[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT TO THE HOMELAND FROM AQAP
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM
AND INTELLIGENCE
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 18, 2013
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Serial No. 113-34
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice Brian Higgins, New York
Chair Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Ron Barber, Arizona
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Dondald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Jason Chaffetz, Utah Beto O'Rourke, Texas
Steven M. Palazzo, Mississippi Tulsi Gabbard, Hawaii
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
Chris Stewart, Utah Steven A. Horsford, Nevada
Richard Hudson, North Carolina Eric Swalwell, California
Steve Daines, Montana
Susan W. Brooks, Indiana
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Mark Sanford, South Carolina
Greg Hill, Chief of Staff
Michael Geffroy, Deputy Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Brian Higgins, New York
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania, Vice Loretta Sanchez, California
Chair William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Jason Chaffetz, Utah Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Chris Stewart, Utah (ex officio)
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex
officio)
Kerry Ann Watkins, Subcommittee Staff Director
Dennis Terry, Subcommittee Clerk
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence.............................. 1
The Honorable Brian Higgins, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence:
Oral Statement................................................. 2
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 18
Witnesses
Mr. Frank J. Cilluffo, Associate Vice President, Director,
Homeland Security Policy Institute, The George Washington
University:
Oral Statement................................................. 19
Prepared Statement............................................. 21
Ms. Katherine L. Zimmerman, Senior Analyst Critical Threats
Project, The American Enterprise Institute:
Oral Statement................................................. 27
Prepared Statement............................................. 28
Mr. Brian Katulis, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress:
Oral Statement................................................. 35
Prepared Statement............................................. 37
Appendix
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence:
Statement of Robin Simcox, Research Fellow, The Henry Jackson
Society...................................................... 4
Excerpt, ``Jihadist Terrorism: A Threat Assessment''........... 6
Statement of The Jewish Federations of North America........... 9
UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT TO THE HOMELAND FROM AQAP
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Wednesday, September 18, 2013
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:06 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Peter T. King
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives King, Higgins, and Keating.
Mr. King. Good afternoon. The Committee on Homeland
Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence will
come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony
examining the threat to the homeland from al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula, AQAP. I now recognize myself for an opening
statement.
At the onset of today's hearing I want to express sincere
sympathies to the families, friends, and coworkers of the 12
victims and 8 people who were wounded in the shooting at the
Washington Navy Yard on Monday. Investigations are on-going
into both the shooter and how he was able to gain access to a
sensitive military facility, and I fully support those efforts.
On Dec. 7, 2011, I held a joint hearing with Senator
Lieberman on the threat to military personnel and facilities
within the United States. While there is no evidence currently
or any reason to believe that the tragic events of Sept. 16
were inspired by ideology, the reality is that our military
personnel are a target and more needs to be done to address
security in its ranks and at military facilities.
Also this month we recognize the 12th anniversary of the
Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. In the past 12 years Islamist
terrorists have carried out additional attacks, including the
murder of two U.S. Army soldiers at a Little Rock recruiting
center on June 1, 2009, the murder of 13 people and 42 others
being injured at a deployment center at Fort Hood on November
5, 2009, and the attack during the Boston Marathon killing 3
people and injuring approximately 260 people on April 15, 2013.
We have been lucky that not all of these attempts resulted
in the loss of innocent lives. There was the unsuccessful
detonation of an explosive device on Flight 253 on Christmas
day 2009, the attempt to detonate a vehicle-borne improvised
explosive device in Times Square on May 1, 2010, the discovery
of two bombs hidden in printer cartridges on U.S.-bound cargo
planes on October 29, 2010, a disrupted plot to smuggle an
explosive device onto an airline in May 2012, and numerous
other plots that have been disruptive.
AQAP, the Yemen-based al-Qaeda affiliate, has been linked
to most of these either directly or indirectly through
inspiring home-grown radicals. Most recently the U.S.
Government closed 22 embassies, mainly in the Middle East and
North Africa, for weeks due to security concerns relating to a
threat from AQAP.
As a result, the U.S. embassy in Yemen remained closed for
2 weeks. The closure of any U.S. diplomatic facility for even 1
day, let alone 22, is a decision that is not made lightly. This
incident should remind all of us what a danger AQAP poses.
Many reports reveal that intercepted electronic
conversations between AQAP and al-Qaeda leaders disclose that
the plans for a major attack during a specific time frame, but
not details on targets and locations for the attack. While
additional counterterrorism pressure seems to have disrupted
the attack in the short term, the situation is a reminder that
we must remain vigilant, and that al-Qaeda and its affiliates
remain intent on carrying out an attack against U.S. interests
and especially against the homeland.
In the past 12 years, under both the Bush and Obama
administrations, we have made great efforts to track down and
remove senior al-Qaeda leaders, including al-Awlaki, Samir
Khan, and Said al-Shihiri within AQAP, and of course Osama bin
Laden. Unfortunately, however, in many ways the al-Qaeda
network is stronger today than it was before 9/11 because it
has metastasized its footholds in so many locations.
As the White House and Congress continue to grapple over
the situation in Syria, it is vital that we do not lose sight
of the threat posed by AQAP and other al-Qaeda affiliates. That
is why I look forward to today's hearing from the witnesses
regarding the on-going threat to the U.S. homeland from AQAP,
including an evaluation of the current intent and capability.
Also to review U.S. counterterrorism policy towards the group
and the lessons learned from the August embassy closures.
With that I now yield to the distinguished Ranking Member
of the subcommittee, Mr. Higgins from New York.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for
holding this hearing. I would also like to thank the witnesses
for their testimony.
According to the director of national intelligence al-Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula is the greatest immediate threat from
a terrorist group in the United States. Even though the group
has not been successful in recent years in its plots to attack
the United States, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's reach
and ability expose our country and our homeland to
vulnerabilities that make it an extremely dangerous
organization.
The United States has attempted to make strides to diminish
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's terror capabilities, but
the threat from this organization remains.
In 2011 the United States through a drone strike killed
Anwar al-Awlaki, who was once considered the most dangerous man
in the world. Without al-Awlaki, the English-speaking American
who recruited people to exploit Islam and perform terrorist
acts, it was thought al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's
ability to strike the United States would be weakened.
However, many in the intelligence community do not believe
that al-Awlaki's death had a significant impact and the
National Counterterrorism Center Director Matthew Olsen has
stated that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has the ability
to attack the United States with little or no warning. Aside
from al-Awlaki, more than 35 senior leaders of al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula have been killed by drone strikes. Yet the
organization still continues to be a threat to the United
States.
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula moves fast and recognizes
targets and opportunities for recruitment and exposure. For
example, in the wake of the Boston Marathon bombing, the al-
Qaeda recently dedicated an issue of its magazine Inspire to
the Boston bombings. It praised the bombers and encouraged
others to emulate the attack. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
is also not afraid to attack the United States where it can, be
it on the United States soil or our interests throughout the
world.
We saw this summer when the intelligence community
intercepted a credible threat that al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula was planning an attack on the United States
facilities in the Middle East and North Africa. This threat was
taken very seriously, was considered imminent. The threat
prompted the United States and European countries to close
their embassies in the Middle East and North Africa for days.
It is astonishing that even though the United States has
eliminated much of their senior leadership and one of its most
effective recruiters, the group can still have capability to
conduct attacks against the United States. It also recognizes
the economic devastation terrorist acts can bring.
A terrorist attack in the Buffalo/Niagara Region, which was
the busiest passenger border crossing with Canada and the
second-busiest for cargo crossing, would be devastating.
However, the Department of Homeland Security does not recognize
the Buffalo/Niagara Region as a high-risk area. Hence, local
law enforcement in the Buffalo/Niagara Region are left without
the resources that could possibly be needed if an attack from
this dangerous organization were to occur.
As we saw with the Boston Marathon bombings, the role of
first responders is invaluable to the response. With this
terrorist group consistently adapting to and seemingly lying in
wait for an exposure to our vulnerabilities, this Nation should
be prepared to prevent attacks in all areas and on all fronts.
I thank the Chairman for holding this important hearing. I
look forward to the testimony of our expert witnesses.
[The statement of Ranking Member Higgins follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Brian Higgins
September 18, 2013
I would like to thank the Chairman for holding this important
hearing this afternoon.
I would also like to thank the witnesses for their testimony.
According to the director of national intelligence, al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula is the greatest immediate threat from a terrorist
group to the United States. Even though the group has not been
successful in recent years at its plots to attack the United States,
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's reach and ability to expose U.S.
homeland security vulnerabilities makes it an extremely dangerous
organization. The United States has attempted to make strides to
diminish al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's terror capabilities, but
the threat from this organization remains.
In 2011, the United States, through a drone strike, killed Anwar
al-Awlaki who was once considered the most dangerous man in the world.
Without al-Awlaki, an English-speaking American who recruited people to
exploit Islam and perform terrorist acts, it was thought al-Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula's ability to strike the United States would be
weakened. However, many in the intelligence community do not believe
that al-Awlaki's death had a significant impact and National
Counterterrorism Center Director Matthew Olsen has stated that al-Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula still has the ability to attack the United
States with little or no warning. Aside from al-Awlaki, more than 35
senior leaders of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula have been killed by
drone strikes, yet the organization still continues to be a threat to
the United States.
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula moves fast and recognizes targets
and opportunities for recruitment and exposure. For example, in the
wake of the Boston Marathon bombings, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
dedicated an issue of its magazine, Inspire, to the Boston bombings. It
praised the bombers and encouraged others to emulate the attack. Al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is also not afraid to attack the United
States where it can, be it on United States soil or our interests
abroad.
We saw this summer when the intelligence community intercepted a
credible threat that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula was planning on
attacking United States facilities in Middle East and North Africa.
This threat was taken very seriously and was considered imminent. The
threat prompted the United States and European countries to close their
embassies in the Middle East and North Africa for several days.
It is astonishing that even though the United States has eliminated
much of their senior leadership and one of its most effective
recruiters, the group can still have the capability to conduct attacks
against the United States. It also recognizes the economic devastation
terrorist acts can bring. A terrorist attack in the Buffalo/Niagara
region, which has the busiest passenger border crossing with Canada and
second-busiest cargo crossing would be devastating. However, the
Department of Homeland Security does not recognize the Buffalo/Niagara
region as a high-risk area. Hence, local law enforcement in the
Buffalo/Niagara region are left without the resources that could
possibly be needed if an attack from this dangerous organization were
to occur.
As we saw with the Boston Marathon bombings, the role of first
responders is invaluable to the response. With this terrorist group
constantly adapting to and seemingly lying in wait for an exposure to
our vulnerabilities, this Nation should be prepared to prevent attacks
in all areas and on all fronts.
Thank you and thank you Mr. King for holding this important
hearing.
Mr. King. I thank the Ranking Member.
Just to get one bit of business out of the way, it is
apparent for today's hearing we use information provided by
additional security experts.
I ask unanimous consent to include in the hearing record
one testimony for the record on the threat posed by AQAP
written by Robin Simcox with the Henry Jackson Society, and
excerpts on the threat from AQAP from September 2013 report
released by the Bipartisan Policy Center. Additionally I ask
unanimous consent to include a letter and report from the
Jewish Federation of North America regarding the continued
terrorist threats to the Jewish community.
Without objection these items will be included in the
record.
[The information follows:]
Statement of Robin Simcox, Research Fellow, The Henry Jackson Society
The threat to the U.S. homeland from al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP) is real, sustained, and likely to be enduring. AQAP is
today the most aggressive branch of al-Qaeda, and a severe security
threat within Yemen.
However, the threat from the group is not restricted to its own
borders. It is also the al-Qaeda group most capable of carrying out an
attack against not only the U.S. homeland, but the Western homeland
more broadly.
AQAP's creation was announced in January 2009, following a merger
between al-Qaeda's Yemeni and Saudi branches. Its leadership is largely
made up of experienced and dedicated jihadist fighters whose
connections to al-Qaeda predate 9/11.
The group's emir, Nasir al-Wahayshi, is a former secretary to Osama
bin Laden who connected with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan in the 1990s.
Earlier this year, he was promoted to the role of al-Qaeda's ``general
manager'', a sign of his increased influence within the group. The
group's former deputy emir--the recently deceased Said al-Shehri--also
fought in Afghanistan.
Furthermore, AQAP's military chief, Qasim al-Raymi, attended al-
Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan in the 1990s, as did Ibrahim al-
Rubaish, a senior AQAP theologian.
The explosives expert within the group is a Saudi named Ibrahim al-
Asiri, although he has now likely passed his expertise on to others. It
was he who constructed the bomb that AQAP recruit Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab had concealed in his underwear and unsuccessfully
attempted to detonate on a flight headed to Detroit, Michigan, on
Christmas day of 2009.
Al-Asiri was also likely involved in the construction of bombs
discovered in U.S.-bound cargo planes on 29 October 2010, that were
discovered during stopovers in the United Arab Emirates and the United
Kingdom; as well as the second underwear bomb plot, that was thwarted
in April 2012 when an AQAP plan to bomb a flight headed to the United
States was thwarted by a Saudi agent that infiltrated the group.
One man partially responsible for AQAP's focus on the West was the
American-born cleric, Anwar al-Awlaki. For example, it was he who,
while in Yemen, assessed Abdulmutallab's dedication to jihad; and his
instructions or sermons have inspired a host of others to attempt
terrorist attacks within the West itself.
One of these attacks led to a tragic loss of life, when Major Nidal
Hasan, a U.S.-born army Major shot and killed 13 people in November
2009 at Fort Hood army base in Killeen, Texas. Hasan and al-Awlaki were
in e-mail contact prior to the attack.
There are numerous other examples of al-Awlaki's influence. Rajib
Karim, a British Bangladeshi, was in e-mail contact with al-Awlaki in
January and February 2010. Karim worked for British Airways and
discussed with al-Awlaki how his access to aviation information could
facilitate a terrorist attack. Karim has since been jailed for 30
years.
Others were inspired to act by al-Awlaki's rhetoric, such as Faisal
Shahzad, who planted a bomb in New York's Times Square on 1 May 2010.
He has now been sentenced to life in jail.
Another who had been persuaded to act--in part because of al-
Awlaki's on-line sermons--was Roshonara Choudhry, who was convicted for
attempting to murder Labour Member of Parliament Stephen Timms at his
constituency surgery in London on 14 May 2010.
Al-Awlaki was killed in a U.S. drone strike in al-Jawf, on 30
September 2011. However, the dissemination of his rhetoric--as well as
the appeal to Western audiences that Inspire, AQAP's English-language
magazine, has--means that the threat to the Western homeland by no
means ends with his death.
However, the group's ambitions do not begin and end with attacks
against the United States. AQAP regards itself as an alternative
government to that in Sana'a. Therefore, it has attempted to gain, and
then control, territory within Yemen.
Between March 2011 and June 2012, it controlled towns in the
provinces of Abyan and Shabwa in southern Yemen, subsequently declaring
them Islamic ``emirates''.
Aware of al-Qaeda's divisive reputation, AQAP introduced themselves
to locals in Yemen as members of Ansar al-Sharia. They empowered local
jihadists and rebranded their movement with a positive message that
they could restore peace and justice to the area, while also providing
key services. They achieved some success with this, providing food,
water, and electricity. This only served to highlight the shortcomings
of the government in Sana'a, who proved incapable of providing such
basics for the population it purports to govern.
A June 2012 government offensive removed AQAP control from its
southern ``emirates''. However, by mid-2013, AQAP had once again begun
to control territory: This time, in Hadramout, eastern Yemen.
While the government is capable of expelling the group from these
areas militarily, this has led to AQAP dispersing its presence even
more widely throughout Yemen. It now largely focuses on ``hit-and-run''
attacks against the government's military and counterterrorism
officials, often employing tactics as crude as ``drive-by'' motorcycle
shootings.
It is vital to understand that the threat to the West from AQAP is
on-going. In August 2013, it was (in part) a response to intercepted
communications between Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda's emir, and Nasir
al-Wahayshi, that led to the U.S. Government shutting down its
embassies across the Middle East and North Africa and issuing a global
travel warning to its citizens. Al-Zawahiri and al-Wahayshi were
believed to be discussing a large plot against Western targets and
government infrastructure in Yemen.
The U.S. Government response must be an all-encompassing policy
that can address both terrorism issues as well as problems specific to
Yemen that may be facilitating the group's growth.
Attempts must be stepped up to aid the development of Yemen's
economy and its basic infrastructure, as well as encourage the creation
of a genuinely representative and democratic government. This should be
backed up by a limited number of drone strikes against AQAP's key
leaders. These strikes may be controversial within Yemen, but remain
vital in disrupting AQAP's activities. The strikes should be carried
out alongside the stepped-up counterterrorism training to Yemeni
government forces.
While America may take the lead on these issues, the entire effort
will require support from key partner nations across the Middle East,
Africa, and Europe if it is to be successful.
Ultimately, the security of all those threatened by AQAP will be
greatly enhanced if a cohesive, co-ordinated policy--that addresses
both security and development issues--is formulated.
______
Excerpt Submitted For the Record by Hon. Peter T. King
jihadist terrorism: a threat assessment
A Report From the Bipartisan Policy Center, September 2013
Chapter 3: The International Threat
______
2. al-qaeda in the arabian peninsula
Threat Assessment
Because AQAP remains interested in launching attacks against the
West, and its chief bomb-maker, Ibrahim al-Asiri, remains at large,
senior American counterterrorism and defense officials, including
Director of National Intelligence James Clapper and former Secretary of
Defense Leon Panetta, have assessed that al-Qaeda's affiliate in Yemen
poses the greatest immediate threat from a jihadist group to the United
States.\74\ In testimony before the U.S. Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence in January, Clapper said that while AQAP is under attack
in Saudi Arabia and Yemen, ``the group continues to adjust its tactics,
techniques and procedures for targeting the West.''\75\ However, AQAP
has not attacked a U.S. target since its October 2010 attempt to plant
bombs hidden in printer cartridges on cargo planes destined for the
United States. And while the organization gained significant territory
in Yemen as it exploited the popular uprising in the country in 2011,
it also lost these gains within about a year.
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\74\ Schmitt, Eric. ``Intelligence Report Lists Iran and
Cyberattacks as Leading Concerns.'' The New York Times. January 31,
2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/01/world/intelligence-chief-sees-
al-qaeda-likely-to-continue-fragmenting.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
\75\ Garamone, Jim. ``Terror Threat Potent, But Dispersed,
Intelligence Chief Says.'' American Forces Press Service. March 13,
2013. http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=119522.
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Nonetheless, AQAP presents a lesson of how terrorist groups in the
21st century can become more lethal and shift their focus abroad more
quickly than their 20th-century counterparts. It took core al-Qaeda a
full decade from its founding to launch its first significant
international terrorist attack--the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania. By comparison, it took AQAP less than nine months
from its from its emergence out of the remnants of decimated al-Qaeda
cells in Saudi Arabia in 2009 to launch its first transnational attack,
the near-miss assassination of the senior Saudi prince responsible for
counterterrorism, and less than a year to launch its first attack
against the United States, another near-miss, but one that, on
Christmas Day 2009, shook American confidence that the terrorist threat
to commercial aviation had receded. Had the AQAP suicide terrorist, a
young Nigerian man recruited into the group by al-Awlaki been
successful, nearly a decade's worth of successes in the war on al-Qaeda
and its allies could have been reversed in a matter of minutes.
AQAP Activities Since 2009
In the last few years, while core al-Qaeda declined in Pakistan,
AQAP strengthened in Yemen.\76\ AQAP's core membership grew from
approximately 300 members in 2009 to around 1,000 in 2012, as hundreds
of tribesmen joined AQAP in the fight against the U.S.-backed Yemeni
government.\77\ Then-National Security Council spokesman Tommy Vietor
stated in May 2012 that, ``while AQAP has grown in strength . . . many
of its supporters are tribal militants or part-time supporters who
collaborate with AQAP for self-serving, personal interests rather than
affinity with al-Qaeda's global ideology. The portion of hard-core,
committed AQAP members is relatively small.''\78\
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\76\ Schmitt, Eric. ``As Al-Qaeda Loses a Leader, Its Power Shifts
From Pakistan.'' The New York Times. June 7, 2012. http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/06/08/world/asia/al-qaeda-power-shifting-away-
from-pakistan.html?_r=1&.
\77\ Johnsen, Gregory D. The Last Refuge: Yemen, al-Qaeda, and
America's War in Arabia. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2013.
\78\ Raghavan, Sudarsan. ``In Yemen, U.S. Airstrikes Breed Anger,
and Sympathy for al-Qaeda.'' The Washington Post. May 29, 2012. http://
articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-05-29/world/35456187_1_aqap-drone-
strikes-qaeda.
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In the summer of 2010, AQAP increased its attacks in Yemen,
assassinating dozens of Yemeni security officials while simultaneously
plotting to place printer cartridges containing explosives on U.S.-
bound flights. The packages were intercepted on October 29 while en
route to the United States due to a tip from Saudi intelligence.\79\
AQAP also launched Inspire magazine in July 2010 and established the
Arabic-language al-Madad News Agency in 2011.\80\
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\79\ Shane, Scott. ``Qaeda Branch Aimed for Broad Damage at Low
Cost.'' The New York Times. November 20, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/11/21/world/middleeast/21parcel.html.
\80\ ``Counterterrorism 2013 Calendar: Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP).'' National Counterterrorism Center. http://
www.nctc.gov/site/groups/aqap.html.
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In March 2011, when Yemen's then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh
sanctioned the killing of Arab Spring--inspired protesters in the
Yemeni capital, Sana'a, his allies turned against him and a substantial
portion of his army deserted.\81\ Soldiers in the south, who hadn't
been paid in weeks, abandoned their posts, leaving the area open for
AQAP to move in.\82\ Other troops returned to Sana'a to support the
government there. The United States was forced to pull some Special
Operations Forces out of Yemen, and counterterrorism training there
slowed dramatically.\83\ Fighters from Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and
Somalia are believed to have joined the insurgency, and in the spring
of 2011, AQAP gained control of two Yemeni provinces and increased
their presence in ten more.\84\
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\81\ Stier, Eric. ``In Yemen, top military commanders defect from
Saleh regime.'' Christian Science Monitor. March 21, 2011. http://
www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/0321/In-Yemen-top-military-
commanders-defect-from-Saleh-regime.
\82\ Johnsen, Gregory D. The Last Refuge: Yemen, al-Qaeda, and
America's War in Arabia. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2013.
\83\ Schmitt, Eric. ``U.S. Teaming With New Yemen Government on
Strategy to Combat Al-Qaeda.'' The New York Times. February 26, 2012.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/27/world/middleeast/us-teaming-with-
yemens-new-government-to-combat-al-qaeda.html?_r=0.
\84\ Swift, Christopher. ``To Defeat Al-Qaeda, Win in Yemen.''
Bloomberg View. June 21, 2012. http://christopher-swift.com/
publications/to-defeat-al-qaeda-win-in-yemen.
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In a sign that AQAP may have learned from some of the mistakes
other al-Qaeda affiliates have made in the past, it has provided some
services to Yemeni citizens. It has also, on occasion, operated without
using the al-Qaeda name, a brand that even bin Laden understood to be
deeply tarnished. For instance, AQAP operates under the name ``Ansar
al-Sharia'' when reaching out to Yemeni locals and aims to demonstrate
its adherence to Islamic law.\85\ According to Christopher Swift, a
Georgetown University researcher who has done field work in Yemen,
economic factors, rather than religious extremism, provide AQAP with
influence among locals. Insurgents offer local men ``the promise of a
rifle, a car and a salary of $400 a month--a veritable fortune in a
country where nearly half the population lives on less than $2 a
day.''\86\
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\85\ Swift, Christopher. ``Arc of Convergence: AQAP, Ansar al-
Shari'a and the Struggle for Yemen.'' CTC Sentinel. June 21, 2012.
http://christopher-swift.com/publications/arc-of-convergence-aqap-
ansar-al-sharia-and-the-struggle-for-yemen.
\86\ Swift, Christopher. ``To Defeat Al-Qaeda, Win in Yemen.''
