[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE FATAH-HAMAS RECONCILIATION: THREATENING PEACE PROSPECTS
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 5, 2013
__________
Serial No. 113-2
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania Massachusetts
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
TREY RADEL, Florida GRACE MENG, New York
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
TED S. YOHO, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
LUKE MESSER, Indiana
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
TOM COTTON, Arkansas DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida JUAN VARGAS, California
TREY RADEL, Florida BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina Massachusetts
TED S. YOHO, Florida GRACE MENG, New York
LUKE MESSER, Indiana LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Matthew Levitt, Ph.D., director, Stein Program on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence, The Washington Institute for
Near East Policy............................................... 9
Michael Rubin, Ph.D., resident scholar, American Enterprise
Institute...................................................... 21
Mr. David Makovsky, director, Project on the Middle East Peace
Process, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy......... 28
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Matthew Levitt, Ph.D.: Prepared statement........................ 12
Michael Rubin, Ph.D.: Prepared statement......................... 23
Mr. David Makovsky: Prepared statement........................... 31
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 64
Hearing minutes.................................................. 65
THE FATAH-HAMAS RECONCILIATION: THREATENING PEACE PROSPECTS
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TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 2013
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o'clock
a.m., in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana
Ros-Lehtinen (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. The committee will come to order. I would
like to welcome everyone to our first hearing on the
Subcommittee on Middle East and North Africa on the 113th
Congress. I want to congratulate my good friend, my fellow
Floridian colleague, Mr. Deutch, for earning the spot of
ranking member. I look forward to working with Ted and with his
staff throughout our Congress and our congressional session.
Thank you, Ted.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. It is a pleasure to be with you.
After recognizing myself and the ranking member, Mr.
Deutch, for 5 minutes each for an opening statement, I will
then recognize other members seeking recognition for a 1-minute
opening statement. We will then hear from our witnesses. And,
without objection, the witnesses' prepared statements will be
made a part of the record. Members may have 5 days in which to
insert statements and questions for the record subject to the
length limitation in the rules. The Chair now recognizes
herself for 5 minutes.
With so much instability and turmoil surrounding the Middle
East, Israel is in a more precarious situation than ever now,
as it is surrounded by rogue regimes and terrorist
organizations that wish to wipe her off the map. To Israel's
northeast, the prospects of Assad falling to Syria seems to be
a matter of when and not if as fears grow that Assad's chemical
weapons arsenal might fall into the wrong hands. Yet, that
isn't the only concern for Israel as she looks to her neighbors
across the Sinai and sees Egypt once again engulfed in turmoil.
Just 2 years after demonstrators took to the streets
demanding freedom and an end to the regime of Mubarak, it
appears that Egyptians are no better off now than they were
back then. A continued threat to the Israeli people stems from
smugglers and extremists bringing everything from drugs and
weapons through the Sinai. The Egyptian Government continues to
let the Sinai be used as a sanctuary for illicit activities and
provides Iran the pathway to provide weapons to rearm Hamas.
The threat is more apparent by Ahmadinejad arriving in Cairo
today, making it the first time that an Iranian leader has
visited Egypt since 1979.
The existential threat that a nuclear Iran poses to Israel,
to our U.S. allies, and our national security interests seeks
to destabilize the entire region as recent reports suggest that
Iran has told U.N. nuclear officials that it plans to add
hundreds more centrifuges to further its nuclear enrichment
program.
Vice President Biden's recent comments about the
administration's willingness to talk to the supreme leader will
only embolden the Iranian regime. Instead, we must concentrate
on enforcing and expanding our sanctions and cooperate with
responsible nations to compel Iran to abandon its nuclear
weapons ambition. And if all of that were not enough, we are
witnessing Abu Mazen and Hamas seeking to unify their mutual
hatred toward the democratic Jewish State of Israel.
These overtures can leave the future of a peace process in
serious jeopardy. The Palestinian Authority is corrupt and has
not prevented Hamas and other Palestinian extremist groups from
allowing violence to turn against the Jewish state. Congress
needs to exert our oversight responsibility and urge the Obama
administration to hold the Palestinian Authority accountable
for its aggressive actions against our ally Israel.
The destructive actions by the Palestinian Authority at the
U.N., negotiating with Hamas, and undermining the peace process
with Israel cannot continue without any repercussions. As a
former chair of our Foreign Affairs Committee, I exercised due
diligence at holding funds from reaching the Palestinian
Authority.
We should also leverage our contributions to the United
Nations, specifically entities like UNESCO, to prevent the P.A.
from pushing its anti-Israel agenda.
I am disappointed that the administration continues to
advocate for millions of taxpayer dollars to Palestinian
programs and ignores existing U.S. law, which already prohibits
funds to entities that recognize Palestine at the U.N. Should
the U.S. be sending millions in hard-earned U.S. taxpayer
dollars to the Palestinian Authority when it continues to
embrace extremist violence against the Israeli people?
It has become clear that Abu Mazen is more interested in
joining forces with Hamas, a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist
organization, than he is with brokering peace with Israel. This
is the same entity that was visually attacking Israel with a
persistent and ongoing barrage of rocket attacks from Gaza.
They have all been clear signals that Israel cannot count on
Abu Mazen as a true partner for peace. While he actively seeks
to reconcile with Hamas, he shows where his true priorities
lie, undermining the peace process.
I agree with Prime Minister Netanyahu that Israel cannot
negotiate with a partner who openly embraces a foreign
terrorist organization that wishes to see the destruction of
the Jewish State of Israel. Israel cannot find a true partner
in peace with any government that is comprised of members of
Hamas. If these efforts of unification are real, it gives us
all a great deal of reason for concern for both the future of
the peace process and, indeed, Israel's safety in the rapidly
changing Middle East.
And, with that, I am pleased to turn to my friend, the
ranking member, Mr. Deutch, for his opening remarks.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I'll first say how
pleased I am to serve the subcommittee with you. We have had a
chance to work together for years on our mutual efforts to
thwart Iran's nuclear program, to ensure the safety and
security of the State of Israel, and to advocate on behalf of
the thousands of Holocaust survivors in south Florida and
around the country.
I would also like to welcome members of the subcommittee,
especially those who are new to the Foreign Affairs Committee.
This committee tackles one of the most volatile, yet vitally
important regions of the world. And I thank you for your
dedication to these issues.
Today's hearing comes at a crucial time for both Israel and
the Palestinians. Just 2 weeks ago, Israeli elections saw the
highest turnout in a decade with a last minute surge by
centrist parties. And once again we are reminded that Israel's
vibrant democracy is a model in a region where many still
struggle for free and fair elections.
This weekend, President Perez officially tasked Prime
Minister Netanyahu with forming a coalition government. The new
government will grapple with precisely the question before us
this morning. And it will grapple with broader issues
surrounding Israel's quest for peace with its neighbors and the
very possibility of a two-state solution.
In 2010, Prime Minister Netanyahu began an unprecedented
halt to construction for 10 months in the West Bank. And while
this moratorium was demanded by President Abbas as a condition
for negotiations, only in the last 3 weeks of the moratorium
did he even agree to talks. And since September 2010, they have
been frozen. Instead, Abbas abandoned direct talks and pursued
the unilateral creation of a Palestinian state. In doing so,
they violated U.N. resolutions 242, 338, and the Oslo, of
course, all of which lay out the framework for a negotiated
settlement between the two parties. He then internationalized
the process by seeking statehood through the Security Council
at the U.N. and pushing for upgraded status for the
Palestinians at the U.N. this fall, again contrary to the
established framework for peace talks.
Alongside these unilateral actions, Fatah began negotiating
reconciliation with Hamas, a terrorist organization that
continues to call for Israel's destruction. To be sure, Hamas'
rejection of the quartet principles precludes it from being a
legitimate partner for peace.
In May 2011, I was in Ramallah the day after Hamas and
Fatah first announced reconciliation. We sit here today, nearly
2 years later, after witnessing Hamas rain rockets down on
Israel and continue to defy international conditions. Just
weeks ago, Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal and President Abbas met
in Cairo to further their supposed reconciliation. Talks will
resume in Cairo again next week, and it remains unclear whether
either side really intends to move forward.
Let me be clear. The United States will not accept a
Palestinian Government that includes Hamas. In fact, our laws
dictate that aid to the P.A. will cease should Hamas play any
significant role in the government without first adhering to
the quartet principles. I made this very point to Prime
Minister Fayyad 2 years ago.
So the question remains, will President Abbas demand Hamas-
renounced violence? We know Abbas' supposed request that Hamas
dismantle militias to disarm is a major divide in these talks.
And for Hamas, the answer appears to be an unwavering no.
Today, Israeli and Palestinian security forces work
together each day to secure the region and to enhance Israel's
security with U.S. support. This assistance actually advances
peace. So while I share my colleagues' frustration with Abbas'
unilateral actions and pursuit of reconciliation with Hamas,
U.S. law remains clear. Reconciliation with a terrorist group
will mean no United States aid. But if we are to advance the
prospect of peace and ensure lasting security for Israel, we
have to assess the implications of our actions. Our goal must
be to prevent reconciliation so that there continues to be a
viable partner for peace with Israel operating in the West
Bank.
I don't want this to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. We
have got to ensure that our discussions regarding
reconciliation, our policy regarding reconciliation, do not
leave the P.A. without any other option but reconciliation.
Prime Minister Fayyad has worked tirelessly to build
institutions capable of supporting a Palestinian state. These
institutions are essential to the creation of an economically
viable, stable Palestinian state and to the long-term lasting
security of Israel. But the P.A. is facing massive budget
shortfalls.
And while the U.S. has been withholding funds for nearly a
year, Israel recently agreed to resume the transfer of revenue
to the P.A. after a 4-month suspension following Abbas' efforts
at the U.N. And while I acknowledge the natural reaction to
Abbas' efforts is to withhold funds, the longer salaries go
underpaid, the more likely Fatah supporters will look elsewhere
for support.
I have grave concerns that the collapse of the Palestinian
Authority would pose the gravest of threats to security in the
West Bank and to our ally Israel and destroy any prospect for
negotiations. This critical juncture demands that we examine
all opportunities. Will a new Israeli Government renew
prospects for the resumption of direct negotiations? And are
direct negotiations even possible? Will Fatah drive to unify
with a group that seeks Israel's destruction or will it take
the only road to peace: Negotiations with the State of Israel?
I would like our witnesses this morning to address the
prospects for peace, how we will talk of reconciliation and
U.S. policy about not just reconciliation but those very
discussions affect the prospect for peace.
Madam Chairman, as always, it is a pleasure to examine
these issues with you. And I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much to my friend.
And now I would like to recognize the members for a 1-
minute opening statement, starting with Mr. Chabot, who is the
chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you for holding
this important hearing this morning. I certainly enjoyed
chairing this committee for 2 years, which happened to
correspond to the 2 years of the so-called ``Arab Spring.'' So
it was very interesting times, and I look forward to working
with you on this committee again.
As I said, it is a very timely hearing. While President
Obama has reiterated a number of times his belief that the
resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of
America's core interests in the Middle East, there has been a
disconnect, I believe, between stated administration policy
objectives and our aid policy.
Palestinian leadership has, let's face it, thumbed its nose
at Israel and its allies, including the United States, by
unilaterally seeking non-member state status at the United
Nations, and it now seeks a merger or a reconciliation
agreement, as they call it, between Abu Mazen, its PLO faction
in the West Bank and the terrorist-led Hamas in Gaza. Yet, over
the last 3 years, as the Palestinian leadership has repeatedly
retreated from a peace process, American assistance to the
Palestinians has remained unchanged. I would certainly like to
see that addressed this morning.
Again, thank you very much for holding this hearing.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts is recognized.
Mr. Kennedy. Madam Chair, thank you very much. Mr. Ranking
Member. Thank you for holding the hearing.
To our witnesses, I want to thank each of you for being
here today and my colleagues as well.
The potential of a consensus government in Palestine and
the effect that that would have on Israel and the broader peace
process is of particular importance to my district back home in
Massachusetts as well as to this country's foreign policy at a
critical region and a critical time.
Last year, I had the privilege of visiting our great friend
Israel. I was deeply humbled by the incredible courage and
dignity of Israelis who live, work, and raise families in the
face of a daily existential threat. I saw firsthand in
communities like Sderot, where kindergartens are reinforced by
reinforced concrete and gas filtration systems. We saw it
across the country where bus stops double as bomb shelters and
enhanced security is a way of life, protecting innocent
civilians from the threat of terror.
