[Senate Hearing 112-650]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-650
OVERSIGHT OF THE CRUISE SHIP INDUSTRY:
ARE CURRENT REGULATIONS SUFFICIENT TO PROTECT PASSENGERS AND THE
ENVIRONMENT?
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 1, 2012
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas,
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts Ranking
BARBARA BOXER, California OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri ROY BLUNT, Missouri
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
TOM UDALL, New Mexico PATRICK J. TOOMEY, Pennsylvania
MARK WARNER, Virginia MARCO RUBIO, Florida
MARK BEGICH, Alaska KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
DEAN HELLER, Nevada
Ellen L. Doneski, Staff Director
James Reid, Deputy Staff Director
John Williams, General Counsel
Todd Bertoson, Republican Staff Director
Jarrod Thompson, Republican Deputy Staff Director
Rebecca Seidel, Republican General Counsel and Chief Investigator
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on March 1, 2012.................................... 1
Statement of Senator Rockefeller................................. 1
Prepared statement........................................... 4
Statement of Senator Rubio....................................... 5
Statement of Senator Isakson..................................... 6
Statement of Senator Begich...................................... 9
Statement of Senator Nelson...................................... 10
Statement of Senator Lautenberg.................................. 11
Statement of Senator Klobuchar................................... 99
Statement of Senator Boozman..................................... 102
Witnesses
Vice Admiral Brian M. Salerno, Deputy Commandant for Operations,
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard.............. 12
Prepared statement........................................... 14
Bill Johnson, Director, PortMiami, Miami-Dade County............. 19
Prepared statement........................................... 22
Captain William H. Doherty, Director of Maritime Relations, Nexus
Consulting Corporation......................................... 25
Prepared statement........................................... 27
Ross A. Klein, Ph.D., Professor, School of Social Work, St.
John's College, Memorial University of Newfoundland............ 38
Prepared statement........................................... 40
Christine Duffy, President and CEO, Cruise Lines International
Association.................................................... 83
Prepared statement........................................... 85
Appendix
Response to written questions submitted to Vice Admiral Brian M.
Salerno by:
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV.................................. 117
Hon. Barbara Boxer........................................... 118
Hon. Amy Klobuchar........................................... 122
Hon. Tom Udall............................................... 122
Hon. Mark Begich............................................. 122
Hon. John Boozman............................................ 123
Hon. Marco Rubio............................................. 124
Response to written questions submitted to Bill Johnson by:
Hon. Marco Rubio............................................. 124
Response to written questions submitted to Dr. Ross A. Klein by:
Hon. Barbara Boxer........................................... 125
Hon. Amy Klobuchar........................................... 128
Response to written questions submitted to Christine Duffy by:
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV.................................. 129
Hon. Barbara Boxer........................................... 136
Hon. Amy Klobuchar........................................... 138
Hon. Mark Begich............................................. 139
Hon. Tom Udall............................................... 142
OVERSIGHT OF THE CRUISE SHIP INDUSTRY:
ARE CURRENT REGULATIONS SUFFICIENT
TO PROTECT PASSENGERS AND THE ENVIRONMENT?
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 1, 2012
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in Room
SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John D.
Rockefeller IV, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA
The Chairman. Good morning. We have, as usual, a
complicated, potentially fluctuating morning schedule. I know
that one thing will not fluctuate and that's the 11:00 o'clock
vote, and I'd like to get as much of this done but will come
back if more members, I hope, will appear.
We have Georgia and Alaska and West Virginia, which should
be enough to cover the country but there ought to be more
people here and they probably will be here. And I'm very glad
that you are and first of all, I want to say to the Coast Guard
that I feel very sad about the helicopter crash that happened
in Mobile Bay, and it was just Tuesday night, wasn't it?
Admiral Salerno. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. My thoughts and the Committee's thoughts are
with the families and also with the Coast Guard on this because
the Coast Guard is a family unto itself.
Admiral Salerno. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. I got that correct, didn't I? All right. Let
me give my opening statement. Senator Rubio will be along and
Senator Isakson has a one-hour-and-three-quarter speech. One
minute? OK. I knew that actually. It's fun teasing you. He's a
good friend. He's a Braves fan.
The cruise ship industry is large, it's successful and it's
very profitable. The industry's revenues top $25 billion a
year. Nearly 13 million Americans, including a couple of my own
children, took a cruise last year, although I think they did it
the year before. But they enjoyed it.
The industry is growing with larger and larger ships
entering service every year. Some ships will carry over 5,000
passengers and a crew, and I can't speak for Alaska and Georgia
but in West Virginia terms that would be a modern cruise ship
carrying the entire population of most West Virginia towns.
So they're floating private cities. A unique and complex
set of international rules governs the operations of the ship
and the safety of the passengers. This is a safety committee,
the Commerce Committee. We are a safety committee. We do many
things but safety is always on top.
I believe that these rules work, really, to protect the
companies more than to protect their passengers. If there are
those who disagree with it, I'm sure they will so say. In any
event, we're here today to examine whether existing regulations
are in fact sufficient to protect the health and safety of
passengers and the fragile ocean environment in which they
operate, and I recognize some of you testified yesterday before
the House and this is something that I've wanted to do for a
long time and so please don't be troubled by so much attention.
Or be troubled by so much attention.
In addition to reviewing the industry's safety and
environmental record, I believe that we must ask why an
industry that earns billions and uses a really very wide
variety of Federal services from the Coast Guard to the Customs
Bureau to the Centers for Disease Control pay almost no
corporate income taxes at all.
Good morning, Senator. I just started.
Senator Rubio. Good. I was watching you on TV.
The Chairman. Trust me, when something goes wrong with a
cruise ship, it is always the Coast Guard that comes to the
rescue, and this is a time when the Coast Guard is fighting for
revenues, has 45-year-old ships which are trying to break up
ice in Alaska in northern territory and we can't get the money
to build new ships. It's an embarrassment, and they're strapped
for cash because they don't get the same attention that the
Marines do or that the Air Force does.
But they do in this committee. We care about the Coast
Guard a lot. And the Coast Guard is struggling. The entire
Federal Government is struggling to maintain critical missions.
Everybody's cutting back. All of our offices here are streamed
into every day by people who are making very legitimate
requests for projects that need to be funded in our various
states and we can't always give them very good news. We have to
tell them the truth about what's happening here.
But in any event, in spite of all of this, it's
inconceivable to me that with this amount of Federal help that
comes to the help of a cruise ship when it runs into trouble
that this industry doesn't pay some part of a fair share of the
services they're getting for it. I think it's sort of unique
that way.
For any mode of transportation, safety must be priority
number one. That's the way we look at things here. We're very,
very glad when companies make a lot of money and we're very,
very glad when passengers are very safe, and we tend to focus
more on the second than on the first because that's more of our
mission.
The rarity of major cruise ship accidents suggests, in
fact, that an industry has an excellent safety record, and let
that be on the record. But the recent sinking of the Costa
Concordia off the Italian coast is, in fact, a stark and tragic
reminder that no mode of transportation is 100 percent safe.
There aren't so many cruise ships around that when you have an
incident with two or three that it doesn't represent a
disproportionately large share of difficulties.
The reports from the survivors of the Costa Concordia do
not inspire confidence, at least in this Senator, in the
industry's ability to respond to a major accident. There's a
wonderful person, Martha Manuel, who is a constituent of mine
who was a passenger on board this particular ship and she said
that there was a clear lack of communication from the ship's
staff.
She survived the accident because she refused to follow the
instructions, which were to go back to her room, which could
have been the end of her, and so she went elsewhere and
survived.
But the point, obviously, isn't just what happened to her.
But is there a pattern of safety? What do you do when there's a
crisis? Is the crew trained? Do they practice the training?
There are hundreds and hundreds of crew members, I think
maybe 900, 800 crew members on these ships, and they have to--
from the captain on down--they have to properly train so that
passenger evacuation procedures not are only in place but have
been practiced and therefore do work.
When accidents do occur and lives are tragically altered,
passengers have little recourse against the cruise ship
operators. Complicated ticket contracts limit passenger rights
and antiquated laws prevent passengers from collecting fair
compensation. Our laws have not kept up with the changes in the
industry and I believe that we must revisit them.
Although major accidents are, in fact, rare, and let that
be understood, the environmental damage caused by cruise ships
happens not so rarely. Happens all the time, and it's a
particular source of angst for me.
These floating cities produce enormous volumes of sewage
and solid waste, and just three miles from shore they can do
that because then they're out of our jurisdiction as a country.
A cruise ship can discharge thousands of gallons of raw sewage
and they sp do, and they dump a significant amount of solid
waste at sea.
I've often joked without humor about having a hearing on
one of these floating, you know, two or three square miles of
just trash and awful things that float in various parts of our
world's oceans.
Obviously, I'm not going to do that. That would be unwise
and I would no longer be Chairman and I like being Chairman.
But the dumping of all of this waste really gets to me because
it's against the law, it is not in tune with what a modern
industry should be doing and a profitable industry should be
doing.
So the practices of the industry, I think, have to come
under scrutiny. Unfortunately, the Coast Guard, as I've
indicated, has very limited resources to police against these
discharges. Where in the world would they be happening? They
can't follow all of these ships. And there may be a possibility
of seeing them from eyes in the sky, and my guess is you
probably could see them.
But the point is we cannot continue to let our oceans fill
with trash and fill with debris. It's a little bit like space.
We have so much stuff up in space now that it's dangerous not
only for our country for falling debris but also for other
spaceships that are up there. It's just getting dangerous.
Americans consider debris a part of their heritage and cultural
pursuit. It's not a wise idea for any of us.
So I think we have to adopt stronger laws to protect our
fragile marine ecosystem, which is part of what this committee
is charged with.
As taxpayers, we deserve to have the industry pay its fair
share.
Without numerous government services, the industry could
not operate and it's time that they contributed to the cost of
helping with the expense of the government services they
receive.
So just in ending, I think our children and grandchildren
deserve an ocean environment free of trash--I believe that very
deeply--and sewage and hazardous materials. The industry needs
to do more to protect the environment for future generations
and so we will talk about this and other subjects.
[The prepared statement of Senator Rockefeller follows:]
Prepared Statement of John D. Rockefeller IV,
U.S. Senator from West Virginia
The cruise ship industry is large, successful, and vastly
profitable. The industry's revenues top $25 billion a year. Nearly 13
million Americans took a cruise last year. The industry is growing with
larger and larger ships entering service every year--some ships will
carry over 5,000 passengers and crew. A modern cruise ship can carry
the entire population of most West Virginia towns. They are floating
private cities.
A unique and complex set of international rules governs the
operations of the ship and the safety of passengers. I believe that
these rules work to protect the companies rather than their passengers.
We are here today to examine whether existing regulations are
sufficient to protect the health and safety of passengers and the
fragile ocean environment in which they operate.
In addition to reviewing the industry's safety and environmental
record, I believe that we must ask why an industry that earns billions
and uses a variety of Federal services--from the Coast Guard, to the
Customs Bureau, to Centers for Disease Control--pays almost no
corporate income tax. Trust me, when something goes wrong on a cruise
ship, it is the Coast Guard that comes to the rescue. At a time when
the Coast Guard and the entire Federal government are struggling to
maintain their critical missions, it is inconceivable to me that this
industry doesn't pay its fair share.
For any mode of transportation, safety must be the number one
priority.
The rarity of major cruise ship accidents suggests that the
industry has an excellent safety record. But, the recent sinking of the
Costa Concordia off the Italian coast is a stark and tragic reminder
that no mode of transportation is 100 percent safe. The reports from
the survivors of the Costa Concordia do not inspire confidence in the
industry's ability to respond to a major accident. A constituent of
mine, Martha Manuel, was a passenger aboard the ship. She said that
there was a clear lack of communication from the ship's staff. She
survived the accident because she didn't follow instructions to go back
to her room. Passengers have a right to expect that the crews of these
ships are properly trained and passenger evacuation procedures are in
place.
When accidents do occur and lives are tragically altered,
passengers have little recourse against the cruise ship operators.
Complicated ticket contracts limit passenger rights and antiquated laws
prevent passengers from collecting fair compensation. Our laws have not
kept up with the changes in the industry, and I believe we must revisit
them.
Although major accidents are rare, the environmental damage caused
by cruise ships happens far too regularly. These floating cities
produce enormous volumes of sewage and solid waste. Just three miles
from shore, a cruise ship can discharge thousands of gallons of raw
sewage. In addition, they dump a significant amount of solid waste at
sea. The environmental practices of the industry are unconscionable.
Unfortunately, the Coast Guard has limited resources to police
against these devastating discharges. We cannot continue to let our
oceans fill with trash and debris. We must adopt stronger laws to
protect our fragile marine ecosystems.
As taxpayers, we deserve to have the industry pay its fair share.
Without numerous government services, the industry couldn't operate. It
is time that they contributed to the costs that they impose on the
government.
Our children and grandchildren deserve an ocean environment free of
trash, sewage, and hazardous materials. The industry needs to do more
to protect the environment for future generations.
Now, I turn to Senator Rubio for his opening remarks.
The Chairman. And I turn now to my distinguished colleague,
Senator Rubio, for his opening remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Rubio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to begin by
thanking you for holding this hearing and for all of you for
being a part of it, especially Director Bill Johnson from the
Port of Miami, my hometown. So I appreciate you being here
today.
Just want to also let you know I'll be back and forth today
because there's also a hearing going on in Foreign Relations
regarding Syria, which is critically important as well but I
definitely wanted to be here for the start of this and I've
read all of your testimony on this important issue.
Let me begin by just offering my condolences to the Heil
family who lost two family members, Barb and Jerry, on the
January 13th, 2012, Costa Concordia cruise ship off the coast
of Italy. The sad thing about it is that from all indications
it's a tragedy that could have been avoided.
As Captain Doherty points out in his testimony later today,
ships run aground because someone made a terrible mistake or
was negligent, and in this case, while I understand we're still
waiting for the final report, all the indications point to a
captain who not only crashed a ship but abandoned it before
ensuring the safety of any of the passengers.
Despite this, I commend both the Coast Guard and our
domestic cruise line industry for their quick response to the
incident. The Coast Guard immediately offered assistance to the
government of Italy, and through the Cruise Lines International
Association the industry immediately made corrections to their
own mandatory muster drills and continue to search for
voluntary improvements through their own cruise industry
operational safety review that was launched in January, late
January, in response to the incident.
The industry's quick response I think is a testimony to the
industry's self-accountability, and rightfully so. This bad
news hurts the industry more than anyone else. This is whether
it's bad news from time to time when you turn on the television
and hear about some people getting food poisoning on a cruise
to these kinds of things. The cruise industry has always taken
this stuff seriously because above all else it is about
customer service.
And the cruise industry is largely built on return
customers and people just won't come back if they had a bad
experience or if they watch the news and think they're going to
have a bad experience. And so that's why we see such a high
level of self-accountability in the industry and I think that's
a very positive thing.
What we'll hear in today's testimony is that the industry
has, in addition to its long history of ensuring through
voluntary policies, the stewardship of both the safety of the
passenger and also environmental protection, you'll also hear
that we have a very robust and safe cruise industry that
supports thousands of jobs in Florida and across the United
States.
There are more than 230 ships worldwide in the cruise ship
fleet and 176 of them, over 75 percent of those cruise vessels,
were operating in North America in the year 2010. The North
American cruise industry generated $37.85 billion in the U.S.
in economic benefits and supported nearly 330,000 jobs here in
America in the same year.
That's a bright spot in our bleak economy, and in Florida,
particularly in our port cities, I can tell you firsthand the
impact that this industry has on the real lives of real people.
I'm proud to say that the state of Florida accounts for 60
percent of all U.S. cruise embarkations and we hope to make
that 61 percent and growing.
And so we're excited about that and we're excited about
expansions in some of our ports that will allow for an
expansion in this. So as we hear today from Bill, the Port of
Miami is one of the busiest cruise ports in the world. It
handled more than 4 million passengers in the year 2011 and the
Port of Miami is just one of several ports in Florida that
support the cruise line industry--Port Canaveral, Jacksonville,
Tampa, and others.
So overall, the industry accounted for about $6.3 billion
in my state and direct spending in 2010 that generated over
123,000 jobs in Florida. It means 123,000 families who make
their living off the safety, the accountability and the
prosperity of the cruise industry. So it's an important
industry. It brings valued and high-paying jobs to it and,
again, as we all hear this testimony today let's just remember
that they've consistently shown their willingness to
voluntarily make themselves one of the safest industries in our
country.
With that, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing
on an issue so important not just to our country but especially
to my home state and, again, I've read all the testimony here
today and look forward to asking some questions and I'll look
forward to that in a few moments.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Rubio, the
Ranking Member.
And now I'm going to call on Johnny Isakson because he
represents Georgia, which is bigger than our two states. And
then I'm going to call on you, Senator Begich.
Senator Begich. Only by population.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNY ISAKSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA
Senator Isakson. Absolutely correct. You got a lot more
mileage at sea than we do too.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing. I want
to commend you on the timely calling of this hearing and I
think it's a very important hearing for the Commerce Committee
to conduct.
Like Senator Rubio, I have another commitment so I will be
in and out as well. But I started off here because I wanted to
be sure and submit for the record and ask unanimous consent
that the testimony of Lynda D. Sanford, a resident of my state
who lost her mother on the high seas in a cruise in 2001, be
entered for the record in this hearing.
The Chairman. Absolutely.
[The information referred to follows:]
To: John Clark Rayfield, Republican Staff Director
U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation
From: Lynda D. Sanford
Survivor of Capsizing on July 13, 2001 with Loss
of Life
U.S. Coast Guard Report 16732Subject: Written Testimony of Lynda D. Sanford
Hearing on Cruise Ship Safety Lessons from the
Costa Concordia AccidentDate: February 29, 2012
It has been more than a decade since I managed to survive the
boating accident that killed my mother and 2 other cruise ship
passengers and injured me and 13 other cruise ship passengers. I filed
charges of negligent homicide against the boat driver and escorted the
three corpses back to Los Angeles, California where I questioned what
went wrong. The cruise line told me that our tragedy was a ``freak
accident''. After burying my mother in Texas, I returned home to
Atlanta, Georgia and contacted the cruise line attorney who had been
flown to Cabo San Lucas, Mexico to interrogate me about my mother's
death. The cruise line would not provide me with any more information
and ignored my family's requests for answers.
I was devastated after having flown across the United States to
meet my mother in California for a 7-day mother-daughter cruise and
returning with her corpse and no explanation for her death other than a
``freak accident''. I acquiesced to my family's request to sue the
cruise line because our mother had died and was horrified to learn that
we could not do so because all of my mother's children were adults. The
Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) of 1920 did not allow us to sue for
negligence resulting in the death of our mother, her pain and suffering
as she drowned or the loss of her contribution to society as a
bilingual, special education teacher and mother who raised five
children without child support from our deadbeat dads. The U.S.
Congress had allowed the cruise line industry to influence it when
DOHSA was amended in 2000. Consequently, DOHSA by Wrongful Act entitles
these legal remedies only to commercial aviation victims. The Death on
the High Seas Act (DOHSA) of 1920 entitled my mother's corpse to
receive only burial expenses!
In 2006 and 2007 my Congressman, Congressman John Lewis of Atlanta,
Georgia, co-sponsored Death on the High Seas Act amendments introduced
by Congressman Lloyd Doggett for cruise ship victims. These bills held
cruise lines accountable for negligent deaths regardless of the age of
the victims. The amendments became a part of the original legislation
of the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act. However, again, the
cruise lines' paid lobbyists successfully pressured the U.S. Congress
to allow the cruise line industry to evade accountability. All of the
protections of the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act were in
jeopardy in 2010 if DOHSA was not removed. So, DOHSA was removed and
the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act became law in July 2010--
including the requirement that all cruise ships have a man-overboard
system within 18 months. The United States Coast Guard acknowledged in
February 2012 that the cruise line industry has not implemented this
provision of the law. Freedom of Information Act requests indicate that
the U.S. Coast Guard spent over $900,000 for just two searches for
cruise ship passengers whose bodies were never found. American
taxpayers pay for these searches. The cost to the cruise line is
nothing.
Despite cruise line claims of safety, a 2008 U.S. Senate hearing
divulged that cruise lines did not know how many passengers had died or
disappeared from foreign-flagged cruise ships using American ports. The
cruise lines did not keep count of the dead or missing because they
were not required to do so. Consequently, complaints of negligent death
when the deceased has no dependents continue to be dismissed from court
because DOHSA does not allow surviving adult family the right to sue
for the death of their loved one. The family of the deceased does not
have the opportunity to have the facts of their loved-one's death heard
and decided by a jury.
Unlike DOHSA of 1920, state tort laws have evolved to reflect the
value of human life in commercial maritime deaths. Every state in the
United States has laws that allow victims to sue for financial damages
for wrongful death. Some states also allow surviving family members to
recover damages for the conscious pain and suffering of the deceased.
Others also impose punitive damages for serious wrongdoing and to serve
as a deterrent. In the case of wrongful maritime deaths, state law is
superior to Federal law.
It is inequitable, unfair, and inhumane to force cruise ship
victims to apply the antiquated Death on the High Seas Act of 1920 to
their loved one's death. My mother's life is no less valuable than an
airline passenger's life and my family's grief is no less painful than
the grief of any airline victims' family. The U.S. Supreme Court has
recommended that Congress correct this inequity for maritime victims
and there are no costs associated with making this change. By
continuing to force maritime victims to do so, the U.S. Congress is
telling survivors that the life of their loved is worthless in
comparison to that of an aviation victim! The result is that cruise
ship victims are victimized not only by cruise lines but by the United
State Congress. I urge Congress to do what is was intended to do--
represent its people--by correcting the injustice of DOHSA of 1920
during the 100 year anniversary of the RMS Titanic tragedy that took
more than 1,600 lives.
Respectfully,
Lynda D. Sanford, Vice-President
International Cruise Victims Association (ICV)
http://www.internationalcruisevictims.org/
Lynda D. Sanford, MBA, CIA, CFE, CISA
Lynda Sanford has been auditing for the public and private sector
for 25 years. She was an internal auditor, forensic auditor, and
external auditor for the Federal Government for 17 years. She has
received numerous awards for her audit work and earned her designations
as a Certified Internal Auditor, and Certified Information Systems
Auditor, and Certified Information Systems Auditor through
examinations. She earned her Master of Business Administration with a
concentration in international business from Kennesaw State University
and her Bachelor of Business Administration degree in accounting from
Texas A&M, Corpus Christi. She has worked in North and South America,
Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and the South Pacific. She has lived in
Georgia since 1986 and has been a resident of Atlanta, Georgia since
January 2001.
About Our Mother
Elizabeth Sanchez Stevens (left) of Anchorage, AK and with her
daughter, Lynda Sanford (right), of Atlanta, GA in Los Angeles, CA in
July 2001.
Elizabeth was a single mother of five children. She began her
career as a Licensed Vocational Nurse in Corpus Christi, TX. She earned
her Bachelor's Degree in Secondary Education and Master's Degree of
Public Administration in her mid-40s. She moved to Anchorage, AK in
1987, where she continued to teach Special Education and English as a
Second Language, until her death in July 2001.
Senator Isakson. And I thank the industry for being
represented. To Admiral Salerno, thank you for the many things
the Coast Guard contributes to the safety and security of the
citizens of our country on the high seas and thanks for what
you do for the country. And to the others testifying, we look
forward to hearing your testimony although I, like Senator
Rubio, read it all last night because I knew I would be in and
out.
So Mr. Chairman, this is a very timely hearing on a subject
that's of great interest to the people of my state and I
appreciate your letting Ms. Sanford's statement be entered for
the record.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Isakson. As
always, you're to the point and effective.
Senator Begich, followed by Senator Nelson.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARK BEGICH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Begich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief
because I'm anxious for the opportunity to hear the testimony
but also for the questions and answers. I have a state that has
an enormous amount of impact with the cruise industry, 15,000
jobs approximately in our state, related to the cruise ship
industry a $1 billion-plus economic impact. But along with
that, we have the largest single Coast Guard base in the
country in Alaska.
So I'm anxious to have this hearing. I know in Alaska we
have taken exceptional steps in Coast Guard, relationships with
our cruise ship industry and our local community in making sure
we have not only, I think if not the highest standards pretty
close to the top highest standards of environmental standards
that the cruise ship industry worked with us on as well as
safety standards where we were able to do some things where we
put pilots on the cruise ships, which is very unique to a lot
of ports.
So I think we have a lot to talk about today but also from
Alaska's perspective I think a lot to show off of steps we have
taken. We consider ourselves a domestic port. Many people
consider us an international port in a lot of ways because the
coastline is so diverse and lengthy.
So, again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity.
I'm anxious to hear the dialogue and discussion and then, of
course, as you know, Mr. Chairman, I will always be bragging
about Alaska's unique steps that we've taken to improve another
industry that's so important to our country.
The Chairman. I thank you, and actually Alaska probably
gets a pretty large percentage of these boats because that's
spectacular territory.
Senator Begich. We're getting more every day and that's why
I was a little concerned when Senator Rubio said he wants to
grow his to 61 percent. We want him to go down, ours go up. So
we're working it.
The Chairman. All right. Well, you two guys work that out
on your own.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. Senator Nelson.
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, thank you for doing this.
Senator Rubio and I have the busiest cruise port in the world,
which is Miami, and when you combine all the cruise ports that
we have--Everglades, which is at Fort Lauderdale; Cape
Canaveral, which has become famous because of the Disney
cruises, although Carnival is there and other lines as well;
Jacksonville, another major cruise port, as well as Tampa--
these are major cruise lines and ports.
And so we've got our port director here of Miami, Bill
Johnson. He's going to be contributing mightily to this
conversation. And, of course, this cruise industry produces
120,000 jobs in Florida and untold amounts of economic activity
because of this phenomenon that cruise guests fly in and they
stay a night or two, getting ready for the cruise, and then
they go to the cruise.
Now, with Disney, of course, they've got this incredible
thing. They take them to the park. Then they go on the cruise,
or vice versa, and this just generates phenomenal economic
activity. Back a couple years ago we passed the Cruise Vessel
Security and Safety Act, which is going to continue to protect
the traveling public, and I really appreciate you calling the
hearing and giving the cruise lines the opportunity. I'm
looking forward also to the Coast Guard's presentation today. I
think that will be very, very helpful.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
And Senator Lautenberg has just arrived and he is Chairman
of the Subcommittee.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thought I'd
have a more dramatic entrance than this.
The Chairman. It was pretty dramatic.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. Sort of threw off the rhythm of the hearing,
you know.
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Lautenberg. Thanks, everybody, for being here. The
industry is so important, as we've now learned, and well, we
may talk about some improvements in safety and security that
we'd like. When a passenger steps onto a cruise ship, their
expectations--relax, enjoy time off from the pressures of
everyday life. No one comes aboard expecting to enter a real
live nightmare.
That's what happened in January when the Costa Concordia, a
950-foot luxury liner, slammed into rocks, capsized off Italy's
Tuscan coast. More than 4,000 passengers, and if this was said
before please repeat it--forgive me, I think it's worth
repeating--more than 4,000 passengers and crew members were
aboard this ship when it crashed, killing at least 25 people,
injuring more than 20 others and the survivors included a young
married couple from Brick Township, New Jersey.
The couple told reporters the scene was chaotic and
confusing, that they received little instruction from the
captain and the crew as they rushed to get life vests, endured
long panic-filled waits for instructions and information and
crammed onto lifeboats.
In chaotic moments like this, passengers look to their
ship's captain for leadership and that, as we now know, the
Costa Concordia's captain abandoned ship after the crash. And
I've got to be clear--crashes like this, though few and far
between--are pretty significant when a tragedy of this
magnitude occurs, and we've got to ask the tough questions and
get honest answers.
And we owe it to the public to make sure that only the
safest vessels are allowed to cross our seas and that only the
best qualified, best trained crew members are operating these
ships. Additionally, we've got to make sure that passengers
receive their own proper safety and evacuation training and we
also need a better understanding of whether international
standards are being followed and where improvements are needed.
It's not, after all, the first time the questions have been
raised about the cruise ship industry. In 2010, Congress passed
cruise ship safety legislation aimed at protecting passengers
from crimes on cruise ships, and this legislation recently went
into effect but we still have serious concerns.
For example, one of the law's key objectives is to have all
serious crimes reported and posted online but there are
indications that it's not happening. So I'm going to have
questions, Mr. Chairman, for the witnesses about whether the
public is being informed and made fully aware of the crimes,
that are taking place. The bottom line is that while cruises
are intended to be a time of relaxation and fun, safety can
never take a vacation.
I took 20 members of my family on a trip last year and it
was a spectacular trip all and will be remembered for long,
long years. We felt safe and comfortable and I hope that's the
way all passengers will feel on cruise ships in the future and
I trust that you will help us to do that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Lautenberg, very much, not
just for this but for your hard and productive work on your
subcommittee. You produce a lot of good stuff.
I'm going to start with the questions and we'll keep it to
about 3 or 4 minutes each.
Voice. Testimony.
The Chairman. Yes, I do that very frequently.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. It's an ego problem, I think.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. But I start asking questions before I've
listened to you and this is exactly the opposite of what we
want to present, that we're interested, that we want to hear
what you have to say and that you probably don't want to hear
what I have to say.
So I've been duly corrected. I apologize to all and,
Admiral, you should start.
STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL BRIAN M. SALERNO,
DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR OPERATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. COAST GUARD
Admiral Salerno. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Rubio, distinguished members of the Committee. Thank you for
this opportunity to appear before you and to discuss issues
related to cruise ship safety.
Thank you also, Mr. Chairman and committee, for your
expression of sympathy for the tragedy the Coast Guard suffered
earlier this week. We continue to search for our three missing
colleagues and, as you can imagine, in a small service this is
always a very painful time for us. So thank you.
Every year over 170 large passenger ships operate from
United States ports and they embark approximately 11.7 million
passengers. The safety of these passengers and the crews which
operate these vessels has been a long-standing focus of the
Coast Guard.
Every year, we conduct thorough examinations of these
vessels to ensure that they comply with all United States and
international safety, security and environmental standards.
In my role as the Deputy Commandant for Operations, I'm
responsible for setting the safety, security, and environmental
standards for all U.S. flag vessels, commercial vessels, as
well as for the foreign vessels which operate and visit our
ports. I'm responsible for conducting investigations when
accidents or violations of our standards occur and I'm
responsible for setting policy regarding the conduct of search-
and-rescue activity.
For all of these reasons, the recent casualty involving the
Costa Concordia is of great interest to us. We are certain that
there will be much to learn from this casualty and we are open
to the possibility that our regulations and the international
standards produced by the International Maritime Organization
may need to be strengthened based on the outcome of the
investigation now being conducted by the Italian government.
Accordingly, we have offered to assist in Italy's
investigation as an interested party due to the significant
number of American citizens who were on board, including the
two who remain missing. This was a tragic accident and all of
us in the Coast Guard extend our heartfelt condolences to the
families and friends of the passengers who are lost and who
remain missing.
This year marks the 100th anniversary of the loss of the
Titanic. Despite a century of technological improvements in
maritime passenger safety, the Costa Concordia reminds us that
our new technologies, as beneficial as they are, cannot be
taken for granted, that they are only as good as the human
systems that operate and maintain them and the regulatory
regimes which enforce the rules.
To improve passenger safety on a global scale, the Coast
Guard leads the U.S. efforts at the International Maritime
Organization where world maritime safety standards are set.
This focus on international standards is important because,
just as in the Costa Concordia case, American citizens are
frequently passengers on vessels which otherwise have no U.S.
connection.
As the agency responsible for verifying the safety of
foreign vessels in our ports, the Coast Guard has established
the most rigorous port state control program in the world. All
foreign flag cruise ships which embark passengers in the U.S.
must undergo a controlled verification examination before they
are permitted to operate.
This examination is comprehensive in nature. It includes
preconstruction concept reviews of the ship design. It includes
examinations of the hull and tests of safety systems during
construction of the ship followed by annual and periodic
examinations for however long that ship is operating from a
U.S. port.
It is during these examinations that we also verify
compliance with environmental standards and security
procedures, including those procedures required under the
Cruise Vessel Safety and Security Act.
In 2009, the Coast Guard established a Cruise Ship National
Center of Expertise. This center is the focal point for
providing Coast Guard marine inspectors with the in-depth
technical knowledge of cruise ship design and operations and it
serves as an indicator of just how seriously we take this
responsibility.
One of our greatest safety challenges that we could
potentially face is a mass rescue operation involving a cruise
ship. While we work diligently with the cruise lines to
minimize the risk of such an event ever occurring, we have also
developed and we continually refine our search-and-rescue and
mass rescue contingency plans.
We undertake this level of emergency planning in
conjunction with the cruise industry. We hold copies of cruise
ship emergency plans and we periodically test them to ensure
seamless coordination in the event of an actual emergency.
Over the last 5 years, the Coast Guard has conducted 36
mass rescue exercises involving passenger vessels.
Each Coast Guard district has specific positions
identified, authorized by Congress, to focus on this
responsibility. As mentioned, we do not yet have the facts in
the Costa Concordia accident.
However, as an immediate measure, I have directed Coast
Guard field inspectors to witness passenger muster drills
required by the International Safety of Life at Sea Convention
whenever they are on board a ship for an annual or periodic
examination. This contrasts with the international requirement
for a muster drill within 24 hours of leaving port.
I'm also very pleased to see that the cruise industry
itself has announced new emergency drill policies requiring
mandatory muster drills for embarking passengers prior to
departing from port. Again, this is exceeding the international
requirement.
In closing, I want to assure the Committee that the Coast
Guard views the safety of passengers as its highest marine
safety priority. We have the best port state control program in
the world for verifying the safety of vessels and for safety of
passengers embarking from our ports, and through IMO we work
diligently to enhance the safety of U.S. passengers regardless
of where in the world they may embark a vessel.
And meanwhile, we've also undertaken measures to implement
the Cruise Vessel Safety and Security Act and are engaged in
additional regulatory efforts to give full effect to that law
and to enhance the personal protection of passengers on cruise
ships.
Coast Guard looks forward to working in continued
cooperation with this committee, with passenger victims groups
and with the industry itself to maximize cruise vessel safety,
security and environmental protection.
So thank you again for the opportunity to testify today and
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Salerno follows:]
Prepared Testimony of Vice Admiral Brian M. Salerno, Deputy Commandant
for Operations, Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard
Introduction
Good morning Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Hutchison, and
distinguished members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity
to appear before you to discuss issues related to cruise ship safety.
In my role as the Coast Guard's Deputy Commandant for Operations, I
am responsible for setting standards for safety, security, and
environmental stewardship for commercial vessels, facilities and
mariners, ensuring compliance with those standards, and conducting
investigations of violations and accidents. I am also responsible for
policy regarding the conduct of Search and Rescue (SAR). I'll touch on
each of these areas in my testimony today in the context of foreign
flagged cruise ships operating in U.S. waters.
While it is still too early in the investigation to comment with
any certainty on the cause of the tragedy involving the cruise ship
Costa Concordia, or the conduct of the passengers and crew after the
initial incident and during the evacuation of the vessel, as mariners
and safety professionals--all of us in the U.S. Coast Guard extend our
heartfelt condolences to the families and friends of the loved ones
lost in this tragic event.
Impetus for Safety Requirements
To understand where we are today with respect to passenger vessel
safety, we should look at the lessons the past has taught us.
The 100th anniversary of the sinking of the RMS Titanic in April
1912 is only weeks away. The Titanic tragedy prompted overwhelming
international response which resulted in the first Safety of Life at
Sea Convention, also known as SOLAS 1914. This first version focused on
lifeboats, emergency equipment, and radio watches. Improvements to the
Convention made in 1929, 1948, and 1960 added requirements for
subdivision, stability, machinery, firefighting, lifesaving,
communications, and navigation systems. SOLAS is the key international
maritime agreement focused on safety.
For the most part, large passenger vessels visiting the United
States before the 1960s were in liner service, with the primary purpose
of transporting passengers from one part of the world to another. With
the advent of commercial airlines, the international passenger vessel
industry evolved from transportation to entertainment, and liners
became cruise ships.
In the 1960s, a number of serious cruise ship fires, involving
heavy loss of life, brought the issue of cruise ship safety to the
attention of maritime authorities worldwide. These fires involved the
older passenger ships Lakonia, Yarmouth Castle, and Viking Princess,
which had superstructures that contained some combustible materials,
allowing the rapid spread of flames and total destruction of passenger
spaces.
In May 1966, the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) of the
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), now called
the International Maritime Organization (IMO), met to consider measures
to improve the fire safety of passenger vessels. The committee first
directed its attention to the problem of fire safety in older passenger
vessels and crafted the 1966 amendments to SOLAS 60, which included
additional fire protection standards for existing passenger vessels.
Congress showed great interest in this work, especially since the Coast
Guard had conducted a Marine Board of Investigation into the 1965
Yarmouth Castle fire. On November 2, 1968, Public Law 89-777 (R.S.
4400(c); 46 U.S.C. 362(c)), Fire Safety Standards for Foreign and
Domestic Passenger Vessels, came into effect, which required the Coast
Guard to verify that foreign cruise vessels complied with the 1966 fire
safety amendments.
In 1968, the United States unilaterally required all passenger
vessels with overnight accommodations for 50 or more passengers to meet
the 1966 fire safety amendments or U.S. passenger vessel requirements.
The Coast Guard promulgated Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular
2-68, which provided implementing guidance on how to conduct a control
verification examination on foreign flag cruise ships, specifying that
``this verification may necessitate a degree of plan review, removal of
panels, ceilings, etc., in addition to the testing of construction
materials.'' On August 26, 1983, Public Law 98-89 provided additional
authority for the Coast Guard to verify that foreign flag cruise ships
embarking passengers in U.S. ports comply with SOLAS convention
requirements.
The Coast Guard made improvements to its vessel examination program
in 1985 and 1993, which further expanded examination requirements and
provided much more detailed guidelines for control verification
examination procedures on foreign cruise ships. Since 1993, cruise ship
designs have continued to evolve, growing in size and complexity with
the capability of carrying thousands of passengers and crew, and the
Coast Guard has frequently updated guidance for plan review and control
verification examinations necessary for foreign cruise ships operating
out of U.S. ports. Last year, there were 143 cruise ships, sailing
under foreign registry, that operated out of U.S. ports and carried
over eleven million passengers.
Modern Standards for Cruise Ships
Over the past decade, the international shipping community, through
the IMO and with Coast Guard leadership, has moved decisively toward a
proactive approach to passenger ship safety. With cruise ships growing
progressively in size and capacity, in May 2000, the IMO agreed to
undertake a holistic examination of safety issues pertaining to
passenger ships, with particular emphasis on large cruise ships. The
outcome of this proactive initiative is an entirely new prevention and
survivability based regulatory philosophy for the design, construction,
and operation of cruise ships.
The U.S., through the efforts of the Coast Guard, has taken a very
active leadership role throughout this initiative, putting forward many
of the recommendations for action taken by the various IMO Sub-
Committees. The effort identified a number of areas of concern related
to cruise ships, and resulted in substantial amendments to major IMO
conventions, including SOLAS, International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution From Ships (MARPOL) 73/78, International
Tonnage, Standards for Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping (STCW)
and Load Line conventions. These conventions provide internationally
accepted standards for the design, construction, outfitting, and
operation of ships. They address surveys, structures, stability,
machinery, fire safety, lifesaving equipment, communications,
navigation equipment, safety management, maritime security, pollution
prevention, crew competency, watertight integrity, and safe loading.
Significant improvements under the five main pillars of the
initiative entered into force in July 2010:
Prevention: Amendments to the STCW Code and supporting
guidelines focus on navigation safety and resource management;
Improved survivability: New SOLAS requirements for the
``safe return to port'' concept address essential system
redundancy, management of emergencies, and casualty mitigation,
including the new concept of dedicated shipboard safety centers
to manage emergencies;
Regulatory flexibility: Amendments to SOLAS provide a
methodology for the approval of new and innovative safety
technologies and arrangements;
Operations in areas remote from SAR facilities: Guidelines
on external support from SAR authorities, as well as guidance
to assist seafarers taking part in SAR operations have been
developed; and finally
Health safety and medical care: Guidelines on establishing
medical safety programs, and a revised Guide on Cold Water
Survival.
Other recent improvements include stability and survivability of
cruise ships through new probabilistic subdivision and damage stability
regulations, and flooding detection systems; improved voyage planning,
particularly in remote and high latitude areas; and voyage data
recorders. As a separate initiative, stemming from the 2006 fire aboard
the Star Princess, significant improvements have been made to the fire
safety features of external areas on cruise ships. Overall, the past
decade has been an enormous leap forward in cruise ship safety measures
and has been largely proactive as opposed to reactive to casualties as
has generally been the case in the past. Coast Guard's leadership in
the international community with respect to cruise ship safety measures
and our support to foreign casualty investigations evidences our
dedication to U.S. passenger safety whereever our citizens embark on
cruise ships.
The Safety, Security, and Environmental Protection Net
The IMO conventions form the bases for the international safety,
security, and stewardship net designed to ensure consistent standards
across the worldwide fleet of cruise ships. The owners and operators,
flag states and port states each have distinct roles in ensuring
compliance with those standards.
Flag states have the primary responsibility to ensure vessels of
their flag meet international and domestic standards. They often
achieve this through recognized third party organizations who certify
that vessels meet design, construction, operating, and manning
requirements throughout the life of the vessel.
Port states verify substantial compliance with international
standards and ensuring compliance with applicable domestic requirements
for vessels of all flags calling in their ports. As the port state
authority for the U.S., the Coast Guard has established a robust
control verification program that subjects cruise ships calling in U.S.
ports to a much higher level of scrutiny than other foreign flag
vessels, and much higher than any other port states require for foreign
flag cruise ships in their ports.
Coast Guard Control Verification Program for Foreign Flag Cruise Ships
The Coast Guard has a very robust port state control program for
cruise ships. All foreign flag cruise ships arriving in the United
States that embark passengers or make a U.S. port call while carrying
U.S. citizens as passengers must participate in the control
verification process. Cruise ships that return to U.S. service after a
prolonged absence are treated as if they had never been in service in
the U.S. and must undergo the entire process again.
The Coast Guard control verification program includes initial,
annual, and periodic examinations for foreign flag cruise ships calling
in our ports. It includes concept review during the very earliest
stages of design, pre-construction plan review by Coast Guard naval
architects and fire protection engineers, mid-construction inspections
at the builder's yard by Coast Guard marine inspectors, an initial
operational inspection of the vessel upon completion of construction,
and at least annual inspections while the vessel is in service in U.S.
ports. This regime allows the Coast Guard to determine that the vessel
is in substantial compliance with all applicable international and
domestic standards.
The engineering review of plans for structural fire protection
arrangements provides a great level of assurance that shipboard fire
safety arrangements meet international standards. After review, these
same engineers visit the ship and confirm that the actual arrangements
on the vessel are the same as those shown on the structural fire
protection plans. No other port state provides this level of attention
to detail for cruise ships. On the basis of this initial examination,
the Coast Guard issues a certificate of compliance that allows the
vessel to operate in U.S. ports.
The annual examination ensures that foreign cruise ships continue
to maintain all the systems the Coast Guard previously examined during
the initial exam in proper operating condition and that the flag
administration has performed annual renewal surveys as required by
SOLAS. Inspectors focus on firefighting, lifesaving, and emergency
systems and witness a comprehensive fire and boat drill by the crew. In
addition, inspectors examine the vessel for modifications that would
affect the vessel's structural fire protection and means of escape.
They also check for modifications completed without the vessel's flag
administration approval. After a satisfactory annual examination, the
Coast Guard re-issues a certificate of compliance.
Periodic examinations are also conducted, typically midway between
the annual examinations. These examinations are limited in scope and
build on the more comprehensive annuals, and they are intended to
ensure vessels are being operated in a safe manner. The periodic
examinations focus on the performance of officers and crew, with
specific attention paid to their training on and knowledge of the
ship's emergency procedures, firefighting, lifesaving systems, and
performance during the drills. To ensure the overall material condition
of the ship has not appreciably changed since the annual examination,
inspectors randomly select sample items for examination.
Inspectors also vary the scope of the examination depending upon
the material condition of the vessel, the maintenance of the vessel,
and the professionalism and training of the crew. At every Coast Guard
examination of a foreign cruise ship, the inspectors will determine
whether the vessel is in substantial compliance with the international
convention standards.
As a result of the Costa Concordia incident, I have directed Coast
Guard field inspectors to witness the passenger muster required by
SOLAS whenever they are onboard a cruise ship conducting an initial,
annual, or periodic examination. Our personnel will witness these
musters either immediately before or during vessel departure from port.
I am pleased to see that the cruise industry associations announced a
new emergency drill policy requiring mandatory muster for embarking
passengers prior to departure from port.
Investigations
Foreign vessels operating in U.S. waters are required by U.S. law
to report accidents immediately. Upon accident notification, we
proactivly investigate to determine causes and issue safety
recommendations to prevent recurrences. It is a continuous improvement
process which incorporates lessons learned from accident investigations
to enhance cruise ship safety and ensure compliance with national and
international laws.
After the Costa Concordia incident, the Coast Guard immediately
offered technical expertise and support to the Government of Italy's
marine casualty investigation. The Coast Guard's expertise in marine
casualty investigations will prove helpful as we move forward with the
investigation. Currently, Coast Guard teams are conducting interviews
with the U.S. passengers to ascertain the vessel's crew level of
preparedness and response. Information gained from the Costa Concordia
investigation may assist in identifying marine casualty causal factors
that could have broad application. It is long standing practice to
cooperate in all manner of accident investigations involving different
flag and coastal states and the Coast Guard routinely acts in this
accord.
Search and Rescue (SAR) and Mass Rescue Operations (MRO)
The Coast Guard has maintained a good relationship with the cruise
lines regarding search and rescue and medical evacuations. For the
Coast Guard, a Mass Rescue Operation involving a cruise ship casualty
offshore, with potentially thousands of passengers and crew forced to
evacuate into lifeboats and the water, presents our greatest search and
rescue challenge. Working with cruise line and passenger vessel
companies, the Coast Guard continues to develop and improve SAR and MRO
contingency plans. In addition to internal Coast Guard SAR plans, the
Coast Guard holds a copy of cruise ship SAR plans and is able to
incorporate the cruise ship plans into our overall SAR planning in the
event of an emergency. The Coast Guard also meets periodically with
cruise line medical personnel to discuss plans for medical emergencies,
which pays dividends during actual medical evacuations. For example,
many of the 857 medical evacuations performed by the Coast Guard last
year, were conducted from cruise ships. evacuations last year.
In addition to working directly with cruise lines, Coast Guard has
been working in partnership with the passenger vessel industry
associations, including Cruise Lines International Association and the
Passenger Vessel Association. Coast Guard works with the associations
to develop, coordinate and represent Coast Guard policies and positions
related to passenger vessel mass rescue plans, coordination, and
exercises.
Recently, Coast Guard led a Department of Homeland Security
sponsored interagency table top exercise for Federal agency
representatives involving a cruise ship emergency in the Arctic. Mass
rescue planning involves support from many of our Federal agency and
State partners.
In 2002, Congress appropriated funding for 22 permanent billets for
the Coast Guard's Passenger Vessel Safety Specialist/Mass Rescue
Operation Program. These billets provide the Coast Guard with increased
capacity and capability to help coordinate and promote passenger vessel
prevention plans, manage risk and maintain a state of readiness in
response to the impressive growth in foreign and domestic passenger
vessels over the past decade. Planning for a mass evacuation of a
cruise ship carrying thousands of passengers and crew involves intense
preparation and extensive coordination to meet the varying types of
emergencies that could arise.
Coast Guard passenger vessel safety personnel at each of our
Districts assist in the conduct and coordination of Coast Guard mass
rescue exercises. Over the last 5 years, the Coast Guard conducted
thirty-six mass rescue exercises involving passenger vessels, three of
which involved a cruise ship. The Coast Guard has an agreement with
CLIA to include an actual cruise ship as part of these exercises every
2 years. Since 2007, CLIA has fulfilled this partnership agreement by
providing a cruise ship every other year for a full scale exercise. The
purpose of these exercises is to assist the Coast Guard, other Federal,
state and local search and rescue authorities and cruise ship industry
partners in exercising mass rescue plans, practice interagency/industry
cooperation and coordination and identify ways to improve the overall
response to a major maritime disaster.
Mass rescue exercises have been structured around a 5-year cycle.
In 2010, the Coast Guard directed that, at a minimum, each Coast Guard
District conduct and/or participate in one discussion based (e.g.,
seminar, workshop, game, or tabletop) and one operations based (e.g.,
drills, functional, full scale) mass rescue exercise over a 5-year
period. To meet this exercise requirement, beginning this year, the
Coast Guard has planned a 5-year mass rescue exercise series known as
``Black Swan.'' The exercise series will begin this year with a cruise
ship seminar in New Orleans, followed by a functional drill in 2013,
also in New Orleans, and full scale mass rescue exercises in Miami in
2015 and Norfolk in 2017. The scope of these exercises provide a
valuable opportunity to identify and resolve the difficulties
associated with rescuing hundreds or thousands of people at once. It is
also a chance to address the unique challenges posed by off shore mass
rescues.
The Black Swan mass rescue exercise series will focus on the
exercise of Coast Guard mass rescue plans, coordination with other
authorities and industry partners, notification and information
processes, personnel accountability, embarking thousands of survivors
on rescue ships from the water, lifeboats and rafts, and rescued
passenger and crew support.
Cruise Ship Security and Crime
September 11, 2001 spurred the development of the Maritime
Transportation Security Act (MTSA) and the IMO International Ship and
Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, both of which are rigorously
enforced by the Coast Guard. Prior to the MTSA and ISPS, only the
cruise ships that visited the U.S. and cruise terminals were required
to have security plans in place. The requirement for cruise ship and
facility security plans in the United States had come into effect as a
result of the 1985 Achille Lauro terrorist incident in the
Mediterranean Sea, resulting in the murder of Leon Klinghoffer--a
wheel-chair bound U.S. citizen.
The Coast Guard examines every cruise ship that visits the U.S. for
compliance with MTSA and ISPS requirements at the same time it carries
out annual and periodic examinations. Overall, cruise ship compliance
records have been extremely good, with only three security-related
detentions in approximately 1,800 security examinations since July
2004.
Notwithstanding this security compliance regime, there have been
serious incidents and crimes that have affected U.S. citizens aboard
foreign-flagged cruise ships, however, this has led to an increased
focus on protecting our citizens both in port and while they are at
sea. In 2010, Congress bolstered passenger safety and security with
respect to such incidents and crimes by enacting the Cruise Ship
Security and Safety Act of 2010 (CVSSA). Since then, the Coast Guard
has worked diligently to implement the provisions of this act.
The CVSSA prescribes security and safety requirements for
designated cruise ships and is the authority for a rulemaking now under
development by the Coast Guard. CVSSA amended Title 46, United States
Code, by adding passenger vessel security and safety requirements, and
crime scene preservation training requirements for passenger vessel
crewmembers. CVSSA addresses many areas that affect personal safety and
security, including: ship design; better public access to information
about crime aboard cruise ships; improved precautions, response,
medical care, support for victims of sexual assault; preservation of
evidence necessary to prosecute criminals; and more consistent and
complete reports about criminal activities. A large number of these
requirements went into effect when the President signed the legislation
on July 27, 2010; however, there are areas that require implementation
through the publication of regulations.
Thus far, the Coast Guard has completed the following actions with
respect to implementing the CVSSA:
In June 2011, the Coast Guard published policy establishing
guidelines for Coast Guard Marine Inspectors examining cruise
vessels for compliance to include physical requirements, such
as: rail heights; door peep-holes as one commonly sees on hotel
doors, which allow cabin occupants to see who is outside before
opening their cabin door; and the passenger security guide.
The Coast Guard established an Internet-based portal
([email protected]) to facilitate electronic submission of crime
reports.
The Coast Guard established a web link to publish cruise
ship sexual assault and criminal activity data received from
the the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in accordance
with the act: http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg2/cgis/.
An Inter-agency workgroup consisting of Coast Guard, FBI,
and the Maritime Administration personnel completed development
of a model course addressing crime scene preservation standards
and curricula. In July 2011, the Coast Guard published policy
promulgating training standards and curricula for the
certification of passenger vessel security personnel.
Closing
As I close, let me emphasize that the Coast Guard places the
highest priority on vessels that embark passengers in the United
States; and embark U.S. passengers worldwide. We have a strong and
effective port state control program for foreign cruise ships and
ensure that vessels that visit the United States are in substantial
compliance with applicable international and domestic standards.
We participate in casualty investigations, even those taking place
overseas, and we lead efforts at IMO to improve maritime safety,
security, and environmental protection standards.
Furthermore, we have one of the best Search and Rescue programs in
the world and we work closely with the industry on SAR planning and
medical evacuations. We have efforts underway to plan for mass rescue
operations.
We are taking measures to implement the CVSSA. We have accomplished
much, but additional work must take place.
As a result of the Costa Concordia incident, we have also put into
place a regime to witness passenger musters as part of our mandatory
vessel examination program. As the investigation unfolds, the Coast
Guard will capture lessons learned and incorporate them into our safety
regime.
The Coast Guard also looks forward to continued cooperation with
this committee, passenger victims groups, and the passenger vessel
industry to maximize cruise vessel safety, security, and environmental
protection. Although we are not asking for, or recommending to
Congress, new legislation at this time, we may do so in the future once
we have had the opportunity to review the Costa Concordia
investigation.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today. I will be
pleased to answer any questions you may have.
The Chairman. Thank you, Admiral.
And we call now on Bill Johnson, Seaport Director, Port of
Miami.
STATEMENT OF BILL JOHNSON, DIRECTOR, PortMiami,
MIAMI-DADE COUNTY
Mr. Johnson. Good morning. Chairman Rockefeller and
honorable members of the Committee, first, I want to thank you
for the opportunity to testify before you today. I am
especially pleased to be invited to appear before our two great
senators from the state of Florida, Senator Bill Nelson and
Senator Marco Rubio.
Both our senators, as they've stated, are keenly aware of
the importance of the cruise industry to the state of Florida.
My name is Bill Johnson and I'm the Director of the Dante
Fascell Port of Miami, now known as PortMiami. I also serve as
the Chairman of the Florida Ports Council, which has
responsibility for coordination with Florida's--all of
Florida's 15 deepwater ports.
I also have the privilege of serving as the third Vice
President of the International Association of Ports and Harbors
where we work on issues of national and global concern
including issues pertaining to the cruise industry.
Believe me, I cannot emphasize enough that safety is the
cruise industry's number one priority. I underscore that.
Safety and security is also my highest priority as the director
of the world's busiest cruise port.
As a way of some quick background, the Port of Miami,
PortMiami, we're a small little port. We're about 518 acres
located right in the beautiful part of downtown on Biscayne Bay
between the City of Miami and the City of Miami Beach. Our port
is governed by our county mayor, Carlos Gimenez, and our Board
of County Commissioners serve as our board of directors. We're
a public port but we operate with a private sector mentality.
Last year, PortMiami generated over $18 billion, direct and
indirect, to the economy of our community, our state and our
nation, and we generated in excess of 180,000 jobs in south
Florida, in our state, and these are, I would like to add, are
high-paying jobs. The average job through the Port of Miami
with a high school education is approaching $56,000 a year. So
the maritime industry and, specifically, cargo and crews, are
very high paying important jobs.
As stated, PortMiami is the world's busiest cruise port.
We've just completed our fourth consecutive year exceeding 4
million passengers. In addition, our community, Miami-Dade
County, is the global headquarters of five of the world's
largest distinguished cruise lines including Carnival Cruise
Line and its parent, Carnival Corporation, Royal Caribbean
Cruise Limited, Norwegian Cruise Lines, Oceania, Regent.
The importance of having these global headquarters in
Florida but, most importantly, in America I cannot stress
enough, and I'm sure we'll come back to that issue in a few
minutes.
PortMiami, again, and its cruising really is the bread and
butter of the economy of my town and a strong piece of the
economy of my state. While there are 15 deepwater ports in
Florida, five of those ports, as indicated I think by Senator
Nelson, five of those ports have a heavy emphasis on cruise and
cruise-related business.
During the recent several years in the downturn of our
economy, the cruise business in America and in Florida remained
a strong and a continued, if you will, strong presence to the
economy, protecting local and state jobs and companies in a
significant way.
I'd like to present, if I would, just a few statistics. In
2011, over 13 million overnight visitors came to Miami --13
million. The number is growing. In the state of Florida, it was
over 82 million visitors, in 2011.
In Miami, those visitors spent over $20 billion last year.
They stayed an average of almost six nights, those visitors.
And of this number, over 7 percent were cruise passengers.
These visitors spent an average of roughly $265 a day while in
our community and they stay--this is important--an average of
2.4 nights per cruise. That is the single--the cruise industry
is the single largest contributor to overnight stays, to
occupancy of hotels, in our community.
When you examine how they spend their money, these cruise
passengers spend approximately 35 percent for lodging in our
motels and hotels, nearly 26 percent for food, for meals, 15
percent for entertainment, unfortunately only 10 percent for
shopping. We'd like that to be higher. Of course, this is just
the tip of the iceberg.
