on long-term assignment, and report
freely on the news without personal threats or harassment.
How we can expect to expand our reach if we don't make this
a more prominent point in our bilateral discussions?
Answer. The State Department shares your concern about the
obstacles we face in communicating directly with the Chinese people. We
frequently raise the issue with the Chinese--with their Embassy here
and at various high-level meetings. Given the heavy censorship of the
print and broadcast media, both the Department and BBG are increasingly
taking advantage of the Internet to expand outreach to the Chinese
public. The proposed Internet strategy for VOA would focus resources on
the media most used by audiences in China, provide a more cost-
effective approach, and position U.S. broadcast efforts for the future.
There has been a sharp decline in shortwave listenership in China. In
contrast, the use of the Internet and mobile technology is increasing
rapidly. China has the highest number of Internet users in the world.
Despite blocking by the Chinese Government, many Chinese access BBG
content through proxy servers. VOA will continue to produce audio and
video programs which will be distributed on Web and mobile systems.
Radio Free Asia will continue to broadcast to China via shortwave,
giving RFA access to transmissions during peak listening hours and
effective frequencies that were previously utilized by VOA. In
addition, we will continue to advocate with the Chinese for the
granting of more visas for BBG journalists to work in China.
In addition, our mission in China increasingly focuses on Chinese
portals and bloggers so as to reach broader and younger audiences. Due
to a constant need for new content, Chinese Internet portals are very
receptive to U.S. proposals for cooperation. These projects, including
Web chats and blog hosting, cover topics including visas, U.S.
elections, trade and the environment, and regularly generate over half
a million page views each. President Obama's 2009 townhall with
students in Shanghai generated more than 50 million hits. Active State
Department Twitterfeeds target diverse audiences with content tailored
to the interests of followers. Currently, the U.S. mission in China is
piloting three new cell phone applications. Meanwhile, the Department
continues to strongly advocate for Internet freedom in China.
We do not believe limiting access by Chinese journalists to our
country would serve our goals. The more Chinese journalists report from
American soil, the more likely it is that important details of U.S.
values and society will reach Chinese audiences. The open and
democratic nature of the U.S. system does not lend itself to
restricting access to Chinese journalists in the same fashion that is
unfortunately imposed on U.S. and other foreign journalists in China.
Question #107. During your rollout of the 2009 ``Trafficking in
Persons Report,'' you emphasized the need to build effective
partnerships in the fight against human trafficking. The role of
diplomacy, early and often, is vital in building such bridges.
a. How have you been using diplomacy to create partnerships
with Tier 3, Tier 2 Watch List, and Tier 2 countries in the
common fight against human trafficking?
Answer. While the report is an occasion for publicity, analysis,
and engagement, the real action in the fight against modern slavery
takes place throughout the year, too often unpublished and unseen,
through the ongoing efforts of U.S. diplomats in Washington and in our
embassies around the world. Our staff works daily in partnership with
foreign governments and nongovernmental organizations to fight this
heinous crime. U.S. diplomatic and programmatic achievements have
included the passage of comprehensive antitrafficking laws, the
establishment of shelters for victims, increased conviction rates, and
support for antidemand efforts, especially for commercial sex. We are
marshalling the resources of the entire State Department to tackle the
issue of human trafficking worldwide and to embed it within our foreign
policy. We realize that these achievements are not our own, but are
created and brought to fruition with our foreign government partners.
The fourth ``P'' of partnership in the fight against trafficking
informs all of our work either in coordination with other federal
agencies, the private sector, academic institutions, or NGOs. G/TIP
actively works to create public/private partnerships in order to expand
and share its unique expertise on human trafficking, leverage finite
government resources, and advance new approaches to solving
trafficking-related challenges. In 2010, we collaborated with UC
Berkeley School of Law to assess promising government practices in
prevention and protection. With the State Department's Senior Advisor
for Innovation, we coordinated with the University of Southern
California Annenberg School's Center on Communication Leadership &
Policy, on a Human Trafficking and Technology seminar. We worked with
the International Business Leaders Forum and the hospitality industry
to offer life skills and employment training for human trafficking
survivors; with federal agencies, NGOs, academics, and business in the
development of a stronger set of standard practices to ensure that
agricultural goods imported into the United States are not made with
slave labor; and with the United Nations and the private sector on
groundbreaking guidelines for corporate social accountability and human
trafficking.
Additionally, a message that we carry around the world is that law
enforcement and NGOs, governments and civil society, and public and
private sectors, must work together in partnership to achieve true
antitrafficking accomplishments in the areas of prevention,
prosecution, and protection. While we target our technical assistance
and programming efforts primarily at Tier 2 Watch List and Tier 3
countries, this messaging is embedded in the message we share with
every country that we engage--Tier 1 through Tier 3.
b. Is the FY 2012 request of $20.8 million for the Office to
Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons sufficient to fulfill
the partnership mandate you have given it?
Answer. Currently, our partnerships are largely developed through
the convening and engagement of potential partners. Some of these
partnerships do not require specific funding beyond staff to
accomplish. We routinely provide advice, comments, and our expertise to
civil society partners as they develop antitrafficking initiatives; in
this way, we leverage our subject-matter expertise and further their
programs because they compliment and support our targeted goals. Right
now, we are partnering with the NGO and business community to promote
and encourage the adoption of some corporate social accountability
guidelines on human trafficking. In other partnerships, the Office has
relied on the partners to provide the financial support for the
particular project. A good example of this was the development of a
partnership forged by the Office, USAID, NetHope, and the Demi and
Ashton Foundation to find technological solutions to trafficking in
Russia; the Office was unable to contribute financially to this effort,
yet staff helped to ably guide and shape the content of the project.
There are certainly other partnerships that the Office could undertake
or even augment with the availability of matching funds to contribute.
Partnerships also figure prominently as we work to ensure that the
antitrafficking funds we administer are used most effectively. Through
our competitive grant programs we support scores of projects each year
in which we partner with U.S.-based NGOs, public international
organizations and foreign NGOs to build the capacity of government
institutions and civil society and develop or expand critical services
for victims of trafficking.
c. To live up to the ``partnership'' approach, the State
Department through the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking
in Persons (G/TIP) must be able to respond to unforeseen urgent
requests by governments, particularly those in Tier 2 Watch
List, for assistance to protect and assist victims of human
trafficking. I believe that through such assistance, we can
help governments build expertise, gain ownership of the issue,
and credibly graduate from Tier 2 Watch List. Does your 2012
budget foresee some element of ``urgent'' assistance capability
and funds for G/TIP to offer assistance in such situations?
Answer. The ability to respond quickly to provide technical
assistance or training when foreign governments request it and to
respond to emergency assistance needs of trafficking victims when no
other source of assistance is available are both critical as we work to
advance antitrafficking goals worldwide. Although the 2012 budget does
not include specific funding for these two ``urgent'' response
capabilities, our office has established mechanisms for such endeavors
within the limited funding of the budget request.
If there were additional funding available to the office we
anticipate that we would expand these initiatives to include the
formation of a dedicated training and technical assistance team. This
multidisciplinary team would be comprised of subject-matter experts
(investigation, prosecution, victim assistance) that could develop
trainings and be deployed to train in foreign settings. They could also
deploy short-term countertrafficking professionals already in the
specific country or region to provide targeted, country-specific
assistance. These target training efforts would be available to those
countries ranked on the lower tiers of the annual ``Trafficking in
Persons Report.' The results of these efforts would assist countries in
addressing human trafficking thus raising their tier ranking in the
annual ``Trafficking in Persons Report.''
We would also expand our capacity to swiftly respond to the needs
of victims in situations where no other emergency assistance is
available to meet basic needs such as food, shelter, clothing, and
immediate medical care. While these situations are not frequent, when
they arise they require prompt but deliberate action by professionals
with subject matter and programmatic expertise.
d. Section 203 of the 2008 reauthorization of the
Trafficking Victim Protection Act of 2000, Public Law 110-457,
122 Stat. 5057 (Dec. 23, 2008), set forth requirements for and
limitations on the issuance of A3 and G5 visas, including a
requirement in Section 203(a)(2) that the Secretary of State
suspend issuance of A3 and G5 visas to applicants seeking to
work for officials of a diplomatic mission or an international
organization in certain circumstances. Have you ever determined
that Section 203(a)(2) has been triggered with respect to any
diplomatic mission or international organization?
Answer. The State Department takes very seriously its role in
attempting to prevent the abuse of domestic workers and to address
allegations of abuse, as appropriate. Toward that end, the Department
has created an internal working group consisting of representatives
from the Office of the Chief of Protocol, the Office of the Legal
Adviser, the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, and
the Bureaus of Consular Affairs and Diplomatic Security, as well as
relevant regional bureaus. The working group meets on a periodic basis
to share information, discuss ongoing cases and coordinate Department
strategy to address this issue. The Office of the Chief of Protocol
coordinates this effort and is the central collecting and disseminating
point for information obtained by those offices about allegations of
abuse.
The Department of State has implemented dramatic changes in its
response to trafficking of domestic workers including: prenotification
of application for A3 and G5 visas (to be able to keep track of
domestic workers being employed by foreign missions in the United
States and to facilitate the denial of eligibility for such workers for
diplomatic personnel where there is credible evidence that they have
abused a previous worker); proof of ability to pay prevailing or
minimum wage whichever is higher to be eligible for such workers; a
system that provides objective evidence of salary payments (as salaries
must be paid either by check or direct deposit); and contracts with
specified provisions (kept on file with the visa application) including
the requirement that domestic workers retain possession of their
passports, provided to the worker in a language s/he understands. The
Department has also established a mechanism to facilitate NGO reporting
of allegations to the Office of Protocol.
In the fall of 2009, the Department hosted a briefing along with
Department of Justice experts for the Diplomatic Corps on the
Department regulations regarding employment of domestic workers and the
relevant requirements of the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA). The briefing included
information on section 203 providing that the Secretary of State
``shall suspend, for such period as the Secretary deems necessary, the
issuance of A3 visas or G5 visas to applicants seeking to work for
officials of a diplomatic mission or an international organization, if
the Secretary determines that there is credible evidence that one or
more employees of such mission or international organization have
abused or exploited one or more nonimmigrants holding an A3 visa or a
G5 visa, and that the diplomatic mission or international organization
tolerated such actions.''
The Department has not yet suspended the issuance of A3 or G5 visas
to any diplomatic mission or international organization pursuant to the
TVPRA. In the cases of reported abuse that have come to the
Department's attention since enactment of the TVPRA, the Department has
referenced its obligations under the TVPRA as part of its demarche to
the relevant diplomatic missions and has found that the possibility of
A3 or G5 visa suspension has served as vital leverage that has
encouraged a response to address allegations of abuse or exploitation.
The TVPRA requires that the Secretary herself determine that there is
credible evidence of abuse and credible evidence that the mission
tolerated the abuse. In one case, the threat of visa suspension under
the TVPRA motivated the government at issue to take concrete measures
to demonstrate that it did not tolerate the abuse, which included the
issuance of a formal reprimand of the employee, working with the
diplomat such that he made an offer to provide compensation to the
former domestic worker, and advising its diplomats that abuse of
domestic servants is not tolerated and has consequences.
The Department's internal working group meets regularly to assess
any and all allegations of abuse or exploitation of domestic workers by
diplomatic personnel and to determine appropriate steps to be taken,
including bringing allegations to the attention of the Department of
Justice's Human Trafficking Prosecution Unit, Criminal Section of the
Civil Rights Division; issuance of a diplomatic note to a specific
mission when allegations of abuse of a domestic servant by one of its
employees is brought to the Department's attention; denial of A3 or G5
visas for domestic workers for a diplomat against whom there are
credible allegations of abuse; and, where appropriate, preparing an
action memo for the Secretary recommending suspension of A3 or G5 visas
for a specific mission or organization.
e. If so, please provide the name of the diplomatic mission
or international organization in question.
Answer. The Department has not yet determined that section
203(a)(2) has been triggered with respect to any diplomatic mission or
international organization.
Question #108. Is the FY 2012 request of $20.8 million for the
Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons sufficient to
fulfill the partnership mandate you have given it?
Answer. Currently, our partnerships are largely developed through
the convening and engagement of potential partners. Some of these
partnerships do not require specific funding beyond staff to
accomplish. We routinely provide advice, comments, and our expertise to
civil society partners as they develop antitrafficking initiatives; in
this way, we leverage our subject-matter expertise and further their
programs because they compliment and support our targeted goals. Right
now, we are partnering with the NGO and business community to promote
and encourage the adoption of some corporate social accountability
guidelines on human trafficking. In other partnerships, the Office has
relied on the partners to provide the financial support for the
particular project. A good example of this was the development of a
partnership forged by the Office, USAID, NetHope, and the Demi and
Ashton Foundation to find technological solutions to trafficking in
Russia; the Office was unable to contribute financially to this effort,
yet staff helped to ably guide and shape the content of the project.
There are certainly other partnerships that the Office could undertake
or even augment with the availability of matching funds to contribute.
Partnerships also figure prominently as we work to ensure that the
antitrafficking funds we administer are used most effectively. Through
our competitive grant programs we support scores of projects each year
in which we partner with U.S.-based NGOs, public international
organizations and foreign NGOs to build the capacity of government
institutions and civil society and develop or expand critical services
for victims of trafficking.
Question #109. To live up to the ``partnership'' approach, the
State Department through the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking
in Persons (G/TIP) must be able to respond to unforeseen urgent
requests by governments, particularly those in Tier 2 Watch List, for
assistance to protect and assist victims of human trafficking. I
believe that through such assistance, we can help governments build
expertise, gain ownership of the issue, and credibly graduate from Tier
2 Watch List. Does your 2012 budget foresee some element of ``urgent''
assistance capability and funds for G/TIP to offer assistance in such
situations?
Answer. The ability to respond quickly to provide technical
assistance or training when foreign governments request it and to
respond to emergency assistance needs of trafficking victims when no
other source of assistance is available are both critical as we work to
advance antitrafficking goals worldwide. Although the 2012 budget does
not include specific funding for these two ``urgent'' response
capabilities, our office has established mechanisms for such endeavors
within the limited funding of the budget request.
If there were additional funding available to the office we
anticipate that we would expand these initiatives to include the
formation of a dedicated training and technical assistance team. This
multidisciplinary team would be comprised of subject-matter experts
(investigation, prosecution, victim assistance) that could develop
trainings and be deployed to train in foreign settings. They could also
deploy short-term counter trafficking professionals already in the
specific country or region to provide targeted, country-specific
assistance. These target training efforts would be available to those
countries ranked on the lower tiers of the annual ``Trafficking in
Persons Report.'' The results of these efforts would assist countries
in addressing human trafficking thus raising their tier ranking in the
annual ``Trafficking in Persons Report.''
We would also expand our capacity to swiftly respond to the needs
of victims in situations where no other emergency assistance is
available to meet basic needs such as food, shelter, clothing, and
immediate medical care. While these situations are not frequent, when
they arise they require prompt but deliberate action by professionals
with subject matter and programmatic expertise.
Question #110. Section 203 of the 2008 reauthorization of the
Trafficking Victim Protection Act of 2000, Public Law 110-457, 122
Stat. 5057 (Dec. 23, 2008), set forth requirements for and limitations
on the issuance of A3 and G5 visas, including a requirement in Section
203(a)(2) that the Secretary of State suspend issuance of A3 and G5
visas to applicants seeking to work for officials of a diplomatic
mission or an international organization in certain circumstances. Have
you ever determined that Section 203(a)(2) has been triggered with
respect to any diplomatic mission or international organization?
Answer. The State Department takes very seriously its role in
attempting to prevent the abuse of domestic workers and to address
allegations of abuse, as appropriate. Toward that end, the Department
has created an internal working group consisting of representatives
from the Office of the Chief of Protocol, the Office of the Legal
Adviser, the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, and
the Bureaus of Consular Affairs and Diplomatic Security, as well as
relevant regional bureaus. The working group meets on a periodic basis
to share information, discuss ongoing cases and coordinate Department
strategy to address this issue. The Office of the Chief of Protocol
coordinates this effort and is the central collecting and disseminating
point for information obtained by those offices about allegations of
abuse.
The Department of State has implemented dramatic changes in its
response to trafficking of domestic workers including: prenotification
of application for A3 and G5 visas (to be able to keep track of
domestic workers being employed by foreign missions in the United
States and to facilitate the denial of eligibility for such workers for
diplomatic personnel where there is credible evidence that they have
abused a previous worker); proof of ability to pay prevailing or
minimum wage whichever is higher to be eligible for such workers; a
system that provides objective evidence of salary payments (as salaries
must be paid either by check or direct deposit); and contracts with
specified provisions (kept on file with the visa application) including
the requirement that domestic workers retain possession of their
passports, provided to the worker in a language s/he understands. The
Department has also established a mechanism to facilitate NGO reporting
of allegations to the Office of Protocol.
In the fall of 2009, the Department hosted a briefing along with
Department of Justice experts for the Diplomatic Corps on the
Department regulations regarding employment of domestic workers and the
relevant requirements of the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA). The briefing included
information on Section 203 providing that the Secretary of State
``shall suspend, for such period as the Secretary deems necessary, the
issuance of A3 visas or G5 visas to applicants seeking to work for
officials of a diplomatic mission or an international organization, if
the Secretary determines that there is credible evidence that 1 or more
employees of such mission or international organization have abused or
exploited one or more nonimmigrants holding an A3 visa or a G5 visa,
and that the diplomatic mission or international organization tolerated
such actions.''
The Department has not yet suspended the issuance of A3 or G5 visas
to any diplomatic mission or international organization pursuant to the
TVPRA. In the cases of reported abuse that have come to the
Department's attention since enactment of the TVPRA, the Department has
referenced its obligations under the TVPRA as part of its demarche to
the relevant diplomatic missions and has found that the possibility of
A3 or G5 visa suspension has served as vital leverage that has
encouraged a response to address allegations of abuse or exploitation.
The TVPRA requires that the Secretary herself determine that there is
credible evidence of abuse and credible evidence that the mission
tolerated the abuse. In one case, the threat of visa suspension under
the TVPRA motivated the government at issue to take concrete measures
to demonstrate that it did not tolerate the abuse, which included the
issuance of a formal reprimand of the employee, working with the
diplomat such that he made an offer to provide compensation to the
former domestic worker, and advising its diplomats that abuse of
domestic servants is not tolerated and has consequences.
The Department's internal working group meets regularly to assess
any and all allegations of abuse or exploitation of domestic workers by
diplomatic personnel and to determine appropriate steps to be taken,
including bringing allegations to the attention of the Department of
Justice's Human Trafficking Prosecution Unit, Criminal Section of the
Civil Rights Division; issuance of a diplomatic note to a specific
mission when allegations of abuse of a domestic servant by one of its
employees is brought to the Department's attention; denial of A3 or G5
visas for domestic workers for a diplomat against whom there are
credible allegations of abuse; and, where appropriate, preparing an
action memo for the Secretary recommending suspension of A3 or G5 visas
for a specific mission or organization.
Question #111. If so, please provide the name of the diplomatic
mission or international organization in question.
Answer. The Department has not yet determined that Section
203(a)(2) has been triggered with respect to any diplomatic mission or
international organization.
Question #112. We are on the verge of a new Southern Sudan but also
a profoundly different northern Sudan. Do current U.S. laws provide the
needed flexibility to address these changes?
Answer. Current legislation imposes numerous restrictions upon
Sudan. While present authority allows the United States to provide
assistance to the South, assistance to the government in the North,
with the exception of Darfur and the Three Areas (Abyei, Southern
Kordofan state, and Blue Nile State), remains prohibited, largely
consistent with, but not limited to, Sudan specific restrictions that
appear in the annual appropriations act (e.g., Section 7070(f) of the
FY 2010 Appropriations Act) as well as the Darfur Peace and
Accountability Act.
Question #113. For example, how would USAID's work in the North be
affected?
Answer. If the USG decides to expand assistance to the North,
modifications to the current restrictions, or waivers of those
restrictions where statutorily allowable would be necessary.
Question #114. Are there opportunities that the United States
should explore to expand this work in order to promote overall peace
and security?
Answer. We are discussing these options currently through an
interagency process and will continue to engage with Congress going
forward as the promotion of peace and security in the North is linked
to ensuring the viability and security of both the North and the South.
Question #115. Current law prohibits all transactions by U.S.
persons relating to the Sudan's oil industry. How is that affected if
Southern Sudan is independent but its oil continues to flow through the
North, as it must for the South to be an economically viable state?
Answer. We are continuing to explore this issue, but under current
law U.S. sanctions against the Government of Sudan would continue to
limit the ability of U.S. persons to invest in the oil sector in the
South because it would directly benefit the North.
Question #116. What is your perspective on the Government of
Sudan's call for the ``domestication'' of the Darfur peace process?
Answer. While we believe that it is important that a broad range of
Darfuris have the opportunity to discuss their grievances and
participate in discussions about their future, we do not support the
Government of Sudan's ``domestication'' of the Darfur peace process.
The United Nations and African Union have begun to set up a Darfur
Political Process (DPP) which they will manage; the Government of Sudan
would not be involved until the last stage of these Darfuri
consultations. We have not yet taken a position on the DPP, but we
believe that any result from the peace negotiations in Doha must be
connected with any Darfur-based process.
Question #117. Could civil society freely and safely participate in
such a process?
Answer. At the present time, we do not believe that civil society
could freely and safely participate in a Darfur-based consultative
process due to conditions on the ground. Various conditions would need
to be in place for such consultations to take place. These conditions
include lifting the State of Emergency in Darfur; permitting
unrestricted access across Darfur to UNAMID, humanitarian agencies, and
NGOs; granting UNAMID a radio transmitter for independent broadcasting
of news; full inclusion of representatives of all stakeholders, to
include women, IDPs, refugees, and political opposition; granting of
visas for NGOs working with IDPs; significant steps to end impunity in
Darfur; freedom of assembly, movement, and expression to all
participants; and a ceasefire agreement among armed movements and the
Government of Sudan.
Question #118. The United States has shifted its approach to
Somalia, from one solely focused on bolstering the Transitional Federal
Government (TFG), to a ``two-track approach'' that also aims to engage
clan leaders and the semiautonomous regions of Somaliland and Puntland.
What are the short- and long-term goals for U.S. policy in Somalia and
how do you plan to assess progress?
Answer. The United States has in place a long-term process to
stabilize Somalia. We announced the Dual Track approach to Somalia in
September 2010 to allow us the space to broaden our approach by taking
into account the complex nature of Somali society and politics, as well
as to allow our engagement to be more flexible and adaptable. On Track
One, we continue support for the Djibouti Peace Process, the
Transitional Federal Government (TFG), and the African Union Mission in
Somalia (AMISOM) as a first line of effort to stabilize Somalia, as
well as to repel al-Shabaab's advances in Mogadishu. On Track Two, we
are deepening our engagement with the regional Governments of
Somaliland and Puntland, as well as with local and regional
administrations throughout South Central Somalia who are opposed to al-
Shabaab, but who are not affiliated with the TFG. Progress over the
short- and long-term in Somalia will be based on the successful
achievement of representative governance in Somalia, the degree of safe
international access to Somalia, mitigating the security threat to the
region caused by instability inside Somalia, including the absence of
piracy from Somalia's shores, and a reduced Somali dependence on
international humanitarian assistance.
In the short term, we will continue our political and security
sector support to the TFG and AMISOM in close partnership with the
U.N., the African Union (AU), and other international partners.
Politically, we are focused on establishing a clear path forward after
the August 2011 expiration of the TFG mandate. We were disappointed
with the Transitional Federal Parliament's (TFP) mid-February
unilateral 3-year extension. We continue to push, along with
international partners, for a reversal of that position and a
commitment to TFG governance reforms.
On the security sector, our ongoing and critical support to AMISOM
and the TFG is essential to maintaining a safe space from which the TFG
can operate and to preventing an al-Shabaab takeover of Mogadishu. We
are undertaking these efforts in lockstep with our international and
regional partners, including the U.N. and the AU.
Meanwhile, we are working with U.N. and AU partners to convene
broad meetings aimed at bringing more groups together in political
dialogue, including the TFG, Puntland, Ahlu-Suna Wal Jama (ASWJ), and
regional administration representatives from Galmuduug. We also are
incorporating discrete community-based projects aimed at employment and
tradecraft.
We realize that state failure is the root cause of piracy in the
waters off the coast of Somalia. Achieving stability and good
governance in Somalia represents the only sustainable long-term
solution to piracy. Through our dual-track approach in Somalia, we will
continue to support the most important lines of action for countering
piracy: building governance, security, and economic livelihoods on land
in Somalia. We are working through the U.N. Contact Group on Piracy off
the Coast of Somalia to emphasize the role of Somalia itself in
counter-piracy efforts, and press Somali authorities to take the
necessary steps to pass and implement antipiracy legislation upon which
the international community can help Somalia build enforcement capacity
in the context of the rule of law.
Long term efforts on Somalia will continue to focus on security,
governance, and humanitarian and development assistance as we deepen
our engagement outside of Mogadishu and, security permitting, find it
possible to operate from inside Somalia on a more regular basis. We are
working toward a Somalia that is at peace with itself and its
neighbors, and one that is inhospitable to terrorist organizations.
Long term success toward Somalia's stabilization will require
international support in all of these areas for the foreseeable future.
Question #119 & #120. There is no U.S. diplomatic presence in
Mogadishu or any remotely sustained U.S. diplomatic presence elsewhere
in Somalia. While the security of U.S. personnel is of paramount
importance, what are the opportunity costs in terms of U.S. policy that
are lost by not having our people in the country?
Answer. Although the United States never formally severed
diplomatic relations with Somalia, the U.S. Embassy in Somalia has been
closed since the collapse of the Siad Barre government in 1991. The
United States maintains regular dialogue with the Transitional Federal
Government and other key stakeholders in Somalia through the U.S.
Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. Consular coverage for Somalia is maintained
by U.S. Embassy Nairobi, while American Citizens Services in the self-
declared ``Republic of Somaliland'' are provided by the U.S. Embassy in
Djibouti.
The United States suffers a strategic disadvantage in critical
policy areas by not having a sustained diplomatic presence inside
Somalia. The first image of U.S. diplomacy our foreign partners should
see is that of engaged diplomats and aid workers operating in an open
and constructive manner. Our international partners, namely the United
Kingdom and the European Union, enjoy somewhat greater access to areas
like Somaliland and Puntland on a semiregular basis, further
diminishing our ability to demonstrate the national priority we place
on Somalia or to effectively lead on policy issues where travel into
Somalia would promote those priorities.
The continued absence of U.S. diplomatic personnel from Somalia,
which is driven by concerns for the safety and security of U.S.
personnel, has the unfortunate impact of defining the U.S. image of
engagement in Somalia as one that is hands-off, disinterested, and
driven by fear of the unknown. We are unable to reach beyond Mogadishu
or Hargeisa with meaningful counterpiracy or counterterrorism
programming, despite the clear priority of supporting programming in
these areas throughout the United States Government. In addition, we
have very limited means through which to explore or oversee
humanitarian and development operations inside Somalia. Finally, we
lose the ability to engage partners on the ground directly, as we are
forced to conduct political work by cell phone, hold meetings in
regional capitals, and triangulate information gathered from our
embassies in Nairobi, Addis Ababa, Kampala, Bujumbura, and Djibouti.
As security permits, we will seek to expand the ability of U.S.
personnel to travel into Somalia, including Mogadishu, Bossasso, and
Galcayo. In the short term, the inability to visit these destinations
consistently will remain a significant challenge. Without a more
consistent presence of United States diplomats and aid workers,
determining viable actors with whom to engage will be difficult and
establishing greater credibility with key players on the ground will be
an uphill battle.
Question #121. Recent newspaper accounts have described expanding
roles by private security contractors in Somalia. Could you describe
the role of private security contractors in supporting U.S. policy and
the AMISOM mission in Somalia?
Answer. The Department has contracted two logistics providers, PAE
and AECOM to deliver equipment and training to African Union Mission in
Somalia (AMISOM) and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which
is central to our efforts to build the capacity of AMISOM and the TFG's
National Security Force (NSF) to defend the TFG from al-Shabaab and
other extremist groups. Additionally, we are funding two cooperative
agreements with the Governments of Burundi and Uganda to provide their
AMISOM contingents with noncombatant advisers and mentors. Both of
these countries subsequently contracted with Bancroft Global
Development, a Washington-based nonprofit organization that specializes
in advisory and mentoring services to governments operating in conflict
or post-conflict environments. Bancroft is providing AMISOM's Burundi
contingent with counter-IED training and mentoring to help that unit
better operate in Mogadishu. It is also assisting the Ugandan
contingent with its efforts to organize and train the TFG's NSF.
Question #122. Given that the U.S. Government does not have a
diplomatic presence in Somalia, to what extent does the Department feel
confident in its oversight of their activities?
Answer. The Department contracts with two U.S. logistics companies
to deliver equipment and supplies to Mogadishu in support of the
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and in support of our
security sector efforts with the Somalia Transitional Federal
Government's National Security Force (TFG/NSF). These two companies
also provide training and construction assistance to both entities. In
order to oversee the performance of these two companies, the Department
contracts with a separate company for a Technical Monitor, who splits
his time between Kampala and Mogadishu to verify all equipment
deliveries and other services under these contracts. As a result, the
Technical Monitor spends approximately 2 weeks of his time in Mogadishu
during any 1-month period. Through the Monitor's evaluations and weekly
reporting, the Department has confidence that our logistics contractors
are performing in accordance with their contracts' Statements of Work.
We are also reasonably confident of the performance of work being
done in Mogadishu by Bancroft Global Development, which is funded
through our cooperative agreements with Burundi and Uganda. Because
much of Bancroft's work is performed in nonsecured areas of Mogadishu,
we rely heavily on the two grantees to monitor and report on their
performance. Our Technical Monitor does, however, observe and report on
Bancroft's activities in the areas of Mogadishu where he is able to
operate safely.
Question #123. What role are private security actors playing in
Somaliland and Puntland?
Answer. We are aware of and have been closely monitoring reports
about the involvement of private security companies (PSCs) in Puntland,
including reports that the PSCs are providing training and equipment to
Puntland security forces and militias in the absence of authorization
from the U.N. Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea.
We are concerned that these unregulated efforts could play a
significant destabilizing role in the region.
We are not currently aware of any significant activities undertaken
by PSCs on behalf of the regional authorities in Somaliland.
Question #124. The Democratic Republic of Congo remains the scene
of often horrific violence. U.S. policy and attention have particularly
focused on two facets of Congo's struggle in the East: gender based
violence and conflict minerals. Those issues are extremely important,
but they are in many ways products of Congo's larger struggles with
governance, security, and the rule of law. I am concerned that without
a more holistic approach and without greater attention to the DRC as a
whole, our policies will fall short of our intended objectives.
Please outline the U.S. strategy to help the DRC make
progress in these areas. Does the administration intend to name
a special adviser on the Great Lakes to help coordinate and
advance this strategy in the region?
Answer. The root of most of the DRC's problems is the lack of
functioning state authority in much of the country. Many of the organs
of state authority, including the security services, and the providers
of basic services such as health care, education, and infrastructure,
are all either woefully inadequate or nonfunctioning. Corruption, lack
of capacity and resources, arbitrary application of laws, and a largely
informal economy create a vicious circle. All U.S. Government efforts
(diplomatic, security, and developmental) focus on strengthening the
government's ability to function and provide services to its citizens.
Our top priorities in the DRC are building government capacity and
improving security in the east to protect civilians and territory.
Sustained effort in both of these areas is vital for consolidating the
DRC's stability over the long term. In the coming months, our immediate
priority is to ensure that the Presidential and legislative elections
scheduled for November are credible and their results are accepted by
the general population and losing candidates. Our success in all
priority areas will be contingent on our ability to work constructively
with the Congolese leadership and demonstrate how our specific efforts
can meet their needs.
We have taken under advisement the recommendation to name a special
envoy or adviser for the Great Lakes Region. At this time, based on
extensive discussions with NGO groups, regional states, donors, and
others with interest in the Great Lakes Region, we believe the
selection of such an envoy or representative would not be the most
effective means to advance U.S. interests or to utilize limited
resources. Some critical issues in the region are transnational in
nature, such as efforts to stop the Lord's Resistance Army and the
illicit trade in natural resources. However, the regional states have
not been particularly receptive to Great Lakes special envoys--either
from the United States or from other governments. In the past, the DRC,
Ugandan, and Rwandan Governments have never worked solely with regional
envoys to resolve regional issues. Instead, each sought the support of
bilateral ambassadors who could also address other problems and
challenges specific to the country. Engagement through our resident
ambassadors, with support from senior U.S. Government officials, has
proven significantly more effective from both diplomatic and cost
perspectives. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs,
Ambassador Johnnie Carson, and his team are actively managing the Great
Lakes regional portfolio in close coordination with the Chiefs of
Mission in relevant capitals, as well as with the concerned governments
and regional organizations.
Question #125. In 2011 alone, 27 countries in Africa are scheduled
to hold Presidential, legislative and/or local elections. While these
elections are positive signs for democratization on the continent, they
also have the potential to enhance existing national divisions and
foster instability. To what extent have you seen positive returns on
the U.S.'s long-term investment in Africa's electoral systems and in
what ways do you hope to augment or refine our existing assistance?
Answer. The fact that there are 27 elections this year shows how
much our investments of assistance and time have paid off; it was not
so long ago that an entire year could pass in Africa without any
democratic elections whatsoever. Indeed, our assistance has resulted in
positive returns in building electoral systems in key democratic
countries in Africa including Mali, Benin, Ghana, Sierra Leone and
Liberia, among others. USG assistance has helped each of these
countries consolidate democratic gains over several electoral cycles.
For example, in Ghana's successful, fifth consecutive democratic
Presidential and parliamentary elections in December 2008 USG support
helped guarantee the smooth transition to a new President and reduced
political tensions that could have led to violence. For the first time
in Ghana's history, Ghanaian civil society organizations used a
parallel vote tabulation (PVT) to confirm official election results,
which reinforced the validity of John Atta Mills' razor-thin margin of
victory. The strong observer presence--along with the independent
poll--reassured the public and enabled political parties and the
electorate to accept the results of the elections.
Going forward, we hope to amplify and further refine our electoral
assistance activities in Africa. It is important that we continue to
work closely with African Governments and civil societies to strengthen
the infrastructure for credible elections not only at the national but
also at the provincial and local government levels. Accountability at
the local level is often the key to public confidence in democracy. In
addition, we believe that it is critical to move beyond technical
support to election commissions and international observation to focus
equally on increasing societal demand for credible elections. In that
context, we hope to expand work with local civil society groups to
assist in their advocacy for election reforms and to enable them to
carry out their own domestic monitoring of elections and parallel vote
tabulations. In this realm we aim to increase the use of new
technologies, from the use of SMS to report voting irregularities to
the use of cell phones to educate and prepare voters well in advance of
election day. We have seen that support for civic education and
election commissions in the few months prior to elections is
insufficient to build the strong democratic states needed in Africa.
Rather, we must expand assistance activities to maintain a consistent,
holistic approach on this issue.
Question #126. Peacekeeping.--H.R. 1, as passed by the House of
Representatives, would cut our peacekeeping contribution to the United
Nations by over $200 million which would put us back into arrears.
What would the impact of cutting these funds be on United States
policy objectives, particularly in countries such as Sudan and the
Democratic Republic of Congo where the United Nations peacekeeping
missions are playing critical roles in civilian protection, conflict
prevention, and stabilization efforts? While these missions lack all
the tools and capabilities that they need to fully carry out their
mandates in these difficult environments, without their presence both
individual lives and American hopes for progress would be jeopardized.
Which regions might you anticipate a need for funding that
is not in the current budget request?
Answer.
H.R. 1 provides $1.898 billion for the Contributions for
International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) appropriation. In
FY 2011, it is anticipated that U.N. peacekeeping assessments
will be approximately $2.353 billion, which reflects additional
mission requirements. Even with anticipated offsets from U.N.
peacekeeping credits and FY 2010 carryover funds, the reduced
level for CIPA in H.R. 1 would be insufficient to meet our
treaty obligations. It also must be recognized that our paying
27.14 percent for a peacekeeping operation is significantly
less expensive for the United States than our shouldering all
or the majority of the burden ourselves.
The $2.182 billion requested for CIPA in FY 2011 is required
to pay our assessments for these critical U.N. peacekeeping
missions. Less than full funding will impact all missions,
including those in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. Failure to obtain the full funding would place
increasing strain on critical U.N. peacekeeping operations by
reducing funds available to support deployments, support key
tasks and roles, and lengthen delays in reimbursements to troop
contributing countries.
U.N. peacekeeping requirements are inherently unpredictable;
however, at this time, we do not anticipate a request for
funding currently not identified in the budget request.
In the FY 2012 request, the administration assumes the
application of approximately $200 million in credits to offset
U.N. peacekeeping assessments. Application of these credits in
FY 2011 would mean that the FY 2012 request would not contain
sufficient funds for the United States to meet its treaty
obligations in full in FY 2012.
