[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
GLOBAL AL-QAEDA: AFFILIATES, OBJECTIVES, AND FUTURE CHALLENGES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 18, 2013
__________
Serial No. 113-44
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania Massachusetts
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
TREY RADEL, Florida GRACE MENG, New York
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
TED S. YOHO, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
LUKE MESSER, Indiana
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
TED POE, Texas, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina BRAD SHERMAN, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TOM COTTON, Arkansas JUAN VARGAS, California
PAUL COOK, California BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
TED S. YOHO, Florida Massachusetts
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Seth Jones, Ph.D., associate director, International Security and
Defense Policy Center, RAND Corporation........................ 3
Frederick W. Kagan, Ph.D., Christopher DeMuth chair and director,
Critical Threats Project, American Enterprise Institute........ 20
Mr. Thomas Joscelyn, senior editor, The Long War Journal,
Foundation for Defense of Democracies.......................... 29
Thomas Hegghammer, Ph.D., Zuckerman fellow, Center for
International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University.... 44
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Seth Jones, Ph.D.: Prepared statement............................ 6
Frederick W. Kagan, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.................... 22
Mr. Thomas Joscelyn: Prepared statement.......................... 31
Thomas Hegghammer, Ph.D.: Prepared statement..................... 46
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 74
Hearing minutes.................................................. 75
The Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Texas, and chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade: Prepared statement................ 76
GLOBAL AL-QAEDA: AFFILIATES, OBJECTIVES, AND FUTURE CHALLENGES
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THURSDAY, JULY 18, 2013
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o'clock
p.m., in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Poe. The committee will come to order. Without
objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements,
questions, extraneous materials for the record subject to the
length limitation in the rules of the committee.
We have been told that al-Qaeda is on its last legs, that
al-Qaeda died with bin Laden, and that whatever remnants of al-
Qaeda that remain are too weak for us to be concerned about.
The purpose of this hearing today is to see whether that is a
correct statement or an incorrect statement.
These locations in red are where al-Qaeda operated prior to
9/11. Since September 11th occurred, we are now looking at the
global al-Qaeda today. The red is al-Qaeda. And the blue is
other terrorist groups that operate in these regions of the
world, primarily the Middle East and North, Western, and
Eastern Africa. And our purpose of this committee hearing today
is to go into depth about al-Qaeda's presence and to some
extent, other terrorist groups as well.
I will submit the rest of my statement for the record, and
I will turn over to the ranking member, Mr. Sherman from
California, to hear his remarks in his opening statement.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your brevity. It
will not be reciprocated. [Laughter.]
Mr. Poe. You have 5 minutes.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you for your maps. I will notice that
the first map did not show Iran in blue as an area of non-al-
Qaeda terrorist base. Certainly, Iran was as worthy of being
marked in blue on your first map as on your second.
Al-Qaeda has failed to carry out a major attack in the
United States since 9/11. However, the danger posed by al-Qaeda
to the United States is still significant. Al-Qaeda's structure
has become more decentralized, less of an integrated
corporation, closer to a franchise. Its chief terrorist
activity is now being conducted by its local and regional
affiliates.
Over the past few years, al-Qaeda's core in Pakistan has
been weakened. We have killed four of the top five leaders.
And, of course, the top of their leadership changes from time
to time as some are dispatched to where they ought to go.
On May 23 of this year, the President outlined tighter
rules for drone strikes. The President discussed how our system
to make an effort to dismantle terrorist organizations must
continue. He stated that this war, like all wars, must end, but
the intensity of this war is less than virtually all of the
others that we have faced and its length is longer than
virtually--well, than certainly all of the wars we have faced.
Obama has announced his intention to work with Congress to
refine and ultimately repeal the 2001 authorization for use of
military force, which is now 12 years old, is laudable but even
while our activities in Afghanistan wind down, terrorism
directed at the United States and its allies remains a
significant threat.
It is true, as the President says, that not every
collection of thugs that uses the al-Qaeda name poses a
credible threat to the United States, but it is also true that
the war against terrorism is not over.
The fastest growing al-Qaeda affiliate is in Syria. Jabhat
al-Nusra is emerging as the best motivated, best trained, and
best equipped force fighting the Assad regime. The modern
umbrella group, the Free Syrian Army, has been losing fighters
and capacities to Jabhat al-Nusra. And Jabhat al-Nusra has even
taken to assassinating competing rebel commanders. I will be
interested in learning from our panelists what role Qatar and
the Saudis have played in funding Jabhat al-Nusra and other
questionable groups in Syria.
The Alawite community in Syria is in the cross-hairs of
Sunni extremists. And we have to arm the best elements in Syria
but do so quite carefully. In March of this year, I joined with
Eliot Engel, the ranking member of this committee, and House
Intel chairman Mike Rogers in introducing the Free Syria Act,
which would authorize the President to provide lethal
assistance to carefully vetted Syrian opposition groups.
Through al-Qaeda and the Islamic Maghreb, we have seen
chaos in Libya since 2011. We have seen it spill into
surrounding regions, including the Tuareg fighters, who
supported Gaddafi and have taken weapons into Mali. And then we
saw those weapons in the hands of those who killed three
Americans in Algeria.
It is, of course, the most jingoistic and politically
popular thing to say that America should take the lead in
everything. The fact is France took the lead in Mali. We
supported. And we have to get away from the natural attractions
of Machismo and realize this is a complicated conflict in which
sometimes we will play a secondary role in some of the
theaters.
This will be a long effort. I doubt there will be any
triumphal end to this war. We have to manage this problem and
do so at the least cost of lives, treasure, the least cost to
our privacy, and the least cost to our other competing foreign
policy objectives.
Eventually, even those who have been told that objectives
can be achieved over a period of many decades through terrorism
will come to realize that al-Qaeda methods and al-Qaeda
ideology will not improve the world and will not bring about a
worldwide caliphate, but until we win this war, it will
continue.
I yield back.
Mr. Poe. The gentleman yields back the remainder of his
time. All other members of the subcommittee who wish to make an
opening statement, I am asking that they submit those for the
record.
I will introduce each witness and then give them time for
their opening statements before questions. Dr. Seth Jones is
Associate Director of International Security and Defense Policy
Center at the RAND Corporation as well as an adjunct professor
at Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced International
Studies. He specializes in counterinsurgency and
counterterrorism, including a focus on Afghanistan, Pakistan,
and al-Qaeda.
Dr. Fred Kagan is Christopher DeMuth chair and director of
the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise
Institute, previously an associate professor military history
at West Point. Dr. Kagan is a contributing editor at the Weekly
Standard and has written for Foreign Affairs, the Wall Street
Journal, and other periodicals.
Mr. Thomas Joscelyn is a senior fellow at the Foundation
for Defense of Democracies and a senior editor of the Long War
Journal. Mr. Joscelyn is also a frequent contributor to the
Weekly Standard and was a senior counterterrorism adviser to
Mayor Giuliani during the 2008 Presidential campaign.
Dr. Thomas Hegghammer is the Zukerman fellow at Stanford
University Center for International Security and Cooperation
and a senior research fellow at the Norwegian Defense Research
Establishment in Oslo. Dr. Hegghammer frequently advises
government agencies in North America and in Europe on
counterterrorism issues.
I want to welcome all four of our panelists here today.
Each of you have 5 minutes. Your statements have already been
made part of the record. And we will stick to the 5-minute rule
after each of you have testified. And members of the committee
will ask you questions. Dr. Jones, you are first.
STATEMENT OF SETH JONES, PH.D., ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR,
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY CENTER, RAND
CORPORATION
Mr. Jones. Thank you, Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Sherman,
and other members of the committee. Thanks for inviting me and
a really esteemed crew here on global al-Qaeda.
I would first point out that I think the growth of al-
Qaeda's affiliate in Syria and other recent developments make
this hearing particularly timely and important.
In reviewing al-Qaeda's evolution since 1988, I am going to
make three arguments in my opening remarks. First, contrary to
some interpretations of the weakness of al-Qaeda today, I would
respond that it is actually quite resilient. As I look at both
al-Qaeda as it stood reflected, in part, in your map, Mr.
Chairman, there has been a net expansion in the number and the
geographic scope of al-Qaeda affiliates and allies over the
past decade, indicating that al-Qaeda, at least in my view, and
the movement are far from defeated. I will explain in a moment
what I mean by al-Qaeda.
This growth in my view is caused by at least two factors.
One is the Arab uprisings, which have weakened regimes across
North Africa and the Middle East and created an opportunity for
al-Qaeda and its affiliates to establish or attempt to
establish a foothold or a safe haven. I would submit that the
developments in Egypt are of particular concern. It is where
the current head of al-Qaeda is from. And it is another
potential avenue for a foothold depending on how that situation
develops over the next several weeks and months.
In addition, the growing sectarian struggle across the
Middle East between Sunni and Shi'a, which has been funded on
the Sunni side by both states and non-state actors, has
increased the resources available to militant groups, including
to al-Qaeda and its affiliates. So the first point is that I
think there has been a slight net expansion in al-Qaeda's
geographic scope and its number.