Bloomberg View. June 21, 2012. http://christopher-swift.com/
publications/to-defeat-al-qaeda-win-in-yemen.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
AQAP has also given towns new wells, water, and food in exchange
for the tribal elders' help in recruiting. In areas of the country with
the most chaotic security environments, AQAP has used a combination of
armed militias to gain control of territory, gifts of money, and
weapons to prop up local sheikhs, and sharia courts to prosecute
criminals and provide some semblance of law and order. ``In doing so,
the movement exhibits a pragmatic approach that has more in common with
the Taliban's operations in Afghanistan than it does with Osama bin
Laden's globalized, decentralized jihad,'' Swift says.\87\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\87\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In mid-2011, as the fight between the Yemeni government and armed
opposition groups escalated, AQAP moved to seize more territory in
southern Yemen, and the Yemeni government launched aggressive counter-
assaults.\88\ The United States also resumed its campaign of air and
drone strikes, which had been halted the previous year. In February
2012, under pressure from the Obama administration, President Saleh
signed an agreement to step down. Abd Rabu Mansur Hadi took over as
president and subsequently gave the U.S. drone program unfettered
access to targets in Yemen.\89\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\88\ Johnsen, Gregory D. The Last Refuge: Yemen, al-Qaeda, and
America's War in Arabia. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2013.
\89\ Schmitt, Eric. ``U.S. Teaming With New Yemen Government on
Strategy to Combat Al-Qaeda.'' The New York Times. February 26, 2012.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/27/world/middleeast/us-teaming-with-
yemens-new-government-to-combat-al-qaeda.html?_r=0.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With the broad permission granted by Yemen's new president, the
United States greatly expanded its drone campaign in 2012 and began to
train and equip the Yemeni military to better combat AQAP.\90\ Since
2010, U.S. drone strikes in Yemen have killed at least 31 high-level
al-Qaeda operatives, including al-Awlaki and Samir Khan, the AQAP
operative believed to have been the driving force behind Inspire
magazine.\91\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\90\ Ibid.
\91\ New America Foundation, National Security Studies Program.
``U.S. Covert War in Yemen.'' Last updated June 9, 2013. http://
yemendrones.newamerica.net/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Al-Awlaki's death likely reduced the organization's ability to plan
transnational attacks because he was a key operational planner.\92\ The
group has not attempted an actual attack on the West since the failed
2010 cartridge-bomb plot. (A 2012 AQAP bombing plot was, in actuality,
controlled by Saudi intelligence, which had inserted an informer into
the group.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\92\ Schmitt, Eric. ``Intelligence Report Lists Iran and
Cyberattacks as Leading Concerns.'' The New York Times. January 31,
2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/01/world/intelligence-chief-sees-
al-qaeda-likely-to-continue-fragmenting.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With his native English-speaking ability, al-Awlaki was also AQAP's
chief recruiter of foreigners, particularly those with Western
connections; the group's foreign recruitment has dried up since his
death. However, even in death, his voice continues to resonate with
militants in the West. The surviving Boston bombing suspect, for
example, admitted to watching al-Awlaki's sermons on-line, though there
is no evidence that the Boston bombers ever communicated with him.\93\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\93\ Schmitt, Eric, Mark Mazzetti, Michael S. Schmidt, and Scott
Shane. ``Boston Plotter Said to Initially Target July 4 for Attack.''
The New York Times. May 2, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/03/us/
Boston-bombing-suspects-planned-july-fourth-attack.html?-
pagewanted=all&_r=0.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On July 17, 2013, AQAP confirmed the death of Said al-Shihri, the
group's deputy commander, in a video posted to jihadist websites.
Shihri, a Saudi and 6-year resident of the U.S. detention facility in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, had long been reported dead from wounds he
received from a drone strike in late 2012. The statement said Shihri
had indeed died in a U.S. drone strike and that ``lax security measures
during his telephone contacts enabled the enemy to identify and kill
him,'' though it did not confirm the date of his death.\94\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\94\ ``Al-Qaeda Confirms Death of Yemen Leader in American Drone
Strike.'' Al-Akhbar English. July 17, 2013. http://english.al-
akhbar.com/content/al-qaeda-confirms-death-yemen-leader-american-drone-
strike.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shihri's death is another blow to the organization, which as of
mid-2013 is battered, though not defeated. In the past three years, as
outlined above, more than 30 al-Qaeda leaders and other senior
operatives in Yemen have been killed by U.S. drone strikes, according
to a count by the New America Foundation.\95\ AQAP's only remaining
leaders appear to be its chief bomb-maker, Asiri; AQAP's leader and
founder, Nasser al-Wuhayshi; and the man who delivered Shihri's eulogy,
Ibrahim al-Rubaish, another former Guantanamo detainee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\95\ New America Foundation, National Security Studies Program.
``U.S. Covert War in Yemen.'' Last updated June 9, 2013. http://
yemendrones.newamerica.net/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In June 2012, AQAP elements withdrew from their southern Yemen
strongholds when Yemeni military forces--with the support of local
tribesmen and U.S. airstrikes--regained control of cities and towns in
Abyan and Shabwah provinces.\96\ They have since been reduced to
carrying out smaller-scale, hit-and-run attacks; nothing close to the
massive attack in May 2012, when an AQAP suicide bomber blew himself up
at a military parade rehearsal in Sana'a, killing upward of 100 people,
mostly soldiers, and injuring more than 200.\97\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\96\ ``Counterterrorism 2013 Calendar: Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP).'' National Counterterrorism Center. http://
www.nctc.gov/site/groups/aqap.html.
\97\ ``Al-Qaeda Attack on Yemen Army Parade Causes Carnage.'' BBC
News. May 21, 2012. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-
18142695.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Western Recruitment
AQAP has led global online radicalization efforts and has made
Western recruitment to its cause a priority in its propaganda. This
``lone wolf'' strategy is spearheaded by AQAP's al-Malahem Media
Foundation. Written in eloquent English and formatted like a U.S.
tabloid, al-Malahem's Inspire magazine incites Western youth to join
the jihad and carry out attacks within their own communities. According
to the spring 2013 issue of Inspire, ``Lone-Jihad is impossible to
counter and stop, except when basic cooking ingredients and building
material become illegal!''\98\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\98\ Almoravid, Abu Abdillah. ``Who and Why?'' Inspire. Spring
2013, Issue 11. http://info.publicintelligence.net/
InspireSpring2013.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
______
Statement of The Jewish Federations of North America
September 17, 2013.
The Honorable Peter T. King,
Chairman, Counterterrorism and Intelligence Subcommittee, U.S. House of
Representatives, Washington, DC 20515.
The Honorable Brian M. Higgins,
Ranking Member, Counterterrorism and Intelligence Subcommittee, U.S.
House of Representatives, Washington, DC 20515.
Dear Chairman King and Ranking Member Higgins: I write today on
behalf of The Jewish Federations of North America to applaud you for
scheduling tomorrow's hearing on the ``Al-Qaeda Threat.''
As you know last week, in marking the twelfth anniversary of 9/11,
the leader of al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, issued a message to
followers and adherents to undertake ``lone-wolf'' attacks in the
United States. Provocative statements such as this are not new from al-
Zawahiri. On multiple occasions, he has called upon al-Qaeda followers
and sympathizers to attack Jewish interests in the United States and
worldwide.
This focus on ``soft'' Jewish civilian targets is deeply engrained
in al-Qaeda's method of operation. In February 2002, the Associated
Press published an English translation of an al-Qaeda training manual
smuggled out of Afghanistan that directed followers to attack Jewish
organizations and institutions in every country Jews exist and to carry
out the attacks in a manner designed to cause mass causalities.
There have been several deadly attacks and potentially deadly
attempts targeting the Jewish community in the United States and abroad
in the intervening years, as set forth in the attached risk
compilation--from al-Qaeda to extremists across the ideological
spectrum. At a February 15, 2012 hearing of the Homeland Security
Committee, Chairman King recognized the ``almost imminent threat posed
by Hezbollah quite possibly to Jewish houses of worship and religious
institutions.'' For these reasons, we seek your consideration of the
risks to Jewish communal security as you hear from and question
tomorrow's panel of distinguished witnesses.
Sincerely,
Robert B. Goldberg,
Senior Director, Legislative Affairs.
Appendix.--September 13, 2013
risk overview: threats, vulnerabilities, and potential consequences
Existential Threats to Jewish Communal Institutions
Since 9/11, the FBI, Department of Homeland Security and other law
enforcement entities have warned the U.S. Jewish community of a number
of plots by international terrorist organizations, white supremacists,
prison Islamic radicals, and other home-grown violent individuals
across the political spectrum. While a number of prominent plots have
been averted, others became operationalized.
One regular thread among many terrorist occurrences is the
symmetrical selection of targets that include both Government/military
facilities/personnel, and Jewish communal institutions and civilians.
One large distinction, however, is that the latter category comprises
soft nonprofits with limited resources and capabilities with which to
harden their facilities and to train their personnel.
Additionally, over the past decade, the FBI has reported that
approximately 70% of religious-based hate crimes have been perpetrated
against the Jewish community--well above the combined occurrences of
all other faiths. (Source: Annual FBI Hate Crimes Statistics Reports;
Link: http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2012/december/annual-hate-crimes-
report-released/annual-hate-crimes-report-released).
December 10, 2012.--Of the 1,480 victims of an anti-religious hate
crime, 63.2 percent were victims of an offender's anti-Jewish bias--
more than all other categories combined. (Source: FBI Hate Crime
Statistics, 12/10/12; Link: http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2012/
december/annual-hate-crimes-report-released/annual-hate-crimes-report-
released).
July 20, 2012.--New York police believe Iranian Revolutionary
Guards or their proxies have been involved so far this year in nine
plots against Israeli or Jewish targets around the world. According to
NYPD analysts, ``through its own Revolutionary Guard and Hezbollah,''
Iran had ``sharply increased its operational tempo and its willingness
to conduct terrorist attacks targeting Israeli interests and the
International Jewish community worldwide.'' (Source: Reuters, 07/20/12;
Link: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/20/us-iran-hezbollah-
plots-idUSBRE86- J0SW20120720).
June 5, 2012.--According to Homeland Security Secretary Janet
Napolitano, ``Jews face special risks that require vigilance.'' She
also stated that, during her tenure at DHS, threats to the Jewish
community came from foreign entities, homegrown extremists, and
domestic hate groups. (Source: The Forward, 06/05/12: Link: http://
forward.com/articles/157280/jews-face-special-risks-napolitano-says/
?p=all).
February 16, 2012.--With tensions between Iran and the West running
high, law enforcement officials are concerned Iran or its surrogates
could mount attacks against Jewish targets inside the United States.
(Source: CNN, 02/16/12; Link: http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/15/us/iran-
fbi-warning/index.html?iref=allsearch).
January 9, 2009.--Terrorist analysts report that throughout the
world, Jewish communities will be specifically at risk from several
``fatwas'' disseminated through Arab media and jihadist websites,
including one instructing that ``any Jew is a legitimate target that
can be struck by Muslims.'' (Source: European Strategic Intelligence
and Security Center, 01/09/09).
March 24, 2008.--Al-Qaeda's second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri,
released an audio tape on which called upon al-Qaeda followers and
sympathizers to attack Jewish interests worldwide. The tape, part of a
string of provocative statements by bin Laden and his senior cohorts,
was regarded by counter terrorism experts as a new and bold escalation
by al-Qaeda to link the Middle East conflict with immediate and urgent
violence in the West, including against Jewish targets in the United
States. (Source: Associated Press, 03/24/08).
November 24, 2002.--In a ``Letter to America'' Osama bin Laden
released soon after the 9/11 attacks, to explain his reasoning and
intent to justify the attacks, he wrote, ``The creation and
continuation of Israel is one of the greatest crimes, and you are the
leaders of its criminals.'' ``This is why the American people cannot be
innocent of all the crimes committed by the Americans and Jews against
us.'' The letter also made clear that, to bin Laden, civilian
populations, as with governments, were acceptable (equivalent) targets
for retaliation. (Source: Guardian (UK), 11/24/02; Full text of the
letter: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/nov/24/theobserver).
June 3, 2002.--Abdul Rahman Yasin, one of the terrorists in the
first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993, revealed in a CBS 60
Minutes interview that the World Trade Center was not the terrorists'
original target. Rather, they initially planned to blow up Jewish
neighborhoods in Brooklyn. But after scouting Crown Heights and
Williamsburg, they decided to target the World Trade Center, instead.
The reasoning: Rather than undertaking multiple small explosions in
Jewish neighborhoods, they figured that one big explosion in the World
Trade Center would kill mostly Jews who they believed made up a
majority of the workforce there, according to Yasin's statements.
(Source: CBS News 06/02/02; Reuters, 06/03/02).
February 2, 2002.--Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, al-Qaeda's
training manual was translated by the Associated Press, which included
a directive to followers to attack Jewish communal organizations and
institutions in every country Jews exist and to carry out the attacks
in a manner designed to cause the most causalities. It specified
community centers, hospitals, places of worship, and wherever there are
large gathering places of Jews. (Source: Associated Press, 02/02/02).
Recent Jewish Security Threats
May 16, 2013.--A 22-year-old Moroccan man has been convicted and
sentenced to 5 years and 4 months in jail for plotting a terror attack
against a Milan synagogue. The man was arrested in March 2012 after
police noted that the suspect had used a Google maps application to
case security at the synagogue. (Source: The Associated Press, 05/16/
13).
May 7, 2013.--Israeli airstrikes on Syrian missile stockpiles
suspected to be destined for Hezbollah raise concern for retaliation
against Jewish civilians. According to the Washington Post, ``U.S. and
Middle Eastern officials say any retaliation would probably come in a
familiar form: Attempted attacks by Hezbollah operatives on Israeli or
Jewish civilian targets, perhaps far outside the Middle East.''
(Source: Washington Post, May 8, 2013; Link: http://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/western-officials-fear-
retaliation-for-israeli-airstrikes-in-syria/2013/05/07/2989f1a4-b72f-
11e2-92f3-f291801936b8_print.html).
May 1, 2013.--Bomb threats were phoned in to two different Houston
synagogues (Congregation Beth Israel and Congregation Or Ami) causing
their schools to cancel classes, so that the FBI and Houston Police
Department could search the institutions for explosives. When the
buildings reopen, it was reported that they will require extra security
personnel and police presence.
April 8, 2013.--Ruben Ubiles, 35, who the police say has more than
50 prior arrests, on charges including robbery, assault, and weapons
and drug possession, was arrested for the hate-crime burning of a dozen
Jewish doorway adornments in Williamsburg, Brooklyn, on Holocaust
Remembrance Day. The ornaments, known as mezuzot, contain scrolls with
Old Testament verses that are intended to bless and protect the home.
(Source: New York Times, 04/10/13).
March 18, 2013.--French President Francois Hollande on Sunday paid
tribute to the 7 people who last year fell victim to terrorist Mohamed
Merah, saying he remains committed to the fight against terrorism. A
self-described al-Qaeda sympathizer, 23-year-old Merah murdered Rabbi
Jonathan Sandler, his sons Aryeh and Gavriel and Miriam Monsonego at a
Jewish school, Otzar HaTorah, in Toulouse. Before that, he murdered
three paratroopers. (Source: Arutz Sheva, 03/18/13: Link: http://
www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/166321).
March 17, 2013.--Marked the 21st anniversary of the March 17, 1992
terrorist attack that left 28 people dead and 240 wounded at the Israel
Embassy in Buenos Aires. Two years later (July 1994) 85 members of the
Argentine Jewish community were killed in an attack on a community
center. This was the deadliest terror attack in Argentina's history. In
both cases, the attackers were never caught. (Source: Arutz Sheva, 03/
17/13; Link: http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/166301).
March 15, 2013.--An Algerian man convicted of plotting to bomb
synagogues was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. According to New
York City Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly, ``Ferhani posed a real
threat to New York's Jewish community, eagerly purchasing a hand
grenade, two guns and 150 rounds of ammunition from an undercover
officer as part of Ferhani's stated intention to attack and then blow
up a synagogue in Manhattan, and take out the whole entire building.''
(Source: CNN, 03/15/13).
January 30, 2013.--A new policy paper from the Washington Institute
for Near East Studies finds that Iran's elite Qods Force and Hezbollah
militants pose a growing threat to the United States, fueling worries
that they increasingly have the ability and willingness to attack the
United States, and, in particular, Jewish targets. Among the most
likely scenarios, stated the report, ``an attack targeting a location
affiliated with a Jewish community abroad'', such as the report noted,
the 1994 bombing of AMIA Jewish community center in Buenos Aires.
(Source WINES, January 30, 2013; Link: http://
www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus123.pdf).
January 23, 2013.--The Congressional Research Service published a
comprehensive analysis on the complex threat of American Jihadist
Terrorism, including particular threats to Jewish communal security:
(1) The 2005 plot by the group Jamiyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh, to attack
Jewish institutions, including synagogues, and military recruiting
offices and military bases, which the report described as the ``most
prominent post-9/11 example of domestic violent jihadist activity
inspired in prison;'' (2) The 2009 Newburgh Four case, which involved a
plot to trigger explosive in front of a synagogue and Jewish community
center and to shoot down military aircraft; (3) The 2011 grenade plot
by Ahmed Ferhani, an Algerian, and Mohamed Mamdouth, a naturalized U.S.
citizen from Morocco, who plotted to blow up prominent synagogues in
New York City; and (4) The 2012 bombing plot by Amine El Khalifi, a
Moroccan citizen living in the United States on an expired B2 tourist
visa, who targeted the U.S. Capitol, a synagogue, and a restaurant that
was frequented by U.S. military personnel. (Source: CRS, 01/23/13;
Link: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41416.pdf).
January 16, 2013.--The FBI warned the Detroit Jewish community of
potential risks after discovering in the home of a known white
supremacist and convicted murderer, Richard Schmidt, 18 firearms
including assaults weapons, high-capacity magazines, and more than 40
thousand rounds of ammunition; Nazi paraphernalia; a ``Jewish hit-
list'' of 500 Jewish-owned businesses; and detailed information on the
leadership of the Jewish Federation of Metropolitan Detroit and
diagrams of the facility. (Source: U.S. Attorney, Ohio, 01/16/13; Link:
http://www.justice.gov/usao/ohn/news/2013/16janschmidt.html).
Historic Record of Threats
December 4, 2012.--A man from Queens accused of plotting to blow up
a synagogue in Manhattan ended on Tuesday when the man, Ahmed Ferhani,
pleaded guilty to 10 charges, including conspiracy as a crime of
terrorism and criminal possession of a weapon as a crime of terrorism.
He was arrested immediately after making a downpayment in exchange for
a hand grenade, three semiautomatic pistols and 150 rounds of
ammunition. (Source: New York Times, 12/04/12; Link: http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/12/05/nyregion/ahmed-ferhani-pleads-guilty-in-
plot-to-blow-up-synagogue.html).
July 20, 2012.--New York police believe Iranian Revolutionary
Guards or their proxies have been involved so far this year in nine
plots against Israeli or Jewish targets around the world. According to
NYPD analysts, ``through its own Revolutionary Guard and Hezbollah,''
Iran had ``sharply increased its operational tempo and its willingness
to conduct terrorist attacks targeting Israeli interests and the
International Jewish community worldwide''. (Source: Reuters, 07/20/12;
Link: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/20/us-iran-hezbollah-
plots-idUSBRE86- J0SW20120720).
June 22, 2012.--The FBI announced the 11.5-year sentence for
American Jess Curtis Morton, aka Younus Abdullah Muhammed, for running
several internet sites in the United States to solicit attacks and
future threat against Jewish organizations in the United States. His
co-conspirator lived in Fairfax, VA (less than 20 miles from Capitol
Hill). The websites Morton ran perpetuated al-Qaeda-produced propaganda
and included hit lists. (Source: U.S. Attorney's Office/Eastern
District of Virginia, 06/22/12; Link: http://www.fbi.gov/washingtondc/
press-releases/2012/leader-of-revolution-muslim-sentenced-to-138-
months-for-using-internet-to-solicit-murder-encourage-violent-
extremism?utm_campaign=email-Immediate&utm_-
medium=email&utm_source=washington-press-releases&utm_content=108401).
June 20, 2012.--This week, the New York Post described a new
``Crime Wave'' against Brooklyn's Jewish community when it reported
several synagogue thefts and anti-Semitic vandalism targeting
synagogues and Jewish neighborhoods. (Source: New York Post, 06/20/12;
Link: http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/brooklyn/
anti_jewish_crime_wave_GNiQRau6jWlgBeqM7ugEBO; Forward, 06/05/12; Link:
http://m.forward.com/articles/157280).
June 5, 2012.--According to Homeland Security Secretary Janet
Napolitano, ``Jews face special risks that require vigilance.'' She
also stated that, during her tenure at DHS, threats to the Jewish
community came from foreign entities, home-grown extremists, and
domestic hate groups. (Source: The Forward, 06/05/12: Link: http://
forward.com/articles/157280/jews-face-special-risks-napolitano-says/
?p=all).
May 3, 2012.--On the anniversary of the bin Laden raid, the U.S.
Government released a sampling of documents. Only one pertained to
approving funding for terrorism--the approval of a request by a
militant group to purchase and manufacture weapons, and to support
operations against the Jewish community. (Source: CNN, May 3, 2012;
Link: http://edition.cnn.com/2012/05/03/world/osama-bin-laden-
documents/index.html).
April 23, 2012.--Meanwhile, the United States just placed a $10
million bounty on Hafeez Saeed, the leader of Lashkar-i-Taiba, an al-
Qaeda-affiliated militant group, and the mastermind behind the 2008
Mumbai, India massacre. A paramount objective of the massacre was an
attack on that city's Jewish community center and the torture and
murder of its Jewish civilians. Saeed remains at-large. (Source: Pro
Publica, 04.03.12; Link: http://www.propublica.org/article/10-million-
bounty-for-alleged-mumbai-plotter-ups-pressure-on-pakistan).
March 26, 2012.--The livery driver whose two-gun attack on a group
of Hasidic students on the Brooklyn Bridge shocked the city 18 years
ago has finally admitted that he targeted them because they were
Jewish, The Post has learned. Rashid Baz was convicted in 1995 of
murdering Yeshiva student Ari Halberstam, 16, and trying to kill more
than a dozen others in a van with a hail of bullets he fired on a
Manhattan approach to the bridge on March 1, 1994. (Source: New York
Post, 03/26/2012; Link: http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/
killer_Jews_my_target_gOgy- Ds9rPP92Z5irlUqK1H).
March 26, 2012.--According to the Associated Press this morning,
French authorities are defending criticism that their counterterrorism
authorities and laws failed in preventing an Islamic terrorist attack
that killed paratroopers, Jewish children, and a rabbi (teacher) in
front of a Jewish school in Toulouse, France. The general reaction from
Europol, and a growing chorus of other European terrorist authorities,
is that home-grown extremists are hard to track and stop; combating
individuals acting in isolation will be tough and problematic; and it
will be hard for police to apprehend them before they attack. (Source:
Associated Press, 03/26/12).
February 17, 2012.--The FBI announced the indictment of Amine El
Khalifi, an illegal immigrant from Morocco, for attempting a suicide
attack on the Capitol. According to the indictment, El Khalifi had
first indicated his intention to blow up a Jewish civilian target--a
synagogue. (Sources: FBI WFO; Link: http://www.fbi.gov/washingtondc/
press-releases/2012/virginia-man-accused-of-attempting-to-bomb-u.s.-
capitol-in-suicide-attack?utm_campaign=email?Immediate&utm_medium=-
email&utm_source=washington-press-releases&utm_content=72268; Criminal
Complaint Link: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/documents/
amine-el-khalifi-criminal-complaint.html).
February 16, 2012.--With tensions between Iran and the West running
high, law enforcement officials are concerned Iran or its surrogates
could mount attacks against Jewish targets inside the United States.
(Source: CNN, 02/16/12; Link: http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/15/us/iran-
fbi-warning/index.html?iref=allsearch).
