[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
IRAN'S DESTABILIZING ROLE IN
THE MIDDLE EAST
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 16, 2014
__________
Serial No. 113-189
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania Massachusetts
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia GRACE MENG, New York
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
TED S. YOHO, Florida TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
CURT CLAWSON, Florida
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Mr. Ray Takeyh, senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies, Middle
East Program, Council on Foreign Relations..................... 6
Mr. Scott Modell, senior associate, Burke Chair in Strategy,
Center for Strategic and International Studies................. 14
Natan B. Sachs, Ph.D., fellow, Saban Center for Middle East
Policy, The Brookings Institution.............................. 22
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Mr. Ray Takeyh: Prepared statement............................... 8
Mr. Scott Modell: Prepared statement............................. 16
Natan B. Sachs, Ph.D.: Prepared statement........................ 25
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 66
Hearing minutes.................................................. 67
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 69
Written responses from Mr. Scott Modell to questions submitted
for the record by the Honorable Alan S. Lowenthal, a
Representative in Congress from the State of California........ 71
IRAN'S DESTABILIZING ROLE IN
THE MIDDLE EAST
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WEDNESDAY, JULY 16, 2014
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m., in
room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ed Royce
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Chairman Royce. This morning we look at Iran's considerable
efforts to destabilize the Middle East.
When it comes to Iran, attention has rightly been focused
on efforts to stop its nuclear program. But as one witness will
explain this morning, Iran's nuclear program is just the tip of
the revolutionary sphere that extends across the world and
threatens key U.S. interests. Iran's foreign policy, he goes on
to say, is subversive, sectarian, and set on goals that would
come at the expense of U.S. interests.
He is right. Indeed, with Iran's long support of terrorist
groups and support of militias and adversarial regimes, the
region has been feeling the brunt of this revolutionary sphere
for quite some time. Thanks to Iran, Hamas has rearmed since
2012. Iran is the one that rearmed them, and nearly 80 percent
of Israel's citizens are fleeing to bomb shelters this week as
a result. With Iran's aid, Shi'a militias within Iran are
rearming and they are mobilizing. The Assad regime, with the
Iranian forces--with Quds Forces and with Hezbollah--continues
to massacre Syrians. With Iran's aid, Hezbollah is able to
threaten Israel with over 25,000 rockets and I can say that I
saw some of this first hand. During the second Lebanon war I
was on the ground in Haifa as those rockets were coming in.
This was before the invention of the Iron Dome. There were 600
victims in the Rambam Trauma Hospital and they were targeting
civilian neighborhoods, and Houthi rebels supported by Iran are
closing in on Yemen's capital. That is quite a record for a
regime now sitting across the table from us in Vienna where the
administration has conceded that this number-one state sponsor
of terrorism in the world can arguably enrich uranium. My
concern is that they are conceiving that. I hope it is not
conceiving it because that is the pathway to a nuclear weapon.
Of course, these aren't random efforts to support terrorism
by the Iranian regime but concerted actions by this ayatollah-
led--and he is the key decision maker--this Shi'a-led
government to overturn what Iran believes is a regional power
structure that favors the United States, that favors Israel and
their collaborators and when they say collaborators, of course,
what they mean is the Sunni Muslim governments in the Gulf.
This is a recipe for disaster for the region. It is a
recipe for U.S. interests there and today Iran's work is on
full display as hundreds of rockets rain down on southern
Israel. It is Iran that provides, again, the funding, the
weapons, the training to Hamas and other Palestinian terror
groups. Iranian leaders have admitted to providing the missile
technology that Hamas used against Israel during the last Gaza
conflict in November 2012, and just the other week a U.N. panel
of experts concluded that rockets and weapons concealed on the
Klos C including long-range M-302 rockets originated from Iran.
Other shipments have gotten through as Hamas have fired the
recently acquired rockets for the first time and, of course,
those bring all of Israel within--or nearly all within range,
certainly, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. These weapons put 8 million
people into Gaza's range of fire. One of them struck Hadera, a
coastal city between Tel Aviv and Haifa, 73 miles north of
Gaza.
In recent years, Iran has come under increasing strain from
international sanctions aimed at stopping its nuclear program.
This is what, frankly, got Iran to the table. When we talk
about why they are at the negotiation table it is because of
the sanctions passed here and adopted. But even with its
economy damaged, Iran has managed to provide robust support to
extremist proxies as part of its broader geopolitical agenda
across the region. As one Ambassador from the region shared
with me what do we think is going to happen if they come out
from under those sanctions with respect to the capital that
they will then have at their disposal for destabilization. Now
the United States and other world powers are negotiating a
final nuclear agreement with Iran that would lift most of the
sanctions. Bad deal or good deal, and many of us fear a bad
deal, any sanctions relief will bolster Iran.
As one witness notes, Iran stands to gain $100 billion in
frozen bank accounts and billions as oil exports resume. That
is a lot of M-302 rockets. How well an Iran unchained by
international sanctions treat its neighbors--I hope how it
treats its own citizens aren't an indication of how it is going
to treat its neighbors. How are the United States and her
allies positioned to counter Iran's destabilizing activities in
the Middle East? I am afraid we are going to hear from one of
our witnesses today not well.
And I will now turn to the ranking member for any opening
comments that Mr. Engel of New York has.
Mr. Engel. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
for calling this timely hearing about Iran's destabilizing role
in the Middle East.
As Iran continues waging its charm offensive with the
international community, negotiating with the P5+1 over its
nuclear weapons program, we cannot forget a basic fact: Iran
remains the most active state sponsor of terrorism in the world
and Iran is a key driver of regional instability.
From Syria and Iraq to Yemen and the Palestinian
territories, understanding Iran's nefarious behavior is
essential to protecting the interest of the United States and
our allies.