Despite the complexities of an entrenched and painful
conflict, I hold out hope, as so many others do. But for that
to happen, Israel needs a credible partner and a negotiating
table. I look forward to hearing your thoughts today about how
we can move that process forward.
Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Cotton is recognized.
Mr. Cotton. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I served in the Army in Iraq and Afghanistan. And I learned
when someone says they are going to try to kill you or they try
to kill you, you should take them seriously.
Hamas still has that posture toward Israel. They don't
recognize Israel's right to exist. They reject a two-state
solution. They continue to use violence to undermine Israel's
Government and to attack and kill Israelis. Mahmoud Abbas I am
not sure appreciates that principle given his increasing
sincerity on reconciliation with Hamas in trying to create a
unity government. I know that Prime Minister Netanyahu still
does.
I would be curious to hear the panelists' views a little
bit later on the results of the election last week,
specifically the Yesh Atid party and what that would mean going
forward and, as the madam chair and ranking member have said
also, the implications for U.S. foreign aid toward Palestine.
Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
Congresswoman Meng of New York is recognized.
Ms. Meng. Thank you, Madam Chair, Mr. Ranking Member, for
holding this hearing.
At the outset, as a New Yorker, I'd like to note the
passing of a great New Yorker: Mayor Ed Koch. He cared deeply
about the right of the Jewish people to live freely and
peacefully in their own state. He taught us all a great deal,
and we will all miss him.
The prospect of a Fatah-Hamas reconciliation is
particularly disturbing for me because it will render peace and
security almost impossible. Let's be clear. Hamas is not a
partner for peace. Hamas is not close to being a partner for
peace. It is not even close to being a partner for peace. So,
of course, reconciliation will be bad for Israel and bad for
the prospects of peace. It has failed to even recognize
Israel's right to exist.
I look forward to hearing from the panelists about how we
can weaken Hamas. I am particularly concerned about the role of
the Gulf States in financing terror in Gaza and Syria. I also
hope to learn more about Hamas's development of its political
and terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank as well as about
how any reconciliation might affect West Bank women, who in
recent years have had more freedom and opportunity than ever.
Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
I am so proud to have so many Floridians serving on our
subcommittee. DeSantis of Florida.
Mr. DeSantis. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
A reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas represents the
death now of the peace process such that such a process exists.
Hamas is intent on destroying the State of Israel and is
dedicated to using terrorism to accomplish its ideological
ends.
Now, I am grateful, Madam Chairwoman, for you holding this
hearing, but I am also mindful that Israel faces unprecedented
security challenges from a nuclear Iran to the ongoing strife
in Syria to the rise of Islamist militants in Egypt and
throughout North Africa. Israel is our most trusted ally in the
region. And our foreign policy must clearly project our support
for Israel. Her security depends on it.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
My husband and I had the honor of serving with our next
speaker in the Florida legislature. It seems like 1,000 years
ago. Ms. Frankel is recognized.
Ms. Frankel. Thank you so much, Madam Chairman. And it
really is an honor to join both you and Mr. Deutch from Florida
and the rest of this esteemed panel.
You know, I served as a mayor of an urban city in Florida.
And, you know, we dealt with gang violence and hurricanes and
never the threat of our neighbor wanting to destroy us, which
is a threat that Israelis families live with every single day.
So I want to say that I share with our chairwoman and ranking
member any support for the security of Israel, who is our
closest and most important ally in the Middle East.
And I look forward to hearing the views of this panel today
and with a view toward how we can maintain and advance Israeli
security.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Another Florida colleague, Mr. Radel of Florida, is
recognized.
Mr. Radel. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I actually spent some time traveling Israel in the late
1990s and did go to the West Bank. As with most of the areas of
the world that I traveled to, there were great people there
when you talked to individuals one on one: Kind, gracious,
hospitable. And then following the passing of Yasser Arafat, we
did think for a time maybe there was a glimmer of hope when it
came to some sort of path to peace. And as recently as 2010, we
saw direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian
Authority providing hope for a two-state solution. But here we
are today seeing overt signs that Mahmoud Abbas is willing to
work with and partner with Hamas, a U.S.-designated foreign
terrorist organization.
Now, this growing relationship and partnership is a serious
and grave threat to the possibility of any Israeli-Palestinian
peace process. It is a serious and grave threat to the security
of Israel. And it is a serious and grave threat to the security
of the United States as well.
I hope today that we can determine with your testimony the
best use of taxpayer money. At a time when we have challenges
at home with the economy, we need to demand accountability.
And, finally, we must, must ensure that we have and keep our
unwavering commitment to Israel.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Vargas of California is recognized.
Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman and Ranking
Member, for allowing me to have a moment. I stand strongly
behind our country's commitment to our stalwart ally Israel and
to sustainable peace with her neighbors. I also am a very
strong supporter of Israel because of my religious background
and believe that it should be our strongest ally.
I am very concerned about what has happened recently,
especially this merger of, really, a terrorist organization. We
saw this as early as last years. And so Hamas is I think a
great problem and one that I hope we hear extensive testimony
today how we can help as Americans and how we can help on this
committee. And I look forward to that.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Meadows of North Carolina is recognized.
Mr. Meadows. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
As we hear your testimony today, we look carefully at the
situation in the Middle East. And obviously, as the conditions
deteriorate, we have to certainly stand by our closest and
strongest ally in the Middle East: Israel.
What is problematic for me is that over many years, we have
talked a number of times about negotiation. And, yet, here we
have the aggressor always being Israel. You know, we have got a
10,000 square foot country surrounded by 5.2 square miles,
million square miles, of oil-rich land. And, yet, Israel is the
aggressor.
And so what I would like to hear today is how as a nation
we can stand up by our ally and certainly stand unflinchingly
beside Israel.
Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Higgins of New York is recognized.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I just want to say at the outset that before Hamas and
Fatah can seek reconciliation with themselves, they need to
seek reconciliation with the outside world. And the only way
that they can do that is to denounce, to reject violence.
In the Anglo-Irish history, many thought that that was
never a problem that could be resolved. It was only resolved
when two sides rejected violence and move toward a path toward
a peaceful reconciliation, which you now have peace in northern
Ireland.
The fact of the matter is the Gaza Strip, which I have
visited many, many times, could be and was once a beautiful
place under the sun, you know, 27 miles long, 7 miles wide
along the Mediterranean, what was once a destination for Gazans
and for everybody from the Middle East. It has become destroyed
because of war.
So the death and destruction that exist there cannot be
predicated on the continued destruction of Israel as a
political goal. They have to reject violence, denounce
violence. Then and only then can they be recognized credibly
from the outside world.
I will yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
Dr. Yoho of Florida.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
I look forward to hearing you guys speak today on your
expert testimony. And I mimic what everybody here has said. And
I just want to say I look forward to the testimony today to see
what role the United States can achieve, help you achieve, in
this process.
Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
And our last opening statement will be by Mr. Rohrabacher
of California. Thank you, Dana.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. And
thank you for again your leadership in having hearings like
this, as you have done as chairman of the full committee.
Just one observation. And, look, I have been around in this
town for about 30 years. And Israel during that time period has
taken step after step after step trying to find a way to live
in peace with its neighbors. And now they so much as move a
shovelful of dirt and it is claimed that they are breaking down
the peace, et cetera, et cetera, even while the other side
shoots rockets into their territory.
I think it is about time that we make sure that we put some
demands and insist let's have some action out of the
Palestinian side. Israelis have gone out of their way. They
have given up territory. What have the Palestinians given up in
these last 10 and 20 years? Let's see some progress from their
side. And certainly let's pay attention if it looks like it is
going to get worse.
Thank you very much.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Mr. Deutch and I are so impressed with the opening
statements of our colleagues. It is going to be a delight for
us to co-chair this subcommittee. Thank you.
I am so pleased to welcome our witnesses. Many of them
are--well, you all are old friends of our committee. First, Dr.
Matthew Levitt, who is a senior fellow and director of the
Washington Institute's Stein Program on Counterterrorism and
Intelligence. From 2005 to early 2007, Dr. Levitt served as
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis at the
U.S. Department of Treasury. And from 2008 to 2009, he served
as a State Department Adviser to the Special Envoy for Middle
East Regional Security, General James Jones.
Next, we would like to welcome Dr. Michael Rubin, an old
friend of our committee, a resident scholar at the American
Enterprise Institute, a senior lecturer at the Naval
Postgraduate School's Center for Civil-Military Relations, and
a senior editor of the Middle East Quarterly. From 2002 to
2004, Dr. Rubin served as a staff adviser for Iran and Iraq in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
And, finally, we welcome Dr. David Makovsky, who is the
distinguished fellow and director of the Project of the Middle
East Peace Process at the Washington Institute. He is also an
adjunct professor in Middle East studies at Johns Hopkins
University School of Advanced International Studies.
Thank you, gentlemen, for appearing before us this morning.
I would like to remind you that your entire written testimony
has been made a part of the hearing. If you could limit your
testimony to no more than 5 minutes? And, without objection,
your entire written statements will be inserted into the
hearing record.
We will begin with you, Dr. Levitt. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF MATTHEW LEVITT, PH.D., DIRECTOR, STEIN PROGRAM ON
COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR
NEAR EAST POLICY
Mr. Levitt. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman, Mr.
Ranking Member, members of the committee.
It is a pleasure to be here. It is an important subject
because, in the eyes of many still today, reconciliation
between Fatah and Hamas is a prerequisite for advancing peace
between Israelis and Palestinians. And nothing could be further
from the truth. The idea is that Palestinians cannot negotiate
with Israel in any serious way when divided between the West
Bank rule of Fatah and the Gaza rule of Hamas. And, to be sure,
P.A. officials in the West Bank can make neither demands nor
concessions when it comes to the Gaza Strip, but the same
cannot be said for their position of strength in the West Bank.
And there is much that could be done. And I think we, the
United States, should focus our efforts on improving things in
the West Bank. But I will leave that line of reasoning to my
colleague David Makovsky, who has done tremendous work on that
issue.
The other flaw behind the reasoning that a reconciliation
between Fatah and Hamas is some kind of panacea is that Hamas
has not changed. Hamas remains committed to violence aimed at
destroying Israel, refuses to acknowledge Israel's right to
exist, and rejects a two-state solution. So a reconciliation
with Hamas is the equivalent of inviting the fox into the
henhouse. The preconditions for reconciliation from their
position are things like controlling key ministries, like the
Ministry of Interior, so that there can be no security
cooperation with Israel or preconditions like insisting that no
changes be made to the security services in the Gaza Strip so
that they remain under Hamas' control and mixed between Hamas'
security services, as such, and the Hamas terrorist wing: The
Qassam Brigades.
Recently, by the way, Hamas has also talked about trying to
reenter the PLO as another form of reconciliation. This would
be no less of a problem. So, for example, Hamas insists on
``liberation first and then a state.'' We will fight first. And
then we will negotiate over what is left. Why? Because Khaled
Mashal, the head of Hamas, explains, a state based on, and I
quote, ``compromise or settlement is not a real state.'' If
that were not clear enough, he explains that ''Hamas will
always be with the resistance. Resistance is not a hotel that
we can check into and out of.'' Indeed, it is at the core of
Hamas's identity.
So if we look at Hamas over the past period of time, most
people focus on the Gaza Strip and with good reason. The
conflict in November made very clear Hamas has spent its time
procuring weapons, including long-range Chinese-made rockets
and other things that they are more than willing to fire at
Israel. Less people are aware of Hamas' efforts to build up a
domestic production capability in the Gaza Strip so that it can
produce its own long-range rockets. Those are not yet fully
capable, but, according to the Israelis, they were also
building unmanned aerial vehicles to be able to conduct attacks
into Israel proper. But it is not just the Gaza Strip. And I
don't think enough people pay attention to this.
As I go into in my written report, there has been a
tremendous amount of activity in the West Bank. And in the
event that we cease providing funding for the Palestinian
security services, their ability to help Israel contain and
control that threat in the West Bank would be severely
curtailed. And that would be something that would risk Israeli
security, Palestinian security, and U.S. national security
interests.