February 15, 2012.--A statement by House Homeland Security
Committee Chairman Peter King called attention to the ``almost imminent
threat posed by Hezbollah quite possibly to Jewish houses of worship
and religious institutions.'' (Source: Hearing: An Examination of the
President's Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Request for the Department of
Homeland Security; Link: http://homeland.house.gov/hearing/hearing-
examination-presidents-fy-2013-budget-request-department-homeland-
security).
February 14, 2012.--With Iran allegedly striking out at Israeli
citizens and Jewish targets around the world, Israeli and American
security officials in the United States are on high alert. According to
Frank Cilluffo, director of the Homeland Security Policy Institute at
George Washington University in the District of Columbia, the recent
incidents in India, Georgia, Thailand, and Azerbaijan have ``all the
hallmarks of a concerted campaign'' that could extend to U.S. soil. As
such, the NYPD has adjusted its counterterrorism posture to include
increased presence in recent weeks at Israeli government facilities and
synagogues. Furthermore, around the country, private security industry
officials report numerous requests for Jewish institutional security.
(Source: ABC News; Link: http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/heightened-
security-us-iran-threat/story?id=15592451).
February 14, 2012.--In a lead story, the New York Times reported on
the escalation of threats posed by Iran (and its proxies)--meaning
violent actions taken against Jewish targets outside of the region. The
article followed recent plots and attacks that have increased the
concern of American Jewish leaders for the safety and security of
Jewish community centers and synagogues within the United States, and
the article reminds that an attack on the Mumbai Jewish community
center led to the torture and death of a number of Jewish American
civilians in 2008. (Source: New York Times, 02/14/12; Link: http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/02/14/world/middleeast/israeli-embassy-officials-
attacked-in-india-and-georgia.html?_r=2&ref=- world&pagewanted=print).
February 14, 2012.--Convicted arsonist/bomber Omar Bulphred, 26,
will serve his full 7-year prison term for hate crimes--including the
firebombing of a Jewish school for children and attempted bombing of a
Jewish community center--will remain behind bars for his entire
sentence as he continues to pose a serious problem for Correctional
Service Canada (CSC). While investigating the fires, police found
letters in which Bulphred and an accomplice declared jihad and demanded
the liberation of their ``brothers''--a group of men arrested on
terrorism charges in Toronto. (Source: The Gazette (Montreal); Link:
http://www.montrealgazette.com/news/todays-paper/
Hate+crime+convict+refused+early+release/6148040/story.html).
February 10, 2012.--Nine extremists who ``were well advanced in
their terrorist planning'' were convicted. ``The men possessed almost
every famous jihadi publication, including copies of Inspire, an
English language internet magazine produced by Yemen-based extremist
cleric Anwar al-Awlaki's group al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.''
According to the prosecution, ``These men were motivated to act as they
did in large part by extreme jihadist propaganda circulated on the
internet.'' Convicted for planning a ``Mumbai''-style attack that
included targeting the Jewish community, one of the group's leaders and
his brother, ``were bugged claiming that fewer than 100,000 Jews'' died
in the Holocaust and talking about how Hitler ``had been on the same
side as the Muslims'' because he understood that ``the Jews were
dangerous''. (Source: http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/british-
terror-gang-that-plotted-to-blow-680112).
February 9, 2012.--The leader of ``Revolution Muslim'' pleaded
guilty to using the internet to solicit murder and encourage violent
extremism against Jews. (Source: The FBI; Link: http://www.fbi.gov/
washingtondc/press-releases/2012/leader-of- revolution-muslim-pleads-
guilty-to-using-internet-to-solicit-murder-and-encourage-violent-
extremism-utm_campaign=email-Immediate&utm_medium=email&utm-
_source=washington-press-releases&utm_content=69655).
February 1, 2012.--Four defendants inspired by al-Qaeda have
admitted planning to detonate bombs--Mumbai-style--at five symbolic
sites including the U.S. Embassy, the Palace of Westminster (both well-
fortified institutions), and two prominent rabbis from separate
synagogues. The men reportedly admitted to being inspired by the
preachings of the radical al-Qaeda extremist Yemeni American imam Anwar
al-Awlaki and to being in possession of two editions of al-Qaeda
magazine Inspire for terrorist purposes. (Source: BBC News, link:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-16833032).
January 25, 2012.--A joint attack by Iran and Hezbollah against
Jewish targets in Bangkok, Thailand, had been stopped, where the
operative in custody reportedly confessed to having intended to blow up
a synagogue and the Israeli Embassy. Moreover, the New York Times story
reported that Iran and Hezbollah have also planted some 40 terrorist
sleeper cells around the world, ready to attack Jewish targets if Iran
deems it necessary to retaliate against efforts to thwart its nuclear
ambitions. (Source: The New York Times Magazine, 01/25/12; link: http:/
/www.nytimes.com/2012/01/29/magazine/will-israel-attack-
iran.html?scp=1&sq=-
six%20key%20strikes%20thought%20to%20be%20made%20by%20the%20mossad-
&st=cse).
January 13, 2012.--Federal-elected officials from North Jersey and
across the State pledged resources in the investigation into the
firebombing of a Rutherford synagogue at a meeting convened to discuss
safety at Jewish temples Thursday night. (Source: New Jersey On-line;
Link: http://www.nj.com/bergen/index.ssf/2012/01/
officials_pledge_federal_resources_for_investigation_into_temple-
_firebombing_bias_crimes.html).
December 2, 2011.--Homeland Security Director Janet Napolitano and
Attorney General Eric Holder met with their counterparts from Britain
and other European partners to discuss issues of points of cooperation
in fighting terrorism. In seeking this meeting to improve the U.S.-E.U.
partnership to combat global terrorism, the Secretary pointed to the
success of shared efforts in aiding the investigation and prosecution
of American David Headley, the mastermind behind the deadly attack on
the Mumbai Jewish Community Center just over 3 years ago--November 27,
2008. (Sources: Associated Press; Link: http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-
201_162-57336080/napolitano-lone-wolf-terror-threat-growing/).
December 2, 2011.--Jubair Ahmad, 24, a native of Pakistan and
resident of Woodbridge, VA, pleaded guilty of providing material
support to Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), a designated foreign terrorist
organization. ``By preparing and posting a graphic video that glorified
violent extremism, Mr. Ahmad directly supported the mission of a
designated terrorist organization,'' said FBI Assistant Director in
Charge McJunkin. ``The FBI will track down and disrupt those who
communicate with terrorist groups for the purpose of recruiting others
to inflict harm on the U.S. and its interests overseas.'' Ahmad
considered including images of the Mumbai attack to show the power of
LeT. This is a reference to LeT's operation against the city of Mumbai,
India, on Nov. 26, 2008, which resulted in the death of over 160
people, including a number of Jewish Americans killed at the targeted
Jewish Community Center. (Source: U.S. Attorney, Eastern District of
Virginia; Link: http://www.fbi.gov/washingtondc/press-releases/2011/
virginia-man-pleads-guilty-to-providing-material-support-to-terrorist-
organization?utm_campaign=email-Immed-
iate&utm_medium=email&utm_source=washington-press-releases&utm-
_content=53207).
November 14, 2011.--The FBI released hate crimes data for 2010. As
has been the case since the FBI first began reporting incidents of hate
crimes, approximately 70% of all religious bias crimes are committed
against Jewish institutions and civilians in the United States.
(Source: FBI Hate Crime Statistics: http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/ciis/
ucr/hate-crime/2010).
November 9, 2011.--The Cold War's most notorious international
terrorists, Ilich Ramirez Sanchez (aka ``Carlos the Jackal''), went on
trial in France, on charges of instigating four attacks in 1982 and
1983. Sanchez's first terrorist strike was an assassination attempt
against major British philanthropist of Jewish charities, Joseph Sieff.
Sanchez gained entrance into Sieff's home by gunpoint, and shot the
past vice-president of the British Zionist Federation at point-blank
range in the face. (Sources: Associated Press; Link: http://m.ctv.ca/
topstories/20111107/carlos-ilich-ramirez-sanchez-jackal-terror-trial-
france-111107.html and TruTV; Link: http://www.trutv.com/library/crime/
terroristsspies/terrorists/jackal/1.html).
January 17, 2011.--Five synagogues and a Jewish school in a Jewish
enclave in Montreal were attacked in a single night. Condemning the
attack, the Liberal Leader, Michael Ignatieff, remarked, ``Our thoughts
and prayers are with Jewish communities across Canada that once again
have been made to feel that their congregations and the children in
their schools have cause to fear for their safety.'' (Sources: The
Globe and Mail (Canada), 01/17/11).
October 29, 2010.--Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula attempted to
ship air cargo bombs addressed to Chicago-based synagogues. (Source:
MSNBC, 10/29/10).
January 20, 2010.--FBI Director Robert Mueller testified before the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary that al-Qaeda; self-directed groups
linked to terror organizations; and self-radicalizing, self-executing
homegrown terrorists remained determined to strike the country and the
threat has not diminished. (Source: http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/10-
01-20Mueller'sTestimony.pdf, 01/20/10).
December 28, 2009.--The FBI Year in Review chronicled the U.S. top
terror cases, including: The arrest of David Coleman Headley, a U.S.
citizen, for his role in planning the 2008 Mumbai attacks, where six
Americans (4 Jewish) were killed; the arrest of four radicalized
individuals for attempting to blow up a Riverdale, New York synagogue
and Jewish community center; the deadly shooting at the Holocaust
Museum in Washington, DC; and the attack on an Army recruiting center
in Little Rock, Arkansas, by an assailant who was also found to be
targeting Jewish sites in Little Rock, Philadelphia, Atlanta, New York,
Louisville, and Memphis. (Source: FBI Release, 12/28/09; Link: http://
www.fbi.gov/page2/dec09/review122809.html).
December 15, 2009.--The House Homeland Security Subcommittee on
Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk held a hearing on
the emergence of violent extremism and domestic terrorism in the United
States. In her opening remarks, Chairwomen Jane Harman (D-CA) focused
on two infamous plots and attacks against Jewish communal interests at
home and abroad: (1) The plot by Jami'yyat Ul-Islam Is-Shaheeh, a
prison-founded radical Muslim group, to attack prominent synagogues and
other Jewish iconic sites in the Los Angeles area; and (2) The massacre
in Mumbai, India, where American David Headley is now accused by
Federal law enforcement officials of having helped to identify and
surveil for attack, among others, the Chabad House Jewish community
center, whose director, Rabbi Gavriel Noach Holtzberg, his wife, unborn
child, and four others were tortured and killed. (Source: House
Homeland Security Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing,
and Terrorism Risk, 12/15/09; Link: http://homeland.house.gov/Hearings/
index.asp?ID=229).
September 13, 2009.--Osama bin Laden warned the American people
over their Government's close ties with Israel. In the tape, bin Laden
warned, ``If you stop the war, then fine. Otherwise we will have no
choice but to continue our war of attrition on every front.'' (Source:
Washington Post, 09/13/09).
August 17, 2009.--A man was sentenced to 70 months in prison today
for his role in a domestic terrorism plot to wage war on the United
States by attacking Jewish synagogues and military bases. Hammad Riaz
Samana is the fourth member of Jami'yyat Ul-Islam Is-Shaheeh, or JIS, a
prison-founded radical Muslim group that wanted to make a political
statement that also had plans to attack the Israeli consulate in Los
Angeles and El Al Israel Airlines at the Los Angeles International
Airport. (Source: The Orange County Register, 08/17/09).
June 16, 2009.--Critical aspects of the nonprofit sector are
particularly vulnerable and regular targets of terrorist groups and
radicalized home-grown individuals. A number of incidents make this
point clear. In remarking on the June 10, 2009, attack at the U.S.
Holocaust Memorial Museum by a radical right-wing fanatic, Secretary
Napolitano stated that the attack underscored the need for the
Nonprofit Security Grant Program, so that high-risk nonprofits can take
their own security measures. (Sources: Remarks by Secretary Napolitano
Announcing Fiscal Year 2009 FEMA Preparedness Grants, Release, 06/16/
09).
June 3, 2009.--The Arkansas man convicted of killing an Army
recruiter and wounding another had used the popular Google Maps
application to investigate recruiting centers in at least five States,
as well as Jewish institutions in Little Rock, Philadelphia, Atlanta,
New York, Louisville, and Memphis. (Source: ABC News, 06/03/09).
April 7, 2009.--Two accusatory tactics associated with the current
rise in right-wing radicalization and the potential for violence are
aimed at the Jewish community. The first is a belief in anti-Government
conspiracy theories related to a Jewish-controlled ``one world
government.''--The second is a prevalence of right-wing extremist
chatter on the internet that focuses on the perceived loss of U.S. jobs
in the manufacturing and construction sectors, and home foreclosures
they attribute to a deliberate conspiracy conducted by a cabal of
Jewish ``financial elites.'' (Source: Rightwing Extremism: Current
Economic and Political Climate Fueling Resurgence in Radicalization and
Recruitment, Office of Intelligence Assessment and Analysis, Department
of Homeland Security, April 7, 2009.)
April 4, 2009.--The New York Police Department beefed up security
at the city's synagogues and other Jewish sites amid escalating
tensions between Israel and Iran. Concerns that Muslim extremist groups
might retaliate against civilians in the city's Jewish community if
Israel were to attack Iran's nuclear facilities prompted the NYPD to
put together a response plan that includes deploying extra officers,
including heavily armed ``Hercules Teams,'' to synagogues, Jewish
community centers, and Israeli diplomatic offices. (Source: Jerusalem
Post, 04/04/09).
March 24, 2009.--A British terrorist cell with alleged links to al-
Qaeda discussed bombing revelers at a large central London nightclub as
well as targeting several synagogues in London and one in Manchester,
according to prosecutors. One of the defendants, Salahuddin Amin, even
discussed trying to buy a radio-isotope ``dirty bomb'' from the Russian
mafia. (Fox News, 03/31/09; European Jewish Press, 03/24/09).
February 23, 2009.--FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III warned that
extremists ``with large agendas and little money can use rudimentary
weapons'' to sow terror, raising the specter that recent attacks in
Mumbai that killed 170 people (including victims at the Chabad House
Jewish community center) could embolden terrorists seeking to attack
U.S. cities. Mueller said that the bureau is expanding its focus beyond
al-Qaeda and into splinter groups, radicals (who come in through the
visa waiver program) and ``home-grown terrorists.'' He warned that
``melting-pot'' communities in Seattle, San Diego, Miami, or New York
were of particular concern. (Source: Washington Post, 02/23/09).
February 2, 2009.--According to Michael J. Heimbach, assistant
director of the FBI's Counterterrorism Division, al-Qaeda and like-
minded individuals are still the country's No. 1 concern in 2009, and
that there is significant intelligence out there that indicates their
focus remains on the United States. Threats from Hamas and Hezbollah
are quite concerning to the United States as well, he stated. In
addition, he acknowledged that home-grown extremism is still a
significant focus of the FBI, and that we can't lose sight of the
domestic terrorism issues, such as White supremacists and neo-Nazi
group, who need to remain on the FBI's radar. (Source: WTOP (New York),
02/02/09).
January 9, 2009.--Terrorist analysts report that throughout the
world, Jewish communities will be specifically at risk--from several
``fatwas'' disseminated through Arab media and jihadist websites,
including one instructing that ``any Jew is a legitimate target that
can be struck by Muslims.'' (Source: European Strategic Intelligence
and Security Center, 01/09/09).
January 6, 2009.--Al-Qaeda's second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri,
called on Muslims to strike at Jewish targets in the West and around
the world. (Source: Reuters, 01/06/09).
January 5, 2009.--Hamas leader, Mahmoud Zahar, called on
Palestinian sympathizers to target Jews abroad (including their
children) in response to Israel's incursion into Gaza. (Source:
Associated Press, 01/05/09).
May 21, 2009.--The Federal Bureau of Investigation and other
cooperating law enforcement agencies arrested four Muslim men as they
attempted to carry out a plot to bomb a synagogue and Jewish community
center in Riverdale, New York. Law enforcement sources are calling it a
home-grown terrorist plot. (Source: NBC News; Los Angeles Times, 05/21/
09).
January 1, 2009.--For the third time in a year, a Jewish pre-school
was defaced by swastikas and hate speech. Investigators are exploring
whether they might be related to Israeli's conflict with Hamas
militants in Gaza. (Source: Ventura County Star, 01/01/09).
January 1, 2009.--Jewish day schools in Chicago received a bomb
threat in the mail. The letter was sent to the Chicago offices of the
Associated Talmud Torahs and the Ida Crown Jewish Academy. (Source:
WBBM newsradio 780; JTA World Report, 01/01/09).
September 15, 2008.--Top counterterrorism officials at the U.S.
Department of State reiterated a growing refrain among American
intelligence agencies that Hezbollah is emerging as an increased threat
to the United States (Associated Press, September 15, 2008). The story
followed reports in August 2008 that deepening ties between Iran and
Venezuela may lead to the establishment of a new Hezbollah front in the
Western Hemisphere to carry out abductions and attacks against Jewish
targets (Source: Los Angeles Times, August 27, 2008). Similar reports
in June 2008 pointed to warnings raised by intelligence agencies in the
United States and Canada that Hezbollah sleeper cells are operating
along the U.S. border with Canada, and are poised to mount terror
attacks against Jewish targets in the West (Source: ABC News, June 19,
2008).
April 9, 2008.--The U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee
on Intelligence held a hearing on ``Assessing the Fight Against al
Qaeda.'' On the subject of tactics and targeting al-Qaeda will use in
the future, counterterrorism experts testified that since 9/11 al-Qaeda
and its affiliated groups have directed an ``intensified campaign''
against Jewish targets. Moreover, since 2004, Osama bin Laden has moved
the Israeli-American alliance to the center of his justification for
al-Qaeda's attacks against the West. (Source: U.S. House of
Representatives Select Committee on Intelligence, 04/09/08; Link:
http://intelligence.house.gov/Media/Word/Bergen040908.doc).
March 4, 2008.--Al-Qaeda's second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri,
released an audio tape on March 24, 2008, which called upon al-Qaeda
followers and sympathizers to attack Jewish interests world-wide. The
tape, part of a string of provocative statements by bin Laden and his
senior cohorts, was regarded by counter-terrorism experts as a new and
bold escalation by al-Qaeda to link the Middle East conflict with
immediate and urgent violence in the West, including against Jewish
targets in the United States. (Source: Associated Press, 03/04/08).
February 16, 2008.--With known Hezbollah fundraisers and supporters
in the United States, U.S. counterterrorism authorities have been
particularly concerned about the threat of Hezbollah sleeper cells
against synagogues and other potential Jewish targets in the United
States. On February 14, 2008 the FBI put 101 Nation-wide Joint
Terrorism Task Forces on alert for potential threats against the Jewish
community by Hezbollah operatives. (AP, February 14, 2008). A day
later, the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security sent out a rare
joint bulletin to State and local law enforcement authorities advising
them to watch for strikes by Hezbollah against Jewish targets, as well.
(Source: Los Angeles Times, 02/16/08).
January 15, 2008.--The Wall Street Journal reported a policy shift
within the White House (and among its allies) to place greater pressure
on the Iranian regime through an investigation that centers on the 1994
bombing of the AIMA Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires, Argentina.
In an effort to redefine its Iran policy, the administration's focus on
the JCC bombing, ``Serves as a model for how Tehran has used its
overseas embassies and relationships with foreign militant groups, in
particular Hezbollah, to strike at its enemies.'' (Source: Wall Street
Journal, 01/15/08).
May 1, 2007.--Convicted British home-grown Islamic terrorists with
links to the 2005 London subway bombings were in advanced stages of
planning, and were targeting synagogues for attack when they were
arrested. (Source: CNN.com, 05/01/07).
February 13, 2007.--Osama bin Laden's last known personally-
authorized terror attacks were made against two Jewish synagogues in
Istanbul. The simultaneous attacks, in 2003, killed 27 people and
injured more than 300. (Source: Washington Post, 02/13/07).
The FBI warned Jewish community leaders that Hezbollah operatives
were conducting surveillance on numerous synagogues and Jewish
community centers for possible terrorist attacks in the United States.
(Source: New York Post, 07/19/06).
October 10, 2006.--Home-grown Islamic militants were convicted of
plotting terrorist attacks against prominent synagogues and other
Jewish iconic sites in Los Angeles. FBI Director Mueller reported that
the group was ready to strike when they were brought down. The plot is
considered by counterterrorism officials to be the closest to
operationalization since 9/11. Of particular concern, the groups'
clandestine terrorist activities were discovered serendipitously during
a police investigation into a string of gas station robberies that only
later were connected to the funding of the terrorist operation.
(Source: Department of Justice Releases, 7/24/08; 12/14/07;
International Herald Tribune 10/10/06).
July 28, 2006.--Naveed Haq was found guilty of murder and hate
crimes in his second trial for a 2006 shooting spree at the Jewish
Federation of Greater Seattle. On July 28, 2006, Haq, a Muslim
American, attacked the Federation, a center of Jewish communal life and
supporter of social welfare, youth, and adult education programs. Of
the 6 women he gunned down, one was 17 weeks pregnant and another,
Pamela Waechter, died of her wounds. At trial evidence was presented
that ``he railed against Jews and U.S.-Israeli policies as he opened
fire in the Jewish Federation,'' and that in telephone calls recorded
by the King County Jail, Haq told his mother he was ``a soldier of
Islam.'' (Source: Associated Press, 12/15/09; The Seattle Times, 12/15/
09; Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 08/06/08; 2008; The Seattle Times, 02/
21/08; 07/29/06).
May 31, 2005.--Department of Justice convicted an Iraqi-American
who had obtained illegal machine guns and targeted Jewish communal
sites in Nashville, Tennessee. (Source: Department of Justice Release,
10/08/04; Associated Press, 05/31/05).
April 13, 2004.--Terrorists responsible for the Madrid train
bombings in March 2004 also were planning additional attacks on a
Jewish community center outside of Madrid, home to the largest Jewish
population in Spain, according to evidence gathered in the
investigation. (Source: New York Times; CNN.com, 04/13/04).
November 24, 2002.--In a ``Letter to America'' Osama bin Laden
released soon after the 9/11 attacks, to explain his reasoning and
intent to justify the attacks, he wrote, ``The creation and
continuation of Israel is one of the greatest crimes, and you are the
leaders of its criminals.'' ``This is why the American people cannot be
innocent of all the crimes committed by the Americans and Jews against
us.'' The letter also made clear that, to bin Laden, civilian
populations, as with governments, were acceptable (equivalent) targets
for retaliation. (Source: Guardian (UK), 11/24/02; Full text of the
letter: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/nov/24/theobserver.)
June 3, 2002.--Abdul Rahman Yasin, one of the terrorists in the
first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993, revealed in a CBS 60
Minutes interview that the World Trade Center was not the terrorists'
original target. Rather, they initially planned to blow up Jewish
neighborhoods in Brooklyn. But after scouting Crown Heights and
Williamsburg, they decided to target the World Trade Center, instead.
The reasoning: Rather than undertaking multiple small explosions in
Jewish neighborhoods, they figured that one big explosion in the World
Trade Center would kill mostly Jews who they believed made up a
majority of the workforce there, according to Yasin's statements.
(Source: CBS News 06/02/02; Reuters, 06/03/02).
January 2, 2002.--Al-Qaeda's training manual, translated by the
Associated Press, directed followers to attack Jewish organizations and
institutions in every country Jews exist and to carry out the attacks
in a manner designed to cause mass causalities. (Source: Associated
Press, 02/02/02).
Mr. King. Other Members of the subcommittee may introduce
opening statements for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
September 18, 2013
Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for holding this hearing on
AQAP, and I thank the witnesses for appearing today.
For the past 2\1/2\ years, democracy has been on the march in North
Africa and the Middle East. Yemen, the poorest country in the Arab
world, has seen a change in leadership as its former President Ali
Abdallah Saleh was forced to transfer power to Abd Hadi. Yemen is one
of the places that has seen its share of unrest--which continues to
make it ripe for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to thrive.