Prompt payment of U.S. peacekeeping assessments in full is
essential to meet U.S. treaty obligations and to avoid reducing
resources available to support deployments and mission aims,
which strains critical U.N. peacekeeping operations and
lengthens delays in reimbursements to troop contributing
countries.
H.R. 1 also does not provide for the requested increase in
the statutory cap on the U.S. share of assessed contributions
for each U.N. peacekeeping operation, from 25 percent to 27.2
percent, for assessments received in calendar year 2011.
Limiting U.S. contributions to 25 percent as of January 2011,
as well as providing insufficient funding, would negatively
impact the U.N.'s ability to support peacekeeping operations
and relationships with troop contributing countries and would
likely result in the accrual of additional U.S. arrears. This
would in turn undermine U.S. global stabilization goals.
Question #127. Global Health. H.R. 1 would drastically cut the
Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. The Global
Fund is a public-private partnership where every American dollar is
leveraged twice over, and--as required under the 2008 Lantos-Hyde
Reauthorization Act, U.S. HIV/AIDS, malaria, and TB programs are deeply
intertwined with the Global Fund.
What would the impact of the House's proposed cuts to the
Global Fund be on bilateral and multilateral efforts to combat
these diseases?
Answer. The United States is the largest donor to the Global Fund
to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund). Through our
contribution to the Global Fund the United States is able to: support
the delivery of concrete health results; expand the geographic reach of
and enhance bilateral efforts; catalyze international investment in
AIDS, TB, and malaria; build capacity, country ownership, and
sustainability; and demonstrate political commitment to international
cooperation.
The Global Fund has estimated that the cuts proposed by the House
Appropriations Committee, if enacted, would have the following impact
on the Fund's ability to provide services in 2012 alone:
--10.4 million bed nets to fight malaria will not be provided;
--414,000 people will not be provided with antiretroviral (ARV)
medications;
--58,286 HIV positive pregnant women will not receive drugs to prevent
transmission of the virus to their children; and
--372,000 people will not be tested and treated for tuberculosis.
Given the interdependence of PEPFAR's bilateral programs and Global
Fund-financed programs, both multilateral and bilateral resources are
needed to maximize our results. Cuts to the U.S. contribution to the
Fund would also have a profound impact on U.S. bilateral programs to
fight the three diseases. In most PEPFAR countries, PEPFAR bilateral
programs work with Fund grant recipients to support a wide range of
services. PEPFAR bilateral resources are allocated strategically in
coordination with Fund resource allocations, and the PEPFAR programs
would be unable to achieve maximum results in the absence of Fund
programs. The discontinuation or reduction of Fund-financed programs
would also place severe pressure on U.S. bilateral programs to fill
resource gaps. The Fund disbursed over $3 billion to country-level
programs for the three diseases in 2010, and the United States does not
have the resources to fill the gaps if these resources are reduced.
U.S. contributions to the Global Fund catalyze continued
investments from other donors in AIDS, TB, and malaria. Every dollar
the U.S. contributes to the Fund leverages an additional $2.50 from
other donors. It is difficult to estimate the impact that decreased
contributions from the United States would have on the investment
decisions of other donors.
Question #128. The fight against terrorism needs to be multifaceted
but Anti-Terrorism Programs tend to be overshadowed by ``hard''
approaches such as drone strikes and direct military intervention. How
does the State Department plan to better integrate its efforts with
those of the Defense Department and the Intelligence Community?
Answer. The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT)
works closely with all departments and agencies on comprehensive
counterterrorism strategies that draw on all elements of national
power, including diplomatic, law enforcement, military, and
intelligence.
S/CT has staff dedicated to coordinating with the Department Of
Defense (DOD) on counterterrorism operations, including several DOD
officers currently assigned and housed at the State Department. While
current liaison activity provides a direct line of effective
communication with DOD, discussions are ongoing to further enhance our
coordination and relationship. A similar discussion is underway with
the Intelligence Community (IC) that will also augment current
mechanisms and further improve coordination. Having a direct open line
of communication with our intelligence and defense partners is key to
whole of government coordination that seeks to integrate hard and soft
power, matching the right tool or coordinated approach to the
situation.
For example, S/CT is working with the IC and the military to
identify hotspots of radicalization. In close collaboration with the
Combatant Commands, USAID and the IC we are developing programs to
ameliorate radicalization through Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)
efforts. By virtue of being a State office with responsibility for U.S.
Government counterterrorism efforts overseas, S/CT is uniquely situated
to coordinate CVE efforts. At S/CT's request, USSOCOM created a pilot
polling initiative that is measuring radicalization at the provincial
level in three countries (Bangladesh, Maldives, and Yemen). When the
results are complete, we will work with USAID and the Combatant
Commands to develop programs to address the drivers of radicalism where
it is most virulent.
Additionally, in collaboration with other agencies, S/CT leads the
Department in Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA), a law enforcement
training program carried out in partnership with State/Diplomatic
Security. The ATA law enforcement capacity-building program for foreign
partners reaches the security forces of some 55 nations. With a budget
of $215 million in fiscal year 2010, ATA is a valuable tool to provide
a wide variety of tailored counterterrorism training to a broad range
of civilian security officials. The ATA program creates host country
capacity, giving them more ownership of CT challenges and creating
viable partners for the United States. Our work on ATA is done in light
of the other U.S. counterterrorism capacity building efforts underway,
including DOD efforts, and in a coordinated fashion designed to achieve
our counterterrorism goals.
While these specific examples provide an insight to our
collaborative work, each situation is different and requires a tailored
response. S/CT seeks to combine the options available to the U.S.
Government and employ the right approach to achieve U.S. objectives. In
all cases, we are committed to working in collaboration with other
departments and agencies to make the best possible use of government
resources and expertise.
Question #129. How is the Department measuring the efficacy of
Anti-Terrorism Assistance to determine which programs are worth keeping
and perhaps expanding and which programs have failed?
Answer. The Secretary's Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism (S/CT) determines which foreign countries will be
invited to participate as Partner Nations in the Antiterrorism
Assistance (ATA) programs. S/CT establishes the policy goals and
strategic objectives for each Partner Nation. To measure success, S/
CT's primary implementation partner, the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security's Office of Antiterrorism Assistance (DS/T/ATA), develops
programmatic objectives derived from each Partner Nation's strategic
objectives into programmatic objectives.
A team of representatives from DS/T/ATA, S/CT, and other agencies,
as appropriate, conduct in-country counterterrorism capabilities
assessments using performance standards approximately every 2 to 3
years. These assessments help to inform the development of Country
Assistance Plans for each partner nation. The assessments also
establish a baseline that is used in subsequent in-country program
reviews to determine the degree to which the Partner Nation's
capabilities are improving or faltering.
The improvement or decline in capabilities in turn serves as the
primary indicator of the ATA program's effectiveness in accomplishing
its programmatic objectives.
S/CT also uses findings of the program reviews--along with political,
diplomatic, and other factors--to evaluate whether the ATA program is
making progress toward accomplishing its strategic objectives and
whether programs in particular partner nations should be maintained,
discontinued, redirected, expanded, or diminished.
Question #'s 130-132. Global Climate Change. The President's FY12
request for the Global Climate Change Initiative is focused on
promoting clean energy and increasing resilience to climate change in
the most vulnerable regions of the world. While U.S. leadership in
Copenhagen brought the world's major emitting nations together in an
agreement to reduce greenhouse gases, unfortunately today we are seeing
our commitments come under international scrutiny because of
significant proposed budget cuts to vital climate programs coupled with
attempts to remove existing authorities from the Environmental
Protection Agency to address carbon pollution.
Given how important our leadership has been in securing
global commitments to address greenhouse gases, can you please
discuss how the proposed FY12 budget for climate finance
promotes export opportunities for clean technology, strengthens
our diplomatic relations with key emerging economies to secure
global reductions in carbon pollution, and enhances our
national security?
How do these investments help reduce future costs for the
U.S. by bolstering preparedness for increasingly extreme
weather events?
Recently Admiral Mullen said, ``climate change . . . not
only could produce a humanitarian crisis, but also could
generate conditions that could lead to failed states and make
populations more vulnerable to radicalization.'' As vulnerable
regions of the world face increasingly severe droughts, floods,
crop losses and water shortages, how does the FY12's climate-
related investments address the future costs caused by
conflicts and instability (caused by resource scarcity and
other impacts) that will require U.S. resources and engagement?
Answer. Global climate change indeed has serious implications for
U.S. national security interests. The impacts of climate change will
worsen problems such as poverty, social tensions, environmental
degradation, resource pressures and competition, and weaken political
institutions internationally, according to the 2008 National
Intelligence Assessment on climate change.
The administration's planned investments in international climate
programs will:
Support an international climate approach in which all major
countries--including developing countries--contribute to the
global effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Conserve forests, foster sustainable land management, and
combat illegal logging around the world.
Build resilience in developing countries to reduce the risk
of damage, loss of life and instability that can result from
extreme weather and climate events. (The World Bank and U.S.
Geological Survey estimate that every dollar spent on disaster
preparedness saves $7 in disaster response.)
Help put developing countries on a clean energy path,
improving air quality and human health around the world. Our
climate change assistance to developing countries can help
strengthen their economic growth, increasing export and
investment opportunities for U.S. businesses.
Help the United States meet its international commitments,
putting us in a better position to ensure that other countries
meet theirs.
Mitigate risks to U.S. national security by reducing climate
change impacts internationally. The more we can reduce such
impacts, the more success we will have in reducing climate
change-induced internal conflicts, migration, radicalization or
other destabilizing developments.
American clean energy businesses are well positioned to provide the
innovative technology and services needed to meet rapidly growing
demand in developing countries. U.S. support for international clean
technology programs mobilizes these kinds of investments, and helps
create the functioning, fair, and competitive markets in which American
businesses thrive.
U.S. investments in international climate programs increase our
leverage to ensure that Brazil, South Africa, India, and China take
action, and build opportunities for U.S. clean energy exports in big
emerging markets.
Question #133 & #134. On February 17, the State Department
announced $150 million to support democracy and economic initiatives in
Egypt.
How can we ensure that these funds will be disbursed
quickly, effectively, and directly to initiatives in support of
the democratic and economic transition currently underway?
Answer. The Department of State and USAID have been working closely
to develop assistance programs that can produce quick, concrete results
and have a tangible impact on Egypt's economic and democratic
transition.
In order to quickly and effectively disburse funds in support of
the transition, USAID issued two open calls for proposals on March 8 to
address democracy and economic growth priorities. For the democracy
Annual Program Statement (APS), USAID is actively soliciting proposals
from both registered and unregistered Egyptian NGOs, giving us the
flexibility to fund those organizations most capable of and willing to
implement urgent transition priorities. The economic growth APS was
released directly to Egypt's private sector, ensuring that the best
Egyptian ideas are ready and able to meet Egypt's most pressing
transition needs.
USAID will hold Arabic and English language information sessions in
Egypt--in Cairo, Alexandria, and Luxor--for representatives from
nongovernmental organizations. These information sessions will speed up
the dispersal of these grants by helping organizations write proposals
focused on specific needs and that can be more quickly reviewed
awarded.
The two calls for proposals request responses that are focused on
our near-term priorities for Egypt, including supporting free and fair
elections and a successful democratic transition, economic
stabilization to support this transition, and the promotion of broad-
based and equitable private sector growth. Funding decisions for our
near-term assistance package will be guided by these priorities and be
designed to demonstrate results. Programs will be managed by USAID, as
well as the State Department's Middle East Partnership Initiative
(MEPI) and Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and will
continue to support both unregistered and registered Egyptian NGOs.
In addition to the open calls for proposals, USAID will transfer
$4.5 million to the State Department's Near East Bureau's Middle East
Partnership Initiative (MEPI) to provide direct support to Egyptian
NGOs; provide NGO capacity and coalition building for MEPI grantees;
and to engage Egyptian activists, reformers, and civil society
organizations on issues immediately relevant to the transition. USAID
will also soon transfer $16 million to the State Department's Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor to fund projects which will focus on
preparations for the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections,
and strengthen independent media and independent labor unions. USAID is
also working with State Department regarding funding of
entrepreneurship programs, and OPIC regarding funding for small
business efforts.
How do you plan to distribute the funds?
Answer. Funds will be distributed primarily through grants awarded
to proposals responding to the two APSs and selected by the Technical
Evaluation Committees that have been established by the USAID/Egypt
Office of Procurement. Some funds will be distributed through transfers
from USAID to the State Department for grants to be awarded and
administered by MEPI and DRL.
The U.S. Government assistance priorities for Egypt include support
for free and fair elections, overall stability, and economic recovery.
In the short-term, our assistance efforts will leverage existing
funding to focus on areas where we can produce quick, concrete results
and where we can have a tangible impact in support of Egypt's
democratic and economic transition. We recognize that a prosperous and
democratic Egypt, buoyed by economic growth and a strong private
sector, could be an anchor of stability for the Middle East and North
Africa.
Question #135. Will the State Department utilize all of the
government mechanisms at its disposal--including the Agency for
International Development, the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and
Labor, and the Middle East Partnership Initiative?
Answer. Yes. In order to support Egypt's economic recovery and
democratic transition in the immediate term, we are reprogramming $150
million from previous year bilateral USAID funds to be directed through
DRL, MEPI, and USAID, and $2.6 million in funds from the Middle East
Partnership Initiative (MEPI). These funds will support the political
development necessary to conduct free and fair elections and to
establish a responsive, accountable government that respects the
universal human rights of the Egyptian people. OPIC will also provide
up to $2 billion in financial support to encourage private sector
investments in the Middle East and North Africa. Additionally, the U.S
Export Import Bank has approved $80 million in insurance cover to
support letters of credit issued by Egyptian financial institutions.
Finally, the administration is working with a bipartisan group of
Members of Congress to establish an Enterprise Fund for Egypt that will
stimulate private sector investment, support competitive markets, and
provide business with access to low-cost capital.
Question #136. How will USAID address the policy, adopted at the
behest of the Egyptian Government in 2009, which restricts it from
providing support to nongovernmental organizations that are not
formally registered with the Egyptian Government?
Answer. The dramatic political change in Egypt has created a new
environment. We are reprogramming $150 million in prior-year ESF to
support economic recovery and democratic transition efforts. From these
funds, we will review new NGO proposals equally--whether registered,
unregistered, U.S., or Egyptian--in light of how they best support the
needs as expressed by Egyptians themselves.
Question #137. The United States has been criticized for providing
much greater sums of military assistance than civilian in Egypt. The
military assistance seems to have had some impact in discouraging the
Egyptian Army from responding forcefully against protesters. On the
other hand, Egypt's economic and political needs will be great in the
coming months. Do we have the proper calibration between our civilian
and military assistance programs?
Answer. Our civilian and military assistance programs are key,
complementary elements of our overall engagement with Egypt, and both
are important to our support of a successful transition in Egypt.
During this time of unprecedented change, we have seen the military
assume a much larger decisionmaking role. Our military assistance helps
to reinforce our cooperation with Egypt on many of our shared security
objectives in the region. It also enables a strong military-to-military
relationship that contributes to the achievement of U.S. policy goals
in the region. Our close cooperation with the Egyptian military gives
us an opportunity to discuss with Egypt's military leadership values
that we care deeply about--freedom of expression and association, and a
process of transition to democracy in which Egyptians can have
confidence.
Congress' annual appropriation of $1.3 billion in Foreign Military
Funding (FMF) assists Egypt in maintaining a strong and disciplined
defense force, which is critical to ensuring Egypt's continued role as
a regional leader. Our FMF program and military cooperation also help
ensure our privileged Suez Canal access and unfettered over-flights.
At the same time, we understand that Egypt's success will hinge on
a successful economy and on democratic institutions to carry it through
the transition. That is why we are also looking for new possibilities
to support Egypt's economic and democratic priorities. Our March 15
announcement of additional steps to support Egypt's economy was part of
this effort.
Question #138. Tunisia was the first country to undergo a popular
uprising in the Middle East. As a small country with an educated
workforce, it appears well-positioned for a successful democratic
transition, but international assistance in the coming months may be
critical. Last month, the State Department notified the committee of a
$500,000 obligation of Economic Support Funds for Tunisia. However,
there is no separate budget allocation for foreign assistance to
Tunisia in the FY 2012 international affairs budget proposal.
Do you anticipate that more funding will be announced for
Tunisia in the critical coming months?
Answer. We must work closely with the Tunisian people and the
international community in assisting Tunisia during its democratic
transition. The State Department, through the NEA Bureau's Middle East
Partnership Initiative, has identified $20 million in FY 2010 and FY
2011 Economic Support Funds that we will reprogram to support the
Tunisian transition. Our Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor
(DRL) has identified an additional $1.1 million from its global
democracy fund that it plans to use to support transitional justice
processes in Tunisia. USAID has made $3 million available for programs
that will help prepare Tunisia for elections and has identified $2
million in transition initiatives funding to promote stabilization in
marginalized areas and to encourage new and emerging groups to
contribute to the national dialogue. We will also work with Congress to
establish an enterprise fund for Tunisia to stimulate investment in the
private sector and provide businesses with low-cost capital,
particularly in the less-developed areas of Tunisia.
Finally, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) will
offer financial support in the form of direct loans, guarantees, and
political risk insurance. OPIC is already supporting one Tunis-based
private equity firm that is focused on small- and medium-size
businesses, is conducting diligence on two additional Tunis-based funds
that will invest in the same, and will support investor visits by
American businesses to Tunisia.
Looking ahead, we will continue to prepare assistance levels that
reflect our commitment to supporting the democratic change underway.
Question #139. The State Department's foreign assistance to Yemen
has increased dramatically in recent years, from about $30 million in
FY 2009 to more than $115 million in the FY12 budget request.
What impact does the current political instability in Yemen
have on current programs, both on economic programs (for
example, the ESF and Global Health and Child Survival accounts)
and security assistance (for example, FMF, 1206, NADR, IMET,
and INCLE accounts)?
Answer. The current political situation in Yemen has an impact on
both economic and security assistance programs in Yemen. Economic
programs continue to operate; specifically, USAID is relying heavily on
programming and monitoring through both international and Yemeni
partners. Existing security assistance programs are also continuing
although new project proposals are being carefully scrutinized and in
some cases delayed to ensure that new assistance is appropriate given
the evolving political situation.
Continuing USG programs, including youth employment, education,
health, counterterrorism, as well as much-needed Humanitarian
Assistance during this period of political instability ensures that the
basic needs of the Yemeni people are being met and that critical
national security priorities are not abdicated. We are exploring all
options to continue basic programming should the situation in Yemen
change significantly. In particular, USAID's governance and livelihoods
programs are flexible and were designed for stabilization purposes; as
the situation evolves, USAID can look for opportunities to respond to
changing needs on the ground through these programs.
Question #140. [Regarding Yemen] What kinds of contingency planning
is the Department of State undertaking for the provision of U.S.
assistance, in both the economic and security sectors, in the event
that the situation continues to deteriorate?
Answer. We face truly historic circumstances in a region of great
strategic value, but existing budget levels and earmarks greatly limit
our flexibility to respond to contingencies. In spite of these
challenges, we will need to be creative and flexible in identifying
resources to support Yemen's security and prosperity. We are actively
reevaluating our programming and assistance in order to prepare for
contingencies and adapt our support to the transitions underway across
the region.
Reprogramming finite funds to address short-term needs represents
one form of contingency planning, though it does not ensure stable
support for longer term objectives. Contingency funding capabilities,
such as the Complex Crisis Fund (CCF) and the Elections and the
Elections and Political Processes (EPP) Fund, help provide the U.S.
Government with the flexibility necessary to respond to rapidly
developing political, humanitarian, and security scenarios, without
forcing us to divert funding from other priority programs.
Question #141. Organizations such as Human Rights Watch and others
have raised allegations about improper treatment in Iraqi detention
facilities.
What is the administration doing to address the capacity
within the Ministry of Justice, judicial guarantees and
conditions in places of detention?
Answer. The administration shares the concerns of human rights
advocates regarding conditions in detention facilities. The USG is
using all available and appropriate diplomatic, economic, and security
resources to develop the capacity within the Ministry of Justice to
help Iraqi detention facilities and prisons meet international
standards, address torture and abuse, and reduce overcrowding. The USG:
Provides technical assistance to the Ministry of Justice
(MOJ) to improve their capacity and monitor the performance of
the criminal justice, police and security institutions to
ensure full compliance with Iraq's international human rights
obligations. INL/I Corrections Advisory Program aims to
establish safe, secure correctional facilities for the humane
care, custody, and treatment of persons incarcerated in the
Iraqi Corrections Service (ICS) system as a means of enhancing
the public safety for the citizens of Iraq under rule of law.
INL/I currently has 33 advisors serving at nine MOJ facilities,
ICS Headquarters, and the National Corrections Training Center.
The INL/I Justice Team funds DOJ/ Overseas Prosecutorial
Development and Training Rule of Law advisors, whose
responsibilities include:
1. Assisting the Government of Iraq (GOI) in processing
cases more effectively, including by identifying the most
critical impediments (local, provincial, and systemic) to the
operation of Iraq's criminal justice system, making
recommendations to improve case management, and facilitating
coordination and cooperation between judges, police, and
corrections personnel.
2. Supporting compliance with Iraqi law and international
human rights obligations in Iraqi detention facilities by
coordinating bilateral inspections of detention facilities,
addressing lawful execution of detention and release orders,
reviewing timely processing of detainees, and facilitating
training to build the capacity of corrections officers, among
other activities which further the same goal.
3. Assisting GOI counterparts in transition from confession-
based to evidence-based prosecutions through individual
mentoring, education, familiarization with evidentiary concepts
and otherwise facilitating trainings for judicial police,
investigative judges, and trial judges.
The USG also:
Urges the Government of Iraq to promptly investigate all
allegations of torture and ill-treatment and prosecute
officials who are responsible for the abuse of detainees.
Condemns publicly any use of torture, including during
interrogation with the aim of eliciting confessions.
Encourages the Iraqi Government to finalize ratification of
the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment and ratify the Optional Protocol.
Recommends that the Iraqi Government invite the U.N. Special
Rapporteur on Torture to examine detainee conditions in Iraqi
facilities.
Question #142. Recognizing Iraq sovereignty over its own detention
sites, does the United States pay particular attention to persons
transferred from U.S. custody?
Answer. The USG is working to ensure that the handover of detainees
from the USG to the GOI, including the transfer process and subsequent
detention, is consistent with our international legal obligations and
policy commitments. We have had positive discussions with The
International Committee of the Red Cross regarding the plan that has
been developed jointly between the USG and the GOI. All remaining
detainees in United States Forces-Iraq (USF-I) custody will be
transferred to a Ministry of Justice detention facility, Karkh Prison.
Transferring the USF-I held detainees to Karkh Prison will facilitate
USG oversight of detainee treatment and judicial case processing.
Question #143. What contingency funding streams are available to
provide humanitarian relief for Libya in the event that the current
unrest degenerates to civil war?
Answer. The U.S. Government is providing $47 million to
international and nongovernmental organizations to meet the
humanitarian needs of individuals fleeing the violence in Libya. This
funding is comprised of $15 million from the President's Emergency
Refugee and Migration Assistance Account, $12 million from the
Migration and Refugee Assistance Account, $5 million from the Title II
Account, and $15 million from the International Disaster Assistance
Account, $5 million of which was programmed by USAID/FFP for local and
regional procurement.
We are closely following developments in Libya and should the
situation further degenerate, we would look to these humanitarian
accounts in the first instance.
Question #144. Regional Middle East. In light of the popular
uprisings throughout the Middle East, in countries that might be
looking to enact reforms and move toward more democratic systems, how
does the State Department find an equilibrium between supporting the
legitimate democratic aspirations of the populations with the United
States existing strategic interests in the region?
Answer. It has been and remains in our interest to support Egypt--
the 30 years of peace that followed the Camp David Accords allowed for
both Israel and Egypt to develop and strengthen in a particularly
challenging region. Our engagement with governments enables us to have
honest conversations with them about things like democracy and human
rights. To this end, Foreign Military Financing accounts serve U.S.
interests beyond the direct security imperative; it is probably not a
coincidence that the same Egyptian military that we have supported for
the last 30 years chose not to fire on protesters.
In fact, we talk about these things with other governments because
it is in our strategic interest to do so--to promote good governance
and openness in Middle Eastern societies. I said at the Forum for the
Future in Doha last January that ``in too many places, in too many
ways, the region's foundations are sinking into the sand. If leaders
don't offer a positive vision and give young people meaningful ways to
contribute, others will fill the vacuum.'' By helping Middle Eastern
societies transition toward more democratic systems of government, we
will definitively repudiate the extremist narrative that feeds on
repression and isolation.
The United States maintains an active agenda promoting reform in
the region. Our ambassadors and embassies across the region are fully
engaged in these issues, whether through public statements, private
diplomatic conversations, or targeted programming. Recent events only
reaffirm the importance of our assistance efforts in the region,
particularly those that support the development of economic
opportunities and civil society.
We are committed to enduring partnerships with our regional allies.
As events in the region have unfolded, we have maintained close contact
with them, engaging leaders by phone and in person.
In our interactions with our partners, we have explained the core
principles guiding us in the region, emphasized our conviction that
stability in the Middle East will be enhanced by respecting the rights
and aspirations of the people of the region, and reiterated our strong
commitment to supporting a more peaceful and prosperous Middle East in
close consultation with all our regional partners. We will continue to
engage our colleagues along these lines in effort to secure greater
participation and prosperity for all.
Question #145. How do we resolve the tension between supporting
civil society that is seeking change while also providing support to
government institutions?
Answer. For many years, the U.S. Government, through both USAID and
the Middle East Partnership Initiative, has supported the development
of a robust civil society across the Middle East. This support will not
falter. Where there is resistance from our partners in government, we
have forcefully articulated our view that a prosperous future for the
Middle East depends on governments reaching out in partnership with
their people to reform the political and economic foundations of the
region. Indeed, my January tour of the Middle East and participation in
the Forum for the Future in Doha was a concrete demonstration of our
commitment to this principle. In Doha, I called on our government
counterparts to see civil society not as a threat, but as a partner,
and warned that ``those who cling to the status quo may be able to hold
back the full impact of their countries' problems for a little while,
but not forever. If leaders don't offer a positive vision and give
young people meaningful ways to contribute, others will fill the
vacuum.''
Question #146. A recent report released by the Council of Europe
connects Kosovo's Prime Minister Hashim Thaci to the trade of narcotics
and organ trafficking. Does the EULEX mission have the capacity to
undertake an investigation of this complexity or scale?
Answer. We believe that EULEX is the appropriate organization to
undertake an investigation into the very serious allegations in the
Council of Europe's report. It has the mandate, jurisdiction, and
backing of the European Union and its partners, including the United
States.
Creating another ad hoc U.N. or other international entity to carry
out an investigation would be unnecessary and duplicative, in light of
EULEX's mandate, and would only serve to delay efforts to get to the
bottom of the allegations.
We are currently working with our European partners to assess what,
if any, additional support EULEX may require to conduct a thorough and
impartial investigation.
Question #147. A recent report released by the Council of Europe
connects Kosovo's Prime Minister Hashim Thaci to the trade of narcotics
and organ trafficking. What is the State Department doing to support
further investigation of these allegations?
Answer. Rule of law is paramount for peace, stability, and progress
in Balkans. The United States takes seriously any allegations of
criminal wrongdoing. In this regard, we take seriously the allegations
contained in the Council of Europe report, some of which had previously
been investigated by the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
(ICTY) and the U.N. Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).
We urged the governments of Kosovo and Albania to commit their full
support to a followup investigation, which they have done.
We fully support the EU-led Rule of Law Mission EULEX leading a
thorough and impartial follow-on investigation. EULEX has the
jurisdiction and mandate to deal with the sorts of crimes alleged by
the report; it already exists and has dealt with similar issues in the
past as well as currently; and it will have the full weight of the
European Union and its partners to support it.
The United States is a committed contributor of personnel to
EULEX-- including prosecutors, judges, and civilian police. We are
working with our European partners to determine what further support,
if any, EULEX needs in order to successfully investigate allegations in
the Council of Europe's report.
Question #148. Turkish-Israeli relations have been locked into a
downward spiral. Both countries share our interest in seeing their
Middle Eastern neighbors freer and more prosperous.
What can be done to put this old partnership on a more
constructive basis at a time when positive leadership is needed
in the Middle East?
Answer. Both Turkey and Israel are important allies and partners of
the United States. A constructive relationship between Turkey and
Israel supports our mutual interest in peace and stability in the
region, something we are all trying to achieve.
We will continue to encourage both Turkey and Israel to move beyond
the recent strains in their bilateral relationship and work together
toward the goals we all share.
Question #149. Can you address the results we have seen from
previous diplomatic programs in Belarus and what kind of results we can
expect from a 30 percent increase of funds?
Answer. Despite the challenging and oppressive operating
environment in Belarus under the Lukashenka administration
characterized by repressing pro-democracy groups and independent
political voices, and preventing most citizens from accessing objective
information, our assistance programs have had some important successes.
For example, with the support of U.S. assistance, numerous independent
Belarusian newspapers and Web sites have been able to cover the recent
crackdown and continue to provide objective information to the citizens
of Belarus despite attacks on their Web sites and seizures of their
equipment by the authorities. Last year, U.S. assistance supported 48
business associations that engaged in advocacy and watchdog functions,
and mobilized the business community and broader civil society in order
to affect public-policy development. These efforts led to an increase
in membership of business associations by over 11 percent. Together
with our European partners, we have been supporting the European
Humanities University in Vilnius, which provides a Western-quality
education to Belarusian students. We are also nearly ready to launch a
Western-accredited, English-language MBA program, which will further
expand opportunities for Belarusians. We have increased the number of
Belarusians participating in exchanges to the United States, with the
number of participants in 2010 reaching 100, a 4-year high.
In response to the Belarusian Government's brutal crackdown
following the December 2010 Presidential election, the U.S. pledged a
one-time, $4 million increase in assistance for Belarus. Some of this
funding will continue to address immediate humanitarian and legal needs
to those facing repression in the aftermath of the crackdown, and
support independent media. For the medium to longer term, we are
reviewing our assistance strategy to ensure that our programs are most
effectively aligned with our policy goals and remain responsive to the
evolving environment. This review will inform priorities for the
balance of our $4 million commitment as well as future annual funding.
We will consult with Congress before programming these funds.
Question #150. What sort of obstacles have the provision of
assistance met in the past and what can be done to improve their
efficacy in the future?
Answer. While our efforts to address social and humanitarian issues
as well as to empower entrepreneurs and strengthen the private sector
are generally unimpeded, the Government of Belarus has used a number of
tactics to stymie programs working to advance civil society, democracy
and human rights, which constitute the majority of our assistance. Over
the course of the past decade, many of our implementing partners have
been forced to shut down their offices in Belarus and relocate outside
the country due to the Government's actions. Simultaneously, the
Lukashenka administration has impeded the ability of many of the
Belarusian beneficiaries of our assistance from carrying out their
work, targeting civil society groups, independent media outlets, and
those working to create space for the free expression of political
views. For example, the Government of Belarus harasses activists and
organizations, obstructs freedom of association and assembly, seizes
equipment from NGOs and media outlets, denies independent newspapers
access to distribution networks, blocks or disables independent Web
sites, requires lengthy project approvals, and denies registration of
civic organizations. Additionally, the reduction of staff at U.S.
Embassy Minsk--ordered by the Government of Belarus in 2008--makes
monitoring and evaluating our programs more challenging.
To tackle these challenges, our assistance targets civil society
groups and those promoting political and media freedoms. For example,
we help civil society groups and media outlets comply with legal
requirements and other challenges facing their operations, as well as
aid them to better secure and develop their Web sites. Additionally,
the United States has gone to great lengths to coordinate with our
European counterparts when working against constraints to the operating
environment and to ensure that our programming is successfully
addressing challenges as they arise.
To ensure our programs are most effectively aligned with our policy
goals and responsive to the new, more challenging environment, we are
currently reviewing our assistance strategy. We are also planning a
donor mapping exercise that will aggregate information collected from
all the major donors to Belarus. This project will inform our ongoing
assistance strategy review, while identifying any gaps in international
assistance and avoiding duplication of effort.
Question #151. Belarus. What efforts has the Department of State
made specifically for the release of political prisoners?
Answer. The Department has, from the moment arrests began, made
repeated efforts to persuade the Government of Belarus to immediately
and unconditionally release them. We issued public statements by the
Department, including two joint statements by Secretary Clinton and EU
High Representative Ashton, and several other senior officials of the
State Department have spoken out publicly on this issue, including
former Assistant Secretary Crowley, Principal European Deputy Assistant
Secretary McEldowney, and Democracy and Human Rights DAS Melia, and
several statements at the regular meetings of the Permanent Council of
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Our Embassy in
Minsk has on numerous occasions repeated this same message directly to
Belarusian officials.
As a direct result of our determination that the Lukashenka regime
has created new political prisoners, the United States on January 31
imposed a range of sanctions against Belarus. These sanctions include
visa bans, the revocation of the General License that permitted trade
with two subsidiaries of Belarus' largest oil and petrochemical
corporation, Belneftekhim, and further efforts to freeze assets of
officials responsible for the crackdown.
On April 6, the United States, together with 13 other countries,
requested that international experts undertake an impartial fact-
finding mission to Belarus to address questions related to particularly
serious threats to human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy and
the rule of law that occurred after the December 19, 2010, Presidential
election. This request was made through the invocation of an
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mechanism
known as the ``Moscow Mechanism.'' Approved by consensus of all OSCE
participating States in 1991, the Moscow Mechanism provides a means for
addressing questions related to the fulfillment of human rights
commitments in an individual State.
We are continuing to assess the effectiveness of these steps as we
go forward, and we will decide on any further actions based on the
regime's response. We will continue our close coordination with our EU
colleagues for maximum effect.
Question #152. The U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission
was established in July 2009 in an effort to reset relations between
the two countries and broaden the range of issues they engage on.
Several working groups of the Commission are meeting in Moscow from
February 28 through March 5, 2011, including Science and Technology and
the Education subworking group. There will be discussions of building
academic partnerships and collaborating on technology transfer.
What concrete accomplishments can the working groups point
to now that they've had over a year to cooperate?
Answer. Our efforts since President Obama and President Medvedev
committed to making a fresh start in U.S.-Russia relations have proven
that the reset is real and substantive. This is in no small measure
credited to the work of the Bilateral Presidential Commission and its
now 18 working groups. In its short 2-year lifespan, the Commission has
proven itself as a catalyst for regular interactions between our
governments on a growing shared agenda. It has also added value to
these relationships by bringing in fresh faces, including from our
companies and civil societies, to help sustain its work and to produce
tangible results that impact both Russians and Americans. A detailed
account of the Commission's accomplishments in its first year can be
found on the Commission's Web site at www.state.gov/russiabpc . A short
scorecard of the Commission's more recent achievements include:
Continued coordination on Iran, North Korea, and Middle East
Peace;
Joint U.S. and Russian support for an Afghan-led operation,
which seized over 932 kg of heroin, and the dismantling of a
cocaine smuggling ring between Florida and St. Petersburg;
The shutdown of Russia's last weapons grade plutonium reactor and
the conclusion of an agreement to conduct feasibility studies on
research reactor conversion;
An increase in joint exercises and exchanges between our
militaries, including for the first time in our history a joint
counterterrorism exercise to combat aircraft hijacking, which took
place last August;
Expanded opportunities for two-way trade and investment, including
in innovation sectors, and the launch of new partnerships between our
cities and companies on energy cost saving Smart Grid Technology;
New cooperation on the global eradication of polio and to launch
technology applications to provide health information to new mothers
via text message;
Increased collaboration between American and Russian NGOs to fight
official and corporate corruption and stop the exploitation of
children;
And, the creation of new university partnerships in science and
technology as well as creation of new youth exchanges in sports and
theater.
And that is just the tip of the iceberg, with much more planned for
the future.
Question #153. How often have the working groups met and on what
dates?
Answer. The Commission has achieved its objective to increase
productive interactions between the United States and Russia. According
to the Commission's mission statement, working groups are encouraged to
meet as often and regularly as cochairs consider necessary. In its
first year alone, over 100 meetings and exchanges were held under the
auspices of Commission working groups. Since last July, over 50 high-
level interactions, including visits and digital video conferences,
have taken place. This high level of interaction is indicative of our
shared interest in strengthening our joint work across the Commission's
broad agenda. In our meetings and discussions, Russia's Foreign
Minister and I, as co-Coordinators of the Commission, regularly review
progress and offer guidance on the Commission's initiatives and
activities.
Question #154. Are there plans to restructure, consolidate, or
expand the BPC working groups based on the ongoing experience acquired
as a result of the collaboration?
Answer. As the Commission's terms of reference stipulate, the
composition of the Commission may change as some objectives are
accomplished and new ones are identified. In September, the Defense
Relations Working Group, cochaired by Secretary Gates and Russia's
Defense Minister, Anatoliy Serdukov, was created to enhance
interactions and build confidence between our defense establishments in
areas such as missile defense, defense technology, maritime operations,
regional security, training, and social welfare issues. Thus, as our
shared agenda with Russia grows to include new issues or priorities,
the Commission may also grow to advance our objectives.
