[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
HEZBOLLAH'S STRATEGIC SHIFT:
A GLOBAL TERRORIST THREAT
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 20, 2013
__________
Serial No. 113-6
__________
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______
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania Massachusetts
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
TREY RADEL, Florida GRACE MENG, New York
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
TED S. YOHO, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
LUKE MESSER, Indiana
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
TED POE, Texas, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina BRAD SHERMAN, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TOM COTTON, Arkansas JUAN VARGAS, California
PAUL COOK, California BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
TED S. YOHO, Florida Massachusetts
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Mr. Will Fulton, Iran analyst, Critical Threats Project, American
Enterprise Institute........................................... 10
Matthew Levitt, Ph.D., director, Stein Program on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence, The Washington Institute for
Near East Policy............................................... 21
The Honorable Roger Noriega, founder and managing director,
Vision Americas LLC (former Assistant Secretary of State for
Western Hemisphere Affairs and Former Ambassador to the
Organization of American States)............................... 39
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Texas, and chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade:
Material submitted for the record.............................. 2
Prepared statement............................................. 6
Mr. Will Fulton: Prepared statement.............................. 13
Matthew Levitt, Ph.D.: Prepared statement........................ 24
The Honorable Roger Noriega: Prepared statement.................. 41
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 64
Hearing minutes.................................................. 65
HEZBOLLAH'S STRATEGIC SHIFT:
A GLOBAL TERRORIST THREAT
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 20, 2013
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:30 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Poe. The TNT Subcommittee will come to order. Without
objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements,
questions, and extraneous materials for the record subject to
the length limitation and the rules.
Recent focus on Iran has centered on Tehran's quest for
nuclear weapons, but the Iranians and their proxy Hezbollah
also use terrorism to threaten global stability. Hezbollah
enjoys the full backing of the Iranian regime. The Supreme
Leader and the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps direct
Hezbollah's global terror campaign. Years ago, Hezbollah was a
limited regional threat. Today, it is an international movement
conducting terrorist and criminal acts in several parts of the
world.
Your attention can be directed to the poster on the right
here showing some of Hezbollah's activities since 2010.
[The information referred to follows:]
----------
Mr. Poe. Hezbollah is responsible for plots and activities
throughout the world: Attempted assassination of Israeli
diplomats in New Delhi and India, February 2012; potential
involvement in the bombing of an Israeli diplomat in Tbilisi,
Georgia, February 2012; storing over 8,000 pounds of explosive
material in a warehouse in Thailand, uncovered in January of
this year; attempted assassination of Israeli targets in
Bangkok in February of this year; attempted laundering of
approximately $70 million from Venezuela to Germany in January
2013; running training camps and international narcotics
smuggling operations in Venezuela, Bolivia, Honduras,
Nicaragua, and even Mexico; suicide bombing of a bus of Israeli
tourists in Bulgaria in July 2012.
In addition to these attacks, Hezbollah may have had a hand
in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps' Quds Force plots such
as the attempted assassination of the Saudi Ambassador to the
United States in Washington, DC, in October 2011.
The uptick of Hezbollah's activity in recent years is a
direct result of Iran. The Director of National Intelligence,
James Clapper, recently described the Iran-Hezbollah
relationship as ``a partnership agreement, with the Iranians as
the senior partner.'' The Iranian agents running Hezbollah are
the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Quds Force.
General Qassim Suleimani is the leader of the Quds Force.
In his role, he serves as the de facto director of Hezbollah.
Now major general, which is the highest rank in the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps, he has been the mastermind behind
key Iranian foreign policy moves. He helped Iran grow its
influence in Iraq and continues to support the murderous Assad
regime in Syria. American and British intelligence officials
draw comparisons between the real life Iranian general and the
fictional Soviet spymaster Karla of John le Carre's Cold War
novels. Only Suleimani is real and his war with the United
States is real.
Hezbollah is using social media to spread its propaganda
and get new terrorist recruits. As of August, Hezbollah had
tweeted an average of 250 tweets a day and had 18,000-plus
followers. Clearly, Hezbollah understands the value of Twitter
when it comes to spreading its propaganda. Too bad Twitter and
our own Government don't recognize it, too, and prohibit the
advertising of Hezbollah terrorism.
Hezbollah is also getting information via apps and
smartphones. BlackBerry and iPhone users who download an app
called WhatsApp can get daily updates from Hezbollah. WhatsApp
is one of the top overall paid apps, and the company is based
in Dallas.
The IRGC, Quds Force, and Hezbollah don't have to go it
alone. They maintain lots of friends and allies in the world.
The Venezuelans under the Chavez regime serve as one of the
Iranians' closest allies. Hezbollah has used the Venezuelan
banking sector to launder hundreds of millions of dollars a
year and smuggle narcotics to the United States and even
European markets. Hezbollah has also conducted terror training
on Margarita Island for recruits from Venezuela and other Latin
American countries. Hezbollah operatives and their co-
conspirators hold senior positions in the Venezuelan
Government. They provide travel documents, weapons, and
logistics support to terrorist operations and cocaine smugglers
as our witnesses will explain further.
In Afghanistan, the Iranians provide arms and training to
Taliban fighters to kill United States and Afghan forces. In
Africa, Iran and Hezbollah are expanding their terrorist and
criminal networks in places like Senegal and Gambia. In Asia--
be China, North Korea or smaller countries like Malaysia--the
Iranian-Hezbollah conspirators are outpacing our ability to
constrain them.
So far, U.S. efforts to combat the expanding threat have
fallen short. Sanctions are necessary but they are not enough
to counter the expanding activities of Hezbollah and the IRGC.
Despite several international pressures, the EU has flat out
refused to declare Hezbollah a terrorist group. This is too
bad. This would pave the way for additional sanctions. If
Western leaders continue to allow these actors to engage in a
global campaign of terror without some repercussion, a
dangerous precedent will be set.
Hezbollah is not going away. It is even more troubling to
imagine what the Iranians might be empowered to do if they are
allowed to develop nuclear weapons. The United States and its
allies must understand this threat and develop a comprehensive
strategy of their own to confront these activities of Hezbollah
and Iran.
I will now yield 5 minutes to the ranking member, Mr. Brad
Sherman from California, for his opening statement.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Poe follows:]
----------
Mr. Sherman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this hearing.
