[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
CONFRONTING TRANSNATIONAL DRUG
SMUGGLING: AN ASSESSMENT OF
REGIONAL PARTNERSHIPS
=======================================================================
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
Serial No. 113-67
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Serial No. 113-241
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION,
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
AND THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 29, 2014
__________
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Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman
DON YOUNG, Alaska NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia
THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee, Columbia
Vice Chair JERROLD NADLER, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida CORRINE BROWN, Florida
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
GARY G. MILLER, California ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
SAM GRAVES, Missouri RICK LARSEN, Washington
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York
DUNCAN HUNTER, California MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine
ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, Arkansas GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
BOB GIBBS, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
RICHARD L. HANNA, New York JOHN GARAMENDI, California
DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida ANDREE CARSON, Indiana
STEVE SOUTHERLAND, II, Florida JANICE HAHN, California
JEFF DENHAM, California RICHARD M. NOLAN, Minnesota
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky DINA TITUS, Nevada
STEVE DAINES, Montana SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York
TOM RICE, South Carolina ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas CHERI BUSTOS, Illinois
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois
MARK SANFORD, South Carolina
DAVID W. JOLLY, Florida
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Chairman
DON YOUNG, Alaska JOHN GARAMENDI, California
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey RICK LARSEN, Washington
PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York
STEVE SOUTHERLAND, II, Florida, LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
Vice Chair CORRINE BROWN, Florida
TOM RICE, South Carolina JANICE HAHN, California
MARK SANFORD, South Carolina NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia
DAVID W. JOLLY, Florida (Ex Officio)
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania (Ex
Officio)
(ii)
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania Massachusetts
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia GRACE MENG, New York
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
TED S. YOHO, Florida TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
LUKE MESSER, Indiana JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere
MATT SALMON, Arizona, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina Samoa
RON DeSANTIS, Florida THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
(iii)
CONTENTS
Page
Summary of Subject Matter from the Subcommittee on Coast Guard
and Maritime Transportation of the Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure............................................. vi
Memorandum from the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs................................... xi
WITNESSES
Admiral Robert J. Papp, Jr., Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security:
Testimony.................................................... 7
Prepared statement........................................... 35
Answers to questions for the record from Hon. Eliot L. Engel,
a Representative in Congress from the State of New York.... 40
Ambassador Luis E. Arreaga, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State,
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
U.S. Department of State:
Testimony.................................................... 7
Prepared statement........................................... 42
General John F. Kelly, U.S. Marine Corps, Commander, Southern
Command, U.S. Department of Defense:
Testimony.................................................... 7
Prepared statement........................................... 47
Answers to questions for the record from Hon. Eliot L. Engel,
a Representative in Congress from the State of New York.... 93
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Admiral Robert J. Papp, Jr., Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security:
Response to request for information from Hon. Duncan Hunter,
a Representative in Congress from the State of California,
regarding the percentage of counterdrug Federal/general
grants that are provided to help the Coast Guard's
counterdrug operations..................................... 16
Response to request for information from Hon. Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Florida, for a summary of the Coast Guard's interactions
with Cuba regarding counterdrug operations/initiatives,
including the Coast Guard's April 2014 visit to Cuba....... 26
General John F. Kelly, U.S. Marine Corps, Commander, Southern
Command, U.S. Department of Defense, response to request for
information from Hon. John Garamendi, a Representative in
Congress from the State of California, regarding how the U.S.
Southern Command might deploy unmanned aerial vehicles for the
benefit of its missions........................................ 23
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CONFRONTING TRANSNATIONAL DRUG
SMUGGLING: AN ASSESSMENT OF
REGIONAL PARTNERSHIPS
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 29, 2014
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
joint with the
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m. in
Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Matt Salmon
(Chairman of the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere,
Committee on Foreign Affairs) presiding.
Mr. Salmon. A quorum being present of the subcommittee, the
subcommittees will come to order. I am going to start by
recognizing myself and the ranking member--actually, our
ranking member isn't here. I will recognize myself and my
fellow cochairman, Mr. Hunter, and then we will go to the
ranking member on that subcommittee. And we are pleased to have
this hearing today. Without objection, the members of the
subcommittees could submit their opening remarks for the
record.
And now I yield myself as much time as I may consume to
present my opening statement. And I want to start, first and
foremost, by thanking my colleague, Chairman Duncan Hunter of
the Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee on Coast
Guard and Maritime Transportation and his staff for working
with me and my staff to convene today's timely and important
hearing on confronting transnational drug smuggling and an
assessment of our strategy and regional partnerships.
Recently the U.N. issued a report naming Latin America as
the most violent region in the world, with 13 countries in the
region listed among the top 20 worldwide in homicide rates. In
fact, the top six most murderous countries per capita are all
right here in our own Western Hemisphere.
Transnational criminal and narcotics trafficking
organizations are becoming more sophisticated in evading law
enforcement and, as the U.N. report suggests, increasingly more
violent. This violence along our border and near our shores
poses a great threat to our national security and destabilizes
our region. The United States has spent over $1 trillion since
the 1970s attempting to disrupt and dismantle drug cartels in
Latin America with mixed success. I have convened this hearing
jointly with Chairman Hunter today to drill down into whether
U.S. law enforcement and military assets are being properly
leveraged to address this serious threat.
In this fight we have seen the consequences of our country
being forced to confront dwindling financial resources when the
DOD de-emphasized its commitment to interdiction efforts which,
in turn, affected our overall counternarcotics efforts. I am
concerned what a disengaged DOD means for our overall
counternarcotics strategy in the region. I think we must
assume, at best, a level budgetary environment going forward.
So our strategy to combat transnational criminal organizations
needs to balance this budgetary constraint with still finding
solutions that combat this scourge.
Excuse me. From a foreign policy standpoint, we need to
find ways to better engage our regional partners and help them
build capacity more efficiently and more effectively.
Ambassador Arreaga, you and I spoke briefly about important
steps INL has taken to work with our hemispheric partners to
build capacity and empower them to address the serious
challenges posed by increasingly violent drug-trafficking
organizations. I look forward to hearing more about the
successes and challenges you face in implementing INL's piece
of the overall strategy.
Where possible, I would like to see replicas of some of the
most successful programs that we have helped implement in the
region, like Plan Colombia and the Merida Initiative of Mexico.
Of course, the success plan of Colombia was only possible
because of Colombia having the political will and leadership to
win their country back from the terrorists and narco-
traffickers.
In Mexico we have seen an increased commitment on the part
of the Mexican Government to partner with the U.S. in this
effort through the Merida Initiative and other joint
operations. This commitment has yielded very important
successes, and we continue to build on them. It seems clear to
me that no amount of U.S. taxpayer monies will ever be enough
to finally turn this situation around without the buy-in and
the support of the people and governments of Central America
and the Caribbean.
I am looking forward to hearing more about the success of
Operation Martillo--or ``hammer,'' in English--since its
inception in January of 2012. But I want to personally and
publicly congratulate all who were involved in the two big
cocaine seizures earlier this year in the southwestern
Caribbean. I understand the street value of the seizures would
have been somewhere in the neighborhood of $300 million. I
think that this is a great example of what we can accomplish
when we work together with our regional partners.
I want to thank the Coast Guard and the SOUTHCOM Joint
Interagency Task Force South for hosting my staff in Florida
earlier this year in preparation for this hearing, and for
agreeing to testify today. And it is always a pleasure to have
State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs here to provide their insight on Central
American and Caribbean security programs in the hemisphere. I
thank them for their willingness to work with my staff on a
daily basis, and to come to our hearings, and to answer our
questions.
I am hopeful that this hearing will be an important step
toward a more cohesive and more effective multi-agency strategy
to protect our national security interests in our hemisphere.
I will now recognize Chairman Duncan Hunter for his opening
remarks.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Admiral,
General, and Ambassador. Great to see you. General Kelly,
really great to see you.
The subcommittees are meeting today to review the Federal
Government's efforts to confront transnational drug smuggling
and stem the flow of illegal drugs to the United States. I want
to thank and commend Chairman Salmon and the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs for agreeing to explore this important topic in
a joint hearing.
Illicit drug use remains a serious concern for the United
States. Illegal drugs not only pose a strain on our Nation's
health care and criminal justice systems, but their trade and
transport cause significant safety and security concerns. The
transport of illegal drugs affects millions throughout the
country and the world. Some of the most notorious and violent
criminals, cartels, and narco-terrorists are directly
responsible for drug violence, crime, and corruption that are
destabilizing foreign nations and risking the lives of American
citizens here and abroad.
Representing southern California, I am very aware of the
harm that drug traffickers inflict on our communities. In
recent years, violence stemming from the drug trade has spilled
over the Mexican border and has led to the kidnappings and
murders of numerous American citizens and law enforcement
officers. A little over a year ago, Coast Guard Senior Chief
Petty Officer Terrell Horne was killed while leading a boarding
team in a counterdrug operation off the coast of Santa Cruz,
California. Senior Chief Horne was carrying out the Coast
Guard's mission to interdict and apprehend illegal drug
traffickers on the high seas.
Stopping bulk drug shipments at sea before they are broken
down into smaller packages is the most effective and efficient
way to stop the flow of illegal drugs across our borders. The
Coast Guard is the lead agency in maritime interdiction because
it has unique military and law enforcement authorities which
enable it to seamlessly disable a drug smuggling vessel, seize
the drugs, and arrest the crew. But that only works when the
Coast Guard, SOUTHCOM, and partner agencies and nations have
the resources and assets to act on intelligence targets.
However, cuts to the military's budget, coupled with aging
and rapidly failing Coast Guard assets, are undermining mission
success. SOUTHCOM and the Coast Guard were only able to
interdict roughly 20 percent of the cocaine bound for the
United States in recent years. It is not because you don't know
where the rest is, but that is all you have the assets to
interdict. That is half of the national target. Since 2009, the
Coast Guard has only achieved its cocaine interdiction rate
once.
I hope today's hearing will help clarify the direction we
need to take in the future to ensure our men and women in
uniform have the resources and assets they need to carry out
this and other critical missions.
I know that I said this at our last hearing, but this will
be the last time that Admiral Papp will appear before us.
Maybe. Unless he comes to something else later. I want to again
commend you for your leadership and thank you for your
tremendous service to our Nation.
You know, this is an interesting hearing for one big reason
for me, and it is this: We can do 100 percent of this,
theoretically, if you have the assets to do it. So, by only
doing--by only interdicting 20 percent, what that means is we
don't really care about the other 80 percent. And we are not
talking about marijuana here, we are talking about opiates,
heroin, and cocaine, the main stuff brought up from the south
that we are not decriminalizing here in the United States that
kills our kids.
So, with that, let's just--especially, if we could right
now--talk about why we don't care about the other 80 percent.
Why are we not trying to hit our target, when it just takes
more assets to do so? It doesn't take a new paradigm of how to
interdict or anything; it just takes the assets.
So, with that, I yield back.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you. I recognize Mr. Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Mr. Sires
is not here. Perhaps Mr. Meeks could take his place. OK, good.
Thank you.
