[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
FROM AL-SHABAAB TO AL-NUSRA: HOW WESTERNERS JOINING TERROR GROUPS
OVERSEAS AFFECT THE HOMELAND
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 9, 2013
__________
Serial No. 113-38
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice Brian Higgins, New York
Chair Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Ron Barber, Arizona
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Dondald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Jason Chaffetz, Utah Beto O'Rourke, Texas
Steven M. Palazzo, Mississippi Tulsi Gabbard, Hawaii
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
Chris Stewart, Utah Steven A. Horsford, Nevada
Richard Hudson, North Carolina Eric Swalwell, California
Steve Daines, Montana
Susan W. Brooks, Indiana
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Mark Sanford, South Carolina
Greg Hill, Chief of Staff
Michael Geffroy, Deputy Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
Witnesses
Mr. Michael Scheuer, Adjunct Professor, Center for Peace and
Security Studies, Georgetown University:
Oral Statement................................................. 8
Notes on U.S. and Western Jihadis Returning Home............... 50
Ms. Lauren Ploch Blanchard, Specialist in African Affairs,
Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress:
Oral Statement................................................. 10
Prepared Statement............................................. 13
Mr. Brett Lovegrove, Chief Executive, City Security and
Resilience Network (CSARN):
Oral Statement................................................. 20
Prepared Statement............................................. 22
Mr. Richard W. Stanek, Sheriff, Hennepin County, Minnesota:
Oral Statement................................................. 26
Prepared Statement............................................. 28
Mr. Richard Mellor, Vice President, Loss Prevention, National
Retail Federation:
Oral Statement................................................. 30
Prepared Statement............................................. 31
Ms. Stephanie Sanok Kostro, Senior Fellow and Acting Director,
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Program, Center for
Strategic and International Studies:
Oral Statement................................................. 34
Prepared Statement............................................. 36
FROM AL-SHABAAB TO AL-NUSRA: HOW WESTERNERS JOINING TERROR GROUPS
OVERSEAS AFFECT THE HOMELAND
----------
Wednesday, October 9, 2013
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 2:42 p.m., in Room
311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Michael T. McCaul
[Chairman of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives McCaul, King, Duncan, Barletta,
Stewart, Hudson, Daines, Brooks, Sanford, Thompson, Jackson
Lee, Clarke, Richmond, Barber, Payne, O'Rourke, Vela, and
Horsford.
Chairman McCaul. The Committee on Homeland Security will
come to order. I appreciate the patience on the witnesses'
part. We obviously had votes, and we are running a little bit
late, so I will try to speed up my opening statement.
I want to thank everybody for being here. The Members. I
want to thank the staff for putting this hearing together on a
very important topic. We are here to examine the threats to the
homeland from the recruitment of Westerners to radical Islamic
organizations. I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
Just weeks ago, Americans watched as hundreds ran for cover
and 68 people were murdered by vicious terrorists invading a
Western-style shopping mall in Kenya. Terrorizing these
innocent people, including some Americans, were al-Shabaab
militants, Somalian fighters who executed a horrifying attack
on a soft target, much like many of the malls in our homeland.
The most striking concern for Americans is that within the
ranks of al-Shabaab are our own neighbors, including 40 to 50
known fighters who have left our shores to fight alongside
these jihadists in Africa and the Middle East.
Just last weekend, our military carried out a mission to
damage al-Shabaab, underscoring the direct interest we have in
upsetting its jihadist network. It is yet another group aligned
with al-Qaeda that would not think twice about hitting a
Western target if given the opportunity.
Today we face a disturbing trend, as depicted in this
picture.
[The information follows:]
Chairman McCaul. More than a hundred Americans are fighting
overseas supporting terrorism, from the Middle East and Syria,
or to Africa and Somalia. Individuals in our own communities
are being recruited by organizations like al-Shabaab. These
individuals directly undermine our homeland security. They have
been recruited inside the United States, have left and could
potentially return, presenting a vast vulnerability in our
counterterrorism efforts. Overseas, while fighting and
supporting terrorists, they receive military training, combat
experience, and grow their jihadist network. Coming back with
these skills and connections extends a spider web of extremism
into our own backyards.
We know how this journey commonly starts. Individuals are
either recruited by a trusted member of their community or over
the internet. They are persuaded to leave the United States and
travel abroad to fight against our Nation's interest. We have
seen the recruiting materials, and they offer conflicted views,
the opportunity to join a fight against an enemy it barely
knows.
For example, Omar Hammami, an American citizen from
Alabama, was one of the more public Americans who traveled
overseas to join a terrorist organization. Hammami joined al-
Shabaab in Somalia. Unlike the almost 50 Americans of Somali
descent that have left the United States to support al-Shabaab,
Hammami is not of Somali descent. He made a name for himself in
Somalia and rose to a leadership position, eventually being
placed on the FBI's Most Wanted list for violating U.S. law. He
advocated al-Shabaab becoming more global and violent.
Syria is another example. Americans for the past 2 years
have traveled to Syria to support the rebels, mainly al-Qaeda
factions. While the number of Americans is low, the number of
Westerners is high, which poses a threat not only to our allies
in Europe, but also here in the United States. Fighting
alongside of hardened al-Qaeda jihadists will provide these
recruits with the unfortunate tools they need to wreak havoc on
the country they were once a part of. The training, battle
hardening, the exposure to the most radical ideas and
propaganda all lead us to ask ourselves how we prevent these
people who have turned their backs on their country from
bringing home the hatred and death they learned supporting al-
Qaeda.
The administration must confront this issue with its full
attention. The events in Kenya, while an ocean away, are not
far from us. The notion that it won't talk about it, that the
problem will just go away, is disturbing. The administration's
failed narrative of al-Qaeda being all but decimated shows a
lack of will for addressing threats and presents weaknesses
that our enemies will exploit.
This danger is real. With over 40 percent of DHS leadership
positions remaining vacant, including the Secretary, the
administration is showing the American people how much it cares
about homeland security.
Today we will examine how Americans traveling to fight
alongside jihadists overseas pose a threat to the homeland and
what could be done to stop this problem. From the suicide
bombing last month at a Christian church in Pakistan to the
Westgate Mall attack in Kenya, extremists are increasingly bent
on destroying American values and American lives. We must not
underestimate this threat, and we must better understand and
examine the threat posed by our own citizens joining the fight
abroad and potentially bringing their mission home with them.
[The statement of Chairman McCaul follows:]
Statement of Chairman Michael T. McCaul
October 9, 2013
Just weeks ago, Americans watched as hundreds ran for cover and 68
people were murdered by vicious terrorists invading a Western-style
shopping mall in Kenya. Terrorizing these innocent people, including
some Americans, were al-Shabaab militants--Somalian fighters who
executed a horrifying attack on a soft target much like many of the
malls in our homeland. The most striking concern for Americans is that
within the ranks of al-Shabaab are our own neighbors, including 40-50
known fighters who have left our shores to fight alongside these
jihadists in Africa and the Middle East.
Just last weekend, our military carried out a mission to damage al-
Shabaab, underscoring the direct interest we have in upsetting its
jihadist network. It is yet another group aligned with al-Qaeda that
would not think twice about hitting a Western target if given the
opportunity.
Today we face a disturbing trend. More than a hundred Americans are
fighting overseas supporting terrorism, from the Middle East in Syria
or to Africa and Somalia. Individuals in our own communities are being
recruited by organizations like al-Shabaab. These individuals directly
undermine our homeland security. They have been recruited inside the
United States, have left, and could potentially return--presenting a
vast vulnerability in our counterterrorism efforts.
Overseas, while fighting and supporting terrorists, they receive
military training, combat experience, and grow their jihadist network.
Coming back with these skills and connections extends the spider web of
extremism to our own backyards.
We know how this journey commonly starts. Individuals are either
recruited by a trusted member of their community, or over the internet.
They are persuaded to leave the United States and travel abroad to
fight against our Nation's interests. We have seen their recruiting
materials--and they offer conflicted youths the opportunity to join a
fight against an enemy it barely knows.
For example, Omar Hammami, an American citizen from Alabama, was
one of the more public Americans who traveled overseas to join a
terrorist organization. Hammami joined al-Shabaab in Somalia. Unlike
the almost 50 Americans of Somali descent that have left the United
States to support al-Shabaab, Hammami is not of Somali descent. He made
a name for himself in Somalia and rose to a leadership position,
eventually being placed on the FBI's Most Wanted list for violating
U.S. law. He advocated al-Shabaab becoming more global and violent.
Syria is another example. Americans for the past 2 years have
traveled to Syria to support the rebels, mainly al-Qaeda factions.
While the number of Americans is low, the number of Westerners is high,
which poses a threat not only to our allies in Europe, but also here in
the United States. Fighting alongside of hardened al-Qaeda jihadist
will provide these ``recruits'' with the unfortunate tools they need to
wreck havoc on the country they were once a part of.
The training, battle hardening, the exposure to the most radical
ideas and propaganda all lead us to ask ourselves how we prevent these
people, who have turned their backs on their country, from bringing
home the hatred and death they learned supporting al-Qaeda.
The administration must confront this issue with its full
attention. The events in Kenya, while an ocean away, are not far from
us. The notion that if we don't talk about it, the problem will go away
is disturbing. The administration's failed narrative of al-Qaeda being
all but decimated shows a lack of will for addressing threats, and
presents weakness our enemies will exploit. This danger is real, and
with over 40% of DHS leadership positions remaining vacant, including
the Secretary, the administration is showing the American people how
much it cares about homeland security.
Today, we will examine how Americans travelling to fight alongside
jihadists overseas poses a threat to the homeland, and what can be done
to stop this problem. From the suicide bombing last month at a
Christian church in Pakistan, to the Westgate mall attack in Kenya--
extremists are increasingly bent on destroying American values, and
American lives. We must not underestimate this threat, and we must
better understand and examine the threat posed by our own citizens
joining this fight abroad--and potentially bringing their mission home
with them.
Chairman McCaul. With that, the Chairman now recognizes the
Ranking Member of this committee, Mr. Thompson from
Mississippi.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
for holding today's hearing. I also want to thank the witnesses
for appearing today.
The purpose of this hearing is to explore the possibility
that American citizens may leave this country to join terrorist
groups fighting in areas of unrest overseas and return home to
use tactics learned abroad to launch attacks within the United
States.
We should state at the outset that Customs and Border
Protection currently operates an Immigration Advisory Program.
IAP, as it is commonly known, officers work in partnership with
foreign law enforcement officials to identify terrorists and
other high-risk passengers and then work in coordination with
commercial air carriers to prevent these individuals from
boarding flights destined for the United States. Since the
inception of the program in 2004, IAP officers have been
successful in preventing the boarding of more than 15,700 high-
risk and improperly documented passengers. So while no system
is perfect, we can take some comfort in knowing that we have a
system in place that seems to be working.
Mr. Chairman, I understand that in addition to an
examination of foreign terrorist groups this hearing will
examine the vulnerability of soft targets within the United
States. There is concern that if individuals are able to slip
back into this country they may be most likely to attack soft
targets within our borders. As we have recently witnessed, a
single well-organized terrorist group attacked a mall, a soft
target, in Kenya, killing over 70 people. That group, al-
Shabaab, has a large presence in Kenya and neighboring Somalia.
Until the mall attack, al-Shabaab had many sympathizers in
Kenya. I am sure the attack on Westgate Mall will cause the
Kenyan people to reconsider their support.
Regardless of the fate in Kenya, we all know that al-
Shabaab does not have a large following here. I doubt that the
massacre of innocent men, women, and children at a mall will
likely garner new followers in America.
Recently we have seen our share of violent attacks waged
against innocent people who happen to be at soft target
locations. But those attacks have not been carried out by large
groups. We have witnessed the bombing of the Boston Marathon.
The motivation of the Boston bombing suspects remain unknown.
While one of the suspects engaged in foreign travel, the
purpose of his trip remains unclear. It appears that the
suspects were not involved within a foreign terrorist
organization. They learned to build the bombs they used from
information garnered on the internet through publicly-available
websites.
Mr. Chairman, it seems that the Boston Marathon bombing has
turned all the conventional wisdom about violent extremism
upside down and confirmed that people do not need to travel
abroad to learn violent and destructive behavior. Violent
extremists can be homegrown. Mr. Chairman, as you know, I have
repeatedly called upon this committee to review acts of
domestic violent extremists, particularly those people who act
alone. While we have seen Boston, we have also seen a shopping
center in Arizona, a movie theater in Colorado, and a school in
Connecticut. Those tragic events should not be ignored or
forgotten in our consideration of the possibility of soft
target attacks.
As we develop a policy-driven response to the vulnerability
of soft targets, the most likely scenarios must be considered.
In this country, the most likely scenarios involve a lone
actor. Also, as we consider how soft target attacks affect the
homeland, I suggest that we think about the fact that most of
these locations are privately-owned. I do not know of many
malls or movie theaters that welcome the addition of armed
guards. I know of even fewer that would want the Federal
Government to require the kinds of barriers and other security
measures we see here at Federal buildings.
While the Federal Government should not pay for these
improvements to private businesses, I would think that the
security community would welcome a joint discussion to share
information on best practices. The Federal Government need not
fund these efforts, but the Government can provide an open
forum for an exchange of ideas that would keep us safe without
compromising our privacy or civil liberties. If we want to
proactively encourage these kinds security measures in soft
targets, we need to think about the role of Federal funding in
assisting the States and local jurisdictions address the soft
targets in their midst.
Mr. Chairman, as you know, the Federal Government plays an
integral role in funding homeland security efforts of the
States. Stakeholders from State and local jurisdictions have
repeatedly testified before this committee that the homeland
security grant funds have been essential in developing the
capabilities necessary to quickly and effectively respond to a
terrorist attack or natural disaster. Indeed, at this
committee's hearing on the Boston Marathon bombing in May,
Boston Police Commissioner Davis stated that without grant
funding the response would have been much less comprehensive
than it was, and without the exercise supported through Federal
grant funding, there would be more people who had died in those
attacks.
Unfortunately, the funding of the Homeland Security Grant
Program has been reduced significantly under Republican
leadership of the House, from $2.75 billion to $1.5 billion,
and the sequester cuts will further erode funding. Neither the
grant funding levels nor the sequester cuts are particularly
relevant today; the Government is shut down, and the grants
that make soft targets less vulnerable are not getting to the
States and localities. The training exercises that could have
been conducted or the equipment which could have been purchased
will have to wait. That discussion that could have been held
within the business community and its fellow partners have been
put on hold because the Government is closed.
In addition to the funding provided by those Federal grant
programs, the Director of National Intelligence had indicated
that the Government shut-down may seriously damage our ability
to protect the safety and security of this Nation and its
citizens because 70 percent of the intelligence community staff
has been furloughed.
Further, Mr. Chairman, I should note that we are able to
have today's hearing, although there are no witnesses from the
Federal Government. While the absence of the Federal Government
may be advantageous for your ability to convene today's
hearing, our understanding of the issues raised here today and
our potential legislating or oversight response can only be
effective if we have the benefit of testimony from those
Federal employees who are responsible for administering the
programs that keep this Nation safe. But those people cannot
testify here today because they are on furlough due to the
shut-down. I look forward to hearing from those Federal
employees, and I look forward to their return to work.
With that, I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
March 13, 2013
The purpose of this hearing is to explore the possibility that
American citizens may leave this country to join terrorist groups
fighting in areas of unrest overseas and return home to use tactics
learned abroad to launch attacks within the United States.
We should state at the outset that Customs and Border Protection
currently operates an Immigration Advisory Program (IAP). IAP officers
work in partnership with foreign law enforcement officials to identify
terrorists and other high-risk passengers, and then work in
coordination with commercial air carriers to prevent these individuals
from boarding flights destined for the United States. Since the
inception of the program in 2004, IAP officers have been successful in
preventing the boarding of more than 15,700 high-risk and improperly
documented passengers. So, while no system is perfect, we can take some
comfort in knowing that we have a system in place that seems to be
working.
Mr. Chairman, I understand that in addition to an examination of
foreign terrorist groups, this hearing will examine the vulnerability
of soft targets within the United States. There is concern that if
individuals are able to slip back into this country, they may be most
likely to attack soft targets within our borders.
As we have recently witnessed, a seemingly well-organized terrorist
group attacked a mall--a soft target--in Kenya, killing over 70 people.
That group--al-Shabaab--has a large presence in Kenya and neighboring
Somalia. Until the mall attack, al-Shabaab had many sympathizers in
Kenya. I am sure that the attack on Westgate Mall will cause the Kenyan
people to reconsider their support. Regardless of its fate in Kenya, we
know that al-Shabaab does not have a large following here. And I doubt
that the massacre of innocent men, women, and children at a mall will
likely garner new followers in America.
Recently, we have seen our share of violent attacks waged against
innocent people who happened to be at soft target locations. But those
attacks have not been carried out by large groups.
We have witnessed the bombing of the Boston Marathon. The
motivation of the Boston bombing suspects remains unknown. While one of
the suspects engaged in foreign travel, the purpose of his trips
remains unclear. It appears that the suspects were not involved with
any foreign terrorist organization. They learned to build the bombs
they used from information gathered on the internet through publicly-
available websites.
Mr. Chairman, it seems that the Boston Marathon bombing has turned
all the conventional wisdom about violent extremism upside-down and
confirmed that people do not need to travel abroad to learn violent and
destructive behavior. Violent extremists can be homegrown.
Mr. Chairman, as you know, I have repeatedly called upon this
committee to review acts of domestic violent extremists--particularly
those people who may act alone. While we have seen Boston, we have also
seen a shopping center in Arizona, a movie theater in Colorado, and a
school in Connecticut.
Those tragic events should not be ignored or forgotten in our
consideration of the possibility of soft target attacks. As we develop
a policy-driven response to the vulnerability of soft targets, the most
likely scenarios must be considered. And in this country, the most
likely scenario involves a lone actor.
Also, as we consider how soft-target attacks affect the homeland, I
would suggest that we think about the fact that most of these locations
are privately-owned. I do not know of many malls or movie theatres that
welcome the addition of armed guards. I know of even fewer that would
want the Federal Government to require the kinds of barriers and other
security measures we see in Federal buildings.
While the Federal Government should not pay for these improvements
to private businesses, I would think that the security community would
welcome a joint discussion to share information on best practices. The
Federal Government need not fund these efforts, but the Government can
provide an open forum for the exchange of ideas that will keep us all
safer without compromising our privacy or civil liberties.
If we want to proactively encourage these kinds of security
measures in soft targets, we need to think about the role of Federal
funding in assisting the States and local jurisdictions address the
soft targets in their midst.
Mr. Chairman, as you know, the Federal Government plays an integral
role in funding homeland security efforts of the States. Stakeholders
from State and local jurisdictions have repeatedly testified before
this committee that the homeland security grant funds have been
essential in developing the capabilities necessary to quickly and
effectively respond to a terrorist attack or natural disaster.
Indeed, at this committee's hearing on the Boston Marathon bombings
in May, Boston Police Commissioner Davis stated that without grant
funding, the ``response would have been much less comprehensive than it
was'' and without the exercises supported through Federal grant
funding, ``there would be more people who had died . . . in these
attacks.''
Unfortunately, the funding for the Homeland Security Grant Program
has been reduced significantly under Republican leadership of the
House--from $2.75 billion to $1.5 billion. And the sequester cuts will
further erode funding. Neither the grant funding levels nor the
sequester cuts are particularly relevant today. The Government is shut
down and the grants that make soft targets less vulnerable are not
getting to the States and localities. The training exercises that could
have been conducted or the equipment which could have been purchased
will have to wait. The discussions that could have been held between
the business community and its Federal partners have been put on hold
because the Government is closed.
In addition to the funding provided by these Federal grant
programs, the Director of National Intelligence had indicated that the
Government shut-down may seriously damage our ability to protect the
safety and security of this Nation and its citizens because about 70
percent of the intelligence community's staff has been furloughed.
Further, Mr. Chairman, I should note that we are able to have
today's hearing although there are no witnesses from the Federal
Government. While the absence of the Federal Government may be
advantageous for your ability to convene today's hearing, our
understanding of the issues raised here today and our potential
legislative or oversight response can only be effective if we have the
benefit of testimony from those Federal employees who are responsible
for administering the programs that keep this Nation safe. But those
people cannot testify here today because they are on furlough due to
the shut-down. I look forward to hearing from those Federal employees,
and I look forward to their return to work.
Chairman McCaul. I thank the Ranking Member.
I also look forward to the reopening of the Government and
talking to the Federal witnesses that could be helpful to this
committee in our oversight responsibilities. With that, other
Members are reminded that opening statements may be submitted
for the record.
We are pleased to be joined here today by six distinguished
witnesses to discuss this important topic.
First, Dr. Michael Scheuer is an adjunct professor at the
Center for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown University.
Dr. Scheuer recently concluded a 22-year career with the CIA.
While there, Dr. Scheuer held multiple positions, including
senior advisor for the Osama bin Laden department.
We are very pleased to have you and honored, sir.
Next, Ms. Lauren Blanchard is a specialist in African
Affairs with the Congressional Research Service, where she
provides analysis on African political, military, and
diplomatic affairs, and on U.S. policy in the region.
Thank you for being here as well.
Next, Mr. Brett Lovegrove, who is the chief executive for
the City Security and Resilience Network and former head of
counterterrorism for the city of London police. Mr. Lovegrove
had over 30 years of experience and service with the
Metropolitan Police Service, including a national
responsibility for countering hostile recognizance with a
continuing public-private partnership called Project Griffin.
Thank you so much for traveling so far to be here today,
and we hope to show you some hospitality here in Washington.
Sheriff Richard Stanek is the sheriff of Hennepin County,
Minnesota. Sheriff Stanek has extensive experience in
countering violent extremism, has advised the Department of
Homeland Security and the National Counterterrorism Center.