Iran, indeed, presents a global challenge to the United
States, and Hezbollah is a major part of that challenge. The
United States is building a coalition of countries that are
confronting Iran in meaningful ways. Unfortunately, what we are
doing now is exactly what we should have been doing in roughly
2001. That doesn't mean we are doing the wrong thing, it just
means we have to do more and we have to do it quicker.
The Europeans, or elements in Europe, have asked us not to
take military action against Iran and to use our good offices
to persuade Israel not to do so as well. That being the case,
you would think that Europe would do everything possible to
assist us in using non-lethal methods to control Hezbollah, and
more importantly, to stop the Iran nuclear program. One
important step that European countries could take would be to
list Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. They are on the
spear of Iran's efforts to influence the world and to carry out
terrorism in virtually every continent.
As to Latin America, the United Nations Security Council
approved the first round of U.N. sanctions in 2006. Ahmadinejad
embarked on a tour of Latin America to try to emerge as a
leader of anti-Americanism not only in Venezuela, but also
Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Ecuador. Hezbollah and Iran have
expanded their operations in Latin America, especially fund-
raising for illicit activities. This subcommittee and others,
and the full committee, have focused on how Hezbollah has been
involved in the tri-border region where Paraguay, Brazil, and
Argentina come together. An extensive smuggling network there
run by Hezbollah funnels large sums of money and there have
been reports of training camps in the region.
They have been able to cultivate ties to narcotraffickers
and other criminal enterprises and even the government
officials. And as they engage in narcotics activity, they are
able to combine the true believer dedication of some of their
operatives with the lucrative opportunities provided by the
drug trade.
We should point out that Hezbollah and Iran, working
together, blew up the Buenos Aires Jewish community center late
last century. That illustrates that Iran and its ally
Hezbollah, or proxy, pose a greater danger perhaps than North
Korea. Although Iran doesn't have nuclear weapons, Iran's
desire to influence the world go all the way to Buenos Aires,
which is as far from Tehran as you can get, I believe, on this
planet. In contrast, the thugs who run North Korea seem mostly
focused on maintaining their power in North Korea.
The presence of Hezbollah in the region could very well
serve as an important part of Iran's campaign to retaliate for
efforts to curtail its nuclear program. One need look no
further than the Quds Force sponsors' efforts to kill the Saudi
Ambassador in Washington and the attack on Israeli interests in
Europe and Asia to see examples of what we could see in the
future.
To that end, I worked, along with Chairman Poe and the
author of the bill, Mr. Duncan, on the Countering Iran in the
Western Hemisphere Act of 2012, which raised the profile of
this problem and hopefully provided the Obama administration
with tools that it will use to combat it. This legislation, of
course, was signed into law last December.
As to Syria, Hezbollah has an active part in the defense of
the criminal Assad regime. Tehran has been sending commanders
and fighters from Hezbollah and from the Revolutionary Guard
Corps to Syria, as well as providing aid in arms. For those who
question whether we should provide spare parts to Iran's
supposedly civilian aircraft as ``the humanitarian thing to
do,'' I would say those planes should be grounded until Iran
grounds its nuclear program. Those planes right now are
carrying those who would kill thousands of Syrians, and
humanitarianism requires that we not provide spare parts to
make sure those planes can do even more damage to the people of
Syria.
It appears that Hezbollah has a force of up to 50,000
rockets trained on Israel. Before Iran develops a nuclear
weapon, those rockets are a way of trying to threaten Israel
into not doing something militarily. After Iran, if God forbid,
has a nuclear weapon, we will see terrorism with impunity, and
Iran's nuclear umbrella may allow Hezbollah to fire those
rockets and also have defense.
I see my time has more than expired. Let me just add that
the transfer of chemical weapons to Hezbollah needs to be the
reddest of red lines for the Assad regime. And I yield back.
Mr. Poe. I recognize members for a 1-minute opening
statement.
Mr. Yoho from Florida, you are recognized for 1 minute.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Berman, for holding this hearing today. Today's topic is an----
Mr. Sherman. Point of personal privilege. That would be
Sherman.
Mr. Yoho. I am sorry, sir.
Mr. Sherman. Quite a difference between the two.
Mr. Yoho. My apologies.
We cannot hope to effectively deal with Iran until we
understand the relationship between Iran and Hezbollah, and as
Iran's de facto enforcer, Hezbollah has and will continue to be
a large threat to not only peace in the region, but the world
at large.
I look forward to your testimony. And I have never seen
this kind of involvement in the Western Hemisphere when you see
Hezbollah going into South America in the reaches and the
tentacles it has. I look forward to what you say about it and
how we, on a foreign policy side, can help stop that. Thank
you.
Mr. Poe. The gentleman yields back. Without objection, all
the witnesses' prepared statements will be made part of the
record. I ask that each witness keep your presentation to no
more than 5 minutes. I will now introduce the three witnesses
that we have before they give their testimony.
Mr. Will Fulton is an Iran analyst with the Critical
Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute. His
research focuses on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Quds
Force, and Iran's Global Force Protection Network.
Dr. Matthew Levitt is the director of the Stein Program on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence at the Washington Institute
for Near East Policy. He previously served as a deputy
assistant secretary for intelligence and analysis at the
Department of the Treasury and as a State Department
counterterrorism advisor to the Special Envoy for Middle East
Regional Security. He is also the author of the forthcoming
book, ``Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon's Party of
God.''
Ambassador Roger Noriega is the founder and managing
director of Vision Americas, which advises the United States
and foreign clients on international business issues. He is
also a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
Prior to these roles, he was the United States Ambassador to
the Organization of American States and Assistant Secretary for
Western Hemisphere Affairs.
Mr. Fulton, we will start with you. You have 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MR. WILL FULTON, IRAN ANALYST, CRITICAL THREATS
PROJECT, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE
Mr. Fulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member and
members of the committee, for the opportunity to testify today
alongside my esteemed colleagues.
The Islamic Republic of Iran is first and foremost
concerned with regime preservation. So when we talk about
Iran's global terror campaign and Iran's relationship with
Lebanese Hezbollah, we must think about it in that context.
Iran has established a substantial global force projection
network that includes the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps,
or IRGC, and the Quds Force, Hezbollah, and proxies in Iraq and
Gaza. And although these groups may justify their activities in
religious and ideological terms, at the end of the day they are
a power projection, deterrent, and retaliatory force.