Just at the end of January, a week or so ago, the Israeli
Defense Forces and the Israel Security Agency, the Shin Bet,
arrested 20 known Hamas members who were plotting just the most
recent attack.
The other thing I don't think people pay attention to is
that while Hamas has an immediate interest in fighting Israel,
its ideology is shared not only with the Muslim Brotherhood
extremists that are arising in Egypt and Tunisia and
elsewhere,--indeed, that is one of the reasons it felt so
emboldened as to carry out the violence in November, which it
started with two different attacks that preceded the Israeli
counterattack--but also because its ideology is consistent with
other Jihadist groups. And so we have the case of Abu Ghazala,
an active Hamas member who went off and was fighting with al-
Qaeda in Iraq. We have examples of Mamoun Qafisha and others,
who are running Hamas' operations, not fundraising, not
politics, operations, from Saudi Arabia. We have Hamas
operatives procuring weapons in the Ukraine, in Turkey, in
China. So Hamas is very, very active in these fronts, and it
hasn't changed.
One of the reasons, one of the other reasons, that Hamas
did what it did in the Gaza Strip is because the most hard-
lined members of Hamas in the Gaza Strip have risen to
political prominence. So Ahmed Jabari, until he was killed, and
his successor now are both senior political leaders in Hamas.
And they are moving the organization further to the right,
pushing for ongoing ``resistance'' as they term it, terrorist
attacks against Israel, in an effort to deal with the threat
that they get from the more al-Qaeda-affiliated groups in the
Gaza Strip, who challenge them with not being sufficiently
Islamic or sufficiently tough on Israel.
At the end of the day, while I do think that U.S. funding
for the Palestinian Authority needs to continue, it need not be
unconditional. For years, Congress required that PLO
Commitments Compliance Act, the PLOCCA, which required the
State Department to tell us exactly what then the PLO--we could
do it now with the P.A.--was doing to further its commitments.
But the fact is that, to its credit, the State Department has
been doing some great things, including trying to get Europeans
and others to crack down on Hamas financing in their countries.
I do think, finally,--and with this, I will conclude--that
we need to have a very serious focus on Egypt because Hamas, as
I said, has not changed. And a cease-fire will last only as
long as it takes Hamas to rebuild its stockpile of weapons.
Those come west to east from Libya and south to north Iran
through Sudan. And unless Egypt does what it has to do on its
sovereign territory and not only at the last five yard line
before the Gaza Strip, then those weapons will arrive.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Levitt follows:]
----------
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Dr. Rubin?
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL RUBIN, PH.D., RESIDENT SCHOLAR, AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE
Mr. Rubin. Madam Chair, Ranking Member Deutch, honorable
members, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
Far from advancing peace, Hamas-Fatah reconciliation will
accelerate conflict. At issue is not only the sanctity of
diplomatic agreements which form the basis for Middle East
peace efforts but also the outcome of a battle between more
secular movements struggling against a radical Islamist
revival. The desire to fund the Palestinian Government does
more harm than good, not only to moderate Palestinians who
desire to live in peace with Israel but also to U.S. regional
interests.
The current debate about how to approach Fatah-Hamas
reconciliation falls into a decades-long pattern of shifting
goals and diluting demands to keep diplomacy alive. I have
provided examples in my written testimony, but suffice it to
say the record of the State Department's failure to hold its
Palestinian partners to their commitments to abandon terrorism
is extensive and its results clear. Absent a clear-cut,
inalterable demand that the Palestinian groups first uphold
their commitment to abandon terror, diplomacy will fail and the
situation will worsen.
Too often when it comes to rogue regimes, the passage of
time, rather than reform, legitimizes dialogue in diplomats'
eyes. It is a pattern which discourages reform and compromise.
Engaging and legitimizing the most violent factions
incentivizes terrorism and disadvantages groups which play by
the rules. Diplomacy with terrorist groups can also throw a
lifeline to movements which otherwise might peak and collapse.
It is impossible to consider today's reconciliation between
Fatah and Hamas without reference to the broader context of the
Arab Spring. While the uprisings which sparked the Arab Spring
had their roots in a desire among ordinary people for
government accountability, it was not long before the Muslim
Brotherhood and even more radical Islamist groups and Salafi
movements hijacked the revolutions.
These Islamist groups had two distinct advantages. First,
in opposition for decades, they could promise the world. And,
second, Islamist movements did not have to operate on an even
playing field. Not only rich emirates like Qatar but also
Turkey subsidized the most radical Islamist groups.
The overriding competition within the Middle East today is
between Islamist and secular regimes. Iran may be Shi'ite and
Egypt Sunni, but Teheran sees Cairo as a new ally in its fight
against secularist regimes. Hamas' renewed empowerment comes
not autonomously but against the backdrop of Muhammad Morsi's
rise in Egypt and Hamas' growing relations with Iran.
Fatah may not be moderate, but relative to Hamas, it is
restrained. Rather than see Hamas moderate in order to join a
coalition with Fatah, the opposite will become true. Hamas will
have doubled down on its rejectionism, and Fatah will
radicalize.
To promote the two movements' reconciliation would
effectively enable Hamas to subsume Fatah. The results would be
grave. Should Hamas establish its dominance on the West Bank,
not only would Israel face a growing threat, but the Kingdom of
Jordan would be destabilized. Second and third order effects
will undermine both prospects for peace and broader American
interests in the region. Chaos in Syria and the radicalization
of the Syrian opposition will only compound the problems.
Because money is fungible, it is impossible for the United
States to support only Fatah elements should Fatah and Hamas
govern together. U.S. foreign assistance should never be an
entitlement, and it should never benefit groups which are
endemically and inalterably hostile to the United States.
Diplomacy will fail when any figure, be it Mahmoud Abbas,
Ismail Haniyeh, or Khalid Mishaal, treats diplomatic
commitments not as sacrosanct but as an a la carte menu from
which to pick and choose. It will be hard to expect any
government to place its security on the line for diplomatic
assurances which in practice expire in less than two decades.
The White House and State Department may believe they chart
a path to peace, but if they fall behind Egypt in what Egypt is
trying to do in the region right now, they are committing a
strategic error, which could permanently handicap prospects for
peace and, instead, encourage a more devastating conflict.
With that, thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rubin follows:]
----------
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Makovsky?
STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID MAKOVSKY, DIRECTOR, PROJECT ON THE
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR
EAST POLICY
Mr. Makovsky. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Ranking Member
Deutch, and distinguished members of the subcommittee.
Given the limited time imposed, please see my written
testimony for a more in-depth look at this issue of Fatah-Hamas
unity and its histories since 2007.
Of course, the idea of unity is desirable in most contexts,
but the question remains, on whose terms unity. Does Hamas in
Gaza, which favors Israel's destruction, become more like the
Palestinians in the West Bank or the reverse?
If Hamas wants to be legitimate, the onus is on them to
adhere to the international community or the quartet's terms
for eligibility, which are three: Disavow violence, accept
previous agreements, and accept Israel. The question is whether
the U.S. can use its influence with Egypt, which did play a key
role in the Gaza cease-fire in November, and perhaps Turkey or
Qatar to use their influence to get Hamas to accept these three
terms. So far this has not happened.
Moreover, despite the obvious appeal of unity among the
Palestinians, actual unity is far more elusive. And, therefore,
I am not yet persuaded that, despite all of the statements,
this will indeed occur right now. Fatah does not want to give
up its turf in the West Bank. Hamas does not want to give up
its turf in Gaza.
President Abbas has resisted calls of Hamas demands to give
up security cooperation with Israel. This is very significant.
In 2002, more than 400 Israelis were killed in terror
infiltrations from the West Bank. Thanks to Israel and the
Palestinian Authority working together for more than the last 5
years, the number is about zero. This is an important point for
those of you who care about the security of Israel, as we all
do.
Hamas, at the same time, feels emboldened. And this is a
matter of grave concern. It believes it has leverage with the
establishment of a sister Muslim Brotherhood government in
Egypt. Moreover, Hamas feels emboldened because it has seen the
P.A. be weakened, specifically the reduced domestic leverage of
Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad.
When I testified before the full House Foreign Affairs
Committee in September 2011, I made clear that Fayyad has had
an exemplary record in focusing on reform in governance in the
West Bank since assuming this post in 2007. And he has helped
spur West Bank growth at a 10-percent per annum clip over
several years. However, when I appeared before the full
committee, I stated in my view that if the U.S. withholds
economic support from the P.A., it will undermine the very
moderate forces that have been gaining ground there.
Unfortunately, that is exactly what happened.
According to World Bank report this past September, growth
levels in the West Bank have dropped by a full 3 percentage
points. Unemployment has bumped up from 15-17 percent in the
West Bank. There is a deepening financial crisis, and this has
prevented Fayyad from paying full salaries on time to his
160,000 employees for the last few months.
People ask, is there consequence for the U.N., for the
Palestinian to go to the U.N.? Well, we have seen the economic
consequence. But there are considerable indications that
because of this deepening crisis, there have been
demonstrations outside of Fayyad's office, not outside Abbas'
office. And one could argue that the Fatah people have helped
to orchestrate this because they see him vulnerable now and
they fear him as a threat to succession.
Without regular assistance, the P.A. could collapse. And it
is incumbent upon all of us in this room to ask, who fills the
vacuum if they do? Do the moderates really come in or does this
help the radicals? Pulling data shows an upsurge of support of
Palestinian use of violence against Israelis, despite open
opposition to such violence by Abbas and Fayyad. Nobody could
point to a date when everything could explode, but current
tensions should be noted.
So what can the U.S. do at the start of the second term of
the Obama administration to end the utter impasse between
Netanyahu and Abbas? What is not feasible is a final status
deal. Neither party is prepared for it, and the leaders are
unlikely to make a deal amid turmoil in the region and the
ascendance of political Islam. Instead, we should focus on
interim goals that are more realistic that would prepare for an
eventual two-state solution, such as shrinking practical
Israeli control over parts of the West Bank, where a
Palestinian state will emerge, and acknowledge that Israel will
retain a slice, probably about 5 percent of the West Bank near
Israeli urban areas, adjacent to the old boundary with the
ultimate land exchange or land swaps based on President Obama's
May 2011 speeches.
The trade-off should be between Palestinians extending
their control of the West Bank beyond their own urban areas and
Israel extending its control in the Israeli urban areas in what
is known as the settlement blocks. And this area roughly
coincides to where Israel's security barrier exists.
This overall approach of zones of agreement would delay
security-related issues in the Jordan Valley and along the
Jordan River until the overall volatility in the Middle East
clarifies itself. The approach of zones of agreement will
finally get us out of the box between either a grand deal or
complete paralysis, where we have been for years.
In short, each side says it cannot achieve everything but
still agrees to take certain steps. This could lower anxiety
levels on both sides and give moderates some results against
radicals. Secretary Kerry would have to talk to the parties,
whether this could be achieved through direct talks or the U.S.
mediation.
I have no time left. So I will wait until the Q&A to
discuss the impact of the Israeli election, as one of the
members has asked, on this process.
But I would just like to say, in conclusion, we have to
deal not just with governments. We have to deal with a public
strategy as well with the peoples because there has been a
profound sense of disbelief that peace is possible. And this is
of great concern. You ask both sides, do you believe in the
two-state solution? There are still majorities that say yes.
But then you ask the next question, does the other side want
it? Will it happen? The answer is a resounding no.
I would just argue that, unless we have a public strategy,
which I would like to elaborate in the Q&A, we won't succeed.
This is a conflict that has been tragic. And we should do what
we can. We cannot maybe solve it all at once but do what is
possible and lay the foundations for a better future for both
peoples.
Thank you all very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Makovsky follows:]
----------
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Thank you to our panelists for
their excellent testimony.
And all of you discussed this, but I wanted to get specific
answers about U.S. aid to the P.A. I have been opposed to
sending hundreds of millions of dollars, of taxpayer dollars,
to the P.A. with few restrictions, as you had pointed out, as
if it were an entitlement. While some of it gets funneled into
Gaza and Hamas, it is worth reiterating that U.S. law does
prohibit funding to the P.A. if Hamas is part of any consensus
government.
So my questions are these: What is the return on our
investment on these funds if the P.A. continues to undermine
Israel at the U.N. and threatens the peace process at every
turn? Similarly, is it in the U.S. national security interest
to continue to fund a future P.A. government that might include
members of Hamas that is a designated foreign terrorist
organization?
