[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-89]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES HEARING
ON
FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE
AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST
FROM THE U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS
COMMAND AND THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 13, 2014
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
87-801 WASHINGTON : 2014
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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman
JEFF MILLER, Florida JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida Georgia
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
DUNCAN HUNTER, California DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York
CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York DEREK KILMER, Washington
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada SCOTT H. PETERS, California
Peter Villano, Professional Staff Member
Mark Lewis, Professional Staff Member
Julie Herbert, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2014
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, March 13, 2014, Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense
Authorization Budget Request from the U.S. Special Operations
Command and the Posture of the U.S. Special Operations Forces.. 1
Appendix:
Thursday, March 13, 2014......................................... 25
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 13, 2014
FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE
U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. SPECIAL
OPERATIONS FORCES
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats
and Capabilities............................................... 1
Thornberry, Hon. Mac, a Representative from Texas, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats and Capabilities 1
WITNESSES
Lumpkin, Hon. Michael D., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, Office of the
Secretary of Defense........................................... 2
McRaven, ADM William H., USN, Commander, U.S. Special Operations
Command........................................................ 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Lumpkin, Hon. Michael D...................................... 29
McRaven, ADM William H....................................... 42
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Gibson................................................... 60
Mr. Johnson.................................................. 59
Mr. Langevin................................................. 59
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Carson................................................... 67
Mr. Gibson................................................... 68
Mr. Thornberry............................................... 63
FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE
U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. SPECIAL
OPERATIONS FORCES
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging
Threats and Capabilities,
Washington, DC, Thursday, March 13, 2014.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:24 p.m., in
room HVC-210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Mac Thornberry
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MAC THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING THREATS
AND CAPABILITIES
Mr. Thornberry. The subcommittee will come to order.
Again, appreciate everyone's flexibility with rooms and
times. And we are anxious to have this open hearing, and then,
as Members know, we will continue in closed session downstairs
just across the hall from the Intelligence Committee once the
closed session has concluded.
I will just say welcome to our witnesses. I believe this
will be the first time that Assistant Secretary Lumpkin has
testified in front of our subcommittee.
We are glad to have you.
Admiral McRaven has been testifying a lot lately on both
this side and the other side of the Capitol.
We are always grateful for your openness and your
willingness to engage with this committee on all--a whole range
of issues, and that includes being here today.
So, with that, I will yield to the distinguished gentleman
from Rhode Island for any comments he would like to make.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
RHODE ISLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Lumpkin and Admiral McRaven, I want to thank you
very much for being here today. And we truly appreciate your
service to the Nation, and we certainly hope that you will pass
on our gratitude to all the men and women who serve under each
of you in your charge when you see them next. And, again, thank
you again for the work that you are doing.
The report of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR]
makes clear that our special operations forces [SOF] will
remain an integral part of the way the United States addresses
our global and national security interests today and in the
future.
Even as we draw down in Afghanistan, the QDR calls for the
growth in SOF and for them to remain decisively committed to
our fight against Al Qaeda. It also highlights their role in
dealing with other transnational threats, countering the
spread--or use of WMD [weapons of mass destruction] and, of
course, the critical part in helping to build the capacity of
our partner security forces as well.
Clearly it is a busy future for SOF, and even in our era of
reduced defense resources, that is why I am pleased to see
Secretary Lumpkin's renewed effort at strengthening SO/LIC's
[Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict's] oversight over
SOCOM [Special Operations Command] and ensuring that Admiral
McRaven's forces are properly trained, manned, and equipped.
I know that Admiral McRaven presented SOCOM's posture
statement to the full committee earlier this month, but I am
glad to see you here today together. It is not unlike the
service posture hearings we have at the full committee with the
service secretaries and the chiefs together.
Not to detract from the role the subcommittee plays but,
rather, to emphasize the importance of SOCOM and the role of
SO/LIC, perhaps this is the way the full committee should treat
SOCOM's posture statement in the future.
So now, as we proceed, I will be interested to hear if your
acquisition authorities remain flexible enough to provide SOF
what it needs without duplicating other service acquisition
efforts.
Are your research and development accounts funded so that
you can continue to set the pace to superior technology? Does
your set of existing authorities, both statutory and command,
provide you with the space in which to properly operate? And,
finally and most importantly, how are your people and their
families faring, and what can we do to help you take care of
them properly?
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I yield back.
Mr. Thornberry. I thank the gentleman.
Without objection, your full statements will be made a part
of the record.
And if you would like to summarize, Secretary Lumpkin--
again, thanks for being here--you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL D. LUMPKIN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Secretary Lumpkin. Thank you, Chairman Thornberry, Ranking
Member Langevin, distinguished members of the committee. Thank
you for your steadfast support for our special operators and
the U.S. Special Operations Command.
The authorities and appropriations that Congress has
provided the Department of Defense have allowed us to prosecute
the current fight and ensure we are prepared to confront
emerging threats and to protect the homeland.
I am pleased to testify here today with Admiral Bill
McRaven, who has expertly led the United States Special
Operations Command over the past 3 years.
The threat we face, especially from Al Qaeda, is continuing
to change. Although the scale of the threat to the homeland has
diminished, threats to our interests overseas are actually
increasing.
With their leadership depleting, Al Qaeda still retains
sanctuaries in remote areas of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen,
and Somalia. Terrorist organizations are also expanding in
Syria, North Africa, and the Sahel. The threat continues to
evolve. We must maintain pressure on terrorist organizations to
protect the homeland.
We are in a time of transition. We face a yet undetermined
drawdown in Afghanistan and new fiscal realities. It may become
more difficult to maintain pressure on Al Qaeda in their
traditional safe havens. I closely monitor how the cuts to the
services impact the readiness of USSOCOM.
We are assessing the impact on critical enablers. For
example, we are ensuring that the cuts to the ISR
[intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] fleet will not
erode our capabilities to find, fix, and finish targets. As we
transition in Afghanistan and redistribute SOF into other
theaters, we need to ensure our operations and maintenance
accounts are resourced to support operations.
In accordance with the fiscal year 2014 National Defense
Authorization Act, ASD [Assistant Secretary of Defense] SO/LIC
and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
Logistics are strengthening our roles in the oversight of
USSOCOM to maximize efficiencies and maintain oversight
responsibilities over Major Force Program-11 funds. These
include routine interactions between my staff and USSOCOM and
frequent dialogue between me and Admiral McRaven.
We owe the President the best strategic options to
accomplish our national security objectives. This includes--
this is conducted in close coordination and honest discussion
with the Congress as you exercise your oversight,
authorization, and appropriations responsibilities.
We are moving from a state of perpetual war to perpetual
engagement, engaging with partners to build their capacity,
engaging problems before they become too big to fix, and
engaging in direct and indirect action to disrupt and destroy
our enemies.
As we move towards a globally networked perpetual
engagement, our efforts are grounded in experiences that
demonstrate the success of this approach. Colombia and
Philippines are case studies in how small investment of SOF
resourced for an enduring timeframe can have positive results.
In the Philippines, a task force of about 500 special
operators and supporting general purpose forces helped degrade
a serious transnational terrorist threat from Abu Sayyaf and
Jamaah Islamiyah.
In Colombia, we provided counterinsurgency training and
humanitarian assistance to prevent narcotics traffickers from
developing sanctuaries. This effort in Colombia not only
resulted in a far more secure and prosperous nation now, it has
emerged as a great exporter of regional security.
We have the same opportunities in Africa and the Middle
East. Our support to the French in the Sahel has been critical
in stemming the tide of extremism in Mali.
Modest support to AMISOM [African Union Mission to Somalia]
in the Horn of Africa has helped reverse the trajectory of al-
Shabaab. These discrete activities and operations constitute a
global SOF network required for perpetual vigilance.
I am proud to represent the sailors, soldiers, airmen,
marines, and civilians of USSOCOM. Their sacrifice in this war
are immense. Since October 2001, 385 special operators have
been killed in action and another 2,160 have been wounded.
I am committed to do everything I possibly can to ensure
these brave warriors have the best training, equipment, and
support we can provide. Working closely with Congress, we will
surely have the right strategies and policies in place to
employ them effectively.
Thank you for your support, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Lumpkin can be found
in the Appendix on page 29.]
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
Admiral.
STATEMENT OF ADM WILLIAM H. MCRAVEN, USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
Admiral McRaven. Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member
Langevin, distinguished members of the committee, thank you
again for the opportunity to address you today.
I would also like to recognize my friend and colleague,
Assistant Secretary Michael Lumpkin. Mike and I have a long
history together, and I greatly value ASD SO/LIC's partnership
and oversight of USSOCOM.
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to say that, since my last
hearing, SOCOM has made some great strides in dealing with
current conflicts, preparing for the future conflicts, and,
most importantly, taking care of our people.
SOCOM continues to provide the finest warriors in the world
to the fight in Afghanistan and, as we approach the end of
2014, your special operations forces will be ready to adjust to
whatever decisions are made regarding our future employment in
that country.
Globally, we are developing plans to better serve the
geographic combatant commanders [GCCs] and the chiefs of
mission who, owing to the past 12 years of engagement in Iraq
and Afghanistan, have gone under-resourced with SOF forces.
SOCOM, as the Department of Defense's [DOD] synchronizer
for the war on terrorism, is also working hard to help better
coordinate our activities locally, regionally, and globally
with both the GCCs and the U.S. ambassadors.
I believe the future of U.S. special operations will be in
helping to build partner capacity with those willing nations
who share our interest. This will mean strengthening our
existing allied relationships and building new ones. No nation
alone can stem the rise of extremism. We need our friends and
allies more now than ever before.
Our future as a special operations force is also
inextricably linked to the general purpose force in the
interagency. The past 12 years have shown us that a whole-of-
government effort is required to be successful against
extremism, and in SOF we have always, always, relied heavily on
our fellow soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines for support
around the globe.
Finally, we have gone to great lengths to take care of our
most precious resource, our people. The Preservation of the
Force and Families initiative, or the POTFF, has already seen a
marked improvement in the morale and well-being of those who
serve in SOF. While we still suffer from the tragedy of high
suicide rates, I believe we have laid the foundation for
keeping our force and their families strong and resilient into
the future.
Once again, sir, thank you for your interest and unwavering
support for the men and women in the special operations
community and to those members of the committee, thank you. I
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral McRaven can be found in
the Appendix on page 42.]