Second, however, this expansion has, along with the
weakness of central al-Qaeda in Pakistan, recently anyway,
created a more diffuse and decentralized movement. And I do
think this is important because I think what we see as we look
at Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra, Iraq, al-Qaeda in Iraq, Somalia, al
Shabaab, Yemen, the al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and al-
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in North Africa, the main
affiliates, they largely as I interpret it run their operations
somewhat autonomously, though they still communicate with the
core and still may take some strategic advice.
And I would note that what is interesting in the Syrian
front is the attempt from the core in Pakistan to adjudicate a
dispute between al-Qaeda in Iraq and Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria
and then to have the affiliate in Syria essentially break away
from Iraq, the al-Qaeda in Iraq segment, and swear allegiance
directly to the core element in Pakistan, which to me
symbolizes that there is still some importance to that
leadership.
Now, the way I would, if pressed, define al-Qaeda today
would include the core in Pakistan. And I would say, even if
Zawahiri were killed, there are at least three potential
replacements that sit in Iran today, all of whom are quite
well-esteemed and are members of what was called the Management
Council and one that sits in Yemen. So, even with the death of
Zawahiri, I still think you would get a movement that would
continue.
And, then, third, let me just say that within this
disparate movement, most al-Qaeda affiliates are not actively
plotting today attacks against the United States homeland. In
the near term, I would probably say the Yemen contingent poses
the most serious threat in the sense that we see the most
notable plots coming out of Yemen, along with the inspired
networks.
I think the Boston bombings should be viewed in the al-
Qaeda context. The bomb-makers reviewed al-Qaeda documents from
Inspire magazine, listened to al-Qaeda leaders including Anwar
al-Awlaki, and must be viewed as inspired individuals of al-
Qaeda.
Other groups do not appear to pose a threat, at least in
the near term, to the U.S. homeland, but I think, as the Syria
context shows, the Jabhat al-Nusra's recruitment and funding
networks in Europe, in particular, should be a cause of U.S.
policy-makers.
So, taken together, I will just conclude by saying these
arguments suggest that the U.S. needs to adopt a nuanced
approach to countering al-Qaeda. Where there is a direct
threat, I think there is opportunity for the U.S. to pursue
terrorists. And I think where there is not a direct threat to
the U.S. homeland, as we saw in North Africa, with al-Qaeda and
the Islamic Maghreb, having allies like France take the lead is
well within our grounds.
Let me just say my final sentence. To conclude, this is
going to be likely a long war, much like the Cold War, and I
think we need to view it in those terms. This is really a
decades-long struggle.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jones follows:]
----------
Mr. Poe. Dr. Kagan?
STATEMENT OF FREDERICK W. KAGAN, PH.D., CHRISTOPHER DEMUTH
CHAIR AND DIRECTOR, CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT, AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE
Mr. Kagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sherman.
And thank you to the committee for holding the hearing on this
topic and scoped in this way.
I think it is extremely important that we be able to have a
conversation about what the threat actually is, divorced
somewhat from what we actually want to do about it. And so I
want to make it clear of what I am not here today to do. I am
not here today to propose a solution. I am certainly not here
today to propose invading other countries or repeating Iraq or
something else like that.
There is a caricature of what the position is of some of
those who critiqued the current administration's strategy. My
main critique is that we do not have a strategy that is
remotely adequate. And I think, as Seth said, extremely well,
what is required is a nuanced strategy that will require
different approaches, that will require creativity, but that,
above all, will understand that the al-Qaeda network is a
holistic network, the parts of which interact with one another,
and that the administration's attempts to parse out only those
groups that currently have the stated intent of attacking the
United States and treat them as threats and the others as much
less threats or not threats at all is extremely dangerous and
distorts the actual threat from the movement as a whole
because, as Seth explained, the groups interact with one
another in a variety of ways. And they also changed their
minds. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula was not, from the
outset focused on attacking the United States directly. One
would have made long odds that we would not have anything
connected to the Islamic emirate or the caucuses in any way
show up on our shores. Groups do change their positions. And
that is something that we need to be very cognizant of.
Seth's point about the sectarian war is extremely
important. The context within which we are having this
conversation today is fundamentally different from the context
in which we were having anything like this in the early 2000s
in the early part of the struggle. The sectarian war in the
Middle East, which is expanding rapidly, is our concern for a
number of reasons, but from this standpoint, it is our concern
because that sectarian conflict opens up room and space for
radicals like al-Qaeda and affiliates to expand their reach as
a way of claiming that they are protecting Sunni populations
against Shi'a attacks. We have seen this in Iraq. It was,
unfortunately, very effective for al-Qaeda in Iraq. And it is
effective for al-Qaeda in Iraq again. And it is tremendously
effective for Jabhat al-Nusra. The more that you have an
expansion of sectarian conflict, the more you will have
initiative for and scope for and encouragement for extremist
groups, some of them affiliated with al-Qaeda, to take root and
take advantage of public fear.
I want to highlight a couple of things that I think have
been lost in this discussion and thank the terrific staff at
Critical Threats Project, Katherine Zimmerman, who is here, and
Sasha Gordon, for their work on al-Qaeda and on Yemen, in
particular, to say part of my concern stems from the fact that
the places where we have had strategies like Yemen, the
strategy is failing. It is not working. We have had a strategy
of very limited direct attacks against senior al-Qaeda and
Arabian Peninsula leaders, coupled with a strategy that focused
on the diplomatic resolution of the challenges in Sana'a and
assistance to the Yemeni security forces.
Most of the fighting against al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula was done by the Yemeni security forces. And they did
a very good job of retaking ground that AQAP had taken. And I
think the ranking member's point is a very important one. We
certainly do need to work through our allies whenever possible
and strengthen our allies whenever we can in this fight. The
problem is that the Yemeni security forces are not only not
being strengthened. Not only are they being weakened, but they
are fracturing. And we have counted more than 24 mutinies in
brigade-level units in the Yemeni security forces over the past
couple of years.
The rate of mutinying has been accelerating. We have had
instances of elite units engaged in the fight with al-Qaeda
being effectively dissolved in place by mutinies and the Yemeni
Government response. This is a force that is cracking,
unfortunately. And, as a result of that, we are seeing AQAP
reattack into Abyan, reattack into areas that it had been
driven out of, and begin to reestablish itself.
And I raised this specific case because Yemen has been held
up as a model. And there are even some people who ignore the
fact that Afghanistan has no coastline and suggest that we
should apply the Yemen model to Afghanistan. And before we have
that conversation, it is incredibly important to understand
that the Yemen model isn't working in Yemen.
And if there is any desire on the part of the committee, I
would be happy to talk about similar challenges that our
strategy in Somalia is facing where our allies there, who are
even more limited in capability, are running into very
predictable challenges to their ability to maintain gains, let
alone to expand on them.
So my bottom line is I think that Seth may have been a
little bit too optimistic. I think that we actually need to
consider the possibility that we are starting to lose the war
with al-Qaeda and that we really need to rethink our strategy.
Such as it is, very, very fundamentally in light of the fact
that we maybe need to recognize that it actually is failing for
all the damage that we have done to the core group in Pakistan.
Thank you for your time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kagan follows:]
----------
Mr. Poe. Mr. Joscelyn, you have 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MR. THOMAS JOSCELYN, SENIOR EDITOR, THE LONG WAR
JOURNAL, FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES
Mr. Joscelyn. Well, thank you, Chairman Poe and Ranking
Member Sherman, and other members of the committee, for having
me here today. And I am honored to be on this panel besides
these gentlemen and to testify before you on this topic.
Like Fred, one thing at the outset I would say is I am
somewhat solution-agnostic. I am basically a nerd who follows
the details on a day-to-day basis. And so that is sort of what
I am here to discuss. And, you know, I think that there is a
good, sizable debate to be had about the actual solutions in
various areas about how to approach this, what I characterize,
as they have as well, as an expanding enemy.
The three points--I would like to keep to the bullet point
format. I will say there are three points I would sort of boil
this down to. The first is that a lot of times when we talk
about al-Qaeda, we talk about the threat to the U.S. homeland,
and the ability to carry out mass casualty attacks. And that is
understandable as that is the first goal of the U.S.
Government, to prevent such attacks.
I would say from a comprehensive review of al-Qaeda's
literature and a comprehensive review of their assets and their
operational capacity, that has not been their only goal
throughout their entire existence, not even close, that
attacking us was always a tactic as part of their larger
strategum in the game that they are playing, which involves
politics in a variety of countries and uncertainties of
guerrilla warfare along those lines.
In that regard, I would point to the 9/11 Commission
report, which pointed very early on, now more than two decades
ago, that Osama bin Laden actually employed a strategy of what
I characterize as planting seeds in a variety of countries to
try and hopefully cultivate what we now see as affiliates or
branches.
Now, these efforts have not been fruitful in every country.
They have had fits and starts. And they have not always worked
out. But I would argue that in some ways, in some spectacular
ways, these efforts have actually worked. And so I don't think
the growth of the affiliates is, in fact, a surprise or
anything we should take as some sort of random event that just
happens by happenstance.