Question #155. How are working group activities budgeted?
Answer. U.S. Commission activities are not funded through a
designated budget but supported as appropriate through the existing
budgets of participating agencies and the annual bilateral assistance
to Russia provided through the Assistance to Europe, Eurasia and
Central Asia (AEECA) account. Given growing budgetary constraints, we
have encouraged working groups to be flexible in engaging their Russian
counterparts, including by using video-teleconference. We are also
exploring opportunities for public-private partnerships as well as
potential fund raising mechanisms to support new initiatives,
particularly to further our cultural and youth exchanges.
Question #156. The Government of Azerbaijan continues to make
bellicose statements regarding the ongoing state of tensions with
Armenia. Recently an agreement on military cooperation was concluded
between Turkey and Azerbaijan.
What is the extent of military cooperation between
Azerbaijan and Turkey?
Answer. The Government of Azerbaijan and the Government of Turkey
share close bilateral relations and have been cooperating in the
military sphere in a number of areas.
On December 21, 2010, the Azerbaijani Parliament ratified an
agreement on ``strategic partnership and mutual assistance'' with the
Government of Turkey. We understand the agreement includes cooperation
on a range of bilateral issues, including in the military sphere. The
agreement stipulates joint training, technical cooperation, equipment
provisioning, and consultations on political-military security issues.
Question #157. How concerned are you by the Azeri military buildup?
Answer. As a cochair of the OSCE Minsk Group, the United States
remains concerned about the risk of miscalculation in the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict. We continue to urge the parties to the conflict to
show restraint in order to minimize the risk that any such
miscalculation could lead to unintended consequences. Azerbaijan
remains an active participant in the Minsk Group process and has
committed to seeking a lasting, peaceful settlement of the conflict.
The United States has continued to make clear to Azerbaijan and
Armenia, both bilaterally and through the Minsk Group, that there is no
military solution to the conflict.
Question #158. What is the Department doing to address it?
Answer. As a cochair of the Minsk Group, the United States has
emphasized that all sides should show restraint in their public
statements and on the ground to avoid misunderstandings and unintended
consequences. Secretary Clinton reiterated this message during her
February meetings in Munich with Azerbaijani Foreign Minister
Mammadyarov and Armenian President Sargsian, as did Deputy Secretary
Steinberg during his February visits to Yerevan and Baku.
Question #159. Can you point to any successes the Minsk Process may
have achieved since its establishment?
Answer. The OSCE Minsk Group, of which the United State is a
cochair, continues its vital role as the sole venue for mediating a
peaceful, lasting settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. First
and foremost, the Minsk Group cochairs continue to help Armenia and
Azerbaijan recognize that a return to open conflict would be disastrous
both for them and the region. Through their regular shuttle diplomacy
to the region and meetings with the top leadership of all sides, the
cochairs have helped Azerbaijan and Armenia move closer to peace. In
recent weeks, there has been positive movement toward reaching
agreement on the Basic Principles, which will serve as the basis for a
final peace treaty. In December 2010, the Presidents of Armenia and
Azerbaijan issued a joint statement--along with Russian President
Medvedev, French Prime Minister Fillon, and Secretary Clinton--which
confirmed their commitment to seek a peaceful settlement based upon the
principles and norms of international law; the United Nations Charter;
the Helsinki Final Act; and the statements of Presidents Medvedev,
Sarkozy, and Obama at L'Aquila on July 10, 2009, and at Muskoka on June
26, 2010. Notably, this was the first time Presidents Aliyev and
Sargsian publicly and jointly stated that the Helsinki Final Act and
the elements in the L'Aquila and Muskoka statements should be the basis
of a settlement.
Question #160. U.S. Presence in Asia-Pacific. In the last several
years the United States has shown through both words and actions a
reinvigorated, bipartisan commitment to maintaining a robust presence
in the Asia-Pacific region. While expressing support for this renewed
presence, partners and allies in the region have expressed the hope
that U.S. engagement with the Asia-Pacific will be sustainable. A
critical test of our sustainability--and ultimately our ability to
retain influence--will be maintaining budgetary support for U.S.
programs and personnel in the region.
Does this budget adequately reflect the continuing U.S.
commitment to the Asia-Pacific?
Answer. The FY 2012 budget request supports our engagement in the
East Asia and Pacific region and advances fundamental U.S. interests.
Our foreign assistance is intended to deepen relationships with
burgeoning democracies in Indonesia and Mongolia, strengthen
partnerships with newly emerging democracies such as Timor Leste,
establish a USAID office to implement projects in the Pacific, enhance
relations with long-time partners in Thailand and the Philippines,
improve cooperation with Vietnam and China, and support civil society
needs in Burma. In addition, we seek to further regional integration
through multilateral organizations such as the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation forum and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, as
well as through the Lower Mekong Initiative.
Foreign assistance from the East Asian and Pacific Affairs bureau
will support the key U.S. Government priorities in the region of
advancing the Comprehensive Partnership with Indonesia, improving
security and antiterrorist capabilities in the Philippines, enhancing
engagement with Vietnam, building the capacity of regional multilateral
institutions, and supporting global initiatives on health, climate
change, and food security.
Question #161. What are the funding levels for the ``100,000
Strong'' Initiative and the Lower Mekong Initiative--two signature
administration initiatives in East Asia--in the FY 2012 budget?
Answer. The ``100,000 Strong'' Initiative is a public-private
partnership; there is no FY 2012 funding request.
Our FY 2012 request for the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) is $5.5
million.
Question #162. Is funding sufficient to sustain programming on both
initiatives?
Answer. No U.S. Government funds will be used to support the
100,000 Strong Initiative. The Initiative is a public-private
partnership and will be fully funded and implemented by private sector
organizations. Corporate, foundation, and individual donors pledge
financial support to the Initiative, but funding flows directly to the
schools and study abroad programs of their choice. Our goal is to
secure pledges of at least $68 million in private contributions to
support the Initiative in order to enable study abroad programs to
expand sufficiently to reach our goal of seeing 100,000 Americans
studying in China over 4 years.
Present funding for the Lower Mekong Initiative will allow us to
support programs across the four pillars: infrastructure, education,
health, and the environment. In July 2009, the United States joined
Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and Thailand to launch the Lower Mekong
Initiative with the aim of promoting cooperation on issues of regional
importance.
Since then, we have initiated projects designed to help better
manage the invaluable natural resources that the Mekong River system
provides, such as strengthening water management, cleaning up
waterways, protecting forests, building science partnerships, and
advancing clean energy. The FY12 request of $5.5 million for the Lower
Mekong Initiative would allow the United States to expand those
projects, develop new ones, and leverage resources from the Lower
Mekong countries as they have also offered to contribute resources to
support shared efforts.
Question #163. What impact would proposed budget cuts have on the
United States ability to exert its influence in the region?
Answer. There is no question that the dynamic Asia-Pacific region's
influence is growing and holds the key to our shared future, and that
American leadership in the region is essential to our long-term
national interests. Proposed budget cuts would undermine the
administration's commitment to sustain and strengthen America's
leadership in the Asia-Pacific region. Reduced funding could have
significant consequences for our efforts to engage Asian-Pacific
countries and regional institutions to improve security, heighten
prosperity, and promote democracy and human rights. Budget cuts would
also limit our ability to help build regional capacity to address the
economic, environmental, political, and security challenges facing the
region.
Question #164. What message would cuts send to our allies and
partners in the region?
Answer. Reduced budgetary support for our programs in the Asia-
Pacific region would undermine our efforts to sustain and develop our
influence in the region and would send the wrong signal to our partners
and allies, giving credence to those who have openly questioned the
United States long-term commitment to the region. A reduction in
funding levels would also prevent the United States from fulfilling
important existing commitments to support programs and initiatives in
the region. Reneging on our commitments would not only raise doubts
about our willingness to live up to our promises, but also call into
question our sincerity when making those commitments.
Question #165 & #166. The East-West Center (EWC) was established by
Congress in 1960 as a national educational institution to foster better
relations and understanding among the peoples of the United States,
Asia, and the Pacific Islands through programs of cooperative study,
training, and research. The EWC plays an absolutely critical U.S.
public diplomacy role in the Asia-Pacific, and is an important aspect
of the broader, enduring U.S. presence in the region.
How does your department assess the continuing value of the
EWC's activities to U.S. national security and foreign policy
objectives in the Asia-Pacific?
How would cuts in EWC funding impact U.S. diplomatic efforts
in the region?
Answer. As the importance of U.S. relations with the Asia-Pacific
region continues to grow--including with China as an emerging global
power and Indonesia as the world's most populous Muslim nation--the
East-West Center remains valuable to promoting U.S. national security
and foreign policy objectives. Established by the U.S. Congress in
1960, the Center serves as a key national resource by fostering better
relations and understanding among the peoples of the United States,
Asia, and the Pacific Islands through education and dialogue on
critical issues of common concern. Its success in bringing together
people and institutions from multiple sectors--including government,
academia, journalism, and the private sector--promotes regional
collaboration, intellectual capacity-building and the development of
effective policy options.
The East-West Center has introduced many opinion-makers
overseas to American values. It serves as a forum for meetings
between officials and leaders of Asia and the Pacific and their
U.S. counterparts, offering a unique venue and expertise to
foster cooperation and encourage the sharing of ideas. The
Center's 58,000 alumni form a significant international network
of influence in government, international organizations and
educational institutions, and U.S. embassies support and
benefit from the efforts of these alumni overseas. Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh of India and Prime Minister Najib Razak
of Malaysia are among current Asia-Pacific leaders with East-
West Center experience. Another Center alumnus, Chinese Vice
Minister of Education Hao Ping, has a key role in promoting
enhanced educational cooperation with the United States. The
Center's biannual alumni conferences convene hundreds of
alumni, testimony to the lasting value of the Center
experience.
The Center's leadership programs for graduate students,
young professionals and young women leaders in particular are
helping pave the way for a future of increased cooperation. The
Center also helps Americans improve their understanding of the
Asia-Pacific region by working with high schools and colleges
around the country, strengthening U.S. capacity to engage with
this critical region in the future.
The pending FY 2012 President's budget reflects the
administration's commitment to fiscal constraint, and would
require a number of programs to pursue operating efficiencies
and greater cost-sharing. As has been proposed in past years,
the budget assumes the East-West Center will pursue other
Federal and non-Federal funding sources to support both its
core programs and administrative overhead. The Center raises
approximately $0.60 for each appropriated dollar to further its
congressional mission. Should the Center be unable to increase
this ratio, it will need to reduce a significant number of
staff, reduce the amounts of student scholarships
(approximately 280 currently) and decrease the number of its
other participants possibly by one half, and may be required to
eliminate its Okinawa Initiative and U.S. involvement with the
Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, and implement substantial
cuts in programs for journalists, teachers, political leaders,
and cooperative research. Collaborators and donors have noted
that cutbacks in the appropriation would likely result in
reduced nongovernmental funding as well.
Question #167. Congress has long supported the Asia Foundation's
efforts to build democratic institutions and promote economic reform
and women's empowerment across Asia. Through its longstanding presence
working through 18 field offices across the region, the Foundation
builds local capacity that engages government and civil society in
reform efforts. The Asia Foundation's activities not only improve the
lives of Asians, but they contribute to stability and U.S. national
security interests in the region.
In what ways does the work of the Asia Foundation contribute
to advancing U.S. interests in the region, specifically
including democratic development, good governance, economic
reform, and women's empowerment?
Answer. The Asia Foundation has unique attributes that enable it to
advance U.S. interests in Asia. The Foundation is the only
nongovernmental organization that has maintained 18 offices throughout
Asia for nearly 60 years. Because of its long history in Asia, its
grantmaking, and its deep relationships of trust with local governments
and nongovernment organizations, the Asia Foundation is able to manage
effective on-the-ground programs by providing grants to local
organizations to build local capacity. Specifically, these programs
advance U.S. national interests such as strengthening democratic
institutions and civil society, promoting good governance, creating
economic opportunity, and empowering women, and are often conducted in
countries or target situations in which the U.S. Government is unable
to offer direct assistance.
Using its appropriation from Congress, the Foundation funds pilot
projects and leverages funds from other donors to expand the impact of
U.S. taxpayer-funded programs.
The Asia Foundation continues to be one of the U.S. Government's
most important private partners in developing and implementing
democracy, governance, and human rights programs in Asia. Examples of
those programs include advancing open government and transparency in
rulemaking in China, developing peace processes in the Philippines and
Nepal, countering trafficking in persons, protecting rights and
empowering women in Cambodia and Thailand, and working with religious
organizations in Muslim countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia,
Bangladesh, and Afghanistan.
Finally, the Foundation is an important neutral convener and, as
such, helps to resolve conflicts in key countries in Asia. As seen in
its role as a neutral party in the Philippine peace process, the
Foundation is the only American organization to be invited by both the
Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF) to help monitor the peace agreement.
Question #168. How would cuts in Asia Foundation funding impact
U.S. efforts to promote democracy, good governance, market economic
policies, women's rights, and justice in Asia?
Answer. As a unique American asset relied upon by State, USAID, and
other U.S. Government agencies, Asia Foundation funding cuts would have
a negative impact on U.S. Government efforts to promote democracy, good
governance, and reform in many Asian countries. Cuts specifically would
jeopardize the Foundation's longstanding 18 office network in Asia. The
Foundation effectively manages its limited funding, with a low overhead
rate, and leverages an estimated $4 from other donors for every
congressionally appropriated dollar. The Asia Foundation's 1994
appropriation of $15 million would be equivalent to $23 million in
today's inflation-adjusted dollars, yet the Foundation's appropriation
in FY 2010 was just $19 million.
As the only longstanding American organization with a regionwide
reach, the Asia Foundation's withdrawal from countries could be seen as
a signal of American withdrawal from those specific countries and from
engagement in the wider region.
The Foundation plays an important American nongovernmental
leadership role in helping to convene newly emerging donors in the
region, leading up to the High Level Forum for Aid Effectiveness this
fall, for which the Foundation has been working closely with the South
Korean Government to prepare and shape the agenda. As a valued private
partner of the U.S. Government in implementing important programs to
advance key U.S. interests in the region, any reduction of the
Foundation's presence in the region would be detrimental to the
advancement of U.S. interests in Asia.
Question #169. Burma: When the Obama administration announced its
Burma policy in the fall of 2009 after extensive study, it pledged to
address the urgent humanitarian needs of Burma's long-suffering people
through the expansion of assistance in ways designed to help those most
in need without inadvertently strengthening the government. How does
this year's budget request for Burma-related accounts reflect this
goal?
Answer. Of the total $23.3 million FY 2012 funds requested for
Burma, approximately $12 million ESF will be used for humanitarian
assistance, expanding the FY 2009-funded program from the Delta region
affected by Cyclone Nargis to the ``Dry Zone,'' a drought-ridden region
of Central Burma, where people are among the most disadvantaged. The FY
2012 budget request will support the most vulnerable and poor in three
key sectors: maternal and child health; livelihoods/food security; and
water/sanitation/hygiene. USG implementing partners in Burma are
experienced in the complex operating environment of Burma and have
internal systems and policies in place to ensure that assistance
reaches the targeted communities and that no funds go to or through the
Government of Burma. Implementing partners work in accordance with U.S.
Government statutory restrictions and Office of Foreign Assets Control
sanctions and licenses.
Question #170. Please describe the administration's plans to
support the activities of NGOs in Tibetan regions of China, and the
impact of proposed cuts to foreign assistance on those and related
Tibet programs, as well as on the ability of the administration to
implement the Tibet Policy Act of 2002.
Answer. U.S. Government assistance to Tibetan areas of China
reflects the basic tenets of the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002 to support
cultural preservation, sustainable development, and environmental
preservation.
The State Department and USAID support these objectives through
numerous programs that aid Tibetans both inside and outside of China.
These programs preserve Tibet's unique cultural and linguistic
heritage, provide educational and vocational opportunities, protect
Tibet's delicate environment, and aid Tibetan refugees in neighboring
countries.
Proposed cuts to the foreign assistance request for Tibet programs
would undermine the administration's ability to implement the Tibet
Policy Act of 2002. Reduced funding could have significant consequences
for our efforts to preserve Tibetan culture, promote prosperity for
ethnic Tibetans, and protect Tibet's environment. Budget cuts would
also limit our ability to build local NGO capacity to address
challenges facing the region. For instance, in Qinghai province, the
State Department has been supporting the growth of the NGO sector in
Tibetan areas. The 2010 Yushu earthquake brought devastation to the
area, which is estimated 97 percent ethnic Tibetan, and many NGOs are
still in the process of rebuilding their organizations and environment.
Without continued funding, Tibetan NGOs will lose critical support for
their efforts to ensure that government plans to rebuild the area take
into account the needs of local residents. Budget cuts would also
sharply limit USAID's ability to improve health care services for
Tibetan children and provide training for Tibetan birth attendants.
Question #171. What is the State Department's position on S. 416 (a
bill to develop a strategy for assisting stateless children from North
Korea)?
Answer. Intercountry adoption, as contemplated by S. 416, is ill-
suited to respond to issues relating to statelessness and to North
Korean refugees. We generally find that intercountry adoption is not an
adequate form of assistance to children in situations of distress
arising from a natural disaster, political unrest, the type of
oppression found in North Korea, or the plight of North Korean refugees
in other countries. As difficult as those situations may be, the
children may nonetheless have parents or relatives with whom they may
be reunited, making intercountry adoption a premature option.
Heightened safeguards should be applied to verify that children in such
circumstances are actually orphans and are not merely temporarily
separated from their parents.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton to Questions
Submitted by Senator Richard G. Lugar
Question #1. Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO).--While I
understand that the programs you propose to fund through the new
Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) account are separated from the
core State and foreign operations programs because they are not
anticipated to be long-term programs, you have also included a number
of programs for these frontline states throughout your core budget
request, including, for example, $324 million for Afghanistan for
``rule of law development and the drug trade that fuels the
insurgency'' which your budget states are ``two of the greatest
strategic challenges facing the United States in the war in
Afghanistan.''
Please explain how you determined which funding priorities
fall within the OCO versus your core budget for these frontline
states, and what the total amount of funding for the frontline
states is within your core budget.
Answer. By requesting $8.7 billion in an Overseas Contingency
Operations (OCO) budget, the Department of State and USAID strive to be
as transparent as possible about the extraordinary and temporary
resource demands we face due to operating in frontline states (Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan)--treating these exceptional requirements as
the Department of Defense (DOD) has been treating them for several
years. At the same time, there is still a need to lay the foundation of
a lasting diplomatic presence and continue base assistance programs to
ensure that the gains made by the Department of State and the DOD are
not reversed and that we continue to foster long-term strategic
partnerships. These expenses are included in the FY 2012 core budget
request of $5.3 billion for the frontline states.
Our efforts to stabilize the frontline states and transition from
military-to-civilian-led missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, has led the
Department and USAID to take on extraordinary roles and costs that are
greater than our operations and assistance programs in other regions of
the world. We anticipate that as these missions mature and the
political, economic, and security fortunes of these countries change,
these resource demands will ebb.
Specifically, the OCO costs for the Department and USAID include
higher personnel expenses, enhanced security to operate in a high-
threat environment, new facilities to support expanded operations and
the greater logistical demands such as fuel costs and transportation of
personnel. In Iraq, foreign assistance OCO costs are specifically
related to the transition of police training and military assistance
from the DOD to the Department of State. In Pakistan and Afghanistan,
OCO directly supports civilian-led efforts to develop robust
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency cooperation--the Pakistan
Counterinsurgency Capability Fund and economic and development programs
tied to counterinsurgency efforts. Specific criteria are detailed
below:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number Description
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1......................................... Temporary in nature.
2......................................... Particular to the unique
operational hazards in a
frontline state such as
security to cover
transition activities, life
support and vehicle/
aviation recovery,
acquisition of aviation and/
or secure vehicles for
transition activities.
3......................................... Specific to supporting
counterinsurgency
operations and provincial
stability, such as PRT
funding in Afghanistan and
the EBOs in Iraq.
4......................................... Transitioning programs from
military to civilian
responsibility, such as the
police training and
military assistance
programs in Iraq.
5......................................... Extraordinary in terms of
scale required to meet
political imperatives such
as infrastructure programs
in Afghanistan and the
interagency civilian
uplift.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
In regard to your question about determining the split between OCO
and core foreign assistance programs in Afghanistan, the Department of
State and USAID determined that OCO costs are extraordinary and/or
temporary and specifically intended to achieve joint civilian-military
objectives. The following economic assistance programs, therefore, fell
within the OCO request:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Program Justification
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Provincial Reconstruction Team Programs... These programs provide local
government solutions to
counter insurgent influence
and build support for
legitimate governance
institutions. Programs
immediately follow
``clearing'' and target
conflict-affected
populations.
Strategic Communications.................. The ``Strat-Comm'' program
counters extremist voices
and builds Afghan
communication capacity to
directly counter extremist
domination of communication
space.
Alternative Development................... These programs reinforce
stability by providing
vulnerable populations with
licit, economically
attractive alternatives to
poppy cultivation, in turn
reducing revenues that
support anti-government
elements and contributing
to the development of
sustainable economic
growth.
Roads..................................... This request supports
construction of municipal,
district, provincial and
regional transit routes
that link communities and
markets. These roads are
critical to maintaining the
momentum behind other
economic growth initiatives
that support both
stabilization efforts as
well as long term economic
sustainability.
Power..................................... Economic growth is the key
component of the COIN Build
phase and reliable access
to power underpins economic
growth and job creation.
The OCO component of the
power request supports the
Afghan Infrastructure
Program, including the
Kandahar Power Initiative.
These large-scale
infrastructure projects
will complete large-scale,
high priority power
projects that will provide
up to 50 percent of
Afghanistan's urban
populations along the
eastern corridor with
access to reliable,
uninterrupted power supply.
Cash for Work............................. These programs provide short-
term jobs for urban and
rural families, targeting
unskilled, under-employed
youths in insurgent-
vulnerable areas.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The core components of the request are those programs with the
primary objective of promoting sustainable solutions in Afghanistan,
beyond our stabilization objectives. These programs primarily focus on
longer term capacity-building and sustainable solutions that will help
ensure the irreversibility of transition from international to Afghan
lead. The rule of law and governance programs, for example, are
critical to building Afghan institutions that are responsive to
citizen's needs after military-led efforts have scaled down. Under
infrastructure, the physical construction of projects is considered OCO
because of the extraordinary size of the near-term investment. But the
sustainability components of the project that focus on
commercialization of electricity delivery and the capacity-building
within the government to manage these programs are part of the core
program. Health and education fall under the core program because they
are cornerstone investments that will ensure a stable and productive
society, but also build the capacity of the Afghan Government to
provide these services independently.
Similar considerations were used in developing the State Operations
requests. The enduring program component covers the anticipated longer
term platform that resembles our presence in comparable posts the
region. For example, while the static guard force in Iraq is made up
largely of third country nationals (TCNs) that require sustainment, the
longer term force is anticipated to consist of local guards, as is the
case at other posts. The extraordinary costs associated with the
contracts to provide the TCNs and their sustainment is considered to be
in OCO, while the component of the current contracts that are estimated
to cover the cost of a future local guard program in Iraq is part of
the enduring portion of the request. In Afghanistan and Pakistan, the
enduring request supports long term programs, permanent facilities, and
staffing at the level prior to the civilian uplift. The enduring
funding level was initially based on post requirements and staffing at
FY 2007 levels, with adjustments for the operating costs of new
consulates and other permanent facilities. The extraordinary costs
above and beyond the enduring presence would be considered OCO. The
enduring and OCO split will be continuously reviewed as policy
decisions dictate what the future enduring presence will be.
Question #2. You plan to use Pakistan OCO funds for the Pakistan
Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF) to help Pakistan's military
build the capacity to eliminate insurgency sanctuaries that threaten
the government's stability.
How serious is the threat of internal extremist groups to
the Pakistan security institutions and can the Government of
Pakistan withstand their threat? What role does economic
assistance play in this threat?
Answer. The threat of internal extremist groups to the Pakistan
security institutions is significant, although the Government of
Pakistan, including security institutions, can withstand this threat.
By this, we mean that it is highly unlikely that one or more extremist
groups would topple the federal or provincial governments. However, we
expect continued attacks against state institutions such as high-
profile bombings of military and civilian government facilities.
The economic assistance provided to Pakistan is key to continuing
to help the civilian government build its capacity to secure the
country and meet the needs of its people and, in the long-term, to
increase to the economic, social, and educational opportunities
available in Pakistan, thereby reducing the appeal of extremism.
Question #3. While the circumstances of the death of Pakistani
citizens last month continues to be subject of much speculation, the
loss of life is painful and regrettable. It is imperative to the
effective practice of diplomacy to adhere to international conventions.
What is the status of our relationship with Pakistan in view
of the long detention of one of our Embassy staff, Raymond
Davis? How will his status determine U.S. assistance and
engagement going forward?
Answer. America and Pakistan are pursuing a broad and important
agenda together, specifically our shared desire to see Pakistan become
a strong, prosperous democracy, at peace with its neighbors, and
working with us to build security across the region. We are working
together to build energy projects in Pakistan, launch stabilizing road
projects in the FATA, build clinics and schools, improve macroeconomic
fundamentals, cooperate on fighting terrorism, and coordinate on our
efforts to bring stability Afghanistan. On these and other aspects of
our partnership with Pakistan, we stress the frequency, integrity, and
constancy of our engagement with the people and Government of Pakistan.
This is also a difficult time in our relationship, with tensions
over a series of contentious issues, including the case involving
Raymond Davis, and differences on the most effective means for fighting
terrorism. We know the pain this case has caused, and we are committed
to working with the people of Pakistan to move forward in peace and
partnership based on mutual trust and common interests.
Question #4. The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009
provided authority for the long-term engagement and development of
Pakistan. Such funds are in the national security interest and have
long been intended for a long-term and committed partnership with all
Pakistanis.
a. Why have significant resources of those authorized funds
been expended for the purpose of underwriting a social safety
net program?
b. Why has such a large portion of the first year funding
been allocated to a humanitarian response fund, the Citizen's
Damage Compensation Program, in response to the massive floods
of the past year rather than being sought through emergency
response accounts such as IDA or through multilateral
mechanisms?
Answer. At the October 2010 U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue, in a
discussion of its plan for recovering from the 2010 flood disaster,
Pakistan's economic leadership indicated that their sole priority for
donor funding for the reconstruction effort was the Citizens' Damage
Compensation Fund. The Government of Pakistan (GOP) established the
Citizens' Damage Compensation Fund immediately after the flood disaster
as a mechanism to quickly deliver cash assistance to families
devastated by flooding. This infusion of capital is meant to allow
citizens to rebuild their homes and replant their fields as quickly as
possible. As we articulated in the December 2009 Civilian Assistance
Strategy, addressing Pakistan's priorities is critical to developing a
lasting and productive strategic relationship with the people and
Government of Pakistan.
Since Ambassador Holbrooke announced that we plan to accelerate
$500 million in assistance to support recovery and reconstruction
efforts, the GOP has established a partnership with the World Bank to
strengthen the Compensation Fund mechanism. On March 30, the World Bank
approved its plan to contribute $125 million to the Compensation Fund.
Australia, Canada, Italy, and the United Kingdom are also considering
large contributions, and the GOP itself plans to provide $100 million
to support the expansion of the program.
The significant financial support of these donors, especially the
World Bank, is because this program is serving a critical role in
limiting the economic impact of the flood by supporting relief to
families in need. It also reflects the fact that, according to the
World Bank, the Pakistanis have gained significant experience in
implementing similar programs over the past few years--for the 2005
Earthquake Relief effort, the 2009 cash transfer program for internally
displaced persons in Malakand division, and the Benazir Bhutto Income
Support Program (BISP). These experiences have earned Pakistan's
implementing agency--the National Date Registration Authority (NADRA)--
international credibility.
Following the 2009 Tokyo Donor Conference for Pakistan, the United
States made a contribution to the BISP, a government program that
provides microcredit payments directly to female heads of households,
to demonstrate U.S. commitment to Pakistan's development and directly
impact the Pakistani people, including the most vulnerable populations.
Question #5. In your public remarks in Washington on September 28,
2010, you stated, ``it's one of my pet peeves--countries that will not
tax their elites but expect us to come in and help them serve their
people are just not going to get the kind of help from us that they
have been getting . . . You cannot have a tax rate of 9 percent of GDP
when big landholders and all the other elites do not pay anything or
pay so little it's laughable, and you've got such a rate of poverty and
everybody's looking to the United States and other donors to come in
and help."
Essential fiscal reform measures that would have reduced damaging
subsidies, increased tax revenue and placed Pakistan's economy on a
more sound footing appear to have been halted indefinitely in the
Parliament or reversed altogether by the Government of Pakistan.
Consequently, Pakistan remains at grave risk of financial default. At a
time when Pakistan appeals for greater international assistance to
address the country's severe economic crisis, its tax to GDP rate of
roughly 9.5 percent remains among the lowest in Asia.
(a) In light of continuing economic reform setbacks in
Pakistan, despite the reform imperative, please describe the
purpose and structure of United States assistance to Pakistan
and through the government budget. How will the United States
ensure, bilaterally and through our Executive Director at the
International Monetary Fund, that foreign assistance does not
enable dependency or sustain fiscal imprudence?
(b) What recommendations has the U.S. Representative to the
International Monetary Fund suggested regarding the remaining
two tranches under the current agreement with Pakistan--worth a
combined $2.3 billion?
Answer (a). The Government of Pakistan has made some progress in
expanding the tax net over the last 2 years by removing exemptions,
improving fiscal transparency and discipline, and limiting government
borrowing from the national bank. While significant work remains to be
done to stabilize Pakistan's economy, we must recognize that Pakistan
has made some progress under the Stand-By Arrangement it negotiated
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in November 2008.
As part of our political and policy commitment to building a
partnership with the people and Government of Pakistan, we have made a
concerted effort over the past year to channel increasing amounts of
U.S. assistance toward Pakistani priorities, including through
government institutions when appropriate. Over the past 2 years, USAID
has developed significant experience in designing government-to-
government assistance programs, including through conditional cash
transfer programs like the Benazir Bhutto Income Support Program or the
Citizens' Damage Compensation Fund and fixed-rate reimbursable
agreements for projects implemented by government institutions.
Comprehensive accountability and oversight standards are built into
these agreements to ensure that U.S. taxpayer resources are used for
their intended purposes.
We will continue to engage the Government of Pakistan on the
importance of meaningful reform in bilateral and multilateral fora and
in close cooperation with the international financial institutions.
Ultimately, we must recognize that Pakistan's leadership must lead in
taking the hard choices needed to stabilize Pakistan's economy and
ensure enduring reform.
Answer (b). The United States has indicated to the Government of
Pakistan, the IMF, multilateral development banks, and other donors
that we believe it is critical to continue making progress on
meaningful reform. We continue to urge Pakistan to remain engaged with
the IMF on its reform program, specifically as they design measures to
mobilize their domestic resources, alleviate energy shortages, and
improve fiscal management. The parameters of Pakistan's future
relationship with the IMF, including whether it receives the remaining
credits under the augmented November 2008 Stand-By Arrangement, are
dependent on progress made by the Government of Pakistan in
consultation with the IMF.
Question #6. You made clear in your testimony that U.S. troops will
depart Iraq at the end of the year. Given, as you stated, the
difficulty in predicting any request coming from Prime Minister Maliki,
I hope we have robust contingency plans. While some of these issues are
outside your direct purview, these decisions directly affect the safety
of your frontline diplomats.
What is the current planning for the various components of
the Office of Security Cooperation (military, civilian,
contractors, etc.)? Please be specific on numbers and funding.
What forces does the administration intend to stage in the
region after that end date certain?
Answer. The Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) will be a
critical element of the U.S. post-2011 diplomatic presence in Iraq and
will be squarely focused on helping Iraq fully develop its capacity to
provide external defense. OSC-I will be the key U.S. military-to-
military engagement tool to provide a platform for a long-term United
States-Iraq security relationship consistent with the principles of the
Strategic Framework Agreement, which was signed by both the United
States and the Government of Iraq in 2008. The OSC-I will assist the
Government of Iraq to close gaps in the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
capabilities previously filled by U.S. military forces.
The OSC-I activities will include Foreign Military Sales, Foreign
Military Financing, International Military Education and Training, and
End-Use Monitoring. We anticipate the OSC-I also conducting a full
range of traditional security cooperation activities such as joint
exercise planning, combined arms training, and senior level visits.
The Departments of State and Defense have made significant progress
on OSC-I planning, particularly with regard to finalizing the scope of
staffing and facilities requirements. We are pleased that DOD, through
U.S. Central Command, (CENTCOM), has accepted day-to-day security
responsibility for DOD personnel assigned to the OSC-I and for securing
the field sites that will not be colocated with the Embassy and
constituent posts. DOD will be responsible for any costs associated
with security-related facilities enhancements at all non colocated
sites. Our shared goal for all these planning efforts is that OSC-I
will be mission capable by the end of this year.
The U.S. Government is adhering to all of its obligations under the
U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement (SA), including the obligation to complete
the drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq by December 31, 2011. At this time,
the Iraqi Government has not requested a renewal or amendment of the
SA. We defer to DOD for any information on what military forces, if
any, the USG plans to stage in the region after USF-I completes its
drawdown.
Question #7a. On the civilian presence in Iraq: What is the current
civilian footprint in Iraq and expected level by the end of 2011?
Answer. There are approximately 1,600 State Department direct hire
employees in Iraq and approximately 7,200 life support, technical and
security contractor personnel countrywide, for approximately 8,800
total personnel. This includes personnel in Baghdad and the 16
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).
Following the military-to-civilian transition in 2011, the
Department will consolidate approximately 17,000 Chief of Mission
personnel at 15 separate sites, including five collocated and five
stand-alone sites under the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-
I):
Baghdad:
Embassy Baghdad
Camp Sather (OSC-I collocated)
Joint Security Station (JSS)
Shield (OSC-I collocated)
Erbil:
Consulate General Erbil
Contingency Operating Station (COS)
Erbil (OSC-I collocated)
Erbil Aviation Hub
Basrah:
Consulate General Basrah (OSC-I collocated)
Basrah Aviation Hub
Mosul:
Embassy Branch Office Mosul
Kirkuk:
Embassy Branch Office Kirkuk (OSC-I collocated)
OSC-I Standalone Sites:
Tikrit
Taji
Union III (Baghdad); Besmaya
Umm Qasr
We project overall staffing at these sites to be approximately
13,000 for State and other agency partners (not including OSC-I). This
total includes approximately 2,000 program and management staff from
the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Homeland Security, and
other participating agencies, supported by 11,000 life support,
technical, and security contractor personnel.
The Department of Defense (DOD) plans to have approximately 4,000
personnel in Iraq as part of the OSC-I, with the majority based at the
five stand-alone OSC-I sites and some located at diplomatic facilities.
This total OSC-I population includes the administration's approved 157
DOD military and civilian personnel, who will perform security
assistance and security cooperation functions, as well as 763 Security
Assistance Team (SAT) members supporting specific Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) cases. The OSC-I personnel will be supported by
approximately 3,000 contractors that provide life support, movement,
fixed site security, and personal detachment services.
Question#7b. On the civilian presence in Iraq: What are the
expected annual costs for the next 3 years to maintain the Embassy?
Answer. We estimate that the cost to maintain the Embassy in
Baghdad over the next 3 years will be as follows:
Fiscal year and amount:
2011-- $183M.
2012 -- $202M.
2013 -- Still under development.
These estimates reflect Operations and Maintenance (O&M) costs for
only the Embassy in Baghdad. They include the cost of the PA&E and
LOGCAP contracts; routine maintenance and repair funds and Facility
Manager salaries and allowances allotted to post by OBO; and NEA-funded
O&M projects executed by post. FY12 estimates reflect price inflation
and increased costs associated with new housing and warehouse
facilities currently under construction.
Question #7c. On the civilian presence in Iraq, to what extent has
the Iraqi Government contributed to or approved of U.S. plans for a
continued presence and programs, particularly in the areas of
developing Iraqi military and police forces and securing U.S.
personnel? What levels are they planning going forward?
Answer. All of our programs have been developed in consultation
with the Government of Iraq (GOI). Over the last year, we have watched
Iraqi forces assume more responsibility for their own security and
stability, consistent with the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. We are
encouraged by the Government of Iraq's progress demonstrated to date
and its commitment to continue developing the capacity of Iraqi
military and police forces.
While isolated, high profile attacks continue in Baghdad and in
flashpoints like Kirkuk and Mosul, the number of security-related
incidents throughout Iraq continues to decline from the peak in 2007,
while Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have gradually assumed primacy for
security operations throughout Iraq. The ISF have demonstrated
improvements in both prevention of and their response to security
incidents. They have also shown greater interagency cooperation within
their government, which should be bolstered by government formation,
particularly after PM Maliki appoints his new Ministers of Defense and
Interior.