Of the more than 4 million passengers last year and,
literally, within the next 2 years will be at 4.5 million
passengers and by the end of the decade we're projected to be
over 5 million cruise passengers at Miami, but of those 4
million cruise passengers who visited PortMiami last year, 60
percent--this is very important--60 percent passed through my
sister agency, Miami International Airport, the second largest
international gateway into America, obviously infusing
millions, untold millions of additional revenues to the U.S.
economy through airlines, OK, and million more, if you will, in
terms of passenger fees, meals, sales tax, et cetera, et
cetera.
PortMiami, obviously, is a critical job creator--a job
incubator, if you will, for our state, again, generating over
180,000 jobs just in Miami alone, direct indirect. This number
will continue to increase.
Three new lines, including Disney, have announced that
they're going to call Miami as a home port--three new brands.
We're clearly excited. Also, the maritime industry workers, as
I've told you, are some of the highest paid in our state and in
my community, averaging close to $56,000 a year.
I'd like to say that, of course, these workers, some of
these are, again, both in public and private sector employment.
We have over 1,200 International Longshoremen alone at the Port
of Miami. In Florida as you've heard over $6 billion a year
goes to cruise industry service and these are providers,
This is another benefit, the provisioning of these cruise
ships. Royal Caribbean--and one of the senators made this
point, a very strong point, RoyalCaribbean alone uses more than
2,000 suppliers.
These are American companies. Two thousand suppliers. Three
hundred and fifty--in my community, 350 are located in Miami.
They spend over $400 million in my town, Royal Caribbean alone,
on shipboard products. Carnival Cruise Line has a fleet of 20,
just the line--Carnival Cruise Line has a fleet of 23 ships. On
average, they serve eight meals and snacks a day to between
2,000 and 3,000 guests, to a crew of between 1,000 and 1,500
daily.
When you look at that, as the point was made, they're
serving--it's like a floating city. There's as many people and
staff on these ships consuming product. It's huge for the
American economy.
The Chairman. Mr. Johnson? Very respectfully----
Mr. Johnson. Yes?
The Chairman. If you could kind of begin to----
Mr. Johnson. Sure.
The Chairman. OK.
Mr. Johnson. Moving in the direction in terms of
provisioning, the point I'm trying to make is it's not just the
cruise passenger. It's the related industries that impact the,
if you will, the economy of our state, our nation. And we see
the opportunity for this to increase even more significantly as
the cruise industry continues to flourish.
The comment I'd like to make is that I interact with these
cruise executives--fortunately, they're headquartered in my
town--from the CEOs and the presidents of these cruise lines
all the way down. We are on a weekly basis working with our
cruise partners, working--and it's incredible support we
receive from the U.S. Coast Guard.
I cannot say enough about the importance of the Coast
Guard, their role, the importance of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection and the safety and security of our ports. I can
assure you--I can testify about the commitment not just of your
ports but of the leadership of these cruise lines and these
executives to safety and to environment, and during the
question and answer I'd be happy to get into some of the
responses on both of those issues from the PortMiami
perspective.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Bill Johnson, Director, PortMiami,
Miami-Dade County
Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison, and honorable
members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify
before you today. I am especially pleased to be invited to appear
before our two great senators from the State of Florida, Senator Bill
Nelson and Senator Marco Rubio, who are keenly aware of the importance
the cruise industry brings to the Sunshine State. My name is Bill
Johnson, and I am the Director of the Dante B. Fascell Port of Miami,
now known as PortMiami. I also serve as the Chairman of the Florida
Ports Council and serve as the Vice President of the International
Association of Ports and Harbors where we work together on issues of
national and international concern. Believe me, and I cannot emphasize
this enough, safety is the cruise industry's top priority.
Background
The Miami-Dade County Seaport Department, PortMiami, is a 518-acre
facility located in mid-Biscayne Bay between the City of Miami and
Miami Beach. PortMiami is governed by Mayor Carlos Gimenez and the
Miami-Dade County Board of County Commissioners under a strong mayor
form of government. PortMiami is the busiest cruise port in the world,
handling more than 4 million passengers in 2011 for the 4th consecutive
year in a row. In addition, Miami-Dade County is the global
headquarters for five of the world's largest and most distinguished
cruise lines: Carnival Cruise Lines, Norwegian Cruise Line, Royal
Caribbean Cruises Ltd., Oceania Cruises and Regent Seven Seas Cruises.
Thus, at PortMiami, cruising is our bread and butter and lifeblood of
the local economy. During the recent downturn in the economy, the
cruise business in Florida remained strong and at present continues to
grow, protecting our local and state economy from an even larger
economic disruption.
Economic Impact
With your indulgence, I would like to present the following
numbers--in 2011 Greater Miami had over 13.4 million overnight visitors
who spent $20 billion dollars and stayed an average of 5.8 nights. Of
those visitors, 7.1 percent or 951,400 were cruise passengers. These
visitors spent an average of $264.58 per day and stayed an average of
2.4 nights. When examining how their money was spent, it breaks down
as: 35 percent for lodging, 25.6 percent for meals, 15.2 percent for
entertainment, 10.2 percent for shopping, 7.5 percent for local
transportation; and 6.3 percent for parking. But that is only the tip
of the iceberg. Of the more than 4 million cruise passengers who
visited PortMiami last year, over 60 percent of them passed through our
sister department, Miami International Airport, infusing millions of
additional revenue to U.S. airlines and millions more into the state
and local economy via items such as passenger fees, meals, and sales
taxes.
PortMiami is a critical jobs incubator for the state, supporting
over 180,000 jobs, and that number will increase with three new cruise
brands coming to our port over the next 22 months. Also, maritime
industry workers at the port have one of the highest incomes in the
County. For persons with a high school degree, salaries average around
$52,000 per year, a good salary for South Florida. Jobs created by the
port are in both the public and private sectors, including over 1,200
members of the International Longshoremen's Association.
In Florida, over $6 billion a year goes to cruise industry service
providers, suppliers and vendors according to an economic impact study
commissioned by the Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA).
Royal Caribbean alone uses more than 2,000 suppliers, 350 of which are
local to South Florida and spends more than $400 million annually in
South Florida on shipboard products ranging from fuel, food and drinks,
to furniture. Carnival Cruise Lines, PortMiami's largest cruise tenant,
has a global fleet of 23 ships, where 8 meals and snacks are served
every day to 2,000-3,000 guests per ship (along with 1,000-1,500 crew
members). Celebrity Cruises' Constellation, at full capacity, feeds 3
meals a day to over 2,000 passengers and more than 1,000 officers and
crew, comparable to the provisions that any small town might consume in
1 week. Provisioning of ships gets real money flowing into the
economy--helping small and medium sized businesses not only survive,
but thrive.
Ship Chandlers range in size and product specialization, and
include nationally recognizable names like Coca-Cola and Cargill, to
local and state businesses such as the American Fruit and Produce
Corp., and Sysco. American Fruit and Produce, a fruit and vegetable
supplier based in Miami-Dade County has 125 employees and over 45 years
experience working with the cruise industry. With annual revenues of
over $100 million, they get 30-40 percent of their business from the
cruise industry, supplying lines such as Norwegian, Carnival and Royal
Caribbean throughout Florida, in New Orleans and along the Gulf Coast.
These suppliers support local jobs throughout the South, jobs that
would disappear if we did not have a robust cruise industry.
Although standard fare such as bananas and tomatoes are still in
high demand, more and more ships are changing menus to include organic
and specialty foods, providing additional new business opportunities
for U.S. farmers.
Every cruise ship leaving from PortMiami has a multiplier effect
that also includes 486 companies providing ground transportation,
including bus and limousine services, and thousands of taxi trips
between Miami International Airport, local hotels, and PortMiami on a
typical cruise weekend. The cruise industry also supports jobs ranging
from companies involved in refueling ships, harbor pilots guiding ships
into the harbor, tugboat operators, waste removal, and landscaping, as
well as terminal security services.
In Florida as a whole, these numbers expand exponentially. Florida
is the number one cruise state in the nation, and according to CLIA,
the industry accounted for $6.3 billion in direct spending in 2010,
generating 123,255 jobs and wages totaling $5.4 billion. Florida's five
cruise ports handled 5.8 million embarkations, which accounted for
nearly 60 percent of all U.S. cruise embarkations. The jobs are not
just on-port, they include travel and transportation services, hotel
and hospitality services, food provisioning, ship repair services,
advertising agencies, engineering companies, manufacturers of machinery
and metal, interior designers, and computer consultants, just to name a
few.
Safety and Security
Safety and security must always be our top priority. While serving
as director, I have focused on enhancement of our public safety and
security protocols. I am pleased that our Port is a leader in the state
and nation regarding security. Ensuring our passengers safety is the
number one concern at PortMiami. In addition to the separate private
security hired by cruise lines, we are close partners with U.S. Customs
and Border Protection, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Florida Department of
Law Enforcement, Miami-Dade Police Department and Miami-Dade Fire-
Rescue.
We take the threat of terrorism seriously, as well as preventing
crime on port and providing a safe and secure environment for
passengers, workers and visitors alike. We conduct regular training
drills with our Federal, state and local partners to ensure readiness
for any emergency, be it natural like a hurricane, or man-made.
We also work closely with the Florida Fish and Wildlife Department
and the U.S. Department of Agriculture as well as the Florida
Department of Agriculture to protect against entry of insects or
disease that could harm U.S. interests. For example, PortMiami has
initiated a ``Don't Pack a Bug'' program with the USDA to protect U.S.
farms and produce.
In another innovative program, we have also partnered with a group
called Kristi House in Miami, implementing a plan to train the
personnel at the seaport to identify and respond to children in transit
who may be victims of human trafficking and/or sexual exploitation. In
addition, the plan includes partnering with the cruise lines and
private security companies to facilitate the training of their
personnel as well.
The Port is compliant with all International Maritime Organization
standards that govern the operations of cruise vessels. Our lines
follow the safety standards of the Convention on the Standards of
Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping which deals with crew
training regarding safety procedures.
Our close cooperation with the U.S. Coast Guard assures passenger
safety with the examination of each new cruise vessel when it first
enters service at a U.S. port, three of which will be coming to
PortMiami in the coming year. There are also thorough Coast Guard
examinations of cruise ships when ships reposition from foreign to U.S.
ports, as well as mandatory quarterly inspections. These inspections
emphasize structural fire safety and the proper life saving equipment
along with being present for fire and abandoned ship drills.
I applaud Congress for passing the Cruise Vessel Security and
Safely Act of 2010 in furtherance of efforts to carry out the upmost
passenger safety, including updating ships safety, the installation of
ship rails, visual identification means on entry doors, integration of
technology used to detect any passengers fallen overboard, and the new
protocols regarding reporting crimes aboard.
Environmental
PortMiami continues to be at the forefront in environmental
responsibility. Our well-thought-out vision embraces public and private
input and is consistent with the objectives of County government and
maritime industry needs.
Our Port is surrounded by a unique and fragile, maritime ecosystem
which ranges from sea grass beds to natural coral reefs. These waters
provide our community with the strong tourism base that South Florida
thrives on, including the cruise industry.
The Port has taken steps to ensure that the value of commerce in
our community is supported by an aggressive and proactive environmental
program. Just last year, the Port completed over 40 acres of mangrove
restoration at Oleta River State Park in Northern Biscayne Bay. We have
also installed storm water treatment systems to improve water quality
of the Bay.
To conserve energy, PortMiami has implemented a series of on-going
projects to reduce energy consumption onsite, including the
installation of `variable frequency drives' on the air handlers in
older facilities, retrofitting all lamps from watt reduction throughout
the Port, along with installing computerized panels for controlling the
lights in cruise terminals. To reduce our carbon footprint, we have
replaced cars with hybrids and provided for the separation of cargo and
cruise traffic to decrease idling time and reduce emissions.
We also incorporate green performance standards in our Cruise
Capital Improvement Program, with our most recent renovations using
furniture manufactured with products using renewable and recycled
materials and canopies utilizing a fabric that is 100 percent
recyclable. All re-roofing projects have reflective roof measures, such
as reflective coating and membranes with a solar reflectance that keep
terminals cooler, even in our tropical climate.
Our vision is to continue a tradition of leadership concerning
environmental issues and to practice sustainable green development. By
carefully balancing environmental, social and economic factors into our
business planning and decisionmaking processes, we will ensure a
favorable workplace today and a healthy environment tomorrow.
Conclusion
PortMiami is where the modern cruise industry was born starting in
1972, when cruise shipping pioneer Ted Arison acquired his first
passenger ship and founded what has become the highly successful
business called Carnival Cruise Lines. We look forward to continuing
the growth of the cruise industry in Miami, and welcome new innovations
and best practices with gusto. The safety and security of our
passengers is priority number one. I would like to thank you for
allowing me to speak today and welcome input regarding this most
important of industries.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Johnson.
Now, Captain William H. Doherty is the Director of Maritime
Relations, NEXUS Consulting Group.
STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN WILLIAM H. DOHERTY,
DIRECTOR OF MARITIME RELATIONS,
NEXUS CONSULTING CORPORATION
Captain Doherty. Good morning, Chairman, Senators. Thank
you for having me here today to review the issue of cruise line
safety.
From my background, I'm a proud graduate of Massachusetts
Maritime Academy. I hold two degrees from that institution. I'm
a master mariner in the United States Merchant Marine and a
retired commander in the U.S. Navy. I served 49 years in this
industry including safety manager for one of America's largest
cruise lines just prior to retirement.
As my submitted testimony notes, there's a number of issues
where the international cruise industry has fallen short of its
responsibility to maintain safety and security of the
passengers and crew. In recent days, it's become glaringly
obvious that there are some serious issues within the cruise
industry pertaining to operating safety and security which need
to be resolved.
Just 2 months into 2012, we've already seen at least 34
deaths--one on the Liberty of Sea, one on Carnival Fantasy and
at least 32 on Costa Concordia. We've also seen two sinkings--
the Rabaul Queen off of Papua, New Guinea, and the Costa
Concordia in Italy.
We've seen hundreds of pounds of illegal drugs seized on
three cruise ships; most recently, yet another cruise ship
losing power in the middle of pirate-infested waters due to
reported engine room fire. That ship left passengers in peril
on the sea in a terrible place.
These are only the few known reported incidents on cruise
ships in 2012. However, what we can reliably assume from these
reports coming to light only after the Costa Concordia is that
there is every reason to believe that many more incidents have
gone either unreported or grossly underreported, making it
almost impossible to validate incident data and draw an actual
picture of the state of affairs regarding security and safety
on today's cruise ships.
There's no one specific enforcement agency or mechanism
which regulates or enforces the Law of the Sea in this
international fleet. The maritime domain is regulated by the
International Maritime Organization. More particularly, with
respect to safety, the framework of operational management
safety and environmental protection is covered through IMO-
mandated International Safety Management, or ISM, standards.
These mirror the ISO, or International Standards
Organizations, ashore. That's to say that an industry as a
whole is expected to establish its own standards. It's
regulated by how closely they meet those standards. Again, to
paraphrase would be say what you're going to do, do what you
say.
The regulators of these standards are usually in
administration of the country where the ship is registered,
otherwise known as the flag state, under the IMO worldwide.
Unfortunately, quite often the country for which the ship is
registered, or the flag state, outsources its authority to
contracted agencies, or classification societies.
That was the case in the Costa Concordia where Italy
outsourced its country's compliance program to the private
entity RINA, and they are a private entity. Sadly, these weak
checks and balances have led to a sort of the fox guarding the
henhouse model of governance, you know, at the expense of
passengers, crew and the environment and the maritime domain as
a whole.
What I have called for is a greater focus to be lent in
three areas--obviously, passenger safety; second, strict
shipboard compliance and flag state industry oversight, and
you'll see in my testimony how I've outlined some of those.
I've noted various specific areas of improvement and change
which include, for one, zero tolerance with respect to drugs
and alcohol for everyone, all crew on passenger ships.
We also recommend a passenger-initiated distress system and
we strongly recommend worldwide contingency planning, funding
an organization for future mega cruise ship disasters. Cruise
ship operators and owners must fully comply not only with the
letter but the spirit of the IMO standards of training,
certification and watch standing, otherwise known as STCW,
specifically, the requirements of Bridge Resource Management,
or BRM, to prevent navigational disasters.
While none of us could have ever envisioned the specific
events leading up to the loss of the Concordia and, tragically,
32 lives, there was a clear indication that the root cause of
the grounding was a fatal failure on behalf of the captain and
his senior officers to follow and comply with the procedures of
Bridge Resource Management.
We don't need to reinvent the wheel to bring these
necessary changes and improvements to maritime safety around.
You know, we've got the framework already in place with the
Cruise Ship Security Act and Safety Act of 2010.
This is good legislation but it lacks strict criminal
penalties and addresses more individual crimes against cruise
vessel passengers and as yet does not address strong penalties
or criminal sentencing for reckless abandonment.
We have to decentralize the manner in which emergencies are
reported. The Costa Concordia only lost 34 lives because a few
passengers and crew members were able to call loved ones and
report the distress. Mind you, a ship member needed to phone
out to report the distress, clearly afraid of reporting it,
clear afraid that it wasn't reported by his own ship and that
the signal would go unheeded.
If the survivors weren't lucky enough to be within cell
range, who knows how much larger the death count would have
been? The Office of the Costa Concordia was still only
reporting to the Italian authorities that they had a power
outage, not that they had run aground within the first few
calls from the Coast Guard to the ship. That totally should
have been the other way around.
We're calling for legislation to mandate passenger distress
signals. This would empower passengers to alert the outside
rescue authorities if they feel their lives are in danger and
they're not sure proper distress messages were sent, for
whatever reason, by the ship personnel. Passengers able to
initiate distress signals.
Thank you, Senators, for your time. I'd be happy to answer
any questions with this or my written testimony.
[The prepared statement of Captain Doherty follows:]
Captain William H. Doherty,* Director of Maritime Relations,
Nexus Consulting Group
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\*\ Captain Bill Doherty is a 1967 graduate of the Massachusetts
Maritime Academy, a licensed U.S. Coast Guard Master-Unlimited tonnage,
and qualified First Class Pilot, Prince William Sound, Valdez, Alaska.
Captain Doherty is a retired Commander in the United States Navy
Reserve, and has served on numerous U.S. Navy warships and was the Head
of Maritime Affairs for the Chief of Naval Operations during Operation
Desert Storm. Over the course of his career, he has commanded U.S.
Naval Ships, as well as tankers, containerships, research vessels,
high-speed ferries, and was an instructor at his alma mater. Prior to
retirement, his latest position was as Safety Manager for Norwegian
Cruise Lines. Captain Doherty now serves as the Director of Maritime
Relations for Nexus Consulting, a maritime safety and security firm
based in Alexandria, VA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mark Twain (Samuel Clemens) was a Mississippi Riverboat pilot.
One day, a woman passenger tried to flatter him saying'' My
goodness Captain, you must know where every hazard on this
river lies!'' Captain Clemens replied: ``No Madam. That would
be impossible. I just know where the good water is and keep her
there.''
Ships run aground because someone made a terrible mistake or was
negligent.
A Master (Captain) has a responsibility to navigate in a safe and
prudent manner, taking into account all circumstances--including but
not limited to the existing conditions and the limitations of the
vessel involved. Prudence dictates that the Master allows an ``exit
strategy'' of all possible contingencies including grounding,
collision, fire, serious illness and a multitude of unforeseen
circumstances.
On January 13, 2012, the Italian flag cruise ship, MV Costa
Concordia, stranded and capsized off the Italian island of Giglio. At
least thirty-two lives, (almost all of them passengers) were lost. None
of the lives appear to have been lost during the stranding, but
occurred at least 1 hour later when the ship capsized.
Most often in life, we are judged more on how we react to situations
and events than the incidents themselves. In the case of the
Captain of the Costa Concordia, the lack of planning, training,
drilling and preparing for the subsequent events was tragic and
disgraceful . . .
Maritime safety and prudence starts with competence; achieved
through a combination of training, certification and constant drilling
as well as the maintenance of operational and safety equipment.
Leadership on ships, as in life, starts from the ``top down.''
Abandoning those left in your professional care clearly
demonstrates the lack of moral fiber of the Master and all those other
officers and crew who abandoned not only their passengers but their
fellow shipmates, those ``professional'' mariners, who did in fact
remain at station waiting for leadership and guidance that was never
provided by those [cowards] who deserted their responsibilities and
dignity.
The fact that the passengers were never mustered and briefed in
Emergency Stations, evacuation or any other prerequisite safety
information is not only imprudent, but illegal.
I have commanded ships of all types for over thirty years, have
served ashore in management as Port Captain for major oil companies,
taught navigation at America's finest Maritime Academy, and have served
as Safety Manager for one of the largest cruise lines in the world.
Cruise ships--as well as all vessels plying the navigable waters of
the world--are subject to strict maritime rules and regulations,
including but not limited to Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) regulations,
Standards of Training Certification and Watch keeping (STCW), The
International Safety Management (ISM) rules and most importantly, the
Rule of the Sea (whereby the Master and officers and crew never abandon
the ship until all passengers and crew are accounted for and everything
possible has been done to save them).
On a total lack of leadership and responsibility from the ship's Master
and senior officers & serious questions regarding the Captain's
sobriety and emotional stability . . .
There seems to be a clear indication of reckless negligence,
followed by confusion and chaos in the loss of the Costa Concordia. I
agree that we have to wait until all the facts are in. However,
pictures of that boulder stuck in the side of the ship and the fact
that the Master, and most of the senior licensed officers, abandoned
their ship and their duties prior to accounting for all souls aboard
speak for itself. In fact, several reports portray the Captain, his key
licensed officers and a woman (purported to be his girlfriend) in the
very first lifeboats scurrying away from the sinking ship and
abandoning those remaining souls to the perils of the sea. Emerging
reports paint an ever more bizarre portrait of a ship and crew totally
out of control.
On February 18, 2012, television news \1\ reported that traces of
cocaine were reportedly found on the outside of a hair sample of Capt.
Francesco Schettino, the Master of the Concordia. Notably, the
consultant who did the analyses stated that they found no presence of
the drug in urine samples or within the hair itself.
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\1\ http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/02/19/lawyers-for-costa-
concordia-request-new-drug-tests-for-cruise-captain-after/.
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My company, Nexus, has from the very beginning of this
investigation questioned the ``sobriety'' (be it under the influence of
drugs and/or alcohol) of the Captain and crew members, and how that
condition may (and in my opinion most probably) have factored into this
disaster.
It is clear that there was no timely or proper post-casualty
alcohol or drug testing performed on Captain Schettino, or all those
officers and crew who may have had an emergency duty during this
disaster. Of course, this type of test must be done in a timely fashion
to determine blood alcohol content, and this test was not completed.
Whatever ``drug testing'' was performed, the mere presence of an
illegal substance (Cocaine) on the Captain while he navigated this
majestic vessel onto the rocks, taking the lives of thirty two souls in
the tragedy, is indication enough of the presence of illegal drugs on
the bridge of this ship when she was wrecked. The fact that traces were
found on the body of the Captain is nothing less than STRONG
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE of drug use, by either Captain Schettino
himself at the worst case, or by someone very close to him in the best
case.
The Solution: A Need for Changes in Cruise Vessel Laws in Light of the
Costa Concordia Disaster . . .
The International standard for proper evacuation, mustering and
embarkation into lifeboats and life rafts is a maximum of thirty
minutes from the sounding of the Abandon Ship Alarm, until the boats
are launched and away from the sinking ship.
Cruise ships are required, periodically (not less than annually),
to demonstrate this capability to a governing regulatory body. The
ability for the entire ship's crew to work as a team in accomplishing
this standard requires training, drilling and then continued drilling
and training.
From the time the Costa Concordia hit the rocks and stranded, there
was almost no communication and/or any distress signal sent from the
ship until local authorities were alerted to a problem through cell
phone conversations between passengers and their family members ashore.
The Master downplayed and transmitted false and misleading information
to rescue authorities until the situation became unmanageable and lives
were lost.
No alarms were sounded, nor were passenger evacuations conducted in
a timely manner. Passengers were given false accounts of the extent of
the damage and ordered to return to their cabin rather than assemble at
the abandon ship stations. The Master and senior officers abandoned the
ship and the passengers by boarding the first lifeboats, leaving
passengers and crew aboard to fend for themselves. The Master and
ship's crew refused to cooperate with local rescue authorities, and
there was no muster or accounting for how many souls were left aboard
to be rescued.
The limited resources of the local Search and Rescue (SAR) units
were overwhelmed and unable to affect an expedient and effective
rescue, causing the loss of life of many. No unified command structure
was in place, which would have brought maximum resources to bear on
rescuing trapped souls aboard the ship. Rescue efforts transformed too
quickly to recovery efforts due to lack of resources, information and
effective use of an Incident/Unified Command structure. Obviously there
is a need to insure through proper legislation that no such tragedy
ever occurs again, affecting not only U.S. citizens but passengers
around the world.
The Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010
H.R. 3360: The Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010 was a
well-intentioned and good piece of legislation, but shortfalls in
enforcement, financing and prosecution require amendments. The act
lacks strict criminal penalties and addresses individual crimes against
cruise vessel passengers. It does not address or provide strong
penalties or criminal sentencing for the reckless abandonment
demonstrated in the MV Costa Concordia disaster.
Our proposed amendments to the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety
Act of 2010 would provide additional protection to U.S. citizens
booking passage on any foreign cruise vessels through any ticketing
agency in the United States and to all travelers aboard cruise ships
calling on any United States port during any segment of their
itinerary.
In summary, the amendments proposed by Nexus Consulting Group
would:
Require development and implantation of a Passenger Distress
Signal System (PDS). No timely distress signal was transmitted.
``What can passengers do?''
(a) Passenger Distress Signal
Passengers need to be empowered with capabilities to alert
authorities in event they are concerned that ship personnel are NOT
alerting rescue and responding authorities to situations aboard the
ship in ``real time.''
(b) The PDS system will be tied to the ship's Global Maritime Distress
and Safety System (GMDSS) \2\ system, with protections to deny
interference of distress signal from the ship.
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\2\ The Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) is an
internationally agreed-upon set of safety procedures, types of
equipment, and communication protocols used to increase safety and make
it easier to rescue distressed ships, boats and aircraft. GMDSS
consists of several systems, some of which are new, but many of which
have been in operation for many years. The system is intended to
perform the following functions: alerting (including position
determination of the unit in distress), search and rescue coordination,
locating (homing), maritime safety information broadcasts, general
communications, and bridge-to-bridge communications. Specific radio
carriage requirements depend upon the ship's area of operation, rather
than its tonnage. The system also provides redundant means of distress
alerting, and emergency sources of power.
(c) Passengers are entitled to let the outside world know if there is
something wrong without depending upon people who might have
less than honorable motive to delay or interfere with outside
response agencies becoming aware of potentially life
threatening situations. Can we continue to ask passengers to
check their rights in at the dock? We encourage ``See
Something/Say Something'' in all kinds of Emergencies. Anyone
can dial ``911'' on land; shouldn't passengers have the same
rights?
No ``timely'' distress signal was sent
Aside from a cell phone (which appears to have been the initiating
factor in the Italian Coast Guard response--and most likely saved
numerous lives on the Costa Concordia [calls from passengers to
families worrying about their own safely, resulting in calls to the
Italian Coast Guard]) there are no methods for passengers to initiate a
distress call external from the ship. There are systems on-ship which
allow passengers to contact the officers on watch in the ship's bridge
to inform them of a fire, or a man-overboard or a crime on ship, but
these systems are on-ship only.
These proposed Passenger Distress Systems (PDS) need to be linked
into the ship's external communication system, in a manner that will
not allow any ship personnel to tamper or interfere with transmission,
so that when a passenger ``sees something'' they can ``say something.''
This system will need a redundancy false alarm component; a system
which could work could be tying the on-ship warning system into the on-
ship distress satellite system. The initiation of the passenger
distress system (PDS) could send a message to company DPA, as well as
governmental entities, through systems such as the U.S. Coast Guard's
Automated Mutual-Assistance Vessel Rescue System (AMVERS)\3\, poised to
respond, much like the GMDSS.
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\3\ AMVERS or Automated Mutual-Assistance Vessel Rescue System is a
worldwide voluntary reporting system sponsored by the United States
Coast Guard. It is a computer-based global ship reporting system used
worldwide by search and rescue authorities to arrange for assistance to
persons in distress at sea. With AMVER, rescue coordinators can
identify participating ships in the area of distress and divert the
best-suited ship or ships to respond. Participating in AMVER does not
put ships under any additional obligation to assist in search and
rescue efforts, beyond that which is required under international law.
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A five-minute window could be afforded to the ship from the
governmental response entity to the ship to allow for assessment of
possible false alarm, and if no positive confirmation from the ship
that the PDS is false or manageable on ship, governmental entities can
initiate their appropriate response systems.
Clearly, whether intentionally or unintentionally, there was a
breakdown in the communication of what the true status of the Costa
Concordia was and were the incident was heading quickly. At some point,
and from accounts it seems to be about 20 minutes after the ship ran
aground, the Italian Coast Guard started to realize they had a listing
vessel with more than 4200 passengers and crew and a half-million
gallons fuel 1000m from the coast of Giglio. The Italian Coast Guard
was well behind the curve with night setting in and limited resources
to affect the situation.
From the reports, it does not appear that a ``May-day'' Distress
call went out to any and all vessels to support the rescue operation.
It certainly appears the Italian Coast Guard had very limited response
vessels and staffing to be able to handle the floating city, so what
can be done when littoral (close-to-shore) response systems reach or
start to reach critical mass?
Require affirmative port authority documentation, which will require a
Captain to verify and report that pre-departure Musters and
Evacuation Training has been conducted for all embarked
passengers and crew, prior to a ship leaving port
At this point in time, there is no disputing the fact that the
passengers aboard Costa Concordia were never provided with proper
Emergency Muster information, nor were they given any information or
instruction by any crew members regarding the emergency station, use of
lifesaving equipment and what to do in the event of foreseeable
emergencies.
News reports and real-time videos of the time from when the ship
initially ran aground, and that period between the grounding and the
actual loss of the ship (and thirty-two lives), the actions of the
entire crew could only be described as ``chaotic.''
There was no proper Emergency Signal sounded. In fact unclear; and
in most cases downright false and misleading status announcements only
added to the confusion and chaos.
Unfortunately; current legal guidelines under the International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea decree only that a muster
drill should take place within 24 hours of embarkation.
It's proposed that if passengers arrive after the muster has been
completed, they will be obliged to carry out individual or group safety
briefings. The new policy is effective immediately.
Passengers would now need to attend a pre-departure safety drill
after the industry's governing bodies announced new safety measures
following the Costa Concordia disaster.
The Cruise Lines International Association, European Cruise Council
and Passenger Shipping Association said the muster drills would now be
obligatory on their ships before departure.
In a joint statement, the cruise ship associations said: ``The
formal policy is designed to help ensure that any mandatory musters or
briefings are conducted for the benefit of all newly embarked
passengers at the earliest practical opportunity.''
They also pointed out that the new initiative ``exceed legal
requirements.''
While this is a noble and possibly ``knee-jerk'' reaction to the
Costa Concordia tragedy, this pre-departure muster and training must be
included as statute in the amended ``Cruise Ships Security and Safety
Act of 2010.''
It's time to make Pre-Departure Musters, safety briefings and
instructions the new ``minimum legal requirements.'' Suitable hard-copy
documentation and verification must be required prior to any Port's
Authorities' granting ``clearance'' to depart.
Mandate ``zero tolerance'' aboard cruise ships
The ship's Captain Francesco Schettino was reported to navigate the
ship to pass very close by the island to render a ``salute'' to a
former Costa Cruise Lines Captain retired on the Island. Captain
Schettino and a Ms. Domnica Cemortan, 25, were seen wining and dining
together 30 minutes before the disaster. One passenger, Angelo Fabri,
said: ``the captain was drinking wine''--a claim that contradicts
Schettino's assertion that he stayed off alcohol. Sr. Fabri went on to
say . . ..``They were laughing and in high spirits. The last drops of
wine went into the captain's glass.'' \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ By Rebecca Evans and Arthur Martin The Daily Mail (UK) 20th
January 2012 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2089052/Domnica-
Cemortan-Was-Costa-Concordia-captain-Francesco-Schettino-trying-
impress-ballerina.html#ixzz1nLWH7jlq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While there does not appear to have been any timely post-casualty
alcohol testing (which could have proved or disproved whether Captain
Schettino was drinking or not, or how much he drank), overwhelming
credible circumstantial evidence and eyewitness passenger reports--
coupled with his behavior, before, during and in particular after he
ran the Costa Concordia aground causing her to capsize and sink--
clearly indicate and demonstrate the kind of irrational and
irresponsible behavior we have all come to associate with persons under
the influence.
The question then remains; just what was Carnival Cruise Lines Drug
and Alcohol Program, and just how serious was it taken or complied with
if the most senior officers were allowed to consume large amounts of
alcohol in full view of passengers, immediately prior to conducting
critical maneuvers? Maneuvers conducted aboard Costa Concordia on the
evening of January 13, 2012 were critical enough in this case to cause
the deaths of thirty two souls and the loss of one of the world's
largest and most majestic passenger vessels.
One would have to wonder just how tolerant airline passengers would
be if their pilot of a 777 jumbo-jet, consumed a bottle of wine in the
First-class cabin, immediately prior to returning to the cockpit with
an attractive passenger to ``buzz'' the tower, to salute the
controllers. Or, say, their heart surgeon consumed a bottle of wine
before performing a triple by-pass on them.
There is an assumption, in any profession, particularly those in
which we ``license'' professionals such as Ship Captains, surgeons and
airline pilots, that when we place our trust in our lives and well-
being in there ``competent and responsible'' hands, they will perform
in a sober and professional manner. From all reports, Captain Schettino
violated that sacred trust.
Such a tragedy as the loss of Costa Concordia, and the deaths of
thirty-two souls should never again be allowed to happen. One of many
changes lawmakers will need to address is substance abuse and its
effect on the Safety of Life at Sea.
There is a need to expand the mandatory alcohol/drug testing
procedure for post-incidents to put the onus on the Master and all
persons who were or should have been involved in any actions
surrounding the incident to be available for timely testing. If a
Master does not present him/herself immediately to authorities, the
Master will lose his/her license until reviewed, refusal to submit
implying presumption of guilt.
International Maritime Organization (IMO) and Alcohol Abuse
Alcohol and drug abuse have been identified both a sea and of
course ashore as the direct cause of most casualties. In the
International Labor Organization's (ILO) publication Drug and Alcohol
Prevention Programmes in the Maritime Industry (A Manual for
Planners)(Revised)'' they cite ``In 1993 the International Maritime
Organization adopted the International Safety Management (ISM) Code
(IMO Resolution A. 741(18)) which ``recognized the need for appropriate
organization of management to enable it to respond to the need of those
on board ships to achieve and maintain high standards of safety and
environmental protection'' \5\.
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\5\ Further, in November 1995 the nineteenth IMO Assembly adopted
`Guidelines for the Implementation of the ISM Code by Administrations'
(Resolution A. 788(19)). The requirements of these resolutions became
mandatory for certain types of ships on 1st July1998 with the remaining
types of ships engaged on international voyages being required to
comply by 1st July 2002.''
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The publication goes on to cite:
``Test Results of Affects of Alcohol Consumption of Job Tasks'' \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Note: This test was published in the New England Journal of
Medicine 1990; 323(7) pp. 455-461. Model JG, Mounts, LM. Drinking and
flying: The Problem of alcohol use by pilots.
1st test: Before any alcohol ingestion: 10 percent could not
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
perform all tasks correctly
2nd test: after reaching a blood alcohol concentration of
0.10/100ml; 89 percent could not perform all tasks correctly,
and
3rd test: Fourteen hours later, after all alcohol had left
their systems, 68 percent could not perform all tasks correctly
While test was performed on U.S. airline pilots on a flight
simulator, there is every reason to believe that these findings apply
equally to seafarers!''
The term ``seafarer'' should be applied to all persons working on
ships and not just those in executive or traditional maritime
positions, including hotel staff and entertainers directly employed by
the ship operators.
IMO STCW 2010 ``The Manila Amendments ``regarding Alcohol
consumption afloat.\7\
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\7\ The 2010 amendments The Manila amendments to the STCW
Convention and Code were adopted on 25 June 2010, marking a major
revision of the STCW Convention and Code. The 2010 amendments are set
to enter into force on 1 January 2012 under the tacit acceptance
procedure and are aimed at bringing the Convention and Code up to date
with developments since they were initially adopted and to enable them
to address issues that are anticipated to emerge in the foreseeable
future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Manila Amendments of the STCW convention came into force on 1st
January 2012. For the first time under STCW, mandatory limits for
alcohol consumption are also being introduced (a limit of not greater
than 0.05 percent blood alcohol level (BAC) or 0.25 mg/l alcohol in the
breath), although individual flag states may choose to apply stricter
limits.
In as much as the MV Costa Concordia disaster occurred on January
1, 2012, these statutory limits were effective and ALL hands aboard the
MV Costa Concordia from the Master down to the lowest entry level
seafarers was required to comply with these rules and Costa/Carnival
cruise lines was required responsible to enforce these statues. It was
the Master of the Costa Concordia's responsibility to ``enforce'', not
publically violate these regulations.
It's Time for Zero Tolerance
There is no argument among informed and concerned consumers (Cruise
vessel passengers) that they want to be able to ``assume'' with every
level of confidence, that the cruise ships they are embarked upon are
being operated responsibly and more importantly, soberly.
The current practices aboard almost every cruise vessel flies in
defiance and contrast to the international rules currently in effect
regarding alcohol consumption by ANY crewmembers. By definition, all
crew members embarked in any capacity have specific emergency stations
and duties, and therefore are considered ``on duty'' at all time. We
can't plan emergencies, and if ever there is a time for sober judgment
and capacities, it is in emergencies.
The IMO alcohol regulations must be in effect at all times, twenty-
four hours a day while embarked. Witnessing the . . . ``captain . . .
drinking wine . . . and in high spirits. The last drops of wine went
into the captain's glass'' openly contradicts the rules and clearly
demonstrates Costa/Carnival Lines decision to ignore the Manila
Amendments to the STCW Convention.
In fact, there are actually ``crew bars'' aboard these ships,
specifically for the purpose of facilitating alcohol consumption by
crewmembers. These crew bars are a very neat little ``profit center''
for cruise lines, with crews in excess of 1000. This facilitation, and
open alcoholic consumption of ships' senior officers and well as all
crew must be immediately discontinued. We cannot wait for the next
Captain Schettino to give the ``salute'' to innocent passengers. We may
not be so lucky next time. The ship might not capsize on rocks--she
might sink on impact.
With such large numbers of crew aboard these ``Mega Cruise Ships''
and the temptations to violate these statutory regulations of the
Manila Amendments regarding alcohol consumption, there very well may be
the need for third party-trained security officers to regularly and
randomly test the entire cruise vessel's crew, including the Master and
senior officers while embarked and underway.
This proposal will definitely be considered radical by many, but
the question then is this: is the entertainment of the ship's crew
worth the obvious risks that alcohol consumption brings to the
passengers?
It's time for ``last call'' for cruise ship Crew Bars and staff
alcohol consumption.
Insure greater checks and balances between the IMO, Classification
Societies and Flag-States for safety, security and
environmental
compliance
In recent years, there has been an ever-increasing homogenization
of duties, roles and in some cases authority between Flag State Control
(regulatory body responsible for enforcement of SOLAS Regulations) and
Classification Societies. Here in the United States, there has been a
major shift in the hands-on, on-scene inspection roles between United
Sates Coast Guard Marine Inspection personnel and Classification
(American Bureau of Shipping, Lloyds' Register, DNV, etc.) Surveyors.
Here in the United States, many of the actual inspections and
surveys included in the details of at U.S. Coast Guard Issued
Certificate of Inspection are carried out by authorized Surveyors for
Bureaus such as ABS. In essence, licensed contractors are paid to do
inspections for the Coast Guard by proxy.
While in most cases here in the USA, the oversight between the U.S.
Coast Guard and the approved Classification Societies is adequate, the
policy can sometimes lead to a less thorough and less-than-adequate
inspection of the safety and materiel condition of the ship.
When more and more inspection duties and authority is shifted to
Classification Societies, it leaves the door open for abuse and in some
cases ``conflicts of interest.''
Classification Societies are funded in full by ship owners, and
receive no governmental revenue. This creates a relationship between
the Society and the ship owner/operator which can influence not only
the thoroughness of an inspection, but in the worst cases, the validity
of the Certificates of Inspection issued as a result of their opinions.
Again, there can be little doubt in anyone's mind, that there is
SOME relationship between the sudden resignations of President of RINA,
Gianni Scerni, resigning less than a week after the loss of Costa
Concordia. RINA, the Italian Naval Register, is the classification
society that issued the Costa Concordia a certificate of seaworthiness
and safety management certificate in November 2011.
It's time to review, and in some case reverse this shifting of
responsibilities and inspection services from Flag State Inspection
Agencies to ship owner-funded Classification Societies.
If nothing else, it gives a perception of the ``Fox guarding the
Hen House.''
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) needs to become much
more proactive in demanding quality control from those flag states
becoming more and more lax in delivering quality seafarer training and
certification, and certain classification societies some ship owners
seek out for less-than-thorough inspection requirements.
Flag (States) of convenience must be sanctioned for lax standards
of inspection and certification.
Stricter compliance and audit of International Safety Management
policies and procedures, focusing on training, documentation,
drills and
oversight
I'd like to take a quick look at the Costa Concordia grounding and
subsequent mass casualty incident which is still unfolding off the
coast of Italy a month and a half after running aground and address
just a few of the failed human elements which delayed the response to
the grounding and caused over 30 dead or missing passengers.
A key element of International Safety management and a requirement
of IMO Standards of Certification Training and Watchkeeping (STCW)
regulations, is the establishment of procedures for Bridge Recourse
Management (BRM) sometimes referred to as ``Bridge Team Management''
basically synergizing professional personnel and maximum effective use
of navigation procedures and equipment such as nautical charts, radar,
and electronic navigation systems such as GPS and Electronic Chart
Display and Information Systems (ECDIS)\8\
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\8\ An Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) is a
computer-based navigation information system that complies with
International Maritime Organization (IMO) regulations and can be used
as an alternative to paper nautical charts. IMO refers to similar
systems not meeting the regulations as Electronic Chart Systems (ECS).
An ECDIS system displays the information from electronic
navigational charts (ENC) or Digital Nautical Charts (DNC) and
integrates position information from the Global Positioning System
(GPS) and other navigational sensors, such as radar and automatic
identification systems (AIS). It may also display additional
navigation-related information, such as Sailing Directions and
fathometer.
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Naturally, while understanding how to operate and obtain pertinent
information from such sophisticated navigation systems is an important
element of Bridge Recourse Management, the SINGLE most important
element is the ``Human Factor'' particularly the Master and senior
Bridge professional licensed officers and rated crewmembers such as
Helmsman and Lookouts.'
Obviously, there was a fatal failure in the Costa Concordia's
Bridge Recourse management program, costing the lives of thirty-two
innocent souls and the loss of a majestic ship.
At this point, it looks like no lives were lost upon the grounding
incident or the immediate minutes following the ship running aground.
This is important, as it denotes that in this incident, every life lost
was preventable and directly tied to the response/rescue operation. To
put it bluntly, passengers on the Costa Concordia died due to a failure
of ship's Master and key company officials to follow specific elements
of the International Safety Management (ISM) and the interface with
local port-state authority.
Specifically, the loss of lives aboard Costa Concordia was due to
failure, for whatever motives, to sound internal and external (distress
signals) immediately after the grounding and early damage assessments
which clearly indicated at least the possibility of a serious
emergency.
The International Safety Management (ISM) system is an interface
and procedural system established by the governing body for vessels on
the high-sea, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and is one
based on ISO (International Organization for Standardization) standards
which basically mandate that a company must ``say what it will do, then
do what it says'' to be compliant with ISO certification. The IMO
doesn't define what or how a company will establish its ISM procedures,
but rather outlines the items which a company ISM must cover. The IMO
leaves the details to the company to define how the company safety
management program will be delivered.
The IMO mandates that for a ship to operate on the high-seas, the
company must have a valid ``Document of Compliance'' which is issued by
an organization recognized by the Administration (which is either the
government of the country which the ship is registered and ``flagged''
in, or a recognized compliance body the government may have contracted
to perform these task, most often maritime classification societies)
which allows a ship within that company to be issued a mandatory
``Safety Management Certificate''. Under the ISM Code of 2002,
resolution A.443(XI) and resolution A.680(17) the IMO mandates
companies identify a Designated Person Ashore (DPA) who is the point of
contact for ship Captains and governing bodies when issues arise on
ships. The company is further mandated to establish all resources and
shore-based support to the DPA to support safety and pollution
prevention.
These prevention and crisis response systems and procedures must be
clearly defined and written in the company ISM policies and more
importantly procedures, which are reviewed by the issuing authority of
the ``Safety Management Certificate'' (in the case of the Costa
Concordia, the SMC was issued in November 2011 by the classification
society Registro Italiano Navale (RINA)). This all leads to the first
question that must be asked of the incident--``Was the Costa DPA
contacted?''
President of RINA, Gianni Scerni, resigned January 18, 2012, less
than a week after the Costa Concordia was stranded, and capsized,
taking thirty-two souls with her. RINA, the Italian Naval Register, is
the classification society that issued the Costa Concordia a
certificate of seaworthiness and safety management certificate in
November 2011.\9\
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\9\ The Maritime Executive: President of RINA Resigns, Possible
Consequence of Costa Concordia Incident Wednesday, January 18, 2012.
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Mandatory criminal and psychological background checks of senior
personnel
Criminal and psychological background checks of all licensed
officers, crew and key hotel/staff personnel and established standards
for refusal to employ those found with certain offenses must be
mandated.
At the present time, U.S. Federal laws and regulations require that
safety-related transportation professionals; including merchant
mariners, undergo screening to ensure that they can safely perform
their jobs. Medical certification and background checks are part of the
requirements for licensing these mariners. Certification or licensing
also includes testing workers' knowledge and skills required for the
jobs. These checks are critical because physically or mentally unfit
Mariners pose a danger to themselves and to the public. This regulation
must be extended to all cruise ship personnel aboard all ships covered
by the amended H.R. 3360 Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010.
Scheduled competency testing and recertification of key personnel by
external agencies in ISM, IMO, Flag State regulations,
procedures, and competencies, particularly regarding safety and
lifesaving
For some time now, there has been International concern regarding
``inconsistencies'' between the quality and thoroughness of critical
Safety and Competency Training and Certification, in different flag
states. The IMO has commissioned studies noting that in one particular
study, regarding ``Seafarer Certificate Forgery: The Threat Undermining
the Quality of Training'' the study results found that of a total of
fifty-four administrations participating, 11808 out of 12703 cases of
fraudulent documents were from one South Asian Country. Seafarers from
that same country constituted over 300 of the Costa Concordia's total
ship's crew at the time of the disaster.\10\
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\10\ IMO Fraudulent Documents http://www.imo.org/OurWork/
HumanElement/TrainingCerti
fication/Pages/FraudulentCertificates.aspx.
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In a recent study published by BIMCO \11\, Andrew Guest reported
''Fears That the [South Asian Country] may lose its coveted status on a
list of countries with approved maritime education systems may seem
far-fetched but are still causing jitters in the Asian country. ''
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\11\ BIMCO is the largest of the international shipping
associations representing ship-owners controlling around 65 percent of
the world's tonnage and with members in more than 120 countries drawn
from a broad range of stakeholders having a vested interest in the
shipping industry, including managers, brokers and agents.
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''For months, the country that is the biggest supplier of seagoing
labour has been under the shadow of an investigation by the European
Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) that could result in some and perhaps all
South Asian Country] certificates of competency no longer being
recognized by the European Union (EU).'' \12\
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\12\ https://www.bimco.org/News/2012/02/15_Feature_Week_07.aspx.
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Obviouly, there is concern amoung some of Europe's leading maritime
nations regarding the quality of training and documentation of
seafarers from around the world. It's time the United States take a
proactive position on ensuring the validity and competency standards of
seafarers responsible for the safety of our U.S. citizens embarked on
international cruise ships.
We also propose Universal Criminal Statutes for Masters and Crew
who leave a serious incident. Minimum sentencing for reckless
abandonment, causing injury or death to passengers of at least 5-10
years per death and 3-5 years for injury per passenger should be served
in the United States' Federal prison system.
No financial limits on responsibilities (Unlimited Liability) to
parties
involved
Amid the Costa Concordia tragedy, it seems very likely that cruise
passengers will have to file any lawsuits in Genoa, Italy, where the
cases will be subject to Italian law. Courts in the United States have
consistently upheld the choice of law clauses contained in cruise
passenger tickets absent evidence that ``enforcement would be
unreasonable and unjust,'' ``the clause was invalid for such reasons as
fraud or overreaching'', or ``the enforcement would contravene a strong
public policy of the forum in which the suit is brought''.
More importantly, as part of this comprehensive system, the Athens
Convention allows the carrier to limit its liability for passenger
personal injury or death in the absence of its reckless misconduct. The
current monetary limitation in U.S. dollars is approximately $72,000.
The operative words are ``in the absence of [the carrier's] reckless
misconduct.'' Specifically, Article 13 of the Athens Convention
provides that the carrier will lose its right to limit liability where
it is proven that the damage resulted from an act or omission done with
intent to cause damage or recklessly and with the knowledge that such
damage would probably result.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ What are Costa Concordia Cruise Passengers' Rights under the
Athens Convention? JANUARY 18, 2012 by Leesfield & Partners, P.A.
(@leesfield)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It seems clear that loss of a human life is worth more than
$72,000. In 1990; Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA90)
lifting any liability limits for oil spills. The question then would
be, is our environment worth more than human life? The Athens
Convention has to be dissolved and ANY limitations of liability for
loss of life or injuries aboard Cruise Ships must be removed in the
amended H.R. 3360 ``Cruise Ship Security and Safety Act of 2010.''
Ticketing ``Fine Print''
Cruise lines have made the ``fine print'' contained in the tickets
too one sided \14\. Passengers are engaging in a ``contract'' between
themselves and the ship operator. They should not be compelled to
``waive'' any rights to claims under the jurisdiction o this Act,
merely to by granted boarding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ (Reuters) By Tom Hals, Andrew Longstreth and Steve Stecklow
Tue Feb 21, 2012 6:14am GMT ``The cruise business--led by industry
giant Carnival Corp. & PLC, whose Italian subsidiary owned and operated
the doomed Costa Concordia--has put in place over the years a legal
structure that ring-fences operators from big-money lawsuits.
The rules for seeking redress are spelled out in complex, multi-
page ticket contracts that passengers may not receive until right
before boarding. Victims are often required to file suits in remote
jurisdictions. The wording has been the subject of decades of court
battles. Thomas Dickerson, a New York state judge who has written
extensively on travel law, says the legal hurdles resulting from the
industry's victories over the years give operators the upper hand in
litigation and make the business highly profitable. The industry faces
``fewer payouts because of all the roadblocks,'' he said. Cruise
industry officials say their contracts streamline the litigation
process, prevent frivolous claims and lower cruise costs for
passengers.
In the case of the Costa Concordia wreck, the ticket contract
stated that ``all claims, controversies, disputes, suits and matters of
any kind whatsoever . . . shall be instituted only in the courts of
Genoa, Italy.'' Many survivors are now discovering the challenges of
the Italian court system. Italian lawyers rarely accept cases on a
contingency basis, so clients may have to pay them up front to take a
case. And personal-injury cases can drag on for years, especially if
there is a parallel criminal investigation. The Costa Concordia's
captain is under investigation for allegedly abandoning ship. That
probe must be completed before evidence will be made available to
plaintiff attorneys in civil cases, said Alexander Guttieres, a Rome
lawyer who has litigated major personal-injury cases.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tickets purchased in USA through ANY Agent, or sub agent for any
Cruise Ship, whatever her National Registry, working directly or
indirectly for Cruise ship operator or owner must include the
statement: ``All rights and protections under the amended Cruise Vessel
Safety and Security Act of 2010'' are granted under this contract for
passage. These rights should extend to any excursions of activities
purchase or engaged while on the ship during this passage.
Ticket fine print must be eliminated. Passengers should not be
forced to surrender ANY rights for claims under the intent of this Act
(HR3360). Just as we now have warnings on cigarette packages, Cruise
Ship tickets should advise passengers of the right to retain all legal
and civil rights.
Cruise Vessel Emergency Response Trust Fund
The proposed amendment provides funding for responses to Cruise
Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010 events provided certain criteria
are met. The responsible party is liable for Federal emergency rescue,
response, salvage and cleanup costs and damages as detailed in Cruise
Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010. Federal agencies assisting in a
response action may be reimbursed. Several other Federal agencies may
provide financial support for removal actions.
The Cruise Vessel Emergency Response Contingency Plan is the
Federal Government's blueprint for responding to large cruise vessel
emergencies. The proposed National Cruise Vessel Emergency Response
Contingency Plan is the result of our country's efforts to develop a
national response capability and promote overall coordination among the
hierarchy of responders and contingency plans. All of these actions
contribute to providing financial incentives for compliance.
Failure to carry out Rescue Operations, utilizing an adequate
Contingency Plan and failure to establish an Incident Command
system, utilizing a Unified Command . . . Never Again
It bothers me very much that 3 days after the tragic grounding,
local (Italian) rescue agencies quickly shifted from ``rescue''
operations to Salvage/Recover operations (shifting priorities and
resources from any concentrated effort to safe those who may still be
trapped below decks on this over-turned but not sunken ship, protecting
the pristine environment of the island). In fact, news reports stated
that local churches prayed on the Sunday following the tragic disaster
to ``spare the Island of Giglio from an environmental disaster which
would destroy their tourism and economy, and `Oh yes,' the souls of
those lost in the disaster''.
I am reminded that one and a half years ago, thirty three Chilean
miners became trapped miles below ground in what seemed to be a
hopeless situation. Instead, as the world watched, a quiet nation at
the Southern tip of the Earth mobilized. From their President on down,
mine officials, engineers, construction workers and others banded
together with just about the entire Chilean population--and they
created a miracle.
The whole world watched and prayed as what appeared to be a
hopeless situation evolved through little glimmers of hope and tireless
work on the part of the people of Chile into that miracle.
There wasn't a dry eye in the world, as the first through the last
miner came up that elevator to safety, a full SIXTY-NINE DAYS after
that accident.
On Friday, the 13th of January, 2012 an Italian flag passenger
ship, driven by an Italian Captain, went aground off an Italian Island.
The Captain's actions caused the grounding, his subsequent lack of
competence, leadership, and most of all courage led to at least thirty-
two souls dead or presumed dead.
Granted, we all saw a couple of salvage teams diving, as the
magnificent vessel slides closer and closer to sinking, but there was
NEVER any national mobilization of forces and resources, both
governmental or non-governmental, to try to save those remaining souls
who could be trapped in the hundreds of pockets throughout the ship in
a timely manner.
Three days after the sinking, with the ship is lying on its side
rescues efforts turned to recovery efforts. The Costa Concordia is less
than 150 feet wide at her maximum beam. Last year the Chileans drilled
over a mile into the rock and extricated thirty three miners trapped
for 69 days! It appears that the Italian Captain isn't the only guy or
responsible party or agency that ran (or fell) away from lives in peril
on the sea.
Just a comparison as to how some nations react to tragedy. Some
turn it into victories; others sit around and wait for time to complete
the tragedy.
Never was there any demonstration of an implementation of a
Contingency Plan; nor the establishment of any kind of Incident Command
System, which could have maximized rescue recourses through a ``Unified
Command.''
If I were asked to give you the very best examples of successful
examples of ``Unified Command'' response I would be torn between three.
Probably the most famous would be the rescue of a half million British
troops off the beaches of Dunkirk, France in 1939; and more recently
the successful rescue of every single one of the thirty-nine Chilean
Coal Miners, buried miles beneath the surface of the Earth, and of
course, our own Incident Unified Command response to last year's
Deepwater Horizon oil spill, utilizing Contingency Planning and
Response Plans and Finance Structure through the Oil Pollution Act of
1990 (OPA 90). Contingency Planning, the Incident Command and Unified
Command Systems work. It's time to translate these into a unified
maritime safety program.
Establish and fund the Cruise Vessel Emergency Response Trust Fund
Under the proposed amended Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of
2010, the owner or operator of a vessel on which a violation or
emergency incident occurs (also known as the Responsible Party) is
liable for all of the costs associated with the incident and any
damages resulting from the incident (not limited to pollution but for
the real costs of the rescue efforts, both governmental and non-
governmental).
Once every possible effort has been made to rescue every person
involved in a Cruise Vessel Emergency, the USCG and FBI's first
priority is to ensure that responsible parties pay to effect effective
and appropriate emergency response to their own emergency incidents.
However, when the responsible party is unknown or refuses to pay, funds
from the Cruise Vessel Emergency Response Trust Fund can be used to
cover removal costs or damages resulting from cruise vessel emergency
responses.
The primary source of revenue for the Cruise Vessel Emergency
Response Trust Fund is a $10.00 per passenger day fee on all U.S.
citizen passengers aboard any cruise ship on which passage (tickets)
were sold in the United States, and all passengers aboard all cruise
ships which embark passengers in United States (or its territories)
ports, whether passengers are U.S. citizens or foreign Citizens.. Other
revenue sources for the Cruise Vessel Emergency Response Trust Fund
include interest on the fund, cost recovery from the parties
responsible for the Cruise ship emergency incidents and any fines or
civil penalties collected. The Fund is administered by the U.S. Coast
Guard's Cruise Vessel Emergency Funds Center (NCVEFC).