Even as Iran's economy continues to falter under the weight
of international sanctions, leaders in Tehran are plowing their
scarce resources into elements of Iran's security apparatus
that supports terrorism, particularly the Iranian Revolutionary
Guard Corps and its Quds Force.
Iran also provides funding, weapons and other support to a
wide range of terrorist groups including Hezbollah, Hamas, and
Palestinian Islamic jihad. All of these groups have been
designated as foreign terrorist organizations by the United
States and we will continue to treat them as such no matter
what happens in the nuclear negotiations.
I want to emphasize a point that you made in your opening
statement, Mr. Chairman, with which I certainly agree and you
and I have talked about this a great deal. It was sanctions
that brought Iran to the negotiating table.
It was sanctions that made Iran think twice about moving
forward and I don't think we should remove those sanctions for
any situation that is not preventive of Iran being able to have
a nuclear weapon.
I don't think we should willy nilly loosen sanctions on
Iran. I think we should keep the sanctions until we see that
they are dismantling their nuclear program.
Last week, Chairman Royce and I sent a bipartisan letter to
President Obama signed by more than 340 House colleagues. That
is more than three-quarters of the members of the House of
Representatives. We asked the President to consult with
Congress on the scope of any potential sanctions relief.
The letter noted that U.S. sanctions on Iran are based not
only on its nuclear weapons program but also on Iran's
ballistic missile program, its support for terrorism, its human
rights abuses and its development of chemical and biological
weapons.
Even if a comprehensive nuclear deal is reached, and it
enjoys broad support on Capitol Hill, it is safe to say that
Congress would not lift all sanctions on Iran unless it ceases
to be a bad actor in the region and dramatically improve its
behavior in all of these areas.
With hundreds of Hamas rockets raining down on Israel, we
see the real impact of Iran's support for terrorism. In March,
the Israeli navy intercepted the Klos C, a ship carrying
Iranian rockets to the Gaza Strip including dozens of Syrian-
produced long-range M-302 rockets which are capable of reaching
high-density Israeli population centers such as Tel Aviv,
Jerusalem, and Haifa.
By deliberately targeting civilian areas with these deadly
weapons, Hamas is committing war crimes aided and abetted by
Iran. I have to laugh at the crocodile tears coming out of
Hamas terrorists in Gaza talking about the civilian population.
I think yesterday was an eye opener for many people when
the Egyptian-brokered cease fire was accepted by Israel but
rejected by Hamas. It is clear to see who wants peace and who
refuses to want peace.
And Hamas would not and could not be so bold without all
the support it has received from Iran. Iran, again, is the
number-one supporter of terrorism around the world and Hamas is
a terrorist organization.
So in almost every conflict in the region we see Iranian
fingerprints as Tehran seeks to spread its influence and
manipulate its neighbors.
Iran's support for Assad in Syria and for Hezbollah's
intervention in the Syrian civil war has given the regime a new
lease on life and resulted in the deaths of thousands of
innocent Syrian civilians.
Assad would not be winning, potentially, in Syria if it
wasn't for Hezbollah, a terrorist organization supported,
funded, maintained, and controlled by Iran. Iran's support for
Hezbollah has also destabilized Lebanon and allowed the
terrorist group to amass tens of thousands of rockets on
Israel's northern border.
Iran's involvement with the Maliki government and with
radical Shi'a militias in Iraq have undermined efforts to
establish a more inclusive government in Baghdad.
So I don't think the U.S. should be cooperating with Iran
on the situation in Iraq and I was pleased to hear Secretary
Hagel's remarks last week confirming that we are not doing so.
So Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, let me say at this time of
great instability in the Middle East we need to remain clear-
eyed about the capabilities and intentions of our adversaries,
especially Iran.
I look forward to hearing the testimony of our
distinguished panel of witnesses and thank you again for
holding this important and timely hearing.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Engel. We now go to Ms.
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, chair of the Middle East Subcommittee.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. While
the administration takes unilateral steps to offer concessions
to Iran as it pursues a weak nuclear agreement, it continues to
disregard our calls for congressional oversight and our
warnings on dealing with Iran while ignoring its destabilizing
efforts.
The regime in Tehran continues to actively and openly work
against U.S. national security interests across the globe in
Iraq and Syria. It arms and finances terrorist groups like
Hezbollah and Hamas.
Ted Deutch and I just came back from a trip to the region
and many leaders expressed to us that pushing back Iran's
breakout capability is not as important as dismantling Iran's
nuclear infrastructure would be.
Iran doesn't need the bomb to be dangerous. Just having the
capability to get the bomb is enough to spark a nuclear arms
race in the region.
Instead of offering concessions to the regime, the
administration should be pressing Iran to dismantle completely
its nuclear program; abandon its support for Assad and its
terrorist proxies; and cease its provocations against the U.S.
and our ally, the democratic Jewish state of Israel, or else we
will impose even stricter sanctions that will bring Iran's
economy to its knees. It is the sanctions, stupid.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, and we appreciate you and Mr.
Ted Deutch's recent trip to the Middle East. Mr. Deutch is the
ranking member of the Middle East Subcommittee. We will go to
Ted Deutch for 1 minute.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ranking
Member Engel, for holding today's hearing and for your
continued leadership and attention to Iran not just on the
nuclear issue but to the whole of Iran's habitual bad behavior.
We are just days away from seeing whether Iran is truly
committed to finding a diplomatic solution to the nuclear
crisis. But even if there is a diplomatic resolution to Iran's
ongoing quest for a nuclear weapon, it would not change the
fact that Iran would still be the largest sponsor of terrorism
in the world, it would still be assisting the Assad regime in
Syria, and it would still be repressing the basic human rights
of its citizens.
I would caution those who think that if a nuclear deal is
reached that the world will simply ignore Iran's other
violations of international norms including its meddling in
regional affairs and attempts to incite instability in other
countries.