However, strides made by the Obama administration have made life
more difficult for AQAP. Through drone strikes, several high-profile
AQAP senior leaders including Anwar al-Awlaki, have been killed. Even
though these drone strikes have eliminated senior AQAP leadership,
these targeted strikes have killed Americans. The administration knows
this is a reality and the Department of Justice has issued a guidance
for the use of targeted strikes against Americans abroad.
Once again, 12 years after 9/11, we fall on the side of security
which is a vivid reality in the world in which we live. Even though
AQAP's operations appear to have diminished, it has not prevented the
organization from restrategizing and remaining a threat to the United
States. The deaths of al-Awlaki and Khan have been detrimental to its
publication Inspire magazine. The syntax and grammar is not as amenable
to an American audience. But that does not prevent the magazine from
celebrating the Boston bombing or sympathizing with lone wolves.
Targeted killings also did not prevent AQAP from issuing a threat
considered credible by U.S. intelligence officials. This threat
prompted the closure of several embassies in the Middle East and North
Africa for several days in early August.
See with AQAP, the game is the same, yet the methods are different.
AQAP's ability to incite panic and economic devastation still plagues
the United States. Even though AQAP's large-scale plots--such as the
Christmas day bombing of 2009--have been unsuccessful, they still
impact the way we travel and at a significant economic cost. The
economic cost of terrorism is something that cannot be overlooked. We
cannot call attacks that do not yield a loss of life unsuccessful when
we continue to go into debt as a country and when we change our lives
due to close calls. AQAP knows this and since its capabilities have
diminished, it can certainly use this as leverage.
I am not advocating ignoring credible threats and standing in the
face of danger. These threats can not be ignored. But what also can not
be ignored is the cost of terrorism and terrorist threats. The methods
currently used to decrease AQAP's presence and reach to the United
States still haven't prevented the organization from causing
devastation to not only our lives but also our economy.
I look forward to hearing the witnesses' testimony about the
strength and reach of this organization.
I yield back.
Mr. King. We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of
witnesses before us today on this vital topic: Mr. Frank
Cilluffo and Ms. Katherine Zimmerman and Mr. Brian Katulis.
Beginning with Frank Cilluffo who is an old friend and
testified before this committee a number of times. I say an old
friend, old friend of the committee because he has always been
available to any of us whenever we need assistance or
information.
He is an associate vice president at the George Washington
University where he is the director of the Homeland Security
Policy Institute. The institute is a nonpartisan think tank
that builds bridges between theory and practice to advance
homeland security policy and focuses on counterterrorism and
counter-radicalization efforts, cyber threats and deterrence,
and the nexus between crime and terrorism.
Mr. Cilluffo joined the faculty at George Washington in
2003 from the White House where he served as special assistant
to the President for homeland security, and prior to his White
House appointment, Mr. Cilluffo spent 8 years in senior policy
positions with the Center for Strategic and International
Studies.
Mr. Cilluffo, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF FRANK J. CILLUFFO, ASSOCIATE VICE PRESIDENT,
DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY INSTITUTE, THE GEORGE
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
Mr. Cilluffo. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
for the kind introduction.
Ranking Member Higgins, thank you for the opportunity to
testify before you today.
I will be brief. There are a lot of issues to cover. But
when you are looking at the terrorism threat today I think, Mr.
Chairman, you hit it spot on that the threat has metastasized.
It comes in various shapes, sizes, flavors, and form ranging
from al-Qaeda senior leadership, which is still entrenched in
federally-administered tribal areas led by Ayman al-Zawahiri to
its many affiliates, including al-Qaeda in Iraq, which has been
resurgent, to Boko Haram in Nigeria, Ansar al-Dine in Mali, al-
Shabaab in Somalia, and of course the focus of today's hearing,
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen.
If you have noticed, these are all in under-governed
spaces, and you are talking about huge swaths of territory and
land. So I think that anyone who thinks that since the death of
Osama bin Laden, yes, he may be dead, but the witch lives on.
Unfortunately it comes in various forms.
I also think it is important that now, when all eyes are
fixed on Syria, that we not forget that we have other threats
out there, including one that just a month ago had a very
active threat stream. So I think it is important to keep our
eye on the ball.
Firstly, why al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula? As was
noted by Ranking Member Higgins, this is the group that has
been perhaps the most active threat against the U.S. homeland.
This isn't could-have, should-have, would-have. This is a
group that has actually been engaged in multiple attempts on
not only U.S. targets overseas, but also the U.S. homeland.
Many of those were discussed, with Abdulmutallab in 2009 along
with a number of other active threat streams.
It is also home to the world's most dangerous and
innovative bomb makers in Ibrahim al-Asiri. These guys don't
grow on trees. They are very unique in terms of the value that
they play, not only in terms of building out their own
capabilities, but also to be able to train the next generation.
If you were to put, rack and stack, the most dangerous
terrorists on a list I think he would be on the top of
anybody's list. He has done so in such a way that he has
devised and improvised explosive devices that can circumvent
our security. This is absolutely critical, important, and
something that we need to be very cognizant of.
I think also in addition to AQAP, I think their greatest
hallmark has been Inspire magazine and the role that it plays
in radicalizing and lone-wolf jihadists, especially in the
West. There have now been 11 copies, 11 editions of Inspire
magazine, and you can go back through dozens and dozens of
cases where in Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan and the original
authors played a very significant role in inspiring people to
act, not only in the United States but also in the United
Kingdom and elsewhere.
You actually saw a dip after al-Awlaki and Khan's death in
terms of the quality of the production. Unfortunately, post the
terrorist attack in Boston you saw an increase again in the
quality. I would argue it is definitely being driven by an
English speaker who of course makes this significant. So they
have reached out to the West and they have done so
successfully.
It is also currently led by Nasir al-Wahishi, who is a
long-time confidant of Osama bin Laden. That obviously gives
him some potential additional resolve in terms of taking on the
mantle of al-Qaeda in the broader scheme of things, but also
very directly.
There was a lot of discussion after al-Awlaki's death. Is
the group going to look local? Is it going to continue to focus
global?
I think it is not an either-or proposition. It is both.
Unfortunately, it is playing a more significant role in the
broader tapestry that makes up the al-Qaeda environment.
In addition to Wahishi being named the No. 2 in al-Qaeda,
you have also seen al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula coordinate
their activities with numerous affiliates in the past, most
notably al-Shabaab in Somalia, but others as well. I think this
is important because in addition to their own role they serve
as--they can foster the intent in others to attack the U.S.
homeland. I think you are starting to see that, the sharing of
trade craft.
You are starting to see a conflation of these al-Qaeda
organizations. So that is one thing to keep our eye on.
I am actually beyond my time. But I hope to get to some of
the responses afterwards. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cilluffo follows:]
Prepared Statement of Frank J. Cilluffo
Chairman King, Ranking Member Higgins, and distinguished Members of
the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you
today. The decision to step back and take a hard look at al-Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) at a time when all eyes are fixed on Syria
is a prudent one. It is far too easy to lose sight of key pieces of the
big picture when the heat of a particular crisis draws our focus.
Yet to do so would be a real mistake. Notwithstanding the
importance of Syria as a threat to (U.S.) National, regional, and
international security--and as a situation that terrorists may seek to
exploit, there is a broader range of forces and factors that pose
serious and on-going threats to the United States. One critical example
is the terrorist group AQAP which is currently the al-Qaeda affiliate
that poses the greatest threat to the U.S. homeland.
why aqap matters
AQAP is the most active of al-Qaeda's affiliate groups. AQAP
has directly targeted the U.S. homeland as well as U.S.
interests abroad on multiple occasions.
AQAP (and Yemen) is home to one of the world's most
dangerous and innovative bombmakers who has actively tried and
shown himself to be able to circumvent U.S. countermeasures
intended to thwart his improvised explosive devices.
AQAP has invested significantly in encouraging
radicalization and ``lone wolf'' home-grown attacks, including
Inspire magazine. AQAP's efforts in this regard propagate the
ideology that underpins al-Qaeda as a movement, and provide the
``how-to'' do-it-yourself in terrorist tactics, techniques, and
procedures.
AQAP is currently led by Nasser al-Wuhayshi, formerly a
direct confidant of Osama bin Laden, who was recently named the
No. 2 figure within al-Qaeda writ large. The No. 2 leadership
slot is symbolically important but also operationally so,
particularly as the boundaries between al-Qaeda components
(core and affiliates) fade away and their activities converge.
AQAP has for some time assumed a leadership role within al-
Qaeda as a whole, and has cooperated with multiple al-Qaeda
affiliates. AQAP's leadership position offers a conduit to
foster intent in others to attack the U.S. homeland and U.S.
interests.
AQAP was established in 2009 by the merger of Yemeni al-Qaeda with
Saudi al-Qaeda elements that were driven out of the Kingdom. The
influence of Yemeni al-Qaeda was felt long before, however, and pre-
dated 9/11. Bear in mind that Yemen, the birthplace of Osama bin Laden,
was the host country of the terrorist attack on the U.S.S. Cole in
2000, in which 17 U.S. sailors perished. Since its creation, AQAP has
demonstrated ample evidence of intent to attack the U.S. homeland and
U.S. interests, including the 2009 Christmas day airliner bomb attempt
by ``underwear bomber'' Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab the 2010 cargo/plane
bomb attempt in which explosives were concealed in printer cartridges;
and the spring 2012 concealed explosives plot.\1\ The first two of
these attempted attacks were overseen by AQAP's former external
operations leader Anwar al-Awlaki. AQAP has managed to attract Western
recruits or others with the ability to travel, to facilitate such
attacks. In addition to Abdulmutallab, examples include American Sharif
Mobley, who is in the custody of the Yemeni government following his
shooting of two Yemeni security guards, and British national Minh Qhang
Pham, who was indicted on terrorism charges in New York in 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Reuters, ``Foiled Plot Shows Militants Seek Detection-Proof
Bombs,'' May 7, 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/07/us-usa-
security-plot-idUSBRE84612820120507.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Most recently, this August (before all eyes turned to Syria and the
regime's use of chemical weapons on its own people there), there was
much discussion of a threat stream emanating from Yemen, where AQAP is
based. A spate of articles appeared in the press reporting on a so-
called ``conference call'' between al-Qaeda Senior Leadership (AQSL)
figure Ayman al-Zawahiri and a dozen chiefs of al-Qaeda affiliates
including AQAP's Nasser al-Wuhayshi.\2\ The intelligence suggested that
a major terrorist plot directed against Western targets was afoot and
prompted a range of countermeasures including a U.S. decision to shut
temporarily 19 embassies and consulates. The plot is said to have
involved ``a new generation of liquid explosive, currently
undetectable,'' which U.S. officials described as ``ingenious.''\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Eli Lake, Josh Rogin, ``Exclusive: Al Qaeda Conference Call
Intercepted by U.S. Officials Sparked Alerts,'' The Daily Beast (August
7, 2013), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/08/07/al-qaeda-
conference-call-intercepted-by-u-s-officials-sparked-alerts.html.
\3\ Rhonda Schwartz and James Gordon Meek, ``Al Qaeda Threat:
Officials Fear `Ingenious' Liquid Explosive,'' ABC News (August 5,
2013) http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/al-qaeda-threat-officials-fear-
ingenious-liquid-explosive/story?id=19871892.
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In addition to these various demonstrations of intent to attack,
AQAP has also evidenced a record of innovation in terror tradecraft.
AQAP's lead bomb-maker Ibrahim al-Asiri personifies this, as the
mastermind behind the devices used in the 2009 attempted assassination
of the Saudi Interior Minister, the 2009 Christmas day attack, the 2010
cargo printer bomb, and plots that involve surgically implanted
explosives.
Over and above his own considerable expertise, al-Asiri has been
training the next generation of bomb-makers.\4\ AQAP has also expressed
an interest in attacks using biological warfare agents, including
ricin.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Andrew Scarpitta, ``Terrorist Deck of Cards: Leaders of Al
Qaeda affiliates are clubs, '' The Washington Times--Communities
(September 9, 2013) http://communities.- washingtontimes.com/
neighborhood/simply-world/2013/sep/9/terrorist-deck-cards-clubs/
\5\ Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, ``Qaeda Trying to Harness Toxin
for Bombs, U.S. Officials Fear,'' New York Times (August 12, 2011)
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/13/world/middleeast/
13terror.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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Encouraging radicalization and ``lone wolf'' home-grown attacks has
been a further hallmark and focus of AQAP. Cases of this type inspired
by AQAP--and Anwar al-Awlaki in particular--include the attack on Fort
Hood in 2009 by Major Nidal Hasan, the attack on a military recruiting
center in Arkansas in the same year by Carlos Bledsoe, the 2010 attack
on a British parliamentarian by student Roshonara Choudhry, and the
Boston marathon bombing earlier this year.
AQAP ``bridge figure'' Anwar al-Awlaki possessed an almost
unmatched ability to recruit and inspire new and existing members to
al-Qaeda's cause and ideology. Though killed in a drone strike in 2011,
al-Awlaki's voice lives on including in the many radical and violent
``sermons'' that he recorded in multiple media formats--and continues
to resonate.
Ideology is the lifeblood that sustains al-Qaeda, and instruments
such as Inspire magazine are intended to fuel the fire, including the
``home-grown'' component. Although the original authors and publishers
of Inspire (al-Awlaki and colleague Samir Khan) are now deceased, the
magazine continues and its production values have improved recently.
Immediately following the death of al-Awlaki and Khan, there was a
highly noticeable degradation of Inspire; the more recent issues of
Inspire, including the 11th issue released after the Boston marathon
attack, once again demonstrate high production quality and appear to be
written by a native English speaker.
The linkages between AQAP and other al-Qaeda affiliates and
terrorist groups are another source of significant concern. As
mentioned, current AQAP leader al-Wuhayshi is the overall No. 2 in al-
Qaeda.\6\ He is also directly connected to Osama bin Laden, having
served as his secretary until 2001. For him, the battle may be
personal; being a direct protege of bin Laden may add an extra layer of
resolve and determination to his actions. Other important links exist,
however, beyond al-Wuhayshi's connection with AQSL. These include AQAP
ties to al-Shabaab in Somalia, as discussed by convicted terrorist
leader Ahmed Warsame in his guilty plea;\7\ and a reported AQAP role in
the attack on the U.S. mission in Benghazi.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Barbara Starr, ``US official: Al Qaeda core chief picks number
two from Yemeni affiliate,'' CNN (August 5, 2013) http://
security.blogs.cnn.com/2013/08/05/us-official-al-qaeda-core-chief-
picks-number-two-from-yemeni-affiliate/.
\7\ See FBI press release on Warsame plea deal at http://
www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/2013/guilty-plea-unsealed-in-new-
york-involving-ahmed-warsame-a-senior-terrorist-leader-and-liaison-
between-al-shabaab-and-al-qaeda-in-the-arabian-peninsula-for-providing-
material-support-to-both-terrorist-organizations.
\8\ UPI, ``AQAP Eyed for Benghazi Role,'' May 3, 2013. http://
www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2013/05/03/AQAP-eyed-for-Benghazi-role/
UPI-39181367594594/.
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aqap in broader context
Though AQAP occupies a vaunted place within the larger al-Qaeda
hierarchy (which, as mentioned above, is itself something of a misnomer
as the boundaries between core and affiliates of al-Qaeda are fading
away and operational and ideological activities converge), the
organization is by no means the only important threat that the United
States faces at this time. As evidenced by the above reference to Ayman
al-Zawahiri, even AQSL is now reinvigorated and reappearing. Indeed
just last week, on the day after the twelfth anniversary of the 9/11
attacks, Zawahiri released an audio message calling for further attacks
on the United States, intended to ``bleed America economically by
provoking it to continue in its massive expenditure on its
security.''\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Reuters, ``Al Qaeda calls for attacks inside United States''
(September 13, 2013) http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/13/us-
qaeda-zawahri-idUSBRE98C05820130913.
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Although the primary threat vector no longer emanates from AQSL
alone, the threat streams coming from al-Qaeda affiliates and those
inspired by al-Qaeda are many and varied. At the group level, these
include: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram in
Nigeria,\10\ and Ansar Dine in Mali.\11\ In Africa and the Middle East
alone, there are still multiple al-Qaeda affiliates that continue to
thrive, most notably in the Sahel and in Somalia.\12\ Indeed, there is
an arc of Islamist extremism that stretches across Africa from east to
west, through the Sahel and the Maghreb.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Omar S. Mahmood, ``Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria: No Easy
Fix,'' HSPI Issue Brief (April 3, 2013) http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/
policy/HSPI%20Issue%20Brief%2018%20- Boko%20Haram.pdf.
\11\ Rida Lyammouri, ``Northern Mali: Armed Groups, State Failure,
and Terrorism,'' HSPI Issue Brief (May 30, 2013) http://www.gwumc.edu/
hspi/policy/HSPI%20Issue%20Brief%20- 20%20Northern%20Mali.pdf.
\12\ Navanti Group, ``Somalia's Al-Shabaab: Down But Not Out,''
HSPI Issue Brief (August 27, 2013) http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/
HSPI%20Issue%20Brief%2022%20Somalia%20- Al%20Shabaab.pdf.
\13\ Frank J. Cilluffo, ``The Future of Homeland Security: Evolving
and Emerging Threats,'' Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Committee on
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs (July 11, 2012) http://
www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/Testimony%20-%20SHSGAC%20Hearing%20-
%2011%20July%202012.pdf. Frank Cilluffo, Joseph Clark, and Clinton
Watts, ``Pardon the Pivot: What about Africa?'' HSPI Issue Brief (March
6, 2013) http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/HSPI%20Issue%20Brief%2017%20-
%20What%20About%20Africa.pdf. Navanti Group, ``Origins and Dimensions
of Instability in Post-Qaddafi Libya,'' HSPI Issue Brief (July 30,
2013) http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/
HSPI%20Issue%20Brief%2021%20Instability%20Post-Qaddafi%20Libya.pdf.
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The latest and most concerning hot spot to emerge is undoubtedly
Syria. Outgoing CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell has identified Syria
as ``the greatest threat to U.S. national security.''\14\ Former FBI
Director Robert Mueller echoed the point immediately prior to
completing his term of service and leaving office; he ``warned that an
increasing flow of U.S. citizens heading to Syria and elsewhere to wage
jihad against regional powers could end up in a new generation of home-
grown terrorists.''\15\ Just one returning fighter with lethal intent
and competence could cause serious harm. In Syria alone, there are
thousands of foreign fighters--including from 14 European countries,
Chechnya, China, North Africa, the Balkans, Australia, and North
America.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ ``CIA Official Calls Syria Top Threat to U.S. Security,'' The
Wall Street Journal (August 6, 2013) http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424127887323420604578652330222498920.html.
\15\ Carlo Munoz, ``FBI's Mueller warns of new generation of
homegrown terrorists,'' The Hill (August 23, 2013) http://thehill.com/
blogs/defcon-hill/operations/318539-fbis-mueller-warns-of-new-
generation-of-homegrown-terrorists-.
\16\ Sharon L. Cardash, Frank J. Cilluffo, Jean-Luc Marret,
``Foreign Fighters in Syria: Still Doing Battle, Still a
Multidimensional Danger,'' Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique--
Note no. 24/13 (August 2013) http://www.frstrategie.org/barreFRS/
publications/notes/2013/201324.pdf. See also Frank J. Cilluffo, Jeffrey
R. Cozzens, and Magnus Ranstorp, ``Foreign Fighters: Trends,
Trajectories & Conflict Zones,'' Joint Report of the George Washington
University Homeland Security Policy Institute and the Swedish National
Defence College (October 1, 2010) http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/
report_foreignfighters501.pdf.
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At the same time, a veritable witch's brew of jihadists exists in
Pakistan including, for example: The Haqqani network, Lashkar-e-Taiba
(LeT), Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (often dubbed the ``Pakistani
Taliban''), Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami (HuJI), Jaish-e-Mohammed, and the
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. We have seen in the past and continue
to see substantial evidence of cooperation and collaboration between
these latter groups and al-Qaeda. Though some of these groups may be
more regionally or locally focused, they increasingly ascribe and
subscribe to al-Qaeda's goals and the broader global jihad, with U.S.
and Western targets increasingly in their crosshairs.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Cilluffo, ``The Future of Homeland Security: Evolving and
Emerging Threats'' (July 11, 2012) http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/
Testimony%20-%20SHSGAC%20Hearing%20-%2011%20July%202012.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ungoverned and under-governed spaces such as the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan and Afghanistan, Yemen,
the Sahel, and Somalia pose a potent challenge. Here, failed, failing,
or weak states offer a propitious climate for jihadists to regroup,
train, plan, plot, and execute attacks. Former head of U.S. Africa
Command (AFRICOM) General Carter Ham warned, while still in office last
year, that AQIM (operating in southern Algeria, northern Mali, and
eastern Mauritania; and spreading elsewhere in the Sahel), plus al-
Shabaab in Somalia, and Boko Haram in Nigeria, ``are seeking to
coordinate and synchronize their efforts.'' General Ham characterized
each of these groups as ``by itself, a dangerous and worrisome
threat''; but he was particularly concerned by the emerging trend of
them sharing ``funds, training, and explosive material.''\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ David Lerman, ``African Terrorist Groups Starting to
Cooperate, U.S. Says'' Bloomberg (June 25, 2012) http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-25/african-terrorist-groups-starting-to-
cooperate-u-s-says.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Compounding the challenges posed the ecosystem described above is
the so-called ``lone wolf'' who self-radicalizes and prepares to commit
violence without directly reaching out to al-Qaeda or others for
support and guidance. The term lone wolf is a bit of a misnomer,
however, since individuals in this category have at least been
inspired, goaded, and in some cases facilitated by external forces--
which in turn blurs the line between the foreign and domestic. In such
cases, the mission of prevention is all the harder because there may be
little for law enforcement or counterterrorism professionals to pick up
on ahead of time, when we are still left of boom. The mission remains
critical, though, as evidenced by the discovery of more than 60 ``home-
grown'' jihadi terrorism plots since September 11, 2001.
In short, the system is still blinking red, and the United States
would be extremely ill-advised to think or act otherwise. In a report
released just last week, the Bipartisan Policy Center assessed that al-
Qaeda and affiliates are in ``some 16 different theaters of operation--
compared with half as many as recently as five years ago.'' Among the
``sites of revival and resuscitation'' is Iraq.\19\ Nor can we take our
eye off the ball of state-sponsored terrorism, such as that perpetrated
by the government of Iran and proxies such as Hezbollah. Although
state-sponsored terrorism is beyond the scope of this hearing, it will
undoubtedly demand significant attention.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Anna Mulrine, ``9/11 Commission leaders push for changes in US
terrorism fight,'' The Christian Science Monitor (September 11, 2013)
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2013/0911/9-11-Commission-
leaders-push-for-changes-in-US-terrorism-fight-video. Peter Bergen,
Bruce Hoffman, Michael Hurley, and Erroll Southers, ``Jihadist
Terrorism: A Threat Assessment,'' Bipartisan Policy Center Report
(September 2013) http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/
Jihadist%20Terrorism-A%20Threat%20Assesment_0.pdf.
\20\ Frank J. Cilluffo, ``The Iranian Cyber Threat to the United
States,'' Testimony Before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee
on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and
Intelligence; and Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure
Protection, and Security Technologies (April 26, 2012) http://
www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/
Iran%20Cyber%20Testimony%204.26.12%20Frank%20Cilluffo.pdf. See also:
Cilluffo, ``A Line in the Sand: Assessing Dangerous Threat to Our
Nation's Borders'' (November 2012) http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/
testimony11.16.12.pdf; and Frank J. Cilluffo, ``Cyber Threats from
China, Russia, and Iran: Protecting American Critical Infrastructure,''
Testimony Before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on
Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure
Protection, and Security Technologies (March 20, 2013) http://
www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/
Meehan_Cilluffo%20Testimony%20March%202013.pdf.
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implications for u.s. counterterrorism policy versus aqap
The United States has invested hundreds of millions of dollars in
support of counterterrorism measures directed against al-Qaeda in
Yemen, but the need for direct U.S. counterterrorism engagement in the
country persists. Below I address four elements that should be central
to and included in U.S. counterterrorism efforts against AQAP; but the
list is not meant to be comprehensive.
