[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-19]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
ON
THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND U.S. AFRICA COMMAND
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 15, 2013
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Thirteenth Congress
HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON, California, Chairman
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas ADAM SMITH, Washington
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
JEFF MILLER, Florida ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
ROB BISHOP, Utah JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota JIM COOPER, Tennessee
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado JOHN GARAMENDI, California
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
DUNCAN HUNTER, California Georgia
JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado JACKIE SPEIER, California
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia RON BARBER, Arizona
CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire
JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey DEREK KILMER, Washington
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama SCOTT H. PETERS, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois
RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas
KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
PAUL COOK, California
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma
BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio
JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana
Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
Alex Gallo, Professional Staff Member
Kimberly Shaw, Professional Staff Member
Michael Casey, Professional Staff Member
Mark Lewis, Professional Staff Member
Aaron Falk, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2013
Page
Hearing:
Friday, March 15, 2013, The Posture of the U.S. European Command
and U.S. Africa Command........................................ 1
Appendix:
Friday, March 15, 2013........................................... 27
----------
FRIDAY, MARCH 15, 2013
THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND U.S. AFRICA COMMAND
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.............. 1
WITNESSES
Ham, GEN Carter F., USA, Commander, U.S. Africa Command.......... 2
Stavridis, ADM James G., USN, Commander, U.S. European Command,
NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe........................... 1
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Ham, GEN Carter F............................................ 99
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''.............................. 31
Stavridis, ADM James G....................................... 33
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Conaway.................................................. 123
Mr. Turner................................................... 123
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Coffman.................................................. 132
Mr. Langevin................................................. 130
Mr. McKeon................................................... 127
Mr. Veasey................................................... 135
Mr. Wittman.................................................. 131
THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND U.S. AFRICA COMMAND
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Friday, March 15, 2013.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''
McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The Chairman. Committee will come to order. I would like to
welcome everyone to today's hearing on the posture of the U.S.
European Command and the U.S. Africa Command. We have two men
that have devoted their lives to the service of this country,
and this will be their last hearing.
Gentlemen, thank you for many years of service that we can
never repay you for, but your country is in your debt.
You know, we are going to have votes about 11:15, so I am
going to just put my statement in the record. It was wonderful.
And anybody interested can read it. Mr. Smith is not with us
here today. And in his place that seat is looking up a lot
prettier, Ms. Sanchez.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the
Appendix on page 31.]
Ms. Sanchez. Smarter, Mr. Chairman, smarter.
With respect to time, of course, gentlemen, thank you for
your service. I think it is the last time you are before us.
With respect to that, I will submit the opening statement for
Mr. Smith into the record and go straight to the hearing. Thank
you.
The Chairman. Very good. And with that, Admiral Stavridis.
STATEMENT OF ADM JAMES G. STAVRIDIS, USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
EUROPEAN COMMAND, NATO SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, I will follow your lead, as I
always do, and simply say three things. One is thank you to the
members of the committee, the chairman, to Congresswoman
Sanchez for sitting in and being part of this today. Secondly,
I think Europe continues to matter greatly for the United
States, and I hope in our discussion today I can illustrate why
that is a bit. And then thirdly, on behalf of the men and women
of U.S. European Command and the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
Organization] alliance, again I say thank you to the committee
for the terrific support we receive. With that I will, with
your permission, enter a statement in the record also,
Chairman, and I will turn to Carter Ham, my very good friend.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Stavridis can be found
in the Appendix on page 33.]
The Chairman. General.
STATEMENT OF GEN CARTER F. HAM, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. AFRICA
COMMAND
General Ham. Thanks, Mr. Chairman and Congresswoman
Sanchez. I had about a 20-minute opening statement, but I think
I will follow the lead of all, which makes a lot of good sense.
But it is great to have the opportunity to talk about what the
women and men of AFRICOM [Africa Command] have done. We are the
newest of the combatant commands. This year is our fifth year
in existence and we have changed a lot over those 5 years, and
I look forward to have the opportunity to talk with you a bit
about that. We are in the midst, obviously, all of us, of some
serious resourcing challenges as we move forward. That is going
to take all of our best efforts to address those to ensure that
all of us collectively can meet the national security needs of
our country.
I would join with my great friend and colleague, former
boss, Admiral Stavridis. We are closely joined between Africa
Command and European Command. In just about every endeavor in
Africa I rely on European Command for support. That support has
been unwavering and enduring. And similarly, the support from
this committee for our troops, for their families, for our
civilian employees has been similarly unwavering, and for that,
we are deeply appreciative.
I will depart the command in about a month and be replaced
most ably by General David Rodriguez, again an old friend and
exemplary leader who will take Africa Command and its women and
men to even greater heights, and I look forward to that. And
again thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ms. Sanchez, for your great
support.
[The prepared statement of General Ham can be found in the
Appendix on page 99.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Both your records,
without objection, will be submitted to the record. So ordered.
Admiral, you are our senior combatant commander. You will
be leaving your command shortly. And one of the things that we
are hearing a lot around the Hill here is maybe we don't need
forces in Europe anymore. You know, we are so far advanced
there, maybe we could pull all those troops home, and it would
be a big money savings, and the way things are going right now
financially that would probably be a great thing. That is what
we are hearing. I would like you to, from your experience on
the ground, tell us why it is important to have troops in
Europe. And with four combat brigade teams you have supported,
and now that has changed, if you could tell what you think we
do need there, why, and address that in light of the fiscal
constraints that we have.
Admiral Stavridis. Chairman, I will be glad to. To put the
discussion in context, I think it is worth looking back to the
Cold War, when we had 450,000 troops in Europe and we had 1,200
bases in Europe. That is the height of the Cold War. We have
reduced that by 80 percent. So we have come down very
significantly in the forces in Europe. I would argue that our
current level is roughly right, and I will give you four or
five reasons why I think it is important to continue to be
forward in Europe.
The first is really the most basic, it is values. We share
with democracies in Europe freedom of speech, freedom of
religion, freedom of assembly, freedom of education. Nowhere
else in the world will we find a pool of allies who share our
values.
Secondly, it is the economy. There is a $4 trillion trade
route across that Atlantic Ocean. And that binding of our
economic interests will continue to make Europe our most
important trading partner collectively.
Thirdly, it is geography. You know, Robert Kaplan just
wrote this terrific book, ``The Revenge of Geography.''
Geography matters. Europe, in that regard, is critically
important. People sometimes say, you know, those bases in
Europe, they are kind of the bastions of the Cold War. They are
really not. They are the forward operating bases for 21st
century security. They allow us to support Carter Ham in
Africa. They allow us to support Jim Mattis in the Levant, in
the near Middle East, and indeed in Central Asia. So geography
matters as well.
Fourthly, it is the alliance, it is the NATO alliance.
Fifty-one percent of the world's GDP [gross domestic product],
28 nations, 24,000 combat aircraft, 800 oceangoing ships, 50
AWACs [Airborne Warning and Control] aircraft. This is a
powerful, capable alliance that has stood with us, most
obviously at the moment in Afghanistan, where today we see 90
percent of the non-U.S. troops are indeed from Europe. So the
alliance matters.
And then, fifth and finally, I would say nowhere else in
the world will we find so many trained, capable soldiers,
sailors, airmen, and marines who will stand with us on missions
from the Balkans, to Libya, to the Levant, to Afghanistan, and
indeed around the world.
In terms of posture, we are about right now. We have
reduced the numbers of brigade combat teams. But, Mr. Chairman,
we are going to rotate forces in to make up that shortfall. And
I think we are about in balance. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
General Ham, your special ops force unit was established on
the 1st of October of last year. The committee has learned that
this force doesn't have the necessary enablers to operate in
certain environments. Obviously, if this is correct, this is
extremely concerning, as it would appear that we are not
postured for the next crisis in the region, like the attack in
Benghazi, Libya, on September 11 of last year. What is the
projected timeline to get your special ops forces outfitted
with the appropriate enablers?
General Ham. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. You are correct in that
the Commander's In-extremis Force was formally established on
the 1st of October of 2012. It had been about a year or more in
building that capability. Prior to the 1st of October, Admiral
Stavridis and I shared a Commander's In-extremis Force. It was
assigned to European Command, but available to AFRICOM should
that be necessary.
Today, that force is home-based in Colorado, but always
with an element forward stationed in Europe. We have also
deployed elements of it already to Africa on occasion. It has
most of the enablers that are required, but not all. The
principal shortfalls are in dedicated special operations
aviation. Again, I rely on Admiral Stavridis on a sharing
arrangement with special operations aviation forces that are
forward stationed in Europe. It is my preference to have those
elements dedicated.
Then there are some other enabling capabilities, such as
special operations surgical teams and some others, that I would
prefer to have dedicated exclusively for that force, and at
present we borrow those forces from other organizations. So we
have a better capability, and a quite good capability now, but
not the full capability that I think is necessary in the long
term. Ongoing dialogue with Admiral McRaven at Special
Operations Command as to when we might be able to build those
capabilities and station those capabilities. I think for the
next year, we will probably be in a sharing arrangement.
The Chairman. Thank you. I think as the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs, General Dempsey, pointed out, that if we have any
further cuts in defense it will have to change our strategy, we
won't be able to carry out the strategy that they devised when
we were hit with the $487 billion in cuts. And then with the
sequestration on top of that, we are going to have to revise
that strategy, and we will not be able to respond quickly in
all parts of the world at all times. So I think that it is a
reality that we are going to have to decide if that is what the
American people want. Thank you.
Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you again, Admiral and General, for being before us.
You know, I am from California, so I have always thought
that the United States was pivoted towards the Pacific, you
know, but there seems to be a lot of consternation, especially
among our allies out in the European theaters, that somehow we
are going to slip away from this very critical alliance that is
not only NATO, but all our European allies there. And, you
know, it has really gone from having our troops there in order
to defend Europe and now really being pretty integrated and
having their own troops doing their thing.
One of those things that is important is, you know, the
interoperability and the training and the mission readiness for
a decision that is made to go and intervene in places that are
important for stability around the world, like Libya, for
example, or other places. So my question to you, Admiral, is
how are the Europeans feeling? Where are they with respect to
their defense spending given that they are watching us lower
our defense and most of them have not met the 2 percent
threshold over the last few years? And how is that affecting
our interoperability and our readiness for missions should new
fires erupt out in an area that we would think together we
should handle the situation?
Admiral Stavridis. Thank you, Congresswoman. And as you
know from our discussions in Munich at the Security Conference
there, the Europeans are indeed watching the United States,
both in regard to our rebalancing to Asia and in our potential
significant reductions in defense spending. To kind of put it
in perspective, the United States spends $600 billion, roughly,
on defense base budget. Europeans actually spend about $300
billion per year collectively. So it is a very significant
expenditure on their part. It is more than China and Russia
spend combined. So they spend a fairly significant amount.
The bad news is, in my view, and we have discussed this,
and as you alluded to, they are not meeting their own targeted
2 percent of GDP, which I think is a minimum in order to
continue to maintain the appropriate level, as you said, of
interoperability with the United States. So on the one hand we
want to have full advantage of their spending and their
integration with us. On the other hand, we need to encourage
them to step up and to spend appropriately so that we are in
balance with them. We continue to do that. I work that very
hard within both NATO, in my hat as the Supreme Allied
Commander, but also in the U.S. European Command context.
Lastly, as to the rebalancing to Asia, again, as you and I
have both seen in Munich, the Europeans themselves are kind of
rebalancing toward Asia. And I think the key is that we
maintain both military integration and interoperability as well
as the diplomatic, cultural connections that we have.
