[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE FUTURE OF TURKISH DEMOCRACY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 15, 2014
__________
Serial No. 113-184
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
or
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania Massachusetts
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
TREY RADEL, Florida--resigned 1/27/ GRACE MENG, New York
14 deg. LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TED S. YOHO, Florida
LUKE MESSER, Indiana--resigned 5/
20/14 noon deg.
SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin--
added 5/29/14 noon
CURT CLAWSON, Florida--
added 7/9/14 noon
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats
DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman
TED POE, Texas WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
PAUL COOK, California BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Mr. Nate Schenkkan, program officer, Eurasia Programs, Freedom
House.......................................................... 7
Elizabeth H. Prodromou, Ph.D., visiting associate professor of
conflict resolution, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy,
Tufts University............................................... 14
Soner Cagaptay, Ph.D., Beyer Family Fellow and director, Turkish
Research Program, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 20
Kilic Kanat, Ph.D., non-resident scholar, Foundation for
Political, Economic, and Social Research (SETA)................ 25
Mr. Hakan Tasci, executive director, Tuskon-US................... 35
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Mr. Nate Schenkkan: Prepared statement........................... 9
Elizabeth H. Prodromou, Ph.D.: Prepared statement................ 17
Soner Cagaptay, Ph.D.: Prepared statement........................ 22
Kilic Kanat, Ph.D.: Prepared statement........................... 27
Mr. Hakan Tasci: Prepared statement.............................. 38
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 60
Hearing minutes.................................................. 61
The Honorable George Holding, a Representative in Congress from
the State of North Carolina: Prepared statement................ 62
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 63
THE FUTURE OF TURKISH DEMOCRACY
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TUESDAY, JULY 15, 2014
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o'clock p.m.,
in room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana
Rohrabacher (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Rohrabacher. The hearing will come to order, and the
title of this hearing today is The Future of Turkish Democracy.
Without objection, all members will have 5 legislative days to
submit additional questions or extraneous material for the
record. So ordered.
Just over 1 year ago, I gaveled this subcommittee for a
hearing that focused on the protests that were then going on in
Turkey. At the close of the hearing I stated my hope that
Turkey would use the episode of turmoil that they were going
through as a vehicle to move closer rather than further away
from democratic government.
Today's hearing seeks to address if my hope for a
democratic progress back then was well placed. Turkey is a
strategically located American partner and a valued NATO ally.
That is not hallow rhetoric, the fact is being demonstrated
right now that Turkey is so important to us. And with the
creation of the Southern Gas Corridor, Turkey is poised to
become a key energy transit country for the European Union.
Turkey has also taken in a huge number of civilian refugees
from Syria, most likely over 1 million men, women and children.
Those of us who remember history find it heartening to see
Turkey, which had been in a killing match with different parts
of the Kurdish community, is now a very positive force in the
Iraqi Kurdish Government and reaching out to its own Kurdish
population to find areas of cooperation. Yet, the relationship
between the Turkish people and the American people is built not
on geostrategic calculations but on shared democratic values.
I want to make it very clear that our discussion here
today, our comments and even our criticisms of the Turkish
Government both former and current are not aimed at the
citizens of Turkey, or are being done with great respect to the
Turkish people themselves and yes, the Turkish Government. The
people of the United States and the people of Turkey are
friends and nothing we say today, even though there will be
some criticism registered, will alter that fact.
During the Prime Minister Erdogan's more than 10 years in
office he has led Turkey to tremendous economic growth,
averaging more than 5 percent a year. Unfortunately political
freedom in Turkey cannot be measured by the country's level of
economic prosperity. The prime minister has been at times
intolerant of legitimate political opposition.
The AK Party has increasingly gone down a dangerous path.
And when faced with tough opposition, instead of negotiation
and compromise the ruling party has often been intransigent and
vengeful. Certain social media Web sites have been blocked,
journalists jailed or fired, and the justice system
politicized.
Let me note that in May of this year, Freedom House
downgraded Turkey's freedom, or oppressed freedom ranking to
not free. Those of us who count ourselves as friends of
Turkey--and let me restate that I consider myself a friend of
Turkey--cannot help but be alarmed by such reports. No matter
what political party or leader comes to power in Turkey,
liberal democracy is not possible if key civil society
institutions such as freedom of the press do not function.
The United States wants Turkey to be a stable ally on the
edge of the Middle East. And as the Middle East goes into such
turmoil it is even more important that we have a stable Turkey,
but we don't want stability at the price of democracy. Our
shared national interests stem from our shared democratic
values. That is and must continue to be the bedrock of the
relationship between Turkey and the United States.
I would like to hear from our expert witnesses today, their
views on the state of democracy on Turkey and how the
leadership of this prime minister has affected the freedom of
expression, the media, the minority religious groups and the
economy. And lastly, how can this Congress help to ensure that
Turkey is on the pathway of expanding democratic rights for all
its citizens and yet remains a valued strategic partner of the
United States?
I would like to thank all of our members here, and
recognizing that we are blessed by having the chairman of the
full committee showing a specific interest in this hearing and
he is with us today. And I would ask if Chairman Royce of the
full Committee on Foreign Affairs has an opening statement that
he would like to make.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
associate myself with your remarks, Mr. Rohrabacher, and I
would like to also thank you for holding this important
hearing.
An overwhelmingly Muslim country, Turkey is a NATO ally, as
Mr. Rohrabacher indicated, and it has long been a secular
democracy. But I too am concerned as is Mr. Rohrabacher about
recent events that indicate a shift by Prime Minister Erdogan
away from democratic ideals. And my concern, my concern would
be as that shift occurs and it reverts to more authoritarian
rule, my concern is with some of the comments that I have seen
made. One reportedly stated that ``Democracy is like a bus
ride. Once I get to my stop, I am getting off.''
With that kind of commentary and also with the use of
strong arm tactics against opponents, this is what gives rise
to concern. This approach was clearly demonstrated in the
response to the 2013 protests in which--and I understand the
viewpoint there, but frankly it was treated as though the head
of state regarded that as illegitimate challenge. And it
resorted to violence, it resorted to the dispersing of the
crowds by violence and a key target was the media. You had 153
journalists injured at that time and 39 detained by the police.
Reporters Without Borders noted in their 2014 report on
``Press Freedom in the World'' that 60 journalists, around 60
journalists were in detention in Turkey in 2013, including at
least 28 held in connection with their work, making the country
one of the world's biggest prisons for media personnel.
In reaction to comments last year on Twitter regarding a
corruption investigation involving his AKP party, Erdogan had
an immediate response and it was to vilify Twitter stating,
``There is now a menace which is called Twitter. To me, social
media is the worst menace to society.'' A few days later he
moved to block all access to the site and followed shortly
thereafter to banning access to YouTube.
Freedom of religion is also threatened. According to the
2014 United States Commission on International Religious
Freedom report, ``Politically, religious freedom abuses are
linked with the absence of democracy and the presence of abuses
of other human rights, such as freedom of expression,
association and assembly.''
Religious minorities in Turkey suffer under strict controls
governing their affairs, including their ability to choose
their own church leaders, to manage and raise funds, own
property, and even access to their historic sites of worship.
The continued closure of the Orthodox Church's Halki Seminary
by the Turkish Government presents a fundamental threat to the
Ecumenical Patriarchate.
Despite optimistic claims by Turkish leaders in 2011 that
the revised Foundations Law would allow all church properties
to be returned within a year, a majority of properties remain
confiscated. In many cases the situation has actually gotten
worse. Instead of returning them to their rightful owners, the
Turkish Directorate General of Foundations approved the
conversion of Byzantine Orthodox churches previously
expropriated by the Turkish Government into mosques, and there
is even legislation before the Turkish Parliament to likewise
convert the Hagia Sophia church in Istanbul.
Many believe these actions constitute to eradicate the
presence of the Christian heritage in Turkey since it first
arrived there 2,000 years ago. That is why I am pleased that a
few weeks ago the committee passed my legislation, H.R. 4347,
which will not only call on Turkey to return these properties
but also enact a report requirement to hold Turkish leaders
accountable for progress on this issue.
By committing ourselves to acting on such legislative
measures and by holding hearings on the situation in Turkey, it
is my hope that Congress will send a clear message that the
Turkish Government must renew its commitment to democracy and
the basic human rights for all of its people. And this would be
the foundation for a closer U.S.-Turkey relationship.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Chairman, we appreciate your
particular interest in this hearing and joining us today, and
we appreciate your opening statement. Now have an opening
statement from the ranking member, Mr. Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this important hearing. I would like to thank today's
witnesses for joining us and minority witness, Mr. Cagaptay,
for your participation in what has turned out to be a very
diverse panel. Thank you all.
I would also like to take a moment to recognize the Turkish
hostages that are still missing over a month after they were
taken from the Turkish consulate and other locations in Mosul.
We hope for their safe passage back home to their families.
Turkey is an important U.S. ally in a very different part
of the world, and as Ranking Member Engel and I discussed in a
recent letter to the Economist, their membership in NATO cannot
be understated. Mr. Chairman, if you will allow me I would like
to insert that letter into the record.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So ordered.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Nevertheless, challenges in the relationship remain. I am
interested to hear our witnesses today discuss their thoughts
on what happened to this so-called model partnership, the role
that domestic politics plays in Turkey's foreign policy
decisions and how this ultimately affects the U.S.
Like all democracies, including our own, there are bumps in
the road. But with upcoming Presidential elections in Turkey,
it is important to gauge how long these bumps in Turkey will
persist and what impact they will ultimately have. It seems as
though in the preceding months and years we witnessed the
steady intensification of crackdowns on protests. Authorities
have at times even arrested doctors treating injured
protesters, and lawyers demanding more accountability and
transparency within the judiciary.