The second point is the committee expressed interest in
sort of the delineation between al-Qaeda's core and the
affiliates. Part of my concern is that we talk about the al-
Qaeda core as if it is this group in Afghanistan, Pakistan
solely, which is totally distinct from everything else that is
going on around the world, and that, therefore, if we just kill
off the core, the threat from al-Qaeda as it manifested itself
on 9/11 is no longer a worry for us.
I think even the Bush administration got into that at times
as well, making statements like, ``We killed 75 percent of
senior al-Qaeda leaders.'' You know, President Obama has now
said that we killed 73 percent of senior al-Qaeda leaders. You
kind of wonder, you know, how many times we can kill three-
fourths of the senior al-Qaeda leaders. You know, they are able
to replace their ranks.
And in that vein, al-Qaeda's core is not confined, I would
argue, to Afghanistan, Pakistan. The way I look at it based on
al-Qaeda's literature, including a recently published letter
from Ayman al-Zawahiri, is that it is basically where their
general command is actually headquartered. And they have a
series of committees and advisers surrounding Ayman al-
Zawahiri. But the general command dispatches operatives around
the globe to oversee their interests. And I won't get into the
nerd analysis for you right now, but I can point to specific
operatives we know are in touch with the general command, who
have been dispatched by the general command, and they are
operating in places such as Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Sinai,
you know, across the globe basically.
The third and final point is that, you know, a lot of the
discussion centers on, of course, again, the threat to the U.S.
homeland. And we should be happy that they haven't been able to
execute something on the level of a 9/11-style attack. That is
the good news. Certainly America's defenses have improved
through the years. We have thwarted plots. We have also gotten
lucky on occasion, avoiding mass casualty attacks. But I just
want to highlight something in my testimony.
When you talk about the threats to the U.S. homeland now,
they are more diffuse, not just abroad but also to us here in
this country. Since 2009, the way I look at it, there have been
plots from the al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula starting on
Christmas Day 2009; plots by the Pakistani Taliban in May 2010,
which had the failed Times Square bombing. They actually took
credit for that at my Web site. They emailed us the credit for
that operation.
The Pakistani Taliban, according to the Obama
administration, which has done a good job of describing the
Pakistani Taliban, has a symbiotic relationship with al-Qaeda.
There is a recent plot early this year connected to al-Qaeda
members in Iran which involved derailing the train from New
York to Toronto. And we have seen recent evidence that al-Qaeda
in Iraq, according to the Iraqi Government anyway, may have
considered dispatching operatives to launch some sort of
chemical weapons attack in Europe and also the U.S.
In that regard, I point out that al-Qaeda in Iraq actually
was tied to the 2007 failed attacks in Glasgow and London and
was actually tasked in 2004 by al-Qaeda's general command with
coming up with a plan to attack us.
So, just to wrap this up quickly, most of the affiliates
spend most of their assets doing something else, fighting
guerrilla warfare, trying to gain turf for themselves
elsewhere. Most of their assets are not deployed against us in
any immediate threat capacity. However, I think we have to be
very careful not to assume away that threat and to understand
that these threats manifested themselves very rapidly.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Joscelyn follows:]
----------
Mr. Poe. Thank you.
Dr. Hegghammer, is that correct?
Mr. Hegghammer. That is correct.
Mr. Poe. Thank you. You have 5 minutes, sir. Thank you for
coming from California to be here today.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS HEGGHAMMER, PH.D., ZUCKERMAN FELLOW, CENTER
FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND COOPERATION, STANFORD UNIVERSITY
Mr. Hegghammer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me.
And thank you, Ranking Member and all of the distinguished
members of the subcommittee. It is a great honor to be here.
I have been doing academic research on al-Qaeda since
before 9/11. And never has the future of the jihadi movement
seemed more unpredictable to my eyes than it does today. Still,
for this testimony, I have decided to try to look ahead and
speculate about the long-term future of al-Qaeda. And in these
opening remarks, I will highlight my three most important
conclusions.
First, it is my assessment that we are past the peak of
organized jihadi terrorism in the West. Al-Qaeda core is weak,
and most affiliates are not systematically targeting the U.S.
homeland. The main threat in the next 2, 3, perhaps 5 years is
ad hoc attacks by unaffiliated agents, which are harder to
prevent but less lethal on average. Affiliates seem to be
holding their fire against the West, partly because they have
primarily local agendas, for which overseas operations are not
very useful, and partly because they seem to fear the U.S.
military response that comes with attacks on the homeland. So
deterrence, in other words, appears to be part of the story
here. And to maintain this deterrence vis-a-vis jihadi
organizations, the U.S. in my view should continue to use
military force in counterterrorism selectively, primarily
against those groups with a proven willingness to attack the
U.S. homeland. Using heavy force against groups that have not
yet attacked us runs the risk of provoking the very behavior we
are trying to prevent.
My second and more pessimistic point is that the jihadi
movement writ large is thriving and will be with us for another
decade at least. I think that the optimists were basically
wrong in commenting on the Arab Spring. The Arab Spring was not
an end of the Cold War moment for jihadism. Al-Qaeda core may
be very weak, and al-Shabaab in Somalia may be experiencing
setbacks, but the other affiliates are doing just fine. And the
new Ansar al-Sharia groups in North Africa are growing. The
Syrian war, with its staggering numbers of foreign fighters,
has been a major boost to the movement. For now, most of these
groups are not targeting the West. This could change, however,
and we should pay particular attention in my view to Jabhat al-
Nusra because it disposes of so many Western operatives.
My third point, which is more of a guess, really, is that I
expect to see a second wave of serious plots in the West some
4, 5, 6 years down the line. And the most likely perpetrator
will be an organization that we do not yet know about. It
could, of course, come from existing affiliates as well, but
these groups have the disadvantage of being known to us and
they are led by people who have seen what drones can do, which
means they are less likely to try systematically attacking the
West. And if they do, we know where to direct the retaliation.
Future groups, on the other hand, might be less visible to
our agencies and be led by a new generation prone to
overestimating their own capabilities. Their chances of success
will depend on our continued vigilance and ability to spot such
grouplets early. More than ever, we need a concerted effort,
both in the intelligence community and the academy, to make
sense of this rapidly changing jihadi landscape.
Thank you for your attention.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hegghammer follows:]
----------
Mr. Poe. I want to thank all of you for being here. I want
to go back to the map that I showed you earlier. Won't you
comment on the map? It is over to your left or right, whichever
way you want to look. And you can see that according to this
map, al-Qaeda's presence is in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria,
Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, Algeria, Mali, Libya, Niger, Tunisia,
Morocco, and Nigeria. My question is, do you agree that those
are accurate countries that al-Qaeda has a presence in or not?
Dr. Jones?
Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman just looking at that for the first
time, I would say that al-Qaeda or one of its allies is present
in the countries you have identified. Let me just say two
things. One is that in some of these cases, I would call them,
really, an al-Qaeda affiliate in the case of Somalia and Yemen;
in other cases, as in parts of Algeria, there may be the group
Those Who Sign With Blood or down in Mali, Ansar al-Dine
allies. They have a foreign affiliate.
Mr. Poe. Al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda affiliates.
Mr. Jones. Yes.
Mr. Poe. Let's use that terminology. Dr. Kagan?
Mr. Kagan. Yes. Like Dr. Jones, I would agree that there
are al-Qaeda or affiliated or allied movements in all of those
statements. We might argue about some of the ``blobology.'' And
I think the Afghan presence at the moment is a little less than
what is implied there.
Mr. Poe. Fine.
Mr. Kagan. But in general terms, yes.
Mr. Poe. Mr. Joscelyn?
Mr. Joscelyn. You know, it is funny. We have this
conversation about putting together a map at the Long War
Journal constantly, about how to do this because it is actually
very tricky.
Mr. Poe. You can use my map.
Mr. Joscelyn. Yes. I agree with most of it. I would have to
sort of pick at it a little bit, I think. See, here is the
challenge. Okay? You look at, for example, an area like the
Sinai, where we are tracking terrorists right now and who is
there and we are tracking al-Qaeda operatives right there. They
seem to have built the force in the hundreds, if not thousands,
in the Sinai right now, including specific individuals. In
fact, there is a great article up at the Long War Journal today
about a former doctor to bin Laden, who has been basically
running some jobs there.
The problem is I agree with most of the map. I would have
to sort of pick over it a little bit more. But I think it does
make sense to say that you have al-Qaeda or affiliated groups
and you also have associated movements, which the collusion
there is often a lot stronger than people give them credit for.
Mr. Poe. And there are some want-to-be's in the groups,
too.
Mr. Joscelyn. There are some want-to-be's. You have some
guys who are really just flying the flag who aren't really
connected to the overall network, but I think there are a
number of groups. You know, Seth had mentioned Ansar al-Dine,
for example. The Treasury Department's designation of them is
very clear. The State Department's designation is very clear
that they have been working very carefully and closely with
AQIM for a long time. So it is reasonable to include those
groups in your map.
