[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
TERRORIST ATTACK IN BENGHAZI:
THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S VIEW
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JANUARY 23, 2013
__________
Serial No. 113-11
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
or
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
78-250 PDF WASHINGTON : 2013
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania Massachusetts
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
TREY RADEL, Florida GRACE MENG, New York
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
TED S. YOHO, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
LUKE MESSER, Indiana
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESS
The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, U.S.
Department of State............................................ 4
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton: Prepared statement......... 9
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 60
Hearing minutes.................................................. 61
The Honorable Tom Marino, a Representative in Congress from the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania: Prepared statement............... 63
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 66
The Honorable Luke Messer, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Indiana: Prepared statement........................... 69
The Honorable Brian Higgins, a Representative in Congress from
the State of New York: Prepared statement...................... 71
The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress
from the State of New Jersey: Material submitted for the record 72
Written responses from the Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton to
questions submitted for the record by:
The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress
from the State of California, and chairman, Committee on
Foreign Affairs.............................................. 77
The Honorable Dana Rohrabacher, a Representative in Congress
from the State of California................................. 90
The Honorable Steve Chabot, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Ohio............................................ 104
The Honorable Joe Wilson, a Representative in Congress from the
State of South Carolina...................................... 107
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Texas...................................... 114
The Honorable Tom Marino, a Representative in Congress from the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania................................. 123
The Honorable Jeff Duncan, a Representative in Congress from
the State of South Carolina.................................. 132
The Honorable Adam Kinzinger, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Illinois........................................ 134
The Honorable George Holding, a Representative in Congress from
the State of North Carolina.................................. 139
The Honorable Trey Radel, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Florida............................................. 143
The Honorable Doug Collins, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Georgia......................................... 144
The Honorable Mark Meadows, a Representative in Congress from
the State of North Carolina.................................. 146
The Honorable Ted S. Yoho, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Florida......................................... 158
The Honorable Luke Messer, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Indiana......................................... 164
TERRORIST ATTACK IN BENGHAZI:
THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S VIEW
----------
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 23, 2013
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:02 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ed Royce
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Chairman Royce. This hearing of the Committee on Foreign
Affairs will come to order.
Welcome, Madam Secretary.
Secretary Clinton. Thank you.
Chairman Royce. Madam Secretary, on behalf of the entire
committee, let me say how glad we are to see you healthy, and
how much we appreciate your desire to testify about Benghazi
before you leave office.
And let me also say that our appreciation extends to the
work that you have performed on behalf of our country.
This is our committee's opening hearing of this Congress.
It is my initial hearing as its chairman. Examining the first
murder of a U.S. Ambassador in nearly 35 years and the killing
of three other brave Americans, is not a welcome place to
start, but it is necessary.
The State Department must learn from its mistakes to better
protect its employees, many of whom serve in hostile
environments. Unfortunately, threats to Americans abroad are
growing. Particularly, those threats are growing in North
Africa. The attacks last week in Algeria again show the nature
of the danger.
I support having a wide diplomatic presence. We can't
retreat, as you recognized in your testimony, but it has to be
done with the safety of our personnel foremost in mind.
This committee intends to work with your department in a
bipartisan way and to work to improve security. Every
organization has its shortcomings; few welcome them being
highlighted. But it is this committee's job to get answers to
the tough questions. Our goal is to identify where State
Department management broke down, thus failing to protect our
people in Benghazi. It is clear that the problem was not
confined to a few individuals.
The Accountability Review Board, convened by you, Madam
Secretary, found ``systemic failures and leadership and
management deficiencies at senior levels within two bureaus of
the State Department.'' According to the board, these systemic
failures led to the ``grossly inadequate security in Libya.''
The Benghazi compound was facing a storm of militancy, a
flood of weapons, and a deteriorating security environment.
Attacks were escalating on the compound, yet the compound was
inexplicably forced to rely on unarmed Libyan guards and a
militia that included extremist elements. No wonder the board
found a pervasive realization among those in Benghazi that
security was not a high priority for Washington. According to
the report, the board found that responsibility stopped at the
Assistant Secretary level, below the department's most senior
management. This seems to contrast with the recommendation of
the 1999 Accountability Review Board on the East Africa
bombings, which said that, ``The Secretary of State should take
a personal and active role in security issues.''
This committee is concerned that the department's most
senior officials either should have known about the worsening
security situation in Benghazi or did know something about that
security situation. Either way, the point is that security
requests were denied. I am not sure the board saw the full
picture. And if not, its report is not a complete blueprint for
fixing things.
The State Department must get this right. Al-Qaeda and its
affiliates will very likely be targeting other diplomats for
years to come.
Madam Secretary, the committee stands ready to help.
I learned this morning that you and the administration have
proposed legislation to fix the review board, which the
committee looks forward to considering.
Today's discussion may turn to funding. But when reading
the conclusions of the board, one must ask how more money would
have made a difference in a bureaucracy plagued by what the
board called systemic failures. After all, as the security
situation in Libya worsened, the State Department turned away
free security assets from the Department of Defense.
State Department officials have testified that funding was
not an issue. More resources may have been needed in some
areas, but the tragedy of Benghazi was rooted in bad decisions.
Finally, the Benghazi perpetrators must be apprehended, or
they must be killed. It is troubling that Tunisia recently
released a key suspect. Poor Libyan cooperation has hampered
the FBI's investigation. Success here is a matter of justice.
And it is also a matter of signaling to militants that there is
no place for them to hide if they attack U.S. personnel.
I will now turn to the distinguished ranking member, Mr.
Engel, for his opening remarks.
Mr. Engel. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding
this important meeting. I hope we can use this as an
opportunity to seriously examine the steps we need to take to
prevent a repeat of the tragedy in Benghazi, rather than
engaging in gotcha politics that make it more difficult to
achieve this bipartisan goal.
Madam Secretary, as the new ranking member on the Foreign
Affairs Committee, let me say on behalf of the Democratic
members of this committee, we would like to welcome you back to
our committee, and we are glad that you are feeling better.
This will likely be your final appearance before our committee.
And I want to take this opportunity to let you know how much we
appreciate your outstanding and tireless efforts to represent
our country in the international community. I have no doubt
that you will continue to serve our Nation in some capacity, as
you have for so many years, and I look forward to working with
you in the future.
And might I add, as a New Yorker, I feel especially proud
of the wonderful and outstanding job you have done as Secretary
of State. I think that when we look at the outstanding
Secretary of States in our history of our country, you will be
right up there at the very, very top. The way you have worked;
the tireless effort you have made crisscrossing the globe so
many times. You have just been indispensable to all of us as
Americans. I want to thank you personally on behalf of all the
Democrats, and on behalf of all Americans, Democrats and
Republicans. We really want to thank you.
Mr. Chairman, the committee has no greater responsibility
than making sure that the men and women of the State Department
and USAID, and other public servants who work abroad, are
provided the security they deserve. We must do what we can to
minimize the threats faced by our diplomats and aid workers,
but we also must recognize that some risk is inherent in the
practice of effective diplomacy. We cannot advance America's
interests around the world if we isolate behind Embassy walls
or limit the deployment of our diplomats to low-risk
environments. Let's not learn the wrong lesson from today's
hearing.
The Accountability Review Board, or ARB, convened by
Secretary Clinton, found a number of failures that resulted
from a lack of leadership in two State Department bureaus, as
well as woefully inadequate local security in Benghazi.
Clearly, mistakes were made. But let's be absolutely clear.
Barack Obama was not responsible for the Benghazi attack any
more than George W. Bush was responsible for the 9/11 attacks,
or Ronald Reagan was responsible for the attacks on our Marine
barracks in Beirut, which killed over 200 Marines.
And frankly, whether it was called a terrorist attack or
not in the immediate aftermath, as far as I am concerned, is
irrelevant. We just have to make sure that it never happens
again so that in the future our people are protected. That is
what I want to get out of all of this.
So, Madam Secretary, we commend you for accepting all of
the ARB recommendations, and welcome your commitment to begin
implementing them by the time you leave the department. Even
before the ARB submitted its conclusions, the department moved
to address certain shortcomings through its increased security
proposal. The vast majority of the funding for this proposal
would come from funds previously appropriated for lower
priority programs. I hope Congress will move without delay to
give the department the transfer authority it needs to start
applying these changes. It is important to remember that
security is not a one-off endeavor. Indeed, it is a long-term
responsibility and investment.
In that context, the members of the ARB, led by Ambassador
Pickering and Admiral Mullen, highlighted the State
Department's struggle to get the resources it needs. The
ongoing problem had led to a culture at the department in which
some senior managers appear to be more interested in conserving
resources than in achieving specific goals. The ARB report
says, ``The solution requires a more serious and sustained
commitment from Congress to support State Department needs.''
Regrettably, it is clear that Congress is still failing to
meet this commitment. In the most recent State Department
funding bill approved by the House Appropriations Committee,
the administration's request for Embassy security,
construction, and maintenance was cut by $112 million, and
worldwide security protection reduced by $149 million. The
Senate, by comparison, did not cut either account.
So let me again reiterate what I just said about Congress'
responsibility. Over the past 2 years alone, the
administration's requests for diplomatic security funding has
been slashed by more than $0.5 billion in Congress. This makes
it impossible for the State Department to build enough new
secure diplomatic facilities or improve those that already
exist.
The current appropriations bill for Fiscal Year 2013
continues this negative trend. The measure reported out of the
House Appropriations Committee hacked base funding for
worldwide security protection and Embassy security,
construction and maintenance by more than $260 million. The
Senate Appropriations Committee fully funded both requests.
So what I am saying here is that we have much work to do
for ourselves. If we truly want to maintain a global reach,
then we need to make the necessary investments in safeguarding
our personnel who serve in dangerous environments.
So, Mr. Chairman, you have indicated your intention to work
on a State Department authorization bill. And I would like to
work with you in a bipartisan manner to craft legislation that
improves the department's ability to manage its resources and
provide the funding necessary to secure our people and
facilities globally.
So I thank you, and I look forward to the Secretary's
testimony.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Engel.
To help us understand the State Department's response to
the Benghazi attack, we are joined today by Hillary Rodham
Clinton, the 67th Secretary of State. She has had a long career
in public service, and for the past 4 years, Secretary Clinton
has served as President Obama's Secretary of State. She will
soon move on to the next chapter in her distinguished career.
Madam Secretary, without objection, your full statement
will be made part of the record.
And all members here will have 5 days to submit statements
and questions for the record, subject to the limitations of the
committee rules.
Madam Secretary, please begin.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, SECRETARY OF
STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Secretary Clinton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And I thank you and the ranking member and members of the
committee, both of longstanding tenure and brand new members.
And I appreciate your patience for me to be able to come to
fulfill my commitment to you, actually to the former
chairwoman, that I would be here to discuss the attack in
Benghazi.
I appreciate this opportunity. I will submit my full
testimony for the record.
I want to make just a few points. First, the terrorist
attacks in Benghazi that claimed the lives of four brave
Americans, Chris Stevens, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen
Doherty, are part of a broader strategic challenge to the
United States and our partners in North Africa. I think it is
important we understand the context for this challenge as we
work together to protect our people and honor our fallen
colleagues.
Any clear-eyed examination of this matter must begin with
this sobering fact: Since 1988, there have been 19
Accountability Review Boards investigating attacks on American
diplomats and their facilities. Since 1977, 65 American
diplomatic personnel have been killed by terrorists. In
addition to those who have been killed, we know what happened
in Tehran with hostages being taken in 1979; our Embassy and
Marine barracks bombed in Beirut in 1983; Khobar Towers in
Saudi Arabia 1996; our Embassies in East Africa in 1998;
consulate staff murdered in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in 2004; the
Khost attack in Afghanistan in 2009; and too many others.
But I also want to stress the list of attacks that were
foiled, crises averted, and lives saved is even longer. We
should never forget that the security professionals get it
right more than 99 percent of the time, against difficult odds,
because the terrorists only need to get it right once.
That is why, like all my predecessors, I trust the
Diplomatic Security professionals with my life. Let's also
remember that, as the chairman and the ranking member pointed
out, administrations of both parties, in partnership with
Congress, have made concerted and good-faith efforts to learn
from the tragedies that have occurred to implement
recommendations from the review boards, to seek the necessary
resources to better protect our people in a constantly evolving
threat environment.
In fact, Mr. Chairman, of the 19 Accountability Review
Boards that have been held since 1988, only two have been made
public. I want to stress that, because the two that have been
made public, coming out of the East Africa Embassy bombings and
this one, are attempts, honest attempts by the State
Department, by the Secretary, Secretary Albright and myself, to
be as transparent and open as possible.
We wanted to be sure that whatever these independent,
nonpartisan boards found would be made available to the
Congress and to the American people, because as I have said
many times since September 11, I take responsibility, and
nobody is more committed to getting this right. I am determined
to leave the State Department and our country safer, stronger,
and more secure.
Now, taking responsibility meant not only moving quickly in
those first uncertain hours and days to respond to the
immediate crisis, but also to make sure we were protecting our
people and posts in high-threat areas across the region and the
world. It also meant launching an independent investigation to
determine exactly what happened in Benghazi, and to recommend
steps for improvement. And it also meant intensifying our
efforts to combat terrorism and support emerging democracies in
North Africa and beyond.
Let me share briefly the lessons we have learned up until
now. First, let's start on the night of September 11 itself and
those difficult early days. I directed our response from the
State Department and stayed in close contact with officials
from across our Government and the Libyan Government. So I did
see firsthand what Ambassador Pickering and Chairman Mullen
called timely and exceptional coordination. No delays in
decision-making. No denials of support from Washington or from
our military. And I want to echo the review board's praise for
the valor and courage of our people on the ground, especially
our security professionals in Benghazi and Tripoli. The board
said our response saved American lives in real time, and it
did.
The very next morning I told the American people, and I
quote, ``Heavily armed militants assaulted our compound,'' and
vowed to bring them to justice. And I stood later that day with
President Obama as he spoke of an act of terror. Now, you may
recall, at the same time period, we were also seeing violent
attacks on our Embassies in Cairo, Sana'a, Tunis, and Khartoum,
as well as large protests outside many other posts, from India
to Indonesia, where thousands of our diplomats serve. So I
immediately ordered a review of our security posture around the
world, with particular scrutiny for high-threat posts. And I
asked the Department of Defense to join Interagency Security
Assessment Teams and to dispatch hundreds of additional Marine
security guards. I named the first Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for High Threat Posts so that missions in dangerous
places get the attention they need. And we reached out to
Congress to help address physical vulnerabilities, including
risks from fire and to hire additional Diplomatic Security
personnel and Marine security guards.
Second, even as I took these steps, I quickly moved to
appoint the Accountability Review Board because I wanted them
to come forward with their report before I left, because I felt
the responsibility, and I wanted to be sure that I was putting
in motion the response to whatever they found. What was wrong?
How do we fix it? I have accepted every one of their
recommendations. Our Deputy Secretary for Management and
Resources, Deputy Tom Nides, who appeared before this committee
last month, is leading a task force to ensure all 29 are
implemented quickly and completely, as well as pursuing
additional steps above and beyond the board.
I pledged in my letter to you last month that
implementation has now begun on all 29 recommendations. We have
translated them into 64 specific action items. They were all
assigned to specific bureaus and offices, with clear timelines
for completion. Fully 85 percent are on track to be completed
by the end of March, with a number completed already. But we
are also taking a top to bottom look to rethink how we make
decisions on where, when, and whether our people should operate
in high-threat areas and how we respond. We are initiating an
annual high-threat post review, chaired for the first time in
American history, I suppose, by the Secretary of State, and
ongoing reviews by the deputy secretaries to ensure that
pivotal questions about security reach the highest level. And
we will regularize protocols for sharing information with
Congress.