I am going to really shorten my statement here. The
chairman, Mr. Hunter, handled almost all of it having to do
with the Coast Guard, the Coast Guard budget, and the effect
that the budget, or the lack of a good budget, is having on the
Coast Guard's ability to do its work, and quite possibly the
reality that maybe we really don't care that much, because we
don't seem to be putting sufficient money into the effort. In
fact, it appears as though the current situation would even
further diminish the Coast Guard's budget and its ability to do
its job.
The chairman, Mr. Hunter, has gone through all of that, so
I don't propose to repeat all of it. But there is one thing
that I would like to cover. And since the Foreign Affairs
Committee has joined us--we have joined them--on this hearing,
all too often we look at this problem from the point of view of
America, and not often from the point of view of the countries
that are supplying the drugs. Latin America, looking at the map
that was put on our desk here. We can go to Southeast Asia or
even to a place called Afghanistan. And we need to look at the
perspective from those countries, and hear their view of our
efforts or lack of efforts. You mentioned, Mr. Salmon, the
issue of Colombia and the work that has been done there, which
is a pretty good example of what can be done when we work with
those countries that are our partners in this problem.
So, at some point--I know we have the Ambassador here, and
he will undoubtedly speak to us about the issue from that point
of view, at least from the American point of view. But perhaps
the Ambassador from Mexico might want to give us their point of
view of this, or Colombia, or other countries that are the
partners in this problem. So I would recommend that we do that
at some point, and listen carefully to their point of view, and
see how that would affect our own strategies here.
In the meantime, our subcommittee, the Subcommittee on
Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, is doing the best we
can to make sure the Coast Guard has its assets. However, we
are seriously hampered by sequestration, by the budget that
passed the House of Representatives 2 weeks ago would make it
even more difficult, because it does continue sequestration in
the outyears. In fact, sequestration on steroids, making all of
this even more difficult.
With that, I will yield back whatever remaining time I
have.
Mr. Salmon. Thank the gentleman. I recognize the gentleman
from North Carolina, Mr. Coble.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief.
It has been pretty well covered. As Mr. Duncan Hunter said,
Admiral Papp is probably making his swan song today, my old
shipmate--strike that, my young shipmate. But, Admiral, I
appreciate very much what you have done. Best wishes to you in
your next life. But it has been a good rapport between our
subcommittee and the Nation's oldest continuous seagoing
Service. Always ready. Thank you, Admiral.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you. Mr. Meeks?
Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank
both chairmans that are here, and, of course, Ranking Member.
Let me just say narcotics has long been one of the main
areas of focus of the United States foreign policy in Latin
America. Seventeen of the twenty-two nations which President
Obama identified as major producers of illicit drugs in 2014
are located in Latin America or the Caribbean. So this is not
just an American problem, but it is truly a hemispheric
problem, and one which we must tackle head on, and we must do
it in multiple ways, I believe, and not just one way.
As a friend of Latin America and a frequent visitor to the
region, I have seen the effects of illicit drug trade
personally. In fact, in Colombia, for example, a country which
I care deeply about, have been to several times, I have seen
the devastating effects the drug cartels and related criminal
activity have had on particularly minority populations,
especially the Afro-Colombian and indigenous peoples in places
like Buenaventura and Cali. The horrendous violence and tragic
poverty in such areas is a direct result of the drug trade. And
while recent involvement of the police and military of our
President Santos may give short-term solutions, we must combat
the evils underlying society in these places in order to
elevate the local people to the lives that they deserve.
I returned just last week from a trip to Haiti and
Guatemala and Mexico City. And there, too, I saw what can
result in countries which are the hubs for drug transit. We
must get to the root of this problem, and what facilitates the
plague of drugs in the Western Hemisphere, and we must identify
both the social and economic factors which contribute to the
widespread production and transit of drugs in the region. And
we must not rest until we are sure that they have been
eradicated for good.
We know we have got to coordinate while we do this. We have
got to coordinate what interdictions and what the Coast Guard
is doing and what we have, to try to make sure that it is
coordinated and we can run them out and not use what happens
where we can run them from one country and they run to another
country and--because they feel that we don't have the same kind
of assets there.
So, despite, though, my frustration with what is going--
this ongoing problem in the region, I must also say that I am
optimistic. I am optimistic because we have the tools at our
disposal that are working, and we have new tools that we are
developing. And when I visited, for example, the National
Police Academy in Haiti last week, I learned about a new
partnership with the New York Police Department, and how the
United States is facilitating counternarcotics capabilities
abroad with our friends and partners.
I also believe that legal trade is a powerful antidote to
illicit drug trafficking. The free movement of goods and
services is at the heart of a strong rule of law. And I am
confident that new and upcoming free trade agreements will
bolster the ability of the United States neighbors to develop
robust, diversified economics which are not dependent on drugs.
And I am confident that local farmers and workers will be able
to find ways to make their living honorably, and to give back
to their countries. Building trade capacity is an issue I care
deeply about. And I believe this Congress must lend its support
for the sake of both America and its partner nations.
Lastly, I believe combating the drug trade is also
important to bridge our differences and work together to solve
a problem which hurts us all. I look forward to the day when
America once again--we can't do it now--but can cooperate with
Venezuela, for example, in combating narcotics. I look forward
to extending our hands in friendship to our neighbors in a
sincere effort to rid the hemisphere of this horror, and to
build new regional partnerships that will bring us closer
together than ever before.
Thank you, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you. Ms. Hahn, do you have some comments
you would like to make?
Ms. Hahn. I have a question.
Mr. Salmon. OK, fine. We will go ahead and introduce.
Pursuant to Committee Rule 7, the members of the
subcommittee will be permitted to submit written statements to
be included in the official hearing record. Without objection,
the hearing record will remain open for 7 days to allow
statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record,
subject to the length of limitation of the rules.
Admiral Papp is the 24th commander--Commandant, excuse me--
of the United States Coast Guard. He previously served as the
commander of the Coast Guard Atlantic Area, overseeing all U.S.
Coast Guard operations in the eastern half of the world.
Admiral Papp is a graduate of the United States Coast Guard
Academy. He also holds an M.A. in national security and
strategic studies from the U.S. Naval War College, and an M.S.
in management from Salve Regina College.
Ambassador Arreaga is a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs. Prior to his appointment, he served as the United
States Ambassador to the Republic of Iceland, and deputy chief
of mission at the U.S. Embassy in Panama. Ambassador Arreaga
holds a Ph.D. in economics and an M.A. in management from the
University of Wisconsin.
General Kelly is commander of the United States Southern
Command. Prior to his current position, he served as a senior
military assistant for the Secretary of Defense, and commanded
Marine Forces Reserve and Marine Forces North. General Kelly is
a graduate of the University of Massachusetts and U.S. National
War College.
I know it goes without saying you all understand the
lighting system. Just understand that it goes yellow about the
time you have about a minute left, and it goes red--it is time
to cut it off. And you guys are so distinguished, I am not
brave enough to probably cut you off, so try and be as adherent
to that as you can.
And, with that, Admiral Papp.
TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL ROBERT J. PAPP, JR., COMMANDANT, U.S.
COAST GUARD, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; AMBASSADOR
LUIS E. ARREAGA, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE; AND GENERAL JOHN F. KELLY, U.S. MARINE
CORPS, COMMANDER, SOUTHERN COMMAND, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Admiral Papp. Thank you, Chairman Salmon. And good morning,
again, to Chairman Hunter and Ranking Member Garamendi, and to
all the members of the subcommittees. I want to thank you for
the opportunity to be here this morning to thank you for your
continued support of the Coast Guard, and also to discuss the
challenges that we face in confronting the illicit smuggling in
the Western Hemisphere and its consequences that it has for our
country.
And I would be remiss this morning if I didn't recognize
some of our other partners in this fight: the Department of
Justice, and our partner agencies in the Department of Homeland
Security who also contribute greatly to the efforts to stem the
flow of illicit traffic into the United States.
We continue to face a significant threat in the drug
transit zones of the Western Hemisphere and in the southern
maritime approaches to the United States. Ruthless
transnational criminal organizations advancing their illicit
trade through coercion, bribery, and violence create a
destabilizing effect on both the governments and economies of
the Western Hemisphere and our partner nations.
For instance, for the second consecutive year, Honduras has
the world's highest murder rate, a direct result of the massive
influx of U.S.-bound cocaine entering Central America through
the western Caribbean Sea and the eastern Pacific Ocean. And
those drugs reach our shores, and the activities of those
sophisticated criminal networks have an impact on America's
streets, as well, in the form of gang violence and turf wars by
urban drug dealers.
Coast Guard is the lead Federal agency for maritime law
enforcement in support of the administration's national drug
control strategy, and the strategy to combat transnational
organized crime. On the frontlines of our detection,
monitoring, and interdiction and apprehension operations, the
Coast Guard deploys major cutters, long- and medium-range
fixed-wing aircraft, airborne use-of-force helicopters, and our
law enforcement detachments embarked on Navy and allied
warships to stop drug traffickers in the transit zone, before
the drugs can approach our shores.
And working with U.S. Southern Command and the Departments
of State and Justice--a really important fact here--we have
established more than 40 maritime bilateral law enforcement
agreements with our international stakeholders, including
Venezuela, who we still cooperate with in the drug war.
Our unique combination of ships, aircraft, and authorities,
and partnerships has continuously proven to be an effective
interdiction system when employed in the transit zone. Over the
last 5 years, Coast Guard ships and law enforcement detachments
operating in the offshore regions have removed more than 500
metric tons of cocaine with a wholesale value of nearly $17
billion. This is more than two times the amount of cocaine and
twice the purity seized by all other U.S. Federal, State, and
local law enforcement agencies combined.
This is where we get the very best value for the taxpayer's
dollar. It is also where we have our first best chance to
address this problem: close to the source, and far from our
shores, where the drugs are pure and uncut, where they are in
their most vulnerable bulk form, and before they are divided
into increasingly smaller loads, making them exponentially
harder and more expensive to detect and interdict.
And, Chairman Hunter, in response to do we care about the
other 80 percent, of course we care about the other 80 percent.
But it is not just about the drugs. For every shipment that we
interdict at sea, we gather valuable information about the
sophisticated criminal enterprises that move these drugs. By
understanding the criminal networks, we are better prepared to
combat other illicit enterprises, including human traffickers
and international terrorists. Our interdictions remain a key
weapon in the U.S. arsenal to combat transnational criminal
networks.
The Coast Guard and its partners rely upon this what we
call cycle of success to disrupt the networks behind the
illicit trafficking in the Western Hemisphere. Successful
interdictions and subsequent prosecutions provide actionable
intelligence on future events, producing follow-on seizures and
additional intelligence, thus feeding that cycle of success.
Our at-sea interdictions are the engine that drives this cycle
and our success. More than half the designated priority drug
targets extradited to the United States from South America over
the last 10 years are directly linked to Coast Guard
interdictions.
Over 60 named drug-trafficking organizations have been
dismantled because of our investigations originating with or
supported by Coast Guard interdictions. The removal of these
networks helped countries like Colombia restore citizen
security and economic opportunity, contributing to a $14
billion increase of imports of the United States goods over the
last 20 years.