1. Drones and Special Operations
The bulwark of our strategy has been a sustained drone campaign
informed by solid intelligence. As I have written with my colleague
Clint Watts: ``Light-footprint drone and special operations force (SOF)
missions specifically focused on short-term tactical counterterrorism
objectives can help avoid the long-term quagmire of Yemeni insurgencies
while immediately degrading AQAP's ability to strike the U.S.''\21\
While in itself insufficient and of itself not a perfect option (since
the possibility of ``blowback'' or backlash effects cannot be entirely
eliminated), the described tools have proven to be both powerful and
effective.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Frank J. Cilluffo and Clinton Watts, ``Yemen & Al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula: Exploiting a Window of Counterterrorism
Opportunity,'' HSPI Issue Brief (June 24, 2011) http://www.gwumc.edu/
hspi/policy/issuebrief_yemenaqap.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As I have also stated elsewhere, ``targeted attacks on AQ's
leadership in Pakistan severely disrupted the terror group's ability to
plan and execute terror attacks abroad.'' Applied to Yemen, this same
tactic and strategy has yielded substantial counterterrorism advances
from a U.S. perspective. The threat from AQAP has not disappeared, of
course; but the terrorist group has been forced to look over its
shoulder constantly--which diverts the adversary's limited amounts of
energy and resources into self-preservation, and away from plots and
planning against the United States and its allies. If there is an
alternative policy course that could produce an equally favorable
outcome, the critics have yet to specify it. Meantime, the specified
course of action allows us ``to lay the groundwork and move toward a
long-term Yemen strategy . . . ''.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Ibid. See also Frank Cilluffo and Clinton Watts, ``Countering
the Threat Posed by AQAP: Embrace, Don't Chase, Yemen's Chaos,''
Security Debrief (July 14, 2011) http://securitydebrief.com/2011/07/14/
countering-the-threat-posed-by-aqap-embrace-don%E2%80%99t-chase-
yemen%E2%80%99s-chaos/.
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Although the balance of power between government and al-Qaeda
forces in Yemen has vacillated over time, the ``Arab Spring'' of 2011
toppled Yemeni President Saleh and created a window of opportunity that
al-Wuhayshi and associates exploited successfully. Yemeni government
forces pushed back in 2012, reversing the territorial gains made by the
Islamists the previous year. But the militants remain in-country,
though now they are scattered and interspersed throughout Yemen rather
than heavily concentrated in a few locations. In addition, the
adversary has prioritized the building of anti-drone capabilities.\23\
In some ways, therefore, the current situation is more dangerous and
more difficult to address than in past.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Washington Post (September 3, 2013) http://
articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-09-03/world/41723879_1_u-s-drone-
campaign-al-qaeda-commanders-unmanned-aircraft.
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2. Robust Intelligence Collection
Robust intelligence collection vis-a-vis terrorist threats must
always be a priority, in part because the yield of such collection
efforts informs both strategy and a wide-range tactics (including
operations, counter-measures, etc.). In the wake of leaks, AQAP--which
was already a difficult intelligence target--has become an even greater
collection challenge for the United States. Post-leaks, AQAP has
improved its operational security and changed its practices; think
tradecraft, communications, and planning.
Whether AQAP remains poised to deliver on the plot that came to
light this August is yet to be seen. However, the terrorist group has
demonstrated and continues to demonstrate significant ability and
intent to do harm to the United States and its interests. Some have
even speculated that the August plot was simply a test of U.S. systems,
meant to inform future attack. Whatever the case, AQAP has proven that
it has the capacity to attain global reach, as the source of active
threat to the United States on more than one occasion. Against this
background and despite the level of challenge it entails, it is
imperative to redouble U.S. efforts to obtain robust intelligence on
this threat--with special emphasis accorded to AQAP's bomb-makers and
others involved in external operations.
3. Aviation Security and Thwarting Terrorist Travel
AQAP has demonstrated a persistent interest in carrying out attacks
against and using the global aviation system. With each successive
plot, they have attempted to improve their tradecraft and develop new
devices and techniques to bypass our security measures. Given this, it
is imperative that TSA and its foreign partners remain nimble at
anticipating new types of threats and rapidly developing the means to
detect them.
Given AQAP's focus on finding Western operatives to carry out
attacks, it is also important that intelligence information is used to
inform the risk-based screening of travelers, both by expediting low-
risk travelers through programs such as PreCheck and by providing extra
scrutiny for higher-risk travelers. The Passenger Name Record (PNR)
information that Customs and Border Protection (CBP) receives from
travelers coming from Europe is vital in carrying out such risk-based
screening. CBP and TSA have also been successful since the cargo planes
plot of October 2010 at improving risk-based screening of international
air cargo, through their joint Air Cargo Advance Screening (ACAS) pilot
project.
4. U.S.-Based Efforts to Combat Violent Islamist Extremism
As noted earlier, AQAP has been focused not only on carrying out
its own attacks but also on radicalizing individuals and encouraging
them to act on their own and carry out attacks in their home countries.
The biggest element missing from U.S. statecraft on counterterrorism
relates to our efforts--which have been lacking--to counter and defeat
the jihadist ideology. The result is that the terrorist narrative lives
on and continues to attract and inspire those who wish us harm.
The State Department's Center for Strategic Counterterrorism
Communications is doing some good work overseas in this area in foreign
languages. But it is not enough. A systemic strategic communications
effort is needed, aimed at exposing the hypocrisy of our adversaries'
words versus their deeds. Nor domestically have we figured out how to
address the issue of on-line violent Islamist extremism. Although this
challenge appeared on White House radar years ago and a strategy to
address ``on-line violent extremist radicalization'' was promised by
the White House in 2011, this significant and complex undertaking was
instead treated in a cursory blog post earlier this year.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Frank J. Cilluffo and Sharon L. Cardash, ``It's the Ideology,
Stupid,'' The National Interest (June 3, 2013) http://www.gwumc.edu/
hspi/policy/It%27s%20the%20ideology,%20stupid.pdf. Quintan Wiktorowicz,
``Working to Counter Online Radicalization to Violence in the United
States,'' The White House Blog (February 5, 2013) http://
www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/02/05/working-counter-online-
radicalization-violence-united-states.
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conclusion
The bottom line is that we must not take our foot off the gas pedal
when it comes to U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Now is not the time to
offer our adversaries time and space in which to expand and entrench,
or further regroup and reconstitute.
This admonition is all the more important as the United States
prepares to conclude the combat role of its military forces in
Afghanistan in 2014. The decision on whether to retain or remove U.S.
and allied forces from Afghanistan raises a host of strategic issues.
Strictly from a tactical counterterrorism perspective however, U.S.
withdrawal is a concern, just as it was in Iraq.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Frank J. Cilluffo and Sharon L. Cardash, ``Baghdad Surprise?''
HSPI Commentary (August 20, 2010) http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/
commentary17_BaghdadSurprise.pdf.
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Indeed, nature abhors a vacuum; and there is no shortage of actors
hostile to the United States who presently seek to exploit a range of
ungoverned and under-governed spaces worldwide (failed and failing
states), as well as transitional circumstances such as those that
prevail in Egypt.\26\ Accordingly, along with our allies, we must
continue to target the leaders of foreign terrorist organizations, and
their military and operational planners.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Frank J. Cilluffo and Sharon L. Cardash, ``Tumult in the
Middle East: When and Where Will the Next Shoe Drop?'' HSPI Commentary
(February 17, 2011) http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/
commentary021_mideast.pdf.
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AQAP is just one of many organizations that demand the attention of
U.S. law enforcement and intelligence officials as well as our military
forces. Al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and those inspired by al-Qaeda's
ideology have by no means been defeated.\27\ The United States must
therefore meet the challenge posed by its adversaries with equal
determination, patience, and resolve.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ Katherine Zimmerman, ``The Al Qaeda Network: A New Framework
for Defining the Enemy,'' A Report by AEI's Critical Threats Project
(September 2013) http://www.criticalthreats.org/sites/default/files/
pdf_upload/analysis/Zimmerman_the_al_-
Qaeda_Network_September_2013.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thank you once more for the opportunity to testify before you
today. I look forward to trying to answer any questions that you may
have.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Cilluffo.
Our next witness, Katherine Zimmerman, is a senior analyst
and the al-Qaeda movement's team lead for the American
Enterprise Institute's Critical Threats Project. Her work is
focused on al-Qaeda's affiliates in the Gulf of Asia region,
and associated movements in West and in Northern Africa. She
specializes in the al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and al-
Qaeda's affiliate in Somalia, al-Shabaab.
Recently, Ms. Zimmerman released a new report entitled
``The al-Qaeda Network: A New Framework for Defining the
Enemy,'' which informs American policy and decision makers on
the composition of the al-Qaeda network, and raises concerns
with the lack of evolution in U.S. counterterrorism policy to
target the whole network.
Ms. Zimmerman, thank you for being here today, and you are
recognized. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF KATHERINE L. ZIMMERMAN, SENIOR ANALYST CRITICAL
THREATS PROJECT, THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE
Ms. Zimmerman. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Higgins, thank
you for including me in this important hearing on the threat to
the--about the United States homeland from AQAP. I would like
to highlight my understanding of AQAP's role in the al-Qaeda
network presented in my prepared testimony.
America's failure to understand the complexities of the al-
Qaeda network as it has evolved over the years has led only to
tactical successes on the battlefield. The strategy to disrupt
the network by killing senior leaders in a core group is based
on a faulty understanding that overemphasizes al-Qaeda core
centrality to the network.
There is no single group at the heart of the al-Qaeda
network today. Instead, the network strength now lies in
interwoven connections between regional al-Qaeda groups, as
well in the ties between those groups and the core. The al-
Qaeda network has evolved and our strategy must change with it.
AQAP does pose the most direct threat to the U.S. homeland
from al-Qaeda. But it must be examined in the context of the
entire network. The most significant change occurred in 2009
when AQAP created a new model for the role of groups in the al-
Qaeda network. It focused its efforts on the far war against
the United States, and it began to foster relationships with
other groups.
AQAP is the first known example of an affiliate or an
associate directing an attack against the U.S. homeland, an
effort the group has continued to prioritize. It also provides
training to, and shares resources with al-Qaeda groups in a
manner that is characteristic of Osama bin Laden's group in the
1990s and 2000s.
The previous model for the al-Qaeda network held that
franchises were subordinated to a core, conventionally
understood to be the al-Qaeda leadership in Pakistan. Al-Qaeda
core maintains command and control over its regional affiliates
and directed external operations. This model no longer holds
true.
Al-Qaeda's expansion in 2011 and 2012 is explained as
fallout from the weakening of the core group. But there is an
alternative explanation.
The Arab Spring and bin Laden's death in 2011 served as a
catalyst for change in the network. Other affiliates adapted to
AQAP's model and cultivated intergroup connection spanning the
region. These connections facilitate broader coordination and
cooperation within the al-Qaeda network and it increases
overall resiliency.
Today AQAP's prominence in the al-Qaeda network, or the
appointment of its leader to the No. 2 position in al-Qaeda,
should not be interpreted to mean that AQAP has risen to
replace the core group in Pakistan, or that it is directing the
network. There are three main points to emphasize.
First, there is no group at the heart of the network. It is
not centrally organized or directed. The senior leadership in
Pakistan maintains an advisory role and provides strategic
guidance, but it no longer issues directives.
Therefore, operations specifically targeting a single
group, including AQAP, would have a limited overall effect.
Such a strategy has allowed al-Qaeda's affiliates in Iraq,
Syria, and West Africa to expand virtually unchecked, and has
ignored the growth of associates across North Africa,
especially in Libya.
Second, the lateral connections, relationships among al-
Qaeda core, its affiliates and associates, create an interwoven
structure. The structure is what gives the network its
strength. Al-Qaeda groups are able to interact without running
relations through a central node, creating a much more
dispersed network.
Finally, the entire al-Qaeda network, including groups
operating solely at the local level, must be considered when
devising a strategy to counter it because of the existence of
the interwoven structure. Any additional connections through
added individuals or added groups strengthens the overall
network.
Al-Qaeda today bears little resemblance to the network in
2001. Yet America's strategy to counter it remains largely
unchanged. The network is global, and therefore the United
States needs a comprehensive global strategy.
Al-Qaeda extends beyond the commonly-known affiliates,
AQAP, al-Qaeda in Iraq, among others, to local groups that
operate at the grassroots level. These local groups understand
local grievances and respond to shifts in popular sentiment on
the ground. Any strategy to counter the al-Qaeda network must
recognize the role of these groups.
Including them as part of the network does not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that the United States must deploy
forces or invest heavily in military assets where the al-Qaeda
network is active. But it does require that policymakers invest
in a substantial effort to develop a global strategy with local
solutions.
Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Higgins, if I could leave
you with one take-away from my testimony and research, the view
that this is no longer George Bush's al-Qaeda, but we are still
fighting with George Bush's tactics. The enemy has transformed,
and if we want to win our strategy must transform with it.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Zimmerman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Katherine L. Zimmerman
September 18, 2013
The United States continues to face a threat from the al-Qaeda
network 12 years after declaring war against it. America's failure to
understand the complexities of the terrorist network as it has evolved
over the years has led only to tactical successes on the battlefield.
The strategy to disrupt the al-Qaeda network by killing senior
leadership in a ``core group'' is based on a faulty understanding that
overemphasizes that group's importance and the current intentions of
affiliates to attack the United States. This strategy has been
ineffective in dismantling the network overall. Al-Qaeda today bears
little resemblance to the network in 2001, yet America's strategy to
counter it remains largely unchanged.
The al-Qaeda network has moved away from a centrally organized
network over the years. Al-Qaeda's strength and resilience now lies in
the latticed interconnections between regional al-Qaeda groups, as well
as in the ties between those groups and the center. The most
significant inflection point occurred in 2009 when al-Qaeda's Yemen-
based affiliate, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), established
a new model for the role of groups in the al-Qaeda network. AQAP
focused its efforts on the far war against the United States and began
to foster relationships with other groups. The Arab Spring and Osama
bin Laden's death in 2011 served as a catalyst for change in the
network: Other affiliates, too, adapted to AQAP's model and cultivated
inter-group connections spanning the region. These connections
facilitate broader coordination and cooperation within the al-Qaeda
network, and have increased its overall resiliency.
Targeting individuals or a specific group within the al-Qaeda
network will not be effective alone. Such a strategy has allowed al-
Qaeda's affiliates in Iraq, Syria, and West Africa to expand virtually
unchecked and has ignored the growth of associated groups across North
Africa, especially in Libya. The al-Qaeda network is global and
operates on a global level. Many al-Qaeda groups operate solely on the
local level, but they strengthen the broader network. The United
States, therefore, needs a comprehensive global strategy to counter al-
Qaeda that is tailored down to the local level.
Case Study: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
The most direct threat to the U.S. homeland today emanates from
AQAP, which has attempted to attack the United States homeland at least
three times since its establishment in January 2009. The affiliate is
also behind the threat stream that prompted the unprecedented closure
of over 20 American diplomatic posts across the Middle East and North
Africa.
AQAP's prominence in the al-Qaeda network should not be interpreted
to mean that AQAP has risen to replace the core group in Pakistan or
that it is directing the network in some way. It must be interpreted
within the broader context of the al-Qaeda network. AQAP is an
extremely capable terrorist group that is a member of a network of
other groups all operating in similar manners. Its prominence is a
reflection of its capabilities and its prioritization of conducting
attacks against the United States, not the subordination of other
groups to AQAP.
background
A January 2009 video announced the establishment of AQAP as a
merger between al-Qaeda's Yemeni and Saudi branches. The video
identified four AQAP leaders: Two former Guantanamo detainees (Said al
Shihri and Mohamed al Awfi) and two escaped Yemeni prisoners (Nasser al
Wahayshi and Qasim al Raymi). Saudi al-Qaeda operatives, including at
least five former Guantanamo detainees who had gone through Saudi
Arabia's rehabilitation program, had fled to Yemen in the late 2000s to
escape the crackdown on al-Qaeda in the Kingdom. They began operating
with al-Qaeda in Yemen, which was on the path to being reconstituted
after having been essentially neutralized in 2002-2004. The February
2006 escape of 23 al-Qaeda operatives from a Sana'a prison, including
Wahayshi and Raymi, revitalized al-Qaeda in Yemen.
AQAP's rapid ascendancy in Yemen profited from the expertise of
individuals who had been active in the al-Qaeda network for years and
from the relatively free environment in which these individuals could
operate. The senior echelon of AQAP's leadership structure had decades
of combined experience. Many of the senior leaders had trained at al-
Qaeda's al Farouq training camp or elsewhere in Afghanistan, some were
members of Osama bin Laden's direct human network, and nearly all had
been active in the al-Qaeda network before the 9/11 attacks. Yemen's
weak central government, then headed by President Ali Abdullah Saleh,
did not exert direct control over its territory and in August 2009
dedicated scarce security resources to fighting the sixth iteration of
a rebellion in the north.\1\ The Yemeni government also prioritized
putting down a rising secessionist movement in the south over
counterterrorism operations against AQAP. The permissive security
environment along with the leadership's experience facilitated al-
Qaeda's full reconstitution in Yemen in 2009.
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\1\ For more on the al Houthi wars, see Christopher Boucek, ``War
in Saada: From Local Insurrection to National Challenge,'' Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, April 2010, http://
carnegieendowment.org/files/war_in_saada.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The group continued the small-scale attacks that al-Qaeda in Yemen
had been carrying out. But it also began to focus on external
operations against Saudi and American targets. AQAP's first major
external operation targeted the Saudi deputy interior ministry in
August 2009. Ibrahim al Asiri, the group's top bombmaker, designed an
explosive device that was concealed as a suppository in his brother's
body. The remotely-detonated bomb failed to kill the Saudi official. A
second plot to hit Saudi targets failed in October when a firefight
with Saudi border patrolmen killed Yousef al Shihri and Raed al Harbi,
who were smuggling explosives in to Saudi Arabia.\2\ AQAP became the
first affiliate to target the U.S. homeland in December that year.
Asiri modified the design for Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who conducted
the December 2009 attack. Asiri concealed Abdulmutallab's bomb in his
underwear. The device passed successfully through airport security, but
failed to detonate.\3\ The attack shone a spotlight on the al-Qaeda
affiliate and within a month, the U.S. designated AQAP, Wahayshi, and
Shihri under Executive Order 13224.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ ``Killed Militants Planned `Imminent' Attack: Saudi,'' Agence-
France Press, October 19, 2009, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/
article/ALeqM5jPLO7NB9gaJCikLRqTXEklkdMAHQ.
\3\ For further analysis, see Chris Harnisch, ``Christmas Day
Attack: Manifestation of AQAP Shift Targeting America,'' AEI's Critical
Threats Project, December 29, 2009, http://www.criticalthreats.org/
yemen/christmas-day-attack-manifestation-aqap-shift-targeting-america.
\4\ Philip Crowley, ``Designations of Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP) and Senior Leaders,'' U.S. Department of State Press
Statement, January 19, 2010, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/01/
135364.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The al-Qaeda affiliate was capable of maintaining two lines of
operations by 2010. It continued to pursue attacks on American targets,
evidenced by the October 2010 parcel plot. It also increased its focus
on fighting the Saleh government, which, under U.S. and international
pressure, had begun to intensify its operations against AQAP.\5\ The
retraction of the Yemeni central state into the capital, Sana'a, due to
the political unrest in winter 2011 opened up space for AQAP. The group
fielded an insurgent arm operating under the name ``Ansar al Sharia''
in spring 2011 that seized and held territory in south Yemen. AQAP
briefly governed in certain areas, but more significantly, expanded its
area of operations outside of its historical terrain. AQAP continues to
have a presence in many of these regions, though it has not held
territory since spring 2012. Its operatives have also regularly
targeted Yemeni political and military officials for assassination, a
strategy employed in 2010 and resumed as of 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ James Gallagher, ``Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in 2010:
The Intensification of the Near War,'' AEI's Critical Threats Project,
March 8, 2011, http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/aqap-2010-
intensification-near-war-march-8-2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
AQAP poses the most direct threat to the U.S. homeland out of the
al-Qaeda network. It incorporated lessons learned from the experience
of al-Qaeda in Iraq in building popular support when its insurgent arm,
Ansar al Sharia, tried its hand at governance in 2011 and 2012 (though
it ultimately failed). It has responded to shifting conditions on the
ground and has attempted to appeal to Yemen's various anti-government
groupings. It has innovated in the design of its explosive devices and
repeatedly attempted, with success, to penetrate American National
security defenses. Though the affiliate is extremely capable in its own
right, it must be examined in the context of the entire al-Qaeda
network.
New Model for al-Qaeda Affiliates and Associates *
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* Al-Qaeda affiliates are groups that have publicly pledged
allegiance to the al-Qaeda emir and have in turn received public
recognition as part of al-Qaeda by the al-Qaeda emir. Al-Qaeda
associates are groups that exhibit a sufficient number of
characteristics common within the al-Qaeda network such as shared
resources, overlapping fighter or leadership networks, a common
signature, and ideological alignment with al-Qaeda.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A major inflection point for the al-Qaeda network occurred with the
establishment of AQAP. The Yemen-based affiliate created a new model
for the role of groups in the al-Qaeda network by the end of 2009. The
previous model held that groups in the network were subordinated to a
``core'' group. That core group, which was the al-Qaeda leadership in
Pakistan, maintained command and control over its regional affiliates
and directed external operations. AQAP is the first known example of an
affiliate or an associate directing an attack against the U.S.
homeland, an effort the group has continued to prioritize. It also
provided training and shared resources with al-Qaeda associates in a
manner characteristic of bin Laden's group in the 1990s and early
2000s. The new model indicates that the network is no longer centrally
organized or directed, but continued relations between the ``core'' and
AQAP indicate a continued advisory role for the central group.
The December 2009 attack on Detroit-bound Northwest Airlines Flight
253 was the first attack from the al-Qaeda network on the U.S. homeland
directed by an affiliate, as previously mentioned. U.S. court documents
related to the case against the underwear bomber, Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab, provide the details of the plot.\6\ Abdulmutallab sought
out Yemeni-American cleric and AQAP senior operative Anwar al-Awlaki in
Yemen, and, after getting in touch through an intermediary and
submitting a letter to al-Awlaki, spent 3 days with the cleric. Al-
Awlaki connected him to the bombmaker, Ibrahim al Asiri, who explained
the plan. Abdulmutallab received specialized training on the explosive
device and basic military training at one of AQAP's training camps. He
then received orders from al-Awlaki to detonate the bomb over U.S.
airspace and Asiri provided him with the bomb itself. Osama bin Laden
mentioned the AQAP-directed attack in a message directed at President
Barack Obama, but did not claim credit for it.\7\ AQAP's deputy leader,
Said al Shihri, claimed credit for the attack in February 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ ``Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab Government's Sentencing
Memorandum,'' United States District Court, Eastern District of
Michigan, Southern Division, February 10, 2012, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/documents/umar-farouk-abdul-
mutallab-sentence-brief.pdf.
\7\ The bin Laden statement, an audio statement that runs just over
a minute, was released through al Jazeera on January 24, 2010 and then
through the al Fajr forum on February 16, 2010. ``Bin Laden Warns US of
More Attacks,'' al Jazeera, January 24, 2010, http://www.aljazeera.com/
news/middleeast/2010/01/201012415287209336.html; ``Al-Fajr Releases Bin
Laden Message to Obama,'' SITE Intelligence Group, February 16, 2010.
Available by subscription through www.siteintelgroup.com.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Yemen-based affiliate has attempted to attack the U.S. homeland
at least two more times since December 2009. It shipped two explosive
devices disguised as printer cartridges in October 2010. The bombs were
only discovered with the assistance of Saudi intelligence. AQAP tried
again in May 2012 when it innovated on the underwear-bomb design. That
plot was uncovered and thwarted by American and foreign intelligence
agencies. It is likely that AQAP leadership still seeks to attack the
U.S. homeland.