And over the last decade, we have given billions, with a
``b,'' billions of dollars, to the P.A. knowing its endemic
corruption practices by its officials, by its affiliates. What
steps should the Obama administration take to address these
concerns and tackle the inefficiencies of the programs that we
are funding?
We'll start with Dr. Levitt.
Mr. Levitt. Thank you very much.
I think that, for all of its works, the P.A. in the West
Bank is critical for acting as a security partner to Israel.
Without question, we need to do more to focus on, I would say,
the two big C's: Corruption and civil society. The United
States under multiple administrations of both persuasions has
made the mistake of mistaking elections as democracy when
elections without building civil society are--well, we see what
they are. They are Hamas in Gaza. They are Hezbollah in
Lebanon. And so there is a lot more that can be done. And that
does get to the issue of women, et cetera.
But I think that there is a real return on U.S. policy. The
question is, what type of measurements do we put in place? How
do we measure that? That is critically important.
The other thing I think we need to think of, though I agree
with David that I do not think that reconciliation is likely,
if you look at the polling data that David is referring to,
Palestinians actually are very eager for reconciliation, not
because they are eager for the end of the peace process,
because they are sick and tired of this infighting.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Let me just go to the other panelists, if I could. Dr.
Rubin?
Mr. Rubin. Yes. There is a tendency to try to bolster
partners. And there is a long history of this. Unfortunately,
it hasn't been successful.
Accountability is key. I would agree firmly with you on
that. We do have a legal framework in place. And we have
already discussed the PLO Commitments Compliance Act. However,
if one looks, for example, at the writings of former diplomats,
the memoirs and such, it is also clear that the State
Department at times has omitted reporting information which
would have cased PLOCCA to kick in. It is essential that
Congress use its oversight to ensure that such money and such
commitments to law, such red lines, as it were, aren't shunted
aside because the result of that is disastrous.
Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. David?
Mr. Makovsky. Thank you.
In terms of what have we gotten out of the aid, I would say
we have gotten a quiet West Bank for the last 5 years, which is
not a small measure. We had people blowing up there almost
every day with infiltrations from the West Bank into Israel.
Now Israel and the Palestinian Authority work virtually hand in
glove in the West Bank. And I know the commanders on both
sides. I sit with them. And that is not a small thing if we are
serious about peace.
And the issue of accountability, financial accountability
and corruption, I am glad you raised it, Madam Chairman. I
think that it is very important that, you know, you have
someone like Salam Fayyad there, where there are external
audits.
I mean, remember the Yasser Arafat days? It wasn't too long
ago: In 2002, 2003, and 2004. And they used to pay people out
of a paper bag. I mean, those were the worst corruption days
that were done. Now you have an external auditing. Their budget
is on the internet. It is transparent. I have not heard any
complaints from Prime Minister Netanyahu or any Israeli
official, for example, about corruption. To the opposite, they
laud Fayyad for his effort of cleaning up----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Mr. Makovsky [continuing]. What was a horrible situation.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Let me go back to Dr. Levitt so he could finish what he
wanted to say.
Mr. Levitt. I just wanted to answer the second part of your
question, which is about what happens with U.S. funding if
Hamas joins the government. And here I think that Congress
needs to play a particularly active role because after January
2006, when Hamas won the elections and we did have a government
that had Hamas in it, there were ways to fund that government,
whether it was down to municipalities or otherwise. And so
there are ways to keep things so that the West Bank didn't
implode with the type of consequences David has described.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Mr. Levitt. And that is important.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. All right. Thank you very much.
Mr. Deutch is recognized for 5 minutes of questioning.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
One of our priorities as Israel's ally must be I think
fostering conditions on the ground that would best create an
environment for a sustainable peace. And we have got to promote
conditions to protect and ensure security for Israel.
I have serious concerns that if we were to cut off all aid
to the P.A. in advance of reconciliation simply as a result of
talk of reconciliation, that there are other regional actors
that don't share our goals that will fill the gap. And we can't
ignore the real implications of these discussions. None of you
have. You have all addressed them. The collapse of the P.A.
would be a serious threat to the day-to-day security for
Israelis. It would destabilize the entire region.
I am concerned, very concerned, as, Mr. Makovsky, you spoke
of, that the progress made in the institutions built by Fayyad
in preparation for statehood will crumble. And I am concerned
about what a West Bank with a growing Hamas presence, let alone
controlled by Hamas, would mean for Israel for the prospect of
peace at any time.
Dr. Levitt, you spoke about our inability to continue to
fight Hamas efforts in the West Bank if we ceased funding to
the P.A. security. Dr. Rubin, you spoke about the possibility
of a Hamas stronghold in the West Bank. And, Mr. Makovsky, you
have spoken about a Hamas that has been embolden and what might
happen again if we were to walk away.
So I would ask the witnesses, if the P.A. collapses, what
does that mean for Israel's security in terms of preventing
terrorists from coming into Israel, the flow of weapons into
the West Bank, the possibility that what we saw coming from
Gaza, Israel would be forced to endure from the West Bank or,
alternatively, that the IDF would have to launch a major
operation to prevent that?
And, finally, despite our very real concerns, my very real
concerns, about the P.A. in terms of corruption issues, lack of
true democracy, and the refusal to negotiate without
preconditions, I would ask the witnesses, what are the chances
of preserving any chance, even the possibility of a two-state
solution, if we make decisions that will undercut the P.A.'s
ability to govern in such a way that its very existence may be
called into question?
Mr. Makovsky, let's start with you.
Mr. Makovsky. It is clear. We cut off aid. It is a self-
fulfilling prophecy. And there will be greater radicalization.
You know, we know that in the narrative, the radicals have won.
The U.S.-supported, an internationally supported P.A. has
crumbled. And victory is on our side. We are on the right side
of history in the words of the radicals. So this would be a
terrible, have terrible, implications.
And then, as you point out and as I have said in my
comments, the security cooperation I think would be
devastating. There would be a void. Israel would have to
probably triple the number of forces that it devotes to the
West Bank like it did beforehand in trying to achieve what
achieves very little cost.
Again, I want to be clear. I am for this because I want
dignity for both sides, not just for Israel's security, but
this has been one of the great success stories of the U.S. I
think in this regard. And this is not a small matter.
Mr. Deutch. Dr. Levitt?
Mr. Levitt. You are absolutely right. If the funds are
dried up immediately, someone else will fill the gap. And that
might be the same people who are funding Hamas today: Qatar,
Turkey, others. And that would drive the P.A. to the right,
toward violence. And that would be a huge problem.
One of the things we can do today is to try and push our
allies into the region who have yet to fulfill their
commitments, lots of money that they have pledged, none of
which they have given, Saudis and others. It is a tremendous
embarrassment. And there is a lot of money out there that
should be going to the P.A.
Again, to me, the question isn't, do you fund the P.A.? I
think that would be very bad policy. The question is, how do
you measure their compliance? How do you measure what they are
doing? And I think that there is a lot more we can do there.
You know, when General Dayton went in and took people and
vetted them and trained them, he told them, ``Palestinians, you
may have to take on Hamas. Those may be your cousins or
others.''
And they said, ``Fine so long as it provides dividends and
we see that there is movement toward a state.''
My concern is that if the Palestinians, good, moderate
Palestinians, were working with the Israelis day in and day out
on security, if they don't see the prospect of movement toward
something, at least on the West Bank, how much longer does this
cooperation continue?
Mr. Deutch. And so, Mr. Makovsky, you spoke of the need for
a public strategy, then, which I would imagine is exactly--this
is exactly the need for it.
Mr. Makovsky. That is absolutely true. I mean, either a
public strategy that would--I mean, you know, Matt's point is
without the state and state building, these people would be
accused of being collaborators. And it won't be sustainable
over time, maybe a couple of more years. But it won't work.
And, therefore, this all connects, the bottom up, the top down.
In terms of--and I just want to reiterate what Matt, my
colleague, said about the need to press the Arabs. I would love
that this subcommittee, Madam Chairman--and I said this to you
when you were the chairman of the full committee--would have a
hearing on why it is that Qatar, who is supposedly a friend of
the United States, where we have an Air Force base, gives $400
million to Hamas? There is a perception in the world and not
just in Washington that because of that Air Force base, they
buy immunity from the United States Congress. That is a
terrible perception. I think a hearing about their funding of
Hamas would start getting at that perception and also with the
Saudis. It takes months of prodding before they step up. So
there needs to be some focus on the lack of Arab support here,
too.
Now, Congressman Deutch, about your point about the public
strategy, this is critical. I mentioned these polls saying the
people saying, ``I am for two states, but the other side
doesn't want it. Therefore, it will never happen.'' I think
what we need is a multidimensional approach that would, say,
get some synchronized political messaging; if both leaders
talked about the historic connection of each side, of the other
side, to the land and to Jerusalem, when President Abbas gets
up at the United Nations and says, ``Jerusalem is important to
Islamic and Christianity,'' doesn't mention Judaism, what
message that sends.
The public is getting more and more disengaged. They are
tired. They are skeptical. They are downright cynical as
fatigued as you are, they are even more so. So we need to think
creatively.
I also think, getting back to my idea of the zones of
agreement approach, by clarifying also that Israel's focus on
that 5 percent, indeed, almost all of their settlement
construction--I am not here as a fan of settlement
construction--is in that 5 percent. But because they don't say
it as such, people say,----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Mr. Makovsky [continuing]. ``Oh, we want to take over the
whole West Bank.'' So this ambiguity might be good for some
politicians, but it is deadly for Israel that is more isolated
in the world.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. Thank you.
Mr. Chabot, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and
the Pacific, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Madam Chair.
A couple of years ago, I think it was back in 2011, I was
in Israel meeting with various officials, Palestinian leaders
and Israeli officials. I was in Ramallah meeting with Prime
Minister Fayyad, who, as we all know, has been a critical
figure in that region, and in that part of the world,
specifically in that area, and his important state-building
efforts there, you know, relative to a whole range of things.
Ultimately this reconciliation agreement between Hamas and
Fatah apparently happened while I was in the meeting with him,
we later found out. And we actually met in Tel Aviv with
Netanyahu that evening.
It turned out that, as far as we can tell,--and I have
talked to a lot of people about this--Fayyad didn't know in
advance this was even happening when the agreement was signed.
We talked about a whole range of things. Unless he was a heck
of a good actor, he didn't even bring it up. And we heard he
didn't know about it.
Now, during the months since, observers of the region have
speculated about a whole number of different leadership
scenarios that could take place under a Hamas-Fatah agreement.
Many of those speculate that Mr. Fayyad would not likely even
play a role in a new coalition. I think we all know that
Fayyad's trustworthiness and competence have been critical in
building credibility within the Palestinian institutions. Those
institutions for quite some time have really been a bottomless
pit of corruption, let's face it.
The fact I would like to pose is if, in fact, Mr. Fayyad is
not a part of a new coalition, are the gains that we have seen
in the West Bank sustainable? And if a Fatah-Hamas
reconciliation occurs, what changes to U.S. aid policy to the
Palestinians should be implemented?
Mr. Makovsky, I will begin with you and just go down the
line.
Mr. Makovsky. Thank you. Thank you, Congressman.
I think the point is right. I think every single person in
this room agrees that if the thing actually went through and
they put Hamas people in and they took Fayyad out and they
gathered the security services, there is not a single person I
think in the United States that would support continued
American assistance for such a Palestinian Authority because
the gains are reversible.
And, again, I think, you know, it is--on the corruption
issue, he has made huge inroads with these external audits by
American auditing firms. I mean, I just remember the bad old
days, and it has been a quantum leap forward.
But your point is the right one, which is it is reversible.
If the actual Fatah-Hamas merger takes place with Hamas in,
Fatah out, security over, there is no reason why the U.S.
should support that.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
Dr. Rubin?
Mr. Rubin. I would agree that the gains are absolutely
reversible. There is a danger, however, when it comes to Fayyad
of gearing U.S. policy toward a single personality. We have
seen in Afghanistan and elsewhere a tendency to do that. It
seldom works out positively in the long term.
I would just add very quickly that funding the Palestinian
Authority should be based on Palestinian Authority behavior and
its meeting of commitments. And we'll see how that goes as
things move forward. When we look at the success of the West
Bank relative to Gaza, we also need to recognize that the West
Bank is landlocked. And perhaps this shows that Jordan is a
much better ally than Egypt when it comes to what is supplied.
