[Senate Hearing 112-369]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-369
IRAN'S INFLUENCE AND ACTIVITY
IN LATIN AMERICA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE, PEACE
CORPS, AND GLOBAL NARCOTICS AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 16, 2012
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JIM WEBB, Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TOM UDALL, New Mexico MIKE LEE, Utah
William C. Danvers, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
------------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE, PEACE
CORPS, AND GLOBAL NARCOTICS AFFAIRS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JIM WEBB, Virginia MIKE LEE, Utah
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
TOM UDALL, New Mexico JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Arnson, Cynthia J., Ph.D., director, Latin American Program,
Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, DC.......................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Berman, Ilan, vice president, American Foreign Policy Council,
Washington, DC................................................. 36
Prepared statement........................................... 38
Farah, Douglas, senior fellow, International Assessment and
Strategy Center, Washington, DC................................ 12
Prepared statement........................................... 14
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator from New Jersey, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Noriega, Hon. Robert F., former Assistant Secretary of State for
Western Hemisphere Affairs, former Ambassador to the
Organization of American States, Washington, DC................ 30
Prepared statement........................................... 32
Rubio, Hon. Marco, U.S. Senator from Florida, opening statement.. 3
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Op-ed by Senator Richard G. Lugar ``Growing Risk Posed by Iran-
Venezuela Axis,'' Miami Herald, February 15, 2012.............. 55
(iii)
IRAN'S INFLUENCE AND ACTIVITY
IN LATIN AMERICA
----------
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 2012
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,
Peace Corps, and Global Narcotics Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert
Menendez (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez and Rubio.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Menendez. Good morning. This hearing of the Western
Hemisphere, Peace Corps, and Global Narcotics Affairs Committee
will come to order. Let me welcome all of you to our hearing on
Iran's influence and activity in Latin America. I want to thank
all of our panelists for coming today and I look forward to
hearing your assessment of the growing and multilayered
relationship between Iran and countries in Latin America.
Iran is seizing headlines around the world as its
leadership pursues a singular agenda, to achieve nuclear
weapons capacity. Fortunately, the world is largely united in
its view that such a development would be devastating to our
national security, to that of our allies, and to the stability
of the region. Most of our allies agree that Iran cannot be
permitted to succeed in this endeavor and, thanks to the
leadership of this Congress and the Obama administration, more
pressure has been placed on the Iranian regime than ever
before.
In December, the Senate voted unanimously to impose biting
sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran that have led to a 25-
percent drop in the Iranian currency, the reconsideration of
millions of dollars in purchases of petroleum from Iran, and
the passage of similar sanctions and an oil embargo by the EU
nations. Earlier this month, the Senate Banking Committee
further tightened the noose by approving the Iran Sanctions
Accountability and Human Rights Act, which imposes sanctions on
joint energy ventures and uranium mining ventures, including
some Iran has concluded with countries in this hemisphere, and
support sanctions on the National Iranian Oil Company, which
has also extended its reach into this hemisphere.
As we tighten the noose around the Iranian regime, we must
pay close attention to where President Ahmedinejad's increasing
isolated government looks for friends and resources.
Unfortunately, there are some countries in this hemisphere
that, for political or financial gain, have courted Iranian
overtures. They proceed at their own risk--the risk of
sanctions from the United States and the risks of abetting a
terrorist state.
Within 4 years of President Ahmedinejad's election in 2005,
Iran opened six new embassies in Latin America, including
Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Uruguay, in
addition to the five embassies Iran already had. Iran has
announced its intention to form a joint oil company with
Venezuela, signed a memorandum of understanding to cooperate in
oil activities and personnel training with Ecuador, and been
awarded the right to explore 12 oil and gas blocks in Bolivia.
In October we learned of Iran directing a plot to
assassinate the Saudi Ambassador on United States soil using
individuals it believed to be members of the Zetas drug cartel,
and 2 months later the Spanish language network Univision aired
a documentary that depicted a 2007 cyber attack plot by the
Iranian Ambassador in Mexico, in conjunction with diplomatic
officials from the Embassies of Venezuela and Cuba, to
infiltrate U.S. Government computer systems in the White House,
FBI, CIA, and two nuclear facilities. The Venezuelan official
profiled in that documentary was later reposted to the
Venezuelan consulate in Miami, until the State Department
compelled that she be dismissed for her actions while serving
in Mexico.
Furthermore, an investigation into the Lebanese Canadian
Bank profiled by the New York Times discovered a complicated
web of high-ranking Hezbollah officials involved in South
American cocaine trafficking trade, as well as an extensive
network of money laundering for Colombian and Mexican drug
cartels.
When you view this in conjunction with the fact that travel
between Iran and both Venezuela and Bolivia does not require
visas despite weak commercial and tourist ties between the
countries, and the fact that partnering with Venezuelan banks
allows Teheran to seek to circumvent financial sanctions, it is
impossible to say this issue does not merit more United States
attention.
Ahmedinejad has said, ``When the Western countries were
trying to isolate Iran, we went to the U.S. back yard.'' We
cannot ignore the geostrategic significance of Iran forming
alliances with countries in the Western Hemisphere,
particularly with anti-American leaders like Hugo Chavez and
Daniel Ortega. This is especially threatening in light of the
recent plot to assassinate an ambassador on United States soil,
which our intelligence community believes is evidence that the
leadership in Teheran feels increasingly emboldened in its plan
to undermine American interests and those of our allies.
As expressed by our own Director of National Intelligence,
James Clapper, in testimony before the Senate Intelligence
Committee this month, the Iranian leadership is now, ``more
willing to conduct an attack on the United States in response
to real or perceived U.S. actions that threaten the regime.''
Iran is a terrorist state whose behavior poses a
significant global threat. In the last week, we suspect that
Iran has instigated attacks in India, Georgia, and Thailand.
Iran has a terrorist history even in Latin America, directing
the bombing of the Israeli Embassy and the Jewish Community
Center in Buenos Aires in the 1990s.
So what do countries in the hemisphere hope to gain from a
relationship with a country as isolated, repressive, and
dangerous as Iran? Some may argue that Iranian influence in
this hemisphere has yet to materialize, that what Iran actually
brings to the table is unfulfilled promises, factories unbuilt,
ports undredged, humanitarian aid undelivered; that Venezuela,
Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Bolivia allow themselves to be courted
by Ahmedinejad to stick a proverbial finger in America's eye,
and that may be true. But at the same time, we cannot ignore
the possibility, given Iran's worldwide terror escapades, that
there is more to the story or that, at a minimum, there will
be.
So I called this hearing to sift through the facts, discuss
with the experts before us what about Iran's relationship with
the nations of our hemisphere should be of serious concern, and
discern the appropriate United States response.
With that, I am looking forward to hearing from our
witnesses, and will turn to the distinguished ranking member
and my colleague, Senator Rubio.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Rubio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing. I echo everything you've just said and I just wanted
to add a few things.
First let me thank the witnesses. We have a great panel.
Thank you all for being a part of this. I've already read all
of your statements, so I look forward to hearing them and
answering your questions.
As you've described, Mr. Chairman, the regime in Iran does
pose an international threat, not just to the United States,
but to the world, and the purpose of this hearing is to examine
the increasing role they're playing in the Western Hemisphere
and what's behind it.
I think we need to begin by making sure we don't exaggerate
things. Iran really is not capable of doing much on its own in
the region. All these promises they make about things they're
going to build, they very rarely keep any of them. In fact,
they haven't kept almost any of them. So a reminder to the
people of these countries that the cost-benefit analysis of
being associated with Iran isn't necessarily on the benefit
side.
I would go on to say, however, that, while it's important
to not exaggerate the role they're playing, we need to
understand why it is that they're doing what they're doing, and
we clearly need to identify that Iran is working in the
hemisphere with nations like Venezuela and Cuba and with other
governments like the ones in Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Ecuador.
These leaders of these countries are basically putting their
nations at the service of Iran for the detriment of their
people and to their future.
So I think one of the things I hope to hear today is why
they're doing it, and I think what I hope you'll explore
further in your testimony is a few of the reasons. The first is
they're obviously looking--Iran is looking to avoid isolation.
They want to be able to point to the world and say, look, we're
not alone, these are these other countries that are aligned
with us, this is really a Western nation versus a rest of the
world type argument, and they want to point to these nations as
being part of some sort of new axis that they're helping or
they're trying to create.
The second is they're looking for allies to help them
circumvent sanctions, allies and other countries that have
access to the international banking system that will allow them
to circumvent some of the international sanctions that are
increasingly growing on Iran.
But the third is the one that I think is most dangerous of
all, and that is ultimately they seem to be establishing a
platform to potentially carry out asymmetrical attacks against
the United States in the region, and it's something that we
need to be cognizant of. Now, that may sound farfetched, except
that the evidence is increasingly clear that Iran is much
bolder in their willingness to attack the United States through
terrorism than anyone had ever imagined.
In an open hearing on January 31, the Director of the
National Intelligence, James Clapper, acknowledged when he
said: ``Iranian officials, probably including Supreme Leader
Ali Khamenei, have changed their calculus and are now willing
to conduct an attack in the United States.'' That's his
assessment of Iran, a nation who is now beginning to see its
footprint even more clear in the capitals and in these
countries that we've outlined just a moment ago.
The history and the lessons of history are even more
startling. Let's remember that it was senior Iranian officials
that were linked to the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in
Buenos Aires that killed 30 people, a 1994 bombing at the
Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association that killed 85 people.
In October of this year we uncovered a plot by the Quds
Force to assassinate the Saudi Arabian Ambassador in the United
States in this very city. And earlier this year, the Univision
television network had a documentary that showed an Iranian
diplomat colluding with what they believed to be Mexican
students that were interested in carrying out terrorist attacks
against national security targets inside of the United States.
It showed the Venezuelan consul in Miami, Livia Acosta Noguera,
asking for information and advising the students. Obviously,
she was expelled, but it just shows the lengths of which this
continues to develop. So you look at all these things and we
have cause for concern.
So let me close by saying that I hope the message of
today's hearing and the actions moving forward, which I believe
are shared by both parties--and I, by the way, would encourage
everyone to read an op-ed piece today that ran in the Miami
Herald by our esteemed colleague, Senator Lugar, which I really
think outlines the challenge before us. I think it's important
to send a message to the leaders of both Venezuela and Cuba and
to their puppets, the leaders of Nicaragua, Bolivia, and
Ecuador, that, No. 1, your people and your nations don't agree
with you. They certainly do not want to be associated with a
pariah regime like Iran and they recognize that their benefits
they get for being associated with a pariah are far outweighed
by the cost of being associated with these individuals.
The second message I hope they'll take from today and
moving forward is that the leaders of these countries are
playing with fire. They're playing with fire because they're
associated with an unpredictable group. One thing is to say
these ridiculous statements about how great Moamar Qadafi was
and what a good hero Assad is. Another thing is to actually
give these people operating space in your own country from
which they can do things that you can never imagine, and the
consequences will be extraordinary. They are playing with fire.
It's a very dangerous game they're playing. Their people
deserve better and I hope they'll reconsider.
So thank you for holding this hearing on this important
topic, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Senator Rubio.
Let me introduce our panelists. First we'll hear from Dr.
Cynthia Arnson, the director of the Latin American Program of
the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Dr.
Arnson recently edited a publication titled ``Iran and Latin
America, Threat or Axis of Annoyance,'' and since joining the
center's Latin American program in 1994 she has focused on
questions of democratic governance, conflict resolution, human
rights, the international relations of Latin America, and U.S.
policy in the Western Hemisphere.
Next we welcome Mr. Douglas Farah, an adjunct fellow at the
Americas Program at CSIS and a senior fellow at the
International Assessment and Strategy Center. He is an expert
on transnational criminal organizations, insurgencies,
ungoverned spaces, illicit money flows, and resource
exploitation in Latin America. In recent years he has written
extensively about Iran's growing influence in Latin America,
the Bolivarian revolution, and transnational criminal and
terrorist networks in the region.
We'd also like to welcome Ambassador Roger Noriega back to
the committee. He coordinates the American Enterprise
Institute's program in Latin America and has served as our
Assistant Secretary of State for the Western Hemisphere
Affairs, as well as U.S. Ambassador to the Organization of
American States, and is a former staff member of this
committee.
Finally, we welcome Ilan Berman, vice president of the
American Foreign Policy Council. An expert on regional security
in the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Russian Federation,
he has consulted for both the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
and the U.S. Department of Defense, and recently returned from
an extended fact-finding trip to examine Iran's growing
influence in Latin America.
So thank you all for your willingness to share your
expertise with the committee. We welcome you and ask you that
you limit your testimony to approximately 5 minutes.
Your full testimony will be included in the record.
With that, we'll begin with Dr. Arnson.
STATEMENT OF CYNTHIA J. ARNSON, PH.D., DIRECTOR, LATIN AMERICAN
PROGRAM, WOODROW WILSON CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Arnson. Thank you very much, Senator Menendez, and
thank you, Senator Rubio, for the invitation to testify on this
difficult subject. This is obviously a highly charged topic.
International tensions over the purpose and the lack of
transparency of Iran's nuclear program have escalated
dramatically in recent weeks. The subject of Iran's involvement
in Latin America is additionally difficult precisely because
there's so little transparency in Iran's economic, security, or
intelligence dealings with the region. This is compounded by a
parallel or similar lack of transparency among its principal
allies in the region, the countries of the so-called ALBA bloc.
The allegations about Iran's activities in Latin America,
which both you and Senator Rubio have just outlined, especially
those related to its nuclear ambitions and support for
terrorism, deserve to be treated with the utmost seriousness.
As you mentioned, there is a track record. Five Iranian
officials, including the current Defense Minister, along with
an operative of Hezbollah, have been accused by the Government
of Argentina, and those arrest warrants have been validated by
Interpol, for masterminding the two most devastating terrorist
attacks in recent Latin American history, the 1992 bombing in
Buenos Aires of the Israeli Embassy, and the 1994 bombing of
the Jewish Community Center, the AMIA.
This is a political year in the United States, however, and
it's easy to see how hot-button issues of Iran and its
intentions in the Middle East or in Latin America can become
the subject of heated debate and partisan contention. When one
adds to this mix the polarizing and stridently anti-United
States figure of President Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, the whole
mix becomes especially volatile.
I would argue, however, that the politicization of this
issue will not and rarely leads to good policy. The assessments
of intentions as well as capabilities are by definition hard to
make, all the more so when they involve both state and nonstate
actors who endeavor to keep their activities secret. Vigilance
is essential at this time, as is evidence-based consideration
of these difficult issues.
President Ahmedinejad recently concluded a trip to the
region, prompted by an invitation to visit Nicaragua to attend
the inauguration of President Daniel Ortega. As much as the
Iranian President might have derived some satisfaction from
this trip, showing up again, as Senator Rubio has indicated, on
the United States doorstep, showing that he could poke the
United States in the eye, I think that in a broader sense the
trip was a major failure, demonstrating mostly that Iran has
lost political ground in the hemisphere.
Ahmedinejad was rebuffed by Brazil, which is Iran's largest
trading partner in Latin America, in sharp contrast to
reciprocal visits by the Iranian and Brazilian Presidents in
2009 and 2010. The new government of President Dilma Rousseff
has voted against Iran in the United Nations, for the first
time supporting the sending of a special rapporteur. She has
called Iranian human rights violations, including the proposed
stoning of a woman convicted of adultery, a ``barbarity'' and
``a medieval practice.''
Argentina, which is Iran's second-largest trading partner,
was also not on the itinerary. And despite previous trips to
Bolivia, Ahmedinejad did not stop in La Paz, most likely
because in May 2011 the Iranian Defense Minister, Vahidi, who
was in fact one of those accused of involvement in the
terrorist bombings in Argentina, visited Bolivia at the
invitation of the defense ministry. Following an outcry,
Bolivian President Evo Morales publicly apologized, calling the
invitation to Vahidi a ``grave error'' and apologizing to the
Jewish community in Argentina, saying that the visit was a
mistake.
There were rumors that Ahmedinejad would attend the
inauguration of Guatemalan President Otto Perez Molina, which
took place at the same time that he was in the region, and I
believe that his failure to show up indicates that Guatemalan
authorities backpedaled very substantially to prevent that
visit from taking place.
Finally, I think it's important to note that Ahmedinejad
remains very unpopular in Latin America as a whole. According
to the polling firm Latinobarometro, the citizens of the region
rank Iran last out of nine countries about which they were
asked if they had a favorable opinion. It is interesting and
important to note that the United States ranked first.
I'm almost out of time, but I'll say that the economic
relationship between Iran and Latin America has grown in recent
years, but its significance is easy to exaggerate. The media
use words like ``surge'' or ``increasing sevenfold'' to
characterize Iran's trade relationship with Brazil, but
Iranian-Brazilian trade is a mere 0.6 percent of Brazil's total
foreign trade. Iran-Venezuela trade is less than 0.02 percent
of Venezuela's total trade. My testimony includes some charts
that indicate this.
I share the concern about the efforts of Iran to establish
perhaps a military, intelligence, and security presence. The
Manhattan district attorney's office has launched an ongoing
investigation of Venezuelan collaboration in procuring
financing and materials for alleged weapons production in Iran,
in violation of United States sanctions. As Doug Farah has
written and I'm sure will tell us more, the Iranian financial
presence in Caracas potentially serves as a way to bust
sanctions.
Both of you have indicated the number of actions that the
U.S. Government has taken to sanction Venezuelan diplomats who
have served allegedly as facilitators and fundraisers for
Hezbollah. The U.S. Government has also sanctioned the
Venezuelan oil company, PDVSA, for deliveries of gasoline
components in defiance of sanctions against Iran. As you have
noted, the U.S. Government implicated an Iranian citizen in an
alleged plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador in Washington.
We can go on and on.
At the same time, I think it's important, as much as we
attempt to investigate with the greatest seriousness the
various bits and pieces of information that have come out, most
of which are quite alarming, I think it's important to keep
this issue in perspective. There are other pressing human
security concerns in the hemisphere, including the tens of
thousands of people killed in the past several years, primarily
in Mexico, but also in Central America, in violence related to
narcotrafficking, and the threat to democratic institutions
posed by transnational crime.
We should also be careful--this is now the second or third
hearing----
Senator Menendez. If I could ask you to summarize.
Dr. Arnson. Final point--that we not allow this issue to
overshadow attention to the broader dynamics in the hemisphere,
which are marked by economic growth, the fight against poverty
and inequality, the emergence of Brazil as a global power, the
region's expanding relations with China and Asia, all of which
are issues central on the Latin American agenda. Our failure to
pay attention to the issues that are important in the region
will serve to isolate the United States from our allies in the
hemisphere, as much as the issue of Iran's activities in Latin
America deserves the utmost serious consideration.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Arnson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Cynthia J. Arnson
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for this
opportunity to testify on Iran's relationship with Latin America.\1\
This is a highly charged as well as difficult subject.
It is highly charged in that international tensions over the
purpose and lack of transparency of Iran's nuclear program have
escalated dramatically. Indeed, just as Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad made yet another trip to the region last month, Iranian
authorities threatened to close down the Strait of Hormuz if sanctions
were adopted against its sale of oil; Iranian judicial authorities
sentenced to death a dual Iranian-American citizen and former U.S.
Marine accused of espionage; and speculation about possible military
strikes by Israel or the United States against Iran's nuclear
installations has increased exponentially. The recent assassination in
Tehran of yet another Iranian scientist working on the country's
nuclear program--for which Iran blames the Israeli Government--and
assassination attempts against Israeli diplomats in India and Georgia--
for which Israeli officials blame Iran--have contributed to the
thickening of tensions.
The subject of Iran's involvement in Latin America is difficult
precisely because there is so little transparency in Iran's economic,
security, or intelligence dealings with the region; this problem is
compounded by a similar lack of transparency among its principal allies
in the region, the countries of the so-called ALBA bloc.\2\ What is
assumption, speculation, or suspicion and what is hard evidence based
on reliable sources? The allegations are many and serious but the
ability to verify definitively is often lacking. There are
disagreements within and outside the U.S. Government about the precise
contours of the relationship. For example, in April 2010, a Department
of Defense report to Congress indicated that the elite unit of Iran's
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Quds Force, had increased its
presence in Latin America, particularly in Venezuela. Yet shortly
thereafter, General Douglas Fraser, head of the U.S. Southern Command,
stated that Iran's growing interest in, and engagement with, Venezuela
was diplomatic and commercial, not military. Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton stated in 2009 that Iran was building a large embassy in
Nicaragua; the report turned out to be false.
The allegations about Iran's activities in Latin America,
especially those related to its nuclear program and support for
terrorism, deserve to be treated with the utmost seriousness. There is
a track record: five Iranian officials, including the current Defense
Minister, along with an operative of Hezbollah have been accused by the
Government of Argentina--and arrest warrants have been issued by
INTERPOL--for masterminding and staging two of the most devastating
terrorist attacks in recent Latin American history: the 1992 bombing in
Buenos Aires of the Israeli Embassy, and the 1994 bombing of the Jewish
community center known as the AMIA. One hundred fourteen people died in
those attacks and hundreds more were wounded.
In this political year in the United States, however, it is easy to
see how the hot-button issues of Iran and its intentions--in the Middle
East or Latin America--can become the subject of heated debate and
partisan contention. When one adds the polarizing and stridently anti-
U.S figure of President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, the mix becomes
especially volatile. Politicization of issues, however, rarely leads to
good policy. Assessments of intentions as well as capabilities are by
definition hard to make, all the more so when they involve activities
that state and nonstate actors endeavor to keep secret. Vigilance is
essential, as is evidence-based consideration of difficult issues.