The regime's vulnerability and relative military weakness
demand an aggressive and far-reaching asymmetric capability. As
a result, Iran's leaders have crafted a national security
policy designed to protect the regime from external threats by
demonstrating a capability to strike U.S. and Israeli interests
anywhere in the world, and this strategy dates back to the
regime's earliest years.
Ultimately, Mr. Chairman, the IRGC is responsible for
Iran's global force projection. The IRGC's mission is regime
preservation and is responsible for every related internal and
external security task required to accomplish this mission.
The IRGC is a highly structured organization led by a small
core network of individuals. This group fought side by side
during the Iran-Iraq War, where they developed professional
military experience, as well as enduring personal
relationships. They are battle-tested commanders who played key
roles early on, leading to increasingly important roles later,
including within the Quds Force.
The commander of the IRGC, Major General Mohammad Ali
Jafari, reports to Iran's Supreme Leader. Each of the IRGC's
five combat service commanders report directly to Jafari,
except one. Quds Force Commander, Major General Qassim
Suleimani, also reports directly to the Supreme Leader.
Suleimani has the trust and confidence of the Supreme Leader
and has had it for over 15 years. Any Quds Force activity has
tacit, if not explicit approval of the Supreme Leader.
I think that is one of the most important points to
understand when we think about the complicity of Iran's top
leadership and the global activities of the Quds Force, its
partners and proxies. The notion that Quds Force operations are
undertaken by rogue elements is implausible and not supported
by any available information.
Iran has provided continuous substantial support to
Hezbollah since the 1980s, and their partnership has
materialized in the form of multiple terrorist attacks around
the globe, targeted assassinations, and military operations in
wartime environments. During the Iraq war, the Quds Force
worked closely with Hezbollah to train, fund, and arm Iraqi
Shia militant groups, and plan and execute attacks against U.S.
and coalition forces. I would like to pick out just a couple of
examples where Quds Force commanders involved in Iraq have
resurfaced recently.
In 2007, Senior Quds Force Commander Abdul Reza Shahlai,
along with a senior Hezbollah commander, planned the infamous
attack in Karbala, Iraq, that resulted in the deaths of five
U.S. soldiers. Shahlai later went on to help plan and
facilitate the failed 2011 plot to assassinate the Saudi
Ambassador to the U.S. here in Washington, DC.
The Quds Force's number three in command was also active in
Iraq. Mohsen Chizari, the head of Quds Force operations and
training, was arrested in Baghdad in 2006 by U.S. forces, but
was quickly released at the insistence of Iraqi Prime Minister
Nouri al-Maliki, who cited diplomatic immunity. Now Chizari is
considered one of the key members of the Quds Force's training
and advising mission fighting to keep Bashar al-Assad in power
in Syria.
Syria is enormously important to Iran. It has long been
Iran's closest state ally. It has provided Iran access to its
proxies and partners. Iran has invested in Syria as a strategic
ally as part of its deterrence against Israel. Iran's primary
goal, then, has been to preserve Assad for as long as possible.
But Iran is also working aggressively to establish a militant
network that will enable them to retain a certain level of
capability in post-Assad Syria.
As you might expect, the Quds Force has been leading Iran's
efforts in Syria. Just last month, a brigadier general in the
Quds Force, with substantial ties to Hezbollah by the name of
Hassan Shateri, was killed near Damascus after having been in
Aleppo. We don't know exactly what Shateri was doing in Syria,
but we suspect that he was on a mission related to the Al-Safir
chemical weapons and missile storage facility near Aleppo.
Shateri was important enough that Qassim Suleimani personally
delivered the news of his death to Shateri's family and wept
openly at his funeral. Senior Hezbollah officials also traveled
to Iran to attend Shateri's funeral.
Hezbollah has been integral to Iran's efforts in Syria,
which has collaborated with the Quds Force in several areas,
including training, advising, and arming pro-Assad forces.
Iran, along with Hezbollah, may achieve some success with its
strategy in Syria. But Iran's efforts offer only a temporary
solution to Tehran. A rump Alawite state or a militant network
cannot provide Iran with the same level of deterrence or
political and economic support as Assad's Syria. This is why I
think the fall of Assad has serious implications for Iran's
global force projection strategy, and I will conclude on this
point.
As the conflict in Syria stretches on and Iran sees its
strategic depth continually eroded, they are likely to seek to
expand their operational territory. The interception in January
of an Iranian weapons shipment containing sophisticated
Chinese-made anti-aircraft missiles and large quantities of
light arms, ammunition, and explosive material destined for al
Houthi rebels in Yemen suggests that Iran has already ramped up
its support for militants in at least one area. We should look
for similar behavior in other areas where Iran has a presence.
And finally, if you are wondering what a more active
Iranian global force projection network might look like,
consider the past 2 years where we have seen a plot to conduct
a mass casualty attack here in Washington and plots in Georgia,
India, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Kenya, and Nigeria. We have seen
Iran become more risk prone in its behavior and we are likely
to see this trend continue.
Thank you.
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Mr. Fulton.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fulton follows:]
----------
Mr. Poe. Dr. Levitt.
STATEMENT OF MATTHEW LEVITT, PH.D., DIRECTOR, STEIN PROGRAM ON
COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR
NEAR EAST POLICY
Mr. Levitt. Thank you, Chairman Poe, Ranking Member
Sherman, distinguished members of the committee. It is an honor
to appear before you again this morning to discuss the nature
of the global terrorist threat posed by Iran's strategic
partner and principal terrorist proxy, Hezbollah. The nature of
this threat has indeed increased dramatically over the past few
years.
Today's hearing on Hezbollah's strategic shift is extremely
timely. This week marks the 21st anniversary of the 1992
Israeli Embassy bombing in Buenos Aires. Failure to respond to
that attack emboldened Hezbollah, which incurred no cost for
that attack. Two years later, Hezbollah struck again, this time
escalating from a diplomatic to a civilian target and blowing
up the AMIA Jewish community center, also in Buenos Aires.
Hezbollah is watching Europe and the West closely right now,
much as it watched Argentina 21 years ago this week, to see if
there will be any consequence to its recent escalation of
terrorist activity around the world.