Thank you so much, Sheriff, for being here.
Mr. Richard Mellor serves as vice president for loss
prevention at the National Retail Federation. He also works to
raise the visibility of retail loss prevention issues,
including organized retail crime and return fraud.
Last, but not least, Ms. Stephanie Sanok Kostro, who is
acting director of Homeland Security and Counterterrorism
Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Prior to joining CSIS, she served at the Embassy in Baghdad,
where she developed policy options for the United States
Government.
The witnesses' full statements will appear in the record.
The Chairman now recognizes Dr. Scheuer for an opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL SCHEUER, ADJUNCT PROFESSOR, CENTER FOR
PEACE AND SECURITY STUDIES, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
Mr. Scheuer. Thank you, sir.
In the 17th year of this war, since it was declared in
1996, it should be noted that Americans and other Westerners
have been going to assist and/or fight for the Mujahideen since
at least the 1980s. That occurred during the war between the
Soviets and the Afghans, of course. The numbers have certainly
been increasing since bin Laden declared war on the United
States in August 1996. They especially have spiked since al-
Qaeda's victories of 9/11.
Today, Syria and Somalia seem to be the two most prominent
destinations for U.S. and Western fighters, but North Africa
and the Sahel are also attracting Westerners. From the 1980s
through today, U.S. citizens who go overseas to fight jihad
return to America with several attributes, some new and some
old, but all considerably strong. They return home, of course,
with the same religious faith that led them to travel in the
first place, and they will return with it strengthened because
they won.
Since 1996, America has been engaged in what is
preeminently a religious war for those who are waging it,
notwithstanding the deliberately misleading protestations of
our last three Presidents and many of our leading politicians.
That American fighters have traveled, fought, survived, and
returned home safely proves two things to themselves, their
families, and their communities. First, God was pleased by
their actions and made them successful and helped them survive.
Second, for younger people in the Muslim community, and
especially for young males, they become role models in terms of
an individual fulfilling his religious duty.
They also return with an increased talent in the use of
small arms and explosives, a talent which is of course
teachable, and with increased skills in organization building,
especially organization building in a quiet or covert sense.
They also return with confidence that victory is possible. They
and their colleagues now know that they inflicted humiliating
defeats on the United States military in Afghanistan and Iraq,
and that knowledge will boost both spirits and recruitment.
Finally, the American fighters return with a greatly
increased knowledge of and contacts with other similarly-minded
men from across the Muslim world. All of the Islamist wars to
which American Muslim fighters travel and are fought primarily
by locals, but with a variety of Mujahideen from countries that
span the globe. The Americans will come home fully aware that
the movement bin Laden started is now truly international and
quickly growing in numbers and geographic reach. They come home
with a list of contacts among their fellow Mujahideen from whom
they can seek advice or more material forms of assistance.
As I noted at the start, the subject of our discussion
today is about a phenomenon that is nearly 40 years old. It is
clearly more serious today than ever before, but the factors
that cause the problem, the factors that motivate young Muslim-
Americans to become Islamist insurgents or terrorists have been
the same over time. While there are a number of factors that
motivate these young people, including Saudi-sponsored
religious education in the United States and the bonds of tribe
and clan that remain strong and vibrant even after immigration,
the first and most important motivation of these young American
Muslims to go to war is the interventionist foreign policy of
the United States, which is fully supported by both parties,
whether they hold power in Washington or not, and the existence
of the un-Islamic tyrannies that govern much of the Arab world,
mostly with U.S. and Western support. Since bin Laden declared
war on America in 1996, al-Qaeda and its allies had from their
perspective only two indispensable allies, Allah and U.S.
interventionism.
To conclude my opening statement, I would say that while
what American Muslim Mujahideen bring back from the jihad with
them is important, what they find in the United States upon
their return is much more important in motivating what I
believe will become combat situations, like the recent one in
Nairobi, and even worse, in the United States over the next
decade. What they will find in their return will be the steady-
as-she-goes interventionist U.S. foreign policy in the Muslim
world, which has been a constant for more than 30 years.
We will, for example, continue to unquestioningly arm and
support Israel. We will continue to support tyranny in Saudi
Arabia, Jordan, Algeria, and wherever we find it useful in the
Muslim world. We will continue preaching democracy but readily
intervene to undermine or destroy democratically-elected
regimes in places like Palestine and Egypt. Perhaps most
dangerously, we will continue to prosecute the clash of
civilizations started by President Bush and accelerated by
President Obama and Mrs. Clinton, designed to impose
secularism, democracy, and women's rights in an Islamic
civilization which is willing to fight such Westernization to
the death.
In terms of the length of our war with Islam, this attempt
to impose and teach our little brown Muslim brothers to be just
like us will lengthen the war every bit as much as the
unprovoked and unnecessary military interventions in Libya,
Mali, and Iraq. If you think I place too much emphasis on the
motivation provided to U.S. citizen and other Western
Mujahideen by U.S. and Western interventionism, I would draw
your attention to the reality that, to the best of my
knowledge, neither we nor any of our NATO partners have yet to
capture an Islamist whose words or written or electronic
documents have showed a motivation to attack based on hatred
for liberty, elections, democracy, or gender equality.
Invariably, they attribute their motivation to the U.S. and
Western military intervention.
Thank you.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Dr. Scheuer.
Chairman now recognizes Ms. Blanchard for an opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF LAUREN PLOCH BLANCHARD, SPECIALIST IN AFRICAN
AFFAIRS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS
Ms. Blanchard. Thank you. Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member
Thompson, and distinguished Members of the committee. Thank you
for inviting CRS to testify today. My written testimony
provides a detailed overview of al-Shabaab, a violent extremist
group in Somalia that has repeatedly demonstrated its ability
to recruit both Americans and citizens of other Western
countries. In my brief statement this afternoon, I will address
the transnational threats posed by al-Shabaab through a
discussion of the group, its goals, and its recruitment
strategies.
Al-Shabaab, as it exists today, is a hybrid organization.
It is both a locally-focused Somali Islamist insurgent group
and a transnational terrorist affiliate of al-Qaeda. U.N.
experts have referred to the group as a sprawling coalition of
jihadist business interests and clan militias. Like several
other A.Q. affiliates, al-Shabaab appears to operate largely
independently, although it maintains ties with other extremist
groups in the region, including al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula.
As Members of the committee know, to date, al-Shabaab has
primarily focused its agenda on Somalia, seeking to expel
foreign military forces and govern through its interpretation
of Islamic law. Al-Shabaab Emir Ahmed Godane leads an extremist
faction within the larger group that appears to aspire to pose
a broader international threat.
Al-Shabaab had demonstrated its intent and ability to
strike targets beyond Somalia's borders, at least in the
neighboring region. While some in al-Shabaab may aspire to
conduct terrorist attacks outside Africa, the group's
capability and intent to strike inside the United States
thankfully has yet to be demonstrated.
Somalia offers a permissive environment for extremists to
train recruits to pursue their goals, and al-Shabaab continues
to control large sections of southern and central Somalia.
According to a recent report by the U.N. Monitoring Group on
Somalia, al-Shabaab has at least 20 training camps, including a
suicide training school near the port city of Barawe, an al-
Shabaab stronghold that was the target of the Navy SEALS raid
on October 5. These camps move regularly to avoid targeting
from counterterrorism operations.
Who are its members? The typical al-Shabaab foot soldier is
Somali and is more likely to have joined the group based on
economic reasons or to defend clan interests than based on
extremist beliefs. Al-Shabaab's foreign fighters are also
reportedly holding a range of political and religious beliefs.
Many of the Somali-Americans who have been prosecuted to date
were reportedly radicalized based on a nationalist desire to
defend their ancestral homeland against so-called foreign
invaders. Several other American recruits were reportedly
inspired by the sermons of AQAP cleric Anwar al-Awlaki. One
non-Somali-American, Jehad Mostafa of San Diego, remains on the
FBI's Most Wanted terrorist list. Mostafa, like the late
Syrian-American Omar Hammami, has helped to produce al-Shabaab
propaganda and has reportedly served as a trainer and a leader
of foreign fighters.
Several Americans who were reportedly radicalized in the
United States are reported to have died in Somalia. They
include the first-known American suicide bomber, Shirwa Ahmed,
who was reportedly radicalized while living in the Minneapolis
area. At least three of al-Shabaab's suicide bombings have
included Somali-Americans. Other Americans who have died
fighting with al-Shabaab include converts to Islam with
criminal records. Several would-be jihadists from Illinois, New
Jersey, Maryland, and Virginia, including at least one ex-U.S.
soldier, have been caught before they could reach Somalia.
U.N. experts estimate that the group continues to draw
support from roughly 300 foreign fighters, and this does not
include foreigners of Somali descent. These fighters appear to
be predominantly from Kenya, Sudan, Yemen, but also from South
Asia, Europe, Canada, Australia, and the United States. U.S.
Africa Command officials suggest that these foreign fighters
remain the greatest threat to Western interests, both
regionally and internationally. A U.S. counterterrorism
operation last weekend reportedly targeted a Kenyan-Somali,
Somali-Kenyan, known as Ikrima, who has been identified as the
senior al-Shabaab operative responsible for recruiting foreign
fighters in Europe and directing attacks in Kenya.
How does al-Shabaab recruit? Al-Shabaab has used both real
and virtual social networks to recruit. The group maintains
multiple websites and an on-again, off-again Twitter feed with
links to videos and statements posed on-line in both Somali,
Arabic, and English to reach an international audience. Al-
Shabaab uses internet chatrooms to recruit. Its foreign-born
members often play a key role in this propaganda.
What threat does al-Shabaab pose to the United States? U.S.
policymakers have been concerned for years with al-Shabaab's
terrorist operations and recruitment activities for three main
reasons. First, al-Shabaab has demonstrated its intent to
strike international targets, and several Americans have been
wounded or killed in the attacks. Second, its recruitment
drives have led to participation of U.S. soldiers and U.S.
citizens in al-Shabaab terrorist activities overseas. Third,
the group has recruited Americans or individuals carrying
passports from countries in the Visa Waiver Program, including
countries in Europe, some of whom may seek to target the United
States.
In this regard, al-Shabaab's training camps and its ability
to provide recruits with battlefield experience and training in
terrorist tradecraft, such as bomb-making skills, may pose the
greatest long-term risks to the region and to the broader
international community. The recent attack in Kenya also
demonstrated that al-Shabaab is able to provide the
organizational support for the planning and coordination of
large-scale attacks that individual extremists might otherwise
be unable to manage.
The potential for al-Shabaab supporters inside the United
States to carry out attacks in support of the group's agenda is
unclear and bears further investigation. In particular, U.S.
citizens who have fought with al-Shabaab may inspire
radicalization among family members or acquaintances. Attacks
of the type implemented last month in Nairobi, using small arms
to maximum deadly effect, might draw the attention of so-called
self-starters or would-be terrorists in the United States.
In sum, American recruits to al-Shabaab continue to play a
direct role in the group's operations in Somalia, and it
appears likely that the group will continue to target U.S.
citizens for recruitment. In confronting these threats, U.S.
policymakers face the challenge of determining how, either
through regional partners or directly, the United States can
most effectively prevent al-Shabaab from growing stronger or
attacking the United States without playing into the group's
narrative and further fueling radicalization abroad and here at
home.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Blanchard follows:]
Prepared Statement of Lauren Ploch Blanchard
October 9, 2013
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and distinguished Members
of the committee, thank you for inviting the Congressional Research
Service (CRS) to testify today.
Al-Shabaab is a violent extremist group in Somalia that has
successfully demonstrated its ability to recruit Americans and citizens
of other Western countries. The State Department designated the group
as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in February 2008. While it
has primarily focused on its agenda in Somalia, two developments in the
past month, namely the group's deadly terrorist attack on an up-scale
shopping mall in Kenya, and the death in Somalia of American jihadist
Omar Hammami, have highlighted the transnational threats posed by al-
Shabaab. These events have prompted a number of questions, not least of
which are: ``What role are American recruits playing in al-Shabaab?''
and ``Could American recruits conduct or facilitate similar attacks in
the United States?''.
Many details of the Nairobi mall attack remain unclear, and
investigations are on-going regarding the identity of those who planned
and led the attack.\1\ Eyewitness accounts reported by the press and
initial remarks by Kenyan officials suggested that British and/or U.S.
citizens may have participated in the attack, although more recent
Kenyan government statements have identified only East African
nationals among the attackers.
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\1\ CRS Report 43245, In Brief: The September 2013 Terrorist Attack
in Kenya.
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U.S. policymakers have been concerned for years with al-Shabaab
recruitment abroad for two main reasons. First, such recruitment has
led to the participation of U.S. citizens in al-Shabaab terrorist
activities overseas. Second, and salient to today's hearing, the group
has recruited Americans or individuals carrying passports from
countries in the Visa Waiver Program, including countries in Europe,
who might potentially seek to target the United States.
At this point, while some in al-Shabaab may aspire to conduct
terrorist attacks outside Africa, the group's capability and intent to
strike targets inside the United States have not been demonstrated.
However, the Westgate mall terrorist attack is another sobering
demonstration of al-Shabaab's intent, and ability, to strike targets
beyond Somalia's borders, at least in the neighboring region. The
attack may also provide inspiration for would-be jihadists on how small
arms can be used against soft targets with maximum effect. Even if U.S.
citizens were not involved in the Westgate attack, perhaps the most
important fact for the consideration of this committee remains that al-
Shabaab has successfully recruited U.S. citizens and deployed them in
terrorist operations. In this testimony, I provide some background on
al-Shabaab and briefly discuss the role of foreign fighters within its
ranks and its efforts to recruit from abroad.
BACKGROUND
Al-Qaeda and affiliated groups like al-Shabaab have had a presence
in East Africa for almost 20 years, although the extent of their
operations there has varied over time.\2\ The region's porous borders,
proximity to the Arabian Peninsula, weak law enforcement and judicial
institutions, and pervasive corruption have combined with almost 20
years of state collapse in Somalia to provide an enabling environment
for violent extremist groups.
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\2\ For further background, see CRS Report R41473, Countering
Terrorism in East Africa: the U.S. Response, November 3, 2010, by
Lauren Ploch.
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Al-Shabaab, more formally known as Harakat al-Shabaab Al Mujahidin
(``Mujahidin Youth Movement''), emerged about a decade ago amid a
proliferation of Islamist and clan-based militias that flourished in
the absence of central authority in Somalia. Loosely affiliated with a
network of local Islamic courts, al-Shabaab, unlike the clan militias,
drew members from across clans, ascribing to a broader irredentist and
religiously-driven vision of uniting ethnic Somali-inhabited areas of
Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Somalia under an Islamist caliphate.\3\
Several of al-Shabaab's leaders had reportedly trained and fought with
al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, and known al-Qaeda operatives in the region
were associated with the group.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The courts' leaders varied in their ideological approaches,
which reflected diverse views on political Islam, clan identity, and
Somali nationalism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Al-Shabaab grew in prominence in 2006, when hardliners within the
Islamic courts called for jihad against neighboring Ethiopia. Ethiopia,
reportedly supported by the United States, had backed a group of
Mogadishu warlords, purportedly to capture suspected al-Qaeda
operatives and counter the growing Islamist presence in the Somali
capital. When Ethiopia intervened directly in December of that year,
deploying its own forces to Mogadishu to defeat the courts' militias,
al-Shabaab played upon historic anti-Ethiopian sentiment in the country
to fuel an increasingly complex insurgency.\4\ Some analysts argue that
al-Shabaab and other hardliners benefited directly from the U.S.-backed
Ethiopian intervention that removed their rivals and gave credence to
al-Shabaab's anti-foreign rhetoric.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ See, e.g., Roland Marchal, ``A Tentative Assessment of the
Somali Harakat Al-Shabaab,'' Journal of East African Studies, November
2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. air strikes in early 2007 against suspected al-Qaeda
operatives fighting among the insurgents were incorporated into al-
Shabaab's narrative that Islam in predominantly Muslim Somalia was
under attack by the West and its proxy African ``Crusader'' forces. Al-
Qaeda messaging supported this narrative--in January 2007, Ayman al-
Zawahiri broadcast a call for jihadists to support Somali efforts to
attack Ethiopia.\5\ When African Union (AU) troops from predominantly
Christian Uganda and Burundi joined the fight against al-Shabaab later
that year, under a U.N. mandate and with substantial U.S. and European
support, al-Shabaab repeated its charge that these forces were
surrogates for an American anti-Islamic agenda.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ OSC, ``Al-Zawahiri Urges Somalis, Muslims To Fight Ethiopian
Forces,'' FEA20070105069027, January 5, 2007.
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Al-Shabaab has repeatedly used this narrative against Kenya, which
launched its own military offensive against al-Shabaab in October 2011
with the stated aim of defending itself against terrorist threats and
incursions. Kenya joined the AU force, known as AMISOM (the AU Mission
in Somalia) in 2012. Alleged abuses by AU forces and civilian
casualties purportedly resulting from U.S. and/or Kenyan air strikes
have been exploited by al-Shabaab. For example, in claiming
responsibility for the September 2013 attack on the Westgate mall, the
group charged that the Kenyan military had ``massacred'' innocent
civilians in southern Somalia during its operations.\6\ It used a
similar justification for its deadly July 2010 bombings in Kampala,
Uganda.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ OSC Report AFL2013092380722161, ``Somalia, Kenya--al-Shabaab
Vocal in Claiming Responsibility for Nairobi Attack,'' September 23,
2013. According to the State Department, Kenya has successfully
disrupted several large-scale terrorist threats, but more than 3 dozen
small-scale terrorist incidents were reported in Kenya in 2012. State
Department, ``Kenya,'' Country Reports on Terrorism 2012, May 30, 2013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
AL-SHABAAB TIES TO AL-QAEDA
Al-Shabaab, as it exists today, appears to be a hybrid--it is both
a locally-focused Islamist insurgent group and a transnational
terrorist affiliate of al-Qaeda.\7\ U.N. experts have referred to it as
``a sprawling coalition of jihadists, business interests, and clan
militias.'' The group announced its formal merger with al-Qaeda in
February 2012, although al-Shabaab did not adopt the al-Qaeda name.\8\
Like several other ``AQ affiliates,'' al-Shabaab appears to operate
largely independently. According to the U.S. State Department, it
maintains ties with other extremist groups in the region, like
Nigeria's Boko Haram, and al-Qaeda-affiliated groups like al-Qaeda in
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP), although such links have reportedly been institutional (i.e.,
communications, training, and weapons linkages) rather than
operational.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ The term ``Islamist'' here refers to those who advance a formal
political role for Islam, through the implementation of Islamic law,
political mobilization through a religious party, or the creation of a
religious system of governance.
\8\ U.N. Security Council, Report of the Monitoring Group on
Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1853 (2008), S/2010/91,
March 10, 2010. The media wing of al-Qaeda Senior Leadership in
Pakistan released a joint video message from al-Shabaab leader Ahmed
Godane and al-Qaeda leader Zawahiri on February 9, 2012.
\9\ The U.S. capture in 2011 of a Somali, Ahmed Warsame, has been
referred to by U.S. law enforcement as an intelligence watershed on the
linkages between al-Shabaab and AQAP. For U.S. Government reference to
institutional links see, e.g., the description of Boko Haram leader
Abubakar Shekau on the State Department's Rewards for Justice website,
and see also U.N. Security Council, Somalia report of the Monitoring
Group on Somalia and Eritrea submitted in accordance with resolution
2060 (2012), S/2013/413, July 12, 2013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Public statements from al-Shabaab leaders suggested for years an
aspiration to be part of the al-Qaeda franchise. In 2008, after a U.S.
missile strike killed al-Shabaab leader Aden Hashi Ayro, the group's
leadership made multiple pronouncements of their commitment to the
global jihad movement, and subsequently announced a revenge campaign
against U.S. and Western targets in Somalia.\10\ In August 2008, a top
commander, Mukhtar Robow, publicly acknowledged the group's growing
ties to al-Qaeda, saying, ``We are now negotiating to unite as one. We
will take our orders from Sheik Osama Bin Laden because we are his
students.''\11\ He also threatened, for the first time on record, al-
Shabaab attacks against targets outside Somalia, warning, ``once we end
the holy war in Somalia, we will take it to any government that
participated in the fighting against Somalia or gave assistance to
those attacking us.'' At that time, some U.S. officials, while
recognizing linkages between the groups, publicly dismissed the idea
that al-Shabaab was following orders from al-Qaeda.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ OSC, ``Somalia's Mujahidin Youth Movement Spokesman Discusses
Progress of Jihad,'' GMP20080527873001, May 8, 2008; and OSC,
``Somalia: MYM Commander Shaykh Al-Zubayr Sends Message to Global Jihad
Leaders,'' AFP20080603410001, June 1, 2008. Foreign fighter Omar
Hammami (Abu Mansour al-Amriki) also expressed al-Shabaab's commitment
to global jihad in January 2008, OSC, `` `Abu-Mansur al-Amriki'
Condemns `Courts,' Praises MYM Views, Bin Ladin,'' GMP20080213106001,
February 7, 2008.
\11\ Edmund Sanders, ``Conditions May Be Ripe for Al Qaeda to Gain
in Somalia,'' Los Angeles Times, August 25, 2008.