So on balance, I continue to be pushing of the Europeans to
get their spending levels up. But we should recognize they
already spend a fairly significant amount, and they have, as
you said, stood with us, Afghanistan, Libya, the Balkans. Today
the forces in Mali, in Carter Ham's region, are essentially all
European. So it is a balance. We need to continue to encourage
them.
Ms. Sanchez. And with respect to Bosnia and Kosovo and some
of what I call the unfinished business there, can you give us
an update of where are our allies there and where Europe seems
to be going, and if the current economic conditions that we are
experiencing and others, and how that is affecting that? What
do you think we need to do to really make that, the Balkans
work? I know that is a big question in 2 minutes.
Admiral Stavridis. It is, and I will do it quickly.
Whenever we think about the Balkans, it is instructive to look
back 10 to 15 years when the Balkans of 15 years ago looked a
lot like Syria today. Fifteen years ago in the Balkans we saw
100,000 killed, we saw 2 million pushed across borders, we saw
open combat across Bosnia-Herzegovina, we saw a definite
follow-up in Kosovo, which continues today to have a lot of
tension. So we have come a long way in 10 to 15 years. At one
time collectively there were about 50,000 Allied troops in and
around the Balkans.
Here is the good news. Today we are down to only about
6,000 troops total, and of those only about 700 are from the
United States. So this is now about an 85, almost 90 percent
European mission. There are about 2,000 to 3,000 European Union
troops that are in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where there are no U.S.
troops. So the good news is the Europeans have stepped up and
are doing this. What we need to do is continue the dialogue,
notably between Kosovo and Serbia, as well as between Croatia
and Serbia, so that in the Balkans, instead of reaching for a
gun to solve their disputes, as they did 10 years ago, they
reach for the telephone for a negotiation. I think it is moving
in that direction.
Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased that there are
so many of our members here today for this hearing. And for
that reason, even though I have many, many more questions, I
will end. And thank you so much for the time.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you both for being here, for your service to the
country, and for your families' service to the country over
many years.
Let me start with just something brief that has come to my
attention. I understand we have an airfield in the Azores that
we are going to mothball by the end of 2014. Some people are
concerned about that because of its proximity to North Africa,
and especially not having to have overflight rights and so
forth.
General Ham, are you comfortable with where we are headed
with this? Or is it on your radar screen at all?
General Ham. It is, sir. One of the things that we are
always concerned about is access. I think losing access to one
place won't be a show-stopper. But we have got to look at this
more holistically, and I know Admiral Stavridis does that and
spends a lot of time on making sure that we have enough points
of entry and enough redundancy so that we can have the access
that is needed when it is needed. So I am not overly worried
about one particular case, but I do think it is important that
we look more broadly.
Mr. Thornberry. Okay. I just raise the point because I
think there are some people concerned.
If I can ask you one other question right quick. We had a
hearing earlier this year about the various authorities to
build partnership capacity. Nowhere is that more important than
your region. If you had to give us two or three improvements in
current law, whether they be tweaks or major reforms, what
would you suggest we at least consider to make our existing
authorities more effective in building partnership capacity
across the region that you are responsible for?
General Ham. First, I would thank the committee and all for
providing the authorities that you have. That is a significant
improvement over past years.
I think as we look to the future, though, we probably need
to look at something that is akin to today's overseas
contingency operations, authorities and fundings that are not
specifically tied to Afghanistan and to Al Qaeda, but rather
give us some broader authorities to address a growing number of
violent extremist organizations that don't necessarily fit
neatly under the Al Qaeda umbrella. So I think that would be
the first one.
And secondly, probably some increased authorities for some
of the geographic regions. So the Global Security Contingency
Fund I think is a good step in that direction, and authorities
to apply some of DOD's [Department of Defense] capabilities, in
partnership with State, in new partners. Libya, I think, is a
great example of that. So I think there are some minor tweaks,
but I think we are moving in the right direction.
Lastly, I happen to be a fan of the so-called dual key
authorities, where both the Secretary of Defense and the
Secretary of State have vested interests. I think that ensures
a closer alignment of Defense and State as we move forward.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
Admiral Stavridis, you have been not only combatant
commander in Europe, but in the southern region as well. This
is an unfair question with such limited time, but if you were
to give us on this committee the top three things you think we
ought to be focused on in the years ahead from our standpoint,
not just for Europe but for our total responsibilities, what
would they be?
Admiral Stavridis. Very quickly, I would actually put cyber
at the top of the list. I think in cyber we find the greatest
mismatch between our level of preparation and the level of
danger. I think that, in other words, we prepare an awful lot
for counterterrorism, for spread of weapons of mass
destruction, for many conventional scenarios we are very well
prepared for. But I think cyber we have a lot of work to do. I
mean the big we, not just DOD, obviously. This is something
that cuts across all parts of government and all parts of
society. So I put cyber at the top.
Secondly, may or may not surprise you, I think trafficking
is an enormous problem. The movement of narcotics, weapons,
humans as in slaves, humans as in terrorists, cash, and God
forbid, the weapons of mass destruction. So countertrafficking,
which means ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance], intelligence, understanding what is moving in
the seas and the ways around you, both land, sea, and air, I
think is critically important.
And then I would say my third thing would be special
operations. I believe that as we move forward, that is going to
be the comparative advantage for the United States. And I think
we should continue to focus on how we can use, improve, and
interoperably work with our allies in the special operations
zone. Thanks.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your service to our country and
for appearing here this morning.
General Ham, if I could just start with you. East Africa
remains, obviously, a key operating and training area for Al
Qaeda and associates, and specifically the Somali-based
terrorist group Al Shabaab. How concerned is the Department
about Al Shabaab's ability to attract and train foreign
fighters, including recruits from the United States, who may
project violence outward from East Africa? And what exactly is
the Department doing to counter this threat?
General Ham. Al Shabaab is, in my assessment, significantly
weakened from where they were a year ago, and that is because
of the concerted effort of African forces, certainly supported
and enabled by the United States and others. But there has been
good progress. We are seeing Al Shabaab continuing to have
strong linkages with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, in
Yemen, specifically, and we have seen continued effort by Al
Shabaab to recruit foreigners from other parts of Africa, from
the Mideast, to a lesser degree in Europe and the United
States. But there are certainly those efforts.
We think we are most effective in countering that approach
by supporting the African-led approach to countering Shabaab by
the restoration of a legitimate government, which the United
States now recognizes, focusing on development, countering the
underlying causes that has allowed Shabaab to gain traction.
There are some specific efforts in the information domain that
we work in partnership with other nations and with the
Government of Somalia, again, to help convey the legitimacy of
the African-led effort in Somalia, and we hope that that is
helping to diminish the ability of Shabaab to recruit
externally.
And lastly, sir, we are seeing, because of the increased
pressure on Shabaab, we are seeing a bit of a split between the
foreign fighters who are there and those who are native Somalis
who are part of Shabaab. The foreign fighters are very rapidly
losing influence inside that organization.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, General. I think that is so
important, that if we can get to some of the root causes of why
Al Shabaab had been able to adequately recruit fighters we can
obviously further degrade their ability to be an effective
fighting force. So I think that is important, especially
working with local populations.
Let me ask you this. Do we have a sufficient amount of
Department resources, including intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance assets working on the problem? And is AFRICOM
adequately resourced in general? Do you have to beg, borrow,
and steal too much from the other area commands or do you feel
you are adequately resourced?
General Ham. I have significant shortfalls in intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance. So that causes us to apply a
pretty sharp prioritization. Unsurprisingly, Somalia has been
near the top of that prioritization because of the effort
against Al Shabaab. And so we have conducted a lot of
reconnaissance missions in support of the African-led effort in
Somalia. That has been pretty effective. But it has left us
short in other areas across the continent. So that would be at
the top of my list, sir, is shortfalls in intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, General.
Admiral, let me turn to you, if I could, before my time
expires. Previously you have shared, you touched on something
that is very important, something that I spend a lot of time
on, is the issue of cyber. Can you further summarize for us
EUCOM's [European Command] evolution in this area over the
course of your tour and where you believe more work needs to be
done on cyber from a EUCOM perspective?
Admiral Stavridis. I can very quickly, Congressman. We have
worked very closely with my very good friend, General Keith
Alexander, at U.S. Cyber Command to create a cyber center
within U.S. European Command, a kind of a nascent version of
the Special Operations Command that we enjoy. I think having
such centers in each of the combatant commands is important,
and we should move forward.
Secondly, we have worked very closely with NATO to build a
NATO cyber center in Tallinn, Estonia, a nation which has
experienced a cyber attack, as you know quite well, being an
expert in this area.
And thirdly, we are working operationally across the
alliance to have an appropriate NATO cyber incident response
center mirroring what we have here in the United States. So
those are three quick things, and I would like to add, for the
record, a few more for you.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. I would appreciate that.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Admiral and General, thank you again, as everyone else
has said, for your service to our Nation. You all are real
heroes to America. You really are.
General Ham, I want to read you a statement, and then I
will get to my question.
``Africa cannot be thought of as a monolith. It is a hugely
complex landmass with a hugely diverse population. The nature
of the people, the diversity of cultures and religions, and the
tribal factions all combine to make Africa far more dangerous
than Afghanistan. We need to be wary of being drawn into a
morass.''
Would you agree with that statement?
General Ham. Yeah, I agree with the first part, about the
complexity and the diversity. I don't think that the threats
that are present in Africa yet rise to the seriousness that
existed with Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Pakistan or in--or in
Afghanistan, pardon me--and in the Federally Administered
Tribal Area, but the trend is not good.
Mr. Jones. Okay. Your statement, and thank you, has not at
this point risen to a situation where maybe we would have to
start thinking about committing more men and women to Africa.
As you begin to leave your service and become a citizen outside
of the military, do I understand you correctly that you would
not want to see this Nation make such a commitment that we
begin then to be in a situation, as we have been in Afghanistan
for 12 years, in a failed policy that will not lead to any
success at all? History says that, not me, but history.
I mean I understand the intelligence importance of having a
presence in Africa. I have no problem with that at all. But to
see the footprint get larger, where we are committing more than
300 or 400 troops to be there primarily as advisers and intel
officers. But to see this thing start to grow and expand, would
you rather not see that happen?
General Ham. Congressman, I believe that if the threat that
is present in Africa is left unaddressed it will over time grow
to an increasingly dangerous and imminent threat to U.S.
interests and certainly could develop into a threat that
threatens us in other places. We have already seen from some
places in Africa, individuals from Nigeria, for example,
attempt to enter our country with explosives. I think we have
an opportunity now to work preventive effort, in concert with
African forces and with allies and friends globally, to
suppress the threat, to reverse the trend, which is
increasingly worrisome to me. And that does not necessitate a
large commitment of U.S. forces, and I do not believe that a
large commitment of U.S. forces is either necessary nor
appropriate under the current circumstance.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the admiral and
the general again. And I appreciate you indicating that you
would hope that we will not get into a situation where it would
be Congress funding a larger military presence. As long as we
can work with other countries, which, you know, the situation
in Afghanistan of the coalition forces at best was limited. And
what I am concerned about is that we are here cutting every
program for the American people and the military is getting hit
very hard by sequestration. And I would like to believe that as
time goes forward that we would have leaders like yourself and
the admiral to say that we need to really limit our commitment
to these countries, where we can let other countries come in
and take the lead instead of America. So I thank you very much
for your question.
My time is about up. And again, I thank you both for your
service to our Nation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you.
Admiral and General, thank you for your service. My wife
and I recently returned from a trip to South Sudan. General
Ham, could you please give us your assessment of the situation
there, considering the financial near bankruptcy of the
country, the presence of Lord's Resistance Army in the
southwestern part of the country, and the overall outlook as
you see it for South Sudan?