Today's hearing is also well timed because tomorrow is a
critical day for Hezbollah, the West, and Europe in particular.
This is because a verdict is expected tomorrow in the case of
Hossam Yaacoub, a self-confessed Hezbollah operative now on
trial in Cyprus.
You have the flier from my book, and in there I get into in
great detail Hezbollah's global footprint, its activities in
North America, South America, Asia, Africa, the Middle East,
and Europe. I won't go into that right now. But as Director of
National Intelligence James Clapper testified just last week
before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and I
quote, ``We . . . face uncertainty about potential threats from
Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah, which see the United States and
Israel as their principal enemies.'' He continued, ``We
continue to assess that Hezbollah maintains a strong anti-U.S.
agenda but is reluctant to confront the United States directly
outside the Middle East.''
But Hezbollah is certainly active well beyond the Middle
East, and that uncertainty about these potential threats stems
from Hezbollah's recently increased global terrorist
activities. Hezbollah today has two distinct operational
trends. One involves its intent to avenge the death of Imad
Mughniyah killed in Damascus in February 2008. Hassan
Nasrallah, the head of Hezbollah, promised at the time ``open
war,'' which is a quote, against Israel. They intend to target
a current or former Israeli official in response and they have
tried several times since and they have failed.
The second operational trend is their effort to target
Israeli tourists internationally as part of Iran's shadow war
with the West, and here again we see Hezbollah acting outside
the Lebanese interest, completely and only in the interest of
its strategic partnership with Iran. There are two key dates to
understand this latter threat. The first is September 2009,
where after several failed attempts to conduct an attack
against the Israelis to avenge Mughniyah's death, they tried
again in Turkey, in September 2009, targeting a consul-general
in Istanbul. They failed, despite extensive and increased Quds
Force logistical support for that attack, leading Hezbollah and
Iran to yell at each other, you are not good enough anymore,
you are not providing as much support as you used to.
As they are arguing with each in January 2010, someone
assassinates Professor Mohammedi in Tehran with a sticky bomb.
Professor Mohammedi was a particularly important person in
Iran's nuclear program, and at that point Iran decides that two
things will happen. The one is that the Quds Force will create
a new unit, Quds Force Unit 400, specifically to target Western
diplomats abroad, and also targets reflecting Israel, that is
to say, Jewish targets, for example, the plot in Baku targeting
two Jewish rabbis and a Jewish school. And the second is that
Hezbollah will get its act together, would reenergize itself,
rejuvenate the Islamic Jihad Organization, recruit people with
foreign passports who could travel abroad, and begin to target
Israeli tourists worldwide, and this happened.
Hezbollah has been recruiting people with foreign passports
from Sweden, from Canada, and Australia, just to give some
examples. They have returned to old school tradecraft, and they
have presented threats in Azerbaijan, Thailand, Cyprus,
Bulgaria, kidnapping plots in Africa, delivering weapons to
Houthi rebels in Yemen, and more.
According to Bulgarian authorities, two of the three
suspects from the July attack there last year were foreigners.
One had an Australian passport, one had a Canadian passport.
One returned back to Lebanon through Poland and one through
Romania.
But while that attack killed several people, the one that
is going to have a bigger impact on Europe is the one that
doesn't involve intelligence and information that won't be
shared publicly, but the one that happened and was thwarted 2
weeks earlier in Cyprus, where that information is now not
classified but being presented in open court, in a European
court, undergoing complete European judicial review, including
cross-examination by defense, and that verdict is expected
tomorrow.
Hossam Taleb Yaacoub has described himself as a Hezbollah
operative. In an eerily similar plot to the one in Bulgaria, he
was conducting surveillance of Israeli tourists arriving there.
At one point he said, I am not Hezbollah. Later he said, I
didn't tell the whole truth, something weird was going on and
when Hezbollah told me to conduct surveillance of an airplane,
maybe they were plotting to bring down an airplane. I don't
know. I am just speculating, he said. Later he said he was not
part of a terrorist plot in Cyprus at all. Instead, he said,
and I quote, ``It was just collecting information about the
Jews, and this is what my organization does all over the
world.''
Hossam Yaacoub is a European citizen. He is a Swede. He
grew up in Sweden. His father still lives there. The rest of
his family is in Beirut. Before being sent to Cyprus to carry
out this attack, he was sent on missions--he described them as
missions, I am not describing them as missions, this is his
word--as a courier, first to Turkey, then to Lyons, France, to
meet some Hezbollah operative there, then to Amsterdam to meet
some Hezbollah operative there. Taken together, the Bulgarian
and Cypriot cases present compelling evidence of Hezbollah's
continued operational activity, specifically in Europe.
Hezbollah is watching Europe and the rest of the
international community closely, much as it watched Argentina
21 years ago this week. Argentina failed to respond to
Hezbollah's challenge then and suffered the repercussions 2
years later. Europe has an opportunity now to avoid that same
mistake and should designate Hezbollah in whole or even just in
part as a terrorist group for executing terrorist plots on the
continent. History suggests that failure to do so could result
in still more attacks by even still more emboldened Hezbollah.
Thank you.
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Dr. Levitt.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Levitt follows:]
----------
Mr. Poe. Ambassador Noriega.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROGER NORIEGA, FOUNDER AND MANAGING
DIRECTOR, VISION AMERICAS LLC (FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS AND FORMER AMBASSADOR TO
THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES)
Mr. Noriega. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I applaud
you and other members of the subcommittee for focusing
attention on the global threat posed by Hezbollah, and I thank
you for inviting me to share insights about that terrorist
organization's growing network in the Americas that carries
that threat to our doorstep.
Mr. Sherman and Dr. Levitt referred to the 1992 and 1994
bombings in Buenos Aires for which Hezbollah is considered
responsible, and Iran. This is Hezbollah's despicable legacy in
the Americas, and that terrorist group, along with Iran, has
returned to the scene of the crime. During the last decade,
Hezbollah has extended its reach quickly and substantially in
dozens of countries in the Americas.
This surge can be attributed to two key facts. Hezbollah
counts on the direct political, diplomatic, material, and
logistical support of governments, including one in this
region, Venezuela, which has little in common with Iran but its
hostility to the United States. Also, to facilitate its
smuggling, money laundering, training, and fund-raising
activities, Hezbollah collaborates with well-financed drug
traffickers and narco-guerrilla groups with deep roots in the
region and sophisticated smuggling and money laundering
networks worldwide.