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Other public expressions of allegiance followed, and in September
2009, al-Shabaab released a video expressing greetings to Osama bin
Laden, in which al-Shabaab leader Ahmed Godane spoke of awaiting
guidance from the AQ leader.\12\ Then-Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton referred to al-Shabaab as a ``junior partner'' to al-Qaeda in
early 2010.\13\ In June 2011, after the United States reportedly
directed its first drone strikes against targets in Somalia, President
Obama's then-counterterrorism advisor John Brennan declared AQAP the
``most operationally active affiliate'' in the al-Qaeda network, but
warned that ``from the territory it controls in Somalia, al-Shabaab
continues to call for strikes against the United States.''\14\ In its
2011 National Counterterrorism Strategy, released that same month, the
administration warned, ``influenced by its al-Qaeda elements, al-
Shabaab . . . could--motivated to advance its insurgency or to further
its al-Qaeda agenda or both--strike outside Somalia in East Africa, as
it did in Uganda, as well as outside the region.'' Unidentified U.S.
military officials expressed concern at that time that some within the
group were collaborating more closely with al-Qaeda to strike targets
abroad, and indicated that the targets of the June drone strikes had
``direct ties'' to AQAP's Anwar al-Awlaki.\15\ Press reports suggested
that the strikes sought to disrupt a plan to conduct attacks in the
United Kingdom.\16\
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\12\ OSC, ``Somalia: Mujahidin Youth Movement Issues `O Usama, Here
We Are' Video,'' AFP20090922410001, September 20, 2009.
\13\ Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Remarks during a Senate
Appropriations Committee hearing, March 25, 2010.
\14\ The White House, Remarks of John O. Brennan, Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, on Ensuring al-
Qa'ida's Demise--As Prepared for Delivery, June 29, 2011.
\15\ Greg Jaffe and Karen DeYoung, ``U.S. Drone Targets Two Leaders
of Somali Group Allied with Al-Qaeda, Official Says,'' Washington Post,
June 29, 2011 and Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, ``U.S. Expands Its
Drone War Into Somalia,'' New York Times, July 1, 2011.
\16\ Karen DeYoung, ``CIA Idles Drone Flights from Base in
Pakistan,'' Washington Post, July 1, 2011.
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The practical effect of al-Shabaab's 2012 merger with al-Qaeda is
unclear. Some experts argue that it is largely symbolic, given that the
group appears to remain self-sufficient and continues to follow a
largely Somalia-focused agenda. They see the Westgate mall attack in
Kenya as part of that effort.\17\ Others argue that the Westgate attack
bears the hallmarks of new guidelines reportedly released by al-Qaeda
leadership, instructing affiliated groups to use hostages to attract
maximum publicity, and may signal a strategic shift toward a more
global focus by al-Shabaab leadership.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Nicholas Kulish, Mark Mazzetti, and Eric Schmitt, ``Kenya Mall
Carnage Shows Shabaab Resilience,'' New York Times, September 22, 2012.
\18\ Paul Cruickshank and Tim Lister, ``Al-Shabaab Breaks New
Ground with Complex Nairobi Attack,'' CNN, September 23, 2013. See also
Ayman al Zawahiri, General Guidelines for Jihad, As-Sahab Media,
September 2013.
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THE RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN SOMALIA
The typical al-Shabaab foot soldier is Somali, and is more likely
to have joined the group for economic reasons, or to defend clan
interests, than based on extremist beliefs.\19\ But the group also
continues to draws support from roughly 300 ``foreign fighters,''
according to U.N. reporting.\20\ (The U.N. estimate does not include
individuals of Somali descent--if they were included in the count, the
figure would almost certainly be higher.) These fighters are reportedly
predominantly from Kenya, Sudan, and Yemen, but also from South Asia,
as well as from Europe, Australia, Canada, and the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ U.N. Information Service, Press Briefing by Special
Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia Nicholas Kay in
Geneva, September 24, 2013.
\20\ U.N. Security Council, S/2013/413, op. cit.
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U.S. Africa Command officials suggest that these foreign fighters
``remain the greatest threat to Western interests regionally and
internationally.''\21\ Indeed, two Sudanese, Mohamed Makawi Ibrahim
Mohamed and Abdelbasit Alhaj Alhassan Haj Hamad, who were involved in
the January 2008 murder of a U.S. diplomat in Khartoum, are believed to
be among the group's ranks.\22\ Several foreign fighters have
reportedly been targeted in U.S. military strikes in Somalia, including
Bilal al Berjawi, a Lebanese-born British citizen who was reportedly
wounded in a June 2011 drone strike and killed in a second strike, in
January 2012. Another is Mohammed Sakr, a British citizen of Egyptian
descent killed in a February 2012 strike. The U.K. government revoked
their passports in 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ General David M. Rodriguez, Written Responses to Advance
Policy Questions for the Nominee for Commander, U.S. Africa Command,
Senate Armed Services Committee, February 13, 2013.
\22\ These two individuals, who were convicted of the crime in 2009
and subsequently escaped a Sudanese prison, have been listed by the
United States as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Al-Shabaab is not the first extremist group to attract foreigners
to Somalia to join its ranks, but it may be the most successful.
Somalia offered a permissive environment for al-Qaeda operatives like
Harun Fazul and Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, co-conspirators in the 1998
U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, to train recruits. But
Somalia also poses organizational and logistical challenges for foreign
operatives and fighters. Reports suggest, for example, that AQ
operatives found Somalis' clan identities and suspicion of foreigners,
as well as the unreliability of local ``allies,'' to be impediments to
their operations in the 1990s.\23\ The country's wide-spread banditry,
poor roads, weak financial services, and other logistical challenges
created additional costs for al-Qaeda as it tried to move personnel and
resources through the area for training.\24\
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\23\ The Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point's Harmony
Project, Al-Qaida's (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa, 2006.
\24\ Coastal Kenya, on the other hand, with its porous borders,
relative stability, and basic infrastructure, including banks, provided
what some consider a ``weak state'' environment that proved to be a
conducive setting for al-Qaeda activities, and provided easier access
to high-profile Western targets.
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Al-Shabaab appears to have found ways to work around many of these
challenges, due in large part to its continued ability, despite notable
military setbacks in the past 2 years, to control significant territory
in southern and central Somalia.\25\ According to a recent report by
the U.N. Monitoring Group on Somalia, al-Shabaab has at least 20
training camps, including a suicide training school near the port city
of Barawe, an al-Shabaab stronghold that was the target of a raid by
Navy Seals on October 5.\26\ These training sites move frequently, but
their continued existence demonstrates that al-Shabaab still enjoys
some freedom of movement and territorial control in parts of the
country.\27\
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\25\ Since 2006, al-Shabaab has co-opted clan leaders in south-
central Somalia and manipulated local revenue streams, earning possibly
as much as $15 million a month from illegal charcoal exports through
Barawe port, south of Mogadishu.
\26\ The camps are located primarily in Lower Shabelle region, as
well as in Bay, Hiran, and Galgadud.
\27\ According to the U.N. Monitoring Group, tasked by the Security
Council to report on violations of international sanctions and security
threats in Somalia, al-Shabaab remains in control of Middle Juba, most
of Hiran, Bay, and Bakol regions, and parts of Galgudud, and Lower
Shabelle regions. U.N. Security Council, S/2013/413, op. cit.
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RECRUITMENT IN THE UNITED STATES AND AMONG THE SOMALI-AMERICAN
COMMUNITY
Al-Shabaab has conducted recruitment and fundraising within the
Somali diaspora community in the United States, drawing considerable
attention from U.S. law enforcement officials. Several Somali-Americans
have been prosecuted for terrorist financing, and U.S. citizens (many,
but not all, of Somali origin) have been indicted on suspicion of
traveling to train and fight with al-Shabaab. Others have been
prosecuted for efforts to recruit or provide financial support to the
group. Estimates vary on the number of U.S. citizens who may have
joined al-Shabaab in Somalia, but more than 20 young men from
Minnesota, which hosts the largest concentration of Somali-Americans,
are believed to have gone to fight in Somalia, and at least four
Somali-Americans have been implicated in suicide bombings there.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ ``Somalis Still Leaving U.S. to Join Terror Group,'' Military
Times, September 26, 2013, and Jamie Dettmer, ``Al-Shabab's Jihadi
Recruitment Drive in Minnesota,'' The Daily Beast, September 24, 2013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Al-Shabaab has used both real and virtual social networks to
recruit. The group has proven adept at strategic communications, using
the internet to emphasize its commitment to global jihad, and to pledge
fealty to al-Qaeda, which serves both its fundraising and recruitment
goals. In addition to using domestic media sources to reach Somalis,
the group maintains multiple websites and a Twitter feed (@HSMPress and
variations, which are periodically shut down), with videos and
statements posted on-line in Somali, Arabic, and English, to reach an
international audience. Al-Shabaab also uses internet chatrooms to
solicit contributions and recruits. Its foreign-born members often play
a key role in its propaganda--a British national, for example, is
believed to manage its Twitter account.
Among the most infamous of al-Shabaab's foreign fighters was a
Syrian-American from Alabama, Omar Hammami, also known as Abu Mansour
al Amriki, who appeared in propaganda videos and used social media for
recruitment. Hammami, for whom the State Department had issued a $5
million bounty under its Rewards for Justice program, was killed in
early September 2013, reportedly by former allies within al-
Shabaab.\29\ Another non-Somali-American, Jehad Serwan Mostafa, from
San Diego is also on the FBI's Most Wanted Terrorists List, with a $5
million reward for information leading to his capture. Mostafa, who
like Hammami has helped to produce al-Shabaab propaganda, has served as
a trainer and a leader of foreign fighters, according to the State
Department.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ For more on Hammami see e.g., USA v. Omar Hammami; Andrea
Elliott, ``The Jihadist Next Door, New York Times, January 31, 2010 and
articles by J.M. Berger in Foreign Policy.
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Several Americans who were reportedly radicalized in the United
States have been reported to have died fighting in Somalia, although
authorities have not confirmed information concerning their deaths in
all cases.\30\ They include:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ Laura Yuen, ``Minnesota Men Who Joined `Jihad' in Somalia,''
Minnesota Public Radio, October 1, 2012.
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Shirwa Ahmed, a naturalized Somali immigrant who in October
2008 became the first known American suicide bomber,
participating in coordinated attacks against both domestic and
foreign targets, including a U.N. compound, in the northern
Somali cities of Hargeisa and Bosaso. Ahmed was reportedly
radicalized while living in the Minneapolis area, leaving for
Somalia in late 2007.
Omar Mohamud, a Somali-American from Seattle who may have
been one of two suicide bombers who drove two stolen U.N.
vehicles into an AMISOM peacekeeping base at the Mogadishu
airport in September 2009.
Farah Mohamad Beledi, a Somali-American ex-convict from St.
Paul who was shot and killed while attempting a suicide bombing
against a Somali military checkpoint outside Mogadishu in May
2011.
Abdisalan Hussein Ali, a Somali-American who may have
conducted a suicide bombing against AMISOM in October 2011.
Ali, a pre-med student at the University of Minnesota before he
disappeared in 2008, was identified in an al-Shabaab audio tape
calling for jihad in the United States, Canada, and Europe.
Dahir Gure, a Somali-American who was reportedly among the
group of young men who traveled from Minneapolis to Somalia in
2007.
Mohamoud Ali Hassan, a Somali-American engineering student
at the University of Minnesota who was reportedly among the
second group of young men who traveled from Minneapolis to
Somalia, in 2008, and was killed in 2009.
Abdirashid Ali Omar, a Somali-American who was reportedly
among the second group of young men who traveled from
Minneapolis to Somalia, in 2008.
Jamal Bana, a Somali-American engineering student at a
Minneapolis community college who left for Somalia in 2008 and
reportedly died in Mogadishu in 2009.
Burhan Hassan, a Somali-American high school student who
traveled from Minneapolis to Somalia in 2008 and was reportedly
killed in 2009.
Troy Kastigar, aka ``Abdirahman,'' an American convert to
Islam with a criminal record who left Minneapolis for Somalia
in 2008 and reportedly died in 2009.
Ruben Shumpert, a Muslim convert and ex-convict from Seattle
who fled Federal gun and counterfeit currency charges in 2006,
traveling to Somalia, where he declared in a phone call to an
FBI agent that he and his associates ``would destroy everything
the United States stood for.''\31\ He was killed in 2008,
reportedly in a U.S. missile strike.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ ``Seattle Case Raises Questions About War on Terror,'' CNN,
September 18, 2006.
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Three of the Somali-Americans listed above are part of a broader
FBI investigation, Operation Rhino, into the pipeline through which
Somali youth have traveled from the Minneapolis area to join al-
Shabaab. Other individuals who are thought to have gone include Ahmed
Ali Omar, Khalid Mohamud Abshir, Zakaria Maruf, Mohamed Abdullahi
Hassan, Mustafa Ali Salat, Abdikadir Ali Abdi, Abdiweli Yassin Isse,
and Cabdullaahi Ahmed Faarax.\32\ At least two additional Minneapolis
residents may have left for Somalia in 2012: Mohamed Osman and Omar Ali
Farah. Kamal Said Hassan, Abdifatah Isse, and Salah Osman Ahmed, who
returned to the United States after fighting in Somalia, have been
convicted in U.S. courts of terrorism offenses and are now serving
sentences.\33\ Prior to his arrest, Ahmed had found work as a security
guard upon returning to Minneapolis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ United States v. Ahmed Ali Omar et ano., Third Superseding
Indictment in the U.S. District Court of Minnesota.
\33\ United States v. Abdifatah Yusuf Isse and Salah Osman Ahmed
and United States v. Kamal Said Hassan in the U.S. District Court of
Minnesota.
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Other Americans who have reportedly sought to join al-Shabaab have
been arrested while preparing to travel or en route to Somalia,
including:
Craig Baxam, a former U.S. soldier from Laurel, MD;
Mohamed Alessa and Carlos Almonte, New Jersey residents;
Shaker Masri, a Chicago resident;
Zachary Adam Chesser, a Fairfax, VA resident.
Another individual, Brooklyn resident Betim Kaziu, who reportedly
sought to kill U.S. troops abroad made efforts to travel to Somalia and
Afghanistan, among other war zones. He was ultimately arrested in
Kosovo.
Al-Shabaab's foreign recruits have reportedly held a range of
political and religious beliefs. Many of the Somali-Americans who have
been prosecuted to date for joining or providing support for al-Shabaab
were reportedly radicalized based on a patriotic agenda of defending
their ancestral homeland against foreign invaders and local allies
(i.e., the Somali government and its security forces). Several of the
non-Somali-Americans listed above, including Chesser, Masri, Alessa,
and Almonte, appear to have sought more generally to become involved in
violent jihad, and were reportedly inspired by the sermons of AQAP
cleric al-Awlaki, a U.S. citizen who was linked to a number of U.S.-
focused jihadist plots before his death in a U.S. counterterrorism
operation in Yemen in September 2011. Another American killed in that
attack, the Saudi-born Samir Khan, who published the AQAP magazine
Inspire and its predecessor Jihad Recollections, may have influenced
Mohamed Osman Mohamud, a Somali-American who attempted to detonate what
he believed to be a vehicle bomb at a Christmas tree lighting ceremony
in Portland, Oregon in 2010. While Mohamud did not appear to have ties
to al-Shabaab, his actions have further contributed to concerns that
Somali-Americans or others recruited by al-Shabaab might attempt to
strike targets in the United States.
CRS analyst Jerome Bjelopera, who has written on plots by American
violent jihadists both in the United States and abroad, estimates that
there have been 71 plots or attacks in the United States since
September 11, 2001.\34\ He notes a significant uptick in plots
beginning in 2009, which he suggests may reflect a trend in jihadist
terrorist activity away from schemes directed by core members of
significant terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda. Most of the individuals
involved in these plots did not have operational ties to terrorist
groups. These plots suggest, as he posits, that some Americans,
particularly first- and second-generation Muslim American immigrants
and native-born Americans who converted to Islam, are susceptible to
violent jihadist ideologies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ CRS Report R41416, American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a
Complex Threat, by Jerome P. Bjelopera.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the threat posed by al-Shabaab to domestic and foreign
targets in Somalia and the broader East Africa region is clear, the
group's efforts to recruit foreigners raises additional concerns. In
hosting training camps and providing recruits with battlefield
experience and training in terrorist tradecraft such as bomb-making
skills, al-Shabaab is able to impart skills that could be used in
attacks either in the region or abroad. It is also able to provide
organizational support for the planning and coordination of large-scale
strikes that a home-grown violent jihadist might be otherwise unable to
manage. Citizens or legal permanent residents of the United States, or
citizens of countries in the Visa Waiver Program, who have been
recruited by al-Shabaab are a particular concern for U.S. border
security.\35\ Further, U.S. citizens who have fought with al-Shabaab
might inspire radicalization among family members or acquaintances, and
attacks of the type implemented last month in Nairobi, using small arms
to maximum effect, might draw the attention of so-called ``self-
starters'' or other would-be terrorists in the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ Of particular concern are al-Shabaab recruits from the United
Kingdom, Sweden, and other European countries in the Visa Waiver
Program. Canadian citizens also do not require a nonimmigrant visa.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OUTLOOK FOR AL-SHABAAB
Some observers argue that al-Shabaab has been greatly weakened by
AMISOM gains in the past 2 years. However, U.N. experts suggest that
avoiding direct military confrontation has allowed al-Shabaab to
``preserve the core of its fighting force and resources,'' with some
5,000 fighters who remain ``arguably intact in terms of operational
readiness, chain of command, discipline and communication
capabilities.''\36\ Since what it termed a ``strategic withdrawal''
from Mogadishu in August 2011, the group has conducted almost-daily
guerilla-style attacks on government, civilian, AMISOM, and other
foreign targets, in both urban and rural areas.\37\ Notable attacks
against foreign targets in 2013 include a June attack against the U.N.
compound in Mogadishu, in which 22 people were killed, and a July
attack on the Turkish diplomatic residence there. Al-Shabaab conducts
assassinations and attacks using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) of
various types, mortars, grenades, and automatic weapons, causing
hundreds of civilian casualties.\38\ U.N. reporting on al-Shabaab
attacks indicates a surge in the group's use of grenades and IEDs and
suggests evidence that the group has exported technical knowledge for
the manufacture of suicide vests and IEDs to Kenya and Uganda. Complex
attacks, in which explosives or suicide bombers are used to breach a
perimeter and are then followed by gunmen to produce maximum
casualties, have become a hallmark of the group.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ U.N. Security Council, S/2013/413, op. cit.
\37\ See Christopher Anzalone, ``Al-Shabab's Tactical and Media
Strategies in the Wake of its Battlefield Setbacks,'' CTC Sentinel,
Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, March 27, 2013.
\38\ For an overview of al-Shabaab attacks in Somalia in 2012-2013,
see Navanti Group, ``Somalia's Al-Shabaab: Down But Not Out,'' Homeland
Security Policy Institute Issue Brief 22, August 27, 2013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The former head of the U.N. Monitoring Group on Somalia, Matt
Bryden, suggests that the Westgate attack represents a dangerous new
stage for al-Shabaab: ``My assessment has always been that the day al-
Shabaab lets go of the `Cult of the Suicide Bomber,' we will be in a
world of trouble. It's far more complicated to procure the parts for an
explosive vest, as well as to find people willing to be martyrs. I
always worried that if you just get guys riding in with AK-47s and
grenades, they could do incredible damage.''\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ ``At Westgate, al-Qaida Group Figures Out That Less is More,
With Dangerous Consequences,'' Associated Press, October 5, 2013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reports of in-fighting within al-Shabaab's senior ranks have been
the subject of considerable speculation.\40\ Within the broader al-
Shabaab insurgency is an extremist faction, led by al-Shabaab leader
Ahmed Abdi Godane (aka ``Abu Zubeyr''), which appears to aspire to pose
a global threat. Some analysts suggest the Westgate attack in Nairobi
may be an expression of Godane's consolidation of power, after having
neutralized his rivals within the movement.\41\ Godane has reportedly
created a parallel clandestine terrorist organization, the Amniyat,
within the larger al-Shabaab movement that, according to U.N. experts,
has been responsible for a majority of recent suicide bombings and
targeted killings in recent years. By U.N. accounts, the Amniyat is
structured to function underground, unlike al-Shabaab's military
apparatus, which appears vulnerable to political divisions and regional
military offensives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ See CRS Report 43245, In Brief: The September 2013 Terrorist
Attack in Kenya, for more information.
\41\ Godane is blamed for the deaths of several high-profile al-
Shabaab figures in recent months, including senior commanders, as well
as Omar Hammami.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Amniyat bears close watch, as do foreign fighters who have
trained and fought with al-Shabaab--some foreigners have reportedly
deserted the group in recent years, either because of disillusion with
its military losses or because of internal dissent. Reports suggest
some may have travelled to Yemen to join AQAP,\42\ while others,
including those linked to regional al-Shabaab affiliates like Al Hijra
in Kenya, seek to shift their focus from Somalia to fighting for al-
Qaeda and killing U.S. citizens in the region of East Africa.\43\ The
U.S. counterterrorism operation on October 5 in Barawe, Somalia, which
reportedly targeted, unsuccessfully, a Somali-Kenyan Mohamed Abdikadir
Mohamed, aka ``Ikrima,'' may be indicative of the level of U.S. concern
regarding al-Shabaab's Kenyan plots. Ikrima has been identified as a
senior al-Shabaab operative responsible for recruiting foreign fighters
and directing attacks in Kenya, including, possibly, the attack on the
Westgate mall. A Kenyan intelligence report referenced by CNN suggests
that Ikrima, who has also been linked to AQAP and Al Hijra, may have
been planning a complex attack against Kenyan government and U.N.
targets in Nairobi.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ ``Al-Shabaab on Verge of Defeat, Analysts Say,''
Sabahionline.com, February 27, 2012. The Sabahi website is sponsored by
U.S. Africa Command.
\43\ Treasury Department, ``Treasury Targets Regional Actors
Fueling Violence and Instability in Somalia,'' July 5, 2012.