General Ham. I had the great pleasure and honor,
Congressman, of on the 9th of July of 2011, of attending as a
member of the U.S. delegation the independence celebration for
South Sudan in Juba, and it was an exuberant moment. But one of
the lasting memories from that was after the celebration, the
chief of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army, the South
Sudan's Army, we were having a discussion, and he rightfully
said, now the hard work begins. Independence is important, we
are glad, the U.S., obviously, has been supportive of that for
a long time. There are many, many challenges that South Sudan
faces. The army is far too large. It consumes an exorbitantly
large portion of the national budget, upwards of 40 percent.
That is obviously not sustainable.
So one of the key priorities that we and those in the State
Department are helping with South Sudan is defense structure
and reform, which is very important. In the same time, we are
also working with the South Sudanese on some specific leader
development training. We think that is probably an area where
we can provide a very positive influence. I am concerned about
the continuing inability of Sudan and South Sudan to resolve
their lingering border conflicts. It is promising to see now
indications that South Sudan will soon begin oil production.
That will help both countries, frankly, Sudan and South Sudan.
And to your point, sir, about the Lord's Resistance Army,
the South Sudanese have been very supportive in terms of
supporting the African Union-led effort. They have welcomed us,
our advisers, and the capabilities that the U.S. team brings in
terms of aviation support, logistics support, and advisers. And
they have been an active and supportive participant with the
other nations, Uganda, Central African Republic, and Democratic
Republic of Congo, in the effort for the Africans to resolve
the Lord's Resistance Army challenges.
Mr. Garamendi. I thank you for that. On a different line,
there are numerous violent extremist organizations in the
Sahel. It is argued and pointed out by many NGO [non-
governmental organization] groups, wildlife groups and the
rest, that the organizations are supported through the
slaughter of elephants and the ivory trade. Do you have
authority to assist the governments in the Sahel in dealing
with this issue? And do you need authority if you don't have
it?
General Ham. Congressman, we have very limited specific
authorities to help with the specific challenge of poaching.
But we do have some, and we work with State Department and with
the U.S. ambassadors in that regard. But where we can have an
effect and are having an effect is many African militaries do
have responsibilities within their own nations for countering
poaching. And I would cite as one example in Cameroon the Rapid
Intervention Battalion, a special operations organization which
we have had a long relationship with. It is an exceedingly
capable force. They have been designated by their President to
take on a counter-poaching role. So our support for them
extends, while not directly to counter-poaching, the equipment,
the training, the advising that we have provided helps enable
that force.
And so I think our best efforts, again, probably will be in
a more indirect approach. The one exception, sir, would be if
we see that financing has a direct relationship, financing from
poaching has a direct relationship, then there are some law
enforcement authorities that the United States possesses in
terms of addressing the finance aspect of that which could be
helpful.
Mr. Garamendi. I thank you. In my last 9 seconds, I am told
by wildlife organizations operating in the region that they do
in fact have evidence that these violent extreme organizations
are using ivory and other animal parts as a financing
mechanism.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Miller.
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, General, thank you very much for being here. I
apologize for missing some of your opening statements. General
Ham, I would like to know a little bit about the cooperation of
Boko Haram and AQIM [Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb], Al
Shabaab. Talk to me about the level of cooperation between
those organizations, if you will.
General Ham. Congressman, it is very worrisome to me. The
three organizations which you mentioned, Al Shabaab in Somalia,
Boko Haram in northern Nigeria for the most part, and Al Qaeda
in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb in Mali and in that region,
each individually presents a significant challenge. But when
they collaborate, and we are seeing them increasingly
collaborate, I am very worried about that, particularly the
relationship between Boko Haram and Al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb, as you mentioned. We have seen indications of sharing
of financing.
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is, we believe, Al Qaeda's
best-funded, wealthiest affiliate, if you will, mostly from
kidnappings for ransom, but also through drug trade. And we
believe they have provided financing directly to Boko Haram. We
believe that they have shared training, to include explosives
training. And we believe that fighters from Nigeria, Boko
Haram-sponsored fighters have found their way over the past
year to training camps in northern Mali. So the relationship,
sir, is very worrisome to me.
Mr. Miller. Do you assess that Boko Haram has it within
their desires to come to the United States and do something
here on our continent?
General Ham. Sir, Boko Haram, like most terrorist
organizations, is not monolithic. There are a couple of
different elements within Boko Haram, some of which are
exclusively focused on domestic Nigerian issues, but there are
others who more closely align, while not directly part of Al
Qaeda, but an Al Qaeda-like global ideology. And so I would say
that in my view there are elements of Boko Haram who aspire to
a broader regional level of attacks, to include not just in
Africa, but Europe and aspirationally to the United States. And
I think that is why it is important for us, in partnership with
Nigeria and others, to help them counter this before their
capability matches their intent.
Mr. Miller. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Duckworth.
Ms. Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Ham, my question pertains to Mali. My understanding
is that when the coup happened, the United States, all non-
humanitarian aid had to be pulled out of Mali because
technically it is a military junta and a coup and not a
legitimate government because there was an overthrow of the
government. I am interested to know if there are any future
training plans or any other types of engagement that we may be
thinking about into the future with the military in Mali, even
though it is technically not a legitimate government.
General Ham. Congresswoman, we do want, we very much would
like to reengage on a military-to-military basis with Mali, but
it is premature to do so. But we are starting to think now what
we would like to do when there is a legitimate government in
Mali, and we have gotten some indications that the Malians are
very interested in restoring that normalized military-to-
military relationship. I think our efforts probably will
initially focus perhaps on helping the Malians develop a
capable counterterrorist force, but there are other aspects of
an enduring relationship that I think would be helpful.
I would just note also, ma'am, that while we are prohibited
from having a direct relationship, as Admiral Stavridis
mentioned, the European Union and others are already present
and are working with the Malians to good effect.
Admiral Stavridis. If I could, Congresswoman, just to
amplify quickly, the European Union has 200 soldiers. They are
going to ramp that up very quickly. And they are stepping up in
this. And I am encouraged to hear what General Ham says about
potentially us as well. Thank you.
Ms. Duckworth. General Ham, I have a slightly different
follow-up question. This is really with regard to trying to use
our forces more wisely and with greater cost savings. And
specifically, I would like to talk about the State Partnership
Program, which in the admiral's testimony really talks about
the success of the program being used by the European Command.
Do you have any plans, looking to the future, to really
capitalize on this? I see that, for example, California, which
participated in the State Partnership Program in 1993, later,
10 years later took on the role of helping work with the
Nigerians. North Carolina, after 12 years' experience working
with Moldova, is now working with Botswana since 2008. For a
program that has demonstrated its successfulness and its cost
savings by using the National Guard and that institutional
knowledge and those long-term relationships that can be
established by the cadre of the National Guard in particular
States, are you looking to expand this program in AFRICOM?
General Ham. I would like to think that you probably have
the co-chairs of the State Partnership Program fan club seated
here. It is an extraordinarily effective and low-cost effort to
achieve our national security objectives. We have eight
partnerships presently in Africa. I think we are close to
having a few more. Don't have any in East Africa. We have had
discussions with some East African countries, and I think we
are close to getting a couple to formally request. The Chief of
the National Guard Bureau is already, you know, working with
the state adjutants general to see who might be willing to take
on some relationships.
Another aspect, ma'am, that I would highlight, we have a
couple of instances where States have State partnerships both
in Europe and in Africa. And I think that is something that we
can leverage to a further extent in the future.
Admiral Stavridis. Yeah, if I could, three I would really
highlight. Illinois-Poland is terrific. Kosovo is married up
with Iowa. And Georgia, imaginatively enough, is married up
with Georgia. And they are bang for the buck one of the best
things going. We had an earlier question about authorities and
what we could do. Anything that enhances State partnership is
money in the bank for the regional combatant commanders, ma'am.
Ms. Duckworth. That is good to hear. I, too, am a fan of
State Partnership Programs because of two things. One, that
long-term institutional knowledge. I am, of course, biased
being from Illinois, but also because of the great cost
savings. You do not have to have Active Duty troops carry that
load for the whole time. So thank you for your answers,
gentlemen.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And Admiral, General, thank you for your service.
General, each year I am always interested in finding out
what the latest is on potentially relocating AFRICOM command. I
know that last October there was a determination not to
relocate because of one-time relocation costs, even though
there could be a savings from $130 million to $60 million to
$70 million to relocate back in the United States. I have
information from the Charleston Metro Chamber of Commerce that
puts in perspective a benefit of relocating AFRICOM back to the
United States. It is clear that in Charleston, with the joint
military complex, there are assets to support the command. The
Charleston Air Force Base already supports the African air
cargo channel missions. It is the largest C-17 wing, and the
only C-17 special operations unit. SPAWAR [Space and Naval
Warfare Systems Command] at Charleston is already an integrator
of joint communications for DOD, Department of Homeland
Security, State Department, and other Federal agencies. The
Port of Charleston provides approximately 50 percent of import-
export seagoing container traffic between the United States and
Africa. The Department of Homeland Security's Project SeaHawk
command and control center in Charleston integrates nearly 50
Federal, State, and local law enforcement, intelligence
agencies, technologies, and assets. With two-thirds of Africa's
nations having sea access, SeaHawk could be a major contributor
to AFRICOM's training and security missions. The Charleston
Federal Law Enforcement Training facility can accommodate
maritime and law enforcement training for African nations, and
currently operates an international training site at Botswana.
Charleston and the State of South Carolina already have close
ties with African nations in the field of medicine,
agriculture, education, religious institutions, business, as
well as a shared heritage with a large percentage of the
Lowcountry Charleston population originating in West Africa.
In light of the defense cutbacks, particularly
sequestration, will this be looked at further, to relocate the
AFRICOM command?
General Ham. Congressman, I am uncertain. As you are aware,
Congress did require the Department of Defense to conduct a
study. They did. That was led by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense. Obviously, Africa Command had an operational role in
that. The Department did respond, and it was the Department's
determination that the command is best retained in its current
location in Stuttgart, Germany. But clearly, having been part
of the discussion, the cost factors were a significant aspect
of this, and I know that Secretary Panetta, as he was in office
at the time, wrestled hard between many of the attributes that
you spoke of, the cost savings and the operational impact. But
the Department's conclusion was that the command is best
retained in its current location.
Mr. Wilson. Well, and do understand that we appreciate what
you have done so much and recognize how important it is. That
is why we would love for you to relocate to South Carolina. And
we like to point out we have the right climate. It is
meteorological, and you would appreciate that. And then the
people are very warm and would be very supportive.
Admiral, at the last several posture hearings before this
committee you strongly advocated for retaining four Army
brigade combat teams in Europe. How has the decision to
withdraw two of the brigade combat teams affected your ability
to meet operational and training requirements?
Admiral Stavridis. Obviously, it decrements them. What we
are doing to substitute for them, Congressman, is instituting a
rotational policy so we can bring a brigade combat team that is
located back in the United States. As you were just talking
about, Charleston is a good place to be located, we are
rotating out of Georgia. They will come to the European
theater, they will train, operate, interoperate, be part of
NATO exercises, and be part of assurance, reassurance, and
deterrence. So we are substituting a rotational structure. And
so far, so good.
Mr. Wilson. And would it be rotating out of Fort Stewart
or----
Admiral Stavridis. Initially, that is the indications we
are getting. It will probably bounce around within the United
States. But we would like to see it centralized in a particular
unit so we could build the experience base working that piece
of it.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much.
Admiral Stavridis. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Castro.
Mr. Castro. Thank you, Chairman.
Thank you, Admiral and General. The question I have is one
that I asked on my other committee, which is Foreign Affairs,
and the answer there was that it would be more appropriate for
you guys at Defense. That is, as we try to understand the
emerging terrorist groups, in North Africa in particular, how
do we distinguish between those with legitimate ties to Al
Qaeda and those that are simply posers trying to take advantage
of the credibility and the prestige that comes to wrongdoers
who are attached to Al Qaeda.