Iran's relationship with the Western Hemisphere goes back half a
century or longer. Venezuela and Iran were founding members of OPEC in
the 1960s, and for decades pursued a common agenda around keeping oil
prices high. Iran also sought to expand commercial relations with
Mexico and Brazil, and through the Non-Aligned Movement established
friendly relations with a number of Latin American countries. The
overtly political aspects of the current relationship deepened after
the 1979 Iranian revolution, the same year in which the Sandinistas
took power in Nicaragua. The election of Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad in 2005 and his promotion of an ``aggressive foreign
policy'' to counter Iran's international isolation marked a new phase
in Iran's relationship with Latin America, and it is this current phase
that has been of greatest concern to the Washington policy
community.\3\
The relationship between Iran and several Latin American countries
since in 2005 is driven by multiple factors. These include, for both
sides, economic self-interest--the search for new trade partners and
markets--the desire to assert foreign policy independence and
sovereignty and diversify international partners beyond the United
States, and for some, a shared anti-U.S., ``anti-imperialist'' agenda.
Negotiations over Iran's nuclear program served as an opportunity for
Brazil during the Lula administration to project its own global
ambitions, even if such efforts were highly controversial within Brazil
and in the United States at the time. (As described below, the
government of current President, Dilma Rousseff, has adopted a
significantly different posture.) Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has
most actively courted Ahmadinejad, using the relationship to express
antipathy to, and score propaganda points against, the United States.
He has facilitated Iran's relationships with ALBA allies such as
Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Bolivia, whose governments similarly exploit
antagonism with the United States for internal political purposes,
albeit to a degree far less than Venezuela.
President Ahmadinejad's most recent trip to the region in January
2012 was organized around an invitation to attend the Presidential
inauguration of Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua; the agenda also included
Venezuela, Ecuador, and Cuba. Ahmadinejad may have derived some
political satisfaction from the trip; he showed up once again on the
U.S. doorstep, attempted to demonstrate that Iran was not entirely
isolated internationally; and was joined by leaders in Caracas and
Quito in rejecting claims that Iran's nuclear program was for anything
but peaceful purposes. In a broader sense, however, the trip was a
major failure, demonstrating that Iran has lost political ground in the
region:
Ahmadinejad was rebuffed by Brazil, Iran's largest trading
partner in Latin America, in stark contrast to the visits by
Ahmadinejad and Lula to each other's capitals in 2009 and 2010,
respectively. In March 2011, the government of President Dilma
Rousseff voted against Iran in the United Nations for the first
time in a decade, supporting a resolution in the Human Rights
Council to send a special rapporteur to Iran to investigate
human rights violations. As President-elect, Rousseff condemned
the sentence--death by stoning--of an Iranian woman convicted
of adultery, calling the proposed punishment a ``barbarity''
and a ``medieval practice.'' Brasilia ultimately abstained when
the rapporteur's final report on human rights in Iran was
brought to a vote. But a spokesman for Ahmadinejad in Tehran
publicly criticized Rousseff for ``destroying years of good
relations'' built up under President Lula.
Argentina, Iran's second-largest trading partner, was also
off the itinerary.
Despite a growth in bilateral trade, the issue of Iran's role
in the two terrorist bombings in the 1990s precludes a deeper
relationship.\4\
Despite previous visits to Bolivia, Ahmadinejad did not stop
in La Paz. In May 2011, Iranian Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi--
accused by the Argentine Government of involvement in the AMIA
case--visited Bolivia at the invitation of the Defense
Ministry. Following an outcry in Argentina, Bolivian President
Evo Morales publicly apologized, calling the invitation to
Vahidi a ``grave error.'' Morales also apologized to
representatives of Argentina's Jewish community, saying that
the visit was a ``mistake.''
Ahmadinejad did not attend the inauguration of Guatemalan
President Otto Perez Molina, even though its timing coincided
with the trip to the other four countries, and even though
reports in the Guatemalan press indicate that Ahmadinejad had
been invited, along with the Presidents of all countries with
which Guatemala has diplomatic relations.
The relationship with Cuba also manifests some important
areas of divergence. Fidel Castro has openly condemned the
IranianGgovernment's anti-Semitism and denial of the Holocaust.
Finally, Ahmadinejad remains extremely unpopular in Latin
America as a whole. According to the polling firm
Latinobarometro in 2011, citizens of the region ranked Iran
last out of nine countries about which they were asked if they
had a favorable opinion. (The United States ranked first.)\5\
The economic relationship between Iran and Latin America has grown
in recent years, but its significance is also easy to exaggerate (see
Table 1). The media use words like ``surge'' and ``sevenfold'' increase
to characterize Iran's trade relationship with Brazil. Yet the $2.1
billion in bilateral trade in 2010 constituted less than 0.6 percent of
Brazil's total foreign trade (see Table 2). Similarly, Iran-Venezuela
trade is less than 0.02 percent of Venezuela's total trade. According
to IMF statistics reported by the European Commission, Iran ranks 27th
among Brazil's trading partners, and ranks only 48th for Venezuela. Of
Iran's major trade partners, Brazil appears in 18th place, and
Argentina is in 34th place (both are dwarfed by Iran's trade with the
United Arab Emirates, China, India, Japan, Turkey, and South Korea).
Notably, none of the countries of the ALBA bloc figures among Iran's
top 50 trading partners.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Similar exaggeration characterizes Iran's aid and investment to its
closest allies in Latin America. Scores, if not hundreds, of
cooperation agreements have been signed and billions upon billions have
been pledged, in areas as diverse as energy, infrastructure and port
development, agriculture, cement, textiles, and mining. Most of the
projects have not and will never come to fruition, in no small measure
because they are unpopular in Iran. The Iranian Parliament must approve
funding for such projects and opposition is stiff in light of the
economic pain inflicted by international sanctions.
Iran's behavior in the international system, from the support of
terrorist movements to the defiance of the international community with
respect to inspections of its nuclear program, raises the most concern
and alarm about its increased activities in Latin America. Several
years ago the Manhattan District Attorney's office launched an ongoing
investigation of Venezuelan collaboration with Iran to procure
financing and materials (including uranium) for weapons production in
violation of U.S. and international sanctions. The Iranian financial
presence in Caracas, through the Banco Internacional de Desarrollo
(BID) and the Banco Binacional Irani-Venezolano, raise concerns about
Iran's use of the Venezuelan banking system to avoid sanctions. Indeed,
the Toseyeh Saderat Iran Bank, the primary shareholder in the BID, was
designated by the U.S. Treasury Department in 2007 as a vehicle for the
funding of Hezbollah.\6\
There is every reason to be watchful and vigilant, and treat
allegations about Iran's military and intelligence activities in the
region with the utmost seriousness. As mentioned earlier, the secrecy
and lack of transparency that characterize the behavior of the Iranian
regime, including its dealings with allies in Latin American on
economic as well as military matters, heighten the level of concern.
The U.S. Department of Treasury in 2008 accused a Venezuelan diplomat
who had served in Lebanon and Syria of acting as a facilitator and
fundraiser for Hezbollah.\7\ In May 2011, the U.S. Government
sanctioned the state-owned Venezuelan oil company PdVSA for deliveries
of gasoline components to Iran in defiance of sanctions. In October
2011, the U.S. Government implicated an Iranian citizen in an alleged
plot to arrange the assassination of the Saudi Ambassador in
Washington. In January 2012, the Obama administration expelled
Venezuela's consul in Miami, Livia Acosta, following the airing of a
television documentary linking her to the planning of cyber attacks on
the United States.
Allegations about Iranian efforts to obtain uranium in Venezuela
and Bolivia are more difficult to substantiate, but these, along with
questions raised about an increased presence of the Quds Force in
Iranian diplomatic missions, should be further investigated. At the
same time, counterevidence should also be weighed seriously. For
example, in 2011 a reporter writing for the Wilson Quarterly attempted
to learn more about the direct flights between Caracas and Tehran
inaugurated in 2007. But when he visited the office of the Venezuelan
airline, Conviasa, to inquire about purchasing a ticket, he was told
that the service had been canceled ``about a year ago.'' Similarly, the
same reporter who visited a car dealer to inquire about purchasing a
vehicle made by the joint Venezuelan-Iranian car and tractor
manufacturer Veniran was told there weren't any and that there was a
waiting list from 2010 of more than 4,000 customers.\8\ Is this the
definitive word? Probably not. Sifting through what is real and what is
not is an important and indeed urgent task.
At the same time, other pressing human security concerns in the
hemisphere, including the tens of thousands of people killed in the
past several years in violence related to narcotrafficking or the
threat to democratic institutions posed by transnational crime also
deserve serious attention. Attention to this issue should not
overshadow the broader dynamics in the hemisphere, marked by economic
growth, the fight against poverty and inequality, the emergence of
Brazil as a global actor, expanded relations with China and other Asian
countries, democratic deepening, and a growing clamor for the United
States to reform its immigration and counterdrug policies. Losing sight
of the concerns and priorities of Latin American countries themselves
risks isolating the United States from important allies in the
hemisphere; these countries will look elsewhere for global partners who
share their priorities and are willing to act on a common agenda.
Thank you for your consideration.
------------------
End Notes
\1\ I am grateful to Adam Stubits, Program Associate at the Woodrow
Wilson Center, and interns Julie Anderson, Melissa Nolan, and Hanif
Zarrabi-Kashani for research assistance.
\2\ The Bolivarian Alliance of the Peoples of our America (ALBA)
was founded in 2004 and includes Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba,
Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and
Venezuela.
\3\ For additional background on Iran's foreign policy toward the
region, see Farideh Fahri, ``Tehran's Perspective on Iran-Latin
American Relations,'' in Cynthia Arnson, Haleh Esfandiari, and Adam
Stubits, eds., ``Iran in Latin America: Threat or `Axis of
Annoyance'?'' Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Latin
American Program and Middle East Program, 2009, http://
www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Iran_in_LA.pdf
\4\ Press reports that the Argentine Foreign Ministry was
contemplating a warming of relations with Iran and a softening of the
position vis-a-vis the 1990s bombings caused a firestorm. Whatever the
validity of the reports, the Argentine Government's position remains
unchanged.
\5\ The United States had a 72-percent favorable rating, followed
by Spain (71 percent). Ranked more favorably than Iran were the
European Union, China, Canada, Venezuela, Cuba, Israel.
\6\ See Douglas Farah, ``Iran in Latin America: An Overview,'' in
Cynthia Arnson, Haleh Esfandiari, and Adam Stubits, eds., op.cit.
\7\ In January 2011, a Congressional Research Service report on
Hezbollah noted that ``there is little credible evidence of the present
activity of operational Hezbollah cells in Latin America,'' but
indicated that Hezbollah and its supporters and sympathizers were
involved in illegal activities such as drugs and arms trafficking,
money laundering, and other forms transnational crime.
\8\ Joshua Kucera, ``What is Hugo Chavez Up To?'' Wilson Quarterly,
Vol. 35, No. 2, Spring 2011.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
Mr. Farah.
STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS FARAH, SENIOR FELLOW, INTERNATIONAL
ASSESSMENT AND STRATEGY CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Farah. Thank you, Chairman Menendez and Ranking Member
Rubio and members of the subcommittee, for the opportunity to
testify today on an issue I feel is of profound importance.
Latin America is undergoing significant changes as numerous
extra-regional state actors with little history in the region
engage there in trade, military sales, resource extraction, and
intelligence collection on an unprecedented scale. These
include China, Russia, and Iran. While the interests of Russia
and China will often diverge from those of the United States,
the interests of Iran, a state sponsor of terrorism and sponsor
of a terrorist group operating in the region, are directly and
openly antagonistic.
Iran's interests lie in strengthening ties to the highly
criminalized states in the Bolivarian axis. Iran and the
Bolivarian states, led by Hugo Chavez, including Rafael Correa
of Ecuador, Evo Morales of Bolivia, and Ortega in Nicaragua,
bring a significant and dangerous new set of threats to the
region as they work together with transnational organized
criminal groups and terrorist groups. This threat includes not
only drug trafficking, but also the potential for WMD-related
trafficking.
These activities are carried out with the participation of
regional and extra-regional state actors who have a publicly
articulated doctrine of asymmetrical warfare against the United
States and its allies that explicitly endorses as legitimate
the use of WMD in that struggle. This is still a statement of
intentions, not of capacity, but, given Iran's past terrorist
activities, this intent must be taken seriously.
The goal of Iran's presence in the region is twofold in my
opinion: to develop the capacity and capability to wreak havoc
in Latin America and possibly the United States homeland if the
Iranian leadership views this as necessary to the survival of
its nuclear program; and to develop and expand the ability to
blunt international sanctions that are crippling the regime's
economic life. These corrosive activities are accelerating the
weakening of states and hollowing out of many of the first
generation democracies in Latin America and setting a predicate
for the reassertion of authoritarian rule in these states and
their neighbors.
The relationship between Iran and the Bolivarian states is
built on a shared perception of history and grievances against
the United States that leads directly to the doctrine of
asymmetrical warfare and the embrace of the concept of
justified use of WMD against their enemies. While Iran's rulers
view the 1979 Iranian revolution in theological terms as a
miracle of divine intervention against the United States, the
``Great Satan,'' in which they defeated the Great Satan, the
Bolivarians' view this as a roadmap of how to defeat the United
States through asymmetrical means.
Among the first to articulate the merging of radical Shiite
Islamic thought with Marxist aspirations of destroying
capitalism and U.S. hegemony was Ilich Sanchez Ramirez, better
known as ``Carlos the Jackal,'' a Venezuelan citizen who until
his arrest in 1994 was one of the world's most wanted
terrorists. Sanchez Ramirez writes that Islamism and Marxism
combined could form a global anti-imperialist front that would
definitively destroy the United States, globalization, and
imperialism. In his seminal 2003 book ``Revolutionary Islam,''
written from prison where he is serving a life sentence,
Sanchez Ramirez praises Osama bin Laden and the 9-11 attacks
and warns that, ``from now on terrorism is going to be more or
less a daily part of the landscape of your rotting
democracies.''
The public praise of Chavez for Sanchez Ramirez is a
crucial element in Bolivarian ideology. In a 1999 letter to
Sanchez Ramirez, Chavez greeted the terrorist as a
distinguished compatriot and wrote that, ``Swimming in the
depths of your letter of solidarity, I could hear the pulse of
our shared insight that everything has its due time, a time
when you can fight outright for principles and a time when you
must choose the proper fight.'' He signs off: ``with profound
faith in our cause and our mission, now and forever, Hugo
Chavez.''
Chavez has adopted as his military doctrine the concepts
and strategies articulated in ``Peripheral Warfare and
Revolutionary Islam: Origins, Rules, and Ethics of Asymmetrical
Warfare,'' by Spanish politician and ideologue, Jorge
Verstrynge. I have a copy of the book here if you'd like to
look at it later.
The tract is a continuation of Sanchez Ramirez's thought,
incorporating the endorsement of the use of WMD to destroy the
United States. Chavez liked Verstrynge's book so well that he
had a special pocket-sized edition--I also have a copy of that
here--printed and distributed to his officer corps, with the
Venezuelan flag imprinted on the cover, and making it the
official military doctrine of the Venezuelan military.
To further ingrain this teaching and eradicate any vestiges
of U.S. military doctrine in the region, Chavez and other
Bolivarian leaders, in conjunction with Iran, have recently
opened a new military academy to teach Bolivarian military
doctrine, operating in Santa Cruz, Bolivia. Iran's interest in
the project was made clear when Iranian Defense Minister Ahmad
Vahidi arrived in Bolivia for the school's inauguration. He had
to leave, of course, before it was actually inaugurated when
his presence caused an international outrage.
Iran and its Bolivarian allies systematically engage in a
pattern of financial behavior, recruitment exercises, and
business activities that are not economically rational and
could be used for the movement and/or production of WMD and the
furthering of Iran's stated aim of avoiding international
sanctions.
These include significant investments in financial
institutions in the region that can easily be used to move
money from Iran to banks around the world through third
parties. Among the most important are the Banco Internacionale
de Desarrollo, the Export Development Bank of Iran, the Fondo
Binacional Venezuela-Iran, established in 2008 with a capital
of $1.2 billion, and FONDEN, the Fondo de Desarrollo Nacionale,
which is most interesting because it receives direct injects
from the PRVSA, and in 2010 official government figures showed
that FONDEN had received $15 billion in money that was not
officially part of the state coffers. From 2005 to 2010, an
estimated $63 billion had been put into that fund and
disappeared from public accounting.
Finally, Iran's Sadra Marine Industry Company, which
operates illicit shipping or sanctioned shipping companies
around the world, is also owned by the Revolutionary Guard and
operates out of Venezuela.
Finally, I would like to say that one of the most
significant new developments I've found is Panama's role in
helping Iran avoid sanctions, often through Venezuelan front
companies operating in the Colon Free Trade Zone. Iranians
traveling in the region often use identity cards issued by
Bolivarian states, particularly Ecuador and Venezuela, to move
freely across the region.
I'd welcome your questions afterward. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Farah follows:]
Prepared Statement of Douglas Farah
Thank you Chairman Menedez, Ranking Member Rubio, and members of
the subcommittee for the opportunity to testify today on an issue that
I feel is of profound importance to the security of the Homeland as
well as the survival of democracy in Latin America.
the regional context
In order to understand Iran's role in the region it is important to
understand the overall context in which its diplomatic, military,
intelligence and economic expansion is taking place. Latin America is
undergoing significant changes as numerous extra-regional state actors
with little history in the region engage there in trade, military
sales, resource extraction, and intelligence collection on an
unprecedented scale.
These include China, Russia, and Iran. While the interest of Russia
and China will often diverge from those of the United States in the
region, the interests of Iran--a state sponsor of terrorism and sponsor
of a terrorist group operating in the region--are directly and openly
antagonistic. Iran's interests lie in strengthening ties to highly
criminalized states in the ``Bolivarian'' axis\1\, whose leaders, while
espousing 21st century socialism, are deeply involved in transnational
organized crime (TOC) enterprises, particularly the cocaine trade.
The Bolivarian bloc of nations--led by Hugo Chavez of Venezuela,
includes Rafael Correa of Ecuador, Evo Morales of Bolivia, and Daniel
Ortega of Nicaragua--seeks to break the traditional ties of the region
to the United States.
To this end, the Bolivarian alliance has formed numerous
organizations and military alliances--including a military academy in
Bolivia to erase the vestiges of U.S. military training from the
militaries--which explicitly exclude the United States.\2\ What the
academy, partly financed by Iran, is teaching in its place, as I will
discuss later, is a military doctrine explicitly based on a concept of
asymmetrical warfare modeled on Hezbollah, the terrorist group in
Lebanon that receives extensive financing and support from Iran.
Iran and the Bolivarian states bring a significant and dangerous
new set of threats to the region as they work together with TOCs and
terrorist groups. This threat includes not only traditional TOC
activities such as drug trafficking and human trafficking, but also the
potential for WMD-related trafficking. These activities are carried out
with the participation of regional and extra regional state actors
whose leaders are deeply enmeshed in criminal activities. These same
leaders have a publicly articulated doctrine of asymmetrical warfare
against the United States and its allies that explicitly endorses as
legitimate the use of weapons of mass destruction in that struggle.
This is, at this point a statement of intentions and not one of
capacity. But, given Iran's past terrorist activities, including the
1994 AMIA bombing in Argentina, the intent of the statement should be
taken seriously. Given the publicly stated intent of the Bolivarian
nations to not comply with the United Nations trade sanctions on Iran,
expressed at a joint meeting of Foreign Ministers in Tehran on July 14,
2010, it is safe to assume, I believe, that the economic ties with Iran
will deepen.
In a joint statement, the Foreign Ministers of Venezuela, Bolivia,
Ecuador, Nicaragua, and other members of the Chavez-led ALBA alliance
vowed to ``continue and expand their economic ties with Iran.'' ``We
are confident that Iran can give a crushing response to the threats and
sanctions imposed by the West and imperialism,'' Venezuelan Foreign
Minister David Velasquez said at a joint press conference in Tehran.\3\
Each of the Bolivarian states has lifted visa requirements for
Iranian citizens, thereby erasing any public record of the Iranian
citizens that transit these countries. Given the extremely small number
of tourists that ply the routes from Iran to Latin America, and the
relatively small number of businessmen who are not tied to the Iranian
state, one can assume most of the travel is related to Iranian
officials.
According to data I have collected, many hundreds of Iranian
citizens, if not thousands, travel to Latin America on undisclosed
business. More than 400 Iranians traveled just to Panama in 2011, and
an even higher number travel regularly to Ecuador, Bolivia, and
Venezuela.
Panama is a significant new player in helping Iran avoid sanctions,
often through Venezuelan front companies operating in the Colon Free
Trade Zone. Iranians traveling in the region often use identity cards
issued by Boliviarian states, including Ecuador and Venezuela, to move
freely across the region.
The intentions of Iran in the region have long been a subject of
debate; but today there is a much clearer indication available, to both
the intelligence community and investigators on the ground, that the
goal of Iran's presence in the region is twofold: to develop the
capacity and capability to wreak havoc in Latin America--and possibly
the U.S. homeland--if the Iranian leadership views this as necessary to
the survival of its nuclear program; and, to develop and expand the
ability to avoid international sanctions that are increasingly
crippling the regime's economic life.