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you. I appreciate the testimony of
you both.
Admiral, I was struck when you testified in the full
committee posture hearing, and I believe you said, essentially,
the most important thing we can do to fight terrorism is
working with others. And you just reiterated that the future of
special operations is building partnership capacity.
Have I got that right as far as the most important thing we
can do, in your view, to fight terrorism?
And then, secondly, my perception is we are very good, best
in the world, at a variety of direct action and so forth, but
we are still evolving our authorities, our organizations, our
skills even, on building partnership capacity, this thing that
you say is the most important.
Do you agree with my perception of where we are?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, I do. And to maybe not clarify my
words, but to add some emphasis on this, I think the most
important thing to kind of fight the extremist threat that is
out there is keep the pressure on them.
I think the way we do that in the special operations
community is by building partner capacity so that the host
nation where the extremists live, they can take care of their
own security problems.
So I do think that that is the best tool we have,
recognizing, however, that we are always going to have to be in
a position to conduct direct action against those
irreconcilables.
Mr. Thornberry. Okay. Let me just ask one other question
right quick.
I had a Member of Congress within the past few weeks come
to me and say, ``Look at how much money Special Operations is
asking for in the President's budget. That is nearly as much
money as the Marine Corps is asking for, and they have a lot
fewer people.''
What is your answer to the question of why Special
Operations Command, with fewer people, requires the funding
that it does require?
I mean, it is one of the only--one of only--really, two
areas in the budget where funding is going up was special
operations and cyber.
But what is your answer to folks who say, ``Why is this so
expensive?''
Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir. The fact of the matter is it
takes a lot to kind of grow a special operations operator. So
when you look at the time from the time we bring them into the
SOF community--and most of them, historically, the data will
show that they spend about 7 to 8 years in the general purpose
force.
So you see the general purpose force already picks up a
certain amount of the financing of the base-level training. So
by the time they hit, you know, E-5, some of them E-6, that is
when they come into the special operations community.
Then to really make them world-class in--whether that is
language, cultural training, direct action training,
reconnaissance, it just takes more to train an average SOF
soldier than it does a basic infantryman in the Marine Corps or
in the Army.
And, obviously, as we look at the technology that we are
able to apply against a problem set, that really isn't
scalable, to some degree, across broad brigades or battalions.
It is scalable if you want to provide everybody in your
squad a radio. If you want to make sure that ISR is supporting
a platoon or an ODA [official development assistance] level
operation, we have the resources to do that because it requires
special technology and specially trained people to do the
missions that we are being asked to do.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you again, gentlemen.
So, Admiral McRaven, as you--I am sure you know that this
committee has been very interested in support of the
development and fielding of directed-energy weapons to support
military applications, and we understand that SOCOM, supported
by JIEDDO [Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat
Organization], has been funding development of a manned
portable high-energy laser system to address SOCOM particular
needs.
Could you talk a little bit about the status of this
development effort as well as what actions have been taken to
test and potentially field such a weapons system.
Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir. As you point out, we have been
working with the JIEDDO. They have provided us some funding to
do some initial testing with the manned portable high-energy
weapons.
I do think that we have a future in looking at the high-
energy weapons. The problems we have right now, of course, is
we are going through to make sure that we are in compliance
with the law.
The laser safety law is something we have to make sure that
whatever manned portable device we have is compliant with that,
and then there are some health laws and others that we have got
to take into consideration as we are doing the testing.
We have done some basic-level testing in the continental
United States. The results of that I have not seen, sir; so, I
am happy to get back to you and take that one for the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 59.]
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Admiral.
And right now what is the current status of SOCOM's
Undersea Mobility Program? And what gaps do you foresee?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, we have two areas in our Undersea
Mobility that we are looking at. We have a smaller version, a
wet submersible, the SWCS [shallow water combat submersible] we
refer to it, and then we have our dry combat submersible.
So the dry combat submersible, we currently have a vessel
that we are leasing, and we are doing some test and evaluation
on that. And then we have two prototypes that are being built,
one in the U.K. [United Kingdom] and one in Italy.
The eventual program of record is looking at a total of
three dry combat submersibles. This really puts us in a
position to have our SEALs [Sea, Air and Land forces] in this
case, but other operators, in a dry environment as they transit
from point A to point B.
The shallow water combat submersible, the SWCS, is a new
variation, new technology based on our old SEAL delivery
vehicle. So a wet submersible, a little bit more limited
capability than the dry submersible.
But, frankly, we need both. The wet submersible will be
able to get into regions where the dry submersible will not,
but you have to have both capabilities. So we are looking at a
program of record of about 10 shallow water combat
submersibles.
The dry combat submersible, sir, is on track, and we are
pleased with the direction we are heading. We have been working
with the Navy on classifying this, as you know, classification,
making sure that we are meeting industry standards for dry
combat submersibles, and the Navy again has been working with
us and doing this.
This submersible, the dry combat submersible, will not be
attached to a larger submarine. So that actually allows me to
buy down some of the risk as we are building the vessel itself.
The shallow water submersible, again, we are working with
the Navy in developing that. And while we have had a little bit
of slippage in the development because it is a new piece of
equipment, I am confident we will be on track to produce the
right number, sir.
Mr. Langevin. And I know that the submersible--that we had
problem--technical problems with those in the past.
Have those been substantially overcome?
Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir. In fact, sir, that is why we are
actually going through an industry standard and looking at
prototypes before we get into a final build.
So by looking at how industry works their dry submersibles,
we think we are going to learn a lot in terms of kind of a
systemic approach to building the dry submersible that industry
is very good at doing.
And then we will take the lessons learned from there and
incorporate them into our long-term dry combat submersible.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
So the Secretary of Defense has recently commented that SOF
will grow to 69,700 personnel from roughly 67,000 today, and
the fiscal year 2015 budget request includes this growth with
declining budgets.
How will you ensure that this force will not become hollow?
How will you ensure you are not choosing quantity over quality?
And this is for both witnesses.
Secretary Lumpkin. I think the key is, when we look at the
numbers of SOF, we are not actually--even though from a
programmatic view it is 72,000 going down to the 69,700, that
is not actually a cut in the force. It is actually just
stemming the growth of the force.
So because it has been a metered and well thought-out
process on how we would grow the force, I think that we are
definitely in a position and a trajectory to make sure that the
force is robust.
What I am concerned most about is the cuts in the other
services that provide the enablers for U.S. Special Operations
Command. These are the things that are not organic to them,
whether it is the ships that support them or, as I mentioned in
my opening comments, the ISR that supports them.
So that is what I am diligently working on and focusing on
because that is my greatest concern on making sure SOF
maintains its capabilities. The services have been absolutely
great, but there are competing requirements that they are
having to resource. So I am working diligently with them to
make sure that doesn't happen.
Mr. Langevin. Admiral, do you care to comment?
Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir.
The only thing I would add is our basic qualification
courses that we do at basic SEAL training or the special forces
qualification course we have had to ramp up over the years as
the demand signal for SOF increased.
So now we are fortunate to have the infrastructure in place
to be able to meet the demand signal of the increasing force
size. So I am not concerned at all, sir, that the quality of
our force will diminish.
I can tell you from my experience the quality now is better
than it has ever been, and I am pleased to say--and that is
across the board with our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
marines, sir.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. Thank you, Admiral.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I yield back.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, gentlemen.
Just to remind all Members, after this open session, we
will head downstairs for a closed session, hopefully, all
before votes resume.
The gentleman from New York, Mr. Gibson.
Mr. Gibson. Well, thanks, Mr. Chairman.
And I welcome the panelists as well and express my deep
gratitude for your leadership and to your command for their
achievements and their sacrifices and their families.
I am going to ask a question on integration and
cooperation, recognizing we are in open session here, fully
understanding that, but also recognizing that the American
people are looking for confidence in what we are doing.
So to the degree that you can bring it up to in the
unclassified level, your response helps me communicate so we
can keep that confidence going.
In 2009, a radicalized youth gets on an aircraft and is en
route to our country, lights himself on fire, and it is not our
system that saves us. It is really a brave soul on the aircraft
puts him out.
And it turns out that weeks prior this young man's father
had called our country and--expressing that he didn't recognize
his son, that he was talking crazy talk that he could attack
our country.
And when I had a chance to come here in 2011, I chatted
with Admiral Olson, and I asked him--I said, ``Did that call
ever land on your desk?'' And he said, ``No.''
And so, you know, working with General Clapper, we worked
an amendment in the intel authorization bill to try to, you
know, take some of the effective action that I saw firsthand in
Iraq in terms of flattening intelligence, linking it with
operations, and trying to elevate that up to a national-level
asset.
And about 10 months or so later he came back and said,
``You know, we are making progress on the cloud in terms of
sharing information and, also, budgeting so that we can have
better integration.''
So I am interested in hearing how we have been doing in the
last year on integration within the whole of government--I
appreciate your opening remarks on that score--and then, also,
cooperation.
I couldn't agree more, associate myself, with the remarks
talking about how important it is that we work with our friends
and allies.
And I think that goes across the whole of government as
well in terms of our diplomacy and how we work and interact
with countries across the world.
And then, of course, as--part of that is the deterrent and
when deterrence fails and when we have irreconcilables, is
taking direct action there.
So I am interested in that and certainly understanding the
classification, but to the extent that I could get a response
that helps me communicate to the public the confidence that I
have with you.
Secretary Lumpkin. The collaboration on the intelligence
front within the interagency is phenomenal. I mean, my
relationship with the folks at NCTC [National Counterterrorism
Center], CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], FBI [Federal Bureau
of Investigation], DHS [Department of Homeland Security]--I
mean, and it is just not my relationships. It is the
departments and how we dialogue and we discuss.
So we are firing on all eight cylinders. I mean, the
machine is working. So I feel very confident on the information
and intelligence sharing that is happening.
The other piece is the information and intelligence with
our allies and our partners, and that becomes--because this is
truly a global challenge that we are facing, the security of
the United States, because many of the threats, of course, come
from outside the country. And that is a work in progress.
I mean, as we build our relationships and we continue to
build the partner capacity, part of this is to make sure we can
also have this information and intelligence sharing across the
national security spectrum.
Admiral McRaven. And, sir, I would echo the Secretary's
comments.