We have also witnessed the blocking of important
communication tools such as Twitter and YouTube. Most recently,
many observers have raised valid concerns that the electoral
dominance of Prime Minister Erdogan's AK Party will result, as
some observers argue, in a Turkey that is now essentially a
one-party system. They say that opposition parties can no
longer voice, much less influence, decision making.
These issues take on special importance to Congress. Not
because we have any interest in meddling in Turkey's internal
affairs, but simply because we represent hundreds of U.S.
citizens of Turkish origin, American companies, as well as
other groups who continue to be affected by these decisions and
the overall instability that these policies create.
The United States and Turkey are also dealing with serious
issues of mutual concern over terrorism and extremism which is
bubbling up right at Turkey's border. As we weigh our own
international budget priorities in Congress, we need to
understand the role that Turkey's internal dynamics have on our
own counterterrorism initiatives in the region. It is unclear
to what extent Turkey's internal disputes have disrupted our
cooperation in the areas of counterterrorism and mutual
defense, but I doubt that there has been no impact at all.
To cite just a few perplexing matters, in just the last few
years the top brass of the Turkish military, the first line of
defense against the extremists in the region, were imprisoned
then released. Weapons interdictions along the Syrian-Turkish
border continue to occur, and allegedly, recordings pointing to
large-scale bribes between the prime minister, his family,
party officials and Iranian businessmen may have larger
implications for our policy on Iran and sanctions.
Our job in this subcommittee is to look into these
incidents, their veracity, the implications that they might
have for the U.S., and I am happy we are doing so today. That
being said, the actual resolution of these disputes and any
attempt to mend longstanding fault lines based on religion,
ethnicity or ideology can only be completed by the Turks and
the Turks alone.
I believe the Turks through civil society engagement and
diverse economic activities can overcome many of the obstacles
that the headlines are focusing on today. Great strides have
been made to open up the Turkish economy, trade and culture to
others. This is a positive sign as economic security and human
rights issues are all interlinked, and I believe that one can
propel the other in this case.
I know that the administration, Members of Congress, the
vibrant Turkish diaspora here in the U.S., and the Government
and the people of Turkey all deeply value U.S.-Turkey
relationships. Despite concerns about human rights, I am
encouraged by the many energetic discussions taking place in
Turkey and their implications for the future of Turkey's
democracy and I look forward to hearing our witnesses and their
perspectives on Turkey's future.
With that Mr. Chairman, I yield my time back.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Did you have time to yield back?
Mr. Keating. I did, 2 seconds. Two seconds.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And it is the intent of the Chair to break
after we have one more opening statement and then to return
here at 15 minutes to 3 o'clock to hear the testimony and to
proceed with the hearing.
Mr. Sires?
Mr. Sires. For the sake of time I will just summarize a
little bit of my concerns. I have concerns of the way the
government has been behaving. I share the comments that my
colleague made. I am concerned about the hard lines he seems to
be taking all the time to the Cyprus issue. I am concerned
about the amount of troops that Turkey has in Cyprus.
And, quite frankly, I understand that they are a good
friend, members of NATO, but at the end of the day I think that
their behavior at least ought to be the sign in some areas. So
I thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. And this hearing is
now in, not adjourned, it is in recess. There we go.
[Recess.]
Mr. Rohrabacher. I do not believe that the ranking member
will be upset if I proceed with just the introduction of the
witnesses so when he gets here we will be ready to have the
testimony. So I call this hearing back into order, and I want
to apologize about if I mispronounce names. With a name like
Rohrabacher I have had my name mispronounced forever. But it is
okay.
Okay, our first witness today is Nate Schenkkan--okay, got
it--who is a program officer for Freedom House. He has been
closely following media freedom in Turkey and coauthored the
Freedom House's special report on Turkey earlier this year. He
has previously worked as a journalist in Central Asia and
earned his masters degree from Columbia University.
We then have with us Professor Elizabeth Prodromou--okay,
thank you. She is a visiting associate professor at the
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. She
also previously served as vice chairman of the United States
Commission on International Religious Freedom and earned a
doctorate in political science from MIT.
I would also like to welcome back Dr. Soner Cagaptay--got
it--who is the director of Turkish Research Program at the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He is a widely
published expert on U.S.-Turkish relations and who has
regularly testified before Congress. He has earned his
doctorate from Yale.
Then we have Mr. Hakan Tasci--got it--and he is executive
director of Tuskon, the U.S. representative office of a large
confederation of Turkish businesses which represent thousands
of companies in Turkey. And before his current job he taught
economics at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
and earned his masters degree from Bilkent University in
Turkey.
And then we have Dr. Kilic Kanat. He is a resident scholar
at SETA Foundation here in Washington. He also is assistant
professor of political science at Pennsylvania State University
at Erie, and the professor had earned a Ph.D. in political
science from Syracuse University.
And I would welcome all of you today and also express my
gratitude to you for your testimony. And we will wait another
couple minutes, but in the meantime let me just explain that if
you could keep your remarks to 5 minutes you can submit remarks
that long for the record. But if you could put them down to 5
minutes we could then get to some questions and answers and
perhaps some dialogue.
And I am a little bit hesitant about starting the actual
testimony until one of our minority members are here. So with
that said, well, I could tell a few jokes if you would like. So
you know about the story about the woman who set up, an elderly
woman who set up a pretzel stand outside of a large business.
Well, it could be in Turkey for all that matter. And it was a
big modern business building, and every day a businessman would
stop by and--oh, you are never going to get to hear the end of
this joke.
With your permission I will finish the joke.
Mr. Keating. I have heard it before.
Mr. Rohrabacher. He has. So every day he stops by and he
puts 50 cents into her plate and then he runs into the
building. But he never takes a pretzel. This goes on for over a
year. And finally, as he puts 50 cents into the plate she grabs
him by the arm, and he looks into her face and he says, you
probably want to know why for a full year I have been putting
50 cents into your plate but I have never taken a pretzel. And
she says, well, no, I just want to tell you pretzels are up to
75 cents.
All right. They get it. Gratitude. I have already
introduced the witnesses, and with your permission we will
proceed with the testimony.
STATEMENT OF MR. NATE SCHENKKAN, PROGRAM OFFICER, EURASIA
PROGRAMS, FREEDOM HOUSE
Mr. Schenkkan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the
subcommittee for the invitation to speak today. My opening
remarks touch on the most recent developments in 2014 affecting
fundamental freedoms in Turkey. This is a summary of my full
testimony.
I think the statements of Chairman Rohrabacher and Chairman
Royce on the Gezi protests captured well the sense that the
government missed an opportunity to acknowledge the large
minority in Turkey that was frustrated with its lack of voice
in an increasingly majoritarian system. Since the time when the
government halted the Gezi protests with police force in July
2013, the government has grown even more intolerant and
dismissive of criticism. This tendency intensified following
the corruption investigation announced on December 17th, 2013,
which implicated leading members of the government. The
December 17th investigation sparked a furious effort on the
part of the government to suppress the investigation and the
ensuing leaks.
In this effort, the government has directly targeted the
ability of journalists and others to access and disseminate
information, and I would like to describe some of those key
negative steps in 2014. First, amendments to the already
repressive law governing Internet services, Law 5651, which
make it easier and faster to block Web sites and to determine
the identities of Internet users.
Two, the complete blocking of Twitter and YouTube 1 week
prior to the March 30th local elections. Although the
Constitutional Court overturned both of these blocks after the
election, they still violated freedom of expression and the
right to access information especially during a political
campaign.
Three, and the most disturbing development is the new law
granting special powers to the National Intelligence
Organization, or MIT. The law entitles the MIT to collect all
information, documents or data, from any entity in Turkey. It
makes publishing information about the MIT punishable by 3 to 9
years in prison. It places the MIT and its employees outside of
normal structures of legal accountability. This supra-legal
National Intelligence Organization is a grave threat to Turkish
democracy.
There also continue to be serious problems with freedom of
association and assembly that I will mention quickly. The
prosecution especially of members of Taksim Solidarity, the
original organizers of the first Gezi Park protest, on the
absurd charge of founding a criminal organization.
Now a few words directly on the subject of the panel of The
Future of Turkish Democracy. Like most people I expect Prime
Minister Erdogan will win the Presidential election in August,
likely in the first round. Then his first priority will be to
create de facto Presidential rule, and then following the June
2015 parliamentary elections, a de jure Presidential system
through constitutional reform.
A Presidential system is not inherently bad, and Turkey
needs a new Constitution. But given Mr. Erdogan's ``with us or
against us'' style of governance, I fear constitutional reform
will be neither inclusive nor consultative. Mr. Erdogan sees
himself as leading a revolution against elites and outside
powers, and a revolution requires constantly creating enemies,
real or imagined, who must be defeated.
I fear Mr. Erdogan's presidency will sharpen divisions
within Turkish society and further weaken institutions in favor
of personalized rule. This will harm human rights and
fundamental freedoms, and also the rule of law and economic
management.
If there is a slim silver lining from the last 13 months,
it is that the U.S. Government no longer casts Turkey as a
model democracy. For many years of AK Party rule, U.S. policy
toward Turkey ignored and overlooked highly visible problems
with human rights, democracy and rule of law. This exercise in
positive thinking did not serve Turkey and it did not serve the
United States.
The new frankness about Turkey's internal dynamics offers
an opportunity for the U.S. to make supporting Turkey's
democracy a serious part of its policy planning. The European
Union remains the best mechanism for the U.S. to support the
development in Turkey of effective institutions with checks and
balances. Right now Turkey's accession has lost momentum. The
U.S. has been committed to Turkey's EU membership, but
primarily through rhetorical support through to what is treated
as an EU-Turkey process.