As James Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence recently
stated, ``some Iranian officials--probably including Supreme Leader Ali
Khamenei--have changed their calculus and are now more willing to
conduct an attack in the United States in response to real or perceived
U.S. actions that threaten the regime. We are also concerned about
Iranian plotting against U.S. or allied interests overseas.'' \4\
A recent Univision documentary ``La Amenaza Irani'' (The Iranian
Threat) showed Iranian diplomats in Mexico, working with their
Venezuelan and Cuban counterparts, to try to develop the capacity to
carry out a sophisticated cyber attack against U.S. military, nuclear,
and economic targets. The documentary shows military training provided
by Hezbollah to Venezuelan militias directly under the control of
Chavez, with weapons and ammunition provided by the Venezuelan
military. It also identifies by name the leaders of Hezbollah in
Venezuela.\5\
Some of what is happening in Latin America in terms of TOC is
deeply rooted and goes back several decades. Significant TOC
organizations, principally drug trafficking groups, have posed serious
challenges for U.S. security since the rise of the Medellin cartel in
the early 1980s, the growth of the Mexican drug trafficking
organizations in the 1990s, and continuing to the situation we see in
Mexico and Central America today.
This emerging combination of threats comprises a hybrid of
criminal-terrorist, and state- and non-state franchises, combining
multiple nations acting in concert, and traditional TOCs and terrorist
groups acting as proxies for the nation-states that sponsor them. These
hybrid franchises should now be viewed as a tier-one security threat
for the United States.
These franchises operate in, and control, specific geographic
territories which enable them to function in a relatively safe
environment. The franchises comprise pipelines, or recombinant chains
of networks, which are highly adaptive and able to move a multiplicity
of illicit products (cocaine, weapons, humans, bulk cash) which
ultimately cross U.S. borders undetected thousands of times each day.
The actors along the pipeline form and dissolve alliances quickly,
occupy both physical and cyber space, and use both highly developed and
modern institutions, including the global financial system, as well as
ancient smuggling routes and methods.
The threat increases dramatically with the nesting of criminal/
terrorist groups within governments that are closely aligned
ideologically, such as Iran and the Bolivarian states in Latin America;
and, when TOC becomes an instrument of state power. The primary
nonstate actors in this case are the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de
Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-FARC) and Hezbollah;
both are U.S.-designated terrorist organizations with significant
involvement in TOC activities.
These corrosive activities, taken together, are accelerating the
weakening of states, hollowing-out of many of the first-generation
democracies and their constitutional and civil society processes, and
setting a predicate for a reassertion of authoritarian rule and ruin in
these states and their neighbors. These states' survival and growth are
critical to long-term regional and U.S. security.
Concurrently, we see the further empowerment, training, and
technological support of the oppressive internal security apparatuses
in the increasingly undemocratic Bolivarian states provided by the
Iran-Hezbollah-ICRG/Quds forces combine. Other outside powers, notably
China and Russia further compound these efforts. However Iran,
Hezbollah, and the ICRG/Quds forces are the sharpest edge of this sword
at present, and the one most openly aimed at the U.S., and least
tractable to diplomacy.
All of this comes at the expense of U.S. influence, security and
trade--including energy security, and hence economic and infrastructure
security (Venezuela is the fourth-largest supplier of U.S. petroleum
imports, just behind Mexico; indeed Latin America is our second-largest
source of petroleum imports overall, only slightly behind the Middle
East). While this hearing focuses on Hezbollah, the nonstate, armed
branch of radical Shiite Islamists, one cannot ignore the direct
relationship of this organization to state sponsors. As the DIA noted
in 2010:
The Qods Force stations operatives in foreign embassies,
charities, and religious/cultural institutions to foster
relationships with people, often building on existing socio-
economic ties with the well-established Shia diaspora. At the
same time, it engages in paramilitary operations to support
extremists and destabilize unfriendly regimes. The IRGC and
Quds Force are behind some of the deadliest terrorist attacks
of the past three decades, including the 1983 and 1984 bombings
of the U.S. Embassy and annex in Beirut, the 1983 bombing of
the Marine barracks in Beirut, the 1994 attack on the AMIA
Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires, the 1996 Khobar Towers
bombing in Saudi Arabia, and many of the insurgent attacks on
coalition and Iraqi security forces in Iraq since 2003.
Generally, it directs and supports groups actually executing
the attacks, thereby maintaining plausible deniability within
the international community.
Support for these extremists takes the form of providing
arms, funding, and paramilitary training. In this, Quds Force
is not constrained by ideology; many of the groups it supports
do not share, and sometimes openly oppose, Iranian
revolutionary principles, but Iran supports them because of
common interests or enemies.
The Quds Force maintains operational capabilities around the
world. It is well established in the Middle East and North
Africa, and recent years have witnessed an increased presence
in Latin America, particularly in Venezuela [author emphasis].
As U.S. involvement in global conflicts deepens, contact with
the Quds Force, directly or through extremist groups it
supports, will be more frequent and consequential.\6\
As the DIA notes, many groups, including the Quds Force, are no
longer constrained by ideology or theology, but work with whomever they
have a common, though perhaps temporary, common interest. This growing
TOC threat in multiple theaters was recognized in President Obama's
recent ``Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime,'' released
in July 2011. It was the first such strategy released since the end of
the Clinton administration, an indication of how other priorities have
eclipsed TOC in recent times.\7\ The strategy states that TOC networks
``are proliferating, striking new and powerful alliances, and engaging
in a range of illicit activities as never before. The result is a
convergence of threats that have evolved to become more complex,
volatile and destabilizing.'' \8\
The Strategy also noted that
Terrorists and insurgents increasingly are turning to crime
and criminal networks for funding and logistics. In FY 2010, 29
of the 63 top drug trafficking organizations identified by the
Department of Justice had links to terrorist organizations.
While many terrorist links to TOC are opportunistic, this nexus
is dangerous, especially if it leads a TOC network to
facilitate the transfer of weapons of mass destruction material
to terrorists.\9\
The profits of global TOC activities, even before factoring in the
growing efficiencies derived from state sponsorship and protection, are
enormous. The sheer scale of the enterprise, and the impact it has on
legal economies, argues for sustained national and international
attention and resources as a tier-one security threat. These new
factors further increase the threat.
The most recent comprehensive studies of global criminal proceeds
demonstrate the magnitude of the challenge. The White House estimates
in its 2011 ``Transnational Organized Crime Strategy'' that money
laundering accounts for $1.3 trillion to $3.3 trillion--or between 2
percent and 5 percent of the world GDP. Bribery from TOCs adds close to
$1 trillion to that amount, while drug trafficking generates an
estimated $750 billion to $1 trillion, counterfeited and pirated goods
add another $500 billion, and illicit firearms sales generate from $170
billion to $320 billion. This totals to potentially $6.2 trillion--
fully 10 percent of world GDP--placing it behind only the U.S. and
E.U., but well ahead of China, in terms of global GDP ranking.\10\
Other estimates of global criminal proceeds range from a low of about 4
percent to a high of 15 percent of global GDP.\11\
Understanding and mitigating the threat requires a whole-of-
government approach, including collection, analysis, law enforcement,
policy and programming. No longer is the state/nonstate dichotomy
viable in tackling these problems, just as the TOC/terrorism divide is
increasingly disappearing.
the bolivarian and iranian revolutions: ties that bind
Iran, identified by successive U.S. administrations as a state
sponsor of terrorism, has expanded its political alliances, diplomatic
presence, trade initiatives, and military and intelligence programs in
the Bolivarian axis.
This press for expanded ties comes despite the almost complete lack
of cultural or religious ties to the region, linguistic affinity, or
traditional economic logic and rationale in the relationships. The
relationship, in fact, is built on a common perception of history and
grievances against the United States that lead directly to the doctrine
of asymmetrical warfare and the embrace of the concept of justified use
of WMD against its enemies.
The most common assumption among those who view the Iran-Bolivarian
alliance as troublesome (and many do not view it as a significant
threat at all), is that sole points of convergence of the radical and
reactionary theocratic Iranian Government and the self-proclaimed
socialist and progressive Bolivarian revolution are: (1) an overt and
often stated hatred for the United States and a shared belief in how to
destroy a common enemy; and (2) a shared acceptance of authoritarian
state structures that tolerate little dissent and encroach on all
aspects of a citizen's life.\12\
These assumptions are true but do not recognize the broader
underpinnings of the relationship. While Iran's revolutionary rulers
view the 1979 revolution in theological terms as a miracle of divine
intervention in which the United States, the Great Satan, was defeated,
the Bolivarians view it from a secular point of view as a roadmap to
defeat the United State as the Evil Empire. To both it has strong
political connotations and serves a model for how asymmetrical
leverage, when applied by Allah or humans, can bring the equivalent of
David defeating Goliath on the world stage.
Ortega has declared the Iranian and Nicaraguan revolutions ``twin
revolutions, with the same objectives of justice, liberty, sovereignty,
and peace . . . despite the aggressions of the imperialist policies.''
Ahmadinejad couched the alliances as part of ``a large anti-imperialist
movement that has emerged in the region.''
Among the first to articulate the possible merging of radical Shite
Islamic thought with Marxist aspirations of destroying capitalism and
U.S. hegemony was Illich Sanchez Ramirez, better known as the terrorist
leader ``Carlos the Jackal,'' a Venezuelan citizen who was, until his
arrest in 1994, one of the world's most wanted terrorists.
In his writings Sanchez Ramirez espouses Marxism tied to
revolutionary, violent Palestinian uprisings, and, in the early 2000s
after becoming a Muslim, militant Islamism. Yet he did not abandon his
Marxist roots, believing that Islamism and Marxism combined would form
a global ``anti-imperialist'' front that would definitively destroy the
United States, globalization, and imperialism.
In his seminal 2003 book ``Revolutionary Islam,'' written from
prison where he is serving a life sentence for killing two French
policemen, Sanchez Ramirez praises Osama bin Laden and the 9/11 attacks
on the United States as a ``lofty feat of arms'' and part of a
justified ``armed struggle'' of Islam against the West. ``From now on
terrorism is going to be more or less a daily part of the landscape of
your rotting democracies,'' he writes.\13\
In this context, the repeated, public praise of Chavez for Sanchez
Ramirez can be seen as a crucial element of the Bolivarian ideology and
an acceptance of his underlying premise as important to Chavez's
ideological framework. Chavez ordered his ambassador to France to seek
the release of Sanchez Ramirez and on multiple occasions referred to
the convicted terrorist as a ``friend'' and ``true revolutionary.''
\14\ In a 1999 letter to Sanchez Ramirez, Chavez greeted the terrorist
as a ``Distinguished Compatriot'' and wrote that
Swimming in the depths of your letter of solidarity I could
hear the pulse of our shared insight that everything has its
due time: time to pile up stones or hurl them, to ignite
revolution or to ignore it; to pursue dialectically a unity
between our warring classes or to stir the conflict between
them--a time when you can fight outright for principles and a
time when you must choose the proper fight, lying in wait with
a keen sense for the moment of truth, in the same way that
Ariadne, invested with these same principles, lays the thread
that leads her out of the labyrinth. . . .
I feel that my spirit's own strength will always rise to the
magnitude of the dangers that threaten it. My doctor has told
me that my spirit must nourish itself on danger to preserve my
sanity, in the manner that God intended, with this stormy
revolution to guide me in my great destiny.
With profound faith in our cause and our mission, now and
forever! \15\
In fact, the Bolivarian fascination with militant Islamist thought
and Marxism did not end with the friendship between Chavez and the
jailed terrorist. Acolytes of Sanchez Ramirez continued to develop his
ideology of Marxism and radical Islamism rooted in the Iranian
revolution.
The emerging military doctrine of the ``Bolivarian Revolution,''
officially adopted in Venezuela and rapidly spreading to Bolivia,
Nicaragua, and Ecuador, explicitly embraces the radical Islamist model
of asymmetrical or ``fourth generation warfare,'' and its heavy
reliance on suicide bombings and different types of terrorism,
including the use of nuclear weapons and other WMD. This is occurring
at a time when Hezballah's presence in Latin America is growing and
becoming more identifiable.\16\
Chavez has adopted as his military doctrine the concepts and
strategies articulated in ``Peripheral Warfare and Revolutionary Islam:
Origins, Rules and Ethics of Asymmetrical Warfare'' (Guerra Periferica
y el Islam Revolucionario: Origenes, Reglas y Etica de la Guerra
Asimetrica), by the Spanish politician and ideologue Jorge
Verstrynge.\17\ The tract is a continuation of and exploration of
Sanchez Ramirez's thoughts, incorporating an explicit endorsement of
the use of weapons of mass destruction to destroy the United States.
Verstrynge argues for the destruction of United States through series
of asymmetrical attacks like those of 9/11, in the belief that the
United States will simply crumble when its vast military strength
cannot be used to combat its enemies.
Although he is not a Muslim, and the book was not written directly
in relation to the Venezuelan experience, Verstrynge moves beyond
Sanchez Ramirez to embrace all strands of radical Islam for helping to
expand the parameters of what irregular warfare should encompass,
including the use of biological and nuclear weapons, along with the
correlated civilian casualties among the enemy.
Central to Verstrynge's idealized view of terrorists is the belief
in the sacredness of the willingness of the fighters to sacrifice their
lives in pursuit of their goals. Before writing extensively on how to
make chemical weapons and listing helpful places to find information on
the manufacture of rudimentary nuclear bombs that ``someone with a high
school education could make,'' Verstrynge writes:
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We already know it is incorrect to limit asymmetrical warfare
to guerrilla warfare, although it is important. However, it is
not a mistake to also use things that are classified as
terrorism and use them in asymmetrical warfare. And we have
super terrorism, divided into chemical terrorism, bioterrorism
(which uses biological and bacteriological methods), and
nuclear terrorism, which means ``the type of terrorism uses the
threat of nuclear attack to achieve its goals.'' \18\
In a December 12, 2008, interview with Venezuelan state television,
Verstrynge lauded Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda for creating a new type
of warfare that is ``de-territorialized, de-stateized and de-
nationalized,'' a war where suicide bombers act as ``atomic bombs for
the poor.'' \19\ In his interview with Univision, Verstrynge said his
model was specifically modeled on Hezbollah.
Chavez liked the Verstrynge book so well that he had a special
pocket-sized edition printed and distributed to the officer corps with
express orders that it be read cover to cover. It has since been
adopted as official Venezuelan military doctrine. Even more worrisome,
copies of the book have been found over the past year, for the first
time, in FARC camps in Colombia, indicating the doctrine is being
passed on to Venezuela's nonstate proxy.
According to Colombian military sources the new FARC leadership is
more open to a tactical alliance with radical Islamist groups.\20\
Given the FARC's longstanding desire and capacity to build alliances,
and exchange technologies and lessons learned with other terrorist and
criminal groups (ETA of Spain, Irish Republican Army, the Sinaloa
cartel of Mexico),\21\ one can assume the group is open to an alliance
with Hezbollah and other radical Islamist organizations.
To further ingrain this teaching, and explicitly to eradicate any
vestiges of U.S. military doctrine in the region, Chavez and other
Bolivarian leaders, in conjunction with Iran, have recently opened a
new military academy to teach Bolivarian military doctrine, operating
in Santa Cruz, Bolivia. The ALBA Defense School is going to teach the
``beautiful projects and experiences that unite our military,'' said
Nicolas Maduro, Venezuela's Foreign Minister. This includes, he said,
the doctrines of Jose Marti, the hero of Cuban independence; Simon
Bolivar, the hero of South American independence; Eloy Alfaro, an
Ecuadoran revolutionary; Augusto Cesar Sandino, a Nicaraguan
revolutionary.\22\
Bolivian President Morales at the inauguration of the facility said
the School would prepare the peoples of the region to defend against
``imperialist threats, which seek to divide us.'' He said that the
``Peoples of the ALBA are being besieged, sanctioned, and punished by
the imperial arrogance just because we are exerting the right of being
decent and sovereign.'' He added that, ``We must not allow that the
history of colonization repeats and that our resources are the loot of
the empire.'' An official Bolivarian Web site report on the
inauguration stated that
Facing this aggressive power (the United States) the
countries and peoples of the region have no choice but to seek
ways to defend themselves. The just struggles of the Latin
American peoples for independence, freedom, and social progress
deserve the support of everyone.\23\
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Iran's interest in the project was made clear when Iranian Defense
Minister, Ahmad Vahidi, arrived in Bolivia for the school's
inauguration, despite having an Interpol Red Notice issued for his
arrest for his alleged participation in the 1994 AMIA bombing in Buenos
Aires. His public appearance at a military ceremony the day before the
school's inauguration set off an international scandal and sharp
protests from Argentina, which had asked Interpol to emit the Red
Notice. Vahidi quietly slipped out of the Bolivia.\24\
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This ideological framework of Marxism and radical Islamic
methodology for successfully attacking the United States is an
important, though little examined, underpinning for the greatly
enhanced relationships among the Bolivarian states and Iran. These
relationships are being expanded and absorb significant resources
despite the fact that there is little economic rationale to the ties
and little in terms of legitimate commerce.
For Iran, however, the benefits are numerous, particularly in
building alliances with nations to break its international isolation.
It also affords Iran the opportunity to mine strategic minerals for its
missile and nuclear programs, position Quds Force and Revolutionary
Guard operatives under diplomatic cover, greatly expand and enhance its
intelligence gathering, and operate state-to-state enterprises that
allow for the movement of just about any type of goods and material.
One glimpse at the type of shipments such a relationship can be
used for came to light in 2009, when Turkish authorities randomly
inspected some crates being shipped from Iran to Venezuela at the port
of Mersin. The 22 crates were labeled ``tractor parts'' but in fact
carried equipment for manufacturing explosives.\25\
One need only look at how rapidly Iran has greatly increased its
diplomatic, economic, and intelligence presence in Latin America to see
the priority it places on this emerging axis--given that it is an area
where it has virtually no trade, no historic or cultural ties and no
obvious strategic interests. The gains, in financial institutions,
bilateral trade agreements and state visits (nine state visits between
Chavez and Ahmadinejad alone since 2006), are almost entirely within
the Bolivarian orbit and, as noted, the Bolivarian states have jointly
declared their intention to help Iran break international sanctions.
Iran is also spending scarce resources on expanding its cultural
influence. Part of the effort through a strong Spanish language, Latin
American-based Internet presence, with Web sites in most countries. The
sites generally laud Hezbollah, offer the teachings of Iran's
revolutionary leaders, extol the peaceful nature of its nuclear
program, as well as offer Spanish language literature on Shia
Islam.\26\ What is of particular concern is that many of the bilateral
and multilateral agreements signed between Iran and Bolivarian nations,
such as the creation of a dedicated shipping line between Iran and
Ecuador, or the deposit of $120 million by an internationally
sanctioned Iranian bank into the Central Bank of Ecuador, obey no
economic rationale.\27\
The most recent salvo by Iran is the launching of a Spanish
language satellite TV station, Hispan TV, aimed at Latin America.
Bolivia and Venezuela are collaborating in producing documentaries for
the station. Mohammed Sarafraz, deputy director of international
affairs, said Iran was ``launching a channel to act as a bridge between
Iran and the countries of Latin America was a need to help familiarize
Spanish-speaking citizens with the Iranian nation.''
He said that Hispan TV was launched with the aim of reinforcing
cultural ties with the Spanish-speaking nations and helping to
introduce the traditions, customs, and beliefs of the Iranian people.
Attempting to show the similarities between Islam and Christianity the
first program broadcast was ``Saint Mary,'' depicting ``the life of
Saint Mary and the birth of Jesus Christ from an Islamic point of
view.'' \28\
There is growing evidence of the merging of the Bolivarian
Revolution's criminal-terrorist pipeline activities and those of the
criminal-terrorist pipeline of radical Islamist groups (Hezbollah in
particular) supported by the Iranian regime. The possibility opens a
series of new security challenges for the United States and its allies
in Latin America. The 1994 Hezbollah and Iranian bombing of the AMIA
building in Buenos Aires, Argentina, is a useful reminder that these
groups can and do operate in Latin America.
As noted above, Operation Titan provides clear evidence of the
merging relationship among drug trafficking organizations with strong
ties to the FARC and purchasers and money launderers with close ties to
Hezbollah.
A clear example of the breadth of the emerging alliances among
criminal and terrorist groups was Operation Titan, begun by Colombian
and U.S. officials in 2006 and still ongoing. Colombian and U.S.
officials, after a 2-year investigation, dismantled a drug trafficking
organization that stretched from Colombia to Panama, Mexico, West
Africa, the United States, Europe and the Middle East.
Colombian and U.S. officials say that one of the key money
launderers in the structure, Chekry Harb, AKA ``Taliban'' acted as the
central go-between among Latin American DTOs and Middle Eastern radical
groups, primarily Hezbollah. Among the groups participating together in
Harb's operation in Colombia were members of the Northern Valley
Cartel, right-wing paramilitary groups and the FARC.
This mixture of enemies and competitors working through a shared
facilitator, or in loose alliance for mutual benefit, is a pattern that
is becoming more common, and one that significantly complicates the
ability of law enforcement and intelligence operatives to combat these
groups.\29\
A more recent example was the alleged October 2011 plot by elements
of the Quds Force, the elite arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard
Corps, to hire a hit man from a Mexican cartel to assassinate the Saudi
Ambassador in the United States. The plot could be the first time
members of an official Iranian institution, albeit a secretive one long
known to support terrorist activities, dealt directly with a Mexican
cartel to carry out an attack in the United States.\30\
While there has been little public acknowledgement of the Hezbollah
ties to Latin American TOC groups, recent indictments based on DEA
cases point to the growing overlap of the groups. In December 2011,
U.S. officials charged Ayman Joumaa, an accused Lebanese drug kingpin
and Hezbollah financier, of smuggling tons of U.S.-bound cocaine and
laundering hundreds of millions of dollars with the Zetas cartel of
Mexico, while operating in Panama, Colombia, the DRC and elsewhere.