I believe this challenge must be understood as the product
of a conscious strategy of rogue regimes, Iran and Venezuela,
to wage asymmetrical warfare against the United States'
security interests and allies close to the homeland. This
unconventional challenge in each of its political, criminal,
and terrorist components requires a much more robust and
comprehensive response. Allow me to share some of the details
that explain the breadth and the depth of what Hezbollah is up
to in our hemisphere.
Two terrorist networks proselytize, fund-raise, recruit and
train operatives on behalf of Hezbollah in many countries in
the Americas. One of these parallel networks is operated by the
Lebanese-born Ghazi Atef Nassereddine Abu Ali. That
Nassereddine clan is based in Venezuela. And another is managed
by Mohsen Rabbani, a former Iranian diplomat and Muslim cleric
who is wanted for his role in those 1992 and 1994 bombings.
Hezbollah operatives and their radical anti-Semite allies,
anti-Semitic allies, use their senior positions in the
Venezuelan Government to provide logistical, material, and even
diplomatic and political support to help Hezbollah and other
terrorist groups grow stronger very close to our homeland. In
recent years, the Chavez regime has sent weapons to Hezbollah
and it has shipped refined fuel to Hezbollah's allies in Iran
and Syria. Venezuela's Margarita Island has become a safe haven
for terrorists and drug smugglers. Hezbollah operates numerous
businesses and safe houses in Venezuela and it has provided
terror training in that country for recruits from that country
as well as from other countries in Latin America.
Numerous Latin American governments have detained Iranian
and Lebanese and other persons carrying authentic Venezuelan
passports among the thousands of Venezuelan passports and other
documents that were issued to people of Middle Eastern
background in the last dozen years. The state-owned airline of
Venezuela, Conviasa, provides Iran, Hezbollah, and associated
narcotraffickers a surreptitious means to move personnel,
weapons, contraband, and other material in and out of this
hemisphere. The Lebanese drug lord, Ayman Joumaa, was indicted
in the United States in November 2011 for running cocaine-
smuggling and money-laundering schemes that benefitted
Hezbollah. His network, which laundered as much as $200 million
a month, involved criminal associates and corrupt businesses in
Colombia, the United States, Mexico, Panama, Venezuela, as well
as Lebanon. Also, in recent years, Mexico has arrested numerous
individuals associated with Hezbollah engaging in various
criminal activities, including smuggling of persons across the
U.S. southwest border.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that the foregoing discussion about
the facts on the ground would lead most reasonable observers to
conclude that Hezbollah is a problem in the Americas that can
no longer be ignored, and I will highlight just a few
recommendations on how we ought to respond.
First, congressional leadership is absolutely essential,
and pressure from this body is really important to get
executive branch agencies to act more decisively. Legislation
that Mr. Sherman referred to, I think the chairman referred to
as well, passed by this Congress with strong bipartisan support
late last year requires the State Department to report to
Congress on Iran's activities in the region and to provide a
strategy for countering this threat. This committee must insist
on a whole-of-government response from the State Department. In
some cases, you might decide that more resources are needed by
the intelligence or law enforcement organizations responding to
the threat, but also political will is just as important, and
that requires pressure and oversight to ensure that the
executive branch acts responsibly and rigorously.
The links between Venezuelan officials and state-run
agencies with drug trafficking, terrorism, Iran, and Hezbollah
must be on the table as the State Department presents tough
conditions for normalizing bilateral relations with Venezuela
in a post-Chavez era. In the meantime, this criminal activity
must be publicized and punished in the form of Federal
indictments. Administrative sanctions are good interim
measures; however, the Department of Justice should be asked,
where are the indictments?
And finally, the narcoterrorism on our doorstep advanced by
Hezbollah with Iranian and Venezuelan support demands a
response from those whose job it is to keep us safe. Our
Government must take effective measures to disrupt and
dismantle illicit operations and neutralize unacceptable
threats before it is too late.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Poe. I thank the witnesses for their testimony. The
rest of their testimony will be made part of the record.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Noriega follows:]
----------
Mr. Poe. Some observations. We had a map of some of the
activities of Iran and where their tentacles of terrorism
through Hezbollah have moved throughout the world. I suspect
that if we come back a year from now and we have a similar
hearing, we will have more red lines throughout the world
instead of fewer red lines. Hezbollah is moving throughout the
world, and I think the situation, based on your testimonies, is
getting worse.
Ambassador Noriega, you mentioned in your testimony that
Hezbollah, working in the Americas directly in the south and
southwest, is smuggling into the United States. Would you care
to elaborate on that? Smuggling what?
Mr. Noriega. Well, smuggling people and smuggling drugs and
other things. They involve themselves in various criminal
activities and collaborate with narcotraffickers on techniques
in terms of smuggling. There is anecdotal information that
Hezbollah provided Mexican narcotraffickers with training in
how to make car bombs, which soon became a tactic used by the
Mexican narcotraffickers in that country. You have a
significant number of cases of individuals who were associated
with Hezbollah in Venezuela also having contact with Mexican
narcotraffickers. It is a little known fact that the Mexican
cocaine smuggler, Chapo Guzman, who is the biggest----
Mr. Poe. Public enemy number one.
Mr. Noriega. Yes, absolutely. He spent most of the year
2010 in Venezuela, including part of that time on Margarita
Island, and we believe that it is there that some of the very
highest links with Hezbollah and with some of the Venezuelan
generals who are also involved in narcotrafficking took place,
and some of that collaboration took place.
Mr. Poe. Just for the record, he is the leader of the
Sinaloa drug cartel that operates in Mexico and other places.
And is your testimony that he has been trained or works with
Hezbollah as well to bring drugs into the United States?
Mr. Noriega. Well, I think it is pretty clear that
Hezbollah cooperates with narcotraffickers all along that
chain, not only smuggling but in the money laundering part of
it.
Now, whether Guzman was operational there, I don't have
proof of that, but my sense of it is that that is where he had
contact, regular contact while he was in Venezuela on Margarita
Island with Hezbollah elements, and they cooperate up and down
the chain, smuggling, money laundering, training in tactics to
confront law enforcement, and all of those issues.