Mr. Poe. All right. Dr. Hegghammer?
Mr. Hegghammer. Well, I agree largely with the map and also
with the comments that have been made already. I would also
have added perhaps a little red dot in the Sinai.
Mr. Poe. Little red dot to the Sinai.
Mr. Hegghammer. Yes.
Mr. Poe. Okay.
Mr. Hegghammer. In Egypt, yes. But I would also mention in
this context that the size of the area covered is not
necessarily a measure of strength. Some of the groups happen to
be in desolate areas. So they get a lot of red ink there.
Mr. Poe. Because there is nobody else there.
Mr. Hegghammer. That is right.
Mr. Poe. There is nobody in those areas.
Mr. Hegghammer. Some of the smaller dots have very powerful
affiliates.
Mr. Poe. Okay. Thank you.
Dr. Kagan, if I wrote your comments down correctly, you
said that the United States lacks an overall strategy. What
does that mean? And explain it briefly?
Mr. Kagan. Sir, I do not think that we have articulated a
strategy for defeating al-Qaeda as a global network with
affiliates and its associates. I think that we have undertaken
a collection of tactics and we have made a number of broad
statements about this. But I believe that this is a challenge
that is worthy of the kind of analytical and planning effort
that went into NSC-68 or any other extremely serious war. And,
candidly, especially after the death of Osama bin Laden, I
looked for a major planning effort of that variety to think
about what the next stage was. And I do not believe, at least
if that has happened, then I am completely unaware of it.
Mr. Poe. So if I understand what you said, overall strategy
of the United States to deal with al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda
operatives, affiliates, we don't have one of those. But if
events occur, we have tactical response to each specific
attack. Is that a fair statement or not?
Mr. Kagan. Well, more than that. I mean, there is an
offensive component to what the Obama administration is
attempting to do. And there is a theory behind I think what
they are undertaking with their targeted strikes and other
activities. But I don't see a coherent, holistic strategy that
says, ``This is the network we are looking at. These are the
effects we need to generate on the network. These are how we
are going to apply all the tools of government and so forth to
do that.'' And I think it is going to require an effort of that
magnitude to scope the problem and then scope a strategy that
might be successful.
Mr. Poe. Let me ask you this question. I want to talk about
al-Nusra in Syria and their influence in Syria. What are they
doing in Syria? I guess of all of the rebel groups there, I am
concerned about them. How influential are they? And what are
they actually doing? Does anybody want to weigh in on that? You
all know. So just somebody tell me.
Mr. Kagan. Sure. I am happy to keep talking. Jabhat al-
Nusra is extremely influential in Syria, and I think its
influence is generally growing. That has largely to do with its
ability to receive large amounts of external aid.
Mr. Poe. From?
Mr. Kagan. From Qatar, from other countries in the Gulf,
and from the international----
Mr. Poe. Governments are supporting al-Nusra?
Mr. Kagan. I can't prove that governments are supporting
Jabhat al-Nusra.
Mr. Poe. You think they are?
Mr. Kagan. But I believe that the Qatari Government has
been, and I have seen indications that the Kuwaiti Government
may be as well, or elements within the Kuwaiti Government may
be as well. Certainly private jihadi donors within the Gulf and
elsewhere in the world are supporting the movement. And, as a
result of that, it is probably the best armed and equipped
fighting force in Syria.
I think we are already in a situation where there is going
to be a conflict between the Free Syrian Army and the moderate
forces that it represents and Jabhat al-Nusra under almost any
scenario unless there is a complete Assad victory, which I
think is very unlikely. Right now my assessment is Jabhat al-
Nusra probably would win that fight.
Mr. Poe. So, as we progress, those are the two factions on
either side that are going to come to conflict. And your money
is on al-Nusra.
Mr. Kagan. Unless the situation changes, I think that al-
Nusra, Jabhat al-Nusra, has the advantage. They also have the
advantage in that they have been establishing local government
and they have been setting up local authorities in various
different parts of Syria that they control and are trying to
build themselves now. I don't think they actually have a whole
lot of pocket or support for the ideology, but we have seen
this phenomenon before that they are effective defenders. And,
therefore, they put themselves into leadership roles.
Mr. Poe. Thank you.
Ranking member, Mr. Sherman?
Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
I don't want the panel to think that the absence of
Democrats here reflects any disinterest or that my own absence
soon will do that. As it happens, we have scheduled an
important caucus meeting at the same time as this hearing. And,
of course, this hearing was delayed by votes on the floor.
My concern is not just with an attack on the American
homeland, although that is a natural focus. I think that
attacks on U.S. interests of blood and overthrow of relatively
friendly governments pose as great a threat to us as anything
else, even a modest attack, at least, on the U.S. homeland. I
am concerned, not just with al-Qaeda and its affiliates, but
just about any one inspired by the same movement.
This is a complicated area. I mean, in World War II, we
could put a color on the map. There were neutrals. There were
countries on our side. There were countries against us. Kuwait
exists only because we liberated them. Now we are told that the
Kuwaiti Government and elements in it are allowing private
monies and even government monies to go to Jabhat al-Nusra.
That confuses me a little bit. What confuses me more is the
testimony we have heard that, on the one hand, Iran is
sheltering three of the most important al-Qaeda leaders.
On the other hand, Jabhat al-Nusra may be part of an effort
to obliterate the Alawite community. This focuses our attention
on the Shiite/Sunni divide and Iran.
Does Iran have those al-Qaeda leaders under house arrest or
should we call it hospitality? Mr. Joscelyn?
Mr. Joscelyn. Well, the answer is both, but because what
Seth is talking about in terms of the network inside Iran is
very important. In July 2011, then December 2011, then February
2012, and then October 2012, the Obama administration's
Treasury and State Departments' designated al-Qaeda network
inside Iran that operates under an agreement between the
Iranian regime and al-Qaeda. So those are the four things I
would point you to to go look at. And there is specific factual
detail in those designations that is a very rigorous process
the Treasury Department and the State Department go through to
explain that.
What they have done is since 2005, at least, there has been
a facilitation network inside Iran to basically shuttle
fighters to south Asia and elsewhere. And simultaneously the
Iranian----
Mr. Sherman. So those that are motivated, can arrive in
Iran and then end up in Afghanistan or Pakistan?
Mr. Joscelyn. Sure. And in some cases, I uncovered, for
example, that in 2010, one of Osama bin Laden's last plots
against the West used the same facilitation network to try and
execute Mumbai-style attacks in Europe. So it is a robust
facilitation network.
Mr. Sherman. Okay. I see what al-Qaeda gets out of it.
Mr. Joscelyn. Right.
Mr. Sherman. They get a sanctuary in a place where we are
reluctant to use drones.
Mr. Joscelyn. Sure.
Mr. Sherman. What does Iran get out of it?
Mr. Joscelyn. Well, I think they want to influence where
al-Qaeda is attacking. They don't want al-Qaeda coming after
them. They also have common enemies. They have common interests
and throughout. They don't have common enemies in Syria right
now, which is what I think your question was really pointed at,
which is that right----
Mr. Sherman. Wouldn't it upset the alliance, if you will,
for Iranians to know that this is a group bent on the
destruction of the Alawite community when Iran sees itself,
first and foremost, as a defender of Shiites, even different
flavors of Shiites, than they themselves embrace?
Mr. Joscelyn. Sure. Even beyond that, you have Hezbollah
and the IRGC on one side of the Syrian war and al-Qaeda and its
affiliate and related groups on the other.
Mr. Sherman. Right.
Mr. Joscelyn. So they are directly in conflict. I mean,
this is something we are watching right now. Just to your
point, Muhammed al-Zawahiri, who is the brother of Ayman al-
Zawahiri, for example, released a statement calling for attacks
against Shiite-led governments because of what is happening in
Syria. So this is the type of statement from somebody in al-
Qaeda's sphere that shows there is clearly tension over Syria.
The head of al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, has certainly
ratcheted up the rhetoric against Iran as well.
Mr. Sherman. Finally, where do al-Qaeda and its affiliates
and allies get their money? And have we been all too willing to
do business with those who countenance such contributions? Dr.
Jones?
Mr. Jones. Sure. The proper answer is it depends on which
affiliates you are referring to. There is a lot of redundancy
among al-Qaeda's affiliates. Some are involved in illegal or in
some cases legal charcoal trade. Most get some funding from
different players in the Gulf.
Mr. Sherman. Charcoal?
Mr. Jones. Yes. There is----
Mr. Sherman. That can't be a high-profit item.
Mr. Jones. Well, when you are able to tax various elements
of it, you might be surprised. But the broader point that
timber trading, gem trading, there have been a range of--when
you control trade in a given area, you can tax individuals
living there. So there is a redundancy in----
Mr. Sherman. Looking at all of the allies and affiliates of
al-Qaeda as a group, what portion of their money comes from--
what would I say?--revenues they have generated? And what
percentage comes from donations from governments and
individuals in the Islamic world?
Mr. Jones. I would say I could not put a percentage. And I
would say I have never seen anybody put a reliable percentage
on it.