The U.S. should elevate Turkey's accession as an urgent
strategic priority and create a high level policy dialogue with
the Turkish Government in consultation with the EU to deploy
U.S. support where it is needed. A good immediate step toward
accession would be lifting EU member state blocks on opening
chapters 23 and 24 of the EU acquis on Judiciary and
Fundamental Rights and Justice, Freedom and Security. The best
way for the U.S. to support democracy in Turkey is by
integrating democracy and human rights into the strategic
bilateral policy relationship just as security and trade have
been integrated. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schenkkan follows:]
----------
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much for your testimony,
and we will have questions and answers after everyone is
complete.
STATEMENT OF ELIZABETH H. PRODROMOU, PH.D., VISITING ASSOCIATE
PROFESSOR OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, THE FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW
AND DIPLOMACY, TUFTS UNIVERSITY
Ms. Prodromou. Good afternoon and thank you as well. I want
to express my thanks to the subcommittee and to the full
committee for this hearing. Having served as a commissioner and
vice chair on the U.S. Commission on International Religious
Freedom, I am also, currently, as a member of the Secretary of
State's working group on Religion and U.S. Foreign Policy, I am
very heartened by the committee's attention to the matters that
bring us here this afternoon.
I am going to begin by offering some general remarks and
then some very specific data points that focus particularly on
the issue of religious freedom and the rights of religious
minorities in Turkey, particularly as these relate to broader
questions of media freedom and democracy as a whole.
The starting point, I think, the best starting point is to
reference the international human rights standards such as the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Both of these
unequivocally identify the right to religious freedom, freedom
of thought, conscience and religion as a universal human right
and that includes freedom to change one's religion or belief,
freedom either alone or within community in public or in
private, to manifest a belief as well as teaching, practice,
worship and observance.
So measured within this context, it is fair to say, I
think, that there have been some evidences of minor progress in
Turkey during the period since the AKP was elected in 2002.
When it comes to the rights of religious minorities in the
country, I would say that that the progress largely lies within
the context of a discursive expansion in the form of a far more
public discussion of previous taboo issues concerning
violations against the rights of religious minorities.
And then the second is what I would call minor
improvements, cosmetic and episodic in nature that have been
designed to loosen restrictions on religious freedom for
Turkey's religious minority communities largely regarding the
rights of the country's tiny Christian community and very small
Jewish community. And within this second category we could
include the 2011 property rights law on foundations.
But even here the progress has been very, very small. Only
23 percent of applications for return of properties have been
accepted and that means that 77 percent of applications for the
return of properties to individuals and groups belonging to
religious minorities have been arbitrarily rejected by the
government. So measured against these small improvements, I
think the real sobering picture is as follows, and that is that
there has been a real failure to make any kind of substantive
legal and institutional changes that would ensure that all of
Turkey's citizens regardless of what religious faith community
they belong to are seen as equal before the law.
And there are a few emblematic examples, I think, that
underscore this point and which speak to again the corrosive
effects of religious freedom violations on Turkey's democracy.
Some of these were mentioned in brief in the opening remarks,
but I think they are worth emphasizing. A quite aggressive
Islamization strategy that has been based on the conversion of
Christian churches into mosques over the last 2\1/2\ years
alone, the conversion of the church of St. Sophia in Trabzon,
and then as St. Sophia, at Isnik, into functioning mosques, and
then the declared commitment of the AKP government with no
response to the contrary by opposition party members to convert
the church of Aghia Sophia in Istanbul into a functioning
mosque. And that is actually a UNESCO World Heritage site.
Second example. The continuing interference in the internal
governance structures of Christian and Jewish minority
communities in Turkey by the Turkish state imposing arbitrary
citizenship requirements for election to hierarchical
positions. And third example, prohibitions continue on
religious education and especially on the training of clergy
that Greek Orthodox Theological School of Halki remains closed
after more than 40 years, and the prime minister as well as
senior members of his government declared publicly that there
is absolutely no legal impediment to reopening the Halki
school. That it is a political issue, pure and simple.
Two other examples, and I will move to close. One
particularly concerning example, the Turkish state's continuing
use of a racial coding system for its religious minority
communities. They are called the ancestry codes, and
accordingly Greeks, Armenians, Syriacs and others presumably in
that category, Roman Catholics and Protestants, are coded 1
through 5 by the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of
Information and the Population Directorate, and that racial
coding system has been designed to exclude those groups from
government as well as to facilitate massive property
expropriations on citizen revocations.
And then finally, the comprehensive religious cleansing
policy that has been pursued systematically for 40 years by the
Turkish Armed Forces and the Turkish Cypriot authorities in
Turkish-occupied Cyprus. It will be 40 years on this coming
20th of July that the Turkish Armed Forces set up occupation on
the north of the island. And when I say religious cleansing, I
mean the cleansing of any kind of presence of Christian
communities in the occupied north. That is living human beings
as well as religious patrimony, everything from churches,
monasteries, cemeteries. They have been desecrated. There has
been a systematic looting and black market sale of moveable
artifacts from those properties, and there are continuing
limitations on the ability of those tiny, less than 400 members
of the Christian community there to worship.
What does all this mean? All this is very sobering, I
think, for the direction of Turkish democracy. And as my
copanelist mentioned, I think there is every reason to be
concerned about the immediate future. The move to a
Presidential system is likely to bode very poorly for religious
freedom rights for minorities in Turkey, and also concerningly,
the secular opposition in Turkey has indeed been supportive. In
fact, they are the architects of most of the legislature that
exists in Turkey that have violated the rights of the country's
religious minorities.
In terms of the United States and our commitment to
religious freedom, I would reinforce the remarks of my
copanelist and also encourage the committee to move
expeditiously for the passage of House Resolution 4347, and
also to work with the U.S. Commission on International
Religious Freedom around issues related to the violations of
religious minorities in Turkey. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Prodromou follows:]
----------
STATEMENT OF SONER CAGAPTAY, PH.D., BEYER FAMILY FELLOW AND
DIRECTOR, TURKISH RESEARCH PROGRAM, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE
FOR NEAR EAST POLICY
Mr. Cagaptay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
members of the committee, for giving me the opportunity to
testify on developments in Turkey and their implications for
U.S. policy. The following is a summary of my prepared remarks.
Obviously Turkey is an important country for us. It is a
NATO ally, but it is also a country that borders vital U.S.
interests in Ukraine, Russia, Iraq and Syria and therefore is
an important partner to the United States with regards to U.S.
policy in each of these countries. With these developments in
mind, Turkey's long term stability matters to the United
States.
In this regard, I think we have seen significant progress
in Turkey in the last decade. The country has been transformed
dramatically in the economic sense, rising as a stable and
wealthy nation. The Turks had experienced a decade of
prosperity when all of their neighbors went through economic
and political downturn and some even experienced war. And as a
result of this transformation, Turkey now is in even a better
position to be a prime partner for the United Stated given its
robust economy.
As I point out in my monograph, ``The Rise of Turkey''--if
I can make a shameless plug--Turkey has become a majority
middle class society in the last decade and this has huge
ramifications. This is a country now that is on the cusp of
becoming history's first large Muslim majority, a universally
literate society. The country is connected to a global society
in ways that cannot be reversed, and these are refreshing
developments.
There are also comforting improvements in terms of
religious freedoms in Turkey, especially for non-Muslim
communities. As my colleague, Dr. Prodromou, pointed out, the
government has started restoring property belonging to church
and synagogue foundations to its rightful owners, so far
totaling about $1 billion of property. Obviously progress has
been made and there is still progress that can be made and I
think we should encourage that process.
These are key accomplishments for which Turkey's
Government, AKP government and its Prime Minister Erdogan
deserve credit. But I also have to add that there is a darker
side to Erdogan's legacy and that is when it comes to the issue
of freedoms. Ironically, while Turkey has become more
prosperous under the AKP, simultaneously it has also become
less free.
As measured by international indices, the country's record
on liberties improved significantly when the AKP came to power
in 2002 in conjunction with the country's work to qualify for
EU accession, but then somehow it stagnated and then took a
nose dive somewhere around the end of the last decade.
According to Freedom House, Turkey was, for example, ranked 58
out of 100 in terms of press freedoms, 100 being the least
free, zero being the most free. That was in 2001 before the AKP
came to power. The country's record improved in 2005, it went
up to 48. But then it declined, hitting 62 in 2013. So in terms
of freedom of expression, Turkey is worse off than it was
before the AKP.
Despite being through a democratic process, I think this is
a party that governs in authoritarian fashion. It is intolerant
of dissent and opposition as we have seen most prominently
during the 2013 Gezi Park rallies as well as the bans on
YouTube and Twitter.
A second alarming concern obviously is Turkey's pivot to
the Middle East. That is a concern for the United States in the
sense that this pivot has met challenges. Before the AKP, the
Turks thought of themselves as a European country placed next
to the Middle East. They were not from there, they just lived
there.
This perception was challenged by the AKP elite who decided
that the path to great power and influence for Turkey was
through the Middle East rather than Europe, and that pivot
turned out to be a miscalculation a decade later. With the
exception of the Kurds, Turkey has no allies in the Middle
East. Not only that, it borders enemies from the Assad regime
to ISIS, Islamic State.