``Ayman Joumaa is one of top guys in the world at what he does:
international drug trafficking and money laundering,'' a U.S. antidrug
official said. ``He has interaction with Hezbollah. There's no
indication that it's ideological. It's business.'' \31\
Other cases include:
In 2008, OFAC designated senior Venezuelan diplomats for
facilitating the funding of Hezbollah.
One of those designated, Ghazi Nasr al Din, served as the charge
d'affaires of the Venezuelan Embassy in Damascus, and then
served in the Venezuelan Embassy in London. According to the
OFAC statement in late January 2008, al Din facilitated the
travel of two Hezbollah representatives of the Lebanese
Parliament to solicit donations and announce the opening of a
Hezbollah-sponsored community center and office in Venezuela.
The second individual, Fawzi Kan'an, is described as a
Venezuela-based Hezbollah supporter and a ``significant
provider of financial support to Hezbollah.'' He met with
senior Hezbollah officials in Lebanon to discuss operational
issues, including possible kidnappings and terrorist
attacks.\32\
In April 2009, police in the island country of Curacao
arrested 17 people for alleged involvement in cocaine
trafficking with some of the proceeds being funneled through
Middle Eastern banks to Hezbollah.\33\
A July 6, 2009, indictment of Jamal Yousef in the U.S.
Southern District of New York alleges that the defendant, a
former Syrian military officer arrested in Honduras, sought to
sell weapons to the FARC--weapons he claimed came from
Hezbollah and were to be provided by a relative in Mexico.\34\
Such a relationship between nonstate and state actors provides
numerous benefits to both. In Latin America, for example, the FARC
gains access to Venezuelan territory without fear of reprisals; it
gains access to Venezuelan identification documents; and, perhaps most
importantly, access to routes for exporting cocaine to Europe and the
United States--while using the same routes to import quantities of
sophisticated weapons and communications equipment. In return, the
Chavez government offers state protection, and reaps rewards in the
form of financial benefits for individuals as well as institutions,
derived from the cocaine trade.
Iran, whose banks, including its central bank, are largely barred
from the Western financial systems, benefits from access to the
international financial market through Venezuelan, Ecuadoran, and
Bolivian financial institutions, which act as proxies by moving Iranian
money as if it originated in their own, unsanctioned financial
systems.\35\ Venezuela also agreed to provide Iran with 20,000 barrels
of gasoline per day, leading to U.S. sanctions against the state
petroleum company.\36\
In addition, Chavez maintains his revolutionary credentials in the
radical axis comprised of leftist populists and Islamic
fundamentalists, primarily Iran. As a head of state, he is able to
introduce external (nonregional) actors into the region for a variety
of purposes, some of which directly benefit nonstate actors.
Iran is not the only extra-territorial actor that Chavez has
courted and whose interests diverge notably from U.S. interests. Of
primary concern are Russia and China, with Russia acting in a dual
capacity as weapons facilitator and the provider of choice for nuclear
development in conjunction with Iran. China has served as both a market
for goods from all of Latin America, as well as provider of billions of
dollars in investments, loans, military sales, and advanced satellite
services.
In late September 2008, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin of Russia and
Chavez announced joint plans to build nuclear plants in Venezuela.
Atomstroyexport--the same company building the Bushehr nuclear power
plant in Iran--will be the project operator.\37\ In September 2009,
Chavez announced that Venezuela and Iran would jointly build a
``nuclear village'' in Venezuela and pursue nuclear technology
together.\38\ Ecuador and Russia also inked an agreement on civilian
nuclear power cooperation and uranium exploration,\39\ and Russia has
offered similar assistance to Bolivia. In 2009, Ecuador and Iran signed
a Memorandum of Understanding to carry out joint mining activities and
geological mapping.\40\
None of these agreements violate international sanctions, but the
constellation of actors and the fervor with which the agreements have
been embraced raise many questions. Given the opaque nature of the
agreements, and the history of some of the principals involved in
supporting the use of WMD to annihilate states viewed as the enemy
(Israel and the United States), and flaunting international regulatory
regimes, it is both reasonable and prudent to approach these
developments warily.
major findings
The assumptions and framework presented above were arrived at
through IASC research in the region. The following summary was first
prepared for the Department of Defense's Defense Threat Reduction
Agency `s (DTRA) Advanced Concepts office, which released this
UNCLASSIFIED summary.\41\
The level of concern for WMD proliferation issues in this context
has risen over time, in part because it has become increasingly clear
that many of the Iranian instruments used in the region are closely
linked to its ongoing and systematic efforts to acquire banned nuclear
material and have already been identified and sanctioned as part of
Iran's proliferation efforts.
(1) Iran and its Bolivarian allies (Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua,
and Ecuador) in Latin America are systematically engaged in a pattern
of financial behavior, recruitment exercises and business activities
that are not economically rational and could be used for the movement
and/or production of WMD and the furthering of Iran's stated aim of
avoiding international sanctions on its nuclear program. As shown
below, those Iranian financial institutions engaged in the region have
been designated by the United States and/or the United Nations for
their participation in Iran's proliferation efforts or to support
Hezbollah and other designated terrorist entities. These actions
include:
i. Significant investments in financial institutions in the
region that can easily be used to move money from Iran into the
world financial sector through the use of banks and joint
investment corporations. The financial institutions being used
enjoy special protection from the states in which they operate
and have no oversight from banking commissions, the
congressional branch, or the public.
ii. Among the most important are: the Banco Internacional de
Desarrollo (BID) in Venezuela, a wholly owned Iranian bank
operating in Venezuela which, after several years of operation,
was formally sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department but
continues to operate; The Economic Development Bank of Iran
(EDBI), under U.S. sanction for working its role in helping
Iran evade nuclear sanctions and one of the main Iranian owners
of BID. EDBI signed agreements with the Central Bank of Ecuador
(2008) and the Central Bank of Bolivia (2009) to finance the
purchase of Iranian goods (including helicopters and military
materiel in the case of Bolivia).
iii. According to internal documents obtained in Venezuela,
the BID's profits have plummeted 96 percent in early 2010,
perhaps an indication that U.S. sanctions are having an impact.
It maintains only one office in Venezuela (8th Floor, Edificio
Dozsa, Avenida Francisco de Miranda, El Rosal, Caracas,
telephone +58 212 952 65 62). It still offers a wide variety of
banking services, including international transfers, investment
advising, automobile loans and others. The board of directors
is composed of seven Iranian nationals, while the legal
representative is a Venezuelan (identities available from
author). It remains exempt from taxes and is, at least on
paper, one of the smallest banks in the country, with one
office, 14 employees, and 313 depositors. Most of its loans are
given to Iranian citizens living in Venezuela. However, it does
not appear that BID has been completely shut out of the
international banking system.
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According to local banking industry sources, BID operates
correspondent accounts through another government bank, BANDES, which
is unsanctioned. This allows BID to move money as if it were of
Venezuelan rather than Iranian in origin or from BID.
iv. Perhaps replacing BID as a major financial vehicle for
Iran is the Fondo Binacional Venezuela-Iran (FBVI), established
in May 2008 with an initial capital of $1.2 billion. Each
country provided half of the initial capital. This institution
is directly managed by Ricardo Menendez, the Minister of
Science, Technology and Industry, which is responsible for
Venezuela's nascent nuclear program. It is an especially opaque
institution, and none of its expenditures pass through the
National Assembly or any other outside body for approval or
auditing.
v. The FBVI is only one of a host of para-state institutions
the Chavez government has set up that are accountable only to
the executive. Others include FONDEN, FONDESPA, El Fondo Chino
(Chinese Fund), the Belarus Fund and others. Among these,
FONDEN (Fondo de Desarrollo Nacional or National Development
Fund) is by far the most important because it receives direct
funding injects from the state petroleum company. So far in
2010 government figures show FONDEN received $15 billion in
money that does not officially form part of the state coffers.
Since 2005 an estimated $63 billion has been put into the fund,
and then virtually disappeared from all public accounting.
vi. Playing a crucial role in Iran's economic activity in the
region is the Economic Development Bank of Iran (EDBI), an
Iranian financial institution designated by the U.S. Treasury
Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control as part of Iran's
illegal nuclear proliferation network. The designation states
that: ``EDBI provides financial services to multiple MODAFL-
subordinate entities that permit these entities to advance
Iran's WMD programs. Furthermore, the EDBI has facilitated the
ongoing procurement activities of various front companies
associated with MODAFL-subordinate entities. Since the United
States and United Nations designated Bank Sepah in early 2007,
the EDBI has served as one of the leading intermediaries
handling Bank Sepah's financing, including WMD-related
payments. In addition to handling business for Bank Sepah, the
EDBI has facilitated financing for other proliferation-related
entities sanctioned under U.S. and U.N. authorities.'' \42\
The BID is reportedly a Venezuelan bank, which the EDBI would
have no influence over. In fact, BID, sanctioned by OFAC at the
same time as the EDBI, and is wholly owned by Bank Saderat, an
Iranian bank under U.S. and U.N. sanction. The BID was
sanctioned because it was deemed by the Treasury Department to
be acting on behalf of EDBI. According to an OFAC statement:
``Bank Saderat has been a significant facilitator of
Hizballah's financial activities and has served as a conduit
between the Government of Iran and Hizballah, Hamas, the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command,
and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
``Another primary banking relationship is between the Export
Development Bank of Iran (EDBI) and the Central Bank of
Ecuador, according to an agreement signed in November 2008 but
not made public until almost a year later.'' \43\
The heart of the deal is for EDBI to deposit some $120
million in Ecuador's state bank, to be used to foment export
and import activity between the two countries.\44\ This sum
seems unusually high for legitimate commercial activity since
total trade between the two nations has never exceeded $2.3
million, a sum reached in 2003. In 2006 and 2007 Ecuador
registered zero exports to Iran and imports of $27,000 and
$16,000 in those years.\45\
There is a significant part of the agreement that demonstrates how
interlinked these banking institutions (EDBI and BID) are, despite
Venezuela's public denial of any linkages. Point 6 of the ``Protocol of
Cooperation'' between the Central Bank of Ecuador and EDBI,``EDBI
manifests its readiness to establish a branch of Banco Internacional de
Desarrollo (BID) in the Republic of Ecuador.'' \46\
The BID is reportedly a Venezuelan bank, which the EDBI would have
no influence over, including where it opened branches. In fact, EDBI
can open branches of BID as part of EDBI.
Despite later assurances by the Ecuadoran Government to the U.S.
Embassy in Quito that the deal was not consummated, and that a branch
of BID was not opened, at least not publicly, Ecuadoran banking sources
say that Iran is, in fact, using the Ecuadoran Central Bank to hold
Iranian Government funds.
(2) Iran has sought to establish independent binational agreements
in Ecuador and Venezuela to establish joint shipping lines to these
countries. The primary company that is used is Sadra Iran Marine
Industrial Company, which is majority owned by the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps' Khatam al-Anbia force.\47\ It is part of the
IRGC's shipping conglomerate, the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping
Lines (IRISL), a entity, along with all its constantly shifting
components, that have been designated by OFAC for aiding Iran's missile
and nuclear programs.
As Stuart Levey, the Treasury Department's Undersecretary for
Terrorism and Financial Intelligence said: ``Iran has consistently used
its national maritime carrier, the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping
Lines (IRISL), to advance its missile programs and to carry other
military cargoes. Some shipments have been stopped, and were clear
violations of Security Council resolutions--including arms shipments
believed to have been destined for Syria, for transfer to Hezbollah.''
Levey stated that the sanctioning of IRISL was to ``sharpen the focus
on another sector that is a critical lifeline for Iran's proliferation
and evasion: shipping. Some of Iran's most dangerous cargo continues to
come and go from Iran's ports, so we must redouble our vigilance over
both their domestic shipping lines, and attempts to use third-country
shippers and freight forwarders for illicit cargo.''\48\
The importance of the shipping lines may have grown since the
weekly flights between Caracas and Tehran appear to have been
cancelled. The reasons for the cancellation were not clear, but it
removes another state-protected method for moving significant amounts
of resources between the two countries.
Despite this work by Treasury there is very little reporting on
Iran's shipping activities in Latin America, despite the fact that Iran
makes little effort to hide its actions (see picture below, taken at a
public Iran-Venezuela trade exposition in Caracas). This area is of
particular concern because of the increased reports of Iran's increased
interest in mining strategic minerals in the Boliviarian states,
particularly minerals that can be used in missile programs and nuclear
fusion facilities.
Given the state-to-state nature of the shipping lanes, the cargo on
the ships moving to and from Iran can be used to move virtually
anything either state wants to move, as there will be no Customs checks
and no need to declare the contents of the shipping containers. Unlike
illicit or contraband activity outside of state control, where the
state may actually be interested in hindering the process, movements
under state control can easily be used to further the movement of
sensitive, undeclared goods.
Iran's efforts to establish dedicated shipping lines with
individual countries, such as Ecuador,\49\ where there is virtually no
commerce and certainly not enough to sustain a shipping line, raises
serious questions in light of Levey's statements. Given Iran's already
demonstrated capacity and capability to move materiel banned by
international sanctions, this LOE by Iran should be of significant
concern.
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(3) Iran appears to be engaged extensively in increasing mining
activities in Latin America of minerals that have WMD and/or weapons
uses. These include tantalum (Bolivia) and thorianite (Guyana-Brazil-
Suriname). Thorianite, a radioactive rare earth mineral with nuclear
applications as part of the thorium group, is being mined in an area
where gold is traditionally mined, but the increasing number of
Iranians in the region and a sharp increase in requests for gold mining
permits has brought some notice to the new mining. Tantalum is used in
highly heat resistant alloys and high-powered electronic resistors.
These are minerals that are found elsewhere, but seem to be being
acquired in Latin America, perhaps in order to avoid scrutiny
(4) The Bolivarian states appear to be laying the groundwork for
public (internal and international) acceptance of the acquisition of
nuclear power, always carefully couched as for peaceful uses. This
seems to be aimed at developing a political acceptance for the unusual
activities, if they become too big to remain clandestine, as part of a
normal development of bilateral and multilateral relations.
Bolivian President Evo Morales visited Tehran shortly after
Venezuelan President Chavez visited Iran and several other staunchly
anti-U.S. countries, including Syria. Both publicly declared their
intentions to acquire, in the shortest time possible, nuclear
capabilities. This bodes ill for the region, particularly given Iran's
ability to keep international inspectors at bay for many years. While
much of the current talk may be bluster, it also signals the clear
intention of these groups to work with rogue nations to acquire nuclear
capacity.
conclusion
Iran and its proxy force Hezbollah are engaging in a widespread and
multifaceted effort to expand their influence along with their
intelligence capabilities, military capacities, and sanction-evasion
methods. In this effort they are allied with the Boliviarian states of
Latin America led by Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, and his proxy force, the
FARC. Both Hezbollah and the FARC, as designated terrorist entities
that engage in extensive TOC activities, are instruments of statecraft.
This alliance of state and nonstate actors, engaged in terrorism
and TOC, has an expressed doctrine of asymmetric warfare that endorses
the use of WMD against the United States, viewed by both blocs as the
primary enemy. Iran has taken concrete steps to enhance its ability
evade international financial sanctions through numerous financial
institutions acting on its behalf in the Bolivarian states. It also
engages in extensive purchases of dual use equipment and other
purchases through the Bolivarian states and Panama. All of Iran's
activities in the region, and the activities of the Bolivarian nations
to help, are designed to be as opaque as possible and all oversight and
accountability. Such basic data as the number of accredited diplomats
Iran has in the Bolivarian countries are not obtainable by the
Congresses of those nations.
Given the nature of the actors, the deliberate opaqueness of the
activities and public articulation of a military doctrine to strike the
United States, one can only conclude that Iran's aims and intentions
are hostile and that the Bolivarian states are aiding and abetting Iran
in these efforts despite clear violations of international sanctions
regimes and clear ties to TOC activities.
----------------
End Notes
\1\ The self-proclaimed ``Bolivarian'' states (Venezuela, Ecuador,
Bolivia, and Nicaragua) take their name for Simon Bolivar, the revered
19th century leader of South American independence from Spain. They
espouse 21st century socialism, a vague notion that is deeply hostile
to free market reforms, to the United States as an ``imperial power,''
and toward traditional liberal democratic concepts, as will be
described in detail.
\2\ These include recently founded Community of Latin American and
Caribbean States (Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribenos-
CELAC), and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America
(Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra America-ALBA). The
military school in Warnes, in the department of Santa Cruz, is called
the Escuela de Defensa de la Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de
Nuestra America (Defense School for the Bolivarian Alliance for the
Peoples of Our America.
\3\ ``Venezuela/Iran ALBA Resolved to Continue Economic Ties With
Iran,'' Financial Times Information Service, July 15, 2010.
\4\ James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence,
``Unclassified Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of
the U.S. Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, January 31, 2012, p. 6.
\5\ Univision, ``La Amenaza Irani,'' aired December 8, 2011.
\6\ Lt. Gen. Ronald L. Burgess, Jr., Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency, ``Iran's Military Power,'' Statement before the United States
Senate Committee on Armed Services, April 14, 2010.
\7\ National Security Council, ``Strategy to Combat Transnational
Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National Security,''
Office of the President, July 2011. The Strategy grew out of a National
Intelligence Estimate initiated by the Bush administration and
completed in December 2008, and is a comprehensive government review of
transnational organized crime, the first since 1995.
\8\ ``Fact Sheet: Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized
Crime,'' Office of the Press Secretary, the White House, July 25, 2011.
\9\ ``Fact Sheet: Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized
Crime,'' Office of the Press Secretary, the White House, July 25, 2011.
\10\ ``Fact Sheet: Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized
Crime,'' op. cit.
\11\ On the lower end, the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime
estimate TOC earnings for 2009 at $2.1 trillion, or 3.6 percent of
global GDP. Of that, typical TOC activities such as drug trafficking,
counterfeiting, human trafficking, weapons trafficking and oil
smuggling, account for about $1 trillion or 1.5 percent of global GDP.
For details see: ``Estimating Illicit Financial Flows Resulting from
Drug Trafficking and other Transnational Organized Crimes,'' United
Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, September 2011. On the higher end,
in a speech to Interpol in Singapore 2009, U.S. Deputy Attorney General
Ogden cited 15 percent of world GDP as total annual turnover of
transnational organized crime. See: Josh Meyer, ``U.S. attorney general
calls for global effort to fight organized crime,'' Los Angeles Times,
October 13, 2009, accessed at: http://articles.latimes.com/print/2009/
oct/13/nation/na-crime13.
\12\ For a more detailed look at this debate see: ``Iran in Latin
America: Threat or Axis of Annoyance?,'' op cit., in which the author
has a chapter arguing for the view that Iran is a significant threat.
\13\ `` `Jackal' book praises bin Laden,'' BBC News, June 26, 2003.
\14\ See, for example: Associated Press, ``Chavez: `Carlos the
Jackal' a `Good Friend' '' June 3, 2006.
\15\ Paul Reyes (translator) and Hugo Chavez, ``My Struggle,'' from
a March 23, 1999, letter to Illich Ramirez Sanchez, the Venezuelan
terrorist known as `Carlos the Jackal,' from Venezuelan President Hugo
Chavez, in response to a previous letter from Ramirez, who is serving a
life sentence in France for murder. Harper's, October 1999, http://
harpers.org/archive/1999/10/0060674.
\16\ In addition to Operation Titan there have been numerous
incidents in the past 18 months of operatives being directly linked to
Hezbollah have been identified or arrested in Venezuela, Colombia,
Guatemala, Aruba, and elsewhere in Latin America.
\17\ Verstrynge, born in Morocco to Belgian and Spanish parents,
began his political career on the far right of the Spanish political
spectrum as a disciple of Manuel Fraga, and served as a national and
several senior party posts with the Alianza Popular. By his own
admission he then migrated to the Socialist Party, but never rose
through the ranks. He is widely associated with radical
antiglobalization views and anti-U.S. rhetoric, repeatedly stating that
the United States is creating a new global empire and must be defeated.
Although he has no military training or experience, he has written
extensively on asymmetrical warfare.
\18\ Verstrynge, op cit., pp. 56-57.
\19\ Bartolome, op cit. See also: John Sweeny, ``Jorge Verstrynge:
The Guru of Bolivarian Asymmetric Warfare,'' www.vcrisis.com, Sept. 9,
2005; and ``Troops Get Provocative Book,'' Miami Herald, November. 11,
2005.
\20\ Farah interviews with senior Colombian officials and recent
FARC deserters.
\21\ Douglas Farah, ``The FARC's International Relations: A Network
of Deception,'' NEFA Foundation, September. 22, 2008.
\22\ Juan Pauliler, ``Que busca la academia military del ALBA?''
BBC Spanish Service, June 15, 2011.
\23\ ``ALBA School of Defense and Sovereignty Opens,'' Anti-
Imperialist News Service, June 14, 2011. Accessed at: http://www.anti-
imperialist.org/alba-school-of-defense-opens_6.
\24\ Robin Yapp, ``Iran Defense Minister Forced To Leave Bolivia
Over 1994 Argentina Bombing,'' The Telegraph (London), June 1, 2011.
\25\ ``Turkey holds suspicious Iran-Venezuela shipment,''
Associated Press, June 1, 2009. http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/
0,7340,L-3651706,00.html.