Require adequate Certificates of Financial Responsibility (COFR)
for ALL cruise vessels where any part of this act applies. COFR shows
the funding availability and name of Company-Qualified Individual (QI)
authorized to disburse funds by responsible party (ies).
The Cruise Vessel Emergency Response Trust Fund can provide up to
$1 billion for any one cruise vessel emergency incident and claims in
connection with any single incident. The main uses of Cruise Vessel
Emergency Response Trust Fund expenditures are:
State Authority access for response actions.
Costs incurred in emergency response.
Payment of claims for uncompensated response and salvage costs
and damages, and
Research and development and other specific appropriations.
Summation: Paraphrasing Robert Kennedy paraphrasing Bernard
Shaw: ``Some men see things as they are and say `Why?' I dream
of things as they that never were; and say `Why Not?' ''
Why not make H.R. 3360; The Cruise Ship Security and Safety Act of
2010'' strong enough to prevent future Costa Concordia disasters?
The Chairman. Thank you, Captain. We've been joined by
Senator Klobuchar and you're welcome to say a couple words.
Senator Klobuchar. I do not need to.
The Chairman. OK.
Now Dr. Ross Klein, who is Professor, School of Social
Work--I identify with that--St. John's College, Memorial
University, Canada, welcome.
STATEMENT OF ROSS A. KLEIN, Ph.D., PROFESSOR,
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL WORK, ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE,
MEMORIAL UNIVERSITY OF NEWFOUNDLAND
Dr. Klein. Thank you. It is an honor to be asked to share
my knowledge and my insights with the U.S. Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation. In my brief oral
comments I will identify some of the key points in my written
submission.
First, I will discuss safety and security issues related to
cruise ships. There are a number of issues. One issue is on-
board crime. Between October 1, 2007, and September 30, 2008,
the cruise industry reported 421 incidents of crime to the FBI.
These include 115 simple assaults, 16 assaults with serious
bodily injury, 101 thefts and 154 sex-related incidents, more
than 17 percent of which were against children under the age of
18, and in that data the rate of sexual assault on Carnival
Cruise Lines was 50 percent higher than the rate of sexual
assault in Canada.
The data was accessed through a request under the Freedom
of Information Act. Unfortunately, given the wording of the
Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010, comparable data
is not available for subsequent years so it is impossible to
judge whether things are getting better or getting worse. An
analysis of these crimes is in my written testimony, Appendix
B.
A second issue is whether cruise ships, as the industry
often claims, are the safest mode of commercial transportation.
Appendix A presents various events at sea--ships that have
sunk, 16 between 1980 and 2012; ships that have run aground, 99
between 1973 and 2011; ships that have experienced fires, 79
between 1990 and 2011; ships that have had collisions, 73
between 1990 and 2011; and ships that have gone adrift or have
had other issues that could be seen to pose a safety risk, 100
between 2000 and 2011. These events speak for themselves.
A third set of issues comes directly from the Costa
Concordia disaster, the challenge of abandoning a ship within
the 30-minute time period after an abandoned ship call, as
dictated by the Convention on Safety of Life at Sea.
A large ship in 1974, when this regulation was established,
accommodated less than 3,000 passengers and crew, one-third the
number of the largest ships today.
Also, the ability to comply with the requirement that
lifeboats can be deployed on a ship listing up to 20 degrees.
Reports I have seen are that the Costa Concordia was listing 20
degrees and that lifeboats on one side could not be used. As
well, changes in the manner in which muster drills are run
today as compared to earlier times. There is still a question
whether industry commitments are adequate.
Other issues worthy of comment are the fact that the Costa
Concordia did not have a functioning black box when it
experienced this tragic accident and, thus, much objective data
is lacking.
The crew training for dealing with crime scenes is
inadequate and that onboard security as cruise ship employees
is not in a position to objectively investigate crimes on board
cruise ships.
And finally, the passengers on cruise ships are treated
differently by the Death on the High Seas Act than passengers
on aircraft, an anomaly that appears unwarranted.
The second area I discuss in my written testimony is
environmental concerns. I compliment the U.S. Congress for its
endorsement of the North American Emission Control Area and I
applaud the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for its plan
to extend regulations pertaining to the discharge of gray water
in U.S. waters.
However, I express concern that the U.S. is an anomaly in
the world by allowing discharge of treated sewage within three
miles of the coast, untreated sewage between three and 12
miles.
I also address shortcomings to the advanced wastewater
treatment systems and of marine sanitation devices, both of
which discharge treated sewage so it can discharge in areas
where discharge or gray water is prohibited; the problem posed
by permitting sewage sludge dumping at sea, which is often
considered treated sewage; the lack of adequate regulation of
onboard incinerators and problems associated with dumping at
sea of solid waste including incinerator ash.
Finally, I discuss the patchwork of widely varying
environmental regulations across coastal states in the U.S. and
I advocate for reconsideration of the previously introduced
Clean Cruise Ship Act in order to bring consistency across
jurisdictions in the U.S.
The third area I discussed in my written testimony is
qualifications of medical care staff and medical care provided
on cruise ships and illness on cruise ships.
There are four issues. One relates to the qualifications of
onboard medical staff, something that was supposed to be
addressed by the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act.
However, the provisions are inadequate and leave less
protection to passengers and to victims of sexual assault than
I believe was the intent of the legislation's authors. A second
issue is medical malpractice and liability, that a cruise ship
is not fully responsible or liable for improper medical care
provided by its medical personnel, a loophole in U.S. law that
should be addressed.
The third issue is norovirus and how the industry can more
effectively deal with the problem with greater transparency and
without creating incentives that indirectly encourage spread of
illness. Already this year we've seen 1,725 people reporting
ill on cruise ships.
Finally, I discuss the case where potable water on as many
as 50 cruise ships was potentially contaminated, leaving many
at risk. Unfortunately, information about the situation was
sealed in 2006 by the High Court in the U.K., making it near
impossible to gain full and complete knowledge about the
problem. It is still difficult to secure reliable information.
I wish I could go into greater detail in these oral
comments. I invite questions to allow me to expand further on
any of these issues. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Klein follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ross A. Klein, Ph.D. *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\*\ Ross A. Klein, Ph.D., is an international authority on the
cruise ship industry. He has published four books, six monographs/
reports for nongovernmental organizations, and more than two dozen
articles and book chapters. He is a professor at Memorial University of
Newfoundland in St. John's, Newfoundland, Canada and is online at
www.cruisejunkie.com.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table of Contents
Oral Testimony
Written Testimony
I. Safety and Security Issues
Onboard Crime
Persons Overboard
Abandoning a Ship in an Emergency
Crew Training
Muster Drills
Functionality of Life-Saving Equipment
Shipboard Black Boxes
Crime Reporting
Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA)
II. Environmental Issues
North American Emission Control Area
Regulation of Grey Water
Regulation of Sewage
Sewage Treatment
Marine Sanitation Devices (MSD)
Advanced Wastewater Treatment Systems (AWTS)
Sewage Sludge
Incinerators
Solid Waste
Oily Bilge
Patchwork of Regulations and the Clean Cruise Ship Act
III. Medical Care and Illness
Malpractice and Liability
Norovirus and Other Illness Outbreaks
Potable Water
IV. Labour Issues
U.S. Congressional Interest
U.S. Courts and Labor
Arbitration Clauses
Crew Member Work Conditions
Appendix A: Events at Sea
Appendix B: Analysis of Crime Reports Received by the FBI from Cruise
Ships, 2007-2008
______
Oral Testimony
It is an honor to be asked to share my knowledge and insights with
the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. In
my brief oral remarks I will identify some of the key points in my
written submission.
First, I will discuss safety and security issues relating to cruise
ships. There are a number of issues:
One issue is onboard crime--between October 1, 2007 and September
30, 2008, the cruise industry reported 421 incidents of crime to the
FBI. These include 115 simple assaults, 16 assaults with serious bodily
injury, 101 thefts, and 154 sex related incidents. The data was
accessed through a request under the Freedom of Information Act.
Unfortunately, given the wording of the Cruise Vessel Security and
Safety Act of 2010, comparable data is not available for subsequent
years, so it is impossible to judge whether things are getting better
or worse. An analysis of these crimes is in Appendix B.
A second issue is whether cruise ships, as the industry often
claims, are the safest mode of commercial transportation. Appendix A
presents various events at sea: ships that have sunk, 1980-2012 (n=16);
ships that have run aground, 1973-2011 (99); ships that have
experienced fires, 1990-2011 (n=79); ships that have had collisions,
1990-2011 (n=73); and ships that have gone adrift or have had other
issues that could be seen to pose a safety risk, 2000-2011 (n=100).
These events speak for themselves.
A third set of issues comes directly from the Costa Concordia
disaster: the challenge of abandoning a ship within the thirty minute
period after an abandon ship call, as dictated by the Convention on
Safety of Life at Sea (a large cruise ship in 1974 when the regulation
was established accommodated less than 3,000 passengers and crew, one-
third the number on the largest ships today; the ability to comply with
the requirement that lifeboats can be deployed on a ship listing up to
20 degrees (reports I have seen are that the Costa Concordia was
listing 20 degrees and that lifeboats on one side could not be used);
and changes in the manner in which muster drills are run today as
compared to earlier times--there is still question whether industry
commitments are adequate. Other issues worthy of comment are the fact
that the Costa Concordia did not have a functioning black box when it
experienced its tragic accident and thus much objective data is
lacking; that crew training for dealing with crime scenes is inadequate
and that onboard security (as cruise ship employees) is not in a
position to objectively investigate crimes onboard cruise ships; and
that passengers on cruise ships are treated differently by the Death on
the High Seas Act than passengers on aircraft--an anomaly that appears
unwarranted. In my written testimony I discuss several changes that
need to be considered to the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act,
including the need for public reporting of all alleged crimes on cruise
ships.
The second area I discuss in my written testimony is environmental
concerns. I compliment the U.S. Congress for its endorsement of the
North American Emission Control Area and I applaud the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency for its plan to extend regulations
pertaining to discharge of grey water in U.S. waters. However, I
express concern that the U.S. is an anomaly in the world by allowing
discharge of treated sewage within three miles of the coast; untreated
sewage between three and twelve miles. I also address shortcomings of
Advanced Wastewater Treatment Systems (AWTS) and of marine sanitation
devices (MSDs), both of which discharge ``treated sewage'' so can
discharge in areas where discharge of grey water is prohibited; the
problem posed by permitting sewage sludge dumping at sea (which is also
often considered treated sewage); the lack of adequate regulation of
onboard incinerators; and problems associated with dumping at sea of
solid waste (including incinerator ash). Finally, I discuss the
patchwork of widely varying environmental regulations across coastal
states in the U.S. and I advocate for reconsideration of the previously
introduced Clean Cruise Ship Act in order to bring consistency across
jurisdictions in the U.S.
The third area I discuss in my written testimony is qualifications
of medical care staff and the medical care provided on cruise ships,
and illness on cruise ships. There are four issues. One relates to the
qualifications of onboard medical staff, something that was supposed to
be addressed by the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act, however the
provisions are inadequate and leave less protection to passengers and
to victims of sexual assault than I believe was the intent of the
legislation's authors. A second issue is medical malpractice and
liability--that a cruise ship is not fully responsible or liable for
improper medical care provided by its medical personnel; a loophole in
U.S. law that should be addressed. The third issue is norovirus and how
the industry can more effectively deal with the problem--with greater
transparency, and without creating incentives that indirectly encourage
spread of the illness. Finally, I discuss a case where potable water on
as many as 50 cruise ships was potentially contaminated, leaving many
U.S. passengers at risk. Unfortunately, information about the situation
was sealed in 2006 by the High Court in the UK, making it near-
impossible to gain full and complete knowledge about the problem; it is
still difficult to secure reliable information.
I wish I could go into greater detail in these oral comments. I
invite questions to allow me to expand further on any of these issues.
Written Testimony
It is an honor to be asked to share my knowledge and insights with
the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. My
testimony focuses on the parameters I was given when I was invited to
testify:
safety and security issues relating to cruise ships (i.e.,
onboard crime; persons overboard; abandoning ship in an
emergency, including muster drills and crew training; shipboard
black boxes; crime reporting; and the Death on the High Seas
Act (DOHSA)).
environmental issues related to cruise ships (i.e, the North
American Emission Control Area; regulation of grey water,
sewage, sewage sludge, and limitations of marine sanitation
devices (MSDs) and advanced wastewater treatments systems
(AWTS); incinerator air emissions; solid waste; oily bilge; and
the patchwork of regulations around the U.S. and the not-
enacted Clean Cruise Ship Act).
medical care and illness on cruise ships (i.e., medical
malpractice and liability, norovirus and other illness
outbreaks, and issues relating to potable water).
Labor issues (i.e., the absence of labor laws governing
hours of work and remuneration, and the use of arbitration
clauses to truncate worker rights to use U.S. courts to address
injuries and onboard injustice).
I. Safety and Security Issues
The Costa Concordia disaster has refocused attention on cruise ship
safety and security. Following this tragic event, the cruise industry
predictably repeated its mantra that cruise ships are the safest mode
of commercial transportation. They often cite a 1996 Coast Guard
``comprehensive safety study that concluded the cruise industry is the
safest form of commercial transportation.'' \1\ The study was based on
Bureau of Transportation statistics and compared accidents involving
occupants of cruise ships with those involving motor vehicles
(including occupants, pedestrians, and pedacyclists), and U.S. air
carriers; it compared fatalities (natural deaths and those caused by
injury), injuries requiring more than first aid, and ``accidents/
incidents'' (left undefined). The study apparently did not consider
sexual assaults. Since the study period (1990-1994), the number of
cruise ships and cruise passengers has more than tripled and the
industry has undergone considerable change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See CLIA website, ``Safety Standards, April 2006.''
, Accessed April 11, 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rather than accept the industry's claim at face value, it is
important to consider the history of accidents and occurrences on
cruise ships. Appendix A provides a list of known incidents where
cruise ships have sunk; run aground; experienced onboard fires;
collided with other ships, quays, or objects; and other significant
problems such as loss of power and going adrift, severe lists,
encounters with storms, etc. The Appendix does not include the many
cases where ships operate with engines that are not functioning or have
``mechanical issues'' such that ports are missed and itineraries
changed. The reader can judge, after reviewing Appendix A, whether
cruise ships are truly as safe a mode of transportation as the cruise
industry claims.
Onboard Crime
There have previously been hearings on onboard crime, particularly
sexual assaults and disappearances. I will not rehash what has already
been presented to these esteemed committees, however I call your
attention to my previous testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on
Surface Transportation and Transportation and Merchant Marine
Infrastructure, Safety, and Security on June 19, 2008. I have also
attached Appendix B, which presents analysis of reported crimes to the
FBI from October 1, 2007 to September 30, 2008. The data speaks for
itself: 115 simple assaults, 16 assaults with serious bodily injury,
101 thefts, and 154 sex related incidents.
Perhaps the most distressing findings is the number of onboard
sexual assaults--more than 17 percent against children under the age of
18--a rate that on Carnival Cruise Lines in 2007-08 is 50 percent
higher than the rate for sexual assault in Canada (using the same
definition for sexual assault for ships as on land). Royal Caribbean
International in the period 2003-2005 had a rate comparable to Carnival
Cruise Lines, but reduced the onboard rate by about half between 2003-
2005 and 2007-2008. They are to be complemented.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Klein, Ross A. and Jill Poulston. 2011. ``Sex at Sea: Sexual
Crimes Aboard Cruise Ships,'' Tourism in Marine Environments, 7:2, pp.
67-80.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When one thinks about what can be done it is still timely to refer
to two reports completed by consultants for Royal Caribbean in 1999.
They had been charged with making recommendations for preventing sexual
harassment and assault. The problem was obvious. As one report stated,
``. . . improper activity occurs frequently aboard cruise ships, but
goes unreported and/or unpunished.'' \3\ The other report acknowledged:
``crew members generally understand that if they commit an offence and
are caught they are most likely going to lose their job and be returned
home, but not spend time in jail.'' \4\ (Greenwood, 1999: 4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Krohn, Kay. 1999. Unpublished consultant's report examining
current efforts of Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. In the area of
preventing sexual harassment and assault. May 26.
\4\ Greenwood, Don. 1999. ``Reducing Sexual Assaults on Cruise
Ships: Risk Assessment and Recommendations.'' Unpublished consultant's
report. June 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The reports make a range of recommendations, including:
increased video surveillance of high risk areas (including
the disco bar and dance area, main service corridors on crew
decks and key intersections on passenger decks, and youth
activity areas);
cameras already in place be monitored periodically, at least
on a random basis, and be recorded at all times;
an increase in the number of security staff by two per ship;
increased training and education of staff and crew members;
responses to sexual harassment and assault be standardized
across brands and ships;
training for medical personnel include an interview protocol
for sexual assault incidents;
that a staff member be identified and assigned
responsibility to serve as an advocate for the target of sexual
harassment or assault;
that a shore side hotline be established to receive
telephone reports of wrongdoing and that investigations be
consistent and evenly handled.
better educating passengers and better signage onboard
demarcating areas that are ``off limits'' to passengers.
These recommendations are great, but many had not been implemented
before passage of the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010,
and many have still not been fully implemented.
In addition to sexual assaults, Appendix B shows there is a fair
number of assaults and thefts. Admittedly, many assaults are between
traveling companions and can be considered a case of domestic violence;
but not all. Take the case of San Diego grocer Scott Boney who in
September 2007 went on Carnival Cruise Lines' Elation to celebrate his
fiftieth birthday with his wife and a number of friends. On the first
night of the cruise, he was pushed down a flight of stairs by a twenty-
one year old fellow passenger. When he was found he was nonresponsive.
Seven months later he still couldn't speak or write, couldn't stand on
his own, was fed through a stomach tube, and didn't appear to recognize
many family members and friends who visit or help care for him.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ See Boney v. Carnival Corporation, Case No. 08-22299-CIV, U.S.
District Court, Southern district of Florida, Miami Civil Division;
Darce, Keith. 2008. ``Rehabilitation Slow, Uncertain for Grocer Hurt in
Cruise Ship Fall,'' San Diego Union Tribune, April 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I mention the Boney case because two relevant issues are
highlighted. One is the question of whether there is adequate security
personnel on cruise ships. This is a theme that has repeatedly been
raised as concerns incidents of sexual assault.
Of particular note in those cases is not just the number of
security staff, but the training of those personnel. Several cases
indicate security personnel may not be adequately trained to deal with
crimes and with crime scenes. A model course on ``Crime Prevention,
Detection, Evidence Preservation and Reporting,'' developed by the U.S.
Coast Guard, FBI, and Maritime Administration in July 2011, and
recently implemented, devotes a total of 3.5 hours to actions to
preserve crime scenes and crime scene reporting and documentation,
considerably less than the 40 hour course advocated by International
Cruise Victims Association. The course is taught online; not in-person.
This might be sufficient as a refresher for already-trained
individuals, but not for those who appear to serve those roles on
cruise ships. As related by Laurie Dishman after her 2007 testimony
before the House of Representatives:
I didn't know who to call, because my rapist was supposedly
``security''. I told [my friend] what had happened, and we
decided to call the Purser's desk, which prompted two officers
to come to our cabin. Instead of securing the cabin, they sat
on the bed, where the rape occurred. Eventually, I was
permitted to go to the ship's doctor, but he told [my friend]
and I to go back to our cabin and collect the sheets & clothing
from the incident and to place then in plastic bags, which they
had provided.\6\
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\6\ Dishman, Laurie. 2007. ``Laurie Dishman.'' International Cruise
Victims Association.
The other issue is the responsible serving of alcohol. The bar tab
of Mr. Boney and one of his friends shows the purchase of 24 drinks (at
a cost of more than $250) and several bottles of wine between ten
people over dinner from the time they boarded the ship to 11 PM.
Depositions taken in the court case indicate Mr. Boney was intoxicated.
There are other cases where intoxication has been a factor in grave
events. Take the case of Lyndsay O'Brien, an Irish 15-year-old who on
January 2, 2006, fell overboard from the Costa Magic after being served
a lethal amount of alcohol. Also consider page 10 of Appendix B, which
shows alcohol is involved in at least 62.5 percent of onboard assaults
with serious bodily injury, 35 percent of simple assaults, and 36
percent of sexual assaults. While this data suggests greater concern
with responsible serving of alcohol and curtailing alcohol misuse, some
cruise lines now offer ``all you can drink'' packages at flat rates for
the duration of a cruise. Bar sales is one of the top sources of
onboard revenue for cruise ships.
There is a third issue with regard to shipboard security. Unlike
police in a community setting, who are objective and are a
disinterested party in their investigation, shipboard security
personnel are compromised by the fact that they must investigate crimes
onboard a ship where their own employer may be complicit in, or party
to the crime. Can these security personnel truly act in a
disinterested, objective manner that places the interests of the victim
above those of the organization from which they receive their paycheck
and continued employment? It is difficult to imagine that onboard
security can reasonably be viewed as parallel to the quality and
objectivity of a land-based, community police force. This is a
disservice to crime victims on a cruise ship.
Persons Overboard
The issue of persons overboard has already been discussed at
previous Congressional hearings in December 13, 2005, March 7, 2006,
March 27, 2007, September 19, 2007, and June 19, 2008. While the cruise
industry tends to view these incidents as comprising accidents and
suicides, this is not supported by the 177 incidents recorded since
2000.\7\ Admittedly, many incidents are intentional suicides--the 15
year old child who leaves a note after fighting with his parents, the
82 year old man who goes missing in the North Atlantic, and cases where
a spouse jumps overboard after an argument--and some are accidents,
such as the 23-year-old man who fell overboard while urinating over the
side as the ship steamed away from San Juan (he swam to shore), or a
19-year-old man who climbed over a railing and threatened to kill
himself after an argument with his girlfriend; when his girlfriend
pleaded with him to climb to safety he complied but slipped and fell
overboard. However, there are at least two known murders (and a third
where a body was thrown overboard to hide a murder), a number of cases
where a severely intoxicated person bent over a railing to vomit, and
many incidents that are mysterious.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ See www.cruisejunkie.com/Overboard.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is the mysterious incidents that raise the most concern. These
are people who have given no sign of being suicidal, are happy and
enjoying the cruise (often with family members along), and then go
missing. Congressional hearings have already heard about some of these
cases: Merrian Carver, Annette Mizener, and Hue Pham and Hue Tram, to
name a few. In these cases, video surveillance footage was not made
available--in the case of Annette Mizener the camera had been covered
with a map or newspaper. Interestingly, video surveillance footage is
readily available when it confirms the incident is a suicide or
accident, but is not available in these incidents that remain a
mystery. The situation suggests there is need for better video coverage
of deck areas and that video feeds be monitored in real time, at least
on a random basis and at times when these incidents most frequently
occur.
Another issue is the cost borne by U.S. taxpayers when the U.S.
Coast Guard is enlisted to search for a missing passenger. This expense
is not trivial. In just one case--that of Michelle Vilborg who went
missing 70 miles southwest of Pensacola, Florida on June 15, 2009--the
total cost incurred during the search was estimated by the Coast Guard
to be $813,807.\8\ This is on a not-cost-recovery basis. It would seem
that the cruise corporation (Carnival Corporation in this case) could
be held liable for a portion these costs. In 2009 the corporation
earned $1.790 billion in net income. Despite the U.S. corporate tax
rate of 35 percent, Carnival Corporation's corporate tax paid in the
U.S. in 2009, as a Panamanian-register corporation, was 0.9 percent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ The figure is in a response to a FOIA request, #09-4707: Linda
Griesman Christopherson; Requesting the Coast Guard cost that was
incurred in the search for Michelle Vilborg, letter dated October 15,
2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One additional issue is proper detection of persons overboard. The
Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act requires that ``the vessel shall
integrate technology that can be used for capturing images of
passengers or detecting passengers who have fallen overboard, to the
extent that such technology is available.'' \9\ The degree to which the
cruise industry has complied with this requirement is entirely unclear.
There may be additional camera surveillance (but no indication that
this is the case), however there has not been adoption of any of the
active measures recommended by the International Cruise Victims
Association in discussions with the industry prior to the legislation
being passed. There are many systems available, many manufactured and
marketed in the U.S., but none of these appear to be under
consideration for adoption, no doubt because of the cost involved.\10\
In addition, the U.S. Coast Guard posted a Federal Register Request for
Input from the Industry, and received a number of proposals, but there
is no indication that these have been acted upon.\11\
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\9\ See Sec. 3507(a)(1)(D).
\10\ For a description of systems available see ``Man-Overboard
Devices,'' Motor Boating, April 11, 2011.
\11\ It appears proposals were received from Seafaring Security
Systems and Radio Zealand DMP Americas, along with supporting
documentation, as posted on the U.S. Coast Guard website.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Abandoning Ship in an Emergency
The Costa Concordia disaster brought to the forefront concerns
about the ability for a ship to be abandoned within the requisite 30
minutes from an abandon ship call, as required by the Convention of
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). While the cruise industry might argue
that larger ships cannot meet the 30-minute requirement and the period
of time should be extended, this gets at the crux of the matter. A
catastrophic event, such as seen with the Estonia, which in 1994 sunk
in 30 minutes with loss of 852 lives, does not allow for a luxury of
time. On some large ships today it could conceivably take a passenger,
especially one with mobility issues, 30 minutes to get to a lifeboat
station.
There are two issues at play. First, how large can a ship become
before it is no longer feasible for the number of people onboard to be
offloaded within a reasonable timeframe. When the SOLAS requirement was
promulgated a large ship accommodated 2,000 passengers and crew. The
Costa Concordia had more than twice that number, and the largest ships
afloat today have more than four times that number--more than 6,200
passengers and 2,500 crew members. There need to be drills and tests to
determine whether current systems for abandoning ship can meet the
SOLAS requirement; they should be required by the U.S., given that
otherwise compliance with SOLAS is left with the country where the ship
is registered, most commonly Panama or the Bahamas.
Second, related to the issue of increasing size is ship design.
There needs to be consideration for width of passageways, width of
stairwells, and the ease with which passengers can make their way from
cabins and entertainment areas to their muster stations. That which is
practical when people are calm and orderly is quite different, as can
be seen in video from the Costa Concordia, than what is possible in the
frenzy of an emergency.
A related issue also follows from SOLAS requirements. They dictate
that lifeboats can be deployed when a ship is listing by 20 degrees or
less. This did not appear to be the case with the Costa Concordia. If
this requirement cannot be met, then consideration needs to be given to
alternative methods of evacuation and that there be sufficient life-
saving equipment on both sides of the ship for the full complement of
passengers and crew. While the Captain of the Costa Concordia has
shouldered responsibility for the cause of the accident, it has not
been sufficiently acknowledged that he likely saved 100s or 1000s of
lives by maneuvering the ship to run aground close to shore, making
evacuation by helicopter practical.
Three other issues are brought to the forefront by the Costa
Concordia: crew training, muster drills, and functionality of life-
saving equipment.
Crew training. There is no basis on which to say that crew was not
adequately trained on the Costa Concordia. However, what can be said is
that the multiple languages used on board led to increased confusion
and messages were not always clearly available to all passengers. This
suggests the U.S. Coast Guard pay particular attention to the ability
for all crew to speak and understand English on cruise operating out of
U.S. ports of call.
While there are conflicting reports, it also appears that crew
members (some at least--there were many others who were notably heroic
in their efforts) forgot their training and their responsibility by
failing to keep passengers calm and by not providing sufficient
assistance with getting to muster stations and getting off the ship. It
isn't just a matter of some senior officers not remaining onboard until
all passengers and crew were safely evacuated, but also that there are
some reports of crew members trading priority on lifeboats for money,
and others leaving the ship before they had completed all of their
responsibilities. This underlines the need for additional training and
additional drills for how to respond when an emergency occurs.
Muster drills. Cruise ships have appeared to become complacent
about lifeboat drills. When I was cruising in the 1960s, 1970s, and
early 1990s there was always a lifeboat drill at the muster station
(lifeboat) before a ship left port. A senior officer (usually the
captain) would inspect whether each passenger properly wore their life
vest (pulling straps tighter and fixing those that had been worn
improperly), attendance was taken by roll call, and clear instructions
were given about what to do in an emergency. Often the lifeboat would
be lowered and a demonstration given on how the boat would be boarded
and in what order. In the case of the Costa Concordia, the muster drill
was planned the afternoon after the cruise began, which isn't
inconsistent with SOLAS requirements, but in hindsight not a good
decision.
By the mid-to-late 1990s, roll calls were taken less frequently and
the inspections became less vigilant. Undoubtedly, with 3,000 or more
passengers, officers could no longer complete inspections in a
reasonable period of time, and there may have been a reaction to
increasing complaints from passengers who didn't see the need for the
drills. By the late-1990s I began to see virtual lifeboat drills.
Passengers would muster in a lounge or a bar and be instructed on
procedures to follow in an emergency. They were instructed how to put
on a life vest, but there were no longer inspections to ensure they
wore them correctly. And there were no longer demonstrations on how a
lifeboat was lowered or boarded, or instruction on the order of
boarding (children and women first, assist those with mobility issues,
and able-bodied men last).
The Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA) and some cruise
lines have now announced there will be mandatory life boat drills
before a ship leaves port. However, it is still unclear whether these
will be virtual drills or real drills, whether passengers will be
inspected as to whether they properly wear a life vest, and whether
there will be demonstration of life-saving equipment. It appears, based
on a cruise director's blog, that attendance will not be taken.
. . . once guests are gathered at the muster stations then the
staff will walk around with clickers to count the number of
guests at the muster stations. . . . These numbers are then
given to each muster station supervisor who will then tell the
bridge. . .the cruise director will let guests know this is
happening, it will be very obvious and should take
approximately 5 minutes to accomplish as the line has multiple
staff assigned to this new task.\12\
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\12\ Young, Susan. 2012. ``Carnival Cruise Lines Adjusts Muster
Drill,'' Travel Agent Central, February 16.
The ``old-fashioned'' lifeboat drills normally took 30 minutes or
more.
While I applaud CLIA's requirement for a mandatory muster drill, I
have to ask what will happen to those members who do not comply. The
Association has had mandatory environmental standards since 1999,
however no cruise line has knowingly been sanctioned for violations,
numbering in the hundreds and leading to more than $50 million in fines
in the U.S.
Functionality of Life-Saving Equipment. Reports from the Costa
Concordia indicate some lifeboats did not easily deploy given corrosion
and rust. I wasn't there, so I can't say what was the case. However,
these reports, if accurate, underline the importance for U.S. Coast
Guard inspections to include a determination that each and every
lifeboat on a cruise ship freely lowers.
I also understand from news reports following the accident that
some cruise ships no longer place life vests in passenger cabins, but
leave them on the deck where passengers muster to their lifeboat. The
wisdom of this practice might be worth reconsidering in the aftermath
of the Costa Concordia accident. What if passengers can't get to their
muster station? Will there be a sufficient supply on each side of the
ship to outfit all passengers in the case that one side of the ship
isn't accessible? These questions need to be seriously considered.
Shipboard Black Boxes
Like airplanes, modern cruise ships have black boxes that record
critical information about the ship and conversations on the bridge.
Following the Costa Concordia accident the captain reported the black
box on the ship had been broken for more than 2 weeks; that he had
notified the company and it had yet to be repaired or placed.\13\
Without a black box there is limited objective data about the accident.
Just as an airplane is likely not allowed to knowingly operate without
an operating black box, the same should be legislated for cruise ships.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Kenna, Armorel. 2012. `Concordia Captain Says Black Box Wasn't
Working, Repubblica Says, January 22. and Hoskins, Paul and Himanshu Ojha. 2012. ``How the Cruise
Ship Industry Sails Under the Radar,'' Reuters, January 24.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Crime Reporting
The data in Appendix B was received from the FBI in response to a
Freedom of Information request. A similar request was made in 2011 for
data after October 2008. The material returned in response was totally
unhelpful. All useful information was redacted. As well, the FBI says
they are not required to keep track of or report crimes committed on
cruise ships unless they have opened a file of investigation and
subsequently closed the file. That means that allegations of crime are
no longer available for analysis (including crimes where the FBI has
judged a sexual assault to be a ``he said, she said'' situation, and
thefts of less than $10,000 given that these are not treated as worthy
of prosecution). One obvious problem is that it is impossible to
measure whether cruise ships are doing better or worse than the 2007-08
baseline. Another problem is that it is impossible to compare onboard
crime rates with crimes on land. On land crime rates are based on the
number of allegations; these can't reliably be compared to only the
number of incidents opened for investigation and subsequently closed.
While this absence of data may serve the interest of the cruise lines,
which prefer incidence of crime to remain hidden, it is not in the
interest of the public or in the spirit of the Cruise Vessel Security
and Safety Act of 2010.
Unfortunately, the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010
(CVSSA) was amended from what was proposed to what was passed. Here is
the text of the Act as introduced:
(4) AVAILABILITY OF INCIDENT DATA VIA INTERNET--
(A) WEBSITE--The Secretary shall maintain, on an Internet site
of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating, a
numerical accounting of the missing persons and alleged crimes
recorded in each report filed under paragraph (1)(A). The data
shall be updated no less frequently than quarterly, aggregated
by cruise line, and each cruise line shall be identified by
name.
(B) ACCESS TO WEBSITE--Each cruise line taking on or
discharging passengers in the United States shall include a
link on its Internet website to the website maintained by the
Secretary under subparagraph (A)
The Act as passed reads:
(4) AVAILABILITY OF INCIDENT DATA VIA INTERNET--
(A) WEBSITE--The Secretary shall maintain a statistical
compilation of all incidents described in paragraph (3)(A)(i)
on an Internet site that provides a numerical accounting of the
missing persons and alleged crimes recorded in each report
filed under paragraph (3)(A)(i) that are no longer under
investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The data
shall be updated no less frequently than quarterly, aggregated
by cruise line, each cruise line shall be identified by name,
and each crime shall be identified as to whether it was
committed by a passenger or a crew member.
(B) ACCESS TO WEBSITE-Each cruise line taking on or discharging
passengers in the United States shall include a link on its
Internet website to the website maintained by the Secretary
under subparagraph (A).
The change was made in Committee before it was reported back to the
full Congress and my understanding is that the sponsors of the bill
missed this. As you can see, there is a huge difference between
reporting alleged crimes versus reporting crimes no longer under
investigation. I encourage the Committee to change the language back to
the original so the public has accessible accurate information about
crime onboard cruise ships, and so researchers have access to reliable
data that can be used to accurately measure the industry's progress in
dealing with crime.
Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA)
Cruise ship passengers are treated differently than airline
passengers under the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) The Act,
originally passed in 1920, presently does not allow non-pecuniary and
punitive damages to families of someone who has died while at sea.
These limits were deemed to be unfair in the context of aviation cases
and were removed, but they were not changed for passenger ships. House
Resolution 2989, introduced by Representative Doggett July 11, 2007,
intended to correct this inconsistency, but it was not approved. Two
bills were introduced in the 111th Congress, H.R. 5803 (Conyers and 26
co-sponsors) andS. 3600 andS. 3755 (Rockefeller/Schumer), but they also
didn't go beyond Committee. Given the obvious unfairness that American
citizens on cruise ships are treated different on a cruise ship than
when traveling by airplane, I hope amendments to DOHSA are revisited.
II. Environmental Issues
Environmental issues and the cruise industry were brought to the
forefront in the late 1990s after Royal Caribbean International was
fined more than $30 million for illegal discharges into U.S. and Alaska
state waters of oil, hazardous chemicals, and for making false
statements to the U.S. Coast Guard. The incidents date back to the
early 1990s.\14\ The U.S. General Accounting Office subsequently
reported in 2000 that between 1993 and 1998 the Federal Government
confirmed 87 illegal discharges from cruise ships (81 involving oil, 6
involving garbage or plastic). Seventeen ``other alleged incidents''
were referred to the countries where the cruise ships were
registered.\15\
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\14\ See Klein, Ross A. 2002 Cruise Ships Blues: The Underside of
the Cruse Industry, Gabriola Island, BC: New Society, pp. 88-89.
\15\ See U.S. General Accounting Office. 2000. Marine Pollution:
Progress Made to Reduce Marine Pollution by Cruise Ships, But Important
Issues Remain, February. (Doc #GAO/RCED-00-48)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It wasn't only Royal Caribbean. Holland America Line was fined $2
million in 1998 for pumping oily bilge into Alaska's Inside Passage, in
addition to other violations,\16\ Then in April 2002, Carnival
Corporation entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to numerous
pollution incidents from 1996 through 2001--discharging oily waste into
the sea from their bilges by improperly using pollution prevention
equipment and of falsifying the Oil Record Book on six ships to conceal
its practices. Part of the plea agreement, in addition to an $18
million fine, was that the company was required to have environmental
officers on all its ships; it was also required to file compliance
reports with the court, which was later found to not comply with.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ See Klein, Ross A. 2009. Getting a Grip on Cruise Ship
Pollution, Washington, DC: Friends of the Earth. See also Klein, Ross
A. 2005. Cruise Ship Squeeze: The New Pirates of the Seven Seas,
Gabriola Island, BC: New Society.
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A few months later, in July 2002, Norwegian Cruise Line signed an
agreement with the U.S. Department of Justice pleading guilty to having
discharged oily bilge water for several years and to having falsified
discharge logs. The company was fined $1 million and ordered to pay
$500,000 toward environmental service projects in South Florida.
Federal prosecutors considered the sentence lenient. There have been
other fines since, but it is overkill to list them here.\17\
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\17\ See Klein, Ross A. 2008. Paradise Lost at Sea: Rethinking
Cruise Vacations, Halifax, NS: Fernwood. Also see Pollution and
Environmental Violations and Fines, 1992-2010
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
North American Emission Control Area
Governments have recently taken action to curtail air pollution
from ships. The European Community issued Directive 2005/33/EC
requiring all ships while in European ports to use fuel with sulfur
content of 0.1 percent or less effective January 1, 2010. Six months
later, provisions in Annex VI of the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) regarding Sulfur Dioxide
Emissions Control Areas (Baltic Sea, North Sea, and English Channel)
placed a limit of 1.0 percent sulfur content; the limit reduces to 0.1
percent in 2015. Following developments in Europe, the U.S. and Canada
partnered to establish the North America Emission Control Area
(extending 200 miles from the coast), which was ratified by the
International Maritime Organization on March 26, 2010.\18\ It limits
sulfur content in fuel to 1.0 percent effective August 1, 2012 and 0.1
percent by 2015.\19\
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\18\ Lagan, Christopher. 2010. ``IMO adopts 200-mile North American
Emissions Control Area,'' Coast Guard Compass, March 26.
\19\ See Klein, Ross A. 2011. ``Responsible Cruise Tourism: Issues
of Cruise Tourism and Sustainability,'' Journal of Hospitality and
Tourism Management, 18, pp 107-116. See also Klein, Ross A. 2010. ``The
Cruise Sector and Its Environmental Impact,'' Tourism and the
Implications of Climate Change: Issues and Actions Bridging Tourism
Theory and Practice Volume 3 (ed. Christian Schott), London:Emerald
Group Publishing, pp. 113-130.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The cruise industry argued against the emission control areas (ECA)
in Europe. It also voiced concern about increased fuel costs associated
with the North American ECA and asked that consideration be given to
``. . . alternative means, such as scrubbers, that ships could use to
meet emissions goals, and to take a piecemeal, rather than blanket
approach. `The ECA area should be tuned to prioritize those areas where
urgency exists and the greatest health and environmental benefits can
be achieved.' '' \20\ Ironically, while saying they support the health
and environmental goals behind the creation of the ECA, cruise industry
associations questioned the research on which the regime is based and
warned it could hurt the Canadian and North American cruise sector
insofar as ships relocating elsewhere.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Steuk, Wendy. 2010. ``Clean-fuel Rules May prompt Cruise Line
to Bypass Canada, Globe and Mail, July 9. Page A4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The North American Emission Control Area is an important step in
dealing with air emissions from cruise ships. The U.S. needs to stand
its ground under pressure from the cruise industry to delay
implementation or to ``water down'' the measure. With air emissions
from fuel dealt with, it is possible to now shift to other sources of
pollution from cruise ships.
Regulation of Grey Water
Except for the Great Lakes, Maine, and Alaska, gray water was until
2009 largely unregulated. However, effective February 6, 2009, pursuant
to a Clean Water Act (CWA) National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) Vessels General Permit issued by U.S. EPA (VGP), cruise
ships must meet treatment standards for gray water as well as 25 other
types of incidental vessel discharges--from ballast water to deck
runoff. Operational limits in the permit prohibit the discharge of
untreated gray water within one nautical mile (nm) of shore. Gray water
discharges are only allowed within one nm if they meet specific
effluent limits and can not be discharged in waters of marine
sanctuaries, units of the National Park System, units of the National
Wildlife Refuge System, National Wilderness areas, and national wild
and scenic rivers system components. Discharges of untreated gray water
are allowed between one nm and three nm of shore if the vessel is
traveling at a speed of six knots or more. The EPA is proposing for
2013 extending the present grey water treatment standards (the same
standards that currently exist in Alaska) for large ships out to three
nautical miles. The extension is to be complemented and encouraged.
The VGP is a positive step. However, there is room for improvement
because the VGP only regulates gray water out to three nautical miles.
As indicated by the U.S. EPA, untreated gray water falls woefully short
of National Recommended Water Quality Standards and the Title XIV
Standard for Continuous Discharge in Alaska Waters, in particular for
fecal coliform, chlorine, biological oxygen demand, suspended solids,
ammonia, copper, nickel, zinc, and tretrachloroethylene.\21\ This
suggests the need for upgrading and regular testing of systems treating
gray water, and for further extending the area in which gray water
discharges are prohibited. As well, it is necessary to perform system
inspection and monitoring more frequently than required in the NPDES
VGP, which only requires annual inspection and evaluation by the U.S.
Coast Guard or the ship's classification society.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ See United States Environmental Protection Agency. 2008.
Cruise Ship Discharge Assessment Report, Washington, D.C.: EPA. (Report
#EPA842-R-07-005)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regulation of Sewage
A cruise ship produces more than eight gallons of sewage per day
per person. The cumulative amount per day for a ship such as Royal
Caribbean's Explorer of the Seas (4,190 passengers and 1,360 crew) is
more than 40,000 gallons; almost 300,000 gallons on a 1-week cruise.
These wastes contain harmful bacteria, pathogens, disease, viruses,
intestinal parasites and harmful nutrients. If not adequately treated
they can cause bacterial and viral contamination of fisheries and
shellfish beds. In addition, nutrients in sewage, such as nitrogen and
phosphorous, promote algal growth. Algae consume oxygen in the water
that can be detrimental or lethal to fish and other aquatic life.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ See United States Environmental Protection Agency. 2008.
Cruise Ship Discharge Assessment Report, Washington, DC: EPA. (Report
#EPA842-R-07-005)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sewage from cruise ships is a critical problem, compounded by the
fact that it is excluded from the Clean Water Act's (CWA) National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permitting requirements
and ignored beyond three nautical miles from shore. The Clean Water
Act's provision for sewage discharges from vessels sets treatment
standards that are inadequate, and now outdated, and does not require
permits or reporting. Further, the discharge of untreated sewage from
vessels in coastal waters beyond three miles is not regulated.
It is worth note that the U.S. is one of the few coastal nations in
the developed world that has not signed Annex IV of the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL). While
its neighbors ban the discharge of treated sewage within four nautical
miles of shore, and untreated sewage within twelve nautical miles of
shore, the U.S. permits sewage treated with a Type II Marine Sanitation
Device to be discharged between zero and three miles of shore, and
untreated sewage to be discharged anywhere beyond three nautical miles.
This anomaly in national regulations around the world has led a number
of jurisdictions to request the EPA for ``no discharge areas'' within
three miles of shore (such as Maine, New Hampshire, Michigan, Rhode
Island and California), has led to state legislation (as in the case of
California and Alaska), and has made necessary Memoranda of
Understanding in other jurisdictions (such as Washington).
Sewage Treatment
Marine Sanitation Devices. Sewage from a cruise ship traditionally
has been treated by a Type II marine sanitation device (MSD). Under
Section 312 of the U.S. Clean Water Act, commercial and recreational
vessels (including cruise ships) with installed toilets are required to
have a MSD. Type II MSDs are the most common type of wastewater
treatment systems on cruise ships and consist of flow-through devices
that break up and chemically or biologically disinfect waste before
discharge. Within three nautical miles of shore vessels must treat
sewage with an approved Type II MSD prior to discharge. Beyond three
nautical miles, discharge of raw sewage is allowed. The U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) regulations governing MSDs have
not been updated since they were instituted in 1976.
Type II MSDs are supposed to produce effluent containing no more
than 200 fecal coliform for 100 milliliters and no more 150 milligrams
per liter of suspended solids.\23\ Whether MSDs achieve that standard
was called into question in 2000 when the state of Alaska found that 79
of 80 samples from cruise ships were out of compliance with the
standard. According to the Juneau port commander for the Coast Guard,
the results were so extreme that it might be necessary to consider
possible design flaws and capacity issues with the Coast Guard-approved
treatment systems.\24\ A 2008 report from the U.S. EPA suggests
problems identified in 2000 with MSDs continue today.
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\23\ 33 C.F.R. Sec. 159.3 (2008); 40 C.F.R. Sec. 140.3(d) (2008).
\24\ See McAllister, Bill. 2000. ``A Big Violation on Wastewater:
Some Ship Readings 100,000 Times Allowed Amount,'' The Juneau Empire,
August 27 .
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Advanced Wastewater Treatment Systems (AWTS). The cruise industry
in recent years has adopted the use of AWTS (an advanced form of Type
II Marine Sanitation Device) on many ships--most often ships visiting
Alaska's Inside Passage where such systems are required for continuous
discharge in state waters. A ship with an AWTS avoids the need to
travel outside Alaska state waters to discharge treated sewage.
Installation of AWTS for ships visiting other waters with less
stringent or no regulations has been at a much slower pace. For
example, Carnival Corporation (which includes Carnival Cruise Lines,
Holland America Lines, and Princess Cruises) had AWTS installed on
slightly less than one half of its fleet at the end of 2008. But
Carnival Cruise Lines, which sends only one ship to Alaska per season,
has installed an AWTS on only one of its twenty-three ships. The
corporation's spokesperson says they try to make sure AWTS are included
on ships that go to Alaska and to other sensitive areas.
AWTS are a vast improvement over MSDs--yielding what the industry
refers to as drinking-water quality effluent. However this terminology
must be treated with skepticism. Such water cannot be recycled for
onboard human consumption nor can it be used in the laundry because
sheets and towels apparently turn gray. Both the EPA and Alaska have
found that even the best systems still had difficulty with a number of
constituents. A key problem is the AWTS do not adequately address
nutrient loading, which means they pose similar problems as MSDs with
regard to nitrogen and phosphorous. In addition, tests in Alaska have
shown levels of copper, nickel, zinc, and ammonia that are higher than
the state's water quality standards. The EPA has also found that AWTS
exceed permitted concentrations of chlorine and tetrachlorethylene. As
a result, 12 of 20 (60 percent) ships permitted to discharge in Alaska
waters violated discharge limits in 2008, logging 45 violations
involving 7 pollutants. These include ammonia, biological oxygen
demand, chlorine, copper, fecal coliform, pH, and zinc. The year 2009
was even worse, with 13 of 18 (72 percent) ships permitted to discharge
in Alaskan waters violating Alaska discharge limits during the season,
racking up 66 violations involving 9 pollutants. Comparable data is not
available for 2010 or 2011; the state lowered its limits for waste from
AWTS under pressure from the industry, so there is no way to reliably
measure improvement by publicly available data. It is noteworthy that
nearly 30 percent of ships discharging in Alaska in 2008 and 2009 were
able to meet the water quality standards.\25\
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\25\ See Klein, Ross A. 2009. Getting a Grip on Cruise Ship
Pollution, Washington, DC: Friends of the Earth.
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Sewage Sludge. Most Type II MSDs and AWTS filter solids from sewage
as part of treatment. This yields on average 4,000 gallons of sewage
sludge per day; \26\ cumulatively, it adds up quickly. It is estimated
that 4.2 million gallons of sewage sludge are produced every year by
ships as they pass through Washington State waters on their way to
Alaska \27\--this is small compared to what cruise ships generate
outside Washington state waters. In some cases (about one in sixteen
ships with an AWTS), sewage sludge is dewatered and then incinerated.
In other cases sludge is dumped at sea. Most jurisdictions permit
sludge to be dumped within three miles of shore; in California a ship
must be beyond three miles from shore and in Washington beyond twelve
miles. In either case, these sludges have a high oxygen demand and are
detrimental to sea life. Sewage sludge poses the same problem as
sewage, but in a more concentrated form.
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\26\ National Marine Sanctuaries. 2008. Olympic Coast Marine
Sanctuary: Condition Report 2008, Washington, D.C.: NOAA. p. 43
\27\ King County Wastewater Treatment Division. 2007. Cruise Ship
Wastewater Management Report. Seattle: Department of Natural Resources
and Parks.
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A report issued in August 2003 by the California Environmental
Protection Agency and the California State Water Resources Control
Board said ``it found `particularly troubling' the discharging of
sludge twelve miles out to sea.'' \28\ This concern is in stark
contrast to regulations elsewhere that define sewage sludge as treated
sewage and permit its discharge within three miles of the U.S.
shoreline. The need for minimum regulations applicable to the entire
U.S. coastline is obvious.
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\28\ Weiss, Ken. 2003. ``Cruise Line Pollution Prompts
Legislation,'' Los Angeles Times, August 18. Also see: Report to the
Legislature: Regulation of Large Passenger Vessels in California,
Cruise Environmental Task Force, August 2003
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One option is to require sewage sludge to be dewatered and
incinerated onboard, however incineration creates an air quality
problem and the ash must be disposed of somewhere. Dumping the ash
overboard raises new problems. Another option is to require sewage
sludge to be held onboard and offloaded for treatment in port.
Washington State has in recent years explored the commercial use and
value of sewage sludge as a fertilizer, but no clear plans have yet
been made.\29\ Clearly, a workable solution to the huge volume of
sludge being dumped into the waters of the U.S.--28,000 gallons per
week on an average-sized cruise ship--must be identified and
implemented.
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\29\ See Port of Seattle. 2008. Cruise Vessel Biomass Management
Study, Phase 1A (Draft): Data Compilation and Initial Assessment, Port
of Seattle, Nov. 18.
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Incinerators
Cruise ships incinerate and burn a variety of wastes, including
hazardous wastes, oil, oily sludge, sewage sludge, medical and bio-
hazardous waste, outdated pharmaceuticals, and other solid wastes such
as plastics, paper, metal, glass, and food.\30\ A cruise ship may burn
1 to 2.5 tons per day of oily sludge in these incinerators and
boilers.\31\ The emissions from onboard incineration and its ash can
include furans and dioxins, both found to be carcinogenic, as well as
nitrogen oxide, sulfur oxide, carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide,
particulate matter, hydrogen chloride, toxic and heavy metals such as
lead, cadmium and mercury, and hydrocarbons.\32\
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\30\ California Cruise Ship Environmental Task Force. 2003. Report
to the Legislature: Regulation of Large Passenger Vessels in
California, August, p. 54
\31\ California Cruise Ship Environmental Task Force. 2003. Report
to the Legislature: Regulation of Large Passenger Vessels in
California, August, p. 56
\32\ Bluewater Network's EPA petition on cruise ship incineration,
April 2000.
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In contrast to incinerator use on land, which is likely to be
strictly monitored and regulated, incinerators at sea operate with few
limits. MARPOL Annex VI bans incineration of certain particularly
harmful substances, including contaminated packaging materials and
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). There are no national standards
limiting emissions from ship incineration.
The State of California has established that air emissions from
incineration, generated between 27 and 102 miles off the coast, could
negatively impact the air quality of the state.\33\ The state initially
introduced legislation in 2003 to prohibit ships from using onboard
waste incinerators while within 20 miles of the coast, but subsequently
passed legislation applicable only to waters over which the state had
jurisdiction. The final California law prohibits incinerator use when a
ship is within three miles of the coast.
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\33\ California Cruise Ship Environmental Task Force. 2003. Report
to the Legislature: Regulation of Large Passenger Vessels in
California, August, p. 66
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Clear parameters are needed for operational requirements for
onboard incinerators, much like on land. In addition, it is wise to do
as California has done and ban the use of incinerators within a
specific distance from the coast. Any such law must take into account
the potential for onshore winds and ocean currents to move incinerator
pollutants on-shore.
Solid Waste
A cruise ship produces a large volume of non-hazardous solid waste.
This includes huge volumes of plastic, paper, wood, cardboard, food
waste, cans, glass, and the variety of other wastes disposed of by
passengers. It was estimated in the 1990s that each passenger accounted
for 3.5 kilograms of solid waste per day. With better attention to
waste reduction this volume in recent years has been cut nearly in
half. But the amount is still significant, more than eight tons in a
week from a moderate sized cruise ship. Twenty-four percent of the
solid waste produced by vessels worldwide comes from cruise ships.\34\
Glass and aluminum are increasingly held onboard and landed ashore for
recycling, but only when the itinerary includes a port with reception
facilities.
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\34\ Copeland, Claudia. 2008. Cruise Ship Pollution: Background,
Laws and Regulations, and Key Issues. Washington, DC: Congressional
Research Service (Report #RL32450)
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Food and other waste not easily incinerated is ground or macerated
and discharged into the sea. These ``. . . food waste can contribute to
increases in biological oxygen demand, chemical oxygen demand, and
total organic carbon, diminish water and sediment quality, adversely
effect marine biota, increase turbidity, and elevate nutrient levels.''
\35\ They may be detrimental to fish digestion and health and cause
nutrient pollution.\36\ An additional problem with discharging food
waste at sea is the inadvertent discharge of plastics. Under MARPOL, 38
throwing plastic into the ocean is strictly prohibited everywhere.
Plastic poses an immediate risk to sea life that might ingest or get
caught in it. It poses a longer-term risk as it degrades over time,
breaking down into smaller and smaller pieces, but retaining its
original molecular composition. The result is a great amount of fine
plastic sand that resembles food to many creatures. Unfortunately, the
plastic cannot be digested, so sea birds or fish can eventually starve
to death with a stomach full of plastic.\37\
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\35\ United States Environmental Protection Agency. 2008. Cruise
Ship Discharge Assessment Report, Washington, DC: Environmental
Protection Agency (Report #EPA842-R-07-005), p. 5-11
\36\ See John Polglaze. 2003. ``Can We Always Ignore Ship-Generated
Food Waste,'' Marine Pollution Bulletin 46:1, pp. 33-38
\37\ Reid, David. 2007. ``Earth's Eighth Continent.'' The Tyee Nov.
21.
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Solid waste and some plastics are incinerated on board, with the
incinerator ash being dumped into the ocean. Incinerator ash and the
resulting air emissions can contain furans and dioxins, both found to
be carcinogenic, as well as heavy metal and other toxic residues. For
this reason Annex V of MARPOL recommends, but does not require, that
ash from incineration of certain plastics not be discharged into the
sea.\38\ At the very least, incinerator ash should be tested before
each overboard discharge. This would include analysis and accounting of
the contaminants typically found in cruise ship incinerator ash to
determine whether it should be categorized as solid waste or hazardous
waste.
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\38\ See MARPOL Annex V, Appendix B, Section 5.4.6.2, referenced in
United States Environmental Protection Agency. 2008. Cruise Ship
Discharge Assessment Report, Washington, D.C.: Environmental Protection
Agency (Report #EPA842-R-07-005), p. 5-12
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Under MARPOL 44 and U.S. law,\39\ no garbage can be discharged
within three miles of shore. Between three and twelve miles garbage can
be discharged if ground-up and capable of passing through a one-inch
screen. If not ground-up and capable of passing through a screen, most
food waste and other garbage can be discharged at sea when a ship is
more than twelve miles from shore.
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\39\ See 33 C.F.R. parts 151.63, 151.65, 151.67, 151.69, 151.71,
151.73
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Although cruise ships have reduced their volume of solid waste, the
total amount is still significant. Royal Caribbean's stated commitment
in 2003 to not dump any trash overboard is admirable and should set a
standard for all cruise ships operating from U.S. ports and in U.S.
waters. If it is achievable by Royal Caribbean, then there is no reason
why it is not practical for all cruise lines. This should be
incorporated in legislation in order to ensure cruise ships can be held
accountable for any unnecessary dumping of solid waste in the waters of
the U.S.
Oily Bilge
A typical large cruise ship will generate an average of eight
metric tons of oily bilge water for each twenty-four hours of
operation;\40\ according to Royal Caribbean's 1998 Environmental Report
its ships produce an average 25,000 gallons of oily bilge water on a 1-
week voyage. This water collects in the bottom of a vessel's hull from
condensation, water lubricated shaft seals, propulsion system cooling
and other engine room sources. It contains fuel, oil, wastewater from
engines and other machinery, and may also include solid wastes such as
rags, metal shavings, paint, glass, and cleaning agents.
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\40\ National Research Council. 1995. Clean Ships, Clean Ports,
Clean Oceans: Controlling Garbage and Plastic Wastes at Sea.
Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.
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The risks posed to fish and marine organisms by oil and other
elements in bilge water are great. In even minute concentrations oil
can kill fish or have numerous sub-lethal effects such as changes in
heart and respiratory rates, enlarged livers, reduced growth, fin
erosion, and various biochemical and cellular changes.\41\ Research
also finds that by-products from the biological breakdown of petroleum
products can harm fish and wildlife and pose threats to human health if
these fish and wildlife are ingested.