But despite our success, far too many illicit drugs still
reach our shores. Our reduced numbers of ships can stop only a
fraction of the contraband our intelligence tells us is moving.
Erosion of this cycle of success, either through degraded
intelligence, a reduction in ships and aircraft, or a decrease
in prosecutions, will have a chronic negative impact on our
Department's mission to secure and manage our borders.
And you don't need to look any further than a recent news
report from Chicago to get a sense of how these criminal
networks are impacting our communities once these drugs reach
the homeland. The Sinaloa Cartel uses Chicago as a distribution
hub by exploiting people in underserved communities to traffic
their illicit goods. The impacts of this cartel activity are
felt throughout our communities and manifest themselves in a
host of problems infecting our society.
This problem is not going away. The flow of illicit trade
and drugs, people, and all the many forms it takes continues to
threaten our homeland. Those engaged in this business bring
their traffic on, over, and even under the sea, and exploit our
global supply and transportation chains to deliver contraband
to the market. The offshore interdiction of illegal drugs in
bulk quantities is critical to the safety and security of our
Nation.
But even more important is the understanding and disrupting
the sophisticated criminal networks that transport these drugs
and sow instability throughout Central America and Mexico, and
adversely impact our safety, security, and prosperity. As the
Department of Defense rebalances the bulk of its fleet to the
western Pacific, and as Coast Guard cutters continue to age, I
fear that this problem is only going to get worse. Sustaining
the cycle of success by strengthening international
partnerships, investing in cutter and aircraft
recapitalization, and leveraging interagency capabilities will
keep deadly, addictive drugs off U.S. streets, disrupt
transnational criminal networks, create space for security
within the Western Hemisphere, and facilitate the safe flow of
legitimate commerce and transport.
So, I want to thank you for the opportunity to speak on
this very important topic this morning, and I look forward to
answering your questions.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you, Admiral.
Ambassador Arreaga?
Mr. Arreaga. Good morning, Chairman Salmon, Chairman
Hunter, Ranking Member Garamendi, and other distinguished
members of the subcommittee. Just a word of warning, my accent
sometimes gets the better of me. So if you hear something that
doesn't make sense, it really does make sense; I just
mispronounced it.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Arreaga. Thank you so much for the opportunity to
appear today with my colleagues, General Kelly and Admiral
Papp, to discuss our work to undermine transnational organized
crime, minimize its impact in the United States--on the United
States, and improve citizen security in the Western Hemisphere.
The State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs, or INL, leads the Department's
anticrime, counternarcotics efforts globally. We shape and
deliver assistance programs in nearly 80 countries to help
partner nations build their capacity to fight crime and
prosecute criminals under the law. This is, no doubt, an
enormous responsibility. And INL does not approach it alone. We
partnered with the best and brightest in the United States
Government to impart expertise and training, and we also
partner with police departments, courts, and corrections
entities from a number of your constituencies.
In the Western Hemisphere the United States has established
partnerships to confront shared threats and advance common
interests. The collection of the maritime initiative with
Mexico, our longstanding partnership with Colombia, the Central
America Regional Security Initiative, CARSI, and the Caribbean
Basin Security Initiative constitute our strategic approach to
enhance and professionalize civilian enforcement institutions,
court systems, and corrections capacity, so that they can
investigate and undermine criminal groups, prosecute criminal
offenders, and remove them from their operations.
While the State Department has no direct role in
interdiction efforts, the governments that we mentor and train
in the Western Hemisphere do. Our assistance efforts results in
enhanced foreign government capacity to interdict drugs,
investigate crimes, and prosecute and incarcerate criminals.
In the Bahamas, Jamaica, Panama, and Costa Rica, civil
police and prosecutors, working with maritime law enforcement
components, patrol their waters, seize narcotics, and
judicialize cases. In other areas of the hemisphere, where law
enforcement capacity is less developed, our regional partners,
such as the Government of Colombia, are working in coordination
with our programs to develop basic policing skills, and they
are also working with our U.S. law enforcement and military
partners to pursue narcotics traffickers.
These successes, large and impressive as they are, pale in
comparison to the magnitude of the drug transit threat in our
hemisphere. Furthermore, while we are making progress in
building partner nation capacity, and I want to emphasize this,
it cannot make up for gaps in U.S. interdiction assets in the
region. Let me repeat that. It cannot make up for gaps in U.S.
interdiction assets in the region.
We know that the Caribbean is experiencing an increase in
drug flows, with a majority of shipments occurring by a
maritime means. In 2011, cocaine transiting the Caribbean to
the U.S. totaled approximately 5 percent of the total flow.
This increased to 9 percent by 2012, and 16 percent by the end
of 2013. Central America remains a priority, as 80 percent of
documented drug flow from South America transits Central
American territory. Under CARSI, the United States is
implementing a comprehensive and integrated approach to stem
illegal trafficking.
We also recognize that it will take many years to see
fruits of our efforts in Central America, owing to the
magnitude of threats we confront there.
The partnerships between the State Department, partner
nations, the U.S. Coast Guard, and U.S. SOUTHCOM constitute a
proven and trusted mechanism that works every single day.
It is also important to note that regional partnerships
between nations are flourishing, that joint operations have
become more common, and that information sharing is happening
in a near-real-time basis. This is a proven formula. While
these are all significant developments, they are not enough to
curtail the magnitude of trafficking operations. U.S. foreign
assistance expertise and engagement by our law enforcement and
military partners remains critical. However, the capability
gaps abroad require more from us.
Chairman Salmon, Chairman Duncan, and other distinguished
Members, thank you for your focus on this important topic. I
look forward to our discussion.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you.
General Kelly?
General Kelly. Members of the committee, I look forward to
discussing the strong counternarcotics partnerships between
U.S. Southern Command and the interagency--especially the U.S.
Coast Guard and the Department of Homeland Security and INL.
Together we defend the southern approaches, or we try to defend
the southern approaches of the United States.
Chairmen, Members, those southern approaches are being
assailed by dangerous criminal networks that are well
resourced, adaptive, and skilled at exploiting all avenues of
approach to the United States. Illicit trafficking threatens
our country at every land, air, and sea border, and challenges
the sovereignty of many of our partners in Latin America and
the Caribbean. The Department of Defense plays a critical
supporting role in the fight against illicit trafficking,
although this role is under discussion and some disagree with
it.
As you know, we have congressionally mandated statutory
responsibility as the lead Federal agency--that is, U.S.
Southern Command does--as the lead Federal agency for detection
and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs
towards the United States. Like the U.S. Coast Guard and DHS,
along with DEA, FBI, and INL, we also build the partner
capacity of nations which helps enhance security, stability,
and antitrafficking efforts throughout Latin America and the
Caribbean. Together, with U.S. law enforcement and intelligence
from foreign, military, and law enforcement partners, we focus
on combating illicit drug trade, and supporting interdiction as
far from our borders as possible, before those drugs are broken
down into nearly impossible-to-detect load sizes.
Our support to interdiction efforts not only keeps drugs
like cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamines from violating our
shores, it puts international drug traffickers in jail and
leads to invaluable intelligence that enhances our
understanding of trafficking networks. All with almost no
violence.
And when we are adequately resourced, the defend-forward
approach is very effective, although my component--Joint
Interagency Task Force in Key West receives only 1.5 percent of
the total U.S. Government counternarcotics budget, 1.5 percent.
With the support of partners like DHS and the Coast Guard, DEA,
and FBI, they remove--are responsible for removing 68 percent
of all of the seized cocaine heading towards the United States.
Our international partners are also key to our
effectiveness, especially in our ongoing counterdrug operation,
Martillo. Fifty percent of Martillo's interactions would not
have been possible without the contributions of our partners.
The outstanding support of nations like Colombia, Panama,
Guatemala, Honduras, Belize, Costa Rica, and even Nicaragua,
not to mention Canada, the United Kingdom, France, and the
Netherlands, it is what makes Martillo a success. I will be
frank; we could not do it without these partners. They are
fighting our drug fight for us. And their courage and
commitment, in my opinion, is second to none.
And human rights, ladies and gentlemen, are first and
foremost in all of our relationships with these countries. And
there is a lot we can do for them for very little, like
providing inexpensive patrol craft with maintenance and
training packages, as well as providing them ISR and
intelligence support. Since we are unlikely to get any
additional assets due to other global priorities, right now our
partners are the only hope we have of putting a dent in the
drug flow coming to the United States.
And I emphasize this is our fight, not their fight. It is
destructive to their countries, but it is our problem. And they
are fighting it for us at great loss of life. They help us make
a big dent all of the time. Last year alone, 132 metric tons of
cocaine were seized and disrupted, thanks in part to their
contributions to Operation Martillo, 132 tons, no violence.
Unfortunately, that number is just a small fraction of the
cocaine and other drugs that still reach our shores, which we
were unable to get at, due to asset shortfalls. Since 2012,
Southern Command has faced limited and declining U.S.
Government maritime and air assets required for detection and
monitoring and end game interdiction missions. We also receive
less than 5 percent of our annual airborne ISR requirements.
These limitations mean less presence, less deterrence, and less
awareness of what is moving on trafficking networks, be it
drugs, weapons, cash, human beings, or something even more
detrimental to our national security, like terrorist agent or
WMD.
Make no mistake. Drug traffickers are exploiting our lack
of presence, especially in the Caribbean. As we focus our
limited assets off the Central American coast, we have started
seeing a shift back to the old smuggling routes through the
Caribbean. I worry that smaller Caribbean nations may soon be
overwhelmed--I think they are being overwhelmed--by violence
and powerful criminal networks as we have seen in some parts of
Latin America--correction, Central America--already.
On a recent trip to Haiti I saw some real improvement in
the right direction in that country, but I fear the shift to
the Caribbean, if left unchecked, could change the positive
direction Haiti has taken.
We are doing everything we can to at least partially
mitigate this lack of assets. We are relying heavily on both
the U.S. Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection and
other DHS assets, which now provide over 70 percent of the
aircraft and cutters to support detection and monitoring
mission. However, over the next few years, both the Department
of Defense and the U.S. Coast Guard are facing an unprecedented
downturn in the availability of large surface assets like U.S.
Navy frigates and U.S. Coast Guard High Endurance Cutters.
In 2016, the Navy frigate inventory will go to zero. This
makes our reliance on the U.S. Coast Guard--the Nation's
reliance on the U.S. Coast Guard and its national security and
planned Offshore Patrol Cutters all the more critical. And I am
deeply concerned to hear that the U.S. Coast Guard is facing
major budget cuts, as is DOD.
In closing, I share the Commandant's conviction--the Coast
Guard Commandant's conviction that illicit trafficking by
powerful criminal networks is a direct threat to our national
security and the stability of our partners. I also share his
concern that continued asset shortfalls pose a direct threat to
the Department of Defense and U.S. Coast Guard's ability to
counter drugs.
I look forward to discussing these and other issues with
you. Thank you.
Mr. Salmon. I thank the distinguished panel. I yield myself
5 minutes to ask my questions.