You know, I have a personal and professional relationship
with Tish Long at NGA [National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency]; Mike Flynn at DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency]; John
Brennan at CIA; Jim Clapper, DNI [Director of National
Intelligence]; Matt Olson at NCTC. I mean, these are personal
and professional friends, and they do not hesitate to reach out
to me personally if they think there is intelligence that is
worth knowing.
But in the case of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the underwear
bomber you were referring to, I am not sure we will ever be
good enough to see, you know, these individuals that are
radicalized out in the middle of Yemen, in his case, just
because, no matter how good our intelligence gets, it is very
difficult sometimes to get that detailed and that in-depth on a
particular target.
So this is why I think, again, we need to continue to build
our relationships with other host nations so that they may see
things that we don't see. And those relationships, sir, as you
indicated, they need to be at the intelligence community level,
the law enforcement, the mil to mil, the diplomatic levels.
And I am a very big believer in partnering, and I think
this is where the tripwires will be crossed in our ability to
find threats that maybe our intelligence community wasn't
looking for, but the law enforcement community was, or just
somebody comes in from the tribal region and says, ``Hey,
something doesn't seem right here.''
So--but, again, I would echo the Secretary's sentiments
that our relationship today is as good as I have ever seen it
in my 37 years of doing this.
Mr. Gibson. Well, thanks, gentlemen. My time is just about
expired.
So I would ask for the record, if you have recommendations
as we move towards the mark where we could continue this trend,
whether it be with regard to resources or approvals,
authorities, would welcome that.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 60.]
Mr. Gibson. And I thank you, gentlemen.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Secretary Lumpkin and Admiral McRaven, thank you for
being here. It is good to see you both.
I wanted to ask you first, Secretary Lumpkin, about the
Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office [CTTSO]. And you
mentioned that in your statement, and I certainly have been
very supportive of a whole-of-government approach.
Could you share with us, I think, why this investment is
critical?
But I also at the same time know that we have a development
and acquisition center. It seems like there is several
different entities, and I suspect they interact, but I am a
little concerned.
Is there replication and--or duplication, really? And what
about the other services? Is there some way--as we talk about
cost, is there some way that some of that effort maybe could be
more helpful to the other services or vice versa? I mean, how
much of this is going on that we could streamline a little bit
more?
Secretary Lumpkin. Thank you for the question.
The Counterterrorism Technical Support Office, or CTTSO, is
truly a unique enterprise in the fact that it partners with not
only the State Department, but each of the services, the
combatant commands, and our international allies in order to
work research and development projects.
So we have U.S.-U.K. projects. We are working projects in
support of the U.S. Army where we can actually do cost-sharing
and bring monies together for a common goal.
So it truly is a place where we do exactly what you are
saying, is that we can support people's requirements and we can
leverage it across the entire defense sector not only in the
United States, but, also, with our partners.
So we can take an idea, whether it is a new type of
ammunition that we need to look at in our support of special
operations or even law enforcement, and then we can work
together to do the development and then share the results and
maybe even find a company or a technology that can provide
something that we truly don't have today.
So it is----
Mrs. Davis. So is that different from DARPA [Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency] or does DARPA interface with
that?
Secretary Lumpkin. There are discussions that go on. DARPA
and CTTSO--CTTSO is largely focused on truly the combating
terrorism piece, whereas the DARPA has a much larger----
Mrs. Davis. Larger frame.
Secretary Lumpkin [continuing]. Aperture that they are
looking at.
So the other piece of it is the CTTSO gives us the ability
to--if there is a project that we want to put in the future and
we see it coming, we can do the initial research and
development in order to support a future project. So it is
quite agile and gives us the flexibility to do what we need.
Mrs. Davis. Admiral McRaven, did you want to comment on
that? And can we--maybe could we save in some other areas if we
put, you know, really the resources that you need to do this
right? And do you have those resources today? Do you think that
we do?
Secretary Lumpkin. I think, again, the beauty of CTTSO in
itself is that it is not just DOD money. I mean, because we are
taking money--I mean, leveraging money from the interagency as
well as the international community. So we have this pooling of
resources for a common goal, and I think that is the real
beauty of it.
Mrs. Davis. Is there also a way--and we know from certainly
the San Diego community and others that there are many
businesses that would like to be engaged in some way, and
sometimes what they share with us is it is very difficult for
them to get the attention for something.
And I am just wondering, how do you do that in terms of the
business piece to that so that we can bring those things
online, innovate quickly, and get the job done?
Secretary Lumpkin. Well, we have an open forum for business
that we do once a year before--and make sure they understand
what we anticipate the requirements are.
In fact, I just did the opening comments for it here last
month. So I think it is generally the first week in February we
do that.
So we open it to business. We did it at the Reagan Center
this year, and we had over 600 businesses in attendance who
came to see what we were looking for at the future.
Mrs. Davis. Admiral McRaven, General Dunford was with us
this morning talking about Afghanistan and where the gains--the
good stories and some of the concerns.
What are your concerns when it comes to their special ops
forces?
Admiral McRaven. Ma'am, I am very confident in their
special ops forces. In fact, I just received a detailed brief
today from our folks in Afghanistan.
We are very pleased, very proud, of the great work the
Afghans have done and that, frankly, my forces have done in
training them. I think they have a very capable commando
element, special forces element, and we are pleased with the
development of the Afghan Local Police.
So I think, as long as we can continue to be in a position
to shepherd these forces as they go forward into the future--
and it doesn't require a lot to do that, but I do think we need
to continue to be in a position to train, advise, and assist
for a little bit longer in order to make sure that all the
processes that General Dunford and General Allen before him and
others before them have put in place and make sure those are
functioning processes, pay, maintenance, those sorts of things.
I think, if we can get to that point, then they will be
successful in the future. And so we certainly look forward to
having the opportunity to continue to partner with our great
Afghan special forces.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
Mr. Thornberry. Mrs. Hartzler.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, gentlemen, for your service.
In your testimony, Secretary Lumpkin, you mentioned the
advances that Colombia has achieved. And I just had the
opportunity to go with Chairman McKeon on a CODEL
[congressional delegation] to Colombia, Chile, Brazil, and
Panama, and I was so impressed with what the Colombian people
and the military has done and how they have really taken it to
the FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia] and they have
pushed them down and now they are in negotiations on that
operation.
But while we were there, the general in charge was very
adamant, saying, ``We are on the 10-yard line. We are so close,
but please don't leave us yet. The game is not over and, if you
leave, it would be a game-changer for us. We need that.''
So considering advances there that you mentioned in your
testimony, how much longer do you anticipate that we will be
engaged there with them? And what level of involvement do you
foresee us pursuing still with them?
Secretary Lumpkin. Thank you for the question, because, you
know, it is interesting from my days. I mean, my first time in
Colombia was in the late 1980s when I was in uniform at the
time. To see where it has gone from that period to now is
amazing.
And they are--the comment was absolutely correct, on the
10-yard line, and we need to make sure we sustain our presence
and partnership with the Colombians in this effort.
I think the key is that we looked at it from the outset,
when the development of Plan Colombia came into place, was--is
that it was going to be an enduring commitment on our part.
And we--when we looked at it for that way, we knew that we
weren't looking--we weren't playing the short game here. It was
going to be the long game, and we focused on that.
And the enemy gets a vote, you know, as far as how long it
is going to go; so, I am hesitant to say that it is going to be
X number of years or months or what have you. But I think that
the fruits of our labor and our efforts and the resources, it
is a tremendous return on investment long term.
And I think it has served as a model that we could use in
other regions and other areas and countries that--where there
are challenges, because there is many countries that are
challenging for us now that aren't near as bad as the situation
that Colombia was in the late 1980s.
Mrs. Hartzler. It did give me hope for other countries.
And do you see it possibly being used as a model for
Mexico? I know that NORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command] has added
a Special Operations Command, North there to establish that. So
what lessons do you think that we can translate from Colombia
to, say, Mexico?
Secretary Lumpkin. I am kind of hesitant to say which
country it would go to. But I think the key is that there has
to be a comprehensive plan that is supported by the interagency
that we make a commitment to and we know, again, it is a
mindset of having the long game here and that there is going to
be this enduring commitment to see it through to the end and
having very clear metrics that we had with the Colombians and
the Colombians clearly had skin in the game, which was key.
And so it is about everybody sitting around a table,
understanding, with tremendous support from the Congress, and
making sure that this was resourced. And it wouldn't have
happened if the Congress had not been decisively engaged at the
beginning.
Mrs. Hartzler. If you were to list the five things--and
that is what I kept trying to narrow down while I was there--
what were the keys to the success here that we could translate
to other countries?
And some of the answers that I got was, one, first of all,
the people have to stand up, have to be fed up with it. The
people of the country have to say enough is enough and be
willing to get behind leadership.
And the second thing they said was to have strong
leadership within their own government, willing to take them
on, who are not corrupt and that sort of thing, but then having
our engagement, too.
Now, those are three things from just visiting with a few
people. But I would like to hear your top five things, lessons
from Colombia, why has that worked or why is it working, that
we can translate to others.
Secretary Lumpkin. If I could, just off the top of my head,
I think that the top five things would be, first of all, as you
mentioned, the people, but it is also a sense of nationalism.
They saw themselves as a cohesive unit as a country. And I
think that is actually key because it wasn't fragmented.
The other one was the interagency commitment and the
support of the U.S. Congress on our part and that we could
enter something knowing that we were looking at a long-term
relationship. So we weren't rushing against timelines, but,
rather, had key milestones because it was milestone-based.
I think that the other piece is it was resourced to the
level that it needed to be resourced. And I believe that we--
and my final one here is because there was a commitment and we
had the relationship and the skin in the game of the Colombian
people.
Mrs. Hartzler. Very good.
Secretary Lumpkin. Thank you.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you for all you do.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral McRaven, you along with General Odierno and General
Amos have embraced the concept of the human domain in a white
paper entitled ``Strategic Landpower'' with great vigor.
This concept is built upon the lessons of the decade of war
from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff along with his
staff, and that noted--and it noted that the failure to
understand the operational environment was the primary reason
for the problems encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Do you agree with that assessment? And, if so, why?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, we have had a great conversation
between the Commandant, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and
myself about the human domain.
My point has always been you have to take the population
into consideration, I think, regardless of what you are doing,
whether it is a major conflict or whether it is an insurgency.