And we also can't pretend that it is only American money
which is causing Palestinian behavior to moderate, if you will.
The fact of the matter is Israel has conducted unilateral
security measures, such as the wall. And that, arguably, has
had a far bigger impact on restraining Palestinian terrorism
from the West Bank than has endless American subsidiaries.
Thank you.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
Let me just emphasize what you just said about the wall.
There were an awful lot of people years ago who were talking
about this Draconian wall and how terrible it was. I think it
was one of the most positive things that has been done in a
long time, both to protect Israeli citizens and also to
stabilize the whole region and to allow peace to at least have
a chance.
Dr. Levitt?
Mr. Levitt. Thank you.
Everything that Fayyad stands for is what Hamas has issue
with. There is the transparency on the finance side. They love
to commingle the money, muddy the waters, the security
cooperation. It is clear that all of the good things about him
are the reasons Hamas despises him. And one of their
preconditions for reconciliation is that he not hold a senior
position.
One of the reasons I can't see the reconciliation going
forward as such is that Hamas still insists on taking control
of the Ministry of Interior. This has to be an absolute red
line. For Hamas to take over the whole security portfolio would
be the end of everything and certainly would be the end of U.S.
funding.
I do believe that the wall, the security barrier, has been
tremendously successful, but, like David, I have spent a lot of
time in the West Bank and Israel speaking to the two different
security services. They both talk about the need to be able to
couple that with cooperation on the ground. And I do not think
that on its own, without that cooperation, the wall alone would
stop all of the infiltrations as it has over the past 5 years.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chabot.
Ms. Frankel of Florida is recognized.
Ms. Frankel. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I listened to--there is great angst on the part of some of
my colleagues as to whether or not to continue to fund the
Palestinian Authority, either with more conditions, or not to
fund it.
My question is, what are some of the indicators or measures
we should be looking at to know whether there is either
progress or regression? Mr. Levitt?
Mr. Makovsky. I think, what I would look at to, you know,
gauge progress in the Palestinian Authority, I mentioned
security cooperation, the lack of terrorism, of Israel and the
Palestinians working together. I mentioned the idea of Fayyad's
efforts of external audits, transparent budgeting, working with
the World Bank, the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, and others to
make sure that its finances are in order. Yes, it has been
running deficits, but that is because of a lack of external
funding, frankly.
And I would look at how much they continue the reform
process, too. They had municipal elections last fall that
Fayyad pushed. And that is important as well. You know, these
are all positive metrics going forward.
I mentioned in my testimony, though, that there are some
financial setbacks, which have coincided with the lack of
funding from the outside. And that has hurt Fayyad. He is the
goose that lays the golden eggs. And without that, that effort
is hurt.
And then there are also the negotiations with Israel, which
is a whole issue in and of itself, which I am happy in follow-
up questions to get into greater detail.
Mr. Rubin. I would agree, but let me just add one more
point. We should also be looking at incitement in the education
system and state media against not only Israel but also against
the United States.
Thank you.
Mr. Makovsky. I agree with that.
Mr. Levitt. Yes. We are all in agreement on all of this.
I will just add there are all kinds of things that have
been going on that haven't been getting a lot of public
attention. So, for example, in a short period of time, when you
had this Hamas-Fatah government after the 2006 elections, it is
not well-known that Hamas simply started rubber-stamping every
request for Hamas individuals to open up charities, businesses,
et cetera. And for the years since, Fatah in the West Bank has
been auditing and going through every one of these and finding
all kinds of Hamas front organizations and just shutting them
down, no press coverage, no fanfare.
I had the opportunity to spend a decent amount of time,
more than once, with the woman--one of you had asked about
women before--who heads this department in the ministry in the
West Bank. And they are doing phenomenal work. It is important
that this type of thing continue.
And the fact that Hamas was able to open up so many of
these fronts in such a short period of time before the Hamas-
Fatah government collapsed is a sign of how quickly all of the
good work could fall apart if we allow it to.
Ms. Frankel. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Ms. Frankel.
Mr. Weber of Texas is recognized.
Mr. Weber. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I really don't have a lot of questions or comments. I am
basically here to learn from our witnesses and their comments.
It is doubtful they can learn much from me. So I yield back my
time.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Okay. Thank you.
Let me see. Who is the next one? He is yielding his time.
So we will go with--thank you. Mr. Radel of Florida is
recognized.
Mr. Radel. Thank you, Madam----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. He had yielded his time. So I am not
butting anybody here.
Mr. Radel. A specific question and then bigger context
here. And I think, Mr. Makovsky, you can answer both. The first
very specific question, you talked about the West Bank and its
economy. I am curious. Is any of it self-sufficient? How much
of it is strictly dependent upon our money, taxpayer dollars?
In the bigger picture here, though, what we are seeing, it
is kind of a darned if you do, darned if you don't with foreign
aid. Should we seek to prevent any kind of political unity,
reconciliation? Is there any kind of laws or policy--you can
include foreign aid in this--that would be even influential
into preventing reconciliation?
I would start with you, Mr. Makovsky, and anyone else who
wants to chime in.
Mr. Makovsky. Well, I think the West Bank has had usually a
middle class that has been growing in recent years. They have
been exporting to Israel. They export to Jordan and elsewhere.
There have been some issues about exporting into Europe with
security concerns. But a lot of that, it might be cumbersome,
but Israel has legitimate security concerns in terms of
material coming in and out.
But I tend to think that this is something that should be
encouraged. That is why I am so focused on the economics of
this. And I say, you know, when you don't pay salaries--you
know, that is times 5, 160,000 people times five--it affects a
lot of people.
Is donor assistance--that is kind of implied in your
question, which is a very legitimate questions. Part of
Fayyad's success that he has been so successful in getting
donor aid, that it has helped grow the economy. I think it is
part of it. I don't think it is the whole thing. I think we
finally have a leader in Fayyad who believes that he will be
measured more how much does he raise living standards upwards,
rather than tear Israel down. That is a revolutionary idea.
He is a PhD from the University of Texas in economics. He
worked at the IMF for many years. And I think this idea of
growing the middle class is something that is very important.
And that is why it is not just about, you know, focusing on an
individual. It is about the set of ideas that he is trying to
install in government. And that is why I think this is such a
vitally important experiment.
Mr. Radel. Okay. Dr. Levitt, your take on preventing any
kind of reconciliation, influence, policy, foreign aid?
Mr. Levitt. I think we need to be very vocal about the fact
that Hamas coming into this partnership without changing is
crossing every red line. If people understand that that is the
American position, they will understand there are consequences
to that kind of behavior.
I also don't think that this reconciliation--for all of the
signing of documents and subsequent meetings, I don't see it
happening simply because Hamas still insists on changing not
one iota of its behavior and insisting that Fatah change its
and getting the Interior Ministry.
I think that we just need to make very, very clear how
serious we are about the fact that there are things that Hamas
can do to be admitted into the family of nations, starting with
recognizing that there are Quartet principles, et cetera. Short
of that, it is completely outside.
Mr. Radel. And on the flip side, the consequences of not
doing so.
Dr. Rubin?
Mr. Rubin. We have to be very careful of allowing ourselves
to get into a situation where we fall victim to good cop/bad
cop pressure on the part of various Palestinian groups, who may
believe that we consider any particular group too big to fail.
While I recognize, as David has said, the success of Fayyad, it
is also important if we look at the metrics and public opinion,
that the growth of the middle class and the West Bank, while
good in long term, hasn't fundamentally altered attitudes. And,
for that, we need to start focusing on issues such as--and I
repeat--the incitement.
There is always a tendency of the State Department to--an
unwillingness to hold firm to declared principles if such a
stand of holding firm would prevent more dialogue. It is
crucial Congress intercede in such cases to ensure that the
United States national security interests are upheld.
Mr. Radel. Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield my time.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Vargas of California.
Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I appreciate
it.
I don't understand at all how we could possibly give any
aid to any organization that would have terrorist elements. And
so any merger here I think would be an absolute cutting off of
aid. That is my view.
I do want to ask, however, about Egypt. All three of you
mentioned it very briefly. I mean, here is a nation of over 80
million people, the current President talking about incitement
in incendiary language. I mean, the comments that President
Morsi had made in the past are just incredibly outrageous.
Could you comment a little bit about what is happening and how
this, our so-called allies, come into this? Because I do think
it is very frightening to see what is happening with the
implosion of many of these countries that border Israel through
its security.
If we could start off with Dr. Rubin? I see you were most
anxious to answer. If you could go ahead and begin?
Mr. Rubin. When I was in the Persian Gulf last year, I was
talking to a number of liberals throughout the Persian Gulf.
And they said, ``Look, it is not a surprise the Muslim
Brotherhood would win in Egypt. They have been in opposition
for eight decades. They could promise people the world. They
could promise everyone a chicken in every pot, a pot in every
home.'' They would provide everything. As soon as they won the
elections, not just the Muslim Brotherhood but other Islamists
behind them, they started losing support because what quickly
became apparent is years of religious rhetoric would not be a
panacea for ordinary people.
What I was told by liberals in the Persian Gulf is the
tragedy isn't that the Muslim Brotherhood would have won in
Egypt. The tragedy is if anyone considers them too big to fail
and refuses to allow them to fail because perhaps the best
thing that could happen would be that Egyptians would wake up
one day, as perhaps it seems they are, and recognize that the
religious rhetoric of the Muslim Brotherhood and more radical
groups doesn't provide an answer to them.
So what we need to really ask is whether the Muslim
Brotherhood is involved in a situation of one man one vote one
time or, to paraphrase Recep Tayyip Erdogan back in the days
when he was mayor, when he said, ``Democracy is like a
streetcar, you ride it as far as you need and then you get
off.'' We don't want a situation like that. Ultimately, the key
United States interest in these regions is to ensure
accountability.
I would argue what the United States policy should be
toward Egypt isn't simply apologizing for the Muslim
Brotherhood but, rather, ensuring that there is another
election in which the Muslim Brotherhood can be replaced if
need be.
Mr. Levitt. I agree. And I would add that, therefore, the
fact that they kicked out U.S. civil society is a huge, huge
issue.
But, just focusing on Hamas, I think it is important to
remember Hamas is the Palestinian branch of the Muslim
Brotherhood. Its ties to Egypt go back very, very far, run
very, very deep.
When Mousa Abu Marzook, the deputy leader of Hamas, left
Syria, he didn't go to Qatar. He didn't go to other places in
the Persian Gulf. He went to Egypt. He now lives in Cairo. That
is of particular interest to you and to me because he is
indicted here in the United States. He is a fugitive of U.S.
justice. And he is no longer living in a country that doesn't
have an extradition agreement with us, as I understand. What
would Egypt do if we asked them? I am pretty sure I know they
wouldn't have ever heard of someone named Mousa Abu Marzook.
But, again, I want to focus, as I did in my remarks and in
my written testimony, on Sinai. The issue of the smuggling is
of critical importance. Now, as we speak, I guarantee you
weapons are moving across that territory headed for the Gaza
Strip. The cease-fire from November will last only as long as
it takes Hamas to rearm.
Hamas has not changed one iota. It has pressures within the
Gaza Strip from groups that are to the right of it that are al-
Qaeda-like. And it, therefore, feels the need to act, even more
than it did before. There is no situation under which Hamas
simply stops attacking. All it is waiting for is to rearm. And
Egypt here is the player.
Mr. Makovsky. Congressman, I think, you know, taking a step
back, I think it is very important for America's interests that
we recognize that the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty of 1979 has
been a cornerstone of American strategy, a successful one, for
over three decades. There used to be interstate wars there,
costing billions and billions of dollars every few years,
dating back to 1948. The peace treaty, once you take 84 million
people, the biggest Arab state, out, there are no more
interstate wars.
There are other problems: Hezbollah, Hamas, the Iran issue
we could discuss. But this was a watershed. And the U.S.
Congress was visionary in the early 1980s in understanding this
is something we have to support. Again, I consider one of the
great success stories of the United States of the last three
decades that we were helpful in keeping that peace together.
It is clear and we want to make sure that we don't want to
take the aid away and become a self-fulfilling prophecy that
they pull the rug from the peace. Yes, the aid, though, is part
of their support for peace. There is no doubt. They only have
$15 billion in foreign reserves; $1.2 billion in military
assistance is important.