Mr. Poe. Two more questions, one for Mr. Fulton and one for
Dr. Levitt.
You mentioned that Hezbollah really is under the auspices
and control, not just of Iran, but of the Supreme Leader in
Iran. Would you elaborate on that some?
Mr. Fulton. Mr. Chairman, I don't know that I would say
that Hezbollah is completely and utterly under the control of
Iran. In recent history, we have seen Hezbollah emerge as
somewhat of an independent actor. However, Iran obviously still
maintains significant control over Hezbollah operationally. And
when I say the Supreme Leader, what I mean by that is that,
based on all of the information I have seen, there is nothing
to indicate that there are rogue elements in the IRGC or other
elements of the Iranian regime that are working with Hezbollah
to undertake operations or to undertake any of the activity
that they are involved in. So, if there is activity that the
Iranian Government and Hezbollah are collaborating in, then
that is undertaken with, at a minimum, tacit approval of the
Supreme Leader.
Mr. Poe. All right.
Dr. Levitt, what is going to happen next with Hezbollah? I
mean, where are they going next? Back to you and Ambassador
Noriega's comments about some of the things that we can do, and
also, in your opinion, why hasn't Europe labeled this group as
a foreign terrorist organization? So, where are we headed? What
about the Europeans?
Mr. Levitt. You can't put a clock on me for that, sir.
Mr. Poe. I will have to.
Mr. Levitt. Where we are going is more of the same.
Hezbollah has multiple interests and identities. It is Lebanese
and it is interested in its position in Lebanon. It is pan-Shia
and it is in partnership with Iran. What we are seeing is that
the identity of its partnership with Iran is trumping the
others. It is willing to do things now, whether it is targeting
tourists in Bulgaria or Cyprus or flying a drone over southern
Israel last fall that are completely in the Iranian interest,
even explicitly against Lebanese interests. That makes
Hezbollah very, very dangerous.
Why are some European countries uninclined to designate
Hezbollah? For a variety of reasons, from concern about what
might happened to the UNIFIL soldiers, many of whom are
European, Italian, and French, in particular in southern
Lebanon, to what this means for the stability of Lebanon, which
is politically quite unstable right now, to concern about
retaliatory attacks at home. There are answers to all of those
questions. There is no evidence that Hezbollah has ever
retaliated with attacks against the entity that has designated
it. Let's be honest, a designation is just calling it a name,
saying that blowing things up is terrorism.
There is no one that does more to undermine stability in
Lebanon today than Hezbollah, which dragged Israel and Lebanon
both into a war neither country wanted in 2006, took over
downtown Beirut by force of arms leading to the deaths of
fellow Lebanese in 2008, and raided the Chouf Mountains. It has
been accused by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the U.N.
Tribunal, with the assassination of Rafiq Hariri and other
political assassinations, and of course now what is happening
in Syria, which is going right across the border into Lebanon.
We have to be, and I assure you that U.S. and foreign
intelligence and law enforcement agencies are quite aware of
the need to be very on top of these two threats, Iran,
Hezbollah, which operate together and sometimes in competition,
especially as we are concerned about Iran's nuclear program. If
the diplomatic track doesn't produce results, the theory is
that eventually there might have to be a strike on Iran's
nuclear facilities and that Iran would, without a question,
respond with asymmetric terrorist attacks worldwide.
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Dr. Levitt.
Yield 5 minutes to the ranking member from California, Mr.
Sherman.
Mr. Sherman. Mr. Levitt, Mr. Fulton, if Israel did take
military action, obviously, Iran would want Hezbollah to open
up with all the rockets it has got in southern Lebanon. Is
there any doubt that Hezbollah would be willing to do that?
Mr. Fulton. Sir, I would say on the Iranian side we have
seen senior IRGC commanders state explicitly that Hezbollah
would respond were Iran to be attacked by Israel. But I will
defer to Dr. Levitt on the internal Hezbollah politics.
Mr. Sherman. And who in Hezbollah has said that?
Mr. Levitt. Thrown under the bus.
My assessment is a little bit different. My assessment is
that if Iran is attacked by Israel or someone else, that there
will definitely be rockets fired at Israel from Lebanon,
probably from Gaza, but that, depending on who attacks and how
they attack and what the damage is and what the collateral
damage is, will have a big impact on how many rockets, what
types of rockets, because at the end of the day, you shoot a
rocket into Israel, Israel can respond back. The only thing
that there is no question is that there will also be reasonably
deniable asymmetric terrorist attacks as well.
Mr. Sherman. Turning to Syria, Mr. Levitt, what is the
status of Iran and Hezbollah's involvement in Syria, what
specifically are they doing to help the Assad regime, and what
have Iran and Hezbollah done to prepare for a possible transfer
of chemical weapons to Hezbollah if the Assad regime is likely
to fall or at least lose Damascus and other key parts of Syria?
Mr. Levitt. Iran and Hezbollah are deeply committed to the
Assad regime even today, even though it is clear that the Assad
regime will in time fall. The question is how it falls and when
it falls. Is Assad killed, does he flee, do they establish an
Alawi statelet along the coast? I think that is something that
Hezbollah, in particular, is very eager to see happen. It is
trying to help the Syrian regime establish territorial
contiguity in Syria between Damascus and the Alawi areas.
Failure to do that, it will provide that contiguity through the
Bekaa Valley. One of the reasons----
Mr. Sherman. Continuity between Damascus, which is in south
Syria, and the Alawite region, which is in north Syria.
Mr. Levitt. Curving along the Lebanese border where the
Syrian FSA and others maintain control of some of the area in
between.
The reason Hezbollah is so keen for this is because one of
the things that Hezbollah is most worried about, aside from
losing the state sponsorship and all that, which it clearly
sees it is going to lose, is the ability to get resupply of
rockets and other things from Iran. If it can't get those
resupplies, it will be much more constrained in shelling Israel
indiscriminately for fear that it won't be able to restock. But
if it has access to places like Latakia, which has an airport
and which has a seaport that Hezbollah has long, long used for
its international criminal arms proliferation purposes,
something that has come up in several FBI investigations of
Hezbollah here in this country, I think they feel that would
give them some hope.
In terms of the chemical weapons, we have a lot of
questions. We are very concerned. But in particular we were
concerned when we saw Hezbollah setting up small, little
movable training camps right next to chemical weapon depots.