And as we look at the human domain as kind of the totality
of the cultural, the ethnic, the social fabric that makes up
the people that live in a particular area, you have to know
that before you can make any decisions, whether those are, you
know, large maneuver decisions for the Army, expeditionary
decisions for the Marine Corps or counterinsurgency decisions
for SOF.
So the human domain, to me, really is a fundamental area
where we in the special operations community have to focus our
time and our attention. We have to understand everything about
the culture before we, you know, go off and make decisions that
are going to affect those people in a certain area.
Mr. Johnson. And thank you.
Does a program like the Human Terrain System support the
human domain concept?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, I am only vaguely familiar with the
Human Terrain System. We have a number of programs out there
that look at the human terrain. I am not familiar with that
exact system.
Having said that, we have a number of systems that layer
our knowledge of the human terrain. So if you look at a valley
in Kunar Province, for example, the systems we have out there
can tell you the ethnicity, they can tell you the cultural
ties, they can tell you the tribal relationships.
They can begin to layer this information one on top of the
other. That gives us a much better appreciation for the
dynamics in a certain region in Kunar or in Latin America or in
Africa or wherever.
So we use a number of systems to, again, layer that
information so we have a better understanding of the problem
set we are dealing with.
Mr. Johnson. Do you think that SOCOM would be a good fit
for the Human Terrain System?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, if I can take that for the record and
get back to you. Again, I am not personally familiar with that
specific system, but I will find out and get back to you, sir.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 59.]
Mr. Johnson. All right. Thank you.
What status of operations--excuse me.
What special operations forces core mission areas and
activities remain of critical importance to United States
national security? In other words, given fiscal constraints,
what should remain off of the chopping block to ensure that we
do not hollow out the forces?
Secretary Lumpkin. All of the core missions that are
codified in Title 10 remain valid and necessary; so, I don't
recommend shedding any mission sets from the U.S. Special
Operations Command inventory.
Mr. Johnson. Okay. According to the May 2013 Presidential
Policy Guidance on standards and procedures for the use of
force in counterterrorism operations outside the United States
and areas of active hostility, lethal action may only be taken
in the case that an assessment has been made that capture is
not feasible at the time of the operation.
Which individuals or which entity is responsible for making
the original determination that capture of any given target is
not feasible?
Secretary Lumpkin. We have an interagency process that
works and discusses that particular issue and makes
recommendations.
Mr. Johnson. What would be the titles of those interagency
personnel?
Secretary Lumpkin. PPD-1, which is the Presidential Policy
Directive Number 1, outlines the process for decisionmaking
along this way.
So, normally, it is a process of interagency meetings,
deputies meetings, principals meetings, and ultimate
recommendations.
Mr. Johnson. So it is a collective decision?
Secretary Lumpkin. It is a process that works through where
we make sure everybody's concerns and equities are known. It
makes recommendations.
Mr. Johnson. How quickly can it be called to act?
Secretary Lumpkin. Quite rapidly, when necessary.
Mr. Johnson. All right. Thank you.
Secretary Lumpkin. Thank you.
Mr. Thornberry. Mr. Nugent.
Mr. Nugent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I want to thank the Secretary and Admiral McRaven again
for you being here in the last 2 weeks.
And, Admiral, I really do appreciate your candor in regards
to how you have discussed issues, particularly as it relates to
our conventional forces.
Obviously, I know we are here about SOCOM, but you can't
have one without the other, and I think sometimes people get
somewhat confused about that.
And just for my good friend, Mr. Johnson, I mean, if you
are ever interested in finding out what the criteria is and how
decisions are made, we do have that in classified setting that
goes over those particular issues, because I had the same
concerns that you had, Mr. Johnson. So the committee has done a
good job in that.
But, Admiral, today was the first time I heard that we were
not going to use the dry combat submersible off of a submarine.
Did I hear that correctly?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, we have--right now our path is to
take a look at what we have in terms of prototypes out there.
So, as I said, we are leasing one vessel. We have two
prototypes we are building.
However, the intent right now is, because we think our
major platform, the SSGN [nuclear-powered guided missile
submarine], is scheduled for retirement in the mid-2020s, we
are preparing to be in a position, you know, not to build a
submarine that is tied necessarily to the SSGN or to the
follow-on vessel.
Now, having said that, we are absolutely, absolutely,
looking at alternatives that would mate to a U.S. submarine.
Right now, however, these prototypes are designed to industry
standards first, and then we will learn from the industry
standards to make a decision on what the final product will
look like.
Mr. Nugent. Obviously, to do that, I mean, you do have to
have some type of a dry facility on the sub--on the deck of a
sub.
Admiral McRaven. No, sir. Not necessarily.
Mr. Nugent. Okay.
Admiral McRaven. So there--I mean, there are alternatives
out there that would imply that you do not necessarily have to
have a hangar, as we think of it----
Mr. Nugent. Right.
Admiral McRaven [continuing]. In order to be able to launch
a dry submersible.
So, again, while we are not heading down that path right
now, we are looking at alternatives that would put us in a
position, if necessary, to be able to have the dry combat
submersible launched from a U.S. submarine.
Mr. Nugent. Having the ability to do that, launch it from a
submarine, does that increase your capabilities?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, it does. Clearly, the clandestine
nature of a large submarine puts us in a position to gain the
element of surprise in certain areas.
However, having said that, you know, without going into too
much detail in the open session, we have good tactics and good
procedures that can get us close enough and, as we build the
technology, we think we will be in a position with the dry
combat submersible to meet most of our targets that we have
looked at.
Mr. Nugent. Both of these submersibles that you are talking
about, the dry and the wet, replace--what is the legacy model
sitting out there?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, the legacy model now on the wet side
is the SEAL Delivery Vehicle or the Swimmer Delivery Vehicle
[SDV], Mark 8, Mod--I'm not sure where we are now--Mod 3, Mod
4. I was raised on the Mark 8 SDV almost 30 years ago.
We have continued to upgrade it, however, and the
technology on the Mark 8 today is reasonably good. But,
frankly, the new technology that is coming online will make the
next shallow water combat submersible really a generational
leap beyond what the current capacity is.
We have no dry combat submersible in the inventory right
now. Our Advanced SEAL Delivery System is no longer active. So,
we are down to--we have no capability within the dry side.
Mr. Nugent. And the wet obviously limits you in regards to
distance that you can travel based upon the operator's ability
to operate after being exposed to extremely cold water.
Is there anything else that is, I guess--is big Navy on
board with the opportunity to utilize a dry combat submersible
housed somewhere on another submarine to be named?
Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir. So we are partnered with the
Navy in this process. One of the reasons we are going with the
industry standard is because, if you mate a dry submersible now
with a Navy vessel--with a Navy submarine, then you have to
comply with Navy standards.
And, frankly, we think the industry standards are good
enough for our operations right now. If we had to do it in
compliance with the Navy standards now, we think it would cost
much more to meet those standards and may not, may not, give us
a better capability.
So that is why we are exploring a number of different
options, to find out whether or not the industry standards will
be good enough for our future dry combat submersibles.
Mr. Nugent. And I would think as we--you know, as we move
along and budgets are tight, that is a good way to go, looking
at industry standards, because every time we try to invent a
new mousetrap--I hate to say it--one of my sons has one of
those on his leg when he flies a Black Hawk--not too good.
So I appreciate it. And, Admiral, we are certainly here to
support you. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank the gentleman.
All sorts of implications for the larger acquisition reform
effort in the exchange that you all just had, it seems to me.
Mr. Carson.
Mr. Carson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Lumpkin, looking across the globe and considering
the threat of transnational terrorism, what are your largest
concerns? What are we assuming? Where are we assuming risk in
current strategies? And are we postured to counter these
threats?
Secretary Lumpkin. Not only am I the Acting Assistant
Secretary for Special Operations, but I am also performing the
duties of the Under Secretary for Policy right now. So I have
an opportunity to take a--I have a much broader view than I
would normally have just looking at it from the SOF
perspective.
The world is just a much smaller place now. So when you ask
what are the threats and--I would say the threat is it is
coming from everywhere, I mean, in the sense that it is
totally--space is fungible now. People can move from place to
place, and the world is just much smaller.
So there aren't--while there are lines where the threat
comes more directly, it can come from anywhere. So, for us, it
is about having that--truly a global presence and having this
networked approach that USSOCOM has built so well, as to making
sure that each of the theater special operations commands and
the SOF operators across--and there is--each geographic
combatant commander has a TSOC, a theater special operations
command--has got the ability to talk to each other.
And each one of them now works in supporting the geographic
combatant command, but for Admiral McRaven at USSOCOM, and he
has the ability to synchronize their operations. And I think
that is key to--that allows me to sleep at night so I am not
worrying about this and it keeps me up.
So I think we are postured for success, but the key is just
making sure that that global SOF network remains resourced,
active, and viable.
So would you like to add something?
Admiral McRaven. Well, I am glad you are sleeping at night.
But I will tell you that the Secretary nailed it. When we
talk about kind of the evolution of U.S. special operations--
and I appreciate the opportunity to roll this out--you know, we
have had a special operations enterprise for decades. We have
been globally dispersed for the last 27 years that USSOCOM has
been around.
Now that global enterprise--because of our ability to bring
them together with communications, now we have taken those
thousand disparate nodes and we have connected them through
communications.
And starting last October we established a very disciplined
what we call battle rhythm. So video teleconferences--whereas
the Secretary said I have four video teleconferences a week, my
staff has them every day with the entire network now.
And so we talk about the global SOF network. That is just
the name. The enterprise has been there forever. Communications
has allowed us to connect those various nodes, and now we can
better meet the geographic combatant commander's requirements
because we are much better synchronized.
And so the Secretary exactly characterized it. But the
point I wanted to raise is, for decades, we have had thousands
of people out on the battlefield. Until recently we haven't
been able to connect them globally through both communications
and authorities, and now we have that ability.
Mr. Carson. To that point, Admiral, I have been interested
in some time in service member mental health, particularly
providing mental health assessments throughout deployment.
Can you give us some assessment of SOCOM's embedded
behavioral health programs and the impact that they have had on
resiliency, for that matter, in your units?
Admiral McRaven. Sir, thank you for the question.