And among the many problems I think that Turkey's pivot to
the Middle East has caused is ISIS to the grave threat it wants
to establish a Taliban-like state along Turkey's longest land
border, 800 miles of border with Iraq and Syria. Nobody wants
Taliban as a neighbor. Nobody wants Taliban presence in the
Middle East, which suggests that Ankara, Washington and NATO
will work together against this threat and this will cement a
strong U.S.-Turkey relationship, and in my view for years to
come because what is in Turkey's interest is in the interest of
the United States.
There are other reasons, I think, to be optimistic about
Turkey's future. One is the rise of the middle class, which has
grown as result of the AKP's economic policies and which is
challenging its style of governance, and also the opposition,
Republican People's Party, which is slowly but surely turning
into a liberal movement. Recently the State Department awarded
party deputy Safak Pavey with International Woman of Courage
Award, recognizing the party's commitment to gender equality
and democracy.
Turkey's trajectory, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee, points toward democracy, and the Turkish people need
the European Union to drive further reform at home. And I think
the ISIS threat has caused many Turks to clamor for the day
when their country stayed out of the Middle East and looked to
Europe.
So we stand at an opportune moment for a pivot. Washington
should capitalize on this, relying on Turkey in combating ISIS
as well as promoting the country's repositioning toward Europe.
The Middle East may not have panned out the way the Turks
hoped, but Turkey can still be a major power. It can be a major
European power. Turkey is of vital interest to Europe and
therefore to the United States. Its location, its proclivity to
capitalism and democracy make it an important ally. Washington
and Ankara share interests and Turkey's path will have great
strategic importance to the United States in situations ranging
from Ukraine to Iraq and Syria for years to come. Thank you
very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cagaptay follows:]
----------
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. Dr. Kanat?
STATEMENT OF KILIC KANAT, PH.D., NON-RESIDENT SCHOLAR,
FOUNDATION FOR POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL RESEARCH (SETA)
Mr. Kanat. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am deeply honored to
discuss Turkey with you, and I greatly appreciate the
invitation to do so. And you have my statement. This is a
summary of my statement.
Democratization in Turkey has been a long and challenging
process. And despite some bumps and concerns, Turkey's track
record with democratization and societal transformation
demonstrates that there will not be a reversal from democracy
that will drag Turkey back to authoritarianism.
There are a couple of reasons that Dr. Cagaptay also
mentioned. One of them is that democracy has been made possible
in the last 10 years in part due to the rise of the middle
class whose demands center around a more inclusive and
representative governance. This new and growing social class
has opposed any top-down approach in politics and has
challenged the political and social engineering of previous
decades. The class is now almost 50 percent of the population
and economic indicators demonstrate that it will continue to
grow in the coming years. It will be unlikely for this group to
cede any democratic gains in the coming years, thus preventing
any political party or actor from bringing Turkey back to the
illiberalism of previous decades.
Second and related to this, this middle class, especially
its youth, is more integrated with the world today. There is a
growing number of active social media users that connect and
interact with other users worldwide. The political and social
demands of these citizens are increasing as they become more
exposed to other cultures and they have increasingly used
social media to express those demands.
Third, despite some criticism, the Turkish Government
itself also recognizes the structural problems in Turkish
democracy, which have been partly the residuals of previous
periods and need to be resolved. In his vision statement for
the Presidential election, for example, Prime Minister Erdogan
made democratization the first of his three pillars in his
candidacy platform.
The prime minister's recent statement of condolence to the
Armenian victims of the events of 1915 and apology to the
Alawites for the Dersim events can also be considered as steps
toward this direction. Furthermore, the current government has
also realized that it is politically expedient to favor
democracy. Every political reform that the government has
promoted has increased the strength of the AK Party and
contributed to its electoral victories; it doesn't seem likely
for the AK Party to change this course in the coming future.
Lastly, the European Union integration process will
continue to play an important role in Turkey's democratization.
Despite the declining enthusiasm of the Turkish public, mostly
because of the discouraging statements of some European leaders
about Turkey's potential membership, the EU process is still
considered the most significant foreign policy dimension of
Turkish politics. In order to avoid any disruption in its
political and economic relations, the Turkish Government and
society will not allow its democratic standards to fall short
of the Copenhagen Criteria.
Although Turkey seems to be on the right track for
democratization, it still has some significant problems. Most
of these challenges are structural ones which may require more
time, energy and cooperation from other parties. One of the
most significant challenge lies in the formation of democratic
institutions that will protect the democratic achievements of
previous decades. Particularly in Turkey, an independent,
impartial and credible judiciary is needed to consolidate the
process of democratization and strengthen the rule of law in
the country.
The judiciary has always been a major political actor in
Turkey, and as such the public trust in the judiciary has been
lower than in other democratic states. Although the referendum
and legal reforms brought some improvement, there are still
major problems. The majority of Turkey citizens' opinion that
recent events were an attempt to launch a coup via the
judiciary demonstrates the depth of Turkish peoples' mistrust
in that branch of government. If Turkey wishes to consolidate
and improve its democracy, the judiciary must also heed its
responsibility to be an impartial and independent body.
Moreover, the government in the last 10 years has
implemented many reform packages; however, these half-fixes of
rights are no longer sufficient to satisfy the wishes of
Turkish people. Consequently, a democratic and civilian
Constitution is necessary in order to guarantee freedoms and
liberties in the country. Drafting the Constitution must be an
inclusive and pluralistic process to be considered a valid
social contract. It must equally address the concern of all
citizens in Turkish society in regards to freedom of religion,
media and expression.
Finally, Turkey must develop a more powerful opposition
that has a democratic, inclusive and representative vision in
order to harness the support of the new middle class so that it
can push for further democratization in the country. If not,
Turkey will continue to face the problem of a weak and not very
credible opposition as it did in the 2011 and 2014 elections,
where the main opposition parties failed to act as a viable
alternative to the AK Party. On the one hand, this absence of
an opposition leaves the AK Party as the only party in the
political arena capable of producing policy. On the other hand,
the failure of opposition parties fosters mistrust for the
political parties in general in Turkey, which fuels increasing
street politics.
In summary, Turkey's path to democratization has been a
challenging and convoluted one. However, the country has
undergone an irreversible transformation and the next step its
leaders must take should be to the consolidate the country's
democratic gains by building institution, drafting a civilian
Constitution and responding to the democratic demands of a
rapidly changing society. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kanat follows:]
----------
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, and next we have Mr.
Tasci.
STATEMENT OF MR. HAKAN TASCI, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, TUSKON-US
Mr. Tasci. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee, for giving me the opportunity to testify on the
future of Turkish democracy. The following is summary of my
prepared remarks. And I am a little bit sick, so I am sorry
about that.
The AKP government transformed Turkey into an upper middle
income country with a strong middle class and more than 20
powerhouse Anatolian cities in last decade. In order to
overcome the middle income trap, however, structural reforms
are essential and, specifically, tax code, institutional
structure and the judicial system. Turkey's growth model is
dependent on capital flows, foreign energy resources and
Central Bank policies, especially before the municipal
elections, they successfully controlled the exchange rate
3:40:00 in Turkey. And the independence of the Central Bank,
which is increasingly undermined by Mr. Erdogan during the
process, has been a key factor for combating inflation and
financial stability.
Other investor worries are the problem with rule of law,
diminishing economy and political checks and balances. Having
tamed the military and crushed political opposition, Mr.
Erdogan consolidated his power by suppressing the media and
dissent to a large extent. This disproportional use of force
and harsh rhetoric against Gezi Park protestors sparked an
outcry inside Turkey and abroad. Mr. Erdogan has presented
events as an international conspiracy to undermine his
government and portrayed dissenters as traitors.
A similar pattern was evident during the corruption scandal
of last December which implicated sons of three Turkish cabinet
ministers, high level bureaucrats and government friendly
businesses. Among the suspects are Reza Sarraf, an Iranian
businessman dealing with gold trade in sanction era, and Yasin
Al Qadi, a businessman who used to be on U.N. terror list for
10 years. Instead of complying with prosecutors, Mr. Erdogan
presented corruption investigations as a coup effort led by
domestic and international actors such as U.S. Ambassador,
influential preacher Fethullah Gulen, and the ``interest
lobby.''
In a clear attempt to obstruct justice, thousands of police
officers and hundreds of prosecutors have been purged or
reassigned. Turkish Parliament dominated by ruling party passed
legislation which seriously threaten independence of judiciary
and provides almost immunity to intelligence. This is a huge
setback for rule of law and accountability in Turkey and quite
antidemocratic laws.
Mr. Erdogan launched a fierce campaign against the Gulen
movement, a major independent social force for democracy and
modernization in Turkey, blaming it for masterminding the
corruption investigations with the help of sympathizers in the
bureaucracy. Pro-government media follows with orchestrated
headlines and lies. The PM is not shy of publicly declaring
this a witch hunt. Thousands of bureaucrats were discredited,
demoted or reassigned. Without any evidence of wrongdoing,
guilt by association has become the norm.
Witch hunt has taken a toll not only in bureaucracy but
also in civil society, business community and media. He calls
Gulen movement sympathizers in public mass as viruses,
assassins, leeches, traitors, spies and vampires. In addition
he is cancelling public tenders, changing zoning of existing
structures----
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Chairman, was he talking about Fox News?
No, no.
Mr. Tasci. Cancelling public tenders, changing zoning of
existing structures, revoking mining permits, deploying tax
inspectors, rejecting venue rentals for programs are among the
common practices. Members of my organization, TUSKON, a leading
business NGO, face government retribution if they don't resign
from membership. Bank Asya was nearly bankrupt due to
orchestrated defunding efforts by the government.