Did they do that because they felt that was a good place where
they could set up camp and people probably wouldn't shell them
for fear of hitting the chemical weapon depots? Did they set
that camp up because it is a good place to be to raid the
storage site in the event that the regime falls? Both? We don't
know. But as you, sir, said, and I couldn't say it better, that
has to be the reddest of the red lines.
Mr. Sherman. And I assume Hezbollah has the technical
capacity to use these chemical weapons in the event that they
get their hands on them? Does anyone disagree?
Mr. Levitt. I think the biggest concern is that they get
them. Once you have them, you can get the capability to use
them, especially since you are so close to Iran.
Mr. Sherman. And you are right there with the Assad regime,
so you only need a few of their people to help you out.
Mr. Levitt. Exactly.
Mr. Sherman. You have talked about Europe not designating
Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. What can the United
States do to push Europe in the right direction on that? I will
take an answer from any one of the three of you.
Mr. Levitt. I just came back yesterday from a trip to
Europe, Rome, Paris, and Berlin. The good news is I saw more
movement in those three countries on this issue than I have in
a long time, including since I was last in several of those
countries.
Mr. Sherman. I mean, this is a terrorist organization that
carries out terrorism on European soil.
Mr. Levitt. Europeans often see things in big dialectics.
For them, there is no longer a debate is Hezbollah engaged in
these activities, which there long was. Now the debate is, is
this the right policy? What would it mean for stability in
Lebanon? What would it mean for UNIFIL? I believe those are all
answerable questions, and I made what I thought was a forceful
argument to them that they need to do this not as a favor to
the United States, not as a favor to Israel, but as a
responsibility that they have to their constituents. Hezbollah
has challenged them. Hezbollah is active in Europe, again
operationally. And let's be clear, there was never a point when
it was not active in Europe in terms of logistics, finance,
arms procurement, or for sending people into Israel or
elsewhere to carry attacks through Europe.
Mr. Sherman. And finally, the Europeans care a lot about
overflowing Assad. They may or may not want to provide weapons,
but here is a chance to help the free Syrian forces.
I yield back.
Mr. Poe. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
California, Mr. Cook, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cook. Thank you, Judge.
It is kind of ironic, I guess. Many years ago I was a
company commander, spent a long time, as I said, as a leader of
troops and marines, 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, which happened
to be the unit that was blown up by Hezbollah in 1983, and we
are perhaps going full circle.
I appreciate the ranking member asking the question about
chemical weapons. That is what I was going to ask. But I am
also concerned about the Strait of Hormuz from a military
standpoint. If you have got an organization that are almost, if
you described it correctly, if I understood it correctly, that
are almost like the Spetsnaz, to a certain degree, of Iran, and
they have issues right now as to what is their international
border, can they stretch it out. And it is that chokepoint
which is very, very inflammatory and which many people think,
you know, if a shooting engagement starts, it could very well
be.
And I was surprised that there has been no activity against
Qatar or the United Arab Emirates because of their support for
the United States and other more moderate regimes, and I just
wanted to see if you would comment on the possibility that this
agency that has been at the forefront of Iranian policy might
be involved in that area in the future.
Mr. Fulton. Sir, the IRGC has said time and time again, as
has the chief of the Armed Forces General Staff that they
intend to close the Strait of Hormuz if they were struck or if
their interests were threatened otherwise. Now, my expertise
does not lie in Iran's conventional military power. My
understanding, from assessments that I have seen, is that they
could close the Strait of Hormuz, but it would be for a very
limited period of time. But absolutely, if that were to happen,
the IRGC would be in the lead of those operations.
Similarly, if there were to be any type of flash point
conflict in the Persian Gulf in the Strait of Hormuz, it would
very much likely be the IRGC and its navy at the forefront of
that, sir.
Mr. Levitt. I will just add two quick comments. The first
on the 1983 Beirut bombings. The relevance to today is that in
the book I was able to find, for the book, a significant amount
of declassified intelligence, declassified CIA reports, FBI
reports, done a lot of interviews with current and former
officials, and it is quite clear across the board that the
assessment after the fact was that our failure to respond to
those attacks in a way that was meaningful to Iran and to
Hezbollah, again after the Khobar Towers bombing in 1996,
emboldened both Iran's Quds Force, the IRGC more generally, and
Hezbollah. We are at that type of a precipice again right now.
In terms of the Gulf regimes, I think there are lots of
parts of the book that will surprise people, maybe nothing more
so than the fat chapter on Hezbollah in Southeast Asia. But I
think some people will be surprised by how extensive the two
chapters are on Hezbollah in the Gulf. One chapter more
historically oriented leading up to Khobar Towers bombing,
regarding some of the earlier history, and the second one,
getting much closer to today, Hezbollah established a dedicated
unit to target coalition forces in Iraq, Unit 3800, and if you
talk to our allies and friends in the Gulf area, of course they
are concerned about Iran's nuclear capabilities, power
projection in the region. They are no less concerned about
Hezbollah's activities in the region. Iran, I believe, not only
is interested in regime preservation, but also it remains today
as it was at its founding, interested in exploiting the
revolution, and that starts, for them, in the Gulf.
Mr. Cook. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Yoho,
for 5 minutes. We are going to try to finish before votes.
Votes have already started, but we will try to finish the
hearing so you all don't have to come back.
Go ahead. Gentleman from Florida.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate you guys' testimony. And the big thing I see,
you know, that concerns me probably more than anything is the
infiltration into the Western Hemisphere of Hezbollah. My
question is for all three of you, how much effect do the
sanctions on Iran for funding to Hezbollah, how much effect do
they have, our sanctions, and what can we do to make them
stronger? And also how much funding is Hezbollah maybe getting
out of Venezuela that we may not know about.
Mr. Noriega. Well, as a matter of fact, for our sanctions
on Iran to be more effective, we should be going after
Venezuelan institutions.
Mr. Yoho. That is what I was thinking.
Mr. Noriega. The Saderat Bank of Iran, which is involved in
all of these illegal activities and rogue nuclear programs, et
cetera, wholly owns a bank called the Banco Internacional de
Desarollo in Venezuela. They also have tens or probably
hundreds of millions of dollars in every bank in Venezuela
today, the Iranians do. And Hezbollah also is able to skim some
money out of some of the fundraising activities that they do in
their own right, but also in some of these criminal activities
with narcoterrorist organizations, so they are able to skim
money off of that. My sense of it is they probably take
hundreds of millions of dollars because of the foothold that
they have and the complicity they have in Venezuela.