My first question would be for you, Ambassador. There is a
number of initiatives in the Western Hemisphere that share the
objective of improving citizen security, including the Merida
Initiative in Mexico, the Central America Regional Security
Initiative, CARSI, the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative,
CBSI.
In what ways have State and USAID applied lessons learned
from the various initiatives to maximize the effectiveness of
their efforts across the Western Hemisphere? And maybe look at
replicating success, as you mentioned--and I think yesterday,
when we spoke, as well, we all agree that we have enjoyed
tremendous success with Colombia. And I am wondering. How do we
put all of that together and, from the lessons we have learned,
how do we replicate some of those things?
And I know that there are different nuances, but I would
like your thoughts.
Mr. Arreaga. Thank you for your question. That--it is a
very good question. And, as you know, Chairman, you have--
different countries have different challenges, different levels
of development. What we do try is to take the lessons learned
from one to the other. And I think the case of Colombia is one
case where Colombia is such a success story that they have
become our partners. They export security. So we use them to
train the forces, some of the forces in Central America on
investigative techniques, polygraph management, interdiction
techniques. And so--we take the success in one part of the
country, we take it to another.
Now we--let me give you another example. We are just about
to establish a nationalized customs training academy in Panama.
Now, this is a training academy that was established with INL
funds and with enormous support from the Department of Homeland
Security and CBP. This academy is now going to become a
regional training center, where we are going to bring people
from other parts of the hemisphere, from Central America, from
Guatemala, and other places, so that they have the same
doctrine, the same approach, the same type of techniques to
control borders.
Depending on the circumstances, when you think about, for
example, our success in Peru, the success we have had in the
Upper Huallaga Valley is because we have combined alternative
development along with eradication. So we are looking at that
model and see what we can transfer it to other areas. We are
beginning to see some potential plantings of coca plants, as in
other parts of Peru.
Mr. Salmon. And I have said this before, and I think most
people that worked with the Colombia initiative have recognized
that, while the United States contribution to that process was
substantial, I think all of you have said pretty much the same
thing: there is no way that that would have been accomplished
without the political will coming from the leaders themselves
in Colombia.
And so, as we look to try to replicate some of those
successes, I am really heartened to know that you are using
folks who are in the trenches in Colombia to actually advise
and consult and, you know, get their hands dirty with Mexico,
with possibly other Latin American nations. But I think there
is also another reason for that. Besides actually having the
people that demonstrated the political will, I think that using
them, you know, is a little bit more influential, because
sometimes I wonder if we suggest it, if it might just be dead
on arrival just because we suggested it and, you know, the fact
that it is the Big Brother or, you know, the--you know, the
United States, sometimes it causes more problems than
solutions.
Why do you think in Colombia they finally turned the
corner? Was it--you know, was it a rebound? Was it his efforts?
Was it, you know, a combination of things? What are your
thoughts? And I am interested in all three of you, because, as
I look at some of the things going on in Mexico right now, I
know a lot of people are kind of wait-and-see with the new
administration in Mexico, and we have all been kind of
pleasantly surprised with the tenacity that they have
approached this problem.
I would like your thoughts on, you know, how can we better
utilize some of the successes in the region, and what can we
recommend, going forward, to do that? General, I will start
with you.
General Kelly. Mr. Chairman, first I would say the term--
you said the U.S. investment in Colombia was substantial,
significant, or whatever the term was. You are right, except
that is a very relative term. United States, I think, 4, 5, 6
cents on the dollar in terms of what was spent to, if you will,
turn Colombia around in the drug fight. And, of course,
virtually no boots on--they did their own bleeding. They did
their own fighting and dying.
What we did--and they will be, I think, eternally grateful
for--is the encouragement that this country, our country, gave
them in the drug fight. I can remember when I worked up here on
Capitol Hill some years ago, the discussion back in the late
1990s was should the United States allow Colombia to buy--not
be given, but buy six Black Hawk airplanes, conventional
helicopters. And the discussion in this room rotated around or
oriented around the fact that why would we allow them to buy
these things, it is a failed state, it is a narco state, it has
gone over the edge, there is no hope for them. And, of course,
here we are, 14 years later, 15 years later, and it is
virtually a miracle, heroic effort. Why did they win? Because
they were losing so badly. Why did they turn it around? Because
they had no choice.
The good news is we, as I say, allowed them--we supported
them, we encouraged them. We did, in fact, in a sense, unleash,
but unleash a small number of advisors and trainers, U.S.
military. And it turned the place around. But the Colombians
really did that themselves because they were losing so badly.
Unfortunately, that same plan, that same attitude we are not
focusing in the same way on countries that are today very close
to going over the edge. Where Colombia was in the 1990s, they
are just a few inches away from falling off the cliff. Yet we
are restricted from working with them for past sins in the
1980s.
The beauty of having a Colombia--and they are such good
partners, particularly in the military realm, they are such
good partners with us--when we ask them to go somewhere else
and train the Mexicans, the Hondurans, the Guatemalans, the
Panamanians, they will do it almost without asking, and they
will do it on their own. They are so appreciative of what we
did for them. And, again, what we did for them was really
encourage them for 20 years. And they have done such a
magnificent job.
But that is why it is important for them to go. Because I
am, at least on the military side, I am restricted from working
with so many of these countries because of limitations that are
really based on past sins. And I will let it go at that, Mr.--
--
Mr. Salmon. Thank you. I have run out of time. I am going
to recognize Duncan Hunter.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, I guess it
would be great if we could have the Judiciary Committee, where
the money comes out for the counterdrug money that gets put
into Federal grants throughout the United States. That is one
big question, is why do you get so little of that. Is it
because it is a jobs program throughout the United States for
drug enforcement agencies at the municipal levels in the cities
and States?
I mean if you collect--if you had that money, you could
theoretically reduce their need for a job at all, right, when
it comes to drug interdiction within the United States. So why
do you think that is? Do they have better lobbyists than you
do? That is my question. Why is there less money going to you,
as opposed to all these different agencies that the Department
of Justice doles out grants to these agencies? Every local
sheriff and every local police gets drug money to interdict
drugs, and you don't. So why is that? Admiral Papp?
Admiral Papp. Mr. Chairman, I--that is a real great grenade
to jump on.
[Laughter.]
Admiral Papp. But----
Mr. Hunter. Sorry I didn't ask one of the prescheduled
questions.
Admiral Papp. But truth be known, I don't know what the
percentage is that they get, domestically. But what I do know
is that I wear a number of hats. One of the hats I wear is----
Mr. Hunter. General Kelly said 1.5 percent, 1.5 percent
goes to SOUTHCOM and Coast Guard interdiction efforts. So that
leaves 98.5 for everybody else.
Admiral Papp. I can't confirm or verify or deny----
Mr. Hunter. I trust----
Admiral Papp [continuing]. On that figure. I would have to
go back and research that.
But what I will say is that one of the hats I wear is as
chairman of the Interdiction Committee, the TIC, which reports
to the director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy.
We are focused on interdiction. But one of the things I have
gained during my time as Commandant is an appreciation for the
need for supply reduction and demand reduction. It has to be
spread out. We can argue, and certainly I would advocate for
more funds for what we do.
On the other hand, I can't make a good judgment, because I
think it has to be--much like Mr. Meeks talked about, we have
to have a balanced approach to this. We need to work on
reducing the demand, while we reduce the supply, while we work
on trying to disrupt the transnational criminal organizations
as well.
Mr. Hunter. I don't want to run out of time----
Admiral Papp. So I am trying to respond to your question,
but I just don't know the figures and the percentages to give
you an accurate enough response.
[The information follows:]
As part of the 11 statutory missions, the Coast Guard is the
lead Federal agency for maritime drug interdiction (and co-lead
agency for air interdiction). The Coast Guard receives
appropriated funds to carry out these missions and does not
receive grant money.
Mr. Hunter. General Kelly?
General Kelly. Congressman, I think, first of all, the 1.5
percent is not what the Coast Guard gets. What I get to manage
the detection and monitoring of--and to assist in interdiction,
the drug flow. I would be guessing, though.
On your question about domestic funding, I would guess
because we have tended to look at this issue as, you know, the
cancer that is within our country. And we see the--you know,
what it does to our youth and, for that matter, middle-aged
people and older people, and the drug abuse. You know, 40,000
Americans die of drug overdoses every year. And you can't even
count the human misery of the number of people living under
bridges or selling their bodies for a fix, and all of this kind
of thing.
So, I think, you know, we look at it and we say, ``This is
terrible, let's try to solve this problem at home.'' The last
place to solve this problem--it is--part of the solution is
here at home. But you know, once this drug gets ashore and
makes its way into Mexico and the United States, it is
impossible, really. I think we have a million law enforcement
heroes in this country--DEA, local police, FBI--there is a
million, and they get, about total, 20, 25 tons of cocaine
every year. I can get 20--we can get, collectively, 25 tons of
cocaine in a month, no violence.
Mr. Hunter. That is not balanced. Admiral Papp, you said--
--
General Kelly. Well, but that is where the fight is.
Mr. Hunter. That is not balanced at all.
General Kelly. I think the efficiency of the fight is
before it gets ashore in Central America or, now, increasingly
into Haiti and Dominican Republic. But we focused this war on
drugs for 30 or whatever years on the streets of America, which
is the last place you really want to kind of put your main
effort. My thoughts.
Mr. Hunter. I was reading, like, National Geographic or The
Economist or something last week, and it said that the Sinaloa
Cartel in the Sinaloa area in Mexico, that they are not growing
weed any more, they are not growing any marijuana. They are
growing poppies. What is the big uptick on heroin coming in?
General Kelly. Surprise to me when I took this job. I
thought heroin that fed the United States demand, the habit,
came from other parts of the world. Virtually all of it now
comes from Latin America--and if you talk to the DEA, they will
confirm this--virtually all of the heroin that comes and feeds
the drug habit in the United States is grown now and produced--
grown throughout Latin America, poppies, and then turned into
heroin in Mexico, and then comes in. Virtually all of it. A
tiny bit may come down from Canada, through Canada from, say,
Afghanistan, but not a lot. It is almost entirely--and, oh, by
the way, methamphetamines, again, largely produced today in
Mexico and comes across the border.
So, the zone that I live in, and that Admiral Papp, to a
very large degree, fights alongside me, the zone that I live
in, the three most detrimental influences in our society--
cocaine, which is the big money-maker, by the way, cocaine,
heroin, and methamphetamine, is all produced south of the
border and trafficked in on this incredibly efficient criminal
network on which anything can ride: drugs, human beings,
terrorists. Anything can ride on this network. It is--and it is
globally linked.
It is an amazing thing to see, and it is virtually a wide
open entry into the United States or, for that matter, the
United Kingdom. Or, for that matter, Africa. Or, for that
matter, the Middle East.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you. Mr. Meeks?
Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me--I guess I will
just start with General Kelly, just so that I have an
understanding of where the figure come from. I think I saw
someplace that in March you told the Senate Armed Services
Committee that you only had 5 percent of the assets you need to
perform drug interdiction duties in the Caribbean region. And
so, I was wondering, where that figure comes from, because I
thought that the annual DOD's budget for counternarcotics
funding was over a billion dollars. So if it was only 5 percent
that you had, I was just wondering how could that be.