Without any indictment or charge, Mr. Erdogan presses the
U.S. Government to extradite Mr. Gulen who lives in
Pennsylvania as a legal resident. White House had to issue a
rare correction after he suggested that Mr. Obama agreed to
comply with him. Media affiliated with the movement that
maintains its independence is a constant target. Private
tutoring centers will be closed starting June 2015 because of
25 percent stake of movement. Erdogan government heavily
lobbies against the movement's peaceful and successful
educational institutions in more than 150 nations, and some
closed already due to pressure.
Undermining peaceful and constructive Sufi initiatives
which offer an antidote to extremism and violence is a
disservice not only to Turkey but to the world. Witch hunt and
smear tactics is not limited to Gulen circles. Businessmen,
associations and media who come from different ideological
backgrounds are under intense pressure to either comply or face
consequences. According to press reports, 100,000 small and
midsized businesses were profiled based on their donations,
flight arrangements and other confidential data.
AKP leadership tries to justify recent antidemocratic
practices pointing out electoral victories. However, Professor
Omer Taspinar describes this overturn as transformation from
tyranny of Kemalist minority to ``tyranny of majority.'' Prime
Minister Erdogan thinks his election victory with 43 percent in
March 30 municipal elections have cleared him and his party
associates from the corruption allegations as well. He does not
hide his ambition to force constitutional boundaries to make
executive and legislative branches, if not judiciary,
subservient to him.
And one last thing. The Erdogan government deserves credit
with its continued commitment to resolution of the Kurdish
question. And finally, Turkey is a strategically important
country for the West as a relatively successful democractic and
free market experiment in a volatile region. Turkey's Sufi
interpretations of Islam represent a powerful alternative to
violent extremism. Therefore it is imperative for friends and
allies of Turkey in the West to support and engage Turkey on
its democratic and economic journey.
Turkey's continued EU accession path is essential for
reforms. TTIP, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership,
might open a new and an important gateway for Turkey's future
integration with the EU and the U.S. One must not lose hope
with the future of Turkey democracy and economic potential.
Despite occasional downturns, Turkey has historically always
found a way to recover.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Tasci follows:]
----------
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much.
Mr. Connolly, with the permission of the committee and
unless I hear any objections, Mr. Connolly will be treated as a
member of the committee.
Mr. Connolly. I thank my friend.
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. Well, let me just ask, well,
first of all, let me just note I accept that there is criticism
and just criticism of Turkey or any other country. What we need
to do is make sure that that criticism is within the
perspective of what is happening in other countries and what is
the norm and whether Turkey is operating as a norm or whether
or not Turkey is headed in the wrong direction which is not the
norm.
And let me just go through a few things here. You were
mentioning about, Doctor, what was going on in Cyprus. Although
this is not a hearing on Cyprus, this is a hearing on democracy
in Turkey, are there mosques in the Christian areas that have
not been, and property in the Christian areas of Cyprus that
are also being--your criticism of how the Christian churches
and properties are being treated in the Muslim side of Cyprus,
what about in the other areas? Is there a balance there
somewhere, or the Turkey side is way more repressive against
Christians than the Christian side is against Muslims?
Ms. Prodromou. The only reason that I introduced what was
happening in Turkish occupied Cyprus was because I think it is
a very useful metric for the overall quality of democracy in
Turkey. After all, the Turkish Armed Forces have absolute
control over the northern part of Cyprus and unfortunately
there is a pattern in the occupied section of Cyprus that I
think speaks to the broader pattern in terms of what has
happened with religious freedom issues on the Turkish mainland.
Mr. Rohrabacher. To be specific, the specific question I
asked is your testimony criticized the activities going on in
the Turkish areas with Christian properties. Can that same
criticism be leveled in Christian areas to Islamic properties?
Ms. Prodromou. Absolutely not.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay, good. That is what I am looking for.
Because we had a bill about return of Christian properties. And
by the way I am in favor of return of properties to people who
they belong to whether they are Christians or Muslims. But
there was a hearing that we had and I have also heard that
there are Muslim properties in mosques in Greece, for example,
that needed to be addressed as well.
And what we need to hear and what we need to find out, is
it a just criticism of Turkey alone? We as a people who believe
in freedom and treating people decently would hope no countries
participate in this, but also we have to make sure we are not
singling out one country for criticism that is of activities
that are going on in all countries.
Let me ask about the censorship there. And at this time is
the Internet censored in Turkey?
Mr. Schenkkan. It is a complicated question. There are
upwards of, I believe the number is upwards of 30,000 Internet
sites that are blocked----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Blocked?
Mr. Schenkkan [continuing]. In Turkey. Blocked.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So blocked by whom?
Mr. Schenkkan. Blocked by the government. Blocked by the
telecommunications.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So we have 30,000 sites that are blocked
by the government.
Mr. Schenkkan. That is correct. And that includes sites
that a democracy might also recognize as----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Like pornography, gambling.
Mr. Schenkkan. There could be legitimate reasons for
blocking sites. The question is whether----
Mr. Rohrabacher. How many of them are? How many would you
say are----
Mr. Schenkkan. We don't know because the government doesn't
release a list of sites. This number is gathered by an NGO. The
government stopped releasing a list, I think it was 3 years
ago.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, we have a testimony from this
witness that says that the government is relying on social
media to promote progress in their country. And we have another
testimony here saying that we are blocking all of these sites
but we don't know whether or not how many of them are political
or they may be very legitimate blockage.
Mr. Schenkkan. Well, what we can say is that the process
for blocking sites is not transparent. It is not able to be
contested by the owners or the users of the site, and has been
the subject of European Court of Human Rights ruling on this
issue, a 2012 ruling, Yildirim v. Turkey, which held that the
law that I mentioned that was amended, in my remarks, 5651,
that this law was not in line with the European Convention on
Human Rights which is legally binding upon Turkey. And the
court said that Turkey needed to revise that law. They did not
do so. They made these amendments this year that actually made
the problems worse.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay, well, let me get to the--you have
mentioned again the judicial activity involved with some of
these questions. One of our witnesses talked about the purge,
the purge of judiciary. All right. But we heard from another
witness that traditionally Turkish judiciary is political and
politicized. So it is a purge to kick out certain people of a
political persuasion when they themselves took the spot of
someone because they were more in tune with that political
persuasion? So is that a justified criticism then? I will give
you a chance to answer that.
Mr. Tasci. I can say a few words on it. I mean as I said in
the beginning of my remarks, the judicial system was always a
problem in Turkey. It didn't start on December 17th or during
the Gezi protest or even before. But the problem is the people
who are not a problem on December 16th become the problem
within the judicial system on December 17th, which happens. I
mean what happened in that period, just 2 days after the
December 17 investigations is filed, they said this is very big
case and appointed two new prosecutors to the system, now
three. And two of those three signed the prisonment (sic) of
the suspects. Then those two were again purged, 3 or 4 days
after the election.
So this is not about the politics of the judiciary or
impartial behavior of the judiciary, as it becomes an are you
with me or are you against me? Are you going to follow what I
say?
Mr. Rohrabacher. That leads to the question that I have got
to lead up to here, and that is we have--look, we are Americans
and demand a certain standard. And let me just say that I am
not in favor of our Government getting involved in the Internet
at all. I am for Internet freedom. But right now we are trying
to assess democracy in Turkey, all right. And if indeed we have
seen this type of politicization of the judiciary in the past
as standard, to criticize Turkey right now on that is not
necessarily a just criticism of this administration.
Now with that said, I am going to let my colleagues have
their chance, but I would like to get a one answer from all of
you. And that is, with the challenges or the problems that we
are talking about right now this is, Turkey seems to be
stepping back from the positive direction in democracy, et
cetera that we had all been so happy about 10 years ago and 5
years ago, is this a problem with structure? The judiciary has
always been politicized. Or is it a problem with you have got a
leader with an ego who is now exercising powers that because of
his own personal evaluation it is more of a personal thing?
Because this happens to leaders around the world as well, I
might add, that if they stay in too long--that is why George
Washington stepped forward and said he is getting out after 8
years by the way and George Washington saved our country a lot
of anguish because of that. Maybe after 8 years people begin to
lose the perspective when they have had so much power. So is it
structural or is it personal? Just give me, what is it?
Mr. Schenkkan. Both.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Both, okay.
Doctor?
Ms. Prodromou. It is both, but I think it is more deeply
structural than personal.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay.
Mr. Cagaptay. I think it is structural but that is not the
reason it should stay around. The argument that you always had
problems with judiciary and media freedoms in Turkey, therefore
problems today should be recognized is anachronistic. Turkey is
a European country. It should have European style liberties.
And justifying violations of freedom of expression based on
past violations is not an excuse.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Let me just note, I never justify any
violation of human rights.
Mr. Cagaptay. I didn't suggest----
Mr. Rohrabacher. I know, but I accept that as the standard
that you are mentioning there.
Yes, sir?
Mr. Kanat. I think it is mainly structural.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Structural.
Mr. Tasci. I think both.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Both. Oh my. Well, thank you very much. I
will now turn to our ranking member.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mention that Turkey's
in a very dangerous neighborhood, and we are all saddened by
the news of the Turkish hostages in Mosul and urge that they
are released quickly. But this really poses a question in my
mind because there have been other reports that the Turkish
Government aids extremist factions in Syria, maybe not
militarily but with access to borders and medical help and
other types of help.
So how do you reconcile this that in one sense the
government has been doing this, reports are indicating, while
falling victim to the groups themselves. Are the reports
accurate? What would ISIS particularly target in Turkey? Why
would they do that if they were getting this kind of help? And
how are the Turkish people hearing about this given some of the
blackouts in communication that occur?
So I just wanted to get into that and I would like to ask
Dr. Cagaptay first and then Dr. Kanat.