\26\ For a fuller examination of the use of Web sites, see: Douglas
Farah, ``Islamist Cyber Networks in Spanish-Speaking Latin America,''
Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center, Florida International
University, September 2011.
\27\ For a more complete look at Iran's presence in Latin America,
see: Douglas Farah, ``Iran in Latin America: An Overview,'' Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars, Summer 2009 (to be published
as a chapter in: ``Iran in Latin America: Threat or Axis of
Annoyance?'', edited by Cynthia J. Arnson, et al. 2010. For a look at
the anomalies in the economic relations, see also Farah and Simpson,
op. cit.
\28\ Tehran Times, ``Hispan TV begins with `Saint Mary,' ''
December 23, 2011, accessed at: http://www.tehrantimes.com/arts-and-
culture/93793-hispan-tv-begins-with-saint-mary.
\29\ While much of Operation remains classified, there has been
significant open source reporting, in part because the Colombian
Government announced the most important arrests. For the most complete
look at the case see: Jo Becker, ``Investigation Into Bank Reveals
Links to Major South American Cartels,'' International Herald Tribune,
December 15, 2011. See also: Chris Kraul and Sebastian Rotella,
``Colombian Cocaine Ring Linked to Hezbollah,'' Los Angeles Times,
October 22, 2008; and ``Por Lavar Activos de Narcos y Paramilitares,
Capturados Integrantes de Organizacion Internatcional,'' Fiscalia
General de la Republica (Colombia), October 21, 2008.
\30\ Evan Perez, ``U.S. Accuses Iran in Plot: Two Charged in
Alleged Conspiracy to Enlist Drug Cartel to Kill Saudi Ambassador,''
Wall Street Journal, October 12, 2011.
\31\ Sebastian Rotella, ``Government Says Hezbollah Profits From
U.S. Cocaine Market Via Link to Mexican Cartel,'' ProPublica, December
11, 2011.
\32\ ``Treasury Targets Hizbullah in Venezuela,'' United States
Department of Treasury Press Center, June 18, 2008, http://
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1036.aspx.
\33\ Orlando Cuales, ``17 Arrested in Curacao on Suspicion of Drug
Trafficking Links With Hezbollah,'' Associated Press, April 29, 2009
\34\ United States District Court, Southern District of New York,
The United States of America v Jamal Yousef, Indictment, July 6, 2009.
\35\ For a look at how the Ecuadoran and Venezuelan banks function
as proxies for Iran, particularly the Economic Development Bank of
Iran, sanctioned for its illegal support of Iran's nuclear program, and
the Banco Internacional de Desarrollo, see: Farah and Simpson, op cit.
\36\ Office of the Spokesman, ``Seven Companies Sanctioned Under
Amended Iran Sanctions Act,'' U.S. Department of State, May 24, 2011,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/164132.htm.
\37\ Russia Izvestia Information, September 30, 2008, and Agence
France Presse, ``Venezuela Wants to Work With Russia on Nuclear Energy:
Chavez,'' Sept. 29, 2008.
\38\ Simon Romero, ``Venezuela Says Iran is Helping it Look for
Uranium,'' New York Times, September 25, 2009.
\39\ Nikolai Spassky, ``Russia, Ecuador strike deal on nuclear
power cooperation,'' RIA Novosti, August 21, 2009.
\40\ Jose R. Cardenas, ``Iran's Man in Ecuador,'' Foreign Policy,
February 15, 2011, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/02/15/
irans_man_in_ecuador.
\41\ Douglas Farah, ``Iran and Latin America: Strategic Security
Issues,'' Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Concepts Office, May
2011.
\42\ United States Department of Treasury, ``Export Development
Bank of Iran Designated as a Proliferator,'' Press office of the Office
of Foreign Assets Control, October 22, 2008.
\43\ Copies of the agreement described here were presented to ASCO
in the October update briefing.
\44\ ``Banco Irani Que Despierta Dudas se Asocia con el Central,''
Hoy (Ecuador), September 7, 2009.
\45\ Montufar, op cit.
\46\ Document in possession of the author.
\47\ Ardalan Sayami, ``1388: Year of Militarization of Iran's
Economy,'' Rooz Online, March 23, 2010, accessed at: http://
www.payvand.com/news/10/mar/1213.html.
\48\ Stuart Levey, ``Iran's New Deceptions at Sea Must be
Punished,'' Financial Times, August 16, 2010.
\49\ On December 7, 2008, Ecuador's Minister of Foreign Affairs and
Commerce, Maria Isabel Salvador, and her Iranian counterpart, Masoud
Mir Kazem, signed a ``Memorandum of Understanding For the Study of a
Maritime Shipping Line'' between the two countries. A copy of the MOU
is attached.
Senator Menendez. Thank you very much.
Ambassador Noriega.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT F. NORIEGA, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, FORMER AMBASSADOR TO
THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Noriega. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning. I applaud you and Senator Rubio for
initiating this review of Iran's growing shadow in Latin
America.
You made reference to General Clapper's very startling
statement that Iranian officials at the highest levels are now
more willing to conduct an attack in the United States. General
Clapper's statement represents a significant break with the
skeptics in the foreign policy establishment, including too
many U.S. diplomats, who have failed to appreciate the dire
implications of Iran's activities in the Western Hemisphere.
I coordinate a project at the American Enterprise Institute
to monitor and expose Iran's activities in Latin America, in
order to inform the public as well as policymakers who are
responsible for protecting our national security. Our team has
conducted dozens of interviews with experts from throughout the
world and with eyewitnesses on the ground in the region. We
also have obtained reams of official Venezuelan and Iranian
documents, some of which we have published to support our
conclusions. I want to share with the committee some of the
essential conclusions that we have made to date.
Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chavez and Iranian leader Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad are conspiring to wage an asymmetrical struggle
against United States security and to abet Iran's illicit
nuclear program. Iran has provided Venezuela conventional
weapons capable of attacking the United States and our allies
in the region. On this subject, I would suggest that United
States officials focus on the military-to-military cooperation
and, in particular, the Iranian companies that are involved,
that are associated with the Quds Force. Iran has used $30
billion in economic ventures in Venezuela to launder money and
to evade international financial restrictions.
I also refer the committee and U.S. officials to the work
of the district attorney of New York, Cyrus Vance, Jr., whose
office has continued to look into this important issue and the
implications for our security.
Iran discovered vast uranium deposits in Venezuela in 2005
and it is conducting suspicious mining operations in uranium-
rich areas in Venezuela, Ecuador, and other countries. Two
terrorist networks, one home-grown Venezuelan clan and another
cultivated by radical Iranian cleric, Mohsen Rabbani,
proselytize, fundraise, recruit, and train operatives on behalf
of Iran and Hezbollah in numerous countries in the Americas.
The Venezuelan state-owned airline, Conviasa, operates
regular service from Caracas to Damascus and Teheran, providing
Iran, Hezbollah, and associated narcotraffickers a
surreptitious means to move personnel, weapons, contraband, and
other material in and out of our hemisphere.
Mr. Chairman, our project has shared substantial
information about these aforementioned threats with U.S.
Government officials. Quite frankly, too often the attitude we
have encountered among these career officers has been one of
skepticism or indifference. To offer just a couple of brief
examples.
About 6 months ago we provided U.S. officials the name and
contact information of a reliable Venezuelan source with
privileged information about the Conviasa flights between
Caracas and the terrorist states of Syria and Iran. To this
day, that source has never been contacted. That's fine. I'm
sure that the U.S. Government has many, many sources. However,
congressional staff members tell us that executive branch
officials are unable to answer the simple question of whether
those Conviasa flights are continuing. Our source reassures us
that that critical logistical link is still in service, and as
a matter of fact there are reports that it may extend its
service to Ecuador.
Another brief example: Almost 7 years after the first
reports that Iran discovered or was seeking uranium in
Venezuela, United States officials are still unable or
unwilling to say clearly whether Iran is mining uranium in
Venezuela, notwithstanding documentation revealed by our
project over a year ago regarding Iranian mining in the
uranium-rich Roraima Basin in eastern Venezuela.
Mr. Chairman, quite frankly, the risk we are running today
is not that we exaggerate the threat, but that we're ignoring
it. I believe--and I'm sure you will agree because of the work
that you've done in this area--that the executive branch,
beginning in the waning days of the last administration and
continuing today, has been slow to recognize and respond to
this multidimensional threat.
We believe that congressional scrutiny is essential to
encourage executive branch agencies to act. The dangerous
activities of Iran and Hezbollah so near our borders demand a
whole of government strategy, beginning with an interagency
review to understand and assess the transnational, multifaceted
nature of the problem, to mobilize friendly governments to
respond, and to insist on inspection of suspicious operations
and military inventories.
This is all being carried out against the backdrop of Hugo
Chavez dying of cancer. We have reports from our sources that
on February 12 after a military parade he collapsed, was
unconscious, and it took an hour and a half for his medical
staff to stabilize his condition. So the transition that will
be under way will be very dangerous. It may include chaos and
create a very troubling environment where our enemies are at
work. Our government must be prepared to implement effective
measures unilaterally and with willing partners to disrupt and
dismantle illicit operations and to neutralize unacceptable
threats.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Noriega follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Roger F. Noriega
Mr. Chairman, I applaud you and other members of the subcommittee
for initiating a review of Iran's activities in Latin America.
Since you announced your inquiry, the Director of National
Intelligence, James R. Clapper, testified earlier this month that
``Iranian officials'' at the highest levels ``are now more willing to
conduct an attack in the United States. . . .'' General Clapper also
reported that Iran's so-called ``Supreme Leader'' Ali Khamenei was
probably aware of the bizarre plot discovered last October to conspire
with supposed Mexican drug cartel leaders to commit a terrorist bombing
in the heart of our Nation's capital.\1\ Only because American law
enforcement officials were willing to set aside conventional wisdom
about how and where Iran would wage war against us were they able to
thwart that attack.
Iranian officials have made no secret of the regime's intention to
carry its asymmetrical struggle to the streets of the United States and
Europe. For example, in a May 2011 speech in Bolivia, Iran's Defense
Minister, Ahmad Vahidi, promised a ``tough and crushing response'' to
any U.S. offensive against Iran.\2\ In the same week in early January
that Iran caught the world's attention by threatening to close the
Strait of Hormuz and brandishing shore-to-sea cruise missiles in a 10-
day naval exercise, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced a five-nation swing
through Latin America aimed at advancing its influence and operational
capabilities on the U.S. doorstep.\3\
To comprehend what Iran is up to, we must set aside conventional
wisdom about its ambitions, strategies, and tactics and follow the
evidence where it leads. General Clapper's public statement represents
a dramatic break with the skeptics in the foreign policy
establishment--including too many U.S. diplomats--who have failed to
appreciate the breadth and depth of Iran's activities in the Western
Hemisphere. The Intelligence Community's fresh assessment of Iran's
willingness to wage an attack on our soil leads to the inescapable
conclusion that Teheran's activities near our homeland constitute a
very real threat that can no longer be ignored.
The next logical question is, ``What is that hostile regime doing
with the support of its trusted allies very close to our borders?'' In
my capacity as a Visiting Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research (AEI), I am coordinating an ongoing effort
to answer that very question. I cooperate with a team of experienced
experts who are committed to monitoring and exposing Iran's activities
in Latin America in order to inform the public as well as policymakers
who are responsible for protecting our national security.
To date, we have conducted dozens of interviews with experts from
throughout the world and with eyewitnesses on the ground in the region.
We also have obtained reams of official Venezuelan and Iranian
documents, only a few of which we have published to support our
conclusions.
Our exhaustive work leads us to the following conclusions:
Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chavez and Iranian leader Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad are conspiring to wage an asymmetrical struggle
against U.S. security and to abet Iran's illicit nuclear
program. Their clandestine activities pose a clear and present
danger to regional peace and security.
Iran has provided Venezuela conventional weapon systems
capable of attacking the United States and our allies in the
region.
Iran has used $30 billion in economic ventures in Venezuela
as means to launder money and evade international financial
sanctions.
Since 2005, Iran has found uranium in Venezuela, Ecuador,
and other countries in the region and is conducting suspicious
mining operations in some uranium-rich areas.
Two terrorist networks--one home-grown Venezuelan clan and
another cultivated by Mohsen Rabbani, a notorious agent of the
Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps--
proselytize, fund-raise, recruit, and train operatives on
behalf of Iran and Hezbollah in many countries in the Americas.
Hezbollah conspires with drug-trafficking networks in South
America as a means of raising resources and sharing tactics.
The Venezuelan state-owned airline, Conviasa, operates
regular service from Caracas to Damascus and Teheran--providing
Iran, Hezbollah, and associated narcotraffickers a
surreptitious means to move personnel, weapons, contraband, and
other materiel.
Mr. Chairman, our project has shared substantial information about
these aforementioned threats with U.S. Government officials--either
directly or through Members of Congress. Quite frankly, too often the
attitude we have encountered has been one of skepticism or
indifference.
To offer just two examples, we understand that U.S. executive
branch officials have continued to misinform Members of Congress about
the existence of Conviasa flights between Venezuela and the terror
states of Syria and Iran. Many months ago, we provided U.S. officials
the name and contact information of a reliable Venezuelan source with
privileged information about those ongoing flights. Unfortunately, that
source was never contacted. And congressional staff members tells us
that executive branch officials continue to provide vague or misleading
answers to direct questions on this relatively simple subject of
whether those Conviasa flights continue.
Another example of this official indifference: Almost 7 years after
the first reports that Iran was seeking uranium in Venezuela, U.S.
officials are still unable or unwilling to state clearly whether Iran
is mining uranium in Venezuela--notwithstanding documentation revealed
by our project over a year ago regarding Iranian mining in the uranium-
rich Roraima Basin in eastern Venezuela. That U.S. officials do not
know whether Iran is supporting its illicit nuclear program with
uranium from Venezuela is incomprehensible. That they do not care
enough to find out is unacceptable.
I believe that the executive branch--beginning in the waning days
of the last administration and continuing today--has been slow to
recognize or respond to this multidimensional threat. At long last, it
is time for our national security agencies to get smart and get busy.
Mr. Chairman, I am convinced that congressional attention, such as
this hearing, is essential to encourage executive branch agencies to
act. For example, sanctions last year against Venezuela's state-owned
petroleum company for transactions with Iran were the direct result of
pressure by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, acting in part on
information provided by my project. Representative Jeff Duncan (R-SC)
has introduced H.R. 3783, the ``Countering Iran in the Western
Hemisphere Act of 2012,'' which will require the executive branch to
report to Congress on Iran's activities in a host of areas and to
provide a strategy for countering this threat.
I believe that such a thorough, congressionally mandated review
will require the executive branch to apply additional needed
intelligence resources to collect on subject matters in Venezuela,
Bolivia, Ecuador, and beyond. Once they understand the scope and depth
of the problem, I hope for a whole-of-government response to protect
our security, our interests, and our allies against the threat posed by
Iran, Hezbollah, and their support network in the Americas.
Of course, my project at AEI is prepared to cooperate with this
policy review by providing the subcommittee documents and analysis
regarding suspicious transactions and installations operated by Iran in
Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and elsewhere in the region.
background and discussion
Iran's push into the Western Hemisphere is part of a global
strategy to break its diplomatic isolation, develop new sources of
strategic materials, evade international sanctions and undermine U.S.
influence. To these ends, Iran expanded the number of its embassies in
the region from 6 in 2005 to 10 in 2010.\4\ The real game-changer,
however, has been the alliance developed between Iran's Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad and Venezuela's Hugo Chavez.
In the last 7 years, Iran has begun to take full advantage of its
Venezuelan partner. Chavez's petro-diplomacy has paved the way for
Ahmadinejad to cultivate partnerships with anti-U.S. regimes in Cuba,
Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua, et al. Today, a shadowy network of
commercial and industrial enterprises in several countries affords Iran
a physical presence in relatively close proximity to the United States.
Iran is well-positioned to use its relationships with these countries
to pose a direct threat to U.S. territory, strategic waterways and
American allies. Iran also has provided the Venezuelan military with
weapon systems that give Chavez unprecedented capabilities to threaten
its neighbors and the United States.
Chavez's support for terrorist groups such as the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia is notorious. In recent years, Chavez's most
trusted security officials--from senior to operational levels--have
provided material support to Hezbollah. Today, Venezuela's Margarita
Island has eclipsed the infamous ``Tri-Border Area'' (TBA) in South
America as the principal safe haven and center of Hezbollah operations
in the Americas.
Indeed, wherever Iran goes, Hezbollah is not far behind; Latin
America has been no exception. Research from open sources, subject-
matter experts and sensitive sources within various governments has
identified at least two parallel, collaborative terrorist networks
growing at an alarming rate in Latin America. One of these networks is
operated by Venezuelan collaborators, and the other is managed by the
Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. These networks
encompass more than 80 operatives in at least 12 countries throughout
the region (with their greatest areas of focus being Brazil, Venezuela,
Argentina, and Chile).
The Nassereddine Network
Ghazi Atef Nassereddine Abu Ali, a native of Lebanon who became a
Venezuelan citizen about 12 years ago, is Venezuela's second-ranking
diplomat in Syria. Nassereddine is a key Hezbollah asset because of his
close personal relationship to Chavez's Justice and Interior Minister,
Tarik El Aissami, and because of his diplomatic assignment in Damascus.
Along with at least two of his brothers, Nassereddine manages a network
to expand Hezbollah's influence in Venezuela and throughout Latin
America.
Nassereddine's brother, Abdallah, a former member of the Venezuelan
Congress, uses his position as the former vice president of the
Federation of Arab and American Entities in Latin America and the
president of its local chapter in Venezuela to maintain ties with
Islamic communities throughout the region.\5\ He currently resides on
Margarita Island, where he runs various money-laundering operations and
manages commercial enterprises associated with Hezbollah in Latin
America. Younger brother Oday is responsible for establishing
paramilitary training centers on Margarita Island. He is actively
recruiting Venezuelans through local circulos bolivarianos
(neighborhood watch committees made up of the most radical Chavez
followers) and sending them to Iran for follow-on training.
The Rabbani Network
Hojjat al-Eslam Mohsen Rabbani, who was the cultural attache at the
Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Buenos Aires, Argentina,
oversees a parallel Hezbollah recruitment network.\6\ Rabbani is
currently the international affairs advisor to the Al-Mostafa Al-Alam
Cultural Institute in Qom, which is tasked with propagation of Shia
Islam outside Iran.\7\ Rabbani, referred to by the important Brazilian
magazine Veja as ``the Terrorist Professor,'' \8\ is a die-hard
defender of the Iranian revolution and the mastermind behind the two
notorious terrorist attacks against Jewish targets in Buenos Aires in
1992 and 1994 that killed 144 people.\9\
At the time, Rabbani was credentialed as Iran's cultural attache in
the Argentine capital, which he used as a platform for extremist
propaganda, recruitment and training that culminated in the attacks in
the 1990s. In fact, he continues to exploit that network of Argentine
converts today to expand Iran's and Hezbollah's reach--identifying and
recruiting operatives throughout the region for radicalization and
terrorist training in Venezuela and Iran (specifically, the city of
Qom).
At least two mosques in Buenos Aires--Al Imam and At-Tauhid--are
operated by Rabbani disciples. Sheik Abdallah Madani leads the Al Imam
mosque, which also serves as the headquarters for the Islamic-Argentine
Association, one of the most prominent Islamic cultural centers in
Latin America.
Some of Rabbani's disciples have taken what they have learned from
their mentor in Argentina and replicated it elsewhere in the region.
Sheik Karim Abdul Paz, an Argentine convert to Shiite Islam, studied
under Rabbani in Qom for 5 years and succeeded him at the At-Tauhid
mosque in Buenos Aires in 1993.\10\ Abdul Paz is now the imam of a
cultural center in Santiago, Chile, the Centro Chileno Islamico de
Cultura de Puerto Montt. Another Argentine convert to radical Islam and
Rabbani disciple is Sheik Suhail Assad, who lectures at universities
throughout the region and recruits young followers to the cause.\11\
A key target of the Rabbani network--and Hezbollah in general--is
Brazil, home to some 1 million Muslims. Rabbani travels to Brazil
regularly to visit his brother, Mohammad Baquer Rabbani Razavi, founder
of the Iranian Association in Brazil.\12\ Another of his principal
collaborators is Sheik Khaled Taki Eldyn, a Sunni radical from the Sao
Paulo Guarulhos mosque. Taki Eldyn, who is active in ecumenical
activities with the Shia mosques, also serves as the secretary general
of the Council of the Leaders of the Societies and Islamic Affairs of
Brazil.\13\ A sensitive source linked that mosque to a TBA network
cited by the U.S. Treasury Department as providing major financial and
logistical support to Hezbollah.\14\ As far back as 1995, Taki Eldyn
hosted al-Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden, and 9/11 mastermind, Khalid
Sheik Mohammed, in the TBA region. According to Brazilian intelligence
sources cited by the magazine Veja, at least 20 operatives from
Hezbollah, al-Qaeda and the Islamic jihad are using Brazil as a hub for
terrorist activity.\15\ The fact that Brazil is set to host the FIFA
World Cup tournament in 2014 and the Summer Olympics in 2016 makes it
an inviting target for international terrorism.
waking up to a threat
Bracing for a potential showdown over its illicit nuclear program
and emboldened by inattention from Washington in Latin America, Iran
has sought strategic advantage in our neighborhood. It also is
preparing to play the terrorism card--exploiting its new ties with
Venezuelan operatives, reaching into Mexico, and activating a decades-
old network in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile.