We were encouraged that in February, the GOI passed a budget for
2011 that increased the Ministry of Defense (MOD) allocation to $5.8
billion, an increase of 18 percent over 2010 levels. Additional funding
for sustainment of the Iraqi Army was included in the 2011 MOD budget.
The 2011 budget also includes $6.3 billion for the Interior Ministry,
which includes the addition of 110,000 new police positions. The GOI
will not pass a 2012 budget until the end of this calendar year.
To complement GOI efforts, the U.S. Government is planning for a
robust Office of Security Cooperation (OSC-I), under the Chief of
Mission. The OSC-I will be our key U.S. military-to-military engagement
tool to achieve our strategic objectives in Iraq. OSC-I activities will
include Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Financing,
International Military Education and Training, and End-Use Monitoring.
We also anticipate the OSC-I will conduct a full range of traditional
security cooperation activities such as joint exercise planning,
combined arms training, and senior level visits. Additionally, the
State-led Police Development Program (PDP) will support and assist the
GOI in developing the leadership and management functions of its police
and Interior Ministry.
The United States remains fully committed to a comprehensive long-
term partnership with Iraq and will continue to work together in
helping the GOI improving security capabilities.
Question #7d. Have you broken ground on the consulate buildings [in
Iraq]? If not, what's your schedule and what are the expected costs?
Answer. Work is underway on the two consulates in Iraq and has been
divided into four phases. Phase I, starting in September 2010, included
work completed by the U.S. military, using its resources (e.g.,
engineering support, identification and movement of excess military
property). Phase II work, begun in January 2011, is ongoing and
includes the establishment of T-wall compound perimeters (prefabricated
concrete wall sections); preparation for utility infrastructure such as
drilling water wells, standing up reverse osmosis water purification
units, movement and setup of life support areas utilizing containerized
housing units from U.S. Forces in Iraq's excess property; and the
gathering of other excess property items necessary for the
establishment of the sites. Similarly, work is also being undertaken at
both Embassy branch office sites.
Consulate General (CG) Basrah: The Phase III design/build contract
that covers the bulk of the unclassified work will be awarded the week
of March 14; notice to proceed will be issued to the contractor on
March 22; and a preconstruction conference involving the contractor,
the military, and personnel from the Department's Bureau of Overseas
Buildings Operations (OBO) will be conducted onsite the week of March
28 to coordinate the construction schedule with the military's
withdrawal schedule. The ``Mission Capable'' date (i.e., the target
date that critical facilities will be ready for their intended purpose)
remains the same, as it does for all the sites: October 1, 2011. The
total budgeted cost for Basrah facilities is $172.3 million.
Consulate General Erbil: CG Erbil will remain in the Ankawa
Compound located in the Ankawa neighborhood of the city of Erbil. OBO
has budgeted $10 million for security and facility upgrades. OBO is
currently working to add this work to the Phase III design/build scope
of work (SOW) for Erbil's Contingency Operating Site (COS) (so named by
the U.S. military). The bidders' proposals for the COS Erbil site are
due to the Department on April 8, 2011. The site is adjacent to the
Erbil International Airport and will primarily support the Department's
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)
Police Development Program advisors and the Embassy Aviation personnel.
The total budgeted cost for COS Erbil is $121.5 million. The Mission
Capable date for both sites is October 1, 2011.
Question #8a. On DOD Support for Embassy Iraq: Will State be
reimbursing DOD fully for its use of the LOGCAP contract mechanisms for
Basic Life Support and Core Logistics Services, Postal Operations,
convoy support, etc? What's your estimated cost for these services?
Answer. State will fully reimburse the Department of Defense (DOD)
for LOGCAP. Under the current Department of State Task Order for LOGCAP
III services, we provide funding to DOD to cover all contract costs
attributed to support for the State Department. This will continue
under the expanded Task Order under the new LOGCAP IV Task Order that
is now being solicited by the Rock Island Army Sustainment Command. The
estimated FY 2011 cost for LOGCAP is $164 million, which includes
mobilization for LOGCAP IV. The final cost can't be determined until
the on-going solicitation process is completed, but we don't anticipate
costs to drastically change from our estimates.
Question #8b. On DOD Support for Embassy Iraq: How about for the
delivery of food and fuel that the Defense Logistics Agency provides?
How long will that continue, and what are your estimated food and fuel
costs going forward?
Answer. We are currently in discussions with the Department of
Defense (DOD) and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) on arrangements to
continue food and fuel deliveries through FY 2012. While the exact cost
will be determined as a result of DLA procurement actions with their
vendors and associated logistics costs, we estimate that the costs will
range from $200 million to $300 million (including convoy security).
Question #8c. On DOD Support for Embassy Iraq: Have you requested
these funds in your budget? If not, why not?
Answer. We have requested $297 million (including convoy security)
for food and fuel in our FY 2012 budget request.
Question #8d. On DOD Support for Embassy Iraq: To what extent, and
for how long, does State anticipate being able to rely on services
provided by Department of Defense agencies, such as the Defense
Contract Management Agency and the Defense Contract Audit Agency, to
help manage and oversee its contracts in Iraq?
Answer. The Defense Contract Management Agency and the Defense
Contract Audit Agency now provide contract management support to LOGCAP
III and will continue, on a reimbursable basis, to provide that
function under LOGCAP IV through FY 2012. State is in discussion with
DOD on options for FY 2013.
Question #8e. On DOD Support for Embassy Iraq: Has State made plans
to bring those services in-house so that it has an organic capability
and capacity to manage and oversee its contracts? If not, why not?
Answer. The State Department expects to transition to its own base
life support contract in the future. Our plan is to have an organic
capability to oversee and manage this contract.
Question #9. What use are you making of the Office of the
Stabilization and Reconstruction during this transition in Iraq?
Answer. As is the case in Afghanistan, the Office of the
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and the
Civilian Response Corps (CRC) are providing support for specific
targeted missions in Iraq. For example, two members of the CRC Active
component from the U.S. Marshals Service are working with the Iraqi
Higher Judicial Council to improve courthouse security and personal
security for the judiciary. In addition, S/CRS is working with the
Bureau for Near Eastern Affairs on capturing best practices and lessons
learned in Iraq. These efforts include a collaborative review for the
Iraq transition to collect information so that lessons can be applied
to the anticipated military-to-civilian transition in Afghanistan.
S/CRS and the CRC will continue to support the transition in Iraq as
needed and requested.
Question #10. The GAO has made several recommendations in the area
of contractor oversight. What steps has State taken to implement GAO's
recommendations regarding the use of contractors to manage and oversee
other contractors?
Answer. The Department of State has taken positive steps to
implement the GAO recommendations contained in GAO-10-357 ``Contingency
Contracting: Improvements Needed in Management of Contractors
Supporting Contract and Grant Administration in Iraq and Afghanistan.''
Some additional actions are being taken to close out the
recommendations.
Recommendation 1: Determine the extent to which contractors should
perform administration functions for other contracts and grants in
accordance with strategic human capital planning principles outlined in
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance.
The Department of State completed a pilot study of the workforce
mix in two Department offices to validate our ability to determine the
appropriate combination of government versus contractor personnel as
part of a blended workforce. This study included a determination of
whether contracted positions are inherently governmental, or closely
associated with inherently governmental, and resulted in the
development of a framework that could be more broadly applied. Our
first ever Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR)
identified the Information Resources Management (IRM) bureau as an area
for further analysis of the Department's workforce balance.
The Acquisitions Management Office (A/LM/AQM) determined that it
should significantly reduce its reliance on contractor support of the
acquisition function. A/LM/AQM converted 20 positions from contractor
to government performance as a result of reevaluating its workforce
mix.
The Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) increased staffing of agents
on protection programs to reduce reliance on contractor support for the
administration of protective details.
The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL)
increased staffing to reduce reliance on contractor support and to
increase contract oversight. INL is in the process of recruiting up to
190 USG employee police advisors to serve in Iraq in lieu of a similar
number of advisors currently working under contract.
Training for Contracting Officer Representatives (CORs) was revised
to include guidance on (1) the extent to which contractors can be used
to perform contract administration, and (2) strategies to mitigate
risks when contractors perform functions closely associated with
inherently governmental work. Additional Departmental guidance is under
development to ensure wider dissemination of this information. This
guidance is expected to be issued by the end of June.
Recommendation 2: Develop guidance to identify approaches that
contracting and program officials should take to enhance management
oversight when nonpersonal services contractors provide services that
closely support inherently governmental functions.
The Department modified Contracting Officer Representative (COR)
Training to identify the risks of using contractors to support contract
administration as well as strategies to mitigate these risks. The
training includes guidance on contractor organizational conflicts of
interest and how to mitigate them. Additional guidance is being
developed to ensure wider dissemination of this information. This
guidance is expected to be issued by the end of June.
Recommendation 3: Require before award of any nonpersonal services
contract or task order for services closely supporting inherently
governmental functions that program and contracting officials document
their consideration of related risks and the steps that have been taken
to mitigate such risks.
The Department modified Contracting Officer Representative (COR)
training to teach how to identify the risks of using contractors to
support contract administration and services that closely support
inherently governmental functions as well as strategies to mitigate
these risks.
Acquisition planning requires the determination of whether a
function is inherently governmental as part of the requisition. The
risk of contractor organizational conflicts of interest is identified
and mitigated by the inclusion of a Conflict of Interest clause
requiring contractors to identify any organizational conflicts of
interest such as requirements to evaluate their own or their direct
competitors' products or services. The Department is developing
additional guidance that will further disseminate the techniques taught
in the COR course. This guidance is expected to be issued by the end of
June.
Recommendation 4: To improve State's ability to mitigate risks
related to potential conflicts of interest among personal services
contractors, we recommend that the Secretary of State clarify the
Department's policies regarding the application of Federal ethics laws
to personal services contractors.
The Department drafted a standard contract clause for all Personal
Services Contractors (PSC) requiring them to adhere to all Federal
ethics laws as a contract requirement. In addition, the Department is
instituting a requirement that Personal Services Contractors submit a
financial disclosure based on the nature of the position so that
financial interests can be vetted for conflicts of interest. The clause
and financial disclosure requirements are in final review and should be
issued by the end of June.
Question #11. I read recently a troubling article in the Atlantic
entitled, ``When Freedom is Bad for Business,'' about the Iraqi economy
in general and specifically about challenges an entrepreneur would have
in starting up a small business. Could you comment on this? How do you
see the economic situation beyond oil? What efforts are continuing in
this arena that could impact the challenges described in this piece?
Answer. I disagree with the article's claims about the root causes
of Iraq's current economic situation. Iraqis have called for
improvements to services and security, and the democratically elected
government is responding. An open society is, fundamentally, better for
business and economic growth.
The article does present a reasonably accurate assessment of the
challenges facing Iraq's economy. While living standards for most
Iraqis are improving and Iraq's macroeconomy has remained reasonably
stable over the past few years, a number of factors continue to
threaten economic growth and the well-being of Iraq's citizens.
Sustainable economic growth and diversification in Iraq will require a
vibrant private sector and more robust economic institutions.
The article identifies some of the key potential barriers to
economic growth in Iraq, such as cumbersome business registration
processes, limited availability of financial services, electricity
shortfalls, corruption, and dilapidated infrastructure throughout the
country. There are also significant inefficiencies in the agricultural
sector, housing shortages, a limited transportation network, and an
unstable security situation. Furthermore, as the article accurately
points out, Iraq's institutions are still being rebuilt--or even
established for the first time.
Despite these issues, there are some real reasons for optimism. The
IMF currently projects Iraq's non-oil real GDP growth at 5 percent or
more over the next 2 years. The Iraqi Government plans to invest tens
of billions of dollars in non-oil sectors like health, education,
construction, transportation, and agriculture, according to the 2010
National Development Plan. U.S. Government assistance will, in turn,
help the Iraqis to maximize the effectiveness of their own resources by
their own institutions and human resources. Iraq is also working with
the U.N. and World Bank to corporatize 176 state-owned enterprises. In
addition, Prime Minister Maliki issued an order in December 2010
promulgating regulations that make government land available to
investors for housing and other investment projects. Based on these
actions, Iraqi officials seem genuinely committed to economic reform
and bolstering the private sector.
Our bilateral engagement in Iraq, through our assistance programs,
is focused on encouraging private sector growth and encouraging a
robust economy. Among the most important activities the Embassy and
Washington agencies undertake is promoting business-to-business
connections between U.S. and Iraqi companies. The U.S. Government has
sent three trade missions to Iraq, and supported several visits to the
United States by Iraqi businessmen and businesswomen. These connections
are helping U.S. companies forge important partnerships with Iraqi
firms that understand the local context in Iraq. The Embassy also works
very hard to connect U.S. companies with Iraqi officials, promoting
U.S. exports and helping Iraqi officials understand the very real
concerns U.S. companies have about investing in Iraq.
The U.S. Government also has many important programs focused on
economic growth. USAID's economic growth and agriculture programs focus
on strengthening Iraq's private sector development by supporting
broader access to credit through microfinance, small and medium
enterprise lending, World Trade Organization accession, and small
business development centers. These programs also focus on youth
entrepreneurship and job creation. USAID also works with national and
local government officials to build technical and oversight capacity in
key ministries, provincial offices, and legislative committees, while
building the Iraqi Government's capacity to develop and put in place
trade policies that meet international standards and treaty
obligations. For its part, the Commerce Department's Commercial Law
Development Program is providing training and technical assistance to
Iraqi officials to develop their contracting capacity, and helped stand
up Iraq's first commercial court earlier this year. USDA also provides
technical assistance to Iraq's Ministry of Agriculture to promote
better management and oversight of the agricultural sector.
Furthermore, our Embassy has a dedicated office to work with Iraqi
anticorruption bodies and inspectors general to address corruption and
improve transparency.
Question #12. Global Security Contingency Fund. You have requested
$50 million for a new, 3-year pilot program for the government to more
effectively provide military and security assistance, border and
maritime security, internal security and counterterrorism activities. I
understand that this program is a partnership effort with DOD which is
requesting $450 million for the effort and State which is requesting
authorizing language in addition to funds. How do you justify the
creation of this fund, an entirely new program, at a total cost of half
a billion dollars when combined with the Defense Department's portion,
with the dire fiscal situation we face here at home?
Answer. To clarify, the Department of Defense is not seeking
dedicated funding for the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) in FY
2012. However, the legislation proposed would allow either the
Department of State or the Department of Defense to transfer additional
funds from their existing appropriations into the GSCF, up to a
combined total of $500 million in appropriations and transfers. The
intent of the fund is not to spend $500 million on an annual basis, but
to have adequate resources available to the Departments to respond
rapidly to emergent challenges or opportunities within a given fiscal
year, in the event that such resources are necessary. Actual
expenditures in a given year will depend on the requirements. We
believe this approach is a responsible way to balance the need for
additional agility with a funding structure that encourages rigor in
programming decisions owing to the need to transfer funds from other
sources.
Question #13. The past two Congresses, I worked with Senator Casey
and others on the multifaceted Global Food Security Act which this
committee passed. I understand that the Feed the Future initiative will
be carried out in a number of countries and focuses on assisting small
farmers, especially women; however, $1 billion is a significant
expenditure. What does an investment of this magnitude mean in terms of
our own national security and economic growth?
Answer. World food prices have been increasing over the past 6
months due to strong global demand and weather-related production
losses. Escalating food prices in 2007-08 are thought to have sparked
demonstrations and violence in more than 25 countries. Rising food
prices, particularly when combined with high fuel prices, can rapidly
undermine a household's purchasing power and undermine a household's
asset base--pushing the already poor closer to destitution and forcing
the near-poor below the poverty line. Rising fuel prices also have an
inflationary effect on food prices by increasing the cost of
transportation of commodities.
We know that nutrition and good health, which correlate directly to
food security, are critical to national prosperity, stability, and
security. As we watch food prices rise sharply around the world, it is
critical to global stability that the United States take the lead in
saving lives and in securing a sustainable path out of hunger and
poverty.
The administration's FY 2012 Budget request is addressing both the
symptoms and causes of hunger and food insecurity, including mitigating
the adverse impact of episodic food price increases. The President's FY
2012 budget requests $1.6 billion, of which $1.1 billion is for Feed
the Future USAID/State assistance, $308 million is for a U.S.
contribution to the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program, and
$150 million is for USAID nutrition programs which support both the
Feed the Future and Global Health initiatives. This request will enable
the President's Feed the Future Initiative to assist 18 million
vulnerable women, children, and family members--mostly small farmers--
to escape hunger and poverty, and reach 7 million undernourished
children with highly effective nutrition interventions to prevent
stunting and child mortality.
Reducing funding will undermine efforts to change what is otherwise
a grim, hungry, and unstable future for the developing world. Adequate
levels of funding now for both short- and medium-term objectives will
help to ensure that developing partner countries shift from being
dependent on international assistance to becoming strong and stable
trading partners.
Question #14. The Congressional Research Service recently completed
a report, ``The Obama Administration's Feed the Future Initiative,'' in
which it highlighted that 578 million people in Asia and the Pacific
suffer from chronic hunger, compared with 239 million people in sub-
Saharan Africa. Yet, the majority of the countries you focus on in the
Feed the Future Initiative are in Africa. Please explain how you have
selected the countries for this Initiative, and how you justify this
discrepancy?
Answer. Feed the Future prioritizes and concentrates our efforts
and resources on those poor countries where the overall political and
investment environment will enable the United States to have the
largest impact in promoting agricultural development and reducing food
security. The Feed the Future initiative has 20 focus countries: 12 in
sub-Saharan Africa, 4 in Asia, and 4 in Central America and the
Caribbean. Focus Countries were selected based on five factors related
to the needs and opportunities for reducing food insecurity:
Level of Need: We assess the level of need based on income
levels, poverty rates, the Global Hunger Index compiled by the
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) in
conjunction with Deutsche Welthungerhilfe and Concern
Worldwide, and the IFPRI categorization of level of food
security, among other factors. The Global Hunger Index uses
three equally weighted indicators to represent a
multidimensional measure of global hunger--the proportion of
undernourished as a percentage of national population,
prevalence of underweight children under the age of 5, and
mortality in children under 5.
Opportunity for Partnership: We seek to work in countries
that place a high priority on food security for all of their
citizens and that are committed to working in partnership with,
among others, donors, civil society, international
organizations, and the private sector. Our assessment is based
on a range of factors, including basic political stability and
the absence of conflict, the quality of governance, the overall
economic policy environment, and the commitment to design and
implement a high-quality strategy to enhance food security.
Potential for Agricultural-led Growth: Within our strategy,
the principle mechanism for reducing extreme hunger and poverty
is agricultural-led growth. Thus, we will prioritize countries
where poverty is still predominantly rural and where there is
significant potential for improvements in agricultural
productivity and market development.
Opportunity for Regional Synergies: We work with countries
that present strong opportunities to strengthen regional trade
and development corridors, integrate markets and accelerate
regional growth, and play a major role in regional trade.
Resource availability: A central tenet of our strategy is
that creating lasting progress in food security will require
deep investments in agricultural, economic, and social systems.
To achieve this, our resources will be concentrated in a set of
countries that have committed a substantial proportion of their
own resources to provide the level of support necessary to
catalyze growth and significantly contribute to accelerating
progress toward the Millennium Development Goals. We are
committed to coordinating with development partners to leverage
additional resources, but recognize that prioritization and
strategic choices are still required due to resource
constraints.
Question #15. I understand that you are developing strategic
partnership with countries under the Feed the Future Initiative. What
specific objectives do these partnerships set? What countries are
included?
Answer. The FY 2012 President's budget requests $14 million for
strategic partnerships in Brazil, India, and South Africa to leverage
the expertise, resources, and leadership of these countries for the
benefit of Focus Countries. These countries were selected because of
their influence on neighboring Focus Countries, their role as a
regional anchor for food security, and/or their potential to contribute
to the development of Focus Countries outside their region.
Through strategic partnerships, we seek to foster trilateral
cooperation in the following areas:
Joint research and dissemination of technical assistance
related to agriculture, nutrition, and poverty reduction that
build on the technical expertise in strategic partner
countries.
Promotion of regional or bilateral economic reforms based on
the strategic partner's participation in regional economic
organizations or trade relationships.
Development of a strategic partner's role as a regional
anchor through projects and policies that increase its
stabilizing influence on Focus Countries.
Political leadership to advance action in the Focus
Countries.
Mobilization of the private sector to participate in
private-public partnerships and to invest in Focus Countries.
Question #16. The Treasury Department is also working to strengthen
global food security through its Global Agriculture and Food Security
Program (GAFSP). How does this program differ from the Feed the Future
program? How is it the same? Do program managers from the two programs
work together in a coordinated effort? If so, how?
Answer. At the G8 summit in July 2009, the President pledged to
provide at least $3.5 billion over the next 3 years (FY 2010 to FY
2012) to attack the root causes of global hunger through accelerated
agricultural development and improved nutrition. Feed the Future (FTF),
the U.S. Government's global hunger and food security initiative,
renews our commitment to invest in sustainably reducing hunger and
poverty. As a whole-of-government initiative, FTF is led by USAID but
closely coordinated with other USG agencies including but not limited
to USDA, Treasury, the Department of State, USTR, MCC, and Peace Corps.
In line with the objectives of FTF, the GAFSP seeks to reduce the
number of poor and hungry people in developing countries. To achieve
this goal, the GAFSP provides an additional, unified source of
financing to support sustainable food security strategies of those
developing countries which demonstrate their commitment to addressing
the food security needs of their population. The GAFSP aligns its
financing with country priorities and harmonizes its financing with
that of other donors in order to support country ownership and avoid
redundant investments.
The President's FY 2012 FTF budget requests $308 million for a U.S.
contribution to the GAFSP. Contributions to GAFSP have leveraged other
donor contributions and established a pool of funding that will
complement the bilateral assistance investments budgeted in FTF focus
countries by supporting rural infrastructure investments (e.g.,
transportation and irrigation), commercial financing, and research and
extension. The fund's public sector window helps finance the
agricultural development strategies of developing countries that have
demonstrated their commitment to a strategic approach for achieving
lasting improvements in the food security of their populations. The
fund, which is administered by the World Bank, leverages the technical
expertise of other multilateral institutions such as the International
Fund for Agricultural Development and the regional development banks.
GAFSP received requests for funding from 25 low-income countries in
2010 and awarded grants totaling $337 million to 8 of those countries
(Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Haiti, Mongolia, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone,
and Togo). Project implementation for grants awarded in June 2010 will
begin in the first quarter of 2011 and initial progress reports will be
available in the third quarter of 2011. Additional grant awards are
anticipated to be made in 2011, depending on additional donor
contributions. A private sector window, which will provide financing to
small and medium-sized agribusinesses and small-holder farmers, will
also become operational in 2011. The fund incorporates a number of
innovative design features including in-depth impact evaluations on a
significant percentage of all the projects financed by GAFSP, an
inclusive governance structure that provides potential recipient
countries and civil society organizations with a strong role in fund
governance, and an open and transparent application process that relies
on independent evaluations by a group of experts in agriculture and
development issues.
Question #17. The administration has also committed to
significantly increasing exports of U.S. goods, including agricultural
products. How is the administration coordinating these two efforts?
Answer. Increasing global food security and U.S. exports are
complementary endeavors. The administration has identified several
points of intersection between Feed the Future and the National Export
Initiative and is employing a coordinated whole-of-government approach
to advance both programs.
Feed the Future seeks to raise the incomes of the world's poor
through agricultural development. As incomes increase, the rural poor
are able to purchase a more diverse diet and higher quality food, which
can include food and intermediate products produced in the United
States--for example, economic growth in Asia has spurred additional
demand for meat, which in turn has spurred demand not only for U.S.-
produced meat, but also corn and other feed.
Furthermore, as the United States is a major exporter of farming
inputs such as seed, fertilizer, and equipment, U.S. companies will
benefit from advances in agriculture in developing countries.
Because trade is a key enabler of food security, Feed the Future
works with countries and regions to improve their trade regimes and
adopt sound policies and science-based regulations. Transparent
policies improve market access for safe, high-quality, U.S.
agricultural products.
Finally, the administration is reaching out to U.S. businesses to
inform them of commercial opportunities arising from the implementation
of the Feed the Future program, both through direct procurement by
USAID and indirect opportunities arising from large agricultural
programs in Feed the Future countries. USAID is also developing a
variety of public-private partnerships that help U.S. companies source
from, operate in, and sell to developing countries.
The administration is pursuing a whole-of-government approach to
implementing both Feed the Future and the National Export Initiative,
focusing on each agency's area of comparative advantage. Several
agencies, including State, USDA, and USTR, are involved in both
programs, ensuring that efforts across multiple agencies are well
coordinated.
Question #18. Current events in Libya, and the decision of Saudi
Arabia to tap into its spare oil production capacity, underscore the
importance of transparency in oil markets. Under current conditions,
the International Energy Agency relies upon reporting data from OPEC
that is of questionable reliability and is difficult to be
independently verified. More transparency could bring greater price
stability.
Please describe State Department efforts to enhance
transparency in production, reserves and spare capacity in
global oil markets.
Answer. The Department supports United States participation in the
Joint Oil Data Initiative (JODI), a collective effort by oil producer
and consumer countries which aims to improve data transparency in oil
markets. The initiative, facilitated by the International Energy Forum
(IEF), involves more than 90 countries and economies representing
around 90 percent of global oil supply and demand. The IEF also
coordinates the inputs from representatives of six organizations: APEC
(Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), the European Union's Eurostat,
International Energy Agency (IEA), the Latin American Energy
Organization (OLADE), the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) and the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD). The
initiative includes a strong training program designed to improve the
capacity of members to collect and report data in an accurate and
timely manner.
The Department will continue its efforts to engage in discussions
with rapidly growing energy-intensive economies to promote greater
transparency in oil markets. We work closely with the Department of
Energy in this effort. The Department has also specifically encouraged
both the Energy Information Agency (EIA) and the IEA to reach out to
economies like China, to discuss how best to improve their capacity to
collect, analyze, and report out oil market data in more accurate and
timely ways.
The Department will continue to reach out to the private sector,
governments and international organizations to seek ways to improve
transparency in oil and other energy markets.
Question #19. Development of the ``Southern corridor'' to link
Caspian region oil and natural gas resources has been a bipartisan
strategic priority for several years. Please update the committee on
progress in extending the southern corridor.
Answer. There has been significant progress on development of the
``Southern corridor'' to bring Caspian (and possibly Iraqi) gas to
Europe, which would be anchored by gas from the second phase of
development of Azerbaijan's Shah Deniz Caspian offshore field. Gas from
the first phase of the Shah Deniz project already flows through
Azerbaijan and Georgia into Turkey.
The June 2010 signing of Turkey-Azerbaijan MOUs covering
Azerbaijani gas sales to Turkey and gas transit terms to Europe was a
major step forward. The next steps, currently underway, are negotiation
of detailed agreements implementing the June 2010 MOUs and commercial
negotiations with gas purchasers in Europe and with three competing
pipelines, Nabucco, the Italy-Turkey-Greece-Interconnector (ITGI), and
the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). The Shah Deniz consortium has asked
that the three pipeline groups submit their final tariff offers by
October 1, 2011. The expectation is that a decision on a pipeline route
will be made by the end of the year.
The completion of any one of the proposed Southern corridor
pipelines would be a win for our energy security policy. Nabucco may
have more strategic value since it would provide larger volumes of gas
to more countries, but it also is the most complicated, since it
requires gas from at least one other source beyond Azerbaijan. Given
doubts about the availability of gas to justify a large pipeline, there
are discussions underway on the possibility of developing a
``scalable'' project, which would be sized to meet currently planned
production, but would be expandable to handle additional volumes that
might become available in the future from Turkmenistan, Northern Iraq,
or perhaps Azerbaijan.
Question #20. Please describe efforts to engage the Governments of
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan in energy development.
Answer. We continue to engage on energy development in Central
Asia, including on export diversification and issues pertaining to
foreign investment. This engagement occurs during our Annual Bilateral
Consultations (or ABCs), visits by key State Department principals,
such as Ambassador Richard Morningstar, and through everyday engagement
by our embassies.
Our engagement in Kazakhstan has been largely focused on the
country's investment climate and plans surrounding Kazakhstan's
anticipated rapid increase in oil production in the coming decade.
Kazakhstan represents one of largest potential increases in non-OPEC
production in the next 10 years. We have an interest in this production
moving forward and additional Kazakhstani crude reaching world markets.
The U.S.-Kazakhstan Energy Partnership with has been active for 8 years
and continues to be an essential part of our relationship with this
hydrocarbon-rich nation. The next U.S.-Kazakhstan Energy Partnership
meeting is scheduled for November 2011 in Washington, and will include
a visit by the Minister of Oil and Gas Sauat Mynbayev. The most recent
U.S.-Kazakhstan Annual Bilateral Consultations, which took place March
24-25 in Astana, focused on investment climate issues and
diversification of Kazakhstan's economy. We expect to have an ABC
review session with the Kazakh government here in Washington in
September 2011, where we will continue the discussion of deepening our
economic and energy partnership.
We continue to engage with Turkmenistan on energy development and
commercial relations at every opportunity. The first ABC, which took
place June 14-15, 2010, in Ashgabat, included bilateral engagement on
economic, commercial and energy issues. Alongside both the first ABC
and the ABC review, the U.S.-Turkmenistan Business Council--which now
includes 24 U.S. company members, a number of which are energy majors--
led the first U.S. business delegation to Turkmenistan. Most recently,
the U.S. Embassy in Ashgabat partnered with the Turkmen Chamber of
Commerce to host the first-ever U.S. Business exhibition in
Turkmenistan. More than 50 U.S. companies--many of them in the energy
field--participated in the event. We expect the next ABC here in
Washington this coming November. In addition, Richard Morningstar, our
Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy, travels frequently to Ashgabat to
discuss a variety of potential energy developments there, including the
proposed Trans-Caspian and Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India
(TAPI) pipelines.
Our engagement with Uzbekistan has been more limited, primarily
because there are few U.S. companies active in the country's energy
sector generally, and no U.S. major is involved directly in upstream
exploration and development at this time. Although Uzbekistan produces
about as much gas as Turkmenistan annually, its exports are relatively
small. Uzbekistan is one of the most energy inefficient countries in
the world and about 75 percent of its annual gas production fuels its
heavily gasified economy. Our Embassy in Tashkent compiled an extensive
report on Uzbekistan's oil and gas industry last spring, which was
subsequently posted on Commerce's ``Buy USA'' Web site. We have had
discussions with the Uzbeks about their plans for energy efficiency and
are hopeful that U.S. companies will participate in several projects in
this area. Energy efficiency is perhaps the most promising area for
energy-related U.S. engagement in Uzbekistan.
Question #21. Export of natural gas through Turkey offers large
potential for revenue generation for Iraq and energy security in the
wider region, as well as potential regional stability benefits. Please
update the committee on necessary steps and activities of U.S.
personnel in Iraq to promote agreements to export Iraqi gas through the
Nabucco pipeline.
Answer. Iraqi leadership has expressed interest in the future
export of natural gas through Turkey and into the Southern corridor,
although the timeframe remains unclear. In addition to providing a
steady stream of revenue, Baghdad recognizes the strategic benefit of
linking up with this important piece of regional energy architecture.
The State Department's Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy, Ambassador
Richard Morningstar, has visited Baghdad and Ankara as part of a
continuing discussion with Iraqi, Turkish, and EU leaders, as well as
the private sector, about developing Iraq's energy potential.
There are at least two important conditions that must be met before
Iraq can offer a bankable commitment of natural gas supplies to Nabucco
or any other Southern corridor pipeline project. First, recent
political progress between Erbil and Baghdad must be expanded to
include a workable national agreement on the development of
hydrocarbons and revenue sharing. Second, in light of Iraq's
electricity shortages, future development of natural gas will have to
be integrated into a more comprehensive national energy strategy,
including potential contributions from the private sector.
Question #22. What is the timeline for appointment of a replacement
for David Goldwyn as Coordinator for International Energy Affairs?
Based on the experience of this office to date, is it your opinion that
the International Energy Coordinator should have the rank of
Ambassador?
Answer. The establishment of the International Energy Coordinator,
based on your leadership, was instrumental in formalizing a consistent
mechanism for high-level diplomatic engagement on energy security
issues. The State Department has committed to the effective
coordination of resources to address the political, security, economic,
development, and environmental challenges posed by energy. Hence, the
Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) calls for the
creation of a ``new Bureau for Energy Resources to unite our diplomatic
and programmatic efforts on oil, natural gas, coal, electricity,
renewable energy, energy governance, strategic resources, and energy
poverty.'' Implementation of the QDDR is underway and the appointment
and rank of the Coordinator for International Energy Affairs is being
evaluated as we determine how best to organize the new Bureau of Energy
Resources. In the meantime, Ambassador Morningstar has taken on the
portfolio of Coordinator for International Energy Affairs in addition
to his duties as Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy Affairs.
Question #23. The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review
indicates that the State Department will reorganize to form a position
of Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy and the Environment
under which there will exist three Bureaus and two offices.
Will all environmental functions currently housed within
Global Affairs be consolidated under this proposed arrangement?
From what office will climate change negotiations be led,
including the office of the negotiator?
Will the three new Bureaus be led by Assistant Secretaries?
Is it the opinion of the State Department that these changes
require legislative changes? What resources will be requested
for each of the proposed new Bureaus?
Answer. In accordance with the Quadrennial Diplomacy and
Development Review (QDDR), the Assistant Secretary for Oceans and
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, who currently
reports to the Under Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs, will
report to a renamed Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and
the Environment. Climate change negotiations will continue to be led by
the Special Envoy for Climate Change within the Office of the
Secretary. Resources to complete this realignment of responsibilities
are expected to come from within current funding allocations.
Following the realignment, three Assistant Secretaries will report
to the Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the
Environment, from: (1) the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs; (2)
the Bureau of Energy Resources; and (3) the Bureau of Oceans and
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs. The Bureau of
Economic and Business Affairs and the Bureau of Oceans and
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs are already led by
assistant secretaries. The QDDR envisions that the Bureau of Energy
Resources, when created, shall also be led by an Assistant Secretary.
The administration has sent a Congressional Notification about the
establishment of the Bureau of Energy Resources.
Question #24. The QDDR states the International Energy Coordinator
and Eurasian Energy Envoy will be housed within the reorganized Bureau.
These positions were established with direct reporting to the Secretary
in order to increase the international profile of these issues and to
overcome bureaucratic ``stove piping'' between both functional and
political policy bureaus.
a. How would this reorganization ensure these demands are
met?
Answer. You have the Secretary's full commitment that anything that
the Department does on energy will be intended to increase the profile
of this issue, its importance to U.S. national interests, and its full
integration into U.S. foreign policy, national security, and economic
priorities. The Department will ensure that senior level leadership is
directly engaged in providing oversight and direction to the energy
leadership team in the Department.
b. Does the Department intend to request that law
establishing the office of the International Energy Coordinator
within the Secretary's office be revised?
Answer. We recognize that some legislative changes may be necessary
to conform existing provisions to the intended organizational structure
of the new Bureau. We would work closely with key committees on this
matter.
Question #25. Please explain the plans for continuation and
expansion of the global shale gas initiative. What resources are being
requested for this purpose? Given the President's declaration of
natural gas as a ``clean'' energy source, is support for gas being
given equal treatment with renewable power in State Department and
USAID initiatives?
Answer. GSGI Update.--The Department of State's Global Shale Gas
Initiative (GSGI) has accomplished much since it was launched in early
2010. During this time, we have coordinated with our agency partners to
undertake shale gas resource assessments and technical training in more
than a dozen countries, including China, India, Chile, Argentina,
Uruguay, Colombia, Morocco, Jordan, and South Africa. We have signed
memoranda of understanding with five countries--including China, India,
and Ukraine--that serve to underscore our commitment to cooperation on
shale gas development. In August 2010, the Department of State hosted
the GSGI Regulatory Conference at the Department. The event drew 100
participants from 21 countries and included participation by 10 U.S.
Federal and State agencies, and covered a range of technical,
operational, regulatory, market, and environmental issues associated
with shale gas resource development.
The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) provides considerable support for
the GSGI program. The USGS is undertaking shale gas resource
assessments and launching bilateral technical engagement in the GSGI
program's various countries. This support has been funded by the
Department of State, which transferred $1.3 million of FY 2009 funds to
USGS in mid-2010.
The Department of State also has promoted ongoing information
exchange with GSGI member countries by tapping into existing
departmental programs, such as the International Visitors Leadership
Program (IVLP). This mechanism has allowed for continued bilateral
educational dialogues and an ability to showcase the U.S. shale gas
experience. Through IVLP support, we have hosted two countries--Morocco
and Poland--and have arrangements for visits by officials from India,
Jordan, South Africa, Ukraine, Romania, and Hungary in the beginning to
advanced planning stages
Continuation of GSGI.--Our goal for the future of GSGI is to
continue bilateral and multilateral government-to-government engagement
with other countries included in our initial discussions and to expand
our outreach to include additional countries with resource potential,
if resources permit.