I would just say you people, all of you on this panel, have
a lot of influence because you are going to be meeting with
Egyptians, the Egyptian military, the Egyptian political
establishment. The Egyptian military has been a lobby within
the Egyptian system for peace. And that is something that
Israel has wanted to encourage: The Egypt-Israel military-to-
military relationship.
But I think you need to tell the Egyptians like what Matt
Levitt just said. And that is the issue of the tunnels. Morsi
cannot tell all of you people, ``Well, I don't really control
it. It is the military.'' This past summer, he politically
decapitated 70 top generals when he had to. He has influence.
And you know what? If you really get into the Sinai, which
I have really started doing, what you see is there are only a
few routes that are passable to get Fajr-5 rockets, the ones
that hit Jerusalem, that hit Tel Aviv. There are only three
roads they can use.
So it is not like there are thousands of roads here. There
are two or three. I would even say two. But the point is it is
Morsi using his influence with the military.
And I personally believe if the Members of Congress could
say it quietly, you could say it any way you feel useful.
Convey that message here, ``We want to support you. We want to
support peace. We just want to know what direction you are
heading in when it comes to a peace treaty with Israel. We want
to know your efforts on stopping the tunnel smuggling,'' which
does more to bolster Hamas than anything else.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
Dr. Yoho is recognized.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
You know, I hear this debate. And I have watched this for,
you know, 20-30 years unrolling and just over and over again
and Chairwoman, Ms. Ileana, saying that we have given billions
of dollars. And we have seen this go back and forth. And we are
given that money. And how can you separate it from Hamas and
Fatah, you know, is one thing.
You know, I agree with you, Dr. Rubin, that if we are going
to give the money, there have got to be certain hoops or
criteria that they follow. And if we don't do that, you know,
we are just going to--I don't want to say kick the can down the
road, but that is a phrase that I want to put to rest forever.
You know, we are going to stomp on the can so it doesn't roll.
But, you know, this has been an ongoing process.
What I want to know is, what are they trying to accomplish?
I know peace is the ultimate thing. But, yet, what is Egypt
doing? You were saying the money that we give to Saudi Arabia.
And we can't get them to the table. How do we do that?
And why are they not coming to the table? Because, I mean,
they are bordering countries. And they should be there every
bit as we want because if we want the peace, you know, we are
the outside player. We are the third person here. I want to
know what they are doing to encourage that more than we should
be. And we should take a supportive role. I just want to hear
your thoughts on that.
Thank you. Yes. You can start, Mr. Makovsky.
Mr. Makovsky. I said in my remarks that I think that, you
know, you should register your disappointment with the
Egyptians, not that we give Saudi Arabia aid, but they should
be giving the assistance to their Palestinian brothers, whom
they always talk about.
Mr. Yoho. Right.
Mr. Makovsky. But, in practice, they are very slow to give
the money. And I think it wouldn't be bad to bring the Saudi
Ambassador here and ask him a lot of questions, saying, ``Here.
Look, this is what we have done to help the Palestinians. What
have you done?''
And I mentioned my point about Qatar, $400 million to
Hamas. And I feel that unless the Congress people are not
active, the administration will always say, ``We have other
equities to deal with. And we can't raise this issue too far,''
of either side, Republican/Democratic administration. So I
think it is very important the U.S. ask them about their level
of support.
You know, I don't want to repeat myself about what has been
achieved about the metrics. I feel that we have had a quiet
West Bank where Israel and the Palestinians are working
together. And I think that is very valuable.
I listed some other metrics. I wholeheartedly agree with my
colleague Michael Rubin about the incitement issue that needs
to be stressed as well. Attitudes of violence, of using
violence, against Israel have dropped. But lately it has spiked
up amid the impasse and the financial crisis there.
Mr. Yoho. You were saying how it was quiet, but back in
November, we had that massive, you know----
Mr. Makovsky. From Gaza, Gaza, not West Bank.
Mr. Yoho. Okay.
Mr. Makovsky. So two separate places. Hamas controls Gaza.
And the Palestinian Authority controls the West Bank. So all
three of us I think are--you know, I don't want to speak for my
colleagues but see these two very differently and call for
saying, you know, where it is working in the West Bank we would
want to bolster.
And all of us have no illusions about what Hamas is. They
are a terrorist organization.
Mr. Yoho. Absolutely.
Mr. Makovsky. There are no two ways around that.
Mr. Yoho. Dr. Rubin?
Mr. Rubin. Very briefly. You asked about the broader
situation. I think it is important to recognize that for some
people, the process is more important than the peace. Ideology
matters. And we shouldn't assume the sincerity of all of our
partners just because they may sit down at the same diplomatic
table.
If we look back at the Oslo process, Yasser Arafat visited
the White House during the Clinton administration more than any
other foreign leader. He wanted the recognition, the
legitimacy, the aid which that brought him. Unfortunately, he
was never willing to make the peace.
And if we look at what so many people in the region already
say--and Representative Cotton referred to this in his opening
statement--we need to actually take people at their word. And
if they are not willing to stand up publicly and say that they
want peace, we should stop pretending they do.
Mr. Levitt. I will just add on the question of how do you
separate the funding between Fatah and Hamas, it is separated
now. We are talking about what if there were a reunification?
Therefore, I think it is important to stress again that I think
any discussion of preemptive defunding would be
counterproductive.
Post-reunification, if there were to be such a thing, which
would be very bad, as we all agree, then there would be a
serious discussion need to be had about what kind of funding
could be continued and under what circumstances.
There is precedent. The Bush administration continued
funding in 2006 after Hamas and Fatah formed a government
together. It was very flawed. I was in government at the time.
It was very complicated. I don't know that it could be done
again. Maybe we should learn from that lesson. That is
something we should look back on. We should anticipate.
I think from both sides of the aisle, there will be
pressure to find ways to fund non-military things, other things
because of humanitarian issues, et cetera. That is something we
should think about beyond just the broad statements of ``We
don't want to fund Hamas.'' Nobody wants to fund Hamas. And
there are clear U.S. laws against giving money to any part of
Hamas, but there will be serious conversations that will need
to be had about is there a way--maybe not--to provide funds to
some elements of the Palestinian governance that aren't Hamas--
--
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Mr. Levitt. It may be uncomfortable, but that conversation
will have to be had.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Mr. Higgins of New York?
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I think there is a lot of discussion about essentially the
same thing. The crux is the same. And that is, you know, the
West Bank, I get where you would try to legitimize Fatah by
assisting Mahmoud Abbas toward the goal of creating economic
growth in a place that really has not experienced any kind of
impressive economic growth. And if you succeed in that regard,
then what you do is the only thing that you can do. You present
a model to Palestinians that their future is either here on the
road to stability and recognition or it is back in Gaza under
Hamas that is preoccupied with the destruction of Israel.
So you can't state build without political stability. And
you can't have political stability without a categorical
rejection of violence and a recognition of Israel's right to
exist and Israel's right to defend itself.
So, you know, I don't think there is anything the West
really can do to change that. You know, they have decided a
future that says it is better to fight the Jews than it is
whether you win or lose than it is to fight for a better future
for your own kids.
So I would just throw that out and ask you to respond.
Mr. Makovsky. Let me just say that I think you are hearing
some skepticism, at least from Matt and myself, Congressman,
that this unity thing is really going to happen. They all love
to talk about it because who could be against unity as a
theory, but, as we tried to say in our testimony, there are
some real impediments to actually making it happen.
And, by the way, it might even help for Members of Congress
to consider that people are able in the Arab world to say that
America is against unifying the Palestinians. We are not
against them. We just want to make sure that unity happens on
the basis of international criteria and that Hamas is not ten
feet tall.
If you would have told them in 2006 that they couldn't peel
off the Europeans from the United States, they would have
laughed at you. They would have been shocked. And, yet, the
United States and the Europeans have held together, something
that is not usually discussed, but that is an important point.
We are kind of in the situation like West Berlin/East
Berlin. And we want to see the West Berlin model be successful.
And we are doing what we can, and everyone should do what they
can, I should say, to make sure that the West Berlin model
works because we have seen some positive results.
Mr. Levitt. I will just add, as we have said, it comes
down--you know, the idea of reconciliation isn't bad. It is on
what terms, on whose terms. That is the key.
I find the theme that you raised is an extremely important
one. It is the most frustrating one to me. I wrote my book on
Hamas in 2006. It came out shortly after Hamas won the
elections. And the concluding chapter argued, ``Why don't we
beat Hamas at their own game?'' Because what makes Hamas
popular isn't actually their attacks, but it is the provision
of social service, their Dowa, social welfare infrastructure.
And, actually, if you look at the numbers, it is actually not
huge numbers. If we directed some of our aid to that, maybe we
could beat them at that game, at least in the West Bank.
The international community was on board with the idea. The
quartet was on board with the idea. Former Prime Minister Tony
Blair was given that portfolio. And, for reasons that are a
hearing unto itself, we have failed, all of us, miserably in
this regard.
I think it is absolutely crucial that we try and create in
the West Bank something that people look at and say, ``Oh, you
can succeed.'' The idea of peaceful negotiation can succeed. It
requires the type of interim steps David talked about so
Palestinians and Israelis both see that progress can happen
politically, but it also requires things on the ground in terms
of social welfare, economic opportunity. And then let people
look at Gaza and see what it is.
Mr. Rubin. Very, very quickly. Attacks do bolster
popularity, unfortunately. We saw this after the Hezbollah
conflict in 2006. We saw this most recently last year. If we
legitimize a strategy, which is their strategy, then what we do
is ensure that we have more violence down the road. It is all
well and good to try to extract what you can at the diplomatic
table or through the political process, but if you still have
in the back of your mind the idea that if you can't get what
you won at the ballot box or in diplomatic circles, then you
are just going to fire rockets at Israel, then that really is a
commitment to violence that we can't afford to ignore.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
Mr. Kinzinger, it is a pleasure to have you on our
committee.
Mr. Kinzinger. Oh, it is great to be here.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you. Thanks, Madam Chair. And thank
you guys for coming out. Appreciate it.
You know, we have hammered a lot of those issues and may
hit some of them as the discussion progresses.
Mr. Makovsky, I have a couple of questions for you
specifically. You mentioned in the Sinai region, that there are
basically two or three roads. That could be whether it is
controlled or patrolled or whatever. Do those terminate, do
those actually terminate, into Israel? Is there a termination
point in Sinai? And if they do terminate in Israel, are we
seeing that the weapons are getting off that road at some point
and being smuggled in? Are they being smuggled through those
roadblocks? What can you tell me about that a little bit?
Mr. Makovsky. Here it is. Let's take the Fajr-5 rockets
that were used, the longer-range rockets, by Hamas from Gaza in
the November attacks. The rockets start off in Iran. And
Matthew Levitt is a bigger expert than I am, but you asked the
question of me. So it often goes through Eritrea or Sudan and
gets brought in through the shore, the western shore, of Sinai
on these two or three roads and goes into Gaza, southern Gaza.
Israel isn't there. Israel got out of Gaza in 2005. And it
goes, you know, through these tunnels from Egypt, of northern
Sinai into southern Gaza, often in trucks, to northern Gaza and
then fired in Israel. And there are only two or three roads.
And it is really--I am sorry--in my view an issue of political
will of the Egyptians to stop it. And I totally----
Mr. Kinzinger. You said there are two or three roads. But
it basically gets to a point whereby Israel itself cannot
necessarily----
Mr. Makovsky. Israel doesn't control Sinai. It is Egyptian
sovereign territory.
Mr. Kinzinger. Right. I understand that.
Mr. Makovsky. And Gaza is not Israeli territory either. So,
I mean, the point to me is that it is about a political
resolve----
Mr. Kinzinger. Sure.
Mr. Makovsky [continuing]. Of Morsi, of Egypt. Matt and I
agree you don't stop it at the 5-yard line.
Mr. Kinzinger. Right.
Mr. Makovsky. You are on the goal line, like right just at
the tunnel from northern Sinai into southern Gaza. You want to
stop it way back,----
Mr. Kinzinger. Yes.
Mr. Makovsky [continuing]. Much earlier. Now, is----
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you.
Mr. Makovsky. It could bomb some convoys in Sudan----
Mr. Kinzinger. Yes.