Even as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) affirmed in a
recent report that foreign support is crucial to Iran's capability of
developing a nuclear weapon,\16\ U.S. diplomatic, intelligence, and
security agencies apparently are in the dark on whether Iran is
extracting ore from vast uranium basins in Venezuela, Ecuador, or
Bolivia or whether Argentina has resumed nuclear technology-sharing
with Teheran.
An important exception to executive branch neglect of this
troubling phenomenon is the work of the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) and the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the Department
of the Treasury to sanction numerous Venezuelan officials and entities
for their complicity with and support for Iran and international
terrorism. Again, according to sources in these agencies, State
Department officers systematically resist the application of sanctions
against Venezuelan officials and entities, despite the fact that these
suspects are playing an increasingly important role in Iran's
operational capabilities near U.S. territory.
conclusion
President Obama declared in December 2011, ``We take Iranian
activities, including in Venezuela, very seriously, and we will
continue to monitor them closely.'' \17\ Merely monitoring Iran's foray
into Latin America is the very least the United States must now do to
frustrate Teheran's plans to threaten U.S. security and interests close
to home.
The dangerous activities of Iran and Hezbollah so near our borders
demand a whole-of-government strategy, beginning with an interagency
review to understand and assess the transnational, multifaceted nature
of the problem; educate friendly governments; and insist on inspection
of suspicious operations and military compounds. Our government must be
prepared to implement effective measures--unilaterally and with willing
partners--to disrupt and dismantle illicit operations and neutralize
unacceptable threats.
Ahmadinejad's January visit to Venezuela and elsewhere in the
region was clearly intended to shore up Iran's interests in Latin
America as Chavez loses ground in his fight with cancer. Iran can be
expected to make common cause with Cuba, Russia, and China to protect
their Venezuelan haven--if necessary, by encouraging Chavez's leftist
movement to scuttle the October 2012 elections. If the United States
were to be more vigilant at this critical post-Chavez transition phase,
it might be possible to spoil Iran's plans by supporting a peaceful,
democratic solution. If not, Washington may find itself confronting a
grave and growing Iranian threat that it can neither diminish nor
evade.
----------------
End Notes
\1\ ``Notorious Iranian Militant Has a Connection to Alleged
Assassination Plot Against Saudi Envoy,'' by Peter Finn, The Washington
Post, October 14, 2011.
\2\ ``Sanction Shows U.S. Weakness, Says Iran Minister,'' Iranian
Students' News Agency, June 1, 2011; ``Iran Warns of Street War in Tel
Aviv If Attacked,'' Fars News Agency, November 8, 2011.
\3\ ``Iran Seeking To Expand Influence in Latin America,'' by Joby
Warrick, The Washington Post, January 1, 2012.
\4\ General Douglas M. Fraser, USAF, ``Posture Statement,''
Testimony before the 112th Congress, House Armed Services Committee,
March 30, 2011.
\5\ This organization was founded in Argentina in 1972 to unite
Muslims, namely the Syrian and Lebanese communities, in Latin America
and has spread rapidly throughout Latin America, with offices in
Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Cuba, Venezuela, Guadalupe Island, Antigua,
and Uruguay. It is overtly anti-Israel; supportive of anti-American
regimes in the Middle East and Latin America; and used as a platform
for Hezbollah to raise money, recruit supporters, and solicit illegal
visas.
\6\ ``Reis-Jomhour-e Arzhantin Dar Sazeman-e Melal: Tehran Ba
Mohakemeh-ye Maqamatash Dar Keshvar-e Sales Movafeqat Konad'' [The
President of Argentina: Tehran Should Accept Trial of Its Authorities
in a Third Country], Asr-e Iran (Tehran), September 25, 2010,
www.asriran.com (available in Persian, accessed September 29, 2011).
\7\ ``Din va Siasat Dar Amrika-ye Latin Dar Goftegou Ba Ostad
Mohsen Rabbani'' [Religion and Politics in Latin America in
Conversation with Professor Mohsen Rabbani], Book Room (Tehran), May 3,
2010.
\8\ ``The Terrorist `Professor,' '' Veja (Brazil), April 20, 2011.
\9\ Marcelo Martinez Burgos and Alberto Nissman, Office of Criminal
Investigations: AMIA Case (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Investigations Unit
of the Office of the Attorney General, 2006),
www.peaceandtolerance.org/docs/nismanindict.pdf (accessed September 27,
2011).
\10\ ``Goftegou Ba Sarkar-e Khanom-e Ma'soumeh As'ad Paz Az
Keshvar-e Arzhantin'' [Conversation with Lade Ma'soumeh As'ad Paz From
Argentina], Ahlulbayt (Tehran), June 13, 2011.
\11\ Marielos Marquez, `` `El Islam es una forma de vida': Sheij
Suhail Assad,'' DiarioCoLatino, August 27, 2007.
\12\ ``Sourat-e Jalaseh'' [Agenda], Iranianbrazil (Brazil), March
17, 2010.
\13\ ``Aein-ha-ye Ramezani Dar Berezil'' [Ramadan Traditions in
Brazil], Taghrib News (Qom), September 5, 2010.
\14\ U.S. Department of the Treasury, ``Treasury Designates Islamic
Extremist, Two Companies Supporting Hizballah in Tri-Border Area,''
news release, June 10, 2004.
\15\ ``The Terrorist `Professor,' '' Veja (Brazil), April 20, 2011.
\16\ ``IAEA Says Foreign Expertise has Brought Iran to the
Threshold of Nuclear Capability,'' by Joby Warrick, The Washington
Post, November 6, 2011.
\17\ ``El Universal Interviews President Obama on U.S.-Venezuela
Relations,'' by Reyes Theis, El Universal (Caracas, Venezuela),
December 20, 2011.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Ambassador.
Mr. Berman.
STATEMENT OF ILAN BERMAN, VICE PRESIDENT, AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Berman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Senator
Rubio, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today
to discuss this very important topic.
I'd like to take a somewhat different tack than my
colleagues before me and discuss, rather than Iran's activities
themselves, the motivations that underlie them. In the
discussions in Washington that have predominated about Iran's
presence and activities in the Western Hemisphere, many times
the missing part of the puzzle is identifying and soberly
assessing what Iran wants in the hemisphere--and whether or not
it's succeeding in getting it.
I think when you look at the level of activity that Iran is
carrying out in the region, it's possible to discern four
distinct strategic motivations that the Iranians have with
regard to their presence and their activities in our
hemisphere. The first, of course, is diplomacy and coalition-
building. Outreach to Latin America is seen by Iran first and
foremost as a means to lessen its deepening international
isolation, an isolation that's gotten deeper as a result of
recent sanctions passed by the United States and by the
European Union. The Iranian response--and we have seen this
from the start of international efforts to pressure Iran's
nuclear program in 2003, but certainly these efforts have
escalated in recent times--has been to observe and interact
with sympathetic regimes beyond their immediate periphery as a
way of skirting and diluting sanctions and attempting to
preserve the continuity of their nuclear program.
Due to its favorable geopolitical climate, which is
typified by vast ungoverned areas and widespread anti-
Americanism, Latin America has emerged as an important focal
point of that effort. Most prominent, obviously, with regard to
Iran's regional contacts is the relationship that Iran has
built with Venezuela since Mahmoud Ahmedinejad's inauguration
in 2005. That's a relationship that has gone from, if I may
say, zero to 60 practically overnight in foreign policy terms,
and now boasts billions of dollars of concrete investment, as
well as activities that both support Iran's efforts to skirt
sanctions that have been imposed upon its dealings with the
international financial system, as well as the activities of
Iranian proxies such as Hezbollah.
But Iran's activities are not simply centered on Venezuela.
They extend beyond it to a burgeoning relationship with Evo
Morales in Bolivia, to a growing relationship with Rafael
Correa and Ecuador, and beyond that to a softening of the anti-
Iranian position that one is witnessing in places such as
Buenos Aires.
I think it would be premature to suggest that the Iranian
presence in the region is diminishing, or in decline. I think
it is very much a work in progress. But it's important to point
out that this presence is not simply pragmatic, and it's not
simply defensive. In fact, Iran has engaged in a systematic
outreach to regional states in a way that suggests that it sees
the Western Hemisphere as a strategic theater where it can
expand its own influence and dilute that of the United States.
This can be called an antiaccess strategy on the part of the
Iranians, wherein they sew up and engage regional regimes so it
is more difficult for the United States to do so.
Beyond diplomacy, Iran is engaged in a quest for strategic
resources. Conventional wisdom has it as Iran's nuclear program
has progressed and matured to the point that it has become well
nigh self-sufficient, but this, in fact, is not the case. The
opposite is actually true. As Iran's stockpile of uranium
centrifuges has expanded, so has its need for the critical raw
material that will be placed in those centrifuges: uranium ore.
Iran itself runs a deficit of naturally occurring uranium,
and when the Shah launched a national nuclear endeavor in the
1970s he was forced to procure a large-scale supply from South
Africa. Four decades on, that supply is mostly depleted and of
poor quality, and as a result recent years have seen a widening
Iranian quest to procure uranium from abroad.
Iran can now be said to be looking extensively for uranium
in two places: in sub-Saharan Africa, where it's engaging with
regimes such as Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of Congo;
and in Latin America. We heard from Ambassador Noriega about
the expanding evidence that Iran is mining extensively in the
Roraima Basin adjacent to Venezuela's border with Guyana. But
also you have a burgeoning relationship on the strategic
resources front with the government of Evo Morales in Bolivia.
Regional officials that I talked to when I was in the region
last month suggested that there are no fewer than 11 sites in
eastern Bolivia, adjacent to the industrial capital of Santa
Cruz, in which Iran is suspected to be mining. Not
coincidentally, it is rumored that the Conviasa flight that
Ambassador Noriega talked about could soon have an additional
leg that will go from Caracas down to Santa Cruz, suggesting
that there is certainly at least something of interest in Santa
Cruz that the Iranians desire.
Beyond that, Iran has been involved in building a
surprisingly robust asymmetric presence in the region. This
involves not only Iran's exploitation of grey and black markets
and free trade zones, such as the ``Triple Frontier'' and
Venezuela's Margarita Island, but increasingly a paramilitary
presence as well. Regional officials that I spoke with
suggested that there were between 50 and 300 Iranian trainers
linked to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard present in Bolivia at
this particular time.
There is not a great deal of clarity as to what they're
doing, or their level of activity. I would point out, however,
that Iran has provided at least some of the seed money for the
regional defense school recently set up by the ALBA bloc, which
was inaugurated by Iranian Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi when
he was in Bolivia in the late spring/early summer last year.
This asymmetric capability has created a latent operational
capability. The conventional wisdom in this town has long been
that Iran uses the region opportunistically rather than
operationally. In fact, as you pointed out, the failed plot to
assassinate Saudi Ambassador Adel al-Jubeir in Washington in
October suggests that there has been a significant strategic
shift in Iranian thinking and that Iran now begins to look at
the region operationally.
General Clapper concluded his recent testimony to the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by saying that: ``The
Iranian regime has formed alliances with Chavez, Ortega,
Castro, and Correa that many believe can destabilize the
hemisphere. These alliances can pose an immediate threat by
giving Iran directly through the IRGC, the Quds Force, or its
proxies like Hezbollah a platform in the region to carry out
attacks against the United States, our interests, and our
allies.''
In conclusion, I think it's important to reiterate that
Iran's presence in the region is very much a work in progress.
Iran has not managed to firmly entrench itself, or to
operationalize the relationships that it's seeking to build.
But the interests and the strategic imperatives that drive them
are clear, and they're worth our attention.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Berman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ilan Berman
Chairman Menendez, Senator Rubio, distinguished members of the
subcommittee, it is a privilege to appear before you today to discuss
an issue of growing importance to the national security of the United
States: that of Iran's activities and influence in the Americas.
Although Iran's inroads into the Western Hemisphere have recently
garnered considerable attention among experts and the press, the
motivations behind them remain poorly understood. Yet in tracing Iran's
pattern of behavior in the region over the past several years, it is
possible to discern four distinct strategic objectives.
i. diplomacy and coalition-building
Outreach to Latin America is seen by Iran first and foremost as a
means to lessen its deepening international isolation. Since 2003, when
its previously clandestine nuclear program became public knowledge, the
Islamic Republic has faced mounting global pressure over its nuclear
ambitions. The Iranian regime has sought to mitigate the resulting
political and economic restrictions levied against it by the United
States and its allies through intensified diplomatic outreach abroad.
Due to its favorable geopolitical climate--typified by vast
ungoverned areas and widespread anti-Americanism--Latin America has
become an important focal point of this effort. Over the past decade,
Iran has nearly doubled the number of its embassies in Latin America
(from 6 in 2005 to 10 in 2010).\1\ It also has devoted considerable
energy to forging economic bonds with sympathetic regional governments.
Far and away the most prominent in this regard has been Venezuela.
Since Hugo Chavez became its President in 1999, alignment with Iran has
emerged as a cardinal tenet of Venezuela's foreign policy. The
subsequent election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the Iranian Presidency in
2005 kicked cooperation into high gear, with dramatic results. Today,
Venezuela and Iran enjoy an extensive and vibrant strategic
partnership. Venezuela has emerged as an important source of material
assistance for Iran's sprawling nuclear program, as well as a vocal
diplomatic backer of Iran's will to atomic power. The Chavez regime
also has become a safe haven and source of financial support for
Hezbollah, Iran's most powerful terrorist proxy.\2\ In turn, Iran's
feared Revolutionary Guards have become involved in training
Venezuela's secret services and police.\3\ Economic ties between
Caracas and Tehran likewise have exploded--expanding from virtually nil
in 2007 to an estimated $40 billion today.\4\
Just as significantly, Venezuela has served as Iran's ``gateway''
for further economic and diplomatic expansion into the region. Aided by
its partnership with Caracas and bolstered by a shared anti-American
outlook, Iran has succeeded in forging significant strategic, economic,
and political links with the regime of Evo Morales in Bolivia and
Rafael Correa in Ecuador. Even Iran's relations with Argentina, where
Iranian-supported terrorists carried out major bombings in 1992 and
1994, have improved in recent times, as the government of President
Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner has hewed a more conciliatory line
toward Tehran.\5\
It would be a mistake, however, to view these contacts as simply
pragmatic--or strictly defensive. Iran's sustained systematic outreach
to regional states suggests that it sees the Western Hemisphere as a
crucial strategic theater wherein to expand its own strategic influence
and dilute that of the United States. Indeed, a 2009 dossier prepared
by Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that ``since
Ahmadinejad's rise to power, Tehran has been promoting an aggressive
policy aimed at bolstering its ties with Latin American countries with
the declared goal of `bringing America to its knees.' '' \6\ This view
is increasingly shared by the U.S. military. In its 2010 report on
Iranian military power, the Office of the Secretary of Defense noted
that ``Iran seeks to increase its stature by countering U.S. influence
and expanding ties with regional actors'' in Latin America.\7\
To this end, Iran is ramping up its strategic messaging to the
region. Late last month, on the heels of Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad's very public four-country tour of South America, the
Iranian regime formally launched HispanTV, a Spanish-language analogue
to its English-language PressTV channel. The Bolivian-headquartered
television outlet has been depicted by Ahmadinejad as part of his
government's efforts to ``limit the ground for supremacy of dominance
seekers''--
a thinly veiled reference to U.S. influence in the Western
Hemisphere.\8\
As Ahmadinejad's statement indicates, Iran is pursuing an ``anti-
access'' strategy in Latin America--one that promotes its own ideology
and influence at the expense of the United States. In this endeavor,
Iran has been greatly aided by Venezuelan strongman, Hugo Chavez, who
himself has worked diligently to diminish America's political and
economic presence in the region under the banner of a new
``Bolivarian'' revolution.
ii. a quest for strategic resources
Since the start of the international crisis over Iran's nuclear
ambitions nearly 9 years ago, the popular perception has emerged that
Iran's atomic program are now largely self-sufficient--and that its
progress is therefore largely inexorable. This, however, is far from
the case; in fact, the Iranian regime currently runs a considerable,
and growing, deficit of uranium ore, the critical raw material needed
to fuel its atomic effort.
According to nonproliferation experts, Iran's indigenous uranium
ore reserves are known to be both ``limited and mostly of poor quality
. . .'' \9\ Thus, when Iran's Shah mapped out an ambitious national
plan for nuclear power in the 1970s, his government was forced to
procure significant quantities of the mineral from South Africa. Nearly
four decades later, however, this aging stockpile reportedly has been
mostly depleted.\10\ As a result, Iran in recent years has embarked on
a widening quest to acquire supplies of uranium ore from abroad. In
2009, for example, it is known to have attempted to purchase more than
1,000 tons of uranium ore from the Central Asian republic of Kazakhstan
at a cost of nearly half-a-billion dollars.\11\ In that particular
case, deft diplomacy on the part of the United States and its European
allies helped stymie Iranian efforts--at least for the time being.
However, Iran's search has not abated. In February of 2011, a new
intelligence summary from a member state of the International Atomic
Energy Agency reaffirmed to the international community that the
Islamic Republic continues to search extensively for new and stable
sources of uranium to fuel its nuclear program.\12\ Today, this effort
is focused in two principal geographic areas. The first is Africa,
where in recent years Iran has made concerted efforts to engage a
number of uranium producers (such as Zimbabwe, Senegal, Nigeria, and
the Democratic People's Republic of Congo).\13\ The second is Latin
America, where Tehran now is exploring and developing a series of
significant resource partnerships.
The most well-known of these is with Venezuela. Cooperation on
strategic resources has emerged as a defining feature of the alliance
between the Islamic Republic and the Chavez regime. Iran is currently
known to be mining in the Roraima Basin, adjacent to Venezuela's border
with Guyana. Significantly, that geological area is believed to be
analogous to Canada's Athabasca Basin, the world's largest deposit of
uranium.\14\
Bolivia, too, is fast becoming a key source of strategic resources
for the Iranian regime. With the sanction of the Morales government,
Iran is now believed to be extracting uranium from as many as 11
different sites in Bolivia's east, proximate to the country's
industrial capital of Santa Cruz.\15\ (Not coincidentally, it is
rumored that the now-infamous Tehran-Caracas air route operated jointly
by Conviasa, Venezuela's national airline, and Iran Air will be
extended in the near future to Santa Cruz.\16\) Additionally, a series
of cooperation agreements concluded in 2010 between La Paz and Tehran
have made Iran a ``partner'' in the mining and exploitation of
Bolivia's lithium, a key strategic mineral with applications for
nuclear weapons development.\17\
Iran even appears to be eyeing Ecuador's uranium deposits. A $30
million joint mining deal concluded between Tehran and Quito back in
2009\18\ has positioned the Correa regime to eventually become a
supplier for the Islamic Republic.
Regional experts note that Iran's mining and extraction efforts in
Latin America are still comparatively modest in nature, constrained by
competition from larger countries such as Canada and China and by
Iran's own available resources and know-how.\19\ However, the region is
unquestionably viewed as a target of opportunity in Iran's widening
quest for strategic resources--both because of its favorable political
operating environment and because states there (especially Bolivia)
represent unknown quantities in terms of resource wealth. This raises
the possibility that Latin America could emerge in the near future as a
significant provider of strategic resources for the Iranian regime, and
a key source of sustenance for Iran's expanding nuclear program.
iii. an asymmetric presence
Iran's formal political and economic contacts with regional states
are reinforced by a broad web of asymmetric activities throughout the
Americas.
Illicit financial transactions figure prominently in this regard.
Over the past several years, Iran's economic ties to Venezuela have
helped it skirt the sanctions being levied by the international
community, as well as to continue to operate in an increasingly
inhospitable global financial system. It has done so through the
establishment of joint companies and financial entities, as well as the
formation of wholly Iranian-owned financial entities in Venezuela and
the entrenchment of Iranian commercial banks there.\20\ Experts note
that this financial activity exploits an ``existing loophole'' in the
current sanctions regime against Iran--one that leverages the freedom
of action of Venezuelan banks to provide the Islamic Republic with ``an
ancillary avenue through which it can access the international
financial system despite Western pressure.'' \21\
Iran is also known to be active in the region's ubiquitous gray and
black markets, as well as its free trade areas--operating both directly
and via terrorist proxy Hezbollah.\22\ Most notoriously, these include
the so-called ``Triple Frontier'' at the crossroads of Argentina,
Paraguay, and Brazil, as well as Venezuela's Margarita Island.
Iran also boasts an increasingly robust paramilitary presence in
the region. The Pentagon, in its 2010 report to Congress on Iran's
military power, noted that the Quds Force, the elite paramilitary unit
of Iran's Revolutionary Guards, is now deeply involved in the Americas,
stationing ``operatives in foreign embassies, charities, and religious/
cultural institutions to foster relationships with people, often
building on existing socio-economic ties with the well-established Shia
diaspora,'' and even carrying out ``paramilitary operations to support
extremists and destabilize unfriendly regimes.'' \23\
This presence is most pronounced in Bolivia. Iran has been
intimately involved in the activities of the Bolivarian Alliance for
the Americas (ALBA) since the formation of that Cuban- and Venezuelan-
led geopolitical bloc--which also encompasses Ecuador, Bolivia,
Nicaragua, and a number of other nations--in the early 2000s. As part
of that relationship, Iran reportedly provided at least some of the
seed money for the establishment of the bloc's ``regional defense
school'' outside Santa Cruz, Bolivia. Iranian Defense Minister Ahmad
Vahidi reportedly presided over the school's inauguration in May 2011,
and Iran--itself an ALBA observer nation--is now said to be playing a
role in training and indoctrination at the facility.\24\ Regional
officials currently estimate between 50 and 300 Iranian ``trainers'' to
be present in Bolivia.\25\ Notably, however, a personal visit to the
facility found it to be largely unattended, at least at the present
time.
iv. a latent operational capability
Conventional wisdom in Washington has long held that Iran's
activism in the Americas is opportunistic--rather than operational. Yet
the growing asymmetric capabilities being erected by Iran throughout
the region have the potential to be directed against the U.S. homeland.