General Ham. It sometimes can be a tough challenge,
Congressman, because, again, many of these organizations have
multiple personalities. So some of them are relatively easy. So
Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb, they are very
clearly an Al Qaeda-associated organization. They have said so,
Al Qaeda senior leaders have said so. So that makes it pretty
easy.
But others have not quite so clear views. Some of them
originate with dissatisfaction with the host government. And
then sometimes an element of that group may get co-opted by an
ideologically motivated entity. And so there are a number of
those types of organizations that operate in North Africa that
make it very difficult.
What that necessitates for us is that we cannot paint with
too broad a brush to say that every VEO [violent extremist
organization] has an Al Qaeda-like ideology. We really have to
be very precise in our application. It requires us to work very
carefully with host nation governments, particularly with their
intelligence organizations, so that we can more clearly
understand where are the hard-core, ideologically committed
extremists that require one approach, and where are those
others who have perhaps unfulfilled expectations or have been a
long-disaffected population whose concerns can be addressed
through nonmilitary means.
Admiral Stavridis. If I could add a thought on that, it is
the importance of cyber and the social networks as tools that
allow us to do the kind of discriminatory analysis. So it is
another aspect to this. Traditional intelligence has its
merits, obviously, but here you can learn more about these
groups by getting inside them because so many of them are using
the cyber world in articulating their vision, as well as
actually conducting operations.
Mr. Castro. Thank you, gentlemen. And I think we all agree
that our understanding of those relationships affects the
United States engagement with those different groups and the
level of resources and energy we attend to those groups. So
thank you all very much.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Stavridis, thank you for being here. And I want to
thank you also not just for the confidence that we here in this
committee have in you, but also the confidence that you have
earned with our NATO allies. And it certainly is, I think, very
important both for the credibility of the United States and for
our relationships that you have such high regard from our NATO
allies.
I want to talk about an issue of which I have concern about
that relationship with our NATO allies. I serve on the
Strategic Forces Subcommittee and have served as chair, and
missile defense is one of those areas where you have worked
very diligently to obtain support from our NATO allies for
adding missile defense as a NATO mission. As you and I have
talked previously, I was very concerned with the way the Obama
administration ended the Bush plan to put ground-based missiles
in Poland, both because I thought it was going to be essential
for the protection of our mainland United States, but also
because of the way in which the Poles were treated in that
retreat. They had made a political commitment, and I think it
was done in a way that was detrimental to our relationship.
Now we are to the Phased Adaptive Approach, which I have
some concerns about, and the GAO [Government Accountability
Office] has recently issued a report that the SM-3 IIB
[Standard Missile-3 Block IIB] missile may have, I believe
their view is, very little national missile defense
contribution from land-based sites in Poland and Romania. My
concern from that report is it begins to signal again that
perhaps we could disappoint our allies in commitments that we
have made.
Secretary Miller recently said in remarks to the Atlantic
Council that the Pentagon, in view of the internal DOD reports,
was looking very hard at the future of the SM-3 IIB missile.
And I am concerned about the DOD commitment to this missile and
the administration's commitment to this missile. Now, I don't
see this as an alternative to ground-based sites, because I
believe that they are complementary and they could be both used
together, but in looking at the SM-3 IIB, I mean this
Republican House has always funded the IIB missile. The Senate
Democrat appropriators have cut funding for that. And when the
Department of Defense in the conference report issued its
objections of the appeals with respect to the appropriations,
defense of the SM-3 IIB was not there. So we have the
administration saying they are going to the SM-2, the SM-3 IIB
funding being cut from the Democratic-controlled House, the
administration not objecting, the Republicans on the House side
funding it, and now technical issues having been raised. I am
concerned about the DOD's commitment both to our allies, the
Romanians and Poles, with respect to this missile, but also the
protection of the mainland United States.
What is the Department of Defense's commitment to the SM-3
IIB? And how do you see its role both with our allies and in
protecting the homeland?
Admiral Stavridis. Well, as you know, Congressman, from our
long conversations about this, let me start with the Poles and
Romanians. At the moment, in my conversations with my
interlocutors, military to military, and indeed conversations
with ministers of defense, ministers of foreign affairs, they
appear to me to be comfortable with the EPAA [European Phased
Adaptive Approach] and the upcoming addition of shore-based
sites, as you know, coming into Romania and then into Poland
2015 and 2018 and so forth.
So my sense is the allies have adjusted to EPAA, and they
are in fact looking for ways to contribute. The Dutch, the
Spanish, the Italians are all looking at maritime-based
contributions. The Germans and Italians are looking at point
defense solutions. Germany is providing command and control. So
I think the structure under the NATO hat that you know from
your time as a NATO Parliamentarian, sir, is in fact coming
together.
In terms of where we are going through this progress, as
you know, SM-3 IIB is scheduled to come online in 2020, so that
is 7 years from now. I suspect there will continue to be
technical discussions regarding it. What I would like to do is
take that for the record and come back to you with a defined
departmental position that includes some technical analysis,
because I sense that is what you are hungry for, and I will
obtain that from MDA [Missile Defense Agency] and come back.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 123.]
Mr. Turner. Admiral, I would appreciate that. But the other
aspect of this is that, as we look to the emerging threats we
are going to need to make certain that we have every
technological available means to address it. The SM-3 IIB
certainly has additional capabilities. I am concerned by the
press reports that seem to indicate that Congress is the one
that is cutting it because this side of Congress has been
funding it. The administration, if it really wants it,
certainly has influence with the Democratic Senate to be able
to obtain it.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, good to see you again, sir. We were just recently
in Europe, visited EUCOM headquarters, and I want to thank you
and your staff for your outstanding support during that trip.
And I also have a little egg on my face because I think I
assured you that there is no chance that sequestration would
kick in. And I have got egg on my face. Really it is more like
manure on my face, I feel. And so, bam, it is what it is.
But the chairman asked you during his questioning about the
need for troops in Europe, and you mentioned that from the
height of the Cold War we have decreased by 80 percent the
troop strength in Europe. I have heard questions from those who
would question why we need those other 20 percent troops in
Europe: Why can't we just bring them all home and let Europe
take care of itself? Can you rebut that assertion?
Admiral Stavridis. Sir, I think I can give you the view
from U.S. European Command. I mentioned earlier values, the
economic base we share, the significant geography and access we
enjoy in Europe, as well as the alliance itself, which is a
treaty obligation which goes back and forth across the Atlantic
for mutual defense. And finally this very pragmatic reason:
that Europe is this largest pool of allies we have in the
world, trained soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, as well as
high technology. So I think that basket of reasons is very
strong.
Mr. Johnson. Well, what threat, though, is posed to our
allies and ourselves that require us to maintain such a
presence in Europe?
Admiral Stavridis. I think as you look around the periphery
of Europe, particularly, as Carter Ham knows extremely well,
look to the south, along the Sahel, and the northern rim of the
Mediterranean, as well as the Levant----
Mr. Johnson. And the Levant, for those who don't know, is
what?
Admiral Stavridis. Near Middle East, Syria and that region,
sir. So that arc of crisis, if you will, that runs today from
Syria down through and across the northern part of Africa, I
think represents threats to the United States, as well as to
our allies. So I would argue that we continue to have enduring
presence needs, enduring interoperability needs, and a treaty
obligation that would require some level of forces in Europe.
Again, we have come down 80 percent. I think that is probably
about right for the moment, but we should keep looking at it as
we go forward.
General Ham. Mr. Johnson, may I?
Mr. Johnson. Yes.
General Ham. Sir, I would make two points to that, hardly
as a guy who is reliant upon Europe-based forces to a large
degree. And I would make two points.
One, in terms of near-term response, when the President,
when our President made the decision to commit forces initially
in Libya, that simply would not have been possible on the
timelines that were required absent Europe-based air and
maritime forces. Had those forces been in the continental
United States the timelines would have been significantly
different and we don't know what might have happened if we had
not been able to respond on timelines.
Second is, one of the many missions which combatant
commanders are given is to assure access for the United States
and for others in the global trade. And so as we look to
Europe, the Straits of Gibraltar, a strategic chokepoint, the
Suez Canal, further down, the Bab el-Mandab, access through the
Gulf of Guinea, all important economically not just to our
country but to many others, and the presence of U.S. forces
nearby helps assure that access that is vital to our economy.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you. I will yield back the balance of my
time.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, gentlemen, thank you both for your service and for
being here today.
Admiral, could you give us a rough order of magnitude as to
the size of our nuclear weapons in Europe, forward deployed.
Admiral Stavridis. Yes. Sir, if I could, that is
classified, so I will take that for the record and provide you
with a precise number.
[The information referred to is classified and retained in
the committee files.]
Mr. Rogers. Let me ask this then. Can you tell us how many
so-called tactical or nonstrategic weapons that Russia has that
are forward deployed in Europe?
Admiral Stavridis. I think you will find press reports that
Russia possesses some low number of thousands of tactical
nuclear weapons. They are on Russian territory. The United
States possesses orders of magnitude, smaller numbers than
that. Again, I will respond on a classified basis.
[The information referred to is classified and retained in
the committee files.]
Mr. Rogers. And I understand, and I appreciate it. And you
have painted the picture that I was after.
Admiral Stavridis. Okay, sir.
Mr. Rogers. As you know, I have taken over the chairmanship
of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee.
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rogers. So I am concerned about press reports about the
administration's intent to pursue reduction talks with the
Russians and not through a treaty structure, which I find
disturbing. Is it your professional opinion that if those talks
were to proceed, that they should include tactical weapons as
well as strategic weapons parity?
Admiral Stavridis. I would obviously defer to the State
Department for negotiations and treaties. I will say from a
military perspective we have a small number of weapons, as you
know, that are in Europe, and that any changes to that
structure would need to be first and foremost negotiated within
NATO so we had an overall position before we could even move to
a discussion with Russia.
Mr. Rogers. Well, it is my observation that as we continue
to discuss reductions in our strategic weapons, not only with
Russia but our position in the world, Russia, China, and other
countries continue to dramatically increase their tactical
weapons and we don't seem to ever take account for that. And I
think that is mistaken.
But the next question, on the subject of tactical weapons,
are you familiar with the Presidential Nuclear Initiative of
1991 between President Yeltsin and George H.W. Bush?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir, in general terms.
Mr. Rogers. In 2006, then Assistant Secretary Stephen
Rademaker noted President Yeltsin committed to similar
reductions in Russian tactical nuclear weapons but considerable
concern exists that the Russian commitments have not been
entirely fulfilled. What are your thoughts about that? Do you
think the Russians are fulfilling their commitments and are we
able to verify that?
Admiral Stavridis. Well, you are correct that we are not
able to verify that. With some treaties, as you know, in a
treaty structure you have verification regimes, think Nunn-
Lugar. Here we don't have that. So it is difficult to say with
certainty. I think you are correct in the assumption that there
is a wide disparity in terms of numbers of such weapons. And at
the moment there is no mechanism for monitoring, verifying, or
following up on those discussions.
Mr. Rogers. I appreciate that. I do want to follow up on a
couple of things. Mr. Turner talked about the SM-3 IIB. I
completely concur with his position. I think that it appears
that the administration and some in the Congress on the other
side of the Hill have lost their enthusiasm for that program
and my concern is that the DOD may be in a similar situation.
When you do respond to him in a follow-up, I would appreciate a
copy of that.
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Like to know what your perspective is about the
DOD's long-term commitment----
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rogers [continuing]. To that weapon system.