In the more likely scenario that a nuclear deal with Iran
is not reached or if the duration of the deal is not long
enough, an Iranian regime that still possesses the capability
of developing a nuclear weapon would surely set off a nuclear
arms race in the region.
Mr. Chairman, we will know a lot more about Iran's
intentions in the coming days. We must also be making our
intentions clear--deal or no deal. The U.S. will not turn a
blind eye to Iran's attempts to exploit a volatile Middle East.
I appreciate it and I yield back.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Deutch. Mr. Brad Sherman of
California is the ranking member on the Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee.
Mr. Sherman. Iran is the number-one state sponsor of
terror. Hezbollah, Assad--a reach that included the Buenos
Aires Jewish Community Center, a point on the globe as far from
Tehran as one can get.
Now imagine an Iran with the impunity of being a nuclear
weapons state. But we should realize that we have limited
bargaining power. We do not have Iran's economy completely on
the ropes.
We did not adopt sanctions that were effective 10 or 15
years ago. We did it 10 or 15 months ago. We brought them to
the table but we have not brought them to their knees unless we
can imagine Iran with no centrifuges, no terrorism, and no
theocracy.
But I don't know whether we have rallied public opinion to
the point where we are willing to, for just an example, ban
Chinese imports to the United States as long as Japan
maintains--or China or any other country maintains an economic
relationship with Iran. That is the level of sanctions that I
think goes beyond what we can adopt here in Washington.
We are wise to have this hearing to illustrate to Americans
and Europeans why it is so important that all options remain on
the table. I yield back.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This morning we are pleased to be joined by a distinguished
group of experts on this subject. Dr. Ray Takeyh is senior
fellow for Middle East studies at the Council on Foreign
Relations.
Mr. Takeyh was previously a senior advisor on Iran at the
Department of State. He was professor at the National Defense
University.
We also have Scott Modell, a senior associate at the Center
for Strategic and International Studies. He serves as a senior
advisor to U.S. Special Operations Command on counter threat
finance issues. He was previously a senior officer in the
National Clandestine Service at the Central Intelligence
Agency.
And Dr. Natan Sachs--Natan, as he is known, is currently a
fellow at the Brookings Institution's Center for Middle East
Policy. Previously, Dr. Sachs was a fellow at Stanford Center
on Democracy Development and Rule of Law and a Fulbright Fellow
in Indonesia.
So without objection, these witnesses' full prepared
statements will be part of the record. We are going to
encourage them to summarize and then we will go to questions.
Members will have 5 calendar days to submit statements and
questions and anything extraneous for the record.
Dr. Takeyh, if you would like to begin.
STATEMENT OF MR. RAY TAKEYH, SENIOR FELLOW FOR MIDDLE EASTERN
STUDIES, MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
Mr. Takeyh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a privilege for
me to be here again as well as with my colleagues Scott and
Natan.
I will just briefly discuss some aspects of my testimony. I
think the high drama of arms control negotiations and diplomacy
in Vienna today dominates our impressions of Iran and defines
those.
In the next couple of weeks the diplomats will debate how
much centrifuges are to be traded for how much sanctions
relief. There is already talk that negotiations may be extended
past July 20th, given the significant gaps that remain between
the two powers.
The nature of the inspection regime and enforcement
mechanism will also be discussed. Whether a durable agreement
can be negotiated with an unreliable partner, as you suggested,
such as the Islamic Republic, will be put to a test.
Hovering over all these technical issues is the challenge
of addressing Iranian revisionism in the era of nuclear
diplomacy. Tehran, as was mentioned, is busy advancing its
claims in a contested Middle East, and Washington would be wise
to check the surge of Iranian power and negate its regional
designs.
The key actors defining Iran's regional policy are not
urbane diplomats mingling with their counterparts in Europe but
the Revolutionary Guards, particularly the famed Quds Brigade.
For the commander of the Quds Brigade, General Qassem
Suleimani, the struggle to evict America from the Middle East
began in Iraq and now has moved to Syria.
Syria is the front line of that particular resistance. For
the hardliners in Iran, the Sunni state's attempt to dislodge
Bashar Assad from power is really a means of weakening Iran.
The survival and success of the Assad dynasty today is a
central element of Iran's foreign policy. Next door, Iran's
model of operation in Iraq actually draws from its experiences
in Lebanon in the early 1980s when Iran essentially amalgamated
various Shi'i parties into a lethal Hezbollah organization and
Hezbollah has remained the instrument of Iran's foreign policy
since then.
Since the removal of Saddam, Iran has similarly been busy
strengthening Shi'i forces in Iraq by subsidizing their
political activities and arming their militias. Iran hopes that
Shi'ites will continue to exploit their demographic majority to
solidify their political gains.
But should the political process fail, they must be
sufficiently armed to win the civil war. The purpose of Iran
military dispatches to Iraq initially were to evict the United
States and now it is to maintain the viability of Shi'a forces.
A certain misapprehension, I think, was born in Kabul and
has migrated to Baghdad, mainly that we need Iranian assistance
to stabilize our war-torn charges. The ISIS surge in Iraq is
once more portrayed as an opportunity for the two powers--
United States and Iran--to collaborate.
The stark reality remains that United States launched Iraq
with much sacrifice on this path of precarious stability
despite Iran's harmful interventions and to do so again will
require American initiative rather than Iranian benevolence.
Iran's fundamental interest in Iraq tends to diverge from
those of the United States. We ostensibly seek an inclusive
Iraq with greater participation of Sunni forces in the Shi'i
government.
Iran desires a Shi'i hegemony with the veneer of Sunni
participation. Iran essentially desires an Iraq that is
estranged from the Arab Councils and at odds with the United
States.