\44\ Paul Cruickshank and Tim Lister, ``U.S. Target in Somalia: An
Inside Story on an Al-Shabaab Commander,'' CNN, October 7, 2013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In summary, al-Shabaab presents U.S. policymakers with a paradox:
The group has demonstrated its intent and capacity to wage a violent
war on Somalis and other targets in East Africa. It has also shown its
ability to recruit Americans. Its ties to groups that have conducted
terrorist attacks against the United States, namely al-Qaeda and AQAP,
and the reported presence of foreign fighters in Somalia with the
intent to strike targets beyond the African continent, raise the
group's profile among foreign terrorist organizations watched by the
U.S. intelligence community. The challenge for policymakers, however,
is calibrating the appropriate response--determining how, either
through regional partners or directly--the United States can most
effectively prevent the group from growing stronger or focusing on
attacking the United States without playing into their narrative and
further fueling radicalization.
Chairman McCaul. Thanks, Ms. Blanchard.
Chairman now recognizes Mr. Lovegrove.
STATEMENT OF BRETT LOVEGROVE, CHIEF EXECUTIVE, CITY SECURITY
AND RESILIENCE NETWORK (CSARN)
Mr. Lovegrove. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for your
invitation from the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on
Homeland Security. I am delighted to be here with my witnesses
to talk about this subject.
You will know that United Kingdom has a very tragic and
long history of being attacked by different terrorists, both
national and international. But what that has done over the
years is made us focus our minds on how we protect ourselves,
whether it be government level, whether it be public sector, or
whether it be the business sector. The business sector I will
mention later on.
Surprisingly, these modern-day terrorists are a little bit
more hidden than the ones that we have traditionally been used
to. We have been focused on the jihadists, who seem to be on
the list for attacking us the most.
The Muslim religion, as you know, is wholly peaceful. I
want to make that point, because although I am going to be
talking about jihadists, we understand in the United Kingdom--
and the Muslim community has been there for in excess of 800
years--they have been a very peaceful community that have
embedded themselves into the Anglo-Saxon and U.K. community,
and they have great respect for other faiths.
I speak in a week where the head of MI5, Andrew Parker,
underlines the fact that the United Kingdom is witnessing
evidence of a movement from Pakistan and Yemen and several
thousands who have been identified who see the British as a
target, an ideal target for terrorist acts. He describes the
whole situation of radicalism as being more diffuse, more
complicated, and more unpredictable than anywhere before.
There is a responsibility from the community, however. In
the United Kingdom we are in great talks with the different
parts of the Muslim community to make them realize that they
have a great responsibility for taking the lead in many, many
things. One of the things that we have been talking about is
how the Muslim community can supply more intelligence to the
police community. They have done, but they need to do more.
Hopefully they feel so abhorrent about the terrorists in their
midst that they will come through with more information, and
hopefully more convictions and prosecutions will take place
after that.
We identify our main areas of returning jihadists, their
elements and their areas of working to be prisons and youth
offender institutions, the universities, colleges, and schools,
mosques and other religious institutions, family environments,
and any environment where vulnerable potential recruits can be
identified. More recently we have noticed the gang culture is
somewhere where the jihadists are recruited because of the
vulnerabilities of the young there.
This is a week also where we have reformed the Serious
Organized Crime Agency into the National Crime Agency and the
National Cyber Crime Unit. When we talk about soft crimes--and
I will be going on to that in a minute--we mustn't forget the
internet, as has already been mentioned in the previous
witnesses.
Ironically, one of the main areas of radicalism is in our
education departments, and that is something that we are
focusing on to ensure that universities themselves actually
play their part. But we would like the Muslim community to be
active in condemning the legitimization of jihadism, to provide
even greater amounts of community intelligence, condemning the
call for the death of nonbelievers, enabling the ability for a
new generation of Muslims to have a balanced discussion within
the community, deliver a balanced syllabus in Muslim faith
schools, and disband Muslim-only areas in universities and
colleges. These are really very serious in the United Kingdom,
things that we must overcome if we are going to make any
positive impact.
So, soft targets: In the United Kingdom we have done an
enormous amount of work already. We are not complacent, and we
continue to work with the business community. But there is an
increasing focus on soft targets. We have heard already the
long list of things that have happened in the past where the
United Kingdom is learning from those incidents. We are taking
the lessons identified, and we are learning them and embedding
them into our society.
I am going to move on now to the outcomes of activity. We
have two very good examples, very good solutions in the United
Kingdom that works well for us. The two projects are Project
Griffin--and, Mr. Chairman, you were kind enough to mention
that before. That is the police service working with the
security industry that teaches them, and of course teaching the
police officers, how to identify hostile recognizance when it
takes place. We have known for many, many years that the
process the terrorists go through has to include hostile
recognizance, and it happens to be the most vulnerable part of
their process. So we teach the private security industry, the
front-of-house guards, the managers of people who are
patrolling in private areas to make sure they identify that
kind of behavior, to call police immediately. Many, many
arrests have taken place.
The second project that I would like to mention is Project
Argus. Project Argus is being led by the National Counter
Terrorism Security Office, which is police function within MI5.
The Project Argus gets managers and submanagers of corporates
together and trains them to responding to scenarios. We train
them to identify how they can prevent incidents happening, how
to manage incidents, and how to help their companies recover.
Those particular initiatives have gone world-wide. We have
great interest from Australia, some interest from America, I
hasten to add, and India. It is seen as a very low-cost, a very
practical, and very well worthwhile set of projects.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lovegrove follows:]
Prepared Statement of Brett Lovegrove
October 9, 2013
INTRODUCTION
I would first like to thank the U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Homeland Security for inviting me to submit this paper and
give testimony on this very important issue to both our nations.
Whether the motivation has been foreign policy, national policy,
ideological beliefs, military deployment, religious beliefs,
territorial dispute, or social unrest, the United Kingdom tragically
has a significant history of being the victim of terrorist attack from
a number of different national and international groups. This has
ultimately led the government, the public, and military sectors and the
business community to re-think their ability to reduce the risks of
further incidents taking place, prepare the United Kingdom for any
eventuality, manage the outcomes of an attack, and respond effectively
to incidents on an almost continual basis over the years.
Whereas historically the intended targets in the United Kingdom
were more readily identifiable (police, military, and political) and
the terrorists were known (the Irish Republican Army), the difference
between the tactics, methodology, and ideology of the last century and
those of today couldn't be more extreme. The terrorist in the 21st
Century is more hidden from the authorities, partly because of their
ability to integrate into our cosmopolitan society and be born and
raised within the society they will be taught to hate. The internet
also exacerbates this ability to remain anonymous and remote,
transcending physical borders and with an ability to communicate their
ideology to a wide audience incredibly quickly.
Unsurprisingly, it is these modern-day terrorists who use a whole
range of methodologies that will continue to receive the full attention
of the authorities and, in the main, the focus is placed upon the
Islamists and Jihadists who have managed to turn the teachings of the
wholly peaceful Muslim religion into their own vehicle for hate and
murder. This focus has meant that the global society has had to totally
re-think its approach to not just the act of terrorism, but all aspects
of causation and effect and a real effort to understand the issues
underpinning such violence.
I have therefore been asked to comment within this paper upon how
the United Kingdom is currently responding to returning individuals who
appear to have undergone training abroad in order to inflict harm on
U.K. communities and also detail the preparations that have been put in
place that are designed to protect so called ``softer'' targets from
attack. This paper will of course not comment on confidential and
secret arrangements that are currently deployed. Where I mention ``UK
authorities'', this term includes the activities of the government, the
police service, and the security services.
THE COMMUNITY-BASED RESPONSIBILITY
The ideal response to individual or groups of radicalised returning
Jihadists is to make the environment so unwelcoming, that operating
within society becomes difficult at least and with a high potential of
being caught and introduced into the criminal justice system.
Fortunately, the vast majority of people within the Muslim community in
the United Kingdom has shown that it adheres to the true meaning of the
Koran and not only maintains a peaceful co-existence with the many
other communities, but has also shown its abhorrence to terrorists
within their midst.
Despite the lack of knowledge within the Muslim community about the
different methods of countering radicalisation, the abhorrence often
translates into assisting the authorities and security services with
intelligence that regularly disrupts the planning stages of an attack
and secures the convictions of offenders. The British policing style is
one that has always been embedded within its communities and therefore
locally-deployed police officers are often the first to receive
intelligence and they are therefore trained to gather and disseminate
it quickly. The real difficulty for members of the community and police
officers alike is that it is often difficult to differentiate between a
radicalised person and passionate belief.
But the responsibility for identifying terrorist activity also
extends to other environments where Jihadists operate. Only when they
have reasonable grounds, the U.K. authorities identify and monitor
potential terrorist planning activities within:
Prisons and youth offender institutions;
Universities, colleges, and schools (including faith
schools);
Mosques and other religious institutions;
Family environments;
And any environment where vulnerable potential recruits to
the cause may gather. There is also some evidence that the gang
culture is also a fertile ground for promoting Jihadist
ideology.
This of course includes the internet which the U.K. authorities are
increasingly dedicating time and expertise to identifying offenders and
interdicting planning processes.
Ironically, despite the fact that some radicalisation processes
take place in education facilities, it is here that the all-important
counter narrative is taking place and there is also a growing call for
the wider Muslim community to take the lead in overtly countering the
misrepresentation of their faith. It has been suggested that these
initiatives could include:
Condemning the legitimisation of Jihadism;
Providing greater amounts of community intelligence to the
U.K. authorities;
Condemning the call for the death of non-believers;
Enabling the ability for a new generation of Muslims to have
a balanced discussion within the community;
Deliver a balanced syllabus in Muslim faith schools;
Disband ``Muslims only'' areas in Universities and colleges.
There are already positive trends in the United Kingdom that
members within the Muslim community are calling for change and the U.K.
authorities are harnessing this enthusiasm.
AT A MORE STRATEGIC LEVEL
Apart from the call for more work to take place within the Muslim
community, observers are calling for new thinking that should come from
the wider society; a balanced and non-sensational narrative from the
media and where necessary, government-led and -funded initiatives. This
strategic level call includes:
De-radicalisation centres;
Providing contextual information to vulnerable groups;
Early educationally-based interdiction to identified
individuals before the risk of radicalisation takes place;
Learning opportunities from former Jihadists;
Promoting a better understanding of Western political
processes, democracy, and secularism;
Denying Jihadists unchallenged platforms;
Promoting the recruiting of Muslim scholars with a balanced
teaching syllabus;
Providing financial and institutional support to work
centred in the community.
HOW ``SOFT'' ARE THE UK'S ``SOFT TARGETS''?
There is an increasing list of evidence that so called ``soft
targets'' around the world are becoming more popular as terrorist
targets than previously experienced. Reasons for this change in tactic
could include the fact that many previously preferred targets such as
embassies, military installations, and police stations are better
protected than ever before and the attacker stands to fail in their
objective. Another could be that a higher ``kill rate'' could be just
as easily achieved in crowded places in the neighbourhoods where people
gather to shop, visit, relax, and work. This latter point is also far
more likely to have a more emotional and psychological impact on
society because this is the very place where people live and retreat
from the stresses elsewhere. If their homes, shopping centres, and
schools are attacked by gunmen or bombers who select random targets,
then society would quite rightly feeling even more exposed than if it
occurred in a city centre.
Just for clarification, I would list soft targets as being:
Hotels;
Airports (airside);
Train, Marine, and bus systems;
Shopping centres;
Tourist attractions;
Universities and colleges;
Travelling business people;
Cinemas and Theatres;
Hospitals;
Office blocks.
The Westgate Centre in Nairobi, the bus bomber in Bulgaria, the 10-
man attack in Mumbai, and the gunman in Aurora, Colorado, and the
suicide bombings in London are all tragic reminders about how
vulnerable these types of locations are and unfortunately there are
many more examples. Just like other countries across the world, the
United Kingdom and the business sector reviews these incidents and
tries to learn, embed, and sustain the lessons into its own society and
organisations respectfully.
The considerations of applying a much stricter security regime to
the above list are necessity, reasonableness, intelligence, societal
expectation, cost, and people's rights. I believe that the pivotal
consideration amongst this list is whether or not there is sufficient
intelligence to believe that an attack on a soft target is likely, if
so then the other considerations fall into place. A very close second
to intelligence is reasonableness. If society can understand and accept
the presence of these two principles, then target hardening of the soft
targets is more likely.
The United Kingdom already has a number of projects that have been
developed and delivered for a number of years. As I mentioned before,
the United Kingdom has suffered from intermittent attacks in the past
and the following initiatives are our way of hardening soft targets.
But before I go into more detail, I think that it is important to
make the point that for many years U.K. authorities have engaged with
the national and international business sectors with the objective of
intelligence sharing, sharing best practice, briefing staff, developing
alliances, and working on resilience projects. Like other developed
countries there are a number of non-governmental organisations that
represent subject matter companies (technologies, cyber, physical
security, CCTV, petro chemical, etc.) who meet and discuss specific
solutions to resilience issues.
My own company, City Security and Resilience Networks (CSARN) is a
not-for-profit organisation that brings together global corporates,
government departments, law enforcement, and security services across
the United Kingdom and more recently Australia in order to enable these
entities to share and work more effectively together. This dialogue and
sharing activity has an impact on a number of business sectors,
including the ``soft'' targets mentioned in this paper, many of whom
are members of CSARN.
The outcomes of this activity are manifest in the different
resilience areas that the U.K. authorities and the business community
focus upon, such as:
The convergence of inter-discipline planning and delivery;
Business Crisis Management planning;
Cyber system resilience;
Physical security;
Technological security advancement;
Multi-agency emergency response;
Crisis Leadership;
Information and Intelligence exchange;
Counter espionage;
Organisational resilience;
Effective fast time communication;
Fraud;
Crime prevention;
Regional partnerships;
Major event planning;
The insider threat;
Pandemics.
Another outcome is the rise over many years of the U.K.
authorities, the business and voluntary sectors working and training
together. There are a number of regular ``live play'' and large-scale
table-top training sessions that tests the coterminous responses from
government departments, financial authorities, the voluntary sector,
police officers, special forces, and businesses. This regularity of
working together promotes familiarity between the decision-makers, the
differing systems, the abilities and constraints of each organisation,
the strengths and weaknesses, and the opportunity to learn and change
process and practice. Such joint training ensures that, in extremis,
the U.K. authorities and the business community deploy their assets
together and in a co-ordinated way.
Most of the participants come from the soft-target community and
there is a real sense that hardening and securing their assets is their
responsibility and over the years these organisations have built their
capability in training their crisis leaders and crisis teams, reviewed
their ability to prevent or recover from a sustained cyber-attack,
briefing and training their security teams, and introducing a security-
minded culture.
There are two long-standing national-level projects that are worthy
of note:
Project Griffin
Project Griffin is a police-led initiative to protect the United
Kingdom's cities and communities from the threat of terrorism. It
brings together and coordinates the resources of the police, emergency
services, local authorities, business, and the private-sector security
industry. Project Griffin was developed by the city of London Police
and formally introduced in London in April 2004 as a joint venture
between the city and Metropolitan police forces. Its remit was to
advise and familiarise managers, security officers, and employees of
large public and private-sector organisations across the capital on
counter hostile reconnaissance, security, counter-terrorism, and crime
prevention issues.
Following its unqualified success in London, Project Griffin has
been recognised as national best practice and is being implemented by
police forces cities and communities throughout the United Kingdom. It
has also generated interest and acclaim overseas, particularly here in
the United States, in Canada, and Australia.
Project Griffin seeks to enlist the help and support of individuals
or groups responsible for the safety and security of buildings,
businesses, districts, or neighbourhoods. It provides an official and
direct channel through which the police can share and update vital
information relating to security and crime prevention.
Its principal aims are to:
Raise awareness of current terrorist and crime issues;
Share and gather intelligence and information;
Build and maintain effective working relationships;
Seek solutions to defeating terrorism and crime;
Maintain trust and confidence in the police and other
authorities;
Empower people to report suspicious activity and behaviour.
The operational framework of Project Griffin consists of four main
strands:
1. Awareness Days.--These are staged locally by participating
police forces to introduce the concept and establish
relationships and networks. They focus on how to recognise,
respond to, and report suspicious activity and behaviour. They
also help participants think about their own local procedures
for dealing with certain types of incidents and emergencies.
2. On-line Refresher Module.--An informative, interactive and
easy-to-follow refresher package has been developed to help
keep participants engaged and informed. Successful completion
of the module also formally recognises their participation.
3. Bridge Calls.--Most participating police forces employ a system
of regular Bridge Calls, whether by conference call, SMS,
pager, or email. These keep individuals and groups aware of
current information and intelligence, as well as issues or
incidents affecting their particular area.
4. Emergency deployments.--Although the primary role of Project
Griffin is to focus on community awareness, surveillance, and
reporting, additional procedures might be activated in times of
emergency. Police forces, utilising civilian powers, might seek
to deploy Project Griffin registered personnel for activities
such as setting up cordons or high-visibility neighbourhood
patrolling.
Project Argus
Project Argus is an initiative developed by the National Counter
Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) and delivered by local police
Counter Terrorism Security Advisers (CTSAs) throughout the United
Kingdom. The 3-hour multimedia simulation poses questions and dilemmas
for participants working in syndicates and aims to raise awareness of
the threat from terrorism, providing practical advice on preventing,
handling, and recovering from an attack. It is aimed at managers and
assistant managers and can be presented at a police station, or at the
location of choice, and it is free of charge.
Project Argus sessions are designed and delivered for the following
sectors:
Office and retail;
Night-time economy;
Hotels;
Education;
Health;
Designers, planners, and architects.
Both Project Griffin and Project Argus have been widely embraced by
the business community as a means to improve the way in which staff
individually approaches security issues and be more readily able to
identify threats and report suspicious behaviour, such as hostile
reconnaissance, to police officers.
CONCLUSION
The United Kingdom shows its understanding of the terrorist threat
to its shores by its ability to bring the authorities and the business
communities together with the intention to ensure that it can recover
quickly if attacked. The complacency doesn't exist at the strategic
level as new ideas continue to take traction as new threats reveal
themselves. The challenge has always been to secure the heart-and-mind
engagement of professionals and decision-makers who have not
necessarily succeeded through the resilience industry route and who may
not be able to give due credence or effort to the solutions.
The movement and training of the radicalised should be the alarm
bell that sounds as a reminder to all that the global community should
be addressing these concerns both nationally and internationally
together; something that the United States and the United Kingdom have
always done and long may that sharing and working relationship
continue.
The United Kingdom has a track record for absorbing learning and
working in partnership both at home and abroad and thankfully there
isn't any sign that this will stop. The soft target issue is of great
concern to us and so it should be; as we all see the changing tactic of
the terrorist towards crowded and comparatively unprotected sites in
order to increase their ability to kill more effectively for their
cause.
The U.K. authorities will continue to work, brief, train, educate,
learn, share, and listen to its partners. In that way, we all stand a
much greater chance of protecting every part of society from the
constantly changing face of terrorism.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Lovegrove. Thank you for
your travels across the pond to see us here.
The Chairman now recognizes Sheriff Stanek.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD W. STANEK, SHERIFF, HENNEPIN COUNTY,
MINNESOTA
Sheriff Stanek. Thank you, Chairman McCaul and Members of
the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to be here today.
My name is Rich Stanek. I am the sheriff in Hennepin County,
Minnesota. I also serve as the president of the Major County
Sheriffs' Association.
In the aftermath of the Westgate Mall mass shooting in
Kenya, I have been asked to testify today about the potential
threat to our homeland posed by al-Shabaab, a foreign terrorist
organization, as designated by the United States in 2008.
Hennepin County is home to the largest Somali population in the
United States. For the record, Mr. Chairman and Members, the
vast majority of our Somali residents are law-abiding, valuable
members of our community.
Since 2007, it is believed that several dozen young men
have left Minnesota for Somalia to fight in the holy war and/or
support the al-Shabaab movement. A mix of nationalism,
religious extremism, underemployment, and economic conditions
motivated these young men to join the fighting. These
recruitment efforts are well-organized, they are professional,
and they are intended to compel young men to abandon their
lives in Minnesota and join the jihad.
We know some of these young men do not return. At least 7
young men from Minneapolis area have been confirmed dead, while
others have since traveled to Somalia to join al-Shabaab. Three
are confirmed suicide bombers, and the rest are believed to
have been killed during battles or executed for trying to
disassociate themselves from al-Shabaab.
We also believe that after spending time abroad, some of
these young men return to Minnesota, assimilate back into the
community, and attempt to radicalize others in the Twin Cities.
Our concern is that these al-Shabaab-trained operatives pose a
significant threat to our community by preying on vulnerable
individuals for material or direct support or by carrying out
an attack in the United States.
Now, we know the issue of fraudulent travel documents,
including visas and passports, go hand-in-hand with their
travels abroad. With this degree of fraudulent activity, it is
very hard to determine if someone has left the country or if,
in fact, they have returned to our country. If someone has been
radicalized and they have fraudulent paperwork letting them
back into the United States, this is a gateway for future
problems. Somali individuals are leaving Minnesota and
illegally crossing the U.S.-Canadian border to facilitate
travel easier overseas, and it is believed that travel
arrangements for some of these individuals are being made
within the Minneapolis area in obscure storefronts, insulated
from outsiders and difficult for law enforcement to infiltrate.
In Minnesota, there were Federal indictments of individuals
providing financial and material support to terrorist
organizations. This was deemed the largest terrorism
investigation in the country since September 11, 2001. In terms
of community support for al-Shabaab, we still have an uphill
battle to stop recruitment and win over the community at large.
The al-Shabaab terrorist network is seen as heroic to some in
the local Somali community.
As stated in this committee's Majority investigative report
on July 27, 2011, a Saudi cleric who denounced al-Shabaab and
other Somali combatants inside a Minneapolis Islamic center was
assaulted by an angry mob for his comments. A recording of this
assault was immediately posted on overseas-based jihadi
chatrooms.
Mr. Chairman, Members, to get the crux of the issue, I have
several suggestions for this committee. One, that local law
enforcement must work in close partnership with our Federal
partner agencies, and a large part of this effort is
information sharing. Specifically, local law enforcement does
not always receive intelligence and information in a timely
manner. Without timely access to potentially key information,
local law enforcement's ability to protect the public safety
can be compromised.