Mr. Sherman. Give me your best guess.
Mr. Jones. I would say that a fairly significant amount of
funding of al-Qaeda's core and its affiliates does come from
wealthy donors is the way I would put it in the Gulf.
Mr. Sherman. Okay. I will ask each member of the panel if
you can just give me your best guess number. What percentage
from the wealthy donors? What percentage from----
Mr. Kagan. Sir, I don't make up numbers. And I have never
seen evidence.
Mr. Joscelyn. You know, I have never seen a specific
budget. However, I would say that I agree with Seth that a
significant percentage comes from donors in the Gulf, sure.
Mr. Sherman. And one quick follow-up. Maybe the doctor
can--and that is, what happened to Osama bin Laden's personal
fortune? And is that being deployed by this? You know, he was
once worth tens of millions of dollars. Go ahead.
Mr. Hegghammer. Regarding the first question, I would also
say that I don't know. And I haven't seen any numbers from
people who know. My guess would be that the proportion of funds
coming straight from donors in the Gulf to al-Qaeda and its
affiliates as a whole is relatively small, although this varies
between affiliates.
So perhaps the only affiliate that we in the open source
world know of is the account of al-Qaeda in Iraq in the mid
2000s. And they got quite a lot of their money from the foreign
fighters that were coming from the Gulf. They were bringing the
money with them. That was their main supporter. But if you go
to another group, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, they get
most of the money from a completely different one, which is
kidnappings.
Mr. Sherman. I yield back.
Mr. Poe. The gentleman yields back. As the ranking member
mentioned, the Democrat Party has an important caucus this
afternoon. And yes, you may. I will yield. And he may need to
leave, too. So I will turn the question over to the gentleman
from Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Perry. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, the gentleman. Thanks for
your testimony. Particularly enlightening for me was some not
surprising but new news with Qatar and Kuwait being brought
into the discussion; like I said, not surprising but a little
new for me anyhow.
Having served in Iraq--and, Tom, you served there as well--
I have got to tell you I was particularly frustrated,
disappointed in disagreeing with the administration on the lack
of a status of forces agreement when we departed. I would like,
I think, Dr. Kagan, maybe Dr. Jones, your comment on the
effects of that regarding al-Qaeda particularly and then
looking forward to Afghanistan, recent posturing, whether it is
posturing or not, the same relative discussion regarding
Afghanistan and the status of forces agreement in relation to
resurgent or revitalized al-Qaeda in both areas.
Mr. Jones. I think those are very good questions. I think
the failure to establish and reach a status of forces agreement
in Iraq in the U.S. withdrawal allowed two things: It allowed
al-Qaeda in Iraq to regenerate. Its attacks are greater this
year than they were in the last year of U.S. involvement in
2011.
And, second and perhaps more important there, it allowed
al-Qaeda and Iraq to help establish Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria.
Those were two I think devastating steps in that region that
the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq at least allowed.
And, second, that means that the agreement in Afghanistan
assuming it comes will be quite important. I think if the
United States leaves Afghanistan with an active al-Qaeda
presence up in Kunar, Nuristan, Nangarhar Provinces, it does
create the possibility for a reestablishment of the
organization in an area that it does have local allies.
Mr. Kagan. Congressman, thank you. Thank you for your
service. And thank you for your question.
I think you can identify three main reasons why the
departure of U.S. forces from Iraq has contributed to the
revitalization of al-Qaeda in Iraq. One was that the Iraqi
security forces were not designed to be able to continue to
conduct operations against AQI without American enablers. We
knew as we were building the ISF that it would not have the
capability to replicate our ISR capabilities, to replicate our
precision strike capabilities, or to do a variety of other
things that were allowing us and allowing the Iraqi security
forces to conduct precise operations that were effective,
highly effective, against the al-Qaeda organization.
What we have seen as we have watched Iraqi security forces
try to operate against the movement is that they have reverted
to patterns that will be familiar to people who have watched
how they tried to operate on their own in 2006. And they have
been largely ineffective, although they have been in some
cases, courageous. That pattern would be replicated in
Afghanistan. The Afghan National Security Forces in my opinion
are incapable of operating effectively without American
enablers after 2014. And we would be inviting exactly the same
situation in Afghanistan that we have in Iraq now if we
withdrew all of our enablers.
The second major driver in Iraq has been that the departure
of all of our forces, which also, not inevitably perhaps but
coincidentally perhaps, matched the departure effectively of
all of our influence in the country, enabled, perhaps
encouraged, Prime Minister Maliki to embrace his sectarian
side. And it is surely not an accident that it was pretty much
on the way home from Washington, DC, when he gave the orders to
have Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi arrested, which began a
process of sectarization, driving Sunni out of the political
process. We had been acting as a significant break on that kind
of sectarianism by putting pressure on him, by having
visibility on the situation. We are performing a different role
in Afghanistan but still a stabilizing role that would go away.
And, lastly, we were performing a critical peacekeeping
function along the green line between the Kurds and the Arabs.
And we have seen revival of conflict along that line now. And I
think you could fear a revival of civil war in Afghanistan if
we cease to play a peacekeeping role there.
Mr. Perry. So real quickly and not many seconds for big
foreign policy issues like this, but if you could, the future
of al-Qaeda in Iraq based on current trends and their
proclivities as you see them, either, any one of you gentlemen?
And then our relationship with Pakistan post a pullout of
Afghanistan and the resurgent al-Qaeda?
Mr. Kagan. Well, I am very concerned about the trajectory
that al-Qaeda in Iraq is on, particularly conjoined because you
can't separate it from the trajectory that Jabhat al-Nusra is
on. And I fear the possibility of the establishment of an
effectively al-Qaeda-controlled area that crosses from western
Iraq into eastern Syria, along those tribal lines. And, of
course, as you know, the tribes straddle the border as well.
That is of tremendous concern to me. And I think that the issue
of threat to the United States is, as my colleagues have made,
important because we need to think about the capabilities and
capacities that an organization that had that kind of breathing
space would have to plan, develop, and conduct a task against
the United States if it so chose. And I find that very, very
worrisome. And I find the likelihood that it will continue to
deteriorate in Iraq very high.
And I have a very serious concern that I would like to air
here, which is that there will be a natural tendency for the
United States to be drawn in on the side of Nouri al-Maliki in
the name of conducting operations against al-Qaeda in Iraq. And
those of you who have served in Iraq and have seen that on the
ground know exactly what the danger is.
We really will run the risk of becoming the hit squad, a
sectarian hit squad, for al-Maliki in a way that will simply
make us appear to be the enemy of the Sunni people without
being effective against this group. So we are going to have to
approach this with a great deal of nuance and complexity such
as I don't see apparent so far in our discussions about this
such as there have been any.
Mr. Poe. Next turn to the gentleman from Illinois, Mr.
Schneider.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to
the witnesses for your testimony and insights today.
I would like to pick up--Dr. Kagan, you talked a little bit
about Syria and al-Qaeda's increasing influence in Syria. We
recently saw the assassination of Commander Kamal Hamami, who
is one of the senior members of the military council.
And, Dr. Jones, in your testimony, your submitted
testimony, you talked about a U.S. strategy to include--I will
quote you--``three steps utilizing a light footprint strategy,
improving the effectiveness of governments in countries
threatened by al-Qaeda, and undermining al-Qaeda's ideology to
help weaken al-Qaeda.'' In Syria, in particular, which in many
ways someone wants to describe in this room as a hub state at
the center, to the whole panel, how do you see our strategy
developing to address the threat of al-Qaeda in Syria to take
us in a direction that will provide the best outcome in a very
bad situation?
Mr. Jones. Well, I think the results are fairly
straightforward. The decision not to intervene in any way in
Syria strengthened al-Qaeda's affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra. It is,
as I think virtually everybody here has said, probably the most
capable al-Qaeda affiliate on the globe with the weapons it has
seized from, among other places, Syrian military bases that it
has helped overrun.
I think the strategy has got to include two elements of it,
which may appear contradictory but I think one can find ways to
deal with. One is to take down the Assad regime. And second is
to weaken Jabhat al-Nusra at the same time. I am not sure we
are doing either particularly effectively right now.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you.
As you look at Jabhat al-Nusra and my understanding is, in
addition to Jabhat al-Nusra, there are other al-Qaeda fighters
coming into Syria from other places, work to take down the
Assad regime, other al-Qaeda fighters in weakening the Free
Syrian Army, the prospects for the opposition, how do we
address that issue?
Mr. Jones. Well, I think if you look at Syria today and you
look at some of the polling data that has come out of the
region, it looks like the support for al-Qaeda's ideology,
including Jabhat al-Nusra's ideology, in Syria is small, is
minimal. We saw it recently in Mali when the French deployed. I
think the issue is sidelining is--I think the bulk of the Sunni
opposition to the Assad regime does not buy into Jabhat al-
Nusra's ideology of an Islamic Emirate, at least in their
vision. I don't think the bulk of the population in Syria
supports an Islamic Emirate, at least in the al-Qaeda vision.