AQAP has fostered relations with other groups in the al-Qaeda
network. (See figure 1.) It has an established relationship with al-
Shabaab, al-Qaeda's affiliate in Somalia. It provided explosives and
basic military training to at least one al-Shabaab operative in 2010
and 2011.\8\ AQAP also facilitated al-Shabaab's communications with al-
Qaeda ``core,'' though al-Shabaab also appeared to have a line of
communications that ran outside of Yemen as well.\9\ Multiple sources
document the movement of fighters across the Gulf of Aden.\10\ The Arab
Spring presented AQAP with the opportunity to develop additional
relationships. It purportedly supported the establishment of an al-
Qaeda-linked cell in Egypt under the leadership of Mohamed Jamal Abu
Ahmed by sending him fighters and funding.\11\ Mohamed Jamal, a former
member of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, knew AQAP leaders Nasser al
Wahayshi, Adil al Abab, and Qasim al Raymi.** The Wall Street Journal
reported that Jamal's group was connected to the September 11, 2012
attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Libya.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ ``United States of America vs. Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame,''
United States District Court, Southern District of New York, July 5,
2011, http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/
Warsame_Indictment.pdf.
\9\ Brian Bennett, ``Al-Qaeda's Yemen Branch Has Aided Somalia
Militants, U.S. Says,'' Los Angeles Times, July 18, 2011, http://
articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/18/world/la-fg-bin-laden-somalia-
20110718.
\10\ Martin Plaut, ``Somalia and Yemen Swapping Militants,'' BBC,
January 17, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8463946.stm, Casey Coombs,
``African Militants Learn from al-Qaeda in Yemen,'' Global Post,
September 10, 2012, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/war/
conflict-zones/120907/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-yemen-somalia-al-
shabaab-gulf-aden.
\11\ ``State Security Prosecution Present Nasr City Cell File to
Public Prosecutor for Transfer to the Criminal Court,'' Youm7, February
6, 2013 [Arabic], http://www1.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=935561&.
** Mohamed Jamal had been imprisoned under Hosni Mubarak's regime,
but was released in 2011. He was arrested in 2012 and is incarcerated
in Egypt.
\12\ Siobhan Gorman and Matt Bradley, ``Militant Link to Libya
Attack,'' Wall Street Journal, October 1, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10000872396390444549204578020373- 444418316.html.
Nasser al Wahayshi, AQAP's emir, was also in direct contact with
Abdelmalek Droukdel, AQIM's emir, and the al-Qaeda core leadership in
Pakistan, in addition to al-Shabaab's leadership. Two separate letters
recovered in a document cache in Timbuktu, Mali, reveal Wahayshi's
counsel to Droukdel.\13\ In his first letter, dated May 21, 2012,
Wahayshi congratulated Droukdel on his progress in Mali and compared
AQIM's relationship with Ansar al Din (an ethnically Tuareg militant
Islamist group) with AQAP's Ansar al Sharia. He advised Droukdel that
AQIM could generate support by providing basic services and fulfilling
daily needs, like food and water. In his second letter, dated August 6,
2012, Wahayshi explained AQAP's loss in south Yemen against the Yemeni
security forces and cautioned Droukdel against declaring an emirate
when he would not be able to fulfill the role of a state.*** Wahayshi
also mentioned he held communications from the core group for Droukdel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Rukmini Callimachi, ``Yemen Terror Boss Left Blueprint for
Waging Jihad,'' Associated Press, August 9, 2013, http://
bigstory.ap.org/article/yemen-terror-boss-left-blueprintwaging-jihad.
The letters are available here: http://hosted.ap.org/specials/
interactives/_international/_pdfs/al-qaida-papers-how-to-run-a-
state.pdf.
*** Osama bin Laden offered Wahayshi similar advice, but it appears
to have been ignored in Yemen.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Today, AQAP continues to seek to attack the United States and to
nurture lateral connections with other groups in the al-Qaeda network.
It is believed that a credible threat stream from the Arabian
Peninsula, where AQAP operates, instigated the closure of diplomatic
posts across North Africa and the Middle East. Like other groups in the
al-Qaeda network, AQAP preferenced its local fight against the Yemeni
government during the Arab Spring, but it was also able to sustain a
second operational line devoted to attacking the United States. Other
al-Qaeda groups follow the model established by AQAP today, though many
have yet to develop the capabilities to conduct an attack against the
United States and to support such efforts.
The implications for this new model for al-Qaeda groups are far-
reaching when studying the al-Qaeda network. First, there is no group
at the heart of the network. The core group in Pakistan maintains a
mediatory or advisory role, but it no longer issues directives.
Therefore, operations specifically targeting a single group, including
AQAP, would have a limited overall effect on the network. Second, the
lateral connections--relationships between al-Qaeda groups--create a
latticed structure that adds to the resiliency of the network. This
latticed structure is what gives the network its strength. And finally,
the entire al-Qaeda network, including groups operating solely at the
local level, must be considered when devising any strategy to counter
the network because of the existence of the latticed structure.
countering the al-qaeda network
The strategy in place to counter al-Qaeda today remains largely
consistent with that adopted by the Bush administration in 2001. That
strategy emphasizes the killing of senior leadership in the core group
as the means by which to disrupt the network. Under this strategy, the
United States also pursues localized train-and-assist programs to
enable local militaries to counter the growth of al-Qaeda-linked
groups. The network model around which this strategy was designed is
one that holds there is a central group at the heart of the network. In
2001, this group was the one Osama bin Laden led directly, and it is
often referred to as al-Qaeda core. The Obama administration grouped
AQAP in with this central group after the December 2009 attack and
began targeting both AQAP and al-Qaeda core senior leadership. The same
occurred after the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan's (TTP) May 2010 Times
Square bombing. The recent appointment of AQAP's emir Wahayshi to
ma'sul al 'amm (general manager or al-Qaeda's No. 2 position), has even
led to assertions that AQAP has replaced the core group.
The United States has been extremely successful at killing al-
Qaeda, AQAP, and TTP senior leadership. The United States has killed
four of the top five al-Qaeda leaders in Pakistan in the past 3 years,
including Osama bin Laden, Sheikh Said al Masri, Atiyah Abd al Rahman,
and Abu Yahya al Libi.\14\ In Yemen, it has killed senior leader Anwar
al-Awlaki, USS Cole bombers Abdul Munim al Fathani and Fahd al Quso,
AQAP senior operative Mohamed Said al Umdah, spiritual leader Adil al
Abab, and deputy leader Said al Shihri. The same is true for the TTP.
AQAP and the TTP have both been able to regenerate leadership, limiting
the long-term impact of U.S. operations. Al-Qaeda core is decimated,
but such an effect required the dedication of significant U.S. military
and intelligence assets and resources, and still, there are al-Qaeda
senior operatives active today that are capable of leading the group.
Partners' successes against al-Qaeda groups have been mixed, but
overall, the network has expanded since the outbreak of the Arab
Spring.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Leon E. Panetta, ``The Fight against al-Qaeda: Today and
Tomorrow,'' (speech at the Center for New American Security,
Washington, DC) November 20, 2012, www.defense.gov/Speeches/
Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1737.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The strategy to counter AQAP relies on American direct action
operations targeting AQAP leadership and on Yemeni counterterrorism
operations to combat the group on the ground. As noted, U.S. targeted
strikes have killed a number of AQAP's leaders. America's partner in
Yemen has had limited success. Yemeni troops, partnered with local
militias, re-captured territory under AQAP's control in the beginning
of 2012. Yemen's security forces have not, however, been able fully
clear the territory of AQAP's local network. They are also riven with
low-level instances of insubordination, which may limit their overall
effectiveness. Many of the conditions that created a permissive
environment in Yemen remain in place, including grievances against the
central government and local conflict over access to resources such as
water. It is not clear that this strategy will be effective against
AQAP.
America's tactical successes against al-Qaeda have not succeeded in
weakening the overall network and probably will not have the desired
effect. Instead, al-Qaeda is more expansive than it was at the
beginning of 2011 and of 2001. Al-Qaeda's affiliate in Iraq has
resurged and is conducting operations in both Iraq and Syria, for
example.\15\ It also supported the establishment of Jabhat al Nusra,
al-Qaeda's Syrian affiliate. The strengthening of these affiliates has
strengthened the overall network. The targeting of a single group or
select senior leadership has not disrupted the network, and only in
Pakistan has it effectively weakened the al-Qaeda group. The failure to
understand properly how the al-Qaeda network is operating today has
confused U.S. strategy to counter it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Jessica D. Lewis, ``Al-Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent: The Breaking
the Walls Campaign Part 1,'' The Institute for the Study of War,
September 11, 2013, http://www.understandingwar.org/report/al-qaeda-
iraq-resurgent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Al-Qaeda has evolved since 2001 and the network today is much more
complex and resilient. The heart of the network is now its latticed
structure, which is composed of the interconnections among al-Qaeda
core, the affiliates, and the associates.\16\ The relationships among
al-Qaeda groups facilitate inter-group cooperation and the sharing of
resources. The network is global, and therefore the United States needs
a comprehensive global strategy to counter it. Al-Qaeda groups operate
on the local level, though, and have proven to be responsive to minute
shifts in local conditions. America's strategy to counter al-Qaeda must
not only be global, but it also must be tailored locally to respond
directly to the local conditions. Only then will the United States be
able to neutralize effectively the threat from the al-Qaeda network.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ See Katherine Zimmerman, ``The al-Qaeda Network: A New
Framework for Defining the Enemy,'' AEI's Critical Threats Project,
September 10, 2013, http://www.criticalthreats.org/al-qaeda/zimmerman-
al-qaeda-network-new-framework-defining-enemy-september-10-2013.
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looking forward: the al-qaeda network in 2014
Afghanistan is extremely important to al-Qaeda and the global jihad
movement because of its history. The mujahideen's fight against the
Soviets was the birth of the global jihad movement and brought together
the future senior leaders of what would come to be known as al-Qaeda.
Osama bin Laden's first major alliance was with the Pashtun warlord
Jalaluddin Haqqani, who offered sanctuary to bin Laden's forces and
shared in bin Laden's vision. There, bin Laden founded al-Qaeda and he
would return in 1996 to Haqqani's sanctuary with the Taliban's approval
when he lost favor in Sudan.
President Barack Obama announced plans to draw down forces in
Afghanistan and said that U.S. troop levels would be at 34,000 by
February 2014. The American force posture in Afghanistan in the second
half of 2014 and beyond remains unclear, and the bilateral security
agreement discussions for a long-term American military presence in
Afghanistan are formally suspended. Regardless of its shape, the
reduced American military footprint will limit U.S. counterterrorism
operations capabilities in the Afghanistan-Pakistan theater.
Considerations extend beyond America's own military capabilities to
those of the Afghan government: It must be able to sufficiently govern
its territory to prevent civil war, the return of the Taliban, or
significant power vacuums.\17\ If not, there is the risk that progress
made in Afghanistan will be reversed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ ``Why We Must Win in Afghanistan,'' American Enterprise
Institute, October 17, 2012, http://www.aei.org/issue/foreign-and-
defense-policy/why-we-must-win-in-afghanistan/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Retreat from Afghanistan in any form will be a victory for al-Qaeda
and will feed into its propaganda. Al-Qaeda's objective in Afghanistan
has been to defeat the American military the way that the mujahideen
defeated the Soviet military in 1989. The Soviet-supported Afghan
government, under Mohammed Najibullah, faced a continued insurgency and
collapsed in 1992, opening the space for the eventual rise of the
Taliban. It is probable that today's insurgency in Afghanistan would
continue after the withdrawal of American and international troops and
would challenge the survival of the Afghan government. Afghanistan's
political elite is also increasingly consumed by the upcoming
presidential elections in April 2014, the outcome of which will
determine the longevity of the country's constitutional system.\18\
These conditions set the stage for the possible return of al-Qaeda to
Afghanistan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Mara Tchalakov, ``The Northern Alliance Prepares for Afghan
Elections in 2013,'' The Institute for the Study of War, August 23,
2013, http://www.understandingwar.org/report/northern-alliance-
prepares-afghan-elections-2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Al-Qaeda's return to Afghanistan would have a resounding effect on
the network. Al-Qaeda associates in Afghanistan such as the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan, weakened by the American and international
military presence, would probably resurge and destabilize the region.
Jalaluddin Haqqani's son, Sirajuddin, who heads the Waziristan-based
Haqqani network, would likely seek to regain territory in Khost,
Paktika, and Paktia provinces in Afghanistan and would almost certainly
maintain his group's partnership with the Afghan Taliban, possibly
positioning the Haqqani network to extend beyond its previous
territories. The Haqqani network would also probably maintain its ties
with al-Qaeda given the Haqqanis' ideological sympathies and trajectory
of supporting the group over the past 25 years.\19\ Such a relationship
may translate to support for al-Qaeda in Haqqani-controlled territory.
The al-Qaeda-run training camps in Afghanistan in the 1990s churned out
leaders of militant Islamist groups in Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya,
among others. Today, these groups are members of the al-Qaeda network.
Though freedom of movement for al-Qaeda operatives is more limited now
than in the past, the resumption of militant training and religious
indoctrination in Afghanistan would be a significant boost to the
overall al-Qaeda network.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Vahid Brown and Don Rassler, Fountainhead of Jihad: The
Haqqani Nexus, 1973-2012 (London: C. Hurst and Co. Ltd., 2013) 243.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
conclusion
The United States still faces a significant threat from the al-
Qaeda network. One of the reasons for this is that American strategy to
counter al-Qaeda did not change as the network evolved. Tactical
successes in Yemen or Pakistan will not lead to victory, and may be
reversed should pressure on groups be removed. Understanding the
latticed structure that forms the heart of the al-Qaeda network will
more fully develop a picture of how the entire network is operating.
Locally focused al-Qaeda groups, currently dismissed and at times
ignored, are extremely important to the al-Qaeda network because of how
they support the efforts of such groups as AQAP. Any strategy to
counter the al-Qaeda network must recognize the role of these local
groups in strengthening the network. Including them as part of the
network does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the United
States must deploy forces or invest heavily in military assets where
the al-Qaeda network is active. It does require that policymakers
invest in a substantial effort to develop a global strategy with local
solutions to counter the entire al-Qaeda network.
We must fully understand the al-Qaeda network, and then, and only
then, will we be in the position to craft a strategy to defeat it.
Mr. King. Thank you very much.
Our next witness, Mr. Brian Katulis is a senior fellow at
the Center for American Progress where his work focuses on U.S.
and National security policy in the Middle East and South Asia.
Excuse me.
Mr. Katulis has served as a consultant with--no reflection
on Mr. Katulis--served as a consultant to numerous Government
agencies, private corporations, and non-Government
organizations in more than 2,000 countries including Iraq,
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Egypt, and Colombia. From 1995 to
1998 he worked in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Egypt for the
National Democratic Institute of International Affairs.
We welcome your testimony. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF BRIAN KATULIS, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR AMERICAN
PROGRESS
Mr. Katulis. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think you
will hear that the panel today is in violent agreement on most
issues. So what I wanted to do was highlight four points from
my written testimony.
First, at the outset I want to highlight that more than a
decade after the 9/11 attacks it is my assessment that the
United States still lacks the overall ability to assess
strategically whether the Government is properly matching
resources to meet the threats posed by these various terrorist
networks.
This picks up from a point that Katherine just made in her
testimony that despite the great work by our military personnel
and people serving in our intelligence agencies, and despite
the tremendous leaps and advances in technology and our ability
to target financial networks and other things. It has been a
stunning revolution.
The United States still lacks this overall strategy that
anticipates the emergence of new threats and nimbly changes our
approach to adapt to these new networks. These networks are
very adaptive. I think Congress has a very important role in
pressing the Executive branch in this area to help the Nation
become even more secure.
In sum, I think the United States still lacks clear metrics
that can help senior policymakers assess whether the current
strategic focus of U.S. efforts to protect the homeland has the
right priorities, objectives, and tactics.
The USCT efforts against al-Qaeda in Yemen is a prime
example of a series of tactical efforts producing some
successes, some failures. But all of these efforts are nested
in an overall weak strategy lacking sufficient focus on the
long-term investments needed to produce sustainable security.
So that is the first point.
Second point is mostly to echo much of what Frank and
Katherine said about AQAP, and then what you, Mr. Chairman and
Mr. Higgins said in your opening testimonies about AQAP. It is
the most dangerous organization. It is a hybrid form in that it
has both local goals and the goal of attacking the United
States and international targets. It is very dangerous for the
reasons that we have all mentioned here.
It maintains a very strong regional focus, particularly
against the governments of Yemen and Saudi Arabia. In addition
to the actions it has undertaken against Saudi Arabia and
Yemen, AQAP, as Frank mentioned, has served as a key
interlocutor with a number of all al-Qaeda terrorist branches
like al-Shabaab and AQIM, al-Qaeda in the Maghreb.
So this is the second point, to agree that this assessment
is correct. There is not much disagreement about where AQAP is.
I think the third point I want to stress is more of an
assessment on U.S. efforts against AQAP. I think since 2009 the
United States has been increasingly involved in an air campaign
against AQAP using a range of measures, air strikes in Yemen
that escalated in 2012 up to about 54 according to some Open
Source information.
Again, this policy has had several tactical successes in
eliminating key al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula leaders. In
fact the recent shift towards regional plots by AQAP, as
evidenced by the recent regional embassy closures this summer,
suggest a possible degradation of AQAP's capabilities to mount
plots outside of the Middle East. A possible degradation of
that ability, but I think AQAP still remains dangerous.
The main point I want to stress here is that I think we
have a series of tactics focused on kinetic measures. That our
policy in Yemen needs to focus more on what we can do to help
the Yemenis help themselves, in building institutions, in
building a stronger government so that they themselves are
carrying this fight much more effectively, and eliminating
threats in the long run.
That is where I think over the last 12 years in Yemen, in
Iraq, in Afghanistan the United States has fallen short. That
is where I think we need a more holistic assessment.
In closure, and the final point, fourth point I want to
make is more towards the future and what we are likely to see
in the region. AQAP, as I mentioned, is a hybrid organization
that has this dual focus on international targets and regional
targets.
However, what we have seen in the last 2 years in the
upheaval in the Middle East, the proliferation of jihadist
militant groups, presents I think a potential recruitment
problem for AQAP and core al-Qaeda. In particular, Syria's
civil war has provided a magnet for both jihadist funding and
recruitment. The lawlessness in the Sinai in Egypt should
concern all of us.
There is a bigger picture going on here. AQAP, I think, is
facing some stresses because of that. It is facing greater
competition from other jihadist groups for potential recruits.
This competition may both serve to harm and help American
interests by drawing jihadi funding and recruitment away from
AQAP and towards more regionally-focused targets. But it could
also spin out in ways that continue to present a threat for the
United States in the long run.
In sum, and I will close here, is that our discussion on
counterterrorism needs to be nested also in this complicated
discussion about the broader upheaval in the Middle East
because it needs to be much more interlinked to how these
societies build their governments and build a much more
capable, functioning security system for themselves.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Katulis follows:]
Prepared Statement of Brian Katulis
September 18, 2013
Mr. Chairman and Members of the subcommittee: More than 12 years
after the September 11 attacks, and 2\1/2\ years into the Middle East
uprisings, the United States continues to face dangerous threats on a
daily basis from that region of the world. Complicated security and
political dynamics present new challenges for U.S. National security in
the Middle East, and new threats posed by a number of Islamist
terrorist networks affiliated with al-Qaeda in transition have emerged
across the region.
That is why it is important to take opportunities such as today's
hearing to step back from the daily events, assess the security
implications of the recent changes in the Middle East, and focus in on
the overall status of the al-Qaeda network and the particular threats
posed by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP.
At the outset, it is worth noting that more than a decade after the
September 11 attacks transformed the way we as a Nation view these
threats, the United States still lacks the overall ability to assess
strategically whether the Government is properly matching resources to
meet the threats posed by these various terrorist networks.
The United States has invested in many new sophisticated means to
collect intelligence against a range of terrorist networks, and it has
substantially enhanced its capabilities to take action against these
networks through various kinetic actions, targeting financial networks,
and countering propaganda produced by terrorist groups. The use of new
technologies and weapons systems by the United States has been a
stunning revolution. The U.S. Government has become more capable in
reacting and responding to new threats.
But the United States still lacks an overarching strategy that
anticipates the emergence of new threats and adapts nimbly to fast
changes within terrorist networks. America's ability to assess the
overall strategy to counter terrorist networks around the world remains
limited and hampered by bureaucratic challenges. In sum, the United
States still lacks clear and discernible metrics that can help senior
policymakers assess whether the current strategic focus of all U.S.
Government efforts to protect the homeland from terrorist attacks has
the right priorities, objectives, and tactics to reinforce the
strategy. The U.S. counterterrorism efforts to respond to the threats
posed by AQAP in Yemen is a prime example of a series of tactical
efforts producing some successes and some failures, but all of these
efforts are nested in a weak overarching strategy lacking sufficient
focus on the long-term investments necessary to help produce
sustainable security.
current state of al-qaeda and al-qaeda in the arabian peninsula
Since 2008, al-Qaeda's core organization in Pakistan has suffered a
series of severe losses, including the death of founder Osama bin Laden
at the hands of U.S. forces in 2011. These continuing losses have
sufficiently harmed the group such that, according to the U.S. director
of national intelligence's March 2013 worldwide threat assessment, core
al-Qaeda ``is probably unable to carry out complex, large-scale attacks
in the West.''\1\ As a result, the major threats posed by al-Qaeda are
increasingly less about the core organization that attacked the United
States on September 11, 2001, and more related to a series of local and
regional organizations sharing a common ideology.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ James R. Clapper, ``Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US
Intelligence Community,'' March 13, 2013, available at http://
www.dni.gov/files/documents/Intelligence%20Reports/
2013%20ATA%20SFR%20for%20SSCI%2012%20Mar%202013.pdf.
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The most dangerous of these more local organizations is AQAP, which
represents a hybrid of the transnational core al-Qaeda organization on
the one hand and largely regional groups like al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb, or AQIM, or the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, or ISIS.
Whereas core al-Qaeda remains focused on global strategic goals, groups
such as AQIM and ISIS focus primarily on national or regional
objectives. By contrast, AQAP pursues both local goals and attacks
against the United States and other international targets.
One possible reason for this hybrid focus is a stronger
organizational tie between AQAP and core al-Qaeda. Yemen served as a
core al-Qaeda communications hub prior to the 9/11 attacks. Before 9/
11, al-Qaeda elements attacked the U.S.S. Cole in Aden in October 2000.
AQAP's leader, Nasir al-Wuhayshi, had served as bin Laden's personal
secretary and was in Afghanistan prior to the fall of the Taliban in
2001. He was also part of the February 2006 jailbreak in Yemen that
preceded the formation of AQAP, and was tapped this summer to serve as
core al-Qaeda's ``general manager'' by Ayman al-Zawahiri.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Eric Schmitt and Mark Mazzetti, ``Qaeda Leader's Edict to Yemen
Affiliate Is Said to Prompt Alert,'' The New York Times, August 5,
2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/06/world/middleeast/
qaeda-chiefs-order-to-yemen-affiliate-said-to-prompt-alert.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The 2006 jailbreak is a seminal moment that contributed to the
eventual creation of AQAP. Along with Wuhayshi, 22 other jailed al-
Qaeda members escaped. By September 2006, al-Qaeda in Yemen, or AQY,
was conducting large-scale suicide terrorist attacks against Yemeni oil
facilities. In 2008, AQY conducted a series of attacks against Western
diplomatic and Yemeni government facilities, including an attack with
multiple car bombs outside the U.S. embassy that killed 13 in September
2008.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ National Counterterrorism Center, ``Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP),'' available at http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/
aqap.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In January 2009, AQY merged with the remnants of the al-Qaeda
organization in Saudi Arabia that had been conducting attacks in the
Kingdom since 2003 to form AQAP. During the last 4 years, AQAP has come
to form the most direct terrorist threat to the United States, as
direct threats to U.S. homeland security from Pakistan reduced in part
due to the aggressive counterterrorism efforts pursued since 2008
there.