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\41\ Copeland, Claudia. 2008. Cruise Ship Pollution: Background,
Laws and Regulations, and Key Issues. Washington, D.C.: Congressional
Research Service (Report #RL32450), November 17, p. CRS-5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oily bilge water in U.S. waters is regulated by the Clean Water
Act. The Act prohibits the discharge of oil or hazardous substances, in
such quantities as may be harmful within 200 miles of the coast. In
addition, Coast Guard regulations specifically prohibit discharges
within 12 nautical miles of shore unless it has been passed through a
fifteen parts per million (ppm) oily water separator and does not cause
a visible sheen.\42\ The NPDES VGP reinforces the 15 ppm standard and
it requires large vessels (over 400 gross tons) to discharge oily bilge
beyond 1 nautical mile from shore if the vessel is underway and the
discharge is technologically feasible and safe. Beyond 12 nautical
miles, oil or oily mixtures can be discharged while a vessel is
proceeding en route so long as the undiluted oil content is less than
100 ppm. The oil extracted by the separator can be reused, incinerated,
and/or offloaded in port. Vessels are required to document the disposal
of oil, oily bilge water or oily residues in an Oil Record Book.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ See 33 C.F.R. Sec. 151.10.
\43\ Copeland, Claudia. 2008. Cruise Ship Pollution: Background,
Laws and Regulations, and Key Issues. Washington, D.C.: Congressional
Research Service (Report #RL32450), November 17, p. CRS-14
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To address the deleterious effect of oil to marine life, even in
minute quantities, the discharge of oily bilge water should be
prohibited in sensitive areas and in coastal zones out to 12 nautical
miles. Additionally, consistent minimum water quality standards for
oily bilge should be set across all waters under U.S. control either at
the Coast Guard's current level of 15ppm or as low as 5 ppm. The
reduction to 5 ppm is achievable.\44\
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\44\ An example of current technology that demonstrates the
achievability of 5 ppm is a system manufactured by North Carolina-based
EnSolve Biosystems. The company's PetroLiminator oily water separator
``is a green technology that consistently achieves effluent levels of
less than 5 parts per million (PPM).'' See ``EnSolve Biosystems
Launches Operating Cost Guarantee Program For Bilge Water Treatment
Program, '' EnSolve Biosystems Inc. News, Volume 1, Issue 1, October
2008.
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Patchwork of Regulations and the Clean Cruise Ship Act
There is a patchwork of different regulations in the U.S. Cruise
ships are permitted to legally discharge waste in one place but not
another. On the west coast for example, enforceable regulations have
had a positive effect in Alaska, Washington, and California, but leave
open for greater environmental harm in neighboring jurisdictions such
as Oregon and British Columbia. In fact, British Columbia is a good
illustration of the problem with a patchwork approach. In some circles
it is referred to as the toilet bowl of the Alaska cruise industry.
This is because a ship may not discharge wastes in certain areas in
Washington State (such as sewage sludge, untreated gray water, and
sewage treated with a MSD) and it is restricted in the waste permitted
for discharge in Alaska, but it can discharge those same wastes in
Canada. The reason is weaker Canadian regulations (except for sewage)
and Canada's failure to enforce the regulations it has. The same
scenario operates on the east coast where gray water cannot be
discharged in the waters of Maine, but can be discharged in the waters
of Canada, and until the extension of the NPDES comes into effect every
other coastal state.
Inconsistent regulations permit the cruise industry to argue that
it meets or exceeds all environmental regulations while at the same
time showing relatively different regard for environmental protection
from one place to the next. These differences are even seen in the fuel
ships use. It was reported in 2007 that when Holland America Line's
Zaandam operated on the west coast of North America (British Columbia
and Alaska) it used fuel with a sulfur content of about 1.8 percent;
while operating during the winter months in the Caribbean the sulfur
content was as much as 3 percent.\45\ The North American Emission
Control Area addresses this problem directly.
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\45\ Montgomery, Christina. 2007. ``Setting Out to Sea in an Eco-
Friendly Ship.'' The Province, May 31.
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These variations raise to the forefront the need for comprehensive,
minimum national regulations that maintain uniformly high standards for
protection of the marine environment. One approach was the Clean Cruise
Ship Act of 2008 (CCSA) sponsored by Durbin in the Senate (S 2881) and
Farr with 20 cosponsors in the House of Representatives (HR 6434). This
was the third session of Congress in which this legislation was
introduced. In the 109th Congress Farr had 47 cosponsors; Durbin had 5
cosponsors, and in the 108th Congress there were 42 cosponsors in the
House and 9 cosponsors in the Senate. Key provisions of the CCSA
include:
Prohibits the discharge of sewage, graywater, and bilge
water out to 12 miles and in nodischarge zones such as marine
protected areas;
Prohibits the discharge of sewage sludge, incinerator ash,
and hazardous waste within 200 miles of the U.S. coastline.
Sludge, incinerator ash, and hazardous waste must be offloaded
at an appropriate land-based facility;
Requires EPA to establish effluent standards for sewage,
graywater, and bilge water discharges from 12 to 200 miles.
These effluent limits must be consistent with best available
technology. The ship must be traveling at not less than 6
knots;
Establishes a monitoring, sampling, reporting and inspection
program with unannounced annual inspections and samples;
Establishes an observer program for monitoring discharges
(one observer per ship), similar to the ``Ocean Ranger''
program in Alaska;
Establishes the Cruise Vessel Pollution Control Fund to
carry out the programs in the Act. The fund is comprised of
reasonable and appropriate fees collected from cruise vessels
for each paying passenger. This, too, is modeled after how
Alaska pays for its monitoring and enforcement program.
III. Medical Care and Illness
International maritime law surprisingly does not require a cruise
ship to provide medical services. The only legal requirement is under
the Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers
(SCTW) Convention, which requires certain crew members to have various
levels of first aid and medical training. Regardless, all modern cruise
ships maintain an infirmary. Those dispensing medical care are
concessionaires for whose actions the cruise line assumes no liability.
Their precise qualifications can vary widely. Some small cruise ships
may have a nurse but no doctor. Some large ships have two physicians as
well as two or more nurses.
In 1996, the International Council of Cruise Lines (ICCL) adopted
industry guidelines for medical facilities and personnel on cruise
ships. The guidelines were a response to pressure from the American
Medical Association (AMA) which had that year called on the U.S.
Congress for the development of medical standards for cruise ships.
Based on a number of cases of disease, including a recent outbreak of
gastroenteritis on Carnival Cruise Line's Jubilee in which 150
passengers became ill and one person died, the AMA also called for
greater awareness of the limited medical services available aboard
ships. The AMA position was supported by a survey administered by two
Florida doctors to eleven cruise lines.
[T]he doctors found that 27 percent of doctors and nurses did
not have advanced training in treating victims of heart
attacks, the leading killer on ships, and 54 percent of doctors
and 72 percent of nurses lacked advanced training for dealing
with trauma. Fewer than half of shipboard doctors--45 percent--
had board certification, an important credential that is
granted after three to 7 years of residency and a written
examination in a specialty or its equivalent . . . As for
equipment, the survey found that 63 percent of ships did not
have equipment for blood tests for diagnosing heart attacks,
and 45 percent did not have mechanical ventilators or external
pacemakers. ``What we found was that the quality of maritime
medical care was less than adequate, from the medical
facilities to nurse and physician credentials . . .'' \46\
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\46\ Frantz, Douglas. 1999. ``Getting Sick on the High Seas: A
Question of Accountability,'' New York Times, October 31.
The American Medical Association has continued to lobby for
government regulation of health care on cruise ships, but with no
success.
Some have suggested that Section 3507 (d) (3) of the Cruise Vessel
Security and Safety Act of 2010 addresses this matter. The section
states that in the case of a sexual assault the owner of a vessel to
which the section applies shall make available on the vessel at all
times medical staff who have undergone a credentialing process to
verify that he or she----
(A) possesses a current physician's or registered nurse's
license and----
(i) has at least 3 years of post-graduate or
postregistration clinical practice in general and
emergency medicine; or
(ii) holds board certification in emergency medicine,
family practice medicine, or internal medicine;
(B) is able to provide assistance in the event of an alleged
sexual assault, has received training in conducting forensic
sexual assault examination, and is able to promptly perform
such an examination upon request and provide proper medical
treatment of a victim, including administration of anti-
retroviral medications and other medications that may prevent
the transmission of human immunodeficiency virus and other
sexually transmitted diseases; and
(C) meets guidelines established by the American College of
Emergency Physicians relating to the treatment and care of
victims of sexual assault.
While this section requires a doctor or nurse to be onboard for the
treatment of a victim of sexual assault, it does not dictate where the
person has received their training, license, and board certification,
so there can still be wide variation in the nature and quality of care
(the original proposals made by the International Cruise Victims
Association were that these personnel be board certified in the U.S.).
In addition, the American College of Emergency Physicians' guidelines
are general enough that they provide little assurance, especially given
that they are not easily transferable to the setting of a cruise
ship.\47\ It is relatively easy to comply with this section of the Act,
however there is less protection to victims than is apparent at first
blush.
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\47\ See American College of Emergency Physicians. 2012. Policy
Compendium, 2012 Edition. Dallas, TX: ACEP. Pages 124-125.
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Malpractice and Liability
No doubt there are cases of malpractice on cruise ships. Most
Americans and Canadians assume they have the same rights and the same
protections as they would on land when something happens. But that is
not the case. Even though a physician wears the uniform of a senior-
ranked officer, is introduced to passengers onboard as the ship's
physician (implying he, like the Captain, is an employee of the cruise
line), and like other senior officers may host a dinner table for
invited guests, the cruise lines without exception say the physician is
a private concessionaire and as such the cruise line accepts no
liability for mistakes made. It is a hard concept to get one's head
around given that the service is offered by the cruise ship and the
cruise ship collects the fees, but one that was supported by the
Florida Supreme Court in February 2007 and by the U.S. Supreme Court in
October 2007.
The case began 10 years before in March 1997. Fourteen-year-old
Elizabeth Carlisle was on a Caribbean cruise on Carnival Destiny with
her family. On the second night out of Miami she developed severe
abdominal pain. She consulted the ship's physician, Dr. Mauro Neri--he
had finished medical school in his native Italy in 1981, had held nine
medical jobs in Italy, Africa, and England in the fifteen years before
joining Carnival Cruise Lines and was earning $1,057 a month from the
cruise line. Dr. Neri advised that Elizabeth was suffering from the flu
and sent her on her way. But her pain became worse. On the third visit
to the infirmary, after Elizabeth's parents specifically asked whether
the problem could be appendicitis, Dr. Neri conducted his first
physical exam. He responded that he was sure the problem was not the
girl's appendix.
When the pain continued to grow worse Elizabeth's parents called
their family physician in Michigan and he advised they return home. The
family took the advice and shortly after arriving home Elizabeth
underwent emergency surgery to remove her ruptured appendix. The
infection had rendered the fourteen-year-old sterile and caused
lifelong medical problems. Elizabeth sued Carnival Cruise Lines in
Florida state court, a case she lost on Carnival's motion for summary
judgment. The cruise line claimed it was not responsible for the
medical negligence of the doctor on board and pointed to the fine print
in the passenger cruise contract to support its position.
The family appealed the Circuit Court's decision to Florida's Third
District Court of Appeal where the parents argued the cruise line was
vicariously liable for the doctor's negligence. Judge Joseph Nesbitt
agreed and reversed the lower court's decision. The judge held that the
cruise line had control over the doctor's medical services for agency
law purposes; the doctor was to provide medical services to passengers
and crew in accordance with the cruise line's guidelines. And as it was
foreseeable that some passengers at sea would develop medical problems
(and that the only realistic alternative for such a passenger was
treatment by the ship's doctor) the cruise line had an element of
control over the doctor-patient relationship. As such, the cruise
line's duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances
extended to the actions of a ship's doctor placed on board by the
cruise line. The doctor was an agent of the cruise line whose
negligence was imputed to the cruise line. This invalidated the cruise
ticket's purported limitation of the cruise line's liability for the
negligence of its agents.
Judge Nesbitt's decision was groundbreaking. It was likely the very
first case where a cruise line was held responsible for the care
provided by a ship's physician. Not surprisingly, Carnival appealed the
case to the Florida Supreme Court. While the court almost agreed with
the lower court's assertion that times had changed and that a doctor's
negligence at sea also shows negligence by the cruise line, it
ultimately found in favor of Carnival. Justice Peggy Quince wrote in
her opinion,
We find merit in the plaintiff's argument and the reasoning of
the district court. However, because this is a maritime case,
this Court and the Florida district courts of appeal must
adhere to the Federal principles of harmony and uniformity when
applying Federal maritime law.\48\
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\48\ Supreme Court of Florida. 2007. Carnival Corporation vs. Darce
Carlisle, Case No. SC 04-393, February 15.
The case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court and the court
refused to hear it. The Florida Supreme Court's decision was the final
word. If the Carlisle family wanted to pursue the case they would have
to sue the physician directly. But this is difficult in their case, and
in most involving medical malpractice on cruise ships, given that
they'd first have to locate the physician in his or her present home,
something with which cruise lines historically have not provided
assistance. Malpractice cases involving treatment in international
waters must be filed in the courts of the physician's country of
origin, which is both difficult and expensive.\49\
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\49\ Chen, Stephanie. 2007. ``Trouble at Sea: Free-Agent Doctors,''
Wall Street Journal, October 24.
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The bottom line is that cruise lines escape liability for the
medical errors committed (on a daily basis) of its employed staff and
it's independent contractor staff/doctors. The decisions are all based
on a relatively old 5th Circuit Court case, Barbetta.\50\ The court in
Barbetta said that the cruise line is not in the business of providing
medical care and that the passenger has alternatives. Neither is
correct. The cruise lines are in the business of providing medical care
because (1) they attract passengers by representing that they have
medical staff onboard, and (2) by having onboard medical care they
avoid the obligation of diverting the course of the vessel every time
there is a medical situation onboard. The passenger has no alternative
for medical care when the vessel is at sea and the passenger gets sick
or injured. Even when the ship is at or near port, the port is usually
in a developing world country with developing world medical care.
Cruise lines know that an overwhelming majority of their business is
from Americans who expect and deserve first world medical care.
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\50\ See Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star, 848 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir.
1998).
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It is worth noting here that emergency medical evacuations from
cruise ships are not uncommon. Here again we have the U.S. taxpayer
often footing the bill for these endeavors, supporting a cruise
industry that doesn't fall under many U.S. laws and regulations and
that does not pay corporate income tax to the U.S. Government.
Norovirus and Other Illness Outbreaks
The complexion of illnesses found on cruise ships has shifted over
the past two decades. In the 1980s and 1990s outbreaks were commonly
caused by food borne bacteria such as shigella, salmonella and E coli,
but these gave way to norovirus as it increased in incidence in 2001.
Also in 2001 the Food Standards Agency in the United Kingdom announced
that it would give health officials the statutory right to enter and
inspect cruise ships (similar to the Vessel Sanitation Program in the
United States). It was reacting to a report from the Consumers'
Association which indicated an increase of food poisoning cases among
cruise ship passengers. The Consumers' Association had received
complaints about fourteen ships in 2000 and 2001, with illnesses
ranging from salmonella poisoning to the potentially fatal
Legionnaires' disease.\51\
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\51\ Gadher, Dipesh. 2001. ``Cruise Liners Face Tougher Hygiene
Tests,'' Sunday Times, May 6.
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With better food processing and refrigeration, and more careful
testing and treatment of drinking water loaded from shore, incidents
caused by bacteria have reduced significantly. In fact, from 2002
through 2011 there are only four known outbreaks caused by salmonella
and seven caused by E coli. There were four reports of Legionnaires'
disease during the same 9 year period.\52\ During the same time there
were 378 outbreaks involving norovirus, plus another nine in 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\52\ See www.cruisejunkie.com/outbreaks2012.html, and other years
listed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As bacteria-caused illness has decreased, the incidence of illness
caused by norovirus increased significantly. Between 1999 and 2001,
there were four or five illness outbreaks per year on cruise ships
recorded by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) that were
attributed to norovirus (to be considered an outbreak, 3 percent of
passengers or 2 percent of crew members must report illness). In 2002,
the CDC's reported numbers jumped to twenty-nine illness outbreaks
(most of which were caused by norovirus); in total there were forty-
four cases of gastrointestinal illness reported on cruise ships in
2002. The CDC's rate of outbreaks increased from 0.65 per 1000 cruises
in 2001 to 6.45 per 1000 cruises in 2002--a tenfold increase.\53\ The
number of outbreaks has fluctuated since 2002 with a high of fifty-four
in 2006 and a low of twenty-three in 2011. The number of passengers
reporting ill has ranged from a low of 1,970 in a year to 7,215. Thus
far in 2012, 1,725 passengers and crew have reported illness.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\ Cramer, Elaine H., David X. Gu, and Randy E. Durbin. 2003.
``Diarreal Disease on Cruise Ships, 1990-2000,'' American Journal of
Preventive Medicine 24, 3 (April).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the industry, since 2002, has characterized norovirus as
something passengers bring onboard with them, this is not entirely
accurate.\54\ Rather than debate this point there are two points to be
made here.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\ For a fuller discussion of the causes of norovirus and how the
industry has characterized the illness and its response see Klein, Ross
A. 2008. Paradise Lost at Sea: Rethinking Cruise Vacations, Halifax,
NS: Fernwood.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
First, a cruise ship is a perfect incubator for the spread of
norovirus and once it takes hold it is difficult to eradicate. A common
practice is that crew members reporting ill are taken off work (often 2
days) while they are symptomatic, however this is contraindicated given
that the virus continues to be shed (and thus a person is potentially
contagious) for up to 2 weeks. Because crew members are often not paid
when they are off work, there is an obvious disincentive to report when
they are ill, increasing the likelihood that the virus will be
transmitted to others (NB: the virus follows a fecal-oral route and is
most commonly transmitted by poor personal hygiene: people not washing
their hands after using the toilet). This needs to be confronted in a
more vigilant manner.
Second, most passengers learn that if they report being ill they
will be quarantined to their cabin until they are asymptomatic--
reportedly a very unpleasant experience. As a result, there are many
cases where ill passengers do not report their illness in order to
avoid being quarantined. In other words, there is a disincentive to
behaving in ways that minimize the spread of the disease. These
disincentives need to be removed. As well, the cruise lines can do a
better job of educating passengers about the nature of norovirus and
steps to be taken to avoid contracting the illness, and its spread if
one becomes ill. Rather than engaging in media campaigns that attempt
to state how common the illness is and that it isn't a cruise ship
virus, the industry can do a better job of accepting the illness as a
problem they must deal with and confront norovirus as a problem that
manifests itself on cruise ships (as is the case in many institutional
settings).
Potable water
While I don't wish to raise alarm, it is necessary to raise one
other health concern because it gives some insight into how problems
may be dealt with by the cruise industry. This is concern based on a
case about which there is incomplete information (it has been sealed by
the British courts), about which those involved are not permitted to
comment for fear of fine or incarceration and about which the lack of
transparency suggests there is a real basis for fear. Information
available in October 2005 at provided a body of
information about toxicity in potable water aboard certain cruise
ships. But that material disappeared, as has all information about the
case that followed (the case, Hempel A/S v. B Bradford [2006] EWHC
2528, is cited at the website of the attorney for the industry, but
otherwise no information may be found anywhere).
Gleaning from what was on the website, and from recent appeals
filed with the High Court of Justice in the UK and European Court of
Human Rights, we can extrapolate that a paint coating used in potable
water tanks on a series of cruise ships built in Pappenburg, Germany
(at least four ships owned by two major companies serving North America
and Europe, but perhaps as many as 50) was found to be defective. It
could purportedly break down and potentially release toxins
(acrylonitrile, a known carcinogen) into the water system of these
vessels. The problem was apparently discovered and repairs undertaken.
Drinking water on these ships could not be certified as safe until
repairs were completed.
Rather than take the ships out of service for proper repair, the
work was done while ships were in service with passengers and crew
onboard. The work required sanding the interior surface of water tanks
and then applying a new, safe coating. If done properly, repairs would
also address contamination that had already occurred and was now part
of the water delivery system. Regardless, while the problem coating was
being ``solved'', the repair may have itself produced another set of
problems. There is no certainty that fine dust produced from sanding
potable water tanks did not make its way into other areas of the ship,
including air ventilation and food preparation areas. On one ship the
fine dust clogged vent pipes that allowed air to escape as water tanks
were filled, creating a serious and dangerous situation when one of the
tanks was put back into use.
The lack of transparency about the case, and the way in which the
information has been sealed from public knowledge, gives good reason
for a passenger on any cruise ship to be cautious. The purportedly
defective paint coating was manufactured by a large-scale provider
(Hempel A/S) to shipyards building cruise ships and it is hard to know,
without adequate testing for chemical contamination, on which ships
there is reason for concern. This isn't a matter of opinion or
conjecture--there are apparently affidavits admitting to the problem of
toxicity, but these too are sealed. The cruise lines involved suggest
there was never any danger to passengers and crew, and that the problem
has been fully ameliorated. However, given the effective silencing of
Mr. Bradford and the information he had, it is difficult to be
confident in those assurances.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\ See Foggo, Daniel. 2011. ``Gag Hid Cancer Threat to Cruise
Ship Passengers,'' Sunday Times, November 13. Page 4
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
IV. Labor Issues
Workers on foreign flag vessels generally work without union
protection and their pay is determined by the employer. They may even
have to accept arbitrary cuts in pay in order to keep their jobs. In
the view of Paul Chapman, a Baptist minister who founded the Centre for
Seafarer's Rights in New York in 1981, the typical cruise ship is a
sweatshop at sea. ``A ship owner can go any place in the world, pick up
anybody he wants, on almost any terms. If the owner wants to maximize
profit at the expense of people, it's a piece of cake.'' \56\ Though
the requirement to pay minimum wage was extended to ships registered in
the United States in 1961, Congress left intact the exemption for
foreign ships. This exemption was further defined in a 1963 Supreme
Court decision that held that U.S. labour laws, including the right to
organize, do not apply to foreign vessels engaged in American commerce,
even if the owners of these ships are from the United States. This is
the context in which the modern cruise ship industry developed and took
hold. Foreign labour, whose first language is not English, may be a
factor in cruise ship safety and security, especially in an emergency
situation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ Reynolds, Christopher and Dan Weikel. 2000 ``For Cruise Ship
Workers, Voyages Are No Vacations,'' Los Angeles Times, May 30.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Congressional Interest
Working conditions on cruise ships emerged as a momentary concern
in late 1980s and early 1990s. William Clay, Chairman of the House
Labor-Management Subcommittee of the Education and Labor Committee of
the House of Representatives introduced legislation to extend the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) to vessels foreign-flagged cruise ships operating primarily in
the United States.\57\ At hearings in October 1989, the Committee was
told of exploitation of sailors, who had no redress for grievances
about their working conditions. Reverend James Lingren, the Director of
the New England Seaman's Mission, specifically described conditions in
the cruise ship industry:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ See House of Representatives, 1994 Coverage of Certain Federal
Labour Laws to Foreign Documented Vessels (House Report #103-818),
Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1994, page 1.
We have discovered that on several of the largest cruise ship
lines calling in U.S. ports a typical seafarer works 100 hours
each week with no days off during his 1 year of employment.
Many of them work without benefit of anything resembling a true
contract of employment. They often earn less than 75 cents an
hour . . . I personally saw the contract of . . . [a] seafarer
who signed for $192 a month to work for 7 days a week for 1
year. He was to be paid overtime for any hours over 8 hours a
day, and while he was required to work 12 hours a day, the
company refused to pay the overtime. This meant he was
effectively making 53 cents an hour. When he complained he was
relieved of his duties and sent home.'' \58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\ House of Representatives, 1994 Coverage of Certain Federal
Labour Laws to Foreign Documented Vessels (House Report #103-818),
Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1994, page 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The subcommittee approved the bill in the summer of 1990 though it
never went any further. It was reintroduced in the next Congress on
February 27, 1991 and again died in committee.
On March 30, 1993 Clay introduced H.R. 1517, another version of the
same legislation. Hearings were again held; they yielded no new
information. However, for the first time the cruise industry, through
its main lobbyist, the International Council of Cruise Lines (ICCL),
threatened that if the House of Representatives passed the legislation
the cruise industry would be forced to relocate to non-U.S. ports. In
testimony before the Subcommittee on Labor Standards on May 13, 1993
the president of the ICCL, John Estes, stated:
Some have told you that we will not relocate. I am here to tell
you that this industry will relocate if the Bill is passed. It
won't happen all at once, but it will happen.'' \59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\ Estes, John. 1993. Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Labor
Standards, Occupational Health, and Safety of the Committee on
Education and Labor of the House of Representatives, May 13.
Washington, D.C.: GPO. (Document # Y4 ED8/1 103-9)
He pointed out the ease with which cruise ships can be moved from
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
one homeport to another and that:
. . . in order to keep international costs competitive we do in
fact on occasion move from country to country. International
shipping will always seek a hospitable economic and political
climate from which to operate . . . It would be an unfortunate
failure of United States policy not to recognize that homeports
are unimportant to passengers.\60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\ Estes, John. 1993. Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Labor
Standards, Occupational Health, and Safety of the Committee on
Education and Labor of the House of Representatives, May 13.
Washington, D.C.: GPO. (Document # Y4 ED8/1 103-9)
The legislation this time made its way to the floor of the House of
Representatives, but it failed to be heard by the full House and died
with the end of the Congress.
Pro-industry legislation introduced in 1995 by Representative Don
Young had much greater success. He attached a tort reform measure to
the Coast Guard Reauthorization bill passed on May 9, 1995. The
amendment, referred to by Young as a `noncontroversial manager's
amendment;' was for the most part written by the International Council
of Cruise Lines.\61\ It passed the House by a vote of 406 to 12. Only
afterwards did people read the final print.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\61\ Glass, Joel. 1996. ``Compromise on U.S. Cruise Tort,'' Lloyd's
List, October 1. Page 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For one thing, the amendment limited the rights of foreign
seafarers to sue in U.S. courts for grievances against foreign cruise
lines. This went against the stream of court cases taken up by the U.S.
Government several years earlier. In 1991, the U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) won two cases against foreign flag cruise
vessels. In one, the court enjoined a foreign cruise line from
discriminating on the basis of sex against any actual or potential job
applicant. In the other, Norwegian Cruise Line (NCL) was charged with
sex discrimination by an assistant cruise director who alleged she lost
her job after becoming pregnant, and with discrimination by race and
national origin by a bar manager who says he was forced to resign. NCL
disregarded two subpoenas claiming the EEOC lacked jurisdiction. It won
in the U.S. District Court in Miami but the decision was reversed by
the U.S. Court of Appeals in Atlanta, which affirmed the EEOC's
jurisdiction. This was a dangerous precedent for the cruise industry
and Young's amendment gave them an out. Another provisions in the
amendment was designed to protect ship owners from unlimited liability
in suits brought by passengers or crew members who were harmed by
medical malpractice at a shore side facility.
The final version of the legislation followed intense lobbying by
opponents to the amendments and by the cruise industry. In the end, a
cruise line sued by one of its workers in regard to treatment at a U.S.
health facility or doctor's office can invoke an award cap allowed
medical practitioners under the laws of the state in which the care is
provided. The provision limiting seafarer's use of U.S. courts was
replaced with a provision that seafarer employment contracts can block
the worker from seeking legal remedies in U.S. courts.\62\ This
provision has crept into seafarer employment contracts and has thus far
been ruled enforceable by U.S. courts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\ Glass, Joel. 1996. ``Compromise on U.S. Cruise Tort,'' Lloyd's
List, October 1. Page 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
US Courts and Labor
There is a long history of court cases where cruise ship workers
have successfully sought relief in cases of, among other things, breach
of contract, injury and death. Claims have often been under the
Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (Jones Act) or the Federal Seaman's Wage
Act. But access to the U.S. courts appears to be waning for seafarers
on foreign-flagged cruise ships that operate out of U.S. ports.
A Federal court decision issued in October 2003, and upheld on
appeal in January 2005, ruled that the families of Filipino cruise ship
workers injured and killed during a 2003 boiler explosion aboard NCL's
Norway had to resolve claims in the Philippines per their employment
contract. The decision meant that death claims for the eight crew
members killed in the accident were limited to $50,000. The U.S.
National Transportation Safety Board subsequently ruled that the
accident, which also severely injured about 20 crew members, was the
result of ``. . . deficient boiler operation, maintenance, and
inspection practices of Norwegian Cruise Line, which allowed material
deterioration and fatigue cracking to weaken the boiler.'' \63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\63\ NTSB. 2007. Marine Accident Brief: Boiler Rupture on Bahamian
Cruise Ship S.S. Norway, Port of Miami, May 25, 2003. NTSB Report
Number MAB 07/03, November.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The court's ruling had more far reaching consequences. It upheld
the enforceability of employment contracts that require disputes to be
resolved through arbitration and only in particular places--for
Filipino workers the place is Manila. It also lent support to Carnival
Cruise Lines' desire to have a new clause inserted in its new crew
member contracts requiring all claims against the employer to be
arbitrated internationally in London, Manila, Panama City, or Monaco,
whichever is closer to the crew member's home.
Arbitration Clauses
Arbitration clauses are now commonplace in cruise ship worker
contracts. These clauses have dire consequences for crew members. The
fact is that foreign seaman have no rights to sue in U.S. Courts.
Because a cruise line can have foreign law apply thereby circumventing
the Jones Act, it has a disincentive to hire American workers. The
arbitration clauses, and the opinions enforcing them, are therefore job
killers for Americans, and they circumvent long standing U.S. Law--the
Merchant Marine Act of 1920.
For those who are not familiar with the Jones Act, it provides to
the worker the right to sue for pain and suffering damages for job
related injuries. The general maritime law that was inherited from the
English also provides for the obligation to pay the seaman maintenance
(expenses of daily living) and cure (prompt and adequate medical care)
until the seaman reaches maximum medical improvement. Historically, the
seaman was viewed as a ward of the court because typically s/he is in a
place where s/he does not know anyone and s/he has little resources.
Thus the law says that if the shipowner/employer does not pay
maintenance and cure properly, punitive damages can be awarded. The
shipowner/employer escapes these obligations with the arbitration
clauses that apply foreign law. This was seen in a case brought by a
Filipino worker with Holland America Line, filed in U.S. Federal court
in Seattle, Washington on April 27, 2007 (Case #C07-0645) and which
sought class action status. The suit claimed the company illegally
forced crew members to pay back the cost of airfare to and from the
ships and fired them if they failed to do so. The worker was a
bartender who had signed a standard twelve-month contract with the
cruise line, working a mandatory 77 hour workweek. He received a
monthly guaranteed salary of $442 per month (inclusive of overtime,
vacation and allowances) and was required to repay $212 per month for
``deployment costs''--leaving a net income of $230 per month.
Deployment costs include round trip air far to/from the ship, uniforms,
medical exams, visas, recruiting costs, and union dues.
The U.S. court refused to hear the case given terms of the
employment contract between the crew member and the cruise line; it
referred the case to the Philippines for arbitration. The arbitration
board ruled in favor of the individual claimant, but there was no basis
on which it could certify a class action claim. The cruise line
benefits because the penalties assessed by an arbitration board are
small by comparison to those historically garnered through the U.S.
courts, and it avoids a payout to other workers in the same situation.
Crew Member Work Conditions
There are many work conditions I could discuss, but there are only
three worthy of mention here. The first relates to the normal contract
from cruise ship employees. The typical workweek is a mandatory 77
hours--11 hours a day, 7 days a week. The length of a contract
generally varies by work role (officers typically work 4 months;
laborers work six to twelve months, depending on whether they work on a
European contract or a Filipino, Central American, or Asian contract),
and salary also varies by the worker's national origin within the same
job category. Whether this is fair is a matter of vantage point; it is
a matter of fact. With these hours, worker fatigue may also be an issue
in emergency situations.
A second issue is the common use of recruiting agents. Though
International Labor Organization (ILO) regulations prohibit agents from
collecting fees from the worker--they are supposed to be paid by the
employer--workers are often required to pay to secure a position. These
can range as high as $4,000. According to the International Transport
Workers Federation, Filipinos normally pay $1,500 to join a ship.\64\ A
1997 story in the Wall Street Journal cites a Croatian worker who paid
$600 to an agent to confirm his employment. In addition, he started
work with a $1,400 debt to Carnival Cruise Lines, which had advanced
the cost of his transportation to the ship.\65\ In February 2000, an
article in the Miami New Times described a cook on Carnival Cruise
Line's Paradise who had given a Bombay agency $2,000, which included
airfare. That sum, much of which he borrowed from relatives, is almost
one-third of the $7,000 he will make during his ten-month contract.\66\
And in 2001 it was reported that an agent in Rumania was charging $500
to interview for a position with Norwegian Cruise Line; if the person
is hired s/he paid an additional $1,000 to secure the position.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\64\ ITF. 2000. ``The Dark Side of the Cruise Industry,''
Seafarers' Bulletin, no. 14. Page 17.
\65\ Prager, Joshua Harris. 1997. ``For Cruise Workers, Life Is No
`Love Boat' '' Wall Street Journal, July 3. Page B1.
\66\ Nielsen, Kirk. ``The Perfect Scam: For the Workers Life Is No
Carnival, Believe It or Not,'' Miami New Times, February 3-9, 2000
\67\ Klein, Ross A. 2002. Cruise Ship Blues: The Underside of the
Cruise Industry, Gabriola Island, BC: New Society. Page 128.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The final issue is unpaid overtime. This matter was successively
resolved with each of the major cruise lines through class action suits
between 2002 and 2006. However the problem re-emerged recently with NCL
America, a U.S. registered carrier. The company agreed to pay $526,602
in back wages to 2,059 employees in Hawaii after a Federal labor
investigation found that the company had violated minimum wage,
overtime (many employees were working 60 hours a week), and
recordkeeping provisions for employees on Pride of America between July
2009 and November 2011. The investigation also found that because NCL
Amereica took large meal and lodging credits, some employees were paid
less than the Federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour, and that the
cruise line failed to record and pay the housekeeping staff for
cleaning the cabins between cruises. Following the investigation, the
cruise line agreed to bring its pay practices into compliance with the
law.\68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\68\ Gale, Kevin. 2012. ``Norwegian Cruise Lines Settles Overtime
Investigation,'' South Florida Business Journal, February 16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
V. In Closing
Thanks again for the opportunity to share my observations and
insights generated from my 16 years as an academic whose research has
focused on the cruise industry. I welcome your questions.
Appendix A: Events at Sea*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\*\ Source: Cruise Junkie dot Com
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A.1--Cruise Ships that Have Sunk, 1980-2012
A.2--Cruise Ships Running Aground, but not Sinking, 1973-2012
A.3--Fires Onboard Cruise Ships, 1990-2011
A.4--Collisions Involving Cruise Ships, 1990-2011
A.5--Other Significant Events Involving Cruise Ships, 2000-2011
http://www.cruisejunkie.com/Sunk.html
http://www.cruisejunkie.com/Aground
http://www.cruisejunkie.com/fires.html
http://www.cruisejunkie.com/collides.html
http://www.cruisejunkie.com/Disabling.html
______
A.1--Cruise Ships That Have Sunk, 1980-2012
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Year Ship (Cruise Line) Incident
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2012 Costa Concordia Hit submerged rock off Giglio,
(Costa Cruises) Italy, partially sunk after
taking on water and severely
listing. 4,200 evacuated; 32
deaths
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007 Explorer Ship abandoned near the South
(GAP Adventures) Shetland Islands after it hit an
unidentified object (likely ice).
Environmental impact. 154
evacuated; no deaths
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007 Sea Diamond Ship abandoned after hitting a
(Louis Cruises) reef a half mile from shore in
Santorini. 1,524 evacuated; 2
deaths
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004 Wilderness Ship evacuated after striking ice
Adventurer and taking on water in Tracy Arm,
(Glacier Bay Cruise AK. All evacuated safely.
Line)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003 Safari Spirit Ship hit some rocks about 80 miles
(American Safari in SE Alaska. Sank in 30 feet of
Cruises) water. All evacuated safely to
lifeboats.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1999 Sun Vista Engine room fire--Sinks of
(Sun Cruises) Malaysia. 1,090 evacuated safely
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1998 Fantome Sinks trying to outrun Hurricane
(Windjammer Cruises) Mitch. 30 crew deaths
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1995 Club Royale Gambling ship sinks off Florida
coast trying to outrun Hurricane
Erin. 8 crew rescued; 3 crew
deaths
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1994 Estonia The passenger cruise ferry sunk in
(Estline) a storm in the Baltic Sea. Sunk
in 30 minutes. 852 deaths
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1992 Royal Pacific Collided with a fishing trawler in
(Greek cruise ship) the Straits of Malacca with 500
rescued; more than 30 deaths
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1991 Oceanos Sunk in a storm off South Africa.
(Greek cruise ship) All 571 people onboard were saved
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1988 Jupiter Sank within 40 minutes after a
(Greek cruise ship) collision with a car carrier
outside Piraeus. 581 safely
rescued; 4 deaths.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1986 Admiral Nakhimov Sank in 7 minutes after colliding
(Russian cruise with a large bulk carrier. 811
ship) safely rescued; 423 deaths
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1986 Mikhail Lermontov Ran aground on rocks off New
(Baltic Shipping Zealand and sank within 3 hours.
Company) More than 1,000 rescued safely; 1
death
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1984 Sundancer The ship declared a total loss
(Sundancer Cruises) after hitting a rock north of
Vancouver. Investigators found
that crew were disorganized and
evacuation was largely
coordinated by passengers. All
evacuated safely.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1980 Prinsendam An engine room fire forced
(Holland America evacuation to lifeboats while 140
Line) miles from Alaska. All evacuated
safely.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A.2 Ships Running Aground (but not sinking), 1972-2011
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Year Ship (Cruise Line) Incident
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2012 Poesia Ran aground near Freeport,
(MSC Cruises) Bahamas. Waited for tide to get
high.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011 Polar Star Sustained a minor breach of its
(Polar Star Cruises) outer hull by grounding on a rock
near Antarctica's Detaille
Island. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010 Clipper Adventurer Ship evacuated after it ran
(Clipper Cruises) aground 55 nautical miles from
Coppermine, Nunavut. Cruise
terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009 Zenith Ship went aground on the approach
(Pullmantur Cruises) to Copenhagen having cruised too
close to a wind farm of twenty-
four turbines in the Oresund
Strait.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009 Ocean Nova Ran aground about one mile from
(Quark Expeditions) the San Martin base (Antarctica),
pushed by ``extremely high
winds'' into craggy rocks. 64
passengers and 41 crew members
aboard. Cruise terminated.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009 Richard With Ran aground at the port of
(Hurtigruten) Trondheim on the west coast of
Norway. Suffered propeller damage
and took on board water through a
leak in a seal. 53 passengers on
board evacuated. Cruise
terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 Ushuaia Ran aground on a rock close to
(Fathom expeditions) Wilhelmina Bay in Antarctica
causing a hull breach, and
possibly fuel leak. All 130
aboard safely evacuated. Cruise
terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 QEII Ran aground at the Brambles
(Cunard Line) sandbank near Calshot,
Southampton, with three tugs
attached to her stern. Five tugs
were sent out to assist her
getting off the sandbank.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 Antarctic Dream Ran aground off Svalbard, just
(Antarctic Shipping) east of the island of
Spitsbergen, with 130 passengers
on board. Freed after 6 hours.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 Queen Victoria Ran aground while leaving port.
(Cunard Line) Freed in about an hour.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 Spirit of Glacier Grounded in Tarr Inlet near
Bay Glacier Bay. Refloated the next
(Cruise West) day and towed to port. Crack in
hull.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 EasyCruise Line Ran aground inside the port of the
(EasyCruise) Aegean island of Syros with 353
passengers and 105 crew on board.
Freed by tug.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 Spirit of Alaska Touched bottom in Tracy Arm, AK.
(Cruise West) It did not take on water and did
not have interior damage but is
having a problem with its
propulsion system Towed to Juneau
for inspection and repairs;
passengers disembarked. Cruise
terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 Mona Lisa Ran aground on a sandbank about 10
miles from the Latvia coast.
Attempts to free itself were
unsuccessful; almost 1000
passengers needed to be evacuated
. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 Sky Wonder Ran aground in port of Kusadasi
(Pullmantur) (Turkey). All 1,029 passengers
evacuated. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007 Spirit of Nantucket Ran the vessel aground in Virginia
(Cruise West) Beach to prevent it from sinking.
It began taking on water while
passing through the Intercoastal
Waterway after striking something
that left a 2 inch by 12 inch
gash in the hull near the end of
the ship. None of the 61
passengers or five crew members
were as injured. Cruise
terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007 Spirit of Columbia Ran aground in Prince William
(Cruise West) Sound. Refloated when tide came
up.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007 Royal Express 4 Ran aground as it was returning to
(SunCruz) shore. Several passengers
injured.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007 Millenium Drifted onto submerged rocks while
(Celebrity Cruises) at Villefranche, France, damaging
propulsion system. Cruise
terminated next day
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007 Disko II Ran aground off Greenland and more
(Albatros Travel) than 50 people evacuated. Cruise
terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007 Empress of the North Ran aground off Alaska coast and
(Majestic America began taking on water. 281 of 320
Line) aboard evacuated. Cruise
terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007 Regal Princess Sustained damage after touching
(Princess Cruises) bottom. Out of service for 3
weeks for repairs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007 Nordkapp Touched ground near Deception
(Hurtigruten) Island in the Antarctic. The ship
sustained an 82 foot long gash to
its outer hull--environmental
damage. All evacuated. Cruise
terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007 Sky Wonder Ran aground in Rio de la Plata.
(Pullmantur) Freed at high tide.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006 Lyubov Orlova Ran aground in Whalers' Bay while
(Quark Expeditions) visiting Deception Island in the
South Shetland Islands with 150
passengers onboard. Towed free
after 8 hours.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006 Statendam Touched bottom in Port of
(Holland America Melbourne with 1,700 persons
Line) onboard. Found to be traveling
too fast. Minor damage.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006 Grand Princess Ran aground while heading out of
(Princess Cruises) Livorno harbor. Freed after 30
minutes.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006 Norwegian Crown Ran aground in Bermuda. Freed
(NCL) after 10 hours.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006 Columbus Scraped bottom during her visit to
(Hapag-Lloyd) Sault Sainte Marie, sustaining no
damage.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006 Celebration A propeller struck bottom while
(Carnival Cruise approaching the dock at Nassau
Lines) spilling an estimated 200 liters
of lubricating oil and affecting
the operation of the engine.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006 Yorktown Clipper Ran aground at Matia Island in
(Clipper Cruises) Washington state. Company fined
$1000 for placing passengers at
risk because company officials
did not report a dent the ship
sustained on its bottom.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006 Regal Princess Became stuck on a sandbar in the
(Princess Cruises) Amazon. Freed after 1.5 hours,
``by using its bow thrusters,
emptying the pools and probably
grey water and some ballast.''
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006 Empress of the North Ran aground on the Columbia River
(American West with 250 people onboard.
Steamboat) Refloated 2 days later. Cruise
terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006 Queen Mary 2 Touch a submerged object, damaging
(Cunard Line) propulsion system. Departure
delayed 41 hours.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005 Pacific Sky Suffered engine problems and
(P&O Princess) drifted onto a reef. Ship freed
one day later by tugs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005 Hanseatic Ran aground near the island of
(Hapag-Lloyd) Luroy off the Norwegian, causing
a 5 meter hole in the ships hull.
Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004 Sapphire Princess Lost power and out of control for
(Princess Cruises) about 5 minutes, which caused it
touching the coral reef at
Moorea. Damage to thrusters.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004 Clipper Odyssey Ran hard aground on rocks in the
(Clipper Cruises) Aleutian Islands, forcing 153
passengers and crew to transfer
to other ships and spilling an
undetermined amount of fuel from
a ruptured tank. Cruise
terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004 Mona Lisa Got stuck in the mud close to St.
(Holiday Mark's Square in Venice, Italy
Kreuzfahrten) with 1000 passengers onboard.
Freed.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004 Astor Grounded in the shipping channel
(Transocean Cruises) after leaving Townsville port.
Detained for 2 hours.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004 Empress of the North Hit the gate at Ice Harbor Dam and
(American West became stuck in the navigational
Steamboat) lock. 200 passengers bussed back
to Portland. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003 Empress of the North Went aground on the Oregon side of
(American West the Columbia River. Two crew and
Steamboat) one passenger suffered minor
injuries.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003 Mona Lisa 670 passengers were evacuated
(Holiday after the ship ran on to rocks
Kreuzfahrten) near Sptisbergen. Both propellers
and the hull damaged. Cruise
terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003 Summit Hull damaged when the ship hit a
(Celebrity Cruises) rock leaving Hubbard Glacier. The
result was a 10-foot-long hole in
the ballast tank midway along the
hull, and a 140-foot-long crease.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003 Spirit of Columbia Hit bottom and possibly bent port
(Cruise West) shaft and propeller in Prince
William Sound.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003 Vistamar Collided with underwater rocks
(Plantours & near the port of Ibiza. Towed by
Partners) tugs to Ibiza and all passengers
and crew evacuated. Cruise
terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003 Safari Spirit Hit rocks in SE Alaska. All
(American Safari evacuated to lifeboats. Cruise
Cruises) terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2002 Olympic Voyager Grounded and experienced minor
(Royal Olympic damage. Passengers evacuated.
Cruises) Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2002 Clipper Adventurer Ran aground in the vicinity of
(Clipper Cruises) Deception Island. Freed by a
Chilean icebreaker.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2002 Holiday Lodged on a sandy bottom of the
(Carnival Cruise Caribbean Sea, a quarter mile off
Lines) the coast of Playa del Carmen.
Passengers evacuated. Freed 3
days later. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2002 Clipper Odyssey Went aground on St. Matthew Island
(Clipper Cruises) in the Bering Sea in favorable
conditions with 184 persons
onboard.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2002 Clipper Adventurer Ran aground on a sand-bank in the
(Clipper Cruises) Essequibo River (Guyana's major
waterway). Stuck for more than a
day.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2002 Black Prince Ran aground on a sand bank while
(Fred Olsen Cruises) leaving Casilda, Cuba. Passengers
evacuated. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2001 Costa Tropicale Grounded at Venice, towed free by
(Costa Cruises) tugboats.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2001 Costa Tropicale Grounded at Mykonos, towed free by
(Costa Cruises) Costa Atlantica
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2001 Wilderness Explorer Grounded in Alaska
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2001 Regal Princess Grounded in Cairns. Freed and
(Princess Cruises) continues.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2001 Mistral Grounded off Nevis. Stuck for a
(Festival Cruises) day.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2000 World Discoverer Hit rock or reef and holed--Forced
to beach. 100 passengers rescued--
Solomon Islands. Cruise
terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2000 Carousel Sun Ran over rocks causing propeller
(Sun Cruises) damage and oil leak (50 ton
spill)--Abandon ship at Calica.
Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1999 Norwegian Sky Grounded in St. Lawrence Seaway.
(NCL) Out of service for 8 weeks.
Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1999 Radisson Diamond Grounded near Stockholm--Refloated
(Radisson Seven Seas
Cruises)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1999 Spirit of '98 Grounded in mouth of Tracy Arm (SE
of Juneau)--Holed. Evacuated.
Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1999 Wilderness Explorer Grounded west of Juneau--Refloated
(Glacier Bay Cruise
Line)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1998 Monarch of the Seas Strikes charted reef at St.
(RCCL) Maarten--holed. 27,000 sq feet of
coral reef damaged. Out for 4
months. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 Leeward Collides with Great Mayan Reef
(NCL) near Cancun--damages 460 sq yard
swath of coral
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 Noordam Soft grounding off Mexican coast--
(Holland America Propeller damage. Passengers sent
Line) home. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 Hanseatic Grounded in Norwegian Arctic--
(Hapag Lloyd) Evacuated, refloated, continues.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 Albatross Holed while leaving Isles of
(Phoenix Horizon) Scilly--Out for 2 weeks. Cruise
terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1996 Hanseatic Grounded in Northwest passage--
(Hapag Lloyd) refloated after being evacuated.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1996 Gripsholm Grounded 2 miles from Swedish
(Cunard Line) port. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1996 Royal Viking Sun Collision with reef in Red Sea--
(Cunard Line) Holed. Out for 2 months. Cruise
terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1996 Tropicale Grounded while leaving Tampa--
(Carnival Cruise Freed. Harbor pilot complains
Lines) that ship failed to respond to 3
different orders to turn.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1995 Sovereign of the Grounded in mud bank in San Juan
Seas Harbour--Freed after 80 minutes;
(RCCL) Towed to port, leaves 24 hours
late.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1995 America Queen Grounded in Ohio River for 1 day--
(Delta Steamboat) Refloated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1995 Star Princess Grounded in Alaska--40' long, 8''
(P&O Cruises) wide gash + 100' gash,modest
pollution. Evacuated by tender.
Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1995 Royal Majesty Grounded off Nantucket--17 mi off
(Majesty Cruise course.
Line)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1995 Renaissance Six Grounded, eastern Aegean--
(Renaissance Evacuated. Cruise terminated
Cruises)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1994 Royal Odyssey Grounded leaving Rome. Cruise
(Royal Cruises) terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1994 Starward Grounded in St. John, VI--oil
(NCL) spill of 100 gallons.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1994 Nieuw Amsterdam Grounded in SE Alaska--200 ft
(Holland America crease in hull, damaged
Line) propeller, puncture in ballast
tank, 260 gallon spill. Refloated
in 30 minutes. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1994 Sally Albatross Grounded in Gulf of Finland--Half-
(Silja Line) sunk. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1993 Yorktown Clipper Grounded in Glacier Bay--Spills
(Clipper Cruises) 28,000 gallons of fuel 45 west of
Juneau Evacuated. Cruise
terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1993 Ocean Princess Grounded near Belem--Life boat
(Pacquet Cruises) evacuation Declared a total loss.
Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1992 Nantucket Clipper Aground off Maine--4 minor
(Clipper Cruises) injuries. Refloated 3 hours
later--Damage to hull and diesel
tank
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1992 QEII Grounded off Cape Cod--74 foot
(Cunard Line) gash. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1992 Mermoz Grounded off Scandinavia. Cruise
(Pacquet Cruises) terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1992 Tropic Star Ran aground in Freeport.
(Starlite Cruises)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1991 Seaward Runs aground near Miami after
(NCL) plastic bag caught in an air
intake and engine shut down.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1990 Regent Star Fire and grounded while
(Regency Cruises) approaching Philadelphia--
Evacuated. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1990 Bermuda Star Grounded off Nova Scotia--
(Bahamas Cruise evacuated. Freed after 13 hours.
Line) Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1986 Dolphin Grounded in Bahamas
(Dolphin Cruises)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1985 Amerikanis Grounded off Mexico--5 days to
(Fantasy Cruise free. Cruise terminated
Line)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1985 Bermuda Star Grounded off Key West
(Bahamas Cruise
Line)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1984 Yankee Clipper Grounded after tearing from
(Clipper Cruises) anchorage at St. Martin.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1984 Rhapsody Grounded off Cayman Islands--
Evacuated after 4 days; freed
after 12 days. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1982 Alaskan Majestic Grounded--Evacuated 1 dead; 2
Explorer injured. Captain charged with
(Exploration negligence. Cruise terminated
Cruises)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1978 Kungsholm Aground for 5 days at Martinique
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1973 Mardi Gras Maiden Voyage--runs aground
(Carnival Cruise leaving Miami Harbour. Stuck for
Lines) 24 hours.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A.3--Fires Onboard Cruise Ships, 1990-2011
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Year Ship (Cruise Line) Incident
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011 Amsterdam Fire in hydraulic unit in
(Holland America incinerator room. Put out in 35
Line) minutes.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011 Ocean Princess Fire in one of the generators,
(Princess Cruises) contained without serious damage.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011 Queen Mary 2 Fire in gas turbine rendering it
(Cunard Line) useless. Passengers told to get
their children and stay in
cabins.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011 Nordlys Fire in engine room. 100
(Hurtigruten) passengers and crew evacuated by
lifeboat; 162 evacuated when
towed to port. 2 deaths. Cruise
terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011 Ocean Star Pacific Generator fire knocked out power
(Ocean Star Cruises) to the ship, forcing the
evacuation of nearly 800
passengers and crew off Mexico's
coast. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011 Thomson Dream A starboard engine fire early in
(Thomson Cruises) the cruise that departed
Barbados. No impact on itinerary
and no reported injuries.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010 Musica Fire in engine room knocked out
(MSC Cruises) air conditioning and the water
supply. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010 Carnival Splendor Engine room fire disabled the
(Carnival Cruise ship's electrical system (3,299
Lines) guests, 1,167 crew). Towed to San
Diego. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010 Infinity Electrical fire caused loss of
(Celebrity Cruises) power for several hours while in
Alaska.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010 Deutschland Fire in engine room while docked.
(Peter Deilmann Passengers evacuated. Cruise
Cruises) terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009 Zenith All passengers were evacuated when
(Pullmantur Cruises) the ship had a major fire while
docked at Stockholm. Sailed one
day late.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009 Crown Princess Fire in passenger cabin.
(Princess Cruises) Contained.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009 Royal Princess Fire in engine room. Passengers
(Princess Cruises) called to muster stations. Cruise
terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009 Sea Cloud Fire extinguished by fire brigade
(Sea Cloud Cruises) before returning to port.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009 Golden Princess Fire in main engine room.
(Princess Cruises) Contained within 1.5 hours.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009 Costa Romantica Fire in the generator room causes
(Costa Cruises) brief blackout. 1,429 passengers
and 590 crew members evacuated.
Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009 Ecstasy Fire in passenger cabin at 2:30
(Carnival Cruise AM--several cabins damaged.
Lines)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 Zuiderdam Small electrical fire reported
(Holland America overnight--No injuries or known
Line) damage.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 Eurodam Passengers awakened at 4AM by fire
(Holland America alarm. Fire in engine room.
Line)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 Norwegian Dream At about 2:45 a.m. an electrical
(NCL) fire broke out on deck three in
an electrical locker of the ship.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 Azamara Quest While docked in Chios (Greece)
(Azamara Cruises) there was a fire in the ship
laundry room. The fire was
contained quickly and it did not
affect the schedule.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 Fantasy Fire (or smoke) caused by welder.
(Carnival Cruise Embarkation suspended; passengers
Lines) onboard moved to Lido Deck.
Contained.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 Zuiderdam Onboard fire while docked at
(Holland America Dubrovnik. Firefighters called
Line) from city. Under control within
45 minutes.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 Queen of the West Fire broke out in the engine room
(Majestic America while the ship was near Maryhill,
Line) WA. Passengers evacuated. Cruise
terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 Star Princess Fire in incinerator room.
(Princess Cruises) Contained.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007 Norwegian Spirit Fire in engine room. Contained.
(NCL)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007 Jewel of the Seas Fire in laundry room at 2:30AM.
(Royal Caribbean Contained.
International)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007 Pacific Star Small fire in an electrical panel;
(P&O Australia) mustering of crew to prepare for
a possible emergency. Contained.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007 Enchantment of the Fire in closet of unoccupied
Seas cabin. Contained in less than an
(Royal Caribbean hour.
International)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007 Mariner of the Seas Incinerator fire. Contained.
(Royal Caribbean
International)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007 Norwegian Star Escorted into the Prince Rupert
(NCL) harbor by the a Canadian Coast
Guard vessel following a small
fire in the engine room.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007 Disney Magic Fireworks mishap caused fire by
(Disney Cruise Line) Palo's restaurant. Contained.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006 Seabourn Spirit Small fire in Verandah Cafe.
(Seabourn Cruises) Contained.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006 Radiance of the Sea Fire at 2AM in Windjammer Cafe.
(Royal Caribbean Contained in less than an hour.
International)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006 Oosterdam Engine room fire disables one of
(Holland America the Azipod propulsion systems.
Line) Contained.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006 Jewel of the Sea Fire in trash can. Contained.
(Royal Caribbean Seven staterooms evacuated and
International) passengers moved.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006 Statendam At 5:30AM fire alarm went off.
(Holland America Fire in stack of incinerator
Line) contained.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006 Calypso Disabling fire off UK coast. 462
(Louis Cruises) passengers and 246 crew were at
muster stations, but evacuation
was not necessary. Towed to port.
Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006 Seabourn Pride Serious fire in engine room.
(Seabourn Cruises) Contained
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006 Star Princess Fire in passenger accommodations.
(Princess Cruises) About 150 cabins damaged. 1
death; cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005 Costa Classica Escorted back to Athens after a
(Costa Cruises) fire broke out in mooring area,
aft side. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005 Carnival Legend Heavy smoke from engine room.
(Carnival Cruise Passengers mustered to lifeboats.
Lines) All clear given an hour later.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005 Infinity Fire in stateroom 7067 that gutted
(Celebrity Cruises) the room.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005 Seven Seas Navigator Electrical fire in generator room
(Radisson Seven Sea at 1AM caused temporary blackout
Cruises) and propulsion problems. Next
cruise canceled
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004 Carnival Destiny Fire in trash incinerator while at
(Carnival Cruise St. Thomas. Embarkation delayed
Lines) 45 minutes.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004 Sun Cruz V Engine room fire extinguished.