Today, as you mentioned, the region is feared and gripped
with fear that arms control policy will lead to a larger
detente between the United States and Iran. This concern has
some justification in history during the heydays of arms
limitation talks between the United States and the Soviet
Union.
Nuclear accords were often followed by commerce and
diplomatic recognition. Washington has often been seduced by
the notion that nuclear agreement can pave the way for other
areas of cooperation.
The challenge that the United States faces today is to defy
its own history. America must find a way to impose limits on
Iran's nuclear ambitions through negotiations while restraining
its regional ambitions through pressure.
This will require rehabilitation of America's battered
alliances in the Middle East. Strategic dialogues and military
sales are not going to be sufficient. Washington can reclaim
its allies' confidence but it cannot do so without being an
active participant in Syria and Iraqi sagas.
Further attempt to exempt ourself from this conflict will
mean that our pleasures will ring hollow to a sceptical Arab
audience. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Takeyh follows:]
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Chairman Royce. Thank you, Doctor.
STATEMENT OF MR. SCOTT MODELL, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, BURKE CHAIR IN
STRATEGY, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Mr. Modell. Chairman Royce, members of the committee, thank
you very much for the opportunity to come here today. You have
read my testimony. I think everybody is sort of in agreement
with what I have summarized in my testimony.
There are a few points I wanted to extract from it, expand
a bit on it and one was the idea that I think has been
encapsulated in some of the initial comments was basically that
Iran, beyond the nuclear program, approaches its revolutionary
agenda in a whole of government approach.
There is a lot of talk here in the United States about how
we do things around the world, you know, sort of incorporating
a whole of government approach currently working in the
Pentagon and a lot of our time is spent trying to figure out
how do we bring together State Department and a variety of
agencies to accomplish certain foreign policy objectives
overseas and it is not easy.
But if you look at what Iran does from bottom up in terms
of trying to project their power and trying to accomplish their
agenda throughout the Middle East they really do take a whole
of government approach, certainly more so than the Arab States
that I have seen.
The nuclear deal, I think, one of the things that I am
continuously seeing and hearing that really surprises me is the
fact that people are going to--that they are considering giving
a pass on the possible military dimensions of the program. I
hope that is inaccurate. We have been watching this for over a
decade and it is almost astonishing that that could be ignored.
So in the run-up to a deal and discussions between the
administration and Congress on the implementation of a long-
term deal I really hope that that is addressed.
I also agree with the chairman that I think the
revolutionary agenda is going to go on. Years ago I recall in
2011 and 2012 members of the Basij who were posted, you know,
into Syria and Iraq and elsewhere there were several public
interviews and they were asking them what they thought about
Iran's agenda in the region.
And this was--these were public interviews and they were--
and they said well, we have--our agenda is to create a million-
man force across the entire region.
They recently said that again--they are interested in
making a 200,000-man force that is going to spread from Iran
all the way to Lebanon. I think there is a lot of obstacles in
the way of doing that but the core objective remains true and
you can see they are pushing on that objective constantly.
The other thing I would say is, just because Iran is
involved in P5+1 talks and has been for some time, I think
there is a quick rush to assume that the proliferation
activities have stopped. I think in the run-up to an agreement
or in the aftermath of an agreement people are going to start
wondering what is this inspection and verification regime going
to look like.
And I would posit to you the most--one of the most
important aspects of it has to be how do we devise a new
containment strategy with our allies in the region, not only
with the IAEA inside looking at facilities to ensure they are
not cheating and abiding by the terms of the agreement but it
is the external part that they have built up and done such a
good job over the last decade that contributes to proliferation
and has allowed them to move their program so far forward.
When we start to think about how we are going to work
together with the GCC more effectively in the future and
develop a new containment strategy we have to have that in mind
and I have recommended a number of ways in which we should
start thinking about how the U.S. Government should be using
resources overseas to that end in my paper.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Modell follows:]
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Chairman Royce. Thank you.
Dr. Sachs.
STATEMENT OF NATAN B. SACHS, PH.D., FELLOW, SABAN CENTER FOR
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
Mr. Sachs. Thank you very much, Chairman Royce, Ranking
Member Engel, distinguished members and staff for the
opportunity and honor of speaking here today, especially
alongside Ray and Scott.
I will speak briefly about Israeli views of this issue.
While there is considerable good will in Israel toward the
Iranian people, the Islamic Republic's regime is viewed very
differently, and with good reason. Indeed, virtually no one in
Israel, including those who strive in earnest for peace with
their Arab neighbors, expects good relations with the Islamic
Republic as currently constituted. Nonetheless, important,
though limited, variation exists among Israeli policy makers on
the regional challenges posed by the Iranian regime.
In my testimony I will touch briefly on the spectrum of
Israeli views on two such regional challenges--Iran's nuclear
program and its involvement in terrorism and conflicts abroad.
In my written testimony I elaborate further on these issues
and discuss the related question of an alliance of interest
between Israel and Saudi Arabia and Iran's nuclear program.
It is important to note first that far more unites Israelis
on the Iranian nuclear issue than divides them. Diversity of
opinion exists but the spectrum of opinions is narrow and much
more limited than on other issues, such as the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. Virtually no one in Israel's national
security elite, nor for that matter in the U.S., doubts Iran's
intention to reach threshold nuclear capabilities.
Israeli experts and, indeed, the government do not contend
that Iran has already decided to build a nuclear weapon but
they do not doubt that Iran intends to have the capability to
do so.
Further, almost all in Israel view the possibility of a
nuclear threshold Iran as a very negative development, for a
variety of reasons. Most mainstream thinkers support the need
to project a credible threat to stop Iran's nuclear program if
all else fails, even by means of conventional force.
And yet, there remain meaningful differences among
mainstream Israeli thinkers. First, not all view the Iranian
nuclear threat with equal severity or use the term
``existential threat'' to describe it.