General Kelly. Sir, it is 5 percent of the ISR. That is
airborne intelligence and reconnaissance. That is what--I only
get 5 percent of what I think I need. And what that means is I
only get 5 percent of aircraft like P-3 patrol aircraft, either
from the United States Navy or from Homeland Security. The
Border folks fly them and do tremendous work. We tend to fly
those airplanes out of places like El Salvador, great partners.
Or Honduras, great partners. But I only get 5 percent.
And how you track this stuff as it moves on the high seas
is we have a very, very good idea of when it leaves either
Ecuador or Colombia. And then, as it moves either side of
Central America--or now, increasingly off towards Puerto Rico,
Haiti, Dominican Republic--as we get the intel, human intel, if
you will, that it is about to move, then we pick it up, we
vector--if we have them, which we generally don't--ISR
airplanes to pick up the go-fast--it is a speed boat carrying
anywhere between 1 and, say, 4 tons of cocaine. And we pick
that up, and then that airplane watches it until either a Coast
Guard or U.S. Navy helicopter--ship with a helicopter on it--
can get close enough. And once the helicopter shows up, they
basically stop and we seize and it is seized.
So, without that airborne assets--and, oh, by the way, we
use anything we can get. I mean I have had B-52s flying
training missions with ISR parts on them, B-1 bombers with ISR
parts on them, flying over the Caribbean, not--in international
airspace, doing that mission for me. So we beg for the assets.
And, as I say, I will take any asset I can get. And sometimes,
believe it or not, it is a bomber or a JSTARS airplane.
Mr. Meeks. So, that--could there be some negotiations
within DOD, or you talking about we need to give you additional
assets or additional dollars to go to DOD to give you what you
think you need?
General Kelly. Sir, the national security policy or
strategy of the United States, of course, is to pivot the
Pacific, and to deal with the wars in the Middle East, and to
deter other countries--you know who they are. That leaves--with
the size of the U.S. military getting smaller, that leaves
almost nothing for SOUTHCOM. I am not criticizing; that is just
the reality of it.
But again, this drug scourge causes our country 40,000
deaths a year, $200 billion in costs, and I think, to a very,
very large degree, the biggest crime, or the biggest emotional
thing, in my mind, is the human misery it causes. Because the
dead are dead, but the people who are struggling with this
stuff--and, again, living under bridges and selling their
bodies for a hit, is just something that, to me, you know,
keeps me awake at night.
But again, these are decisions made outside of my purview.
I just define the problem.
Mr. Meeks. And Admiral Papp, in your opening statement you
indicated that you--we are continuing to work with Venezuela
with reference to drug interdiction. Can you tell us how, and
what is the relationship, or how--are they cooperating, or not
cooperating?
Admiral Papp. Yes, sir. We are getting good cooperation. I
mentioned that we have 40 multilateral agreements. These have
been worked out over the last 20 years with countries
surrounding the Caribbean, South and Central America, based
upon a partnership with the United States Coast Guard. And we
work through the Department of Justice to hammer out these--and
each one of them is a little bit different.
But we still do, in fact, have protocols in place where we
have a suspected vessel or Venezuelan vessel, we are able to go
through these protocols to the Government of Venezuela,
primarily the Venezuelan Coast Guard, and get permission to
board vessels. And sometimes we have to make decisions that the
vessels are returned to Venezuela. Other times we can take them
for prosecution. But we continue to have cooperation there.
And going back to what was--what Chairman Salmon answered,
I have got a unique perspective on this, because I have been
not only down there driving ships around the Caribbean, trying
to do interdictions, but back in 1998 had a chance to do a
diplomatic mission, going into Venezuela and Colombia. At the
time, Venezuela was very friendly with us, and accepted us in
there. When we pulled in Cartagena, in Colombia, quite a
different situation there. Cartagena was one of the few towns
that you could go around in safely.
So I have had a chance to watch how Plan Colombia has
worked, the partnerships we developed with the Colombians, and,
in fact, have been down there dealing with their head of navy.
And we are very proud of the way that they have taken on a
regional leadership down there. In fact, they are running drug
symposiums, bringing in other countries, and we continue to
work with them and sustain that relationship.
And I think the key to that has been a continued
commitment. They know we are not going away. But I have to
admit that, as they see fewer and fewer resources devoted to
the counterdrug mission down there, they begin to get a little
anxious, because they perceive that as perhaps us backing away
from sharing the battle with them.
Mr. Meeks. Can I ask one more question, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Salmon. I would like to go to the Ambassador now. I
mentioned in my opening statement about this program that I saw
in Haiti with New York City Policy Department officers there,
working with them on a law enforcement and--on this--you know,
this is, I think, good work on behalf of the State Department.
I was wondering whether or not--are there other
partnerships like that, where you find law enforcement from the
United States working on the ground in some of the Caribbean
islands to help with their judicial systems, or helping with
their police systems? That way we can also get information
there, and they can, in fact, lock up hardened criminals there
before they come to the United States and spread illicit drugs.
So is there any other kind of cooperation that the State
Department is working with like the Haiti program any place
else in Central America or the Caribbean?
Mr. Arreaga. Indeed, and thank you for your question. This
is a great question, because it gives us a chance to highlight
some of the partnerships that we have developed with States all
over the United States. For instance, we have a relationship
with the corrections department in New Mexico. So we train
corrections officers so that jails in the region are actually
jails that are meant to rehabilitate, as opposed to make them
worse criminals. We work with attorneys general to teach about
prosecution. We do this with a number of States. We work with--
in fact, if I may, I would like to submit for the record a
paper explaining all of the partnerships that we have.
But this is one of the unsung aspects of what--the work
that the United States is doing overseas. We are taking the
expertise developed at various States--for instance, the Miami-
Dade Police Department does a lot of training in
counternarcotics. We also have a partnership with the Port of
Miami, where customs officers come to Miami to see how we
handle port security.
You talked about doing some prosecutions there. Absolutely.
That is exactly what we are trying to do. We are trying to
build capacity on the investigation side and the prosecution
side and the courts, because we want to empower these
governments, these countries, to apprehend criminals, to try
them, and to incarcerate them and, you know, do the whole range
of judicial--the process. And we do that, depending on--it all
depends on, of course, the level of development. But that is
part of our approach to security in the region.
We also work with the office of--that deals with money
laundering. We are encouraging countries to pass asset--for
future laws, so that a lot of these agencies that have no
resources can use that law to resource their activities. So we
have lots of partnerships. And I think it is one of the best
parts, because it gives us the flexibility to provide different
types of assistance, depending on what is needed.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you. Ms. Hahn?
Ms. Hahn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Papp, during the
last Coast Guard hearing you mentioned that drug, weapon, and
human smuggling from panga boats still remained a huge threat,
but that budget cuts hindered the Coast Guard's ability to
counter this danger, since they reduced the manpower and
operating hours of the assets the Coast Guard needs to combat
this continuing threat.
For instance, in your previous testimony, you stated that
sequestration clearly affected the Coast Guard's drug
interdiction efforts, as evidenced by the 35-percent reduction
in marijuana seizures in fiscal year 2012 to 2013, when
sequestration began to take effect. This clearly, obviously,
shows that there is a direct correlation between the budget and
operational capability, and that this common theme around here,
that we all need to be doing more with less, is an impossible
principle to constantly adhere to.
Chief Petty Officer Terrell Horne lived in my congressional
district at the time of his death from one of these panga
boats. I live a mile from where one of those boats made land on
the Palos Verdes Peninsula recently. So, of course, in my area,
I am concerned about the potential effect that the next round
of sequestration cuts could have on this danger, and especially
as more evidence is showing that smugglers are increasingly
using the southwest maritime route more and more.
Just met last week in my district office with Admiral
Schultz, the commander of the 11th District, and I also met
with Captain Jenkins, the captain of the Port of Los Angeles.
And I am very excited. And we also met with Captain Williams,
who will be the incoming captain of the port, the first woman
to hold that position in the history of the Coast Guard.
So, we are all excited about that, but want to know what
you can tell me of how you are working with local and foreign
partners to ensure that our major American ports along these
popular drug-smuggling routes such as L.A. and Long Beach are
fully protected against this threat. And maybe in your answer
you can also tell us how important it is that the Coast Guard
at least maintains its current funding levels in order to
preserve its current capability.
Admiral Papp. Thank you, Ms. Hahn. That is a great
question, and I thank you for your advocacy. And also, once
again, I will thank you for being out there for the memorial
service with me for Senior Chief Horne, and the compassion that
you showed for his family.
While I am answering your question, if I could ask for the
slide that I brought with me, if I could get that up there, or,
if not, we can use the table drop that we did. There we go.
[Slide]
Admiral Papp. The challenge that you are talking about is
right there, of course, along the border. And you are right.
When we dropped our activities by 30 percent, we showed a 35-
percent reduction in cocaine seizures for fiscal year 2013. And
we are back to--we have restored our historic levels of
operations right now. In fact, we have increased.
Two new things that we are doing out there in your area is
we are more frequently putting one of our major cutters in the
area, rather than just patrol boats, because we can operate
airborne use of force, one of our HITRON helicopters that stops
the go-fast, the pangas, through--with trained marksmen. That
has been so successful that, rather than tie up a cutter, we
are now using--and we have cleared through the Department of
Justice--we are using land-based airborne use of force. In
other words, putting our HITRON helicopters at a shore station,
and flying them under direction of the sector out there.
The other thing that we are doing is we are leveraging our
partnerships. We have the regional coordination mechanism, we
call it. We have a command center at Sector San Diego, where we
bring in our partners from Customs and Border Protection,
Customs Air and Marine, the other Federal partners, and State
and local law enforcement, as well, so we can coordinate and
effectively synchronize all of our activities, get the most out
of the resources that we have. We do that throughout the
country.
Each one of our captains of the port or our sector
commanders, as you noted there, has very broad authorities.
They head up area maritime security committees, they do port
safety committees, and they bring all the partners together The
only way we can get our business done effectively is through
these partnerships that the Coast Guard is able to develop
because of our broad-based authorities.
Having said that, we are still limited by the amount of
resources we can get out there. On this chart that I brought
with me, we refer to these as threat vectors. But what they
are, they are also vectors of prosperity. Those are our trade
routes, as well, that we have to maintain and keep safe and
secure.
The blue shaded areas surrounding both coasts around
Alaska, around the Hawaiian Islands, and our trust territories
out in the Pacific, that is our exclusive economic zone. That
is about--over 4 million square miles of exclusive economic
zone. It is the largest exclusive economic zone of any country
in the world. And we have to distribute our major cutters over
that entire area. So it is a lot of ground to cover. And we
just have to make reasoned, risk-based decisions.
General Kelly generally asks for at least six Coast Guard
cutters. We are only able to provide four nowadays. And if we
move one up there off the Baja, we reduce him to three. So it
is like squeezing a balloon. You only have so much in it. And
if you have got threats and other areas, you have got to move
them around, and it is zero-based right now, and really--we are
really hurting for resources there.