Now, in addition to the immediate action we took, and the
review board process, we are moving on a third front,
addressing the broader strategic challenge in North Africa and
the wider region. Benghazi did not happen in a vacuum. The Arab
revolutions have scrambled power dynamics and shattered
security forces across the region. Instability in Mali has
created an expanding safe haven for terrorists who look to
extend their influence and plot further attacks of the kind we
just saw last week in Algeria. And let me offer our deepest
condolences to the families of the Americans and all the people
from many nations killed and injured in the Algerian hostage
crisis. We remain in close touch with the Government of
Algeria, ready to provide assistance if needed, and also
seeking to gain a fuller understanding of what took place so we
can work together to prevent such terrorist attacks in the
future.
Now, concerns about terrorism and instability in North
Africa are not new, of course. Indeed, they have been a top
priority for this entire national security team. But we need to
work together to accelerate a diplomatic campaign to increase
pressure on al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and other terrorist
groups in the region. I have conferred with the President of
Libya, the Foreign Ministers and Prime Ministers of Tunisia and
Morocco. Two weeks later, after the attack, I met with a very
large group of regional leaders at the U.N. and was part of a
special meeting focused on Mali and the Sahel. In October, I
flew to Algeria to discuss the fight against AQIM. In November,
I sent Deputy Secretary Bill Burns on an interagency group to
Algiers to continue that conversation. And then, in my stead,
he co-chaired the Global Counterterrorism Forum that was held
in Abu Dhabi and a meeting in Tunis, working not only on
building new democracies but reforming security services.
These are just a few of the constant diplomatic engagements
that we are having focused on targeting al-Qaeda's syndicate of
terror, closing safe havens, cutting off finances, countering
their extremist ideology, slowing the flow of new recruits. We
continue to hunt the terrorists responsible for the attacks in
Benghazi, and are determined to bring them to justice. And we
are using our diplomatic and economic tools to support the
emerging democracies, including Libya, in order to give them
the strength to provide a path away from extremism.
But finally, the United States must continue to lead in the
Middle East, in North Africa, and around the globe. We have
come a long way in the past 4 years, and we cannot afford to
retreat now. When America is absent, especially from unstable
environments, there are consequences: Extremism takes root; our
interests suffer; and our security at home is threatened.
That is why Chris Stevens went to Benghazi in the first
place. I asked him to go. During the beginning of the
revolution against Ghadafi, we needed somebody in Benghazi who
could begin to build bridges with the insurgents and to begin
to demonstrate that America would stand against Ghadafi. Nobody
knew the dangers or the opportunities better than Chris, first,
during the revolution, then during the transition: A weak
Libyan Government, marauding militias, even terrorist groups, a
bomb exploded in the parking lot of his hotel. He never
wavered. He never asked to come home. He never said, let's shut
it down, quit, and go somewhere else, because he understood it
was critical for America to be represented in that place at
that pivotal time.
So, Mr. Chairman, we do have to work harder and better to
balance the risks and the opportunities. Our men and women who
serve overseas understand that we do accept a level of risk to
represent and protect the country we love. They represent the
best traditions of a bold and generous Nation. They cannot work
in bunkers and do their jobs. But it is our responsibility to
make sure they have the resources they need to do those jobs
and to do everything we can to reduce the risks they face.
For me, this is not just a matter of policy; it is
personal, because I have had the great honor to lead the men
and women of the State Department and USAID, nearly 70,000
serving here in Washington and at more than 275 posts around
the world. They get up and go to work every day, often in
difficult and dangerous circumstances, thousands of miles from
home, because they believe the United States is the most
extraordinary force for peace and progress the Earth has ever
known.
And when we suffer tragedies overseas, the number of
Americans applying to the Foreign Service actually increases.
That tells us everything we need to know about the kind of
patriots I am talking about. They do ask what they can do for
their country. And America is stronger for it. So today, after
4 years in this job, traveling nearly 1 million miles and
visiting 112 countries, my faith in our country and our future
is stronger than ever. Every time that blue and white airplane
carrying the words ``United States of America'' touches down in
some far off capital, I feel again the honor it is to represent
the world's indispensable Nation, and I am confident that with
your help, we will continue to keep the United States safe,
strong, and exceptional. And I would be very happy to answer
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Clinton follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Our State Department personnel do certainly accept a level
of risk. And they do so in order, as you have said quite
properly, to continue to lead. And we recognize that hindsight
is 20/20.
But with regard to the Benghazi attacks, what is probably
most disturbing, as the question comes before the committee and
as the media looks at the situation, is that the dots here were
connected ahead of time. The State Department saw this risk
coming. And the State Department didn't act in order to prevent
what could have been handled by answering the requests by our
personnel.
If we look at the State Department e-mail exchange on top
officials in the bureau, written right after the assassination
attempt on the British Ambassador in June 2012, here is the
exchange,
``This is very concerning when you start putting the
events together, the anti-American demonstration, the
attack on our compound, and now the U.K. Motorcade
attack. If the tide is turning and they are now looking
for Americans and westerners to attack, that is a game
changer. We are not staffed or resourced adequately to
protect our people in that type of environment. We are
a soft target.''
Here is the point. Senior officials fully appreciated the
grave threats in Benghazi. They knew that al-Qaeda was there.
They knew that our security was insufficient. But instead of
adding security, in this case, they took it away. They withdrew
mobile security detachment teams. They sent packing a special
team that the Defense Department provided at no cost. If senior
officials knew that our diplomats weren't safe and weren't
adequately staffed, then why did they continue to withdraw
security? I think that is the first question.
In testimony this morning, you said you never saw those
requests, and I understand that. Last month, though, Deputy
Secretary Burns testified that memos regarding the
deteriorating security situation did make their way to the
seventh floor, to top management. So which senior official was
he referring to when he talks about top management there? Who
in the senior management was responsible for responding to
those requests that were coming from the field? That would be
my question.
Secretary Clinton. Well, there are a lot of important
questions in that, Mr. Chairman.
And let me begin by saying that I was aware of certain
incidents at our facility, and the attack on the British
diplomat. I was briefed on steps taken to repair the breach in
the perimeter wall after the June bombing, steps taken to
reduce off-compound movements. Our team, led by security
professionals, but also including intelligence professionals
and others, did not recommend, based on those incidents,
abandoning Benghazi, in part because over the last years, we
have become accustomed to operating in dangerous places in
Pakistan, in Iraq, and Afghanistan, and Yemen, and elsewhere.
And we do, as by necessity, rely on security professionals to
implement the protocols and procedures necessary to keep our
people safe. And as I said in my opening statements, I have a
lot of confidence in them because, you know, most of the time,
they get it right.
But I was also engaged, and I think this is what Deputy
Secretary Burns was referring to, in the issues related to the
deteriorating threat environment, particularly in Libya--there
were other places across the region we were also watching--to
try to see what we could do to support the Libyan Government to
improve the overall stability of their country, to deal with
the many militias. We have many programs and actions that we
were working on. I had a number of conversations with leading
Libyan officials. I went to Libya in October 2011. In fact,
shortly before the attack on Benghazi, we approved Libya for
substantial funding from a joint State-DoD account for border
security, CT capabilities, and WMD efforts.
Chairman Royce. I understand that, Madam Secretary.
Secretary Clinton. So I want to just clarify that there
were specific instances and assessments going on primarily by
the security professionals related to individual posts,
including Benghazi.
Chairman Royce. But what I saw was a communique, which
indicated that those assets, like the security site team, were
in fact pulled. You had free of cost here, from the Department
of Defense, a team in place. And on about August 15, some weeks
before the attack, the question was, can we extend that
security team? And the answer is no, it would be embarrassing
to our agency if that agency is providing the protection. That
struck me as a little bit of the problem that we had before
between the CIA and the FBI, between, you know, two agencies
that were more focused perhaps on the rivalry than they were on
providing the security. And we are full circle now, based on
the reading, literal reading of those memos. Here you had the
requests.
So that is my question. They didn't come to the conclusion
that we should increase security, but what about the question
of having security actually withdrawn August 15 in terms of the
security site team provided by the Department of Defense?
Secretary Clinton. Again, I am glad you raised that. The
ARB looked into this, as it looked into everything. It does not
even discuss the SST or recommend that our personnel on the
ground should have asked for its continued deployment. And I
think that is in part because the SST was based in Tripoli.
Chairman Royce. Right.
Secretary Clinton. It hardly ever, less than 2 percent of
the entire time it was in Libya, did it even go to Benghazi.
Its responsibilities, which were about the siting of and
security of the Embassy, were focused on Tripoli. And it was
not an open-ended arrangement, as it has been understood. It
was intended as an interim measure. And the experts who were
there played vital roles. They were communications specialists,
airfield specialists, trained medics. They helped to stand up
our Embassy in Tripoli when we reopened it. And I think it is
important that they were very helpful with the Embassy. But at
the end of the day, they really were not focused on, nor did
they pay much attention to, Benghazi. And I think since their
primary mission was at the Embassy, the Embassy did acquire a
lot of assets. And that was the decision that they should not
be extended for a third time.
Chairman Royce. Madam Secretary, thank you.
We are going to go Mr. Engel from New York.
Mr. Engel. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, you and the State Department have
rightfully taken responsibility for what happened, convening
the ARB and implementing its recommendations. But as I said in
my opening statement, we need to be clear-eyed that there is
blame to share right here in Congress. Over the past 2 years
alone, the administration's requests for diplomatic security
funding has been slashed by more than $0.5 billion in Congress.
And the current appropriations bill for fiscal 2013 continues
this negative trend by slashing funding for worldwide security
protection, Embassy security, construction and maintenance by
more than $260 million.
So I would like to ask you, Madam Secretary, do you think
that Congress has provided adequate resources for diplomatic
security in recent years? Can you talk about security
priorities you have not been able to complete due to an
inadequate budget? And what advice would you give the committee
as it considers funding to protect our diplomats? And I want to
also ask what would happen to the security of our diplomats and
our diplomatic facilities if there is a sequester, or worse, a
government shut down? Has the State Department begun planning
for the dangers of Congress not agreeing to a budget?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Congressman Engel, this is a
bipartisan problem. Since 2007, the Department has consistently
requested greater funding for Embassy construction and
diplomatic security. But with the exception of 2010, the
Congress has consistently enacted less than requested.
Most notably, in 2012, the department received $340 million
less than requested, close to 10 percent less. Now, over the
last 2 years cuts to the Embassy construction, security and
maintenance budget was almost 10 percent of that as well. Now,
the ARB, and I would refer to them, because, you know, they had
an independent view of this, has recommended an increase in
facilities funding to $2.2 billion per year to restore the
construction levels that were called for in the 1998 ARB
report.
But I think it is also fair to make the point the ARB made.
Consistent shortfalls have required the government to try to
prioritize. And the department has attempted to do that. But I
do think that there became a culture of reaction, you know, as
the ARB report says, husbanding resources, and trying to figure
out how to do as much with as little as possible. And so
although our prioritization was certainly imperfect, the funds
provided by Congress were inadequate. So somehow we have to
work on both ends of that equation. Now, what can you do?
Well, first of all, we came up with a request to the
legislative and budget staffs for transfer authority language,
namely taking money we already had in this budget and letting
us move it quickly to do what the ARB told us to do. More
Marine security guards, more Diplomatic Security guards, more
construction and upgrades. We were able to get that included in
the Senate version of the Sandy supplemental, which passed on
December 28, but we were unable to get the language included in
the House version. This is not new money. So, first and
foremost, I would greatly appreciate this committee weighing
in, working with your counterpart in the Senate, to give us
this transfer authority. Otherwise, we are going to be behind
the curve again.
Secondly, I think it is very important to change the laws
about best value contracting versus lowest price technically
qualified. By statute, the State Department local guard
contracts in dangerous places like Libya, and everywhere else,
except Iraq and Afghanistan, must be awarded using a lowest
price technically acceptable selection process. We have
requested a change in the legislation that would allow us to
use some discretion to try to deal with the varieties and
vagaries of these local guard forces. We currently have it, as
I said, in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan. But it is going to
expire. So that is something else that I would respectfully ask
this committee to look into.
And finally, the point that the chairman made and that you
echoed, Congressman, an authorization. You know, working on an
authorization. I was on the Armed Services Committee in the
Senate. We did an authorization every year no matter what was
going on in the world. It was a great organizing tool. It made
sure that our defense needs were going to be met. I believe
that in the world in which we are living, our diplomacy and
development needs are very important. But we don't have the
same focus. And so working with the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on an authorization where you can look at everything
and you can have subcommittees really delving into all of these
different issues, coming up with an authorization, I think
would be a great step forward.
Mr. Engel. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Chairman Royce. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen from New York--from
Florida.
They retire from New York to Florida. From Florida.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. We will take them either way. New Jersey,
New York, come on down. Madam Secretary----
Secretary Clinton. There are a lot of New Yorkers already
down there, I think, aren't there?
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. But you can only vote once. We are very
picky about that.
Madam Secretary, thank you for the positive working
relationship that we have had during your tenure at the State
Department. I request that I get written responses for the
questions that I am going to ask.
First, why were you not interviewed for the review board by
the review board investigators? How can this review be
considered thorough when the person at the top, the Secretary
of State, was not part of the investigation? That is what was
said in our open hearing when it was confirmed that you were
never questioned for this report, and I think that is
outrageous.
Also, the State Department was clearly allowing the false
narrative that Department officials were being held accountable
for what went wrong in Benghazi, for ignoring the threat, and
it was perceived as fact. Look at these headlines: The New York
Times, ``Four are out at State Department after scathing report
on Benghazi attack,'' not true. ``Heads roll at the State
Department,'' not true. Yet State did nothing to correct the
record. Here we are 130 days after the terrorist attack, why
did you not take steps publicly to correct this false
narrative, even up to and including today? Even when your
deputies, Burns and Nides, testified before us, they both said
that steps were being taken to discipline those State
Department officials, when in fact no significant action had or
has occurred. There has just been a shuffling of the deck
chairs.
Do you find it acceptable that the State officials
responsible for this lack of leadership and mismanagement, and
for ignoring security requests during the Benghazi attack and
before, remain employed within the State Department?
Also, the accountability report cites several systemic
failures at the department that cannot be overlooked or
ignored. Given that State was aware of the dangerously
declining security situation in Benghazi--as pointed out by our
chairman--the assassination attempt on the British Ambassador,
and other attacks on Western interests, why did State not
immediately revamp our security protocols prior to the
September 11 attacks? Did State fail to act preemptively
because it ignored the threat, or did it fail to act because it
was unable to recognize this growing pattern of violence?
Either way, State did fail to act.
These failures highlighted by the ARB report serve as a
blueprint for terrorists on where our weaknesses lie, where we
are vulnerable. So what actions have been taken to ensure that
when another Embassy, another consulate sounds the alarm on
security threats, as it happened in Benghazi, that those
requests are not yet again ignored? As we examine the
willingness and capacity of host countries in the region, we
must condition aid to countries with these high-threat posts
based on their cooperation with the United States. I hope that
we do that.
Further, regarding the State's request for more money, it
is worth pointing out that some State Department officials have
stated that budget constraints are not to blame for the loss of
lives in Benghazi. However, the State Department is notorious
for wasteful spending and continues to have misplaced funding
priorities. Between the State Department, Treasury, and USAID,
the Fiscal Year 2012 request for global climate change
initiative is over $1.3 billion. Now, what do we think or what
do you think is a higher priority and a better use of
taxpayers' money, national security or global climate change?
This money could have been used for Embassy construction, for
hiring more diplomacy security agents, for providing our posts
and personnel overseas with adequate equipment and training.
There is more that I can't get to, but certainly I would
appreciate your written answers, including the 64 specific
action items that you will be taking on the task force
recommendation. Also, we look forward to getting a detailed
report here in Congress on explaining their justification,
their itemized funding layout, et cetera.
So thank you, Madam Secretary, for the time.
Secretary Clinton. Congressman, obviously, we will answer
all of your questions. Let me just comment on two of them even
though my time has run out. First, I was not asked to speak
with the Accountability Review Board during their
investigation. The specific issues they were looking at
regarding the attack on Benghazi were handled by security
professionals in the department. And that is where the ARB
focused. Obviously, if they had thought that I was relevant or
had information that would have helped the investigation, I
would have gladly discussed that with them at their request.