And then lastly, you talked a little bit about Romania and
Poland. I fear that what happened in Poland is about to happen
in Romania. I am very concerned about that and our credibility
going forward to negotiate with our European allies. So I would
urge you to be sensitive to making sure that we don't leave the
Romanians feeling like that we left them at the altar, as we
did the Poles.
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir. Understood.
Mr. Rogers. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to both of you for your extraordinary
service. I have enjoyed working with you.
General Ham, I wonder if you could just take a moment and
talk about our partnership capacity. We have certainly dealt
with that on this committee, but I am referring particularly to
our humanitarian assistance missions. And I know that San Diego
was very proud last evening, or I guess Wednesday evening, they
honored the USNS [United States Naval Ship] Mercy for its work.
This was the Center for Conflict Resolution, which usually
honors individuals, but in this case they honored the Mercy.
And certainly from my experience in working with them in Papua
New Guinea, I really appreciate that honor to them.
But I also know that the USNS Comfort has not been deployed
to the coast of Africa. And I am wondering, you know, number
one, where you feel that this humanitarian mission lies in
terms of the needs that we have to support our friends around
the world. We have already talked about the importance of
cyber, trafficking, special operations. I know that those are
certainly high priorities, but I wondered where humanitarian
assistance lies in this, but also whether or not we should be
using the tools that we have better, and particularly the USNS
Comfort as part of that growing partnership.
General Ham. Both ships and their crews are extraordinary.
Comfort and Mercy have been great symbols for the people of the
United States in a wide variety of contingency operations and
other engagements globally. And so I think they do offer great
capability. But it is also a capability that is best applied
when there is some host nation capability to reciprocate and
can build upon the capabilities that Comfort or Mercy provide.
So we do look at that and we look for opportunities to deploy
those ships. We haven't found, frankly, quite the right
circumstance just yet where in an engagement purpose it might
be useful.
But rather our humanitarian assistance, and I would wrap
into that umbrella also disaster response, is a high priority
for us in Africa. There are many circumstances in which African
military forces are required for humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief. And a large number, the preponderance of the
exercises that we do both bilaterally and regionally with
African forces, are built on a humanitarian assistance or
disaster relief scenario. We have seen some improvements in
their regional capabilities and I think that is an area of
enduring effort for us.
I think there are ways we can improve that. We have a good
relationship with USAID [United States Agency for International
Development]. I have a senior development adviser at my
headquarters; also folks from the Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance. They are hugely beneficial. I have got a planner
embedded at USAID that helps as well. And we have got to
tighten the relationship with the many nongovernmental
organizations that do such good work in humanitarian assistance
missions.
So I think there is significant room for improvement. And
for us the trick is how do you bring the African militaries and
capabilities so that they are increasingly capable of
responding. I think Admiral Stavridis had a point.
Admiral Stavridis. In my previous life, when I was
commander of U.S. Southern Command for 3 years, I was lucky
enough to have Comfort deploy several times to Latin American
and the Caribbean. I cannot overstate the impact of that. When
you see a little 8-year old boy who has hiked through the
jungle with his mother for 3 days to get to the Comfort put on
his first set of eyeglasses and say, ``Mama, veo el mundo--Mom,
I see the world''--multiply that times 400,000 patient
treatments, that creates security for the United States because
it portrays us in a very different and positive way.
Mrs. Davis. As we grapple with budgetary concerns, is this
a place that you think people would naturally go to and think
we should just cut out this kind of assistance? And how would
you respond?
General Ham. I don't think so, because for us on the
military side it is pretty low cost. I mean, it is typically
small teams of medical experts, whether they are preventive
medicine or veterinarians, or as Admiral Stavridis mentioned,
deployable eye surgical teams that can go into the heart of
Africa. I think we will be okay, ma'am.
Admiral Stavridis. And can I add that on the Comfort about
a third of the personnel are volunteers from the private
sector. So this is a good example of private-public partnering.
Mrs. Davis. Right. Thank you. And the Mercy as well.
The Chairman. Thank you. Thank you.
Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen. You know, we always want to take the
opportunity to express appreciation because we know that
American freedom is anchored in the freedom that is alive in
your hearts, that you dedicate yourself to that end for your
whole lives.
Admiral Stavridis, I know that it is difficult to kind of
have a dual-hatted challenge of being in the role of SACEUR,
Supreme Allied Commander of Europe; that is not an easy
challenge, and I would commend you on that. And I am, like so
many others on this committee, committed to seeing a robust
missile defense capability against whatever enemies might
challenge us. And with that in mind, would you provide us with
an update on your command's missile defense capacity and force
structure requirements, specifically highlighting any concerns
that you might have about our ability to meet the European
Phased Adaptive Approach policy and its requirements?
Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir. As you know, we are in phase
one, which means we have an Aegis ship deployed, typically to
the Eastern Mediterranean. We have what is called a TPY-2
[Transportable Radar Surveillance], it is a phased-array radar.
That is hosted by Turkey. The command and control that lashes
it together is in Ramstein, Germany. It is a NATO command and
control structure. At the moment it is manned by the nations of
NATO with a very strong U.S. underpinning to it. So that is
phase one, and it relies on the SM-3 IA missile system, which
can be launched from the Aegis ship.
The next phase, phase two, will add a land-based side in
Romania, which we discussed earlier this morning. It will
upgrade the missile. That will come in, in about 2015, and it
will include an enhanced command and control structure, tying
more exactly to overhead systems.
The third phase, which will come in, in 2018, will include
a land-based site in Poland, another upgrade to the missile, a
further upgrade in the overhead sensor system. And then it gets
a little less defined as you get into that fourth phase, but
the current plan, as we have been discussing this morning, is
to add another upgrade to the missile system. So that is kind
of the flow of this over the next 7 years, sir.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you. Let me, if I could, ask you
about the Russian missile defense system. Is it true--and I am
asking these questions sort of like a lawyer does, you know,
you have some perspective of the answer already, but for the
sake of the record and the committee--is it true that Russia is
undertaking a significant modernization of its system? Is it
true that they use nuclear-armed interceptors? And have we, the
United States, gotten assurance that Russia's missile defense
system is not aimed at our nuclear deterrent? You know, I
suppose that is a pretty relevant question since we witnessed
Russia's hysteria about our relatively small non-nuclear-armed
missile defense system when Russia deploys one that seems so
clearly aimed at deterring ours. So I have given you a lot to
shoot at there, but I might not get a chance to rephrase the
question.
Admiral Stavridis. Well, let me begin by saying I will
respond for the record in a classified manner to several
elements of what you say.
[The information referred to is classified and retained in
the committee files.]
Admiral Stavridis. It is very true that Russia is expanding
generally in their defense spending to include missile systems,
seagoing systems, as well as advanced air and so forth. So
Russia is increasing their defense budget by about 12 percent
this year, for example. I am sure that will include enhanced
systems. Beyond that we would probably get into a classified
realm there that I would like to address for the record.
I want to state for the record that the U.S. missile
defense system, and therefore the NATO missile defense system,
poses no threat to Russian strategic systems, and the science
and the kinematics of that are very clear.
Mr. Franks. Well, Mr. Chairman, I guess I would just close
by suggesting that during the Bush and Obama administration
both of them have spent much time and political capital in
trying in good faith, in my opinion, to assuage the Russian
concerns or its stated concerns about our missile defense
system. At the same time Russia has this extensive missile
defense system in place that seems clearly aimed at our
deterrent, and at some point we need to realize that Russia may
be playing us to some degree. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
The vote has been called. It looks like we are going to be
45 minutes to an hour. What I am going to try to do is get Mr.
Enyart and Mr. Conaway, if we can get those questions in, and
we probably will conclude the hearing at that time.
Mr. Enyart.
Mr. Enyart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Ham, it is good to see you again.
Admiral Stavridis, good to see you again.
You know, I was certainly glad to hear that you are the co-
chairs of the State Partnership fan club, and I would like to
think that that may be in large part due to the great
partnership you saw between the Illinois National Guard and
Poland.
I would like to ask you a couple of questions about the
State Partnership Program, and I know it is a very small part
of the budget. You know, at $22 million it is really dust, but
I think it is a very effective program and I know that you do,
too. So I would ask that you relay your thoughts on that to
your incoming commanders when you get replaced eventually.
Now, the State Partnership Program has been such a great
success because what we tried to do was take those Eastern
European nations that were formerly part of the Warsaw Pact and
bring them close to the West and eventually integrate them into
NATO, which we have successfully done. And of course we align
States like Illinois with Poland because of cultural ties.
Chicago is the second-largest Polish city in the world. And so
we had some very firm bases there to work with. Do you believe
that that model would translate also to Africa?
General Ham. I do, Congressman. And we have some clear
examples of that with the eight partnerships that we do have.
And I think you are exactly right, the real benefit in the
State Partnership Program is the enduring nature of the
relationship, that sergeants and lieutenants and captains grow
up together and have multiple engagements. So I think the
premise is exactly right.
Admiral Stavridis. If I could, because I have seen State
Partnership both in Europe and in Latin America and the
Caribbean, I can tell you it is easily transportable from
significant and advanced to developing nations. It is a very
powerful tool, and bang for the buck it is unmatched.
Mr. Enyart. Has there been any thought given to what is
called a multilateral partnership, where you would take a long-
established partnership, like Illinois and Poland, which has
been in existence for 20 years, and pairing that partnership
then with an African nation? Has there been any thought given
to that?
General Ham. There has, and we have one good example of
that with Michigan and----
Mr. Enyart. Latvia.
General Ham. Estonia and Liberia. So that three-part
relationship I think is a model for what might be possible in
the future.
Mr. Enyart. Admiral Stavridis, you indicate that the
brigade combat teams [BCTs] that are leaving will be replaced
on a rotational basis. Can you tell me how long a period of
time you are talking about rotating the BCTs into Europe?
Admiral Stavridis. Very much still under discussion. We are
starting with a big exercise later this year called Steadfast
Jazz. We will bring in headquarters elements and probably
company level-size formations to do this. Then we will build it
up to a battalion level phase the following year, and then we
are hopeful to bring in the first brigade-size unit in about 3
years. So we are building up to doing this. I am very confident
of the support from the U.S. Army, they are enthusiastic about
this, and we will mature the process as it goes along and make
sure, Congressman, that it plugs into the NATO exercise
schedule so we are getting the maximum bang for the buck both
bilaterally, as well as within the alliance.
Mr. Enyart. Any thought to using National Guard BCTs as
part of those rotational forces?
Admiral Stavridis. I think it is a terrific idea. And I am
sure the Army is looking at a wide variety of different units
to support this over time.
Mr. Enyart. It sounds like what we are talking about is
essentially a 2-week, maybe a 3-week training exercise.
Admiral Stavridis. Yes.
Mr. Enyart. Not any kind of permanent rotational.
Admiral Stavridis. Correct, correct. Probably longer than 2
to 3 weeks so that would get the efficiencies out of bringing
them over, but probably a couple of months on the ground type
of thing.
Mr. Enyart. The Kosovo and Sinai peacekeeping missions have
been a National Guard mission for the last 10 years, and I
think that has been great for the Guard in terms of training.
It has also saved our country money when you consider the fully
burdened cost. Do you envision those missions continuing to be
a Guard presence or are those going to become an Active Duty?
Admiral Stavridis. I think that is up to the Army to sort
through that. I noticed the next rotation in Kosovo is going to
be an Active Duty unit. You are correct that for the previous
decade it has been National Guard. I think the Army really
values that flexibility.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time expired.
Mr. Conaway.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you both for your long, distinguished
service to our country, and it is a heartfelt thank you.
General Ham, you have had forces in Congo and Uganda for a
little better than a year now on the hunt or helping hunt some
folks. Can you give us a quick couple of sentences on whether
that is working or not or how you see the value of those
resources?