Mr. Makovsky [continuing]. Out of, I would say, frustration
that the Egyptians have not done their part. And this is a big
issue.
Mr. Kinzinger. Mr. Levitt, just briefly do you want to
address that? I just had one other issue I wanted to hit, too.
Mr. Levitt. It is an honor that David tells me I am the
expert on this, but----
Mr. Kinzinger. Yes.
Mr. Levitt [continuing]. It makes me feel good. You know, I
feel like you touched it well. And I'll use your football
analogy. He loves sports analogies.
Look, the thing is this. It is not just that there are two
or three roads. There are certain mountain passes that they
have got to get through. They can go off those roads as they
get closer to the Sinai. This is being done by criminal
syndicates, mostly Bedouin, in the Sinai, been smuggling for a
long, long time. Some of them discovered radical Islam and
Jihad along the way. Some of them will work for anybody for
money. All of them are very heavily armed. And the Egyptians
don't want to take them on, even though----
Mr. Kinzinger. So is it a lack of will to take them on or
is it----
Mr. Levitt. Absolutely.
Mr. Kinzinger [continuing]. A desire to see this stuff
actually happen?
Mr. Levitt. It is absolutely a lack of will, even after
Egyptian soldiers have been killed by some of these entities. I
think there is also a small element of lack of capability if
that still exists, but that is something that is easily
rectified. We can be providing intelligence on some of these
convoys, et cetera. But, short of that, the only thing that
Israel has left is, as David said, air strikes, either in
Sinai--there have been some----
Mr. Kinzinger. Sure.
Mr. Levitt [continuing]. Or further abroad.
Mr. Kinzinger. Let me ask you, had we used, had the
administration used, the deliverance of the F-16s or the N-1
Abrams as kind of a stick to say, ``We will withdraw the
deployment or the selling of these assets to you or the giving
of these assets to you in Egypt. As a result, if you want these
to follow through on our contract, you have to crack down on
this in Sinai,'' could that have been effective or do you think
that is just something totally different?
Mr. Levitt. I think that type of that discussion has to be
had. I would phrase it differently. I wouldn't make it an
explicit threat. I would say, ``Look, we are excited to give
you this stuff, but we really need to know, how do you intend
to solve this problem here?''
Mr. Kinzinger. And I think that is a big concern we have
been having. You know, we have had this for decades, the idea
of, well, if we pull aid away or reduce aid, then we lose a
seat at the table and then we can't have influence, but, as we
are seeing, we don't have influence. And so, in essence, how
was aid even being used for that? You see that in Pakistan. You
see it in Egypt. So that is even a bigger question.
And let me hit, then, when it comes to the Palestinian
Authority--I know we have addressed it a little bit--so if this
unification happens, we are in that question--I heard, Mr.
Makovsky, I think you said something about you can't reduce
aid. And I think, Mr. Rubin, you said you can use aid as a way
to negotiate. Maybe I didn't exactly get that correctly.
But let's say unification happens, got the aid. Why don't
you just very briefly address because I am almost out of time
how the carrot or stick approach to aid can be used in ensuring
that there is stability in a world that, frankly, kind of
appears to be on fire?
Mr. Rubin. I just want to clarify. I don't think United
States aid should ever be an entitlement to a hostile regime. I
very much do think we can use aid as a stick and that we
shouldn't be giving aid to any administration, be it in the
Palestinian areas or anywhere else, that is actively promoting
terrorism and hostile----
Mr. Kinzinger. I agree with you. And I think as pro foreign
aid as I am, I think it is important that foreign aid not just
be used as a seat at the table and a table that you are not
going to get a seat at and actually be used to guarantee that
we do get a seat at the table.
With that, I am out of time. Madam Chair, thank you.
Mr. Makovsky. Can I just respond? I just want to be sure
that no one misinterprets me. I want to reiterate it again.
When I called for U.S. support for the P.A., I did not say that
if there is a P.A.-Hamas government with Hamas people there and
no security and no Fayyad. I certainly said I don't think a
person in the United States would support it. I just called for
continuing now while there is no unity deal. I don't believe it
is happening.
Mr. Kinzinger. Yes.
Mr. Makovsky. And so I just want to be sure no one confuses
those two.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. Thank you, Adam.
Mr. Schneider, thank you so much.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you to the
witnesses for joining us.
I believe one of you, I believe it was Dr. Levitt,
mentioned in opening remarks that Hamas has a long view in
history and I think the Arab world does this. And we see in the
region around the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with the Arab
Spring, the Arab emergence, whatever you want to call it,
countries at a crossroads. And my sense of what is happening in
Israel and the Palestinian territories is that they feel that
they are not at a crossroads, not on a path anywhere, but,
really, on a treadmill, that we are doing the same thing over
and over again and, Mr. Makovsky, your comment that we should
have a policy that rewards those that focus on coexistence with
Israel, those that will take the steps toward peace and we
should make sure we never reward those who promote antagonism
or terrorism. And, yet, what we see in the West Bank is Hamas
is becoming re-emergent, and we are taking steps backwards as
Fatah continues in its path of corruption.
And Fayyad for all of the support we wants to give him
seems not to have any support, any constituency getting behind
him. How do we help Fayyad? How do we help that third way, if
you will, to a path that can get this off of this treadmill?
Mr. Makovsky. My point is that, look, we are holding up a
lot of aid. I think a lot of the 2012 aid has not been
disbursed. He has been viewed as indispensable to that. And I
tend to believe that as long as he is continuing on the path of
reform--and, by the way, he doesn't often get credited for
this, but he has been pivotal in the security cooperation with
Israel and the Palestinian Authority. You know, we support
those who, you know, support our values. And I think that he
has had a lot of success.
I said in my opening remarks where I feel the lack of aid
has hurt him and made him more vulnerable. And there are a lot
of people who fear his ascension to follow Abbas has enabled
them to unite around it.
And so, instead of our lack of aid hurting Abbas and having
demonstrations outside of his office, all the demonstrations
are outside Fayyad's office. In my view, that is
counterproductive.
And as long as there is no unity on the basis of Hamas
accepting the international criteria--again, I am not against
the idea of unity, but until Hamas changes along the
international criteria lines, there should be no unity. And
Fayyad keeps his policies. And we should be supportive and
release the holds on this money so we could bolster those key
people who support the idea of coexistence and have helped
Israel keep the area quiet for the last 5 years.
Mr. Schneider. Dr. Levitt?
Mr. Levitt. Hamas does have a long view. And when it looks
at the Arab awakening, it sees its long view vindicated. It
feels empowered right now. As I said, I think this is one of
the reasons why it decided to open up hostilities in November.
And when you compare that to the position of the moderates
in the West Bank who are taking a position of non-violence,
taking a position of two-state solution in negotiations and are
getting defunded, it becomes extraordinarily difficult for them
to explain to their constituents why their position still holds
merit. While Hamas is still bravely fighting and sticking its
eye in Israel's finger [sic] and then you are competing for
public opinion, it is very, very hard. I think this is the type
of thing that helps Palestinian public opinion polling data
lead to questions like, do you support violence and see a
short-term uptake in that after violence like November because
we don't see the moderates on the other side being able to show
tangibly what they are getting.
Mr. Rubin. Let me just phrase this a different way.
Throwing the lifeline to Egypt and describing Turkish Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan as best friend to America is to
throw a lifeline to Hamas right now. What we are seeing between
Hamas and Fatah cannot be separated from what is going on in
the broader region. And, unfortunately, rather than having a
broader strategy to address it, we tend to be in full-blown
reactive mode.
Thank you.
Mr. Schneider. Pulling you back to the West Bank in
specific because the people I talk to are saying that over the
past couple of years, the cooperation, security cooperation, in
particular, between Israelis and P.A. forces has led to a great
reduction in violence in the West Bank, hopefully to get us off
of that treadmill. How do we make sure that we don't compromise
that ability of the Israelis and Palestinian to cooperate in
the West Bank?
Mr. Rubin. There will not be a continuation of that
cooperation if there is a reconciliation with Hamas. The West
Bank has had the advantage both to be under Fatah's leadership
or Fayyad's management and also to border Jordan, which takes
the threat of Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood more broadly and
as seriously as does Israel.
What we see in Gaza isn't simply the Hamas administration
there but the active involvement of some of the neighboring
states. It is important to recognize not only the support we
have given to Fayyad but the unilateral Israeli security
measures, like the wall,----
Mr. Schneider. Right.
Mr. Rubin [continuing]. And the cooperation of the Kingdom
of Jordan. We should be coordinating with the Kingdom of Jordan
on some of these issues, rather than seeing everything through
the lens of Egypt.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you. I am out of time.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Mr. DeSantis of Florida is recognized.
Mr. DeSantis. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I thank the
panelists.
I have missed a lot because I am also on Judiciary, and we
are starting our immigration hearings, more cameras in that one
if you can imagine. But thank you. So if I ask questions that
have been asked, I apologize.
I think we all agree on Hamas, but in terms of the
Palestinian Authority, Mr. Abbas, what is your sense? Because
when I started first following this a while ago, it struck me
that, you know, we would have this idea of a peace process. You
had Arafat at the time, various Israeli Prime Ministers, and
the American President would be involved. But then if you
actually went back and looked at what was going on in the
Palestinian areas, you would see maps that didn't have Israel
there. You would listen to some of the things that were said in
Arabic. And it was not necessarily conducive to wanting a
peaceful solution.
So at the end of the day, people like Hamas and the
Palestinian Authority, just what is your sense? Do they
honestly think a two-state solution is a lasting peace or is
that just a step to eventually move Israel out of the area?
Mr. Makovsky. I think on the issue when you asked about
President Abbas, in particular--and I think he is flawed in
many ways, but I will say this for him. He is a man of this
way, of great courage in the sense that he has been very
consistent against violence. And he has had death threats
against him.
He said the Second Intifada--at one point, he said it was
terrorism. That was between 2000 and 2004, where there are
1,000 dead Israelis, 3,000 dead Palestinians. He has paid a
price. He has said publicly, you know, ``We want the West Bank,
but the rest of it, Israel, that is Israel forever.'' That is
good. He has done certain things. But he has been,
unfortunately, risk-averse in the sense of wanting a grand deal
that would--he would have to make historic concessions.
And people could look at 2008 in his final months of the
Olmert premiership. People say, ``Well, Olmert was a lame duck.
He was at 3 percent in the polls. Come on.'' But Abbas there
had a great opportunity that, you know, he didn't take.
And so this risk aversion to do the grand deal I think is a
very fair question about his ultimate attentions and maybe
things like refugees, Jerusalem, any sort of compromises there.
He is not capable. We don't know yet.
My point is--and Matt says I love football and sports. So I
will use an analogy. If we throw a hail, Mary pass, we are
going to throw an interception or we are going to throw an
incomplete pass. We should focus on screen passes, short
passes, that enable us to make yardage down field. We might not
score a touchdown, but we will have made a lot of progress. I
think that you can do with him. And I think the fact that he is
committed to security cooperation is a very important point.
I mean, I just remember Yasser Arafat. That is not for me
ancient history. This is a guy who yelled ``Jihad'' and
``Aljazeera'' in the middle of an intifada. That is like
calling for fire in a crowded theatre.
And so I think they have come a long way, but there are
definitely shortcomings. And if we had more time, I would like
to go into greater detail.
Mr. DeSantis. Dr. Rubin?
Mr. Rubin. Well, to make another football analogy--thank
you for not completely running down the clock--Mahmoud Abbas is
in the ninth year of his 4-year term as President. I think that
shows a little bit about his interest in the rule of law.
As I argued before, he is a man that shows a deep interest
in the process, rather than the peace, so long as he gets the
privileges of the process. I don't think he is willing to take
that final step.
And, lastly, I would just suggest that his strategy at the
United Nations and his willingness to cast aside all of the
previous agreements which the Palestinian Authority had made,
which its existence has been based upon, suggests that perhaps
he is not as committed to the same end goal that many diplomats
in the State Department believe he is.
Thank you.
Mr. DeSantis. And if you could, Dr. Levitt, just beyond
Abbas the man, I mean, is he just reflecting a deep hostility
amongst the Palestinian people to have a two-state solution in
your judgment?
Mr. Levitt. I don't think so. I don't think he is. I think
that most Palestinians want a two-state solution, certainly in
the West Bank and I think even predominantly in the Gaza Strip,
though I haven't been in the Gaza Strip for several years now.