And so I think the way to do this is to work with a range of
those opposition groups to target and undermine the ideology of
Jabhat al-Nusra.
I don't think there is much popular support within Syria
for al-Qaeda's ideology. That is in my view their biggest
weakness, not just in Syria but in other areas we see them
operate.
They need a vacuum. They don't have a lot of popular
support.
Mr. Schneider. I think that is a great point, but, Dr.
Kagan, as you mentioned, the potential for a vacuum across the
border between Iraq and Syria, in that land where you do have
tribal affinities, any thoughts or advice you would have for us
how to address that or what to be watchful for?
Mr. Kagan. Yes. Look, I am happy to say very forthrightly
that we need to be providing lethal support to the Free Syrian
Army and we need to be--because that is one of the best ways to
accomplish the goals that staff identified, which are the
correct goals.
On the one hand, hastening the fall of the Assad regime,
the protraction of this war is one of the greatest dangers to
national security from the standpoint of bringing in more
foreign fighters, strengthening the al-Qaeda front, turning
this more and more into a sectarian conflict. The sooner that
one can move past that stage, if it is possible--and now it is
looking much harder--the better it would be. But, most of all,
because I believe that there is very likely to be a conflict
between the moderate forces, which I would entirely agree with
Seth, represent the will of the majority of the Syrian people
and Jabhat al-Nusra, it is critical for us that the moderate
forces win that fight.
And we should be working now to ensure that the outcome of
that fight is not endowed, which might be a way of limiting its
scale when it actually happened. And that would have positive
effects in Iraq also. It is obviously very difficult to imagine
what we could do directly in Iraq to shape the situation there,
but anything that we can do to weaken the rear of al-Qaeda in
Iraq and its ability to use Syria as a base of support, which
it is using now, would limit its ability to operate freely in
Iraq, but I don't have a good answer for you about what to do
in Iraq.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you. I wish I had more time, but I see
that I am out. I will yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Poe. Thank the gentleman.
Just a follow-up question from Mr. Schneider's comments.
You mentioned strategy, strategy, strategy. Big picture. What
is al-Qaeda's strategy? What is the point? Can you keep it
simple, Dr. Jones?
Mr. Jones. I will keep it simple. In my view, Ayman al-
Zawahiri's strategy includes the establishment of a caliphate
that cuts across North Africa, the Middle East, and into South
Asia. If you were to ask the affiliate leaders, you would
probably get a more parochial answer, Islamic Emirates, in
their regions. So I think the core would have a slightly
different answer than most of your affiliate leaders.
Mr. Poe. All right. We turn now to Mr. Cotton from Arkansas
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cotton. Can I answer your question as well, Judge Poe?
Mr. Poe. Yes, you can answer my question.
Mr. Cotton. I think their strategy is simple. They want to
eject America from where they want to establish a caliphate,
and they want to kill you and they want to kill your
constituents. That is where I think their strategy is.
Can we talk about what I might call the ghost of Syria
future? Al-Nusra right now is a potent force in Syria 2\1/2\, 3
years ago. Was there much al-Qaeda presence at all in Syria?
Can we just go down the panel? Does anyone think there was much
al-Qaeda presence in Syria 2\1/2\, 3 years ago, before the
uprising?
Mr. Jones. No. Well, Syria was used as a major funnel for
fighters into Iraq. So it was used for Iraq facilitation.
Mr. Cotton. Dr. Kagan?
Mr. Kagan. That was a very limited and carefully
controlled, ironically, by the Assad regime pipeline because he
feared precisely this would happen. So it was a very limited
presence.
Mr. Joscelyn. That is right. There was a pipeline that was
run by Abu Ghadiya, who was the al-Qaeda facilitator. The U.S.
forces had to take direct military action against him inside
Syria because the Assad regime wouldn't crack down on him. He
was aided by Assif Shawkat and other Syrian officials.
Mr. Cotton. Dr. Hegghammer?
Mr. Hegghammer. I concur.
Mr. Cotton. Okay. So not my presence in al-Qaeda in Syria
2\1/2\, 3 years ago. Target of opportunity has arisen. I have
asked for the map to be put back up. The point here is not the
extent of the blobs but where they circle around. AQIM, Syria,
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Al-Shabaab are all forming a
circle around Egypt.
I would like to get your perspective on the risk that we
face of having the kind of magnet or flypaper effect in Egypt
given the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood is founded there
intellectually and philosophically, the hearts of their world.
Ayman al-Zawahiri is Egyptian, has deep ties there and the risk
that America faces, either of a situation like Syria or perhaps
a situation like Algeria, going forward in Egypt.
Mr. Jones. I think we already saw a statement within the
last week from leaders of al-Qaeda and the Islamic Maghreb al-
Nusra front and Al-Shabaab supporting jihad against the
Egyptian military in Egypt. I would also note the Muhammed
Jamal group was involved in the assassination of U.S.
Ambassador Stevens in Libya. So Egypt is concerning for, as
several people here said, what is going on in Sinai, what has
gone on with Muhammed Jamal's network in Egypt, and also what
we are seeing as potential support for the opposition to the
Egyptian military.
Mr. Cotton. Dr. Kagan?
Mr. Kagan. In addition, I agree with everything that Seth
said. In addition to that, we are tracking fighters moving from
Gaza into Egypt in order to fight the Egyptian military as part
of this takeover. There have been a number of want-to-be
claims, you know. And want-to-be claims are want-to-be claims
until they do something and then they get recognized. So I
don't think we should dismiss them. I am deeply concerned about
this.
And the revolution against Morsi or whatever we are going
to call it has absolutely cemented a narrative of ``I told you
so'' from the faction, from Zawahari's faction, which those
rejected political course. And their slogan now is, ``Bullets,
not ballots.'' So I am very concerned.
Mr. Joscelyn. Just real quick, al-Qaeda has been pursuing a
two-pronged strategy in Egypt since 2011. One is dawa, or
proselytization, inside Egypt's urban areas and settled areas.
We don't know how extensive those efforts have been, fruitful
in terms of earning new recruits but keep your eyes out for it.
They have also used the urban areas as facilitation points for
the attack in Libya and elsewhere. And simultaneously in the
Sinai, they have been building this contingency of al-Qaeda-
related groups in the hundreds of thousands in the Sinai. And I
pretty much guarantee you are going to see terrorist attacks
from that group very soon.
Mr. Hegghammer. I agree. I think there is a very clear risk
of more violence in Egypt in the coming year, but I do think
also that in the mid and long term, that that threat is
manageable, both because the militants in Sinai will be
squeezed between, you know, a police state in central Egypt and
Israel. So those actors together I think will be able to manage
that. So the casualty here will be democracy in Egypt and the
sort of the momentum of the Arab Spring.
Mr. Cotton. Thank you all for your time and your
perspective. Let's hope that the map in 2015 doesn't have a
blob in Egypt.
Mr. Poe. Thank you, sir.
Gentlemen, I appreciate you being here. And it is an honor
to have so much wisdom here. If we were to add all of your
degrees up together, it would look like a thermometer. So I
appreciate you guys being here.
We have got to get this right. I mean, I look out along the
group here, and I see a lot of young people. And, you know, I
am 58 years old. And when I look back, when we had the first
oil embargo, it was in the '70s. And we have been dealing with
Middle East conflicts in this country for a long time. We have
got to get it right. We want to keep our young men and women
here to grow America strong.
And I want to start with you, Dr. Jones. You stated that
you felt al-Qaeda was not a direct threat to the U.S., but they
claimed responsibility for 9/11 and indirectly with the Boston
Marathon, as you said, Mr. Joscelyn, that Osama bin Laden
wanted to spread the seeds of al-Qaeda or jihad by seeding
countries all over the world. And these were people that were
sympathetic to their beliefs. And I think we see that
happening. I think Boston was a great example of that.
Unfortunately, it was here.
And so my questions come back to, what is the sentiment and
the mindset of al-Qaeda fundamentalists today versus that at
its creation back in the '80s toward the U.S. and Western
countries, I guess Western beliefs more in general? I want to
kind of rotate between you guys. So if you would first just
kind of answer that question?
Mr. Jones. Two things. One is I do believe al-Qaeda is a
threat. So not all of its affiliates pose a threat.
On your question, I think the biggest difference is the
social network and social media have allowed the views of key
al-Qaeda leaders to influence young Muslims in multiple
locations. And so what we have seen is and what makes this
different, I think the ideology coming from Ayman al-Zawahiri
in my view is not that different from what he was writing about
in 1998 and 2000 and 2001, but he has got more access to key
mediums to push that information out to influence individuals
so that the organization can be more decentralized. You can
reach Americans in Detroit and New York and Boston online.
Mr. Poe. Right.
Mr. Jones. And that makes this a very different
organization than what existed back in September 11th and in
many ways a more dangerous one.
Mr. Poe. All right. Let me ask you guys this, and you guys
all join in. So would you consider our lack of border security?
Could that be a national security threat, you know, not just
our northern border but our southern and our coastal? And just
is that a national security threat, the lack of border security
that we have in this country today?