(Sun Cruz) Towed back to port with 160
passengers onboard.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004 Majesty of the Sea Passengers directed to muster
(Royal Caribbean stations when a galley fire broke
International) out at 5 AM in the Windjammer
Cafe. Contained in less than an
hour.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003 Explorer of the Sea A minor fire at the aft end of
(Royal Caribbean Deck 13 extinguished within 15
International) minutes, causing damage to the
inline skating facility and the
top of the waterslide on Deck 12.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2002 Statendam Five tugs boats tow ship back to
(Holland America Vancouver after a small fire
Line) knocked out four generators and
two main propulsion motors.
Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2002 Disney Magic Smoke stack fire; extinguished
(Disney Cruise Line) within an hour. Passengers were
awakened at 5 AM and told to go
to their assembly stations with
their life jackets.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2001 Arkona Runs into dock after engine room
fire causes loss of power. Cruise
terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2001 Nordic Prince Engine room fire, loss of power.
(Royal Caribbean Passengers flown home from
International) Bermuda. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2000 Nieuw Amsterdam Fire in crew quarters while in
(Holland America Glacier Bay--Delayed 12 hours
Line) until given clearance by U.S.
Coast Guard.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2000 Celebration Fire in generator--Adrift for 6
(Carnival Cruise hours until power restored. No
Lines) toilets or air conditioning.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1999 Tropicale Engine fire--Disabled. Arrives in
(Carnival Cruise port 2 days late. Next 6 cruises
Lines) canceled
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1999 Sun Cruz Engine room fire before it left
port--Evacuated. Cruise canceled
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1999 Norway Fire in turbocharger room while in
(NCL) Barcelona mid-cruise. Cruise
terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1999 Sun Vista Fire in engine room--Sinks off
(Sun Cruises) Malaysia.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1999 Enchantment of the Engine fire/failure 60 miles from
Sea St. Thomas. Cruise terminated
(Royal Caribbean
International)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1998 Ecstasy Fire in laundry room while leaving
(Carnival Cruise Miami--54 injured and 4
Lines) hospitalized. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 Romantica Fire 10 mi off Cypress (total
(New Paradise loss)--Evacuated. Cruise
Cruises) terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 Vistafjord Fire while in Straits of Magellan--
(Cunard Line) disabled for 2 days.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 Vistafjord Fire in ship's laundry room. 1
(Cunard Line) death; cruise terminated.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 Fair Princess Fire in casino--passengers called
(P&O Cruises) to muster stations--fire
contained.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1996 Universe Explorer Laundry room fire, 67 crew and 6
(Commodore Cruises) passengers injured. 5 deaths;
cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1996 Golden Princess Fire in engine room--Towed to
(Princess Cruises) Victoria. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1996 Sagafjord Fire--Stranded off coast of Manila
(Cunard Line) (listing)--Towed to dock. Cruise
terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1995 Regent Star Engine room fire while in Prince
(Regency Cruises) William Sound-Disabled.
Passengers transferred to
Rotterdam. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1995 Celebration Engine room fire when 370 miles
(Carnival Cruise south of Miami--Adrift for more
Lines) than 2 days. No a/c or hot food
or elevators. Passengers
transferred to Ecstasy. Cruise
terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1994 Regal Empress Fire when 30 min from NYC--
(International Evacuated.
Shipping)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1994 Pallas Athena Fire while berthed in Piraeus--
(Epirotiki) Total loss.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1992 Star Majestic Fire--Evacuated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1991 Pegasus Fire while berthed in Venice--
(Epirotiki) Total loss
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1991 Eurosun Fire off Canary Islands
(Europe Cruise Line)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1991 Sovereign of the Fire in lounge while in port at
Seas San Juan--Evacuated. Cruise
(RCCL) resumed.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1990 Crystal Harmony Temporarily disabled from fire in
(Crystal Cruises) auxiliary engine room--Drifted
for 16 hours. Evacuated at port.
Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1990 Regent Star Fire--put under control. Possible
(Regency Cruises) arson.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1990 Scandinavian Star Fire while in North Sea--
(International Evacuated. 159 deaths; cruise
Shipping) terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1990 Fairstar Engine room fire--Not disabled. 1
(Sitmar Cruises) death
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A.4--Collisions Involving Cruise Ships
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Year Ship (Cruise Line) Incident
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011 Veendam A container derrick tore off a 50
(Holland America foot section of railing on deck
Line) 12 and cracked a window in the
Crows Nest while leaving Buenos
Aires.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011 Avalon Tranquility Danube cruise abandoned after
(Avalon Waterways) vessel struck by a cargo ship.
Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011 Oriana Ship dented after bashing into
(P&O Cruises) quay at Kristiansand, Norway.
Ship's stern stoved in.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011 Emerald Princess Sustained considerable damage to
(Princess Cruises) several lifeboats when a fuel
loading barge collided with the
side of the ship while in the
port of St Petersburg, Russia.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011 Westerdam Collision between the ship and ice
(Holland America in the vicinity of Yakutat Bay,
Line) Alaska. Sustained damage
approximately 15 feet below the
water line.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011 Opera Collided twice with the pier as it
(MSC Cruises) was leaving Buenos Aires,
damaging several cabins. Detained
in port for 10 hours.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010 Costa Classica Collided with a cargo ship near
(Costa Cruises) the deep water channel of the
Yangtze River. News images show a
scrape or gash stretching about
20 meters along the starboard
side of Deck 5 midships.
Passengers disembarked. Cruise
terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010 Sergei Kirov The cruise ship, carrying hundreds
(Russian ship) of U.S. and German tourists,
collided with a barge on the
Volga River. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010 Black Watch The ship's port bow collided with
(Fred Olsen Cruises) an iceberg off Greenland
resulting in a significant
impact. Superficial damage.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010 Caribbean Princess The ship hit the gangway structure
(Princess Cruises) and was delayed several hours in
departure.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010 Columbus Ship bumped a cargo vessel and hit
(Hapag-Lloyd) a steel bar while docking at the
Iloilo International Port in
Loboc, La Paz (Philippines). The
front part of the cruise ship was
damaged. Departure delayed for
repairs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010 Costa Europa Crashed into a pier in the
(Costa Cruises) Egyptian resort town of Sharm el-
Sheikh. 3 deaths; cruise
terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010 Ecstasy While docking at Galveston, hit
(Carnival Cruise the elevated gangway used to
Lines) embark & disembark guests. Little
damage to the ship, but several
window panels fell out of
gangway. The $1.8 million
structure was out of commission
for 30 days or more for repairs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009 Carnival Splendor Collided with the pier at Puerto
(Carnival Cruise Vallarta causing damage to the
Lines) stern. Departure delayed 20 hours
for repairs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009 Saga Ruby Hit a concrete bollard while
(Saga Holidays) berthing in New York, and had to
have emergency repairs to a hole
in the bow before setting off
back to the UK. One day delayed
departure.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009 Carnival Legend Two ships collided in Mexican port
(Carnival Cruise in an incident that left both
Lines) & vessels with minor damage.
Enchantment of the
Seas (Royal
Caribbean
International)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009 Antarctic Dream While coming alongside the quay in
Longyearbyen the ship collided
with a smaller passenger vessel.
Damage repaired.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009 Avalon Tranquility Collided with the tall ship
(Avalon Waterways) Schoenbrunn while it was
maneuvering in Linz on the Danube
River. Damage to the Schoenbrunn
was extensive; damage to the
riverboat was minimal.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009 Golden Princess A 31-foot-long fishing vessel
(Princess Cruises) ``erratically'' crossed within
about 30 feet of the front of the
cruise ship as it entered Los
Angeles harbor. Near miss.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 Costa Concordia Ship hit the dock in Palermo
(Costa Cruises) harbor. The bow was damaged.
Repairs were undertaken after the
ship was firmly docked.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 Imagination A minor crash that left a huge
(Carnival Cruise dent and needing some paint touch
Lines) up on the front side of the ship.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 Boudicca Sustained minor damage to bow
(Fred Olsen Cruises) whilst in Barbados. The damage
caused a 7ft dent which needed to
be repaired. Held in port for a
day.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 Seven Seas Voyager Hit the quay in Rhodes with her
(Regent Seven Seas stern, no injuries but minor
Cruises) damage done to the ship.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 Spirit of Adventure In Kepez, Turkey the ship hit the
(Saga Holidays) quay after tug failed and gashed
hull. It was repaired and
continued cruise.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 Crystal Collided with a ferry at Piraeus
(Louis Cruises) port. There were 955 passengers
on board the cruise ship. Only
material damage was caused to
both vessels.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 Zenith Ships collided in Greece's main
(Pullmantur) and port of Piraeus causing damage
Aegean Pearl but no injuries. Aegean Pearl's
(Louis Cruises) cruise canceled.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 Costa Classica Collided in the Adriatic Sea near
(Costa Cruises) and the Croatian tourist town of
Poesia Dubrovnik, but no one was
(MSC Cruises) injured.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 Norwegian Spirit While docking in NYC the ship
(NCL) rammed into Pier 90 at 50th St.
and 12th Ave. The city Buildings
Department said the accident
damaged beams supporting upper-
level parking lots.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 Queen Victoria Hit the quay of the Valletta
(Cunard Line) Waterfront, denting the stern of
the ship. Malta Maritime
Authority officially attributed
the incident to a mechanical
failure in the ship. Detained for
repairs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 Aquamarine Scraped against a pier as it was
(Louis Cruises) leaving Iraklion (Crete) causing
damage to the hull.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007 QEII A cross-channel ferry had to slam
(Cunard Line) on the brakes when the cruise
liner failed to give way at sea
off the Dover coast and sailed
into the passenger ferry's path.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007 Fram Had engine failure and was without
(Hurtigruten) power for about 2 hours while
near Brown Bluff on the northern
tip of the Antarctic Peninsula.
Drifted into a towering wall of
ice; bent the railing and a
lifeboat was completely crushed.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007 Norwegian Dream Collided with a barge being pulled
(NCL) by a tug in Uruguay's main port,
sending several cars and
containers off the barge and
shutting the port down. The ship
received damages above the water
line, which did not appear
serious. Detained for repairs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007 Lirica Damaged in Civitavecchia when it
(MSC Cruises) scraped the pier. An area between
the bow and portside bulwarks was
damaged.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007 Thomson Celebration Collided in the Greanger fjord
(Thomson Cruises) (Norway ) as the two were
and berthing. The damage was reported
Ocean Majesty as slight with some lifeboats and
(Page and Moy) davits taking the brunt of the
slow collision. Ocean Majesty's
cruise terminated.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007 Spirit of Yorktown Collided with a Seattle-based
(Cruise West) fishing vesssel, leaving the
seiner ``dead in the water'' with
a disabled steering mechanism.
The cruise ship appeared
undamaged.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007 Serenade Slightly damaged when it grazed
(Louis Cruises) the pier while docking at the
Greek island of Tinos, leaving a
small hole on the left side of
the ship's bow above the water
line. Repaired.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007 Kristina Regina Collided with a timber loaded deck
(Kristina Cruises) barge in dense fog south of
Gedser. Only slight damage and
continued to Helsinki.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007 Fantasy A barge struck the ship on the
(Carnival Cruise Mississippi River near New
Lines) Orleans, leaving a 30 foot gash
(about 5 feet above the
waterline) in its hull. Cruise
canceled
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006 Enchantment of the Ship dragged its anchor 300 metres
Seas before it ran into a moored barge
(Royal Caribbean off Pageant Beach Georgetown ,
International) Cayman Islands . Other than two
dents in the port side and a long
100-foot scrape, there was no
damage to the ship.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006 Pride of America Struck a 2,800 pound navigational
(NCL America) buoy as it left Honolulu and
dragged the buoy chain all the
way to Maui . Remained in Maui an
extra day for inspections and
repairs of the propeller, to
which the chain became attached.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006 Freedom of the Seas Collided with a refueling ship as
(Royal Caribbean it was leaving Montego Bay.
International) Damage was not significant.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006 River Empress Hit a bridge on the Danube near
(Uniworld) Melk at 6 AM. All passengers
(111) were evacuated. Cruise
terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005 Norwegian Spirit Collided with the pier as it
(NCL) docked at Juneau , breaking out
windows in 3 or 4 rooms and
making a large dent in the side.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005 Norwegian Majesty As the ship moored at St.
(NCL) George's, Bermuda, it knocked
into three yachts moored in
Powder Hall anchorage and almost
sucked one yacht under. The
ship's propeller appears to have
been damaged.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005 Grandeur of the Seas Struck the pier in Costa Maya,
(Royal Caribbean Mexico while docking causing a
International) puncture 42 feet long and 5 feet
wide at its widest point. The
puncture was in the first deck,
approximately five feet above the
waterline. Delayed 2 days for
repairs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005 River Duchess Crashed into a dockside restaurant
(Uniworld) in Amsterdam on Sunday. Police
said the ship--owned by U.S. firm
Uniworld--went off course due to
technical reasons.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004 Enchantment of the While docked at Key West, struck
Seas by a barge leaving an 8 foot hole
(Royal Caribbean in the vessel's hull. Repaired.
International)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004 Holiday Lost engine power and collided
(Carnival Cruise with some pilings along the
Line) Mobile River before dawn.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004 Van Gogh Collided with an oil tanker in
(Travelscope) foggy conditions off the southern
coast of Spain. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004 Viking Europe The ship (135 passengers; 39 crew)
(Viking River hit a bridge in Vienna , injuring
Cruises) 19 passengers.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004 Diamond Princess Ship pushed into pier at Victoria,
(Princess Cruises) BC, while docking. Damage minor,
except for bent propeller blade
tips, which caused altered
itineraries and missed ports.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004 American Glory Destroyed a 40 foot section of the
(American Cruise Downtown Marina dock in Beaufort,
Lines) SC (and damaged two yachts) when
a strong current and tide
combination forced the stern into
the pier. One of the cruise
ship's doors was damaged and two
windows shattered.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004 Stena Nautica Collided with a cargo ship (the
(Stena Line) Jamaican registered Joanna) en
route from Denmark to Varberg in
Sweden. 91 passengers and 37 crew
were evacuated to another ship.
The collision caused an 11-metre
hole in the ship's hull. Cruise
terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003 Royal Princess Collided with the pier when it was
(Princess Cruises) docking, causing an 8 foot rent
in the bow of the vessel and
delaying its departure until
repairs were completed.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003 Opera Collided with a Yermak icebreaker
(Silja Line) stationed at the exit of a St.
Petersburg port. The ship's
lifeboats were damaged but the
ship remained capable of
traveling.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003 Sundream Collided with the pier. It
(Sun Cruises) required repairs at Tenerife and
returned early to Southampton for
further repairs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003 Opera Collided with several ships and a
(Silja Line) crane at St. Petersberg. Damage
not sufficient to delay
itinerary.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003 Melody Ran into the pier at Kusadasi
(MSC Cruises) harbor. Ship had to wait several
days for repairs to be completed.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003 Star Flyer Sustained minimal damage and a
(Star Clippers) small section of the wharf
collapsed at Port Klang, Malaysia
after it collided with the wharf.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2001 Asuka Collision with cargo ship off
coast of Kobe.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2001 Royal Princess Broke loose from mooring at Port
(Princess Cruises) Said; drifted into the path of a
cargo ship.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2000 Island Breeze Collision w/tugboat--damaged
(Premier) propeller; Tug sinks. 2 cruises
canceled
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2000 Carnival Destiny Propulsion problems--Adrift for 27
(Carnival Cruise hours.
Lines)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1999 Norwegian Dream Collision with cargo ship in
(NCL) English Channel--Out for 2
months.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1998 Rhapsody of the Seas Hits pier in Curacao causing a 7
(Royal Caribbean meter hole above water line--
International) Repaired and continues.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 Island Princess Collision with unmarked
(Princess Cruises) obstruction at Civitavecchia--2
cruises canceled.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1996 Statendam Near miss with barge carrying
(Holland America 80,000 liters of propane and
Line) pallets of dynamite in the
Discovery Passage, British
Columbia. Collision averted by
barge's action.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1993 Noordam Collision with freighter in the
(Holland America Gulf of Mexico.
Line)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1992 Europa Collision with freighter 180 miles
(Hapag-Lloyd) off Hong Kong.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1991 Regent Sea 2 ships collide in strong winds at
(Regency Cruises) Skagway--Regent Sea had its steel
Island Princess hull plating on the stern ripped;
(Princess Cruises) Island Princess had a 50' gash 30
ft above water line and 11 cabins
were exposed.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1990 Azure Seas Struck while moored by container
ship in LA harbor.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A.5 Other Significant Events Involving Cruise Ships, 2000-2012
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Year Ship (Cruise Line) Incident
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2012 Independence The starboard engine drive shaft
(America Cruise broke on leaving Savanah.
Line) Returned to port where the
problem was determined. Left port
with blessing of the CG. On one
engine cruised to Brunswick, GA
where the CG withdrew its
approval to continue with the
passengers. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011 Disney Magic Loss of power and adrift at sea
(Disney Cruise Line) for more than 90 minutes.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011 Balmoral Ship detained by Maritime and
(Fed Olsen Cruises) Coastguard Agency after finding
fault with life boats and
inconsistent record keeping of
crew hours of rest.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011 Opera Detained in Southampton following
(MSC Cruises) an inspection by Maritime and
Coastguard Agency. The MCA said:
``The ship was not fully
compliant with international
maritime safety regulations.''
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011 Opera Suffered a failure to an electric
(MSC Cruises) panel, causing an initial low
power and afterwards a total loss
while the ship was near Wisby in
Baltic Sea. It was adrift for
more than 9 hours.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2011 Radiance of the Seas The ship is currently operating
(Royal Caribbean under USCG Captain of The Port
International) Order (COTP) due to one of two
main propulsion azipods being
inoperative for maneuver and
requires a tractor tug tethered
escort every arrival & departure
from Tampa Bay to insure safe
transit should the one remaining
azipod propulsion fail.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010 Clelia II A large wave slammed into the ship
(Travel Dynamics with 88 passengers and 77 crew
International) members aboard, but the ship's
crew overcame minor damage and is
heading safely back to its
scheduled port (Ushuaia). The
ship declared an emergency
yesterday, reporting it had
suffered engine damage amid heavy
seas and 90 kph winds when it was
northeast of the South Shetland
Islands and about 845km from
Ushuaia. The International
Association of Antarctica Tour
Operators issued statement saying
the wave that hit the Clelia II
caused a broken bridge window and
some electrical malfunctions that
temporarily knocked out some
communications and affected
engine performance.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010 Costa Atlantica The ship experienced steering
(Costa Cruises) problems minutes after leaving
Bermuda. The Bermuda Maritime
Operations received a distress
call. The duty officer said:
``The ship departed Dockyard at
1:10pm. She reported problems
with her steering. The pilot
immediately stopped the ship and
ordered two tugs to come out to
assist. The tugs came alongside
and took her to an area with more
sea room and then the engineers
were able to fix the problem.''
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010 Celebrity Century Passengers were offloaded in
(Celebrity Cruises) Villefranche after the ship's
rudders were damaged. Cruise
terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010 Queen Mary 2 The ship was approaching Barcelona
(Cunard Line) when one of 12 capacitors in a
harmonic filter failed,
accompanied by a loud explosion.
The explosion resulted in
extensive damage to the
surrounding electric panels and
caused the vessel to black out.
The ship was adrift for an hour.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010 Atlantic Star An electrical problem meant no air
(Pullmantur) conditioning and problems with
toilets. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010 Clelia II The ship lost all power,
(Travel Dynamics apparently the result of human
International) error.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010 Pacific Dream Experienced engine failure. Cruise
(Pullmantur Cruises) terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010 Fascination Lost power for several hours and
(Carnival Cruise was adrift at sea. Carnival says
Lines) the ship had a ``technical
malfunction.''
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010 Vistamar The UK Maritime and Coastguard
(Plantours & artner) Agency detained the ship at
Belfast Docks after numerous
faults were identified on board
including broken or missing fire
doors and failure to maintain the
vessel in line with International
Safety Management (ISM) code. The
coastguard had said that 10 of
the ship's 100 fire doors were
faulty. It also said that one of
the lifeboat engines would not
start. Cruise canceled
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010 Prince Albert II The ship was impounded for several
(Sliverseas Cruises) hours in Portsmouth amid safety
fears. One concern was that it
was overloaded. The other concern
was that senior officers had not
had enough rest. The report also
says the ship's lifeboats were
'not ready for use,' there were
three unsafe emergency routes in
case of fire, and there was an
air bubble in the ship's magnetic
compass.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010 Minerva The ship broke down in the
(Swan Hellenic) Mediterranean and was taken for
emergency dry dock in Syros in
Greece for engine repair. No a/c
or lighting. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010 Pacific Dawn A pilot averted a possible
(P&O Australia) disaster by bringing the out-of-
control ship to a stop just 700m
away from the six-lane Gateway
Bridge over the Brisbane River.
Two tugboats got the ship under
control, bringing her to a
complete standstill 70m shy of
the bridge.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010 Caribbean Princess A steering malfunction caused the
(Princess Cruises) ship to list 5 to 9 degrees as it
approached port.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010 Explorer of the Seas Human error caused a severe list
(Royal Caribbean (10 to 12 degrees) that put
International) passenger windows on Deck 3 under
water. The list lasted 2-3
minutes.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2010 Louis Majesty 26-foot waves crashed into the
(Louis Cruises) ship off France, smashing glass
windshields and killing two
passengers. Another fourteen
people suffered light injuries. 2
deaths
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009 Norwegian Dawn The ship temporarily lost all
(NCL power off the coast of Puerto
Rico. Power was restored much
later in the day.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009 Silja Europa With almost 1,700 people onboard,
(Silja Line) the ship was towed to the Finnish
port City of Turku due to
problems with its rudder system.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009 Brilliance of the The ship's departure was delayed
Seas because of needed repairs after a
(Royal Caribbean storm broke out a number of
International) windows on Decks 3 and 4.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009 Oceanic The ship (with 848 passengers) was
(Peace Boat) detained after U.S. Coast Guard
inspectors found a small hole in
the ship's hull during a routine
safety inspection. About a gallon
of water per hour was coming into
the ship. An additional 16 safety
violations were cited.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009 Maasdam The ship severely listed, causing
(Holland America damage onboard, when the captain
Line) took evasive action to avoid
running aground on a sandbar in
the St. Lawrence Seaway.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009 Seven Seas Voyager One of the pods was caught in a
(Regent Seven Seas fishing net. Attempts to release
Cruises) the pod failed. The ship is on
its way to Dubai where it will be
dry docked to fix the pod. Cruise
delayed; itinerary adjusted.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009 Costa Europa The ship underwent repairs in the
(Costa Cruises) Kenyan port of Mombasa, before
sailing toward Reunion Island,
but passengers said the vessel's
speed remained ``erratic,'' while
others noticed black smoke coming
from the engines. Itinerary
changed.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009 Aurora Broke down 4 hours after leaving
(P&O Cruises) Sydney. The Port Shaft Thrust
Bearing had gone. Sailed at
reduced speed to Auckland for
repairs (taking 4 days instead of
two). Itinerary changed.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009 Explorer of the Seas A propeller on one of the ship's
(Royal Caribbean engines struck an unidentified
International) object and was bent while leaving
Samana. Cruise continued.
Repaired on the next cruise when
the ship was in St. Thomas.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 Grand Princess The ship diverted to safe harbour,
(Princess Cruises) anchoring outside English Harbour
(Antigua). It had to be diverted
to that part of the island
because it was having problems
with its bow thruster.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 Lyuba Orlova The ship was detained by
(Quark Expeditions) Argentinian officials due to
mechanical problems. Four cruises
were canceled.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 Queen Victoria The ship suffered a severe list of
(Cunard Line) about 7 degrees causing damage
onboard, and later in the cruise
had a full power failure that
lasted for some time.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 Sea Princess The ship encountered `technical
(Princess Cruises) difficulties' as it attempted to
dock at Port Zante, which
resulted in passengers being
ferried to the nearby marina by
the ship's life crafts. Initial
reports were there had been a
fire onboard that caused engine
damage to the vessel and hindered
its berthing.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 Fantasy There was a minor technical glitch
(Carnival Cruise a few hours after the ship left
Lines) New Orleans, leaving the ship
adrift. The problem was fixed and
the ship resumed sailing.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2008 Discovery The ship was detained by Polish
(Voyages of and later by UK authorities for
Discovery) safety deficiencies. The ship was
cited for seven deficiencies.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007 Enchantment of the The ship had a power failure in
Seas the early morning and was
(Royal Caribbean assisted by a tug into Fort
International) Lauderdale at the cruise's end.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007 Norwegian Star A severe list causing damage
(NCL) onboard attributed to human
error.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007 Island Princess Engines failed off the coast of
(Princess Cruises) France, plunging the ship into
darkness. Passengers were ferried
to shore by the ship's tenders.
Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007 Black Prince Propeller damaged. Cruise
(Fred Olsen Cruises) terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007 QEII The ship was delayed in port for
(Cunard Line) 24 hours, mid-cruise, because of
mechanical problems.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007 Ryndam Power failure and propulsion
(Holland America failure. Power restored. The
Line) Coast Guard required the ship to
have 2 tugboats to assist
entering San Diego harbor and
docking.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2007 Brilliance of the A complete power loss, leaving the
Seas ship adrift for 2.5 hours.
(Royal Caribbean
International)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006 Ryndam The ship reported engine problems
(Holland America about an hour after sailing and
Line) stalled in the channel between
the port and the Skyway Bridge.
Power was subsequently restored,
but the Coast Guard said the ship
would remain moored overnight
while they investigated the
problem with the engines.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006 Thomson Destiny The ship's toilets did not work
(Thomson Cruises) for 3 days and there was no hot
water for 24 hours. A series of
blockages in the plumbing system
were blamed for the problem;
experts were dispatched to deal
with the problem.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006 Crown Princess Severely rolled (15 degrees) to
(Princess Cruises) one side shortly after leaving
Port Canaveral (at 3:25 PM ).
240 passengers were treated for
various injuries; 94 were
transferred to local hospitals
ashore for evaluation and
treatment. The roll was
attributed to a problem with the
auto-pilot.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006 Costa Allegra The ship twice lost all power for
(Costa Crociere) 30 minutes or so (shortly after
leaving Shanghai and again on its
return).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006 Seabourn Pride Sailed through very heavy seas on
(Seabourn Cruises) way to Bergen . There was a
substantial amount of water
damage on board--forward suites
had broken windows and flooding;
other rooms also had water damage
(including electrical systems).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006 Vistamar Ship impounded in London because
(Plantours & of serious safety deficiencies,
Partners) including inoperable lifeboats.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006 Rhapsody of the Seas The ship listed 10 degrees due to
(Royal Caribbean a malfunction with the
International) stabilizing mechanism.
Considerable damage onboard.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006 Zuiderdam The ship lost all power and was
(Holland America adrift for about an hour
Line) (midnight to 1 AM) while between
St. Thomas and Tortola.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006 Sensation Coast Guard inspectors detained
(Carnival Cruise the ship at Port Canaveral until
Lines) the captain and crew could fix
violations related to the ship's
fire-control systems.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006 Carnival Liberty There was a complete power failure
(Carnival Cruise that lasted approximately 1 hours
Lines) (10--11PM) and it was another
hour or so before everything
appeared ``back to normal``.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006 Pacific Sky Five hours after leaving Singapore
(P&O Australia) the ship experienced engine
problems, came to a shuddering
halt, and sat anchored in the
Malacca Strait for 30 hours while
crew tried to fix the problem.
The cruise finally resumed on one
engine.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006 Grand Princess Two hours after leaving Galveston,
(Princess Cruises) a medical emergency required
return to port. The ship made a
sharp turn while traveling at 21
knots, causing 18.5 degree list,
which resulted in considerable
damage onboard. Twenty-seven
passengers and ten crew suffered
injuries
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006 Norwegian Spirit Several windows were smashed and
(NCL) 11 cabins flooded when the ship
encountered a storm.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005 Funchal The ship was stuck in Safaga
(Classic (Egypt) for a week, mid-cruise,
International while repairs undertaken to the
Cruises) port main engine. Many passengers
canceled the remainder of the
cruise.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005 Sun Princess A power outage while docked at St.
(Sun Princess) Thomas, USVI, left passengers
mostly in the dark for more than
2 hours. Backup generators
provided limited power. Power was
restored and the ship left port 2
hours late.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005 Norwegian Jewel The ship lost power as a result of
(NCL) problems with the port-side
azipod while leaving St.
Petersburg . The ship was
assisted by Finnish tugs to reach
the next port.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005 Carnival Legend Heading for NYC a, ``computer
(Carnival Cruise glitch'' caused a hard left turn,
Lines) that resulted in a 14 degree list
causing injuries and damage.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005 Carnival Destiny The ship lost power and propulsion
(Carnival Cruise at 7AM--it was dead in the water
Lines) for 8 hours and without
electricity and air conditioning
for about 2 hours.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005 Thomson Celebration 600 passengers flown home after
(Thomson Cruises) the plumbing in 250 cabins
failed. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005 Norwegian Dawn The ship was struck by a 70 foot
(NCL) wave enroute from the Bahamas to
New York . The wave knocked out
windows in two passenger cabins
and on the navigation bridge and
damaged the ships hull. Diverted
to Charleston for repairs. 300
passengers chose to fly home.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005 Pacific Sky Problem with the shipboard's
(P&O Australia) gearbox ends cruise. Cruise
terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005 Grand Voyager A huge wave breached a bridge
(Iberojet Cruises) window, resulting in damage to
electrical control systems, a
temporary loss of propulsion, and
loss of all communications. A
distress call was issued. Twenty
passengers reported minor
injuries (including eight with
broken bones).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005 Explorer Lost power in three of its four
(Semester at Sea) engines when a 50-foot wave broke
bridge windows and damaged
controls while 650 miles south of
Alaska's Aleutian Islands.. Crew
members were able to start a
second engine and the ship
``limped'' to Honolulu for needed
repairs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005 QEII The ship lost power in the early
(Cunard Line) hours of New Year's Day. Without
power there is no propulsion,
ventilation, lighting or water.
The ship drifted for about an
hour before power was restored.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004 Pacific Sky Cruise aborted because of problems
(P&O Australia) with the starboard engine.
Departure had been delayed for
more than a day because of a
faulty boiler and a damaged
gerarbox. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004 Rotterdam Ambulances greeted the ship in
(Holland America Halifax after passengers and crew
Line) endured monster waves generated
by hurricane Karl in the North
Atlantic . About a dozen
passengers were taken to hospital
with suspected fractures and
severe bruising. 90 people
(including 5 crew) reported minor
injury. Ship lost power and for
3.5 hours was tossed around in
high waves and in total darkness.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004 Carnival Destiny The ship lost power and was adrift
(Carnival Cruise for several hours while cruising
Lines) to St. Thomas from Dominica.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004 Caronia The ship ``suffered a total power
(P&O Cruises) failure following a leak from a
swimming pool that took out the
main electric board. Drifted for
approximately 2 hours before
partial power restored.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004 Norwegian Crown Fuel fumes filled 50 cabins as a
(NCL) result of a hole in a ventilation
duct in the air conditioning
system, and there were reportedly
power outages.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004 Black Prince Enroute to her first journey after
(Fred Olsen Cruises) engine repairs, the ship broke
down just off Southampton docks
and lost all power.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004 Diamond Princess The ship suffered several short
(Princess Cruises) power failures on one cruise and
``technical difficulties'' on the
next cruise.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003 Brilliance of the While cruising between Corfu and
Seas Civitivecchia, the ship was hit
(Royal Caribbean by a storm--twice listing hard to
International) the port side approximately 13.6
degrees. After daybreak the ship
had a power blackout that lasted
several hours.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003 Norway A boiler explosion killed 8 crew
(NCL) members and injured dozens of
others. All future cruises
canceled. 8 deaths
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003 Pacific Sky The ship had to turn back to
(P&O Australia) Auckland on an 11 day cruise to
Fiji. The ship took on 17 tonnes
of water after it sprang a leak
through cracked and corroded
plating on the side of the 19-
year-old ship.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003 Ryndam The ship listed to the port side
(Holland America around 6:30 PM, causing injuries
Line) and considerable damage onboard.
The incident was explained as the
result of a mechanical failure
from going from manual to
automatic pilot
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003 Carnival Conquest The USCG investigated a sharp roll
(Carnival Cruise that sent passengers running for
Lines) life vests, and glass crashing to
decks. Seven passengers reported
to a newspaper in New Orleans
that they saw the lights of
another vessel silhouetted in
thick fog less than 200 yards
from the ship.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003 Radiance of the Seas Ship struck by strong winds as it
(Royal Caribbean crossed a squall line and briefly
International went into a seven degree list. No
injuries.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003 Marco Polo After being pushed by wind on to
(Orient Lines) shallow waters while in the South
Shetland Islands, the hull of the
ship was found to have three
cracks (4, 3, and 1.7 meters long
by 2 centimeters wide). Eight
millimeter thick plates were
welded over the cracks at Ushuaia
and the cruise continued.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003 Wind Spirit The ship experienced engine
(Windstar Cruises) problems and generator problems
that left it adrift for a night
and part of a day. The ship made
it back to Torotola and underwent
necessary repairs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2002 Olivia With 650 passengers onboard, the
(Ukraine-registered) ship was detained for a full day
by the New Zealand Marine Safety
Authority. Safety inspectors
found problems with an emergency
pump and with equipment that
separates oil from water in the
ship's bilges.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2002 Brilliance of the A propulsion problem required
Seas shutdown of the complete
(Royal Caribbean propulsion system at sea while
International) technicians worked to repair it.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2002 Radiance of the Seas USCG reports the ship experienced
(Royal Caribbean a 3-minute power outage disabling
International) the ship's steering and
propulsion capability while in
Frederick Sound (preparing to
transit the Gatineau Channel en
route to Juneau).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2002 Ryndam A generator stopped running while
(Holland America the ship was in the Lynn Canal
Line) (Alaska) causing it to lose
power--it lost all propulsion and
was adrift for about 20 minutes
(at 1:30 AM). The water was too
deep for the ship to drop anchor.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2002 QEII A large sea water leak was
(Cunard Line) discovered in the aft engine
room, caused by the perforation
(from corrosion) of a sea water
inlet pipe. The leak was stopped
after several efforts (over 36
hours), but not before several
hundred tones of sea water had to
be pumped overboard so that
workers could get at the leaking
pipe in the engine room (which
was submerged by water from the
leak).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2002 Oriana While crossing the North Pacific
(P&O Cruises) an auxiliary engine failed,
causing the other three engines
to stop. Ship drifted for 2 hours
and proceeded at reduced speed
after it was restored.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2001 Caledonia Star Damaged by rogue wave--escorted to
port by Argentinean Navy.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2001 Bremen Hit by rogue wave--wheelhouse
(Hapag-Lloyd) windows break and water enters
bridge; detour to Montevideo for
immediate repairs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2001 Radiance of the Seas Hit heavy seas--balcony cabins,
(Royal Caribbean Seaview and Windjammer cafes
International) flooded
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2001 Norway Ship detained in port because of
(NCL) safety violations--106 leaks in
fire sprinkler system.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2001 Norwegian Sky Autopilot malfunction causes roll
(NCL) 70+ injured, 16 hospitalized.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2000 Ocean Explorer Engine failure; world cruise
ended. Cruise terminated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2000 Sundream Failing generators; no a/c and
(Sun Cruises) limited power for 2 days.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2000 Gradeur of the Seas Loss of electrical power. Towed to
(Royal Caribbean port--delayed 12 hours.
International)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2000 Aurora Hit by 40 foot wave--smashed
(P&O Cruises) windows in 6 cabins; 20 cabins
flooded. 6 injured.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2000 Oriana 18 hours into maiden voyage--
(P&O Cruises) problem with over heated
propeller shaft. Cruise
terminated.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Appendix B
Analysis Of Crime Reports Received By The Fbi From Cruise Ships
October 1, 2007-September 30, 2008
Table 1.--Crime by Cruise Ship, October 1, 2007-September 30, 2008
(based on reports to the FBI) \1\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cruise Simple Assault Theft Sexual Sexual Sexual
Line/Ship Assault \2\ w/SBI \3\ Theft\4\ >10K \5\ contact \6\ assault \7\ harass \8\ Death \9\ Overboard \10\ Drugs \11\ Other \12\ TOTAL
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Azamara
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Journey 1 1 2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Quest 1 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL 2 1 3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Carnival 1 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Celebratio 1 1 1 3
n
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conquest 1 1 4 1 4 2 1 1 15
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Destiny 4 1 1 6
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ecstasy 1 3 1 4 9
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Elation 2 1 3 1 1 8
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fantasy 1 3 1 1 1 7
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fascinatio 4 2 4 10
n
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Freedom 6 2 1 1 1 11
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Glory 1 1 4 3 1 1 1 12
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Holiday 1 1 1 3
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Imaginatio 1 6 3 4 14
n
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Inspiratio 1 3 2 1 7
n
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Legend 1 1 1 1 4
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Liberty 3 1 1 1 6
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Miracle 4 4
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paradise 1 1 4 1 6 3 16
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pride 1 3 2 2 8
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sensation 3 4 4 11
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Spirit 1 2 2 5
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Triumph 1 7 2 1 11
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Valor 5 7 4 1 17
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Victory 2 1 2 3 1 9
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL 9 5 73 3 48 40 5 5 3 6 197
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Celebrity
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Century 2 1 2 5
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Constellat 1 1 1 3
ion
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Galaxy 1 1 1 3
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Infinity 1 2 3
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mercury 1 1 1 3
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Millennium 1 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summit 1 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL 5 1 2 3 7 1 19
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Costa
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fortuna 1 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mediterran 1 1
ea
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL 2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Crystal
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Serenity 1 1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Discovery
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sun 1 1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disney \13
\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wonder 1 1 2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Holland
America \1
4\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amsterdam 1 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maasdam 1 1 2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oosterdam 1 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ryndam 1 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Statendam 1 1 2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Volendam 2 2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Westerdam 2 1 3
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Zuiderdam 4 4
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL 1 4 3 8 16
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NCL \15\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dawn 2 2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Majesty 1 1 2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Star 1 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL 1 1 1 2 5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NCLA
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pride of 1 1
America
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Princess \
16\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Caribbean 2 2 1 1 1 7
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Coral 1 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dawn 1 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL 2 1 2 2 1 1 9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RCI
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Adventure 4 1 3 1 9
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Brilliance 1 1 2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Empress 1 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Enchantmen 5 2 2 1 10
t
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Explorer 4 2 2 8
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Freedom 18 1 2 2 3 1 27
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Grandeur 4 2 6
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jewel 1 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Liberty 7 2 2 1 12
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Majesty 6 1 2 1 2 12
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mariner 8 1 2 1 12
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Monarch 14 3 1 2 2 1 23
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Navigator 1 1 2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Radiance 2 2 4
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rhapsody 1 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Serenade 1 1 1 3
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sovereign 13 1 3 1 18
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Splendor 1 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vision 6 1 3 1 11
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Voyager 1 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL 96 8 7 3 19 17 3 3 8 164
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Seabourn
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Legend 1 1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SeaEscape
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Island 1 1
Adventure
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Windstar
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Windstar 1 1 2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GRAND 115 16 89 12 75 75 4 9 7 3 15 421
TOTAL
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
\1\ Data was secured through a Freedom of Information request by Ken Carver/International Cruise Victims Association.
\2\ Simple assault refers to incidents where there is an altercation or fight; one or both parties may experience minor injuries requiring medical
attention.
\3\ Assault with Serious Bodily Injury refers to incidents were there is an altercation or fight; one or both parties require medical attention for
serious cuts, abrasions, concussion, or broken bones.
\4\ Theft refers to incidents where items of value have been stolen or are missing from a cabin, a safe, luggage while in the care of the cruise line,
or items lost onboard.
\5\ Theft greater than $10,000 refers to incidents where the value of a theft exceeds $10,000.
\6\ Sexual contact refers to incidents of unwanted sexually touching, unwanted kisses, and incidents where a minor has been propositioned or otherwise
approached by an adult.
\7\ Sexual assault refers to incidents of unwanted sexual contact with genetalia, unwanted attempts to have sexual relations, and forcible rape.
\8\ Sexual harassment refers to incidents of verbal sexual abuse and/or where an employee is asked to trace sexual favors for advancement in or
continuing in their job.
\9\ Death refers to incidents where there is a natural death or suicide.
\10\ Overboard refers to incidents where a passenger or crew member has gone missing. Three ships had media reports of passengers/crew overboard, but
these were not reported to the FBI: Celebrity Constellation (non-U.S. crew)--February 18, Carnival Victory--April 22, 2008, Norwegian Dawn--May 11,
2008.
\11\ Drugs refers to incidents where drugs have been found on the person or in the cabin of a passenger or crew member.
\12\ Other refers to incidents otherwise unclassified, including passengers missing the ship, security breaches, fire, etc.
\13\ Disney Cruises Line has one ship with no crime reports received.
\14\ Holland America Line has five ships with no crime reports received.
\15\ NCL has seven ships with no crime reports received.
\16\ Princess has 13 ships with no crime reports received.
Table 2.--Crime by Cruise Line, October 1, 2007--September 30, 2008
(based on reports to the FBI) \1\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cruise Simple Assault Theft Sexual Sexual Sexual
Line/Ship Assault \2\ w/SBI \3\ Theft\4\ >10K \5\ contact \6\ assault \7\ harass \8\ Death \9\ Overboard \10\ Drugs \11\ Other \12\ TOTAL
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Azamara 2 1 3
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Carnival 9 5 73 3 48 40 5 5 3 6 197
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Celebrity 5 1 2 3 7 1 19
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Costa 1 1 2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Crystal 1 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Discovery 1 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disney \13 1 1 2
\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Holland 1 4 3 8 16
America \1
4\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NCL \15\ 1 1 1 2 5
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NCLA 1 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Princess \ 2 1 2 2 1 1 9
16\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RCI 96 8 7 3 19 17 3 3 8 164
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Seabourn 1 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SeaEscape 1 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Windstar 1 1 2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GRAND 115 16 89 12 78 73 7 9 7 3 15 424
TOTAL
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
\1\ Data was secured through a Freedom of Information request by Ken Carver/International Cruise Victims Association
\2\ Simple assault refers to incidents where there is an altercation or fight; one or both parties may experience minor injuries requiring medical
attention.
\3\ Assault with Serious Bodily Injury refers to incidents were there is an altercation or fight; one or both parties require medical attention for
serious cuts, abrasions, concussion, or broken bones.
\4\ Theft refers to incidents where items of value have been stolen or are missing from a cabin, a safe, luggage while in the care of the cruise line,
or items lost onboard.
\5\ Theft greater than $10,000 refers to incidents where the value of a theft exceeds $10,000.
\6\ Sexual contact refers to incidents of unwanted sexually touching, unwanted kisses, and incidents where a minor has been propositioned or otherwise
approached by an adult.
\7\ Sexual assault refers to incidents of unwanted sexual contact with genitalia, unwanted attempts to have sexual relations, and forcible rape.
\8\ Sexual harassment refers to incidents of verbal sexual abuse and/or where an employee is asked to trade sexual favors for advancement in or
continuing in their job.
\9\ Death refers to incidents where there is a natural death or suicide.
\10\ Overboard refers to incidents where a passenger or crew member has gone missing. Three ships had media reports of passengers/crew overboard, but
these were not reported to the FBI: Celebrity Constellation (non-US crew)--February 18, Carnival Victory--April 22, 2008, Norwegian Dawn--May 11,
2008.
\11\ Drugs refers to incidents where drugs have been found on the person or in the cabin of a passenger or crew member.
\12\ Other refers to incidents otherwise unclassified, including passengers missing the ship, security breaches, fire, etc.
\13\ Disney Cruises Line has one ship with no crime reports received.
\14\ Holland America Line has five ships with no crime reports received.
\15\ NCL has seven ships with no crime reports received.
\16\ Princess has 13 ships with no crime reports received.
Table 3.--Crimes Involving Minors, Alcohol, or Domestic Violence by Cruise Ship
(based on reports to the FBI) \1\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Minors \2\ Alcohol Involved \3\
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Domestic
Cruise Line Sexual Sexual Sexual Assault w/ Sexual Contact/ Simple Violence\10\
Contact \4\ Assault \5\ Harrassment \6\ SBI \7\ Assault \8\ Assault \9\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Azamara
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Journey
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Quest
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Carnival
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Celebration 1 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conquest 1 1 1 1 2 1 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Destiny
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ecstasy 1 2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Elation 4 2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fantasy 1 2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fascination 4
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Freedom 2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Glory 1 3 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Holiday
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Imagination 1 5
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Inspiration 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Legend
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Liberty
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Miracle
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paradise 1 3 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pride 2 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sensation 5
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Spirit 1 2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Triumph 2 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Valor 1 4
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Victory 1 3
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL 6 3 2 5 47 6 1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Celebrity
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Century 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Constellation
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Galaxy
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Infinity
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mercury
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Millennium 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summit
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL 1 1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Costa
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fortuna 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mediterranea
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Crystal
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Serenity 1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Discovery
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disney \11\ 1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Holland
America \12\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amsterdam
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maasdam
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oosterdam
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ryndam
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Statendam
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Volendam
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Westerdam
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Zuiderdam
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NCL \13\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dawn 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Majesty 1 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Star
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL 1 1 1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NCLA
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pride of
America
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Princess \14\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Caribbean 2 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Coral
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dawn
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL 2 1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RCI
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Adventure 1 1 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Brilliance 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Empress
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Enchantment 1 2 3
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Explorer 2 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Freedom 1 1 4 4
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Grandeur 1 1 2 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jewel
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Liberty 3 2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Majesty 1 3 5
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mariner 1 5
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Monarch 2 1 2 6 4
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Navigator 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Radiance 1 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rhapsody
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Serenade 1 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sovereign 1 1 4 8
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Splendor 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vision 3 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Voyager
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL 4 6 4 7 30 36
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Seabourn
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Legend
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SeaEscape
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Windstar
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Windstar 1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GRAND 14 11 3 10 54 40 37
TOTALS
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
\1\ Data was secured through a Freedom of Information request by Ken Carver/International Cruise Victims Association.
\2\ Minor refers to passengers aged 17 or younger.
\3\ Alcohol involved are incidents where the crime reports the victim of perpetrated was intoxicated.
\4\ Sexual contact refers to incidents of unwanted sexually touching, unwanted kisses, and incidents where a minor has been propositioned or otherwise
approached by an adult.
\5\ Sexual assault refers to incidents of unwanted sexual contact with genitalia, unwanted attempts to have sexual relations, and forcible rape.
\6\ Sexual harassment refers to incidents of verbal sexual abuse and/or where an employee is asked to trace sexual favors for advancement in or
continuing in their job.
\7\ Assault with Serious Bodily Injury refers to incidents were there is an altercation or fight; one or both parties require medical attention for
serious cuts, abrasions, concussion, or broken bones.
\8\ Sexual contact/assault refers to any incident of a sexual nature (i.e., it combines the categories of sexual contact and sexual assault).
\9\ Simple assault refers to incidents where there is an altercation or fight; one or both parties may experience minor injuries requiring medical
attention.
\10\ Domestic violence refers to incidents of spousal abuse or the physical abuse of a child.
\11\ Disney Cruises Line has one ship with no crime reports received.
\12\ Holland America Line has five ships with no crime reports received.
\13\ NCL has seven ships with no crime reports received.
\14\ Princess has 13 ships with no crime reports received.
Table 4.--Crimes Involving Minors, Alcohol, or Domestic Violence by Cruise Line
(based on reports to the FBI) \1\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Minors \2\ Alcohol Involved \3\
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Domestic
Cruise Line Sexual Sexual Sexual Assault w/ Sexual Contact/ Simple Violence \10\
Contact \4\ Assault \5\ Harrassment \6\ SBI \7\ Assault \8\ Assault \9\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Azamara
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Carnival 6 3 2 5 47 6 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Celebrity 1 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Costa 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Crystal 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Discovery
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disney 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Holland
America
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NCL 1 1 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NCLA
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Princess 2 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RCI 4 6 4 7 30 36
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Seabourn
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SeaEscape
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Windstar 1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTALS 14 11 3 10 54 40 37
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
As % of 18.7% 14.7% 50.0% 62.5% 36.0% 34.8% 32.2% \2\
TOTAL for
CRIME
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
\1\ Data was secured through a Freedom of Information request by Ken Carver/International Cruise Victims Association.
\2\ Minor refers to passengers aged 17 or younger.
\3\ Alcohol involved are incidents where the crime reports the victim of perpetrated was intoxicated.
\4\ Sexual contact refers to incidents of unwanted sexually touching, unwanted kisses, and incidents where a minor has been propositioned or otherwise
approached by an adult.
\5\ Sexual assault refers to incidents of unwanted sexual contact with genitalia, unwanted attempts to have sexual relations, and forcible rape.
\6\ Sexual harassment refers to incidents of verbal sexual abuse and/or where an employee is asked to trace sexual favors for advancement in or
continuing in their job.
\7\ Assault with Serious Bodily Injury refers to incidents were there is an altercation or fight; one or both parties require medical attention for
serious cuts, abrasions, concussion, or broken bones.
\8\ Sexual contact/assault refers to any incident of a sexual nature (i.e., it combines the categories of sexual contact and sexual assault).
\9\ Simple assault refers to incidents where there is an altercation or fight; one or both parties may experience minor injuries requiring medical
attention.
\10\ Domestic violence refers to incidents of spousal abuse or the physical abuse of a child.
\11\ Disney Cruises Line has one ship with no crime reports received. \12\ Holland America Line has five ships with no crime reports received.
\13\ NCL has seven ships with no crime reports received. \14\ Princess has 13 ships with no crime reports received.
Table 5.--Crimes Involving Crew Members
(based on reports to the FBI) \1\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Crew on Crew (F Crew on Pax (F Pax on Crew (F
victim : M victim) victim : M victim) victim : M victim) TOTAL
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Simple Assault 6 (1:5) 1 (1:0) 4 (1:3) 11 (3:8)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assault w/SBI 3 (0:3) -- 1 (0:1) 4 (0:4)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subtotal 9 (1:8) 1 (1:0) 5 (1:4) 15 (3:12)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% of all onboard assaults 6.9% 0.7% 3.8% 11.4%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sexual Harass 4 (4:0) -- -- 4 (4:0)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sexual Contact 13 (10:3) 12 (11:1) 7 (2:5) 32 (23:9)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sexual Assault 11 (11:0) 20 (20:0) 2 (0:2) 33 (31:2)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other -- 1 (1:0) -- 1 (1:0)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subtotal 28 (25:3) 33 (32:1) 9 (3:6) 70 (60:10)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% of sex-related incidents 17.9% 21.1% 5.8% 44.9%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Theft \1\ 20 (8:12) -- -- 20
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Theft of ship property \2\ 3 -- -- 3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Theft >10K \3\ 5 -- -- 5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subtotal 28 -- -- 28
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% of all onboard thefts 27.7% -- -- 27.7%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Overboard -- -- -- 4
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% of all persons overboard -- -- -- 57.2%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GRAND TOTAL 65 34 14 117
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
\1\ Data was secured through a Freedom of Information request by Ken Carver/International Cruise Victims
Association.
\2\ Total value of theft of crew is $49,600 (average $2,480 per theft).
\3\ Total value of theft of ship property is $8,200 (2 incidents) plus one incident of stealing mail (value
unknown).
\4\ Total value of theft >10K is $120,000 (average $24,000 per theft)--all were thefts against the cruise ship.
The Chairman. Thank you very much for that very interesting
and good testimony.
And finally, Ms. Christine Duffy, and I apologize.
Recently, the House had a hearing about women and there were
all men at the table, and you're at the table but you're just
barely at the table.
So I want to apologize on behalf of the Committee. You
should be right there with those other guys.
Ms. Duffy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. And you are President and CEO of Cruise Lines
International Association. We welcome your testimony.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTINE DUFFY, PRESIDENT AND CEO, CRUISE LINES
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION
Ms. Duffy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison and
respected members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me
to testify today. My name is Christine Duffy and I am President
and Chief Executive Officer of Cruise Lines International
Association, also known as CLIA.
Before joining CLIA last year, I was President and CEO of
Maritz Travel Company, one of the largest travel companies in
the world, working with a variety of corporations.
I would certainly prefer to be with you today under very
different circumstances. The Concordia incident has had a
significant impact on the entire industry and I speak for all
of our cruise line members in expressing our deepest
condolences to all of those that were affected by this tragedy.
As an industry, we are wholly committed to examining what
happened and to identifying lessons that can be learned from
this tragic incident. Due to the ongoing investigations by
Italian authorities, my remarks today will not focus on
speculating about the causes of the Concordia tragedy.
Rather, my testimony will provide a broader industry
perspective on the regulation of the cruise ships, the
importance we play on our commitment to protecting our
passengers' safety and security and our efforts and progress to
protect the environment.
We applaud the Committee's leadership and interest in
reviewing cruise industry operations and we welcome the
opportunity to discuss our practices and procedures.
CLIA represents 26 major cruise lines serving North America
and more than 16,000 affiliated travel agents and agencies
across the United States that sell and promote cruises to their
customers in their communities across this country.
Last year, our member lines' 211 ships served 16.3 million
passengers. That number is up from 7.2 million in the year
2000. CLIA's mission is to promote the unique benefits of
cruising and also to promote the policies and practices among
our members that foster a safe, secure and healthy cruise ship
environment for all of our passengers and crew onboard.
As was said, safety is the cruise industry's number one
priority and there is nothing more important to our business
than that. Every aspect of the cruise experience is heavily
regulated and monitored under both U.S. and international law
for the purpose of protecting the safety of crew and passengers
onboard our ships.
These regulations begin with the design and construction of
ships and extend to the operation and navigation of the vessel,
the training of the crew, emergency equipment onboard and
evacuation protocols.
The International Maritime Organization mandates global
standards for the safety and operation of all cruise ships. The
most important of these standards are detailed in the
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, or
SOLAS, which provides the uniform worldwide set of mandates
regarding safety equipment, crew training, evacuation,
emergency procedures and navigation safety standards.
In the United States, the U.S. Coast Guard enforces all
maritime regulatory requirements through both announced and
unannounced rigorous inspections. At any time, the local Coast
Guard captain of a port can prevent any cruise ship from
departing if a serious violation of any one of these
regulations is found.
CLIA's senior staff include four retired U.S. Coast Guard
officers so we are intimately familiar and work very closely
with the Coast Guard and are committed to this branch of
service. Because of the cruise industry's commitment to safety,
along with a sound regulatory regime and vigorous enforcement
mechanisms, cruising is one of the safest forms of leisure
travel in the world.
In the decade prior to the grounding of the Concordia,
there were a total of 28 fatalities on cruise ships related to
an operational casualty out of 223 million guests and crew who
sailed during these years. Twenty-two of those fatalities
involved crew members and six were passengers.
I want to be very clear that not a single fatality is
acceptable to our industry, and we will work tirelessly and
continuously to prevent such an incident from occurring.
Almost immediately following the Concordia incident, CLIA
members launched a cruise industry operational safety review, a
comprehensive assessment of the critical human factors and
operational procedures for maritime safety. This review
continues a long tradition in our industry and within CLIA of
taking action proactively by working together across all of our
member lines to improve and enhance safety procedures.
I am pleased to report that the industry has already moved
forward with recommendations from this review. On February 9th,
CLIA members announced that we had instituted a new passenger
muster policy that requires the muster drills for embarking
passengers to be conducted prior to departure from port.
This new policy does exceed the existing legal
requirements, which call for muster drills within 24 hours of
passenger embarkation. This new muster drill policy became
effective immediately and applies not only to U.S. ships but
internationally as well for CLIA members.
Additionally, we worked with members of this committee to
assist in developing and enacting the Cruise Vessel Security
and Safety Act, which was signed into law by President Obama
July 27th of 2010.
CLIA member lines are already in compliance with the
effective provisions of the CVSSA, including crime reporting
procedures, the use of latch and computerized key technology
and the requirement that log books include all reports of crime
and thefts over $1,000.
With regard to environmental stewardship, in the 37 years
since CLIA was established our industry has made significant
progress in reducing our environmental impact by implementing
responsible practices and investing in new technologies.
We believe it is our responsibility to protect the
environment in which we operate and, certainly, our industry
has been at the forefront of wastewater treatment, emissions
reduction and developing innovative technologies to reduce the
environmental impact of cruising.
The management of wastewater is a complex and vitally
important element of cruise ship operations and our industry
has adopted its own set of stringent wastewater practices that
go substantially beyond the rules and regulations.
As more fuel-efficient ships have come into service, our
members have been systematically reducing air emissions,
including sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, carbon dioxide and
particulate matter. In the near future, international
regulations will further reduce sulfur limits, helping to
reduce air emissions across all oceans to meet these standards.
The industry has also invested in new technology that
manages the use of energy more effectively, such as testing the
first ever cruise ship engine exhaust gas scrubbers and
developing engines that run more efficiently.
Our industry does have a vested interest in protecting the
environment, not only because it is the right thing to do but
also the very nature of our product depends on a healthy,
natural environment. That's what our cruise passengers want to
see when they experience a vacation onboard a cruise line.
Clean oceans and beaches are essential to the cruise
experience and we have made great strides and worked hard to
become a leader in the maritime industry with responsible
practices and innovations to reduce our environmental impact.
Thank you for the opportunity to provide this testimony. We
do remain fully and deeply committed to continuous enhancement
of the safety of our guests and crew members, and it is without
question our top priority.