We have our program called the Preservation of the Force
and Families. And my predecessor, Admiral Eric Olson, did a
lengthy task force study before I took command, spent about 10
months looking at--talked to 7,000 soldiers, about a thousand
spouses, 440 different units.
That report landed on my desk when I took command, and
clearly what the report showed was that the force was frayed.
And I can tell you in the last, you know, almost 3 years that I
have been in command, the force has continued to fray.
But I am confident now that, as this body has provided us
the resources necessary, we are getting ahead of the problems.
So we are investing in the psychological performance, we are
investing in the physical performance capabilities, and we are
investing in family resiliency.
And we think the family resiliency piece is absolutely
critical, and we do so with the support of the services. We
leverage every service program out there. But we greatly
appreciate what the Congress has allowed us to do in terms of
the Preservation of the Force and Families.
Mr. Carson. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you both for being here.
If it is all right, Admiral McRaven, I will start with you.
I am always grateful to men like you that give your life to the
cause of freedom. My 5-year-olds have a better chance to attain
that and live in that freedom, and I appreciate that, along
with all the folks there behind you that wear the uniform.
You know, it has been the conviction of many of us that the
threat and the challenge in terms of our national security
should drive the budget rather than the reverse. And you know
that, as much as we try to put that concept forward, that it
usually is the victim of sometimes mathematics.
But you have outlined some pretty significant challenges
that you face, and you have mentioned that the force is frayed.
And I just noticed that the initiative fund that you
submitted in the fiscal year 2015 budget, the Opportunity,
Growth, and Security Initiative, included--includes 14--I am
sorry--$400 million for SOCOM readiness and infrastructure.
And maybe give us just a quick idea of what those
requirements are. And why were these not included in the fiscal
year 2015 budget request?
Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir. So the $400 million is actually
broken down into two parts. One of them, 300-some-odd million,
is for readiness.
So we are going to go back and--where we had to take cuts
in order to meet the budget numbers were in flying hours and
steaming hours and training hours.
So we will be able to put, I think, $350 million or so back
into readiness to make sure that we are able to improve the
readiness of our folks back in the continental United States.
It has never affected the readiness of our forces deploying
forward. We always make sure that they are absolutely ready to
go forward wherever that might be, whether it is Afghanistan or
anywhere else on the globe.
But in the past we have taken some liberties with the
readiness in the continental United States until they were
ready to go forward.
Having said that, there were also three programs within
that $400 million that are part of our Preservation of Force
and Families. There are MILCON [military construction] projects
that we are looking at.
And so we are grateful for this additional money coming in
because we will be able to solve some of our readiness problems
and, hopefully, some of our MILCON projects with the
Preservation of the Force and Families.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, sir.
You know, as much as we try, whether it is QDR or whatever
it might be--try to ascertain what our challenges are, it seems
that the serendipity always outpaces our predictive capability.
And so the only real answer is to have a comprehensive force
that can meet whatever potential threat might come.
And it seems to me that may be one of the greatest things
that we are overlooking here. We think that, you know, we are
getting a leaner, meaner machine. And I appreciate that. But we
need to have the overall capacity, ultimately, to handle what
comes that we can't predict.
And so it is--with that in mind, Secretary Lumpkin, you
have talked about a globally networked perpetual engagement for
our special operations troops, and that is the same force that
Admiral McRaven, in my judgment, wisely and rightly has
indicated is fraying from the demand placed on them.
And at the same time, in asking for diplomatic immunity
here, this administration has depended on our special operators
to sort of be the glue for our worldwide military operations
during a time that we are withdrawing and, really, backing off
of our obligations to friends and allies alike across the
globe. And to top it off, the budget is being cut.
So there is a breaking point to all of this. And I am just
wondering what your own assessment of that breaking point is.
Secretary Lumpkin. Going back to the QDR and--the QDR is a
strategy-driven document. It happens to be budget-informed in
order to recognize the realities of what we have as far as from
a budget and what we have to operate with.
That said, the global engagement piece, I mean, this is
about fulfilling our obligations and our commitments to our
allies and our friends to help them build the partnership
capacity, to build the capacity to deal with these security
challenges that become too big to fix, and to leverage their
capabilities to do things on their own so we don't have to have
this big military general purpose force to roll in and do that.
But this was--when we did QDR 6 and QDR 10, this was the
reason we built the force. And QDR 6 was to grow the special
operations force in order to focus and allow us to do this
building partnership capacity mission. And the QDR 10 was
focused on giving USSOCOM those organic enablers to do those
missions whenever possible to reduce their reliance on the
other services when feasible.
So that is--as we look at 2014 and we took in mind is--the
end of combat operations in Iraq and we are looking at a
reduction, we don't know what the--whether we are going to end
up with a bilateral security agreement in Afghanistan at this
juncture.
But at some point our footprint will be reduced in
Afghanistan, and those forces--there is a demand signal by the
geographic combatant commanders. They want more SOF in their
theater.
And with the post-2014 Afghanistan and, as we draw down the
forces, it will give us the ability to meet those unmet demands
within the GCC. So they can do that capacity building with our
partners and our allies.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
Talk about MILCON reminds me that I believe we have an
outstanding request for special operations military
construction that was requested to be submitted with the
budget. I don't think we have quite gotten it yet.
So, Secretary Lumpkin, I might just put that on your radar
screen, if you don't mind, when you go back to the building, to
check and see where that is.
You were talking earlier that, in addition to being the
Assistant Secretary for Special Operations/Low-Intensity
Conflict, you are the Acting Under Secretary for Policy.
You are also in charge of the task force looking for one of
our folks who has been taken captive. Correct?
Secretary Lumpkin. I am the Department lead for that
endeavor. Yes.
Mr. Thornberry. Looks to me like you have got a full plate.
Secretary Lumpkin. I keep busy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thornberry. Well, have they nominated somebody for
Policy yet?
Secretary Lumpkin. Yes, sir. Been nominated, had the
hearing. We are waiting for the confirmation process to work
its way through.
Mr. Thornberry. Okay. When you testified in front of the
Senate, I know you were asked about the Authorization for the
Use of Military Force [AUMF]. And, frankly, I have gotten a
little confused over the years what the administration policy
is towards that. Sometimes we hear that it is don't mess with
it. Sometimes it is change it.
Can you help me understand the administration's policy? And
from your experience, isn't it getting harder and harder to do
the things that we ask our special operators to do around the
world, relying back on the Authorization for the Use of
Military Force that was passed in September 2001?
Secretary Lumpkin. Thank you for the question, sir. I truly
do appreciate it.
In May of last year, the President in his May speech at
National Defense University mentioned about revising and
eventually repealing the AUMF as a goal.
I truly believe that the AUMF has served us well. It
continues to serve us well. It gives us the ability to keep
this Nation safe and do the missions that we need to do.
That said, my comment to the Senate was that we are at an
inflection point. We are at a point that is--it is always good
to relook at authorities because they evolve. The threat
evolves.
And so I would encourage a look at the AUMF, make sure it
is doing everything we need it to do. And if it is not, if it
needs to be taken in or expanded or whatever, it is a chance to
do that if we are going to take a look at it. And that is what
I support.
Mr. Thornberry. Okay. Well, I agree, actually.
And what I also agree with is that we should not ask our
men and women to go and do something anywhere in the world that
they are not fully backed up with law to do.
And I worry about this strain as we get further and further
away from 9/11, and the exact wording of the AUMF makes it
harder and harder to draw those connections.
So. Speaking of authorities, Admiral, let me just touch
back. We talked at the beginning about working with others. One
of the things that has been requested is an extension of the
1208 authority as well as increasing the dollar limit on that.
In this forum, can you describe for us the role that 1208
plays, how important you think it is in the menu of options
that special operators have to work with others, with 1206 and
global security.
Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir. And then I would like to defer
to Secretary Lumpkin because he has been very supportive of
increasing the amount of money for our 1208.
Sir, I would tell you 1208 is probably the single most
important authority we have in our fight against terrorism. It
allows us to build forces, to train them, to equip them, and to
do so with, I think, the right amount of oversight. And right
now we are finding that this is a--again, about building
partner capacity. This is a growth industry.
So whereas a couple of years ago we had a certain level of
authority, we found that our expenditure rates didn't really
match the authority. Now already we are closing in on the $50
million authority, and I think the demand signal--I know the
demand signal out there is even larger than that. So Secretary
Lumpkin has put forth a proposal to increase the authority, and
I am in strong favor of that.
However, one of the problems we run into is, as we look at
how we build partner capacity, we do have to have a patchwork
of various authorities. So we do use 1206 when appropriate;
1207, the Global Security Contingency Fund; 1208.
And we make it work, but there is an awkwardness to it and
sometimes limitations to it. Some of the authorities allow us
to work with the Minister of Defense, but not the Minister of
Interior [MOI], where, in some cases, their counterterrorism
forces actually are in the MOI, or some allows us to build
minor military construction, you know, a small shoot house or a
small barracks; others don't.
So what we try to do is find the right authority for the
right situation, but that is not always easy. 1208 is the--
gives us the greatest latitude, but it is strictly focused on
counterterrorism, whereas 1206 and 1207 give us a little bit
more latitude in other areas.
Secretary Lumpkin. And, if I may, I absolutely agree with
the admiral in the sense that 1208 is a tremendous tool for us.
And we are rapidly approaching our maximum authorization of the
$50 million, and we are not even halfway through the year yet.
We are tightening up our obligation, looking at what we
can--find other mechanisms to fund so we don't find ourselves
up against a wall.
But the other concern I have is that, in the event it is
not renewed or we end up with a continuing resolution where it
doesn't allow me to continue operations, stopping that
particular mission set has significant impact operationally.
So I would encourage and support getting an extended
authorization sooner rather than later.
Mr. Thornberry. Well, I am struck by the conversation you
all were having with Mrs. Hartzler. This is an operational
authority, not some of the other authorities. And, yet,
operationally it still takes a while to help develop some of
these capacities. And so we don't want to be shortsighted about
it.
Mr. Langevin, do you have other questions?
Mr. Langevin. I probably will hold for the classified
session.
Mr. Thornberry. Okay. Does anybody else have open session
questions?
Mr. Hunter. Sure. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Thornberry. Mr. Hunter.
Mr. Hunter. Really quick.
JIEDDO. I am just wondering what do you see with JIEDDO
going forward? You know, what do you do with JIEDDO right now?