Natural Gas as compared to Renewable Power.--Natural gas is an
important bridge fuel that will assist the world in moving toward a
cleaner energy future. The GSGI is only one way in which the Department
is working to promote the responsible development of use of cleaner
burning natural gas that would allow energy consumers to reduce their
dependencies on coal for power generation. The Department of State
promotes the development of renewable energy and efforts to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions from power generation through bilateral
diplomatic engagement. These efforts complement the work of USAID which
has programs to reduce natural gas flaring and to provide assistance in
support of renewable energy activities. Language in the FY10
appropriations bill generally did not allow the use of funds designated
as ``Clean Energy'' funds under the Global Climate Change Initiative to
be used for natural gas and other fossil fuel production activities,
but other foreign assistance funds could and were used for such
activities. The Department also works with multilateral lending
institutions to promote electricity generation projects that employ
renewable energy and cleaner burning natural gas, as appropriate.
Question #26. Please explain plans to continue and expand the
energy governance and capacity initiative. What office will lead State
Department efforts on this initiative? What staffing resources are
being allocated to the program?
Answer. The Energy Governance and Capacity Initiative (EGCI) is
ramping up implementation in eight countries, following the successful
completion of technical needs assessment missions by U.S. interagency
teams in 2010. Two top priorities for EGCI engagement remain Uganda and
Papua New Guinea (PNG). Both countries have world-class oil and gas
developments that could generate multibillion dollar revenue flows
later this decade. The President's FY 2012 request includes $11 million
of Economic Support Funds (ESF) within USAID's Bureau of Economic
Growth, Agriculture, and Trade (EGAT) to support EGCI.
The EGCI program's other countries--Sierra Leone, Liberia,
Suriname, Guyana, Timor-Leste, and Seychelles--also have sizable
undiscovered oil and gas resource potential. Each of these countries
has unique energy sector management and revenue governance capabilities
and related assistance needs. International energy companies are
planning a wide range of offshore exploratory and appraisal drilling
plans in each of these countries during the next year.
The EGCI program was launched with $1.4 million in 2010. It is
managed actively by senior career staff in the Office of the
Coordinator for International Affairs (S/CIEA) in close partnership
with USAID, the Department of Treasury's Office of Technical Assistance
(OTA), U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), Department of Interior's Bureau
of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE), and
the Department of Commerce's Commercial Law Development Program (CLDP).
The program's core objective is to help new oil- and gas-producing
countries establish the capacity to manage their revenues wisely and in
a manner that maximizes the value of the resource development for the
government. Although EGCI goals are country-specific in nature, the
program broadly tries to ensure sound and transparent energy sector
governance for the benefit of national economic development. Depending
on oil and gas exploration efforts and progress in capacity-building,
the list of current EGCI countries may change over time. Other
countries may be included for consideration for EGCI program assistance
depending on their suitability for the program (e.g., development of
their oil and gas sector and buy-in by the host government in
supporting sound revenue and environmental management) and if
additional funding becomes available.
The EGCI program supports a broad range of U.S. foreign policy
objectives, including ensuring the security of global oil and gas
supplies, supporting energy efficiency in oil and gas resource
development, furthering political and economic stability in developing
countries, minimizing the environmental risks associated with oil and
gas development, promoting democracy and human rights, and combating
corruption.
Question #27. What is the Department doing to help encourage other
countries to adopt the Dodd-Frank extractive industries transparency
standard? Specifically, how is the State Department engaging through
the OECD, EU, G8, G20, World Bank, and IMF to promote the adoption of
this standard by other country stock exchanges? How is the State
Department engaging bilaterally to promote the adoption by country
exchanges, particularly with the United Kingdom, France, Canada, China,
Japan, European Union, Germany, South Africa, Australia, Malaysia,
Chile, and Brazil?
Answer. We have raised the issue of adopting regulations similar to
Section 1504 of Dodd-Frank in international fora where it would be
effective and appropriate, including the G20 and G8 meetings. The
French and U.K. Governments have already indicated support for Dodd-
Frank provisions to be adopted by the European Union. We have also
discussed incorporating Dodd-Frank-like standards with the Australian
Government. We think the Dodd-Frank disclosure requirements are already
emerging as a model of transparency for other countries.
Question #28. The Department of State received a permit application
for the Keystone XL pipeline to cross the United States--Canada border
in 2008. We are now well into 2011. Public comment has been extensive,
studies carried out, analysis done. Please provide the committee a
timeline for decisionmaking on the permit for Keystone XL, including
specific milestones. If specific dates for decisionmaking are
unavailable, please provide a range of dates for the decision and
accounting of what variables will be considered on when said decision
will be made. Please also compare the decisionmaking timeline to other
previous pipeline permitting decisions and explain any reasons for why
Keystone XL is taking more or less time.
Answer. We expect to make a decision on whether to grant or deny
the permit before the end of 2011.
Since issuance of the draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS),
new and additional information has become available relevant to the
proposed Keystone XL Pipeline Project and its potential impacts. To
provide the public with the opportunity to review and comment on this
information and to ensure openness and transparency in the NEPA
environmental review process, the State Department decided to prepare a
supplemental draft EIS (SDEIS), which will be published in mid-April.
The public will have 45 days to comment on the SDEIS.
When ready, the Department will prepare and issue a Final
Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS). Upon issuance of a Final EIS,
the Department will solicit public comment and host a public meeting in
Washington, DC, before it makes a determination under Executive Order
13337 on whether issuance of this permit is in the U.S. national
interest. Cooperating Federal agencies will have 90 days from issuance
of the FEIS to provide their input into that process. The U.S.
Department of State expects to make a decision on whether to grant or
deny the permit before the end of 2011.
Possible contributing factors to the length of the review process
on TransCanada's application for the Keystone XL Pipeline Project
include the size of the pipeline--1,384 miles in the United States; the
extensive public and interagency input--21 public comment meetings and
over 8,000 individual comments that needed to be considered in the
process of revising the EIS; supplemental filings by TransCanada with
changes or updates to the project; and the desirability of a
supplemental draft EIS.
Question #29. Does the Department of State require additional
information to conclude its environmental review of Keystone XL
pipeline? Does the State Department intend to carry out an additional
environmental impact statement?
Answer. The U.S. Department of State expects to release a
Supplemental Draft Environmental Impact Statement (SDEIS) for the
proposed Keystone XL pipeline project in mid-April. The SDEIS contains
new and additional information relevant to the proposed project and its
potential impacts, which the State Department feels would benefit from
further public input. The public will have 45 days to comment on the
Supplemental Draft EIS after a Federal Register notice is published.
Question #30. Please explain the factors that are generally
considered in making a national interest determination on whether to
permit a pipeline border crossing. Please explain the State
Department's role in making such a determination vis-a-vis other
departments and agencies. If the Keystone XL pipeline is rejected on
concerns related to greenhouse gas emissions, what precedent will that
set for future permitting applications as well as other State
Department, USAID, and Defense activities around the world that may
have an impact on greenhouse gas emissions.
Answer. Many factors are considered in making a national interest
determination, including but not limited to the potential effects of
the proposed project on energy security, the environment, the U.S.
economy, health and safety, and foreign policy goals. There is no fixed
list of factors to be considered. Decisions on permit applications are
based on an assessment of each unique project's own merits and
drawbacks with regard to the national interest, rather than based on
setting, following, or avoiding a precedent. The State Department has
been working continuously with the cooperating Federal agencies,
allowing them to comment on and contribute to the NEPA review process.
During the 90-day period between issuance of a Final EIS and the
Department's decision on the national interest determination, the
Department of State will consult with other agencies and consider their
input regarding whether or not granting this permit would be in the
national interest.
Question #31. Does the United States have a position on Canada's
domestic environmental protection regime as it relates to energy
production and export? If so, what is that position? Will that position
being considered in the permitting consideration of Keystone XL?
Answer. The State Department is assessing the potential
environmental impact that the Keystone XL pipeline project would have
in the United States. The responsibility of protecting Canada's overall
domestic environment belongs to Environment Canada, an agency of the
Canadian Federal Government. The Province of Alberta is responsible for
environmental protection at the provincial level in Alberta. In the
event that the U.S. Government encounters either actual or potential
pollution problems in Canada that could impact the United States, it
employs various diplomatic and official channels to raise these issues
with the Canadian Government.
Question #32. Please identify any known case of a foreign country
prohibiting import of U.S. goods based on U.S. domestic environmental
controls. What was the response of the United States to the country in
question, if any?
Answer. We are not aware of any current cases of a foreign country
prohibiting import of U.S. goods based on U.S. domestic environmental
controls. However, the United States Trade Representative (USTR)
submits an annual National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade
Barriers (NTE) to Congress. In conjunction with the NTE, USTR also
submits a specialized report on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS)
Measures dedicated to describing significant barriers to U.S. food and
farm exports that appear to be unscientific, unduly burdensome,
discriminatory, or otherwise unwarranted and create significant
barriers to U.S. exports. A related Report on Technical Barriers to
Trade (TBT) addresses significant foreign trade barriers stemming from
technical regulations, standards, and conformity assessment procedures.
The information for each of these reports is provided by U.S.
embassies and consulates worldwide, as well as by the Departments of
Commerce and Agriculture, private sector trade advisory committees and
interested stakeholders. The Department of State works with USTR to
engage with foreign governments to ensure market access for Americans,
advance the rule of law internationally, and create a fair, open, and
predictable trading environment. USTR coordinates trade enforcement
actions, asserting U.S. rights through the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and bilateral trade agreements. The Department of State supports
USTR in its trade enforcement agenda.
Question #33. In its Presidential Permit application, TransCanada
asserts that constructing the proposed Keystone XL pipeline is in the
national interest to maintain adequate crude oil supplies for U.S.
refineries. The application argues that the pipeline will allow U.S.
refiners ``to diversify supply away from traditional offshore foreign
crude supply and to obtain direct pipeline access to secure and growing
Canadian crude supplies'' from Canadian oil sands during a time of
rising domestic oil demand and declining domestic production. In
particular, the application asserts that the pipeline would allow the
United States to decrease its dependence on foreign crude oil supplies
from Mexico and Venezuela, the two largest oil importers into the U.S.
Gulf Coast. In its draft EIS for the project, the State Department
similarly finds that the Keystone XL pipeline ``would counteract
insufficient domestic crude oil supply while reducing U.S. dependence
on less reliable foreign oil sources.'' Given the complex and ever-
changing nature of the global oil market, however, the availability of,
and access to, foreign oil supplies is hard to predict--especially over
the decades-long operating life of a major pipeline.
While it seems likely that a new oil pipeline constructed between
Canada and the United States would increase supply reliability in terms
of secure deliverability, the potential impacts of the pipeline on
overall U.S. access to oil supplies must be considered in the context
of key trends in the global oil market. Please explain the possible
impacts on U.S. oil imports from any particular foreign source, but
especially Mexico and Venezuela.
Answer. The State Department is in the process of considering the
Keystone XL application. As a part of this process, the Department is
currently editing the draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). We
are preparing to release a Supplemental EIS in mid-April 2011 that will
include a more detailed analysis of international oil markets and the
possible impacts from the proposed pipeline. Also, in connection with
the points you raise here, you may find the Ensys Energy Report,
commissioned by the Department of Energy, released December 23 and part
of the documentation we are considering in connection with the Keystone
XL application, to be of particular interest as it examines the
potential impact of the pipeline on world oil markets, including
impacts of different types of oil imported into the United States. It
is currently available on the Keystone Web site and will be included in
the Supplemental EIS. We encourage you as well as other interested
parties to comment on the additional new information during the 45-day
public comment period that will follow the release of the Supplemental
EIS.
Question #34. The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (or
PEPFAR) is the U.S. Government's largest bilateral health program. As
you know, the program is housed at the Department of State, where the
Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator oversees and manages this
interagency program. PEPFAR is the main pillar in the administration's
proposed $63 billion over 6 years Global Health Initiative, which will
be housed within USAID. This suggests a disconnect between who is
coordinating versus who will be managing the funding allocations.
a. Can you explain how you envision how these programs will be
coordinated in Washington?
b. Will there be a GHI coordinator at the mission?
c. What role will the in country PEPFAR coordinator have in terms
of the GHI?
Answer. The Global Health Initiative (GHI) connects U.S. Government
health investments, including PEPFAR, in order to help them integrate,
coordinate, and work together more efficiently to save more lives. The
Department of State's Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review
(QDDR) proposes a transition of the leadership of GHI to USAID upon its
achievement of defined benchmarks aimed at ensuring USAID has the
capacity and structures to lead a coordinated, inclusive, whole-of-
government effort. The Secretary of State will make the final
determination on transitioning the Initiative to USAID, with a targeted
timeframe at the end of FY 2012. Should such a transition occur, PEPFAR
will remain at the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator. The statutory
and legislative mandate will continue to be fulfilled and managed
through the Department of State.
(a) Implementation of the Global Health Initiative is coordinated
through regular meetings of the interagency Operations Committee
(consisting of the heads of the Centers for Disease Control, Office of
the Global AIDS Coordinator, and USAID) and the newly appointed GHI
Executive Director, Lois Quam. Broad coordination is also facilitated
through the Strategic Council, which brings together senior officials
from a wider range of agencies across the U.S. Government to discuss
ways in which we can link our global health programs in a strategic,
coordinated manner.
(b) In each country, a Planning Lead is selected for the
implementation of GHI. This individual is selected from existing health
staff at missions with interagency consultation. Planning Leads serve
as chief coordinators, responsible for facilitating the in-country
processes required to develop, implement, and monitor/report a GHI
Country Strategy and for ensuring the inclusive processes inherent in
GHI.
(c) Given the weight of PEPFAR's importance to GHI, the PEPFAR
Coordinator plays a central role in the implementation of GHI in
countries where PEPFAR programs exist. PEPFAR's goals and strategic
objectives are those of GHI, and the PEPFAR Coordinator will be
responsible for ensuring that the interagency PEPFAR program fulfills
the principals and targets laid out under GHI. In addition, the PEPFAR
Coordinator will work with the other members of the U.S. Government
health team to ensure that PEPFAR programs are integrated with and
leveraging other U.S. Government health and development initiatives.
As GHI implementation moves forward, we will continue to consult
with and seek the input of Congress on these important issues of
coordination and leadership.
Question #35. The GHI stresses transparency and accountability at
many levels. GHI plus countries have been selected; however, despite
the fact that the GHI was announced over 2 years ago, GHI plus
strategies for these countries have yet to be released. Without the
release and implementation of these strategies, how can Congress, the
American people, and global health implementers on the ground be
assured that the transparency and accountability emphasized by the GHI
is being put in place?
Answer. With the launch of the new GHI Web site (http://
www.ghi.gov), GHI Country Strategies for Bangladesh, Ethiopia,
Guatemala, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, and Nepal are now available online and
available for public review. The Country Strategy for Rwanda will be
posted shortly. As GHI is implemented in more countries and GHI
Strategies are developed, each will be made available on the website.
Question #36. Increasing human capacity of health infrastructure is
a priority in both GHI and PEPFAR. A major road block in a number of
developing countries is the separation between medical training
programs and local health clinics. The Minister of Health has
jurisdiction over health facilities and the Minister of Education has
jurisdiction over the training programs. Due to the disconnect, in a
number of countries, medical and nursing students are not permitted to
train with medical personnel in government hospitals or clinics. Upon
completion of their programs, some of these individuals have had little
patient interaction.
Does the United States have a role in working with host
governments to rectify this situation?
Answer. USG assistance plays a significant role in addressing the
potential for disconnection between Ministries. Our assistance approach
strengthens preservice programs to ensure the quality, quantity, and
relevance of health care workers with focus on: bringing all key
stakeholders, including both Ministries and others, to jointly identify
what is needed in the health workforce and how best to attain it;
assisting Ministries of Education to tailor curricula to the health
profile of the country; utilizing proven education approaches and
learning methods to develop measurable competencies for the efficient
and effective delivery of quality health services at different levels
of care and according to recognized service delivery models; and
developing public and private hospitals, clinics and other teaching
sites embedded in health service delivery facilities, as well as the
community, to serve as practice sites. As a result of both improved
classroom education and clinical practice, they are valuable members of
the workforce as soon as they complete their studies.
Question #37. The United States is committed to investing in health
programs in developing countries. We have seen much progress in this
area, especially in the fight against HIV/AIDS. As we work toward
sustainability and encourage country ownership, what is the United
States doing to persuade countries to invest in their own country's
health programs?
Answer. A central focus of PEPFAR's strategy and of the Global
Health Initiative (GHI) is promotion of country-led sustainable
programs. Strong government leadership of the health system is integral
to long-term success, and health systems are strongest where
governments have leadership and technical skills to address health
system weaknesses. A focus on country ownership is critical to ensure
that capacity is built in technical and program areas of HIV/AIDS
(Prevention of Mother to Child Transmission, treatment and gender,
etc), leadership, management, and capacity-building in financial
management so that programs supported by PEPFAR are as effective as
possible and able to transition to long-term sustainability. Therefore,
a key component of PEPFAR's country ownership strategy is the promotion
of Partnership Framework agreements between the United States and host
country governments.
Partnership Frameworks provide a 5-year joint strategic framework
for cooperation between the U.S. Government, the partner government,
and other partners to combat HIV/AIDS in the host country through
service delivery, policy reform, and coordinated financial commitments.
Furthermore, Partnership Frameworks have provided the basis for
discussions with governments on long-term planning and alignment
between PEPFAR and national strategies. In addition, Partnership
Frameworks provide the mechanism for dialogue around investments in
capacity by both the partner country government and PEPFAR, all of
which are the building blocks for country ownership. Through the
Partnership Framework mechanism, we have seen many countries taking
ownership of their health programs. For example, as part of the
Partnership Framework on HIV/AIDS between Nigeria and the United
States, the Government of Nigeria is committed to being the leader and
steward of its efforts to fight HIV/AIDS. This includes increasing its
financing from 7 percent of the national HIV/AIDS response in 2008 to
50 percent of the cost by 2015. To date 19 countries and two regional
programs have signed partnership frameworks.
Question #38. Is authorizing legislation needed to implement the
administration's GHI strategy?
Answer. The core principles established by GHI--the focus on women,
girls, and gender equality; country ownership; leveraging of
partnerships; coordination and integration; learning, research, and
innovation; and strengthening health systems--guide a USG development
agenda with ambitious targets. In the first phase of GHI, this agenda
was implemented in a diverse set of eight Plus countries that represent
learning opportunities for the Initiative. As we continue to implement
the Global Health Initiative, a need for authorizing legislation may
arise, but no such need exists at present. We will continue to consult
with Congress as we move forward.
Question #39. Two complaints I hear from the field relate to the
lack of coordination among the different government agencies and the
onerous reporting requirements which keep staff from going into the
field to conduct oversight. How can coordination improve between all
the players promoting the U.S. development agenda? What ideas do you
have about streamlining the reporting requirements in order to provide
useful data while freeing up staff to monitor and evaluate funded
programs and grants?
Answer. As articulated in the QDDR, State and USAID are committed
to streamlining their joint strategic planning and reporting processes
as a high priority. We will do this by moving to a multiyear planning
framework that sets out 3-year strategic objectives that will form the
basis of annual resource requests, operational planning, performance
monitoring, and reporting processes. Within this structure, content
will flow from and be updated from one process to the next. By using a
common organizing principle for both planning and reporting, we will
improve the links between strategic planning, performance, and resource
decisions while focusing on the core information needed to make
decisions. We are also setting up a joint governance structure to
manage and oversee the emergence of new or changed reporting
requirements by using a cost-benefit approach. This will help preserve
streamlining gains and ensure that field staff continue to have
sufficient time for monitoring and oversight.
Question #40. In his annual letter, Bill Gates spoke of vaccination
programs and polio eradication as being a priority of his foundation
for the coming year. At the World Economic Forum meetings earlier this
year in Davos, Switzerland, Mr. Gates announced an additional $102
million commitment to polio eradication efforts. Rotary International
and UNICEF are also active in this area. What is the United States role
in the polio eradication, especially in Pakistan and Afghanistan where
the United States has such a large economic investment?
Answer. The United States continues to be committed to eradicating
polio. Along with WHO, UNICEF, and Rotary International, our
interagency partner HHS/CDC is spearheading the Global Polio
Eradication Initiative (GPEI) and has contributed substantial financial
and technical support. The United States also raises the issue with
other countries, such as Pakistan and Afghanistan, at every opportunity
and seeks their support in eradication efforts. Through our interagency
partners, such as HHS/CDC and USAID, we have also assisted the Afghani
and Pakistani Ministries of Health in evaluating and strengthening the
Expanded Program on Immunization as well as funded medical officers/
epidemiologists and technical officers at WHO for polio eradication. We
have also supported the Field Epidemiology and Laboratory Training
Program (FELTP) in Pakistan, which trains both Pakistani and Afghani
public health staff in surveillance, outbreak investigation, and public
health program evaluation, building longer term capacity. Finally, in
partnership with the Pakistan Ministry of Health and WHO, we are
currently launching the training, deployment, and technical oversight
for the first National Stop Transmission of Polio team of 16 nationals
from its FELTP.
In addition to this work around training, we also work with others
to encourage significant financial contributions from the Organization
of Islamic Conference member states to support the GPEI. We have also
been working hard to keep polio eradication high on the G8 agenda and
mobilize other countries to provide additional resources in this
effort.
We recognize, as Bill Gates does, that worldwide polio eradication
would be a tremendous success for the international global health
community. To date, the U.S. Government has invested nearly $2 billion
in polio eradication efforts for activities including polio
surveillance and laboratory networks, state-of-the-art global polio
reference laboratory services, polio vaccine for mass campaigns, mass
campaign planning, implementation, and evaluation, research and
evaluation, and social mobilization. Any threat to derail these efforts
would be a serious setback to global health efforts worldwide.
Question #41. According to the World Health Organization,
pneumococcal infection kills over 500,000 children a year. Over the
last couple of months, a global pneumococcal vaccine has been rolled
out in Kenya, Nicaragua, Guyana, Yemen, and Sierra Leone. The funding
has primarily come from a $1.5 billion GAVI Alliance pioneered
financing mechanism, the Advance Market Commitment (AMC). Although the
United States was not part of the AMC, what role, if any, is the U.S.
Government planning to support the rollout of this life saving vaccine?
Answer. USAID is committed to working with our partners, including
GAVI, to introduce pneumococcal vaccine in countries where pneumonia
mortality among children is highest. USAID's contribution to GAVI and
our funding to WHO is used to provide technical support to countries.
USAID has also led the development of GAVI's Supply and Procurement
Strategy to optimize the use of GAVI's funds to procure high-quality
vaccine at affordable prices.
As a bilateral technical partner, USAID has played a key role in
strengthening the country-level immunization systems that deliver the
new vaccines. Countries are likely to need support in three core areas:
cold chain and logistics; new vaccine introduction preparedness (e.g.,
new vaccine assessments, health worker training, development of
training materials, waste management planning, and social
mobilization); and expansion of coverage of the unreached and
unimmunized through strengthened routine immunization. Such support has
played a key role in the successful introduction of the pneumococcal
conjugate vaccine in Rwanda and Kenya. In Rwanda, for example, USAID
provided cold chain equipment and technical assistance to support
Rwanda's Ministry of Health effort to reach all children under 1 year
of age. Additional country work is planned in Tanzania, Malawi and
Benin. USAID/Washington will continue its work with missions to
encourage their engagement in the introduction of this critical, highly
effective new vaccine.
Question #42. The United Nations Development Program is a major
implementer for the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Malaria, and
Tuberculosis. According to the UNDP, as of January 2011, UNDP is
currently Principal Recipient in 27 countries, managing a total of 60
active grants amounting to more than $1.1 billion. Policies of the
Executive Board of the UNDP only allow Member States, not
nongovernmental organizations such as the Global Fund or World Bank,
access to internal audits, even when fraud is suspected in the grants.
What actions should the United States pursue to increase the
transparency and ensure the integrity of United States taxpayer
investments in the Global Fund that are managed through UNDP?
Answer. The United States is committed to ensuring Global Fund
resources reach people in need and are used as effectively and
efficiently as possible to save lives. We strongly support the Global
Fund's Office of the Inspector General (OIG), and its ongoing efforts
to strengthen the Global Fund's oversight systems. We have consistently
advocated for increased transparency, accountability, and oversight
over U.S. contributions to the Global Fund, including Global Fund
resources managed by UNDP.
The United States has had high-level discussions with UNDP
management on the importance of sharing relevant audit information with
the Global Fund's OIG and cooperating with the OIG in instances of
suspected fraud. While UNDP does not currently share its internal audit
reports with the Global Fund, UNDP has taken several interim steps to
coordinate with the Global Fund's OIG, including (1) consulting with
the OIG on development of UNDP's annual audit plan, (2) sharing
summaries of UNDP's Global Fund-related audits, and (3) bringing
potential irregularities involving Global Fund projects to the
attention of the OIG whenever and wherever they are found. These steps
are helpful but not sufficient, and the United States is continuing to
push for full Global Fund access to relevant UNDP audit reports.
With strong U.S. encouragement, UNDP management has agreed to
present options for allowing increased access to its audit reports to
the UNDP Executive Board for consideration and approval in September
2011. The United States is working to build support among UNDP Board
members for amendments to UNDP's audit disclosure policies that would
allow increased transparency, accountability, and oversight over
resources under UNDP management.
Question 43. In assessing effectiveness of multilateral
international organizations, United Kingdom Secretary of State for
International Development Andrew Mitchell told the House of Commons
that the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Malaria, and Tuberculosis is ``very
good value to the U.K. taxpayer.''
Do you agree with Mr. Mitchell's assessment regarding the
current U.S. investment?
Answer. While the judgment that the Global Fund is a good value to
the U.K. taxpayer is based in part upon a comparison to the U.K.'s
development priorities, the United States believes that investments in
the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund)
also represent a very good value for the U.S. taxpayer. Through our
contribution to the Global Fund the United States is able to:
--Support the delivery of concrete health results;
--Expand the geographic reach of and enhance the USG's bilateral health
efforts;
--Catalyze international investment in AIDS, TB, and malaria;
--Build capacity, country ownership, and sustainability; and
--Demonstrate political commitment to international cooperation.
The USG contribution to the Global Fund supports the achievement of
significant health results. By December 2010, the Global Fund estimated
it had supported the following results:
3 million people on ARV treatment;
150 million counseling and testing sessions;
Prevention of Mother to Child Transmission for 930,000
pregnant women;
Provision of 5 million basic care and support packages;
Detection and treatment of 7.7 million infectious TB cases;
Distribution of 160 million bednets for malaria prevention;
Delivery of 142.4 million malaria treatments.
By providing 28 percent of Global Fund resources, the USG is
directly supporting a significant portion of these results.
U.S. contributions to the Global Fund support programs in 150
countries, significantly expanding the geographic reach of PEPFAR, the
President's Malaria Initiative (PMI), and USG tuberculosis programs and
our ability to support affected individuals around the world.
U.S. investments in the Global Fund complement and support our
bilateral health investments and enhance the sustainability and country
ownership of national responses to the three diseases.
Furthermore, the U.S. contributions to the Global Fund catalyze
continued investments from other donors in AIDS, TB, and malaria. Every
dollar the U.S. Government has contributed to the Global Fund leverages
an additional $2.50 from other donors.
The United States is working closely with the Global Fund
Secretariat and Board to further improve the Global Fund's health
impact and ``value for money'' in its operations and grants. For
example, USG country teams are working closely with Global Fund
Secretariat staff and Global Fund recipients to ensure that activities
are closely coordinated both to avoid duplication and to ensure that
both USG and Global Fund programs achieve the maximum health impact
possible through strategically targeting resources.
Question #44. The Global Fund has formed a committee to consider
the adoption of a number of internal reforms. The United States has a
voice on the committee. What reforms should be a part of the package
presented to their board?
Answer. In December 2010, Board members and the Secretariat
embraced the United States call for comprehensive reforms designed to
improve the impact of Global Fund grants and ensure the effective,
efficient, and accountable use of Global Fund resources. The Board
established a Comprehensive Reform Working Group that is charged with:
--Developing and defining a comprehensive reform agenda of specific
action steps that will maximize the cost-effectiveness and impact
of Global Fund investments in saving and improving lives affected
by AIDS, TB, and Malaria;
--Establishing clear timelines and measures of progress for each of the
action items on the reform agenda;
--Developing 4-5 high-impact concrete policy reforms/recommendations
for the Board to enact immediately; and
--Creating practical mechanisms for the Board, Secretariat,
stakeholders, and public to track implementation of action items
contained in the reform agenda.
The Working Group will present its recommendations to the Board in
May 2011.
The United States has been deeply involved in the Working Group's
efforts to articulate a clear reform agenda that advances the following
goals:
1. Enhanced fiduciary control and risk-management.
2. Improved resource allocation and increased value for money.
3. Improved proposal development and review processes.
4. Improved grant management/reduced transaction costs.
5. Improved Global Fund internal management.
6. Improved partnership and in-country structures.
7. Improved governance.
8. Enhanced resource mobilization.
9. Increased sustainability and efficiency.
The Global Fund has also created an Independent High-Level Panel on
Global Fund Fiduciary Controls and Oversight, which is being chaired by
Former Secretary for Health and Human Services, Michael Leavitt, and
the former president of Botswana, Festus Mogae. The United States
strongly supports the establishment of this panel, and will work to
ensure its findings and recommendations are incorporated into the
Global Fund's reform agenda.
Question #45. The Global Fund Board is currently reviewing income
criteria for grant eligibility. Presently, the Fund uses the World Bank
Country Income Classifications and disease burden to determine
eligibility for countries on the higher end of the income scales. A
number of these countries do not receive much bilateral assistance from
the United States due to income eligibility. What criteria should the
Global Fund adopt to ensure that only countries that truly need the
grants receive them?
Answer. In accordance with its Framework Document, the Global Fund
is committed to ensuring its resources are used to support global needs
and reach those with the greatest need and least ability to pay.
The Global Fund Board is currently reviewing its eligibility and
prioritization criteria and cost-sharing requirements and has agreed to
make a decision on these matters in May 2011, prior to the launch of
Round 11.The United States strongly believes that Global Fund
eligibility, prioritization, and cost-sharing criteria must ensure
Global Fund resources are targeted strategically towards countries and
regions with the greatest need and least ability to pay. We also
believe the Global Fund can play an important role in providing
limited, catalytic support for high-impact interventions targeted at
vulnerable populations in middle income countries with high disease
burdens. Such interventions could include support for MDR/XDR
tuberculosis programs in Eastern Europe and HIV prevention and
treatment programs for marginalized populations.
Question #46. In light of the current economic situation, what is
the current status of U.S. global efforts on programs to address the
needs of orphans and vulnerable children? As these children move into
adulthood, what efforts are being made to assist in integrating them as
productive members of society?
Answer. U.S. Public Law 109-95, the Assistance for Orphans and
Other Vulnerable Children in Developing Countries Act of 2005, focuses
on the world's most vulnerable children. The law calls for
international assistance from the U.S. Government (USG) for such
children to be coordinated, comprehensive, and effective. In fiscal
year 2009, USG assistance amounted to over $2.6 billion, through almost
2,000 projects in over 100 countries. Assistance is administered by
more than 20 offices in seven USG departments and agencies, operating
under their respective mandates. Under the law, the Special Advisor for
Assistance to Orphans and Vulnerable Children, housed at USAID, is the
lead in coordinating USG assistance.
Many USG-funded programs reaching orphans and vulnerable children
feature education, vocational training, psychosocial support and
economic strengthening components. Economic strengthening encompasses a
range of activities, such as the direct provision of cash or material
assistance and access to services that reduce household economic
burdens (e.g., ensuring children's free access to school), implemented
through market-based interventions that promote asset growth, asset
protection or income growth of participating households. These critical
programs aim to support vulnerable children and youth as they strive to
become productive members of their communities and societies. A
database on USG assistance for highly vulnerable children, available
online and publicly accessible, provides detailed information about
these projects. For instance, in FY 2009, a total of 13 offices within
five USG agencies and departments supported more than 230 projects that
included economic strengthening components for vulnerable children in
nearly 60 countries. Seventeen offices in five USG agencies and
departments supported more than 300 programs that featured education
components for vulnerable children in more than 80 countries.
Question #47. You are requesting $71.8 million for programs in the
USAID Forward initiative for innovation, science and technology (S&T)
and evaluation. Other agencies in the Federal Government also work with
inventors and the private sector in developing new technologies. To
what extent do you work with other Federal agencies to share
information on new technologies that could be used in USAID-funded
locations? If you do collaborate with other agencies, what are they,
and what is the mechanism you use for this coordination? Do you share
common programs objectives for new technology.
Answer. We are aggressively pursuing formal partnerships with other
Federal agencies to enhance our ability to leverage their scientific
and technical expertise in the service of development. Formal
agreements are at various stages of discussion or have been negotiated
with: NASA, NSF, EPA, USGS, USDA, NOAA, and NIH. Examples of specific
activities include:
The Partnerships for Enhanced Engagement in Research (PEER)
program with the National Science Foundation (NSF):
Competitive grants program supporting researchers in
developing countries to collaborate with U.S. researchers
funded by NSF. Based on USAID's interest and NSF's existing
portfolio, likely areas of collaboration would include
biodiversity, climate change, water, and food security.
Expected to be launched in May 2011.
Estimate that this leverages over $30 of NSF investment
for every $1 invested by USAID.
The LAUNCH initiative, to support entrepreneurship and new
S&T applications for sustainability and development through a
partnership with NASA:
Identified innovative solutions for development problems.
DTI-r--a participant in LAUNCH: designed and developed a
gravity-fed water pipe that is capable of treating gray
water to be used for irrigation in arid regions, such as
Jordan. Due to its proven success, the pipe is now poised
to be scaled up.
LAUNCH features recurring interagency cooperation in
designated sectors. Current programs have addressed water
and health challenges. Our next one will be focused on
energy in late 2011.
USAID and USDA partner in a number of areas, including under
Feed the Future. The Norman Borlaug Commemorative Research
Initiative with U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) is one
example:
USAID and USDA technical working groups address key
agricultural challenges of significance to both U.S. and
developing country farmers.
Priority research areas are livestock health, legume
productivity, food safety, and wheat stem rust.
Research activities harness USDA technical expertise
through collaboration with USAID-funded research partners,
such as the international agriculture research centers
(CGIAR), in support of Feed the Future's food security
goals.
USAID partners with NOAA to utilize their expertise in
weather and hydrological forecasting, climate impacts, use of
remote sensing data in support of Disaster Risk Reduction, and
fisheries management. Examples of collaboration include:
USAID's FEWS NET activity has maintained an interagency
agreement with NOAA since 1986 which provides a variety of
weather, climate and drought monitoring and forecasting
products.
USAID's SERVIR (the Spanish acronym for Regional
Visualization and Monitoring System) program collaborates
with NOAA on capacity building activities in meteorological
services and training modules in Central America.
USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance supports
NOAA's RANET program which uses communication satellites to
transmit information, via radio, to remote areas in
developing countries.
The Research Division of the Office of Population and
Reproductive Health has maintained ongoing collaborative
relationships with the CDC's Division of Reproductive Health,
and NIH's National Institute of Child Health and Human
Development (NICHD) for many years:
Many of the contraceptive technologies available today--
such as the progestin-only oral pill, the 5-year implant,
and the Female Condom--were first developed by USAID
partners and then tested in the NIH CCTN for FDA approval.
These fruitful interagency relationships have enabled
USAID, CDC, and NICHD to come together frequently to review
scientific results, respond to new research questions in
reproductive health, harmonize research plans and
priorities, and leverage their respective resources to
facilitate promising research.
The Research Division has had a long history collaborating
with NIH's National Institute for Allergy and Infectious
Diseases (NIAID) on the development of microbicides for HIV
prevention in women:
This productive interagency relationship has led to
several microbicide products developed by USAID partners
being tested in NIH's HIV Prevention Trials Network and the
Microbicide Trials Network.
The collaboration between USAID's Office of HIV/AIDS
(where the microbicides portfolio now resides) and NIAID
has increased dramatically with the recent tenofovir gel
results that showed the first-ever proof of a microbicide
effective in preventing HIV acquisition in women.
USAID and NIAID are actively collaborating on a combined
portfolio of research to accelerate the introduction of
this product and the further development of other
microbicides.
In addition, we are developing a strategy for enhancing the
Agency's ability to leverage, in the service of development, the depth
and breadth of the academic community's science and technology
resources, both academic and physical.
Question #48. You recently released the Department's first
Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR). In your letter in
which you submitted the fiscal year 2012 budget request, you noted that
the QDDR ``is changing the way we do business.'' How does your budget
request reflect a more focused development agenda? How does it
demonstrate your recognition that the Department ``should just stop
doing'' some things altogether?