In addition, we have the same commitment to be a leader in
the environmental stewardship in the maritime community. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Duffy follows:]
Prepared Statement of Christine Duffy, President and CEO,
Cruise Lines International Association
Chairman Rockefeller, Ranking Member Hutchison and respected
members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today.
My name is Christine Duffy. I'm President and CEO of the Cruise Lines
International Association--widely known as CLIA. I became CLIA's
President last February. Before joining CLIA, I was President and CEO
of Maritz Travel and I began my career as a travel agent.
The Concordia incident has had a significant impact on our
industry. I speak for all our cruise line members in expressing our
deepest condolences to everyone affected by this tragedy. As an
industry, we are wholly committed to examining what happened, and to
identifying lessons that can be learned.
My remarks today will not focus on speculation over the causes of
the Costa Concordia tragedy. There are ongoing investigations by
Italian maritime and law enforcement authorities and we hope to have
their conclusions as soon as possible.
Rather, my testimony will provide a broader industry perspective on
how cruise ships are regulated and the importance we place on our
commitment to safety. We applaud the Committee's interest in reviewing
cruise industry operations and we welcome the opportunity to discuss
our industry's practices and procedures.
The Cruise Lines International Association represents 26 major
cruise lines serving North America, more than 16,000 affiliated travel
agents and agencies across the United States, and 120 Executive
Partners spanning a broad array of industries--from ports to food
suppliers--that help make the cruise industry run efficiently and
effectively. Many of CLIA's travel agent members are small businesses.
The majority of cruises continue to be booked through travel agents and
they are an important cruise industry partner and national economic
engine. Our travel agents play a pivotal role in assuring passengers of
the safety and security of their cruise vacations. They are often the
first to hear passenger concerns and first to relay them important
information. Their tireless work plays an important role in helping
their clients understand and appreciate that cruising continues to be
one of the safest of all vacation options.
In 2010, the North American cruise industry generated $37.85
billion in U.S. economic benefits including nearly 330,000 U.S. jobs.
Last year, our member lines' 211 ships served 16.3 million passengers--
up from 7.2 million in 2000.
CLIA's mission is to promote the policies and practices that foster
a safe, secure and healthy cruise ship environment for our guests. To
fulfill that mission our member lines participate in ongoing,
specialized committees, working groups, task forces and other forums to
develop and promote industry-wide policies, routinely meeting with
regulators and enforcement officials to promote efficiency and best
practices throughout the world. Through these varied groups, and aided
by a professional technical staff, consultants, and maritime
authorities, our members share information, review and assist in
developing applicable national and international legal requirements,
and identify best industry practices for all members to adopt.
Safety is the cruise industry's number one priority. Providing a
safe environment begins with the industry's hiring process and policies
for crewmember and guest behavior. It continues with training our
crewmembers on our safety policies and enforcing them.
Of course, we are not alone in this effort. Every aspect of the
cruise experience is heavily regulated and monitored under U.S. and
international maritime law for the purpose of protecting the safety of
cruise passengers and crews.
These regulations begin with the design and construction of the
ship and extend to the operation and navigation of the vessel, the
training of the crew, the emergency equipment on board, and the
evacuation protocols. A United Nations agency--the International
Maritime Organization (IMO), mandates global standards for the safety
and operation of cruise ships. The United States Coast Guard under the
supervision of the Department of State is the primary agency that
represents the United States at the IMO.
The most important of these standards are covered by the
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea or SOLAS. This
treaty has been ratified by the United States, all European Union
Member States and most other nations, providing a uniform worldwide set
of mandates regarding safety equipment, crew training, evacuation and
emergency procedures, and navigation safety standards.
One of the most vital components of SOLAS is the International
Safety Management Code or ISM. This Code is the primary mechanism for
assigning safety responsibilities, functions, and procedures--both
among the crew onboard an individual vessel, and the cruise line as a
whole. The purpose of the ISM Code--and the continuous training
exercises that instill it--is to ensure that every member of the crew,
from the Captain to the most entry-level hospitality staff member,
understands his or her precise responsibilities, especially in an
emergency.
The stringent standards embodied by the IMO, SOLAS and the ISM Code
have multiple layers of enforcement. The primary responsibility rests
with the flag state of the vessel. Secondarily, all ports where the
vessel calls can and do take additional measures to ensure compliance.
In the United States, for example, the U.S. Coast Guard enforces
all maritime regulatory requirements through both announced and
unannounced inspections and a rigorous annual examination of every ship
that embarks passengers in the U.S. At any time, the local Coast Guard
Captain of a Port can prevent any cruise ship from departing if a
serious violation of any regulation is found. CLIA's senior staff
includes four retired U.S. Coast Guard officers, so we are intimately
familiar with the dedication and commitment of this branch of service.
Additionally, all crewmembers receive training in emergency
procedures, safety, security, and first aid. This includes but is not
limited to: emergency signals and alarms; abandon ship procedures; man
overboard; fire prevention and safety; and the location and donning of
lifejackets. This safety training is required every 5 years, however,
all crew are to receive familiarization training each time they report
on board and each crew member must participate in the ship's weekly
emergency drills at least once a month. This training ensures the
crewmember is familiar with the emergency operations and the location
of emergency equipment on that particular ship.
Certain members of the crew also will be trained in the operation
of the lifeboats and other survival equipment. Masters, officers and
other personnel designated to assist passengers in an emergency are
also required to have completed specific training in ``crowd
management'' and ``crisis management and human behavior.''
Crewmembers are also required to undergo emergency drills provided
for in SOLAS, Chapter III, Regulation 19 regarding abandon ship
protocols and firefighting. Instruction and training in the use of the
ship's fire-extinguishing appliances, life-saving appliances, and in
survival at sea must be given at the same interval as the drills. This
training includes a mock search and rescue of passengers trapped in
their staterooms. SOLAS also addresses record keeping for these drills
and training sessions. Other crew training is specified in Chapter III,
Regulation 19.4 as well. Chapter III, Regulation 37 also contains
detailed requirements for the muster list and emergency instructions.
All crew must be trained in the performance of their listed emergency
duties.
All modern cruise ships are required by SOLAS to have an array of
electronic navigational instruments that assist in properly navigating
the vessel. Most cruise ships substantially exceed the regulatory
requirements in this regard.
Additionally, the average CLIA ship, of approximately 97,000 gross
tons carrying approximately 2,700 passengers and 800 crew, typically
has five firefighting teams whose main members have advanced shipboard
firefighting training, 4,000 smoke detectors, 500 fire extinguishers,
16 miles of sprinkler piping, 5,000 sprinkler heads and 6 miles of fire
hose.
Because of the cruise industry's commitment to safety, supported by
strict regulations and vigorous enforcement mechanisms, cruising is one
of the safest forms of recreation and travel in the world.
In the decade from 2002 through 2011, prior to the grounding of the
Costa Concordia, there were a total of 28 fatalities on cruise ships
related to an operational casualty. Twenty-two of those fatalities
involved crew members; six were passengers out of approximately 223
million passengers and crew who sailed during those 10 years.
Let me be clear: Not a single fatality is acceptable to our
industry and our industry will continue to work to prevent such
incidents. One of the reasons fatal casualties are so rare is that we
treat every one of these tragedies as a profound reminder of our duty
to put ourselves under a microscope so we can continuously improve our
practices, procedures and performance.
Almost immediately following the Concordia incident, CLIA member
cruise lines launched a Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review--a
comprehensive assessment of the critical human factors and operational
aspects of maritime safety. We announced this publicly on January 27,
2012 on behalf of the global cruise industry. This Review, which is
well underway, is comprised of four key components:
First, an internal review by CLIA members of their own
operational safety practices and procedures covering issues of
navigation, evacuation, emergency training, and related
practices and procedures.
Second, consultation on these issues with independent
external experts.
Third, the identification and sharing of industry best
practices and policies, as well as possible recommendations to
the IMO for substantive regulatory changes to further improve
the industry's operational safety.
Fourth, a commitment to collaborate with the IMO,
governments, and regulatory bodies to implement any necessary
changes--but also to act independently and voluntarily where
possible to speed safety improvements.
I'm pleased to report that the industry is already moving forward
with recommendations from this Review.
On February 9, 2012 CLIA members instituted a new passenger muster
policy requiring mandatory muster drills for embarking passengers prior
to departure from port. This new policy exceeds existing legal
requirements, which call for muster drills within 24 hours of passenger
embarkation. It is being undertaken voluntarily and became effective
immediately. Rather than waiting until the entire Review is completed,
we will take steps to implement recommendations on industry best
practices as soon as they are identified and on an ongoing basis.
The Cruise Industry Operational Safety Review continues a long
tradition in our industry of taking action proactively and voluntarily
to improve our safety procedures. Another recent example was CLIA's
development and adoption in 2008 of a series of best practices related
to guest care--specifically the need to provide passengers practical
assistance and emotional support during times of significant stress or
trauma.
CLIA's guidelines on guest care practices cover a broad range of
services. While each situation is different, these services typically
include assigning a specific care team to work with guests or their
families in times of need, both on-ship and onshore; meeting
transportation and logistical needs; providing immediate, complimentary
communications to shore; serving as a liaison with local governments or
the U.S. embassy when appropriate; and contacting a guest or family
once they have returned home to determine if they need additional
support.
The cruise industry also has a strong record of working with
Congress to enact new laws dedicated to advancing passenger safety. In
2010, CLIA worked with many members of this Committee to assist in
development and enactment of the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act,
which was signed into law by President Obama on July 27, 2010.
This legislation brought consistency and clarity to the security
and safety laws and regulations for the cruise industry in the United
States. CLIA member cruise lines are already in compliance with the
effective provisions of the CVSSA, including crime reporting
provisions; the use of latch and computerized key technology; and the
requirements that log books include all reports of crime and thefts
over $1,000. To bring further transparency to the industry, the U.S.
Coast Guard and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) now maintain
a website with the required reporting of closed case totals by cruise
line in each category.
Our members are also in compliance with new mandates that became
effective on January 27, 2012 requiring 42-inch rail heights in all
passenger areas and peep holes in all passenger and crew cabins. We
will continue to work with the U.S. Coast Guard, the FBI and other law
enforcement agencies both in the U.S. and around the world to ensure
that all of the bill's provisions are fully implemented.
Quite simply Americans are extremely safe at sea today. In many
ways--again, well documented by statistics and other evidence--they are
even safer in the well-protected environment of a cruise ship than they
are on land.
Independent surveys show that the vast majority of cruise
passengers--95 percent--say they are very satisfied with their cruising
experience. Nearly half say they are extremely satisfied. And more than
half of all passengers become repeat customers--cruising for a second
or third or fourth time.
I submit that this would not be the case if safety or security were
perceived as a serious problem. As the Coast Guard has testified, crime
aboard cruise ships is extremely rare.
Our position is that even one incident or crime of any kind is one
too many.
At the same time, we have to recognize the existence and the
dangers of exaggeration. Assertions are sometimes made and unofficial
statistics are sometimes quoted that bear no relation to any known
reality.
In contrast, detailed studies by the renowned criminologist Dr.
James Alan Fox of Northeastern University confirm the safety of
passengers aboard today's cruise ships.
In Dr. Fox's words--and I quote--``While virtually no place--on
land or sea--is totally free of risk, the number of reported incidents
of serious crime from cruise lines is extremely low, no matter what
benchmark or standard is used.''
Now I would like to provide information on the cruise industry's
efforts to prevent the introduction and/or spread of Gastrointestinal
illness (such as Norovirus) aboard cruise ships. Historic incidence
rates of Gastrointestinal Illness aboard cruise ships are low and
according to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
the vast majority of outbreaks occur in land based settings such as
schools, hospitals, and nursing homes. Nevertheless, CLIA member lines
regularly communicate with one another, local and state health
departments, the U.S. CDC and other international public health
authorities to gather epidemiological information, identify sources of
infection and share best practices.
CLIA member cruise lines employ a variety of sanitation practices
and each line has specific, well-established Outbreak Prevention and
Response Plans, all designed to keep passengers healthy during their
cruise vacations. Our members take steps designed specifically to
prevent sick passengers from bringing norovirus on board a ship and in
the rare instances of outbreak, CLIA lines immediately employ numerous
practices to mitigate its spread and treat ill passengers and crew.
Our lines also communicate with passengers and crew, especially to
increase awareness of proper hand hygiene practices. Public health is
an evolving area and new research and information is ongoing, so cruise
lines are always assessing and updating procedures as appropriate. In
fact, outbreak prevention methods are typically developed in close
collaboration with CDC officials.
Unlike land-based outbreaks, which are generally not reported, the
robust reporting structure for shipboard cases of norovirus allows
cruise lines to share information with local and Federal health
officials. This practice enables these agencies to better identify the
original source of infection and allows cruise lines to more
effectively implement mitigation strategies. If at least 3 percent of a
ship's passengers or crew members report a Gastrointestinal Illness
(GI), including norovirus, CDC officials have the option to conduct an
investigation. In addition, thorough and regular inspections by the CDC
Vessel Sanitation Program (VSP) ensure that cruise ships operating from
U.S. ports have exceptional food handling and sanitary practices. A
former VSP Sanitation Chief has said that the CDC program standard to
which cruise ships are held for sanitation is one of the very the
highest in the world for public places.
Another area that I know is of interest to this committee, is our
industry's commitment to environmental stewardship. In the 37 years
since CLIA was established, our industry has made significant progress
in reducing our environmental impact by implementing responsible
practices and investing in new technologies. CLIA believes that it is
our responsibility to protect the environment in which we operate. Our
industry has been at the forefront of wastewater treatment, emissions
reduction and developing innovative technologies to reduce the
environmental impact of cruising.
The management of wastewater is a complex and vitally important
element of cruise ship operations.
Blackwater--water from toilets and medical facility drain, and
graywater--water from cabin sinks and showers, laundry, galleys and
spas, discharge are often regulated or treated to a higher standard
than most land based systems. Also, our industry adopted its own set of
stringent wastewater practices that go substantially beyond the rules
and regulations. For example, while international regulations permit
the discharge of untreated blackwater 12 nautical miles from shore, as
a policy CLIA members treat all blackwater using equipment certified to
meet the standards set by the U.S. Coast Guard or using an advanced
wastewater treatment system.
Cruise ships have adopted rigorous programs to tackle waste
disposal in an environmentally friendly manner, including doing all we
can to minimize the potential waste coming on board ships. We also take
extensive measures to recycle as much waste as possible by using
segregated on-board collection bins. CLIA lines recycle approximately
80,000 tons of solid waste annually, comprised largely of paper,
plastic, aluminum cans and glass. Other waste, such as hazardous waste
and oily bilge water receive special treatment as well.
As more fuel efficient ships have come into service, CLIA members
have been systematically reducing air emissions, including sulfur
oxides, nitrogen oxides, carbon dioxide and particulate matter. In the
near future, international regulations will further reduce sulfur
limits, helping to reduce air emissions across all oceans. To meet
these standards, the industry has been investing in new technologies
that manage the use of energy more effectively, such as testing the
first ever cruise ship engine exhaust gas scrubbers and developing
engines that run more efficiently.
Cruise lines are also working alongside ports to reduce waste and
emissions. This is best demonstrated by the use of shore power, a
relatively new technology in the cruise ship arena, which involves a
ship connecting to shore-side power and shutting down its own engines
while in port. A handful of ports on the North American west coast are
now equipped with the necessary, and technically rather complex,
facilities for ships to `plug-in' when they are in port. CLIA members
are involved at the international regulatory level to explore a
universal approach toward shore power that would overcome current
obstacles, which involve the source of shore power, the connection
adapter itself, as well as electrical disparities from one country to
the next.
Other innovations help ships conserve energy. Environmentally
friendly hull coatings make ships' hulls smoother, and a ship's design
itself can be modified into a bulbous bow, for example, that generates
a bow wave slightly earlier. Both result in energy savings by reducing
resistance. Other innovations include heat recovery that allows heat to
be collected from one system aboard a ship and used for another, and
innovative air conditioning systems that run more effectively and
utilize technology that minimizes the amount of energy used to cool a
room when it is not occupied. Ships are now using energy-efficient
light bulbs that generate less heat. Because ships spend so much time
under the bright sun, solar panels are a promising source of
supplementary energy and are used on many cruise ships.
Our industry has a vested interest in protecting the environment,
not only because it is the socially responsible thing to do--but
because the very nature of our product depends on a healthy natural
environment--clean oceans and beaches are essential to the cruise
experience. CLIA has made great strides to become a leader in the
maritime industry with responsible practices and innovations that are
reducing environmental impact.
Thank you again for the opportunity to provide this testimony to
the Committee. I hope the information is helpful in addressing the
substantial oversight and accountability of cruise lines, both in the
U.S. and internationally. CLIA will continue to lead the Cruise
Industry Operational Safety Review and, as with the recently agreed
Muster Policy, will look to apply what is learned through that process
so that future incidents, however rare, can be avoided. We remain fully
and deeply committed to continuous enhancement of the safety of our
guests and crewmembers, as it is without question our top priority. In
addition, we will continue to be a leader in environmental stewardship
in the maritime community. I look forward to answering your questions.
Thank you.
The Chairman. I'm going to start the questioning.
Ms. Duffy, that's sort of like everything is just working
wonderfully, and I'm just thinking about those three miles
beyond which you can dump anything you want, and you do.
So talk to me about the environment, and I'm willing to
hear your testimony and I have to accept what you say
seriously. But don't expect me to be moved by it because
there's an embarrassment which works at my soul. Genuinely. I
don't use those words in committee hearings. About the
irresponsibility of the environmental record and the luck that
you have, the so-called three miles, that beyond that you're on
your own.
You do what you want. You can talk about treated sewage.
You can talk about untreated sewage. You just pour it out
there, and there are islands of it in various oceans around the
world.
That's not, however, my question. Many Americans don't
think the corporations pay their fair share of taxes, and I'm
one of them. We have, actually, when you strip it down, the
lowest tax rate of anybody in the industrial world. You
wouldn't think so during all of this political debate. But I
can't blame them.
And I read a recent report in The New York Times about your
industry, Ms. Duffy. According to this report, the largest
company in your industry, Carnival, which has a lot of
percentage of the cruise market and which makes about $11.3
billion in profits over the last 5 years, on this profit the
company has only paid 1.1 percent in Federal, state, local or
foreign taxes. True?
Ms. Duffy. Mr. Chairman, I can't speak to the specific tax
payments or corporate structures of a specific member. What I
can say is that all of our members pay taxes both in this
country and internationally based on the current laws and will
continue to do so.
The Chairman. Well, you should be able to say what you pay,
and if you don't, that's fine. But the fact is that 1.1 percent
on, you know, 5 years, $11.3 billion in profits, is absolutely
unthinkable to me. According to SEC filings that my staff has
reviewed, Carnival actually paid no U.S. corporate taxes at all
in 2011, which I believe was last year.
Do you have a comment on that?
Ms. Duffy. Again, I----
The Chairman. Do you think that's right?
Ms. Duffy. Again, I can only say that----
The Chairman. You're here representing your industry.
Ms. Duffy. I'm here represent----
The Chairman. If I'm right, do you think that that's right
that that happened?
Ms. Duffy. I think what is appropriate is that the cruise
industry pays its taxes based on the current laws.
The Chairman. So if you paid no taxes there must be some
current law that I'm not aware of.
Ms. Duffy. Well, the cruise industry--many of our members
are multinational corporations and are doing business around
the world. We operate in many countries. We have crew from over
150 countries. We have passengers that are cruising from around
the world and----
The Chairman. I understand that, Ms. Duffy. All I'm saying
is if you're going to go before congressional committees, and
particularly this one, you've got to be more prepared. You
can't just say you're not sure and talk about your
international nature.
Most industries, particularly big ones in this country, are
international and then we're not very happy when they don't pay
taxes. I think it's amazing.
Can you explain why a multibillion-dollar company which is
headquartered in Miami and extensively uses Miami and
extensively uses up to 20 Federal agencies at various points in
time should not be paying any U.S. taxes?
Ms. Duffy. I believe that our members do pay for services
that we use at the ports----
The Chairman. You don't. You do not.
Ms. Duffy.--or per passenger for Customs and Border
Protection work. And, again, I can only come back to state that
our members pay taxes.
The Chairman. Do you want to comment on that, Dr. Klein?
Dr. Klein. Yes, I would just make one comment because,
really, it gets into what you were talking about because I also
have in my written testimony the absence of paying taxes.
I have from a Freedom of Information request indication
that a single search for a missing passenger costs the U.S.
Coast Guard $813,807, which comes out of the U.S. Treasury.
It's not cost recovered. And I think this is what you're
getting at. That's just one missing passenger.
The Chairman. That's part of what I'm getting at. That's
reimbursing for the services they've been rendered----
Dr. Klein. Oh, yes.
The Chairman. Or partly. But I'm talking about corporate
taxes.
Dr. Klein. Exactly, the absence, and it's because Carnival
is registered in Panama as a Panamanian corporation. Royal
Caribbean Cruises Limited is a Liberian corporation. And as a
result, between that and flying and using ships that have
foreign flags, they find themselves exempt from most of the
U.S. taxes.
The Chairman. Well, then maybe you should have your
headquarters in one of those countries and that you just
wouldn't have the Coast Guard to help you when you run into
trouble. Don't think I'm being mean. I'm being very fair.
You are a world unto yourself up to 5,000 people in these
huge ships which dominate the skylands, which makes the Virgin
Islands practically disappear in terms of size. And you have
your own rules and you say you're international and you're
registered not in the United States and all these things, all
of which lawyers can work out to reduce your safety
responsibilities and your payment of taxes and all kinds of
other things.
Now, last time we had hearings on this, I believe, Senator
Lautenberg, that we talked a lot about, rapes and things on
boats of that size, and when you have that many people you
can't sort of use the standards of an American community
because the chances of something happening to somebody are so
much greater simply because of the compaction of people.
They're so close. So your standards have to be really, in many
ways, better than others.
I'm over my time but I will just end this part of my
questioning by saying there are at least 20 different Federal
agencies that help the cruise industry run cruises and you're
not, evidently, willing to pay for what they do. And I'm
distressed by that and will continue the questioning, but the
questioning now goes to Senator Begich.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Senator Begich, will you accept as part of
the written record that the seventh largest port in the United
States is Huntington, West Virginia, on the Ohio River?
Senator Begich. I will consider it.
Senator Lautenberg. What's the draft on those ships?
The Chairman. I only----
Senator Lautenberg. What's the draft on those ships, Mr.
Chairman?
Senator Begich. Yes. Twelve inches.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. Anyway, please proceed, Senator Begich.
Senator Begich. I have a few questions for the Admiral
first, but let me, Ms. Duffy, I want to follow up on the
Chairman's questioning. I know this from our work in Alaska--
the cruise ship industry--you know, it's interesting because I
should be in the Budget Committee also, which is doing tax
reform right now, matter of fact, but I'm here so it's
interesting. I get to do both now on this committee so this is
good for me. I get to do dual.
But just to give you an example, and I want to make sure
I'm saying this right, I know we did a study because we have
also so much cruise ship industry in our state, just in our
southeast region where a lot of the cruises run. Local sales
tax revenue is in the millions, in the millions that's paid.
The dockage fees, and I'll turn to the port, is in the
millions and I'll just make my comments here. The income tax
issue is another debate. I'm anxious to have that because I
think there are a lot of industries that need to be readjusted.
We have a tax reform bill. Matter of fact, Johnny Isakson, who
was here earlier, and I have sponsored or have talked about
issues around tax reform.
But there is a great need for it global Federal tax reform,
but on the local end, I know we have passenger fees in Alaska.
You drop a person off on our dock, we're charging you.
We appreciate your visit but we want a little of that cash
in our economy, to be very blunt with you, but also in the
sales tax generation that occurs by those additional
expenditures and dock expenditures that the cruise ship
industry puts into the mix.
So I want to make sure that's part of the discussion also,
that for Alaska it's millions and maybe--you know, I don't know
if I can hold you on that thought because I know in Miami it
must be tens of millions.
But I don't know how your port operates. I know how we
operate. We love the cruise ship industry but we also want a
piece of the action.
Mr. Johnson. And it's a great piece of the action. Your
ports at the local level, again, by state are generating untold
tens of millions. My port alone--the reason I say this--you can
look at this many different ways, Senators, but, clearly, we
charge harbor fees. We charge--you know, we're charging
dockage. We're charging for water. We're charging for
electricity.
My port alone, you know, we're talking--on the cruise side
I'm generating annually, I call it revenue, $40 million, $50
million a year just on the cruise side. So they are paying
fees. It's a combination. Some of that is passed through to the
cruise passenger. A lot of it is coming from the corporation,
from the cruise line.
Security is a huge cost. The cruise lines themselves are
providing all of the security at their cost inside the
terminal. I myself, because we're top ranked in my state, one
of the leaders in America in safety and security, I spend--I
have a very hefty security budget to keep us in that top
position because it is our highest priority.
All of these programs--safety, security, environmental at
the port level--we look at it as a fee-based structure, whether
it's in Alaska, California, whether it's in Florida. And so
yes, to be really honest, I'm generating revenue. I have
expenses.
At the end of the day when you balance the book it's a
public port. I'm generating a profit. This is the direct. The
indirect is, again, the multiplier, through the creation of
jobs, through, you know, all of that, through the provisioning.
You're into the billions and billions and billions.
So my point is, and again, I understand, you know, Mr.
Chairman, what you're saying--I think it's extremely important
for America, and this is just my belief, I think it's extremely
important for America that these cruise lines are headquartered
in America.
I would hate to lose, OK, I'd hate to lose it in Florida
off my community out of Miami. I'd hate to lose--but I'd hate
to lose it out of the United States. And I can tell you at the
CEO level of one of the largest cruise lines in the world--it's
not Carnival, but another one--I spent a year negotiating a
renewal on their headquarters, which is on my port, and the
alternative, quite honestly, was London, all right.
They can move these headquarters to other places. So
there's a lot of ways you can look at this and analyze. But,
Senator, you're absolutely right.
Senator Begich. Let me hold you there because I do agree on
the broader suite that there should be this corporate tax
reform on the general, and I can tell you industry after
industry. So that's another subject. Let me ask the Admiral. I
only got a few minutes left.
I know in 2000 the GAO found that, you know, more
monitoring was needed in discharging for the cruise ship
industry, and since then there has been some things changed.
Tell me kind of how that has progressed.
I know in Alaska we've done some incredible things
regarding discharge but we also do some other things for
example, they use our port power rather than running their
ships, which is important for emissions, the cruise ship
industry is part of that equation now. Tell me, how has it
improved in the last decade on discharge in your ability?
Admiral Salerno. Well, Senator, we do look at all of the
environmental requirements as part of our regular annual and
semi-annual examinations of cruise ships. In Alaska, in
particular, as you point out, there are some special
requirements particularly relating to discharges from the
vessel.
We have worked with the cruise lines and with the state of
Alaska to make sure that those requirements are reflected in
our inspection procedures and that involves, for example,
sewage discharges. We've----
Senator Begich. We have a higher standard.
Admiral Salerno. You do, and that has been, but it's also
become a Federal requirement to comply with that.
Senator Begich. Right.
Admiral Salerno. So as Federal law enforcement officers, we
do work with the lines. We witness the taking of samples. Those
samples have to go to approved laboratories or accepted
laboratories is the technical term, and we verify that
whatever's going over the side meets the EPA effluence
standards.
Senator Begich. Very good.
Admiral Salerno. And similar, the North American emission
control area that is, you know, coming into effect, which will
affect the nature of emissions into the air.
Senator Begich. I'll stop there, Mr. Chairman. I know we're
limited on time but I do have other questions. I'll probably
put them for the record unless we get a second round. I'll
leave it there.
The Chairman. No. Why don't you go ahead? You know, the----
Senator Begich. Can I go ahead?
The Chairman.--vote has been postponed until 11:30.
Senator Begich. Can I do one more quick question? And this
is, I think, important when we look at the accident in Italy.
We have requirements, and I look toward, again, the admiral. We
require local mariners or marine pilots to be on the ships as
they come into our waters.
Do you think that kind of standard would have made a
difference? And then the reason I want to ask you is I want to
then flip back to one quick question to Ms. Duffy. But do you
think that standard could have had an impact on international
waters, the incident in Italy?
Admiral Salerno. Well, it's hard to tell exactly in the
Italian case, sir, but that's part of why we're so interested
in the facts in this case. Just looking at the chart, I'm not
certain that that was pilotage waters for that area.
Senator Begich. Yes.
Admiral Salerno. But, clearly, pilots are very much part of
the safety system in the United States. When pilots, you know,
guide ships in and out of port they are advisors to the master.
They're local experts.
Senator Begich. They know the waters.
Admiral Salerno. They know the waters. In our view,
indispensable component to the overall safety structure.
Senator Begich. Ms. Duffy, if I can ask you one last
question and that is on--you said the international agreement.
Is it called SOLIS?
Ms. Duffy. SOLAS.
Senator Begich. SOLAS. Do you as an industry review those
international requirements on a regular basis? How is that
reviewed and do you take like an incident which has occurred in
Italy and say as an organization, that international
organization, we have to review now our standards again? How
does that work? I don't know.
Ms. Duffy. CLIA is a nongovernmental organization that
represents the cruise line industry at the International
Maritime Organization in London. But there are 170 member
nations that are also represented----
Senator Begich. Are part of this agreement.
Ms. Duffy.--in IMO. And for the United States, that's under
the State Department. The U.S. Coast Guard is actually our
delegates----
Senator Begich. OK.
Ms. Duffy.--at the International Maritime Organization.
That is the body that is setting and establishing all of these
regulations, which SOLAS is one of those. They also establish
and have the environmental requirements for the maritime
industry as well. Here in the United States, then, the Coast
Guard is the enforcement agency for those regulations and, as
the vice admiral said, the port state control provides that
enforcement and is obviously delivered through the----
Senator Begich. But those are reviewed and updated.
Ms. Duffy. Those constantly--there are committees and
meetings throughout the year. We actually have a CLIA--our
environmental director, environmental public health director
from CLIA, is actually at the IMO right now in London
participating in an environmental committee meeting.
Senator Begich. Very good.
Dr. Klein. May I make one comment? May I?
I just wanted to say I agree Alaska has some of the most
stringent regulations with regard to environmental concerns and
they are really to be admired for that.
I guess I want to point out in some ways Washington State
has even more stringent regulations. What's sad, however, is
the majority of coastal states in the U.S. don't enjoy the same
level of protection, and that's why I advocate----
Senator Begich. That was your point about the national.
Dr. Klein. Yes. Yes, because there's this real patchwork,
and I think there's no reason why the people of Alaska should
enjoy a cleaner environment from this industry than Georgia,
Mississippi, Oregon or other places.
Senator Begich. We like having the best standard.
Dr. Klein. And I admire it, most definitely.
The Chairman. Senator Begich, thank you----
Senator Begich. Thank you.
The Chairman.--very much for your question. I want to go to
Senator Lautenberg, who's Chairman of our Subcommittee here, to
be followed by Senator Boozman.
Senator Lautenberg. Thanks very much. I think you heard me
talk about the two constituents from New Jersey who were on the
Costa Concordia, and they said things were chaotic and
confusing and had no idea about what to do first. And they said
they were not given any safety training called muster drills
before the crash, making the evacuation more chaotic and more
confusing. In response, the industry voluntarily changed their
policy to require muster drills prior to leaving port.
Now, I ask whether Admiral Salerno or Ms. Duffy know that
these muster drills are taking place and that they're effective
in the familiarization for the passengers. Are they at this
point?
Admiral Salerno. Senator, the international requirement is
to hold them within 24 hours. We have nothing to suggest that
that's not occurring. However, we feel that it's important to
strengthen that.
So we have directed our inspectors to witness those drills
whenever they're onboard for a periodic examination, and the
industry has also voluntarily required their members to conduct
those drills prior to getting under way. So that's in excess of
the international requirement and, in our view, that is an
appropriate interim and first measure even though we don't have
all the facts in the Costa----
Senator Lautenberg. Yes. Should we perhaps, Admiral, modify
the international standards to make the muster drills
mandatory?
Admiral Salerno. Sir, I think we do need to look at that,
and that is on the agenda at the International Maritime
Organization for the upcoming Maritime Safety Committee, not
only that particular issue but a review of cruise ship
standards overall.
Senator Lautenberg. Yes, because it is amazing, honestly,
as I look at it, and I like the income that comes from cruises.
I like the enjoyment that comes with the tour and travel boat
excursions now and New Jersey has a busy area and near the
Hudson River the Statue of Liberty stands promptly there. And
I'm an honorary member of the Pilots Association of Sandy Hook.
That doesn't mean I go out there and do it--and I wouldn't want
a boat that I was the pilot for. I wouldn't want to be there.
But, Ms. Duffy, I commend the industry for changing its
policy to require the pre-departure muster drills. Now, how
will the industry enforce the policy so that all the cruise
ships do conduct these drills before leaving port?
Ms. Duffy. Many of our members already conduct the drills
prior to departure from port, and now that we have announced
this policy it becomes part of the mandate and part of the ship
system of procedures to ensure. And, obviously, we've made a
very public announcement. I believe that our members will
conduct these musters.
Passengers will be expecting that the musters will be
conducted prior to departure, and as the Vice Admiral says,
this is something that the Coast Guard as part of the
enforcement role that they play to ensure----
Senator Lautenberg. What's the penalty?
Ms. Duffy.--inspections.
Senator Lautenberg. If they fail to do it?
Admiral Salerno. Senator, the ultimate penalty is they may
not be allowed to leave port, you know, so that is a very----
Senator Lautenberg. Are there fines if they don't?
Admiral Salerno. There are provisions, civil penalty type
provisions, which I can----
Senator Lautenberg. Yes.
Admiral Salerno.--provide to you the exact amount if you'd
like.
[The information requested follows:]
A civil penalty may be assessed only if a vessel fails to comply
with a law or regulation for which there is a penalty provision. In
this case, there is no law or regulation that states a cruise ship must
perform a passenger muster before a vessel departure from port.
However, as a matter of current policy, the Coast Guard is
witnessing passenger musters before or upon departure on cruise ships
concurrent with each control verification examination performed under
the authority of Title 46 U.S.C. 3505. If the vessel does not perform
the passenger muster, the control verification examination will be
deemed incomplete and the Coast Guard will not issue or endorse the
vessel's Certificate of Compliance. If this were to occur, the Coast
Guard may order the vessel to remain in port until the passenger muster
has been performed.
Senator Lautenberg. The question----
Dr. Klein. May I make one quick----
Senator Lautenberg. Yes, Dr. Klein.
Dr. Klein. I'll make it very quick. I think it's important
for us to define what we mean by a muster drill. When I used to
cruise, a muster drill was--it took a half hour. You went to
the muster station. The captain came by or a senior officer
made sure you put your lifejacket on properly, made sure people
knew the procedures, and it was a 30-minute ordeal.
Today, according to a cruise director from Carnival Cruise
Lines, they gather at the muster station. A person walks by
with a clicker to count the number of people there. There is
not attendance taken, which it used to be, and they're finished
within 5 minutes. This is according to a cruise director on his
own blog.
I guess all I want to raise is I think we need to define
what we mean by muster drill as opposed to leaving it kind of
as this sort of, you know, a label that we're not sure what we
mean.
Senator Lautenberg. Yes. Well, I would imagine--Captain
Doherty, did you want to say something here?
Captain Doherty. With respect to pre-departure musters, you
asked if the Coast Guard can enforce it. If you don't make it
the law the Coast Guard can't enforce it.
It's laudable for the industry to say yes, we're going to
do this. But there's nothing to measure the penalties against
unless it's included in the amended Cruise Vessel Act and also
included in the international standard--International Safety
Management procedures so you can measure their safety
compliance against, one, just exactly what a muster is defined
as, as Dr. Klein said----
Senator Lautenberg. Yes.
Captain Doherty. And two, you know, what the penalties are
under the law, not under an industry association.
Senator Lautenberg. We know what the intentions are, and I
leave it to the industry to come up with something that passes
the taste test here. But it's obvious that despite the great
safety record, the huge numbers of travelers that you have,
that something like this is very discouraging. It stands out
despite the millions of passengers that have passed through
safely.
One last thing is----
The Chairman. Senator Lautenberg, can I just add a thought?
I think we're getting at it here. I think you have two lives.
One is at port, and the Coast Guard, which is singing your
praises here, somewhat to my amazement, what you do in port. I
come from a state where there are a lot of coal mines and
there's a lot of talk about safety practices and coal mines
that are sort of in very remote places. They're, you know, 300,
500, 2,000 feet underground. And it's a little bit like your
world. Once you're beyond the three miles, the world is yours.
Once you go into a coal mine, you can't go into a coal mine
unless you're a coalminer or a safety inspector, something of
that sort.
But they can talk about rules but that has nothing to do
with whether the rules are carried out and whether enforcement
is enforced. And how in Heaven's name is the Coast Guard going
to, just on the environmental basis of dumping sewage, follow
them around? Because they don't have the resources to do it or
the time to do it, to follow them around to see what they're
doing. We know these islands are out there.
Senator Lautenberg. That's a good thought, Mr. Chairman,
and I think the one thing that we have to do is get past the
lack of resources because if anything more happens I think it's
very damaging to the industry and we don't want to do it. So I
agree with you. We're on the same wavelength here.
Ms. Duffy, one of the things that's talked about somewhat
is crimes aboard ship or connected with the crews in some way,
and the cruise lines are required to inform the FBI about
serious crime, the number of crimes supposed to be made public.
However, according to the FBI data that I obtained, the
number of crimes posted online is lower than reported by
industry. For example, last year cruise lines reported more
than 40 sexual assaults but only 14 are posted publicly. Will
the industry commit to publicly disclosing the actual number of
serious crimes that happen on cruise ships?
Ms. Duffy. Senator, all of our cruise lines and the
industry overall comply today with all of the reporting
requirements that were established under the cruise line--the
Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act.
The reporting of those crimes are part of what the FBI does
and we're reporting everything that we are required to report
to the FBI, who, I believe, is then responsible for working
on----
Senator Lautenberg. Yes. OK. We have to make certain that
not only should it be public but should be timely and I'm going
to pursue this with you at another time. Thank you.
Ms. Duffy. Thank you.
The Chairman. Colleagues, I am embarrassed to tell you--I
didn't realize time was passing so quickly--that the vote has
started and there are about 9 minutes left on the vote.
Senator Klobuchar. Could I just get two questions or----
The Chairman. No. I mean, I want to come back.
Senator Klobuchar. OK.
The Chairman. Can you do that because there's----
Senator Klobuchar. No, but thank you. It's fine. All right.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Well, ask the questions and then we'll
recess.
Senator Klobuchar. OK.
The Chairman. Take the answers. Quickly.
Senator Klobuchar. OK.
[Laughter.]
STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Klobuchar. I just want to thank you, Mr. Chairman,
for holding this hearing and, as you know, the tragedy hit home
in Minnesota. We lost a couple from White Bear Lake, Minnesota.
And I think whenever you have a tragedy like this happen it
makes you look at safety, and I'm head of the Tourism
ubcommittee and care very much about this.
But I also am concerned about the legal remedies from this,
and if we are out of time you can put your answers in writing
later. But I understand that under the Death on the High Seas
Act families who lost a loved one have limited legal remedies
that they can pursue for the tremendous loss that they have
suffered.
Current law prevents victims' families from recovering
anything other than lost income or wages. In contrast, if a
family suffers the loss of a loved one in a plane crash, they
may choose to pursue non-pecuniary damages in court.
And I would ask in writing so no one has to wait, whether
from all of you, what kind of impact you think this disparity
in the law has on the surviving families of victims. And I will
also pose a question on----
The Chairman. Senator Klobuchar, before you do that, she
will ask her question. After that, we will go into recess. We
will go vote. We will come back, at least I will. I hope
Senator Boozman does because I haven't been fair to him. And
we'll continue this hearing.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. Very good.
The Chairman. OK?
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Our hearing is adjourned after you've asked
your question.
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you.
The Chairman. Recessed, not adjourned.
[Laughter.]
Senator Begich. Did you finish the question?
Senator Klobuchar. OK. I guess I'm going to continue to ask
my question. So one of the other questions that I have is the
cruise industry, and you could choose to answer either of
these, and these are statistics about the--as you know,
millions of Americans are passengers on a cruise ship.
They deserve to know if there's transparency and
accountability for ensuring their safety onboard, and so just
safety record issues and whether or not the industry should be
required to report these statistics to a Federal or an
international entity. Can anyone answer that question? Yes, Dr.
Klein?
Dr. Klein. Well, what I find is that there is no
comprehensive recording of incidents at sea. I've been--I
started writing about the cruise industry in the late 1990s,
and at that time went through the media and extracted every
event I could find.
As you'll see in my written testimony, Appendix A is a
reflection of what I've been able to cull from the media and
from reports from cruise passengers. I get 3,000 visitors a day
to my website. To my knowledge, there's nowhere else that one's
going to find a comprehensive list of known accidents at sea,
and I think it's just worth mentioning.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. Ms. Duffy?
Ms. Duffy. There is an authoritative report that is
produced by an independent party internationally, G.P. Wild, on
cruise industry casualties, and that is where the numbers came
from for the 223 million crew and passengers between 2002 and
through 2011 with 26 deaths due to marine casualty. We'd be
happy to submit this report to the Committee.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. Dr. Klein?
Dr. Klein. If I could just say, in no way to impugn G.P.
Wild or anything else, my work is truly independent. I'm an
academic.
Senator Klobuchar. Yes.
Dr. Klein. I have no vested interest and I report on my
website, CruiseJunkie.com, any information that comes to me in
a dispassionate manner. So when I say information being
available is not digested. It's there and----
Senator Klobuchar. And there's--but there's no requirement
right now to report the stats to a Federal or international
entity, which is----
Dr. Klein. Not that I know of.
Senator Klobuchar. My exact question.
Ms. Duffy. The International Maritime Organization also
maintains a database of casualty--marine casualty reports, and
that is information that is reported to the IMO. I believe that
Dr. Klein's numbers also include ferries and all kinds of
other----
Dr. Klein. Not what I presented here.
Ms. Duffy.--ships. So----
Senator Klobuchar. OK. Well, we will--why don't----
Dr. Klein. The data I presented in Appendix A does not
include ferries. It only includes cruise ships.
Senator Klobuchar. OK.
Dr. Klein. If you want to see the ferry data then you go to
my website and you'll see considerably more accidents. But I
purposely extracted those.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. Anyone else? And then the first
question that I asked, which is more complicated, on the legal
questions of the high seas, I'd appreciate answers in writing
on that. Did you want to add something?
Admiral Salerno. I would just add to the discussion----
Senator Klobuchar. Vice Admiral.
Admiral Salerno. The Coast Guard does track all reportable
marine casualties for events that occur within our
jurisdiction. So these are not global numbers but, you know,
U.S. numbers.
Senator Klobuchar. OK.
Admiral Salerno. So if a foreign flag ship has an accident
in U.S. waters we track that, and that information is publicly
available.
Senator Klobuchar. So we have the U.S. numbers. We're just
not sure about the international numbers, although there are
arguments about this study, and we'll see that. And then the
other question that has come up for me before with the BP oil
spill and other things with the explosion, with the people
dying and what happens on the high seas. I'm curious about that
with the difference with the plane crash. So we'll be asking
that in writing. So very good. I really appreciate it. Thank
you very much.
Senator Begich. We'll be back. Thank you.
Senator Klobuchar. We'll be back.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. My apologies, but that was a very important
vote. I seem to be by myself here so we may be here until about
7 o'clock.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. But I doubt it.
I want to just pick up on something that Senator Klobuchar
made as a question, and she asked about the Death on the High
Seas Act, DOHSA, before our hearing recessed, and she wanted to
know why the victims of a cruise accident don't have the same
legal remedies as victims of plane crashes. And I know that she
asked for a written response from the witnesses but, frankly,
I'd like to hear what some of you might think about that, and
Dr. Klein, you probably have some thoughts. We run into the
same problem in, you know, deep water.
Dr. Klein. Yes. Well, I guess the thing is that cruise
passengers--there was legislation that was passed to provide
the rights to airline passengers to file lawsuits, and I
guess--let me back up. The original Death on the High Seas Act
was passed in 1920 and it does not allow non-pecuniary and
punitive damages to families of someone who has died while at
sea.
These limits were deemed to be unfair in the context of
aviation cases and were removed but they were not changed for
passenger ships. There was House Resolution 2989 introduced by
Representative Doggett back in July 2007, and this was intended
to correct this inconsistency. But it was not approved.
Two bills were introduced in the 111th Congress, House
Resolution 5803 and Senate 3600 and 3755, and, of course, you
were the sponsor of one of those, but they also didn't go
beyond committee. Basically, from my perspective, it's unfair
to American citizens who go on cruise ships to be treated
differently than when they're traveling on an airplane to get
to that cruise ship. It makes no sense.
The Chairman. A little bit like those on land and those on
oil-drilling platforms at sea.
Dr. Klein. Precisely. Yes.
The Chairman. I'm going to bow to Senator Boozman.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN BOOZMAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ARKANSAS
Senator Boozman. thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this hearing.
I agree with the Chairman that, certainly, we need a
fairer, simpler tax code.
I would say, though, that I don't think anybody on the
panel is trying to say that the cruise industry is not paying
what we as Congress have agreed on what they need to pay, and
we have a number of prominent individuals that feel like that
they're not paying enough taxes but I don't see any of them
voluntarily paying more.
So if there is blame, again, we need to work on that and
get a fairer, simpler tax code. And I think the cruise industry
would agree with that because that would help our economy and
also be good for a number of different reasons.
The other thing is--and I appreciate Mr. Johnson and the
Senator from Alaska--that the cruise industry truly is
contributing many millions of dollars to the economy. Ms.
Duffy, what is the size of the industry? What does it represent
for the United States?
Ms. Duffy. In 2010, Senator, the North American cruise
industry generated $37.85 billion in U.S. economic benefits,
including nearly 330,000 U.S. jobs.
Senator Boozman. Yes. So it's a huge entity. And the other
thing too is that, we need adequate rules to make sure there is
safety and keeping lots of things safe.
But probably, Mr. Johnson, you know, the risk of having a
significant car accident driving to the pier in Miami is
greater than getting on the cruise ship and going to whatever
destination. The other thing is I'm really interested in is the
disease aspect of this.
That's a huge problem, and I know that the industry itself
is working really hard to figure that out because it's a huge
negative. We all read about those things. But it is a difficult
problem.
I know that if you listed the hospitals throughout the
country you're probably much more likely to go into the
hospital with a minor problem and then come out with a
significant infectious disease, percentage wise, than on a
cruise ship. So these are things that we all need to be
committed to grappling with and we would like to work with you.
Ms. Duffy, in your testimony you talked about how things in
the continual process of evolving. When you run into a problem,
a significant problem like an outbreak or something similar,
what are the steps that the industry goes through to identify
problems and put procedures in place?
Ms. Duffy. The cruise lines currently, on the issue that
you raised about public health, meet or exceed all the Federal
codes and regulations and the international requirements.
Every ship undergoes regular inspections and crew training,
and we are in frequent communication with the CDC directly if
there is any sort of an outbreak. There are regular inspections
also under the VSP, or Vessel Sanitation Program, to ensure
that all of the ships operating from U.S. ports have the
appropriate and exceptional food handling and sanitary
practices.
Actually, one of the former VSP sanitation chiefs said that
the CDC program standard to which cruise ships are held for
sanitation is among the highest in the world for any public
place, I think to your point about hospital outbreaks or
outbreaks that we've seen in schools.
So our members are very committed, obviously, to ensure
that we have a very healthy environment for our passengers and
crew.
Senator Boozman. We'll ask Mr. Johnson, then you, Dr.
Klein, if that's OK.
Mr. Johnson. This is a good example, perfect example, about
how a port at a local level works with the Coast Guard, works
with Customs, works with the Center for Disease Control in
particular on these issues of a health issue. You have,
obviously, the issues of disembarking passengers. You have the
issue of the queuing for embarkation for another cruise.
You have the importance of sterilizing the cruise terminal
itself. This is an area, again, to the point of continual level
of interaction, both at the security level--your ports are only
secured because of the cooperation of all agencies, Federal,
state and local, and it starts really with U.S. Coast Guard and
I can't say enough good things about the Coast Guard, but
Customs--Federal, state, local interaction--and your level of
security, your level of safety, is only as good as that level
of clear communication, clear cooperation. In the health area,
that's a specific one.
We're engaged. It could be literally--and to hold a ship
over, instead of departing my port at 4 p.m. as scheduled, you
know, it may be a midnight, 1 p.m.--those passengers have to be
properly handled, dealt with nicely. But, again, it's an
important issue that we deal with.
Admiral Salerno. If I could add, Senator, the reference to
CDC is an important one. The CDC does have the lead for vessel
sanitation. The Coast Guard has a very close relationship with
CDC. We rely on them for advice on operational controls that
are necessary to control any outbreak.
So if they feel a ship needs to be detained in port or
prevented from entering port or remain at anchorage, we can
apply those controls on behalf of CDC and we have protocols in
place to do that.
Senator Boozman. Thank you, Admiral.
Dr. Klein?
Dr. Klein. I just wanted to say a couple of things. First
of all, I won't dispute the statements about sanitation. I
think the VSP does a fine job. I also want to say that I'm
sympathetic to what the cruise industry deals with. I
distinguish between sanitation and norovirus, which isn't
related to sanitation. It has to do with people not washing
their hands when they go to the bathroom. It follows a fecal-
oral route. We know that.
The industry, in 2002, in response to a major set of
outbreaks, came up with the mantra passengers bring it with
them. They continue to say that today. However, I know of an
analysis of data from the CDC which indicates there are a fair
number of incidents where, when there's a passenger outbreak,
it is preceded by an elevated number of crew members reporting
ill. This disputes the passengers bring it with them. Also,
that there are outbreaks on successive cruises suggests
passengers aren't bringing it with them.
Need to make two comments because I indicate in my
written--in my oral statement that there are disincentives to
reporting. Generally, I understand that crew members who report
ill are kept off work for 2 days or until they're asymptomatic.
Makes perfect sense.
However, one remains, one continues to shed the virus for 2
weeks. One continues to be contagious if you don't properly
wash your hands for 2 weeks. But these people are back at work.
As well, passengers who report ill are quarantined. Again,
makes sense.
But there's a disincentive. If you're a worker and you're
not working, many of them say they're not being paid. If you're
a passenger, why would you report being ill if you can still go
out and enjoy your holiday even if you don't feel well? So
people don't have an incentive to go out of circulation in
order to deal with preventing the spread of the illness.
The other thing I want to say, and this is anecdotal so I
can't stand up and say it's truth, but anecdotally I have heard
from crew members who say that the chemicals used for
sanitation, for dealing with the illness, are so caustic that
it isn't uncommon for them to replace the chemicals with water
because it's so hard for them to apply.
Now, that may be happening one in a hundred times, one in a
thousand. But I think there needs to be a greater attentiveness
rather than, again, saying passengers bring it with them--we're
the victim here. I think there can be more of a proactive
dealing with the problem.
Senator Boozman. And I know I'm over time, Mr. Chairman. I
apologize. I guess the only thing I would say, Dr. Klein, is
that I don't disagree with the problem. So much of that is just
doing right. It's just hard to get somebody to wash their
hands. And then the other thing too is that those who are
watering it down now, it doesn't matter what regulation you put
on them. They're still going to water it down. Do you see what
I'm saying?
I mean, that to me is absolutely crazy because the result
is that outbreak. You turn a little problem, regardless of the
cost, into this huge problem, you know. So, again, it's
difficult things to deal with and----
Dr. Klein. And I agree and I'm sympathetic to the industry.
I guess my feeling, and it doesn't need to be reflected in
legislation, but my feeling is they could go further than they
currently go, and I'm more than happy to share with them my
views and my insights.
Senator Boozman. And I think that's very appropriate, and I
think that that's what this is all about. It's just trying to
get some information out so that we can really help each other
because it is an important resource.
I've been to Ketchikan and other places. There's nothing
else like it, and they really are great economic contributors,
kind of a bright spot in our economy. So thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Boozman.
I want to continue on a couple of fronts, Ms. Duffy. This
business of taxation is very important, and I think all of us
have seen the movie or read the book, Too Big to Fail, and in
the last administration they did something that had to be done,
which is to bail out a number of banks so that smaller banks
would not start to fold and then the whole system would
collapse.
But in the making of that deal with the nine major banks in
the country, the idea was that there was going to be a capital
injection into these banks, varied according to their size,
which is odd philosophy to give successful banks the capital
injection.
But the point was if you want people to spend money or you
want them to be able to have credit, you've got to have the
credit available, and the credit wasn't available. So they got
whatever it was, $700 billion, and the American people weren't
very happy about it.
I thought it was a wise thing to sort of stem what was
beginning to be a general collapse in the economy until it
turns out that they got all of this money and didn't spend one
dime on what they were meant to spend it on, which was
mortgages. That was the whole thing all the way through. They
were meant to spend it on mortgages, to bail out homeowners--
not them. It all went into their pockets. It was all used on
compensation.
And why do I say that? Because you live in this town and
you see what people with smart lawyers are able to do. You can
get pretty cynical, which is why when I'm looking at you, Ms.
Duffy, I'm thinking of--you know, there's inside the three-
mile--that's one part of your life. Outside, that's all your
life and nobody else.
You know, the Coast Guard can't follow you around and you
don't pay taxes, and then you do that classic American thing
that a lot of corporations use or a lot of very wealthy
Americans use, I'm paying everything that I'm required to under
the law.
I'm not sure that you do. In fact, I don't think you do. I
can't prove it right now but I'm going to work at it. But I'm
asking you just as an American citizen don't you think that as
profitable as you are that it's really incumbent upon you not
just to say oh, we're paying everything that we're required to
under the law, but since I get the feeling that the only people
that you really reimburse are private sectors like the port.
Port's doing very well. Coast Guard doesn't get a dime from
you.
And so I'd like your thought about how you think you could
represent your industry. My follow-up question is going to be
what 5 or 6 things do you think you could be doing better than
you're doing outside the three-mile limit.
Senator Boozman's question about the virus is on MRSA.
There are hospitals who lose their accreditation because of
MRSA, and that basically comes down to little hospitals or big
hospitals, busy hospitals, not well-run hospitals not cleaning
up the bathrooms that Dr. Klein was talking about. And they
just lose their accreditation.
Now, have they broken a law? No. But they don't get
accreditation, which is, you know, a death knell to a hospital
or for many hospitals would be. So it's not sometimes just a
matter of doing what the law says but doing what you think is
appropriate and paying your fair share. I mean, that's sort of
what this country is about, paying your fair share.
We're having that argument now. Half the Senate doesn't
want very wealthy people, millionaires and billionaires, to pay
any more taxes than they're paying currently, which are at a
very, very low rate, and others are saying look, this country
doesn't hold together, either individually or in terms of
corporate behavior, unless we all do our fair share.
Do you think you're doing your fair share in terms of taxes
that your industry pays?
Ms. Duffy. Again, Mr. Chairman, I represent the industry
and on behalf of the industry I can say that we pay what is
appropriate for the business that we conduct. We are a----
The Chairman. What is appropriate or what is----
Ms. Duffy. What is--what is required.
The Chairman. Well, there's a big difference between
required and appropriate. Which do you mean?
Ms. Duffy. Well, what is required of us as an industry, and
the industry does pay over 100 different types of taxes and
fees. As we've discussed, we provide a lot of jobs. We provide
a lot of economic benefit, not just to the ports, not just to
even the states and places that our ships depart from. I also
represent----
The Chairman. So did Goldman Sachs.
Ms. Duffy. I also represent 16,000 travel agents and
agencies across the country.
The Chairman. And I'm thrilled about that. That wasn't my
question.
Ms. Duffy. And those travel agents and agencies rely upon
the cruise industry.
The Chairman. Look, I'm going to be rude. If you're going
to be effective up here, and you're new to this.
You've got to speak more truth. I'm not accusing you of not
speaking truth. I'm just saying you ought to speak more
credibly if you're going to have credibility with this. We take
our work very seriously. Yes, we're consumer-oriented.
We assume that corporations are doing pretty well but we
also do a lot to help corporations. Your corporations are doing
very, very well. And so I am going to ask you outside of three
miles name to me about four or five or six things that you
think that you could be doing better, that you should be doing
better.
Ms. Duffy. I think as part of the operational safety review
that we announced we are already beginning to explore areas
where we can improve. We focus specifically on the human
factors, which includes things like crew training, focus on
bridge team management, the muster policy, which we talked
about, continued and ongoing investment in new technology that
improves the efficiency of the ships in terms of environmental
impact, the recycling programs that we have onboard ships, the
investment in advanced waste water treatment systems onboard
the ships, new technology in scrubbers that reduce emissions,
shore power and working with some of the port communities
that--where we are able to use shore power. So there are
things----
The Chairman. I don't understand the term ``shore power.''
Ms. Duffy. Shore power is where our cruise ships can
actually plug in when they're at port. So these are things that
we are doing that no one is requiring us by a regulation to do
that the industry is doing to continue to invest that helps
passenger safety and health as well as reduce our environmental
impact.
The Chairman. Did you notice what we did with automobiles?
Toyota had a lot of recalls because of problems with brakes.
And then it turned out that a lot of companies had problems
with unintended acceleration. I've been through that myself in
the car where it doesn't matter how hard you put the brakes on.