They have been supporting SOCOM for a long time. They are
also supporting, you know, big Army, Marines, everybody else,
too.
But from your side of things, what do you want to see
happening with them going forward? What parts of them should be
kept and what parts of JIEDDO are just bureaucratic and won't
be needed anymore once we get out of Afghanistan?
Secretary Lumpkin. From a larger policy perspective,
JIEDDO, as you are keenly aware, has been crucial and
instrumental and been tremendously supportive to our operations
and initiatives forward.
So, for me, from a policy perspective, would really like to
ensure we codify it in the Department long term and it doesn't
go by the wayside as we move past--beyond our current
operations.
Mr. Hunter. Let me ask you this, though. When you codify
it, you want to make sure it is really, really good. So you
want to maybe cut out the parts that you don't think are being
productive right now or not as productive or change those parts
and keep the parts that are really good, if you codify it.
So what parts would those be? What parts would you keep?
What parts would you change? Or you can get back to me if you
don't have that on you right now.
Secretary Lumpkin. I will defer to see if Admiral McRaven
has it, but I can get back to you on that.
Admiral McRaven. Sir, we have a JIEDDO rep, as you know, in
almost every location where we have our SOF forces. And, as the
Secretary said, JIEDDO has been absolutely fabulous over the
years.
For us, you know, what JIEDDO has learned to do is to
understand networks. So as we look at the terrorist threat,
frankly, where JIEDDO started out focusing on IEDs [improvised
explosive devices]--and, of course, understanding IEDs meant
you had to understand the IED network--now the folks at JIEDDO,
because they understand the foundation of network development,
you can take that talent and that capability and overlay it on
the threat networks elsewhere.
So I am a very big believer that what JIEDDO has learned,
the IED fights in Iraq and Afghanistan, is fungible as we move
forward and have to fight networks globally.
So I wouldn't portend to tell you where you could cut them
or not cut them. I can tell you that they have been a
tremendous resource to SOCOM and we greatly appreciate what
they have done and, frankly, how they have, to some degree,
reshaped themselves and looked at the broader network problem
set.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you.
That is all I have got, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Thornberry. All right. Thank you both.
With that, the open portion of this hearing will be
adjourned, and we will move swiftly down one floor and across
the hall.
[Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned,
to be reconvened in classified session.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 13, 2014
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 13, 2014
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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
March 13, 2014
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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Admiral McRaven. USSOCOM is currently pursuing directed energy
systems as a non-kinetic, stand-off anti-materiel solution. We have a
requirement to surgically disable or disrupt a variety of fixed
facility infrastructure and systems, with required capabilities ranging
from breaching and access to disablement of critical equipment. The Man
Portable High Energy Laser is one of several technologies under
consideration for this critical mission.
The MPHEL system was developed in close cooperation with the Joint
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization. Boeing Directed Energy
Systems Albuquerque, NM has served as the lead contractor from
September 2012 to present. The current prototype MPHEL system has an
output power of 2 kilowatts and weighs approximately 750 pounds in a
configuration the size of four large Pelican cases. The emphasis of
further development will be on reducing the form factor, reducing
weight, and increasing effective range.
Initial testing of the prototype MPHEL system was conducted at
Kirtland AFB, NM from January to February 2014, and produced positive
results. The prototype demonstrated an ability to disable electronics
devices, burn through various metals, and disable electrical systems.
The prototype system will now be shipped to USSOCOM in May 2014 for
user evaluation and target characterization, establishing the baseline
for further development. At this time there are no plans to procure or
field the MPHEL in its current form factor.
Recognizing the importance of safety, and the unique legal
implications of directed energy systems, USSOCOM engaged early with the
US Army Institute of Public Health. A preliminary evaluation of the
system was conducted in December 2013 to determine potential health
hazards. Initial results placed the MPHEL in a mishap risk category of
medium, and identified several proposed design modifications for future
versions. The final report is pending. [See page 7.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. JOHNSON
Admiral McRaven. The human domain fills a critical conceptual gap
in visualizing the operating environment. None of the existing domains
(air, land, maritime, space, and cyber) sufficiently address the
centrality of people to contemporary and future strategy, operations
and activities. The human domain complements the other domains and more
fully describes the contemporary and future operating environments. It
is not new in warfare, and a host of related terms have been developed
to describe it. Most of these terms insufficiently define the scope and
scale of the centrality of humans within the operating environment.
The Human Terrain System (HTS) is a U.S. Army program implemented
by the Army's Training and Doctrine Command to develop, train, and
integrate a social science based research and analysis capability that
enables sociocultural understanding across the operational environment.
In this regard, the HTS supports operations in the human domain by
enhancing understanding of the cognitive, information, social,
cultural, and physical elements that affect the domain. The HTS
supports joint and coalition forces by providing social science support
to military commanders in the form of Human Terrain Teams (HTTs)
composed of individuals with social science academic backgrounds. HTTs
deploy with tactical units to assist in bringing knowledge of the local
population into a coherent framework. Developing this sociocultural
understanding provides a method for considering the effects of military
operations among local populations. Operations in the human domain
require this identification and ability to influence relevant
populations in order to enhance stability, prevent conflict, and when
necessary, fight and defeat adversaries.
The HTS continues to support commanders in Afghanistan with HTTs
that provide sociocultural information and reporting to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF), and to U.S. commanders and staffs in order to build
understanding, peace and security. In August 2013, fourteen HTTs were
deployed to Afghanistan. [See page 15.]
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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GIBSON
Secretary Lumpkin. I believe our military forces and Geographic
Combatant Commanders have the authorities and programs necessary to
mitigate current transnational terrorist threats. Our forces leverage,
integrate, and implement a wide variety of security assistance and
military cooperation programs. The current authorities available, such
as Sections 1203, 1206, 1207, and 1208, provide additional and focused
tools that the Department of Defense and our Geographic Combatant
Commanders use to build directly or to enhance the capabilities and
capacities of our partner to counter the threats of terrorism or
indirectly support counterterrorism operations. I do not recommend any
immediate changes to existing counterterrorism authorities or program
resourcing. However, the Department of Defense is taking a close look
at our statutory authorities for assistance to foreign security forces
to assess the extent to which they meet evolving requirements. We
intend to engage with Congress to discuss our findings following this
internal review. [See page 10.]
Admiral McRaven. U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is
currently conducting information sharing initiatives under existing
authorities. CDRUSSOCOM derives authority to share information and/or
intelligence with foreign partners from National Disclosure Policy-1
and any applicable exceptions in accordance with CJCSI 5221.01D and DOD
Directive 5230.11. USSOCOM is coordinating disclosure and/or release of
information and/or with partners through the appropriate information
sharing/foreign disclosure offices. [See page 10.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 13, 2014
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. THORNBERRY
Mr. Thornberry. Do our forces and geographic combatant commanders
have the authorities they need to mitigate current and future
transnational terrorist threats? What changes would you recommend,
including potential changes to the AUMF?
Secretary Lumpkin. With the strong support of Congress, the
Department has gained several new authorities since 2001 that have been
essential to conducting counterterrorism operations and building
partner nation capabilities. Key authorities for partner capability
building are found in uncodified, temporary provisions of law, and
looking ahead we will be challenged to sustain our current capabilities
should these authorities lapse. We would like to work with Congress to
determine what is needed beyond the ``current fight.'' With respect to
the AUMF, the President has said it needs to be revised and ultimately
repealed. We look forward to working with Congress on this as well.
Mr. Thornberry. A great deal has been written and said about the
relationship between special operations forces and the CIA. What is
your opinion of how the CIA and SOF should share responsibilities that
interlock and overlap, given respective strengths and weaknesses? What
coordination role does your office (Special Operations/Low-Intensity
Conflict) play in helping to coordinate and de-conflict CIA-DOD
operations and activities? What are some areas of improvement?
Secretary Lumpkin. Close coordination and deconfliction between DOD
and CIA is essential to protecting our national security interests, as
is also the case with other departments and agencies as part of a
whole-of-government approach. In those areas in which special
operations forces and CIA have related responsibilities, we coordinate
our efforts through a robust exchange of liaison officers and detailees
who collaborate on a daily basis. At the headquarters level, the
National Security Council Staff hosts regular meetings focused on
counterterrorism coordination and deconfliction. As the ASD SO/LIC, I
represent the Department and provide advice to the Secretary of Defense
on these matters. In this capacity, I work closely with the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the DOD General Counsel to
ensure DOD operations are fully aligned with relevant intelligence
policies and comply with all applicable laws. In the realm of DOD-CIA
collaboration on counterterrorism operations, we are currently working
on initiatives to strengthen and improve the flow of information,
technology, and practical expertise to cross-level capabilities between
the two organizations.
Mr. Thornberry. What changes can you recommend to the present set
of Security Force Assistance authorities such as 1206 and Global
Security Contingency Fund? Are these the right types of authorities to
satisfy future geographic combatant commander requirements to develop
partner nation capabilities?
Secretary Lumpkin. Many of the existing Security Force Assistance
(SFA) authorities, including Section 1206 and the Global Security
Contingency Fund (GSCF), are still relatively new. Since their
creation, in Fiscal Year 2006 and Fiscal Year 2012, respectively, the
Department of Defense has invested a significant amount of time and
effort in developing the organizational structures and processes
required for their effective use. We believe that Section 1206 has been
a success and that the GSCF is now poised to succeed.
However, the global strategic environment has evolved since the
creation of these new authorities, and we anticipate that it will
continue to evolve over the next several years. The threat of terrorism
increasingly flows from Al Qaeda's dispersed affiliates and offshoots
rather than from its core, presenting a diffuse set of threats against
which to apply these authorities. Although we are drawing down in
Afghanistan and uncertain about our level of presence there beyond
2014, many of the partners we trained and equipped to assist with
stability operations there are now poised to assist with similar
operations in other regions of the world. Recent events in Ukraine
underscore the importance of continued engagement with our Eastern
European and Baltic partners. Given this shifting dynamic, the
Department of Defense is taking a close look at our SFA authorities to
assess the extent to which they meet these diverse and evolving
requirements. We intend to engage with Congress to discuss our findings
following this internal review.
Mr. Thornberry. A recent report on special operations forces by the
Council on Foreign Relations suggested that, ``the Office of the
Assistant Secretary for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict has
difficulty fully providing civilian oversight of U.S. Special
Operations Command's policy and resources as directed by law.'' Do you
agree with this assessment? Can you outline for the committee how that
office conducts oversight of policy and resources of SOCOM?