General Ham. Congressman, I think the U.S. presence both in
terms of the 100 or so special forces advisers, some other
enabling capabilities, aviation, intelligence, logistics,
medical, I think has provided a valuable service. We have seen
significant increases in the number of defections from the
Lord's Resistance Army, we have helped enable the Ugandan
People's Defense Forces to conduct long-range patrols that have
resulted in capturing some, to include some senior leaders from
the Lord's Resistance Army. So positive steps. But Joseph Kony
remains at large.
Mr. Conaway. Right. The dustup in Mali, the collapse of the
Mali armed services, what appeared to be, in the face of
whatever fight--I don't know who trained them, if we were
involved in any of the training in that regard. But are there
lessons learned from what happened with the Mali forces that we
can extend across Africa, to say, here is how we train, here is
how we don't train, here is what works and doesn't work?
General Ham. There are, Congressman. And certainly we
looked introspectively in the aftermath of the military coup.
First of all, from an intelligence perspective, did we miss
indicators? We don't think so. We think this was very much a
spur of the moment thing. Secondly, did we miss something in
our training, in our engagement? I am glad to say that the
units with which we were primarily engaged in Mali did not
participate in the coup.
Mr. Conaway. How did they perform in the fight?
General Ham. They didn't. The units that we were mostly
engaged with were largely suppressed by those who did
participate in the coup.
My greatest disappointment, though, sir is with the senior
leaders, senior military leaders in Mali, who neither supported
the coup, but they didn't resist it either. And this goes from
the former chief of defense and to some other senior leaders.
It is my belief that because this was not long planned, this
was a very junior level-led coup, it could have been stopped
relatively quickly had senior leaders in the Malian armed
forces taken positive steps to counter the coup. They didn't,
and that is a failure on their part. We are looking at
ourselves to say, in our engagements with leaders we have got
to continually emphasize the military ethos, the
professionalism, the subordination to legitimate civilian
control, operating according to the rule of law, and that
military coups are not anywhere within the realm of possibility
of a professional military.
Mr. Conaway. Okay. Let me take one for the record on the
fight that they had with the Tuaregs and the extremists in the
north.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 123.]
Mr. Conaway. That was really the subfocus of the question.
Great answer to the other part because that was a big deal as
well.
Your forces in extremis, given the tyranny of distance and
geography that Stavridis mentioned earlier with respect to
Africa, is it rational for you to have the kind of enablers and
others available to respond to the next Benghazi-like event in
Africa.
General Ham. Congressman, what we are seeking to do is to
have forces postured regionally. So one in East Africa,
Djibouti, one in West Africa, maybe maritime-based, maybe
something ashore, and then a Southern Europe force that can
respond to North Africa. In conjunction with the State
Department, the Department of Defense is looking at what are
the other capabilities. Do there need to be more Marines in
more places at U.S. diplomatic facilities?
Mr. Conaway. Have we dealt with the chain of command issues
and the ability of whoever has AFRICOM's command, that you will
be able to use those forces when you need them without having
to go through other layers?
General Ham. Yes, sir. The Secretary of Defense is my boss
and that is who tells me where and when we can use forces.
There is always a diplomatic aspect in terms of access. But I
think we are clear. The chain of command has never, in my view,
never been in question.
Mr. Conaway. When in the Benghazi issue and the excitement
about trying to respond there, there was clear lines of
authorities and clearly operational issues that didn't--or were
there--that got in the way of the response?
General Ham. Sir, there was no lack of clarity on my part
as to chain of command and no impediment.
Mr. Conaway. All right. Thank you.
Yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. If we hurry, we can make the vote.
Gentlemen, thank you very much. And if you could leave your
entire statement it will be taken into the record. But I would
also like staff to make copies and get them to all of the
members of the committee, because you were so expeditious.
I know I had requests from members that they wanted to hear
that whole testimony, so that we will get it to them so they
can read it. Thank you again for your great service to this
Nation.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:36 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 15, 2013
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March 15, 2013
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
March 15, 2013
=======================================================================
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Admiral Stavridis. As of 15 MAR 2013, Secretary Hagel announced
U.S. policy changes with regard to ballistic missile defense (BMD),
including European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) Phase 4. Phase 4 was
cancelled and the prime component of Phase 4, the SM-3 Block IIB, was
put on hold. This hold allows for SM-3 Block IIB engineering
development to continue, but no acquisition milestones will be met.
EPAA Phases 1-3, including Polish and Romanian sites, will provide the
BMD resources to meet U.S. requirements to defend U.S. interests and
support American commitments to our Allies in the 2018 timeframe. The
loss of EPAA Phase 4 will have no effect on EUCOM's regional BMD
requirements. [See page 17.]
______
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY
General Ham. The 2012 Tuareg rebellion was the latest of several
Tuareg rebellions intended to gain economic resources and greater
political autonomy from Bamako. In mid-January 2012, Tuareg rebels from
the National Movement of the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA) and Ansar
al-Din groups conducted a series of attacks on Malian Armed Forces
(MAF) outposts in northern Mali in reaction to the MAF's increased
presence in the region. Weapons and fighters associated with the 2011
Libya crisis enhanced Tuareg rebel military capabilities against the
MAF. Rebel forces isolated and overwhelmed the inadequately supplied
MAF outposts in northern Mali. The 22 March coup d'etat led by Malian
soldiers in Bamako expedited the MAF's retreat from northern Mali.
Islamic violent extremist organizations al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the
Islamic Maghreb and Tahid wal Jihad in West Africa, in alliance with
Ansar al-Din, took advantage of the Tuareg rebellion, and expanded
their control throughout northern Mali--largely expelling the MNLA--
until early January 2013. [See page 25.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 15, 2013
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MCKEON
The Chairman. General Dempsey has stated that ``recognizing longer-
term uncertainty, I've also begun to reassess what our military
strategy should be as well as institutional reforms necessary to remain
an effective fighting force.'' Given the fact that the Department of
Defense is undertaking a reassessment of military strategy due to
sequestration, what would be the implications for EUCOM? Through this
reassessment, what aspects of EUCOM's strategy will you be able to
execute, and what aspects will you not be able to conduct under
sequestration? What are the implications for U.S. force posture in
Europe?
Admiral Stavridis. EUCOM is participating in the Secretary's
Strategic Choices and Management Review, but the implications of this
reassessment of military strategy are not yet clear. However, the
fundamental importance of our strategic partnership with Europe to U.S.
military strategy remains unchanged. This includes the strategic access
that European Allies and partners provide for crisis response and
global operations, the military forces that Europeans contribute to
operations worldwide, and the military operations they lead around the
globe. Therefore, preserving the U.S. strategic partnership with Europe
and adapting it to meet the challenges of the 21st century will remain
central elements of EUCOM's strategy. Being ready to fulfill our
commitment to Article 5, which underpins the strategic partnership with
Europe, and execute other contingency plans will also remain an
enduring EUCOM mission. While these core tenets of EUCOM's strategy
will persist, a reassessment of that strategy and potential impact of
sequestration could affect how we execute the strategy and the level of
risk to achieving our strategic objectives.
The Chairman. To what extent is EUCOM adjusting the command's size
and structure in light of the January 2012 strategic guidance? To what
extent is EUCOM adjusting the command's size and structure in light of
the current fiscal environment?
Admiral Stavridis. DOD's strategic guidance, ``Sustaining U.S.
Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,'' looked out
over the next 10 years and identified the plan for strategic
rebalancing of U.S. defense posture in Europe. The Strategic Guidance
also recognized that ``Europe is our principal partner in seeking
global and economic security, and will remain so for the foreseeable
future.'' In keeping with this evolving strategic landscape, our
posture must also evolve to ensure we have the right force posture in
Europe for the next 10-20 years. Our planned reductions include V Corps
headquarters, two heavy brigades (one is already inactivated), an A-10
squadron, an Air Control Squadron, and approximately 2,500 Army enabler
forces. This reduction of general-purpose forces is offset by the
addition of four ballistic missile defense capable destroyers at Main
Operating Base (MOB) Rota, Spain; a CV-22 squadron at MOB Mildenhall,
United Kingdom; a small aviation detachment in Poland which was
established in late 2012; and potentially, more special operations
forces in Germany to support contingency requirements. There are also
plans to enhance rotational force presence to include elements of a
U.S.-based brigade combat team to support the NATO Response Force
(NRF). This strategic rebalancing ensures the U.S. has the right
capabilities needed to accomplish military missions within and from the
United States European Command Area of Responsiblity (USEUCOM AOR).
The Chairman. As the second largest geographic combatant command,
EUCOM appears to have a close to half its authorized staff dedicated to
providing intelligence support or performing security cooperation
activities. Given DOD's recent strategic guidance and the shift in
priorities to the Pacific and Middle East, please explain EUCOM's
continued requirements for these personnel in further detail.
Admiral Stavridis. [The information referred to is classified and
is retained in the committee files.]
The Chairman. To what extent, if any, has EUCOM been affected by
sharing Navy and Air Force component commands with U.S. Africa Command
(AFRICOM)?
Admiral Stavridis. The sharing of Navy and Air Force Component
Commands between AFRICOM and EUCOM is an imperfect but manageable
command and control compromise caused by a resource constrained
environment. Because it violates the principal of ``Unity of Command''
it has occasionally created operational, organizational, resource and
doctrinal friction. The EUCOM staff, AFRICOM staff, and service
components continue to overcome the associated challenges to provide
effective oversight, direction, and control of subordinate
organizations in pursuit of national and theater strategic objectives.
This sustained success is a testimony to the leadership of the
component commanders as well as the hard work, can-do attitude, and
professionalism of the EUCOM, AFRICOM, and component staffs.
The Chairman. How does the command manage personnel within its
directorates and the directorates of its subordinate unified commands
to ensure that resources are being efficiently allocated and that there
is no unnecessary overlap in functions?
Admiral Stavridis. USEUCOM is manned via the Joint Table of
Distribution (JTD) and managed via the Organization and Functions
Manual. These two documents ensure the exact number of personnel
required to perform specific duties are allocated to each directorate,
and the functions of those directorates are outlined in the
Organization and Functions Manual. The Personnel Strength function
within the J1 works specifically with each Service Personnel
headquarters to man the billets outlined in the JTD with qualified
personnel at the specific service manning rate.
The Chairman. DOD issued Instruction #1400.25 in July 2012
establishing procedures and guidelines for civilian employment in
foreign areas. The instruction also stated it was DOD policy that
``Civilian employment in the competitive service in foreign areas shall
be limited to a period of 5 continuous years unless interrupted by at
least 2 years of physical presence in the United States or nonforeign
area.'' a. Is this DOD policy part of the calculus for EUCOM staff
drawdown? If not, why not? Is EUCOM on track to meet its projected
reduction in staff without following the DOD policy? b. How many EUCOM
civilians have transitioned back to the U.S. because of the 5-year
policy? c. How many EUCOM civilians have asked for an extension? d. How
many EUCOM civilians have been given an exception to the policy and
allowed to stay beyond the 5-year policy?
Admiral Stavridis. a. The DOD five-year policy is always part of
the calculus when planning any staff drawdown or restructuring. EUCOM
is on track to meet its projected reduction in staff.
b. From July 2012 to present, 21 individuals have transitioned back
to the U.S. because of the five year policy.
c. From July 2012 to present, management requested 62 tour
extensions.
d. 40 of the 62 extension requests were approved; 22 requests are
pending decision.
The Chairman. General Dempsey has stated that ``recognizing longer-
term uncertainty, I've also begun to reassess what our military
strategy should be as well as institutional reforms necessary to remain
an effective fighting force.'' Given the fact that the Department of
Defense is undertaking a reassessment of military strategy due to
sequestration, what would be the implications to AFRICOM's strategy?