Secondly, on the personnel, this is another area where I
need your help. First, all four individuals have been removed
from their jobs. Second, they have been placed on
administrative leave. Thirdly, Ambassador Pickering and Admiral
Mullen specifically highlighted the reason why this has been so
complicated. Under Federal statute and regulations,
unsatisfactory leadership is not grounds for finding a breach
of duty. And the ARB did not find that these four individuals
breached their duty. So, fourthly, I have submitted legislation
to this committee and to the Senate committee to fix this
problem so future ARBs will not face this situation, because I
agree with you, there ought to be more leeway given to the
ARBs. But under current law, they were limited.
Chairman Royce. Madam Secretary, we will be working to fix
that problem.
Mr. Faleomavaega from American Samoa.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and our ranking
member for calling this important hearing.
Madam Secretary, thank you for your most eloquent
statement. Your service to our Nation has been exemplary and
outstanding. And any suggestion otherwise during today's
hearing I would consider unfair and unwarranted.
We meet today under difficult circumstances. I am sure that
when you, as Secretary of State, stood at Andrews Air Force
Base for the transfer of the remains of Ambassador Christopher
Stevens, Mr. Sean Smith, Mr. Tyrone Woods, and Mr. Glen
Doherty, you must have had tremendous, or felt tremendous pain
and suffering. As we express in our Samoan proverb, ``Ua tagi
le fatu ma le eleele,'' meaning, ``the stones and the Earth
wept.''
Madam Secretary, please know that we were not--you were not
alone. We wept with you and with the families of our fallen
heroes. It is true that the Benghazi attack is the first time
since 1979 that an American Ambassador has been killed in the
line of duty. But it is also true that the world has changed
significantly since 1979, and consequently the Department of
State is increasingly operating in high-threat locations
throughout the world. This is why the Accountability Review
Board rightly observed that Congress needs to make a serious
and sustained commitment to supporting State Department needs.
But in the Fiscal Year 2013 fiscal year budget, the House
cut the administration's request by about $200 million.
However, having been provided $2.6 billion of security funding,
I wonder if the Congress had done its part and fulfilled its
responsibility in providing the State Department with the
necessary resources and funding to meet its needs, especially
to provide security for our Embassies and consulates throughout
the world. I agree with the ARB's recommendations that we
should restore the capital security cost-sharing program, which
pulls money from different agencies in order to accelerate
construction of new Embassies and consulates.
Madam Secretary, in honor of the lives of Ambassador
Christopher Stevens, Mr. Sean Smith, Mr. Tyrone Woods, and Mr.
Glen Doherty, we need answers so that we can prevent this kind
of tragedy from happening again. It is no good for any of us to
use this tragedy for political gain. This was a terrorist
attack first and foremost.
And we must not lose sight of this brutal fact. Instead, we
must hold together in our commitment to defeat those who would
do us harm. So, Madam Secretary, I commend you for convening
the ARB in accordance with the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and
Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, and for accepting all 29 of the
recommendations of the ARB commission. For the past 20 years,
you have served our Nation well. You have done all you could do
to deliver freedom safely to future generations. I salute you,
and I look ahead to 2016, wishing you much success and
extending to you my highest regards.
I do have one question, or a couple if I have the time.
Madam Secretary, I note with interest one of your quotes, or a
statement here that this is why Ambassador Chris Stevens went
to Benghazi. I want to get the sense that the commitment of our
Foreign Service Officers throughout the world is second to
none, even at the risk of their lives. And I wish that my
colleagues would understand, yes, we have logistical problems,
yes, we have funding, but the fact that these people willingly
did this, not only because of his love for the leaders and the
people of Libya, but because he was so proud to represent this
great Nation of ours.
And I would like to ask if you could elaborate just a
little further what you meant by this, that Ambassador Stevens
went to Benghazi in the first place, knowing the dangers,
knowing the dangers were there, he went still; could you please
comment on that?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Congressman, I think it is
absolutely the case that we have a Foreign Service that is
composed of men and women who take on these responsibilities
because they love our country. They go in with their eyes wide
open. They learn languages. They immerse themselves in
cultures. They go out to the Foreign Service Institute and hone
their skills.
And Chris Stevens was one of our very best. He started off
in the Peace Corps in Morocco, was a fluent Arabic speaker, had
served with distinction throughout the Arab world. And when I
asked if he would be interested in going to Benghazi, where we
had nothing when he first went, where he, you know, bunked up
in a hotel, we didn't have any support to speak of, he was
thrilled. And he understood immediately what it would mean.
In the wake of this tragedy, this terrible terrorist
attack, I think one of the most poignant events has been
overlooked. And that is what happened after the Libyan people,
from Benghazi to Tripoli, learned that Chris Stevens, someone
whom they had gotten to know, whom they trusted and admired,
had been murdered. They went out into the streets. They
protested themselves, thousands, tens of thousands, far more
than the dozens of highly armed, you know, invaders of our
compound and our annex. And they made it clear that that was
not the kind of country they were trying to build. So, in some
ways, Chris' faith after his death was certainly validated.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Chairman Royce. Mr. Smith of New Jersey.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Madam Secretary. You know, we all deeply mourn the
tragic loss of four extraordinarily brave Americans, including
our distinguished Ambassador, Christopher Stevens. But one of
my top concerns is that we seem to be relearning the same
lessons again and again and again.
Madam Secretary, after the August 1998 bombings of U.S.
Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, Admiral Crowe sat exactly
where you sit, that was 13 years ago, and told the subcommittee
that I chaired at the time that, ``In our investigations of the
bombings, the Boards were shocked how similar the lessons
learned were to those drawn by the Inman Commission some 14
years ago.'' In other words, in 1985. In direct response, I
authored a bipartisan law, the Admiral James W. Nance and Meg
Donovan Foreign Relations Authorization Act. In it, we had a
title, the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act
of 1999, to upgrade diplomatic security and residences, to
improve threat assessments and facilities, emergency action
plans, security threat lists, perimeter distances, setbacks,
for example, crisis management training, Diplomatic Security
training, rapid response procedures, storage and emergency
equipment, like fire suppressant capabilities, and increased
antiterrorism training in Africa. Before 1998, there were 1,000
security specialists. Today, there are over 3,100. I agree we
need more. But how present-day security personnel and assets
are deployed are above all a leadership issue. And clearly, we
have and had the Diplomatic Security assets that could have
been deployed to Benghazi.
When it comes to what you knew, Madam Secretary, and what
requests were made of you and the department to beef up
security in Benghazi, there are disturbing parallels to Kenya
and Tanzania. Prior to the East Africa terrorist bombings, U.S.
Ambassador to Kenya Prudence Bushnell repeatedly asked
Secretary Madeleine Albright for more security upgrades. And
the Ambassador's request was rejected. And the loss of life, as
we all know, was horrific.
There are numerous press reports that U.S. Ambassador to
Libya Chris Stevens and his team made repeated requests for
security assistance. So my questions are these: One, you
defined taking responsibility for Benghazi in your testimony a
few moments ago in terms and only in terms of during and after
the terrorist attacks. What about before the attack on
September 11, 2012? What did you personally and your staff
know? When did you become aware of Ambassador Stevens' and his
team's requests for security upgrades? What exactly did you do
in response? You obviously were very close to him. Did he ask
you personally at any time?
When you said a moment ago that Ambassador Pickering's ARB
perhaps didn't think you relevant to be interviewed, you are
the most relevant person of all. You are the leader. You are on
top of it all. So I would join with my colleague Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen; you should have been interviewed, and very important
questions asked. And were you personally in any way at fault?
Secretary Clinton. Well, first, Congressman, I am well
aware of the work that you did after the 1998 bombings. And I
think that work and the legislation that you championed has
been very important in protecting our people around the world.
We have been not only reviewing but continuing to implement the
recommendations of all the former ARBs. And the 18 previous
ARBs resulted in 164 recommendations. And we have been very
clear that the overwhelming majority have been implemented. A
handful of such recommendations were by their very nature
requiring continuous implementation, like what kind of security
upgrades or radio communication was necessary. And there were a
few that were only partially implemented because of some
separate security concerns that that would have raised.
But there was a need for ongoing funding. You remember that
Admiral Crowe said, we wanted $2.2 billion for building
Embassies. We had a number of Embassies that were built in
those early years, thanks to your legislation. Then it petered
off. You know, we put so much time and attention into Iraq and
Afghanistan, trying to make sure that we secured our people
there. We sent a lot of our Diplomatic Security personnel
there. And so we had a slowdown over a number of years in our
ability to build new Inman facilities. And now the latest ARB
is saying, let's get back and do this again because there is no
substitute for it.
Mr. Smith. I am almost out of time, Madam Secretary. When
did you become aware of Ambassador Stevens' request, and how
did you respond to it? And did he ever personally ask you to be
involved?
Secretary Clinton. No, no and----
Mr. Smith. You didn't get----
Secretary Clinton. No. That any of the requests, any of the
cables having to do with security did not come to my attention.
Chairman Royce. Mr. Sherman from California.
Mr. Sherman. Madam Secretary, it is a shame that this is
your last appearance before our committee. And I would have
thought that your last appearance would have been a chance for
us to review your outstanding record as one of our great
Secretaries of State, whether it be leading efforts to enforce
sanctions on Iran, your work supporting women's rights around
the world, engaging with civil society and restoring and
maintaining American influence in a very difficult era. I would
have thought that your last hearing would be your chance to
give us some advice for what to do over the next 4 years and
beyond.
I take seriously your very strong advice, because I happen
to agree with it, that it is about time we pass an
authorization bill through both Houses of Congress. But
instead, we are here on, I guess, our third hearing to deal
with the tragic events in Benghazi because it is a chance for
each political party to beat up on the other. We can talk about
how Republicans did not provide you with resources. We can talk
about the administration inside the State Department.
So I would hope that maybe we get you to come back again--I
realize that would be gratis; you wouldn't even be on the
government payroll at that time--and do the hearing that I
would like to have, which is getting your input on the bigger
issues of foreign policy.
Ultimately, the security of our diplomats depends on the
host country. This is all the discussion is about, well, there
might have been five security people on the ground and if only
there had been more funding, more deployment, this cable, that
cable, maybe there would have been eight or nine security
people on the ground, which might have led to more protection,
might have led to more casualties.
And here in Washington, the decision was made to provide
well more than 16 security people to Libya, and nobody that I
know of in Washington was involved in the issue of how many of
those were in Benghazi, either going with the Ambassador or
there in advance. So the decision that all 16 weren't with him
was a decision that you can't blame either political party or
anyone in Washington for.
Ultimately, all we can have at our Embassies is enough to
stave off a militant attack for a few hours. And after that, if
the host country doesn't come to the rescue, it doesn't matter
whether we have 3, 6, 12, 16 or 36 armed guards and Marines at
the location.
One aspect of protecting our diplomats in the future is
bringing to justice the criminals who did this this time. We
did a lot for the people of Libya. We did a lot for those who
are now ruling Libya. How would you appraise their efforts to
cooperate with us in the investigation? And does this Libyan
Government have the will and the capacity to arrest the
suspects involved? And of course, will and capacity tend to go
with each other. I think they would have to, at minimum, strain
their capacity to try to arrest powerful armed elements in the
eastern part of the country, and I don't know if they have the
will to use that capacity. So can you tell us after the attack
and now that we are trying to bring these culprits to justice,
what do you think of the Libyan Government?
Secretary Clinton. Well, I think, Congressman, you drew
exactly the right description; is it will or is it capacity,
when obviously what you need is both? I have found the Libyan
officials to be willing but without capacity. And part of our
challenge is to help them build greater capacity, because now
it is about them. It is not only about what happened to us in
Benghazi, which every official in the Libyan Government was
deeply upset about, but they have their own problems now. They
are having leaders attacked and assassinated on a regular
basis.
So we have to do more to help them build up their security
capacity. And again, I would ask this committee to work with
us; there are holds on a lot of security funding that would go
to Libya to assist them in building capacity.
There are those I know in the Congress who say, look, Libya
is a wealthy nation, we don't need to give them any money.
Well, until they get up and going, it is in our great interest
to give them the resources, like we have with other countries
over the past 40 years.
Chairman Royce. We go to Mr. Rohrabacher of California.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you for being with us today and putting yourself
through this.
Secretary Clinton. Thank you.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Let me just note that fixing
responsibility, which we are trying to do today, and
identifying bad policy and mistakes is the way that democracies
fix problems. It is not all politics. It is how we do things
here to make it better. So none of us have--should at all
apologize for trying to get to the nitty gritty.
Let me just note that Assistant Secretary of State Lamb
testified here in Congress that budget considerations played
absolutely no role in her decision--it was her decision, not
yours, but you approved them--but her decision as to what the
level of security would be there at Benghazi. So any suggestion
that this is a budget issue is off base or political.
Madam Secretary, you told the Senate this morning that you
learned of the attack around 4 o'clock p.m. on that day and you
were involved widely in the coordinated response, which
included the Department of Defense and the White House, but did
not speak to the President until later that evening. When did
you talk to the President?
Secretary Clinton. Two things, on the first point you made,
Congressman, the ARB disagreed and did find that budget issues
were at stake.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, she testified under oath and----
Secretary Clinton. Well, you know, that is why you have an
independent group like an ARB. That is why it was created, to
look at everything.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Everybody has their own----
Secretary Clinton. Right. I think it is important, though,
and I would urge----
Mr. Rohrabacher. What about when you saw the President,
when did you see the President?
Secretary Clinton. I talked to the President at the end of
the day, but I had been in constant communication with the
National Security Advisor. I had been on secure video
conferences with high level officials in the White House and
the Defense Department.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Secretary Lamb, the lady we are talking
about, did--testified that she had actually witnessed this in
real time, the attack, in real time on a monitor. At any time,
did you see the initial attack on a monitor or the President?
Secretary Clinton. Congressman, there was no monitor. There
was no real time. We got the surveillance videos some weeks
later. That was the first time we saw any video of the attack.
I think there was a misunderstanding. I think that, perhaps, I
am just trying to clarify this--I may be going beyond my brief
here, but I think perhaps what she meant was----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Was there audio?
Secretary Clinton. She was on an open--she was talking to
DS people, who were trying to understand what was going on.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Right. Well, I would have to say that
Admiral Mullen in briefing us suggested that they had seen some
kind of video and that, within a few moments, it was very clear
that this was a very coordinated terrorist attack and not some
demonstration that had gone awry.
Secretary Clinton. Well, I think surveillance video, which
some of you may have seen in a classified setting, does
demonstrate what happened that night.
Mr. Rohrabacher. As you were dealing with the crisis as it
went on, did you think or act on the basis that this was a film
protest gone out of control, and when you briefed the
President, did you tell him that? Or did you tell him, which
Admiral Mullen suggests you knew by then, that this was a well
planned and executed terrorist attack? Which was the President
told?
Secretary Clinton. Well, first of all, I said the very next
morning that it was an attack by heavily armed militants. The
President said that morning it was an act of terror. At the
same time, however, I was dealing with protests against our
facilities that were clearly connected to that video. So we
were managing a number of such events.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Let's say that you noted, and it can be--
people do that so you can say that you said it, but the
emphasis we all remember what the emphasis was, over and over
and over again, it was repeated that we had enraged the Islamic
terrorists, which by the way, what--when you say we enraged the
Islamic terrorists, that means we are at fault. They are not at
fault. And then to look and see that the only people I know are
in jail right now is the filmmaker. Isn't this a little
disconcerting?
Secretary Clinton. Well, first, Congressman, I want to be
clear that, of course, it was the terrorist attack. The very
next day I called it an attack by heavily armed militants on
our compound. I think there are still, however, questions about
exactly what caused it, who the attackers were. The ARB, after
months of research, said the picture is still very complicated.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well----
Secretary Clinton. I think it is worth members looking a
both the both unclassified and classified ARB with that in
mind.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you.