Secretary Lumpkin. My office provides civilian oversight of all
special operations matters as required by 10 USC Sec. 138. As such, I
provide oversight of special operations policy and resources matters
and provide advice to implement Secretary of Defense and Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy security priorities to meet the
challenges posed by the global security environment. The relationship
with the Commander, USSOCOM is collaborative and cooperative, with a
common goal to develop the best possible special operations forces and
to employ them effectively. Ultimately, I advise the Secretary of
Defense and provide recommendations regarding special operations that
are in the best interest of the Department.
During each of the last three QDRs, the Department has reviewed,
evaluated, and determined the appropriate resourcing of USSOCOM to
improve the U.S. capability to combat terrorism on a global basis. With
each of these reviews, SOLIC has also evolved and adapted as an
organization to meet statutory and Department oversight requirements.
SOLIC's oversight of special operations has further developed in
partnership with the other parts of the Office of the Secretary of
Defense staff, interagency counterparts, and Congress, and through
coordination with the USSOCOM staff. I work closely with the Under
Secretaries of Defense for Intelligence; Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics; and Personnel and Readiness and leverage their subject
matter expertise to provide oversight. I also work closely with the
Director of CAPE, the DOD Comptroller, and the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Legislative Affairs to develop the optimum force structure,
resources, and authorities to meet future special operations
requirements.
I will continue work closely with all relevant officials to ensure
our nation sustains a ready, capable Special Operations force, prepared
to meet the fiscal, operational, and global challenges we face today
and into the future.
Mr. Thornberry. In addition to more than 4,000 positions authorized
for SOCOM and its components, the service component commands of the
Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, taken together, have more than
2,000 authorized positions to support SOCOM and its operations. Have
you looked for efficiencies between and among SOCOM and its subordinate
commands? If not, why not? If so, what did you find?
Admiral McRaven. The numbers stated in the question are inaccurate.
Of the 4093 billets, 2168 billets are in commands and organizations
that do not perform Functional Combatant Command (U.S. Special
Operations Command), or Service Component Command activities and
functions. The following organizations do not meet the definition of a
Functional Combatant Command or Service Component Command;
Joint Special Operations Command, a Sub-Unified Command
Special Operations Command-North, a Theater Special
Operations Command
Special Operations Command-Joint Concepts, a Theater
Special Operations Command disestablished in 2013 and manpower zeroed
out in 2014
Special Operations Joint Task Force is an operational
unit with rotational assignment to the U.S. Central Command theater of
operations
Regional Special Operations Coordination Center (RSCC) is
not a direct reporting unit to USSOCOM, and none had been established
in FY13. The manpower was identified on the JTD as a precursor to
possible resourcing in FY14. RSCC is in Proof-of-Concept development,
with activities authorized by Congress on a limited basis
Special Operations Research and Development Center is a
Service-like function that no other Combatant Command Headquarter
possesses. DODD 5100.73 excludes all systems/weapons development and
procurement activities that are not associated with HQ Management
functions
Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) is an
educational activity/entity that no other Combatant Command Headquarter
possesses. DODD 5100.73 excludes NDU, Naval Postgraduate School,
Service Academies, the Defense Industrial University, etc. JSOU falls
into this category and is not a function of a Functional Combatant
Command, or Service Component Command
The 2110 billets identified for the Service Component Commands are
correct.
Mr. Thornberry. Have you looked for efficiencies between and among
SOCOM and its subordinate commands? If not, why not? If so, what did
you find?
Admiral McRaven. USSOCOM constantly evaluates its manpower
requirements. Since 2007, USSOCOM has undergone numerous reviews,
studies, and evaluations from OSD, JS, and internal reviews to find
efficiencies, comply with DOD direction to eliminate contractors,
replace military with civilians, cap the number of both civilians and
military, and to streamline activities wherever possible. In addition
to complying with all OSD and JS guidance, USSOCOM purposely evaluates
our resources, both manpower and dollars to ensure we maintain a
balanced, effective, efficient, and affordable portfolio of
capabilities to meet the National Security and Defense Security
Strategies while complying with the Laws, Regulations, Policies, and
Procedures set forth by the President, Congress, Secretary of Defense,
the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Services. Total
requirements for manpower always far exceed available end-strength, are
dynamic, evolving, and prioritized constantly to mitigate risk across
the breadth of the Special Operations enterprise. Our budget
submissions to Congress outline the most recent and up-to-date
alignment of forces to meet our warfighting requirements within the
resources allotted by OSD.
Mr. Thornberry. The Opportunity, Growth and Security Initiative
fund submitted with the FY15 budget includes $400 million for SOCOM
readiness and infrastructure unfunded requirements. Please outline
these requirements for the committee; and discuss why and how these
requirements were NOT included in the FY15 base budget request?
Admiral McRaven. USSOCOM's $400 million portion of the Department's
$26 billion Opportunity, Growth and Security Initiative (OGSI) is
outlined in the attachment. USSOCOM's request addresses the most
pressing readiness and infrastructure requirements that could not be
resourced within USSOCOM's FY15 President's Budget (PB). The FY15 PB
resourced the highest priority programs required by special operations
forces to conduct missions in support of Geographic Combatant
Commanders' requirements.
Mr. Thornberry. Can you outline some of the more difficult advanced
technology requirements that SOF needs in order to maintain an edge on
the battlefield?
a. As we withdraw from major combat in Afghanistan, will the need
for non-lethal weapons and directed energy weapons increase?
b. How are you managing to stay ahead in research and development
while your budget in this area has steadily declined over the past
several fiscal years?
Admiral McRaven. a. USSOCOM expects to remain engaged in global
counterterrorism operations for the foreseeable future. United States
Special Operations Forces (USSOF) will continue to operate in close
proximity to their Afghan partners, as aggregate US Forces retrograde
from Afghanistan. Today, USSOF forces are gradually migrating from
rural areas to fixed bases in larger population centers. This will
reduce associated operational risk, and allow for sustained advisory
and engagement support at the appropriate operational levels necessary
to enable the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to unilaterally
maintain operational momentum and evolve as an institution.
Village Stability Operations will be completed December 2014 and
on-going USSOF Security Force Assistance efforts, which have always
been the focus of USSOF, are now reorienting away from the tactical to
the operational level. This has led to emphasis being placed on the
development of the Special Mission Wing, ANA Special Operations Command
Headquarters and its brigades, the various Afghan Special Police
headquarter elements and a variety of efforts designed to develop
intelligence and their sustainment capacities. The limited tactical
level advisory support continues and will predominantly occur from
permanent bases, where the Afghan Security forces have established
training centers. Given the limited nature of USSOF's future tactical
operational role in Afghanistan, we do not see demand increasing for
advanced technological requirements. However, as USSOF expands globally
demands for a multitude of advanced technologies will grow enabling
USSOCOM to remain at the tip of the spear and conduct our core
missions, as directed by the President and Secretary of Defense SOF
needs enhanced lethal capabilities against multiple types of moving
targets that will provide greater accuracy and desired target effects
while minimizing collateral damage to near-zero probability. SOF has
long-standing requirements for a variety of less-than-lethal (LTL),
scalable effects weapons (SEW), to include those for which directed
energy may provide the optimal solutions. SOF's interests in LTL SEW
capabilities include dissuading and disabling personnel, and rendering
equipment and/or facilities functionally ineffective. Key technological
challenges include smaller, light-weight and affordable power
generation and multi-mode seekers for long-range precision weapons; LTL
SEW technologies that render personnel or equipment ineffective to
ensure mission success with greater force protection and less
likelihood of civilian casualties; state-of-the-art light-weight
personnel protective armor and multi-spectral sensory enhancement
technologies; and broad spectrum, multi-sensory signature reduction.
The critical aspect for all of these technologies is their
compatibility with SOF tactics, techniques and procedures using SOF- or
GPF-provided soldier, ground, airborne, and/or maritime systems.
b. USSOCOM's S&T Directorate leverages other government agencies
and labs, whenever able, to maximize the efficiency and effect of our
limited RDT&E budget. USSOCOM's overarching FY15-19 S&T Integrated
Priority List (STIPL) which includes Comprehensive Signature
Management, Anti-Access/Area Denial, SOF Small Unit Dominance, Human
Performance, and Battlespace Awareness, requires external support to
address these high priority S&T needs.
USSOCOM's S&T Directorate is coordinating Technology Discovery
Sessions chaired by the SOCOM Deputy Commander and Acquisition
Executive. In these sessions, SOCOM invites forward thinking senior
industry and academic leaders to discuss such topics as technology
investment strategies, how to avoid technological surprise, partnering
opportunities, and how USSOCOM can best prepare for the future. SOCOM
senior leadership establishes specific focused topics and invitees for
two to three planned follow-on events per year.
The following provide a few recent and relevant examples of
collaboration with Service labs and centers. SOCOM S&T, in
collaboration with the Systems Engineering Research Center (SERC), a
University-Affiliated Research Center of the US Department of Defense,
sponsored a joint SERC Capstone project with the University of Alabama
and Stevens Institute of Technology resulting in the development of a
SOF non-lethal capability to stop boats up to 50 meters in length. In
collaboration with the Air Force Research Laboratory, we are developing
wind sensing technologies which will dramatically increase AC-130
Gunship first-round accuracy. Similarly, our relationship with the U.S.
Army's Medical Research and Materiel Command (MRMC) has enabled
efficient development of critical lifesaving technologies for special
operations forces. Uncontrolled external hemorrhage remains the leading
cause of death on the battlefield. Despite recent advances in
hemorrhage control technologies, controlling the bleeding in large
wounds (``sharkbite'') remains difficult and a SOCOM Commander top
priority. A ``Sharkbite'' project developed a novel wound stasis
dressing to treat SOF non-compressible hemorrhagic injuries. The
``SharkBite Trauma Kit'' includes three revolutionary tools that are
now pending FDA approval before transition to USSOCOM's PEO-SOF
Warrior's Tactical Combat Casualty Care Program of Record and SOF
medics. The collaboration may lead to a capability for the conventional
force as well.
Mr. Thornberry. How are the roles of women in SOF changing? Can you
outline for the committee on SOCOM plans for assigning women in
previously closed positions?