Second is looking toward potential solutions. There has
been an on-going effort to update the memorandum of
understanding regarding the FBI's joint terrorism task forces.
This discussion uses an existing model that will more fully
inform our chief law enforcement officers of the JTTF's actions
within their respective areas of responsibility.
The third recommendation is we would also like to see the
security clearances maintained of JTTF task force officers,
even after they are rotated back to their home agencies. This
would allow our local law enforcement to use them as force
multipliers.
Fourth, local law enforcement needs greater access to
Federal classified information systems. It is not enough to
provide clearance levels without access to the database. This
will allow us to connect the dots in real time between local
law enforcement sensitive information and Classified data.
Mr. Chairman, Members, the four recommendations I just
mentioned culminate with the protection of soft targets as a
major concern in the United States. With the recent events
overseas and the hundreds of malls and schools in our
communities, we need to be more vigilant than ever. In Hennepin
County, we have members assigned to the JTTF, and we have a
homeland security unit that specializes in working with our
private-sector partners, such as the Mall of America. By
working with our private-sector partners, we have a better
boots-on-the ground, proactive approach to suspicious activity
reporting, which is critical to preventing attacks.
In wrapping up my testimony, Mr. Chairman and Members,
clearly we need combine resources and work together to protect
the homeland. We need to strengthen our sources of information
to help our short-, mid-, and our long-term investigations
aimed as disrupting these networks. There's a lot of work left
to do, and, Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member Thompson and
Members of this committee, no doubt this is a complex issue. I
appreciate that you are holding this hearing today, and we in
local law enforcement look forward to continuing our work with
you on this important issue. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Sheriff Stanek follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard W. Stanek
October 9, 2013
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to be here today. I am Rich
Stanek, sheriff of Hennepin County in Minnesota, and I also serve as
the current president of the Major County Sheriffs' Association.
In the aftermath of the mass shooting at the Westgate Mall in
Nairobi, Kenya, I have been asked to testify today about the potential
threat to our homeland posed by al-Shabaab, a foreign terrorist
organization as designated by the U.S. Government in 2008.
Additionally, I've been asked to provide testimony on the current
preparedness posture of local law enforcement.
Hennepin County is home to the largest Somali population in the
United States. For the record, the vast majority of our Somali
residents are law-abiding, valuable members of our community. The
tragedy in Nairobi has hit close to home. In fact, a Somali-American
member of my staff lost a cousin in the mall attack.
Since 2007, it is believed that several dozen young men have left
Minnesota for Somalia to fight in the ``holy war'' and/or support the
al-Shabaab movement, which has ties to al-Qaeda. A mix of nationalism,
religious extremism, under-employment, and economic conditions
motivated these young men to join the fighting.
These recruitment efforts are well-organized, professional, and are
intended to compel young men to abandon their lives in Minnesota or
other parts of the United States and join the Jihad. In this video, the
Twin Cities metro area is highlighted, and young men from Hennepin
County are showcased.
We know some of these young men do not return. At least 7 young men
from the Minneapolis area have been confirmed dead by family members or
authorities. Of these 7, 3 are confirmed suicide bombers, 2 are
believed to have been executed, and the rest are believed to have been
killed during battles or executed for trying to leave al-Shabaab.
As recently as July and September 2012, open-source information
reveals that several young men from the Minneapolis area, including 21-
year-old Omar Farah, have traveled to Somalia to join al-Shabaab. This
indicates that travel to Somalia has not stopped.
We also believe that after spending time abroad, some of these
young men return to Minnesota, assimilate back into the community, and
attempt to radicalize others in the Twin Cities. These Al-Shabaab-
trained operatives pose a significant threat to our community by
preying on vulnerable individuals for material or direct support, or by
carrying out an attack in the United States.
We know the issue of fraudulent travel documents goes hand-in-hand
with their travels abroad. This includes: Visas, passports, and travel
paperwork. With this degree of fraudulent activity, it is very hard to
determine if someone has left the country or if they have in fact
returned to the country. If someone has been radicalized and they have
fraudulent paperwork letting them back into the United States, this is
a gateway for future problems.
Somali individuals are leaving Minnesota and illegally crossing the
U.S.-Canadian border--typically through North Dakota. It is believed
that travel arrangements for some of these individuals are being made
within the Minneapolis area, in camouflaged store fronts, insulated
from outsiders and difficult for law enforcement to infiltrate. The
individuals seek passage into Canada for several reasons, including
better social welfare programs and facilitating travel to other
countries with greater ease.
It is also worth pointing out the fact that these individuals do
not get to Somalia on their own. Travelers receive assistance with
travel arrangements, funding, and other logistics. In Minnesota, there
were Federal indictments of individuals providing financial and
material support to terrorist organizations--this was the largest
terrorist investigation in the country since September 11, 2001. These
individuals may not ever leave the United States themselves; however,
they are still providing financing and other support to al-Shabaab.
We still have an up-hill battle to stop recruitment and win over
the community at large. The al-Shabaab terrorist network is seen as
``heroic'' to some in the local Somali community. As stated in this
committee's Majority investigative report on July 27, 2011, a Saudi
cleric who denounced al-Shabaab and other Somali combatants inside a
Minneapolis Islamic Center was allegedly assaulted by an angry mob for
his comments. A recording of this assault was immediately posted on
overseas-based jihadi chatrooms.
Mr. Chairman, Members, to get to the crux of the issue, local law
enforcement must work in close partnership with Federal partner
agencies, and a large part of this effort is information sharing. Since
September 11, 2001, great progress has been made in this area, but I
believe we can do more. Specifically, local law enforcement does not
always receive information in a timely manner from our Federal partner
agencies. Without timely access to potentially key information, local
law enforcement's ability to protect the public's safety can be
compromised.
Looking toward potential solutions, there has been an on-going
effort to update the Memorandum of Understanding regarding the FBI's
Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). Discussion is underway to utilize,
across the country, an existing model that will more fully inform Chief
Law Enforcement Officers of the JTTF's actions within their respective
area of responsibility. Currently, depending on the field office, their
level of engagement with local law enforcement is handled differently.
We would also like to see the security clearances maintained of
JTTF task force officers, even after they are rotated back to their
home agency. This would allow local law enforcement to use them as
force multipliers. This makes sense, given the investment that goes
into the security clearance process and their experience while
participating in the JTTF.
Additionally, local law enforcement needs greater access to Federal
Classified information systems. It is not enough to provide clearance
levels without access to the database. This will allow us to connect
the dots in real time between local law enforcement sensitive
information and Classified data.
The protection of soft targets has to be a major concern in the
United States. With the recent events overseas and the hundreds of
malls and schools in our communities, we need to be more vigilant than
ever. In Hennepin County we have members assigned to the JTTF to work
with our Federal partners and we have a Homeland Security Unit that
specializes in working with our private-sector partners such as the
Mall of America, American Security, and others. By working with our
private-sector partners, we have a better ``boots-on-the-ground''
proactive approach to Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) which is
critical to preventing attacks. Law Enforcement needs to be able to
share certain data on Suspicious Activity Reporting with the private
sector so they know what to look for and can report back to local law
enforcement.
Clearly, we need to combine resources and work together to protect
the homeland. We need to strengthen our sources of information to help
on short-, mid-, and long-term investigations aimed at disrupting these
networks. There is a lot of work left to do.
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the
committee, this is a complex issue, I appreciate that you are holding
this hearing today and we in local law enforcement look forward to
continuing our work with you on this important issue.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Sheriff.
Let me just comment. This committee will be issuing a
report on the Boston bombings in the November time frame. One
of the areas of focus is exactly what you talked about, and
that is information sharing with State and locals, MOUs to
empower sheriffs and police chiefs to have access to this
information, and strengthening the mission of the JTTFs. So
thanks for bringing that up.
Sheriff Stanek. Thank you, sir.
Chairman McCaul. Chairman now recognizes Mr. Mellor.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD MELLOR, VICE PRESIDENT, LOSS PREVENTION,
NATIONAL RETAIL FEDERATION
Mr. Mellor. Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson,
distinguished Members of the committee, my name is Richard
Mellor. I am vice president of loss prevention for the National
Retail Federation. Thank you very much for the opportunity to
testify today.
The recent tragic events at Westgate shopping mall
highlight the potential for retail and other public areas
around the world to be targets for terror. The National Retail
Federation is the world's largest retail trade association
representing retailers of all types and sizes. Retailers
operate more than 3.6 million U.S. establishments and support 1
in 4 U.S. jobs, 42 million working Americans.
As vice president of loss prevention, I am responsible for
the direction of NRF's loss prevention initiatives. I have over
40 years of experience within the retail loss prevention
community and law enforcement. I also serve on several working
committees within DHS and FEMA that are focused on
infrastructure protection.
The safety and security of employees and customers is
paramount to every retailer. Retailers have sophisticated
protocols to deal with threats from a wide range of situations.
Because the threats are always present, retailers invest
heavily to ensure that they are prepared. As criminals and
threats become more sophisticated, so do the retailers.
NRF has a long-standing commitment to working closely with
law enforcement and our members in sharing information of
critical matters. The annual Loss Prevention Conference
includes presentations by retailers, law enforcement, and
experts in violence intervention while protecting life and the
safety of shoppers and employees. While shopping malls have
been categorized by some as soft targets, it would be hard to
imagine and prepare for the devastating attack conducted by the
terrorists at Westgate shopping mall. Collaboration and
partnership between retailers and law enforcement needs to
remain strong and be vigilant now more than ever.
Retailers have been on the front lines of the war on terror
for years. Nowhere is it more evident than the continuing
private-public partnerships to address the growing issue of
organized retail crime. Retailers' close work with law
enforcement has helped to root out millions of dollars in
criminal activity with direct links to terrorist groups and
other overseas criminal organizations. ORC must be recognized
as a significant National threat to our economy and security.
Congress must pass legislation to properly define ORC as a
Federal crime and provide law enforcement with appropriate
resources.
Retailers also continue to seek out the best technology
solutions in an effort to not only protect the businesses, but
to provide the most convenient and safest shopping environment
for customers. These technologies include systems to safeguard
customer information, as well as surveillance systems to ensure
the stores' safety as well as the parking lots.
These systems have become a valuable tool for retailers and
law enforcement. NRF has been engaged in the development of
strategic alliances to assess safety threats to retail
customers, employees, and the general public. These efforts
have been largely focused on active-shooter violence. The NRF
facilitated discussion groups, meetings, workshops between
retailers and law enforcement agencies on this issue leading to
the Department of Homeland Security's active-shooter guidelines
in 2007, followed by a retail-specific supplement in 2011.
Other industries are now using these guidelines.
The importance of the partnership between law enforcement
and retailers has never been more evident after the 2013 Boston
Marathon bombings. After initially ensuring the safety of the
employees and customers, retailers quickly shifted their
attention to helping law enforcement in their investigation.
The video surveillance provided by Lord and Taylor was
instrumental in helping the police identify the two subjects in
the tragic bombing. The Saks Fifth Avenue store served as a
temporary staging area during the initial stages of the
investigation, and other retailers provided needed supplies for
the officers to continue their investigation.
The protection of retail businesses, including the safety
and security of their employees and customers, is a critical
part of every retail business. Retailers are committed to
continuously improving the vigilance in order to stay ahead of
those who wish to do us harm and their employees and the
customers.
Thank you again for this opportunity to testify this
afternoon.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mellor follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard Mellor
October 9, 2013
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, distinguished Members of
the committee, my name is Richard Mellor and I am the vice president
for loss prevention for the National Retail Federation (NRF). Thank you
very much for the opportunity to come here to testify today on the
important topic of whether retail outlets can be considered ``soft
targets'' for potential terrorist attacks.
The recent tragic events at the Westgate Shopping Mall highlight
the potential for malls, shopping centers, and other public meeting
areas around the world to be targets of terror. Today I would like to
highlight some of the actions the retail community has taken to ensure
the safety and security of their customers and their employees.
As the world's largest retail trade association and the voice of
retail world-wide, the National Retail Federation represents retailers
of all types and sizes, including chain restaurants and industry
partners, from the United States and more than 45 countries abroad.
Retailers operate more than 3.6 million U.S. establishments that
support 1 in 4 U.S. jobs--42 million working Americans. Contributing
$2.5 trillion to annual GDP, retail is a daily barometer for the
Nation's economy. NRF's This is Retail campaign highlights the
industry's opportunities for life-long careers, how retailers
strengthen communities, and the critical role that retail plays in
driving innovation.
As vice president for loss prevention for the National Retail
Federation, I am responsible for the direction of initiatives ranging
from NRF's Annual Loss Prevention, or LP Conference and Loss Prevention
Advisory Council to NRF's Investigator's Network. I have over 40 years
of experience within the retail loss prevention community. Prior to
joining NRF, I spent 12 years with Helzberg Diamonds, having most
recently served as divisional vice president of loss prevention. I have
also served as divisional vice president of loss prevention and
security for The Bon-Ton Stores and regional director of security for
Macy's East. Prior to joining the retail industry I spent time in law
enforcement as a police officer.
I also have the pleasure to serve on several working committees
within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) that focus on infrastructure
protection. These include participation in DHS' Commercial Facilities
Sector Coordinating Council, the National Infrastructure Coordinating
Center team, and the National Business Emergency Operations team. I am
also participating in FEMA's Private Sector Sub Working Group (PSSWG)
working on the National Exercise Program (NEP) Capstone Exercise 2014.
safety and security are paramount
The safety and security of employees and customers is paramount for
any retailer.
Retailers have sophisticated protocols to deal with the threats
from a wide range of situations, including organized retail crime (ORC)
activities, robbery, active-shooter incidents, impacts from natural
disasters such as hurricanes or tornadoes, as well as being a potential
target for a terrorist attack. Because these threats are always
present, retailers invest heavily to ensure that they are prepared to
deal with any and all threats against their businesses, their employees
and their customers. Moreover, retailers are consistently evaluating
the effectiveness of their programs and seeking improvements. As
criminals and threats become more sophisticated, so do retailers.
I would like to discuss some of the steps the retail industry is
currently taking to protect their businesses and customers. This
includes the industry's close work with law enforcement at both the
local and Federal level, specifically partnering with the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) on key initiatives. One such initiative is the
development of DHS's Active Shooter program. Finally, I will discuss
retail's role in helping law enforcement throughout the investigation
of the recent Boston Marathon bombing.
RETAIL ASSET PROTECTION ACTIVITIES
The National Retail Federation has a long-standing commitment to
work closely with law enforcement and our members to share information
through tools such as the Department of Homeland Security's guidelines,
on-line training programs, and the emergency response protocols on the
NRF's Loss Prevention Information website, which can be accessed at
www.lpinformation.com.
Additionally the National Retail Federation convenes an annual Loss
Prevention Conference open to retail loss prevention and security
practitioners and law enforcement agencies. At every conference since
the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the conference agenda has included
multiple presentations by retailers, law enforcement partners, and
experts in violence intervention on protecting the life and safety of
shoppers and employees.
While shopping malls have been categorized by some as ``soft
targets,'' it would have been hard to imagine or prepare for the
devastating attack conducted by terrorists at the Westgate shopping
mall in Kenya last month. Collaboration and partnership between
retailers and law enforcement needs to remain strong and vigilant now
more than ever.
Retailers continually partner with law enforcement at every level
of government to protect their businesses, their employees, and their
customers. This partnership is not only in the prevention of crimes
against their businesses, but also in the aftermath of a crime to help
with the investigation.
In fact, retailers have been on the front lines in the war on
terror for years.
Nowhere is this more evident than the continuing private-public
partnership to address the growing burden of Organized Retail Crime
(ORC). Retailers work closely with law enforcement to investigate these
crimes, and their joint efforts have helped to root out millions of
dollars in criminal activity with direct links to terrorist groups and
other overseas criminal organizations.
Through the Seizing Earnings and Assets from Retail Crime Heists
(SEARCH) Initiative, Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) is actively
seeking and pursuing investigative leads related to organized retail
crime that have a nexus to transnational criminal organizations.
These investigations effectively link Federal, State, and local law
enforcement along with prosecutors and the financial services and
retail communities to provide a multi-faceted approach to prosecuting
and deterring individuals and organizations involved in organized
retail crime. The retail industry strongly supports HSI's efforts in
making SEARCH a National initiative.
All too often this type of organized criminal activity has been
looked upon as a local problem. However, Federal investigations have
proven time and time again that these ORC organizations are extremely
sophisticated and regularly cross jurisdictional boundaries. It is
critical that ORC be recognized as a significant National threat to our
economy and security.
One thing Congress can do to strengthen the line of defense is
passage of ORC legislation to properly define ORC as a Federal crime.
Not only will ORC legislation help draw attention to a growing National
problem but a law on organized retail crime will also provide law
enforcement the appropriate resources to deal with the problem in a
holistic way. The need for this legislation grows almost daily as we
see the trend of ORC activities becoming more sophisticated and
violent.
In addition to these partnerships, retailers continue to seek the
best technologies to protect their businesses and provide the most
convenient and safest shopping environment for their customers. These
technology solutions include systems to protect internal operations
from unauthorized access, including safeguarding customer information,
as well as surveillance systems to ensure that the stores and parking
areas are as safe as possible.
Electronic surveillance plays a major role in providing a safe
shopping experience for today's customer. Security personnel cannot be
in all places at all times but video surveillance has become the
standard in the retail business to ensure total coverage. Security
personnel can now view video images remotely on hand-held devices,
including their smart phones, which enable them to respond quickly to
incidents and safety concerns.
Technology advances in detecting movement or an individual in a
restricted or remote area can be transmitted instantly to a video
operator to investigate. These new systems also include analytic
software for facial recognition, although this is not widely utilized
by retailers at this time. Whether these systems help to prevent an
event from happening or they are used in the investigation of an
incident, they have become a valuable tool for retailers and law
enforcement in reconstructing and investigating crimes.
RETAIL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT ``ACTIVE SHOOTER'' PARTNERSHIP
For more than 7 years, the National Retail Federation has been
engaged in the development of strategic alliances to assess safety
threats to retail customers, employees, and the general public in and
around retail and business establishments. These efforts have been
largely focused on the kind of ``active shooter'' violence we saw at
the Aurora Mall as well as the potential for sophisticated terrorist
acts like the Westgate Mall attacks.
Over the past decade, we have seen a rise in a new form of threat,
where individuals enter retail venues and begin randomly shooting at
innocent shoppers and store employees. The term coined to describe this
new form of violence is ``Active Shooter,'' and it used to characterize
a situation where the shooter seems engaged in the killing and injuring
of as many people as possible in an area without cause or provocation.
This type of violence is not only unpredictable and life-
threatening to customers and employees alike but also puts responding
police officers at deadly risk.
The retail industry reacted quickly to the rising threats with the
facilitation of discussions between retail loss prevention directors
and law enforcement agencies from the local, State, and Federal level.
This effort led to the initial Department of Homeland Security Active
Shooter Guidelines in 2007 and later, in 2011, a retail-specific
program known as Emergency Response Protocols to Active Shooters, which
was crafted by the NRF.
Since the Active Shooter Guidelines became available in 2007 to
authorized members of the retail community and law enforcement, other
industries including education, hospitality, sporting event venues, and
food service groups have utilized these guidelines to assess risks,
establish proactive precautions and procedures, as well as investing in
safety and security equipment and technology to protect human life.
RETAIL'S ROLE IN THE BOSTON MARATHON BOMBING INVESTIGATION
The importance of the partnership between law enforcement and
retailers was never more evident than after the 2013 Boston Marathon
bombing. After initially acting to ensure the safety of their employees
and customers when the bombing occurred, retailers in Boston quickly
shifted their attention to helping law enforcement in their
investigation.
As has been reported in the media, video surveillance provided by
the Lord & Taylor store on Boylston Street was instrumental in helping
police identify the two suspects in the tragic bombing. The Saks Fifth
Avenue store served as a temporary staging area for law enforcement
during the initial stages of the investigation, and many other
retailers provided needed supplies (water, food, batteries, cell phone
chargers, etc.) for the officers to continue with their investigation.
Aside from providing supplies and vital necessities, retailers also
opened their stores during off-business hours to provide law
enforcement with a place to get a much-needed break, to call family
members, or rest during the long and extensive search for the suspects.
NRF highlighted the retail/police partnership in a video post on
our This is Retail website--http://www.thisisretail.org. As with the
response and recovery efforts during hurricanes like Katrina and Sandy,
retailers in Boston were instrumental in providing supplies and
technical assistance to help with the emergency response as well as
those affected by the disaster.
CONCLUSION
The protection of a retailer's business, including the safety and
security of their employees and customers, is a critical part of a
retailer's everyday business.
Retailers face many threats; yet through a mix of technology,
partnerships, preparation, and training, retailers are able to ensure
that they are able to respond to any threat.
Retailers are committed to continuously improving their vigilance
in order to stay ahead of those who wish to do harm to their
businesses, their employees, and their customers.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify this afternoon.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Mellor.
The Chairman now recognizes Ms. Kostro.
STATEMENT OF STEPHANIE SANOK KOSTRO, SENIOR FELLOW AND ACTING
DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND COUNTERTERRORISM PROGRAM,
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Ms. Kostro. Thank you, Chairman McCaul, Ms. Clarke, and
other distinguished Members of this committee. Thank you for
the opportunity to testify today.
Allegations that Somali-Americans participated in last
month's deadly siege at the Westgate shopping mall have
highlighted several questions with homeland security
implications. Why are U.S. citizens and other Westerners
traveling overseas to affiliate with terrorist groups? What
training are they receiving? What is the likelihood they will
return to launch attacks on American soil?
U.S. citizens, especially individuals closely associated
with diaspora communities, have proven willing to travel
overseas for terrorist activities. As we have heard, Americans
appear to have begun traveling to Somalia to fight alongside
al-Shabaab against Ethiopia and Somalia's Western-backed
Transitional Federal Government back in 2007. Currently, the
United States is the primary exporter of Western fighters to
this group.