Chairman Royce. Mr. Meeks of New York.
Mr. Meeks. I thank the chair.
Madam Secretary, let me first thank you. First of all, I
want to thank you for an extraordinary daughter who came to the
Rockaways after Sandy, just helping people, unannounced,
without fanfare, just getting down and helping people because
they needed help after that terrible storm. And so just
extraordinary public service.
And then I want to also say, Madam Secretary, that you have
been Secretary of State at an extraordinary time in the history
of the United States of America and the world, and you have
managed the challenge in an equally extraordinary manner.
When you took the job, America had a tarnished image
abroad. You have revised our brand, traveled over 1 million
miles to the furthest reaches of the world, to the most
challenging areas, and touched the lives of the most
vulnerable. With your leadership of initiatives like the QDDR,
you have deepened our confidence that foreign aid can be
responsibly spent. On behalf of a grateful Nation and
definitely the people of the Fifth Congressional District, I
want to thank you for a job well done.
The attacks on our mission in Benghazi were a painful
reminder to all of us that our diplomats of course are in
harm's way. And they are in some of the same unstable and even
hostile environments as our military. Yet they don't have the
same means of protecting themselves. And sadly, we go back, and
we have talked, and I know at this committee I heard Admiral
Mullen and Ambassador Pickering saying that money was and the
budget is very important and makes a difference. Yet, sadly,
this House has failed to do its part in addressing the
challenges they face, even after the tragedy of the Benghazi
attacks.
You, however have been responsible and accepted the
recommendations of the ARB and put measures in place
immediately after the September attacks that demonstrate that
you are serious about changing the status quo. But, of course,
again, it is a two-way street. Congress failed to act in a
meaningful way. And I believe it is a shame on the leadership
for its failure to give the State Department the authority to
transfer already appropriated funds, not new money, already
money that you have toward bolstering security for our
diplomats to give you that discretion. And shame on the House
for its failing to adequately fund the administration's request
for diplomatic security funding.
Now, I hope that this Congress will act swiftly to fix
these critical funding matters.
It is also my hope, as you have said, that we finally have
a State authorization bill that the President can sign into
law.
But let me ask you this question, at the time of the
Benghazi attacks, you indicated, there were risings going on in
Egypt and in Yemen and in Tunisia. It seems as though a lot,
because no one could have imagined and I am sure you did not
when you initially took office, that we would have the Arab
Spring and the nature of what was going on in these various
countries would have happened.
I want to ask you a question, somewhat what Mr. Sherman was
asking, just to get your thoughts, on what we might do as
Members of Congress and how we might move forward with the
nations of the Arab Spring so that maybe that is a way we can
prevent these kinds of things from happening in the future.
Secretary Clinton. Well, it is an excellent question,
Congressman, and deserves a very thoughtful answer, longer than
the time I have.
But let me just make three quick points: First, we cannot
retreat from, give up on, turn our backs on these new Arab
Spring revolutionary countries and new regimes. They are very
new. Most of them have leaders that have never run anything.
They have come from backgrounds where they are suspicious of
security, because security was a dirty word; it through them in
jail. It harassed themselves and their families. So we have to
do some work, and that work requires that we stay engaged.
Secondly, we have to do a much better job in helping
rebuild security apparatus that can be used. Quick example, we
had a terrible assault on our Embassy in Tunis, and I called
the President of Tunisia; I said, you have got to send
reinforcements right now. Our Embassy is going to be overrun.
He sent it. It stopped. The government really has been
responsive, understanding that, you know, these terrorists,
these extremists, don't just threaten us in Western countries.
They threaten the stability and the future of these
governments. So we have to help them the way we helped Colombia
years ago.
And finally, we need do a better job conveying a counter
narrative to the extremist jihadist narrative. You know, I have
said this to this committee before, a lot of new members on it,
we have abdicated the broadcasting arena. Yes, we have private
stations, CNN, FOX, NBC, all of that. They are out there. They
convey information. But we are not doing what we did during the
Cold War, our Broadcasting Board of Governors is practically
defunct in terms of its capacity to be able to tell a message
around the world. So we are abdicating the ideological arena,
and we need to get back into it.
We have the best values. We have the best narrative. Most
people in the world just want to have a good decent life that
is supported by a good decent job and raise their families. And
we are letting the jihadist narrative fill a void. We need to
get in there and compete, and we can do it successfully.
Chairman Royce. Mr. Chabot of Ohio.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, first, let me thank you for your service,
and I wish you the best in your future endeavors, mostly.
I have a couple of questions, but I do want to take a
moment or two to say a couple of words about our late
Ambassador Chris Stevens. Many members and staff on our
committee have had the opportunity to know and to work with
him, even before he was named our U.S. Ambassador to Libya. I
think all would agree that he was one of our most able
diplomats. I had the opportunity to meet with him in Tripoli a
little less than a month before he and three other outstanding
Americans were murdered in Benghazi. His enthusiasm for the job
was really something to behold. He was excited about the
opportunity to help a nation newly freed from decades of brutal
dictatorship.
My first night in country, I had the opportunity to join
the Ambassador for an IFTAR dinner with a number of newly
elected Libyan parliamentarians. They were optimistic about
building a democracy, creating a vibrant economy, and restoring
fundamental human rights for the Libyan people. He was as
enthusiastic as they were about the prospects. There is no
question that he will be missed by all who knew him and worked
with him.
One of the things that really troubles me, Madam Secretary,
is the hoops that we on this committee have had to jump through
to get to the facts surrounding the deaths of these public
servants. The State Department has delayed and delayed coming
forth with information. When this committee was finally
presented with relevant data, it amounted often times to what
might be called a document dump--hundreds of pages of paper in
wide disarray, in no particular order, either in terms of
relevance or in chronology, often duplicates in different
binders, making it very difficult to locate documents that were
of any help.
Our public servants in Libya were murdered on September 11.
It is now January 23, more than 4 months later. It is
unacceptable that the State Department has made it so difficult
for Congress to exercise its oversight responsibility.
Now a couple of questions. Within a couple of months of the
attack, during the July-August period, Ambassador Stevens
expressed concern about militia activity, particularly in
Benghazi, and the need for additional security assistance. We
have seen the cables where security officers on the ground
expressed considerable frustration at the difficulty in getting
the personnel they believed were needed to protect American
diplomats and property. And we now know that management of
security personal, especially the assignment of State
Department agents on very short-term duty, virtually
guaranteeing very limited institutional knowledge was grossly
inadequate. Why was the department hierarchy so obstinate, and
why would the department deny a personal plea from Ambassador
Stevens? Given his expertise on Libyan affairs, why did the
department and senior leadership not take into consideration
the approaching September 11 anniversary, particularly in light
of direct requests from our mission in Libya?
And finally, Madam Secretary, we heard numerous times over
the last several months that more funding is needed for
diplomatic security, including in your testimony before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and to some extent this
afternoon. I don't believe there is anybody in this room who
doesn't want to protect our diplomats stationed abroad, often
in very dangerous regions.
Since 2000, Congress has provided funding in the
neighborhood of $10 billion for Embassy security construction
and maintenance. We will no doubt continue to provide
significant funding in the future. Given that our Nation now
faces a mountain of debt, sadly I might add, given short
shrift, I have to say, by the President in his Inaugural
address, of course means that we cannot fund every single
program that every Federal agency requests. So when we increase
funding in one area, we have to consider cuts in others, at
least that is the way it should work. Is the State Department
currently conducting any internal reviews, for example, to
determine what offsets in current program funding might be
considered?
Finally, I know that some have been pedaling this story
that it's Congress' fault for not providing sufficient funding
for security. I would just note that Robert Baldre, your chief
financial officer for diplomatic security stated, and I quote,
``I do not feel that we have ever been at a point where we have
sacrificed security due to lack of funding.''
I know that I have used my 5 minutes, so I would appreciate
your remarks.
Chairman Royce. The gentleman from Ohio has used his 5
minutes, and if we want to get through the members, we are
going to have to hold to those 5 minutes.
So I will just ask for a response in writing, and we will
go down to Mr. Deutch from Florida.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We won't have to wait long, because those are some good
questions that I will take up in a moment.
Secretary Clinton, first, I would like to thank you for the
truly remarkable job that you have done as Secretary of State.
You have represented the interests of this Nation
magnificently. And I, for one, hope that after a bit of rest,
you will consider a return to public service, and should that
return bring to you Florida, I would look forward to welcoming
you there.
I would be remiss if I did not take this opportunity to
once again thank you for your efforts on behalf of my
constituent Robert Levinson, who went missing in Iran in 2007,
now 2,147 days ago. And I ask that the department continue to
do everything that it can to return Robert to his family.
I also want to thank you for the ways that you have handled
the tragic events in Benghazi. Your personal commitment to
ensuring that those Americans who serve American interests
overseas, often at great risk to themselves, is a testament to
the commitment that you have shown throughout your tenure at
State to strengthen our diplomatic efforts around the world.
And I would like to return to Mr. Chabot's question. There
is an awful a lot of debate here on the Hill about how we spend
our dollars. We all recognize that we have budgetary concerns;
we also recognize that we have an obligation to provide
security and to protect American personnel abroad. As we have
ended our military operations in Iraq, as we wind down in
Afghanistan, what kind of--I would like to ask, what kind of
strain will the presence of less military personnel in the
region put on diplomatic security? Let's start with that.
Secretary Clinton. That is a very important question that
we are really going to have to grapple with together I would
hope. We saw, for example, that when our troops withdrew from
Iraq, it dramatically altered what our civilians were capable
of being able to do, because there had been, over the course of
the war in Iraq, a very good working relationship between DoD,
State and USAID. We are going to face the same kind of
questions in Afghanistan as our troops draw down from
Afghanistan, and in a lot of these places, we don't have
military resources. The Department of Defense was a very good
partner to us in responding to Benghazi, but their assets were
too far away to make much difference in any timely fashion.
AFRICOM was stood up 10 years ago. I think that is going to
look quite prescient because we are going to need to figure out
how to work more effectively together between our civilian and
military assets in Africa, and I think that would be a worthy
subject of this committee, perhaps working with the Armed
Services Committee, because it is often difficult.
In my 4 years, we tried to work out more cooperative
relationship, more funding streams between State and DoD, in
order to be able to maximize the cooperation between us.
Mr. Deutch. When you talk about the need to prioritize,
because of shortfalls, more Marine security guards, talk about
construction budgets and upgrades, what does that mean? What
are the decisions that have to be made, and how do they
actually impact our diplomatic personnel?
Secretary Clinton. Well, first and foremost, we have to do
the right job prioritizing, based on the resources we do have.
And I would be the first to say, it is not all about money, but
it is also not without budgetary consequences. And so we have
to figure out what is the right balance.
Secondly, immediately after this happened, I spoke with
Secretary Panetta, Chairman Dempsey and asked the Defense
Department to work with us in putting together Interagency
Security Assessment Teams to go out and look at our high-threat
posts because our military brings a different perspective, and
that was a very important process, which we are going to
continue.
We are also looking to see how we can better cooperate on
the security aid that we give to other countries. It has got to
be a combination of both military assets and expertise, but
also development, rule of law, democracy building. It can't be
one or the other. They have to be married together.
Mr. Deutch. And if you could, in the few seconds we have
left, Madam Secretary, could you speak more broadly about the
important role that that would play? In this budget debate that
is going to take place, why is it so important for us to
continue to fund this?
Secretary Clinton. Well, let me just give you an example,
Colombia. Colombia, 15, 20 years ago, was in a very difficult
state. It had an insurgency. It had a drug cartel that was
basically controlling territory. The United States stepped in,
worked with the Colombians, and the progress, I think, is
evident for all to see. There was a front page article in the
travel section about go to Medellin. That is what America can
do. We don't do it ourselves. We partner with willing
governments to help them acquire the capacity to protect their
own citizens.
Chairman Royce. We will go to Mr. Joe Wilson of South
Carolina.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And Madam Secretary, thank you for being here today, and I
particularly appreciate your recognition of AFRICOM, and Plan
Colombia. Indeed, these have been extraordinary success stories
promoting peace throughout the world.
The American people will always appreciate as American
heroes, Chris Stevens, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods and Glen
Doherty.
As we begin, I do want to point out, though, for the
record, I believe that Congressman Rohrabacher is correct;
there was an e-mail from the Chief Financial Officer for
Diplomatic Security following the Benghazi attack,
specifically, ``Although diplomatic security has been fiscally
prudent, I do not feel that we have ever been at a point where
we sacrificed security due to a lack of funding.'' That
actually is an attribute to you, and I have faith in the chief
financial officer that it is a correct statement.
As we begin, it has been reported that since you managed
the response to Benghazi attack, why weren't you the person to
appear on the Sunday shows immediately following the attack?
Ambassador Susan Rice said that you declined. Was that correct?
Secretary Clinton. Well, I have to confess here in public,
going on the Sunday shows is not my favorite thing to do. There
are other things that I would prefer to do on Sunday mornings.
And, you know, I haven't been on a Sunday show in way over
year. So it just isn't something that I normally jump to do.
And I did feel strongly that we had a lot that we had to
manage, that I had to respond to, and I thought that is what
should be my priority.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. And I believe that part of
the priority is telling correct information. And you could have
done that, and I think it was very unfortunate--the multiple
appearances by Ambassador Rice with information that has been
discovered not to be correct.
In the November 21, 2012, edition of the Charleston Post
and Courier a letter was published by William J. Boudreau, a
retired Foreign Service Officer of Seabrook Island. He wrote,
``Within the U.S. State Department, there is an office
known as Op Center. It is located in the Office of the
Secretary of State. It is staffed around the clock, 24/
7, by seasoned Foreign Service Officers. Its function
is to be sensitive to any threat to American interests
wherever they might arise. The Op Center has direct
secure communication lines to the White House Situation
Room, the National Military Command Center at the
Pentagon and, the CIA's Op Center. Having worked as a
watch officer at the Op Center, I know that any
information that indicates a threat to the safety of
American citizens overseas is passed to other agencies
mentioned above. If it is of significant message
concerning American interest is received, it is the
watch officer's job to ensure that these other agencies
are informed.''
He goes on, there are many questions that need to be
answered, and I would like to present these questions on his
behalf. First and foremost, what was going on at the Op Center
at the State Department in Washington while our consulate was
under attack for 7 hours?
Secretary Clinton. Well, we can certainly give you greater
detail, but the Op Center is, as you have described, the place
where communications go in and out. They were placing calls.
They were receiving calls. They were deeply engaged in trying
to help us. They don't reach out on their own, but to help us
acquire information so that we could respond in real time.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. And 7 hours, I mean, goodness
gracious, there should have been a response. Why the delay in
labeling the attack as terrorism when it was immediately known
that it was.
Secretary Clinton. Well, you know, again, I would say,
Congressman, that we described the attack, I described the
attack the next morning; the President called it an act of
terror. There with a, as you will find in reading both the
unclassified and classified version of the ARB, there was a lot
of questions about who was behind it, what motivated it, and
the ARB says those questions are still not fully answered
today.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. And he continues, why weren't
Marine guards posted in Benghazi in the first place?
Secretary Clinton. Because historically Marine guards are
at posts where there is classified information. Marine guards
have not historically had the responsibility for protecting
personnel. Their job is to protect and, if necessary, destroy
classified material. At our compound, there was no classified
material.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. He continues in line with
everybody else pointing out that there were requests to enhance
security that were denied. We weren't able to reach all the
questions, but I appreciate your responding to Mr. Boudreau's
questions. I will submit them for the record to your office for
a written response.
Secretary Clinton. Thank you, Congressman.
Chairman Royce. Karen Bass of California.
Ms. Bass. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Chairman Royce and Ranking Member Engel, for
convening this hearing.