Mr. Cagaptay. Thank you, Congressman. I think for a long
time Turkish-Syria policy was based on the following premise,
Assad will fall and good guys will take over, therefore anyone
who wants to go in and fight Assad can do so because when the
good guys take over they will just sweep them away. That
premise has proven to be wrong, and just as other premises of
Turkey's pivot to the Middle East have produced problematic
results.
Assad is not falling and good guys are not taking over, so
the policy of letting anyone and everyone go in is creating
threats long and short term for Turkey. And I think Turkey is
now coming to grips with this conclusion that not only good
guys are not taking over, but bad guys are laying roots in
Syria. And ISIS attack on Turkey was unfortunate and rude wake-
up call for many Turks who did not realize that this group had
built an infrastructure in Syria, just as it was a rude wake-up
call for us here in Washington.
I think at this stage, Turkey having come to this
realization, this actually puts Turkey and the United States on
an alignment. Now Turkey does see a radicalization threat
coming from Syria which has targeted Turkey. ISIS when it took
over Mosul, also attacked the Turkish consulate in that city,
took 49 Turkish citizens including children and babies hostage,
and to this day Turkey has not been able to secure their
release. This is the worst hostage crisis in Turkey's modern
history, and the threat comes from a radical group next door,
ISIS that has grown in Syria.
To me this suggests an even closer U.S.-Turkish cooperation
on Syria on the issue of radicalization because now ISIS is as
big a threat to Turkey as it is to any other country in the
region.
Mr. Keating. And is that sifted down to the people?
Mr. Cagaptay. Yes, I have seen recent polls. In fact,
today, just before we started this hearing, Turkish support for
the government's Syrian and Iraq policy has plummeted, for the
first time under 50 percent. This used to be a 70 percent, 76
percent support in 2011. Now it is 41 percent support for
government Syria policy.
Mr. Keating. I take it in your answer that you thought
there was some type of aid that was there at least before. Has
that ceased?
Mr. Cagaptay. I would not call it aid, Congressman. I think
it was a policy of basically anticipating that whoever went in
would be cleaned out eventually. I think Turkey is now
basically coming to grips with the realization that this is a
long term problem and it will work closer with U.S. and
European allies.
Mr. Keating. Dr. Kanat, do you want to comment on that?
Mr. Kanat. I agree with some of Dr. Cagaptay's statements
about this. Turkey and Syria have more than a 500-mile border
without any geographical terrain. So it is very difficult to
control the border. And then Turkish-Syrian relations were
extremely bad in the 1990s. There was a huge land mine that
basically had a post--a military post and everything. But since
the improvement of the relations and rapprochement, Turkey
removed this and Turkey and Syria had good relations and no
visa requirements; it was basically an open border.
Now after the Arab Spring and the starting of the Assad
regime's killing of its own people, there is this major
problem. There is this border, a huge border--500-mile border--
and it is very difficult to control who is entering and who is
not in those circumstances. Turkey and United States launch a,
actually, initiative, antiterrorism initiative, and Turkey and
both countries contributed to this $500 million last year. And
about the ISIS there is, starting from the emergence of this
trend Turkey basically indicated several times that ISIS may be
a major threat not only for Turkey but for the region as a
whole.
Mr. Keating. In the remaining seconds, if I could, I would
just like to ask Mr. Tasci. Business community, when they are
hearing these things, when they are hearing about issues about
separation of powers, rule of law issues and the closure of
communications like YouTube, can you just comment what the
conversation is among the business communities? And you can
touch on the Soma mining disaster as well. What is the chatter
in the business communities? Just briefly, so it doesn't go too
much longer over time.
Mr. Tasci. What is going on in Turkey is a big concern for
many business people as well. For example, I will give a couple
of things which are in my prepared statement as well. TUSIAD
chairman, for example, one of our competitors, let us say,
business association chairman said, we need rule of law. I mean
he made a comment about rule of law and the importance of rule
of law for international investors. And the response was he is
a traitor, I mean he got the reaction in a public mass that
traitors. And after 3 or 4 months he had very unusual things
happening and he resigned because of his own business
interests. And now they have a new chairman which had his first
meeting with the prime minister and the other cabinet members
as well.
And I am sure he is here as well, American-Turkish Council
chairman and CEO, James Holmes, is one of the leading
businessperson or one of the leading individual who represents
the business community in United States is the chair of ATC.
His institution is blacklisted, and his conference, which they
held last June was the 33rd of that conference and the Turkish
Government blocked it and they didn't come to the event and he
signed his resignation because of that one.
So I mean this kind of treatment is not unique to one
institution or another but rather for everyone. You have to
comply. You have to be silent or you have to face the
consequences.
Mr. Keating. Thank you. I think you have given us a flavor.
We did ask other business groups if they were interested in
this hearing. And I want to thank you for being here. Because I
think much of the progress that Turkey will have and we will
have together with Turkey will be grounded on economic
activities, and certainly some of the concerns you raised are
concerns that may affect that progress. Thank you, I yield
back.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And as the Chair noted in the opening
statement, quite often economic progress can be short circuited
and cut off if the political system does not match the progress
going on in the economic system.
Mr. Sires?
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing. But I find Turkey almost like an enigma. A few years
ago they were poised to be one of the leading countries in the
country that were an example. Now I see all these pivoting
back, more repressive, less democracy concerns. I was just
wondering if you see this because of the region they are in and
there are concerns all around them, or is there an excuse that
they are using to pivot away from what I think was a democratic
way?
Mr. Schenkkan. Thank you, Congressman. I think that Turkey
has obviously suffered through a very difficult history of
coups, of illiberalism of a single party period at the founding
of the country. The democratic tradition in Turkey has been
weak even though it was a multiparty system after World War II.
So you have this long history leading up to the rise of the
AK Party that the party came within that context. And I don't
think the party has escaped that context, and perhaps we
shouldn't be as surprised as we feel we are. But what we are
seeing is the AK Party after this period that Dr. Cagaptay
mentioned, in the early 2000s when the EU accession process was
more active, when the AK Party was more actively courting a
liberal democratic trend for several years, I would say at
least going back to 2007, we have seen the party led by the
prime minister reinstituting many of the habits, reenacting
many of the habits of the illiberal state.
And because the mechanisms of the illiberal state are still
there in the judiciary, in the police forces, to a certain
degree in the culture that is finding fertile ground and it is
something that can be enacted and it is something that is
developing.
Mr. Sires. Would you like to respond?
Mr. Cagaptay. Thank you, Congressman. I think Turkey is a
democracy. It remains a democracy. It has free and fair
elections.
Mr. Sires. But it is pivoting away.
Mr. Cagaptay. Governments, I agree with you. Governments
can be voted out. I think the trend we are seeing is not that
it is undemocratic, it has a democratically elected government
which does rule in an authoritarian fashion. And I think that
suggests a consolidation of two branches of government in one
hand, executive and legislative, and if Prime Minister Erdogan
is elected as President he will also appoint judges to the high
courts also holding power over judiciary. But Turkey does
remain a democracy. It has robust democratic institutions and
the governments are voted in and out democratically.
Mr. Sires. They also in my eyes are very sensitive to
anything in terms of the Armenian genocide or the recent, that
we did in the committee--return of the properties, the churches
and everything else. I had a senior moment, I guess. I should
say that, right?
But I mean, how can I say this? I don't know. I just see it
as turning away from all the good things that they have done. I
mean I even see, I know we are not supposed to bring up the
Cyprus issue, but they act like thugs. Even when you go and
vote here you feel like you are voting with the Turkish order
we had on any of those issues. I mean if you are going to be a
country of 75 million people and you are going to be a world
player, you have got a great history, I mean you have to be
more understanding that you can't be a thug.
And I just feel that is the way they behave in many ways,
and I don't know whether that is due to the growing pains or it
is just in the culture. Maybe it is in their history. But if
you want to be a player, you want to be part of the European
Union, you have other ways of dealing with many of the issues
that they seem to go war.
Mr. Cagaptay. As an historian, if I could respond to your
dilemma, I follow the reaction to the passage of the resolution
in Turkish media, in Turkish, and I think the reaction was not
so much anger at the passing of the resolution but the fact
that Turkey has made some progress in restoring, for example,
property belonging to synagogue and church foundations after
passing a law in 2011. It hasn't restored all property. It has
restored property totaling about $1 billion in value.
Mr. Sires. I get all that.
Mr. Cagaptay. Yes, yes.
Mr. Sires. I understand all that. But if you are going to
say something negative about a country----
Mr. Cagaptay. Right.
Mr. Sires [continuing]. Look at what can say about the
United States. I mean we are like the evil empire. Everybody
criticizes no matter what we do. But if you want to be a role
player in this country, want to be in this world, you have 75
million people with all this history, I just find that for me
perplexing. And maybe I just don't know enough about the
history and I am now not being accurate. Thank you, Chairman.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you. And Mr. Connolly?
Mr. Connolly. I thank the chairman and I thank my friend
the ranking member as well for allowing me to participate.
Well, first of all, I would say to my dear friend Mr. Sires, I
am not sure much is achieved by referring to the Turkish
Government, a NATO ally that has been there by our side for the
entirety of the Cold War and since, as a thug. I just don't
think that is helpful. I also think it is not true to history.
And I----
Mr. Sires. I am not setting policies.
Mr. Connolly. I know. I know. And I would just say with
respect to Cyprus, actually there is a lot of good news coming
out of Cyprus recently, finally, and we want to encourage that.
And we want to be careful about that because the two sides are
talking and there is actually movement and some sense of hope.
And I would hope Congress would encourage that.