Ms. Hahn. Thank you. I appreciate that.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you. Mr. Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Kelly, your
testimony indicates that you are basically pulling your assets
out of the Caribbean area. What percentage of your total budget
is consumed by Guantanamo?
General Kelly. You mean the detainee ops at Guantanamo?
Mr. Garamendi. Yes.
General Kelly. It is a separate budget. It is a very
separate mission. I own it, and we do it really well. But it is
a separate budget. But it is about--I think we spend, just for
the detainee ops, it is right at about $130 million, something
on that order. And, of course, as you know, Congressman, we are
tenants on the Navy base down there. So there are other--just
by being there, you know, we don't have to buy electricity, and
things like that. But $130 million is a good, round figure.
Mr. Garamendi. Well, we are--our task is to make choices
about how we spend our taxpayers' money. And so, Guantanamo and
the continuation of it is expensive. And that is money that
might have been spent elsewhere.
Let's talk about UAVs and the deployment of UAVs for a
patrol. You mentioned helicopters off the coast of California
and other places. What use of--what is the use of--the
potential of using UAVs to increase your patrol capacity? Let's
start with Admiral Papp and then, General Kelly, if you could.
Admiral Papp. Well, we will take maritime patrol aviation
any way we can get it. There is really three key elements to
doing these interdictions. First of all is having good
intelligence. And I think probably we are strongest--out of the
trifecta here I am going to talk about, we are strongest in
intelligence. We have got a lot of actionable information. What
we have is an absence of resources.
The next key thing after you have the intelligence is your
ability to have maritime patrol aviation out there, whether it
is manned aircraft or UAVs. It doesn't matter, as long as we
can have something out there that is going to detect what we
know is moving. At the end of the day, though, you have got to
have a surface asset there that can interdict. And that is
where our real shortfall is.
So, could we use more maritime aviation? Yes. Would UAVs
help? Probably. Any additional hours we can get are going to be
helpful. But at the end of the day you have got to have surface
assets. And we have, as I said earlier, in terms of Coast Guard
cutters for coverage, we are down to four down there right now.
That is four today. We have a fleet of 44 cutters, total right
now. We are building out new cutters. But at the end of this
project, we are only going to have 33 cutters. So we are going
in the wrong direction in order to provide what ends up being
the most critical element of those three, as surface
interdiction.
Mr. Garamendi. General Kelly?
General Kelly. Is there--don't have any drones of any kind
right now. Certainly, if I could get some, I would love some. I
mean, again, it is another form of ISR. The beauty of it is,
you know, you--they don't get tired. So, you know, when an
airplane has to go refuel, that kind--they can stay a lot
longer, and the drone doesn't know that it is tired.
Mr. Garamendi. I am specifically thinking about the use of
UAVs such as the Global Hawk, can stay in the air 36 hours,
long patrol areas, and provides--can provide, I should think,
significant information. The Navy is coming up with its new
Trident, which is a version of the Global Hawk, specifically
designed for maritime purposes.
I would like the two gentlemen to get back to me about how
you might deploy that asset to the benefit of the missions that
you have.
[Information follows from General John F. Kelly, United
States Marine Corps, Commander, U.S. Southern Command:]
Any long-duration, multisensor unmanned aerial vehicles would
be of tremendous value to accomplishing the entire spectrum of
missions in the SOUTHCOM AOR. We have numerous mission areas
that would benefit from the imagery, signals intelligence, and
moving target indictor sensors on board the newer generation
Global Hawk and Triton aircraft. The support the Global Hawk
provided in Haiti proved extremely valuable to rescue and
recovery efforts in the initial stages of Operation UNIFIED
RESPONSE. The extended loiter time would help offset gaps we
currently experience in our detection and monitoring mission,
and assist meeting overland ISR information needs. As I have
testified in the past, the Air Force E-8C Joint Surveillance
Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS), with its moving
target indictor capability, is a game changer in monitoring the
maritime domain. The Global Hawk and the Triton, with their
newest moving target indictor capabilities and extended
duration, could prove to be equally important game changers.
Additionally, these assets provide direct support to our
partner nations in both South and Central America as we work
together to build capability in Countering Transnational
Organized Crime. I understand that the Triton may not be fully
operational until 2017 and that the Air Force is still working
their long-term force structure issues in regard to the
composition of the Global Hawk fleet; however, the current Air
Force Global Hawk Variant and the Navy BAMS-D aircraft would
provide valuable support to my missions in both the maritime
and overland domains.
Mr. Garamendi. Also, General Kelly, I believe it was
earlier testimony in the House Armed Services Committee you
said what you need, among others, is a platform on which to
land helicopters. And I think you actually said an old barge
might actually work well enough, if it had refueling
capability. Could you expand on that, since your frigates are
being removed? What could backfill?
General Kelly. Well, as--that phase of the process is
called interdiction. The detection and monitoring, I do that to
a very, very large degree. But it is an interagency process. So
we see this stuff, whether in go-fast or an aircraft flying out
of Venezuela, which is--virtually all of the aircraft movement
of cocaine is coming out of Venezuela, either making its way to
the Central American isthmus, or increasingly, up the West
Indies to Dominican Republic, as an example, or Puerto Rico.
But the end-game part is, generally speaking, to put a
helicopter in the air, vectored, over there by airborne ISR.
They see the go-fast, they get astride the go-fast. On that
helicopter is a marksman, United States coastguardsman. And he
has, within his rules of engagement, he has the authority to
shoot, if necessary, the engine or engines out of that go-fast.
That hardly ever happens, because the go-fast knows it can't
outrun the helicopter. So they tend to stop, throw the illicit
cargo over the side, and then wait to be picked up by a cutter
or a U.S. Navy ship.
So, in my view, at least, what you really need is something
that the helicopter could fly off of. You don't need an
aircraft carrier, you don't need, you know, necessarily a big
Navy ship or a Coast Guard cutter. In fact, 6 months last year
we had the Royal Netherlands--they had a--I think it was a
Coast Guard buoy tender. And--but it could put a helicopter on
it, and it did great work for us in the interdiction mode.
So, we are looking now at renting, if you will, a merchant
ship that would be able to take a--it would be able to land and
take off a--you know, a Coast Guard or a Navy or a Marine
Corps, for that matter, with a coastguardsman on board, a
helicopter, and also turning that merchant ship into a mother
ship, so that these other smaller countries that really do the
yeoman work for us, including places like Nicaragua, they can
go to sea, and have a mother ship arrangement so they can get
fuel, get food, and help us in this fight.
Mr. Garamendi. Well, it is pretty clear--and I am just
going to take another 30 seconds, Mr. Chairman, if I might--it
is pretty clear that we are in tight budget situations, likely
to continue for the next 5 to 10 years. And we need to be
creative. As you were talking, General Kelly, I am thinking
maritime reserve, the fleets that we have, is there any
potential that we could use one or another of those ships,
maybe with a modification? I like the idea of a mother ship. We
are going to have to be very creative.
Obviously, Admiral Papp, we are going to be short of
cutters. There is no--that is going to be at least for the next
5 years. Can we figure out a way of doing this with different
kinds of assets?
Admiral Papp. So, sir, I think General Kelly is right. We
will take whatever we can get. However, at the end of the day,
I have got a responsibility for the safety of my people in a
very complex, fast-paced operation. Even landing helicopters at
sea is not an easy thing when you have got weather out there,
when you are launching them in the middle of the night. So I am
reluctant to say that landing them on anything is a good thing.
Plus, the other thing is that, even when you stop the go-
fast with your airborne use of force, you have got to have
boats and a boarding team there to take custody, seize the
people and the drugs, and you have got to launch that.
Now, we have used other things. We have great partnerships
with Great Britain, with the Dutch, and with the Canadians and
the French, and we make use of their platforms wherever we can.
And they are professional. They know how to land helicopters.
They can launch and recover boats safely. We put our law
enforcement detachments on board, and we make use of them as
much as we can. But those countries are facing budget
shortfalls, as well, and their participation has been
diminished over the last couple years.
Mr. Garamendi. Which brings us back to austerity budgeting.
Thank you very much, gentlemen.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you. The gentlewoman from Florida.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. First, I
apologize for coming here on Latin time, but our subcommittee
on Middle East and North Africa was meeting at the same time.
So I am still over there and over here. Thank you, gentlemen,
what a delight to be here.
Mr. Chairman, recently we heard the startling claim that
Latin America has surpassed Africa as the world's most violent
region, accounting for about one-third of all global homicides.
And we must recognize this as one of the many alarming symptoms
of a booming transnational drug trade that is the enemy of
security, of good governance, and democratic principles. This
is a particularly pernicious issue in Central America and the
Caribbean.
An example of a proactive approach to the rise in drug-
trafficking activity in the Caribbean is the partnership that
we have established of INL and Port Miami, a major hub for
travel and trade in the region. And through this initiative,
Port Miami personnel provide training in anticrime and port
security matters to their Caribbean counterparts. But this is
just the beginning. The administration has put more resources
into similarly targeted programs and show that it is serious
about combating the illicit drug trade by doing so.
The administration's problem in Latin America is its
failure to address the immediate needs of the region which
affect our national security interests. And, General Kelly,
your written testimony states, ``Insufficient maritime service
vessels and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
platforms impair our primary mission to detect these threats
and defend the southern approaches to the U.S. homeland.'' That
is why last year I offered an amendment to the NDAA to rectify
this impediment and fix this issue. I intend to offer a similar
amendment again this year, because we should not abandon the
Western Hemisphere. And engagement is the key with democratic
allies.
With that in mind, what setbacks have we suffered due to
the fact that our engagement with Honduras has been limited due
to obstacles from the Senate? Has the positive progress of
Operation Martillo evaporated due to the lapse of
counternarcotics efforts?
And, General Kelly, you also mentioned in your written
testimony that legislative restrictions such as the prohibition
of FMF funding with the Guatemalans limit our engagement. It is
my understanding that there is also a DOD policy that prevents
SOUTHCOM from utilizing to the maximum extent possible our
assets in JTF-Bravo and Honduras for a counternarcotics
operation. Has this policy hindered our ability to make a
larger dent in efforts to fight drug trafficking?
And these efforts are critical, not only because they
threaten our security and that of our allies, but also because
the illegal drug trade in this hemisphere impacts our national
security interest through the world. Foreign terrorist
organizations such as Hezbollah and the FARC engage in these
illicit activities and fund their operations and advance the
dangerous ambitions of regimes like that of Iran, which, as we
have seen, is expanding its presence in the Western Hemisphere.
Drugs equals terrorism financing.
And lastly, I would like to raise an issue with the Coast
Guard. My office has received information that our Coast Guard,
with the help of the State Department, traveled to Cuba and is
seeking to reach an understanding with a State-sponsored
terrorism on counternarcotics efforts. I think it is appalling
that our Coast Guard wishes to have closer ties with the Cuban
regime that is the same tyranny that actually gives refuge--it
harbors drug traffickers. It jails American citizens, supports
terrorism, and was caught red-handed as recently as this
summer, trying to smuggle military equipment to North Korea
through the Panama Canal--and we thank Panama for stopping it--
and provides, to this day, safe haven to American fugitives.