The car just shoots ahead.
The automobile industry's been around for I don't know how
long, 75 years, whatever, since the Model T, and they've
changed enormously. They changed in terms of their
environmental efficiency. They're going to have to change a lot
more.
But we fined them and we went after them, even as we're
thrilled that they're coming out of the recession and they're
building cars better than ever. I just say that to you because
I have the feeling that you're kind of a law unto yourself. I'm
a fair person. I've never been considered, you know, the most
liberal part of my party or the most conservative. I'm sort of
in the middle.
But I'm suspicious of what you do, and you're defending the
heck out of every single thing that you do and then listing all
the things that you do and are doing and then say well, maybe
we could do those better.
But I would actually like to see more on the tax thing.
Would you be willing to do that?
Ms. Duffy. We'll be willing to work with you, Mr. Chairman,
under any----
The Chairman. So there's no work that I can do on that. The
work will have to all be yours. You send in the information and
then we look at it.
Ms. Duffy. We will work with you----
The Chairman. You should say yes. You really should.
Ms. Duffy. Yes. Yes. I'm sorry if I----
The Chairman. I don't mean to lead the witness but you
really should say yes.
Ms. Duffy. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. I just got a note here that Captain Doherty
has a perspective on what the industry could do to improve
itself. You're on, Captain.
Captain Doherty. Caught me snoozing. There's certainly----
The Chairman. You can talk.
Captain Doherty. There are certainly many areas where the
industry can improve itself.
The Chairman. Yes.
Captain Doherty. And, you know, the Costa Concordia only
brought to light, I think, the endemic issues that need to be
looked at.
First off, with respect to passenger safety, that's
primary. Crew safety is right up there with it. A soul at sea
is a soul at sea, whether you're a passenger or a crew member.
Each one of them has a right to live.
With respect to the loss of the Concordia, that hour that
was lost between the time that ship went aground and she
subsequently capsized and lifeboats couldn't be launched safely
was the hour that passengers should have had a lot more
empowerment to do something.
You now, a cell phone ashore to a rescue agency isn't the
way to do it. Passengers should have some 911 system onboard
the ship, that if they see something wrong they should be able
to alert shoreside response agencies such as the Italian Coast
Guard, the U.S. Coast Guard, hook it up through AMVERS, which
is the Coast Guard's worldwide Automated Merchant Vessel Mutual
Response System.
Let people know something's wrong. Give the ship the
opportunity to confirm or credibly correct the report that
there's an emergency but get the message out there. The sooner
the message is out there, the sooner response capabilities can
begin.
If those response capabilities aren't there, if they're not
in place, if the organization and structure isn't in place
whether the message is out or not, a mass casualty of, say,
6,000--some of these mega ships going up to 8,000 souls, not
just passengers, but crew too--it's not going to work. You
know, we're talking here literally or littorally with respect
to cruise ship disasters happening along the coast of the
United States where the Coast Guard has not only jurisdiction
but also resources.
But we're sending passengers all over the world, U.S.
citizens, and that same rescue capability should be in place.
That costs money. Who's going to pay for it, as you said
before?
You know, my recommendation was to take a look at the
better parts of other legislation, one of them being OPA 1990,
Oil Pollution Act of 1990, where basic--it says you spill it,
you clean it up. And you put your money where your mouth is,
and pretty much what we're going to have to do if we're going
to get the contingency planning that's needed worldwide, not
just here in the United States, and get the resources
predisposed, you know, if that ship hits a rock and an hour
later it's tipped over, it's too late for Italy to call the
United States, say can you get me some help? That help's got to
be in place and that's going to call for a worldwide
contingency plan, some sort of money put aside, that people
aren't going to be afraid to respond without getting paid.
You know, Incident Command starts with government
authorities but breaks down into Unified Command when you bring
in non-government entities and maximize your resources.
Somewhere along the line you've got to have an organization,
planning, drills and some sort of accountability that in the
event of another accident like that we're going to be ready.
Another area is--you know, Ms. Duffy talked about bridge
team management, which in the IMO and in the Standards of
Watchkeeping is called Bridge Resource Management, and in this
situation, you know, the chain of errors that happened with
respect to this particular accident just are exponential. You
know, was it complacency, you know, shooting from the pants,
deviating from a voyage plan?
Did they have a voyage plan? That voyage plan certainly
didn't bring them that close to a rock, OK, or if that's the
case, you know, why?
There were so many different links in that chain of error,
which is basically what Bridge Resource Management breaks--that
it wasn't ignored, it just wasn't in place. You can say you're
going to do something, but unless you've got some teeth, some
compliance agency that's going to verify that you're meeting
not only the letter, rubberstamping your audits, but the spirit
of the regulations, this stuff's going to go on.
The Chairman. I agree. I think not just with cruise ships,
not just with corporations, but with human beings, you know,
that we have thousands and thousands of people dying and many
more being injured because of something called distracted
driving, and they're using cell phones, and the average cell
phone text takes about 4.6 seconds and the car can go the
length of two football fields in that time. Now, in West
Virginia there isn't a straight road in the state.
So, I mean, it's a guaranteed accident. So some things you
just have to say you're going to be fined if you do this. And I
just get the feeling that the cruise ships are sort of a law
unto themselves. They have a lot of smart lawyers. They make a
lot of people, including two of my kids, very happy, and I'm
very happy about that.
But we don't know about the rate of turnover, for example.
In the coal mines, there's not much rate of turnover so people,
when they're trained to do things, if there's an explosion
underground they really know what to do and but still, when
we've had to toughen the laws on that to make them have--
there's always emergency response teams too available within,
you know, 20 minutes that can go into--if it's a small mine can
go into that mine and help.
And they have very strict standards on how--if they have an
oxygen problem there have to be oxygen chambers and there have
to be ropes that they can guide themselves out through the
explosive smoke.
In other words, this isn't just something the coal
companies dreamed up. This was something that the Federal
government imposed on them to get them to keep people safe.
Now, coal mines are a dramatic example but, frankly, so are
cruise ship lines. And so I'm going to end my questioning with
saying that I respect your success. I'm happy for your success.
But I think when you have success you have an even greater
obligation to make sure that you're going the extra mile to
reimburse the Federal Government for what it does, pay taxes
according to not just what your lawyers can tell you you can
get away with but what is fair and right--that's the big fight
around here now--and that you can't game the system and you
can't just cruise on your success. Yes, and that'll be the end
of me, and Senator Begich----
Dr. Klein. May I just make one quick comment?
The Chairman. Yes, please.
Dr. Klein. It's in my written testimony but it didn't quite
fit into my oral comments, but I think it relates to what we're
talking about here and that relates to the cruise industry's
use of arbitration clauses for cruise worker contracts.
These clauses have dire consequences for crew members. The
fact is that foreign seafarers have no rights to sue in U.S.
courts. Because the cruise line can have foreign law apply,
thereby circumventing the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, it has a
disincentive to hire American workers.
These arbitration clauses and the opinions enforcing them
are therefore job killers for Americans, OK, and I could go on
describing but I'd just refer you to my written testimony, page
30, where I discuss these clauses and the implications.
The Chairman. Do you have a whistleblower system, Ms.
Duffy?
Ms. Duffy. Yes.
The Chairman. In other words, if a crew member reports
something which is not working properly----
Ms. Duffy. Yes, I believe we do.
The Chairman. You believe you do?
Ms. Duffy. Yes.
The Chairman. OK. Well, will you let me know precisely----
Ms. Duffy. I will confirm that----
The Chairman. Send me the language?
Ms. Duffy.--all of our members have whistleblower policies.
The Chairman. OK.
Admiral Salerno. Senator----
The Chairman. And I want that in writing.
[The information referred to follows:]
Cruise Lines International Association, Inc.
August 29, 2012
Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV,
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Rockefeller:
I am writing in response to your request for information regarding
whistleblower protections within the cruise industry. We appreciate the
opportunity to provide further clarification on this matter.
The cruise industry is subject to much the same system of laws
protecting whistleblowers ashore in the United States. In some cases
the protections are even greater on ships. For example, whistleblower
protection under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act applies to all publicly traded
companies and their subsidiaries, encompassing the majority of CLIA's
members and covers violations of law or unethical practices.
Additionally, under 46 U.S.C. Sec. 2114 seamen are expressly afforded
whistleblower protections for reporting violations of law or regulation
to the U.S. Coast Guard, National Transportation Safety Board or other
Federal agencies, or for refusing to perform dangerous work. 33 U.S.C.
Sec. 1908(a) affords protection to anyone reporting marine pollution
violations, entitling whistleblowers to as much as half of any assessed
fine. 33 U.S.C. Sec. 1367 protects employees from retaliation for
whistleblowing in connection with their employers' violations of the
U.S. effluent limitation laws. Many states in which cruise lines
transact business or maintain their headquarters have enacted strict
whistleblower protection schemes, including Florida, North America's
largest cruise industry port state. The Florida statute permits suit in
Florida against any company based in that state for violating
whistleblower protections.
In addition to these and many other U.S. Federal and state
whistleblower protections, other nations have similar laws.
Prospectively, the new Consolidated Maritime Labour Convention (MLC),
unanimously adopted by 106 nations including the U.S. and just this
past week ratified by the required 30 nations, specifically requires
whistleblower protection for all seafarers for complaints affecting any
labor or workplace conditions and seafarer rights. The MLC will become
operative worldwide in August 2013 and has already been ratified by
flag states that register and oversee our largest members.
The Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA) also maintains
its own written Whistleblower Policy whose purpose is to facilitate and
protect the reporting of any violations of law or CLIA policies.
Individual member policies augment the legal system and CLIA's own
policy and may include specific hotline instructions and procedures,
including:
Global hotline systems that allow for attributed and
anonymous reporting via telephone or through an internet-based
portal. Reporting through either channel is free and easily
accessible to the reporter. These hotlines may be used to
report various types of complaints or concerns to the company.
This includes environmental, safety or security issues in
addition to more traditional hotline subjects such as
harassment, retaliation, financial irregularities and fraud.
Highlighting the hotlines to crewmembers in manuals, conduct
and ethics documents, training sessions, posters located in
prominent locations onboard and, where applicable, on pay
stubs. Also hotlines similarly advised to shoreside employees.
Hotlines also are advertised to guests in materials available
in or delivered to guest cabins
Finally, during the Cruise Industry Oversight hearing on March 1,
2012, Vice Admiral Salerno of the U.S. Coast Guard commented that they
use information from existing whistleblower provisions to get
information regarding illegal activity that takes place even beyond the
three mile boundary. Examples of those existing provisions include 33
USC 1908(a) and 46 USC 2114. Vice Admiral Salerno further commented
that Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act has been a very powerful
instrument for bringing incidents to the attention of the Coast Guard.
I hope the above information is responsive to your request. Again,
we appreciate the opportunity to respond.
Sincerely,
Christine Duffy,
President and CEO,
Cruise Lines International Association.
Admiral Salerno. If I may, I know you mentioned your time
is short but if there is time I'd like to comment on the
whistleblower and the activities that can take place beyond
three miles. If there's not time now I'd be happy tomeet with
you.
The Chairman. No, go ahead. But Senator Begich can cut you
off at any moment.
Admiral Salerno. OK.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. Because I'm 15 minutes into my question.
[Laughter.]
Admiral Salerno. OK. So I'll make this very quick. You
correctly pointed out that the bulk of our authorities reside
within three miles.
However, we're not powerless beyond three miles. There are
international systems in place that limit the discharge of oil,
of hazardous materials and garbage, and we enforce those,
certainly on U.S. flag ships anywhere in the world, but on
foreign flag ships that enter our port we still have some
enforcement authority.
Every year we refer to the Department of Justice about half
a dozen to a dozen cases for discharges which originated on the
high seas but they entered the United States with falsified
documents as to how they treated those controlled materials,
and they've been prosecuted.
In fact, we have been so vigorous in this that in
international circles we're often accused of being overly
zealous and, in fact, you may have heard the term
``criminalization of seafarers.''
I dispute that term. But sometimes the rest of the world
looks at us, the United States, as being overly aggressive in
environmental enforcement on their ships. In my view, we're not
criminalizing anybody. We're holding people accountable who
have conducted criminal activity. Typically, what the genesis
of the court case is the falsification of official records
entering the United States, and that's what DOJ uses.
So I did want to correct that. We do look at what takes
place on the high seas. And as for whistleblowers, there is a
whistleblower provision. Crew members are often a source of
information as to illegal activity that has taken place on the
high seas.
Passengers can also be whistleblowers. So Congress passed
that law. I think it's been a very powerful instrument at
bringing to our attention activities on the high seas where we
can then take follow-up action.
The Chairman. OK. I appreciate that.
And Senator Begich, you'll be the last question.
Senator Begich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know it's tight
so I'll just--I just have one question of a technology and
this'll be maybe for Captain Doherty and Vice Admiral, and then
I may have one quick follow-up.
In Alaska we have a group, the Alaska Marine Exchange,
helping the Coast Guard by installing automatic identifications
systems, AIS systems. Very inexpensive compared to doing a
major contract and trying to do this, basically keeps track of
where these vessels are and moving throughout our waters. And I
think it's an incredible way to track. You don't have to be out
there. In some cases, in a smaller version our Coast Guard has
to--when people--and I'll use Glacier Bay as an example.
When some of those boats are going a little too fast for
the area, what happens now Coast Guard has to be out there with
a radar gun and kind of monitor them. This you can actually do
from your desk watching the activity, which we think is
incredible technology. They're also tinkering with it. These
guys are tinkering with it to add weather components for it.
Can you tell me--to either one, Admiral, Captain--is this a
tool that we should try to see how the cruise ship industry and
does the cruise ship industry use this, and I've seen the set-
up and it's very impressive to me what they can do from a
variety of reasons, not only monitoring speed of a ship or
where they might be going but also if there's an oil spill, for
example. We know where all the ships are. We can mobilize very
quickly and utilize in spill response. Can you give me----
Admiral Salerno. Yes, Senator. It is a requirement not only
for cruise ships but for all commercial vessels over 300 gross
tons.
Senator Begich. Excellent.
Admiral Salerno. And we're actually driving the threshold
down. It's enormously----
Senator Begich. Is there a phase-in or are they all--like
today what's the----
Admiral Salerno. Well, all cruise ships today, all ships
are over 300 gross tons today. We're getting down to smaller
vessels, which operate closer to shore.
Senator Begich. Right.
Admiral Salerno. That is being phased in.
Senator Begich. Excellent.
Admiral Salerno. But the larger vessels, certainly all
international vessels, must have the AIS system. It's very
useful to seeing who's out there. It was designed, quite
honestly, as a collision avoidance tool----
Senator Begich. Correct.
Admiral Salerno. So that ships can have awareness of each
other. But it has other port management uses from a safety
perspective and also from a security perspective. There's a
nationwide system whereby we receive that data. It goes into
Coast Guard command centers where we actively track that.
Alaska's a little bit of a special case because of the
distances, the remoteness of the ports, where we have exercised
the ability to work with some private sector providers of those
receiver capabilities.
Senator Begich. Right.
Admiral Salerno. But it's been working very, very well in
Alaska.
Senator Begich. And is the system currently set up or could
the system be set up where a ship that might be potentially in
waters that they may get grounded in or create a hazard, an
alarm system can sound? I know the collision piece but can you
take the technology and do one more level and say, you know,
when you're hitting certain waters that you may have a capacity
or you're in the area that you could get grounded that an alarm
will set off or something will happen? Is there any development
in this arena or could there be?
Admiral Salerno. Not currently, although there are----
Senator Begich. Could there be?
Admiral Salerno.--a number of ports around the country
where we have something called the Vessel Traffic System----
Senator Begich. Right.
Admiral Salerno.--where we have watchstanders who track the
position and movement of ships within those systems, and if a
ship is appearing to veer into areas that would be unsafe,
approaching some navigational hazard, there'd be communications
with that ship.
Senator Begich. It seems like with this technology if you
can now do collision you can do potential weather tinkering and
I, of course, would be biased here and say Alaska's always
tinkering with this technology to figure out that maybe there's
this next level to determine if you can improve this technology
to the point where literally an alarm system will engage if you
are in an area that you may run aground, which seems like if we
can do the collision. I'm not a tech guy but I know how to use
the technology but----
[Laughter.]
Admiral Salerno. The challenge there is ships of different
sizes, shapes----
Senator Begich. Right.
Admiral Salerno.--drafts and so forth, having the same
technology and having it applied in the right places.
Senator Begich. I have great faith----
Admiral Salerno. But I would agree with you.
Senator Begich.--in our technology development.
Admiral Salerno. Technology is getting better all the time
so----
Senator Begich. OK. So it's not out of this realm.
Admiral Salerno.--it's not out of the realm of possibility.
Senator Begich. OK. Great. Captain, do you have a quick
comment on it? Then I apologize, Mr. Chairman. I thought this
was an interesting technology that I think gets to the core of
one of the concerns that you brought up and that is how do we
make this industry safer, and are there things--not just the
cruise ship industry but there's the shipping industry.
I know in the Bering Sea right now, Coast Guard will tell
you, as you know, the volume of traffic has dramatically
increased in the last 10 years. I mean, used to be, you know,
three to four dozen ships.
Now, upwards to a thousand ships are moving through there
in very tough waters, and we have to make sure whatever we're
doing on the waters is as secure and safe as possible. So I'm
just excited about technologies like this because it can do
things.
Admiral Salerno. Awareness of what's occurring in the
maritime domain is very high interest to the Coast Guard. So
we've been working with AIS and another technology called Long
Range Information and Tracking to improve that visibility. So
absolutely looking at further improvements.
Senator Begich. Captain?
Captain Doherty. Senator, the technology that that falls
under is the Global Maritime Safety and Distress System, GMDSS.
That's a broad-spectrum communications system, primarily
satellites, VHF radio, medium-frequency radio. Every seagoing
ship must have a GMDSS system aboard. That system is real time.
AIS is just a part of the GMDSS----
Senator Begich. Piece of it, yes.
Captain Doherty. Piece. It's a piece of the GMDSS picture.
Weather is part of it. Communications is part of it. Most
importantly is distress. The EPRS, the Electronic Position
Reporting System, this is all--comes under the umbrella of
GMDSS. The most important element ashore is the station that
receives that signal. You know, the United States Coast Guard
for--I've been going to sea now--next year will be my 50th year
and I still do go to sea.
[Laughter.]
Captain Doherty. I go to sea once a year as a professor at
the Maritime Academy when they go to sea and I teach safety
management systems. But, you know, the system is in place. It's
whether a tree falls in the forest does anyone hear it or not.
Senator Begich. Right.
Captain Doherty. We were able to beautifully track the
departure from the plan on the Costa Concordia. I've seen
several different TV programs that show exactly what went
wrong, and that was real-time information.
Senator Begich. Right.
Captain Doherty. Somebody has to be looking at it, you
know.
Senator Begich. Right.
Captain Doherty. We put licensed professionals on the
bridge of ship. We expect them to perform as licensed
professionals. We expect them to be sober. You know, part of
the Bridge Resource Management is the health issue, and health
is not only physical but mental. You know, how do you maintain
that health status that you're not part of the chain of errors.
One is to keep yourself physically fit. The IMO January 1st
instituted two very important, very important laws came into
effect January 1st, the first being the new increased
requirements for rest prior to assuming duty.Crew members
actually have to log the time that they have uninterrupted rest
between their duty hours.
The next one, equally important and perhaps even more
important in this case, was the IMO drug and alcohol mandated
regulations, which, while not zero tolerance, were .05 percent
blood alcohol. Again, you can have all the systems. They're
here.
GMDSS is an outstanding system. When I went to--I started
going to sea in 1963. When my first daughter was born I was in
Vietnam. The communications at that time--my daughter was, I
believe, 10 days old before I got the message on the ship that
she was born. Today, in my office I can pick up the phone, hit
a button, call any place in the world. You know, there was no
need for that one-hour window. That's human.
Senator Begich. Right.
Captain Doherty. And all the technology in the world isn't
going to solve that. What will solve it is tying a line into
the GMDSS system which can't be interfered with by anyone on
the ship that allows a passenger to say, ``I see something
wrong. Let me tell the world.'' We don't need new technology
for that. We just need a new line into the transmitter on the
GMDSS.
Senator Begich. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. And thank you and I thank all of you for
this. I think there's the beginning of a process here, and you
noted my request of you.
Ms. Duffy. Yes, I did.
The Chairman. And I thank you and respect you for what you
do and for the time that you spent with us this morning. The
hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:51 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
to Vice Admiral Brian M. Salerno
Question 1. The Coast Guard is responsible for marine sanitation
device design and operation regulations and for certifying compliance
with the EPA rules for MSDs. How often does the Coast Guard inspect and
evaluate MSDs on cruise ships? Is this enough?
Answer. The Coast Guard will typically examine non-U.S. flagged
vessels, including cruise ships, for compliance with international
sewage treatment plant requirements in MARPOL Annex IV at least once
per year. For cruise ships that operate in certain Alaskan waters,
Coast Guard evaluation of the sewage and gray water discharges from
such vessels increases in both frequency and scope in order to
determine the non-U.S. vessel's compliance with the requirements with
Title 33, Code of Federal Regulations Part 159, Subpart E. Under these
regulations, there are additional requirements, including sampling and
reporting of sewage and gray water discharges to the Coast Guard. The
Coast Guard believes the current frequency of examination of cruise
ships for compliance with sewage regulations for both Alaska and the
remainder of the United States is sufficient.
Question 2. How reliable and consistent are MSDs in meeting the
qualitative standards for sewage treatment?
Answer. The Coast Guard certifies each make and model of Marine
Sanitation Device (MSD) before it can be installed on a U.S. flagged
vessel. The certification verifies compliance with the design and
equipment standards in 33 CFR Part 159, as well as the discharge
standards set by EPA in 40 CFR 140. This certification is based on the
Coast Guard's evaluation of the design and construction of the MSD, as
well as comprehensive results from evaluation, inspection, and testing
carried out by an independent laboratory. Accordingly, each make and
model of MSD has demonstrated the ability to withstand environmental
testing while providing effective sewage treatment capability prior to
installation.
The Coast Guard does not subsequently collect or analyze discharges
from installed MSDs; Coast Guard efforts are limited to an annual
external inspection of the MSD. The inspection does not analyze the
effluent; therefore, there is some uncertainty with regard to the
equipment's performance over time.
The one exception applies to passenger ships that operate in
certain Alaskan waters. These vessels are equipped with advanced
wastewater treatment systems approved by the ship's Flag Administration
(the vast majority of these vessels are foreign flagged) and are
subject to continuous monitoring by the Coast Guard while operating in
Alaska. However, it is not appropriate to compare these advanced
wastewater systems with the MSDs that are approved to the standards of
33 CFR Part 159. There are significant differences in the treatment
technology, cost, size, etc.
Question 3. When was the last time the standards for MSD discharges
were updated?
Answer. The last time the standards for MSD discharges were updated
by EPA was in 1976.
Question 4. In 2000 the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
issued a report that was critical of the Coast Guard and other Federal
agencies for their lax enforcement of cruise line environmental
standards. GAO found that the government wasn't properly monitoring
cruise ship discharges. GAO also found that the government wasn't
adequately investigating whether the cruise industry was properly
maintaining its pollution prevention equipment, documenting that is was
properly disposing of garbage and oily sludge. A decade later, does the
Coast Guard have adequate time and resources to conduct this oversight
of the cruise ship industry?
Answer. Since the publication of the 2000 GAO report, the Coast
Guard has promulgated policies for examining cruise ships for
compliance with environmental standards, the foremost of which are
Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular 04-04 and the Office of
Prevention and Compliance Policy Letter 06-01. The Coast Guard
currently has sufficient resources to examine vessels to these and
other related policies.
Additionally, several major environmental crimes cases in the
previous decade involving some major cruise lines resulted in a new
awareness of the need for compliance with environmental standards by
these companies. Environmental compliance by these companies, as seen
through the Coast Guard's compliance program, has improved markedly
since the GAO report.
Question 5. MARPOL Annex IV provides for the prevention of
pollution by sewage from ships. It first entered into force in
September, 2003, which means that IMO member-states representing at
least 50 percent of the world's gross tonnage have ratified it.
Surprisingly, the United States is not a party to Annex IV. Are there
any plans for the U.S. to take action on Annex IV?
Answer. No. The United States has no active plans to take action on
Annex IV. The last time it was formally considered was in 1998 when the
United States informed the International Maritime Organization that it
did not intend to ratify Annex IV given significant differences between
the Annex and U.S. domestic law. In particular, at that time, the
United States cited seven specific issues related to Annex IV:
(1) definition of sewage is broader than U.S. domestic law;
(2) applicability to smaller vessels which are not typically
inspected by USCG;
(3) discharge of sewage without regard to nutrient sensitive
resources, such as coral reefs;
(4) inability to designate special areas as ``no discharge
zones'' to prevent discharges into the sea, including treated
sewage;
(5) lack of adequate facilities to offload sewage ashore in
ports and terminals;
(6) distance offshore for discharging untreated sewage is
greater than U.S. domestic law; and
(7) discharge standards are less stringent than U.S. domestic
law.
Since 1998, several of these issues have been resolved or
substantially improved through a series of amendments to MARPOL Annex
IV. For example, a 2004 amendment raised the tonnage threshold and
resolved issue (2). A separate amendment to the annex allows for the
designation of special areas and resolved issue (4). And in 2010,
MARPOL Annex IV standards for discharging treated sewage into the sea
are now more stringent than U.S. domestic law, thereby alleviating the
concern with regard to issue (7). The discharge standards are set by
EPA. There have been no changes to U.S. laws on sewage discharges since
1976.
Question 6. How does our failure so far to ratify Annex IV impact
our position as a leader on marine environmental issues?
Answer. The United States continues to play an active leadership
role at the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and in other
international forums in deliberations over the wide range of issues
related to the marine environment. The Coast Guard has taken the
necessary steps to ensure that U.S. flagged vessels that sail on
international voyages demonstrate voluntary compliance with MARPOL
Annex IV in order to avoid being detained overseas. Furthermore, the
Coast Guard has also developed port state control policies to ensure
non-U.S. flagged vessels that call in U.S. ports are checked for
compliance with appropriate U.S. laws. As a non-party to MARPOL Annex
IV, the United States will be challenged to be able to directly
influence IMO negotiations on any proposed changes to Annex IV in the
future.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Barbara Boxer to
Rear Admiral Brian M. Salerno
Question 1. The Cruise Line Industry of America and its members
recently instituted a new policy that requires a muster drill for all
passengers before departure. As you know, I believe this to be an
important policy and have written to the Coast Guard asking that they
change the current regulation for a muster within 24 hours of
embarkation, to before a ship departs. Do you all agree that all
passengers should receive muster training prior to departure, while a
ship is still in a controlled environment? Recently, some cruise lines
have started giving a muster briefing or virtual muster training using
a video. How does this conform to the requirement to have a ``muster?''
Shouldn't a muster require that passengers go to their assigned
evacuation point or life boat?
Answer. The Coast Guard supports changing the requirement for
cruise ships to hold passenger musters on or before the vessel's
departure. International Maritime Organization (IMO) members will
discuss the current requirement in more detail at the next IMO Maritime
Safety Committee meeting in May 2012, as well as review the potential
for changing this requirement to hold passenger musters on or before
vessel departure.
The Coast Guard supports the Cruise Lines International
Association's (CLIA) policy to conduct the SOLAS-required passenger
muster before or upon departure. Additionally, the Coast Guard is
witnessing passenger musters when our inspectors are onboard and
performing a certificate of compliance examination.
The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
currently has a requirement for conducting the passenger muster within
24 hours of passenger embarkation. This requirement has been in effect
since at least 1948. Reasons for the current requirement allowing
passenger musters for up to 24 hours after passenger embarkation may
include: passenger fatigue (as they may have travelled all day before
embarking the vessel); late departures from port (conducting the muster
after sunset); and passenger sobriety.
A training video also provides an excellent means to give training
to passengers who neglected to attend the passenger muster. However, a
training video does not satisfy the requirement for a passenger muster.
A training video may be used to supplement the passenger briefing
required by SOLAS Chapter III, Regulation 19.2.3 (a requirement
separate from the passenger muster requirement).
Question 2. In Ms. Duffy's testimony, it states that crew members
receive safety training every 5 years, receive familiarization training
every time they report on board a ship and must participate in one of
the weekly emergency drills once a month. By regulation, airline flight
attendants must undergo training that covers the specific aircraft
type(s) they fly, their position(s) and duties once every 12 months.
Additionally, flight attendants must complete emergency drills/
simulations once every 24 months. And as we all know from flying,
flight attendants brief passengers on emergency procedures on every
flight. Isn't safety training every 5 years for cruise ship crew
members too infrequent?
Answer. The Coast Guard has not conducted an evaluation of the
differences between the frequency of airline flight attendant training
against the frequency of cruise ship crewmember training. However, the
training requirements in the STCW Convention (classroom training and
familiarization training prior to being assigned duties and
responsibilities on board a ship), and the drill requirements in the
SOLAS Convention (abandon ship drills and fire drills) are sufficient
to ensure that the personnel are competent and current in their
emergency duties and responsibilities.
The International Convention on Standards of Training,
Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) contains emergency-
related training requirements for seafarers working on board cruise
ships. The International Convention on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)
contains requirements for emergency training and drills. These
requirements apply to U.S. and foreign vessels. The STCW requirements
are as follows:
All seafarers employed or engaged in any capacity on board a
cruise ship as part of the ship's complement with designated
safety duties shall receive basic ``safety'' training that
includes personal survival techniques, fire prevention and
firefighting, elementary first aid and personal safety, and
social responsibilities. The seafarer must show continued
professional competence (refresher training) every 5 years. In
addition, all persons employed on board a cruise ship, shall
receive familiarization training in personal survival
techniques before being assigned shipboard duties.
Additionally, the STCW Convention includes detailed
requirements for training and qualification of masters,
officers, ratings, and other personnel on passenger ships based
on their duties and responsibilities. These requirements
include a multitude of specific topics within major areas of
crowd management training; safety training for personnel
providing direct service to passengers in passenger spaces;
crisis management and human behavior training; and passenger
safety, cargo safety, and hull integrity training. The seafarer
must undertake refresher training every 5 years.
The SOLAS Convention requires that: (1) crew members are
familiar with their emergency duties before the voyage begins;
(2) abandon ship drills and fire drills are conducted
periodically; and (3) crew members receive on-board training
and instruction on the use of life-saving and fire fighting
appliances.
Question 3. Currently, only certain crew members are trained to
operate a lifeboat, why is this? Shouldn't every crew member be able
operate a lifeboat? All flight attendants are trained to operate
emergency exit doors and slides.
Answer. Large passenger cruise ships are fitted with a mix of
survival craft (motorized lifeboats and non-motorized inflatable
liferafts) to accommodate all on board, plus a substantial reserve.
SOLAS and Coast Guard regulations require a certificated lifeboatman or
deck officer is assigned to be in charge of each lifeboat. For
inflatable liferafts, ``persons practiced in the handling and operation
of liferafts'' may be assigned in place of certificated lifeboatmen or
deck officers.
A typical large cruise ship can have well over 1,000 crewmembers,
but perhaps several dozen survival craft. Thus, the ratio of available
personnel to the number of survival craft requiring supervision is much
higher than on an aircraft, where it is typically on the order of 1:1.
Courses to obtain formal certification as a lifeboatman run from
33-36 classroom hours (i.e., a week), and cost an average of $900.
Thus, a requirement for all crew to be formally certificated would be
quite costly and likely unnecessary since basic training for all
licensed seafarers includes launching and operation of lifeboats and
life rafts, as well as survival techniques to be used while waiting for
rescue.
Question 4. Reports have indicated that language barriers between
crew members on the Costa Concordia contributed to confusion and
hindered the process for abandoning ship. Are there any U.S. or
international regulations that require crew members to have language
proficiency for basic safety terms and instructions?
Answer. Cruise ships' crews are assembled from many countries and
it is not unusual for crewmembers to hail from as many as 50 different
countries. Because of this, various crewmembers are able to speak many,
if not all, of the languages spoken by the passengers.
Largely due to the many languages spoken on a cruise ship, a ship
is expected to establish a working language, providing a common
language so that all crewmembers can give orders and report back in
that language (see SOLAS Chapter V, Regulation 14.3). In the case of
Costa Concordia, the working language was Italian, as required by the
Italian Administration.
Cruise ships are expected to provide passenger safety briefings in
one or more languages likely to be understood by the passengers (see
SOLAS Chapter II, Regulation 19.2.3).
The International Convention on Standards of Training,
Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978, as amended (STCW)
contains a number of language proficiency requirements applicable to
all personnel working on board the ship based on their duties and
responsibilities. These requirements apply to U.S. and foreign vessels.
All officers must be competent in the use of the
International Maritime Organization Standard marine
communication phrases and use of English in written and oral
form applicable to officers to enable them to perform their
functions, and communicate with the crew and shore facilities.
All masters, officers, ratings and other personnel on board
passenger ships on international voyages must complete
specialized training in accordance with their capacity, duties,
and responsibilities. These requirements include a multitude of
specific topics within major areas of crowd management
training, crisis management and human behavior training, and
safety training for personnel providing direct service to
passengers in passenger spaces. The requirements include the
ability to communicate with the passengers during an emergency
taking into account: (1) the language or languages appropriate
to the principal nationalities of passengers carried on the
particular route; (2) the use of elementary English vocabulary
for basic instructions in order to communicate with a passenger
in need of assistance; (3) the possible need to communicate
during an emergency by some other means, such as by
demonstration, or hand signals when oral communication is
impractical; (4) the extent to which complete safety
instructions have been provided to passenger in their native
language or languages; and (5) the languages in which emergency
announcements may be broadcasted during an emergency or drill
to convey critical guidance to passengers and to facilitate
crew members in assisting passengers.
Finally, the STCW requires that companies ensure the use of
effective communications on board ships in accordance with the
SOLAS requirements for the use of on-board working language for
safety matters, and the use of English as the working language
for bridge-to-bridge, bridge-to-shore safety communications and
communications with the pilot.
Question 5. Historically, lifejackets have been located in state
rooms with additional lifejackets located in public areas. However, in
an emergency it seems impractical to require passengers to return to
their staterooms to retrieve lifejackets, and then head to their muster
stations. Recently, newer ships have begun to store lifejackets at
muster stations. This solves the problem of requiring passengers to
return to their staterooms before going to muster stations. However, if
a ship lists to one side, then the life jackets on that side of the
ship will no longer be accessible.
I have heard from a passenger who was aboard the Sea Diamond in
2007 when it wrecked off the coast of Santorini that when the ship
listed, access to staterooms was cutoff by the crew, and passengers
were all directed to the high side of the ship, rendering the life
boats and life jackets on the low side inaccessible. How do we ensure
that if a ship lists there are a sufficient number of lifejackets and
enough life boats for all aboard?
Answer. Neither SOLAS nor Coast Guard regulations specify where
lifejackets are to be stowed, only the numbers required and that they
be ``readily accessible and plainly indicated.'' As noted in the
question, some newer ships have begun stowing lifejackets at assembly
stations because it better fits their particular operations. While this
might appear to preclude the need for passengers to return to their
staterooms before going to muster stations, invariably a large number
of passengers can be expected to return to their cabins in an emergency
to retrieve valuables, identification, essential medications, etc.
In general, it is not true that ``if a ship lists to one side, then
the life jackets on that side of the ship will no longer be
accessible.'' Lifesaving equipment is designed so that in the event of
a sinking, all such equipment on both sides of the ship should be
accessible and capable of operation at angles of list of up to 20
degrees, and angles of trim of up to 10 degrees. For large modern ships
with modern subdivision, in the great majority of cases, these criteria
allow for ample time to successfully access and deploy the lifesaving
equipment. In the great majority of casualties that can reasonably be
anticipated and planned for, there are sufficient survival craft and
lifejackets for all aboard regardless of the listing of the ship.
Question 6. In his testimony, Mr. Klein indicated that the design
of ever larger cruise ships may hinder the ability of passengers to
evacuate a ship. Currently, international regulation and U.S. law
require that a ship can be abandoned within 30 minutes of the call to
abandon ship. The 1994 sinking of the Estonia in 30 minutes illustrates
the need for this requirement. How do the U.S. Coast Guard and the
International Maritime Organization currently ensure that ships are
designed to accommodate this standard? Are there drills run on ships by
the Coast Guard to ensure this?
Answer. The ESTONIA was a roll-on/roll-off (ro-ro) type passenger
ship (car ferry) that was subject to extremely rapid progressive
flooding and capsizing because it had large bow doors opening into full
length vehicle decks without the internal subdivision required of
conventional cruise ships. Because of that internal subdivision, a
conventional cruise ship would be expected to stay afloat for much
longer than 30 minutes in a flooding casualty.
The 30-minute evacuation time specified in SOLAS regulation III/
21.1.3 is for all survival craft to be loaded and launched from the
time the order to abandon ship has been given, with all persons
assembled with lifejackets donned. This 30-minute criterion does not
begin when the passengers become aware of an emergency; it begins only
after all the passengers have been assembled at the embarkation
stations. It does not include the time it takes for the passengers to
travel from their cabins or wherever they may be on the ship to their
assigned assembly stations.
Travel time to the assembly stations is generally not evaluated
with practical drills, which would be impractical and risky for a ship
carrying thousands of persons. Rather, it is determined during plan
review of each ship by calculating the travel times for a typical
population of passengers (i.e., men, women, children, young, aged,
mobility impaired) to pass through the corridors and stairways on each
deck. These calculations are performed in accordance with International
Maritime Organization Maritime Safety Committee.1/Circ. 1238 Guidelines
on evacuation analyses for new and existing passenger ships, which is
intended for use by naval architects in the early stages of design to
optimize the arrangement of escape routes by identifying and
eliminating congestion which may develop during an abandonment, due to
the normal movement of passengers and crew along escape routes. This
planning takes into account the possibility that some portion of the
escape routes, assembly stations, embarkation stations, or survival
craft may be unavailable as a result of the casualty.
Under these guidelines, the maximum total evacuation time for a
large passenger ship is 80 minutes, which includes the 30 minutes
needed for loading and lowering the survival craft. The 80 minute limit
begins when the passengers are notified of an emergency, and includes
time for the passengers to react to the announcement and travel to the
assembly stations, board the survival craft and be lowered to the
water. These calculations are quite complex and are generally done by
computer software that allows ship designs to be analyzed using an
iterative calculation technique. All passenger ships reviewed by the
Coast Guard since approximately 2002 have been designed using such
evacuation guidelines.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to
Vice Admiral Brian M. Salerno
Question. I understand that under the Death on the High Seas Act,
families who lost a loved one have limited legal remedies that they can
pursue for the tremendous loss that they have suffered. Current law
prevents victims' families from recovering anything other than lost
income or wages. In contrast, if a family suffers the loss of a loved
one in a plane crash on the high seas, they may choose to pursue non-
pecuniary damages in court, such as loss of companionship. Can you
discuss the impact this disparity in the law that has on the surviving
families of victims?
Answer. The Death on the High Seas Act is not a statute the Coast
Guard administers and thus, it is difficult to assess the law's impact
on victims' family members.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Tom Udall to
Vice Admiral Brian M. Salerno
Question. Mr. Salerno, I am pleased to hear of the Coast Guard's
progress in implementing the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act.
What else can Congress do to help the Coast Guard's efforts to improve
cruise vessel security and safety?
Answer. Enforcement of select provisions of the Act (e.g., 46
U.S.C. 3507(d) (Sexual assault)) may require organic competencies
beyond those of most Coast Guard personnel and, in time, may warrant
further congressional deliberation. Similarly, implementation of other
requirements of the Act (i.e., the 46 U.S.C. 3507(g)(4) (Availability
of incident date via internet)) may merit a less cumbersome arrangement
and, in time, also may warrant further congressional deliberation. If
so, the Administration will communicate as much in the normal course of
Executive branch recommendations to Congress.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Begich to
Rear Admiral Brian M. Salerno
Question 1. Do cruise ships receive any special treatment under the
existing regulations or laws, when compared to other types of ships?
Answer. The Coast Guard conducts very detailed examinations on all
types of ships subject to examination, including cruise ships. Cruise
ships, specifically, are subject to a wide variety of vessel-type
international standards, as well as cruise-ship specific U.S.
requirements that the Coast Guard confirms during inspections. The
Coast Guard examines cruise ships at least twice each year, which is
more often than any other type of ship (cargo ship or tank vessel).
However, if the ship has a poor compliance record in the United States,
it could be boarded multiple times, as needed for verification of
compliance.
Question 2. Please describe how the U.S. Coast Guard enforces these
regulations and laws on foreign flagged ships and what are the
jurisdictional boundaries for that enforcement?
Answer. The Coast Guard's foreign cruise ship compliance program is
based upon various statutory authorities, the chief of which are Title
46, USC sections 3301, ``Vessels subject to inspection'' and 3505,
``Prevention of departure.'' Further, the Coast Guard implements these
statutes though policy, as outlined in Navigation and Vessel Inspection
Circulars (NVIC) 03-08, ``Control Verification Examinations (CVEs) of
Foreign Passenger Vessels'' and NVIC 06-03, Ch-2, Coast Guard Port
State Control Targeting and Examination Policy for Vessel Security and
Safety.
The Coast Guard's jurisdiction to conduct foreign cruise ships
examinations is restricted to U.S. internal waters and the U.S.
territorial sea. The current practice of beginning initial control
verification examinations overseas should not be construed to mean that
the Coast Guard has jurisdictional authority overseas in this context.
Instead, the Coast Guard's examinations of vessels overseas are based
upon the consent of the cruise vessel owner. By doing so, the Coast
Guard is allowed to begin a thorough examination of the vessel before
it comes to the United States in order to ensure compliance with safety
standards and regulations while the vessel owner minimizes any
potential delays to ship operating schedules.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. John Boozman to
Vice Admiral Brian M. Salerno
Question. There are concerns that a national ocean zoning process
is being developed as part of the National Ocean Policy, calling it
``marine spatial planning.'' This proposal could significantly impact
sectors of the economy, including agriculture, offshore energy
production, transportation, and trade. This zoning proposal has been
developed at the direction of an executive order, without specific
Congressional authorization or specific appropriation of funds to
support its development. What has the Coast Guard's role been in the
developing this multi-agency policy? How many Coast Guard staff have
been involved its development? What resources have these efforts
required so far? Additionally, what resources does the Coast Guard
expect to spend on the development of this policy moving forward?
Answer. The National Ocean Policy (Policy) has a broad platform
providing high-level focus and coordination for improving ocean,
coastal and Great Lakes management. In addition, the Policy directs
Federal agencies to work together to support States, regions, Tribes,
and localities in their efforts to solve problems and support coastal
communities. The Policy also sets common-sense goals (such as healthy,
resilient, and productive waters and better science) to support
national economic, environmental, and national security interests, and
directs Federal agencies to work together to achieve them. The Coast
Guard has been actively involved in all aspects of developing and
implementing the Policy with the goal to improve marine stewardship,
including coastal and marine spatial planning (marine planning).
Marine planning is a non-regulatory tool that provides transparent
information about ocean use, guarantees the public and stakeholders a
voice in decisions, and creates an inclusive, bottom-up, science-
informed planning approach. The Policy applies existing authorities and
non-regulatory measures in an economical and coordinated manner. The
Policy does not involve zoning and imposes no new restrictions. Policy
is based on the work of the Interagency Ocean Policy Task Force, which
met and worked between June 2009 and early 2010 to develop policy
objectives and other proposals to improve the Nation's stewardship of
the ocean, our coasts and the Great Lakes.
The Task Force identified nine priority objectives, recommended a
National Ocean Council to replace a defunct body the previous
administration had created, and developed a framework for marine
planning. The Commandant of the Coast Guard was an active member of the
Task Force. Following approval of Executive Order 13547 on July 19,
2010, the National Ocean Council and its members moved forward to
implement the Task Force's recommendations. Senior Coast Guard leaders
have participated in various meetings of the National Ocean Council,
and other officials have briefed Congressional staffers and
participated in formal outreach events regarding marine planning.
Overall, marine planning is the means to coordinate Federal action to
the service of solving specific problems that States, regions, and
tribes want solved. It also encourages decisionmaking at the regional
and local levels by providing a process and forum for States, Tribes
and regions to define what problems need addressing and what outcomes
to achieve, with the support and participation of Federal agencies.
Two full-time Coast Guard employees have worked over the last 3
years (June 2009 to present) on developing and implementing the
National Ocean Policy. Various Coast Guard military and civilian
subject matter experts have also supported aspects of the development
and implementation of the Policy by performing such duties as assessing
the suitability of waterways and coastal areas for safe navigation,
promoting port security, and coordinating offshore initiatives.
Overall, the Policy seeks to reduce bureaucracy, duplication of
effort, and regulatory uncertainty by making Federal agencies'
application and interpretation of over 100 existing laws, regulations,
and policies more coherent and efficient, and foster interagency
communication and collaboration, thereby resulting in greater
efficiency and streamlined permitting. As a direct result of the
Policy, the Coast Guard is now evaluating shipping routes and
approaches to ports along the entire Atlantic coast from Maine to
Florida, known as the Atlantic Coast Port Access Route Study (PARS).
Previously, PARS only examined shipping routes and approaches on a
regional basis thereby forgoing taking account of the movement of ships
along the entire Eastern seaboard. This effort promotes comprehensive,
safe and efficient maritime operations in conjunction with the
development and production of renewable offshore energy.
Also of vital importance was the development of a comprehensive
ocean/coastal data base, ocean.data.gov, to provide a resource for
science-based and fact-based decisionmaking.
In 2009-2012, the Coast Guard contributed modest financial and
personnel resources as part of normal operations to support the work of
the Task Force, the 2011 Marine Planning Workshop, and outreach
initiatives. For example, the Commandant invited several other key
members of the Task Force to join him on an already-planned trip to
Alaska's Arctic, and Coast Guard commands hosted activities related to
several regional listening sessions. As the regional planning bodies
begin to operate under the Policy, there will be additional associated
expenses the Coast Guard will incur with participating in meetings,
providing information and related work; these costs will be managed
within base funding.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Marco Rubio to
Vice Admiral Brian M. Salerno
Question. In his testimony, Captain Doherty proposed the creation
of a Passenger Distress Signal System that would essentially allow any
passenger to contact authorities off the ship when the passenger
believes there is a cause for alarm. What effect would such a system
have on the Coast Guard's resources?
Answer. To require all cruise ships calling on U.S. ports to
develop and implement a Passenger Distress Signal System (PDS) readily
available to any individual onboard, whether activated deliberately or
not, could have a substantial impact upon Coast Guard resources,
especially the Search and Rescue (SAR) program. Additionally, requiring
PDS aboard foreign cruise ships in international waters could
potentially cause a significant increase in the number of SAR
notifications that could overwhelm the current Global and National
Distress System, supported by the participation of the Coast Guard as
well as other U.S. emergency response agencies.
Today's cruise ships are large, complex, technically advanced
vessels requiring numerous well trained crewmembers to operate the
ships safely and efficiently. Allowing cruise ship passengers to
activate a PDS to directly contact rescue authorities without first
alerting ship's personnel would potentially lead to a major delay in
the crew's otherwise prepared and effective response, thereby having
detrimental effects on the outcome of the situation. It would also
duplicate the pre-existing emergency response capabilities and
resources that cruise ships already possess. Cruise ships maintain
state-of-the-art communication capabilities. Thus, cruise ship
passengers currently have the ability to contact authorities and
activate the existing SAR System if needed, via global satellite
phones, wireless internet, and personal cellular phones.
Finally, a PDS activated by passengers could result in an
unnecessary increase in the time and effort of emergency resources, far
removed from the vessel, to process these notifications, verify
authenticity, and respond. There is also the potential increase in
false alarm and hoax distress calls. As such, Coast Guard SAR resources
responding to these `false alarms' onboard cruise ships could
potentially divert time-sensitive responses and finite resources from
providing assistance to actual distress cases, thereby endangering
lives and property that are truly in jeopardy.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Marco Rubio to
Bill Johnson
Question 1. In your testimony, you mention a program you have
partnered with Kristi House to train personnel to identify victims of
human trafficking. I have toured Kristi House and seen the wonderful
work they have done first hand. Can you please speak in more detail
about this training program and, in particular, the size and scope of
this training?
Answer. PortMiami and Kristi House have partnered in a training
program to train Seaport staff and affiliated companies (including
cruise lines) in recognizing signs of children who may be sexually
exploited. Kristi House and PortMiami opted to utilize the ``train-the-
trainer'' concept. All Seaport trainers have completed training
directly from the Kristi House staff and follow up training with
Seaport employees is ongoing.
The training classes are approximately 45 minutes, which educates
employees on child sex-trafficking, potential warning signs to identify
victims, and specific methods that should be employed when responding
to these situations. In addition, and in conjunction with Miami-Dade
Police Department, PortMiami has developed internal protocols.
Currently, 75 percent of Seaport staff has completed the training;
however, the goal is for 100 percent of Seaport staff to complete this
training by the end of April 2012.
The Port's outreach program includes cruise line partners, private
security companies, and the International Longshoreman's Association.
The objective is to work with companies who have employees interacting
with cruise passengers and train them to identify potential victims of
child sex-trafficking.
It is important to note that the Port has also collaborated with
Miami-Dade Aviation Department and Miami-Dade Police Department to have
uniformity in its training program to identify children who may be
sexually exploited. Kristi House has been a tremendous partner and has
committed to providing continuous support in this training initiative.
Question 1a. What cruise lines and private security companies have
already agreed to participate in the training?
Answer. Royal Caribbean Cruise Ltd (``RCCL'') has an on-going
relationship with Kristi House and has agreed to partner with PortMiami
in its training efforts. Along with the Seaport, RCCL has completed the
``train the trainer'' program with Kristi House. They are committed to
training their staff in the near future.
McRoberts Protective Agency, a private security firm working with
several of Miami's cruise line tenants, has also committed to the
program and has received training. To date, approximately 20 of
McRoberts employees, serving in a leadership capacity, have completed
this training. The Port is reaching out to reach out to other private
security companies to recommend this training.
The International Longshoreman's Association, representing the
largest union of maritime workers, has committed to the program. To
date, ILA Local 1416 employees are scheduled to begin training within a
few weeks.
Question 2. Although I know Kristi House specializes in sex-
trafficking, will personnel also be trained on warning signs for
victims of labor trafficking, which could also be present in these
situations?
Answer. Although the main focus of the training session surrounds
recognizing potential sex trafficking victims, indirectly, the training
touches on labor trafficking. Child trafficking and labor laws are
somewhat intertwined, and since updates to this training will be
continuous, there has been communication to include more on labor
trafficking in the training module.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Barbara Boxer to
Dr. Ross A. Klein
Question 1. Muster Drills--The Cruise Line Industry of America and
its members recently instituted a new policy that requires a muster
drill for all passengers before departure. As you know, I believe this
to be an important policy and have written to the Coast Guard asking
that they change the current regulation for a muster within 24 hours of
embarkation, to before a ship departs.
Do you all agree that all passengers should receive muster training
prior to departure, while a ship is still in a controlled environment?
Recently, some cruise lines have started giving a muster briefing
or virtual muster training using a video. How does this conform to the
requirement to have a ``muster?'' Shouldn't a muster require that
passengers go to their assigned evacuation point or life boat?
Answer. Until the Costa Concordia accident I, like many others,
assumed it was required that a lifeboat drill be held prior to a ship
leaving port. This was consistently my experience in 30 cruises taken
between 1963 and 2002 (27 between 1992 and 2002), and is the experience
of many who I have spoken with since the accident who have cruised more
recently. It isn't just a matter of good sense that these drills be
held before a ship leaves port, but it is consistent with the
industry's oft-stated commitment to passenger safety. It is
irresponsible to wait up to 24 hours to instruct passengers on safety
procedures in case of an emergency. The only logical explanation I can
come up with for why the drill would be delayed is that having a
lifeboat drill will disrupt the sale of alcohol as people celebrate the
start of their vacations (there are significant revenues from sale of
alcohol from the time passengers board to the ``sail away'' parties
coinciding with the ship's departure).
I have experienced a virtual lifeboat drill only once--in 1998 on a
cruise from Civitavecchia (the same port from which the Costa Concordia
departed). Even though the virtual drill may technically satisfy the
requirement under SOLAS (I am not sure that it does) I found the
experience unsatisfying, however having been on many cruises before I
knew procedures. The same could not be said for those who were on their
first cruise or who had had few cruise experiences. The virtual drill
is particularly problematic for families with children--children are
not likely to fully understand the information contained in a video;
they need a more hands-on and concrete experience if we have any hope
that they will know what to do in an emergency, especially given that
they may be separated from their parents in a true emergency.
I am a strong believer in the old style lifeboat drills where
passengers assemble at their lifeboat stations wearing their
lifejackets and having a demonstration of how lifeboats are lowered,
how they are boarded, and are told the priority for women and children
over adult men. These onsite demonstrations, where a roll call was
taken to ensure all passengers were present (as would be done if there
were an emergency), also instructed passengers in a concrete way where
to find additional lifejackets and advised passengers about alternative
lifesaving equipment such as zodiacs that could be used if a lifeboat
were to be disabled. As well, the traditional lifeboat drills included
a senior officer (normally the Captain) visiting each lifeboat station
and inspecting whether each passenger had properly put on their
lifejacket, often correcting mistakes made. It provided personal
contact between the ship's senior officer and passengers, and also
reinforced a sense of safety and security. This type of individual
treatment is impractical with ships carrying more than 6,000
passengers.
Not all lifeboat drills today are virtual, but even those that are
held at lifeboat stations are much less thorough than in previous
times. Lifeboats are not lowered, instructions are sparse (as related
to me by a reporter who went aboard a ship after the industry's
commitments following the Costa Concordia disaster), and attendance is
not taken. As stated by John Heald, a cruise director with Carnival
Cruise Lines, ``Once guests are gathered at the muster stations then
the staff will walk around with clickers to count the number of guests
at the muster stations . . . These numbers are then given to each
muster station supervisor who will then tell the bridge.'' Heald said
the cruise director will let guests know this is happening, it will be
very obvious and should take approximately 5 minutes to accomplish as
the line has multiple staff assigned to this new task. In my experience
of traditional lifeboat drills, they rarely took less than 30 minutes
to complete, and although they were viewed by passengers as being a
nuisance and inconvenience, they were necessary.
Question 2. Crew Training--In Ms. Duffy's testimony, it states that
crew members receive safety training every 5 years, receive
familiarization training every time they report on board a ship and
must participate in one of the weekly emergency drills once a month.
By regulation, airline flight attendants must undergo training that
covers the specific aircraft type(s) they fly, their position(s) and
duties once every 12 months. Additionally, flight attendants must
complete emergency drills/simulations once every 24 months. And as we
all know from flying, flight attendants brief passengers on emergency
procedures on every flight.
Isn't safety training every 5 years for cruise ship crew members
too infrequent?
Currently, only certain crew members are trained to operate a
lifeboat, why is this? Shouldn't every crew member be able operate a
lifeboat? All flight attendants are trained to operate emergency exit
doors and slides.
Answer. I agree that all crew members need to be better trained,
and more frequently re-trained in safety procedures. Once in 5 years is
not enough. Even once a year is pushing it (although that should be the
minimum requirement), however it is better than current practices. This
is particularly important as ships have gotten larger and the passenger
to crew ratio has become larger (many more passengers per crew member--
the passenger crew ratio on Royal Caribbean's Sun Viking in 1996 was
2:1; the ratio on the company's Oasis of the Seas today is 3:1).
As we have seen in several ship disasters, including the Costa
Concordia and Oceanos that sunk off South Africa in 1991, the ship's
officers and crew have not always been the most active in assisting
passengers evacuating the ship--in the case of the Oceanos, like Costa
Concordia, the Captain and senior officer abandoned ship before
passengers and in the case of the Oceanos the musicians played the key
role in assisting passengers into lifeboats. There is obviously need
for training of all staff and crew onboard a cruise ship, and that
training be frequent and reinforced, including an emphasis on the crew
member's and officer's ``duty of care'' to passengers. The reality is
that in an emergency every staff person and crew member should be
equally versed in safety procedures and protocols, and all should be
knowledgeable about deployment of lifeboats and deployment of emergency
zodiacs, as well as all other facets of safety procedures in any type
of emergency. I am not confident that re-training at 5 year intervals
is adequate and advocate annual re-training as a minimum.
Question 3. Reports have indicated that language barriers between
crew members on the Costa Concordia contributed to confusion and
hindered the process for abandoning ship. Are there any U.S. or
international regulations that require crew members to have language
proficiency for basic safety terms and instructions?
Answer. Language has been reported as a problem and has led to
ships occasionally being detained by the U.S. Coast Guard because crew
members could not understand or communicate in English; however, these
incidents are infrequent. The problem of communication between crew and
officers and among officers was perhaps less problematic in the 1960s,
1970s, and 1980s when flag states where ships were registered required
most if not all crew members to be citizens of the flag state, thus
having a common language. Over the years, crews have become more
internationally diverse and a common onboard language less assured. I
believe the U.S. could better enforce the ability for crew members to
speak and understand English for ships operating out of U.S. ports. The
problem is quite different for ships, such as Costa Concordia,
operating outside of North America, especially countries where English
is not the dominant language. In the case of Costa, it is an Italian
cruise line catering mainly to Italian and European passengers. It may
be unrealistic for U.S. passengers to assume that English will be
spoken or understood onboard Costa ships, and the company should take
the initiative to advise passengers of this fact. In the absence of
such advice, it is fair for a passenger to assume that language will
not be an issue even though it is likely to be problematic, especially
in an emergency situation. This may be an area where there needs to be
consumer protection legislation so passengers buying a cruise in the
U.S. are fully informed of the risks they are exposed to by taking a
cruise on a foreign carrier (Costa and MSC, another Italian cruise
line, are both actively marketed in the U.S.).