In the past 4 years, AQAP has attempted multiple attacks against
the United States, including the Christmas 2009 underwear bomb plot
against a U.S.-bound airliner, the October 2010 parcel bomb plot, and
most recently last summer's shutdown of U.S. diplomatic facilities
across the Middle East. This threat has prompted the United States to
become directly involved in Yemen, conducting an active campaign
against AQAP in coordination with the Yemeni government and other
governments in the region.
Moreover, AQAP has sought to foment ``lone wolf'' attacks in the
West via propaganda such as the English-language Inspire on-line
magazine. AQAP ideologues like Anwar al-Awlaki and Inspire have been
implicated in several attacks, including the 2009 Fort Hood shooting
and the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing.\4\ Despite the elimination of al-
Awlaki and Inspire editor-in-chief Samir Khan in a U.S. airstrike in
September 2011, AQAP's desire to spread violence to the West by
encouraging attacks by individuals heretofore unaffiliated with
terrorist organizations remains. This approach has also been encouraged
by core al-Qaeda leader Zawahiri in his latest tape recording.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Caitlin Dewey, ``Al-Qaeda's Inspire Magazine Celebrates Boston
Bombings,'' The Washington Post, May 31, 2013, available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/05/31/al-qaedas-
inspire-magazine-celebrates-boston-bombings/.
\5\ James Gordon Meek, ``al-Qaeda Leader Calls for Followers to Aim
Lower in Attacks,'' ABC News, September 13, 2013, available at http://
abcnews.go.com/Blotter/al-qaeda-leader-calls-followers-aim-lower-
attacks/story?id=20250860.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
AQAP maintains a strong regional focus--particularly against the
governments of Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Yemeni and Saudi officials have
been the targets of AQAP attacks since the group's formation in 2009,
most notably an attempt against Saudi Arabia's then-counterterrorism
chief Prince Mohammed bin Nayef. Saudi intelligence also played a
crucial role in disrupting a May 2012 AQAP plot to bomb a U.S.-bound
airliner with an improved underwear explosive.\6\ The threats posed by
AQAP produced incentives for several countries in the region to work
more closely with the United States on counterterrorism efforts, most
notably Saudi Arabia, which hosts a drone base from which the United
States conducts operations against AQAP in Yemen.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Sudarsan Raghavan, Peter Finn, and Greg Miller, ``In Foiled
Bomb Plot, AQAP Took Bait Dangled by Saudi Informant,'' The Washington
Post, May 9, 2012, available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/
2012-05-09/world/35456649_1_underwear-bomb-bomb-plot-al-qaeda.
\7\ Greg Miller and Karen DeYoung, ``Brennan Nomination Exposes
Criticism on Targeted Killings and Secret Saudi Base,'' The Washington
Post, February 5, 2013, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/brennan-nomination-opens-obama-to-criticism-on-
secret-targeted-killings/2013/02/05/8f3c94f0-6fb0-11e2-8b8d-
e0b59a1b8e2a_story.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Beyond direct action against the Saudi and Yemeni governments, AQAP
has also served as a key interlocutor with other al-Qaeda-linked
terrorist branches. For instance, AQAP has provided weapons and
training to Somalia's al-Shabaab group according to the guilty plea of
Ahmed Warsame.\8\ AQAP leader Wuhayshi has also been in contact with
the leaders of AQIM according to documents found in Mali following the
French intervention against jihadist forces there in January 2013.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ FBI, ``Guilty Plea Unsealed in New York Involving Ahmed
Warsame, a Senior Terrorist Leader and Liaison Between al-Shabaab and
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, for Providing Material Support to
Both Terrorist Organizations,'' Press release, March 25, 2013,
available at http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/2013/guilty-
plea-unsealed-in-new-york-involving-ahmed-warsame-a-senior-terrorist-
leader-and-liaison-between-al-shabaab-and-al-qaeda-in-the-arabian-
peninsula-for-providing-material-support-to-both-terrorist-
organizations.
\9\ Bill Roggio, ``Wuhayshi Imparted Lessons of AQAP Operations in
Yemen to AQIM,'' Long War Journal, August 12, 2013, available at http:/
/www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/08/wuhayshi_imparts_les.php.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Outside of its obvious role in Yemen, AQAP has played little role
in the on-going political transitions in the region. A number of other
jihadist groups have played more direct roles in North African states
such as Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt. AQAP's influence there is likely
limited to advice and possible support. In Yemen, AQAP has sought to
take advantage of the chaos and uncertainty surrounding the transition
from the Saleh regime to take and hold territory. However, this effort
has been met with a U.S.-supported Yemeni government counteroffensive
that has in part reversed AQAP's gains. AQAP's wider regional role has
therefore been limited, which is somewhat expected given its previous
focus on Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the West.
assessment of u.s. efforts against aqap
The United States became directly involved in efforts against AQAP
in December 2009, when the Obama administration launched a cruise
missile strike against AQAP targets in order to prevent ``an imminent
attack against a U.S. asset.''\10\ (This strike is also believed to
have unfortunately killed dozens of civilians.) The U.S. air campaign
against AQAP began in earnest in May 2011, when the United States
launched the first of 14 airstrikes in Yemen that year. Subsequently,
the United States conducted 54 airstrikes in Yemen in 2012 and 23 thus
far in 2013.\11\
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\10\ Brian Ross and others, ``Obama Ordered U.S. Military Strike on
Yemen Terrorists,'' ABC News, December 18, 2009, available at http://
abcnews.go.com/Blotter/cruise-missiles-strike-yemen/story?id=9375236.
\11\ New America Foundation, ``U.S. Covert War in Yemen,'' New
America Foundation, available at http://yemendrones.newamerica.net/
(last accessed September 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This policy has scored several tactical successes in eliminating
key AQAP leaders and helping the Yemeni government reverse AQAP's
battlefield advances. In addition to al-Awlaki and Khan, U.S.
airstrikes in Yemen have killed a number of AQAP leaders from Abdul
Munim Salim al-Fatahani, Fahd al-Quso, and Muhammad Saeed al-Umda in
2012,\12\ to Saeed al-Shehri, then AQAP's second-in-command, and Qaeed
al-Dhahab in 2013.\13\ In addition to their roles in AQAP, Fatahani and
Quso were both believed to have been involved in the Cole bombing, and
Quso likely was involved in supporting the 9/11 hijackers as well. Umda
was believed to have been involved in the 2002 attack on the oil tanker
Limburg.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Bill Roggio, ``AQAP Operative Killed in Recent Drone Strike in
Yemen,'' The Long War Journal, February 3, 2012, available at http://
www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/02/aqap_operative_kille.php; Hakim
Almasmari, ``Senior al Qaeda Operative Killed By Airstrike in Yemen,''
CNN.com, May 7, 2012, available at http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/06/world/
africa/yemen-airstrikes; Reuters, ``FBI Chief in Yemen as Drone Kills
AQAP Leader,'' April 24, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/
article/2012/04/24/us-yemen-idUSBRE83N0X- B20120424.
\13\ Alexander Marquardt, ``al-Qaeda Leader Gets Lazy, Killed in
Drone Strike, Terror Group Says,'' ABC News, July 17, 2013, available
at http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2013/07/al-qaeda-leader-gets-
lazy-killed-in-drone-strike-terror-group-says/; Al-Arabiya, ``Al-Qaeda
Confirms Death of Yemen Leader Qaeed al-Dhahab,'' September 15, 2013,
available at http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/09/
15/Al-Qaeda-confirms-death-of-Yemen-leader.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The recent shift toward regional plots, as evidenced by the
regional embassy closures this summer, suggests a possible degradation
of AQAP's capability to mount plots outside the Middle East.
These tactical successes, however, are not reinforced by a broader,
more coherent U.S. policy to promote Yemen's transition to democracy
under President Abdo Rabu Mansour Hadi. There is an inherent tension
between the long-term objective of supporting a transition to a stable
democracy in Yemen and the short-term imperative of preventing
terrorist attacks against the United States and our allies and partners
in the region. This short-term imperative is being at a quicker speed
than the more difficult problem of transitioning a developing country
from authoritarianism to democracy. This transition cannot be
accomplished at a pace that will solve the immediate and pressing
security challenge presented by AQAP.
However, it is possible for the United States to try and better
link these short- and long-term policies. Doing so will be difficult,
but offers a chance to translate recent tactical success into long-term
stability. President Hadi has recently outlined the progress made in
Yemen's political transition,\14\ and should be commended and supported
as the transition continues. Encouraging Yemen's National Dialogue to
be as inclusive as possible to include Southern Yemenis and those
outside the capital, Sanaa, will be important, as will ensuring the
Yemeni government meets its commitments on human rights and democratic
reforms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi, ``Distancing the Past for a Brighter
and Democratic Future,'' Yemen Times, September 15, 2013, available at
http://yementimes.com/en/1711/opinion/2887/Distancing-the-past-for-a-
brighter-and-democratic-future.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Of particular importance going forward will be support for security
sector reform. Despite some progress in purging the security services
of Saleh loyalists,\15\ developing an effective and professional
security sector capable of tackling AQAP with minimal U.S. support will
likely take time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Holger Albrecht, ``The Security Sector in Yemen'' (Washington:
United States Institute of Peace, 2013), available at http://
www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB142-Security-Sector-in-Yemen.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In short, the United States should make every effort to sync up the
imperatives of its short-term fight against AQAP with the long-term
goal of a stable and developing Yemeni democracy that is able to
provide for its own security. This effort will be difficult, but not
impossible.
next phase of u.s. policy
The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan next year is
unlikely to have a major impact on either core al-Qaeda or AQAP.
Assuming a bilateral security agreement between the United States and
Afghanistan is concluded, U.S. forces will remain in Afghanistan to
conduct operations against core al-Qaeda if and when necessary.
However, core al-Qaeda is less important today than before its
evisceration began in 2008. Branch al-Qaeda organizations such as AQIM
and ISIS are likely to prove greater challenges to U.S. interests even
if they do not directly target the U.S. homeland.
AQAP is a hybrid organization that maintains a dual focus on
international targets such as the U.S. homeland and more local and
regional goals such as fighting the Yemeni and Saudi governments. It
will therefore rightly receive more attention from U.S. policymakers
than AQIM, ISIS, or the myriad jihadist groups operating in Egypt's
Sinai Peninsula. While these groups operate in regions with equally
good prospects for serving as a terrorist ``safe haven,'' they do not
as yet present the same direct threat to the U.S. homeland or regional
interests as AQAP.
However, the proliferation of jihadist militant groups does present
a potential recruitment problem for AQAP and core al-Qaeda. In
particular, Syria's civil war has provided a magnet for both jihadi
funding and recruitment. Increased lawlessness in the Sinai may prove a
more attractive prospect for militants than fighting in Yemen,
particularly in the wake of the Muslim Brotherhood's ouster from power
in Egypt, and AQIM's activities in North Africa present another
possible syphon of recruits and funding. In short, AQAP is facing
greater competition from other jihadist groups for potential recruits.
Paradoxically, this competition may both serve and harm American
interests by drawing jihadi funding and recruitment away from AQAP, the
only non-core al-Qaeda organization that directly targets the U.S.
homeland, and toward various other groups that pose threats both to
U.S. regional interests and the citizens of the region itself.
While it remains appropriate for U.S. policy to concentrate on the
threat posed by AQAP, policymakers should begin re-evaluating the
threat posed by al-Qaeda to take into account its evolution from the
core organization that attacked the United States on 9/11. AQAP serves
as an example of al-Qaeda's transition from a core organization based
in Afghanistan and Pakistan with grandiose global objectives to a
series of largely independent but mutually supportive branch offices
with a more local and regional focus. These movements still pose a
threat to the United States and its allies, but the nature of these
threats are constantly changing.
These changes and transitions within terrorist networks such as
AQAP require a more strategic and nimble policy approach by the United
States. The Middle East has entered a difficult and complicated period
of transitions, one that will likely be prolonged and will present new
challenges for U.S. security. Syria's civil war, on-going unrest in
Egypt, Iran's role in supporting terrorist groups around the region,
and the unsettled security situations in Yemen and Libya all present
substantial challenges to U.S. security.
During the last 12 years, the United States has increased its
capabilities to identify, target, and act against a range of terrorist
networks operating in the Middle East. What it has not succeeded in
doing is helping the countries and governments of the region develop
their own institutions that possess sufficient capability and political
legitimacy to produce the long-term gains necessary ultimately to
defeat the threats posed by groups like al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Katulis. I thank all the witnesses
for the testimony.
I think one thing that struck me is that the three of you
come from such different perspectives yet all share the belief
that AQAP and al-Qaeda and its affiliates and the whole al-
Qaeda organization is so extremely dangerous to the United
States. I agree with you. Probably many Members on this
committee would agree with you. But I don't know if the
American people share that knowledge at all.
Without getting into the whole Syria debate because I
realize that is separate, but one of the reasons why I think
people objected so much to Syria is that they are war-weary.
They just somehow feel this is going on for so many years.
Quite frankly, without making this partisan, I wish the
White House would talk more about what a real threat al-Qaeda
is rather than saying bin Laden is dead and we are back to a
pre-9/11 stage because in many ways I think it is more
dangerous than it was before 9/11.
I guess I am asking for advice from you on how do we get
that out to the public? Is the burden on us as elected
officials, as people in the public eye? Without sounding like
we are war-mongers and we just want a war never to end? I mean
that is another expression that is used a lot, we can't have
endless wars. This is almost as close to one as we are going to
have, I think, certainly in our lifetimes and certainly over
the next 5, 10 years.
Do you have any thoughts to that, as to how we can generate
public intentions so we don't walk around and worry about being
attacked every moment, but also realizing that we have an enemy
that is 24/7 trying to find ways to kill us in many forms. I
guess we will just go down the line.
Frank, Mr. Cilluffo.
Mr. Cilluffo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think you raise a
very significant set of issues that is playing out not only in
respect to Syria, but on a whole host of different matters.
I think first and foremost it is being as transparent as we
can be in terms of conveying the facts. Keep in mind, they are
the ones who declared war, it is not the other way around. So
as much as we can convey the information as clearly in a way
that is not emotional but factually-based I think we have a
responsibility, not just the Executive branch but the
Legislative branch and those of us who study these issues. I
think that is critically important as well.
Let me also suggest that I am very concerned that in a
recent environment that the terrorists are learning from some
of the leaks that continue to leak, like a sieve, from
Washington. Most notably, they are going to alter their trade
craft, whether it is their communications, whether it is their
planning, and even their operations, I would argue, and I am
probably in the minority on this panel here.
Think of suppressive fire. We can wait until the threat
emanates and is in front of us or we can keep the adversary
looking a little bit over their shoulder so they have less time
to plot, train, and execute attacks. We need to continue to
keep our foot, to one extent or another, on the gas pedal.
Let me also just underscore one thing that I think is the
greatest missing dimension of our counterterrorism state craft
since 9/11. This is to paraphrase a campaign manager for Bill
Clinton. I am not suggesting I am talking to you guys, but in
this case it is the ideology, that is stupid.
We have not gotten our arms around the ability to push
back, expose, unpack the hypocrisy that al-Qaeda espouses. That
is what makes AQAP unique. It is 11 editions of Inspire, and
case after case after case after case will show that Anwar al-
Awlaki played a role in some of the home-grown cases, as well
as the foreign fighters.
I think Brian was spot-on. When you look at Syria you have
got thousands of Western foreign fighters fighting along in
Syria right now. What happens when they go home?
In the past you had seen AQAP was the first organization
that truly went out of their way to try to recruit
``cleanskins,'' as they would be referred to, those with the
ability to travel freely. That is a big issue.
It is a very significant issue. Quite honestly we still
have an awful lot to do. Part of that is just as much as we can
without getting into emotion just laying out the facts and let
the American people decide based on that.
Mr. King. Ms. Zimmerman, don't worry about the time because
there are only two of us so take whatever time you need to
answer.
Mr. Cilluffo. I have never had an unspoken thought.
Mr. King. No, no.
Ms. Zimmerman. Thank you.
I think that what I want to draw out is that, though we may
be war-weary, al-Qaeda is still attempting to attack the United
States, and that the strategy to counter it doesn't need to be
solely based on a military strategy.
This draws on some of what Brian brought up in his
testimony that al-Qaeda groups thrive in areas of lower, poor
governance, and are able to take advantage of grievances
against the Government or local administrations, and are able
to find traction where basic services are not being provided.
You can look at south Yemen in 2011, in the spring of 2011,
as a very good example of how AQAP was able to be down on the
ground at the local level and address basic grievances of the
population and actually start taking control of territory. In
the end it wasn't successful, but that example shows how al-
Qaeda is attempting to take advantage of gaps in governance and
gaps in basic services to build popular support.
I want to point you also to a letter from AQAP's leader to
the leader of al-Qaeda's leader in Maghreb, which advised him
and counseled him not to declare a state because then you have
to provide all the goods and services of a state, but to be
almost a state. That way the people would turn to you, but you
are not to blame if you fail. I think that what we are seeing
is al-Qaeda groups applying lessons learned, as Frank
mentioned, and growing from there.
So we can start to counter al-Qaeda by countering issues in
governance, in human rights and on the softer side where there
is much broader appeal for the American people.
Mr. King. How possible is that in Yemen, for instance,
under the current government or the immediately previous
government?
Ms. Zimmerman. The current government is still very weak
from its transition. But there is a lot of popular support
still and hope for change. The National Dialogue, which is a
process that has brought together opposition groups is actually
wrapping up today, and final reports are due tomorrow from
different various working groups that will move forward the
transition process.
What Yemen needs, though, is a much longer-term investment
from partners. It has long-term socioeconomic issues that are
coming to the floor now and that are only going to grow worse.
Unemployment rate, natural resources drawing down, these are
issues that are going to come up in the next 5 to 10 years, and
there doesn't seem to be a plan to address them.
So, some of the underlying challenges besides the terrorism
problem in Yemen will come to the floor. As it has in the past,
will likely distract the government from pursuing our interests
in AQAP.
Mr. King. Mr. Katulis.
Mr. Katulis. On your initial question about this challenge,
I share your concern. I think there is no substitute for
Presidential leadership on this. I share your view on that as
well.
But what I worry about in the last 6, 7 years, what I see
up here is less of a bipartisan focus on how we can educate the
American public about these threats. When you think about that
decade post-9/11, and here it is both parties, different
figures have been--you could blame them for this.
But I think often times Americans, ordinary Americans just
see rancor, whether it is related to the budget negotiations or
other things. Quite frankly, even the security issues. We have
had a lot on that front.
I think Members of Congress, Senators and others, who are
internationally-minded have a special responsibility to go out
and educate the American public that these are long-term
trends. Because if you look at both Republicans and Democrats,
there are strands within both parties that say who cares? Let's
wash our hands of this and let's go home. There really needs to
be a much more focused effort. Educating much in the same way I
think we have all said here.
These are long-term challenges. If no one else will do this
if the United States is not engaged in this.
One last point on that is in my travels in the Middle East,
and I go once a month or so, and in my discussions with senior
U.S. officials, including military officials, they make the
point that what we do here at home as we address issues like
our budget and problems here at home, or if we don't.
The perception of deadlock, the perception that we can't
get anything done on those things that matter most to our own
citizens here at home, it has an impact on our power, on our
ability to actually shape those countries in the Middle East
that we want to say we are a leader. It sends a very negative
message.
Here again I am not assigning blame to anyone here. Here it
is just the sense that there has been this rancor and it spills
over overseas. It has this impact on if--our soft power, if you
will.
If 10 or 15 years ago there was great admiration for our
democracy and our ability to get things done in our economic
system, when I go to Egypt, when I go to Yemen, when I go to
these places, people have tuned out because they see a lot of
division and they see the United States not leading anymore.
Yes, it comes back to our commander-in-chief and our
President and how he talks about it in part. But it is also a
broader point about our system and the special role that we all
play in trying to foster a dialogue that I think keeps America
engaged in these problems in the world.
Mr. King. I wish there were some people here that were
listening to you right now. I have a few of them in mind. But
in any event--not Mr. Higgins.
With that I yield, sir. Blaming both parties. Yield to the
Ranking Member.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Katulis, you had indicated that there is a competition,
in essence, between al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and
fighters that are gravitating toward both Iraq and Syria
because of the instability there. So these are--but the other
issue I--you know there has been a lot of talk the last couple
of weeks about whether or not to strike militarily on Syria and
what the consequence of that is.
You know if you look at the situation in Syria where you
have--it is the last minority-led regime in the Middle East.
First was Lebanon, then Iraq and now Syria. You tip that
balance, Syria is probably 65 percent to 75 percent Sunni.
The opposition is really not that of a freedom and
democracy movement. Its best fighters are al-Qaeda affiliates
and Islamic extremists bent on creating an Islamist state in
Syria.
I understand fundamentally that al-Qaeda thrives in failed
states. Well, the whole region is failed, I mean it is a mess.
So in--you know whatever we do anybody that tells you they know
what the result of that is we should be skeptical of. Because
you know whether it is in Afghanistan we helped the Mujahideen
defeat the Soviets in 1989. Then the Mujahideen basically
facilitated the transfer of bin Laden from the Sudan in 1996 to
Afghanistan, which created really the global jihadist movement.
That is something that it could be said that we helped
facilitate. Unknowingly, perhaps, but we did.
I was taken by your suggestions that America and our
standing in the world is compromised when the rest of the world
sees that America is not functioning well, or is in a state of
dysfunction. I think that is particularly true today with
social media.
You know none of these movements would be occurring in any
of these places without the tools of collaboration and social
media, Facebook, Twitter, and everything else. But those tools
are used not only for organizational purposes, but they are
also used for aspirational purposes as well.
The rest of the world can see how they are not living. If
the United States is strong and prosperous and providing
opportunities for all of its people, that, to me, is the most
powerful influence in terms of people rising up and challenging
the regimes that have kept them oppressed.
So I know I kind of said a lot there without a question,
but I would like each of you to kind of comment on that.
Mr. Katulis. Well, if I could just start out by saying
almost 2 years ago, that 2\1/2\ years ago I testified before
the subcommittee early in what some people called the Arab
Spring. I never called it the Arab Spring, I called it the
uprisings because we were uncertain about which way it would
go.
Now it is more than 2 years into this. The uprisings have
hit its terrible 2's or 3's. I have a 3-year-old, I can attest
to that. It is very complicated. I wouldn't be completely
negative.
One thing you said that struck me, and I will just
respectfully disagree, is that the whole region is a mess. Yes,
a good bit of it is. But in places like Tunisia and even in
places like Yemen which are deeply complicated and there are
lots of threats there, what Katherine said about the National
Dialogue is spot-on. Those sorts of footholds are essential.
I think what I was trying to say in my first point we as a
country have lacked an overarching strategy that actually
defines what we would like to see in the long term in this
region of the world. We have been hesitant to do that. George
W. Bush didn't do it. Barack Obama has not done it.
We often define in the negative. We are going to disrupt,
dismantle, and defeat terrorist networks. We need to continue
to do that. But it doesn't actually tell the American public or
tell ourselves what it is we actually need to help these
societies create.
Now, we can't do it for them. That is the trickier part.
But I think, I fear that we see complexity and see problems in
places like Syria, and I completely agree with I think
everything you said on Syria.
But I think we also still need to stay engaged and we need
to actually figure out what is the long-term solution because
what we are seeing in many of these places, especially in
Syria, is the collapse of a state system potentially. Or at
least it is creating these demographic, social, economic, and
political pressures. All of these are linked together. That is
one thing I wanted to stress is that the terror threat is not
dis-linked at all to the political situation in these
countries.
In fact, places like Tunisia where you have an Islamist
government, and many of these Islamists that are in power have
common ideologies with some of these radical terrorist groups.
But I do think that those non-radical groups that are in
government now have some potential for marginalizing those
radical groups, some potential.
But this is going to take decades. We ourselves can't shape
and determine what will happen. But I think we can have a big
influence if we actually work with others and work with
countries in the region to figure out how to--what is our end-
goal, which is what we are lacking right now.
Mr. Cilluffo. Mr. Higgins, just to build on a couple of the
points, because I think you raised a number of fundamental
issues that go far beyond counterterrorism, but also touch on
what is the U.S. role in the world. One thing I think we also
need to acknowledge and recognize is U.S. credibility in the
world once we start coming up with red lines and the like, not
only with respect to Syria, but to others as well. So there are
no very simple or easy questions here.