I will also say while I certainly appreciate this hearing,
I don't know how often we have a hearing on a fellow European
country and member of NATO to investigate how they are doing in
their internal political process. And I might even have some
candidates for us to consider if we are going to extend the
list. Turkey is a work in progress as a democracy, so are we.
And I would never justify the crackdown on the press, freedom
of religion, freedom of expression, but imperfect is not the
same as being hopeless and retrograde and autocratic and
authoritarian and oppressive.
And one of the concerns I have, quite frankly, in our full
committee is sometimes that gets lost in our rhetoric and even
in our actions. And we want to encourage Turkish democracy. We
want to encourage a secular Muslim society in Turkey. We want
to encourage Turkish membership in the EU. We need to get over
biases and historical problems. Turkey has to come to
acknowledgment with some of its past, as my friend from New
Jersey has indicated, but so do others. And we need to deal
with the Turkey of here and now, not of the Turkey of 100 years
ago or 200 years ago or 500 years ago for that matter. Some of
us are still hung up on Constantinople. But we have to deal
with what we are dealing with here and now.
And so none of that is to excuse behavior that looks like,
to your point Mr. Sires, a regression. And maybe it is
structural and maybe it is personal and maybe it is both. We
have got a government that has been in power for quite some
time and frankly doesn't have much political opposition that is
viable. That is always a dangerous situation for any democracy
because we get complacent, we get arrogant and the like.
So let me ask starting with you, Mr. Tasci, from the
business community's point of view. Do you believe that the
Erdogan government is regressing? That in fact we are risking
democratization, democratic institutions with some sense of
arrogance of purpose with this current government?
Mr. Tasci. So good question, Mr. Congressman. Hard to
answer, but I will try to be as precise as possible. I am
talking about one person and the problems with one person does
not necessarily mean the problem is the problem of everyone in
that sector or everyone who supported that party or other kind
of people. And you may be having problems on one side like the
one that I mentioned about the Gulen movement and other kind of
things, but you may have very progressive and very good
policymakers when people are on your side.
So I mean that is the kind of different approach compared
to like Chinese type or like Korean type or different types of
countries. I mean definitely Turkey is a democracy. Turkey may
be a liberal democracy or maybe it is like majoritarian
democracy. You may call it any way you can. But we have free
elections. Is it fair? Questionable. Does the government use
its power to enhance and improve their own networks and
success? I think there may be some legitimacy on that. But in
general it is going to be very hard to say it is not----
Mr. Connolly. If I may, Mr. Chairman, could I ask Mr.
Schenkkan if he wants to respond to that as well?
Mr. Schenkkan. Yes, thank you. Yes, there is regression
underway. This is being documented by Freedom House. It is
being documented by other human rights organizations, by
journalists on the ground, by international journalists. This
is a major subject of discussion for everyone who is following
Turkey closely. We are seeing the regression in all areas of
fundamental freedoms. We are seeing it in freedom of
expression. We are seeing it in freedom of association. We are
seeing it in freedom of assembly.
And I want to stress that just to anticipate the counter
argument that I am sure the congressmen have heard elsewhere
that this is nothing compared to what it was like in the 1990s
or in the 1980s under military rule or during the dirty wars.
That is true. That doesn't mean that that is the standard for
Turkey. Turkey is, as we have said repeatedly, an EU member
candidate country. It is also a signatory to the European
Convention on Human Rights which is legally binding. There are
a whole host of ways in which Turkey's aspirations and the
standard to which Turkey holds itself are much higher.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
Mr. Cagaptay. Congressman, if I may? I agree with you,
Congressman, that what we see in Turkey is a real progress and
that should be recognized primarily because the country has
come a long way especially on the economic sphere and that is
significant. Countries cannot be transformed politically unless
they are transformed economically first. So Turkey has done the
first part of this tough task. It has become a majority middle
class society and that is a legacy of Prime Minister Erdogan.
If, as my colleague here, Dr. Kanat, says, Prime Minister
Erdogan does commit himself to drafting a liberal democratic
Constitution for the country, he will also go down in history
as the person who has transformed the country politically. He
has not done that so far. And I think given his political
record, it is possible to expect that that political
transformation is probably not going to come from within the
governing party but from the liberal opposition that has been
building in Turkey in the last decade primarily because of the
AKP's successful economic policies, which have produced a
majority middle class society which now demands respect for
individual liberties, freedoms of expression, media,
association and assembly. This was the tone of the Gezi Park
movement and I think it is going to stay around in Turkish
politics.
So we could conclude that Prime Minister Erdogan has
transformed Turkey economically, but it is the liberals--and I
am using the word ``liberal'' here not in the American sense
but in the European sense. It is the liberals who are committed
to democracy who will transform Turkey politically.
Mr. Kanat. Thank you. I think part of this discussion is
about what authoritarianism is, as Prime Minister Erdogan is
winning elections and becoming the predominant leader in
Turkey. And we have to understand that not all predominant
leaders are prone to authoritarianism, not always. And when you
see the reform packages, especially regarding the Kurdish
question, the historic process that we are having right now and
the condolences that offered for the Armenians, this couldn't
be happening with a predominant leader.
And we have to understand that democratization is a moving
target, and I totally understand that for some in Turkey the
current level of democratization may not be enough and
comparing constantly with the 1990s or the previous decades may
not be a good way to understand this. So I think it is a moving
target and it is a learning process at the same time.
But Prime Minister Erdogan and the AK Party government,
from the reform processes that they are in right now and from
their determination to write a civilian and pluralistic
Constitution, gave the signal that especially the period after
the elections would be a new democratic process.
Mr. Connolly. You have been most generous. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Actually it is the Chairman's policy that
people have a chance to answer the questions and then if there
is a discussion that is getting to an important point that we
don't put the 5-minute rule into effect in a way to cut off
some people from getting down to some truths that we are
looking for. With that said, Mr. Lowenthal, I know, will take
about 20 minutes now.
Mr. Lowenthal. Thank you for offering me \1/2\ hour to
speak.
Mr. Keating. We want you to take 5 minutes.
Mr. Lowenthal. It is okay. May be an improvement.
I don't know what question, I want to kind of frame it in
my concerns. About 6 years ago when I was a member of the
California State Legislature we took a visit, some of the
leadership in the legislature, to Turkey and it was a time of
great excitement. It was a time of, it was, I think, the second
term of the AKP party. We met with leadership in the Justice
and Development Party not with Mr. Erdogan but with others just
below. And it was a time of where there was a great change
there.
At that point as I understood, Turkey had had a history of
every 20 years or so a military coup, and the party was trying
to reduce the role of the military at the time. He was in a
major battle with the generals to reduce their power. He was
also, I remember at that time when I was there, there were
great newspaper stories about the fight between the justice
system and his wanting to replace many of the justices because
of some of the tremendous corruption that had taken place
historically. There was greater freedom. There was discussion
on the streets. We met with women's groups in terms of the role
of women. And so it was a time of great hope and aspiration. We
spent time with families. We didn't stay in hotels, we spent
with families as we went across the country visiting schools.
And synonymous with this and with this tremendous support
was a greater amount of religious toleration. And we kept
meeting with people who were very much pro-AKP party and also
some of the people who were in the Gulen movement who were very
synonymous and very similar and really talked about how it was
not a threat. Unfortunately while this is happening, I have
been hearing more and more about the threat to religious
freedoms that are taking place. That a movement that was seen
as not anti, not really anti or pro-government, was now, was
really talking about the role of education, the role of people,
the role was now beginning more and more to be perceived as
threatening.
And so my question is, is this so? Is this really what is
going on? I am sure you have talked about it. And I realize
that over time governments change. It has now been almost,
what, the AKP was, which I believe before 2002 was not even a
major party. It was really, and so it has been only now 14
years as a party, but it has been a party that has been in
power for 14 years.
So I am really concerned about what the future holds and
whether this apparent, is what I heard before, slide away from
democracy, slightly, maybe not totally, but some of this
movement and this lack of religious tolerance is really so, and
what role can we play in both supporting Turkey and also
supporting a movement toward democracy?
Yes?
Ms. Prodromou. I think that your observations are correct
that there has been backsliding and also there are some danger
signals when it comes to religious tolerance. I think it is
important for us to understand that when we speak about
secularism in Turkey and Turkey as a secular democracy, Turkey
secularism has in no way meant freedom of religion from the
state. The Turkish model of secularism has been promised on the
absolute state control over religion in civil society. And I
think that is a very different understanding of secularism and
therefore leads to very different kinds of consequences with
religious----
Mr. Lowenthal. Many of these schools that we visited were
set up by people who followed the leadership of Gulen. Has that
been seen as a threat that now they are educating children in a
different way? I just wonder if the threat is that people,
although, and my impression was Gulen, and this movement when
we talked to it was not anti the government at all, but yet it
was pro-education, pro-parental involvement in the schools.
Tremendous change in how the schools--is this being seen as a
threat to Turkish or centralized control over both education or
religion?
Ms. Prodromou. The initial collaboration and cooperation
between the Gulenist movement and civil society and the AKP
party has been well documented. And I think that----
Mr. Lowenthal. And it was that you could feel it when you
were in the country.
Ms. Prodromou. And the expansion and tolerance for Islam in
the public sphere for Turkey's Muslim population has been
significant. And I think that is a function, initially, of the
cooperation between the AKP and the Gulenist movement. That
kind of expansion, however, and the public presence of the
Sunni majority population has not been matched by an equal
expansion and tolerance for, for example, the 20 percent
Alawite population in Turkey, and it certainly hasn't been
matched by increased tolerance for non-Muslim minorities in
Turkey.