In this group, Americans and other Westerners often
received specialized missions, including propaganda, as we have
seen from the slide showed earlier, recruitment, and suicide
missions. The group's knowledge of firearms, target
surveillance, recognizance, and intelligence-gathering
abilities represent the skills and capabilities that American
members may be learning.
Regarding another al-Qaeda affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra, or
JN, more than 600 Westerners have allegedly traveled to Syria
in recent years to join 6,000 other foreign fighters from
around the world and rebel forces against the Assad regime.
There is growing concern that many of these fighters are
joining JN in particular. The concern is that these individuals
are becoming further radicalized, getting trained, and then
returning as part of the global jihadist movement to Western
Europe and the United States.
JN also appears to be using foreign fighters for
propaganda. The group also has proven capabilities in combat,
counterintelligence, assassinations, suicide attacks, and
improvised explosive devices, such as car bombs.
For terrorist groups like al-Shabaab and JN, striking the
United States at home requires two key elements, motivation and
capability. Let's first take a look at al-Shabaab, which has
long been a combination, as Ms. Blanchard had noted, has been a
combination of fighters focused on issues within Somalian
borders and a smaller number of foreign fighters with
international aims.
Internal factionalism within the group has prevented them
from uniting behind an international agenda, and the vast
majority of al-Shabaab's attacks have occurred within Somalia.
However, in recent months leaders with strong ties to al-Qaeda
have consolidated control, and their leadership may signal a
new willingness to launch international attacks.
On the individual member level, there have been doubts
about the willingness of al-Shabaab's U.S. members to return
home to launch attacks. Many U.S. citizens who went to Somalia
may have been motivated by nationalism and adventurism, not a
desire to participate in an international jihad. Of course,
individual motivations may shift. American participation in the
Westgate Mall attack could indicate a greater willingness to
participate in international operations targeted at Western
interests.
Regarding JN, the group is today one of the most effective
rebel fighting forces in Syria. In April of this year, the
group pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda, presumably meaning that
it will support al-Qaeda's global jihad. But again that is
motivation. That is not enough. What are the capabilities of
these groups? Do they have a capability to launch an attack in
the United States and what would they need to be successful?
First, a group would likely need several American or
Western members to carry out such an attack. With English
language skills and cultural and geographic familiarity, these
individuals would readily identify targets and navigate U.S.
society.
Second, attackers would need proper training. As
demonstrated by Westgate, al-Shabaab possesses the knowledge
and training in firearms, communications, and tactics to
conduct a Mumbai-style attack. The same is likely true for JN,
given that group's ability to conduct combat operations and
bomb attacks.
Third, the group would need to insert members into the
United States. That is where American members with U.S.
passports and those with visa waivers from other Western
nations would allow them to enter the homeland without
attracting the same scrutiny that others might.
Fourth, attackers would need access to weapons.
Individuals, especially U.S. citizens, may not encounter much
trouble acquiring firearms and ammunitions in the United States
as they would elsewhere.
Finally, attackers would need, as mentioned before, a soft
target, such as shopping malls, theaters, concerts, or sporting
events. They could learn lessons from recent non-terrorist
attacks against U.S. soft targets. We have heard earlier today
about the 2011 parking lot shooting in Tucson, various school
shootings from 1999 in Columbine, to 2007 Virginia Tech, to
last year's tragedy in Newtown. Other soft target attacks that
have been useful examples for international terrorists include
the London and Tokyo subway attacks, the Beslan hostage crisis
in Russia, and countless others. They have all demonstrated the
vulnerability of soft targets. Terrorists, including al-Qaeda,
have continued to express interest in striking such soft
targets, and there is clearly no shortage of these throughout
the United States.
In the interest of time, I will truncate my remarks. Again,
thank you for the opportunity to be here today.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Kostro follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stephanie Sanok Kostro
October 9, 2013
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and distinguished Members
of this committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify on the
impact of Western members of certain terrorist organizations on the
homeland security of the United States. Recent allegations that young
Americans participated in the deadly 4-day siege at the Westgate
shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya--an attack against a ``soft'' civilian
target and an attack for which Somalia-based terrorist organization al-
Shabaab claims responsibility--have highlighted several critical
questions with homeland security implications. Why are U.S. citizens
and other Westerners traveling overseas to affiliate with terrorist
groups and receive terrorist training? What training or support are
those Westerners receiving? What is the likelihood they will return to
launch attacks on American soil?
WESTERNERS' AFFILIATIONS AND INSPIRATIONS
It is a fact that U.S. citizens, especially individuals associated
with particular diaspora communities within the United States such as
Somali-Americans in Minnesota, can be vulnerable to radicalization and
willing to travel overseas for terrorist training and activities. For
example, the 2006 military operations of U.S.-supported Ethiopian
forces in Somalia may have inspired Somali refugees and others to join
the fight against Ethiopia and Somalia's Western-backed Transitional
Federal Government. In fact, Americans appear to have begun traveling
to Somalia to fight alongside al-Shabaab in 2007; between 2007 and
2010, roughly 20-40 Americans joined al-Shabaab, ``making the United
States a primary exporter of Western fighters''\1\ to the group.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Seth T. Jones, Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs, October 3, 2013, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/
testimonies/CT400/CT400/RAND_CT400.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, because al-Shabaab has traditionally been a hybrid
movement with some elements focused on the conflict within Somalia and
some elements focused on al-Qaeda's anti-Western vision, other foreign
fighters--from the United States, Europe, the Middle East, and
elsewhere in Africa--may have joined al-Shabaab because of its
international aims. It appears that al-Shabaab recruits Americans and
other Westerners for specialized missions, including propaganda,
recruitment, and suicide missions. Although not much is known about al-
Shabaab's training camps, the group's knowledge of firearms, target
surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence-gathering abilities
alludes to the skills and capabilities that Americans and other
Westerners may be learning.
Of course, many Somali-Americans travel to Somalia for legitimate
reasons, from visiting family and friends to conducting business. It is
near-impossible for U.S. Government agencies to track the activities of
all Somali-Americans once they are in-country, and there are very real
privacy implications for even attempting to do so. That said, in 2009,
a senior FBI official told lawmakers, ``While there are no current
indicators that any of the individuals who traveled to Somalia have
been selected, trained, or tasked by al-Shabaab or other extremists to
conduct attacks inside the United States, we remain concerned about
this possibility and that it might be exploited in the future if other
U.S. persons travel to Somalia for similar purposes.''\2\ More
recently, White House National Security Adviser for Strategic
Communications Ben Rhodes stated that administration officials
``monitor very carefully and have for some time been concerned about
efforts by al-Shabaab to recruit Americans or U.S. persons to come to
Somalia.''\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Philip Mudd, Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, March 11, 2009, http://
www.hsgac.senate.gov//imo/media/doc/031109Mudd.pdf?attempt=2.
\3\ Ben Rhodes, Remarks to the Press, September 23, 2013, http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/23/gaggle-aboard-air-force-
one-en-route-ny.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the numbers of Westerners joining forces with al-Shabaab are
relatively small, some 5,500 foreign fighters have allegedly traveled
to Syria in recent years, including roughly 600 Westerners, to join
rebel forces against the Assad regime. There is growing concern that
many of these fighters are joining al-Qaeda-affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra,
considering that Syria may be becoming ``the predominant jihadist
battlefield in the world . . . The concern going forward from a threat
perspective is there are individuals traveling to Syria, becoming
further radicalized, becoming trained and then returning as part of
really a global jihadist movement to Western Europe and, potentially,
to the United States.''\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Matthew Olsen, Remarks at Aspen Security Forum, July 18, 2013,
http://aspensecurityforum.org/2013-video.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As with al-Shabaab, al-Nusra appears to be using foreign fighters
for propaganda. In addition, foreigners may be acquiring skills in
combat, bomb-making, and counterintelligence. Al-Nusra, in general, has
proven capabilities in assassinations, suicide attacks, and improvised
explosive devices, to include car bombs.
HOMELAND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS
For terrorist groups like al-Shabaab and al-Nusra, striking the
United States at home requires that they have both the motivation and
the capability to do so. Whether either group currently has the
motivation to attack the U.S. homeland directly is a difficult
question.
For example, al-Shabaab has long been composed of a combination of
local Somali fighters, who have relatively few designs beyond Somalia's
borders, and a smaller number of foreign fighters with international
aims. Factionalism within al-Shabaab has traditionally kept the group
from fully uniting behind an international agenda, and the vast
majority of al-Shabaab's attacks have occurred within Somalia.
However, there is evidence that in recent months Ahmed Abdi Godane,
one of the Shabaab leaders with the strongest ties to al-Qaeda and its
international agenda, has eliminated many of his rivals and
consolidated his control over much of the group. If Godane as truly
solidified his place as the central Shabaab leader, it may signal a new
willingness to launch international attacks, potentially in the
West.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Sudarsan Raghavan, ``Al-Shabab leader's ambitions appear to be
as complex as his personality'', Washington Post, September 25, 2013,
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-09-25/world/42373211_1_mall-
attack-militia-al-shabab.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, also important to consider is the motivation of the
individual al-Shabaab members, who would be called upon to carry out an
attack within the United States. These would almost certainly have to
be U.S. citizens or Westerners, given the ability to ``blend'' (e.g.,
English-language skills, cultural familiarity) and perhaps more
importantly, Western passports that would enable entry with minimal
suspicion.
There have, in the past, been doubts about the willingness of al-
Shabaab's U.S. members to return home to launch attacks. Many U.S.
citizens who originally went to Somalia appear to have been motivated
primarily by nationalism and adventurism, rather than a desire to
participate in international jihad. Furthermore, there is a sizable
Somali population in the United States, which includes the families of
many of these young men. It may be that U.S. members of al-Shabaab are
loath to participate in an attack that might bring direct or indirect
harm to the U.S. Somali community.
However, there is the possibility that these individual motivations
are shifting. If it is true that Americans participated in the Westgate
attack, it may indicate a greater willingness on the part of al-
Shabaab's American members to participate in international operations,
even those that may target Westerners or Western interests
specifically.
Regarding al-Nusra, it is important to note that despite this
group's 2012 emergence on the world stage, al-Nusra has in fact existed
for many years. With cells established in the Levant after terrorists
fled Afghanistan in 2001, this group's original primary mission was to
facilitate the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq. Al-Nusra's
infrastructure received a boost after the Syrian revolution began in
2011, and today's the group is one of the most effective rebel fighting
forces in Syria. In April 2013, leader Abu Muhammed al-Julani pledged
the group's allegiance to al-Qaeda, which presumably means that al-
Nusra supports al-Qaeda's vision of global jihad. That said, its focus
remains predominantly on internal Syrian dynamics, and U.S. concerns
are growing about its ability to destabilize the country and, by
extension, the region.
If events (e.g., the ascendency of Godane within al-Shabaab,
possible destabilization in Syria and a more regional or global focus
for al-Nusra) motivate the groups' leadership and American members to
embrace the idea of Western targets, this is cause for concern.
However, motivation is not enough. There is also the question of
whether they have the capability to launch an attack in the United
States.
As my colleague Richard Downie of the CSIS Africa Program pointed
out in his testimony before the Foreign Affairs Committee last week,
the types of attacks al-Shabaab has launched in the past have not
required much capability. Al-Shabaab is not likely to launch a complex
bomb attack against the United States or attempt to bring down an
airliner. As demonstrated by the Westgate incident, al-Shabaab prefers
``Mumbai-style'' attacks, in which multiple gunmen are used to strike
soft targets like shopping malls.
The question is: Could al-Shabaab or al-Nusra carry out such an
attack in the United States, and if so, what would they need to be
successful?
First, a group would likely need several American or Western
members to carry out such an attack. These individuals could more
easily enter the United States without attracting attention and more
readily navigate U.S. society without notice. While many of the
estimated 20-40 Americans who have reportedly joined al-Shabaab may
have already been killed, al-Shabaab likely still has some U.S. or
Western members, who could participate in such an attack. The number of
American members of al-Nusra is also small, with estimates at 10-20.
Second, attackers would need proper training. As demonstrated by
Westgate, al-Shabaab already possesses the knowledge and training in
firearms, communications, and tactics to make a relatively simple
Mumbai-style attack deadly. The same is likely true for al-Nusra, given
that group's demonstrated ability to conduct combat operations and bomb
attacks.
Third, the group would need to be able to insert members into the
United States. American members with U.S. passports and visa waiver
holders from other Western nations would allow them to enter the
homeland without attracting the same level of attention or scrutiny
that others might. However, this is likely the riskiest part of the
process and holds the greatest likelihood of interception for overseas
terror organizations.
Fourth, the attackers would need access to weapons. Given the
relative availability of firearms and ammunition in the United States,
it is doubtful terror organization members, especially U.S. citizens,
would have much trouble acquiring the needed weapons.
Finally, attackers would need a soft target, such as shopping
malls, theaters, concerts, sporting events, or transportation systems.
They could certainly learn lessons from recent non-terrorist attacks
against U.S. soft targets, such as the 2011 parking lot shooting in
Tucson, the 2012 Aurora theater incident, and the various school
shootings from the 1999 Columbine massacre to the 2007 Virginia Tech
rampage to last year's tragedy in Sandy Hook. Other soft-target
attacks, including the London and Tokyo subway attacks, the Beslan
hostage crisis in Russia, and countless others have demonstrated time
and again the vulnerability of soft targets. Terrorist organizations,
including al-Qaeda, have continued to express interest in striking such
soft targets; a recent news article noted that the opening words of a
document found on the body of Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, al-Qaeda's top
East Africa operative and architect of the 1998 embassy attacks in Dar
es Salaam and Nairobi, when he was killed 2 years ago were: ``Our
objectives are to strike London with low-cost operations that would
cause a heavy blow amongst the hierarchy and Jewish communities, using
attacks similar to the tactics used by our brothers in Mumbai.''\6\
Among targets identified were Eton College, the five-star Dorchester
and Ritz hotels, and the Jewish neighborhood of Golders Green in north
London. There is clearly no shortage of soft targets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Paul Cruickshank, Tim Lister, and Nic Robertson, ``Evidence
suggests that Al-Shabaab is shifting focus to `soft' targets,''
September 26, 2013, www.cnn.com/2013/09/26/world/london-bombing-plot-
qaeda/index.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONCLUSION
Information and intelligence are imperfect. The United States and
its allies and partners spend considerable resources--financial and
human--in an effort to prevent and deter terrorist incidents. But the
Nation cannot know the name and location of every individual who
intends to do harm. The Nation cannot harden every soft target. Because
of the Nation's principles and values, which allow for privacy, freedom
of movement, and other individual rights and privileges, and because we
face very adaptable adversaries who seek to exploit these principles
and values, we cannot prevent every terrorist attack.
That said, the United States can certainly improve its current
mechanisms and systems in ways that can increase our ability to
prevent, deter, or mitigate such attacks without compromising the
Nation's principles and values. Recruitment of diaspora members, who
are vulnerable to radicalization, often occurs in person at the local
level or via the internet. Campaigns to counter these recruitment
efforts can come from the private sector, non-governmental
organizations, religious groups, and every level of government from
Federal to State to local. In addition, information-sharing and
coordination of efforts can be vastly improved, in terms of authorities
and abilities to collaborative across levels of government, relations
necessary to facilitate that cooperation, and the technical means by
which to do so. For example, the Boston police chief reportedly
complained about the spectrum availability and communications
interoperability in the immediate aftermath of the Boston bombing
earlier this year. Finally, of course, intelligence-sharing with
friendly foreign nations can also be improved. Our knowledge of al-
Shabaab and al-Nusra leadership, their intentions, and their
capabilities is limited, and expanded efforts to leverage other
nations' intelligence assets and to share terrorist-related
intelligence will be key to addressing these potential threats before
they can reach the U.S. homeland.
Chairman McCaul. We thank you for being here as well.
I want to follow up on a point you made, and that is that I
think, you know, before this event occurred--and I recognize
myself for questions--most Americans have never heard of al-
Shabaab. Now, we had heard of, most of us here in briefings,
knew about them for years. The fact that they targeted what I
would consider to be a Western target is disturbing, but also
the fact that we--Pete King had hearings in 2011 talking about
how there were 40 to 50 Americans who have joined the fight. I
think potentially there are many more. As you mentioned, Ms.
Kostro, with travel documents. With American passports. Some
U.S. citizens. I think the number is probably greater than
that, quite honestly. Getting on the no-fly list, terrorist
watch list is vitally important here.
But I want to focus on what is the real threat to the
homeland. I think the three I would like to focus would be Ms.
Kostro, Ms. Blanchard, and of course the sheriff, who deals
with this, you know, almost on a daily basis. That is, we had
this guy, Hammami, who is from Alabama. He is not Somalian. He
is heading up the American, if you will, sort-of global jihad
view within al-Shabaab. A week before this shopping mall
shooting he is assassinated, about a week before, taken out by
the leader of al-Shabaab. There is some speculation that it may
be Hammami's faction that may have been responsible for the
shopping mall tragic shootings.
Ms. Blanchard, you may be the best-qualified to talk about
that. Then I want to follow up with the sheriff and Ms. Kostro
on, what is a threat to the homeland here in terms of these 50-
plus al-Shabaab fighters that are from the United States?
Ms. Blanchard. Omar Hammami had become a bit of a squeaky
wheel, so to speak, for al-Shabaab. He had been critical for
over a year of Ahmed Godane, the leader of al-Shabaab,
basically his management style, allegations of corruption, that
he was very public in broadcasting on Twitter and chatrooms,
allegations of killing innocent Muslim Somalis in his attacks,
allegations that had he consolidated power and sidelined
several of the other major leaders in al-Shabaab. He had
claimed that there was a death threat on him in April, and a
number of the sort of more nationalist-focused leaders within
al-Shabaab had taken his side against Godane's.
I think there is sort of an agreement among Somali watchers
that him being taken out was part of this internal power
struggle within al-Shabaab, in which Ahmed Godane has appeared
ascendant. Speculating on sort of the correlation between his
death and Westgate is hard to do, except to say that it does
conveniently take away that squeaky wheel when you want to sort
of reattract potential foreign recruits with an al-Qaeda focus.
Chairman McCaul. But certainly the shooting I think raises
their profile on the global stage and will certainly help with
their recruiting. I think the fact he is an American talking
about jihad, Ms. Kostro, does that give you concern?
Ms. Kostro. It does give me cause for concern. As I
mentioned, traditionally al-Shabaab has had two schools of
thought. One has been locally-based. Most of the attacks have
taken place in Somalia. The fact that he had become a squeaky
wheel, talking about that. The Kenya attacks I think was a
coming out for the new leadership within al-Shabaab to say,
listen, we signed up with al-Qaeda, they have got a global
jihad vision, we want to demonstrate that we are capable of
doing something like that against Western-type targets in
Kenya. It certainly is a concern. The fact that he was an
American is always useful for propaganda.
Again, to go back to, you had asked about the likelihood of
an attack here in the United States. In prior years a lot of
these terrorist organizations relied on the educational systems
and the religious constructs here in the United States to
spread their message and to recruit. We have seen from the
Boston situation, as well as what is going on in Minnesota,
that the internet is playing such a huge role right now. I
think having somebody like--I am sorry--like the folks from New
England, there was a gentleman, I am sorry, I am blanking on
his name, from Massachusetts, as well as the gentleman from
Alabama, to be used as propaganda for these groups is really,
really valuable.
Chairman McCaul. Sheriff, you and the FBI have been
responsible for bringing down some of these, well, it is more
recruiting and training and financing. What is your take on
this? You see this again on a daily basis. Let me just say I
think your outreach to the Muslim community is absolutely
essential.
Sheriff Stanek. Yes, I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. In
fact, one of the things I did include in my comments was a
member of my staff, a Somali-American who works for the
sheriff's office, and his first cousin was killed, one of the
first people killed during the Westgate Mall attacks. So it
hits close to home.
But you are absolutely right. I mean, several dozen young
men from across this country, several dozen from the
Minneapolis area itself have traveled overseas. As we know,
some of them have died in suicide bombings, some have died in
battle, glorified battle in the jihad. Some met the same fate
as Hammami, killed by al-Shabaab by themselves when trying to
disassociate or whatever other reason.
Mr. Chairman and Members, I had included in my written
comments submitted to the committee about a video, ``A Path to
Paradise.'' It was released about 6 or 7 weeks ago, prior to
the Westgate Mall attack. If you get a chance to watch this 15-
minute video, it is very well done. It lays out, it talks about
how folks are radicalized through the internet, countering
violent extremism. It lays out the soft targets that we talked
about here this afternoon with your committee, the soft targets
in Minnesota like the Mall of America, like our sporting venues
and professional sports stadiums, like schools, like
businesses. Very, very compelling.
The simple fact of the matter is, Mr. Chairman and Members,
is we don't know what we do not know. We did not know back in
2008 and 2009 that we were missing a number of Somali-Americans
who had traveled overseas to participate in this. We didn't
know until late 2008 when Shirwa Ahmed blew himself up in a
suicide bombing and we recovered parts of him, identified him,
and figured out he was from the Twin Cities area.
From there, over the last 5 or 6 years we have worked very
hard building these trusting relationships with the Somali
diaspora community, not easy to do. But we go back to our
community-oriented policing philosophy, the things that we know
best in order to build those trusting relationships.
I would be less than candid with you, Mr. Chairman and
Members, if I didn't tell you I was extremely concerned as the
sheriff of a large county, as the sheriff in Minneapolis area,
about the potential for what that might bring in the future as
members on the panel here today talked about whether it is a
decade out or tomorrow, extremely concerned. I am very pleased
that this committee has taken the time to look into this, to
have these hearings, to educate yourselves, and help us on a
public policy perspective what we can do in local law
enforcement working with our Federal law enforcement partners.