This was hammered home in October 2011, when U.S. law enforcement
agencies succeeded in foiling a plot by Iran's Revolutionary Guards to
assassinate Adel al-Jubeir, Saudi Arabia's envoy to the United States,
on American soil. That attack, if it had been successful, would
potentially have killed scores of U.S. citizens in the Nation's
capital. The incident marks a significant development; as Director of
National Intelligence James Clapper observed in his recent testimony
before the Senate, in response to mounting international pressure and
asymmetric activity against their nuclear program, it appears that
``Iranian officials--probably including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei--
have changed their calculus and are now willing to conduct an attack in
the United States.'' \26\
Latin America figures prominently in this calculus. The foiled
October 2011 plot is known to have been both orchestrated and
facilitated via South America, suggesting that Iran increasingly finds
the region to be an advantageous operational theater. Moreover, as
Iran's influence and activities there intensify, the Islamic Republic
will be able to field a progressively more robust operational presence
in the Americas. Clapper concluded his Senate testimony with an ominous
warning. ``The Iranian regime has formed alliances with Chavez, Ortega,
Castro, and Correa that many believe can destabilize the Hemisphere,''
he noted. ``These alliances can pose an immediate threat by giving
Iran--directly through the IRGC, the Quds Force, or its proxies like
Hezbollah--a platform in the region to carry out attacks against the
United States, our interests, and allies.'' \27\
opportunity within adversity
Understanding these motivations is essential to assessing the
significance of Latin America in Iran's strategic calculus, and to
determining whether or not its efforts there are in fact succeeding.
For the moment, Iran's regional inroads still represent a work in
progress. The Iranian regime has demonstrated a clear interest in Latin
America over the past decade, and is now striving to expand its
influence there. As of yet, however, it has not succeeded in
solidifying this presence--or in fully operationalizing its regional
relationships and institutionalizing its influence. As experts have
noted, although Iran's promises of economic engagement with regional
states have been abundant, precious little of this aid has actually
materialized, save for in the case of Venezuela.\28\ Moreover, despite
increasingly robust cooperation with regional states on mining and
extraction, there is as yet no indication that Latin America in and of
itself can serve as the answer for Iran's strategic resource needs.
Furthermore, an expansion of Iran's footprint in the region is not
necessarily inevitable. Over the past year, the health of Iran's most
stalwart ally in the region, Hugo Chavez, has become increasingly
critical, and the Venezuelan strongman is now believed to be in the
terminal stages of cancer. Significant ambiguity abounds over
Venezuela's future direction--and, as a result, about the durability of
the partnership forged between Caracas and Tehran under Chavez.
Iran's expanding regional activism therefore can be understood at
least in part to be contingency planning of sorts; an effort to broaden
contacts and ensure the survivability of its influence in the Americas
in a post-Chavez environment. In this context, the regimes of Evo
Morales in Bolivia and Rafael Correa in Ecuador figure prominently,
with Correa in particular increasingly looked at as a potential
successor to Chavez as a standard bearer of the new ``Bolivarianism''--
and as an inheritor of cooperation with Iran.\29\ Iran's future
progress in solidifying and expanding those partnerships will serve as
an important barometer of the long-term survivability of its bonds to
the region as a whole.
Since October 2011, policymakers in Washington have begun to pay
serious attention to Iran's activities in the Western Hemisphere. But
they have done little concrete to respond to it, at least so far.
Despite heartening early steps (such as the ``Countering Iran in the
Western Hemisphere Act of 2012'' recently introduced in the House by
Representative Jeff Duncan), a comprehensive strategy to contest and
dilute Iranian influence in the Americas remains absent. Unless and
until such a strategy does emerge, Iran's efforts--and the threats
posed by them to American interests and the U.S. homeland--will only
continue to expand.
------------------
End Notes
\1\ General Douglas M. Fraser, Posture statement before the House
of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, March 30, 2011, http://
armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?
File_id=fcc6b631-6b51-4bdb-b0a0-6b97ea36cb58.
\2\ Martin Arostengui, ``U.S. Ties Caracas to Hezbollah Aid,''
Washington Times, July 7, 2008, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/
2008/jul/07/us-ties-caracas-to-hezbollah-aid.
\3\ ``Iran Using Venezuela To Duck U.N. Sanctions: Report,'' Agence
France Presse, December 21, 2008, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/
article/ALeqM5h1fferlbgjsi06XFgTklru3hbatA.
\4\ Erick Stakelbeck, ``Iran, Hezbollah Tentacles Reaching Latin
America,'' CBN, December
12, 2011, http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/world/2011/December/Iran-
Hezbollah-Spread-Tentacles-to-Latin-America/.
\5\ Louis Charbonneau, ``Exclusive: Argentina Flirts With Iran As
West Watches Nervously,'' Reuters, December 5, 2011, http://
www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/05/us-iran-argentina-idUSTR
E7B408T20111205.
\6\ ``Israel: Ties to South America Aiding Iran's Nuclear
Program,'' Yediot Ahronot (Tel Aviv), May 25, 2009, http://
www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3721335,00.html.
\7\ U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense,
``Unclassified Report on Military Power of Iran,'' April 2010, http://
www.iranwatch.org/government/us-dod-reportmiliary
poweriran-0410.pdf.
\8\ ``Ahmadinejad Lauds Launch Of Iran's Spanish-Language Satellite
TV As Blow To U.S. `Dominance,' '' Associated Press, January 31, 2012,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/iran-launches-spanish-language-
satellite-tv-channel-in-outreach-to-latin-america/2012/01/31/
gIQAITlIeQ_story.html.
\9\ George Jahn, ``Iran Hunts for Uranium Supplies, Finds
Scrutiny,'' Associated Press, February 24, 2011, http://www.salon.com/
news/feature/2011/02/24/iran_nuclear_capacity_
zimbabwe.
\10\ Vivienne Walt, ``Is Iran Running Out of Uranium?'' TIME, April
27, 2010, http://www.time.
com/time/world/article/0,8599,1984657,00.html.
\11\ ``Report: Iran Seeking to Smuggle Raw Uranium,'' Associated
Press, December 29, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34622227/ns/
world_news-mideast/n_africa/.
\12\ Jahn, ``Iran Hunts for Uranium Supplies, Finds Scrutiny.''
\13\ Ibid.
\14\ Bret Stephens, ``The Tehran-Caracas Nuclear Axis,'' Wall
Street Journal, December 15, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748704869304574595652815802722.html.
\15\ Author's interviews, La Paz, Bolivia, January 23-25, 2012.
\16\ Author's interviews, Santiago, Chile, January 20-21, 2012.
\17\ ``Iran `Partner' In The Industrialization Of Bolivia's Lithium
Reserves,'' MercoPress, October 30, 2010, http://en.mercopress.com/
2010/10/30/iran-partner-in-the-industrialization-of-bolivia-s-lithium-
reserves.
\18\ ``Memorando De Entiendimento Entre El Ministerio De Minas Y
Petroleos De La Republica Del Ecuador Y El Ministerio De Industrias Y
Mineria De La Republica Islamica De Iran En El Sector Geologico
Minero,'' December 3, 2009, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/files/fp_
uploaded_documents/3_AC%20IRAN%20MINERIA%20Y%20NAVEGACION.PDF.
\19\ Author's interviews, Santiago, Chile, January 20, 2012.
\20\ See, for example, Norman A. Bailey, ``Iran's Venezuelan
Gateway,'' American Foreign Policy Council Iran Strategy Brief No. 5,
http://www.afpc.org/files/getContentPostAttachment/213.
\21\ Ibid.
\22\ Rex Hudson, ``Terror and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-
Border Area (TBA) of South America,'' Library of Congress, Federal
Research Division, December 2010, http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/
TerrOrgCrime_TBA.pdf; U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the
Secretary of Defense, ``Unclassified Report on Military Power of
Iran,'' April 2010, http://www.iranwatch.org/government/us-dod-
reportmiliarypoweriran-0410.pdf.
\23\ Office of the Secretary of Defense, ``Unclassified Report on
Military Power of Iran.''
\24\ Author's interviews, Santiago, Chile and La Paz, Bolivia,
January 20-24, 2012.
\25\ Author's interviews, Santiago, Chile, January 20, 2012.
\26\ James Clapper, testimony before the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, January 31, 2012.
\27\ Ibid.
\28\ Bailey, ``Iran's Venezuelan Gateway.''
\29\ Jose R. Cardenas, ``Iran's Man In Ecuador,'' Foreign Policy,
February 15, 2011, http://
shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/02/15/irans_man_in_ecuador.
Senator Menendez. Thank you. Thank you all very much. A
lot's been said here that's valuable and I'd like to explore it
with you. So let me start off.
Let me just make sure I understand. Dr. Arnson, you're not
suggesting that a hearing of this sort is a politicalization of
the topic? I assume if that's the case you wouldn't have
accepted our invitation; is that correct?
Dr. Arnson. That is absolutely correct. But I do think that
it's no secret we're in a political year, and this is a kind of
issue--some of the other witnesses have indicated that they do
not consider the Obama administration to have taken
sufficiently seriously the allegations that have been made.
I know that you'll be meeting with people from the
administration later this afternoon, and I suggest that those
are questions better put to them. I'm not in a position to
independently verify whether or not the administration is
paying attention to it. It says that it is.
Senator Menendez. Our concern here is obviously substantive
and we think that it is important to review all of the views
that exist, to understand the depth of Iran's intentions and
clarify their participation. So when you reference
politicalization I wanted to make sure you weren't referring to
this hearing.
From my perspective, I do believe the Obama administration
has actually engaged in more sanctioning activities and
enforcement of sanctions activity than ever before, and I think
they are fully engaged and understand the nature of the threat.
Our goal here is to determine another dimension of that
potential threat here in the hemisphere.
Could we have even envisioned, in the last decade, that
Ahmedinejad would have been able to visit anywhere in Latin
America? I mean, a decade ago would you have thought that
Ahmedinejad would have had an open door, maybe other than
inside of Cuba?
Ambassador Noriega. Well, Mr. Chairman, if I can jump in, I
think the extraordinarily important point of inflection here
has been the hospitality offered by Chavez. They have absolute
impunity to operate in Venezuelan territory. They have a
partner, they have an ally in terms of evading sanctions,
obtaining uranium, and carrying out activities to support
Hezbollah.
They have a willing partner that seeks to acquire military
capabilities and deploy those military capabilities on
Venezuelan soil. They have a petro-rich economy that carries
out a very vigorous diplomacy, that has opened doors for
Teheran in other countries in Latin America.
So I think the critical ingredient here has been Chavez.
The only thing he has in common with that Islamic Republic is
unrelenting hostility to the United States.
Senator Menendez. Mr. Berman, let me ask you. You ended on
a note that I'm interested in. The question is Iran's
motivation in the hemisphere, its interests and its abilities.
Iran may not have it now, but is it seeking operational
capacity in the Western Hemisphere? Does it have the potential
resources, if it has the right set of allies in the hemisphere,
to seek to effectuate operational capacity?
When you see Univision's ``airing'' of that which they
received about cyber attacks against the United States, when
you know about the facts that are pursued by our own Justice
Department on the attempted assassination of the Saudi
Ambassador, when you hear General Clapper's statements--this is
not someone who would cavalierly suggest that it is something
to be concerned. I'd like to hear your opinion, Is the search
for operational capacity something that we should be concerned
about?
Mr. Berman. I think so, sir. Here, I think it's useful to
point out two things. First of all, Iran's presence in Latin
America long predates the current debate over Iran's nuclear
program. Iran was instrumental in helping Hezbollah put down
roots initially in the Tri-Border region and beyond beginning
in the early 1980s. So Iran's presence in the region is far
more historic than we give it credit for.
Second, that presence has become an important part of
Iran's strategic mix as the crisis over Iran's nuclear program
has deepened. We here in town are still debating what the next
steps will be with regard to Iran's nuclear program if
diplomacy, if economic sanctions, are insufficient.
From the Iranian perspective, however, warfare, at least of
an asymmetric variety, has already been joined, as manifested
through Stuxnet, the malicious cyber worm, and other variants
that have attacked their nuclear program. In this context, a
peripheral strategy, in which Iran has the ability both to
build and then to leverage asymmetric capabilities in various
regions, is certainly smart strategic planning. While, as you
pointed out, they might not have that capability yet, it is
certainly one that they've paid increasing attention to as the
international crisis over their nuclear program has deepened.
Senator Menendez. Several of you mentioned uranium
exploration. This is something that we have sought to address
in the Iran sanctions bill that passed out of the Banking
Committee, that was inspired by my legislation earlier this
month, requiring the imposition of sanctions on persons who
knowingly participate in joint ventures with Iran's Government,
firms or persons acting on behalf of the Government of Iran in
the mining, production, or transportation of uranium anywhere
in the world.
Obviously, there are responsible state actors who will look
at not just the United States, but the world community, the EU
and others, and say, we want to live within an international
order that says that Iran's march to nuclear weaponry is a
concern and that uranium production for them is incredibly
important toward that goal, and therefore we're going to follow
the international effort to eliminate or dramatically reduce
their ability to obtain uranium.
But some countries may very well not care. You both
mentioned the possibilities of uranium mining in our
hemisphere. Isn't this a potential opportunity for Iran to work
with countries who may not necessarily be concerned by the
sanctions consequence?
Ambassador Noriega. Well, apparently Bolivia and Venezuela
are engaged with Iran companies and allowing mining activities
to go on in their countries. Edhasse Sanat is an Iranian
company that has industrial installations in both countries and
operates mines in both countries. We can provide details about
that. These countries may not care about the U.S. law, but
they're obligated under U.N. sanctions to deny Iran access to
material that could encourage its rogue nuclear program.
So I think there needs to be a considerable amount of
attention paid to these activities that are going on and to
hold these governments accountable, and I applaud you for the
legislation that you have pushed in the Senate on this subject.
But we can investigate, even though this is sort of denied
territory--Venezuela and Bolivia being relatively unfriendly
governments--we can nevertheless investigate the international
financial transactions, dollar-denominated transactions, that
are going on to this very day supporting Iran's activities in
both of these countries.
Mr. Berman. Sir, if I may, a quick point. I think this is
also in many ways an answer about the credibility of our
sanctions threat. I commend you for passing legislation that
begins to look at Iran's uranium activities and begins to
counter them. But historically I think it's fair to say that
our application of biting sanctions against Iran has lagged
behind the Iranian threat, and as a result over time more than
a few countries have come to view business with Iran as a
calculated risk; they believe they can essentially get away
with business as usual without facing serious censure from the
United States.
I fear that with that as historical precedent, these
uranium sanctions will face the same high hurdle in terms of
credibility. If Bolivia or Venezuela, which are not predisposed
to cooperate with the United States and help isolate Iran,
sense that, while Congress is seized of the need to sanction
them because of this uranium activity, there is no concrete
followthrough, they're likely to continue business as usual.
Senator Menendez. I'm going to turn to Senator Rubio, but I
think that the amendment that I authored and was passed 100 to
nothing on sanctioning the Central Bank of Iran and sanctioning
entities that deal with the Central Bank of Iran should send a
pretty clear message to those who think they're making a
calculated risk and business decision, that it's far more than
a risk. So far, the administration's enforcement of that has
been one that I applaud. I look forward to its vigorous
fulfillment as the different elements of the law come to pass.
I think that is our last best chance at the end of the day to
deter Iran's behavior.
Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
First of all, the entire panel kind of continues to bring
more clarity to this issue. I think we understand the Iranian
side of this equation pretty clearly, based on your testimony,
that what they get out of this is, No. 1, the ability to avoid
sanctions or trying to avoid sanctions, particularly economic
sanctions; No. 2 is access to uranium and other raw materials
that they need for their ambitions; and the third is an
operational platform, to have--this is a country that clearly
uses terrorism as part of its foreign policy mechanisms, and
they are, according to your testimony, increasingly trying to
develop an operational platform in the region. We don't know
what stage that's in, but any stage is not a good one.
I want to focus for a moment on what these countries get
out of it, and in particular what these governments in these
countries. There's clearly not a religious affinity here. I
mean, they don't share that. So what are--and my sense is, both
from talking to expatriates from these countries and even
people living there now, that it's not like Iran is a beloved
country by the Nicaraguan people, the people of Bolivia, the
people of Ecuador, the people of Venezuela.
In fact, in Venezuela there is a lot of resistance to the
Cuban presence. You can only imagine the resistance there would
be to the Iranian presence there.
What does Hugo Chavez get out of this and what do the other
leaders of these countries get out of this arrangement? Because
they're not getting the kind of economic support that Iran is
promising. I don't know who wants to go first, but I think
that's to the whole panel.
Mr. Farah. I would just say that what Venezuela is looking
for and the Bolivarian states, I think as time has gone on
they've become clearly increasingly criminalized as
governments, particularly in the cocaine trade. I think the
driving impetus has been for Chavez, from the letters I've read
and stuff, his fascination with this ability to destroy the
United States. If you read his letters to Carlos the Jackal,
they're really magnificently megalomaniacal: I am here,
destined to do great things, and I hold your hand as we go
forward into history together, et cetera, et cetera.
So I think his personal view is of himself as this
transcendent revolutionary figure, and I think that--but as
time has gone on, I think they've become increasingly obsessed
with the need to hang onto power at any cost. I think one of
the fascinating things if you look at the Bolivarian trajectory
is that they start out as elected and then over time they take
over the judiciary, all the levers of government, destroy civil
society, free press, et cetera.
But it's driven by the impetus that they know they can no
longer leave power without facing consequences.
I think that one of the things that Chavez finds, besides
his deep attachment to this revolutionary, romantic idea that
radical Islam and Marxism can coexist in the South-North
conflict and defeat the United States, is the tremendous drive
to hang onto power.
I think that you mentioned terrorism as a foreign policy, a
part of Iran's foreign policy. The FARC is a part of Chavez's
foreign policy, and I think one of the great dangers you see in
the region is the coalescing not only just of the state-to-
state relationship, but the coalescing of the nonstate proxy
relationship which you're already seeing.
This book, which was written, designed on Hezbollah's
strategy, has recently been found in FARC camps for the first
time, which shows the transmission of one type of military
doctrine into another state proxy.
So I think long term they want to defeat the United States.
I think that's very real in their minds, whether it's rational
or not. And they really want to hang on to power more than
anything else. I would say those are the two of the driving
forces.
Dr. Arnson. If I could address this for a moment, there's
obviously a huge political benefit that Chavez and other
countries in the region get from publicly appearing with
Ahmedinejad. It's an opportunity not only to assert
independence from the United States, but actually to show their
opposition to U.S. policy. I think that the mutual interests of
the Iranians in showing up in the so-called United States
backyard has a flip side, which is the interest of these
governments in showing that they will oppose the United States
and act to undermine its interests. I think that's----
Senator Rubio. Do you think there's a domestic political
benefit to appearing with Ahmedinejad, for example, for Chavez,
or an international? In essence, do you think he looks like a
bigger leader to his own people when he does this or do you
think that's more from an international perspective?
Dr. Arnson. I think it's more from an international
perspective. I mentioned the poll that was taken by
Latinobarometro. It's very clear that Iran is not popular in
the region. Venezuela is partly a Caribbean country. The idea
that women walk around in head scarves and covered, I mean,
it's just a foreign culture. So I don't think that there's any
political benefit to the countries in Latin America for this
kind of relationship, other than a kind of an assertion of
nationalism and sovereignty in showing that they're standing up
to the ``Yankee empire.''
Senator Rubio. I think, unless someone disagrees with what
Mr. Farah said, we can add to that, but what about these other
countries? Are they doing it because of Chavez, or what does
Nicaragua get out of this? What does Bolivia get out of this?
Ambassador Noriega. I think there are some material
benefits that they're getting from the associations, no doubt.
I think a lot of it is political. They're united, motivated by
hostility to the United States and defiance of the United
States.
When we look at these regimes, and particularly Chavez, we
have to sort of think in his mindset and what we might regard
as irrational, provocative, or irresponsible he sees as just
one more act of defiance and, more importantly, creating the
means to threaten the United States in an asymmetrical
struggle.
So that's what makes the fact that he's dying so
extraordinarily important right now, because there's a real
struggle that will go on in the next 12 months about whether
the hard-liners will hold on to power in Venezuela and might
continue to be hospitable to Iran or whether a democratic
transition has some sort of a chance. That's why we definitely
need to be engaged.
I would say that the U.S. Government really needs to pay
attention to the military-to-military cooperation and what
quite literally Venezuela is getting out of the Iranian
relationship. I think we will be startled by what you find.
Mr. Berman. As an Iran expert rather than a Latin American
subject matter expert, I can only add a brief nuance.
Ambassador Noriega talked in his testimony, at least in
passing, about the transition that's taking place in Venezuela.
From the Iranian perspective, we have a situation that
represents both crisis and opportunity. Iran, in seeking to
entrench itself in the region, is very concerned about
succession in Venezuela. It's very concerned about its post-
Chavez operating environment in the region. And, as a result,
over the last 12 months it has stepped up its diplomatic and
political contacts with the regime of Evo Morales in Bolivia,
as well as with that of Rafael Correa in Ecuador.