Mr. Yoho. Before we go on, Dr. Levitt, what is your opinion
with the changing of guards in Venezuela?
Mr. Noriega. It bodes very ill, sir.
Mr. Yoho. Yeah.
Mr. Noriega. Because Chavez, for all of his bombast and
everything, was a strong character who could modulate some of
these extreme influences that he comes under. Maduro, on the
other hand, is demonstrating that he is very weak and he seems
to be following a script that the Cubans have laid out for him.
And the Iranians and Hezbollah have every intention of keeping
ahold of that, that platform that they have in Venezuela, and I
am afraid that without a strong hand, that whatever regime or
whatever government takes over for Chavez will not be able to
manage this, what Hezbollah and Iran are up to in their
territory.
Mr. Yoho. Okay. Thank you.
Dr. Levitt.
Mr. Levitt. Briefly, the issue of Western infiltration,
infiltrating into the United States in particular, is one that
is mostly one of, when it comes to hard facts, of
vulnerability. There is no question, Roger is right, there is a
lot of overlap in terms of smuggling routes, but there is only
one known instance of a Hezbollah operative entering the United
States from crossing the border illegally. You should take no
comfort from that. He was one of the most dangerous Hezbollah
people ever to be in this country. I refer to him as kind of
Hezbollah's 007. And the person, the Lebanese Mexican who
smuggled him in, admitted that he has smuggled, I think it was
something like 1,500 other people in the country, and there is
vulnerability. We don't know. I can't tell you that any of them
were Hezbollah, I can't tell you none of them were Hezbollah.
But that one individual was a pretty scary guy.
In terms of the sanctions and the impact on Hezbollah, the
good news is we have done some very, very good work there.
There is always more to be done because our adversaries don't
just capitulate. It is like squeezing a balloon, so they move
someplace else. One of the ways Hezbollah has tried to respond
not only to the sanctions against itself, against Hezbollah,
but against our sanctions on Iran, which have made it more
difficult for Iran to be able to be as generous in funding to
Hezbollah, is to expand ever more so into crime, especially
into narcotics trafficking, moving the product, especially from
South America across the 10th parallel, which law enforcement
refers to as Highway 10, to Africa, northward into Europe.
Another point that we raise when we talk to the Europeans,
Hezbollah, aside from its terrorist activity, is deeply engaged
in criminal activity in the continent, in particular and
including moving drugs into Europe. This gives us a whole
nother set of tools that we can use. Roger said we should see
more indictments. I expect that you will. I know that you will.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I am going to yield back because I have got
to go do my duty and vote. Thank you.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman.
I have one last question. Your testimony mentioned not only
Hezbollah and Iran, but the Quds Force and Iran working
together. Can you explain to me briefly the relationship, if
any, between Hezbollah, the Quds Force, and Iran working with
the other two, those two organizations together? Whoever wants
to? Mr. Fulton, go ahead? Whoever wants to weigh in on that.
That will be the last question.
Mr. Fulton. Mr. Chairman, I would just add that, again,
that the Quds Force, it is a component of the IRGC. The IRGC is
first and foremost concerned with regime preservation and is
led fundamentally by the Supreme Leader in that the commander
of the IRGC and the Quds Force both report directly to the
Supreme Leader. The Quds Force is the organization in Iran that
takes the lead in its cooperation with Hezbollah.
Mr. Poe. Dr. Levitt?
Mr. Levitt. Hezbollah is Iran's creation, and the Quds
Force is the primary interlocutor with Lebanese Hezbollah. My
written statement goes into great detail about the nature of
the relationship between them, as does our institute report on
Hezbollah and the Quds Force, and Iran's shadow war with the
West.
I want to make two points that are maybe contrary to
conventional wisdom, however, as we look at this recent trend
of events and threats. One, as I alluded to earlier, is that we
see these two groups engaging in significant operational
cooperation together as they always have, but we also see them
a little bit in competition. Right now from the Quds Force's
perspective, it is Hezbollah 1, Quds Force nothing.
Unfortunately, that means Hezbollah has carried out one
successful terrorist attack, Burgas, Bulgaria, and the Quds
Force has not.
On the flip side, we also see an element of a lack of
deconfliction. So in January of last year, when Hussein Atris,
a Swedish Hezbollah operative, was arrested there in a case
that has ties back to South America, explosives that he was
sending there, just a couple of weeks later an IRGC Quds Force
cell that was putting together sticky bombs was discovered
there, not through any of our activities but because the bomb
they were putting together exploded in their hands. It appears
that there was not enough deconfliction. You would think that
the Quds Force would have stopped its activities in Thailand at
a time when Thai, U.S., Israeli, all international law
enforcement and intelligence agencies were supremely focused on
Thailand.
We have seen it in another case that has gotten basically
no press, and that is Bulgaria. Not only was the attack in
Burgas, Bulgaria, the second Hezbollah attempt to carry out an
attack there, but just about a week or two later authorities
found an IRGC official conducting surveillance of a synagogue
in Sofia. So, again, it is unclear why there is this level of
deconfliction, but there is.
Mr. Poe. Last word, Ambassador Noriega, briefly.
Mr. Noriega. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Twenty seconds.
IRGC has a presence, a foothold in Venezuela. There are
about 70 Iranian companies, many of them sanctioned by the
U.N., EU, U.S., for involvement in the ballistic missile
program or the illicit nuclear program, that have industrial
footprints in the United States and obviously accounts there,
too. And IRGC Major General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, of the
Revolutionary Guard Corps' aerospace program, has visited
Venezuela on two occasions in the last 3 years to sites nearby
of nitroglycerin and nitrocellulose plants associated with the
Venezuelan petroleum industry. So there is something going on,
on the chemical side there, too, that needs to be looked into.
Mr. Poe. I want to thank all three of our witnesses for
being here today and your expertise. Without objection, the
chart, page 1 and 2, of the global map and the detailed back
page, will be made part of the record. And this committee
hearing is adjourned. Thank you once again.
[Whereupon, at 2:23 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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