Answer. The President's FY 2012 Budget for the Department of State
and USAID are informed by the overarching direction and priorities set
by the Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development and the
Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR). The budget
recognizes that development progress is essential to promoting
America's national security and economic interests, as well as our
values. In particular, Secretary's Clinton's cover letter to the 2012
Congressional Budget Justification highlighted priorities related to
our support for diplomatic and military engagement in key frontline
states (Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan); Presidential Initiatives in
food security, climate change, and global health; as well as
humanitarian assistance, conflict prevention, and crisis response.
Within the State and USAID budget, and consistent with the QDDR and
Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development, we are
prioritizing these areas in our development agenda, as well as economic
growth and democratic governance programming that are essential for
reducing long-term dependence on foreign aid and increasing
sustainability.
Efficiency, program evaluation, and fiscal responsibility are major
components of the QDDR. At the release of the QDDR in December, the
Secretary noted that ``We are redefining success based on results
achieved rather than dollars spent.'' We will minimize costs and
maximize impacts, avoid duplication and overlap, and focus on
delivering results.
The cost avoidance from this focus on efficiency and fiscal
discipline are reflected in the President's FY 2012 budget request for
the Department and USAID. It is a budget for tight times, with core
expenses growing just 1 percent over comparable FY 2010 levels. When
the Department's $8.7 billion Overseas Contingency Operations request
is combined with the Pentagon's war costs in Iraq and Afghanistan, the
total U.S. Government spending on these conflict zones drops by $41
billion, highlighting the savings that can be reached through a whole-
of-government approach to our Nation's most difficult challenges.
Finally, the budget reflects tough choices, including slowing the
expansion of the Foreign Service and reducing development assistance to
more than 20 countries by at least 50 percent.
Fundamentally, the QDDR builds U.S. civilian power. This inherently
creates lasting cost-effective benefits for American taxpayers and
enhances our national security through preventative measures. It costs
far less to deploy a diplomat to defuse a crisis than it does to field
a military division if that conflict is allowed to grow. Civilian power
is a wise investment for the United States, and through the reforms
that the Department and USAID have laid out, it will pay dividends for
years to come.
Question #49. The future of high economic growth is shifting from
the developed to the developing world. Over the past 40 years, trade
has tripled as a share of our economy, and more than 1 out of 5
American jobs are tied to international trade. America's fastest
growing markets--representing roughly half of U.S. exports--are in
developing countries. Economic engagement must keep the United States
competitive in the global marketplace.
What is the role of State and USAID programs in helping spur
economic growth here at home and creating American jobs? How do
these programs help U.S. businesses and entrepreneurs to remain
competitive in the global market place?
Answer. You have well identified the crucial role that exports play
in creating U.S. jobs and rebalancing the U.S. economy. That is why the
Department of State and our embassies and consulates abroad are so
deeply involved in the work of the President's National Export
Initiative, helping U.S. manufacturers, services providers, farmers,
and ranchers achieve more sales outside our domestic market. With
increased exports, the nation can create millions of new jobs across
many sectors and throughout the country. The President has challenged
the nation to double overall exports in a 5-year period, and important
progress was achieved in the first year. U.S. exports in 2010 increased
$261 billion compared to 2009, but in too many markets we are only back
to 2008 export levels, before the effects of the global financial
crisis that began in 2008.
U.S. Ambassadors serving abroad and the country teams they lead at
their embassies make promotion of U.S. exports of manufactured goods,
services, and farm goods an important part of their work. The
ambassadors are the CEOs of the interagency process at their posts,
setting priorities for execution by their teams. State Department
economic officers at embassies and consulates are available to counsel
U.S. companies about market opportunities and challenges overseas.
Economic officers and their colleagues also urge policy and regulatory
reforms by our trading partners, to make economies more open and the
application of regulations more transparent, predictable, and even-
handed, thus assisting U.S. companies' access. Effective protection and
enforcement of intellectual property rights--the patents, trademarks,
and copyrights on which so many knowledge-intensive U.S. companies
rely--is an important focus of work by our embassies and the Department
of State (particularly the Office of International Intellectual
Property Enforcement) in conjunction with other agencies in Washington.
Our embassies also help facilitate the establishment of American
Chambers of Commerce overseas and seek counsel from and offer briefings
to such groups. I met with the Business Round Table in December 2010
and the President's Export Council on March 11 of this year. With input
obtained by our diplomatic posts from U.S. exporters and U.S. business
representatives resident in foreign markets, feedback from the
Department's Advisory Committee on International Economic Policy, and
the constructive views offered by many U.S. domestic businesses and
business organizations such as the Business Round Table and President's
Export Council, we strive to integrate private sector issues into U.S.
foreign and economic policy and direct U.S. Government resources to
assist U.S. business interests overseas.
State Department consular officers adjudicate millions of
nonimmigrant visa applications each year, facilitating legitimate
travel by foreign business people, tourists, and students. These
visitors spend annually tens of billions of dollars in the United
States, helping to create jobs across the nation. We provide our
consular officers with clear guidance to provide business-friendly
application procedures while adjudicating applications for business
visas within the bounds of U.S. immigration law.
I convened U.S. ambassadors from around the world at the Department
of State on February 2 and 3 this year, and their great enthusiasm to
be champions on behalf of U.S. exports and U.S. exporters was quite
apparent. They are concerned, however, about the resources available to
our missions abroad, including for export promotion purposes.
U.S. ambassadors are eager to explain commercial opportunities in
their host countries to U.S. business audiences. One, but by no means
the only recent example: the Department of State's Bureau of Economic,
Energy and Business Affairs and the Bureau of Near East Affairs worked
with the Business Council for International Understanding to program
meetings with U.S. domestic business groups for nine U.S. ambassadors
from the Middle East and North Africa in October of last year. The
ambassadors made presentations to business associations from New York
to Seattle and San Francisco, and from Milwaukee to New Orleans. Other
U.S. ambassadors have made similar presentations to U.S. audiences, and
in this year in which the United States will be host to the APEC
summit, many more such events will occur. All of these activities are
designed to help U.S. companies understand the export opportunities in
often unfamiliar foreign markets.
I and other senior officials of the Department of State regularly
advocate on behalf of U.S. bidders on foreign government and foreign
military procurements, in meetings abroad, on the margins of
international conferences, and in diplomatic correspondence to foreign
government officials. Those efforts, and similar efforts by other
Cabinet members and their senior officials, White House officials, and
the ongoing advocacy by our embassy teams abroad, have resulted in
important, sizable export wins for U.S. businesses. You will recall,
for instance, the multibillion dollar contracts for Boeing jets and
other items announced during President Obama's visit to India in
November and during the January state visit of Chinese President Hu
Jintao to the United States. It is important to emphasize that it is
not just our biggest companies and their supply chains that benefit
from commercial advocacy, however large or important those contracts
may be. The day-to-day work of our country desk officers, regional
bureaus, the Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs, and our
ambassadors and embassy teams overseas reap important accomplishments
for U.S. businesses of all sizes across the nation. For example:
Embassy Manila played a crucial role in the successful bid
of the largest North American producer of solid zinc strip and
zinc-based products, Jarden Zinc Products of Greenville, TN, to
supply coin blanks to the Philippines Central Bank. The
contract value exceeded $20 million.
One of our smallest posts in term of staffing, the American
Presence Post in Rennes, France, recently helped a Maryland
firm secure a contract for at-sea refueling systems for
European naval frigates.
The U.S. Embassy in Tirana recently brokered an
understanding with Albanian Customs and National Food Authority
officials, who had differing interpretations of the
requirements of an ambiguous Albanian law. The Embassy's
intervention allowed release of U.S. meat shipments that had
been delayed in an Albanian port because of those bureaucratic
arguments.
Embassy Asuncion officers counseled a southern California
firm in its successful bid to lay 1,000 kilometers of high-
temperature, low-sag transmission cable for the Paraguayan
National Electricity Administration, a contract valued at more
than $10 million.
State's International Communications and Information Policy
Office (CIP) has promoted the benefits of holding wireless
spectrum auctions to other countries. Brazil, India, Costa
Rica, and Mexico have held these auctions with our
encouragement. In Brazil, U.S.-based Nextel won 11 3G (third
generation) wireless licenses, as well as other licenses,
resulting in Nextel Brazil becoming the fifth mobile carrier
with almost 100 percent national coverage there.
The work of many of the offices in State's Bureau of Economic,
Energy and Business Affairs (EEB) actively support the goals of the
President's National Export Initiative or otherwise contribute to U.S.
economic prosperity.
EEB administers a Business Facilitation Incentive Fund used
by dozens of posts without a Commercial Service presence for
export promotion activities.
EEB/CIP works with foreign governments and U.S. industry to
encourage regulatory reform and market access for the
information and communications technology (ICT) sector. Through
public-private partnerships CIP promotes U.S. ICT industry
instruction of visiting foreign officials on best practices,
regulatory reform, international standards, and
telecommunications competition.
EEB's Office of Aviation Negotiations expands markets for
our airlines, which benefits U.S. exporters, the travel and
tourism industries, and the express delivery industry, and
creates demand for long-haul aircraft to fly these new routes.
EEB's Office of Development Finance helps the Millennium
Challenge Corporation increase private sector awareness of
procurement opportunities offered there.
EEB's Office of Trade Policy and Programs represents State
and supports officials of the Office of the United States Trade
Representative in numerous bilateral and multilateral trade
negotiations with the express goal of opening markets and
creating a level playing field for our firms.
EEB's Office of Investment Affairs joins with USTR in
negotiating protections for overseas investors against
expropriation. The United States is the world's largest outward
investor, and an estimated 21 percent of U.S. exports are
intracompany transfers from U.S. parents to their overseas
subsidiaries. The annual Investment Climate Statement produced
by our embassies and published on the State Department Web site
is a key tool used by many American companies to evaluate risk
associated with their overseas investment plans.
EEB's Office of Investment Affairs and Commerce's ``Invest
in America'' program cooperate to attract foreign investment to
the United States that creates thousands of high-value jobs in
our economy. In October, we sent a joint State-Commerce
instruction to all diplomatic and consular posts stressing the
importance of attracting investment to the United States. The
United States is the world's No. 1 recipient of inward foreign
direct investment, and foreign subsidiaries in the United
States provide approximately 19 percent of all U.S. exports.
In sum, International Affairs funding is crucial for the foreign
policy of the United States, but also for our international economic
policies and the creation of a more prosperous economic future for our
workers and companies in an increasingly connected and competitive
global marketplace.
Question #50. In your testimony you mentioned that several al-Qaeda
``foreign fighters'' were from eastern Libya, the part of the country
now liberated from the Qadhafi's control. I have also read reports that
at the peak of the Iraqi insurgency, more Libyans per capita traveled
to join al-Qaeda in Iraq than from any other country. The potential for
al-Qaeda to exploit the turmoil in Libya is of great concern.
Please share with us specifics on any current movement of
people between Libya and Afghanistan/Pakistan of elsewhere, in
classified format if necessary. What sort of foothold does al-
Qaeda or Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have in Libya
now?
Answer. While Qadhafi's claims that the rebellion is an al-Qaeda
(AQ) plot lacks credibility, both AQ and its affiliate Al Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) are looking for ways to play a greater role in
the conflict. They have made rhetorical statements of support for the
rebels in Libya and have advised the rebels to set up an Islamic state
in a post-Qadhafi era. AQ's leaders in Pakistan and Afghanistan have
tried to portray the international intervention as a crusade against
Muslims in order to further their own agenda.
Libyan extremists potentially traveling back from Afghanistan and
Pakistan and from the surrounding region likely retain an interest in
setting up operations in Libya given a deep historical hatred of
Qadhafi by the extremists, the current chaotic state, and the fact that
Libyan state security services are in disarray. It seems likely that
extremists will try to take advantage of the current situation and at
least attempt to ``set up shop.''
Importantly, the Transitional National Council (TNC) has not
demonstrated a desire to support AQ or AQIM or to accept assistance
from either. In fact, on March 30, the TNC issued a noteworthy
statement repudiating terrorism and extremism in broad terms. The
opposition currently is a diverse coalition of Libyans from
professional, tribal, and political backgrounds.
Question #51. I have seen reports that AQIM has announced its
support for the uprising against Qadhafi. What influence would they
have in a post-Qadhafi Libya, particularly if the army and other
security forces are either diminished or splintered?
Answer. At this time, we do not see AQIM having an influential role
in Libya. The Transitional National Council (TNC) has not demonstrated
a desire to support AQ or AQIM, nor to accept assistance from either.
In fact, on March 30, the TNC issued a noteworthy statement repudiating
terrorism and extremism in broad terms. The opposition currently is a
diverse coalition of Libyans from professional, tribal, and political
backgrounds.
With Libyan security services in disarray, however, Al Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) will try to take advantage of the situation
primarily to recruit fighters and procure arms. AQIM has worked to move
some of its Libyan fighters into Libya and is seeking to acquire arms
that have become available from looted government stocks. AQIM
leadership has made rhetorical statements of support for the rebels and
has urged the setting up of an Islamic state. While the Algerian-led
AQIM still retains its focus on Algeria, the chaotic state in Libya
could provide an opportunity for AQIM to increase its area of
operations and freedom of movement.
Question #52. The Government in Venezuela continues to suppress
democratic institutions and practices and abuse human rights. Many of
its officials are becoming involved in narcotics production and trade.
Responding to a question I submitted for the record last summer
during his nomination hearing, Ambassador Larry Palmer, expressed the
administration's concerns about limitations on freedom of the press and
freedom of expression. He also expressed the administration's
willingness to act on other designations such as the ``kingpin'' under
OFAC procedures should the circumstances warrant such measures.
Is it not time to be more aggressive in helping those fighting for
democracy, to demand protection for those whose rights are being abused
and to target any and all Venezuelan Government officials we know all
too well are involved in the narcotics trade?
Answer. We share your concerns about the state of democracy in
Venezuela. Our concerns about Venezuelan Government actions range from
efforts to restrict freedom of expression and assembly to the use of
the judiciary to intimidate and persecute individuals and organizations
critical of government policies and government actions.
We were particularly troubled by the delegation of legislative
authority (decree powers) to the executive that extended beyond the
term of office of the last National Assembly. This kind of majoritarian
rule does not respect minority views and violates the shared values
expressed in the Inter-American Democratic Charter. We have expressed
our concerns both publicly and privately on numerous occasions both in
Caracas and in Washington and will continue to do so.
At the same time, we were encouraged by the decision of millions of
Venezuelans to exercise their democratic right to vote in the September
26 legislative elections. We also continue to be impressed by the
activism and vitality of Venezuelan civil society, a critical
democratic force.
We believe that an opposition's presence in the National Assembly
after a 5-year absence could well facilitate deeper debate on issues of
concern to the Venezuelan people and potentially will allow for greater
accountability by the government for its performance. For the first
time in 5 years, there is a plurality of views in at least one
institution of government.
We are already seeing this play out, with energetic, even
passionate debates on issues of national importance taking place in the
National Assembly. Whatever the continuing obstacles, the opposition
now has a voice.
As we do elsewhere in the world, U.S. programs that support civil
society in Venezuela seek to strengthen democratic governance, support
civic engagement, promote human rights and expand national dialogue.
They are nonpartisan, open to all political tendencies, and support
internationally recognized (including by Venezuela) freedoms of
expression, association, and peaceful assembly. We are committed to
continuing support for such programs in Venezuela.
Regarding your concerns about the involvement of Venezuelan
officials in the narcotics trade, we continue to work closely with
Treasury, Justice, and others to identify and target such officials. As
you know, in September 2008, Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets
Control designated two senior Venezuelan Government officials, Hugo
Armando Carvajal Barrios and Henry de Jesus Rangel Silva, and the
former Justice and Interior Minister, Ramon Rodriguez Chacin, as drug
kinpins for materially assisting the narcotics trafficking activities
of the FARC.
Question #53. Moldova.--In 2009 a reform-minded, Europe-oriented
government was swept to power in Moldova but has been forced to contend
with political uncertainty due to several failed attempts to elect a
President and the unresolved status of the separatist region of
Transnistria, where Russian troops have served since the early 1990s. I
have been very encouraged that Vice President Biden will travel to
Moldova in the coming weeks as a show of U.S. support for the domestic
developments that have taken place there--in my view, a notable
development in light of other flagging democratic movements in the
region.
Several weeks ago I introduced legislation to finally repeal
Jackson-Vanik trade restrictions on Moldovan goods. Will your
administration be working to support passage of this long overdue
measure?
Answer. The Obama administration supports ending of application of
Jackson-Vanik to Moldova and granting Permanent Normal Trade Relations
(PNTR). Moldova has satisfied all requirements of the Jackson-Vanik
amendment regarding freedom of emigration for several years. Even
though Moldova has been a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
since 2001, the WTO Agreement has not applied between the United States
and Moldova because of the Jackson-Vanik amendment. This situation has
denied the United States and our companies and workers the benefits of
Moldova's WTO membership. Ending application of Jackson-Vanik and
granting PNTR will permit us to apply the WTO Agreement and will also
send a positive message to Moldova and the world about the United
States-Moldova relationship.
Vice President Biden delivered both publicly and privately a
message of support for granting PNTR to Moldova while in Chisinau on
March 11. He noted to Moldovan officials that action on this issue
depends on congressional timing and priorities. More broadly, Vice
President Biden commended the government for their democratic and
economic progress, but also urged continued efforts to reform the
judiciary, root out corruption, and fight human trafficking.
Question #54. Lithuania.--The incoming OSCE chairman-in-office
(Note: this is Lithuanian FM Azubalis) has called for restarting the
so-called ``Five Plus Two'' talks led by the OSCE over the status of
Transnistria. Does the administration intend to support this
initiative?
Answer. Yes. The United States has repeatedly called for the
resumption of formal 5+2 negotiations over the past year and supports
the position of the Lithuanian OSCE Chairman-in-Office. While visiting
Moldova on March 11, Vice President Biden publicly reaffirmed U.S.
policy by calling for a formal 5+2 meeting with a real agenda this
year. The United States supports a transparent settlement to this
protracted conflict that defines Transnistria's status while respecting
the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Moldova
within its internationally recognized borders. Informal talks in the
5+2 format are continuing and will hopefully lead to a resumption of
formal negotiations this year, which would represent a step toward
resolving the Transnistria dispute.
Question #55. Russia and Georgia.--The Russia-Georgia cease-fire
agreement of 2008 required that Russia withdraw its troops to prewar
positions and reduce its military to prewar strength. As you know,
Russian policy has moved in the other direction, and Russia has
undertaken a military buildup in Georgia, with latest reports
indicating that an additional 300 troops were just recently deployed in
South Ossetia. What, in your view, are Russia's objectives in Georgia,
and how can U.S. policy be effective in reversing this troubling
development?
Answer. Only Russia can define its overall objectives toward
Georgia, but in public statements, leading officials express a
willingness for serious rapprochement with Georgia only after President
Saakashvili has departed office. Even then, Russia's concept of what
constitutes Georgia differs from that of the rest of the international
community, in that Russia remains committed to recognition of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia as independent states and believes that this must be
accepted as a new reality by other actors in international relations.
This is not an approach accepted by the United States. The United
States strongly supports Georgia's sovereignty and territorial
integrity. We continue to urge Russia at the highest levels to comply
with its obligations under the 2008 cease-fire agreement, withdraw its
troops to preconflict positions, and to end its occupation of the
Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. We have also urged
Russia to reciprocate the ``no-use of force'' pledge expressed by
President Saakashvili in front of the European Parliament on November
23, 2010. We have urged the Russian Government bilaterally and in
international fora to reduce tensions in the region and encourage
incremental practical steps, especially confidence-building measures
and transparency on Russia's military presence in the separatist areas.
We have encouraged Russia and Georgia to participate constructively in
the Geneva process, which provides the only forum for dialogue among
all parties to the conflict. In the framework of the Geneva process,
ongoing meetings of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms
(IPRMs) in Abkhazia and South Ossetia are playing a useful role in
bringing together the parties to the conflict to prevent and resolve
security incidents, and address humanitarian concerns on the ground.
Question #56. Office of the U.S. Assistance Coordinator for Europe
and Eurasia.--I note that the budget request for Europe, Eurasia, and
Central Asia has been cut by $115 million dollars, a 15-percent cut.
The budget for this region has been reduced in past years due to the
success of U.S. assistance and foreign policy initiatives in the
region, as some of these transition countries have become more
affluent, graduated from traditional assistance programs, and in many
cases joined the EU and NATO. I would note that there is much
unfinished business in the region, with fragile democracies in Georgia,
Ukraine, and Moldova, the threat of ethnic conflict remaining in the
Balkans, frontline states in Central Asia that could become sources of
regional instability, and democratic backsliding in a number of
countries. The brutal crackdown on the democratic opposition in Belarus
is only the most dramatic and recent example.
The unique office that has coordinated this assistance for many
years, the Office of the Coordinator for U.S. Assistance to Europe and
Eurasia, known as ``EUR-ACE'' (E.U.R.-Ace) was set up in conjunction
with passage of the FREEDOM Support Act and coordinates all U.S.
Government assistance in the region, tailoring it to the broader
foreign policy objectives pursued by the Bureaus for Europe and Eurasia
and South and Central Asia.
In 2007, my staff conducted a review of U.S. foreign assistance
coordination within the State Department and USAID. The published
report that resulted from this study recommended that: ``The Secretary
of State would be better served by the replication of the office of the
U.S. Assistance Coordinator for Europe and Eurasia . . . for each
regional bureau, perhaps in the form of `deputy assistant secretary for
programs.' ''
In light of the proposed reduction in the FY 2012 budget, and
potential future reductions in U.S. assistance programs in this region,
could you share with the committee your current thinking on the future
role of the Coordinator's office? Do you see any merit in replicating
this structure in other regional bureaus, as the 2007 committee report
recommended?
Answer. The Office of the U.S. Assistance Coordinator for Europe,
Eurasia and Central Asia (EUR/ACE) has employed its unique authorities
and dedicated regional funding account to good effect in helping the
former Communist countries in this region transition into democratic,
free market states. In the two decades since the establishment of the
Coordinator, significant progress has been made toward this goal: 11
country recipients have advanced to the point where they have graduated
from U.S. development assistance; 12 have joined the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO); 10 have acceded to the European Union (EU);
and some Balkan country recipients have made progress toward accession
goals. Many of these countries are now strong partners that support
U.S. priorities, such as our coalition efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan,
and have become foreign assistance donors in their own right. EUR/ACE
has effectively coordinated the interagency assistance community,
including during times of crisis such as the aftermath of the August
2008 conflict in Georgia and the Kyrgyz Republic in 2010. It has also
served as a comprehensive source of information about U.S. assistance
provided to the region.
The reduction in assistance to the Europe, Eurasia, and Central
Asia region is driven by the difficult budget environment. Within that
context, the administration's request for FY 2012 reflects a
reallocation of resources to address other needs globally, weighing
factors such as progress made, the work of other donors, and
assessments of the key remaining challenges in the region. At the same
time, the countries of the region remain vital to U.S. foreign policy
interests and foreign assistance will continue to be essential to
address a range of important national security interests and difficult
development challenges, including democracy backsliding, instability,
rampant corruption, and transnational threats.
In 2006, the Department reformed its foreign assistance management
structure by creating the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign
Assistance (F) to integrate budgets and planning across all State
Department and USAID programs. More recently, the administration has
elevated development to be coequal with diplomacy and defense as core
pillars of American foreign policy and aims to empower USAID as the
U.S. Government's lead on development matters.
Any decisions on the future of EUR/ACE will necessarily be informed
by a number of factors, including the implementation of the Secretary's
Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), foreign assistance
funding trajectories, policy priorities, and country progress toward
political and economic transition goals. The Department would consult
with Congress regarding any potential changes to its current model of
foreign assistance management for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia.
Question #57. U.S. investments in Macau are experiencing an
increasingly hostile business environment on the part of the Macau
Government. This is a remarkable turn of events as the United States is
one of the largest, if not the largest source of foreign investment in
Macau. From the perspective of the Department, what is the genesis of
actions against U.S. companies in Macau? What is the United States
Government doing to protect the interests of U.S. companies in Macau?
Answer. As the United States is Macau's second-largest investor
with over $8 billion in investments in the past 6 years, supporting
U.S. business interests in Macau is a top priority for the Department
of State. We have therefore continued to urge the Macau Government to
maintain a level playing field for investors, including enhancing
transparency in government decisionmaking, allowing more imported
skilled labor, and ensuring legal due process. Although the business
community is currently facing tight labor conditions due to Macau's
unprecedented economic growth, a very low unemployment rate of 2.7
percent, and restrictive labor policies, in general we perceive Macau
as a welcoming environment for U.S. business. The one dispute that we
are aware of involving a U.S. invested company is currently before the
Macau courts, and Consulate General Hong Kong personnel, stressing the
importance of transparency and due process, have raised the matter with
Macau officials on multiple occasions, including with Macau's chief
executive.
Question #58. What venues are available in Macau that represent
viable options for U.S. companies to pursue resolution of disputes? Can
the Chinese Government be of assistance, and has the Department of
State made any contacts in this regard?
Answer. In addition to Macau courts, the Macau Arbitration Center
is available in some circumstances for third-party resolution of
commercial disputes through arbitration and conciliation. The Hong Kong
International Arbitration Centre may also be available to parties.
Regarding whether the Chinese Government can be of assistance, the U.S.
Government policy is to support ``one country, two systems'' and
Macau's autonomy under the Basic Law on issues outside of national
security and foreign affairs. As a result, we believe it is most
effective to continue working directly with the Government of Macau to
resolve commercial disputes.
Question #59. The Department only recently notified Congress that
the United States had over $400 million in credits sitting at the
United Nations.
Given the incredibly difficult budget situation the
Department is in, how did this come to pass?
What does the administration intend to do with this money?
Please describe the nature and purpose of the Tax
Equalization Fund in which these credits accumulated.
Answer. There are approximately $240 million in credits at the
United Nations attributable to U.S. assessed contributions for
peacekeeping-related activities that have accumulated over several
years. Approximately $79 million of these are in the U.N. Tax
Equalization Fund (TEF) and an additional $162 million stem from active
and closed peacekeeping missions where the mission costs came in below
the budgets approved by the General Assembly. There had been an
additional $100 million in the U.N. TEF attributable to U.S.
contributions to the U.N. regular budget and an additional $68 million
attributable to U.S. assessed contributions to peacekeeping activities.
As we have advised the relevant congressional committees previously,
the U.N. applied $100 million in TEF credits to implement critical
perimeter security enhancements at the U.N. complex in New York and $68
million in peacekeeping credits to offset arrears for peacekeeping
missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Haiti.
The majority of the peacekeeping credits have accumulated as a
result of the closure of several peacekeeping missions. The TEF credits
have accrued as a result of the U.N.'s methodology overestimating the
amount actually needed to reimburse American citizens working at the
U.N. for U.S. taxes paid. We are working with the U.N. to make changes
to the methodology in order to achieve more realistic estimates.
The TEF is a mechanism used to ensure that U.S. citizens working at
the U.N. are not disadvantaged in their salary compared to those U.N.
employees from other countries. The U.N. sets its salary scale as if
its employees' salaries will not be subject to the taxes of their home
countries. With U.S. employees required to pay taxes on their U.N.
income, the United Nations and United States recognized that this
situation in effect penalized American nationals by paying them a lower
take-home salary than other U.N. and, therefore, could discourage U.S.
nationals from working at the U.N.
To overcome this, the United States and United Nations adopted a
mechanism whereby the U.N. refunds the income taxes paid by U.S.
employees (as required by U.S. tax code), and the United States
reimburses the U.N. The intended effect is to equalize the net pay of
U.N. employees despite differing national tax obligations.
When the United States pays its assessed contributions to the U.N.,
part of these payments provide funds to reimburse American citizens
employed at the U.N. for national taxes paid. These funds are deposited
in the TEF.
The Department intends to apply all of these available credits to
assessed contributions in FY 2011 and FY 2012, primarily for
peacekeeping, and this was reflected in the President's FY 2012 budget
request.
Question #60. What is the status of American Gary Helseth who
allegedly misappropriated funds as part of his duties with the United
Nations in Afghanistan? According to the U.N. Office for Project
Services, his case was referred to the State Department to decide if
any legal action should be taken in regard to the allegations. Did the
U.N. conduct an investigation into his actions? What is he specifically
accused of, including the dollar amount of any misappropriated funds?
Is the United States conducting its own investigation, if not, why not?
Where exactly is Mr. Helseth?
Answer. The Procurement Task Force (PTF), established by the U.N.
Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) to look into allegations
of fraud and malfeasance in the U.N.'s procurement service following
the Oil for Food scandal, found that Gary Helseth created fraudulent
documents in a scheme to embezzle project money in Afghanistan and
improperly charged personal expenditures to the United Nations Office
for Project Services (UNOPS) for renovations to his house, hosting
parties, personal travel, and luxury items. The PTF estimated that
UNOPS and project donors sustained a combined loss of at least
$480,000. At the time of the PTF report in December 2008, Mr. Helseth
no longer worked for the United Nations.
On May 22, 2009, the U.N. Department of Legal Affairs provided the
United States Mission to the United Nations (USUN) with a copy of the
PTF report for official use only and for use by U.S. authorities in
pursuing their investigation of this matter. Subsequently, the U.S.
Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York requested a
copy of the PTF report and related background documents on June 11,
2009, which USUN provided. I would refer you to the Department of
Justice for further information on the status of this case and Mr.
Helseth's whereabouts.
Question #61. The U.S. Refugee Admissions and Resettlement Program
is antiquated and is in need of urgent reform. The National Security
Council initiated a consultative process with stakeholders to reform
the resettlement program. As part of this initiative, in December 2009
the NSC, ORR, PRM, and DHS, announced a number of short-term reforms.
Long-term reforms were to be announced at the beginning of 2010, but
this has not yet occurred. It is important that the effort of bringing
stakeholders together culminates in long-term, structural reforms.
Will the effort led by the NSC with stakeholders to review
the resettlement program culminate in structural reforms to the
processing of refugees? What kind of reforms do you think this
process should prioritize?
Answer. The Department of State's Bureau of Population, Refugees,
and Migration (PRM) has been an active member of the NSS-led
interagency review of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program. This review
began in August 2009 and involved a host of key stakeholders as well as
the Department of State, the Department of Homeland Security, and the
Department of Health and Human Services. As a consequence of this
review, PRM has implemented a number of substantive and structural
improvements to our processing systems. As of October 2009, we began
providing additional refugee medical information to resettlement
agencies to improve placement decisions and preparation to meet
existing refugee medical needs. We also have made every attempt to even
out the flow of refugee arrivals, achieving about 25 percent of the
yearly total in each quarter of fiscal year 2010.
In addition, PRM has worked with the Department of Health and Human
Services' Office of Refugee Resettlement to enhance the process by
which refugees are placed in communities throughout the United States.
This collaborative effort culminated in February 2011 when we launched
the first quarterly teleconference on placement information between the
Federal Government, resettlement agencies, local service providers,
state refugee coordinators, and state health coordinators. During this
review period, PRM also expanded and strengthened cultural orientation
sessions provided to refugees overseas, which are crucial to the early
success of refugees arriving in U.S. communities. Another significant
structural reform to refugee resettlement was the State Department's
doubling of the Reception and Placement per capita grant from $900 to
$1,800 per refugee. This increase became effective January 2010 and has
expanded housing and other essential support services during the
initial 30-90 day period for which the State Department is responsible.
Question #62. What steps are you taking to increase the
coordination among the various Federal, State and local stakeholders,
as well as private voluntary agencies, to ensure appropriate planning,
ongoing review and development of new initiatives to assist refugees
granted protection in the United States?
Answer. The Department of State coordinates with Federal, State,
and local stakeholders, as well as voluntary agencies, on an ongoing
basis. The Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) is
working to strengthen this coordination at all levels. In the past 2
years, the PRM Assistant Secretary and Deputy Assistant Secretary have
visited eight local resettlement cities across the United States. The
PRM Admissions director and staff have also visited numerous local
resettlement locations. The purpose of this travel is to hear local
community perspectives and increase collaboration between Federal,
State, National, and local stakeholders. Through the NSS-led
resettlement reform process, PRM also has proposed conducting joint
site visits with the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR). These visits
would allow PRM and ORR to both hear from local communities, as well as
increase collaboration as Federal partners in resettlement.
Additionally, PRM holds meetings with National, State, and local
leaders when particular challenges related to resettlement arise in a
given community. Such meetings have taken place via conference call as
well as in person. Finally, in fiscal year (FY) 2011, PRM and ORR began
holding quarterly placement planning meetings to share information and
strengthen planning among Federal, National, State, and local
stakeholders.
Since January 2010, PRM has begun sharing a greater amount of data
with more stakeholders to assist in planning. To further strengthen
planning and increase transparency, PRM plans to make more Reception
and Placement (R&P) program information available and accessible to the
public in FY 2012. For a number of years, recipients of R&P funding
have been required to conduct local consultations as well as consult
with state refugee coordinators and state refugee health coordinators
prior to submitting their annual program proposals to PRM.
Additionally, in the FY 2012 R&P request for proposals, PRM will
require that applicants provide the results of local consultations, in
addition to the results of State-level consultation that are already
required.
In FY 2011, PRM implemented new performance outcomes for the R&P
program to better review the program's progress and its impact on
refugees. This was only one result of a collaborative review of the R&P
program conducted in FY 2009-FY 2010. Another process that reviewed the
resettlement program and examined possibilities for new initiatives is
the NSS-led resettlement reform process. This review will end in May
2011 and information on what was achieved through this process will be
available at that time. The Department of State's partner in domestic
resettlement is the Department of Health and Human Services, through
their Office of Refugee Resettlement. HHS may be able to inform you of
how it is reviewing its programs, coordinating among stakeholders, and
planning and implementing new initiatives to assist refugees resetting
in the United States.
Question #63. Oversight carried out by my staff found that local
elected officials and community leaders are insufficiently consulted by
Federal decisionmakers, although the responsibility for resettling
refugees is largely passed on to cities throughout the United States.
Please describe the nature of your efforts to ensure that the concerns
and recommendations of local stakeholders have been appropriately
considered. The one-size-fits-all approach has been signaled as one of
the characteristics of the program that currently is unable to provide
adequate support for the populations resettled today. What kind of
reforms can be made from PRM's role to better respond to diverse needs
and characteristics of refugees and the local communities in which they
are placed?
Answer. The Department of State is committed to coordination among
stakeholders at all levels regarding the resettlement program. The
Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) has a keen
appreciation for the vital role local communities play in refugee
resettlement in the United States. With this in mind, PRM Front Office
and Admissions staff have conducted numerous domestic site visits to
hear directly from local communities about the resettlement program.
PRM intends to continue making such visits. For a number of years,
recipients of R&P funding have been required to conduct local
consultations as well as consult with State refugee coordinators and
State refugee health coordinators prior to submitting their annual
program proposals to PRM. Additionally, in the FY 2012 R&P request for
proposals, PRM will require that applicants provide the results of
local consultations, in addition to the results of State-level
consultation that are already required.
The Department of State does not believe the R&P program is a one-
size-fits-all program. In January 2010, PRM doubled the per capita
grant for direct services to refugees. In doing so, PRM included a
funding mechanism that allowed refugees to receive different levels of
resources based on their needs. Of the $1,800 per capita, $1,100 must
be spent directly on refugees. While affiliates must spend at least
$900 on each refugee, they may choose to allocate up to $200 of the
$1,100 on other more vulnerable refugees. PRM permits each affiliate to
develop their own policy to define vulnerability and determine the use
of this discretionary portion of the per capita grant. This flexibility
allows affiliates to better address the individual needs of each
refugee resettled. Furthermore, the R&P program is a public-private
partnership. As such, Federal funding is only intended to provide a
portion of the resources needed to serve the refugee. Each national
voluntary agency and its affiliates raise private resources, both cash
and in-kind, to further address the individual needs of each refugee.
Finally, each community is unique, and has different strengths and
weaknesses. Recognizing this, each national voluntary agency and its
affiliates work to determine the most appropriate placement for each
refugee, so that that location best matches the individualized needs of
that refugee and his or her family. ORR's programs and discretionary
funding allow them to create programs to address the diverse needs of
refugees and the communities in which they resettle. You may contact
ORR directly to learn how it addresses these needs and others.
The Department of State believes that, in order to best prepare for
and serve refugees resettling to the United States, their individual
and diverse needs must be recognized, understood, and met, and the
voice and needs of local communities must be heard and acknowledged.
Question #64. In FY10 PRM helped to resettle 73,311 refugees in the
United States. How might potential funding cuts impact the Refugee
Admissions Program?
Answer. In FY 2008, the United States admitted approximately 60,000
refugees through the Refugee Admissions Program, while in FY 2010 more
than 73,000 refugees were admitted. We had anticipated maintaining
current levels of admissions in FY 2011 plus funding initial
resettlement benefits for 2,500 to 5,000 Iraqi Special Immigrant Visa
recipients. If funds in the MRA account were cut to FY 2008 levels, the
administration would have to evaluate its ability to maintain current
levels of admissions.