Look, there is need for political reform, as Mike has
pointed out. There is need for better things on rule of law, as
Mike has pointed out. But I think that David is also right that
on the issue of articulating a message of non-violence, he has
been good.
It is not enough because he has to bring people along on
the whole package, which includes only staying in office as
long as you are supposed to and other issues. But the process
has to be given space to progress in order for all of these
things to happen.
At least in the West Bank, you do have a partner working
with you on security measures. And I speak to the Palestinians
about this. I speak to the administration here about this. But
I speak to the Israelis about it. And they don't like to go out
with pom-poms, but you talk to them privately, and they will
tell you just how much the Palestinians are doing and just how
bad it would be if they stopped.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
Mr. Meadows of North Carolina is recognized.
Mr. Meadows. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Dr. Rubin, earlier, you were talking about, as the chairman
had brought up with some of the funding and so forth, that
there had been already violations as we see it in terms of some
of the foreign aid and that there would need a greater
accountability and oversight. Can you speak to that
specifically and what you would like to see and how either
policy from this body or another oversight body would play into
that?
Mr. Rubin. Specifically, during the Oslo process and after,
there were instances in which the American discussions with
Yasser Arafat and the PLO would have to be severed if the
United States drew the conclusion that Yasser Arafat was
directly involved in terrorism. We had instances, for example,
of his signature on disbursements of $20,000 in aid to
operatives working in Fatah who subsequently staged terrorist
attacks. What we were told by the State Department was that was
not conclusive evidence.
We need to have a willingness to recognize that the State
Department is going to try to continue with dialogue and
continue with the process in the hope of creating, of opening
doors. But so long as we don't hold their feet to the fire when
it comes to definitive evidence or perhaps even the
preponderance of evidence, then ultimately we are going to be
trapped in a good cop/bad cop approach.
Sometimes I would argue we need to go back to the past,
when we were willing, the United States Congress was willing,
to hold up items which the United States State Department
wanted in order to ensure a much more coherent compliance with
the laws which the U.S. Congress had passed.
Thank you.
Mr. Meadows. Okay. And then following--go ahead, Dr.
Levitt.
Mr. Levitt. I was just going to say, you know, historically
this is absolutely true. And if you Google PLOCCA, the first
two things you will get are the reports that I wrote at the
time blasting the State Department for some of these things
that they left out, ignoring the Karin A weapons-smuggling ship
to seize documents, et cetera. And it wasn't just the PLOCCA
report. It was also what we then called the Patterns of Global
Terrorism, the annual CRT report that is now called Country
Reports on Terrorism.
However, if you look at the latest Country Reports on
Terrorism--and bits of it I quote in my written report--there
is a marked improvement in truth-telling, maybe not quite there
but a marked, marked improvement.
And I know firsthand that the State Department over the
past few years has been investing the kind of resources it
hadn't in years in working with foreign governments, especially
in Europe but also elsewhere, to do more to combat the
financing of Hamas and Gaza in an effort to do all of the
things we have been talking about today.
So I want to make clear I completely agree with Mike, but
the really bad actions by the State Department in failure to
tell truth were several years ago. And there is a marked
difference today.
Mr. Makovsky. I am not aware, sir, that the Israelis, for
example, have any complaints about the Palestinian Authority as
smuggling weaponry the way they feared under the Yasser Arafat
battle days. Again, I am not saying that things today are
perfect, but----
Mr. Meadows. Right.
Mr. Makovsky [continuing]. I am just saying I remember
those days. And I don't see any complaints from Israel today
like there were in the old days, which were justified.
Mr. Meadows. All right. And getting back to, you know, the
football analogies that we have on both sides of this, you
know, one is a hail, Mary pass that obviously is either
intercepted or dropped and the other is screen passes. Do we
end up making screen pass plays that never get us past the red
zone?
Mr. Makovsky. It is a fair question. I just feel that right
now we are stuck in this box that it is either all or nothing
in the Middle East. It is always nothing. And we have had other
paralysis for the last 4 years between Israel and the
Palestinian Authority. And I am concerned that this will lead
to radicalization on the ground if people say, ``Look, you have
heard this legacy of non-violence, Mr. Abbas, but what have you
achieved?'' I think that is a real concern.
And, you know, with the screen pass, I can go longer down
the field or shorter down the field----
Mr. Meadows. Okay.
Mr. Makovsky [continuing]. Pending the players. It is not
all up to the United States.
Mr. Meadows. All right. Dr.----
Mr. Makovsky. But I just feel we have got to stay out of
this all or nothing approach because I am concerned that
paralysis is going to lead to an explosion.
Mr. Meadows. Thank you. Dr. Rubin?
Mr. Rubin. Sometimes moral clarity is important on the part
of the United States and its foreign policy. We cannot force a
peace until all Palestinian factions internalize the idea that
they want that peace. Thank you.
Mr. Meadows. Thank you.
Mr. DeSantis [presiding]. Thank you.
The chair recognizes Mr. Collins from Georgia.
Mr. Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I appreciate it.
I am going to stick with the football analogy. It has
become popular today as I will be coming in. But I don't want
to talk about plays. I want to talk about the draft. I am going
to go back a little bit further because some of us mentioned
earlier about the broader view. And I think this is a concern
because I believe as we are sitting in a town of political
motives and we are sitting in a town of harsh realities, that
there may be a deeper issue here that I would like to explore
with each of you and the dealing with Hamas and the unrest in
Syria, Iran, the things that have been going on there and
basically the aid that they have been getting from these two
entities who are now struggling on different fronts, which has
been significantly reduced. Due to the less support that seems
to be coming in for Hamas, do you believe, one--is that driving
them maybe to make more of a show of unification with Fatah? I
happen to believe, as some have said, that maybe unity is not
where this is going to lead to but a show that is being done
that may be hedging this bet or saying, ``Here is where we are
at right now. This is the political reality. Here is the only
place we can go.''
I would like to see what the future would look like because
I think for Israel and other partners there, this is critical.
This is where we need to go. And I would like to hear your
comments on that. And maybe we will just start with whichever
way you want to start.
Mr. Levitt. I am regretting bringing up an old football
analogy. Mr. Kennedy has left. But every time we mention it, I
just think about my Patriots not making it.
There is a myth out there that Iran is not funding Hamas
anymore. It is a myth. Iran is still giving a tremendous amount
of money and weapons, especially weapons, to Hamas. And that is
a huge problem. Syria, of course, is another issue right now,
but the Iran issue is still something we struggle with.
I agree with you that I don't think that either party is
seriously interested in reconciliation right now because both
parties understand that Hamas feels ascendant because of the
Arab awakening and Hamas feels no need to make any concessions
on its key demands for an end to security cooperation, et
cetera.
But both need to be seen or see themselves as pursuing this
because the public, the Palestinian public, still calls for it.
They want it. They want the fighting to stop. They don't deal
with the big picture. Will Hamas do this? Will Fatah do that?
They just want the Palestinian populace to be one again, which,
as David said, sounds like a nice idea but when you get into
the weeds has real ramifications.
At the end of the day, I think that if you have small plays
and you go not only just for the first downs but you make sure
that as you do that, you are continuing to make headway down
field, as an interim thing, that is where we need to be.
Eventually, then, maybe you will have a ripe environment when
you find yourself closer to the red zone. We are nowhere near
that now.
The problem is if you still only think about the red zone,
when the environment is not right for it at all, you are going
to backtrack. So we have to do what we can now so that we don't
have a complete collapse so that when the environment improves,
we will be able to take advantage of it.
Mr. Makovsky. I think your point about the unity facade is
what is accurate. And maybe they are hedging their bets, you
know, if, indeed, something happens, that they have this
opportunity as a plan B. I certainly don't see it as a plan A
for all of the reasons we have been saying in this panel, which
I don't want to repeat. But I do think that there is a need to
find ways to go down field.
Maybe we all talk football because we just saw the Super
Bowl. And hopefully it is not lights out in the West Bank. But
we need to find a way that the people who support the idea of
two-state solutions are not marginalized and parody, ``Oh, you
haven't achieved anything'' because the security cooperation is
based that these Palestinians are telling their public, ``Yes.
We are coordinating against our own brothers working with
Israel because it is part of state building. And we are
building a state.'' If there is no state-to-state building,
these people become vulnerable. And I just don't think that it
will be sustainable over time.
So I think that if we make progress, whether we are--you
know how much the progress is, we could define it, but I think
it is critical there. And it is also critical for Israel, where
it is being more and more isolated and people are trying to
depict Netanyahu, ``Oh, you are doing the settlements because
you really want to take over the whole West Bank.'' And, in
fact, virtually all of his construction is in 5 percent. Again,
I am not defending it, but I am just saying by signaling a
direction, we give the moderates some ammo, political
ammunition, against their own radicals internally.
Mr. Collins. I don't want you to answer, but in dealing
with this, I am looking at the picture as well as Hamas looking
to the future. Every organization is self-fulfilling or self-
sustaining. And I just don't believe at this point there has
been enough proven evidence to say that they are backing off
now become states in doing this. Is there more of an angle that
you see here for a long term of where they are going here?
Mr. Makovsky. Hamas has made clear in its statements that
it doesn't believe that it should ever throw away its gun. If
there is any unity, it will subsume Fatah. Hamas will subsume
Fatah.
I would argue that where my disagreement is with my two
colleagues, very briefly, is there are two general philosophies
of diplomacy. One is to wait for the opportunities to occur,
for the stars to align for the right circumstances to occur.
And the second is to use a process to force those doors to
open. I am not sure not only that the second choice doesn't
work, but sometimes I believe that trying to use a process to
force the right circumstances can actually backfire a great
deal.
Mr. Collins. I think that is something we definitely need
to look forward into the future. And I believe my time is up.
Mr. DeSantis. All right. The chair recognizes Mr. Weber
from Texas.
Mr. Weber. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
David, you said something a minute ago that kind of got my
attention. I forget the terms you used. You said Israel and the
P.A. for the last 4 years have been at a stalemate or
paralyzed.
Mr. Makovsky. I said that there has been a negotiating
impasse for the last 4 years. The Obama administration has only
been 3 weeks of talks in the last 4 years. We have never been
in this situation before.
Now, how do I apportion the blame? Why is that? You know, I
think there is probably enough blame to go around. I think in
terms of Abbas, he should come to the table. He says, ``Well,
if I come to the table and Netanyahu builds settlements, I look
like a fool. And my internal political standing as a politician
is going to be hurt.'' But if you don't try to go forward, on
the other hand, you are not going to be achieving your goals.
So risk aversion I think has led him to be in a shell.
``So all right. I will go to the United Nations,'' which I
think we all know there are no shortcuts. You can't have
statehood without peace. And I think that that has been a major
mistake.
And I think with Netanyahu, he could--we didn't have a
chance to talk about the Israeli domestic results. If anyone
would ask me, I would be happy to offer some thoughts on this.
But I think while he showed boldness in many ways on the
economics and working with Fayyad and taking down checkpoints
in the West Bank and he doesn't always get the credit for what
he has done----
Mr. Weber. I get that part, but, I mean, we said here that,
number one, the violence has decreased from the Palestinian
Authority.
Mr. Makovsky. Right.
Mr. Weber. And we said that the cooperation has increased.
Mr. Makovsky. Right.
Mr. Weber. That doesn't sound like an impasse.
Mr. Makovsky. No, no, no. The bottom-up stuff has been
better than ever. I said there have been some blips with Fayyad
going back, but for the most part, the trajectory has been
forward. But on the negotiation of, can Israel and the
Palestinian Authority find a way to decide ``Where do we draw
this border? How do we build this two-state solution?'' there
has been a complete impasse.
Mr. Weber. On that one particular----
Mr. Makovsky. On that point.
Mr. Weber. I got you.
Mr. Makovsky. On the top-down negotiation. And the question
is, can the bottom up be sustained if there is no top down? And
my argument is that it can be over time, but I am not saying it
is going to break down tomorrow morning. I am just saying they
have to go together. That is all.
Mr. Weber. Thank you.
Mr. DeSantis. Do you yield back?
Mr. Weber. I do.
Mr. DeSantis. Okay. Well, thank you. Thanks to all of the
witnesses for your time and your great testimony. This hearing
is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:58 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Material Submitted for the Hearing RecordNotice deg.
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