Chairman McCaul. Thanks. I know you and Mr. Lovegrove
probably have a lot to share in terms of you being a sheriff of
a county with this problem, and you, sir, Mr. Lovegrove. I
apologize, there are a lot of witnesses and I don't have a
whole lot of time.
Professor Scheuer, you being from the bin Laden unit, I am
very interested in your take on this organization. Bin Laden
wasn't taken seriously and then he rose to power. You saw that.
Al-Shabaab, little known until a couple weeks ago.
This raid in Somalia that was I guess not so successful:
How do you view that impact on this organization's rise? I am
interested also in your comments on Western intervention and
that impact on the rise of extremism in the Middle East.
Mr. Scheuer. I think, sir, there is a general pattern when
we see these groups arise in the world, the Islamist groups.
Very much initially intensely local concern, sometimes with
things like corruption, education, unemployment, and, of
course, always an Islamic or religious influence. Then they
become more regionally-oriented. We are seeing that now with
Boko Haram. We are seeing it with al-Shabaab. Certainly we have
seen it grow in Algeria with the Armed Islamic Group and now
the AQM in the Maghreb. Then you see an international
dimension.
I just think it seems to be a natural progression of how
they work, a function of people coming in from the outside to
fight with them, a function of everyone who said here today
something about the internet. The internet is a terribly
powerful tool.
I think if you want to talk about the attack that didn't
succeed on Saturday, it will make them say, we repelled the
Americans. The media is saying that that was an attack to
capture somebody instead of kill them, and I tend to think that
I am appalled or repelled by the idea that any government in
the United States would risk our soldiers on an idiocy of
trying to take out a terrorist only if they could arrest him
rather than killing him.
Our foreign policy is the only indispensable ally of these
people. Islamic civilization, more than Western civilization,
is shattered in terms of ethnicities, linguistics, sectarian
differences, different levels of modernization, just an
enormous number of differences.
The genius of bin Laden was he did not take up the
Ayatollah Khomeini's useless effort for a decade to generate a
jihad against the United States because we were degraded, we
had women with short skirts, we had X-rated movies, we had beer
after work. It didn't work. No one blew themselves up because
we were behaving in that particular manner.
Bin Laden found one thing that united a Muslim in Montreal
with a Muslim in Buenos Aires and a Muslim in Kuwait, and that
is the impact of U.S. foreign policy in the Muslim world. I
would certainly, if I was in charge, change many of the
policies we have. But it is more important that we in this
country become adults. Nothing a person does in his life
doesn't have a counterreaction. Does our foreign policy cause
this war? Not a chance. The people who attacked us caused this
war. Does our foreign policy motivate these people? Absolutely.
Sir, if you were going to tell the American people they are
fighting a war against a bunch of deranged, nihilist, fanatic
extremists, we are going to be fighting a war that is
constantly going to surprise the American people about the
costs of what they are doing. If we come to a place where we
can have a discussion that says supporting Israel is essential
to the U.S. security, supporting Saudi Arabia is important,
vital to U.S. security, having U.S. troops in Muslim countries
is vital to U.S. security, fine. But also tell the American
people that costs come with that. Right now we have spent 17
years in this war and the American people still think we are
fighting a bunch of long-haired, bearded, goat-eating madmen.
We are at a terrible disadvantage that we impose on ourselves,
sir.
I would finish too long a statement by simply saying that
we must stop the idiocy of democracy spreading. If you want to
fight forever, keep trying to impose women's rights,
secularism, the paganism of American culture, contemporary
culture, on a religious civilization, sir.
Chairman McCaul. I will take stability any day of the week.
With that, the Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Member,
Ms. Clarke.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank our panelists
for bringing their expertise to bear on this very important
topic.
I would be remiss if I didn't remind everyone here that the
issues raised by this hearing could be explored in greater
depth if the Federal Government shut-down did not prevent the
officials charged with watching and monitoring terrorist groups
from appearing as witnesses today. Without the testimony of
these officials charged with watching and monitoring terrorist
groups, then there is little from a policy, legislative, or
oversight perspective that can be truly gained. Many of the
intelligence community have been deemed nonessential and
furloughed because of the Government shut-down. It is my hope
that we work together to end this stalemate and get our fellow
American citizens back to work on protecting the homeland and
our interests abroad.
Having said that, I want to take advantage of all of the
expertise that you have to bear. I have a few questions that I
would like to pose. My first question goes to Ms. Kostro. Is
there any indication that al-Shabaab cells currently and
actively exist in the United States?
Ms. Kostro. In my research I have not come across any
active al-Shabaab cells here in the United States.
Ms. Clarke. Is there anyone on the panel that has a
difference of that opinion?
Mr. Scheuer. Just by implication, ma'am, if they are being
recruited and there is being videos produced to affect that
recruit, you can't be like the FBI and say that we haven't
found it so it is not here. Obviously there is an organized
something in the United States that is getting these people
recruited and getting them to Somalia.
Ms. Clarke. Does it necessarily have to be in the United
States or could it be through the internet but located abroad?
Mr. Scheuer. It could be both, ma'am.
Ms. Clarke. Okay.
Mr. Scheuer. I think without doubt that there is an outside
influence.
Ms. Clarke. Mr. Mellor, how vulnerable are shopping malls
and retail centers here in the United States, especially as we
approach another holiday shopping season that is sure to bring
high volumes of people to these venues?
Mr. Mellor. Thank you, Congresswoman. The assessment on the
retailers' part, certainly the Westgate incident is an example
that you could never be prepared for how devastating that that
attack would be and beyond the imagination of the retailers.
But now it is a reality that we have to deal with, and the
preparation and conversations to be on the alert now as the
busy season approaches for us have begun already. But as a
matter of fact, next week I will be meeting with a large
contingent of loss prevention security leaders from the retail
industry and this will be a topic of conversation. So out of
that I hope to come up with some recommendations we can go back
to the Department of Homeland Security and law enforcement
with.
Ms. Clarke. Wonderful. I hope that you will share that,
because indeed while we don't necessarily categorize some of
the violent outbreaks that we have had domestically as
``terrorism,'' we have seen these incidents in shopping
centers. It is not necessarily under the guise of a jihadist
necessarily, but certainly when you are dealing with mentally-
deranged individuals in a population like ours, bad things can
happen in retail and shopping malls. So I would be interested
in seeing what protocols you are able to share with the DOH.
Then, Sheriff Stanek, can you talk about how the Somali
community in your jurisdiction reacted to the young Somali-
Americans going overseas? Were they less helpful in the
beginning when they didn't understand or didn't believe what
was happening to their children? Could you give us a sense?
Sheriff Stanek. Sure, Mr. Chairman and Members. Going back
to 2007-2008 when this first came to light in terms of these
folks going back overseas and being suicide bombers, law
enforcement simply did not know. Members of the community who
did have the information would tell us that they didn't know
who to tell, how to tell, and shame on us from a law
enforcement side, local law enforcement.
Again, we didn't know what we didn't know. We have worked
very hard now to build those relationships in the community as
a whole. But they are trusted relationships. They take time and
effort to build. It is not something you just flip a switch and
it comes on. It has taken 6 or 7 years to hire Somali-American
deputy sheriffs and police officers. It has taken us years to
build confidence and trust in those communities.
Yet the fact remains that the recruitment efforts continue.
Young men from my community continue to travel overseas to
participate in jihad and/or suicide bombings. We are better
than we were. We are extremely concerned, as I told the
Chairman earlier, of the repercussions and what that might mean
moving forward.
There is one thing I wanted to mention earlier,
Congresswoman, Chairman and Members, and that was about the
National Counterterrorism Center, the Department of Homeland
Security, and the FBI, the Federal Bureau of Investigation. All
three of them work different tracks, sometimes jointly,
sometimes individually, to help us with the diaspora community
and the potential threat that we face.
But we would like to see them work even closer together. I
am not sure what the right alignment would be. I just had a
conversation this morning with an official from the Department
of Homeland Security about this very thing. We would hope that
moving forward they will continue to help local law enforcement
in my part of the country, as well as Ohio and other parts that
have large population and communities of Somali-Americans to
better understand what motivates them, to better understand why
they would choose a path to travel overseas and how they get
there versus what they might be able to do here.
Ms. Clarke. Very well. I thank you all once again for your
testimony here today.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you.
The Chairman now recognizes the Chairman Emeritus, Mr.
King.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Also let me thank the
witnesses for their testimony here today. I want to thank the
Chairman for conducting this hearing on a really vital issue.
Let me begin with Sheriff Stanek. You mentioned what
happened back in 2007 and 2008 and 2009, and we have had
hearings here. For instance, Mr. Bihi testified, his nephew had
been recruited to go to Somalia. He was killed. Now, do you
consider him one of those who was executed or killed?
Sheriff Stanek. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, could you repeat
the question?
Mr. King. That was a nephew of Mr. Bihi. He testified
before our committee that his nephew went to Somalia, was with
al-Shabaab, had telephoned him, said he was coming home, and
then was found dead several days later. Do you consider that an
execution or just that he was killed in action?
Sheriff Stanek. Mr. Chairman and Mr. King, I simply don't
know about Mr. Bihi. I certainly know him. I have spoken to
him. I understand what he has gone through. But I don't have
confirmation one way or another. At any rate, he is deceased
and died overseas.
Mr. King. Right. Also during his testimony, another
analysis we did, as you suggested there were people in the
community who were facilitating the travel to Somalia. In your
testimony you talk about the Federal indictments that come
down. But again just last year and the year before that there
were still young men going to Somalia, and in your testimony
you say they are still providing financing and other support to
al-Shabaab.
How much of a read do you think you have on the community?
Like how many members of your office are working on this and
how much surveillance is going on in the Somali-American
community in Minneapolis?
Sheriff Stanek. Yeah, Mr. Chairman and Members, I have
members of my agency that work on the Joint Terrorism Task
Force, as do the local law enforcement agencies in our county.
Again, we are a county of about 1.3 million folks. Then you
have Ramsey County immediately across the river from us.
We work hand-in-hand with the FBI. I have got at least 6
members of my staff that work with the Somali community in a
community engagement team day in and day out. But, again, that
was something that was born of necessity going back 5 or 6
years after it came to light about Somali-Americans and others
traveling overseas.
We are not by any means to the heart of the problem yet.
You are correct in terms of the Federal Government brought
their full weight to bear with the Federal indictments, the
largest terrorism investigation since September 11, 2001. But
it did not stop or curtail the recruitment efforts in my
community or these young men traveling overseas through
radicalization.
Mr. King. Now, back in 2008 and 2009 there were people in
the community, I think leaders in the community who were
resisting efforts by law enforcement and actually putting
pressure on the relatives, telling them not to cooperate with
law enforcement. Are those people still active in the
community?
Sheriff Stanek. Mr. Chairman and Members, I can't give you
specific names. I believe that many of them are, and as you
know I think the testimony before this committee back in 2011
indicated that clerics, imams, their religious institutions
through the different mosques, and they named them by name,
were clear, and I think that testimony continues to stand today
before this committee and I would concur with it.
Mr. King. Isn't that a dangerous situation, I mean, to
actually have religious leaders in your community facilitating
travel or encouraging an al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorist
organization?
Sheriff Stanek. Mr. Chairman, Members, that question can be
answered two ways. One: Yes, but it needs some clarification.
As I indicated in my testimony, the vast majority of Somali-
Americans and those that live in my community are law-abiding
and want to do the right thing. In fact, today we receive
information generally ahead of time when these young men are
being recruited or do something outside of the bounds of the
Federal Government or the legal means. That is something that
was not done back in 2007-2008. So our inroads and our work
with these communities is having some success.
Mr. King. I would commend you for that. I would just still
say, though, that all you need is 2 or 3 or 4 people, and we
saw it happen in Boston. Whether or not that was locally
recruited or not, the fact is it doesn't take that many people
who are trained terrorists, and especially those who have been
trained in Somalia if they have come back in.
Do you believe that you have a good handle on those who
have come back from Somalia, and are you able to track those
who, let's say, Somali-Americans, the difference between going
to Somalia on a vacation or to visit family and to be trained?
How confident are you that you are able to make that
distinction when they come back?
Sheriff Stanek. Mr. Chairman, Members, that really is the
key question here today as far as I am concerned and why I am
appearing before your committee. I do not have full confidence
that members of the Somali community who have traveled
overseas, participated and trained in al-Shabaab terrorist
training camps, and have returned back to the United States, by
whatever means, that we have a full accounting of where they
are, what they are doing, or what they plan to do in the
future. That concerns me as a 30-year law enforcement veteran,
the sheriff of my county, a member of my citizenry and my
county, and that is why I am here today.
Mr. King. Thank you, Sheriff, and thank you for your
service.
Mr. Chairman, may I just have one moment to make a comment.
Professor Scheuer, I have known you over the years, but I have
to take sharp disagreement with your position about our support
of Israel. I believe it is essential that the United States for
our security continue to support Israel. I believe that if we
back away from Israel or Jordan, for instance using those
countries, Morocco, as examples, that al-Qaeda will find some
other excuse. We can find any number of reasons.
I can tell you during the 1990s, after Iraq, between 1995
and 2001, the only time the Americans used force overseas was
to defend Muslims against Christians in Bosnia and in Kosovo,
and yet the response by al-Qaeda to that was to attack us on
September 11. So I think we make a mistake if we think we can
somehow appease al-Qaeda by taking away whatever----
Mr. Scheuer. Not at all a matter of appeasement, Mr. King,
at all. If it was up to me I would dump the Israelis tomorrow.
Mr. King. I know you would. I know.
Mr. Scheuer. But all I worry about is the continuing
preaching of American politicians to the American people that
our relationship with the Israelis doesn't cause us to have
dead Americans and extraordinary expenses in fighting the
Muslim world.
Mr. King. I would just say we would have more dead
Americans if we didn't stand by our allies in the Middle East.
We would just be encouraging al-Qaeda to take advantage of us.
I think that----
Mr. Scheuer. Our allies in the Middle East are mostly
totalitarian, sir, and they have been for 50 years.
Mr. King. There are not that many good people in world. The
fact is you have to work with those who work with us. If I had
the choice between dealing with the Israelis and al-Qaeda, I
would work with Israel. If I had the choice between dealing
with Jordan or al-Qaeda, I would deal with Jordan. The fact is
that you can find any number of excuses why al-Qaeda is going
to come after us.
Mr. Scheuer. No, sir, you can't.
Mr. King. Yes, I think you can. You certainly can.
Mr. Scheuer. No, you can't, sir. Osama bin Laden would have
been a terrific American politician because he stays on
message. There is only one message that comes out of al-Qaeda--
--
Mr. King. That is the message they are using now. If we
pull out of Israel----
Mr. Scheuer. You have to----
Mr. King. Let me say, if we stop supporting Israel, then
the message would be America was cowardly, America has backed
away, they are not going to stand by their allies. There is the
flip side of everything, and I would rather stand with positive
elements like Israel and back them.
Mr. Scheuer. I am a bearer of little brains, sir, but, you
know, you have got to go with what you go with at the moment.
These people are fighting for something substantive, for
something religious, and they are not fighting us for--what
reason do you suppose they are going to come up with? Because
we have Hollywood? I would like to fight Hollywood. But, I
mean, they are not going to fight us because we have women in
the workplace. That is an insanity. What they are fighting us
about is what we do. We don't have to stop what we are doing,
sir, but we have to realize the cost.
Mr. King. I think there would be more of a cost if we stop
what we are doing, and that is my point.
Mr. Scheuer. Well, that is fine. But tell the American
people that.
Mr. King. There is also a cost to what you are asking for,
and I think that cost would be a lot greater.
Mr. Scheuer. I don't think so, sir. It couldn't be worse
than it is now.
Mr. King. Then we honestly disagree. We honestly disagree.
Mr. Scheuer. You know, you are presiding over a bankruptcy.
What can be worse? What has been the goal of al-Qaeda since it
was formed? To bankrupt the United States. Who is winning
today, sir? We are done like dinner.
Mr. King. We are winning and we will continue to win unless
we take the advice of people like you.
Mr. Scheuer. Sir, you are exactly wrong. We are losing. Two
U.S. field armies were defeated by men in the field with
weapons from the Korean War.
Mr. King. The fact is we have not been successfully
attacked since September 11.
Mr. Scheuer. The fact is, sir, we had two military defeats
overseas, which is far more important.
Mr. King. The fact is we have not been successfully
attacked, we have not been successfully attacked since
September 11, because we disregard guys like you.
Mr. Scheuer. Sir, that is a goofy argument. That is a goofy
argument, sir.
Chairman McCaul. I hate to gavel down the Chairman
Emeritus.
Mr. King. Well, I am certainly an expert on goofiness, so I
yield back.
Chairman McCaul. I appreciate the gentleman's spirited
debate and it added a very great lively discussion, I think.
You can tell his favorite team is the Fighting Irish.
Mr. Scheuer. The Fighting Israelis, sir. Somehow people
think----
Chairman McCaul. Let's come to order. The Chairman now
recognizes, in the order of appearance, Mr. Barletta from
Pennsylvania.
Mr. Barletta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Sheriff Stanek, how concerned should we be about convicted
jihadists continuing their recruitment efforts while they are
serving time in prisons? Should we be concerned that they might
try and recruit their fellow inmates who may have had little
interest in terrorism prior to serving their time? Is this a
threat that you have encountered at all?
Sheriff Stanek. Mr. Chairman and Members, I don't think we
should treat them any different than we treat other gangs in
our American prison system, whether in our State prisons,
Federal prisons, or in our local jail lockups.
We are doing a better job, though, in terms of the
intelligence and information sharing. I can tell you that
several years ago the FBI was not interested in what we were
doing in terms of our local jails, yet I book 40,000 people a
year, several thousand of them Somali, and now finally we have
some connection between the two, and that is a good thing.
Mr. Barletta. Do you believe that recruitment is going on
and is it getting worse?
Sheriff Stanek. Mr. Chairman, Members, I do believe
recruitment happens within the walls of our prisons, jails,
Federal prisons as well. I do not have an estimate on the
number of specifics.
Mr. Barletta. Professor, where else are Americans
supporting terrorist organizations? Somalia----
Mr. Scheuer. We have seen Americans in Yemen. Of course
within Afghanistan and Pakistan. We have seen Americans go to
Iraq. I am not sure about North Africa, but I believe that I
have read there are some Americans with al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb across North Africa and the Sahel, and other places I
am sure we don't know about. But those would cover the
waterfront for me, sir.
Mr. Barletta. Among the Americans that are maybe traveling
to Syria, why might they be more inclined to fight among the
radical rebels?
Mr. Scheuer. Well, they are fighting for a cause, sir. You
know, this is a cause for this generation of young Muslims. It
is a very religious, very religiously-oriented for a lot of
them, organization.
We made a big deal with Osama bin Laden, saying that he was
a man who hijacked the religion of 1.4 billion Muslims, as if
that was a possibility, and that he was a nihilist and that he
was all of these madmen. Bin Laden lived and died as a good
Muslim. He was regarded within the Muslim world far more as a
good man than as a bad man, and he conducted himself according
to the dictates of the kind of Islam he believes in.
Many of these people go overseas to fight for the same
reason, and until we realize that, and until we actually accept
the idea that the Saudis in our country are paying to educate
our young people, are paying to put chaplains into prison that
preach a kind of Islam that is far more dangerous than anything
Osama bin Laden ever preached, far more anti-Jewish, anti-
Christian, anti-Western, then we are fooling ourselves, sir.
Mr. Barletta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCaul. The gentleman from Utah, Mr. Stewart, is
recognized.
Mr. Stewart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you again
for holding this important hearing.
I would like to talk with you, Professor Scheuer, for just
a minute, and then I would turn to some of the other witnesses.
I am not sure that I understand your testimony. Part of the
reason that I am not sure is because I don't have a copy of
your written testimony.
Mr. Scheuer. No one does, sir.
Mr. Stewart. I am wondering if you can help me understand
why.
Mr. Scheuer. Why?
Mr. Stewart. Yes.
Mr. Scheuer. Why you don't have a copy?
Mr. Stewart. Yes. Did you----
Mr. Scheuer. I didn't send one.
Mr. Stewart. Were you asked to send a copy of your
testimony?
Mr. Scheuer. Yes, sir. We had a little bit of electronic
snafu in getting the request to me.
Mr. Stewart. Okay.
Mr. Scheuer. I didn't have time to do it. I am happy to
type up my notes, but I just wrote the notes this morning.
[The information follows:]
Notes on U.S. and Western Jihadis Returning Home
October 9, 2013
(1) As America enters the 17th year of the war much of Islam began
waging against it in 1996, American and other Western Muslims have been
traveling to support and/or fight alongside the mujahedin since the
mid-1980s.
The first Western jihadis went to fight with the Afghan
mujahedin against the Red Army in the mid-1980s.
Westerners continued to trickle into the jihads in such
places as the North Caucasus, Somalia, and the Balkans in the
1990s, but the big increase in their numbers occurred after
Osama bin Laden declared war on the United States in August,
1996, and especially after al-Qaeda's impressive victories on
9/11.
Today, Syria and Somalia seem to be the most prominent
destinations for U.S. and Western Muslim fighters, although
some have turned up in North Africa and the Sahel as well.
(2) From the 1980s through today, U.S. Muslim citizens who go
overseas to fight jihad return to America with several attributes, some
old and some new, but all strongly held.
They return home, of course, with the same religious faith
that motivated to travel abroad to fight, but it will be
strengthened by the simple fact that they were on the winning
side.
Since 1996, America has been engaged in what is preeminently
a religious war for those who are waging it, not withstanding
the deliberately misleading protests against this reality by
our last 3 Presidents.
That American Muslim fighters have traveled, fought,
survived, won, and returned home safely proves two things to
themselves, their families, and their religious communities:
God was pleased by their actions and ensured they were
successful.