So, I share your concern with the rise in drug trafficking
through the Caribbean, but doing business with the Cuban regime
is not the solution, because they are actually part of the
problem. And I will give it to anyone who would like to
comment.
Thank you, Admiral.
Admiral Papp. Thank you, ma'am. And, as always, thanks for
your interest and support for the Coast Guard. And I regret
that you are troubled by the activities. I will get more
specifics and get a report back to you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. It would be very helpful. Thank you so
much. It concerns many of my constituents. I know that it is
dismissed by some. But, as a person who lost her homeland to
Communism--I was born in Cuba, came here as a refugee,
represent thousands of people in similar ways--we don't have a
romanticized view of the Communist tyranny in Cuba.
Admiral Papp. Yes, ma'am. We do keep a line of
communication open I think, first of all, to protect our
people, to make sure that there is never any mistake. As you
know, the Freedom Flotilla and other activities over the years,
we have lost people. And we try to make sure that we at least
have some line of communication open so that we can prevent any
mistakes from happening and putting people in jeopardy. We also
get good information on other illegal activities. But we will
take a review of this and make a report back to you on----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. I would greatly appreciate it. Thank you
so much, Admiral.
Admiral Papp. Yes, ma'am.
[The information follows:]
The U.S. Coast Guard is the lead Federal agency for maritime
safety, security and stewardship. The Coast Guard maintains a
Telex link with the Cuban Border Guard for passing maritime
counterdrug, illegal migration, and search and rescue
information. The Telex link is the formal means of
communication between the Coast Guard and Cuban Border Guard.
The Telex system was established in 1980 to facilitate the
transmittal of preapproved messages containing nonsensitive,
real-time, tactical search and rescue information and
suspicious aircraft and vessel movements.
On a case-by-case basis, the Coast Guard and Cuban authorities
share tactical information related to vessels transiting Cuban
territorial waters suspected of trafficking drugs or migrants
through Cuban territorial waters. This exchange of information
with Cuban Border Guard assists in enhancing the maritime
security and maritime domain awareness of the U.S. The Telex
link is facilitated by a Coast Guard Drug Interdiction
Specialist assigned to the U.S. Interests Section in Havana.
Since July 2009, given an increased rate of maritime drug
smuggling in the Caribbean, the Cuban Government has repeatedly
asked to expand counternarcotics cooperation. The Department of
State (DOS) accepted the Government of Cuba's invitation to
meet in Havana on April 10 and 11, 2014; at the request of the
DOS, two members from the Coast Guard's Office of Law
Enforcement Policy participated in this DOS-led engagement. At
this meeting, the Cuban and U.S. delegations shared concerns
over the rising levels of drug smuggling in the Caribbean, with
a focus on the maritime route around Cuba's eastern tip between
Jamaica and the Bahamas.
The U.S. delegation discussed nonbinding protocols for
operational, on-scene maritime communication coordination
between the U.S. Coast Guard and the Cuban Border Guard; and
for streamlining the bilateral confirmation of suspect vessel
registry and possible ``stop, board, and search''
authorization. If implemented, these procedures would help to
prevent drug traffickers' exploitation of Cuban territorial
waters and Cuban-flagged vessels as a means to evade law
enforcement.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. And I thank the chairman and the
chairman-in-waiting.
Mr. Hunter [presiding]. Thank the gentlelady from Florida.
We are going to go through one more round, if we have time. I
just have--I have one last quick question that goes on what Mr.
Garamendi was talking about.
Admiral, when you talk about the assets, and you talk about
the system, kind of the in-the-box acquisitions programs, and
Congress ruining all of that, when at the same time, if you get
a platform--and I think--I know this is crazy, but to put it in
visual terms, ``Waterworld,'' you got Dennis Hopper on the big
tanker, ``Waterworld,'' you know, the movie? Kevin Costner? I
thought it was a great movie.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Hunter. But you have the big tanker, and you are able
to operate off of that, why couldn't you use the Ready Reserve
Fleet? Why couldn't you use--or why couldn't you use floating
platforms out there? And if the Coast Guard feels that it is
dangerous, why not man those with contractors? It is kind of
like an icebreaker. It doesn't need to be manned by the U.S.
military, be manned by people that know how to drive an
icebreaker. They are not shooting at people who are shooting
back.
So, why can't we think outside the box on this stuff? You
have the Office of Naval Research, and a lot of other groups
have a lot of other ships they can use for interdiction. They
use them for testing purposes in San Diego and Norfolk, off
of--in Florida, too. I mean these--there are interdiction
assets out there. There are platforms out there, tons of them,
which you could land a helicopter off and take off from.
So, if that is what is holding us back, you can't always be
blaming it on sequestration and Congress is dumb. Why not go
outside of the box a little bit and start doing--if you have
everything down, why not do the interdiction part? If it is not
that difficult.
Now, let me just--let me finish. Fifty years ago, if you
had this problem you would have given this to somebody, given
them $5 million, and they would interdict, and they would
probably do a really good job of it. But instead, now, we kind
of have this system that we have to work at. And if we don't
get enough of our ships that we require by nature of our
requirements and the whole shipbuilding fleet building those
particular ships, then we are not going to do it, because we
don't have the right ship to do it.
So why not think outside the box, like Mr. Garamendi was
talking about? Why not use merchant mariners? Why not use the
RAF? Why not use our people that we pay to be ready to go
anyway?
Admiral Papp. I can report back to you on all the
innovative things that we have done. We actually look for
anything that is passing through the area.
While not related to Western Hemisphere approaches, for
instance, right now Admiral Locklear in Pacific Command, when
he has ships that are transiting out to the WESTPAC, we are
putting Coast Guard law enforcement detachments on them and
running them through those--where I showed you the blue areas
out in the Pacific around our trust territories and partner
nations, we are sending them through there and doing fisheries
law enforcement to protect the tuna fleet out there, things
like that.
So, we look for those opportunities. And, as I said, we
have had British oilers, Dutch oilers--anything that we can get
that is going to be in the Caribbean or the eastern Pacific
that we know is going through, we take advantage of. We work
with Fleet Forces Command down in Norfolk to make sure that, if
people are up doing training deployments, whatever--the
Canadian vessels that we have had down there, that is, once
again, the result of talking to Maritime Forces Pacific,
Maritime Forces Atlantic, the Canadian commands. And when they
have ships that have to go on workups, instead of sending them
other places they are now sending them down to the Caribbean or
the eastern Pacific, and we are putting Coast Guard law
enforcement detachments on them.
So, we make use of anything that we know about. We will
investigate and see what else is out there. Like anything else,
if you are going to get a Ready Reserve Fleet ship underway,
somebody has got to pay for that. Somebody has got to come up
with the money, somebody has got to pay the mariners to come on
board. We have reserve fleets that are out there, but I have
seen the challenges that are faced when we have to work them up
to get them ready. Just the one ship, the Cape Ray, that we
sent over to deal with the Syrian chemicals, getting the
mariners available and getting the money to run the ship and
bring it up to standards, it is a challenge.
Granted, I will take a Coast Guard cutter or a U.S. Navy
ship any time I can, because I know, when I put a Coast Guard
helicopter out there, there is standardization of protocols for
landing, recovery, hot refueling, and everything else, because
landing helicopters is a dangerous business. We have lost
people doing that.
So I--my only caution when I was talking to Mr. Garamendi
was that you can't just--it is easy to say, ``Let's put a barge
out there,'' or, ``Let's put a tanker out there,'' or something
else. My Coast Guard pilots can land on anything in an
emergency. Is it an effective platform for prosecuting go-fast
vessels and be able to go back and hot refuel and carry
ammunition and everything else?
Mr. Hunter. I am going to be out of time.
Admiral Papp. I don't know. We would have to work that
through.
Mr. Hunter. But I would argue that it is better than
nothing, which is what you have now, or very little.
General Kelly. If I could add?
Mr. Hunter. Yes.
General Kelly. We are already doing it, actually. Within
the next couple of months I will have a--I have asked the
system, and one of my fellow CO-COMS has found the money, and
we will have about a 350-foot ship manned by U.S. merchant
seamen, and we will use that as a proof of concept--it is not
modified yet--to launch and recover helicopters.
As we move to the next step and do that, of course, we will
have the right kind of training and the right kind of
procedures, and the right kind of gear and equipment. But that
ship, at least for--it is coming on--it will be working for me
within the next 6 or 8 weeks, and I will have it for at least a
year before we then move on to the next step, with helicopters.
But while we are doing that, it will be working close in to
Belize, Honduras, Guatemala. We already have U.S. Special
Forces guys and gals, our U.S. Marines working with those
partner nations on riverine ops, small boat--riverine ops are
close in to the littorals. This ship will give them an
opportunity to go further out, working for us, cued by our
assets to go after go-fast, but they will be able to go further
out because it will be a gas station. So we are actually doing
everything you just described already in the next 6 or 8 weeks.
And I will let you know how it goes.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you. One last question. Do you have to
be--you said Coast Guard snipers out of helicopters. Does it
have to be Coast Guard snipers, or can it be--because they have
the unique law enforcement, military side? Or can it be anybody
from any service?
General Kelly. It is the law enforcement aspect. DOD, we
can--you know, the DOD asset can do everything but the law
enforcement part of it. So the shooter has got to be a Coast
Guard or someone in law----
Mr. Hunter. Or, like, DEA or FBI, or whoever.
General Kelly. Possible. But I think I would let the
Commandant, you know, fill you in on that.
Admiral Papp. Sir, it could be, as long as they go through
the training. Getting the airborne use of force----
Mr. Hunter. They would have to be a sniper, right?
Admiral Papp. Airborne use of force authorities was very
difficult and challenging for us. We have to take that through
the Department of Justice, because we need to be able to get
their support to defend our shooters if something happens or
goes wrong.
So, who the shooter is, as long as we take them through our
courses, get them certified. And, in fact, we have used other
than Coast Guard. We have used Navy marksmen, as well, off Navy
helicopters. And I am sure we could train other people. It is
just a matter of taking them through the process.
Mr. Hunter. That is all I have. I am going to yield now.
But thank you, Admiral and General and Ambassador. Admiral,
great to see you this last time. Wish you well. And I yield to
Mr. Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Working with you, I
want to pursue thinking out of the box, and how we might be
able to pursue the discussion and, quite possibly, the
utilization, as we were just talking here. So we will leave
that for the future and carry that on.
I do want to--I have been asked by one of our friends from
the Foreign Affairs Committee to raise the issue with General
Kelly about the expulsion of 20 U.S. Defense Department
employees that were attached to the U.S. Embassy in Quito. I
believe this happened over the last couple of weeks. Could you
just briefly brief us on that, what it was all about, why it
happened?
General Kelly. I think Quito's actions--Ecuador's actions
are kind of in line with kind of a general loss of U.S.
influence in this part of the world, in Latin America, and for
a lot of different reasons.
In Ecuador's case, in particular, my folks that were
there--and they were my folks--not all of the military, by the
way; an awful lot of disinformation passed by the capital and
by the President of that country. But at the end of the day,
Ecuador has thrown its lot in with countries like Venezuela,
like Russia, like China. That is where they see the future of
Latin America. So they have made that move.