Secretary Clinton, I want to take the time to thank you for
your willingness to come before this committee for the final
time. And I want to offer my sincere and deep gratitude for
your remarkable service to our Nation. I am also very glad to
know that you are feeling much better.
For the past 4 years and well before, you have put country
first, and for that, our Nation is indebted to you. With
confidence and careful consideration, you have shown
extraordinary leadership on countless issues, ensuring that
diplomacy is an essential part of our country's foreign policy.
And your tireless effort to elevate women and girls' rights is
without comparison. You have strengthened our State Department,
made it better today than when you arrived.
As the ranking member on the Africa Subcommittee, I am
especially appreciative of the attention you have given to the
54 nations of Africa. While Africa may lose one of its most
steadfast and dedicated champions at the State Department, I
trust Africa will not be far from your thoughts and will remain
a top priority in your future work.
I also want to associate my comments with Congressman
Sherman, who said that it is unfortunate that it is the last
time we will hear from you, so I want to focus my time on
moving us forward and asking your advice. You made reference in
your testimony about best-value contracts and you mentioned, I
believe, several nations where best-value contracts are not
used. And in thinking about Africa and the instability in a
number of nations in Northern Africa, Central Africa, Mali,
what we are dealing with now, I want to know whether or not
those nations are subject to those types of contracts and
whether or not exemptions or waivers should be made, what
should we do?
Secretary Clinton. Congresswoman, thank you very much for
your emphasis on Africa, which I think is going to be
increasingly important. There are only three nations where the
State Department has an exemption by Congress for using
different contracting rules in order to get the best value for
our country. Those are Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, so
every other country in the world we are under the kind of
contracting rules that I think do interfere with our capacity
to get the best deal, particularly when it comes to security,
that we should in these countries where the threats,
unfortunately, are going to always be with us.
Ms. Bass. Should we look to extend that to Mali, to the
DRC, to Somalia?
Secretary Clinton. Well, I would certainly recommend--there
was an article in I think one of the newspapers today that went
into some detail--basically, here is how it started, for more
than two decades, Federal laws required the State Department to
select the cheapest rather than the best contractor to provide
local guard services at its Embassies abroad. And you know,
there is that old saying, you get what you pay for. And this
lowest-price provision started off in 1990, but it has just
stayed with us, and I would respectfully request that this
committee take a hard look at it.
You can't do a total lifting of it for everybody, at least
look at the high-threat posts, where, obviously, we did it for
Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the countries you are
naming are countries that I think would fall into that
category.
Ms. Bass. Well, thank you very much.
Among the various Islamic extremist groups operating in
Africa today AQIM, al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, to name a few, in
your view, which pose the greatest threats, direct threat to
the United States? And then, given the limited capacity and, in
some cases, the limited political will of the countries in
which these groups operate, are U.S. military, intelligence and
security assistance resources devoted to these threats
adequately or appropriately balanced? And what recommendations
would you have for us?
Secretary Clinton. Well, I think if you are focusing just
on North Africa, al-Qaeda is a brand name, as much as an
organization, people wake up, they form these jihadist groups,
they then claim to be associated with, somehow affiliated with
al-Qaeda in order to gain some credibility with local people,
as well as beyond.
I think that we have to take seriously all of these
terrorist groups, whatever they call themselves. Now, at the
moment, they don't necessarily have either the interest or the
ability to attack our homeland, but we have a lot of
facilities. We have lot of assets in North Africa. We just saw
Americans killed and held hostage at a gas facility because we
do business all over that continent. So I think we have to take
a hard look at all of them and constantly be upping our
military and intelligence and diplomatic assets to deal with
them.
Ms. Bass. Thank you very much.
Chairman Royce. I would like to just take a moment and
explain to the gentlelady, we passed last year the best-value
contract language that you are speaking of in the House
appropriations measure. We are going to try to get our
colleagues in the Senate to take that measure up.
We go down to Mr. McCaul from Texas.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Madam Secretary. Thank you for your service.
Similar to September 11, 2001, there were warning signs
prior to Benghazi September 11. There was an April 6, 2012,
crude IED thrown over the wall of the U.S. Facility in
Benghazi. On May 22, 2012, Red Cross building in Benghazi hit
by two RPGs. The brigades of the imprisoned Blind Sheikh took
responsibility for that attack. On June 6, 2012, U.S. consulate
in Benghazi was targeted by an IED, an attack that blew a hole
in the perimeter wall. Again, the Blind Sheikh brigade took
credit. And then, on August 16, we had this cable that has been
widely reported, a classified State Department cable warning
that the Benghazi consulate could not withstand a coordinated
attack. And the regional security officer believed our
consulate could not be protected at an emergency meeting less
than 1 month before the attack on 9/11. A contingency plan was
supposedly drafted to move the operations to the CIA annex
about a mile away from the compound. This cable was presumed to
have been shared by senior staff. It was sent to your office.
It was sent to the NSC. And even on September 11, the day that
Ambassador Stevens was killed, he personally warned about
``growing problems with security in Benghazi and growing
frustration with security forces and the Libyan police.'' Were
you aware of this cable, this August 16 cable?
Secretary Clinton. Congressman, that cable did not come to
my attention. I have made it very clear that the security
cables did not come to my attention or above the assistant
Secretary level where the ARB placed responsibility; whereas I
think Ambassador Pickering said, the rubber hit the road. Now I
think----
Mr. McCaul. Can I ask, when were you aware of this cable?
Secretary Clinton. After the ARB began to gather
information and material.
Mr. McCaul. Who within your office did see this cable?
Secretary Clinton. I am not aware of anyone within my
office, within the Secretary's Office having seen the cable.
Mr. McCaul. Within the National Security Council.
Secretary Clinton. I have no information or awareness of
anyone in the National Security Council having seen that cable.
Mr. McCaul. Was this cable a surprise to you?
Secretary Clinton. You know, Congressman, it was very
disappointing to me that the ARB concluded there were
inadequacies and problems in the responsiveness of our team
here in Washington to the security requests that were made by
our team in Libya. And I was not aware of that going on. It was
not brought to my attention, but obviously, it is something we
are fixing and intend to put into place protocols and systems
to make sure it doesn't happen again.
Mr. McCaul. I certainly hope so. I think when you have a
United States Ambassador personally warning about the situation
over there, sending this cable to your office----
Secretary Clinton. If I could, 1.43 million cables a year
come to the State Department. They are all addressed to me.
They do not all come to me. They are sorted through the
bureaucracy.
Mr. McCaul. Certainly somebody within your office should
have seen this cable, in my judgment. Could I ask one last
question?
Secretary Clinton. Also, I just want to clarify, you know,
with regard to the security requests subsequent to the August
16 cable, our personnel in Libya had not submitted any
additional security requests to Washington at the time of the
September 11 attack. Now there was an ongoing dialogue, as you
know, between Libya and Washington.
Mr. McCaul. Reclaiming my time, it is very limited. An
emergency meeting was held and a cable sent out on August 16 by
the Ambassador himself, warning what could happen. And this
cable went unnoticed by your office. That is the bottom line.
Secretary Clinton. Well, the facts as we have them,
Congressman, and I will be happy to have people give you this
in detail, the August 16 cable stated that security requests
for Benghazi would be forthcoming. The RSO in Benghazi
submitted to Tripoli a preliminary list of proposed security
recommendations on August 23, but no requests were submitted to
Washington before the attacks. Now this sounds very
complicated, and to some extent, it is. We are trying to
simplify it and avoid the kind of problems that are identified.
Mr. McCaul. One last question, why was he in Benghazi on
September 11?
Chairman Royce. Go down to----
Mr. McCaul. I will submit that in writing.
Chairman Royce. That will be fine.
We are going to go now to Mr. William Keating of
Massachusetts.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You know, I must say that after the tragedy last September,
one of the things that just moved me so much were the comments
of the family members of one of the heroes who lost their
lives, Glen Doherty in Massachusetts. Paraphrasing them, but
they told people they shouldn't lose sight over who was
ultimately responsible for these deaths and made a statement
putting things into perspective here. And the other thing they
mentioned was, do not lose sight of the causes that these men
gave their lives for.
And as a person who has advanced those causes, I want to
thank you for your incredible service as Secretary of State.
Now, one of the parts of the ARB report that is of great
concern to me dealt with what they described as a culture of
austerity in the State Department.
Madam Secretary, can you take a few moments an expand on
the ARB's finding on that subject and how it affects the State
Department's ability to carry out crucial tasks, not just
security but all crucial tasks?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Congressman, that is what the ARB
found. They found that there was a culture of husbanding
resources, of being quite concerned about responding, even on
security, as important as security is, because one never knows
what the budget is going to be going forward.
And we have had some ups and downs budgetary wise going
back, as I said, into prior administrations, but it is fair to
say that many of the professionals in the State Department have
really gotten used to worrying greatly that they will give
something to somebody, and that will become an expectation that
will then have to be taken away. And it did affect the security
professional's decisions according to the ARB.
Mr. Keating. These prioritizations, in my opinion, in this
culture has to change, not just for security reasons but our
overall mission. Just quickly, with the crisis in Mali and the
insurgency there and spreading jihadist threat in Northern
Africa, Maghreb, and the Arabian Peninsula. In that area, they
are relatively technologically advanced, and there are threats
that go along those lines that I am concerned about in terms of
cultural austerity there as well.
Cyber threats and other security upgrades that are going to
be vitally necessary, and I hope those things are not lost as
we review this situation. Can you just comment on what we need
in that regard going forward and how much of a threat that may
pose to us?
Secretary Clinton. Well, you mention a word that is rarely
mentioned in these hearings but I predict will be a major
threat to us and that is ``cyber'' because it is not only going
to be nation states, where we already are seeing cyber
intrusions, both against our Government and against our private
sector. But increasingly, nonstate actors will have more
capacity to disrupt, to hack into, to put out false
information, to accuse the United States of things that can
light fires before we can put them out.
So I think it is important we have a really thoughtful
comprehensive review about the threats of today and the threats
of tomorrow, and that will help guide the committee. It will
help guide the Senate and certainly the administration in
working together to answer them.
Mr. Keating. Thank you and--thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think I am going to do something that hasn't been done
yet; I am going to yield back the rest of my time.
Chairman Royce. We go now to Mr. Poe of Texas.
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, thank you, once again, for your service to
our country.
Gordon Rowan from Oregon; Frederick Buttaccio from Katy,
Texas; and Victor Lovelady from my district of Atascocita,
Texas. Three Americans, overseas killed, not in Benghazi, but
killed at a remote gas facility in Algeria. Killed, in my
opinion, because they were Americans. Over the last weekend,
myself and others have tried to get information. I will just
say that there is too much, in my opinion, red tape while
trying to get just basic information to the families as to what
happened in a situation like that. I would hope that the State
Department would look at that protocol and try to streamline
it, because people died.
The Algerian Government now reports, after they have
captured some of the terrorists alive, some claiming to be from
Egypt. One says that, after interrogation by the Algerian
Government, whatever that interrogation may entail, that there
were Egyptians involved in the Benghazi attack that were at the
attack on the gas plant in Algeria. At the time of the Benghazi
attack, Ansar al Sharia the next day--a terrorist group, as you
know--they claimed responsibility for the attack. We probably
don't know if the statements made by the Algeria or, excuse me,
Egyptian terrorist that was captured are true, if Egyptians
were followed or were involved in that attack or not. It does
seem to show that the whole region is very fluid with different
groups getting together, causing mischief throughout the entire
region.
As of today, several months later after the attack in
Benghazi, has, to your knowledge, any person been put currently
in custody anywhere, by any government, for the responsibility
or as a suspect involved in the Benghazi attack?
Secretary Clinton. Congressman, there is one potential
suspect, who has been placed under monitoring by the Tunisian
Government. There are other suspects that the FBI are both
closely following and consulting with partner governments.
I think, based on my last conversation with Director
Muller, which was just a few days ago, he went to Libya. He
went to Tunisia. He believes that the investigation is
proceeding. I know that the FBI has been up on the Hill doing
classified briefings with certain committees; I don't know
about this committee. But I certainly hope that the FBI is able
to investigate, identify and hold responsible those who waged
this attack against us. And I think that, based on their work,
they feel that they are pursuing some very positive leads.
Mr. Poe. Okay. My understanding is the Tunisian--the person
that was held in Tunisia was held by a judge there, and that
person has been released. So, basically, we don't really know
at this point who did it.
Secretary Clinton. Well, Congressman, I confirmed with
Director Muller, who was just in Tunisia meeting with their
high officials, that this person is basically under law
enforcement surveillance and forbidden to leave Tunis. Director
Muller told me that that had been confirmed to him by the
Tunisians.
Mr. Poe. Just very briefly, we don't know who--no one has
been held accountable, charged with this event. Before Ghadafi
was taken out, my understanding is the nation of Qatar shipped
in 18 shipments, 20,000 tons of weapons, machine guns, RPGs
into the region to help different groups overthrow Omar
Ghadafi. Did the United States give a wink and a nod to this?
And I would like a written answer to that, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Royce. We will go now to Mr. Cicilline from Rhode
Island.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Madam Secretary, for your extraordinary service
to our country, that has earned you the deep respect and
admiration of people all over the world and has enhanced
America's standing all over the globe.
Your leadership on women's issues, LGBT equality,
supporting emerging democracies and enhancing American national
security are too numerous to list. But I want to begin by
thanking you for all of your hard work in everything you have
done in service of our country.
Thank you also for your testimony today. The terrorist
attacks on September 11 in Benghazi, Libya resulted in the
tragic deaths of Ambassador Stevens, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods
and Glen Doherty. And these are constant reminders of the
dangerous work that our diplomats engage in every single day
all throughout the world. And while we cannot eliminate all
risks, it is our duty to enact protocols and policies that will
reduce these risks and to provide all the resources and support
necessary to help mitigate and manage those risks.
With that in mind, I hope my colleagues will consider the
Accountability Review Board, which you, Madam Secretary,
convened, and it calls for, and I quote, ``A more serious and
sustained commitment from Congress to support State Department
needs.'' This is particularly important, given the implications
that the looming sequester as well as potential government
shutdown would have on our diplomatic security, especially in
high-risk posts.
I also want to take a moment to commend and thank Admiral
Mullen and Ambassador Pickering for the comprehensive and
prompt review that they conducted and, of course, applaud you,
Madam Secretary, for the adoption of all 29 ARB recommendations
and for promptly undertaking that implementation and providing
guidance on the status of that implementation here today.
And just to say, there has been some discuss about the
importance of getting to the nitty gritty and fixing problems,
and I hope that we will rely on the security professionals and
the expert advice and recommendations of the ARB. I think they
are much more likely to produce the best response to what needs
to be undertaken.
And so I want to ask you, Madam Secretary, one of the
things that you did, in anticipation of some of the
recommendations, you created for the first time ever a
Diplomatic Security Deputy Assistant Secretary, and I think,
with respect to the ARB report, the importance of examining the
State Department's organization and management as it relates to
security planning, my expectation is that that would be one of
the responsibilities of this new position. I am wondering if
you would just tell us a little bit about the role of this new
Secretary within the bureau, what responsibilities the position
will have, and will this individual in particular have the
authority to reallocate resources in order to fill potential
resource gaps if that is one of the challenges they will face?
Secretary Clinton. Thank you, Congressman, this is a Deputy
Assistant Secretary for High-Threat Posts. I want one person
held accountable, looking at high-threat posts talking to our
military and intelligence partners, being a voice at the table,
not just for all 275 posts but really zeroing in on a real-time
constant evaluation about what our high-threat posts need.
But in addition to that, we are going to continue our work
with the Defense Department and Interagency Security Assessment
to threats. I am also for the first time elevating a lot of
these security issues for high-threat posts to the Secretary
level because it hasn't been there before, and I think, given
what we have experienced, it needs to be. We are also looking
for the transfer authority to add to our Marine security
guards, our construction, and our diplomatic security. We are
enhancing the training for everyone.