And for the younger people in the U.S. Muslim community--
especially for young males--they will become role models in
terms of an individual fulfilling his religious responsibility
to defend Islam.
They also will return with increased talent in the use of
small arms and explosives--a teachable talent--and with
increased skills at building covert organizations. They will
likewise return with confidence that victory is possible. They
and their colleagues know that they inflicted humiliating
defeats on the U.S. and NATO militaries in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and that knowledge will boost morale and
recruitment.
Finally, the American fighters will return with a greatly
enhanced knowledge of and contacts with other similarly-minded
men from across the Muslim world. All of the jihads to which
American Muslims travel are fought by locals and an assortment
of other men from countries that span the globe. The Americans
will come home fully aware that the movement bin Laden started
and led is now truly international in scope, and is quickly
growing in numbers and geographical reach, and they will come
home with a list of contacts among their fellow mujahedin from
whom they can seek advice or more material forms of assistance.
(3) As I noted at the start, the subject of our discussion today is
about a phenomenon that is nearly 40 years old. It is clearly more
dangerous today than ever before, but the factors that cause the
problem--the factors that motivate young Muslim Americans to jihad--
have been the same over time.
And while there are a number of factors that motivate these
young people--including Saudi-sponsored and -funded religious
education in the United States, and the bonds of family, clan,
tribe, and nationalism that remain strong and vibrant even
after immigration--the first and most important motivation for
these American Muslims to go to war is the bipartisan and
interventionist foreign policy of the U.S. Government and the
existence of Israel and numerous un-Islamic tyrannies in the
Arab world, all supported by the United States.
Indeed, since Laden declared war on America in 1996, al-
Qaeda and its allies have had--from their perspective--only two
indispensable allies: Allah and U.S. and Western
interventionism.
(4) To conclude my opening statement, I would say that while what
American Muslim mujahedin bring back with them from jihad is important,
what they find in the United States upon returning is will be much more
important in motivating what I believe will become combat situations--
like the recent event in Nairobi and others much worse--in the United
States over the next decade.
And what they will find on their return will be a steady-as-
she-goes interventionist U.S. foreign policy which has been a
constant for more than 30 years.
We will be continuing to unquestionably arm, support, and
justify Israel.
We will continue to support tyranny in Saudi Arabia,
Jordan, Algeria, and elsewhere in the Muslim world.
We will continue preaching democracy but stand ready to
immediately intervene to undermine fairly-elected governments
in places like Palestine and Egypt.
And certainly most dangerous for U.S. National security,
we will continue to prosecute the clash of civilizations,
initiated by President Bush and accelerated by President Obama
and Mrs. Clinton, designed to impose secularism, democracy, and
women's rights on an Islamic world ready and willing to fight
forced Westernization to the death.
In terms of the length of our war with Islam, this attempt
to teach our little, brown Muslim brothers to be just like us
will lengthen the war every bit as much as the unprovoked and
unnecessary military interventions in Libya, Mali, and Iraq.
(5) And if you think that I place too much emphasis provided to
U.S. citizen and other Western mujahedin by U.S. and Western
interventionism, I would draw your attention to the reality that, to
the best of my knowledge, neither we nor any of our NATO partners have
yet to capture a Western Islamist fighter whose words or documents have
shown a motivation to attack based on hatred for liberty, elections, or
gender equality. Invariably, they attribute their motivation to U.S.
and Western military intervention and support for Israel and Muslim
tyrannies.
Mr. Stewart. Okay. I wish we would have had that because it
would have been helpful to refer to that prior to----
Mr. Scheuer. Well, stuff happens, sir.
Mr. Stewart. Yes, believe me, I understand that stuff
happens. But it is helpful to us and it would help me now in my
questioning for you. Again, I want to come back to understand
some of the things you said.
Before I do that, I just want to mention this quickly, I
find your position on our alliance with Israel as very
troubling. It won't surprise you to tell you that I disagree
with you. You spent 17 years, is that right, or something like
that, as a CIA analyst?
Mr. Scheuer. Over 20 years, sir.
Mr. Stewart. Okay, over 20.
Mr. Scheuer. Not as an analyst. I ran operations, sir.
Mr. Stewart. Okay. Would you say there is a large number of
CIA analysts or employees who agree with your position?
Mr. Scheuer. I wouldn't dare to speak for anybody but
myself, sir. Only a fool wouldn't know that our relationship
with Israel causes us war with Muslims.
Mr. Stewart. Well, my question is fairly simple.
Mr. Scheuer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Stewart. I mean, you worked with hundreds of employees.
Mr. Scheuer. Yes, sir. I didn't work with any fools, sir.
Mr. Stewart. You certainly had conversations with many of
them. I am asking for your opinion. Are there a large number
who agree with you?
Mr. Scheuer. I am not a McCarthyite, sir. I am not going to
say anything about that to you, sir.
Mr. Stewart. Okay. Well, I am going to take that as
nonresponsive because it is a fairly simple question and I
don't think----
Mr. Scheuer. It is fairly none of your business about what
my conversations with other people are about, sir.
Mr. Stewart. I am not asking for specifics of those
conversations. I am asking for your opinion of your experience
whether there are a large number that agreed with you. That is
a fairly simple question, hardly intrusive.
Mr. Scheuer. Very intrusive from my perspective, sir.
Mr. Stewart. Well, okay. You can have your perspective----
Mr. Scheuer. Thank you.
Mr. Stewart [continuing]. And I think others can evaluate
whether you are being agreeable or disagreeable.
Mr. Scheuer. I am being disagreeable on this because it is
none of your business.
Mr. Stewart. Yes, you certainly are.
Mr. Scheuer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Stewart. Now, let me move on then. I would like you to
explain very quickly if you can what you think the primary
motivators are for Islamic jihadism?
Mr. Scheuer. First, our support for the Israelis.
Mr. Stewart. Okay, that is your number----
Mr. Scheuer. No, there are six.
Mr. Stewart. Okay. Put them in order if you could.
Mr. Scheuer. Our support for tyranny for over 50 years in
the Muslim world, okay. As a trigger, our presence on the Arab
peninsula. Third, I would put the Israelis rising. Fourth, our
ability for a long time to get oil at prices that were very
much below the market level. Fifth, our presence, military
presence in other countries in the Muslim world. Sixth, our
abiding willingness to identify as terrorists any Muslim
population that one of our allies dislikes, whether it is the
Russians or the Chinese. Those six things, sir.
Mr. Stewart. I appreciate that. Let me say, and then I am
going to move on to other witnesses, I was an Air Force officer
for 14 years. I have spent significant time with many people
from that region. It is astounding to me that you don't put in
the top six what I know to be true, and that is they are
motivated--many of them are motivated by their absolute hatred
of the United States and what we represent, whether it is
freedom, whether it is democracy, whether it is women's rights.
There are many of them who are absolutely motivated by that. I
know that. I have talked with them.
Mr. Scheuer. They hate them, sir.
Mr. Stewart. I can't imagine that you would not put that in
somewhere----
Mr. Scheuer. They are not going to die for that, sir.
Mr. Stewart. Oh, they absolutely have.
Mr. Scheuer. They have not, sir. This war is not--they
wouldn't have anything we have in this country----
Mr. Stewart. Professor, you are turning a blind eye to
history for you to say that they will not die for that.
Mr. Scheuer. Bullshit, sir. You don't need to call me
professor either. You can just call me Mike. The reality is no
one has blown themselves up because this young lady is in this
place.
Mr. Stewart. Professor, you are absolutely wrong on that. I
am going to move on now.
Mr. Scheuer. Well, no, you pulled this up. You said there
are millions of people out there----
Mr. Stewart. Professor, you are absolutely wrong on that. I
am going to move on, if we could.
Mr. Scheuer. I wish you would move on.
Mr. Stewart. For the rest of you, I would like to ask you
this: In the very brief time that we have, looking at something
like the attacks that we have seen in the last couple weeks
that many of us fear could happen here in the United States, on
a scale of 1 to 10, just generally your feeling, do you feel
that that is something that we should be very concerned with or
something that you think is still very unlikely here in the
United States?
Ms. Blanchard, could I just begin with you, your overall
assessment? Should we be very concerned, or maybe it is not
something that you would consider as an imminent threat?
Ms. Blanchard. Well, I am not an expert in homeland
security, but I would be very concerned about it.
Mr. Stewart. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Lovegrove.
Mr. Lovegrove. I believe from an attack point of view it is
already happening. It may not be the physical attacks that we
are witnessing elsewhere, perhaps in the United Kingdom, but
you are being attacked certainly on the internet, the
electronic platform. You are being attacked in terms of hearts
and minds, and they are being won over by people who are
focusing on the vulnerable. I would share the concerns of
others.
Mr. Stewart. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Stanek.
Sheriff Stanek. Mr. Chairman, Members, I do believe that I
am very concerned about that. I think it is already happening
here in terms of living, thriving, funding. We have had
prosecutions here. What is the difference whether they do it
here or they go overseas? The concern is that they are going to
stay here or come back here and commit those acts here in this
country. I think it is just a matter of time.
Mr. Stewart. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Mellor.
Mr. Mellor. Yes, Congressman. The retail industry is very
concerned. There has been a history of violence at shopping
centers and malls over the past 10 years. This escalation as it
has gone up now is very troubling and we are very concerned.
Mr. Stewart. Okay. Thank you.
Ms. Kostro.
Ms. Kostro. I am very concerned, and that concern is
growing. If you look at the last spate of attacks, the things
that they have in common, soft targets that are enclosed with
multiple entry points, at least 10 attackers, armed with
relatively low-technology equipment, automatic weapons, hand
grenades-type things that can be acquired on the market. So to
go back to my testimony, the motivation is growing for
international jihad that could be visited upon the U.S.
homeland and the capability is there.
Mr. Stewart. Okay. Thank you for all of you. It seems to be
unanimous.
Mr. Chairman, I apologize for going slightly over my time
and I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. No apology is necessary. It was a very
spirited debate.
I would caution the witness not to use vulgarity in this
hearing room.
With that, I recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much.
Mr. Mellor, as part of the Retail Federation's scope, are
you or your members routinely informed by DHS or some other
entity about terrorist-related activities or anything that
might happen on their properties?
Mr. Mellor. Yes, Ranking Member Thompson. We do have a good
handshake with Department of Homeland Security on this. The
passing of information to the National Retail Federation, it is
my responsibility to communicate it as appropriately to the
retail community. So in the way of conference calls and
messaging, reports that are appropriate to be able to pass
down, there is good communication, and I do serve on a couple
of different committees with the Department of Homeland
Security on this.
Mr. Thompson. Are there some things you think we could do
to improve the communication or are there some steps that you
think we might have missed in this process, are you comfortable
with where things are?
Mr. Mellor. I would say that we are not completely
comfortable with where things are in the way of--the timeliness
of passing information before it actually gets on to the news
is an issue that we deal with. Sometimes the news reporting
gets the information before we actually have a chance to react
to it and pass information down.
Mr. Thompson. A lot of times we have Classified briefings
and they tell us you can't tell anybody, and we go out and we
see it on the local newscast. So welcome to the club.
Sheriff, one of the issues we grapple with is, and in my
statement I talked about the dwindling Federal resources that
can go to local communities to support intelligence gathering,
information sharing, and training, so that you know who the
State counterparts are, the Federal counterparts. Do you see a
continued role for the Federal Government to provide funds at
the local level so that these kinds of things would go on?
Sheriff Stanek. Yeah, Mr. Chairman, Members, that is a
great question. By the way, in our fusion center, and I think
this committee knows what those are, we simply have CNN
installed. They have always got breaking news coming across the
bottom. It is the best place to get what is happening across
this country, really, truly, at the end of the day.
But in direct response to your question, the Federal grant
funding to help local law enforcement is extremely important.
Training, prevention, equipment, things that we can't do
ourselves, regionalized assets are really important to us.
Just 4, 5 weeks ago we had JCTAWS, joint counterterrorism
awareness training put on by the DHS in partnership with the
FBI and other Federal entities, and brought in everybody across
the board, from local law enforcement to Federal law
enforcement, to my friends in the private sector, hospitals,
and others. It was a good table-top exercise. It is what we
needed. We identified a number of gaps that we will use in the
future to close those gaps.
In Minnesota and particularly in my community and my
county, we work extremely well with our public-private
partnerships, like I said, the Mall of America, other
companies, and we believe those partnerships are extremely
strong. He should have the same information that I have when I
do my assessments and my risks, and likewise we should know
what he is finding on his properties. That is a sharing of
information that needs to continue in this country.
Mr. Thompson. I think you testified earlier that, in
addition to that, community engagement with local citizens is
an integral part of this process also.
Sheriff Stanek. Mr. Chairman, Members, it absolutely is.
Community engagement, building communities of trust, working
with the diaspora community, just like we work with all
communities, Latino, Asian, African American, Caucasian. It
really doesn't matter at the end of the day. Law enforcement
strategies do not change with one community to another. That is
why we talk about community-oriented police in order to build
those communities of trust.
But, again, it is a long-term relationship. It is not
something that you just flip that switch and it happens. You
have to work at it. You also have to be reflective of those
communities in which we serve.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCaul. I thank the Ranking Member.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from South
Carolina, Mr. Duncan.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just say I am glad that the United States stands
with Israel. I will say that we should support an ally in the
region, someone who is like-minded, a democratic government,
who believes in capitalism and free markets, and who also has a
people that worship the same god that we worship, and that is
the god of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. There is a lot of
commonality there, and so I am proud of that.
In the past 12 years terrorists have succeeded in attacking
the homeland four times: The intentional driving of an SUV into
the crowd of students at the University of North Carolina in
Chapel Hill in 2006; the shooting of an Army recruiting office
in Little Rock, Arkansas, in 2009; the shooting by U.S. Army
Major Hasan at Fort Hood in 2009; the bombings this year in
Boston. Of the 60 plots, 49 of those could be considered home-
grown terror plots. Sixty plots against the country, 49 could
be considered home-grown. This means that one or more of the
actors were either American citizens, legal permanent
residents, or visitors radicalized predominantly in the United
States.
The Washington Post reported this week, in the wake of the
recent special forces action in Somalia, that Obama's State
Department has since 2009 opposed attacking al-Shabaab training
camps because al-Shabaab was ``a hybrid organization in which
there was an element of East Africa, of al-Qaeda, and foreign
fighters, but the large mass of the group was concerned with
Somalia issues and had not signed up for global jihad.''
Ms. Blanchard, do you believe that this is an accurate
description of al-Shabaab?
Ms. Blanchard. I think, as I said in my testimony, it is
both. There are elements of al-Shabaab that are focused on a
global agenda and there are elements of al-Shabaab that are
focused on an agenda inside Somalia. You have members,
particularly among the foreign fighter contingent, that are
focused on international targets. You had two attacks in 2008
and then in June of this year on U.N. compounds inside Somalia.
The narrative publicly released by al-Shabaab about the
Westgate attack includes the specific intent to target
Westerners, Western diplomats, and civilians.
Mr. Duncan. So how do you see al-Shabaab evolving over the
next 10, 20 years?
Ms. Blanchard. Well, I don't want to project a future for
them of 20 years, but they are not going away. Military
advances by----
Mr. Duncan. Do you see them growing into an al-Qaeda-type
threat?
Ms. Blanchard. I think the trend is there. Their military
losses on the battlefield suggest that their ability to conduct
an insurgency is shrinking if we are able to sort of continue
those regional military advances. But what has developed and
very worryingly is a sort of parallel clandestine structure
called the Amniyat within al-Shabaab that Godane leads. It is
composed of both Somalis and foreigners, and it appears to be
structured in such a way that it can continue even if al-
Shabaab loses the territory it now controls.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you for that.
Ms. Kostro, what will that mean for U.S. homeland security?
Ms. Kostro. Well, as al-Shabaab or elements within it focus
more on international targets and knowing that there is a
strongly affiliated Somali-American diaspora here in the United
States, it could mean that their motivation for conducting an
attack on the U.S. homeland is growing. As I mentioned before,
they already have the capability to conduct small-scale attacks
against soft targets. Are going to see them attempt to do what
happened on 9/11? I don't believe so. However, will they do
something that happened at Westgate or Mumbai or even something
that happened in Russia with the Chechens in Beslan? I think
that danger is indeed growing.
Mr. Duncan. Okay. Thank you so much.
Last weekend our Navy SEALs conducted a daring operation in
Somalia to go after a key leader of al-Shabaab. According to
news reports, U.S. Navy SEALs under the cover of darkness
engaged hundreds of Somalis protecting the terrorist compound
after infiltrating from the sea. I am always awestruck by the
bravery of these incredible individuals that serve in our Navy
SEALs. Reportedly, the SEALs chose to withdraw after seeing
that al-Shabaab fighters were using children as human shields,
and the Pentagon noted the operation proves that we can apply
direct pressure on al-Shabaab at a time of our choosing. The
Pentagon justified its weekend actions in Somalia based on the
Authorization of Use of Military Force passed after 9/11. So do
you think that is justification for that?
Ms. Kostro. Do I think the AUMF is justification for----
Mr. Duncan. For our raid on the Somalis.
Ms. Kostro. Yes, that AUMF has actually been cited several
times in operations that we have supported in Somalia and I
believe it is a useful use of that AUMF recently.
Mr. Duncan. That was rhetorical.
I would just like to point out, my time has expired, but
point out that this operation occurred 15 days after the
cowardly mall shooting that al-Shabaab perpetrated in Nairobi.
It has been 393 days since the attack on our consulate in
Benghazi; 393 days since Benghazi was attacked and four
Americans lost their lives. Has the President taken any similar
steps to bring those terrorists to justice? The answer to that,
Mr. Chairman, is no. I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. I thank the gentleman.
The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Member for one
additional question.
Mr. Thompson. Ms. Kostro, you talked about the Somali
population having the capacity to do something here in the
United States. Is that any different from any other community
here in the United States having that capacity?
Ms. Kostro. In fact, it is not. To have the capacity to do
it you need Americans who are familiar with the territory, the
culture, the language. You need access to weapons. You need the
ability to move about freely. You need the training. So I
believe that can be said for any diaspora communities.
What is particular about the Somali-American community is
that they have reportedly felt increasingly marginalized and
discriminated against, according to reports that I have seen,
and that is sort of what sets them apart from similar diaspora
communities that may not feel as marginalized.
Mr. Thompson. We can talk about it, but I will pass.
Chairman McCaul. I thank the Ranking Member.
Let me just close, I want to give Mr. Lovegrove, since he
has traveled so many miles from London to come here, I just
want to give you kind of the final word on this. Similar to the
sheriff, you live in a community, Europe is a lot closer in
proximity to the threat, and you have to deal with this issue
really up-front, close, and personal. How you deal with that I
think could give some sort of lessons learned for us here in
the United States when it comes to homeland security.
Mr. Lovegrove. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think I am going
to speak as an ex-police officer but very much as a policing
point of view, and I think it would be helpful, hopefully.
We are focused totally on solutions, absolutely. We absorb
all the information from the fellow experts on the panel and
people like them in the United Kingdom and across the world,
but we then turn that intelligence, that academic and that feed
into activity. What we are doing in the United Kingdom is we
recognized a long time ago that the business community, the
local authorities, the local government, and the police service
are the tripartite that have a lot of solutions. What I mean by
that is developing joint working with the communities, getting
incredibly close to them, as Sheriff Stanek has already said.
But we have an immediate need to map the areas of activity
of the terrorists, because it is not just about people doing
hostile reconnaissance, it is not just about the internet. They
are operating in an enormous amount in environments that
change, because we develop solutions, they change their
tactics. We then have to develop new solutions and new
innovations.
So what we are doing at the moment, we are encouraging the
development of deradicalization centers, and that is staffed by
people who are ex-terrorists themselves, and we are in a
converse kind of way really pleased they are there. They have
converted back into peaceful solutions and we embrace that
energy.
We are providing contextual narrative for the youngsters
who are only hearing one part of the message of hate. We are
providing contextual narrative around what the West is all
about, what Christianity is all about, what other faiths we
should be focusing on, an appreciation of that strength.
We are focusing on early education-based interdiction, to
identify individuals before they turn into radicalized
individuals. We are very, very keen on that, and we are putting
an enormous amount of effort there.
We are identifying learning opportunities from former
jihadists, and that doesn't just mean about intelligence, about
ideology. We got that. What we are asking for them to focus and
help us on is the solutions that they think where we should be
focusing on to make sure that the community stays on the side.
We are promoting a better understanding of Western
political processes, democracy, and secularism. We are denying
jihadists the unchallenged platforms for preaching hate,
because we know where the platforms are and we are hand-in-hand
with identifying the platforms and challenging what they are
saying to the young and vulnerable. We are providing that
contextual narrative as well, and that is absolutely critical.
Two more points. We are promoting the recruiting of Muslim
scholars with a balanced teaching syllabus, because in the
United Kingdom, in the musallas and in the faith schools they
seem to be dominant, and we are providing financial and
institutional support to work centered within the community to
provide all these solutions.
Chairman McCaul. Just real quick, just following up on
Professor Scheuer's testimony, what is their source of hatred?
Mr. Lovegrove. In the United Kingdom we hear the young men
and women who are saying they are fighting for their brothers
and sisters and the injustice that the United Kingdom and the
coalition--and, of course, that means the United States and
others--providing a war abroad. They are soldiers who are
attacking the homeland, my homeland in the United Kingdom, to
bring the war back to us. So their focus is very much on what
we are doing abroad.
Chairman McCaul. For their brothers and sisters?
Mr. Lovegrove. Against their brothers and sisters, and they
are intent on meting out what they call justice to the Western
coalition.
Chairman McCaul. It is very interesting.
I want to thank the witnesses for an interesting and very
impassioned hearing and lively discussion. According to the
rules, the record will stay open for 10 days.
Without objection, the committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]