Mr. Jones. It should be a cause of concern, yes. There are
foreigners that are moving back and forth across the U.S.-
Mexican border.
Mr. Poe. All right. That was going to be my other question.
Do you believe the entry through our borders is a security
concern? And are they coming? So Dr. Kagan?
Mr. Kagan. It is a concern, but I would say that what we
are seeing that concerns me even more is a tendency in the
policy debate and in the administration's policies to try to
redraw the defensive line, where we are going to actually take
action at our borders or inside our country.
And although the border issue is important, if we harden
our borders as much as we want to but give the enemy all the
free hits they want from outside, I guarantee you they will
find a way through our very large borders, even if we harden
them more.
Mr. Poe. Okay. Mr. Joscelyn, the national security threat
to our borders?
Mr. Joscelyn. It is a national security concern/threat. I
can tell you that Hezbollah, in particular, is one of the
terrorist organizations that uses facilitation. My view is that
anywhere that there is an open or permissive environment, our
enemies are pretty good at finding it.
Mr. Poe. Dr. Hegghammer?
Mr. Hegghammer. In my view, the main challenge is
identifying the people with a bad intention crossing the border
because we have to let people cross borders. The problem is----
Mr. Poe. We are just talking about securing them, not
closing them. So I agree.
Mr. Hegghammer. Right. So in that case, I don't think that
increasing the hard physical measures will have a particularly
great effect on this. Most of the operatives are coming in
through legal means.
Mr. Poe. Okay. So you kind of answered my next question.
And I want to see if the sentiment is the same with all of you.
So based on your statements and answers, you recommend securing
the borders, the southern, northern, and our coastal borders,
to a certain degree more than we have now? Would you all agree
pretty much with that?
[No response.]
Mr. Poe. We will take that as an affirmative.
My last question is--and this goes back to developing
policy so that we can get it right for now and from this point
forward--how do you mount a campaign against an ideology, like
radical Islam, whose goal is to remove the calf, or the
nonbeliever, you know, or the Western ideologies? When there is
not a nation state and when there is not an identified leader,
what policies would you recommend that America can do in the
Middle East or around the world that would make us more
effective at this? If you guys can kind of briefly go through
that, if you guys don't mind?
Mr. Jones. Well, I think one of the major mistakes that the
U.S. has made in the last several decades is to get rid of
organizations like the U.S. Information Agency that did provide
a way to push back against ideologies. If you look at the
successes of the U.S., against the Soviet Union, it was things
like Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty and the U.S.
Information Agency that were able to combat that ideology. We
do not have an organized, collective effort to push back
against extremist ideology.
Where it has been done successfully--and I think it is
worth looking at the successful efforts. Saudi Arabia, in
facing a very serious threat from al-Qaeda between 2002 and
2008--and Tom has written a really good book about this--did
use a very effective strategy to delegitimize al-Qaeda in their
state. So we have got some good examples of where it has been
done. We have got some good historical examples. I think we
need to push those through.
Mr. Poe. Could those policies be used here in the United
States? I mean, we have got two different governmental systems
here.
Mr. Jones. Yes, some of them can. Yes, some of them can----
Mr. Poe. Okay.
Mr. Jones [continuing]. Because it involved getting
moderates to come out against the--moderate Muslims to come out
against----
Mr. Poe. All right. Let me hear from Dr. Kagan real quick.
Mr. Kagan. One of the most effective things that I saw in
my time in Afghanistan was the Jordanian, the JET team, the
Jordanian Education Team, which went around. It was the de-
radicalizing Jordanian preacher. And he just went around and
collected crowds of hundreds and told them what the Quran and
the Hadith actually say, which is not what they had been told.
We actually absolutely have tools now. Obviously we are not
going to bring Jordanians around to do that here, but we
actually have tools to do this. But I want to make a key point
here. The ideology does not exist in a vacuum. We are fighting
an organization that has embodied this ideology now, and it is
seen to have embodied this ideology. If al-Qaeda is seen to
succeed, the ideology will be seen to be successful. If al-
Qaeda is seen to be defeated, the ideology will be to a
considerable extent discredited. And we really mustn't imagine
that we can talk about the--and I know that you weren't
suggesting this but--that we can talk about the ideology as
distinct from its pragmatic, practical manifestation in the
world today.
Mr. Poe. Mr. Joscelyn?
Mr. Joscelyn. Just real quick, one of the biggest looming
issues for al-Qaeda, ideologically and otherwise, is the
slaughter of their fellow Muslims around the world. More
victims of al-Qaeda and their associated terror have been
Muslims than Westerners or any other religion. That is
generally who they kill. And that is a big problem that they
have message-wise. What I have not seen is a unified purpose
across the board, emphasize that everywhere we can, that
understanding that their principal enemies are actually their
fellow Muslims and not the West, on a day-to-day basis.
Mr. Poe. Do you mind if I ask Dr. Hegghammer? Dr.
Hegghammer?
Mr. Hegghammer. So I think that today it is very difficult
to undermine this ideological phenomenon because it is really
several different things. It is not one coherent ideology, one
coherent message that we can kind of pick apart with arguments.
They want different things, these groups. And so it is very
difficult to undermine it with a sort of information strategy.
And maybe there was a time years back when there was a more
coherent message that we could have targeted, but that is no
longer the case.
Mr. Poe. Thank you.
I am going to now recognize Mr. Schneider from Illinois for
5 minutes. And then we will go to Mr. Perry for 5 minutes from
Pennsylvania. Go ahead.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you.
Dr. Hegghammer, you talked about Sinai and the
concentration or increasing numbers of militants, operatives,
terrorists gathering in Sinai. Where in Sinai are they
gathering?
Mr. Hegghammer. Well, I think Mr. Joscelyn may know more of
the details here, but I suspect that most of the bases and sort
of the armed casualties are up in the mountains, where the
reach of the Egyptian police is limited.
Mr. Joscelyn. It is the northern Sinai principally.
Mr. Hegghammer. Northern Sinai, yes.
Mr. Joscelyn. I think what Tom has said about the security
forces, there are pressures from both Israel and security
forces is right. My one big problem, concern there is that they
have overrun security forces in places like Arish and
elsewhere.
Mr. Schneider. Right.
Mr. Joscelyn. And they have also been able to mount limited
attacks via rockets and elsewhere in Israel and that sort of
thing. So you are going to see a pickup in the tempo there.
Mr. Schneider. And that is kind of where I am going with
the questions. I mean, we saw today I think three Egyptian
police were killed in Sinai.
Mr. Joscelyn. Yes.
Mr. Schneider. They are having an increasing freedom of
movement, but that mountainous area is a difficult area.
Between the--I don't know if we call it a nascent government
emerging in Egypt and Israel and U.S. support for both of them,
what strategy should we be taking there to make sure that al-
Qaeda doesn't get another foothold in Sinai?
Mr. Joscelyn. Well, we certainly have to support. This is a
tough situation because you have the politics of the whole
thing and then you have the security concerns of the whole
thing.
Mr. Schneider. Right.
Mr. Joscelyn. And oftentimes they can conflict. But we
certainly have to support some measures security-wise from the
Egyptian regime against the al-Qaeda presence there just
because it is a growing presence and it is going to be a threat
to our interests around the region. Again, the big problem is
balancing that with our other interests inside Egypt.
Mr. Schneider. Dr. Hegghammer, any thoughts on that?
Mr. Hegghammer. I think I would concur with that pretty
much exactly. It is a trade-off between, well, democracy in
Egypt and security in Egypt. So it is a political issue. Where
is that balancing point? You can't have both at this point.
Mr. Schneider. I would posit that the balancing point moves
over time. We have to manage that process across time. I will
turn to you, Dr. Jones, because it is a different world with
the Internet where messages can go from Afghanistan or Pakistan
across the entire Middle East and even into this country. What
messages--I will open this to everyone--do you think we need to
be communicating and working with our allies to help them
communicate so that we can start to win the battle of hearts
and minds as well as the battle on the ground?
Mr. Jones. Well, I think part of this is providing forum
for legitimate Muslim leaders with support networks to get
their views out because when young impressionable kids because
that is who many of them are, not all of them, are surfing
through the Internet and that evolves into jihadist forums,
they need a balance of views. I mean, ultimately this means
giving a forum to legitimate individuals.
If you take the example of solidarity in Poland during the
Cold War, we didn't have to create anything. It was giving air
to legitimate locals. I mean, this is I think what we are
talking about now, legitimate moderate networks, giving them
the space and the ability to air their views and to directly
denounce al-Qaeda. One of al-Qaeda's most significant pushbacks
over the last several years was Dr. Fadl in Egypt, who put out
a book that denounced Ayman al-Zawahiri, led to huge fissures.
That is the kind of stuff I think, letting that air, is quite
useful.
Mr. Schneider. Are there other names of people we should be
watching or reaching out to in the Arab world that are in that
sense the legitimate voice or a legitimate voice that can push
back on the message of al-Qaeda and other groups like that?