And we are taking a hard look at another problem that it
the ARB pointed out and that was other temporary duty
assignments. You know, very often, given especially the
experiences we have had in Iraq and Afghanistan and to a lesser
extent in some other large posts, we have a lot of our most
experienced diplomatic security people going there. I mean, you
know, in the--two times we have had serious assaults on our
Embassy in Kabul. Kabul is fortified. Kabul has ISAF troops
across the street. As they draw down, we have to recognize that
the danger is not going to leave with our ISAF military. So we
have to take a hard look at all of this and we have to embed
that responsibility in this new experienced Deputy Assistant
Secretary to do that.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Royce. Matt Salmon of Arizona.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you.
Madam Secretary, I appreciate your desire to come before
our committee today to testify and answer questions to help us
make the changes necessary to ensure the safety of all of our
Foreign Service Officers, but particularly those who are making
heavy sacrifices serving in high-threat regions.
But I have to say that I am troubled by what seems to be
this administration's pattern of misleading the American people
and failing to hold decision-makers accountable. From Operation
Fast and Furious, where Attorney General Eric Holder has
repeatedly misled the American people and Congress about an
intentional international gun-walking scheme, to U.N. Secretary
Susan Rice, who on five separate occasions went before the
American people days after the attacks on Benghazi talking
about a demonstration at a facility that never happened. It was
not even suggested in any of the reports and information coming
from Benghazi.
And I know the purpose of this hearing is to find out how
to ensure another Benghazi never happens again. I would hope
that we would all include the aftermath of the tragedy, as
well. How can we make sure that such gross misrepresentations
of attacks on Americans never happen again?
A couple of other questions. I know you have put the four
individuals identified as culpable by the Accountability Review
Board on administrative leave. What do you anticipate the final
resolution of their status with the Department will be?
And the Accountability Review Board did not identify any
individuals above the Assistant Secretary level as accountable
for the security failures at the Benghazi mission. Now, you
have said that the numerous cables requesting and begging for
additional security resources sent by Ambassador Chris Stevens
were never seen by State officials above Assistant Secretary
Eric Boswell or Deputy Assistant Secretary Charlene Lamb.
I know you care very deeply about the people that work with
you in the Department. So, given the fact that your testimony
is that you never saw any of these multiple requests and nobody
above Assistant Secretary level saw these requests, does not
that give you some concerns about the flow of information
within the Department, and maybe some of your underlings'
ability to prioritize and bring serious issues to your
attention?
You said that you get hundreds of thousands of cables all
the time. And these cables sent directly to you, I understand
that you do not read them all, nor do you have the time to do
that. But I would think that within the Department you would
have people who work for you who are able to prioritize and get
to you the ones that are more serious in nature, and especially
when somebody's security is on the line.
Finally, President Truman had a placard on his desk that
said, ``The buck stops here.'' I know that you have taken
responsibility, and I applaud you for that. But I really hope
that this isn't just an exercise, another exercise in finding
lower-level bureaucrats who we can kind of throw under the bus,
and actually get somewhere with this. This is not about a game
of ``gotcha,'' but how we can fix this for the future.
And I yield back the balance, and I would love your
answers.
Secretary Clinton. Well, Congressman, that is exactly what
I am intent on doing. And I think the ARB, not I, has made its
findings. The reason ARBs were created is to try to take a
dispassionate, independent view of what happened and then come
up with recommendations that are the responsibility of the
Department to implement.
You know, the ARB makes very clear that Chris Stevens, who
probably knew more about Libya than anybody else in our
Government, did not see a direct threat of an attack of this
nature and scale, despite the overall trend of security
problems that we faced. And I have to add, neither did the
intelligence community. The ARB makes that very clear, that the
intelligence community also did not really zero in on the
connection between the deteriorating threat environment in
eastern Libya and in Benghazi and a direct threat on our
compound.
So we have work to do. We have work to do inside the
Department, we have work to do with our partners in the DoD and
the intelligence community to constantly be taking in
information, making sure it does get to the right people, that
it isn't somehow stove piped or stalled but that it does rise
to decision-makers. And I am committed to improving every way
that I can on what the ARB told us to do, on assessing our
intelligence.
And I think that it is fair to say, Congressman, that we
have to do this now because I predict we are going to be, as we
saw in Algeria, seeing all kinds of asymmetric threats, not
just to our Government facilities but to private-sector
facilities. In Tunisia, although we protected our Embassy, our
school was badly damaged. So we have to take a broader view.
And I think that the ARB gives us a start, but it is not the
whole story.
Chairman Royce. Mr. Grayson from Florida.
Mr. Grayson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you very much, Secretary Clinton, for your
contributions to securing America's place in the world for the
past 4 years and for your contributions toward world peace.
The first question I would like to ask you has to do with
the Accountability Review Board's report. The report does
identify specifically people who were found to have engaged in
the Department in systematic failures and deficiencies. I want
to be clear about this: You were not one of those people; is
that correct?
Secretary Clinton. That is correct.
Mr. Grayson. All right.
Now, it was identified earlier that a report dating from
the 1990s had said that the Secretary should take a personal
and active role in security. Have you done that during your 4
years at the State Department?
Secretary Clinton. I have been very attuned to the
environment in which threats are occurring, the intelligence
that is available; certainly not the specific requests and
decision-making, which rests with the security professionals.
Mr. Grayson. All right.
Regarding the security professionals, is there anybody now
in existence in the Department who is responsible for reviewing
the itineraries of Ambassadors in advance in order to determine
whether there is an undue threat to their safety?
Secretary Clinton. The general answer to that is no.
Ambassadors are given what is called ``chief of mission
authority.'' Ambassadors, especially those who we ask to go to
dangerous posts, are pretty independent folks. Some them might
say, well, what do you think about this or that? But most of
them make their own decisions.
Chris Stevens did not ask anyone for permission to go to
Benghazi; I don't think it would have crossed his mind. Robert
Ford, who served as our Ambassador to Syria, went out on
numerous occasions to talk to the opposition before we pulled
him out of Damascus. We had, you know, very brave Ambassadors
like Ryan Crocker, one of our very best, who it would be very
difficult to say, Ryan, you can't go do this even though you
have decided that you should do it.
But what we are trying to do is to create a more ongoing
discussion between our Ambassadors, our bureaus back in the
State Department who are regional experts, and our security
people so that, at the very least, no Ambassador is taking an
unnecessary risk, however that is defined.
Mr. Grayson. Well, with regard to Ambassador Stevens,
certainly it was brave of him to go to Benghazi on the date
that he did. I have to ask you honestly, though, was there
anything in his itinerary on the 10th or the 11th that actually
specifically required his personal presence?
Secretary Clinton. Well, he certainly thought so,
Congressman. And he did, of course, discuss this with his own
security people. Remember, we do have regional security
officers in these posts. They are the ones that an Ambassador
will turn to.
He believed that it was important for him to go to
Benghazi. There were a number of meetings that he was holding
and some public events that he had on his schedule. And, you
know, he was someone who really believed strongly he had to get
out there. And I think, as the ARB has pointed out, he was
given great deference by the rest of the government.
Mr. Grayson. Do you have any concept of the number of
American troops it might have taken to actually create a
totally secure environment for him in Benghazi on September 10
and 11?
Secretary Clinton. No. The number of Diplomatic Security
personnel requested in the cables was five. There were five
there that night with him. Plus, there was a mutual
understanding with the annex that had a much more heavily armed
presence because of the work that they were doing in the
region.
It is very difficult to, in retrospect, really anticipate
what might have been. One of the RSOs who had served in Libya
said the kind of attack that the compound suffered had not been
anticipated. We had gotten used to, you know, preparing for car
bombs and suicide bombers and things like that, but this was of
a different nature.
And we even saw that, at the annex, which was much more
heavily fortified, had much more heavy military equipment, we
lost two of our best and had one of our Diplomatic Security
officers badly injured. He is still at Walter Reed. So even the
annex, which had more assets in the face of the attack, was
suffering losses that night.
Mr. Grayson. Thank you very much.
Chairman Royce. Mr. Marino of Pennsylvania.
Mr. Marino. Good afternoon, Madam Secretary.
In August 2012, prior to the Benghazi attack, the Library
of Congress published a report on behalf of a division of DoD
called ``Al-Qaeda in Libya: A Profile.'' This report outlined
al-Qaeda's growing presence in Libya, particularly in east
Libya, where Benghazi is located. Something that was especially
alarming to me in this DoD report was the mention that Ansar
al-Sharia and other al-Qaeda groups in Libya have adopted the
black flag, which symbolizes commitment to violent jihad,
promoted by al-Qaeda's senior leaders.
In my hand, I hold a picture of the flag that the
Department of State identified to be a prominent issuance of
this flag and on the rise in Libya. I also hold a picture of
the same flag, same type of flag, in Tunisia, where the
protesters were outside the Embassy there. In addition, I have
a flag--a picture that was taken in Cairo at the U.S. Embassy,
where demonstrations took place. Another picture in Jordan at
the U.S. Embassy, where protests took place. In Bahrain, over
2,000 protesters who burned numerous U.S. and Israeli flags,
again at the Embassy. In Kuwait, U.S. Embassy, 500
demonstrators chanting, ``Obama, we are all Osama,'' the flag
again. And finally in Libya, the U.S. compound, the flag was
flown there and carried through the streets, as well.
My question, Madam Secretary, is, were you aware of this
DoD report prior to the terrorist attack in Benghazi?
Secretary Clinton. Well, I was certainly aware of a number
of reports from throughout our Government. I don't know of the
specific one that you are referring to. There were DoD reports,
intelligence community reports, State Department reports
talking about the decreasing--or the increasing threat
environment in eastern Libya. That was what we were trying to
address with the Libyans.
And remember, the election in July in Libya brought to
victory what we would consider moderates, people who had a very
different view of the kind of future than, certainly, al-Qaeda
or any of these militants have.
But there is going to be a struggle, there is going to be a
struggle in this region. And the United States has to be as
effective in partnering with the non-jihadists, whether they
fly a black flag or any other color flag----
Mr. Marino. I clearly understand that----
Secretary Clinton [continuing]. To be successful.
Mr. Marino [continuing]. Madam Secretary.
Secretary Clinton. What?
Mr. Marino. I clearly understand that. However, this flag
was pointed out to be affiliated with al-Qaeda terrorists who
attack and kill United States citizens and other individuals
around the world.
Did anyone in your department below you, were they aware of
this report and these photos prior to? And don't you think they
should have brought this to your attention?
Secretary Clinton. Well, what I am trying to say,
Congressman, is I am well aware that there were people claiming
to be associated with al-Qaeda that were attempting to
influence militias, attempting to exercise more authority,
along with a number of other groups that didn't necessarily
work under that flag but had the same militant jihadist
mentality.
So, yes, I was certainly aware of that. And so was Chris
Stevens.
Mr. Marino. But my point----
Secretary Clinton. And so was our team in Libya.
Mr. Marino. But my point is this flag kept coming up, and
you did not think that that was important enough to increase
security, when, after how many Embassies where this flag was
shown in demonstrations? I personally think that it would
demand an increase in security. And those below you that might
have known this should have brought that to your attention.
Secretary Clinton. Well----
Mr. Marino. I come from industry. I come from government.
And there are individuals that just have to be cut loose when
they are not performing their tasks. Are these three people
that are on leave, are they still being paid?
Secretary Clinton. They are on administrative leave, and
under Federal law and regulations, they are still being paid.
Mr. Marino. What is the holdup?
Secretary Clinton. Because there are regulations and law
that have to be followed.
Mr. Marino. No, no. Well, what is the holdup from a
management perspective of saying, you three let me down, this
should have been brought to my attention, I no longer need your
services?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Congressman, I would be happy to
give you an answer, because personnel discussions are not
appropriate for public settings. But we have taken every step
that was available, and we will continue to do so, and we are
looking for additional authority.
But to just finish up on the point you made, we had good
security at all of those Embassies, other than in Tunisia
because of the newness of the government. And then when they
were asked to respond, they did.
Because I go back to the point that was made on the other
side of the aisle: We are dependent on host-government support.
And where it doesn't exist, unless we invade and unless we have
a big military presence in a country, we are doing the best we
can with our Diplomatic Security and private security guards
and any other help we can get.
Chairman Royce. Mr. Vargas of California.
Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the
opportunity.
And thank you very much, Madam Secretary, for being here. I
also want to thank you for the excellent work that you have
done not only here in the United States but across the world. I
have to say that because it is true, one, and, secondly, I
don't think that my wife, my 16-year-old daughter or my 9-year-
old daughter, she would probably even turn on me and wouldn't
let me in the house if I didn't say that. You are a hero to
many, especially women. And you seem to bring out these deep
aspirations that they have in ways that I have never seen
anyone do before. So, again, thank you for your service.
When I was reading the information here, it brought back to
mind another assassination, murder. I was a Jesuit for 5 years,
and I spent some time in El Salvador. And in 1989, there was an
assassination of Father Ignacio Ellacuria, Father Segundo
Montes, Father Ignacio Martin-Baro, Father Juan Ramon Moreno,
Father Armando Lopez, Father Joaquin Lopez y Lopez, and also
the housekeeper, Mrs. Elba Ramos, and her young daughter--she
was 15-years-old--Celina Ramos. I knew them because I worked
with them. Segundo Montes was my superior. And I know the pain
that I felt when I heard that they died. I had left the Jesuits
by then. And so I know that, as you being the superior of the
people who died, I am sure felt the same way.
And that is why I am glad that we brought up the names here
today. I think it is important to mention the names: Ambassador
Christopher Stevens, Mr. Sean Smith, Mr. Tyrone Woods, Mr. Glen
Doherty. Because many of us who have faith believe that they
didn't die in vain. And that is why I am very proud that you
are here bravely standing before us, trying to figure out what
to do.
And one of the things that did trouble me as I read this
was the reliance that we have on local security. That is the
part that didn't make sense to me. I come from San Diego. We
have the Marine Corps there. We have the Navy. We have
incredibly good security and service people. Why don't we rely
more on them?
Secretary Clinton. Well, that is an excellent question. And
you brought back some very sad memories in talking about the
losses that occurred in El Salvador.
You know, we do rely primarily on host-nation support, but
we have to take a harder look at the commitment and the
capacity of these host nations. And, therefore, in places all
over the world, we also have private security guards, some
armed, some unarmed. We have Marine guards at many places,
about 150, who at least are demonstrating a line of defense.
But we have to do more.
And when you ask, why do we rely on these? Well, in part
because we don't have military assets everywhere. If you look
at the statements particularly by Admiral Mullen, who was our
Chairman of our Joint Chiefs, he basically said, look, we have
to work together more closely between State and DoD, but it is
unrealistic, in his words, to tether our military to every
high-risk post.
So part of what we are trying to struggle through with is,
how do we make our facilities as secure as possible without
turning them into fortresses? Because our diplomats are not
soldiers. How do we have reliable private security? The
February 17th Brigade was a Libyan Government-supported militia
that started defending Chris Stevens when he showed up before
Ghadafi fell. They had been reliable, they had been responsive.
But they were not particularly available during those first
minutes and hours of the attack on our compound.
So we also had contracted with a private security company
that had a permit to operate in Libya. Because, you know, the
United States, unless we go into a country with massive
military force, we, you know, go in and we follow the rules of
the country. And we had to get a security force that had a
permit from the Libyan Government.
So these are all issues that are being looked at so that we
try to fill the gaps that have been identified.
Mr. Vargas. Well, thank you.
And the last thing I would just correct that you said
earlier, that we haven't done enough about promoting ourselves
around the world, I think you have. I think you have done a
fantastic job. And other than President Kennedy, I don't know
of anyone that has had a better image in Latin America. So we
thank you.
Secretary Clinton. Thank you very much, Congressman.
Chairman Royce. We go now to Mr. Duncan of South Carolina.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Madam Secretary, let me just tell you, Americans are
frustrated. They are frustrated over the handling of Benghazi,
what happened when four Americans died there. They are
frustrated and sometimes they are downright angry about being,
what they think, being misled about what really happened there,
being told that this was a protest over a video not just for a
couple of days but for weeks on in.