And I think another piece of this discussion that needs to
be addressed is the rising anti-Semitism that we have witnessed
in Turkey over the last decade, in particular the kinds of
public statements by even this warning by Prime Minister
Erdogan regarding the interest rate lobby, the Jewish lobby, et
cetera that has led to, I think, a generalized societal
intolerance for non-Muslim minorities in Turkey including the
Jewish community.
Circling back though to the Galenist-AKP relationship,
again I think that the initial globalization that allowed for
greater public presence for Islam in Turkey was driven by the
Galenist movement, but with the cleavage now between the
current government and that movement I think we are beginning
to see a backlash.
Mr. Schenkkan. Congressman?
Mr. Rohrabacher. Very quickly.
Mr. Schenkkan. Yes, a short comment on that. I think the
greatest achievement of the AKP in democratization was
loosening the grip on identity on who could be a Turk, who
could legitimately be a Turkish citizen. As my colleague said
though that was done primarily for the purposes of liberating
people to be conservative Muslims in public. It did have an
effect though across society, and Turkish identity now is much
more flexible and much more open and that is a very positive
development.
The biggest question now in this regard is will, under
President Erdogan will a new unitary identity start to be
established and start to be enforced? And that is probably the
most frightening consequence that could come out of the
consolidation of power.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Let us quickly----
Mr. Cagaptay. Thank you. On the issue of the rights of, and
religious freedoms with members in communities, as someone who
has often gone on the record to criticize the government's
record on liberties I have to disagree with my copanelist, Dr.
Prodromou, with that. The government has actually done well on
the religious rights of the non-Muslim communities and improved
significantly.
I have visited this Greek Orthodox Sumela Monastery,
Armenian Aghtamar Church in the last years. They were both
restored with government funds, public money. Public money has
been spent now to pay for utility bills of churches and
synagogues, a practice that the government has been doing for a
very long time for mosques. That is equality if that could be
construed as such.
On the broader picture, Congressman, on your question of
Turkey's direction on religion and state, I think there are,
broadly speaking, two practices of organizing the relation
between religion and politics. One is the European system which
is freedom from religion in education and politics, and the
other one is the American system which is freedom of religion
in education and politics. Turks for a long time practiced the
first under Kemalism. Because they were Europeans this was
laicite. This is how the Europeans do it.
They have switched to the second model, the American model,
from religion to freedom of religion, education and politics. I
think Turkey needs both to move forward because it is a country
that has Muslims and non-Muslims. It has shades of Islam. It
has shades of practice or the lack thereof. And to accommodate
this diversity of Islam as well as non-Islam and faith and non-
faith and practice and non-faith practice, Turkey needs to be a
country that provides for not just freedom for religion,
education and politics, which is what it does now, but also
freedom from religion, education and politics. These two, I
think, will be the way to move Turkey forward. Thank you.
Mr. Kanat. I want to add a couple things to the religious
freedom side. The Sumela Monastery and Aghtamar Church was
renovated and restored, and in the Sumela Monastery, actually,
after 100 years, the first religious services took place in
2012. And same in 2013, in the Aghtamar Church, after 88 years,
the first religious services are taking place. So there is
improvement in the rights of the non-Muslim community in
Turkey.
And one more thing I want to add about press freedom. You
have to understand that when we are discussing press freedom in
Turkey and censorship, there is a plurality of newspapers in
Turkey. Actually, there are around 40 newspapers in Turkey with
a total circulation of 5 million. And 65 percent--60 percent--
of these newspapers are anti-government and you can see all
kinds of anti-government news in these newspapers. The problem
is that none of the newspapers have pluralism within them so
they become almost homogenous entities, and fighting
journalists, I think, would take place in anti-government
newspapers as well. For example, if you write a pro-government
column in one of the newspapers--anti-government newspapers--
you would probably lose your job immediately. And because of
that, as I was mentioning, there is a structural--deep
structural--problem to understand press freedom in Turkey and
to provide any kind of solution for this problem. Thank you.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you. And we have one last comment,
but let us just note there are journalists here who lose their
job because they are not towing the line of whoever management
is in charge as well. Do you want to make one comment on that
and then we will go there?
Mr. Schenkkan. Thank you. If I may, to respond on the press
freedom issue as it is a special focus. I think there is
somewhat of a simplistic understanding sometimes of what it
means to not have freedom of expression in a repressive
environment. It is not that one makes a statement and then a
piano falls on you or trap door opens and you disappear through
the floor.
What happens in Turkey, what happens often, what happens
dozens if not hundreds of times is that people are fired for
speaking out, for criticizing the government. They are fired
through direct government intervention. Through direct
intervention from government officials with newspaper and media
owners. We know that this happens. This has been confirmed.
They are also sued. They face criminal and civil defamation
suits. They are even sent to jail for certain kinds of
reporting.
Mr. Rohrabacher. That is a very significant point to make
in reference to the point that was made. Finally, the last----
Mr. Tasci. One small thing I would like to add, as you
asked what happened suddenly with this Gulen movement and AK
Party thing, I would like to say one thing about it. I think
you are right that there was a heavy support and religious
movements or religious ideologies from all sects in Turkey saw
by AK Party as their own garden. And especially after 2011
elections when they had that vast majority, 49 percent of
election victory right after the referendum. They feel like it
is time to control the religious area as well, but the movement
was independent as well.
So the movement stays independent, becomes independent
which makes the government a little bit troublesome. As force,
a civil society force, which is very organized, they may lose
in several fronts of the community, educational institutions,
dialogue centers, et cetera, but they cannot be controlled. You
cannot tell them what to do.
So the monopolization of this religious domain also become
an important factor for this separation. For example, other
movements have the similar problems. New movements, for
example, have their own books and now the government is
publicizing that book's publication. So I mean they don't have
the right to publish their own books that they wrote, but the
government institutions have to publish it and it is going to
give the books to them. So controlling everything is the main
sense and is the main reason I can say.
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. The Chair will now ask the
ranking member if he would like to have 2 minutes to summarize
his views on the hearing today, and then I will make a 2-minute
summary as well and that will be it.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Even our own members
have asked why are we having hearings, why Turkey, why not
other countries? We touched upon the fact that over the last
short period of time Turkey has become much more influential in
the world. And Turkey, I believe, has the opportunity to become
even more influential in the world.
So their policies now that they are in this position and
have the potential to move further, their policies now go
beyond their borders more than they did before and they have
influenced beyond their own borders more than before including
the United States. Turkey is our strategic partner and we want
to keep it that way. The U.S. has an interest in Turkey's
democracy becoming stronger. The U.S. has an interest in
Turkey's economy becoming stronger, and we should do whatever
we can to help keep that progress moving forward and not
backwards.
And that is something that I think most of us and I think
all of us can agree upon as we look at this hearing. There is a
lot at stake. There is a lot of progress. There is a lot that
can be done to help the region and the world. And we are very
attentive to Turkey and we are very attentive to things that
aren't moving in a direction where our own interests, Turkey's
interests, in fact, European interests and world interests can
all be benefited by that. I yield back.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I would like to thank our witnesses. I
hope that you were able to make the points that you needed to
make and that we got into some areas of discussion that I think
are important. That is the purpose of these congressional
hearings, is not necessarily to come to the ultimate conclusion
but instead to make sure that people are discussing issues of
significance. And you have given us a lot of food for thought
today so I appreciate all of you for testifying.
Let me just note that just from the chairman's perspective,
some cultures can't accept criticism very well. One of the
great attributes of Americans is that we generally can take
criticism. In fact, when people are saying you are doing this
wrong or you are doing that wrong, we usually think of it as a
good suggestion. Let us go take a look at it and maybe we can
correct it.
And over the years we have certainly had our share of
maladies and sins that we committed against our own people, and
with the open system, and we didn't always have a free press
here. And we had a freer press than in other places of the
world, but we did have people who are in various parts of our
country faced physical retaliation if they said something bad
about the Ku Klux Klan for a long time.
But we basically, our country now that when people
criticize us we are able to accept that. I don't think that the
Turkish culture is the same as the American culture in this
regard. And that is why when people want to talk about what
happened in the Armenian genocide, the Turkish people then
think it is a personal attack on them even though this is
something that happened about 100 years ago.
And certainly if someone started going through the sins
that we committed against the American Indians or against Black
Americans 75 years ago, we wouldn't probably have the same, how
do you say, sensitivity to it. We would just say, well, we have
tried our best and if there is still some remnants around we
are going to make it better even more so.
So we have to understand that about Turkey. That is part of
their culture. Today our intent was not just to offer
criticisms but to understand what is going on and to perhaps
communicate with our friends, and all the Turkish people are
our friends. That we have got some concerns that over the last
10 years we were very joyful that things seemed to be going in
the right direction and now there is some indications that it
might not be going in the right direction.
And that is not to say that is worse off than it was under
the Ataturk regimes that took place for so long, but that there
are reasons there are trim lines. I will just say this that
when, under Ataturk and that regime, young women in the
universities were not permitted to wear head scarves. And some
of my friends, when they permitted women to wear head scarves
at the university, came to me and said how horrible it is to
see this radical Islamic regime there, they are allowing women
to wear head scarves. No, it is when women are mandated to wear
head scarves that the line is crossed and that we should be
concerned.
So there are some areas of concern that we should have
about freedom of press and making sure that people who
demonstrate are not incarcerated, et cetera. But we always have
to put this in perspective and try of what is going on in other
countries but also in how it relates to our basic principles as
a people. And again, the last point is we should not forget
that the Turks have stood with us for so long and through so
many trials during the Cold War, we need to keep them as our
friends and we need to offer our criticisms not as criticisms
but as suggestions of how they can improve things and get
things on the right track. With that said this hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Material Submitted for the Record
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