On the counterterrorism side, I think we really have to
have the hard question of asking what is truly in the U.S.
National interest. Here is where I am going to be a little
hawkish.
I agree with everything that Brian and Katie raised and I
am fans of their work. But at the end of the day we have got
limited resources. We have got all sorts of problems brewing,
including in our own country. We have got economic crises and
challenges that we are going to have to get very focused in
terms of what is in our greatest National interest.
So I still think that while I realize we will never kill
and capture our way to victory, the kinetic instrument is still
important. What we can't afford to do is get pulled into
quagmires that are going to be long-term insurgencies that will
actually foster what it is we are trying to prevent.
So short of that what are our limited options? I would
argue we do have a responsibility, especially if you have got a
threat directly facing the United States. Take some of the
operational and military leadership of terrorist organizations.
I think that some of our soft, light-footprint-type special
operations and light-footprint capabilities are critical to
include drones which kind of get lost. Drones is a means to an
end. It is a vehicle. It is not the end-state in itself. I will
be the first to say that that is in itself insufficient. But at
the end of the day, you also need to focus on the greatest
National interest that is facing you at that time.
I would also argue sometimes short-term interests, if we
move away after we address those could foster and pay us back
in a very different kind-of way long-term if we don't continue
to keep our eye on the ball.
So one thing on social media, keep in mind that many of
these countries don't even have access given their regimes
given that a, because they may not have access to smartphones
and in other cases where regimes are not permitting some of
their citizens access to information. So that does cut both
ways.
Clearly you have others co-opting and exploiting
situations. Take Egypt, the intent may have been very different
than what we see today. So who is in a position to seize and
move in and take advantage of these vacuums? That is something
we need to be thinking about and thinking about strategically.
On Syria there are no easy--there are no good solutions if
you ask me. But this is not a hearing on Syria, so I will shut
up.
Ms. Zimmerman. I will be brief. I think that the point that
I want to draw out here is the narrative that it doesn't matter
what is happening in the rest of the world because we here at
home are safe, and we need to deal with our own budget and
economic issues.
No one can dismiss that the United States has its own
domestic policy decisions to make. But I do want to push back
on the idea that what is happening in Syria, what is happening
in Egypt, some of the unrest that has started happening in
Tunisia following the coup or the ousting of Morsi in July in
Egypt, those do start to have an effect on the U.S. security
because they set the long-term risk for Americans. Where they
create conditions on the ground that let extremism thrive in a
way that we haven't seen before.
That will, in the next few decades, come back to the United
States in the same way that the ungoverned space that we saw in
Afghanistan and Jahim permitted al-Qaeda to train. It was 10
years later that we saw al-Qaeda thrive at the beginning of
2001 and conduct the 9/11 attacks.
That is the message that I think has been missed in recent
years is that for Americans we do very much depend on global
security for our own National security and that the two are not
entirely disconnected. Thank you.
Mr. King. You mentioned earlier that Inspire magazine had
been particularly effective in recruiting Americans. Samir
Khan, who actually went to East Meadow High School right near
my home, was American. He not just spoke English, he spoke
American English, assumed to have a unique ability to impact
young Americans, obviously young Muslim Americans.
I know that Inspire magazine has come back. But is it at
the same level as it was in the Samir Khan, as far as being
able to make that unique appeal to Americans as he seemed to
have, and al-Awlaki, who was an American citizen, seemed to
have?
Mr. Cilluffo. I think that is a great question, Mr.
Chairman. I would have said immediately following his death
some of the editions that came out were grammatically wrong.
They were very poor quality production. But what we saw post
the Boston terrorist attack was at the same level, at least
from a production standpoint.
I think what you are starting to see is in addition to the
attempt to radicalize and recruit Westerners and Americans and
others, they are getting much more focused on also terrorist
tactics, techniques, and procedures. So the TTPs that basically
are providing the how-to, do-it-yourself terrorism. That is a
concern as well.
So it is teaching operational security. It is teaching how
to not get pulled up by the law enforcement authorities,
whether local or Federal. So I think you are starting to see a
bit more focused on TTPs. That does require--that is a concern,
maybe of a different kind of level.
So I was thinking post al-Awlaki and Samir Khan that that
would have been the end of Inspire as we saw it. Unfortunately,
there is a very fluent English speaker, whether American,
British, Australian, Canadian, I am not sure, but clearly
someone who is fluent not only in the language but also
culturally in our country. So it is a concern.
Again, I underscore almost every case of homegrown Islamist
or jihadi-based terrorism had an al-Awlaki connection, at least
from an inspirational perspective. You also see that in the
United Kingdom. So it is a concern.
Mr. King. Anybody else want to comment on this?
Mr. Cilluffo, in your testimony, and again, each of you can
comment on this. You mentioned about the impact of leaks and
the operational impact, the changes we have seen in al-Qaeda
affiliates. Would you care to expand on that?
Mr. Cilluffo. Mainly to underscore its significance. Think
of it as having the playbooks of an offensive and defensive
coordinator, if you are thinking football. That is pretty
dangerous.
I was very concerned, not only in terms of how they can
alter their operational security and trade craft from a
communicating and planning perspective. But perhaps one of the
most eye-opening documents was what al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula and others in the broader al-Qaeda community are
doing to try to protect themselves from drones.
The level of specificity that was in that document is quite
damning. Obviously now the adversary knows what we know that
they know, and that has big potential operational implications.
I might underscore in that same document and in other
reporting, all the principal foreign terrorist organizations
also highlighted just how significant drones were. They were
scared, very much so, about the efficacy of them.
Ms. Zimmerman. I just want to echo that, but I wanted to
add a little bit more. We have seen reporting from I believe it
was Washington Post that specifically said that AQAP changed
the way that it was communicating following the leaks this
summer. That shows a reaction from the groups to our method, an
adoptiveness that we have yet to actually overcome.
There is an idea that we will always have superior
technology. But it will have to meet--be superior all the time
if we are going to be able to glean the intelligence that we
need. It needs to be unknown to the enemy, which means unknown
to the public.
The other point is actually in Inspire magazine where
initially the editors had sought questions and solicited
articles using encryption software. At some point in the middle
of the 11 issues there was a message in Inspire magazine saying
that they were no longer asking because the encryption software
was not working.
I have not been able to tie that to any specific
information, but clearly the organization was very careful
about seeing reflections of its own internal communications in
the public sphere. So we need to be very aware of how the enemy
is watching what we are doing as well.
Mr. Katulis. Just real quick, these tools are essential for
keeping America safe. When I mentioned the leaps in technology
that we have seen in the last few years, that is what I was
talking about. You talk to people who work in the intelligence
community who work this day-in and day-out. These leaks are
damaging beyond belief.
The one point I wanted to stress was in addition to those
tools for collecting information, one place where I feel there
is still a weakness after more than 12 years of being deeply
engaged in the Middle East is our ability to actually collect
human intelligence on these organizations.
We have become much more sophisticated in our technology,
and that is a good thing. We should protect that as much as
possible.
But it is still stunning to me the lack of depth of
knowledge, the lack of Arabic speakers--and it takes a while, I
speak Arabic myself--inside of the community. People that can
embed themselves and understand not only the terrorist
organizations, but also I think some of these Islamist groups
that some of them are actually in power in some of these
countries, and understanding the linkages, at least
ideologically and in terms of heritage.
I am not saying that they are all linked together, but I
think there was a bit of naivete about the Muslim Brotherhood
and other things. Yes, they are separate and distinct from al-
Qaeda. Yes, Ayman Zawahiri was arguing against the Muslim
Brotherhood. But they do share a lineage, and there was a lack
of depth, I think, inside of the U.S. Government of
understanding just what the nature of these organizations were.
I think it is something we should continue to press them on.
Mr. Cilluffo. I hate to jump in because I already spoke too
much. But to pick up on two very important points I think Brian
raised, I mean human is critical in any counter. Only a human
source is going to know when and where and why. So I think a
human source, human enabled by technology, sure, but I think as
much as we can invest there, critical.
But the bigger point being, think back to the Cold War. You
had every war college. Everyone I knew was taking Russian in
college. You had war colleges. You had whole institutions
devoted to understanding the KGB, understanding the Soviets and
understanding their mindset and what made them tick.
You don't see that today in the counterterrorism
environment--either universities like ours and think tanks and
institutions I think are feeling some of that. But not at the
level of training that next generation, educating that next
generation with the linguistic skills all the way through to
understanding cultures, regions, and the like.
I just wanted to bring up one other point because I am very
concerned about the leaks. But the flip side is, as both you,
Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Higgins brought up, we also
have a responsibility to have a dialogue with the American
people.
So we need transparency, but we need to do it in a
calibrated, smart kind of way. We have a responsibility to
communicate with the American people on many of these issues.
But we also have to realize that it is not just the
American people who are reading and learning. In fact, I would
argue many more non-Americans are learning from some of this
information, and that includes obviously our enemies.
Mr. King. Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Yes. Just a couple things that have been said
as well, U.S. credibility is on the line. You get yourself
involved in a quagmire that really creates a long-term
insurgency. I think Iraq is very instructive. We had a
situation within 3 weeks we took out a bad guy, you know,
without question a bad guy, Saddam Hussein.
We issued the death-if-ication order, and dissolved the
Iraqi army and basically said to 100,000 Iraqis there is no
place for you in Iraqi society anymore. They said, oh really?
They created the Sunni insurgency. We are right in the middle
of a situation that you know Iraq today is as violent as it was
in the worst time of our American occupation there in 2006 and
2007.
I see Syria going in the exact same direction.
Now, Assad, obviously a brutal, murderous dictator, much
like his father. You know you take him out and you again have
an opposition whose dominant influences are al-Qaeda and
Islamic extremists. What do they start to do? Ethnic cleansing.
Then we are responsible for that stuff that is going on and we
are supposed to stop that as well.
So let me just say this, you know generally speaking. You
know I don't view America's credibility--I don't have an
answer, and there are no black-and-whites. There is a lot--
there are no straight lines. There is a lot of grey and a lot
of confusion and a lot of other things there.
But you know, at what point does the Arab Muslim
civilization take responsibility for their own future? Because
you know this has been going on for 14 centuries between Shiite
and Sunnis as to who the rightful successor to the Prophet
Mohammad is. Okay.
What they are saying, there are 250 million people in the
Arab Muslim world, half of which are under the age of 25. So
the response to all those kids is there is no future for you. I
think there are certain things that Americans clearly don't
understand about that part of the world.
You know unlike our society we have a victim's mentality.
We feel empathy and sympathy for victims. There it is
survivor's mentality. They shouldn't have been there. They must
have been doing something wrong.
You know I think these are obviously complicated
situations. But our ability to help in places that want to be
and can be helped is greatly undermined by having spent $2
trillion in Iraq and Afghanistan. Those places are no better
than they were the day we entered those places. But they have
seriously undermined the United States' ability to do other
things domestically and internationally as well.
So I just--you know there are no--again, there are no
black-and-whites here. I think, you know, comparisons to what
was going on to Europe. I heard the Secretary of State's point
that this is our Munich moment. That is insulting. That is
insulting.
You know Hitler was an awful guy who was leading a very
prosperous country with the largest army in the world, was
about to conquer--wanted to conquer Europe and potentially the
world. Assad is clearly a bad guy presiding over one of the
poorest countries in the world and having a hard time hanging
on.
You know we can't--history is not always applicable to what
is going on contemporarily in the Middle East and in the
Arabian Peninsula, so.
Mr. Katulis. If I could react here again, I actually agree
with a lot of what you said there. I think the region more than
2 years ago it just started a phase that is going to go on for
a long period of time, a struggle for political legitimacy, a
fragmentation and fracturing of power, of a way of doing
business, essentially, for the last century when the Ottoman
Empire collapsed.
Yes, our ability to shape all of these things is quite
limited. I think there should be a great deal of humility based
on our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, and lessons learned
from all of that.
But it is my view that if the lesson is simply, don't get
involved in any sort of way, or get involved in the way--take
your example of Syria. Where I think we are at on Syria is that
we simply lack a coherent strategy. That is why we have seen
this sort of whipsaw the last couple of weeks.
We have had a series of tactics and tactical reactive
measures bit-by-bit, dribs and drabs. Arm a little bit of the
opposition here, engage a little bit diplomatic with the
political opposition there.
I think if this, whatever has happened in the last couple
of weeks, is offered a moment, it is an opportunity to further
press the administration so that they are not jamming you up on
the Hill for a quick vote on an authorization of use of force.
But it is separate, as Frank said, from the topic of our
hearing.
But it is essential to press them for what their strategy
is. Going back to the point I was saying, what is your end-goal
and what are those means that you are going to us to accomplish
that?
You may end up hearing, Mr. Higgins, a lot of sympathetic
voices to your view inside of the administration because I
think there is that reticence there. But then, we should all
ask ourselves is, what will this serve U.S. interests in the
long run?
I think what we are trying to say is no more nation-
building and going in with boots on the ground. You listen to
Frank especially. All of us are saying that. But how can we get
others to help them help themselves?
The picture you painted of the Syrian opposition is, I
think, essentially correct. But there are others that
Ambassador Ford and others have been trying to work with. So
how do we get them to fight this fight for themselves that
leads it to some sort of conclusion?
Last point I would want to make, and you had mentioned this
on Iraq and Syria, very brief point, is that increasingly I
think we need to look at those challenges at interlinked.
As the problem is either violence in Iraq and the uptick
that you mentioned in your statement there I think is directly
related to what is going on. You see the terrorist groups, al-
Qaeda in Iraq and Asham in Syria. They are becoming much more
cohesive and coordinated.
It is not a problem, in my view, for U.S. National security
interests yet. They don't represent the threat that AQAP
represents yet. But we all, I think, have talked about the
adaptive nature of these networks.
We should keep a close eye on it. We should make sure that
whatever we are doing, how modest and marginal it is with the
Syrian opposition, we are also collecting information on the
morphing of these networks.
Mr. Cilluffo. Underscoring your begging to touch a third
rail, but in addition to what is going on in the Middle East,
Sunni-Shia, you also have minority Christians that we need--we
have a responsibility to protect their right to faith, as well
as obviously Israel and Judaism and every other religion. So I
just put that on the table.
One other thing that I think some of us sometimes forget,
and that is with respect to Afghanistan. Keep in mind the
likelihood that we would have seen other big acts after 9/11, I
would argue, would have been quite high had we not taken
certain actions.
So it is difficult to disprove double negatives. But at the
end of the day, if we didn't degrade that capability, don't
think that we would not have witnessed--there was a lot of
blood, sweat, and tears and of course treasure as well. But at
the end of the day, I think lives were saved. That doesn't mean
I am not putting one cost of life over another, but it is just
something to keep in mind.
One other factor with respect to Pakistan and Afghanistan
today is there is another terrorist group that has just touched
the homeland. We all said that they didn't, but Tehrik-i-
Taliban, the Pakistani Taliban, that our Times Square bomber in
the fine city of New York was a TTP actor.
So, it is not just AQAP. You do have a witch's brew of
folks operating out of Pakistan, Lashkar-e-taiba, Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan. I mean it is a mess. So, at the end of
the day let's not forget that that could change should we not
have a presence.
Ms. Zimmerman. I just want to add here and say that today
the United States actually lacks options that it had 2 years
ago in Syria because of its inaction. That the original
opposition was secular, and that it was predicted by many
individuals studying the region that should the United States
fail to take action, Arab regimes would and that they would end
up supporting religions networks, which is what happened.
So the secular opposition didn't receive the original
support. That allowed Islamist movement to gain strength in a
way that could have--may have been prevented. I am not saying
that it would have been.
The other point is that though the fight against Assad,
whichever side you fall on in the military strength, his
continued presence in Syria means that the Free Syrian Army,
which is the secular group fighting Assad, is continued--will
be continued to be distracted in fighting him rather than in
fighting Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda's affiliate in Syria.
So by removing Assad you advance at least the local
grouping that you would expect to see fight the al-Qaeda
affiliate on the ground there. I think that that idea is being
missed in all of this dialogue about what to do.
So when you look at our option I do think that we need to
think longer-term than we have been. The United States people
tend to think short-term. But we are now on our back foot in
Syria in a way that we might not have been.
The same way that we are in Yemen when AQAP was announced
in 2009, the group al-Qaeda in Yemen had already started to
resurge in a way, but no serious counterterrorism operations
were conducted against it until right after the Christmas day
attack. So we have seen this happen again and again, and I do
think that we need to be more prescient when we decide on
policy.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you very much.
George Mitchell was appointed special envoy to Northern
Ireland under previous administration. The chairman was a
leading Congressional figure in the eventual Good Friday
Accord. But he wrote a book called ``Making Peace'' about his
experiences there. He practically lived there at the later
stages of that negotiation.
But he made a very profound point saying that in all world
conflict--and a lot of people thought that the situation
between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland was
intractable, that nobody was going to be able to resolve it.
They said exhaustion, exhaustion, is a huge variable in
conflict-resolution. You know you think about what those
parties had to do. You know the Protestants and the Catholics
had you denounce violence, and they had you give up their arms.
There was an international tribunal that witnessed the
destruction of those arms.
That makes sense to me that other countries, the United
States, Great Britain get involved in conflict resolution in
that part of the world because you know what? Those people,
both sides are invested in it. You know what they did? They
were able to marginalize the extremists because there was a
consensus that this is what we want to be prospectively.
I just think that in the Arab Muslim world, whether it is
the Palestinians, they are so committed to the conflict. They
are so committed to the struggle. There is no sense of what
they want to be.
I think unless and until you have--I am not even looking
for a constitution. I am looking for a preamble that basically
is a unifying vision as to what these places want to become.
Then and only then, whether it is Syria, Iraq, or anywhere
else, can they expect international help to help them achieve
something that is consistent with our American values.
So you know I just think that you know George Mitchell's
admonishment that exhaustion is a huge variable in all this
stuff, exhausting can't be imposed from the outside. It has to
be experienced from within. That is it.
Mr. King. AQAP was probably the most aggressive as far as
going forward scientifically, whether it is doctors trying to
enflame farms, whether it was the cylinder-type explosives that
they placed on the airplane.
First of all, are they as aggressive today as they were
then? Are they sharing any of that with anyone else in the al-
Qaeda nexus?
Mr. Cilluffo. Mr. Chairman, I think it would be very naive
to think that he has not, Ibrahim al-Asiri shared that with
others within al-Qaeda and the Arabian Peninsula and beyond al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, notably al-Shabaab. There have
been some indictments that have identified some of that.
Again, when we talk about people with unique skills, he is
at the very, very top of the list, and ruthless. I mean the
first time he attempted to use this improvised explosive device
he sent his own brother to try to kill Muhammad bin Nayef, the
Saudi prince.
So I think that is a significant concern and it is a lot
more sophisticated than what you see in Inspire, for example,
of how to build an IED in your mother's kitchen. This is not
that level. This is at a much higher level.
Again, has successfully circumvented some of the security
countermeasures that are put in place, which again underscores
just how important intelligence is, whether technical means,
but especially I would argue human intelligence.
Mr. King. How about AQAP's relationship with Boko Haram or
AQIM or we are seeing in Libya the variation of groups in
eastern Libya? How far are their tentacles spreading, AQAP's?
Ms. Zimmerman. I think the first point is our information
on that is limited because there hasn't been that much
correspondence recovered. We had great insight into al-Qaeda in
Iraq because of the U.S. military presence there. The insight
that we have into AQAP's relationships abroad comes either from
uncovered documents in Mali or from U.S. indictments.
I want to focus on the letters published by the Associated
Press from AQAP's leader, Naser al-Wuhayshi, to the leader of
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Abumallah Tricktel. Those two
letters went to insight both into how the AQAP has envisioned
its role in sharing counsel with other affiliates that actually
mirrors the counsel that bin Laden shared with AQAP.
But also that that relationship is geographically very
far--when you look at the distance between Algeria and Yemen,
that is a long way for correspondents to travel. It is unclear
whether it is electronic or--and whether these are printed or
how they were moved across the region, but that it is certainly
a connection there that shows the breadth of the al-Qaeda
network.
There are allegations that AQAP has helped to fund some
camps in Libya, and again these are allegations and cannot be
proved in any way in the Open Source--or have been proved, to
my knowledge. But what we do see is that AQAP has set itself up
to start funding and financing and training and building up
local groups who share maybe not al-Qaeda's global ideology,
but the local idea of radical Islam, you know in order to
further the message.
This is actually the same thing that bin Laden was doing in
the 1990s. When you look at that it is very concerning to see a
group pushing its message and pushing its capabilities abroad.
Mr. Cilluffo. Mr. Chairman, just to underscore, I think
Katie laid that out perfectly. But I also think fundamentally
the way we need to think about al-Qaeda today is different than
it was just a few years ago. There is a lot of swapping--a lot
of utility infielders that are being swapped between, among,
and across these various organizations.
They are fellow travelers. Whether it is both operationally
and ideologically, clearly they are attempting to co-opt local
grievances to achieve their broader global jihadi objectives.
But I think just the way we think about al-Qaeda you have seen
a conflation. You have actually seen many of these
organizations that you couldn't come up with an org chart in
the same old hierarchical kind of way you could because many of
them criss-cross.
Many of them are fighting in conflict zones in various
places. They are meeting one another, whether it is Syria today
or whether it was Iraq or whether it was Yemen or whether it
was Somalia or whether it was Mali or whether it is you name
the jihadi hotspot of the moment.
They are fellow travelers to one extent or another. The one
thing I would underscore with AQAP and this is probably a very
bad analogy, but they are kind of the Kevin Bacon of al-Qaeda.
I mean they really are. They have connected with a lot of
different organizations in the past.
So I think we have got to stop thinking about it in the
traditional hierarchical approach. It is relatively flat. In
the military they are achieving what we would in the United
States refer to as commander's intent. So we got intentions
coming from on high, but it is ultimately up to those closer to
the pointy end of the spear to execute. That is what you are
seeing now.
You have got the intent, the aspirational objectives. But
when you are talking about operations it is local. They are
fighting in similar conflict zones. They are getting to know
one another. That is unfortunately where we are.
Mr. Katulis. If I could just add one perspective connected
to a point I was trying to make at the start of my testimony of
this adaptive nature of AQAP and how it impacts our approach.
When I said that we are not still properly matching resources
to meet threats, I think we are constantly behind the curve. It
is almost the nature of the threat that that would be the case.
But if you look at--and you mentioned Afghanistan, I think
in 2010 we were spending $120 billion or $130 billion as a
country in Afghanistan. By that time I think the assessment of
most counterterrorism analysts is that the threats had
migrated. The central threat to the homeland security had
migrated to AQAP.
What I think we are all trying to say, and I think we
largely agree here, is these threats migrate and adapt quite a
lot. We are still in a transformative moment. I fear that U.S.
Government policy is not nimble enough at adapting to these new
threats in Syria, Sinai Peninsula again.
We are very good. I think we have done a very good job in
the last 2 years in kinetic strikes against al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula. It has had an impact.
We didn't talk much about the embassy closures a bit, but I
do think it limited their ability. It didn't de-fang it
completely. But the overarching point is it is almost
perplexing to me as an American citizen, 12 years after 9/11 we
still don't have a good read on the metrics of whether we are
winning or losing this thing.
We don't have--and that, I think, contributes, Mr.
Chairman, to your question about educating the American public.
That contributes to the general confusion and disinterest
because of the complexity of this. But the lack of overarching
strategy and metrics is I think a big challenge here.
Mr. King. Before we leave, any points that any of you want
to make before we end the hearing? Anything that hasn't been
brought out that you want to bring out that you think is
important?
Mr. Cilluffo. If you can keep, Mr. Chairman, your
leadership role in bringing these issues to the American people
and to Government and assuming that role, I would appreciate
that. So thank you.
Mr. King. Thank you. Okay. I will end on that note. That is
a great one.
Mr. Cilluffo. Thank you.
Mr. King. Brian, thank you.
With that, the hearing stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:24 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]