And then they are frustrated when they see comments from
you this morning when you said, what difference at this point
does it make? I will tell you what difference it makes. It
makes a difference when Americans think they were misled about
something for political reasons.
In the hearing this morning, you mentioned that we were
clear-eyed about the threats and dangers as they were
developing in eastern Libya. Madam Secretary, if you were
really, in your words, clear-eyed about the levels of threat to
our consulate in Benghazi, or our special mission in Benghazi,
then you should have known about Chris Stevens' memo, I believe
of 16 August, that said our consulate could not be defended
from a coordinated attack.
The question Americans have is, did he expect an attack? If
you were clear-eyed, then why did your department reject the
request, I believe on 7 June, for 16 additional security
agents, the site security team that would have been funded by
DoD, not a State expenditure?
If you were clear-eyed, shouldn't you have known that there
was no real Libyan Government to turn to for security
assistance? You answered that question from Mr. Meeks earlier,
when you said you were unsure about the Libyan Government and
their ability to provide that assistance.
If you were clear-eyed, were you clear-eyed about al-
Qaeda's displeasure with whom we seemed to be supporting during
the summer elections, the moderate that was elected?
If you were clear-eyed, shouldn't you have known that al-
Qaeda roamed freely in and around Benghazi? As my friend from
Pennsylvania pointed out, there were al-Qaeda flags not just at
the protest, there were al-Qaeda flags flying all over
Benghazi.
If you were clear-eyed, were you clear-eyed when the Brits
left Benghazi because they had the attack? Why did four
Americans die? What was so important that Ambassador Stevens,
if he knew there was a security threat in Benghazi--and he went
there on September 10 and 11 and gave his life for our
country--what was so important for him to go to eastern Libya,
knowing all these threats, knowing the memos are clear?
And I think you misspoke earlier when you said that you
didn't know of any requests that were denied for more security.
June 7 e-mail exchange between Ambassador Stevens and John
Moretti, when he requested for one MSD team, or, actually, an
additional MSD team. And the reply from John Moretti said,
unfortunately, MSD cannot support the request. There was a
request made for more security, and it was denied on June 7.
And so, Madam Secretary, you let the consulate become a
death trap, and that is national security malpractice. You said
you take responsibility. What does responsibility mean, Madam
Secretary? You are still in your job, and there are four people
at the Department of State that have culpability in this that
are still in their jobs.
I heard the answer about firing or removing personnel. I
get that. But this was gross negligence. At what point in time
can our administration and can our Government fire someone
whose gross negligence left four Americans dead in Benghazi?
What does the word ``responsibility'' mean to you, Madam
Secretary?
Secretary Clinton. I think I have made that very clear,
Congressman.
And let me say that we have come here and made a very open,
transparent presentation. I did not have to declassify the ARB.
I could have joined 18 of the other ARBs, under both Democratic
and Republican administrations, kept it classified, and then,
you know, just said ``goodbye.'' That is not who I am; that is
not what I do.
And I have great confidence that the Accountability Review
Board did the job they were asked to do, made the
recommendations that they thought were based on evidence, not
on emotion, not on----
Mr. Duncan. There was a lot of evidence----
Secretary Clinton. Well----
Mr. Duncan. Reclaiming my time, there was a lot of evidence
that led up to the security situation.
Secretary Clinton. Well, I am sorry, Congressman----
Mr. Duncan. You mentioned transparency? You haven't
provided the call logs of the messages, instant messages,
during the attack between the post and the operations center.
In an air of transparency, will you release these
communications between Benghazi, Tripoli, and Washington?
Secretary Clinton. I will get an answer to you on that. But
I will tell you once more, the reason we have Accountability
Review Boards is so that we take out of politics, we take out
of emotion what happened, and we try to get to the truth. I
think this very distinguished panel did just that. And we are
working diligently overtime to implement their recommendations.
That is my responsibility. I am going to do everything I can
before I finish my tenure.
And I would also, going back to your first point about the
concerns that people you represented have expressed about
statements that were made, I would refer you both to the
unclassified version of the ARB, where, after months of
research and talking to more than 100 witnesses, the picture is
still very complicated about what happened that night. ``There
are key questions''--I am quoting--``surrounding the identity,
actions, and motivations of the perpetrators that remain to be
determined.'' And I recommend that every member read the
classified version, which goes into greater detail that I
cannot speak to here today.
Mr. Duncan. It was a terrorist attack. It is pretty clear
what the motivation was.
Chairman Royce. Mr. Schneider.
Mr. Schneider. Madam Secretary, let me again thank you for
joining us.
Thank you for opening up the ARB report. We are grateful.
And let me also echo the words of my colleagues and extend
my own personal gratitude for your service. You did our Nation
well and made our people proud. You have done an extraordinary
job as our Nation's top diplomat, and you will be sorely
missed.
The Benghazi attack claimed the lives of four brave
Americans, including Ambassador Chris Stevens, who had done so
much to liberate the Libyan people. Despite the risk involved,
he returned to that country as our Ambassador because he knew
the important work of building a new Libya remained unfinished.
America's diplomatic corps dedicate their lives to
promoting Americans' interests abroad and knowingly put
themselves in danger to serve their country. While we know that
these jobs are not without risk, we must do more to support our
diplomats.
I am pleased that the State Department conducted a serious
investigation, and I appreciate that you have already stated
that you will accept every one of the 29 review board's
recommendations.
The State Department is increasingly operating in high-
threat locations throughout the world, requiring our diplomats
to be stationed further afield and closer to dangers on the
ground. This not only raises the security risks faced by our
diplomats and development experts but also places a strain on
existing resources.
As we move forward, how will the State Department evaluate
the benefits to U.S. interests from having an official presence
in a given location versus the security risks faced by that
diplomatic mission? How do you expect the Department will weigh
the physical and technical personnel and political costs as
opposed to the gains of operating in frontline states? And,
last, what changes do you think these demands will require vis-
a-vis people and other resources at the State Department?
Secretary Clinton. Those are very important questions, and
I can't do justice to them in the time left, but we will
certainly get you additional written information.
But let me briefly say, Congressman, that, you know, I
ordered the first ever Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development
Review because, as I said, I served on the Armed Services
Committee, where we get every 4 years a Quadrennial Defense
Review, which really does help the Armed Services Committees in
both houses plan for their authorization, and I wanted to lay
the groundwork for us to do the same with the State Department.
In that document, we began what is a very difficult
analysis about how to balance and mitigate risk versus
presence. It was one of the most challenging aspects of the
QDDR process, and we have an ongoing effort under way. Because
if you talk to many of our Ambassadors, especially the
experienced ones, they really don't want to be told by
Washington or anybody where they can go, when they can go, what
they can do. They have been in the Foreign Service 10, 20, 30
years or more, and they believe in their missions, and they
believe they have a better sense of how to evaluate risk.
At the same time, we do have to be conscious of and make
difficult decisions about how to protect not just Ambassadors
but all of our personnel and their families in these high-risk
posts. It is a constant debate, Congressman.
You know, we have authorized departure, we have ordered
departure, and it is something that we take very seriously when
we do it. You know, when we left Benghazi on the night of 11th-
12th, there were others still there. The Italians were there;
the Turks were there. The Italians had just left.
I mean, people evaluate risk over time, and I think it is
important to do what we can to minimize it. Some of that will
be done by technology, some of that will be done by hard
security, and some of that will be done by what we call soft
power. But trying to get the balance right is very difficult.
Mr. Schneider. As we look forward to the steps taken, we
will be in new places, we are going to face new challenges. How
do we make sure that we are able to provide the resources to
these high-threat, high-risk posts?
Secretary Clinton. It is very, very difficult. You know,
that is going to be a question of new streamlined processes and
protocols; sufficient security, both hard and soft; and
resources. And we just have to--we have to ask you, based on
our best assessment, about what we need to do our jobs.
And sometimes, you know, you have a budget process, and
nobody has predicted that you are going to have a revolution
against Ghadafi, and then you have to scramble. How do you get
somebody into Benghazi? How do you figure out what to do in
Tripoli? And I could go down the line and tell you 10 or 20 of
those examples that we live with every day.
So it is more of an art than a science, to be honest,
because, as of now, we don't have, you know, hard parameters,
but we are trying to develop the best we can.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you.
Chairman Royce. Madam Secretary, I understand that you have
a meeting at the White House but have agreed to stay so that
members can have a few more questions. We will end by 5
o'clock. And we really appreciate that.
We go to Mr. Kinzinger of Illinois.
Mr. Kinzinger. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, thank you for staying. I really appreciate
it. I appreciate your service to your country. And, you know,
as was mentioned earlier, we look forward to your next steps.
We will see what happens.
Let me just say, I am actually an Air Force pilot. And I
have a few concerns I want to lay out here. One of the first
things I was told as a pilot in the military is that your
country will never leave you behind. If you find yourself down
in enemy lines, rest assured your country will move heaven and
earth to come get you. If you find yourself in armed conflict,
rest assured your country will do everything in its power to
come save you from that armed conflict.
Now, as a representative of the administration here, I have
to ask you this: From the initial attack to the second attack,
there was a lull of 7 hours.
Now, I am going to say this; I was one of a handful of
Republicans to vote to support the President's position in
Libya. I think we did the right thing there. But I did it with
the knowledge that we would have the military forces in place
to be able to rescue any personnel in a tough situation.
In that intervening 7 hours, military assets, to what we
know, what we can talk about, were not put in place. Aviano Air
Base is 1,044 miles from Benghazi. Aviano Air Base is an F-16
base. Airplanes could have been put in the air, after being
fueled, even if they didn't have missiles on them. And there
can be nonviolent things that F-16s can do to disperse crowds
that I know of well. So that is a concern.
Originally, also, when you briefed us, I remember--and this
has been, I know, hammered a little bit--but when you briefed
us, you said unequivocally this was a result of the video. And
I remember, in fact, you got pretty upset about it when
somebody suggested that this was a terrorist attack. This was
our briefing that we had. But we find out now it wasn't. We
find out now that it wasn't the video, it was this terrorist
attack.
When we come to talk about the issue of the drone and the
surveillance overhead, if there was, in fact, a drone overhead,
I would assume that there would be a link in which you could
watch what is going on live, or else maybe somebody under you
was able to see what was going on live, or else that link was
down.
And another question I have, when it comes to--I watched
your testimony in the Senate, and you said, you know, part of
the reason we had a little bit of delay in understanding what
was going on, we did not have immediate access to the security
cameras, the security footage. But yet, at the same time, you
had mortars being reported as being fired on security
personnel. If I would hear that mortars are being fired, I
would immediately assume, regardless of whether I could see
what is going on overhead, regardless of if I could see the
security footage, that this is more than a spontaneous
demonstration.
The other question I have, too--I am laying a few out for
you--the FEST team, the foreign response team, was that your
decision not to deploy that right away? Was that an issue of
logistics? Where does that come from?
And the final thing I want to say is this. As, again, a
believer, which I think you believe, that we are in a time
where it is very important for American leadership to be out in
front to prevent a resurgence of jihadist activity, of al-Qaeda
activity, I am worried about the strategy of leading from
behind.
If the United States Ambassador in Libya--and I say this
respectfully--can't get a message forward to the Secretary of
State about his concern about security in one of the most hot
zones in the world, I worry about a lead-from-behind strategy.
And if we have no assets on alert that can respond in a 7-
hour lull in two different attacks in the most hot spot, one of
the most hot spots in the world, on 9/11, on the anniversary,
is the lead-from-behind strategy failing?
Because I really want American leadership to be strong. I
believe in freedom, and I believe we are the people that are
going to be able to take freedom around the globe.
With that, I will give you the remaining minute, and I
thank you for your generosity.
Secretary Clinton. And I thank you for your service,
Congressman, both in the Air Force and here.
There was a lot packed into that. Let me see what I can
cover quickly, and then we will get the rest to you in writing.
DoD took every action it could take, starting from the time
that the President directed Secretary Panetta and Chairman
Dempsey to do so.
Again, I turn to the ARB because that is, to me, a much
more factually based finding. The board found no evidence of
any undue delays in decision-making or denial of support from
Washington or from military combatant commanders. Quite the
contrary, the safe evacuation of all U.S. Government personnel
from Benghazi 12 hours after the initial attack, and
subsequently to Ramstein, was the result of exceptional U.S.
Government coordination and military response and helped save
the lives of two severely wounded Americans.
Now, having said that, I think it is very important we do
more to coordinate with DoD along the lines of what you are
talking about, because who knows what is going to be facing us
in the next months and years?
With respect to the video, I did not say that it was about
the video for Libya. It certainly was for many of the other
places where we were watching these disturbances.
Now, with respect to Predator feed or video of the attack,
we could not see that at the State Department. There was no
access to that. At no time did I have a live feed of the
attack, not from any system in our compound and not from the
annex, nor from any UAV. There has been confusion,
understandably, because we did talk a lot about the
surveillance camera video that eventually got to us.
I will give you more information about that because I think
it is important to understand how this happened. And, as you
know, Congressman, the annex was not under my authority. So
information was flowing into another agency, more than one
other agency. And those people were incredibly brave, but
overwhelmed as well.
Chairman Royce. Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts.
Mr. Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member.
And, Madam Secretary, thank you for what I can only
describe as a truly exemplary career in public service and a
dedication to public service.
Secretary Clinton. Thank you.
Mr. Kennedy. And I look forward to what the future holds
for you, as well.
I have two broad-based questions for you, if I can, Madam
Secretary.
You now have obviously held this office for 4 years at an
extraordinarily challenging time in our history. We recently
passed the 2-year anniversary of the Arab Awakening. We are
seeing in the recent headlines, emerging threats from Algeria
and Mali across Northern Africa, spreading out through the
Middle East--Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.
As you close on your tenure, I was wondering if you might
be willing to share some important lessons learned from the
time that you have spent in this post and enlighten us as to
what Congress can do to help respond and even get in front of
these threats as you move forward.
And related to that, if I may, assuming that you are going
to say what you have said a couple of times about increased
engagement at the ground level, how do we do that in areas that
are unstable, where we need to depend on local governments or
local security forces that, quite frankly, we have seen don't
have the ability to provide the type of security that our
diplomats are going to demand?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Congressman, it is wonderful to
see you here. And I thank you for your interest in looking,
sort of, into the future.
Let me just make a couple of points.
First, we have a lot of tools that we don't use as well as
we should. I think we have abdicated the broadcasting arena,
where both in TV and radio, which are considered kind of old-
fashioned media, are still very important in a lot of these
ungoverned areas, a lot of these difficult places where we are
trying to do business. And I think we have to get our act
together. I would hope that this committee would pay attention
to the Broadcasting Board of Governors, which is in desperate
need of assistance, intervention, and change.
I think, too, social media is a great tool. We have begun
trying to use it much more in the State Department, and not to
communicate with just, you know, leaders and officials, but
really, as you say, get down into the grass roots.
We have also--I started two organizations to deal with
countering violent extremism: One, a new operation inside the
State Department that is staffed with interagency experts so
that--you know, I am not saying anything that is classified,
but it is beginning to try to respond to al-Qaeda and other
jihadist propaganda. So if they put up a video which talks
about how terrible Americans are, we put up a video which talks
about, you know, how terrible they are. We are trying to meet
them in the media channels that they are communicating with
people.
We are also at the beginning of an organization I helped to
stand up, the Global Counterterrorism Forum. Because if we
don't work with partners and understand more effectively how to
counter violent extremism, how to stop recruiters, how to turn
families and communities against these jihadists, there will be
a constant flow of them. So we have to be smarter about that.
And there are other things that I would, you know, like to
share with you and others on the committee who are interested.
You know, it is not a perfect analogy, but I would say that
our fight against international communism, against the Soviet
Union, during the cold war, we did a lot of things really well.