Through this reassessment, what aspects of AFRICOM's strategy will you
be able to execute, and what aspects will you not be able to conduct
under sequestration?
General Ham. Our strategic approach entails the synchronous
execution of operations, exercises, and security cooperation programs
which contribute to increased security, stability, and prosperity
across the expanse of the African continent. U.S. Africa Command, while
remaining vigilant to threat to U.S. National Security Interests
emanating from the region, specifically those posed by al-Qa'ida,
violent extremist organizations, and illicit trafficking, undertakes a
range of activities focused on strengthening the defense capabilities
of African states and regional organizations so that over the long run
African partners are able to address African security challenges.
We believe that we will be sufficiently resourced and capable of
planning and executing counterterrorism related activities. However, we
are concerned about the impact of reduced resources as we see an
increase in threat activity in Africa. Specifically, we are concerned
with:
The availability of intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR) assets to maintain awareness across a large area
of threat activity.
The availability of Personnel Recovery capability as our
engagement and presence on the African continent increases.
The availability of Special Operations Forces and
enablers to rapidly respond to crisis and contingency operations on the
African continent.
The impact of resource degradation on our interagency
partners since we leverage interagency resources to accomplish
objectives on the continent. Cuts to other agencies could potentially
impact the execution of our theater strategy. Specifically, budgetary
reductions associated with the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism
Partnership (TSCTP), a suite of Global Peacekeeping Operations
Initiative (GPOI) programs, the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS
Relief (PEPFAR), and pandemic response.
Increased--but modest and focused--investments today in
counterterrorism and in strengthening the defense capabilities of our
African partners will contribute to the conditions for a stable and
prosperous Africa and reduce the risk to our National Security
Interests. U.S. Africa Command's ability to sustain gains already made
in East Africa, while responding to emergent security challenges in
North and West Africa, depends upon adequate resources and responsive
partner building authorities.
The Chairman. The Committee understands that AFRICOM is in the
process of conducting an internal review of its size and structure. a.
What is the status of the study? Do you anticipate any changes in
military, civilian, or contractor positions? b. Can you provide details
of any potential areas of concern for the command in terms of staffing?
Please describe how these staffing needs will fulfill ongoing mission
requirements.
General Ham. AFRICOM is currently conducting our annual internal
organizational review to ensure manpower and personnel are aligned
appropriately to support our mission critical needs. This review is the
Combatant Commander's title 10 responsibility for organizing to meet
mission requirements. We are currently 75% complete on the study. Once
the study is complete we will align manpower to ensure mission critical
needs are being met. We will not make any staffing decisions until the
study is complete.
The Chairman. AFRICOM has several temporary task forces that are
not reflected in its permanent authorized personnel numbers. To what
extent is AFRICOM considering realignment and staffing of its temporary
joint task forces (Special Operations Command and Control Element-Horn
of Africa, Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara, and Combined Joint
Task Force-Horn of Africa)? a. To what extent has AFRICOM evaluated
whether these are enduring missions? b. Given the command's initial
focus on phase zero/interagency activities, what is the command doing
to prepare itself to respond to the growing conflicts occurring in
northern and eastern Africa? Do you see an expansion in the role of any
of these task forces?
General Ham. In coordination with the Director of the Joint Staff,
we are conducting a mission analysis of CJTF-HOA to determine what
missions are enduring. We do not anticipate an expansion of CJTF-HOA;
however, we are currently working through the Joint Manpower Validation
Process to pursue a permanent force structure for CJTF-HOA and SOCCE-
HOA. Given recent events in Northwest Africa, we continue to assess the
mission requirements and structure of OEF-TS.
The Chairman. To what extent, if any, has AFRICOM been affected by
sharing Navy and Air Force component commands with U.S. European
Command (EUCOM)?
General Ham. We have shared our Navy component command since the
inception of the command and our Air Force component command for the
past two years. There has been no change in support for U.S. Africa
Command operations, exercises, and theater security cooperation
engagements attributable to sharing component commands.
The Chairman. How does the command manage personnel within its
directorates and the directorates of its subordinate unified commands
to ensure that resources are being efficiently allocated and that there
is no unnecessary overlap in functions?
General Ham. As part of the Command's annual review process we
strive to ensure appropriate resources are allocated efficiently to
support our mission critical requirements. During the annual review we
assess our core and non-core functions to identify overlap and
duplication of functions. Through this annual review process, we
determine the best allocation of our resources by assessing priority of
and risk associated in not resourcing the function. Where sufficient
manpower is not available, we accept risk in lower priority mission
areas. The Command also uses a Joint Resources Board (JRB) to
prioritize and make resourcing determinations to support emerging
manpower requirements throughout the year.
The Chairman. DOD issued Instruction #1400.25 in July 2012
establishing procedures and guidelines for civilian employment in
foreign areas. The instruction also stated it was DOD policy that
``Civilian employment in the competitive service in foreign areas shall
be limited to a period of 5 continuous years unless interrupted by at
least 2 years of physical presence in the United States or nonforeign
area.'' a. What is the role of DOD policy as AFRICOM reviews and
manages its personnel structure? b. How many AFRICOM civilians have
transitioned back to the U.S. because of the 5-year rule? c. How many
AFRICOM civilians have asked for an extension? d. How many AFRICOM
civilians have been given an exception to the policy and allowed to
stay beyond the 5-year policy?
General Ham. Response A: The five-year limitation on foreign area
employment provides headquarters, U.S. Africa Command the necessary
flexibility to accommodate the ever-changing foreign area workforce
requirements. It provides developmental and career-enhancing
opportunities for employees in the U.S. as well as periodically renews
the knowledge and competencies of the overseas workforce. The DOD-wide
policy provides consistency of application between the many commands in
the Stuttgart area.
Response B: Since July 2012, 46 extension requests have been
denied. Of those, eight employees transitioned back to the U.S., 10
employees were denied extension and are currently registered in the DOD
Priority Placement Program (PPP) for job placement assistance in CONUS,
and 28 were denied extension, but have yet to register in DOD PPP or
make plans for departure due to non-extension. This last category is
primarily due to the delay between when employees are notified about
whether they will be extended (a year in advance of their scheduled
departure date) and when they are allowed to register in the PPP
program (six months in advance of their scheduled departure date).
Response C: Since July 2012, 66 overseas tour extension requests
were submitted by either the employee or the management/supervisor.
Seven requests were approved for compassionate reasons (1-6 months), 13
requests were approved for mission related reasons, and 46 requests
were denied.
Answer D: Since July 2012, 20 overseas tour extensions beyond five
years were approved based on mission related reasons and compassionate
reasons (allow dependents to finish the school year).
*Snap Shot of Overseas Tour Extension
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Approved Overseas Extension beyond 5 years 13
Extension approved for Compassionate Reasons 7
Extension requests that were denied 46
(10 on PPP/8 departed HQ USAFRICOM)
Overall Number of Extension Requests 66
------------------------------------------------------------------------
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. Admiral, are the lines of command, control,
communications, and information sharing adequately defined between
EUCOM, CYBERCOM, STRATCOM, NATO and the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense
Center of Excellence, as well as those allies with whom we work on a
bilateral basis on cyber? What, in your view, can we do to better
integrate our allies into network operations?
Admiral Stavridis. The current lines of Command, Control,
Communications and information sharing between EUCOM and STRATCOM/
CYBERCOM are strong and getting stronger everyday through continual
exchanges to include EUCOM's daily participation in CYBERCOM's morning
J3 update and CYBERCOM's participation in EUCOM's weekly Cyber Defense
Working Group. As to NATO and allies with whom we work on a bilateral
basis, EUCOM is the Executive Agent for a number of DOD Information
Assurance agreements with NATO and select countries in the Area of
Responsibility (AOR). These formal agreements govern both what and how
cyber-related information is shared and has been sufficient to date. In
regards to the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence,
while numerous informal exchanges have occurred between EUCOM and the
Center to discuss how we can best support each other's efforts, there
only exists a Memorandum of Agreement on administrative support to U.S.
military members embedded in the Center. EUCOM is working on multiple
lines of effort to achieve greater cyber integration with allies to
include: participating in a number of bilateral/multinational network
operations exercises, sponsoring seminars on best cyber defense
practices, and working with NATO to establish a framework for coalition
communications operations based on the lessons learned from ISAF's
Afghan Mission Network.
Mr. Langevin. Admiral, we understand the Department is considering
a legislative proposal that would increase the authorized funding
amount of the NATO Special Operations Headquarters from $50 million per
year to $75 million per year. Can you tell us why this increase is
needed in a time of declining budgets and sequestration? When can the
committee expect to see this legislative proposal and what priority
would your command assign to this proposal?
Admiral Stavridis. As you know, section 1272 of the FY 2013
National Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 112-239) amends section
1244 of Public Law 111-84 to authorize $50 million per year from the
Operation and Maintenance, Army account for the NATO Special Operations
Headquarters for fiscal years 2013 through 2015. At this point, the
President has not approved a legislative proposal that would increase
that amount, so that any such proposal would be pre-decisional. I am
not at liberty to address pre-decisional matters and, respectfully,
must decline to discuss this matter further at this time.
The Department is currently working with the White House to begin
providing the Committee with legislative proposals in the very near
future, and with as much of the Department's legislative program as
possible before the Committee begins to mark up the fiscal year 2014
National Defense Authorization Act in late May.
Mr. Langevin. General, do you feel that your building partnership
capacity missions have a proper amount of oversight and control, or
does this committee need to consider additional authorities?
General Ham. Under current oversight requirements, I see no risk to
the development and submission of building partner capacity proposals.
We are able to develop and submit proposals to meet our highest
priorities for near-term, emerging partner capacity building.
In general, I believe oversight is sufficient, but more flexible
authorities that enhance our ability not only to respond to emerging
challenges, but to provide stability and consistency in our approach,
would be of strategic and long-term benefit.
Mr. Langevin. General, how does your command currently address
building partnership capacity (BPC) missions in a country where
counter-terrorism functions may be carried out by forces other than the
military, such as a gendarmerie or Interior Ministry?
General Ham. We strive to develop programs in coordination with
non-Department of Defense (DOD) agencies who can work with the police
and border security in support of numerous militarized border security
forces. Department of State led programs such as Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and Partnership for Regional East
Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT) include non-DOD agencies who can work
with the police and border guards. The Global Security Contingency Fund
provides for an integrated approach to border security where U.S.
Africa Command's military requirements can be blended with interagency
law enforcement initiatives.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN
Mr. Wittman. The Readiness Committee was recently told by a
Departmental witness that the Secretary of Defense has initiated a
European Infrastructure Consolidation. We were also told that force
structure drives infrastructure. Can you provide us the future force
structure numbers that will be used for this European Infrastructure
Consolidation and indicate how this diminished force structure will
provide you sufficient forces to meet your Phase 0, peacetime stability
operations? I would particularly like to understand the risks
associated with this diminished force structure.
Admiral Stavridis. The Secretary of Defense directed the European
Infrastructure Consolidation analysis to provide a basis for reducing
long-term expenses through footprint consolidation. The consolidation
of our footprint in Europe will take into account DOD's strategic
guidance for a shift in strategic focus to the Pacific, the planned
inactivation of the two Brigade Combat Teams and associated support
forces, reductions in Air Force units, and decreasing requirements for
support to Afghanistan. This rebalancing also includes the addition of
four ballistic missile defense capable destroyers, a CV-22 squadron, a
small aviation detachment to Poland, potentially more special
operations forces in Germany, and anticipated support to USAFRICOM for
crisis response to meet the new challenges in their AOR. Because the
European Infrastructure Consolidation analysis is ongoing, we cannot
anticipate what impact it will have on our future force structure and
assigned personnel. We also cannot anticipate what impact it will have,
if any, to our Phase 0 steady state tasks.