Admiral McRaven. There are many women currently serving in SOF
positions. Based on the January 2013 direction from Secretary of
Defense, USSOCOM is reviewing all SOF positions closed to women with
the intent of opening them all by January 2016. USSOCOM may only keep
closed those positions that are specifically approved by both the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. The
decision to open or keep specific positions closed to women will be
guided by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's guidance to
ensure ``the success of our Nation's warfighting forces . . . ,'' that
``all Service men and women are set up for success with viable career
paths . . . ,'' and ``to retain the trust of the American people.''
Mr. Thornberry. Can you update the committee on SOCOM's
intelligence functions, requirements, and initiatives?
a. What specific intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) requirements do you have? b. What manned and unmanned ISR systems
are you investing in, and why? c. How do you coordinate with the
Services in these areas? d. What role does your J2 (Intelligence)
Director play in identifying and filling those unique requirements? e.
How is SOCOM working to resource Theater Special Operations Command
intelligence requirements? f. What role is SOCOM playing in the Defense
Intelligence Agency's new Defense Clandestine Service?
Admiral McRaven. (a) USSOCOM is working closely with SOF Theater
and Component commands to refine air, ground, and maritime ISR
requirements to support the Geographical Combatant Commanders (GCC).
Future draw downs in Afghanistan do not change SOCOM's enduring global
AISR requirement, but rather reflect a need to shift ISR capabilities
to other areas of responsibility in support of GCC operations outside
the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. Reference Memorandum for Secretary of
Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-Airborne
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Support to Special
Operations Forces dated 9 January 2012; or Joint Emergent Operational
Need (JEON) for Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
in Support of Special Operations Forces dated 8 June 2012.
(b) USSOCOM currently operates the U-28 as its primary manned ISR
platform along with JAVAMAN aircraft in a GOCO capacity. USSOCOM plans
to transition to the MC-12 that is being divested by the USAF. This
transition will incur an initial investment to upgrade capabilities to
meet the U-28 Mission. However, the MC-12 provides dual-engine
capability, longer flight duration, and additional capacity for ISR
equipment.
USSOCOM's FY15-16 budget includes unmanned MQ-9 baseline investment
funding to enable continued rapid development and integration of
permissive ISR capabilities critical to global SOF operations on up to
50 MQ-9s and associated ground equipment to meet current and future
permissive ISR requirements. This enables USSOCOM to transition from
MQ-1/9 unmanned aircraft to a full MQ-9ER fleet by leveraging the
replacement of USAF provided MQ-1B with USAF provided Extended Range
MQ-9 Reapers.
(c) USSOCOM is partnering with the Services to mitigate shortfalls
like initiatives to promote best practices in full-motion-video (FMV)
exploitation and develop relationships where SOF and Services can share
the burden of exploitation. USSOCOM is working with the Services to
ensure budget reductions of Service-provided assets, like permissive
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft, are protected
to so that SOF can contend with future global threats and challenges.
(d) USSOCOM J2 Intelligence Director conducts weekly ISR Councils
to discuss/evaluate SOF ISR requirements and issues. USSOCOM J2
participates in both deliberate and urgent requirements, planning
processes through Service Warfighter Talks, and formal requirement
document coordination through either their Joint Capability Integration
Development System (JCIDS) or the similar SOF Capability Integration
Development System (SOFCIDS). USSOCOM coordinates closely with USD(I),
ISR Task Force, Services, Components, and TSOCs to refine requirements,
synchronize efforts, and advocate for ISR capability.
(e) USSOCOM is working to capture Theater Special Operations
Command intelligence requirements through weekly ISR Councils and TSOC
Deep Dives as well as addressing requirements identified by TSOC
Commanders during monthly Commander Decision Roundtables (CDRT).
Requirements are validated through the JCIDS or SOFCIDS process and
then resourced through the USSOCOM Strategic Planning Process.
(f) USSOCOM fully supports the Defense Intelligence Agency's new
Defense Clandestine Service. Over the past year DCS has established a
presence in USSOCOM Headquarters to ensure we align our efforts and
requirements. Due to classification, discussions on USSOCOM specific
roles and interaction with the Defense Clandestine Service will need to
be addressed in a closed session.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARSON
Mr. Carson. Do you anticipate that this pace of deployment of SOCOM
forces will change as we withdraw from Afghanistan? And given budget
cuts, the unique training needs of special operators, and the
necessarily small force size, how can SOCOM continue meeting its
deployment requirements?
Secretary Lumpkin. I anticipate as SOF requirements go down in
Afghanistan, we will redistribute forces to other regions in a manner
that is aligned to current, emerging threats and to achieve a more
balanced SOF posture across the Geographic Combatant Commands. The
Department considered this redistribution of SOF during the FY 2015
program review, and we believe we have properly resourced USSOCOM for
training, readiness, and sustainment requirements in the years ahead.
Mr. Carson. Once we have withdrawn from Afghanistan, which areas or
countries do you believe will be the primary recipients of SOCOM
deployments? And can you give us an idea of the types of missions you
expect they will see, either alone or with partner nations?
Secretary Lumpkin. Our goal is to realign and redistribute SOF
across the Geographic Combatant Commands in a manner that is aligned to
current and emerging threats. Consistent with the approach of working
bilaterally when possible, SOF will retain the capability to advise and
assist partners to take action to counter enemy threats and disrupt
their planning, training, and recruitment. We will be postured to
conduct direct action to protect U.S. persons from attack when
necessary. At the same time, we will expand and enrich our engagement
with security partners to build capacity, improve capabilities, and
foster greater cooperation. This includes expanding bilateral
exercises, joint exchanges, and other training events with
international SOF partners.
Mr. Carson. Do you anticipate that this pace of deployment of SOCOM
forces will change as we withdraw from Afghanistan? And given budget
cuts, the unique training needs of special operators, and the
necessarily small force size, how can SOCOM continue meeting its
deployment requirements?
Admiral McRaven. Recently, we have been deploying between 8,000 to
10,000 Special Operations Forces (SOF) personnel throughout the globe,
on a daily basis. I anticipate our pace of deployment to drop below our
current deployed numbers in the near term if we draw down in
Afghanistan, and will increase to comparable numbers of 8-10K deployed
SOF as we mature our SOF Campaign Plan. This plan will focus our
efforts on building partner nation capacity through persistent regional
SOF presence, while posturing a SOF capability that can conduct direct
actions against emerging terrorist threats--both requiring a trained
and ready deployed force. Through prioritization of resources, we can
continue to meet our deployment requirements with our current and
proposed future budgets.
Mr. Carson. Once we have withdrawn from Afghanistan, which areas or
countries do you believe will be the primary recipients of SOCOM
deployments? And can you give us an idea of the types of missions you
expect they will see, either alone or with partner nations?
Admiral McRaven. First, I believe that SOF will continue to be
deployed to Afghanistan in some operational capacity. As we have drawn
down from Iraq in December 2011 and now, Afghanistan, SOF personnel
capacity has become available to deploy to other geographic regions.
Since that time, the African continent has experienced the largest
increase in deployed SOF personnel, and I believe will continue to be
one of the primary recipients of SOF deployments in the future. As our
SOF Campaign Plan focuses on building partner nation capacity, we will
continue to execute those missions of Foreign Internal Defense, Civil
Affairs, Information Operations, Stability Operations, and Humanitarian
Assistance, while also executing direct actions against emerging
terrorist threats. These direct actions will range from advise and
assist, precision reconnaissance, and unconventional warfare, with a
focus on Counter-terrorism. We will strive to partner with foreign
nations at every opportunity to conduct direct and indirect operations,
but we will always be prepared to execute alone. At the present time,
the preponderance of our SOF operations on the African continent is
being conducted with the support of other partner nations. Finally, I
believe that the demand for SOF by the Geographic Combatant Commanders
will outweigh our SOF capacity for future SOF Campaign Plan
requirements.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GIBSON
Mr. Gibson. What are some recommendations for improving
intelligence collaboration across the whole-of-government?
Secretary Lumpkin. DOD works with its partners in the Intelligence
Community to ensure relevant intelligence information is shared
appropriately. Recent initiatives include DOD funded inter-agency
collaboration in the areas of counterterrorism, countering
transnational organized crime (CTOC), and maritime domain awareness.
DOD also provides domestic agencies with valuable instruction in the
detection of improvised explosive devices, conducting terrorism
analysis, and mapping cultural terrain. Lastly, DOD fosters interagency
integration via the embedding of DOD personnel in other agencies,
including the National Counterterrorism Center, FBI Field Intelligence
Groups, and FBI joint terrorism task forces.
Mr. Gibson. What are some recommendations for improving
intelligence collaboration across the whole-of-government?
Admiral McRaven. Intelligence collaboration has increased
significantly as a result of 10+ years of war. The single thread that
forced this collaboration, across the whole-of-government, is our
national security interest. Looking toward the future, we must continue
to wrap our challenges with policies, authorities, process, and
information sharing architectures with this common unifying force of
national security.
We must continue to create conditions for success. For instance, we
must resource efforts like the Department of Defense Intelligence
Information Enterprise (DI2E) and the Intelligence Community
Information Technology Enterprise (IC ITE), and force convergence
between these communities of interest. DI2E and IC ITE convergence has
the potential to significantly increase the speed of knowledge to
decision/action by our most senior leaders of government. It will
increase information transparency and knowledge sharing at all levels.
Increased resources for DI2E and IC ITE will only achieve a technical
solution and many could argue that technology is not a limiting factor.
To a certain extent, they would be correct. Any advances to force
convergence, from a technology perspective, must be accompanied by
reformation of policy that inhibits collaboration.
The policies that protect our nation's critical information and
intelligence are the same policies that inhibit collaboration. The
Intelligence, Law Enforcement, and Diplomatic communities operate
within complicated yet essential frameworks to conduct the business of
national security. We must continue to explore policy reforms that
simultaneously safeguard our knowledge and increase transparency, while
being mindful of intelligence oversight and information assurance.
Likewise, any changes in policy must account for one of our greatest
force multipliers, our coalition partners.
The decade of war has been complimented by the efforts of our
coalition partners. At the lowest tactical echelons, we achieve
remarkable success on the battlefield. We must continue to seek reform
in policies that enable government to government information sharing by
empowering senior leaders and Commanders with greater latitude to make
the call, ease restrictions, and increase collaboration.