I mean, we kept people's hopes alive, we communicated with
freedom lovers and advocates behind the Iron Curtain. We did it
through media, we did through our values. Well, I think we have
a similar challenge, even though it is a very different world.
And let's get smart about it, and let's figure out how we are
going to put some points on the board, so to speak, in dealing
with both governments and populations.
And if I could, just very--I know that Representative
Duncan has left, but his question took me a little by surprise
because our ops center does not do instant messaging. So the
reason you haven't gotten instant messaging is we don't do
instant messaging. So I wanted to put that into the record and
hope that his staff or someone will convey that to him.
Thank you.
Mr. Kennedy. Thank you.
Chairman Royce. Thank you.
We will go to Mr. Brooks of Alabama.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Secretary Clinton.
It is an honor to be here today. And I want to thank you for
the time that you have spent with us and with the Senate, for
that matter. I am sure it has been a long day.
It has been my experience that truth without credibility is
meaningless, and credibility, once lost, is difficult to
reacquire. My concern is the degree to which false statements
about Benghazi have damaged America's credibility not only here
but also abroad.
I don't focus on any of your statements in that regard;
rather, I focus on some others. On September 16, 2012, on Meet
the Press, Ambassador Susan Rice stated, and I quote,
``What happened in Benghazi was, in fact, initially a
spontaneous reaction to what had just transpired hours
before in Cairo. Almost a copycat of the demonstrations
against our facility in Cairo, which were prompted, of
course, by the video.''
Now, let me break this statement down to three parts, if I
might. And I would ask you to confirm, based on the data we now
have, whether her comments were true or false.
Secretary Clinton, is Ambassador Rice's statement that
Benghazi was a spontaneous reaction to the Cairo protests
factually accurate?
Secretary Clinton. Well, I think if you look at the ARB
finding, Congressman, there is still question about what caused
it. So I don't want to mislead you in any way. That is not the
weight of the evidence right now. But I think until the FBI
completes its investigation, we are not going to know all the
reasons why these people showed up with weapons and stormed our
compound.
Mr. Brooks. Well, Secretary Clinton, is Ambassador Rice's
statement that Benghazi was a copycat of the Cairo
demonstrations factually accurate?
Secretary Clinton. Well, it turned out not to be because
the Cairo demonstrations were not heavily armed, and we did
eventually get host-nation security support. So there were
differences.
But, again, I would say that Secretary Rice conveyed
information that had been provided by the intelligence
community and the interagency process.
Mr. Brooks. I am not trying to go into the process right
now. I am just trying to determine what the truth is as best we
know at this time.
Secretary Clinton, is Ambassador Rice's statement that
Benghazi was ``prompted, of course, by an anti-Muslim video''
put on the Internet in the United States factually accurate?
Secretary Clinton. I would have to go back to my first
answer, Congressman, and just say that we don't know all the
motivations, so I don't want to give a sweeping answer as to
what prompted those men to come out that night and attack our
compound.
Mr. Brooks. Okay. Well, on September 16, the very same day
U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice made her statements to the American
people and the world, Libyan President Mohammed Magariaf said
on NPR that the idea that this criminal and cowardly act was a
spontaneous protest, that it just spun out of control, is
completely unfounded and preposterous. We firmly believe that
this was a precalculated, preplanned attack that was carried
out specifically to attack the United States consulate.
As we now know, from everything I have read at least, the
Libyan President told the truth. Contrast that with the
statements by Ambassador Rice, to the United Nations. It forces
one to wonder whether Libya's intelligence was that much better
than America's on September the 16th or whether Libyan leaders
were that much more willing to be candid or to avoid
misstatements.
Secretary Clinton, what evidence was there that was so
compelling that it caused the White House, through Ambassador
Susan Rice, to make these representations about spontaneous
protests, anti-Muslim videos, and the like, despite evidence
and statements of Libya's own President to the contrary? You
know, if she is going to make these statements, an affirmative
act on her part, where was the compelling evidence, and what
was it?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Congressman, I was not involved in
the so-called talking points process. My understanding is it
was a typical process trying to get to the best information
available. It was an intelligence product. They are, as I again
understand it, working with their committees of jurisdiction to
try to unpack that.
But I will say that all of the senior administration
officials, including Ambassador Rice, who spoke publicly to
this terrible incident, had the same information from the
intelligence community.
Mr. Brooks. If I might interject. I appreciate your
response so far. But if you are not familiar with any
compelling evidence that would support the statements made by
Ambassador Rice, who would know?
Secretary Clinton. Well, there was evidence, and the
evidence was being sifted and analyzed by the intelligence
community, which is why the intelligence community was the
principal decider about what went into talking points.
And there was also the added problem of nobody wanting to
say things that would undermine the investigation. So it was
much more complex than I think we are giving it credit for,
sir.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you for your candor, and thank you for
your time.
Chairman Royce. The ranking member and I have discussed
going to 3 minutes for questions from here on out. And, without
objection, that is what we will do.
Let's go to Mr. Bera from California.
Mr. Bera. Secretary Clinton, thank you for appearing before
the committee today.
You know, as a new Member of Congress, I think I speak for
all the freshmen that we are not going to get much time to
serve with you, but we hope in a few years we will get that
chance to serve again.
You know, from my perspective, the tragedy in Benghazi was
the loss of four American patriots. That loss was felt pretty
deeply in northern California, particularly around Ambassador
Chris Stevens. You know, his family had deep roots in our
community.
The best way for us to honor their memory and their service
is to do our utmost to make sure the lessons of Benghazi--and
do everything that we can to honor and protect our men and
women around the world, you know, in an increasingly dangerous
situation. You have been very forthright today and forthcoming
with information, and we truly appreciate that.
You know, much has been made today about the flow of
information, but I want to quote former Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, who said after the ARB
was issued, ``As someone who has run large organizations--and
the Secretary of State has been very clear about taking
responsibility here--it was, from my perspective, not
reasonable, in terms of having a specific level of knowledge
that was very specifically resident in her staff, and over time
certainly didn't bring that to her attention.'' That was
Admiral Mike Mullen.
Secretary, how many cables did you say arrive every year to
the State Department? One-point-four million? Can you tell me
how long it takes you to read 1.4 million cables?
Secretary Clinton. Well, if I had ever tried to read 1.4
million cables, I don't think I would be sitting here today. I
would probably be, you know, collapsed somewhere.
You know, I appreciated what Admiral Mullen said because
when you do sit on top of large organizations--in his case the
United States military, which is huge, and in my case the State
Department and USAID--you put into place processes. And you
have to trust the judgment, the good sense of the people in
your organization.
So those 1.43 million cables, they come into the State
Department. You know, the tradition is they are all addressed
to me, but, you know, the vast, vast majority are funneled
through these processes to get to the right people, who are
expected to take the right actions. And 99.9 percent of the
time people do.
I want to reiterate that. It is an incredible organization,
with dedicated people, particularly our security professionals,
who have stopped so many attacks, protected so many people. But
occasionally we see a serious problem like we have seen here,
and that is what we are trying to fix.
Mr. Bera. Well, thank you for your candor.
Secretary Clinton. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Royce. Mr. Tom Cotton of Arkansas.
Mr. Cotton. Good afternoon, Madam Secretary. Thank you for
coming. We are all here very happy to have you here, very happy
for your recovery. I know I bring greetings from many of our
mutual friends in Arkansas.
Some of our peers on the other side have expressed their
ambitions for your future. I would like to say that I just wish
you had won the Democratic primary in 2008.
Secretary Clinton. I did pretty well in Arkansas.
Mr. Cotton. You did.
You said on September 21 that we will not rest until we
have tracked down and brought to justice the terrorists who
murdered the four Americans at Benghazi.
Secretary Clinton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cotton. Earlier today, you said, I certainly hope the
FBI is able to investigate, identify, and hold those
responsible.
Does the difference in those two statements reflect any
concern on your part of the progress of that investigation?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Congressman, first,
congratulations. It is good to see you here.
Mr. Cotton. Thank you.
Secretary Clinton. No, it does not. But I am conscious of
the fact that talking about FBI investigations is something you
have to be extremely careful about, for obvious reasons.
I think it is clear, or I hope it is clear, that President
Obama, when he says we are going to bring people to justice
even if it takes some time, he means what he says. Obviously,
the FBI is conducting an investigation. What actions are taken
will be determined in the future.
Mr. Cotton. What is the United States Government's position
on the role of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the attacks
at Benghazi?
Secretary Clinton. Again, I am not going to prejudge what
the FBI determines. We know that there are al-Qaeda related
organizations, as we saw from the pictures that were held up,
throughout the region, including in eastern Libya. We know that
people, like we saw with the recent attacks in Algeria, like to
associate themselves with al-Qaeda.
But we have to be careful about what that means. Core al-
Qaeda has been severely depleted coming out of Afghanistan and
Pakistan. What we are dealing with now are the jihadists who
have been associated with al-Qaeda, who have gained,
unfortunately, very serious combat experience, coming back to
the countries that they left in order to go wage jihad in
Central Asia.
So whether they call themselves al-Qaeda or Boko Haram or
Ansar al-Sharia, they are all part of the same global jihadist
movement. And there may be differences between them, but their
goals are unfortunately similar and pose threats to us and our
partners.
Mr. Cotton. Both the chairman and Mr. Poe have referenced a
Tunisian suspect who has been released. I believe that is Mr.
Ali Harzi.
Secretary Clinton. Right.
Mr. Cotton. On January 8, it was reported in The New York
Times.
Do you find it distressing that the Tunisian Government has
released that gentleman in light of the hundreds of millions of
dollars of aid we have given them over the last 2 years?
Secretary Clinton. At this point, Congressman, I do not,
for two reasons.
First, I had a long conversation with high-ranking Tunisian
officials about this, as did Director Mueller of the FBI when
he was there in person. We have been assured that there was an
effort to have rule of law, judicial process, sufficient
evidence not yet available to be presented, but a very clear
commitment made to us that they will be monitoring the
whereabouts of Harzi. And we are going to hold them to that and
watch carefully.
Mr. Cotton. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Chairman Royce. Mr. Lowenthal of California.
Mr. Lowenthal. Thank you, Madam Secretary. First, I also
want to compliment you on your exemplary service. But more than
that, I really want to say how much I have appreciated your
openness, your thoughtfulness today, your transparency.
And what I am struck with in this hearing is a greater
appreciation of the courage of State Department personnel. I
think we are left with that understanding of just how
courageous the personnel have been in taking on assignments
that in the past never had been taken on before. And you have
ably, I think, presented to us why that is important, why it is
important for emerging democracies that we be there.
My question is very similar to the one of Congressman
Schneider's, and that was: How do you make that analysis
between risk and presence? What are some of the obstacles in
making that? How do we move forward with that? And how does the
Congress understand some of that kind of balance?
Secretary Clinton. Well, this is my ongoing hope: That we
can get it more right than wrong. Let me just make a few points
because it is an issue that I hope this committee takes very
seriously.
First of all, you have to remember that when we talk about
the State Department and diplomatic facilities, that covers--we
are the umbrella for so many other agencies in our Government.
If we were not there, many of those agencies' representatives
would have a difficult time being there. I mean, we are the
diplomatic presence that permits us to pursue law enforcement
objectives, intelligence objectives, military objectives, and
so much more.
So it is not just about us sitting around and saying, you
know, do we really want our diplomats at risk? It is, okay,
what are the equities of the rest of the government that would
be affected if we decided we had to close shop because the risk
was too great? I want to stress that because I don't think you
can understand, at least from my perspective, how difficult the
calculation is without knowing that it is not just about the
State Department and USAID.
Secondly, I don't think we can retreat from these hard
places. We have to harden our security presence, but we can't
retreat. We have to be there. We have to be picking up
intelligence, information, building relationships. And if we
had a whole table of some of our most experienced Ambassadors
sitting here today, they would be speaking with a loud chorus,
like, you know, ``Yes, help us be secure, but don't shut us
down. Don't keep us behind high walls in bunkers so we can't
get out and figure out what is going on.''
So that is the balance I have been trying to make for 4
years.
Mr. Lowenthal. Thank you.
Chairman Royce. We will only have time for two more
questions. We will end at 5 o'clock.
We will go now to Mr. Cook from California.
Mr. Cook. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
First of all, I want to compliment you. It has been a long,
long day. And to survive all these questions and everything, it
has been tough.
I want to talk to you about the Marine security guards.
Secretary Clinton. Yes.
Mr. Cook. And this is from somebody who spent a long time
in the Marine Corps but not under the cognizance part of DoD,
not under the State Department.
And you had some things in here about additional Marine
security guard detachments.
Secretary Clinton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cook. And the question is about whether it is prudent
to task-organize those assets that are organic to you and
perhaps put them in those areas that have the high-threat
level. And if you could answer that, I would appreciate that.
Secretary Clinton. Congressman, that is a very astute
observation. I mean, we believe that we need to increase both
our Marine security guard detachments as well as our Diplomatic
Security and create more synergy and cooperation in these high-
threat posts.
The Marine security guards, as you know, are very much a
presence on more than 150 of our posts. And in order to give
them the facilities and support they need, they need a Marine
house, they need to be very close to the Embassy. Because if
you saw the recent movie ``Argo,'' you saw the Marines in
there, you know, destroying the classified material when the
mob was outside in Tehran. They are experts at that; they are
people that are totally relied on by the entire mission.
But as I said earlier, historically their job has not been
personal security. So we have to figure out, working with DoD
and particularly with the Marines, you know--and most of them
are very young. You know, I take pictures with them everywhere
I go, and usually the sergeants, you know, are older, more
experienced, but most of the Marines on duty are quite young.
We have to figure out how we really take advantage of their
presence. And that is a conversation we are in the midst of
with our DoD colleagues. And with your experience, I would
welcome any insight or ideas you have about how we really do
use our Marine security detachments better.
Mr. Cook. Thank you very much.
I yield my time.
Chairman Royce. Thank you.
We will go to Grace Meng from New York.
Secretary Clinton. Congratulations, too, Grace.
Ms. Meng. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member.
Madam Secretary, it is wonderful to see you here again. And
if you have any advice for a fellow New Yorker finding her way
around this town, please let me know.
As a woman and as a mom, thank you so much for being a role
model for women not only in the United States but all
throughout the world. Thank you for your compassion and
leadership always.
I am curious, in the past weeks we have seen the French
respond decisively to the situation in Mali. The African Union
has fought well in Somalia. Do you see this as an advancement
of multilateralism in combating Islamic extremism in the Middle
East, in Africa? And what more can we ask from allies in that
area?
Secretary Clinton. Well, congratulations, Grace.
And that is an excellent question because I think that is
exactly what we are coping with right now. I am very proud of
the work we did with African nations to stand up, financially
support, and train the AMISOM force that has driven al-Shabaab
out of the dominant position that it had. That meant putting
American trainers, working with troops from Uganda, Burundi,
Djibouti, eventually Kenya, advising some other countries that
were willing to put in assets. It took money, it took time. But
we just recognized the new Somali Government, which could never
have been possible without American support and multilateralism
because the U.N. was strongly behind it, we got other nations
to invest.
What we are looking at now in West Africa is to try to help
support an African, AU-blessed, ECOWAS-supported troop
combination from a number of countries to really take the lead
against the terrorists in northern Mali.
Again, this is hard. If the United States comes in and does
something on our own--and I appreciated what Congressman
Kinzinger said--you know, nobody can match us in military
assets and prowess. But a lot of the challenges we face are not
immediately or sustainably solved by military action alone.
Therefore, we have to get countries in the region to increase
their border security, to increase their antiterrorist,
counterterrorist efforts inside their own borders. We have a
lot to do now in West Africa.
So I think you are right to point out the United States has
to play a role, but it needs to be part of a multilateral
effort in order to have a chance at success.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
We have discussed many important issues. I remain concerned
about whether the Accountability Review Board captured the full
picture of what happened. But I think we can agree to work
together moving ahead to improve security in a number of
different areas.
This hearing now stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:02 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
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Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Christopher H.
Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State of New Jersey
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