Mr. Wittman. From an Army perspective, what will be the primary
purpose of U.S. troops based in Europe once the regular deployments to
Afghanistan are done? What kind of threats will they be responding to?
Why should the U.S. continue to forward deploy our troops to Europe?
Admiral Stavridis. Army forces provide a diverse crisis response
capability for the uncertain security environment to include the Levant
and NATO contingency plans; they serve as a demonstration of U.S.
commitment and deterrence, they underpin our NATO Article 5 commitment,
and are key to sustaining interoperability among Allies and partner
nations. As I told the Committee, our European bases are the forward
operating bases for 21st century security.
Their primary purpose of our forces is to provide immediate
response to the full spectrum of operations including global
contingencies, peacekeeping, noncombatant evacuations, humanitarian
assistance and more. They support seven combatant commanders and NATO
with strategic reach into three continents, capitalizing on the
existing European infrastructure.
The threats these forces may respond to include the continued
political unrest in the Middle East, European based terrorism,
ballistic missile threats, and the frozen conflicts in the Caucasus and
Balkans. Land forces in Europe contribute to maneuver and enabler force
capabilities to support a full range of military operations, while
meeting a wide array of engagements to build partner capacity and meet
interoperability objectives. The return on investment of U.S work with
our European partners is enormous, with more than 90% of our coalition
partners in Afghanistan coming from Europe. That equates to 40,000
personnel actively shouldering a common burden in our global defense.
All those nations train with and have close long-term relationships
with European assigned Army units from the strategic to the tactical
level. They also remain a visible symbol of U.S. commitment to European
security and the NATO Alliance.
Mr. Wittman. The Army has announced the reduction of 2,500
``enablers'' as part of our force structure footprint reduction in
EUCOM. During my recent visit to EUCOM, several unit commanders
expressed concerns about the number of enablers being tied to force
structure reductions rather than COCOM missions or crisis response. Do
you share those concerns? Why or why not?
Admiral Stavridis. No. Our posture in Europe, and these attendant
changes, reflects our recent strategy guidance and budget decisions and
are sufficient to meet our current assigned missions. Consistent with
DOD's Strategic Guidance and NATO's Strategic Concept, we continue to
adapt our posture in Europe to meet new threats while maintaining the
forces necessary to fulfill our Article 5 commitments and strengthen
Allied and partner capabilities.
Mr. Wittman. Earlier this year, the Department provided us notice
about the intent to expand airbase operations in Djibouti at a nearby
airfield in Chabelley. Can you explain the current state of aviation
operations at Djibouti and ensure our committee that additional
measures are in place to preserve this critical mission?
General Ham. Currently, civilian and military aviation operations
continue normally at Djibouti's international commercial airport while
talks continue to work out technical arrangements for operations at
Chabelley. We will continue to work with the Department of State as
they complete necessary agreements with the Government of Djibouti for
aviation operations at Chabelley.
We appreciate the reauthorization of the temporary, limited
authority to use operations and maintenance funding for military
construction in support of contingency operations in our area of
responsibility which will permit us to complete necessary construction
at Chabelley.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN
Mr. Coffman. Admiral, I understand we are reducing our military
footprint in the European theater. What is the current force lay-down
for the United States military in Europe? Provide details on the
number, type, and location of all our troops in Europe.
Admiral Stavridis. There are approximately 64,000 military
personnel authorized for the support of U.S. European Command and our
Service component commands. Additionally, there are approximately
10,000 additional U.S. personnel supporting U.S. Africa Command, U.S.
Transportation Command, NATO, and other U.S. Government and Department
of Defense activities in Europe.
2013 Navy/Marines Force Lay Down
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unit Approx. # Location(s) Comments
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAVEUR HQ 600 Naples, Italy Includes NAVAF and 6th Fleet
MARFOREUR/MARFORAF 170 Stuttgart, Germany
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NSWU-2 60 Stuttgart, Germany .................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NSWU-10 25 Stuttgart, Germany .................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
EOD Mobile Unit 8 160 Rota, Spain .................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rota Security Forces 125 Rota, Spain .................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commander Task Force 67 160 Sigonella, Italy .................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other Navy/Marine Forces 5,700 Various locations Includes Navy personnel for
(primarily Rota, Spain; EUCOM, AFRICOM, NATO billets,
Naples and Sigonella, etc.
Italy; and Souda Bay,
Greece)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Navy/Marines 7,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2013 Air Force Lay Down
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unit Approx. # Location(s) Comments
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
USAFE HQ 1,100 Ramstein, Germany Includes support to AFRICOM
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3rd Air Force 500 Ramstein, Germany .................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
31st Fighter Wing 3,800 Aviano, Italy Includes 2 F-16 Sqdns and an Air
Control Sqdn which inactivates
in FY13
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
48th Fighter Wing 4,600 Lakenheath, UK Includes 3 F-15 Sqdns
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
52nd Fighter Wing 3,600 Spangdahlem, Germany Includes F-16 Sqdn and an A-10
Sqdns which inactivates in FY13
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
39th Air Base Wing 1,200 Incirlik, Turkey .................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MUNSS Units 550 Various Locations .................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
65th Air Base Wing 600 Lajes, Portugal .................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
86th Airlift Wing 5,000 Ramstein, Germany .................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
100th Air Refueling Wing 1,800 Mildenhall, UK .................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
435th Air Ground Ops Wing 1,300 Ramstein, Germany .................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
603rd Air and Space Ops 450 Ramstein, Germany .................................
Center
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MUNSS Units 540 Various locations .................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
501st Combat Support Wing 800 Various locations in UK .................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
352nd Special Ops Group 900 Mildenhall, UK .................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
521st Air Mobility Ops Wing 1,000 Ramstein, Germany .................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other Air Mobility Forces 400 Various locations .................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other Air Forces 3,360 Various locations Includes Air Force personnel for
throughout Europe EUCOM, AFRICOM, NATO billets,
etc.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Air Force 31,500 .......................... .................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2013 Army Force Lay Down
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unit Approx. # Location(s) Comments
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
USAREUR HQ 700 Heidelberg/Wiesbaden, .................................
Germany
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
V Corps 775 Wiesbaden, Germany Inactivates in FY13
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
JMTC 1,500 Grafenwoehr, Germany .................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
173rd IBCT (A) 3,500 Bamberg/Schweinfurt, .................................
Germany and Vicenza,
Italy
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2nd CR 4,000 Vilseck, Germany .................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
172nd Inf Bde 4,000 Schweinfurt/Grafenwoehr, Currently Inactivating
Germany
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
12th Combat Avn Bde 2,700 Ansbach, Germany .................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Theater Spt Avn 570 Mannheim/Stuttgart, .................................
Germany and Chievres,
Belgium
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
10th Air Missile Defense 150 Kaiserslautern, Germany .................................
Detachment
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5-7 Air Defense Bn 575 Kaiserslautern, Germany .................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
21st Theater Sustainment 3,000 Various locations Includes 16th Sustainment Bde
Command throughout Europe (HQs in
Kaiserslautern)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
18th Engineer Bde 1,300 Various locations in Includes 2 Eng Bns
Germany (HQs in
Schweinfurt)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
18th MP Bde 1,800 Various locations Includes 2 MP Bns
throughout Europe (HQs in
Sembach, Germany)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
66th MI Bde 1,000 Wiesbaden/Hohenfels, .................................
Germany
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5th Signal Command 1,800 Various locations Includes 2 Signal Bdes
throughout Europe (HQs in
Wiesbaden)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Medical Command 2,800 Various locations Includes Landstuhl Regional Med
throughout Europe (HQs in Ctr
Heidelberg)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IMCOM-Europe 400 Various locations .................................
throughout Europe (HQs in
Heidelberg)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1-10 Special Forces BN 450 Stuttgart, Germany .................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other Army 3,980 Various locations Includes Army personnel for
throughout Europe EUCOM, AFRICOM, NATO billets,
etc.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Army 35,000 .......................... .................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Coffman. Admiral, how many of our troops in Europe are combat
element troops?
Admiral Stavridis. Although there is no doctrinal definition of a
``combat element'' force, EUCOM does have several assigned units that
exercise and employ a direct combat mission. Those units are listed
below. The combined total FY13 military authorizations for these units
are approximately 27,000 personnel; however, several of these units are
deactivating as noted.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unit Service Approx. # Location(s) Comments
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Naval Special Warfare USN 60 Stuttgart, Germany .............................
Unit-2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Naval Special Warfare USN 25 Stuttgart, Germany .............................
Unit-10
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
31st Fighter Wing USAF 3,800 Aviano, Italy Includes 2 F-16 Sqdns and an
Air Control Sqdn which
inactivates in FY13
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
48th Fighter Wing USAF 4,600 Lakenheath, UK Includes 3 F-15 Sqdns
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
52nd Fighter Wing USAF 3,600 Spangdahlem, Germany Includes F-16 Sqdn and an A-
10 Sqdns which inactivates
in FY13
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
352nd Special Ops Group USAF 900 Mildenhall, UK .............................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1-10 Special Forces BN USA 450 Stuttgart, Germany .............................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
173rd IBCT (A) USA 3,500 Bamberg/Schweinfurt, .............................
Germany and Vicenza,
Italy
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2nd Cavalry Regiment USA 4,000 Vilseck, Germany .............................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
172nd Inf Bde USA 4,000 Schweinfurt/Grafenwoehr, Currently Inactivating
Germany
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
12th Combat Avn Bde USA 2,700 Ansbach, Germany .............................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Coffman. Admiral, how many of our troops in Europe are there to
support ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Admiral Stavridis. U.S. troops are stationed in Europe to enable
ongoing operations in Afghanistan as well as other global missions.
First, just like CONUS based forces, U.S. forces in Europe deploy
worldwide. In the case of Afghanistan, U.S. Army Europe deployed on
average approximately 20% of its forces (roughly 7,400 personnel) to
ISAF and U.S. Central Command in 2012. This included the 173rd Airborne
BCT, 12th Combat Aviation Brigade, and V Corps. Currently, we have
approximately 3,500 personnel deployed in support of operations in
Afghanistan. Second, U.S. troops in Europe provide critical logistical
support to global operations. With regard to Afghanistan, this includes
Ramstein AB airmen conducting airlift operations, the movement of cargo
along the Northern Distribution Network, and life-saving urgent care
for wounded warriors at the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center. Third,
our European assigned forces enable Allies and partner nations to
deploy forces in support of U.S. operations. For example, U.S. Army
Europe personnel at the Joint Multinational Training Command in
Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels, Germany conduct pre-deployment training for
Ally/partner nation forces deploying to Afghanistan. U.S. forces in
Europe have provided these same types of support to operations in Iraq
and Libya, and will be required to do so in future global operations.
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. VEASEY
Mr. Veasey. I know you have worked to foster and maintain great
relationships with our NATO allies. And you have encouraged our
partners to build their capabilities as we face challenges across the
globe. Thank you for your efforts. I know that in 2011, you wrote to
the Senate Appropriations Committee in support of the Medium Extended
Air Defense System--MEADS--the next generation Air and Missile Defense
system we are developing in partnership with Germany and Italy. How
important is it, in your view, that we complete our financial
commitment and develop missile defense capabilities for the U.S. and
our partner nations?
Admiral Stavridis. It is very important, and we are grateful that
the Congress passed H.R. 933 (now Public Law 113-6), which provides
that crucial funding. Completion of MEADS development will reassure our
allies by avoiding a situation where the U.S. could have been viewed as
an unreliable partner. Further, this comes at an exceptionally crucial
point in time where EUCOM is working with NATO and multiple nations to
build missile defense capabilities and capacity to allow European
nations to bear more of the load for the defense of Europe.