Mr. Jones. There is a whole range of people, sure. There is
a whole range of people across Egypt, across Saudi Arabia. I
can push you names of individuals that have outright denounced
Osama bin Laden's and Ayman al-Zawahiri's vision of Islam as
un-Islamic, yes.
Mr. Schneider. So if it is not prohibited, if you could
give it to us, that would be helpful. So I would welcome those
names.
Dr. Kagan, you look like you have something to add or----
Mr. Kagan. Just to testify to what Seth is saying, having
seen it on the ground, as I said, in Afghanistan, the
effectiveness of this. There were times when those Jordanian
preachers were preaching and there were Taliban in the audience
who were asking them questions and getting confused because
they weren't winning the arguments. Afghanistan, you know,
there is a highly illiterate population. It is easy to mislead
them. In Egypt where it is more cosmopolitan, it is harder.
But giving voice to the people who will make these
arguments and especially, as Seth says, in the areas, like in
Saudi Arabia, like in Jordan, where they has been very
effective deradicalization programs, we should be building on
that. We should be helping them to build on it. And we should
be asking them what we can do to help them build on it because
it is their interest as well.
Mr. Schneider. So if I can just take one more second? I
think that is critical. I think those are the types of sorts of
investments we can make with a very high return on investment.
So I appreciate it. Again, I thank you all for your time.
Mr. Poe. Thank you for your questions. The chair will now
recognize Mr. Perry from Pennsylvania.
Mr. Perry. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks again, gentlemen. I am interested in your
perspective of al-Qaeda's influence in the camps, the refugee
camps that have become somewhat like cities in Jordan, and what
we can look forward to in the near future or the further term
as Syria grinds on.
And then I would like--why don't we do that and then see
how much time we have left to talk a little strategy.
Mr. Jones. Just very briefly, Jabhat al-Nusra has recruited
fighters out of camps, refugee camps, in Lebanon, has recruited
individuals out of Jordan, and has recruited individuals, in
particular, out of camps in Turkey. So it is a great way for
these organizations to recruit, gain some funding, but also to
gain intelligence about pipelines. In fact, it is worth noting
that the most significant pipeline of fighters moving into
Syria right now is through Turkey, which is a NATO country. And
so in that sense, there has been a lot of recruitment in
Turkey, in particular.
Mr. Perry. Did you have something you wanted to add, Mr.--
--
Mr. Joscelyn. Just real quick. That is right. In fact, the
al-Qaeda and Iraq network that sort of Jabhat al-Nusra has
built itself off of includes very prominent figures in Jordan
who do that recruiting. And they have been doing that
recruiting since back in your days when you were deployed in
Iraq. It is some of the same network guys sending fighters into
Syria today, including a guy that goes by the nom de guerre
Arab Usa Yef. He is very prominent in doing that. So it is very
much in that regard the same type of enemy you face in Iraq.
Mr. Perry. So, then, do we need to be concerned about not
only recruiting in the camps and transitioning across
geographical boundaries but influence in those nation states
where the camps are in Turkey and Jordan and what that
portends? Do we need to be concerned or not? And how much?
Mr. Jones. I think we absolutely need to be concerned. We
also need to be concerned about the spill over of violence into
several of these countries. Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon, in
particular, are three areas where there is a possibility not
just of initial recruitment or additional recruitment but also
the spill over of violence, not just sectarian violence,
although that is part of it. But yes, this is the potential for
regional spill over.
Mr. Hegghammer. If I can add that I agree completely that
there is a very distinct risk of spill over? They are not
entirely sure whether the refugee camps should be the main
concern here. After all, these are people who have left the
conflict. So they have taken the decision not to join it. And
if you look back at Iraq, hundreds of thousands of people left
Iraq at the height of the conflict. And they produced
relatively little spill over in the region. There are certainly
examples, but, you know, compared to the scale of the exodus,
the security implications were not all that large.
So, you know, in the best scenario, you get something
similar from Syria, but I think we should keep an eye on sort
of multiple ways in which the spill over can happen, not just
the refugee camps.
Mr. Perry. And maybe rightly or wrongly, I just see the
camps as somewhat large, sprawling, lawless, almost cities at
this point, without government structures and so on and so
forth, that lend themselves to that type activity. I guess, on
the other side of the equation, they lend themselves to our
ability to be involved and be present and gather intelligence
and so on and so forth. I just wonder how acute the threat may
be.
If we could move on, regarding the previous line of
questioning, the strategy that the United States should take
regarding our pseudo-allies, like Qatar, like Kuwait, who will
have actors within that will be willing to fund--and that is
really I think hard for their government or us to influence.
But the state itself, if the states themselves, are sponsoring
through funding, what should be our strategy? I know it is a
delicate circumstance, but what would you folks think should be
our best plan for that?
Mr. Kagan. You know, I want to make it clear that I have
seen reports that there is Kuwaiti funding and so forth, but I
am not sure exactly who or what. And it is something that I
think merits looking into. And I was surprised by that,
candidly. I would not have expected that. And so my first
suggestion would be getting to the bottom of whether that is
true or not and why that is being tolerated in a state like
that, where there is a much greater ability of the family to
influence that kind of thing.
Qatar is an entirely different problem because Qatar
maintains its sort of balancing position between Saudi and Iran
and us and with Al Jazeera and with al-Qaeda. They have a new
emir. He is a young guy. It may conceivably be possible to help
him see the light some more and help him understand that the
policies he has been pursuing have not been helpful to him in
the region, which is, in fact, true.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield.
Mr. Poe. Thank you.
Gentlemen, I can't tell you how much I appreciate you being
in here because we rely on you guys, the experts, to inform us
so that we can help influence foreign policy. And if you can
bear one more questions? It is a three-part question. It will
be real quick. What role should the U.S. play in Syria? To what
capacity? And would it stabilize or destabilize that region
more, you know, with the spill over into Jordan, the threat to
Israel, you know, in that whole area? And if you can just say
what your thoughts are on that briefly, I would greatly
appreciate it. Go ahead, Dr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. I think the U.S. role in Syria should be to
support the overthrow of the Assad regime. I think it is in
U.S. interests. I do think one has to be very careful about how
one does that and who one is providing both lethal and non-
lethal assistance to, but I think this is a covert, clandestine
war. This is really one that is done by the U.S. intelligence
community and special operations forces. And I think if it is
not done, we will not be able to influence the end results,
none of which will be in our interest.
Mr. Poe. Okay. Dr. Kagan?
Mr. Kagan. I agree with that. I think this is not a case
where putting a lot of U.S. boots on the ground is wise. And I
would not advocate for that. I am not sure that our role can be
entirely clandestine. I think that there may be a requirement
to do damage to the Syrian ability to use its airfields to
receive critical supplies from Iran and other places and also
to conduct operations.
I do not think that a full no-fly zone would be necessary
at this point. I think there is much more nuance in that
discussion than we have had so far in what kinds of tools we
could apply beyond covert aid to assist. But I think it is
absolutely vital because I think that all of the trend lines
are that the longer this conflict goes in the way that it is
going, the more destabilizing it will be, the more spill over
there will be, and the more damage to American interests and
security there will be.
Mr. Poe. Mr. Joscelyn?
Mr. Joscelyn. Just real quick, in terms of sponsoring the
Syrian opposition, I am for it as long as we have a very good
idea of how our enemies are constituted and what groups they
are working with.
Mr. Poe. Right.
Mr. Joscelyn. They can't co-opt them. That is a very
difficult black box a lot of times. Obviously that is why we
are still talking about it, you know.
As far as destabilization, it is already about as
destabilized as it can get. And I can't see it getting any
better absent U.S. intervention or intervention from the
outside world. That doesn't mean boots on the ground, but
definitely it is a destabilizing factor.
And, lastly, just real quick, there has already been a
threat to this to U.S. interests out of Syria, which it needs
to be highlighted more often, which is that last year the
Jordanian regime, the kingdom, shut down a plot, a very
complicated plot, to attack the U.S. Embassy that involved
staging attacks against other targets to sort of build up to a
massive attack on the U.S. Embassy. You are already seeing that
type of spill over. And those were Jabidah, and those were
trained fighters throughout the region.
Mr. Poe. Doc?
Mr. Hegghammer. My view is that the U.S. should provide
weapons to the moderate part of the Syrian opposition, but it
should also do two things. One is to make absolutely clear to
the Syrian opposition how much support they can expect to get
because the biggest problem with providing a little bit of
support is that you can get drawn in. You have the sort of
slippery slope phenomenon. And so you can maybe see part of the
Syrian opposition taking risks that they otherwise wouldn't
take because they think they have the American support. So,
then, you know, if you provide a little, then make absolutely
clear where the line goes. Make sure to communicate that this
does not mean that there is more to follow in case there is a
crisis.
The other thing that is crucial is to prepare for the civil
war that comes after the fall of Assad. There will be one. And
it will be crucial to plan for that and to distribute the
resources with that conflict and the constellations in that
conflict in mind.
Mr. Poe. Gentlemen, again I appreciate it. I know the
members of this committee appreciate it and Congress
appreciates your expertise in being here. And thank you.
This subcommittee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:11 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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