Some even argue that even if all failed, Israel will be
strong enough to deter a nuclear Iran. Most people abroad
believe Israel has a second strike capability--notably, Iran
believes this.
Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons might then entail a
grim but perhaps stable cold war logic of mutually assured
destruction. This debate rests, of course, on a related debate
about Iran's rationality, which I will be happy to discuss if
asked to.
Second, there is an important variation among senior
Israeli thinkers on what might constitute an acceptable deal
with Iran. Some central figures have suggested that very low
levels of uranium enrichment coupled with stringent inspection
might leave enough time to react to an Iranian breach of an
agreement.
Third and perhaps most dramatically, there are different
views in Israel on the wisdom of a unilateral strike on Iran's
nuclear facilities. The Israeli cabinet and security forces
have been strongly divided on the issue and former security
officials have warned publicly against a unilateral strike.
Polling suggests that the Israeli public too is divided on
the issue and is skeptical of a unilateral strike without U.S.
support, and I stress that point. Note that there is
considerable difference and tension between the need to project
readiness to strike if all else fails, something which nearly
all Israelis support, and actual support for a strike, on which
opinion diverges.
While the credible threat of a strike could help the
diplomatic track, its credibility can be undermined when these
differences emerge publicly, as they have.
In sum, on the threat of Iran's nuclear program, far more
unites Israelis than divides them but some differences exist on
the extreme severity of a threat, the nuances of remedies, and
on the wisdom of unilateral strike.
By comparison, there is very little debate in Israel on
Iran's involvement in conflicts and in terrorism in the region
and abroad. In the past, there was some debate over the degree
of Iran's control over Hezbollah, its most significant
subsidiary abroad.
Some argue that Hezbollah should be viewed more as a
Lebanese party than an Iranian proxy. The civil war in Syria
has largely ended that debate in Israel. At Tehran's behest,
Hezbollah has sacrificed greatly in casualties and in sinking
popularity among Arab and Lebanese publics, and yet it has done
so.
Beyond the immediate region, Hezbollah, along with the
Iranian Revolutionary Guard, also carried the threat of global
terrorism against Israeli and even non-Israeli targets, most
famously, the bombing of the Jewish Community Center in Buenos
Aires--AMIA--20 years ago this very week.
A special concern to Israel--at this very moment--is also
Iran's involvement with militant Palestinian groups, most
notably the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, or PIJ--a close Iranian
subsidiary and a very violent terrorist group.
Hamas' relationship with Iran is more complex. Unlike PIJ,
Hamas is a large political party as well as a terrorist
organization. Hamas is also an offshoot of the Muslim
Brotherhood and its relation with Shi'a Iran and with Assad's
regime in Syria, once robust, have soured.
Nonetheless, Iran and Syria have been suppliers of weapons
for militants in the Gaza Strip including Hamas. Syria-produced
M-302 rockets, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, for example,
have been used against Israeli civilians in the past week.
Let me conclude by noting a key concern of all Israeli
policy makers of the full spectrum I described. Israelis fear
that, should a deal with Iran be reached, whether before July
20th or after an extension, there will be some in the
international community who will view the issue as closed--the
nuclear issue and other issues.
In reality, the success of any deal will depend completely
on the monitoring and verification embedded in it. Israelis are
therefore likely to continue to focus on this issue.
U.S. interests, which are aligned with, though not
identical to those of Israel, would be well served if the
United States too maintained a vigilant, pragmatic but
realistic watch over Iran's policies in the future.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sachs follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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Chairman Royce. We appreciate your testimony. Thank you,
Mr. Sachs.
We go now to a question that I have for Mr. Modell and this
goes to your testimony that by most accounts you say Iran
stands to gain access to nearly $100 billion in frozen banks as
well as billions more as oil export restrictions are lifted as
part of any agreement, whether that agreement is good or bad.
That is the consequence.
Could you translate that impact of this relief--what that
would mean? What operational capabilities do you estimate the
Iranians could develop or acquire as a result of the release of
this funding?
Mr. Modell. Mr. Chairman, sure. One of the reasons why the
tempo of Iran's operational activity over the last year or so
since sanctions kicked in in earnest has been exactly that.
They haven't had the funding to fund all of their units.
They haven't had the funding to do certain things, just as
if--the same way with the U.S. Government or any government,
for that matter.
In times of financial crisis there are certain things you
got to cut back and certain things you can't. In the case of
Iran with a surplus--with an influx of $100 billion plus
bringing back oil online, the IRGC ghost force becomes much
more active.
Funding that goes to proxies in the region goes back up to
pre-sanctions levels and you start to see more activity in
places like Yemen. You start to see more activity in places
further outside their normal operating areas in the Middle
East.
They have had to cut back activities in Latin America and
Africa and other places because of the sanctions. Those
activities will pick up, particularly on the covert side, in my
opinion.
Chairman Royce. So the added advantage that what they might
perceive as a windfall what would that give the regime
specifically in the region?
If you were just to look at the Middle East, sort of the
low-level insurrection that they support in Saudi Arabia and
some of these other--among the Shi'a population there and some
of the other developments; could you maybe specify what that
would mean?
Mr. Modell. One of the things that I would say is what they
have been trying to do for a long time now and they did this,
and Dr. Takeyh had mentioned this, in the 80s they had a number
of Hezbollah movements outside of Lebanon. They tried to
replicate the example of Lebanese Hezbollah in Bahrain and
Hezbollah Hejab in Saudi Arabia and so forth.
They have been trying to do that again and they are going
to continue to do that--Kuwait and Bahrain and Saudi. So with
extra money it is exactly what they would try to do. They are
focused on eastern Saudi Arabia. They are focused on Kuwait.
They are focused again--I mean, they have stated very
unequivocally that their goal in Bahrain is to empower Shi'ites
and to overthrow the monarchy there. So those goals become much
more attainable with money and with extra units that are
focusing on those.