The health of those relationships, as Chavez continues to
become more ill and the political transition takes hold in
Venezuela, will be a very good barometer of how entrenched and
how much freedom of operation Iran has after Chavez leaves the
scene.
Senator Menendez. I just have one or two other questions.
When we talk about the ability for operational capacity--Mr.
Farah, maybe you, with your expertise on organized crime and
drug cartels in the Western Hemisphere--but I welcome anybody's
assessment. Looking at Iran's diplomatic outreach and
commercial ventures, we know the IRGC and Quds ultimately in an
Iranian context have a big part of their commercial enterprise
behind them, which is why I targeted the IRGC in our sanctions
legislation.
Do you think that this is an opportunity for them to
establish a force presence in the region? Is that something
that is possible, and what would it take to be able to
operationalize that?
Mr. Farah. Well, I think that targeting the IRGC is exactly
right. I think that they are the driving economic force and in
the military-to-military relationships. I think if you look at
the merging of state and nonstate actors, which I think you've
seen these hybrid transnational organized criminal
organizations now appended to states, and you see particularly
the government of Hugo Chavez, but also Evo Morales, using now
transnational organized criminal groups as instruments of state
policy, particularly the FARC.
I think if you look at how they need specific control of
geographic territory, I think that that is what primarily their
alliance with these transnational organized criminal
organizations can do. If you look at how products--illicit
products--move across the region, if you're moving 30 kilos of
cocaine or 300 AK-47s or 30 Chinese illegal immigrants, they're
going to pass through the same basic pipelines and the same
basic choke points, and 95 percent of the time they will cross
our borders undetected and unimpeded.
So I think access into that network, that pipeline that's
able to move any product basically across the northern tier of
South America, through Central America, across our borders,
undetected is tremendously beneficial to them if they choose to
use that as a way to move either people or elements that could
be either WMD or whatever.
In the report I did for DOD, that was what we were looking
at: What is the potential for WMD movement? That was our
conclusion, that even a tiny country like El Salvador, the size
of Massachusetts, has 460 puntos ciegos, blind crossing border
points that are uncontrolled completely. They have no control
over their air space. People routinely file a flight plan to
land in Comalapa, the main airport, and then say, as they're
flying into Salvadoran air space: We'd like to land in San
Miguel instead. And they say, OK, and there's no customs,
nothing.
So there's a whole pipeline available to them as they plug
in, and I think that, particularly on the sanctions-busting, if
you look at Panama again, as one of their crucial elements now
in how both, Chavez, but particularly Iran, is using to launder
their money or access money and access dual-use things.
I'll just end saying I had a fascinating talk with someone
who had just left the International Atomic Energy Agency, who
knew nothing about Latin America, but had been focusing on Iran
for many years. I was asking them, what is their basic MO? When
they're doing dual-use things and things, what do they look at?
He said: Well, they almost always do two things: tractor
factories and car factories.
I was like: No kidding? We have tractor factories and car
factories both in Bolivia and Venezuela. And I asked him what
the purpose of that was, and he said because they can get so
many things that they need in the manifests, that are tucked
away, that are impossible to detect unless you want to spend 6
months reviewing their manifest, that they can move virtually
anything with those two things. He said that's what they
traditionally use, and if you look at what's happening in Latin
America, they're building tractors that no one buys, cars that
no one buys, and very few of them, but they have the factories
and the shipping component mechanisms in place.
Senator Menendez. It's interesting.
One of my concerns I mentioned in the opening statement is
that places like Venezuela and Bolivia require no visa from
Iran, despite relatively weak certainly touristic ties. And
even in Ecuador, we have seen movement of Somalis coming from
Ecuador up, attempting to come into the United States. So the
pipeline that you talked about for moving anything can start
with an entry point at which there is no visa required. Is that
a legitimate concern?
Mr. Farah. Absolutely. I think if you look at it--I'm doing
a study for Homeland Security right now on human smuggling and
one of the fascinating things is that almost every non-Central
American large contingent of migrants goes through Ecuador.
Why? Because Ecuador listed visa requirements on everyone
except for two or three countries in the world. So they're
suddenly inundated with Chinese organized crime, Russian
organized crime. It's like water running downhill. As you well
know, they'll go where it's easiest to operate, and suddenly
Ecuador has become overwhelmed with massive criminal elements
because it's so easy to get there. Every group of Chinese,
major group of Chinese, Indians, Sri Lankans, Somalis, pass
through Ecuador for that precise reason.
Having the opportunity to review some internal Ecuadoran
documents on immigration, they had more than 480 Iranians
coming and going out of there unregistered, not registered in
the normal way, out of Ecuador, which isn't a huge number, but
given the fact that none of them are tourists, one should
wonder what the purpose is, given that their embassy supposedly
has a very limited number of people, about 6, when they
probably have much closer to 50.
But anyway, there's numerous--there's many interesting
elements to what the lack of immigration control and the lack
of visas offer countries like Iran, as well as transnational
criminal organizations.
Senator Menendez. Two final sets of questions.
Ambassador Noriega. Mr. Chairman, something to recognize as
a tactical opportunity that the Iranians and terrorist
organizations have acquired from the association with the
Venezuelan authorities: the estimates are there have been
hundreds of thousands of official Venezuelan documents issued
to people who have no real association with Venezuela, who
can't even speak Spanish.
We've spoken with security officials throughout the
hemisphere who refer to persons that they arrest or detain with
Venezuelan passports who don't even speak Spanish.
The other question you asked about the operational capacity
to detect what's going on. The DEA was able to discover this
October 2011 plot to commit a bombing here in the United
States, because they set aside conventional wisdom about what
Iran would be capable of doing. And now we know from General
Clapper that this bomb plot was a probably decision made at the
very highest levels of the Iranian regime.
The IRGC was involved in that activity. They are also
mysteriously involved in industrial activities in Venezuela in
the petrochemical industry, for example. You have to ask, What
are they up to there?
Also associated with the IRGC and the Quds Force, Mohsen
Rabbani, who I referred to, who was the cultural attache of
Iran in Argentina and who was implicated in the 1992 and 1994
bombings in Buenos Aires. He maintains a network on behalf of
Hezbollah in the Western Hemisphere. People that he recruited
when he was assigned in Argentina are still operating up and
down the South American Continent, recruiting, proselytizing,
and radicalizing.
His brother lives in Brazil. Rabbani has a red notice from
Interpol. He's not supposed to be able to travel. He has
traveled to Brazil at least a couple of times in the last 12
months. His brother runs a mosque in Brazil, where they
recruited dozens of people to his cause.
So the IRGC footprint is there and the common denominator
is the audacity. We really need to pay attention to this and
set aside conventional wisdom to understand what they're
capable of.
Senator Menendez. Dr. Arnson, I see you want to comment on
this, and then I have a question for you.
Dr. Arnson. Just an additional comment. Assistant
Secretary--former Assistant Secretary of State for Latin
America, Tom Shannon, replied or commented during an earlier
Ahmedinejad trip to Latin America that ``Past is prologue,''
and he was specifically referring to the Iranian involvement in
the bombings that took place in Argentina in the early 1990s.
One can only surmise that in the 20 or so years that have
passed since those took place that that capacity has been
expanded and has developed.
Whether it's an offensive capacity or a defense capacity is
something that I certainly am not prepared to comment on. But
one could imagine that Iran, as it feels encircled in the world
and threatened by military attack, would actively seek to be
able to strike back. Many of the panelists have referred to
asymmetrical warfare and I find that extremely plausible as
something that Iran would try to do. Whether I have evidence
that that is actually taking place or whether it's on the verge
of becoming operational is not something that I can comment on.
Senator Menendez. I appreciate that.
Let me ask you--in a 2010 report on Iranian military power,
the Office of the Secretary of Defense noted that, ``Iran seeks
to increase its stature by countering U.S. influence and
expanding ties with regional actors in Latin America.'' Last
month the Iranian regime formally launched HispanTV, a Spanish
language analog to its English language press. What do you view
that effort to be?
Dr. Arnson. Well, obviously, having a Spanish language news
outlet is an effort to spread propaganda, win hearts and minds
in the region. Iran faces a sharp uphill battle in that effort.
There's not a great deal of sympathy among populations, but
it's an obvious propaganda tool.
I think it's notable that it was several weeks after the
Iranian President traveled to the region most recently in 2012
that that was announced. It's an obvious attempt to spread the
Iranian point of view among what it considers to be a
potentially receptive audience. How effective that will be, I
think, is anybody's guess. My guess is that it will not be that
well received.
Senator Menendez. My final question. There have been
independent sources that have stated that Hezbollah has
training camps in the jungles of Venezuela. I'm wondering if
any of you have any information on that? Also, are any of you
aware of newspaper reports of a jointly constructed missile
base planned for Venezuela's Paraguana Peninsula? Any of you
have any knowledge of that?
Mr. Farah. On the training, sir, I would say that I think
that the Univision documentary, and if you read the book by
Antonio Salas, ``El Palestino,'' it goes into great detail, by
a journalist who specializes in going undercover for many
years. He spent time in the Hezbollah camps in Venezuela, and I
think if you look at his track record, I don't know him
personally, but if you look at his track record of
investigations, they've been really, really outstanding. Many
people in his other investigations have been convicted and gone
to jail based on evidence he's provided. So I would take that
seriously.
I think that what the Univision folks were able to show was
that you have a Venezuela colonel providing weapons and
ammunition to militias being trained by folks who were formerly
of Hezbollah in the field in Venezuela. It's not as direct a
tie as Mr. Salas makes in his book, but he gives names, dates,
exact locations, et cetera. So I would say that that to me
would be a very credible threat.
On the missiles, my people tell me they don't have any
evidence to support that, but others may have.
Ambassador Noriega. Regarding the published reports on the
missiles, of course, we've seen those very specific reports for
close to 2 years. We've received specific information that's
very disturbing, that tends to corroborate the possibility.
This would be a real escalation, because the published
reports that we've read refer to ballistic missiles, which
would be a real escalation in the region, and it would require
a U.S. response. No country in the region really would be
capable of responding to that sort of escalation if Venezuela
has acquired that capability. The good news is it would also
unite other countries in the region with us in wanting to deal
with that escalation.
We have some information. We'd be glad to share it with the
committee privately on that subject.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
Just for the record, it is the reports of a missile base,
not necessarily missiles. But we look forward to seeing some
information.
Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
I want to close my part of this by focusing on the capacity
part, because one of the challenges I have found here is--and
it's hard to get people to believe this. When people think
about terrorism and terrorism threats to the United States or
any threats to the United States, Latin America, the Western
Hemisphere, is just not what comes to mind. It's just not been
the case. It's just hard to get people to take it seriously.
So we don't know where they are capacity-wise. I think
that's still a matter of debate, although we clearly know what
direction they'd like to go. That's what I want to focus on
before we close today, is intent; where their mindset is.
Before that, if I can, I want to rely on an article from
the Miami Herald that cites extensively from the Univision
network's documentary. It says--it talks about this former
consul to Miami, Liva Acosta Noguera, and it says that ``one
month''--``The decision to expel her came one month after
Spanish-language Univision network broadcast a documentary
about Iran's alleged terrorist activities in Latin America,
including a taped segment in which she asks an alleged Mexican
hacker to give her the access code to nuclear facilities in the
United States. In the tape, the alleged hacker''--who is
playing a part--``says that he provided the secret codes and
the location of each of the U.S. nuclear plants to Iran, and a
voice attributed to her is heard to say `You should give me
that,' she says, `so that I can send it to the president,' ''--
meaning Chavez--`` `or rather, the chief of defense. The chief
of presidential security is my friend,' she says.''
This tape was made while she was the cultural attache at
the Venezuelan Embassy in Mexico. Then it goes on to say:
``Documents obtained by the Herald indicate that she actually
performed other functions there as well. According to these
documents, Acosto and Vice Consul Edgar Gonzalez Belandria, who
was in charge of issuing passports at the Miami consulate, were
registered in the Savings Bank of the Bolivarian Intelligence
Service, all indications that they are in the intelligence
service's payroll.'' ``Sources close to Venezuelan security
organizations reached Belandria, said that they had knowledge
that Acosto was a member of the Bolivarian intelligence network
and that she did intelligence work while working in Mexico.''
Now, obviously this wasn't a real hacker and this wasn't a
real offer. But what I think the Univision documentary shows is
intent.
I guess my question is, in your opinions, based on what
you've seen, know, and heard about Iran, is this an isolated
incident of someone trying to show off and be a big shot, or is
this the kind of miscalculation, is this kind of stuff that we
can see from Venezuelan officials in the future, because at the
very top of that organization we have someone that, as you've
described him, is not in touch with reality, has these
illusions about being some sort of transformational historical
figure, and who as a result could lead to someone making a very
serious miscalculation that could quickly escalate into a very
big problem.
So my question is, Is this an isolated thing about someone
trying to show off? Was she just trying to be a big shot, or is
this the kind of behavior that's going on on a repetitive basis
because people are taking direction from the attitude coming
from the top? Because if it is, this is a recipe for a
miscalculation and a regional disaster.
Mr. Farah. I would say it's, unfortunately, far from an
isolated incident. I think we've had numerous. In my work with
the U.S. Government and elsewhere, it's clear there is a
network. I think this is one of the primary misunderstandings
we have about the Bolivarian Project, is we view Venezuela, we
view Bolivia, we view Ecuador, we view Nicaragua, when in fact
they're states operating with a common goal, sharing resources,
and with a common criminalized element to them, which is deeply
disturbing.
But it also implies a very concrete common intelligence
apparatus. If you look at the role that Cuba plays in this
alliance, what they bring to the table is a very structured
internal military intelligence apparatus that these countries
have never had. Bolivia never had it. They tried. They never
got--even through all the military--they never got anywhere
near having a competent internal security service.
Ecuador is the same thing. Iran has now provided President
Correa with specific listening technology, intercept
technology, that runs out of his palace and is directed by him
directly.
So I think that it is far from an isolated incident. I
think exactly what you said is--I don't know if--I think Hugo
Chavez has a greatly exalted view of himself, obviously. I'm
not sure that--he's out of touch with reality, certainly as he
views it. But I think that that's exactly the type of--I think
that is exactly the recipe for the miscalculation that worries
me most, is that because they're wrapped up in their own world
and believe certain things are possible--if you read
Vertrynge's book, it's really rather preposterous. It's not a
smart manual on asymmetrical warfare. It's a diatribe against
the United States and where to go to find out on line how to
make weapons of mass destruction and why we should be able to
do this to defeat the empire.
It's not a rational, coherent, military doctrine as you
would lay out in a U.S. military academy or European or even
Latin American military academy. But it shows this grandiosity
of intent, and I think that that is a profoundly dangerous
element to the Bolivarian revolution, and when you add in the
Iranian mix. We have multiple other cases of Venezuelan
diplomats operating as intelligence agents. We have multiple
cases of Iranian diplomats operating as intelligence services,
and multiple cases of the Cubans serving as facilitators among
the different Bolivarian intelligence structures, which are now
more united than they were.
So I think it's far from an isolated case, and I think that
it is profoundly dangerous to live in a world where you think
you can launch a nuclear attack as a way of destroying the
United States and that there would be no rational consequences
to it.
Ambassador Noriega. Senator, I would like to add to that. I
agree entirely with what Doug said, of course. That Univision
report also included a tape of a Mexican youth who found
himself in Qom at a training center. We've talked about this
recruitment and training of youth, and here's a guy literally
on television explaining his experience. He recognized that
this was not for him and he essentially fled the country. He
saw people around him from other countries in Latin America who
were being trained in this radical Islam and in terror methods
and all of that. It was an insight into the sort of thing that
we're talking about, that's happening behind the headlines.
There is an interesting aspect of the Acosta Noguera
situation. U.S. officials supposedly had access to this tape
before she was even accredited as consul general in Miami. Why
was she even allowed into the United States? More to the point,
her former boss in Venezuela's Bolivarian intelligence system,
who's now retired, was just given a visa to enter the United
States. I guess he's going to Disneyland or something. But it's
just like we do not learn----
Senator Rubio. Who is her former boss?
Ambassador Noriega. I can get you the name.
Senator Rubio. OK.
Ambassador Noriega. I was told by a U.S. law enforcement
official, who was very frustrated that this person was given
the visa to enter the United States.
Senator Rubio. Is the Disney World thing just--is that
really what's happening?
Ambassador Noriega. I don't know.
Senator Rubio. Oh, OK.
Senator Menendez. Senator Rubio has a very serious concern
about Disney World. [Laughter.]
Senator Rubio. That's right. I care who we let in there.
Senator Menendez. Let me close, thank the panelists and
make an observation. After September 11, when as a Member of
the House of Representatives I sought to invoke into law all of
the recommendations of the September 11 Commission, I said:
``We live in a new world. It is a world in which an airplane
used for commercial and business travel has become a weapon of
mass destruction. It is a world in which a letter can be used
as a deadly weapon when it is laced with anthrax. It is a world
in which we must think differently than we thought before
September 11.''
It is in that spirit that I view what this hearing is
about; that we must look at the potential, the possible, think
outside of the box, understanding that if I wanted to do harm
to the United States, and could operationalize the ability to
do that in America's front yard, then I certainly would want
to.
That doesn't mean that it will effectuate itself, but I
would think that the desire to do so would be real, and
therefore I take General Clapper's comment seriously. I take
the Department of Defense's view of the efforts of influence
here seriously. And it is in that spirit that we have held this
hearing and will continue to pursue information as it relates.
Since I assumed the chairmanship of the subcommittee, I've
had it as my focus to pay attention to this part of the world,
which has often not had the full attention of the broad scope
of U.S. policy in a way that is in our national interest and
our national security.
So I appreciate all of the witnesses' attention, and we
thank you for your insights. I thank my colleague for his full
engagement. And with that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:24 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Op-ed by Senator Richard G. Lugar, U.S. Senator From Indiana and
Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
[From the Miami Herald, Feb. 15, 2012]
Growing Risk Posed by Iran-Venezuela Axis
(By Senator Richard G. Lugar)
The growing and deepening alliance between the mullahs of Iran and
the America-bashing leader of Venezuela, Hugo Chavez, poses a serious
threat to U.S. national interests, but the Obama administration has
been behind the curve in appraising these risks and forging effective
policies to counter them.
The administration's neglect of the dangers in the Iran-Venezuela
bonds assumes greater importance against the backdrop of the rising
tensions in the Middle East. Iran continues to be a direct threat to
U.S. national security, the security of our close ally, Israel, and
other U.S. interests. As Iran accelerates its drive toward building a
nuclear weapon in the face of growing U.S.-led sanctions, the
probabilities grow of a major conflict in the region.
Countries that support Teheran, such as Venezuela, could be tempted
to serve as proxies for Iran around the world and in coordination with
Iran openly challenge the United States. Iranian government officials
have already made statements to the effect that any response to
aggression would include the closing of the Strait of Hormuz, the choke
point through which a fourth of the world's oil moves. Venezuela, in
sympathy with its friend Iran, could at the same time cut off its oil
exports to the United States or take other steps to disrupt oil
supplies.
Yet the administration has paid little attention to Venezuela's
tightening links with Iran and the consequences for U.S. security. The
most glaring recent example is President Obama's cavalier decision last
year to delay construction of the Keystone XL pipeline, which would
bring Canadian oil down to Gulf Coast refineries that now rely heavily
on Venezuelan crude. Ending our energy dependence on Venezuela would
take the oil weapon out of Chavez's hands, in effect disarming him
without firing a shot.
Hostile Iranian actions in the Western Hemisphere are not far-
fetched, they are a reality. Iran is seeking to establish terrorist
networks around the world, and it sponsored a terrorist attack in
Buenos Aires in 1992. The bizarre plot by Iran against Saudi Arabia's
ambassador to Washington, disrupted last year, further illustrates the
mullahs' brazen intentions.
The chances of Venezuela serving as Iran's surrogate in the
hemisphere through terrorism or other coordinated action are increased
by its chaotic state of affairs. Venezuela is in the midst of a make-
or-break election that will determine the survival of its democracy
amid continuing doubts about President Chavez's health and a welcomed
show of will by its diverse opposition groups. Divisions in Venezuela's
Russian-armed military, an inflation rate over 30 percent, a
dilapidated oil infrastructure, widespread food and energy shortages,
and soaring crime rates are all putting heavy pressure on President
Chavez.
President Chavez may think he would benefit from redirecting
attention away from his domestic troubles by uniting his followers and
feeding his paranoid ``anti-imperialist dreams'' in a battle against
the United States.
At the same time, Iranian-Venezuelan ties are steadily growing.
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made a five-day visit last month
to Venezuela and three other Latin American countries, his fifth trip
to the region since 2005.
If Iran were to close the Strait of Hormuz in a conflict, global
oil prices would skyrocket. Venezuela supplies about 10 percent of
current U.S. imports of crude oil and petroleum products. In a scenario
where the Strait is closed, a coordinated shutdown of Venezuela's oil
to the United States would be a double blow to the United States.
I call on the Obama administration to address promptly the threats
to the United States should Venezuela use energy as a weapon. The
president should:
Issue an explicit warning to Venezuela that the United
States would regard a cut off of oil exports in coordination
with a belligerent Iran as a threat to U.S. national interests.
Expand strategic energy agreements with Brazil and other
countries in the hemisphere to help assure access to supplies
of petroleum, refined products and ethanol in the event of a
crisis.
Immediately approve construction of the Keystone XL
pipeline, as he is authorized to do under a recent law I
sponsored, to supply Canadian crude to the Gulf Coast
refineries that now depend on supplies from Venezuela.