But the people that were in there working with them with
full knowledge of the Ecuadorian Government, they have been
there for years and years and years. They were working with
them on the counterdrug effort, which is a real problem in
Ecuador. They have been helpful, the Ecuadorians have. But they
have decided to throw their lot in with other countries, so we
are in the process of----
Mr. Garamendi. A geopolitical issue and----
General Kelly. Yes. And, you know, it is a great way to
snub their nose at the United States.
Mr. Garamendi. OK. And this is a question from
Representative Engel to you, Mr. Papp. I am just going to
briefly go over it. The defense--a November 15, 2013, interview
with Defense News, you stated that since you have lost naval
ships in the eastern Pacific and Caribbean for drug
interdiction, the Coast Guard would publish a Western
Hemisphere strategy on how to fill these gaps. That is 5 months
ago, and Mr. Engel wants to know when is the report due. What
is the status of it?
Admiral Papp. Yes, sir. We have been trying to come up with
strategies for the specific areas, evolving missions. We put
out an Arctic strategy just last year, and we have been working
on our Western Hemisphere strategy.
My feeling is, with the focus of the Department of Defense
assets going towards the Pacific, we still have
responsibilities in the Pacific. But my primary
responsibilities are along those threat vectors that were shown
in the chart up there. So, how do we conduct that? How do we
use that for support? How do we lay out what our doctrine is
for the Service and get that approved by our Department is
important.
We are very close. I have read through the draft. However,
we have a new Commandant that is coming in in 30 days. And I
thought that, rather than make it look like I am signing off on
a Western Hemisphere strategy as I go out the door, there
should be buy-in from the next Commandant, which I believe
there is. And he will publish it shortly after taking command
of the Service.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you very much, Admiral. I think that
is exactly the right thing to do, let the next fellow coming
in, let it be his program, also. And I am sure you will be
building off yours. That was Mr. Engel's question.
I see our chairman has returned, and I believe Ms. Hahn has
a question.
Mr. Hunter. I yield to the gentlelady and our colleague
from California.
Ms. Hahn. Thank you, Chairman. And I want to go on the
record. Obviously, it is disheartening for me to hear about the
incredible cuts that we have imposed on our Coast Guard and,
again, continuing to ask them to do more with less. And we are
the United States Coast Guard. To be talking about contracting
out, and landing on barges, and--it is really unfortunate.
I wish we could restore the cuts we made, and not impose
the next round of sequestration on our Coast Guard. We either
believe in your mission and what you are trying to do, or we
don't. And it is unfortunate that we are at this state. So I
just want to go on the record saying I believe in your mission,
and I really feel like we are shortchanging not only your
Department, but certainly the American people.
Ambassador, one of the primary missions behind the Bureau
of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs is to
build partnerships with State and local law enforcement
agencies here at home in order to allow these agencies to
provide their unique expertise to foreign agencies and
governments that desperately need it. In order to incentivize
State and local agencies to provide this expertise, the State
Department reimburses these agencies for the cost incurred.
That strengthens our overall international security. That also
bolsters our relationships with our foreign partners, while
simultaneously creating opportunities here at home.
I would like for you to talk about your agency's work with
our Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department and the California
Department of Corrections, and explain how their expertise and
training has been critical in preventing violence in foreign
countries, particularly Mexico.
Mr. Arreaga. Thank you very much. The California Department
of Corrections and Rehabilitation has provided training to
Mexican and Salvadorian corrections officers. Now, these--the
type of training they receive is the type of training to deal
with some of the very hard-core issues that these institutions
face in their own countries. For instance, riots, the
protection of the facilities, and many times, facilities--we
think of facilities of keeping people from going out. But a lot
of times some of the challenges that they face is actually
people trying to come in to free prisoners. So, we have a whole
range of programs that are trying to provide those kinds of
trainings to them.
I will owe you an answer on the question of the Los Angeles
Sheriff's Department. I don't have that with me right now, but
I will certainly provide it. But we have many other
opportunities. Let me give you a couple of examples.
The Superior Court of Arizona has provided forensic
training to Costa Rica for judges, prosecutors, and defense
attorneys. The New York Police Department, as it was mentioned,
provides some training in Haiti. The Broward County sheriff has
trained the Bahamian police and other agencies on gender-based
violence. The Miami-Dade Police Department has trained Haitian
police. The North Miami Police Department has trained the
Trinidad and Tobago police on sex crimes. I mean the list goes
on. For us, it is quite a pleasure to have these partnerships.
Another example is, for example, the Washington State
Criminal Justice Training Commission hosted a study tour by the
Mexican police managers. The California Department of
Corrections--I think I mentioned that already, yes. So, we have
a long list, and this is a list that is growing.
Of course, we have to be careful not to stretch ourselves
too thin and find the comparative advantage that these
institutions bring to the table, so that we can leverage it
when we go overseas.
Ms. Hahn. Thank you. Admiral Papp, I just want to ask you
one last question. One of the things you mentioned earlier was
that you think we need to address in this war on drugs is the
demand, along with the supply. And wondering if this trend in
the United States--Colorado, Washington, probably California
will be next in legalizing marijuana. Do you think that this is
going to have a long-term impact, or effect, in stemming the
U.S. demand for illegal drugs? Or have we had enough time to
analyze what this is actually going to mean in this--in drug
trade?
Admiral Papp. I don't think we have had enough time. We
discussed it at the last principals meeting of the Interdiction
Committee. And, across the board for most of the agencies--and
this includes all the homeland security agencies, DEA, Justice
Department, FBI, NORTHCOM, SOUTHCOM, and others--the anecdotal
information coming back from most of the partners in dealing
with our South and Central American partners are that they are
confused by the signals that the legalization sends.
They wonder about our commitment to continuing the fight.
And when they are investing so much, both in resources and
blood, they have to question that. They want to know about our
commitment. Plus, they see fewer and fewer U.S. resources
coming down there to join them. We reassure them. We tell them
what the law is, and our continued commitment. But it can't
help but create some doubts.
Other anecdotal information is because of changes in the
market with legalization and homegrown marijuana, that is
causing some people to switch to heroin production now,
increasing the heroin on our streets. So it is a complex,
multivariable equation, which I don't think we have a good
handle on, but it is causing a lot of concern.
And I just want to give you my thanks for, once again, your
advocacy and your comments here before you turn to the other
question. And I don't want to leave anybody with the impression
that I am unwilling to look at other things. We are trying to
innovate and make use of whatever resources are available out
there. My job, as the Commandant of the Coast Guard is to
advocate for what I think, in my best military advice, is best
for the country. I advocate for Coast Guard cutters because
they are a known entity. We have qualified, trained Coast Guard
people, and boarding parties, people who can handle boats, who
can land and launch and recover helicopters safely.
And, if some other incident, whether it is a mass migration
or a fisheries patrol or something in the Bering Sea, I can
send them to do those activities, as well. Whereas as a barge
that can land a helicopter is pretty much a single mission
thing that I can't use for anything else in the Coast Guard.
While it might be valuable and give us something more, my job
is to give you the optimal solution. Then yours is to decide
whether we can afford it or not. But thank you.
Ms. Hahn. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hunter. Thank the gentlelady.
Ms. Hahn. I yield.
Mr. Hunter. And one last question that she just made me
think of. Who is in charge of saying, ``We are not going to go
after weed any more, we are going to focus on''--and do you do
that when it comes to targeting? I mean do you say there is a
bunch of--there is, I don't know, tons of bales of marijuana
coming in, and heroin and cocaine, and we are going to
prioritize those according to--how? And who makes those
decisions? Or is that not how it happens?
Admiral Papp. There is no question, sir. It is illegal, and
we continue to target it. And we will stop it to the best of
our ability with the resources----
Mr. Hunter. But what I am saying, though, is the opposite
of that. If you are going to have--and you are, most likely, in
the next 10 years--let's say 20 States legalize marijuana, it
becomes decriminalized, which it basically is now anyway,
especially in the western side of the country, why keep going
after something that has been approved by the States? And I am
asking who makes that decision? Who says, ``Stop going after
the marijuana loads. We are going to go after heroin and coke
and meth,'' or the precursors, whatever--who makes that
decision?
General Kelly. Well, at least in my realm, Congressman, I
focus--we don't see a lot of marijuana moving from Latin
America into--if you don't count Mexico--moving into the United
States. It is cocaine, methamphetamines, heroin. It is my
understanding most marijuana consumed in the United States now
is grown all over the country.
Mr. Hunter. Made in America.
General Kelly. Domestically, yes. You know, it is grown in
cellars in Manhattan, it is grown in national forests in
Colorado.
But to what the Commandant said about dealing with our
partners, I mean we get--you know, our drug problem has caused
many countries in Latin America, the most violent places on
earth--Honduras being the most violent place on the planet, and
much of that is due--almost all of it is due to our drug
problem, as the drug traffics through. The police throughout
most of the region are either entirely corrupt or so
intimidated that they won't do their jobs, because they are so
intimidated against--because of the violence. Courts and judges
and all of the same thing.
So, to give you an example--or the example--when Colorado
and Washington legalized marijuana, you know, I was queried by
a lot of the partners. And I said, ``Don't worry, it is still
against Federal law, and the law will be enforced.'' And, of
course, it is my understanding--I am not a domestic guy--but it
is not being enforced. And the word--and, you know, I have said
this before--the word ``hypocrite'' comes into the
conversation. And, you know, as we are--everyone at this table
is certainly trying to convince these countries to stay in the
fight, fight our fight against drugs, we seemingly are not
caring much about drugs any more.
So I find it pretty hard. And I am pretty close to a lot of
ministers of defense, Presidents, you know, people like that. A
very different relationship than even our State Department has
with them. And, you know, they are pretty nondiplomatic with
me, as I am to them. And they wonder what, frankly, what the
hell we are doing.
But I don't--and you see an increasing number--start
talking President Santos of Colombia. God, if they stop what
they are doing in terms of our drug fight, we are really,
really screwed. I mean they took 200 tons of cocaine off the
market last year. They manually eradicated 30,000 hectares of
coca before it was picked. They destroyed--found and destroyed
1,500 cocaine labs. If they stop doing that because they see
less of a commitment in our country and a move towards
legalization, we might as well, you know----
Mr. Hunter. Why would you tie in the legalization of
marijuana with heroin and coke?
General Kelly. Well, they see a general lack of enforcement
and getting after some of these other drugs. And as everyone at
this table has pointed out, the solution, to a large degree--
not the elimination, but the solution to the drug problem is
before it gets to Mexico and into the United States. And there
is almost no commitment to do that, based on what they see, in
spite of the fact we do work with them and we do give a certain
amount of money, and we do have, you know, at least--like today
we have three Navy ships, four Coast Guard cutters in the
Caribbean and in the Pacific doing the work. That comes and
goes. And they don't see the commitment. And they have got
others things to spend their money on, as well.
Mr. Hunter. That is all I have. I don't think there are any
other Members here to ask questions. So, with that, this
subcommittee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:51 a.m., the subcommittees were
adjourned.]
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