Chairman Royce. What surprises me is the sheer amount of
weaponry. You know, as I mentioned, when I was in Haifa, I
mean, at that point in time it was tens of thousands of rockets
that they had at their disposal and now it is maybe five fold
that.
So that is over a decade now. Let us just look at Hamas. It
is giving its funding, its weapons, its training from Iran. We
go to March 2011. Israel intercepted the Victoria--intercepted
that ship off its coast.
There were C-704 cruise missiles--as well as a lot of
mortars, but cruise missiles capable of targeting Israeli
shipping and ports--that Israel said were bound for Hamas in
Gaza.
Then you have got on March 5th they intercepted a ship in
the Red Sea that Israel said was carrying Iranian advanced
weaponry bound for militants in Gaza, possibly via Sudan. You
see these M-302 long-range rockets now are what they are
putting their money into.
Why in the middle of these negotiations would they run the
risk of ramping up with resupply of even longer-range rockets?
And this is another question I have.
I listened to this speech that the Ayatollah gave recently
in which he said it was the duty, as I recall--the duty of
every military man to mass produce ICBMs. Why would he, in the
middle of negotiations, go out and transmit that kind of
message through his armed services?
Mr. Modell. The fundamental difference between the
revolutionary agenda he has and the way that we would like them
to come into the mainstream international community. It is as
simple as that.
He separates the nuclear negotiations. Like you said, the
only reason he has come forth for the nuclear negotiations is
out of dire economic necessity. That has nothing to do with his
revolutionary agenda, which they are continuing to push day in
day out.
And that is what they--and that is the message, quite
frankly, that he plays to his domestic audience and he wanted
us to know as well. They are looking for--he said it and
Foreign Minister Zarif has repeatedly said, we are not looking
for rapprochement with the West.
We hope that these will lead to common ground and nothing
more than that. We are going to continue to push forth in our
support to militants in Gaza. We are going to continue to push
forth all of our objectives in the region, which I have stated
over and over in this paper and you guys have said as well.
And when you look at the bases of operation that they have
that are expanding in places like Sudan and Ethiopia and
others, all of that doesn't with a nuclear agreement.
Chairman Royce. I am out of time. We will go to Mr. Engel.
Mr. Engel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me start with you,
Dr. Sachs. How is Israel likely to view a comprehensive Iranian
nuclear deal?
Will they see it as one that empowers Iran and allows Iran
a freer hand on destabilizing activities in the region?
Mr. Sachs. Thank you, Mr. Engel.
The question is in part who in Israel. The government and
almost everyone would view it with great suspicion. There is
very little trust in Iran, in the intentions of the Islamic
Republic.
There is some hope among some that a deal, if it were
stringent enough, might help delay somewhat the advancement of
the nuclear program, and so in that sense there may be some
minor relief.
But Israel, as I mentioned, will be very concerned that any
deal will bring about rapprochement between the U.S. and Iran
would bring about a relief of all the sanctions and would most
importantly make others in the international community go to
sleep on this issue.
Israel would very much like everyone--itself, the United
States and everyone else--to remember that this problem will
remain. I imagine that the reaction in Israel probably will
have to a deal along the lines that we have been hearing will
be negative.
But the question is on the nuance of a negative. Israel may
view it as a terrible deal that it cannot live with. If the
terms are strict enough, it may view it as a step that perhaps
will halt something that it views as very bad, maybe one that
it can live with in the meantime.
Mr. Engel. In your testimony, you alluded to Israel
commonality with some of the Sunni Arab states such as--you
didn't say it but such as Saudi Arabia or United Arab Emirates
on Iran--similar outlooks.
Could you talk a little bit about that?
Mr. Sachs. Certainly. There is, as others have noted, there
is a very common concern with Iran. I do think, though, the
reasons are quite different. The Arab neighbors of Iran have
longstanding challenges with the Islamic Republic and even with
Iran itself.
There is geopolitical issues and there is, of course, the
Sunni-Shi'a divide that has really engulfed the Middle East at
the moment. All these things are things that Israel is not
concerned about.
Israel is first and foremost concerned about the two main
issues we've been talking about today--the nuclear program and
Iran's very active destabilizing activity in the rest of the
region. And so there is room for cooperation which is very
important, is room on the nuclear issue, is room on closing
Iran's opportunity for activity abroad. But it stems from a
different cause. I will add one more thing, which is that the
public aspect of this alliance is very difficult.
The ``Arab street,'' or public opinion, is very sensitive
to the Palestinian issue and especially these days and this
makes it harder for Israel and Saudi Arabia to publicly engage,
although there have been--even despite that there have been
public instances of meetings, for example, of former chiefs of
intelligence between the two countries.
In other words, there is hope on this, although there, I
think, are some limitations.
Mr. Engel. Thank you. Let me talk a little bit about
Iranian support for Hamas and perhaps, Dr. Takeyh, I can start
with you. There have been some differences between Hamas and
Iran since they take different sides in Syria.
Iran supports Assad while Hamas opposes him. How do you see
this playing out? People have said that Hamas is more
internationally isolated now than it has been in the past--
isolated from Egypt, isolated perhaps from Syria. Is there a
chance that this might reduce Iran--that it would cause Iran to
reduce its material and moral support for Hamas?
Mr. Takeyh. I think historically the Palestinian
rejectionist group that has had more in common with Iran has
been the Palestinian Jihad. However, Iran has always had an
instrumentalized approach to Hamas, namely, whenever Hamas has
an agenda that is common with Iran, which is essentially
intrusion against Israel, then they come together.
The notion of supporting Palestinian rejectionist groups
writ large has been the central aspect of Iran policy so I
don't necessarily think that there is going to be any
adjustment in that, particularly at a time when this has some
degree of street popularity.