Question #65. NSPD-12 was created in response to the analysis that
U.S. personnel overseas were at risk for being taken hostage or
otherwise isolated. Given the successes of the personnel recovery
programs in Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia and in light of the
increased threat to Foreign Service personnel and other U.S. Government
personnel in Mexico, Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere, what plans
does the State Department have to establish personnel recovery centers
in other countries in which State Department and other U.S. Government
personnel may be at risk, as well as making sure those personnel
deploying overseas are sufficiently trained to avoid, manage, and
respond to hostage or other isolating situations? How will the State
Department use funds requested for FY 2012 to implement NSPD-12? Will
the State Department require any additional resources for NSPD-12
implementation?
Answer. The threat of kidnapping presents a danger not only to our
citizens conducting business abroad, but to the stability of some
developing societies struggling to combat organized crime and
terrorism. NSPD-12 was drafted in 2002 as broad policy guidance for
management of hostage incidents involving American citizens. In 2008,
Annex 1 to NSPD-12 introduced ``personnel recovery'' as a broad
concept, calling on U.S. agencies to develop and coordinate efforts to
prevent, prepare for, and respond to cases of Americans taken hostage
or isolated abroad. The Department's Bureaus of Consular Affairs and
Diplomatic Security and the Office of the Coordinator for Counter-
Terrorism work collectively to implement Annex 1 policy through efforts
ranging from consular travel warnings and Overseas Security Advisory
Council (OSAC) corporate security outreach, to specialized training for
at-risk U.S. employees and personnel recovery incident managers.
Rescue and recovery coordination has also been improved in high-
risk areas, notably in Mexico, where the interagency country team has
strengthened internal personnel accountability and recovery plans that
include improved countrywide protocols to engage the host-country
rescue architecture. In March 2011, the U.S Air Force Rescue
Coordination Center carried out a broad civil search and rescue
training exercise with their Mexican counterparts, representing a
promising level of practical bilateral cooperation.
The establishment and funding of full-time overseas interagency
personnel recovery coordinators at critical-threat posts is under
review and would likely involve unbudgeted resources. Plans to maintain
and, if necessary, expand training and field coordination initiatives
will also require additional resources.
Question #66. The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review has
set a goal of ``ensuring that all State Department employees serving in
locations where personal digital assistants can be used are provided
with this technology by FY 2012.'' Is the State Department considering
integrating tracking and other emergency communication software and
technology into these mobile devices as part of a coordinated PR
effort? Will non-State Department employees serving overseas have
access to these mobile devices? For example, Peace Corps volunteers are
not under Chief of Mission authority, but are at equal or greater risk
of isolation or kidnapping than Foreign Service officers. Does the
State Department have any plans to incorporate the Peace Corps into its
implementation of NSPD-12?
Answer. The Department of State is working with the Department of
Defense, a variety of interagency partners, and the private sector to
research and develop cost-effective personnel tracking and locating
systems. These systems include custom satellite-communication-based
systems and applications for commercial ``location aware''
``smartphones.'' This technology could seamlessly augment American
Citizen Services warden systems that already make great use of mobile
SMS text networks and would tap the capabilities that already exist in
many of our employees' cell phones and BlackBerries. However, our
experience shows that in many overseas locales, the cellular and SMS
infrastructure is inadequate or unreliable. Additionally, recent events
throughout the world reinforce that in many emergency situations,
cellular systems are either overwhelmed or, in the case of civil
unrest, turned off by the host government. Each location must be
evaluated on the basis of threat, infrastructure, and other factors as
well as the most effective solution utilized; this may in fact be a
hybrid approach using multiple technologies in a single country.
The national policy directives promulgated in NSPD-12 are
especially relevant to Peace Corps volunteers serving our Nation in
hazardous environments overseas. The Peace Corps independently manages
a robust overseas safety and security program that is broadly supported
by the Chief of Mission's security and emergency action planning in
coordination with the Peace Corps Country Director.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton to Questions
Submitted by Senator Barbara Boxer
The State Department is currently evaluating the Keystone XL
pipeline project to determine whether to issue a Presidential Permit
for the project. The following questions address the State Department's
consideration of this project.
Question. In the evaluation of the Keystone XL project, will the
State Department assess how increasing U.S. imports of crude oil
derived from Canadian tar sands will increase the carbon intensity of
the U.S. fuel supply and affect the United States ability to meet
pollution reductions goals?
Answer. In response to the many comments received on the carbon
intensity of crude oil from the Western Canadian Sedimentary Basin
(WCSB), also known as oil sands or tar sands, the State Department
commissioned a report that examined recent literature comparing the
carbon intensity of WCSB crude oil with other reference crudes. As part
of a supplemental draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), the State
Department is releasing this report in mid-April to seek input on how
this information should be used in evaluating the potential
environmental impact of the Keystone XL pipeline.
Question. Will the State Department include a comprehensive
assessment of the carbon pollution and criteria pollutant emissions
impacts associated with increasing our reliance on tar sands oil,
including impacts on the health of communities surrounding refineries
serviced by the pipeline?
Answer. The State Department is including an assessment of the
lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions associated with crude oil from the
WCSB in a forthcoming supplemental draft EIS. The supplemental draft
EIS will also provide information on the similarities and differences
between WCSB derived crude oil and conventional heavy crude oils
refined in the United States, as well as an analysis of the impact the
Keystone XL pipeline could have on the emissions of refineries that may
receive crude oil transported by the pipeline.
Question. Will the State Department assess a broader array of
alternatives as suggested by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
including alternative routes that avoid sensitive areas along the
proposed route?
Answer. The forthcoming Supplemental Draft Environmental Impact
Statement will include an assessment of additional potential route
alternatives, as well as additional analysis regarding many of the
alternatives examined in the draft EIS.
Question. Will the State Department respond to the array of issues
raised by the EPA and issue a revised draft EIS or supplemental EIS for
additional comment, as recommended by EPA?
Answer. The State Department has been working with the EPA and
other cooperating agencies to make revisions to the draft EIS,
following the public comment period that ended in July 2010. The State
Department is releasing a supplemental draft EIS in mid-April. The
supplemental draft EIS addresses many of the issues raised by EPA,
including an analysis of lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions, pipeline
safety, and environmental justice issues. The public will have 45 days
to comment on the Supplemental Draft EIS after a Federal Register
notice is published.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
hispanic diversity at state
Question. Madame Secretary, as you know for many years I have
urged, advocated, and legislated on behalf of enhancing Hispanic
diversity at the Department within the civil service and Foreign
Service. Despite my efforts and the commitment of successive
Secretaries of State, today, Hispanics make up just 5 percent of all
State Department employees and just 3.9 percent of Foreign Service
officers. The average amongst federal agencies is 8 percent. State's
numbers are disappointing.
What is even more disappointing--and which seem to demonstrate the
Department's continued indifference to this issue--is that the State
Department failed to even provide data for 2009 to OPM for its annual
report to the President on Hispanic Employment in the Federal
Government. It was the ONLY federal agency to not respond.
Late last year, I chaired the nomination hearing for Deputy
Secretary Tom Nides and I asked him about the Department's dismal
record on this issue. In his oral and written response he agreed that
this was a priority area for the Department, that there is more that
can be done, and that Department would find innovative ways to improve
minority recruitment and retention.
What specifically are you doing to address this issue [of
increasing the number of Hispanic employees at the Department
of State]? Are you attempting to limit ``in status'' postings
for civil service jobs? Are you working to increase the number
of Hispanic Presidential Management Fellows or Hispanic
students participating in cooperative education programs? What
is the Department doing on this issue? Will the Department
comply with OPM's request for 2010 data for their annual report
to the President on diversity?
Answer. The Department of State's continuing recruitment goal is to
identify, inspire, and employ qualified Americans from diverse
backgrounds, representing the demographics of the Nation's professional
workforce, to effectively carry out our foreign policy.
Hispanics make up 5 percent of State Department Civil Service
employees, 3.9 percent of Foreign Service officers, and 6.1 percent of
Foreign Service specialists. The number of self-identified Hispanics
who took the Foreign Service Officer Test during FY10 was 2,219, up
from 1,465 in FY09 or 10 percent of the total (approximately a 50
percent increase). In 2010 the Department hired 36 Hispanic Foreign
Service specialists, or 7.4 percent of all new specialist hires, and 32
out of 826 Foreign Service generalists, or 3.9 percent.
Department of State's Large-Scale Recruitment Efforts
We recognize there is still much work to be done to ensure the
Department reflects the rich diversity of our Nation. Several of our
efforts are often cited as ``best practices'' and are successful in
attracting outstanding diverse talent to pursue Department careers. We
use a combination of ``high tech'' and ``high touch'' tactics to
identify and encourage the diverse talent we seek.
Sixteen senior Foreign Service officers, also known as Diplomats in
Residence, are based at targeted campuses around the United States.
Each Diplomat in Residence has regional responsibilities, collectively
visiting hundreds of colleges and universities and meeting with
professionals seeking to change careers. On campus, Diplomats in
Residence work in partnership with career counselors, diversity
coordinators, and directly with students to identify talented, diverse
career candidates. The Diplomats in Residence work in partnership with
Washington, DC-based recruiters to identify and contact potential
candidates for all Department careers through Web-based resources and
strategic partnerships with like-minded educational and professional
organizations serving diverse populations, including Hispanics.
In FY 2010, the Department spent $40,000 on advertising in Hispanic
print and electronic media. Marketing studies demonstrate that minority
professionals use social media at higher rates than nonminority
professionals. Our public outreach is integrated with a comprehensive
marketing and recruiting program that includes leveraging new media and
networking technologies (Facebook, Linked-In, Twitter, YouTube), direct
sourcing, e-mail marketing, and online and limited print advertising
with career and niche-specific sites and publications (Hispanic
Business, NSHMBA, LatPro, Saludos, LATINAStyle). In addition, the
Department spent over $250,000 on general diversity media and
Department-specific diversity networking events.
The Department's Recruitment Outreach Office developed and hosted
Diversity Career Networking Events as a tool to target diverse
professionals for Department of State careers, specifically
highlighting deficit Foreign Service career tracks. In FY 2010, events
were hosted in Los Angeles; Denver; Santa Fe, Albuquerque, and Las
Cruces, NM; Miami; New York and Washington, DC, reaching over 1,000
candidates including African-Americans, Asian-Americans, Hispanics,
Native-Americans, women, and critical language speakers.
In addition, over 900 Department employees have volunteered to
support our strategic outreach, highlighting the diversity of our
existing workforce and leveraging existing networks of internal
affinity groups like the Hispanic Employment Council in Foreign Affairs
Agencies (HECFAA).
``In status'' Postings for Civil Service Jobs
All Department of State vacancy announcements are advertised
according to merit procedures. Under those procedures managers have the
option of determining the area of consideration. This area of
consideration ``Status Only'' versus ``Open to Public'' is determined
by how widely the manager feels he/she needs to recruit in order to
obtain a reasonable pool of well-qualified candidates. Approximately
half of our vacancy announcements are advertised ``Open to the Public''
which provides many opportunities for applicants outside of the Federal
workforce to apply for positions at the Department of State. The
Department continues to urge managers to be as inclusive as possible
and to support diversity in the workplace when making selections for
positions.
Cooperative Education Programs
The Department strives to achieve diversity throughout its
workforce through various career-entry programs, including the
Presidential Management Fellowship. All qualified applicants referred
to the Department by the Office of Personnel Management are given full
consideration. The Office of Recruitment conducts regular outreach to
institutions that serve Hispanics in order to increase the pool of
applicants from the Hispanic community and promote awareness of entry-
level employment opportunities.
Our outreach to college students plants the seeds of interest in
global public service and promotes a long-term interest in our
internships, fellowships, and careers. In FY 2009 Congress funded an
additional 100 paid internships for recruitment purposes. In 2009 and
2010, with the support of the Director General, our Diplomats in
Residence identified outstanding, diverse candidates for those
internships, providing them the chance to experience work in
Washington, DC, and embassies and consulates around the world.
Twenty three percent of these 100 paid interns were Hispanic.
Through this program one Hispanic employee, a first generation
American, had the opportunity to experience diplomacy in action working
in our Embassy in Guatemala last summer. Another Hispanic employee, a
Gates Millennium Scholar and recipient of a paid internship, had the
opportunity to represent the United States at our mission to the
Organization of American States. Both of these outstanding students are
still working at the Department in student positions even after their
internships ended.
Two particularly successful student programs are the Thomas R.
Pickering Foreign Affairs Undergraduate and Graduate Fellowships and
the Charles B. Rangel International Affairs Fellowship. These ROTC-like
programs provide financing for graduate school and paid professional
experience in Washington and at our embassies to highly qualified and
mostly minority students, in exchange for their commitment to the
Foreign Service. Diplomats in Residence help recruit candidates for
these Fellowships, which have been essential to increasing the presence
of underrepresented groups in the Foreign Service. In FY 2010, 17 out
of 120 (14.17 percent) Pickering Fellows and 7 out of 40 (17.5 percent)
Rangel Fellows were Hispanic.
Compliance with OPM's Request for 2010 Data for Annual Report to the
President on Diversity
The Department of State has been working closely with the Office of
Personnel Management (OPM) to ensure that it is compliant with the
diversity data reporting requirements. In 2009, we experienced
complications with our submission (Attachment A). This was partially
due to a change of formatting requirements, and partially due to the
complexity of reporting data about our different workforces, the Civil
Service and the Foreign Service.
Unfortunately, by the time these issues were resolved, the
publication deadline had passed. These issues have since been addressed
with OPM and the Department has submitted its information for the 2010
diversity report (Attachment B).
[Attachment A follows:]
[Editor's note.-- Attachment B was too voluminous to be included in the
printed hearing. It will be retained in the permanent record of the
committee.]
latin america aid/narcotics
Question. I am pleased that President Obama is shining a light on
Latin America by traveling to the region later this month, but from my
perspective the Western Hemisphere continues to be more of an
afterthought than a policy priority, even while the scale of drug-
related violence in Mexico and Central America is climbing at an
immense rate--last year, Mexico had more than 15,000 homicides related
to the drug trade and has had more than 35,000 homicides since 2007. We
saw recently how such violence could tragically affect our own ICE
agents. Despite these numbers, this year's budget decreases funding for
counternarcotics efforts in the region by 7 percent.
Additionally, based on the information made available so far, the
foreign assistance request for Latin America will be approximately $1.9
billion, which is 8 percent less than the FY11 request; 1 percent less
than the FY10 appropriation; and 8 percent less than the FY09
appropriation. In the last decade, compared to other regions, aid to
Latin America has dropped from 14 percent of the foreign assistance
budget to just 10 percent of budget.
Is Latin America a priority for the Department and do you
continue to believe, as you stated during your January visit to
Mexico, that ``there's a plan'' to address the scourge of
narcotics threatening stability in the region? Does the
increasing violence suggest that we need to reassess the plan?
Answer. The United States-Latin America relationship is given high
priority by the Obama administration, exemplified by the President's
successful trip to Brazil, Chile, and El Salvador even as crises
elsewhere in the world unfolded. It built on the pledge President Obama
made at the Summit of the Americas early in his Presidency to work as
``equal partners'' in a ``new chapter of engagement'' based on ``mutual
respect and common interests and shared values.'' He highlighted areas
of engagement on overarching issues critical to people in every
society, such as promoting social and economic opportunity for
everyone; securing a clean energy future; ensuring the safety and
security of all of our citizens; and building effective institutions of
democratic governance.
Our plan for addressing counternarcotics and violence in the
hemisphere is based on the National Drug Control Strategy and our
vision for implementing that strategy--a vision that addresses all
forms of crime and public insecurity. Toward this end, the President
has recommitted the United States to creating practical partnerships in
the hemisphere to advance shared interests and protect our citizens.
This cooperative approach is grounded in the recognition of a shared
responsibility for addressing the challenges we face together; the
critical importance of political will, the rule of law, and effective
institutions of governance. We are moving in the direction of a
broader, more integrated view of security; one that advances citizen
safety while simultaneously countering emerging transnational threats
and narcotics trafficking. This approach emphasizes greater reliance on
the will, capacity, and cooperation of regional partners such as Mexico
and Colombia. Our principal mechanisms for implementing this strategic
vision are the Merida, Central American Regional Security (CARSI),
Colombian Strategic Development (CSDI), and Caribbean Basin Security
Initiatives (CBSI). They are partnerships, in which governments
collaborate on programs and initiatives that have been developed and
agreed to jointly and that are aimed at protecting citizens and
strengthening the institutions responsible for ensuring citizen safety.
al-megrahi
Question. On December 21, 1998, Pam Am flight 103 exploded over
Lockerbie, Scotland, killing 270 people on board, including 189
American citizens. Twelve years later Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi
was convicted of conspiracy for planning the bomb that brought down the
plane.
I congratulate you for your statement yesterday that the United
States is considering seeking the prosecution of Libyan leader Moammar
Qadhafi for the 1988 Lockerbie bombing following reports by the ex-
Justice Minister of Libya that Qadhafi personally ordered the attack.
What steps has the United States taken to verify this
information and when can we expect a decision on whether the
United States will seek to prosecute Qadhafi for this heinous
crime?
Additionally, given the false pretenses under which
convicted Lockerbie bomber, al-Megrahi, was released from
Scottish prison, is the United States considering requesting of
any new Libyan Government his extradition to the United States
to serve the remainder of his sentence?
Do we know where Megrahi is now?
Answer. We have met with family members of the victims and
understand their anguish over this heinous act of terrorism. We shared
their outrage at the release of Megrahi to Libya. We are also committed
to seeing that justice is served. We have seen the recent public
statements from a former Libyan official concerning Qadhafi's
responsibility for the bombing. The investigation into the Pan Am 103
bombing remains open and we are committed to assisting law enforcement
efforts in obtaining and evaluating any new information relating to it.
We are coordinating closely with the Department of Justice on this
sensitive law enforcement matter and are committed to assisting with
any appropriate approaches to relevant Libyan officials. As this is an
ongoing investigative matter, please refer to the Department of Justice
for any further details.
Additional information in response to this question will be made
available in a classified response.
cyprus
Question. Since 1993, Congress has appropriated ESF funds to Cyprus
for reunification, but with the restriction that the funds ``be used
only for scholarships, administrative support of the scholarship
program, bicommunal projects, and measures aimed at reunification of
the island and designed to reduce tensions and promote peace and
cooperation between the two communities on Cyprus.''
The ongoing division of Cyprus presents a unique situation that
warrants a level of scrutiny concerning the provision of United States
assistance that goes beyond that which is required for other countries.
Indeed, in recent years, Congress has demanded transparency related to
the use of these funds to ensure that they are being used for bizonal,
bicommunal programs.
With respect to the FY12 funds for Cyprus, will you work to
ensure that the funds are used in a manner consistent with
these congressional restrictions and allocated transparently
after engaging in consultation with the Government of the
Republic of Cyprus?
Answer. Every activity implemented with U.S. funding in Cyprus is
designed to help Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots chart a path to
peace and reunification in line with the congressional mandate.
The United States is committed to consultation and transparency
with the Government of the Republic of Cyprus (``ROC'') on our foreign
assistance program. We have and will continue to be transparent and
sensitive to recognition, property concerns, and other issues raised by
the ROC. Likewise, we will continue to consult with and be sensitive to
the concerns of the Turkish Cypriot community.
That said, for the U.S. foreign assistance program to be effective,
neither side can be allowed to make funding decisions reserved for the
U.S. Government. Indeed, it would contravene recentcCongressional
report language preventing organizations implementing U.S. assistance
to be subject to approval by the government of any foreign country.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ FY 2009 Appropriations Act, House Report--Joint Explanatory
Statement reference to Section 7034(k) regarding nongovernmental
organizations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
iran
Question. With the drama of events in Egypt and overall unrest in
the Middle East, I am concerned that the world's attention will be
diverted from the dangers of Iran's nuclear program. I am worried that
Iran will use this time to speed up its nuclear program and crack down
on the opposition and human rights activists. I am also very concerned
about the lack of sanctions on companies continuing to invest in Iran's
energy sector in violation of U.S. law. The State Department has failed
to sanction even one non-Iranian foreign company for its investments in
Iran's energy sector. Under legislation signed by President Obama last
July, the law now requires the State Department to complete
investigations within 180 days after receiving credible information of
a violation.
The administration has yet to sanction a non-Iranian bank, despite
the reports that several Turkish, South Korean, Ukrainian, and Chinese
banks continue to deal with Iranian financial institutions in violation
of CISADA.
When do you plan to sanction one of these banks? Will you
consider sanctioning Iran's central bank?
I wanted to ask you about the idea of allowing Iran to maintain a
civilian uranium enrichment program.
Taking into account the regime's history of deceptive
tactics, how can the current government can be trusted with a
domestic enrichment program?
I find it hard to believe that the State Department has received no
credible information on companies violating U.S. law.
How many investigations are currently open, and when will
the 180-day clock be reached? Will the State Department issue
sanctions or waivers at that time?
During previous testimony, State Department officials have verified
that there are several cases of confirmed violations of the Iran
Sanctions Act. Last June, Under Secretary of State William Burns
testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that at least a
couple of the violations appear to be ongoing.
What is the status of the investigations into these
violations? It appears that their 180-day clock has long
expired.
Answer. We share Congress' sense of urgency regarding Iran's
nuclear program and work on a global scale to secure the broadest
enforcement of sanctions against it. Iran's nuclear program is one of
our greatest global concerns and a top priority for the administration.
We remain committed to achieving a diplomatic resolution, but Iran has
not shown that it will negotiate seriously with the P5+1. After Iran's
disappointing stance in Istanbul last January, we are working to
increase pressure on Iran by enhancing implementation of existing
sanctions and devising new measures.
CISADA is a valuable tool in our efforts to influence Iran's
decisionmaking and we are working vigorously to enforce it. The success
of these efforts can be seen in the growing trend of international
companies choosing to pull out of Iran, Using the ``special rule'' in
CISADA, we negotiated the withdrawal of five major international energy
companies--Total of France, Statoil of Norway, ENI of Italy, Royal
Dutch Shell of the Netherlands, and INPEX of Japan--out of Iran. This
administration was the first to impose sanctions under the Iran
Sanctions Act by imposing sanctions on the Naftiran Intertrade Company
(NICO), the Switzerland-based company that is responsible for securing
most of Iran's foreign investment and securing supplies of refined
petroleum. As the result of this action, NICO has had difficulties
maintaining the critical foreign relationships it needs to carry out
these functions. Recently, we have also sanctioned Belarusneft, a
Belarusian energy company, for investing in Iran. Sanctioning
Belarusneft will increase pressure on Iran and further hamper their oil
and gas production.
We are working vigorously to enforce the act. These efforts have
been successful as we have seen a growing trend of international
companies choosing to leave Iran. As part of those efforts, we work
very closely with the Department of Treasury. President Obama has
delegated the authority to the Department of Treasury, in consultation
with the State Department, to enforce the sanctions with respect to
financial institutions in CISADA. We respectfully refer you to the
Treasury Department for further details.
We continue to work in conjunction with the Treasury Department to
identify foreign companies that may be involved in sanctionable
activities. We are also conducting a global outreach effort to explain
the details of our sanctions legislation to foreign governments and
commercial interests and warn them about the legal, proliferation and
reputational risks of doing business with Iran as Iran seeks to replace
lost business.
Iran has failed to address the international community's concerns
about its illicit nuclear activities. The February 2011 report by the
IAEA's Director General confirmed that Iran is not compliant with its
international obligations. Iran must fulfill its obligations to the
United Nations Security Council, the IAEA and as a signatory to the
NPT. As we have stated before, Iran has the right to a peaceful nuclear
program, but only when it is in full compliance with its international
obligations and in cooperation with IAEA transparency and safeguards
requirements.
armenia
Question. The American Association for the Advancement of Science
(AAAS) recently documented the demolition of an ancient Armenian
cemetery in Azerbaijan with satellite images. The desecration, which
was caught on videotape, was also condemned by the European Parliament
through a resolution. The cochairs of the Minsk Group pledged to assess
the destruction back in October 2010, but still have not visited the
site.
What are you doing to ensure this assessment and when should
we expect the visit and report?
Answer. As a cochair of the OSCE Minsk Group, the United States
remains closely engaged in seeking a peaceful settlement of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The Minsk Group cochairmen have affirmed
that they believe it is in their mandate as mediators to visit any area
affected by the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In that context, the
cochairs will continue to make such visits, but no dates have been set
at this time for future trips.
Question. The administration has said, since early last year, that
it wants Turkey and Armenia to establish ties ``without preconditions
and within a reasonable timeframe.'' The Bush administration also
supported ending Turkey's blockade of Armenia without any
preconditions. Can you define for us what the administration means by
``preconditions,'' and also what the administration believes
constitutes a ``reasonable time-frame?'' At his confirmation hearing in
March 2009, Assistant Secretary of State Gordon indicated that he hoped
that the Armenia-Turkey border would be reopening by October 2009.
Answer. The administration supports the work done by both Armenia
and Turkey to normalize relations. We continue to urge both sides to
keep the door open to reconciliation and normalization, and we believe
that the normalization process carries important benefits for Turkey
and Armenia as well as for the wider Caucasus region. Ultimately, this
is a decision for Armenia and Turkey.
The border between Turkey and Armenia has been closed for 17 years;
the current normalization process has been going on for only a fraction
of that time. We applaud the Armenians for their commitment to
normalize relations with Turkey. I have said that the ball is in
Turkey's court, and I have encouraged Turkey to move forward.
uganda/lord's resistance army
Question. The rebel Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) continues to
destabilize a vast section of central Africa, where its brutal attacks
have displaced over 400,000 people and resulted in the abduction of
more than 850 children since September 2008. On November 24 of last
year, the administration released to Congress it's ``Strategy to
Support the Disarmament of the Lord's Resistance Army,'' as mandated by
the bipartisan Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda
Recovery Act passed by Congress in May 2010.
What programs and activities will the State Department
support to implement the four components of the LRA strategy,
and how are support for these programs and activities reflected
in the FY12 budget request?
Answer. The Department of State is working with the Department of
Defense to provide enhanced integrated logistical, operational, and
intelligence assistance in support of regional and multilateral
partners in an effort to apprehend or remove from the battlefield
Joseph Kony and senior commanders. In addition, the Department of State
continues to fund logistical and operational assistance through the
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account. Since the launch of Operation
Lightning Thunder (OLT) in 2008, we have obligated $29.1 million in PKO
resources to provide nonlethal equipment, logistics support, and
supplies to the Uganda People's Defense Force (UPDF) in support of its
effort to defeat the LRA. State has programmed PKO funds for counter-
LRA efforts from a variety of sources, including the Africa Conflict
Stabilization and Border Security (ACSBS) program and funds
reprogrammed from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Of the
$29.1 million already committed, $6 million of FY 2011 PKO funds were
obligated to support the efforts through April 2011 of Uganda and the
Central African Republic (CAR) to defeat the LRA. Additional PKO
resources will need to be obligated to support counter-LRA operations
after April 2011. Our FY 2012 request includes $7.15 million in PKO
funds as part of the ACSBS program, a portion of which would be used to
support counter-LRA efforts, as needed.
To promote the defection, disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration (DDR) of remaining LRA fighters, the Department of State
is working with the World Bank's Transitional Demobilization and
Reintegration Program, the United Nations Organization Stabilization
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), regional
militaries, and humanitarian organizations to ensure appropriate
facilities and procedures are in place to receive defectors and
transport them to desired home locations. In Uganda, USAID continues to
support the provision of reintegration assistance to demobilized LRA
members and receiving communities. Our FY 2012 request also includes
$4.4 million for conflict mitigation and reconciliation activities in
Uganda, much of which will focus on northern Uganda.
To increase the protection of civilians, the Department of State
and USAID are installing high-frequency radio networks in the DRC,
expanding communication networks in the CAR, and supporting U.N.
peacekeeping missions and humanitarian agencies in LRA-affected areas.
In FY 2010, the United States provided $387.7 million in assessed
contributions for MONUSCO's overall budget, a portion of which
supported LRA-affected populations. Our FY 2012 request for
Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) includes
$408 million in assessed contributions for MONUSCO and $298 million in
assessed contributions for the U.N. Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), a portion
of which will continue to support these peacekeeping operations'
activities in LRA-affected areas.
To increase humanitarian access and provide continued relief to
affected communities, USAID and the Department of State's Bureau of
Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) are working with humanitarian
agencies to promote increased access and infrastructure for the
delivery of humanitarian services; provide recovery, transition, and
livelihood support for LRA-affected populations; and provide minimum
standards of life-saving support to LRA-affected populations. The FY
2012 budget includes support for humanitarian operations in DRC, CAR,
and Southern Sudan within the Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA)
and the International Disaster Assistance (IDA) accounts. PRM and USAID
will continue to monitor the humanitarian needs of LRA-affected
communities in DRC, CAR, and Southern Sudan and will continue to
promote civilian protection and deliver humanitarian assistance
throughout the region.
climate change/clean energy
Question. How does America benefit from investments in a wide range
of developing countries to combat the causes and impacts of a changing
climate, including by bolstering preparedness for extreme weather,
promoting clean energy solutions, and reducing deforestation? How would
the cuts to these programs proposed by the House, if implemented,
affect our country's national security, job and business opportunities,
and budgetary costs due to increased disaster aid, as well as our
standing in the world and efforts to get global reductions in carbon
pollution?
Do the cuts to the Clean Technology Fund impact the U.S.'s ability
to maintain access to markets to export green technology?
How would cuts to international climate funding impact our
diplomatic relations with emerging economies--such as Brazil, South
Africa, India and China--that are central to our global diplomacy,
including our efforts involving climate change? Will this affect our
ability to get them to take action to reduce emissions or undertake
other policies we would like to see? Which regions might you anticipate
a need for funding that is not in the current budget request?
Answer. Global climate change has serious implications for U.S.
national security interests. According to the 2008 National
Intelligence Assessment on climate change, it will exacerbate tensions
related to poverty, social conditions, environmental degradation, and
weak political institutions.
It would be irresponsible for the United States to fail to work to
reduce these impacts.
The administration's investments in international climate programs:
Help ensure that all major economies--including major
emerging economies--reduce emissions.
Conserve forests, foster sustainable land management, and
combat illegal logging around the world.
Build resilience in developing countries to reduce the risk
of damage, loss of life, and instability that can result from
extreme weather and climate events. (The World Bank and U.S.
Geological Survey estimate that every dollar spent on disaster
preparedness saves seven dollars in disaster response.)
Help put developing countries on a clean energy path,
increasing trade and investment opportunities for U.S.
businesses and improving air quality and human health around
the world.
Help the United States meet its international commitments,
putting us in a better position to ensure that other countries
meet theirs.
America's clean energy industry is well positioned to provide the
innovative technology and services needed to meet rapidly growing
demand in developing countries. U.S. support for the Clean Technology
Fund mobilizes these kinds of investments, and helps create the
functioning, fair, and competitive markets in which American businesses
thrive.
The cuts to international climate programs proposed by the House,
if implemented, would have adverse implications for our national
security interests, and decrease job and business opportunities in
America. Such cuts would reduce our standing in the world and
compromise our efforts to get global reductions in greenhouse gas
pollution, including by reducing our leverage to ensure that major
economies such as Brazil, South Africa, India, and China take action.
These cuts would erode our ability to work with poor countries to
decrease their vulnerability to climate disasters and damage,
increasing the likelihood of U.S. expenditures on disaster aid. And
these cuts would erode our ability to build and maintain opportunities
for U.S. clean energy exports in big emerging markets.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton to Questions
Submitted by Senator James E. Risch
Question. Recently the State Department completed the first
Quadrennial Development and Diplomacy review (QDDR), which as you noted
is based on the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) that the Defense
Department performs.
I applaud the efforts of the Department to develop this important
document, but as you know DOD produces a number of documents and the
QDR is used to help inform the drafting of the Future Years Defense
Plan (FYDP).
With the QDDR finished, can we expect the State Department
to draft a similar long-term strategic budget and other
planning and programming documents?
Answer. The Department is in the early phases of implementation of
the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR). The decisions
and guidance contained in the QDDR have already and will continue to
inform the range of planning and programming processes normally
undertaken by the Department, including the 2013 Mission and Bureau
Strategic Planning, resource requirements and out-year estimates that
are used to inform those documents . Additional planning and
programming processes and documents will be produced as appropriate and
as indicated in the QDDR, including Integrated Country Strategies and
Regional and Functional Strategies.
Question. According to the White House Fact Sheet on the State
Department's FY12 budget, this request ``Makes strategic investments of
$1.4 billion to address the root causes of hunger and poverty and lift
a significant number of people out of poverty and reduce malnutrition
for millions of children under 5 years old by 2015.''
Can you please clarify your metrics and goals more and define what
a ``significant number of people'' means? How many have been lifted out
of poverty so far according to State's statistics?
Answer. The FY 2012 request will enable the President's Feed the
Future Initiative to:
Assist 18 million individuals to significantly increase
their annual purchasing power. For example, current due
diligence on impact projections demonstrate that:
An individual who participates directly in FTF investment
implementation should experience a 68 percent increase in
income compared to individuals that do not receive FTF
support.
This, in real terms, is a buildup of an annual increase of
about $300/year after 10 years.
A majority of FTF's beneficiaries--over 7 million
individuals and most of them women--will start FTF below
the poverty line and experience similarly dramatic
increases in their annual income;
Evidence shows women choose to use increased purchasing
power to:
Diversify dietary intake among household members;
Pay for school fees, including for girls; and
Invest in preventative health care.
Reach some 7 million children to improve nutrition, reduce
stunting, and prevent child mortality.
Generate $2.8 billion over the long term in economic
benefits through research activities to raise agricultural GDP,
distributed broadly among agricultural sector stakeholders in
FTF target regions.
All of these levels assume the following:
Five years of funding. These levels include FY 2010 enacted
as well as request levels for 2011 and 2012. For FY 2013 and
2014, we assume a ``straight line'' to FY 2012 request levels.
Expected results are for the initiative as a whole. They
cannot be applied to specific country levels. BFS is currently
quantifying country specific results using a standard applied
cost-benefit analysis that reflects USG investments aligned
with each FTF focus country's food security investment plan.
Specifically, the first expected result is necessarily a future
projection that must be based on assumptions, such as:
A $280 unit cost on the budgets for the 20 focus countries,
regional programs, private sector initiatives, economic
resilience and multilateral programs;
The total population experiences a 10-percent increase in
initial income levels sustained over a period of 10 years;
Approximately 40 percent of the beneficiary population
starts below the poverty line of $1.25/day.
The second statement regarding nutrition is necessarily a future
projection that must be based on the following assumption:
An average unit cost of $100 against the nutrition budget,
reaching a total population of children under 2. As a result of
this nutrition package, children will experience improved
nutrition, reduced stunting and mortality will be prevented.
The third statement is necessarily a future projection that must be
based on the following assumption:
For every dollar spent on research, four dollars of
additional agricultural GDP are generated over 35 years. These
benefits will accrue broadly and equitably among the population
in the target regions and raise agricultural GDP.
progress to date
FY 2010 funding for the Feed the Future (FTF) initiative was only
made available to missions and other operating units late last summer,
at which point they began their procurement processes. Because FTF
represents a major rampup of new and substantively different activities
in most FTF countries, many missions have had to design and compete new
grant or contract mechanisms. Funds that have been obligated to
existing grant or contract mechanisms by the end of the fiscal year can
be disbursed fairly quickly. As a result, we have no development
impacts to report at this time.
However, knowing of congressional interest in tracking results, FTF
has implemented an aggressive monitoring and evaluation process that
will report actual progress on development indicators against planned
targets by the end of FY 2011. During FY 2010, FTF has been intensively
monitoring important process indicators that signal commitment and
strategic implementation of the Initiative. A sample of these
Performance Indicators and milestones for FTF are listed below.
Sample Performance Milestones:
10 FTF focus country investment plans and one regional
investment plan have successfully completed technical review
and include integrated investments in preventative nutrition
approaches;
Funding provided by the U.S. Treasury to the Global
Agriculture and Food Security Program at the World Bank, which
is the multilateral counterpart to the bilateral initiative,
has begun to flow to eligible countries;
The FTF's Global Research Strategy has been launched to find
new solutions to the global food security needs and initial
awards have been allocated.
Question. Over the past 2 years, the Obama administration has
sought to reach out to the Syrian Government, most notably by
appointing the first American Ambassador to Syria since 2005. This
administration has essentially taken unilateral steps toward Syria in
the hope they would respond positively.
Have we seen any signs that Syria is taking steps to improve
its behavior and its relationship with the United States, if so
please identify these specific signs? Is Syria changing its
relationship with Iran, Hezbollah, or Palestinian terror
groups?
Answer. The President appointed an Ambassador to Syria in order to
protect U.S. interests. Since arriving in Damascus, Ambassador Robert
Ford has been granted access to a range of senior Syrian interlocutors
with whom we have spoken only infrequently, if at all, during the past
6 years. He also worked to secure the release of two American citizens
detained by the Syrian Government. As CENTCOM Commander General Mattis
recently testified, Ambassador Ford's presence is a key component of
our regional national security architecture.