Question 4. Lifejackets and Life Boats--Historically, lifejackets
have been located in state rooms with additional lifejackets located in
public areas. However, in an emergency it seems impractical to require
passengers to return to their staterooms to retrieve lifejackets, and
then head to their muster stations.
Recently, newer ships have begun to store lifejackets at muster
stations. This solves the problem of requiring passengers to return to
their staterooms before going to muster stations. However, if a ship
lists to one side, then the life jackets on that side of the ship will
no longer be accessible.
I have heard from a passenger who was aboard the Sea Diamond in
2007 when it wrecked off the coast of Santorini that when the ship
listed, access to staterooms was cutoff by the crew, and passengers
were all directed to the high side of the ship, rendering the life
boats and life jackets on the low side inaccessible.
How do we ensure that if a ship lists there are a sufficient number
of lifejackets and enough life boats for all aboard?
Answer. I was amazed when I first heard that lifejackets were no
longer being placed in passenger cabins and would only be available at
lifeboat or muster stations. The only possible explanation is that this
is to save money at the expense of safety. It is obvious that
passengers spend more time in their cabin than anywhere else on a
cruise ship (this is where they sleep, and many emergency situations
occur in the middle of the night) and that this is where lifejackets
should be kept. At the same time, it has traditionally been a practice
on cruise ships to have a full supply of lifejackets at lifeboat/muster
stations given an awareness that passengers may not be able to return
to their cabins in an emergency (or the need to return to the cabin
would lose critical minutes that could be the difference between life
and death). The simple solution to a problem that has been created by a
change in practice is to return to previous practice. There should be
adequate lifejackets in each passenger cabin for adults and children
occupying that cabin, and there should be an adequate supply of
lifejackets at all lifeboat/muster stations for the number of persons
(adults and children) assigned to the station. To do otherwise might
make economic sense, but it shows a disregard for the safety and
security of passengers, a value that is often stated by the cruise
industry as the number one priority.
Question 5. Evacuation and Ship Design--In his testimony, you
indicated that the design of ever larger cruise ships may hinder the
ability of passengers to evacuate a ship. Currently, international
regulation and U.S. law require that a ship can be abandoned within 30
minutes of the call to abandon ship. The 1994 sinking of the Estonia in
30 minutes illustrates the need for this requirement.
How do the U.S. Coast Guard and the International Maritime
Organization currently ensure that ships are designed to accommodate
this standard? Are there drills run on ships by the Coast Guard to
ensure this?
Answer. To my knowledge, there are no reliable methods to ensure
that ships are designed to accommodate this standard, and I don't
believe the U.S. Coast Guard or International Maritime Organization
have undertaken any concrete empirical research to determine whether
new ships can comply with the thirty minute requirement. In fact, I
overheard conversations among cruise industry executives in the early
2000s, as ships were ballooning in size, that they were skeptical about
their ability to meet the thirty minute requirement. In contrast, The
Telegraph reported on March 19, 2012, that Royal Caribbean's CEO,
Richard Fain, whose company operates some of the world's biggest cruise
ships, said: ``The truth is the newer, bigger ships are as safe or
safer than any comparable smaller ships.'' A subsequent article states
that in cases of emergency these ships offer more ways to evacuate and
larger lifeboats than any of the smaller ships--they have many more
exits and lifeboats to accommodate each person, so cruise lines can get
everyone off the boats well before the 30 minute mark. It is this type
of thinking, not based on empirical fact or on reliable information,
that underlies the arrogance leading to less-than-responsible practices
around passenger safety and security.
That lifeboats are larger makes no difference if one cannot reach
the lifeboat, and that there are more lifeboats makes no difference if
half the boats are inaccessible because a ship is listing. Rather than
make capricious arguments designed to reassure passengers that they are
safe, the cruise industry should take visible and concrete measures to
reassure passengers that evacuation of a cruise ship is possible within
the 30-minute timeframe, and if it is not possible (which I believe is
the case) then to retrofit ships so timely evacuation is possible. But
this isn't going to happen because the company doesn't make money when
space is devoted to stairwells and hallways rather than to revenue-
generating passenger cabins.
As I have heard from many who have traveled on the largest ships
afloat, beginning with Carnival's Destiny-class ships and Royal
Caribbean's Voyager-class ships, it could take one more than thirty
minutes to find their way from their cabin on a lower deck to their
lifeboat station, especially in the dark and without elevators. The
test of how long it takes is not the length of time one needs in a non-
emergency situation with fully lighted halls and stairways that are
clear, but the time it takes for someone unfamiliar with the ship to
find their way in the dark from a cabin on the lowest passenger deck to
their lifeboat station.
In addition, it is essential that consideration be given to the
carrying capacity of hallways and stairways--how many people can pass
through a stairwell at one time, how many people can pass through a
hallway at one time, and what is the exponential impact as passengers
from lower decks are added to passengers from decks above. According to
the ship diagram for Oasis of the Seas and Allure of the Seas at the
Royal Caribbean website, there is a pair of stairways forward and aft
(thus, 4 total) from Deck 3 to Deck 16. The basic question is whether
6,300 passengers can funnel through these two pairs of stairwells to
lifeboat stations within 30 minutes. This is an empirical question that
to my knowledge has not been tested.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to
Dr. Ross A. Klein
Question. I understand that under the Death on the High Seas Act,
families who lost a loved one have limited legal remedies that they can
pursue for the tremendous loss that they have suffered. Current law
prevents victims' families from recovering anything other than lost
income or wages. In contrast, if a family suffers the loss of a loved
one in a plane crash on the high seas, they may choose to pursue non-
pecuniary damages in court, such as loss of companionship. Can you
discuss the impact this disparity in the law that has on the surviving
families of victims?
Answer. As I stated in my written testimony, Cruise ship passengers
are treated differently than airline passengers under the Death on the
High Seas Act (DOHSA) The Act, originally passed in 1920, presently
does not allow non-pecuniary and punitive damages to families of
someone who has died while at sea. These limits were deemed to be
unfair in the context of aviation cases and were removed, but they were
not changed for passenger ships. House Resolution 2989, introduced by
Representative Doggett July 11, 2007, intended to correct this
inconsistency, but it was not approved. Two bills were introduced in
the 111th Congress, H.R. 5803 (Conyers and 26 co-sponsors) and S. 3600
and S. 3755 (Rockefeller/Schumer), but they also didn't go beyond
Committee. Given the obvious unfairness that American citizens on
cruise ships are treated different on a cruise ship than when traveling
by airplane, I hope amendments to DOHSA are revisited.
It isn't just a matter that families are prevented from recovering
anything other than lost income or wages. Many cruise passengers are
retired and under DOHSA their family can recover nothing other than the
costs for retrieval and burial of the body. The consequence is seen in
the death of Richard Liffridge who died at age 72 on a fire aboard the
Star Princess on March 23, 2006. A subsequent investigation suggests
the fire was caused by a discarded cigarette end heating combustible
materials on a balcony on Deck 10, which smoldered for about 20 minutes
before flames developed. Within 6 minutes the fire had spread up to
decks 11 and 12 and onto stateroom balconies. The fire also spread into
staterooms as the heat of the fire shattered the glass in stateroom
doors but fortunately was contained by each stateroom's fixed fire
smothering system and the restricted combustibility of the room's
contents.
Richard and Victoria Liffridge were onboard and awoke to the short,
faint sound of an alarm followed by static on the ship's intercom.
Victoria opened their cabin door and observed a crewmember knocking on
the door across the hall but he said nothing to her. As she began to
close the door she heard a friend yelling, ``The ship is on fire . . .
The ship is on fire! Everyone get out!'' Victoria turned to Richard and
repeated the words. She says in her statement on the International
Cruise Victims Association website that he sat there in shock for a few
seconds. She then called to him to get up and get dressed! As they
began exiting their cabin the only light shining in the hallway was
from their room.
They crawled through thick, black smoke barely able to see their
hands in front of them, Victoria holding Richard's shirt tail so they
wouldn't become separated. But the ship suddenly shifted and she lost
her grip. Victoria found her way to safety and was taken to the
auditorium, which was being used as a muster station. She asked a staff
person about her husband and was told forty-five minutes later that
everyone had been located and they were safe in Muster Station B. Not
long after she was transported to the infirmary and learned that
Richard had died. Initial reports from the cruise line were that he
died of a heat attack. An autopsy indicated he died from smoke
inhalation. Despite the facts, the cruise line continued to report
Richard's death as a heart attack.
In 2007, Richard's daughter Lynette wrote: ``Five months later, we
still have no answers. What we do know is that my father died
needlessly from smoke inhalation trying to escape a death trap. The
death trap was caused by no emergency lighting, no fire extinguishers
in the corridors and no sprinklers. We do know that the fire originated
on an external stateroom balcony sited on deck 10 on the vessel's port
side. We know that the ship was a Bermuda registered cruise ship and
was not required to have fire extinguishers, sprinklers or smoke
detectors on the external areas of the ship. We also know that it took
one to one-and-a-half hours to fight the fire due to the construction
and partitioning of the balcony areas. We know that highly combustible
materials were used on the balconies and the balcony partitions were of
a polycarbonate material that produced large amounts of dense black
smoke. It should be noted that we still have not received a note, phone
call or sympathy card from Princess Cruise Line. It is as if this never
happened.''
I could cite other cases, but this single case makes the point that
loss of life at sea is not taken as seriously as it should be by cruise
lines. It also identifies the need for families to receive adequate
compensation when a loved one parishes from an avoidable death on a
cruise ship. It is ageist to discriminate against a person who is
retired from gainful employment (the message is that if one doesn't
work, one's life has no value), and it is patently unfair that a cruse
passenger of any age be treated differently onboard a cruise ship than
on the airplane they used to arrive at the ship.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
to Christine Duffy
Cruise Vessel Crimes
Question 1. For the purposes of this question, please query your
member companies and their subsidiaries. Since the passage of the
Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act, how many deaths, serious
injuries, sexual assaults, or cases involving missing persons have
occurred either aboard your vessels or as a part of your cruise-
sponsored excursions? How many of these incidents have been reported to
the Federal Bureau of Investigation or state or local government law
enforcement, pursuant to the requirements delineated in 46 U.S.C.
3507(g)(3)? How many of those incidents involved crew members? How many
of the deaths, serious injuries, sexual assaults, and missing persons
involved American citizens? What are your member companies' practices
for reporting all of these incidents to American officials? Are the
situations in which a serious incident involving an American citizen
would not be reported to U.S. officials?
Answer. Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA) and its
members lines worked closely with this Committee and the Congress to
enact the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act (CVSSA), Public Law
111-207, which was signed into law just last Congress. Enactment of
this law was a major undertaking by both industry and the government to
standardize and expand the existing system of reporting crimes, deaths
and serious injuries that occur on cruise ships. The law specified how
and what information must be reported and to which Federal authorities,
and also required the creation of a website maintained by the U.S.
Coast Guard (USCG) to make relevant data available to the public. The
best resources for obtaining this type of data are the public website
and the Federal law enforcement authorities to whom the reports are
made pursuant to 46 USC Sec. 3507 (g)(3) (which requires reporting to
the FBI of serious felonies and missing persons); 33 CFR Sec. 120.220
(which requires reporting to the FBI and USCG, and in some instances
the Dept. of Homeland Security, of felonies); and 46 CFR Part 4 (which
requires reporting to the USCG of marine casualties, including death
and serious injuries). Our member lines' practice is to report those
incidents required by law and regulation. U.S. law and regulation
requires all serious incidents involving American citizens on a voyage
embarking or disembarking passengers in the U.S. be reported to the
FBI, USCG, or both, regardless of where the incident took place.
Furthermore, Federal law, consistent with international law, requires
the reporting to the USCG of serious marine casualties, including death
or serious injury of American citizens, regardless of where the
incident took place.
The cruise industry takes seriously its responsibility to protect
its passengers and crew and to provide for their security while at sea.
There is always room for improvement and the industry will continue its
efforts to improve in this area. The fact is there are very few crimes
and serious injuries that occur relative to the millions of passengers
that travel on cruise ships each year.
Question 2. For the purposes of this question, please query your
member companies and their subsidiaries. Do you currently have any
reporting requirements in terms of deaths, injuries, and missing
persons for both passengers and crew?
Question 2a. What are these requirements if any?
Answer. See the answer to question 1 above.
Question 2b. To whom do you report?
Anwer. See the answer to question 1 above.
Question 2c. Do you have an objection to having a centralized
database that consumers can refer to? And if you have an objection,
why?
Answer. See the answer to question 1 above.
Questison 2d. What type of remedial measures do you take once you
have reported such incidents?
Answer. The safety and security efforts of CLIA members is to focus
on prevention, training and preparedness, as well as incident response.
If an incident does occur, CLIA members consistently review the
incident and seek to improve operations and procedures as the CLIA
Security Committee and include in their discussions representatives of
various Federal agencies including the USCG, the FBI and the CBP. These
post-incident reviews have led to a number of policy and procedural
changes to enhance the safety and security of our guests and crew.
Health and Safety
Question 3. What are your standard procedures for passengers and
crew who require serious medical treatment during the voyage?
Anwer. Shipboard medical facilities are built, stocked and staffed
to meet or exceed the guidelines established by the American College of
Emergency Physicians (ACEP) and passengers and crew are provided
medical care by licensed medical doctors and nurses in accordance with
these guidelines which may be found at: http://www.acep.org/
Content.aspx?id=29980&terms=health%20care%20guidelines%20for%
20cruise%20ships.
Onboard medical capabilities vary among CLIA members but include
automated external defibrillators (AEDs), ventilators, X-ray machines,
laboratory equipment, blood transfusions, and minor surgical and
orthopedic supplies.
Question 4. What are the qualifications of your medical personnel
on your vessels?
Answer. The Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010
specifically requires cruise ship medical staff to have a current
physician or nursing license and at least 3 years of post-graduate or
post-registration clinical practice in general and emergency medicine
or board certified in emergency medicine, family practice medicine, or
internal medicine. In addition, shipboard medical staff meet or exceed
the requirements of the above-reference ACEP Guidelines (see Guideline
2).
Question 5. Do medical professionals receive specialized training
for the treatment of victims of sexual assault? If so, please provide
details of the training?
Anwer. The Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010
specifically requires that, on all voyages to or from the U.S., the
shipboard medical staff must include licensed medical providers that
are able to provide assistance in the event of an alleged sexual
assault, have received training in conducting forensic sexual assault
examination, and are able to promptly perform such an examination upon
request and provide proper medical treatment of a victim, including
administration of anti-retroviral medications and other medications
that may prevent the transmission of the HIV virus and other sexually
transmitted diseases. The new law also requires cruise ships to
prepare, provide to the patient, and maintain written documentation of
the findings of a sexual assault examination, and that such records be
signed by the recipient. In addition shipboard medical staff must meet
or exceed the requirements of the above-reference ACEP Guidelines (see
Guideline 9).
Miscellaneous Legal Issues
Question 6. In light of your general insurance protections and the
Limitation of Liability Act, why is it necessary to have limited
remedies available for passengers who die on the high seas?
Anwer. The remedies that are available generally are in keeping
with the remedies that are available in most nations of the world,
including European nations. As an international industry that is
carrying and sourcing passengers globally, having an internationally
uniform liability regime promotes predictability and allows for a level
playing field for claimants whatever their nationality. Since the high
seas are, to some degree, under every nation's jurisdiction, U.S. law
governing deaths on the high seas should reflect international norms.
U.S. law, as presently written, is appropriately reflective of these
norms in light of the remedies available in other jurisdictions.
Moreover, the U.S. Limitation of Liability Act prohibits a cruise
line from limiting its liability for death or personal injury caused by
the negligence of a ship's owner, operator, master or any employee or
agent. Cruise lines are also prohibited from limiting liability for
emotional distress claims in cases where a passenger was injured, at
risk of being injured or when the distress was intentionally inflicted.
The Limitation of Liability Act also requires cruise lines to provide
passengers with at least 6 months to make a claim, 1 year to file a
lawsuit to recover in the event of an injury, and up to 4 years to file
a lawsuit in the case of wrongful death.
Question 7. In light of the size and financial resources of your
companies--compared to the financial means and age of your passengers,
why do you require passengers to resolve disputes through mandatory
arbitration? Any U.S. passenger on any vessel that calls at a U.S. port
is protected by Federal statute that mandates an absolute right to a
court trial for personal injury or death. Arbitration is only available
for non-personal injury or death claims (e.g., consumer claims) for
which arbitration is generally acceptable and recognized in all other
industries.
Answer. Any U.S. passenger on any vessel that calls at a U.S. port
is protected by Federal statute that mandates an absolute right to a
court trial for personal injury or death. Arbitration is only available
for non-personal injury or death claims (e.g., consumer claims) for
which arbitration is generally acceptable and recognized in all other
industries.
Question 7a. How can a passenger reasonably expect to know and
understand the requirement of mandatory binding arbitration? The
requirement of choice of forum? The requirement of choice of law?
Answer. The passenger ticket is designed to clearly spell out to
passengers their legal rights, including applicable laws and
jurisdiction, before they ever step foot on the ship. The goal is to
provide passengers with clarity and certainty over what laws apply and
what courts have jurisdiction. Not only is this beneficial to
passengers, it is required by law. Our goal as an industry is to
provide a single document that clearly spells out a passenger's legal
rights. The passenger ticket is the most appropriate document for
accomplishing this goal.
U.S. laws require that these legal rights be clearly communicated
to passengers and the terms are subject to strict judicial scrutiny to
ensure they are fundamentally fair. Every major cruise line also posts
the passenger ticket contracts on line on their websites, along with
appropriate recommendations to read them.
Question 7b. How is this different than any other consumer contract
where the consumer has no bargaining power?
Answer. The U.S. Supreme Court in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v.
Shute expressly rejected the argument that a non-negotiated forum
selection clause in a ticket contract is unreasonable, and thus
unenforceable, simply because it is not the subject of bargaining.
Moreover, the consumer has the choice of not entering into a contract
with the cruise line. That is the ultimate bargaining power.
Question 8. Would the industry support legislation that would
provide that for any American who boarded a foreign flagged vessel for
cruising or pleasure purposes, a U.S. District Court of would have
jurisdiction of their claims, irrespective of any contract provisions?
If not, why not?
Answer. No. Such legislation would be entirely unnecessary. U.S.
passengers already have extensive access to U.S. courts in the event
they need to file a claim. Every passenger on virtually every cruise
line whose corporate base is in the United States already has access to
a U.S. forum, which is expressly stated in the ticket contract,
including U.S. courts in cases of personal injury and death, if they
wish to file a claim. This is true regardless of the cruise's itinerary
or whether it embarks or disembarks in the U.S. or a foreign port. For
claims against cruise lines based in foreign nations, and that offer
cruises between foreign ports that do not include the U.S., foreign
laws may apply and claims may be more appropriately resolved abroad.
Taxes
Question 9. For the purposes of this question, and consistent with
your answer at the hearing, please query your member companies and
their subsidiaries. Over the past 5 years what Federal taxes have been
paid by cruise line companies and their subsidiaries?
Answer. CLIA does not have access to the tax returns of its member
companies, and CLIA cannot request tax returns from its members due to
limitations on the type of information it may receive as an industry
trade association.
Question 10. At the hearing, there was a discussion of the more
than 20 Federal agencies that work with the cruise lines to provide for
health, safety and security of passengers. At a recent conference on
March 13, 2012, you commented that by 2015, 25 new ships will join the
CLIA member line fleet. You also indicated that since 2000, there has
been a 125 percent increase in passengers, including a record 16.3
million in 2011 and the industry has introduced 143 new ships during
that time. Would your member companies be willing to shoulder more of
the costs to support its Federal partners who help provide for the
health, safety and security of the traveling public?
Answer. CLIA members do provide financial support to our Federal
partners. For example, for every cruise passenger who is processed into
the United States the industry pays over $7.00 in Customs and
immigration user fees. With approximately 12 million passengers
arriving annually, this equates to more than $84 million in Customs and
Immigration user fees alone. In fact, in a 1999 report to the Chairman
of the House Transportation Committee, the GAO determined that maritime
industry pays over 124 different fees and assessments to various
agencies of the Federal Government. In addition, agencies of state and
local government collect user fees and assessments of various types.
Maritime industry paid over $22 billion dollars in Federal assessments
during Fiscal Year 1998. Given the growth of maritime industry since
that time, the number today is undoubtedly much greater than 1998.
Maritime industry which includes the cruise lines is paying a
substantial amount of money into the Federal treasury. In addition to
fees and taxes, the cruise industry either directly or indirectly
provides jobs for more than 330,000 Americans. Each of these Americans
pays Federal and state taxes on their income, and the industry pays the
employers' share of taxes and benefits for those it employs.
Question 11. CLIA was a strong supporter of the Travel Promotion
Act, which was primarily funded through both private sector
contributions (up to $100 million) and a $10 fee on foreign travelers.
Could the Congress count on CLIA's support for legislation that would
impose a similar per-passenger or per-vessel fee to pay for some of the
essential services provided by the Federal Government? What
recommendations would you provide related to the legislation?
Answer. The industry pays fair value for services rendered to it by
government and frequently renders assistance to others at sea, often at
substantial cost and without reimbursement, upon the request of the
government. For example, Cruise ships frequently are called upon to
assist in the rescue of persons at sea. The Florida straits have a
significant number of persons who attempt to illegally migrate on
rickety rafts and small boats. As this is a significant cruise ship
operating area, our vessels are frequently requested to render
assistance.
Environmental Issues
Question 12. How many CLIA member line vessels operate in waters
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and how many CLIA
member line vessels operate worldwide?
Answer. The cruise industry is global. Vessels routinely cross
international boundaries and their deployment schedules vary
frequently. Vessels that are in the U.S./Caribbean market in the winter
may operate in the Baltic in the summer. CLIA member lines operate
approximately 200 vessels in the global market.
With regard to the following questions (13 through 37), in general,
CLIA members lines are dedicated to preserving the marine environment
and, in particular, the pristine condition of the oceans and other
waters upon which our vessels sail. The environmental standards that
apply to our industry are stringent and comprehensive. Through the
International Maritime Organization, the United States and flag and
port states, CLIA has participated in the development of consistent and
uniform international standards that apply to all vessels engaged in
international commerce. These standards are set forth in the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL). The international standards of MARPOL have, in turn, been
adopted by the U.S. and augmented by additional Federal legislation and
regulation. The U.S. has jurisdiction over both foreign and domestic
vessels that operate in U.S. waters where U.S. laws, such as the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, the Act to Prevent Pollution from
Ships, the Ports and Waterways Safety Act, and the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, apply. The U.S. Coast Guard enforces
both international conventions and domestic laws.
Question 13. How many CLIA member line vessels that operate in
waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States are equipped
with the best available technology that will reduce the silver content
in photo processing and X-ray development fluid waste discharges,
consistent with CLIA Industry Waste Management Standard No. 1?
Answer. Functionally today, most member lines are using digital
photo and X-ray processing which does not utilize photo processing
fluid. Members that use fluid are to utilize one or both of methods of
disposal identified in CLIA Waste Management Practices and Procedures-
either removing all hazardous materials or treating the fluid as
hazardous material and disposing through a licensed waste management
company.
With regard to hazardous waste in general--photo and X-ray
processing chemicals, fluorescent bulbs, dry cleaning fluids, battery
chemicals, etc.--CLIA member cruise lines have defined handling and
control processes for each type of waste. For example, hazardous waste
products are segregated into leak-proof containers and landed to an
approved shoreside disposal facility or, for permitted types of medical
waste, incinerated onboard. Under no circumstance, may hazardous waste
be disposed of in trash containers or systems for graywater (sinks and
drains) or blackwater (toilets).
Question 14. Approximately how many gallons of photo processing and
x-ray development fluid waste are discharged by CLIA member line
vessels into waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
annually?
Answer. We are aware of none.
Question 15. Approximately how many gallons of dry-cleaning fluids,
sludge, contaminated filter materials, and other dry-cleaning waste
products are discharged by CLIA member line vessels into waters subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States annually?
Answer. We are aware of none.
Question 16. How are pharmaceuticals that are unused, outdated, or
both, disposed of by CLIA member line vessels that operate in waters
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States when so operating and
when operating on the high seas?
Answer. Pursuant to CLIA's policy adopted by its members, they are
to be disposed of in accordance with the CLIA Waste Management
Practices and Procedures. CLIA member lines have agreed to ensure that
unused and/or outdated pharmaceuticals are effectively and safely
disposed in accordance with legal and environmental requirements. In
general ships carry varying amounts of pharmaceuticals. The
pharmaceuticals carried range from over-the-counter products such as
anti-fungal creams to prescription drugs such as epinephrine. Each ship
stocks an inventory based on its itinerary and the demographics of its
passenger base. CLIA member lines have agreed that all pharmaceuticals
will be managed to ensure that their efficacy is optimized and that
disposal is done in an environmentally responsible manner.
CLIA member lines have further agreed that when disposing of
pharmaceuticals, the method used will be consistent with established
procedures, and that pharmaceuticals and medications which are off
specification or which have exceeded their shelf-life, and stocks that
are unused and out of date, cannot be used for patients and therefore
will be removed from the ship. Further, each regulatory jurisdiction
has a posting of listed pharmaceuticals that must be considered
hazardous waste once the date has expired or the item is no longer
considered good for patient use.
Question 17. CLIA's Industry Waste Management Standard No. 6,
dealing with fluorescent and mercury vapor lamp bulbs, states that CLIA
member lines ``have agreed to prevent the release of mercury into the
environment from spent fluorescent and mercury vapor lamps by assuring
proper recycling or by using other acceptable means of disposal.''
Question 18. How does CLIA define the term ``proper recycling'' as
that term is used in Standard No. 6?
Answer. Proper recycling means off-loading to a licensed waste
management company ashore who is certified to handle such waste.
Question 19. What are the ``other acceptable means of disposal''
referred to in Standard No. 6?
Answer. Used fluorescent lamps can be crushed and content filtered
through approved lamp crusher equipment. Filters are disposed of as
hazardous material.
Question 20. Approximately how many spent lamps are disposed of by
``proper recycling'' by CLIA member line vessels that operate in waters
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States?
Answer. CLIA does not collect or maintain records of this type and
they are not in CLIA's possession, custody or control. However, in
accordance with the members' stated policy and practice, we believe
that our members are properly disposing of spent lamps.
Question 21. Approximately how many spent lamps are disposed of by
``other acceptable means of disposal'' by CLIA member line vessels that
operate in waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States?
Answer. CLIA does not collect or maintain records of this type and
they are not in CLIA's possession, custody or control. . However, in
accordance with the members' stated policy and practice, we believe
that our members are properly disposing of spent lamps.
Question 22. Approximately how many spent batteries are prevented
from being discharged into the marine environment by CLIA member line
vessels annually, in conformity with CLIA Industry Waste Management
Standard No. 7, and how many are discharged into the marine
environment?
Answer. CLIA does not collect or maintain records of this type and
they are not in CLIA's possession, custody or control. However, in
accordance with the members' stated policy and practice, we believe
that our members are properly disposing of spent batteries.
Question 23. Approximately how many CLIA member line vessels meet
the international requirements for removing oil from bilge and
wastewater prior to discharge, as agreed in CLIA Industry Waste
Management Standard No. 8?
Answer. All CLIA member lines are required to meet the
international and domestic requirements for disposing of bilge and
wastewater. The procedures are to be included in the members' Safety
Management System manuals and are subject to internal and external
audit.
Question 24. How many CLIA member line vessels that operate in
waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States are equipped
with back-to-back oily bilge water treatment systems?
Answer. Bilge water is a mixture of liquids, primarily fresh water,
collected from machinery spaces and internal drainage systems. The
bilge, located in the engine room at the lowest part of the vessel,
collects water, cleansers and mechanical fluids from operational
sources. These sources include evaporators, potable water treatment
equipment, condensation, technical rooms, seawater cooling systems,
propulsion systems, and main engines. Although CLIA does not audit or
supervise the technology that member lines are using for bilge water
processing, typically bilge water is collected and periodically pumped
into special holding tanks where it is processed to remove contaminants
of concern. The resulting water is then treated to levels that meet or
exceed both U.S. and international regulations and thereafter
discharged.
Question 25. Do any CLIA member line vessels that operate in waters
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States discharge bilge water
or wastewater containing oil in excess of 15 parts per million?
Answer. Not as far as CLIA is aware. International regulations and
CLIA policy prohibit such discharges.
If so, how many vessels do so and approximately how many gallons
such bilge water or wastewater are discharged annually?
Question 26. Ms. Duffy's testimony states that CLIA lines recycle
approximately 80,000 tons of solid waste annually, largely comprising
paper, plastic, aluminum cans, and glass.
Question 26a. Approximately how many tons of solid waste do CLIA
member lines produce annually that is not recycled?
Answer. By law and regulation, the only solid waste that may be
discharged at sea is that permitted by MARPOL Annex V, and that is
restricted to certain areas of the ocean. MARPOL Annex V has recently
been modified to further minimize the discharge of solid waste. In
accordance with CLIA's Waste Management Practices and Procedures, the
vast majority of solid waste is recycled or incinerated onboard.
Recycled material includes glass, aluminum, plastic, cardboard, and
metals. Food packing materials are generally incinerated due to
restrictions on landing ashore and other practical considerations. CLIA
does not collect or maintain records of this type and they are not in
CLIA's possession, custody or control.
Qusetion 26b. Approximately how many tons of solid waste do CLIA
member lines produce annually that is discharged into the marine
environment?
Answer. See response to Question 26(a).
Question 26c. What types of solid waste typically are discharged by
CLIA member lines into the marine environment?
Answer. CLIA is unaware of any, other than comminuted food waste.
Question 27. CLIA's Industry Waste Management Standard No. 9,
dealing with glass, cardboard, and aluminum and steel cans, states that
CLIA member lines have agreed that ``no [such] waste will be discharged
into the marine environment unless it has been properly processed and
can be discharged in accordance with MARPOL and other prevailing
requirements.'' How does CLIA define the term ``properly processed''
for purposes of this standard?
Answer. ``Properly processed'' means, for example, food waste that
has been comminuted.
Question 28. Approximately how much incinerator ash do CLIA member
line vessels discharge into waters subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States annually?
Answer. We are unaware of any.
Question 29. CLIA Industry Waste Management Standard No. 12,
dealing with sewage, reads as follows:
12. Blackwater: CLIA members have agreed that all blackwater
will be processed through a Marine Sanitation Device (MSD),
certified in accordance with U.S. or international regulations,
prior to discharge. For ships traveling regularly on
itineraries beyond territorial coastal waters, discharge will
take place only when the ship is more than 4 miles from shore
and when the ship is traveling at a speed of not less than 6
knots. For vessels whose itineraries are fully within U.S.
territorial waters, discharge shall comply fully with U.S. and
individual state legislation and regulations.
Do any CLIA member lines have a more stringent voluntary policy on
sewage discharges than Standard No. 12--for example, do any member
lines have a policy that all sewage will be processed through advanced
wastewater treatment systems, or that ships traveling regularly beyond
territorial coastal waters will only discharge MSD-processed sewage
when they are more than 12 nautical miles from shore?
Answer. Yes, please see corporate sustainability reports of our
member lines for details of what they have in place.
Question 30. How many vessels do American Cruise Lines, Carnival
Cruise Lines, Celebrity Cruises, Crystal Cruises, Cunard Cruises,
Disney Cruise Line, Norwegian Cruise Lines, Oceania Cruises, Princess
Cruises, Pearl Seas Cruises, Regent Seven Seas Cruises, Royal Caribbean
International, Sea Dream Yacht Club, and Seabourn Cruise Line each
operate in waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and
how many of each of those CLIA member lines' vessels that operate in
waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States have advanced
wastewater treatment systems installed?
Answer. CLIA does not collect or maintain records on when or where
vessels are operating at any given time or exactly what equipment they
are utilizing to process wastewater. These documents are not in CLIA's
possession, custody or control.
Question 31. Of each of those CLIA member lines' vessels that
operate in waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and
do not have advanced wastewater treatment systems installed, how many
discharge treated sewage within 4 nautical miles from shore while so
operating?
Answer. To CLIA's knowledge the only vessels which discharge
treated wastewater within 4 miles of the coast are those which are
permitted by local law to do so.
Question 32. Of each of those CLIA member lines' vessels that
operate in waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and
do not have advanced wastewater treatment systems installed, how many
discharge treated sewage within 12 nautical miles from shore while so
operating?
Answer. Under CLIA's express policy adopted by its members, none
are to do so. CLIA does not collect or maintain records of this nature,
and they are not in CLIA's possession, custody or control.
Question 33. Of each of those CLIA member lines' vessels that
operate in waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and
do not have advanced wastewater treatment systems installed, how many
discharge treated graywater within 4 nautical miles from shore while so
operating?
Answer. None are to do so except as permitted by law. CLIA does not
collect or maintain records of this nature, and they are not in CLIA's
possession, custody or control.
Question 34. Of each of those CLIA member lines' vessels that
operate in waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and
do not have advanced wastewater treatment systems installed, how many
discharge treated graywater within 12 nautical miles from shore while
so operating?
Answer. CLIA does not collect or maintain records of this nature
and they are not in CLIA's possession, custody or control.
Question 35. Do any of each of those CLIA member lines' vessels
that operate in waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
discharge untreated sewage or untreated graywater within 4 nautical
miles from shore while so operating?
If so, how many of each line's vessels do so, and approximately how
many gallons each of untreated sewage and untreated graywater does each
vessel discharge?
Answer. No.
Question 36. Do any of each of those CLIA member lines' vessels
that operate in waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
discharge untreated sewage or untreated graywater within 12 nautical
miles from shore while so operating? If so, how many of each line's
vessels do so, and approximately how many gallons each of untreated
sewage and untreated graywater does each vessel discharge?
Answer. CLIA member lines by policy do not discharge untreated
sewage anywhere. Untreated graywater is to be discharged only when
beyond 4 miles from the shore.
Question 37. Do any of each of those CLIA member lines' vessels
that operate in waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
discharge untreated sewage or untreated graywater beyond 12 nautical
miles from shore while so operating? If so, how many of each line's
vessels do so, and approximately how many gallons each of untreated
sewage and untreated graywater does each vessel discharge?
Answer. CLIA does not collect or maintain records of this nature
and they are not in CLIA's possession, custody or control. CLIA member
lines by policy do not discharge untreated sewage anywhere.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Barbara Boxer to
Christine Duffy
Muster Drills
Question 1. I want to congratulate the Cruise Line Industry of
America and its members for instituting a new policy that requires a
muster drill for all passengers before departure. As you know, I
believe this to be an important policy and have written to the Coast
Guard asking that they change the current regulation for a muster
within 24 hours of embarkation, to before a ship departs. Do you all
agree that all passengers should receive muster training prior to
departure, while a ship is still in a controlled environment?
Answer. Yes and we have announced as a policy that all member lines
have agreed to incorporate into their mandatory practices.
Question 2. Recently, some cruise lines have started giving a
muster briefing or virtual muster training using a video. How does this
conform to the requirement to have a ``muster?'' Shouldn't a muster
require that passengers go to their assigned evacuation point or life
boat?
Answer. There is a regulatory requirement to have a muster.
Passengers are required to attend. In addition there is a requirement
for a safety briefing that is to be made upon departure in one or more
languages likely to be understood by the passengers (including the
language or languages required by the ship's flag State and in the
English language). This required safety briefing is normally
accomplished at the muster stations during the drill. An in room video
or information cards supplement these requirements. Additionally, SOLAS
Chapter III Regulation 8 requires that illustrations and appropriate
languages shall be posted in passenger cabins and at other locations to
inform passengers of: their muster station, essential actions they must
take in an emergency, and the method of donning lifejackets. These
instructions are found on a placard on the inside of each cabin door.
Crew Training
Question 3. Ms. Duffy, in your testimony, you said that crew
members receive safety training every 5 years, receive familiarization
training every time they report on board a ship and must participate in
one of the weekly emergency drills once a month.
By regulation, airline flight attendants must undergo training that
covers the specific aircraft type(s) they fly, their position(s) and
duties once every 12 months. Additionally, flight attendants must
complete emergency drills/simulations once every 24 months. And as we
all know from flying, flight attendants brief passengers on emergency
procedures on every flight.
Isn't safety training every 5 years for cruise ship crew members
too infrequent?
Answer. As indicated in my testimony and above, familiarization
training is held every time a crew member reports onboard. Since
contracts for employment extend from 4 to 8 months, crewmembers are
effectively receiving training according to those intervals. Additional
training and honing of proficiency is provided by the abandon ship and
firefighting drills that take place weekly. Additionally, the boat
crews are required to launch and maneuver their respective lifeboats at
least once in every 3 months. Additional training is specified in SOLAS
Chapter III Regulation 19.4 and required to take place at intervals of
not more than 4 months.
Question 4. Currently, only certain crew members are trained to
operate a lifeboat, why is this? Shouldn't every crew member be able
operate a lifeboat?
Answer. All flight attendants are trained to operate emergency exit
doors and slides. Operating a lifeboat requires distinct skills and
there are a number of crew specifically trained to perform this
function. There are more than enough crewmembers who are trained to
perform this function to provide for backup if a crewmember is
incapacitated in any way. Specifically SOLAS Chapter II Regulation 10
requires that a deck officer or certified person shall be placed in
charge of each survival craft to be used. In some instances, the flag
administration may permit an appropriately trained person to be in
charge of liferafts. A second in command is to be nominated (appointed)
in the case of lifeboats. The U.S. Coast Guard and other flag and port
state inspection authorities regularly, during drills, specify that the
primary lifeboat/liferaft crew in charge are incapacitated and require
that the alternate crew demonstrate their proficiency.
Question 5. Reports have indicated that language barriers between
crew members on the Costa Concordia contributed to confusion and
hindered the process for abandoning ship. Are there any U.S. or
international regulations that require crew members to have language
proficiency for basic safety terms and instructions?
Answer. Each ship is required to have a designated language and all
crewmembers are required to speak this language proficiently. Globally
English is the predominant language for shipping. As stated previously,
the safety briefings are to be provided in one or more languages likely
to be understood by the passengers including the language or languages
required by the ship's flag State and in the English language.
Lifejackets and Life Boats
Question 6. Historically, lifejackets have been located in state
rooms with additional lifejackets located in public areas. However, in
an emergency it seems impractical to require passengers to return to
their staterooms to retrieve lifejackets, and then head to their muster
stations.
Recently, newer ships have begun to store lifejackets at muster
stations. This solves the problem of requiring passengers to return to
their staterooms before going to muster stations. However, if a ship
lists to one side, then the life jackets on that side of the ship will
no longer be accessible.
I have heard from a passenger who was aboard the Sea Diamond in
2007 when it wrecked off the coast of Santorini that when the ship
listed, access to staterooms was cutoff by the crew, and passengers
were all directed to the high side of the ship, rendering the life
boats and life jackets on the low side inaccessible.
How do we ensure that if a ship lists there are a sufficient number
of lifejackets and enough life boats for all aboard?
Answer. SOLAS Chapter III Regulation 21 requires that each
passenger ship carry lifesaving appliances for 100 percent of the
persons onboard. Liferafts may be substituted for lifeboats for up to
25 percent of the persons carried. These liferafts are typically for
use by able bodied crew. An additional number of liferafts for 25
percent of the total persons onboard are also required to be carried.
Lifejackets are required to be carried in numbers specified by
SOLAS Chapter III Regulation 7.2, for every person onboard the ship, as
well as additional lifejackets for children and infants. Additional
lifejackets are required for certain crew on watch. SOLAS Chapter III
Regulation 22 also requires an additional 5 percent of the total number
of lifejackets to be stored at muster stations and other locations. In
long standing CLIA (previously ICCL) policy, CLIA members have agreed
to carry an additional number of lifejackets equal to the number of
passengers berthed in the most populous main vertical zone. These
additional lifejackets are to be stored in public spaces, at the muster
stations, on deck, or in lifeboats and in such a manner as to be
readily accessible to crewmembers for distribution as may be necessary
in the event of an emergency
Evacuation and Ship Design
Question 7. In his testimony, Mr. Klein indicated that the design
of ever larger cruise ships may hinder the ability of passengers to
evacuate a ship. Currently, international regulation and U.S. law
require that a ship can be abandoned within 30 minutes of the call to
abandon ship. The 1994 sinking of the Estonia in 30 minutes illustrates
the need for this requirement. The ESTONIA was a roll on roll of
passenger ferry. The cause of the accident was the massive bow doors
were not properly secured allowing massive amounts of water onto the
vessel in a very small period of time. This class of vessel, with its
large and open vehicle spaces, has much different stability
characteristics than a classic passenger vessel, and is very
susceptible to rapid capsize
How do the U.S. Coast Guard and the International Maritime
Organization currently ensure that ships are designed to accommodate
this standard? Are there drills run on ships by the Coast Guard to
ensure this?
Answer. Ships are routinely exercised and drilled to determine the
length of time it takes to get passengers and crew to their muster
stations. This can vary somewhat depending on the number of passengers
who require assistance and the nature of the assistance. Additionally
lifeboats are regularly lowered to the water to ensure the operability
of the lowering mechanisms. Through these regular drills and exercises
the ships demonstrate their capability to evacuate the ship within 30
minutes.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to
Christine Duffy
Question. I understand that under the Death on the High Seas Act,
families who lost a loved one have limited legal remedies that they can
pursue for the tremendous loss that they have suffered. Current law
prevents victims' families from recovering anything other than lost
income or wages. In contrast, if a family suffers the loss of a loved
one in a plane crash on the high seas, they may choose to pursue non-
pecuniary damages in court, such as loss of companionship. Can you
discuss the impact this disparity in the law that has on the surviving
families of victims?
Answer. Travel by air and sea is different and requires different
considerations. While airline passengers may spend up to several hours
on a flight, the typical commercial maritime passenger spends days, if
not weeks, sailing aboard a ship. Unlike airline passengers, cruise
ship passengers will visit many exotic ports and participate in a
variety of shore excursions and recreational activities during the
course of their travels.
Aviation Death on the High Seas (DOHSA) cases primarily involve
major disasters related to the operation of the aircraft and typically
involve dozens, if not hundreds, of individuals. By contrast, the
maritime DOHSA cases primarily involve an individual who perishes from
natural causes, non-catastrophic circumstances, and/or non-maritime
hazards. The typical cases include heart attack, drowning, and
shoreside incidents. It is important to remember that courts have
applied DOHSA broadly to all loss of life on voyages outside U.S.
waters, including deaths during shore excursions or in foreign waters.
In 2000, Congress amended DOHSA to permit recovery of loss of care,
comfort, and companionship in airline cases. Congress chose not to pass
a similar reform for the maritime industry, partly because shipping has
a far superior safety record and maritime deaths primarily involve an
individual who perishes from a vast array of ancillary activities.
Since the high seas are, to some degree, under every nation's
jurisdiction, U.S. law was crafted to reflect international norms
regarding available damages. DOHSA, as presently written, reflects
these international norms and provides a strong legal remedy to recover
significant damages when warranted, including unlimited economic
damages. Among other things, this includes medical bills, lost wages,
loss of support, loss of nurture, guidance and training for children,
loss of services, inheritance and the value of future support from
children.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Begich to
Christine Duffy
Question 1. Please provide a summary of environmental innovations
that the cruise industry has made in recent years?
Answer. The cruise line industry is committed to protecting the
fragile natural environments in which we operate and we have a strong
record of developing and implementing sound environment practices.
The cruise lines have a variety of environmentally innovative
programs in place that make a difference, from switching to low energy
LED lights, using recycled hot water to heat passenger cabins, to using
special window tinting that keep passageways cooler and utilize less
air conditioning. Below are a few examples:
Environmental stewardship videos for passengers. Many cruise lines
have produced videos for their guests to watch to learn about how they
can do their part while aboard. This can include information such as
turning lights off and participating in towel reuse programs.
Rigorous recycling programs. The cruise line industry is wholly
committed to reducing the amount of waste produced by passengers aboard
ships and at ports of call as well as the waste generated through the
course of operating the ships. Many lines have comprehensive programs
and crew members who are specially trained and responsible for sorting,
processing, storing, recycling, and the final disposal of garbage.
These programs can also include special wastes such as chemicals
including those from photo processing equipment, collected and disposed
with licensed contractors ashore. Other recyclable items include:
paper, glass, plastics, aluminum, scrap metal, fluorescent lamps,
batteries, toner cartridges and cooking oil, among others.
Energy saving LED light bulbs. Halogen and incandescent light bulbs
have either been replaced on many lines or are being replaced with LED
and fluorescent lights, which last 25 times longer, use 80 percent less
energy, and generate 50 percent less heat.
High-Efficiency Appliances. Many cruise lines are installing high-
efficiency appliances onboard their ships in order to minimize their
impact on the environment. Every type of appliance onboard the ships is
being evaluated for efficiency, including: TV's, coffee makers, ovens
and dishwashers.
One outstanding example is a new type of ice maker, which uses 65
percent less water than previous machines. By producing and pumping
less water, more energy is saved. The machine infuses air into the ice
cubes so the drinker gets the same feel, but there is less water in
each cube. The machines themselves are higher efficiency in the way
they freeze the ice, such as more conductive metals where the
refrigerant contacts the water, and utilize more efficient compressors.
Ecological Hull Coatings. The industry is working with paint
manufacturers to deploy innovative and environmentally safe coatings
that increase the smoothness of ship hulls. By creating smoother hulls,
we are reducing the amount of energy needed to travel through water. It
is estimated that these smoother hull coatings will save as much as 5
percent of fuel usage for propulsion.
Propulsion and Hull Design. The industry has been working with
engine and propeller manufacturers to develop a new approach to hull
shapes and propulsion systems, which has resulted in significant energy
savings. By bringing together optimal hull shape with advanced
propeller systems helps to maximize efficiency.
Window Tinting. Cruise lines have applied window tinting designed
for the marine environment, which keep the ships cooler and reduces the
load on air conditioning. This feature also protects our interiors and
furnishings from sun damage and help cut back on corresponding aging
and subsequent waste.
The cruise line industry also works with NGO's, universities,
regulators and scientists around the globe to continually improve our
environmental practices.
Question 2. Please describe CLIA members' wastewater practices. Are
these enforceable?
Answer. CLIA INDUSTRY STANDARD
CRUISE INDUSTRY WASTE MANAGEMENT
PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES
The members of the Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA)
are dedicated to preserving the marine environment and in particular
the pristine condition of the oceans and other waters upon which our
vessels sail. The environmental standards that apply to our industry
are stringent and comprehensive. Through the International Maritime
Organization, the United States and flag and port states, CLIA has
developed consistent and uniform international standards that apply to
all vessels engaged in international commerce. These standards are set
forth in the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships (MARPOL). The international standards of MARPOL have in turn
been adopted by the United States and augmented by additional national
legislation and regulation. The U.S. has jurisdiction over both foreign
and domestic vessels that operate in U.S. waters where U.S. laws, such
as the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, the Act to Prevent
Pollution from Ships, the Ports and Waterways Safety Act, and the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act--which applies to hazardous
waste as it is landed ashore for disposal, apply. The U.S. Coast Guard
enforces both international conventions and domestic laws.
The cruise industry commitment to protecting the environment is
demonstrated by the comprehensive spectrum of waste management
technologies and procedures employed on its vessels.
CLIA members are committed to:
a. Designing, constructing and operating vessels, so as to
minimize their impact on the environment;
b. Developing improved technologies to exceed current requirements
for protection of the environment;
c. Implementing a policy goal of zero discharge of MARPOL, Annex V
solid waste products (garbage) and equivalent U.S. laws and
regulations by use of more comprehensive waste minimization
procedures to significantly reduce shipboard generated waste;
d. Expanding waste reduction strategies to include reuse and
recycling to the maximum extent possible so as to land ashore
even smaller quantities of waste products;
e. Improving processes and procedures for collection and transfer
of hazardous waste; and
f. Strengthening comprehensive programs for monitoring and
auditing of onboard environmental practices and procedures in
accordance with the International Safety Management Code for
the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention (ISM
Code).
INDUSTRY WASTE MANAGEMENT STANDARDS: CLIA member cruise vessel
operators have agreed to incorporate the following standards for waste
stream management into their respective Safety Management Systems.
1. Photo Processing, Including X-Ray Development Fluid Waste:
Member lines have agreed to minimize the discharge of silver
into the marine environment through the use of best available
technology that will reduce the silver content of the waste
stream below levels specified by prevailing regulations.
2. Dry-cleaning waste fluids and contaminated materials: Member
lines have agreed to prevent the discharge of chlorinated dry-
cleaning fluids, sludge, contaminated filter materials and
other dry-cleaning waste byproducts into the environment.
3. Print Shop Waste Fluids: Member lines have agreed to prevent the
discharge of hazardous wastes from printing materials (inks)
and cleaning chemicals into the environment.
4. Photo Copying and Laser Printer Cartridges: Member lines have
agreed to initiate procedures so as to maximize the return of
photo copying and laser printer cartridges for recycling. In
any event, these cartridges will be landed ashore.
5. Unused And Outdated Pharmaceuticals: Member lines have agreed to
ensure that unused and/or outdated pharmaceuticals are
effectively and safely disposed of in accordance with legal and
environmental requirements.
6. Fluorescent And Mercury Vapor Lamp Bulbs: Member lines have
agreed to prevent the release of mercury into the environment
from spent fluorescent and mercury vapor lamps by assuring
proper recycling or by using other acceptable means of
disposal.
7. Batteries: Member lines have agreed to prevent the discharge of
spent batteries into the marine environment.
8. Bilge and Oily Water Residues: Member lines have agreed to meet
or exceed the international requirements for removing oil from
bilge and wastewater prior to discharge.
9. Glass, Cardboard, Aluminum and Steel Cans: Member lines have
agreed to eliminate, to the maximum extent possible, the
disposal of MARPOL Annex V wastes into the marine environment.
This will be achieved through improved reuse and recycling
opportunities. They have further agreed that no waste will be
discharged into the marine environment unless it has been
properly processed and can be discharged in accordance with
MARPOL and other prevailing requirements.
10. Incinerator Ash: Member lines have agreed to reduce the
production of incinerator ash by minimizing the generation of
waste and maximizing recycling opportunities.
11. Graywater: [For ships traveling regularly on itineraries beyond
the territorial waters of coastal states], member lines have
agreed that graywater will be discharged only while the ship is
underway and proceeding at a speed of not less than 6 knots
\1\; that graywater will not be discharged in port and will not
be discharged within 4 nautical miles from shore or such other
distance as agreed to with authorities having jurisdiction or
provided for by local law except in an emergency, or where
geographically limited. Member lines have further agreed that
the discharge of graywater will comply with all applicable laws
and regulations. For vessels whose itineraries are fully within
U.S. territorial waters, discharge shall comply fully with U.S.
and individual state legislation and regulations.
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\1\ For vessels operating under sail, or a combination of sail and
motor propulsion, the speed shall not be less than 4 knots.
12. Blackwater: CLIA members have agreed that all blackwater will be
processed through a Marine Sanitation Device (MSD), certified
in accordance with U.S. or international regulations, prior to
discharge. For ships traveling regularly on itineraries beyond
territorial coastal waters, discharge will take place only when
the ship is more than 4 miles from shore and when the ship is
traveling at a speed of not less than 6 knots.1 For vessels
whose itineraries are fully within U.S. territorial waters,
discharge shall comply fully with U.S. and individual state
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legislation and regulations.
Some member cruise lines are field-testing wastewater treatment
systems that utilize advanced technologies. These onboard wastewater
treatment systems, which are currently being referred to as advanced
wastewater purification (AWP) systems, are designed to result in
effluent discharges that are of a high quality and purity; for example,
meeting or surpassing secondary and tertiary effluents and reclaimed
water. Effluents meeting these high standards would not be subjected to
the strict discharge limitations previously discussed.
Each CLIA cruise vessel operator has agreed to utilize one or more
of the practices and procedures contained in the attached ``Cruise
Industry Waste Management Practices and Procedures'' in the management
of their shipboard waste streams. Recognizing that technology is
progressing at a rapid rate, any new equipment or management practices
that are equivalent to or better than those described, and which are
shown to meet or exceed international and Federal environmental
standards, will also be acceptable. Member lines have agreed to
communicate to CLIA the use of equivalent or other acceptable practices
and procedures. As appropriate, such practices and procedures shall be
included as a revision to the attached document. As an example, when
improved systems for treating blackwater and graywater are perfected
and shown to meet the requirements for MSDs and accepted by appropriate
authorities, the new systems and associated technology will be included
in the attachment as a revision.
CLIA and its Environmental Committee will continue to work with the
U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and other
appropriate agencies to further implement the above commitments.
ATTACHMENT: CRUISE INDUSTRY WASTE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND
PROCEDURES
Revised: November 12, 2006
Effective for non-prior ICCL members: [July 1, 2007]
These practices and procedures have been placed into each members
lines safety Management systems where they are subject to port state
control inspection by the U.S. Coast Guard.
Question 3. What are the U.S. and international regulations that
govern discharges?
Answer. The International Standards for discharges from ships can
be found in the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from ships. This Convention has six annexes:
Annex I Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by Oil
Annex II Regulations for the Control of Pollution by Noxious
Liquid Substances in Bulk
Annex III Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by
Harmful Substances Carried by Sea in Packaged Form
Annex IV Regulations for the prevention of Pollution by Sewage
from Ships
Annex V Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by Garbage
from ships
Annex VI Regulations for the Prevention of Air Pollution from
ships
The U.S. has ratified all of the Annexes to this Convention except
Annex IV. The Convention is incorporated into U.S. law through the Act
to Prevent Pollution from Ships or APPS.
Ships that operate in U.S. waters are also regulated by the Clean
Water Act and various Federal and state laws that regulate discharges
into the water.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Tom Udall to
Christine Duffy
Question. Thank you all for your insight on this issue. Losing so
many lives on the Costa Concordia is devastating and unacceptable. A
couple from my home state were onboard the Costa Concordia at the time
of the tragic incident. They spoke of the chaos they experienced while
trying six times to board a life boat, and once aboard, they
experienced technical issues operating the life boat. Thankfully, they
survived and are home safely in New Mexico. Although the incident is
still under investigation, troubling reports emerged about the crew's
failure to act in accordance with their safety training, leaving the
passengers without any coordinated plan or instructions. How could we
ensure in the future that crew members are adequately prepared for
chaotic situations, such as crisis management skills?
Answer. There are a number of safety regulations in place globally
that require crew to be properly trained and competent at their
responsibilities including all emergency procedures. These are
contained in the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
and the International Convention for Standards for Training
Certification and Watchkeeping. In addition the International Safety
Management Code requires a company to develop a safety management
system which among other things requires a company to evaluate
accidents that occur and corrective actions that should be taken to
enhance safety. There are special requirements that are applicable to
passenger ships and special duties that the officers on passenger ships
must undertake.
All of these international instruments are applicable to ships
operating internationally. The Costa Concordia accident will be the
focus of a great deal of scrutiny at the International Maritime
Organization, where the issue of passenger ship safety is constantly
reviewed.
In the days following the Costa Concordia accident, Carnival
Corporation, the corporate owner of Costa Concordia announced a
corporate wide operational safety review. Shortly thereafter the
members of the Cruise Lines International Association announced an
industry wide operational Safety Review. The purpose of this review is
as follows:
To provide coordinated recommendations for industry safety policy
and procedures related to the safe operations of ships and to recommend
for consideration any regulatory initiatives considered necessary.
Provide overview and recommendations for conducting the
[industry wide] operations safety review and to discuss and
recommend review processes for consideration by cruise line
operators' and to ensure that results from individual members
safety review efforts are presented in a uniform manner.
Provide guidance and recommendations to CLIA for response to
media and other inquiries regarding the progress of the
Operational Safety Review.
Provide coordinated advice [and consent] to CLIA staff in
drafting and submitting papers for consideration at the
International Maritime Organization.
Scope:
Consider human factors, training, and operational aspects of
operations safety during normal operations and in an emergency
including:
Navigation
Evacuation
Emergency training
Related practices and procedures (such as: SMS, damage
control, and audit procedures)
Communications (both internal and external) monitoring of
vessel track line and status of ship, and implications for new
build and existing ships)
Emergency response to: Fire, flooding, collision, grounding,
or other emergency scenarios.
Recommend to the CLIA membership any studies, research or
other actions which may be necessary to clarify, research or
further develop any matters which may be identified or
recommended for action and for which sufficient information is
not available to form a well-grounded and firmly based
recommendation for a policy, procedure or possible regulatory
initiative.
Consider recommendations for inclusion of other or specific
matters which may be presented by CLIA, individual members, or
outside sources such as: flag states, regulatory authorities,
class societies, or other.
This review has been ongoing for 2 months and has already resulted
in Industry wide policies on the following:
Muster the newly embarking passengers for safety
instructions prior to the ship departing port.
Policy on voyage planning requiring the mandatory
application of voyage planning guidelines.
Policy on access to the bridge during special navigational
evolutions.
Policy on extra lifejackets to be stored at muster stations