Mr. Engel. Is it surprising to you--I know Iran has been
supporting and supplying Hamas for many years but in doing so
it is--Iran by doing so is crossing the Shi'a-Sunni divide in
order to help the Palestinians. Is that something that we
should be alarmed about?
Mr. Takeyh. Iran has always suggested that its policy in
the region is not a sectarian one--that it will essentially
make common cause with Sunnis that share its agenda. It is the
Sunni street that likes to portray Iran mostly as a Shi'ite
state but essentially Iran has always tried to have a pan-
Islamic approach and to essentially unite Shi'ites and Sunnis
that share the same common objectives.
Now, that has become very difficult as the region has
become subject to such sectarian division and Iran at this
particular point is more closely aligned with Shi'a state but
is always open to dealing with radical Sunni groups that share
its perspective.
Mr. Engel. Mr. Modell, do you have a comment on that?
Mr. Modell. The only thing I would say is when you look at
the--when you look at the trajectory of transnational organized
crime and Iran's collaboration with, like, a group like
Lebanese Hezbollah, for instance, there are a considerable
amount of Sunnis and Shi'a that are involved in those
activities, you know, I don't think Iran has any problem
crossing, for political convenience, any----
Mr. Engel. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Royce. Mr. Chris Smith of New Jersey. Oh, he is
going to defer to Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Florida.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. He is a gentleman. Thank you so much, Mr.
Chairman, as you are.
Iran agreeing to the weak and easy to live up to interim
agreement is just another ploy by the regime to win concessions
and buy more time, and now that the deadline is quickly
approaching an extension must not be given.
Instead, we need to start reexamining our sanctions program
against Iran and ways to counter its illicit and destabilizing
activities. We have no reason to trust this regime but we have
decades of proof that shows Iran's true colors.
One of the very first acts of terror of this current regime
in Iran was responsible for, after the '79 Islamic revolution,
the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. Led by a group of
students but spiritual followers of Khomeini, these terrorists
held 52 American diplomats and citizens hostage for nearly 450
days.
Iran has been a United States-designated state sponsor of
terrorism since '84. It has been repeatedly redesignated by the
State Department as a country of particular concern for its
continued and flagrant abuse of religious minorities and the
regime has been highlighted year after year by our State
Department's country reports on human rights practices for its
abysmal human rights record.
Then, of course, we turn to the nuclear issue. Iran was
discovered to have been operating a covert nuclear program for
decades in an attempt to create a nuclear weapon, a program
that we did not find for years.
So what confidence do we have that Iran--that we will be
able to catch Iran cheating again? That is a question. Now,
there are six U.N. Security Council resolutions against Iran's
nuclear programs, resolutions that demand that Iran not be
allowed to enrich any uranium at all, and yet Iran continues to
be in violation of those resolutions.
It continues to make progress on its nuclear and ballistic
missile programs. Yet, from the very beginning administration
after administration have failed to hold the Iranian regime
accountable for all of these aggressions--for all of these
aggressive acts.
The hostages of the '79 crisis have yet to receive their
justice. Our policy must be to seek justice for our citizens
who have been victims of terrorism, hold the terrorists such as
Iran accountable, and appropriately compensate the victims.
The administration, this one as have many others before it
with other rogue regimes, believes that a nuclear agreement can
open up avenues for further cooperation.
But we saw this with North Korea and others that this is
never the case. What is the danger in dealing with Iran as if
its nuclear program exists in a vacuum? This is somehow that it
is somehow not related to all of Iran's other illicit and
problematic areas.
In the administration's continued negotiations with Iran,
we have managed to alienate and even anger some of our
traditional partners and allies in the region and our
credibility just keeps going lower.
At what cost will this nuclear deal impact our foreign
policy and objectives in the Middle East in its totality,
whether an agreement is reached or not?
And what would be the benefit of alienating all of these
countries like Saudi Arabia, like the UAE and even Israel, who
has a very real and existential concern over Iran's nuclear
program, in favor of an Iranian nuclear agreement that many
believe will not go far enough?
What would be the benefit of alienating all of our allies?
Thank you, Doc.
Mr. Takeyh. Thanks. I will begin this. I think there has
always been something unusual and peculiar about an arms
control approach because it essentially assumes that you can
segregate your arms control technical disputes with all the
other range of disputes.
So in order to have an arms control approach you have to
continuously use the phrase yes, but. Yes, the Supreme Leader
is an anti-Semite who denies the Holocaust but nevertheless he
can be a suitable custodian of sensitive nuclear technology.
Yes, Iran is a revisionist state that tends to disrespect
international norms but it can nevertheless be a suitable
adherent to various protocols in terms of--in terms of
proliferation.
So you have to continuously use the phrase yes, but it
doesn't matter, and thus has always been very unusual around
arms control pressure. The joint plan of action that you
mentioned has one particularly problematic provision to it,
namely, that it suggests the final agreement that is negotiated
will have a sunset clause.
It will have an expiration date. Ali Khamenei recently
mentioned that he wants to build up to 190,000 centrifuges
after an expiration of the sunset clause, which Iranians wanted
to be 5 to 7 years. He can build 190,000 centrifuges with
impunity.
He can build a heavy water reactor with impunity. He can
build 1.5 million centrifuges with impunity and he can upgrade
those to a level of high advancement and high velocity
centrifuges.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Mr. Takeyh. In essence, Iran can become a nuclear weapon
state with alacrity.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Yes, but--thank you very much. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Royce. We go now to Mr. Gerry Connolly of
Virginia.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
having this hearing. Thank you to our witnesses.
Picking up on your last statement there, Dr. Takeyh, would
it be better if the United States simply disengaged and
announced we are no longer talking to Iran about its nuclear
development program?