Syria has responded by engaging senior U.S. officials in a serious
discussion on a wide range of regional issues, including Lebanon, Iraq,
and Middle East peace. These discussions have helped make clear to
Syrian officials that normal relations between Syria and the United
States will only result when Syria addresses all these regional
concerns, including an end to Syrian support for regional actors that
promote instability and extremism, including Hamas and Hezbollah.
Question. For most of the past 2 years, the Palestinian leadership
has refused to enter into direct talks with Israel. Instead, they have
sought to use the U.N. and other international forums to delegitimize
Israel and seek support for a unilateral declaration of statehood
outside the negotiating process.
Just a few weeks ago, they embarrassed the United States by
insisting on a U.N. Security Council resolution on settlements, setting
up a U.S. veto and then orchestrated West Bank demonstrations to
protest U.S. actions.
What have we communicated to the Palestinians about these
actions? Do they understand that if they continue, it will hurt
their relationship with the United States and possibly effect
aid levels?
Some in the PA leadership have threatened to pursue U.N.
membership and unilaterally declare statehood in September. If
the PA attempts this will the United States actively oppose
Palestinian efforts to gain membership in the U.N. prior to an
agreement with Israel? How will the administration respond to a
unilateral declaration of statehood?
Answer. U.N. members devote disproportionate attention to Israel
and consistently adopt biased resolutions, which too often divert
attention from the world's most egregious human rights abuses. We work
to ensure that Israel's legitimacy is respected and its security is
never in doubt. We will keep working to ensure that Israel has the same
rights and responsibilities as all states--including membership in all
appropriate regional groupings at the U.N. Efforts to chip away at
Israel's legitimacy will continue to be met by the opposition of the
United States.
We have long expressed our opposition to--and work to prevent--the
use of international organizations, particularly the U.N. and its
organs, to single out Israel for criticism.
While we agree with our fellow Security Council members--and
indeed, with the wider world--about the illegitimacy of continued
Israeli settlement activity, we voted against the recently proposed
Security Council resolution on settlements because it risked hardening
the positions of both sides and encouraging the parties to stay out of
negotiations. The resolution would also have encouraged the parties to
return to the Security Council whenever they reach an impasse.
The tough issues between Israelis and Palestinians can only be
solved by substantive and meaningful negotiations between the two
parties, not in New York and not through unilateral actions. We oppose
unilateral actions and have made that position clear. That is why we
continue to pursue a dual track approach, both elements which are key
to peace and stability for Israel and the region: serious and
substantive negotiations on permanent status issues and an equally
vigorous institution-building track that supports Palestinian Authority
efforts to reform and ensure they are prepared for statehood.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton to Questions
Submitted by Senator Bob Corker
Question. During recent travel to the Pakistan and Afghanistan
region, I had the opportunity to discuss the effectiveness of our
assistance in garnering critical support from the Pakistanis in
combating insurgent elements critical to our success in Afghanistan and
remain supremely disappointed in their willingness to target those
elements. What can we do, how should we position our aid package, to
place the appropriate pressure on Pakistan to turn their attention
toward battling the Haqqani Network, al-Qaeda and the Quetta Shura?
Answer. U.S. assistance is critical to maintaining and deepening
the long-term strategic partnership that the United States is forging
with the people and Government of Pakistan. Pakistan, a nuclear-armed
nation with deep ties and strong interests in Afghanistan, has a direct
impact on U.S. national security. As such, we have structured our
assistance to help build a long-term strategic partnership with
Pakistan rather than a transactional one.
Our security assistance builds the Pakistani security forces'
capacity to eliminate safe havens for terrorists, to provide internal
security, and to cooperate with the United States in defeating al-Qaeda
and the Taliban. It also improves the capacity of Pakistani security
forces to engage in counterinsurgency operations. Through this
assistance, we have strengthened our military-to-military relationship,
which has allowed for cooperation against extremists in the border
areas. Continued security assistance to Pakistan is critical to the
success of our investment of American lives and treasure in
Afghanistan, and it is critical to ensuring our security at home.
Equally important is our civilian assistance to Pakistan. We are
broadening our partnership and focusing on shared interests, as well as
addressing Pakistan's political and economic challenges. Since 2009, we
have worked with the Pakistani Government and people, including through
our enhanced U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue process, which met three
times last year at the ministerial level. This has refocused assistance
on Pakistan's urgent energy and economic needs and coordinated our own
efforts as a government to better coordinate, manage, and oversee
foreign assistance funds.
The assistance is designed to help ensure Pakistan is a tolerant,
economically stable, and a civilian-led democracy, with enough economic
prospects and capacity to meet basic human needs so that Pakistan can
prosper over the long-term, so the population turns away from
extremism, not toward it.
Even as we've had serious challenges to the relationship, we have
continued civilian and military efforts throughout the country and even
expanded our cooperation. Some significant challenges must still be
overcome in our relationship with Pakistan, as distrust lingers on both
sides. But it is critical that we remain engaged with Pakistan and help
build the stability of its elected leaders as they work to address the
myriad domestic challenges they face.
Question. How far do we go financially or otherwise to convince
members of the Taliban to reintegrate? Do we have the capability to
provide consistent and sustainable incentives for these individuals in
order to keep them from returning to the battlefield?
Answer. Our military and civilian surges that started last year
have established conditions for the success of the Afghanistan Peace
and Reintegration Program (APRP), a national program designed to
reintegrate ex-combatants back into Afghan society. Today, the
escalating pressure of our military campaign is sharpening a decision
for the Taliban and other insurgent groups: Break ties with al-Qaeda,
renounce violence, and abide by the Afghan Constitution, and you can
rejoin Afghan society; refuse and you will continue to face the
consequences of being tied to
al-Qaeda as an enemy of the international community. As the military
surge weakens the insurgents and pressures them to consider
alternatives to armed resistance, our civilian surge is creating
economic and social incentives for participating in peaceful society.
The security and governance gains produced by the military and
civilian surges have created an opportunity to reintegrate
nonideological insurgents through the APRP. Many low-level fighters
entered the insurgency not because of deep ideological commitment, but
for financial and economic reasons. The international community pledged
over $230 million in financial support for the Afghan Government's APRP
to draw insurgents off the battlefield and back into society. So far,
almost 700 insurgents have entered into the APRP, and around 2,000 more
are potential candidates. As we continue our civilian-military efforts,
we expect more insurgents to seek alternatives to violence. The
possibility of a safe return to Afghan society as well as the means to
restart their lives will be critical.
The U.S. Congress has provided us with what we believe is adequate
funding to support the Afghan Government in its reintegration efforts
for the coming year, with $50 million in Operations and Maintenance
Funds for reintegration purposes under the FY 2011 National Defense
Authorization Act, and another $50 million in 2010 for the National
Solidarity Program's community recovery activities. These funds will be
used to support outreach, promote grievance resolution, and assist
entire communities--including women and Afghans of all ethnic groups--
that reintegrate ex-combatants into them. We are not paying insurgents
to stop fighting, but instead making it possible for the communities
they join to heal and move forward as hostilities cease. We have
stressed that reintegration must not occur at the expense of women's
and human rights, and will continue to advocate that women should be
active participants at all levels of the reintegration process.
The APRP was designed as a 5-year program. By the end of the 5
years, the Afghans should be able to deal with what remains of the
insurgency with their own resources. Reintegration to date has
proceeded slowly, but it is gaining momentum. Critical aspects of this
initiative include international political and financial support,
effective Afghan action in handling reintegration opportunities, and
the flexibility needed for us to support Afghan-led reintegration in
the field. We have the first, and we are witnessing the second develop
at a steady rate.
Question. Given the current state of affairs--political and
security--in Afghanistan and Pakistan, what level of assistance from
the respective governments should we expect to receive in achieving our
``civilian'' goals? How confident do you feel that Afghanistan and
Pakistan are equal partners in achieving the objectives?
Answer. The United States works closely with the Government of
Afghanistan to achieve our mutual civilian objectives, including
growing the Afghan economy and strengthening democratic institutions.
The London Conference in February 2010 and the Kabul Conference in July
2010 helped define the areas where further work is needed. The Afghan
Government participated actively in both of these conferences, which
set the stage for a revitalized effort to make progress on economic,
social, and political challenges in Afghanistan in lockstep with the
international community. In 2012, State and USAID aim to meet the
London Conference goal of channeling at least 50 percent of development
aid through the Afghan Government's core budget. The 50-percent goal is
a shared responsibility, however, in that it requires the Government of
Afghanistan to take critical steps to ensure its ministries and
agencies are prepared to effectively and accountably implement
assistance.
This year, the United States and Afghanistan will conclude a new
Strategic Partnership Declaration that will define the most important
elements of our bilateral relationship through the end of transition in
2014 and beyond. Our negotiations to conclude this partnership will
help establish mutual expectations and obligations that lock in the
gains the Afghan people have made in rebuilding their society since the
ouster of the Taliban regime.
We recognize a politically sustainable partnership must rest both
on shared interests and on shared values. As partners, President Obama
and President Karzai have both acknowledged occasional disagreements do
not have to be an obstacle to achieving our strategic objectives, but
do reflect a level of a trust that is essential to any meaningful
dialogue and enduring partnership.
The U.S. Government and Pakistan are pursuing a broad and important
agenda together, including our shared desire to see Pakistan become a
strong, prosperous democracy, at peace with its neighbors, and to build
security across the region. Yet we still occasionally experience
difficult periods in our relationship over contentious issues.
In this context, we respect the difficulties Pakistan is facing.
Pakistan has lost thousands of its best soldiers fighting against
violent extremists and thousands of its civilians to terrorist
attacks--a cost few other countries have paid. Last year's floods only
compounded the nation's difficulties. Pakistani leaders can build
confidence by making the hard, even unpopular, choices that are
critical to Pakistan's economic reform and stability, all of which will
ensure that development assistance is not wasted. The civilian
government has faced tough challenges but remains a vital partner for
us in achieving our objectives.
We welcome Pakistan's role in supporting a secure and economically
prosperous Afghanistan. As a neighbor, Pakistan plays a vital role in
the realization of a stable Afghanistan, one that is able to provide
for its own security, to exercise sovereignty over all its territory,
to provide economic prosperity, and one that plays a constructive role
in the region.
Question. What needs to be done to improve the contracting
mechanisms or change the types of organizations that we award contracts
to ensure more money goes to programs or indigenous organizations and
less to security and overhead for American companies?
Answer. We are working to change our business processes--
contracting with and providing grants to more and varied local
partners, and creating true partnerships to create the conditions where
aid takes a back seat to local support in the countries where we work.
To achieve this, we are streamlining our processes, increasing the use
of small businesses, building metrics into our implementation
agreements to achieve capacity-building objectives and using host
country systems where it makes sense.
In Afghanistan, USAID has dramatically altered the way we deliver
assistance through changes in our acquisition strategy; devolution of
authority to the field; and, the provision of on-budget assistance to
the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.
Large multiyear international contracts are being replaced with 1-
year or 18-month contracts with options; national-scale contracts and
grants are being replaced with regionally focused awards, to reduce
their size and increase their manageability; and USAID is placing
small-grant authority ($25K) in the hands of qualified and trained
field staff.
For example, one indefinite quantity contract (IQC) with a
ceiling of $1.4B for infrastructure covered roads, power, and
vertical structures was broken down into 3 separate
programmatic areas (energy/water, transportation, and vertical
structures) with up to 12 possible IQC award holders;
Total ceiling for all 12 awards: approx. $2 billion;
Another example is the Stabilization in Key Areas (SIKA)
project where we will have four separate regional awards
totaling up to $43.6M.
USAID is shifting the locus of control from Kabul to the field by
delegating programmatic and administrative authorities for regional
activities to the USAID Senior Development Officer (SDO) at the
Regional Platforms to the greatest practicable extent. The Regional
Platforms East and South are developing regional operating frameworks
(ROF) for transitioning from stability assistance to development
assistance. In addition to providing accountability for current
program/project decisionmaking, the ROFs will be used to inform future
resourcing and programming, engaging Afghan counterparts in program and
project design of stability assistance and longer term development
assistance.
With regard to security, the U.S. Government is currently examining
what is needed to shift from reliance of Private Security Contracts to
reliance upon the GIRoA Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), through
the Ministry of Interior, to satisfy the need for security for
implementing partners. However, not all contractors or projects will
require APPF. Many are looking at different ways of operating without
guards, such as relying more on Afghan staff for field work, and using
unarmed security advisors instead of armed guards. USAID is working,
project by project, to help find the best solution that meets the
security needs of our partners.
Question. The United States has appropriated over $16 billion since
fiscal year 2002 for development efforts in Afghanistan, implemented by
USAID and DOD, focusing on similar initiatives, such as improving
Afghanistan's road, water, and other infrastructure sectors. This line
of effort is an integral part of the U.S. civilian-military campaign
plan focused on countering insurgents in Afghanistan and requires
extensive interagency coordination and information-sharing. In a report
released yesterday, GAO identified these programs as potentially being
duplicative. How are you enhancing processes to communicate across U.S.
efforts to avoid duplicative or contradictory programming?
Answer. USAID is coordinating closely with the military on all
levels to make sure that our assistance is not redundant. At the
district and provincial levels, USAID Field Program Officers meet
regularly and frequently with their military counterparts to coordinate
CERP and USAID programming. Often USAID and CERP programs are designed
to dove-tail with each other. CERP projects tend to be used to build
the infrastructure (i.e., schools and clinics), and then USAID projects
provide the technical oversight and additional inputs (e.g., school
curriculum, teacher training, and clinic supplies). In the
counterinsurgency effort, CERP projects tend to be used to help with
the clearing and the initial ``hold,'' while USAID stabilization
efforts follow in behind to provide ``hold-build'' activities.
At the Task Force and Regional Command level, USAID staff
participate on CERP Boards and wield veto authority if the project is
unsustainable from a development perspective or if it is overlapping
with an effort that USAID is already undertaking.
At the Kabul level, USAID and Embassy Kabul are voting participants
on the DOD countrywide CERP Board. In addition, USAID sits on several
working groups including the Infrastructure Working Group, various
vetting and oversight task forces, Force Reintegration Cell, and
participates in the Country Team meeting with the leadership of all the
Embassy sections and Federal agencies. The USAID Stabilization Unit
interacts regularly with ISAF to help shape military plans, and has
been a key player to help design the Civilian Military Campaign Plan.
At the Washington level, USAID coordinates closely with the
interagency. USAID principals participate in a regular series of high-
level meetings coordinated by the National Security Staff (NSS),
beginning with the Inter-Agency Policy Committee (IPC) meetings, the
Deputies' Committee meetings, and the Principals' Committee meetings.
USAID also regularly participates in the monthly SRAP-organized
``shura,'' as well as the biweekly NSC-led ``Tandberg'' conversations.
USAID/Washington is also sending a liaison officer to work at the
Pakistan Afghanistan Coordination Center in the Pentagon, and engages
regularly with CENTCOM through a liaison in the Office of Military
Affairs and through USAID liaisons in Tampa at CENTCOM.
Question. In the FY12 budget, the economic support line for Tunisia
has been zeroed out. We are at a critical juncture in this country's
transition and Tunisia needs international support in building
democratic institutions and civil society.
What is your plan to provide Tunisia the assistance it needs
to transition?
Answer. Our FY 2012 budget preparation began last April--well
before Tunisia embarked on its remarkable democratic transition. Over
the course of the previous year, the previous Tunisian Government had
been taking steps to terminate security cooperation with us and had
ceased working hand in hand with us on many issues that were in our
mutual interest. These factors provide more context and explain why the
administration requested the amount it did for Tunisia in the FY 2012
budget you received.
I agree entirely that we must work closely with the Tunisian people
and the international community in assisting Tunisia during its
democratic transition. The State Department, through the NEA Bureau's
Middle East Partnership Initiative, has identified $20 million in FY
2010 and FY 2011 Economic Support Funds that will be allocated to
support the Tunisian transition. Our Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights
and Labor (DRL) has identified an additional $1.1 million from its
global democracy fund that it plans to use to support transitional
justice processes in Tunisia. USAID has made $3 million available for
programs that will help prepare Tunisia for elections. We will also
work with Congress to establish a Tunisian-American enterprise fund to
stimulate investment in the private sector and provide businesses with
low-cost capital, particularly in the less-developed areas of Tunisia.
Finally, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) will
offer financial support in the form of direct loans, guarantees, and
political risk insurance. OPIC is already supporting one Tunis-based
private equity firm that is focused on small- and medium-size
businesses, is conducting diligence on two additional Tunis-based funds
that will invest in the same, and will support investor visits by
American businesses to Tunisia.
Looking ahead, we must continue to identify points of entry for
U.S. engagement in Tunisia and prepare assistance levels that reflect
our commitment to supporting the democratic change underway.
Question. Across the Middle East and North Africa, we are
witnessing a transformational moment, with the region's citizens
demanding democratic rights and accountable governments. These
countries will need external support as they undertake what we hope
will be successful transitions to democratic governments.
How will the United States provide sufficient support to the
transitional governments in Egypt and Tunisia, while also being
prepared to assist in other countries as needed, with protests
now sweeping the rest of the region, including Libya, Bahrain,
Jordan, and Yemen?
Answer. We are actively reevaluating our programming and assistance
in order to adapt our support to the transitions underway across the
region. The United States will continue to be a friend and partner of
the Egyptian people, and we are prepared to support Egyptian efforts to
pursue a credible democratic transition. We are also committed to
helping Egypt address the very serious economic difficulties that it
currently faces, which present significant challenges during this
sensitive period.
In order to support Egypt's economic recovery and democratic
transition in the immediate term, we are reprogramming $150 million
from previous year bilateral USAID funds and we intend to reprogram $4
million from the global democracy fund, in addition to $2.6 million of
previously planned funds from the Middle East Partnership Initiative
(MEPI). Our support for democratic transition will help Egypt conduct
free and fair elections and establish a responsive, accountable
government that respects the universal human rights of the Egyptian
people. OPIC will provide up to $2 billion in financial support to
encourage private sector investments in the Middle East and North
Africa; the U.S Export-Import Bank has approved $80 million in
insurance cover to support letters of credit issued by Egyptian
financial institutions; and the administration is working with a
bipartisan group of Members of Congress to establish an Egypt-American
Enterprise Fund that will stimulate private sector investment, support
competitive markets, and provide business with access to low-cost
capital.
In the longer term, Egypt's growth depends on deepening economic
relationships within the region and the wider world, and we are working
to ensure that priority assistance is coordinated with long-term goals
in mind. Many of our friends and allies in the international community
have expressed a similar desire to provide support to Egypt, and we are
also engaging with our colleagues at the multilateral development banks
and other international financial institutions in order to explore how
those institutions may also play a helpful role.
Since the fall of the former Tunisian regime on January 14, we have
been working on ways to reengage with the Tunisian people, support
their democratic transition efforts, and align our resources behind
this priority. The State Department, through the NEA Bureau's MEPI
program, has identified $20 million in FY 2010 and FY 2011 ESF that
will be allocated to support the Tunisian transition. State and USAID
are also working with our international partners to focus on rapid and
tangible support for Tunisia's short-term financial stability, as well
as its long-term economic growth that will create benefits and
opportunities across Tunisian society. My visit to Tunisia on March 16
is a clear demonstration of our support for the Tunisian people and the
country's transition to democratic governance.
Your question correctly intimates that reprogramming finite funds
in the short term does not ensure stable support for longer term
objectives. Contingency funding capabilities, such as the Elections and
Political Processes Fund (EPP) and the Complex Crises Fund (CCF),
provide the U.S. Government with the flexibility necessary to respond
to rapidly developing political scenarios, without forcing us to divert
funding from other priority programs. In addition, MEPI, as well as
USAID and DRL programs, will allow the USG to continue to flexibly
support civil society as it promotes economic, social, and political
reforms, expands opportunities for women and youth, and helps
communities work alongside governments in shaping their own futures.
The combination of the EPP and CCF contingency funds, in addition to
economic assistance funds, allows the U.S. Government to pursue its
regional foreign policy priorities with a variety of tools, including
diplomacy, development, capacity building, public outreach, and
regional dialogue.
We understand that we face an extraordinarily difficult budgetary
climate, and the administration has reflected that in its proposed
budget. However, we must ensure that we have the resources to respond
to the reality of unfolding events in the Middle East and recognize the
opportunity, as well as the security imperative, that these events
bring with them. Simply put, current funding levels make it difficult
for us to meet the emerging needs of the region at this time of
unparalleled opportunity. It is critical that the parameters of our
assistance remain flexible so that State and USAID can respond quickly
and strategically within a rapidly changing environment.
Question. Haiti: With other crises occurring around the globe, we
are at risk of losing focus on the reconstruction and stabilization
efforts in Haiti. Can you discuss the progress that has been made since
funds became available last November? How is execution impacted by the
current political impasse? Do we run the risk of reversing gains made
in some critical sectors last summer?
Answer. The United States will not let the many other challenges it
faces distract us from our efforts in Haiti. As President Obama has
made clear, the United States commitment to Haiti will be sustained.
The U.S. Government (USG) had been working on a comprehensive
strategy to support Haiti since March 2009. The January 12, 2010,
earthquake necessitated careful review and revisions to meet the needs
of the post-earthquake nation. While providing nearly $1.2 billion in
relief and recovery assistance since the very beginning of the crisis,
the State Department and the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) led the planning and development of a whole-of-
government comprehensive strategy to support Haiti's long-term
reconstruction, in close coordination with the Government of Haiti and
other donors. The supplemental moneys that became available in November
are continuing to make this long-term, forward-thinking strategy
possible.
The Supplemental funds have been put to good use. Since November,
the U.S. Government has disbursed $212 million of supplemental money to
provide Inter-American Development Bank debt relief, freeing up money
for the Government of Haiti to meet their highest and most urgent
priorities. The U.S. Government also used $120 million to fund projects
through the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF) to support the construction
and repair of houses targeted to benefit 50,000 people; remove rubble
in critical areas of Port-au-Prince; establish a partial credit
guarantee fund to help finance private sector activity; and to provide
education assistance.
The U.S. Government has also invested almost $300 million of FY
2010 and prior year funds in recovery and development activities. In
addition, USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) has
provided over $45 million for the immediate response to the cholera
outbreak. This money has funded the establishment of more than 30
cholera treatment facilities with more than 1,100 beds. The U.S.
Government is also funding more than 115 oral rehydration posts out of
a total 282 established throughout Haiti.
The U.S. Government has provided nearly $18 million in FY10 and
FY11 moneys to support the November 28 and March 20 elections. This has
included: supporting a long-term international election observation
mission from the Organization of the American States and the Caribbean
Community; contributing $6.6 million to the U.N. Development Program-
managed elections trust fund to purchase election material including
ballots and ballot boxes; supporting the development of training
materials and training of polling center and station staff; providing
technical and financial assistance for a nationwide civic and voter
education campaign, including a call center and SMS ``push and pull''
campaign to help voters locate their polling stations; supporting
nonpartisan action groups for voter education, nonpartisan Get-Out-The-
Vote efforts, and the deployment of more than 5,000 election day
observers; providing technical assistance to political parties in poll
watching, debates, and election dispute resolution. The USG also
provided both technical and financial support for the organization of
Presidential debates prior to both the first and second round election,
which were broadcast nationally on radio and television and screened in
several of the largest IDP camps to help inform voters of their choices
on election day.
Political unrest in Haiti has at times hindered the progress of our
programs. Violent demonstrations following the November 28, 2010, first
round elections impeded the delivery of assistance services and
resources, particularly in the fight against cholera. This is one
reason why the United States, along with Haiti's international
partners, has worked with the people and Government of Haiti in support
of a free and fair electoral process, one in which Haitians can choose
their leaders during this important period. I am pleased that the
second round of Presidential and Parliamentary elections on March 20
went off relatively peacefully, with less confusion than the first-
round balloting and with good voter turnout. The newly elected
Presidential and parliamentary leadership will be critical to realizing
Haiti's vision for its recovery.
It will take years for Haiti to fully realize the gains of
sustainable development. It is important to understand that such change
cannot happen overnight. We want make clear that as we undertake
substantial investment in long-term development, we will not forsake
humanitarian assistance. It is vital that the urgency we all felt in
the days after the earthquake continue to drive our efforts so that we
can support Haiti as it charts a course toward sustainable development
in the months and years to come, and ensure that the gains we have
achieved are not reversed.
Question. Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF): I understand
that the Global Security Contingency Fund is meant as a new funding
paradigm to quickly respond to crises before or as they begin to occur
without the delays that can pague such funding requests, pooling funds
from State and DOD.
Could you explain in brief what the benefits of the Global
Security Contingency Fund would be? Could it demonstrate the
potential of other, broader reforms to the way we plan and
budget for our national security missions?
What would you say to my colleagues on the Armed Services
Committee about the purpose and intent of the GSCF? Would you
tell them it's a good use of reprogrammed DOD dollars?
Answer. Secretary Gates and I have proposed a new tool called the
Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) which would allow DOD and State
to pool resources and expertise to provide assistance to security
forces and the government agencies responsible for those forces as well
as justice sector and stabilization assistance. We believe this
proposal advances U.S. national security interests in four main ways:
(1) it provides us with the agility needed to address today's complex
strategic environment; (2) it serves as a new business model,
emphasizing collaboration and the interconnected nature of defense,
diplomacy, and development; (3) it enables our departments to respond
jointly and effectively to a broad scope of transnational challenges;
and (4) it leverages the resources and expertise of other departments
and agencies.
The legislation we have proposed would allow either the
Department of State or the Department of Defense to transfer
additional funds from their existing appropriations into the
Global Security Contingency Fund, up to a combined total of
$500 million in appropriations and transfers. The intent of the
fund is not to spend $500 million on an annual basis, but to
have adequate resources available to the Departments to respond
rapidly to emergent challenges or opportunities within a given
fiscal year, in the event that such resources are necessary.
Actual expenditures in a given year will depend on the
requirements. We believe this approach is a responsible way to
balance the need for additional agility with a funding
structure that encourages rigor in programming decisions due to
the need to transfer funds from other sources.
We envision specific uses of the GSCF in the future will
vary depending on the emergent threat or opportunity and
operating environment. Current events in the Middle East
suggest increased flexibility and agility in U.S. Government
responses within the budget cycle will certainly be necessary
to respond to rapidly changing circumstances in regions
critical to U.S. interests. We believe that the GSCF would
enable the USG to respond more rapidly and more comprehensively
to emergent requirements through programs that provide
assistance to both security forces and the governmental bodies
responsible for such forces. We envision that such assistance
would often include instruction on accountability, human
rights, and resource management to help develop responsible
security forces.
We intend to have an ongoing dialogue with Congress as this fund is
stood up. In a manner similar to that of the Complex Crisis Fund, we
expect to conduct regular consultations with Congress on the use of the
GSCF. We will report to Congress on the use of these funds on a
quarterly basis so that you can indeed verify that our use of the
authority provided in the GSCF is both prudent and effective. We have
drafted this initiative as a pilot program in order for both the
administration and Congress to evaluate its use and confirm its utility
before extending the duration of the authority.
Question. Interagency coordination has been one of the greatest
obstacles to the effective implementation of the U.S. foreign policy
agenda. What are you doing to break down barriers to effective
coordination, ensuring that all appropriate agency heads have a place
at the table and equal opportunity to provide input and recommendations
in the implementation of our foreign policy that will effectively use
each dollar we appropriate?
Answer. Today's increasingly complex challenges--humanitarian
crises, global economic trends, weak and failing states--require a
whole-of-government solution, and there are significant opportunities
for interagency coordination that we are tapping into well. Agencies
that have traditionally been purely domestic in nature are engaging
more internationally. The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review
(QDDR) specifically refers to our Chiefs of Mission abroad as the CEOs
of multiagency missions and interests. The QDDR calls for an integrated
multiyear strategic planning process that, more than ever, will compel
interagency participation and perspective. State Department and USAID
officials have a long and strong history of engaging with their
interagency colleagues, and I believe that the QDDR will provide an
equally compelling approach for senior leadership of many agencies to
provide insight and input into our foreign policy agenda.
Question. This administration, like the Bush administration,
considers the International Affairs programs to be part of our overall
national security strategy. But I don't think it's widely recognized
just how vital the programs you oversee--development and diplomacy--are
to our Nation's security and strategic interests. Secretary Gates has
said ``without development we will not be successful in either Iraq or
Afghanistan.''
Could you please describe how the budget request for State
and USAID will help meet our national security objectives?
Why are these investments that American taxpayers should be
making at a time like this?
Answer. National security is a fundamental objective of development
and diplomacy. By protecting our interests and promoting security and
prosperity abroad, we shape the world in a way that ensures the
security and prosperity of Americans at home.
Generations of Americans have grown up successful and safe because
we chose to lead the world in tackling its greatest challenges. We
invested the resources to build up democratic allies and vibrant
trading partners in every region. Whether negotiating arms treaties,
brokering talks with belligerent states, fostering stability through
development projects, helping to rebuild countries shattered by war,
countering nuclear proliferation, enhancing economic opportunity for
our businesses abroad in order to create jobs here at home, protecting
our nation's borders and Americans abroad, or serving as the platform
from which the entire U.S. Government operates overseas, our diplomatic
and development work is dedicated to strengthening national security.
The FY 2012 budget request for the Department of State and USAID
clearly reflects this essential mission. Our work in Iraq, Afghanistan,
and Pakistan is focused on promoting stability in these three nations,
to keep them from becoming havens for extremists who threaten the
United States. The request promotes conflict prevention and crisis
response in other fragile states, from helping Haiti stabilize after a
devastating earthquake to civilian and military efforts to strengthen
governance and security capacity in places battling terrorist groups.
Human security is a major goal of our budget and a critical part of
supporting global productivity and prosperity, supporting programs that
promote health, education, and nutrition, and counteract infectious
diseases like HIV/AIDS. By funding new technologies and research, we
increase agricultural productivity and promote food security with the
goal of preventing economic and political crises that can arise from
food shortages and price spikes. Finally, we help nations adapt to the
effects of climate change, efforts meant to ensure that these shifts do
not disrupt vital trade and economies.
These goals represent a wise investment for the American taxpayers.
By supporting diplomacy and development, the nation is able to respond
to problems before they escalate into crises that require a more
significant, and usually much more expensive, response. It costs far
less to deploy a diplomat or development expert than a military
division. And by using a preventive approach to global issues, we are
able to stave off potential threats before they become major risks to
our national security. There have always been moments of temptation in
our country to resist obligations beyond our borders, but each time we
have shrunk from global leadership, events have summoned us back to
reality. We saved money in the short term when we walked away from
Afghanistan after the cold war, but those savings came at an
unspeakable cost, one we are still paying 10 years later in money and
lives.
Question. As you know, the world has changed dramatically in recent
years, and the future of high economic growth is shifting from the
developed to the developing world. Over the past 40 years, trade has
tripled as a share of our economy, and more than one out of five
American jobs are tied to international trade. America's fastest
growing markets--representing roughly half of U.S. exports--are in
developing countries. Economic engagement must keep the United States
competitive in the global marketplace.
Can you describe for us the role our International Affairs
programs play in helping spur economic growth here at home and
creating American jobs?
How do these programs help U.S. businesses and entrepreneurs
to remain competitive in the global market place?
Answer. You have well identified the crucial role that exports play
in creating U.S. jobs and rebalancing the U.S. economy. That is why the
Department of State and our embassies and consulates abroad are so
deeply involved in the work of the President's National Export
Initiative, helping U.S. manufacturers, services providers, farmers,
and ranchers achieve more sales outside our domestic market. With
increased exports, the Nation can create millions of new jobs across
many sectors and throughout the country. The President has challenged
the Nation to double overall exports in a 5-year period, and important
progress was achieved in the 1st year. U.S. exports in 2010 increased
$261 billion compared to 2009, but in too many markets we are only back
to 2008 export levels, before the effects of the global financial
crisis that began in 2008.
U.S. Ambassadors serving abroad and the country teams they lead at
their embassies make promotion of U.S. exports of manufactured goods,
services, and farm goods an important part of their work. The
Ambassadors are the CEOs of the interagency process at their posts,
setting priorities for execution by their teams. State Department
economic officers at embassies and consulates are available to counsel
U.S. companies about market opportunities and challenges overseas.
Economic officers and their colleagues also urge policy and regulatory
reforms by our trading partners, to make economies more open and the
application of regulations more transparent, predictable and even-
handed, thus assisting U.S. companies' access. Effective protection and
enforcement of intellectual property rights--the patents, trademarks,
and copyrights on which so many knowledge-intensive U.S. companies
rely--is an important focus of work by our embassies and the Department
of State (particularly the Office of International Intellectual
Property Enforcement), in conjunction with other agencies in
Washington. Our embassies also help facilitate the establishment of
American Chambers of Commerce overseas and seek counsel from and offer
briefings to such groups. I met with the Business Round Table in
December 2010 and the President's Export Council on March 11 of this
year. With input obtained by our diplomatic posts from U.S. exporters
and U.S. business representatives resident in foreign markets, feedback
from the Department's Advisory Committee on International Economic
Policy, and the constructive views offered by many U.S. domestic
businesses and business organizations such as the Business Round Table
and President's Export Council, we strive to integrate private sector
issues into U.S. foreign and economic policy and direct U.S. Government
resources to assist U.S. business interests overseas.
State Department consular officers adjudicate millions of
nonimmigrant visa applications each year, facilitating legitimate
travel by foreign business people, tourists and students. These
visitors spend annually tens of billions of dollars in the United
States, helping to create jobs across the Nation. We provide our
consular officers with clear guidance to provide business-friendly
application procedures while adjudicating applications for business
visas within the bounds of U.S. immigration law.
I convened U.S. Ambassadors from around the world at the Department
of State on February 2 and 3 this year, and their great enthusiasm to
be champions on behalf of U.S. exports and U.S. exporters was quite
apparent. They are concerned, however, about the resources available to
our missions abroad, including for export promotion purposes.
U.S. Ambassadors are eager to explain commercial opportunities in
their host countries to U.S. business audiences. One, but by no means
the only, recent example: the Department of State's Bureau of Economic,
Energy and Business Affairs and the Bureau of Near East Affairs worked
with the Business Council for International Understanding to program
meetings with U.S. domestic business groups for nine U.S. Ambassadors
from the Middle East and North Africa in October of last year. The
Ambassadors made presentations to business associations from New York
to Seattle and San Francisco and Milwaukee to New Orleans. Other U.S.
Ambassadors have made similar presentations to U.S. audiences, and in
this year in which the United States will be host to the APEC summit,
many more such events will occur. All of these activities are designed
to help U.S. companies understand the export opportunities in often
unfamiliar foreign markets.
I and other senior officials of the Department of State regularly
advocate on behalf of U.S. bidders on foreign government and foreign
military procurements, in meetings abroad, on the margins of
international conferences, and in diplomatic correspondence to foreign
government officials. Those efforts, and similar efforts by other
Cabinet members and their senior officials, White House officials, and
the ongoing advocacy by our embassy teams abroad, have resulted in
important, sizable export wins for U.S. businesses. You will recall,
for instance, the multibillion dollar contracts for Boeing jets and
other items announced during President Obama's visit to India in
November and during the January state visit of Chinese President Hu
Jintao to the United States. It is important to emphasize that it is
not just our biggest companies and their supply chains that benefit
from commercial advocacy, however large or important those contracts
may be. The day-to-day work of our country desk officers, regional
bureaus, the Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs, and our
Ambassadors and embassy teams overseas reap important accomplishments
for U.S. businesses of all sizes across the Nation. For example:
Embassy Manila played a crucial role in the successful bid
of the largest North American producer of solid zinc strip and
zinc-based products, Jarden Zinc Products of Greenville, TN, to
supply coin blanks to the Philippines Central Bank. The
contract value exceeded $20 million.
One of our smallest posts in terms of staffing, the American
Presence Post in Rennes, France, recently helped a Maryland
firm secure a contract for at-sea refueling systems for
European naval frigates.
The U.S. Embassy in Tirana recently brokered an
understanding with Albanian Customs and National Food Authority
officials, who had differing interpretations of the
requirements of an ambiguous Albanian law. The Embassy's
intervention allowed release of U.S. meat shipments that had
been delayed in an Albanian port because of those bureaucratic
disputes.
Embassy Asuncion officers counseled a southern California
firm in its successful bid to lay 1,000 kilometers of high
temperature, low-sag transmission cable for the Paraguayan
National Electricity Administration, a contract valued at more
than $10 million.
State's International Communications and Information Policy
Office (CIP) has promoted the benefits of holding wireless
spectrum auctions to other countries. Brazil, India, Costa
Rica, and Mexico have held these auctions with our
encouragement. In Brazil, U.S.-based Nextel won 11 3G (third
generation) wireless licenses, as well as other licenses,
resulting in Nextel Brazil becoming the fifth mobile carrier
with almost 100 percent national coverage there.
The work of many of the offices in State's Bureau of Economic,
Energy and Business Affairs (EEB) actively support the goals of the
President's National Export Initiative or otherwise contribute to U.S.
economic prosperity.