Mr. Takeyh. No, I don't think that is true at all. I think
this process of negotiations has been helpful. I think an
alternative to the deficient arms control agreement----
Mr. Connolly. Could I interrupt you?
Mr. Takeyh [continuing]. Is a better arms control
agreement.
Mr. Connolly. Okay. Of course, and in a perfect world it is
even better. But given the fact that our two nations haven't
really even talked to each other for a long time, you know,
trying to break the ice so that we kind of get a little bit
comfortable with each other's styles and where we are coming
from would kind of make sense in a negotiating posture, would
it not?
Mr. Takeyh. I don't have any objections to the process.
Mr. Connolly. Do you think that the Phase 1 Interim
Agreement suitably meets that need?
Mr. Takeyh. I think the joint plan of action has some
constructive dimensions to it and I think it has some aspects
to it which were unwise, particularly the sunset clause.
Mr. Connolly. Do we have--you know, Ronald Reagan
popularized the Russian phrase ``doveryai no proveryai''--trust
but verify. How would you assess that level of trust between
the two countries and what are the mechanisms we need to have--
to be able to have sufficient trust to go forward?
Mr. Takeyh. Well, I would suggest in terms of arms control
we should negotiate an agreement whose restrictions are
permanent and not subject to an expiration clause and that way
the program can remain limited and therefore subject to
intrusive verification that can monitor compliance.
Upon expiration of the sunset clause, Iran will have an
industrial-sized nuclear program and persistent diversion of
nuclear resources from an industrial-sized nuclear program are
difficult to defect irrespective of inspection modality.
Mr. Connolly. Do you see any kind of cleavage between the
Rouhani government and the Supreme Leader on the subject and
how might that affect, you know, the negotiations for a
permanent agreement?
Mr. Takeyh. I have only access to the public commentary,
public speeches and what they say to their audiences and in
that particular sense, Congressman, I don't know if there are
too many cleavages between the Supreme Leader and this
President on the nuclear issue.
Their style of representation is different but on the
nuclear issue I have not detected the cleavages that are
suggested.
Mr. Connolly. Is there reason to believe that there is an
awareness in Tehran in governing circles that this really is a
pretty important issue existentially for Iran, that whatever
your desire for the symbolism and the prestige and all that,
this is potentially a direct threat to Iran and its future and
the stakes are so high that you actually have to get serious. I
mean, you are going to have to weigh just how important nuclear
development is to you--that is to say the development of
fissile material for a bomb versus your very future. How would
you assess that awareness in Tehran? Because I think that is
also key to the posture in a negotiating settlement and how we
respond to perceived sincerity or lack thereof.
Mr. Takeyh. I think during his tenure as Supreme Leader,
which began in 1989 which makes Ali Khamenei one of the longest
serving leaders in the Middle East, the tragedy of Ali
Khamenei, which has become Iran's tragedy, is that he has
persistently subordinated national interest to ideological
compulsions and at this particular point I think there are some
in the system that recognize the necessity of having a nuclear
program but also the importance of reviving the economy.
That particular balance doesn't seem entirely obvious in
the way he talks about the nuclear issue. What he says in his
private councils I have no access to. I only know what he says
to his audiences.
Mr. Connolly. Yes. And do you think--some people see
Rouhani genuinely having evolved and creating some political
space, frankly, between the government and the Supreme Leader
on this and some other issues. I would say it is just illusory.
Rouhani comes right out of the leadership circles.
Mr. Takeyh. Well, he has certainly been part of the
leadership for a long time and he has been part of the nuclear
program for a long time. As early as the 1980s he was one of
the officials responsible for procuring nuclear material.
So he has been involved in it for a long time and he has
committed himself to nuclear advancement for a long time. I
think the way he looks at the nuclear program is trying to
situate it in the larger context of Iranian needs. However,
that doesn't seem to be the case with those who he has to
interlocutor with.
Mr. Connolly. Dr. Sachs, in the brief time I have left did
you want to comment? And then I am done.
Mr. Sachs. Thank you, sir. Yes, I just--I think we should
point out that the very real dangers of the Iranian nuclear
program, ones that Israelis and others are extremely concerned
about, are true with a deal to a certain degree. They are
certainly true without a deal.
And so the questions of a deal are very important on
exactly how they are phrased, what kind of modalities there are
for inspections and others. But the lack of a deal, I would
just caution, does not solve our problem by any means.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you very much, and Mr. Modell, I didn't
mean to discriminate against you. I have just run out of time.
Mr. Modell. Okay.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Royce. We go to--certainly. Mr. Chris Smith of New
Jersey.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for calling
this very important hearing. Dr. Takeyh, let me ask you, on
page 2 of your testimony you mentioned--and this is your quote:
``In Khamenei's depiction, America is a crestfallen
imperial state hastily retreating from the region.
Whatever compunctions Tehran may have had about
American power greatly diminished with the spectacle
over Syria where Washington's redlines were erased with
the same carelessness that they were initially drawn.''
Could you elaborate on it? I think that is a very strong
statement and how much of that do you think might be true? But
impression or perception sometimes is as important,
particularly in the eyes of a mischievous actor like Iran.
Secondly, I would like to ask you, you did point out on
page 6 that human rights would have to assume a high place in
our negotiations. Iran must be pressed to honor international
norms on treatment of its citizens.
I have raised with Secretary Kerry on several occasions and
other representatives from the administration my disappointment
that human rights were not at least in part integrated in the
negotiations on the nuclear issue and in mid-June, just June
18th, I had a hearing on human rights in North Korea and former
Special Envoy to Sudan Andrew Natsios who is also the co-
chairman of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea
pointed out that in the Six-Party Talks we left it out there
and when they collapsed in totality we had nothing when it came
to human rights.
And, you know, we have raised Saeed Abedini, Amir Hekmati
and Robert Levinson time and time again and said make that a
part. Your thoughts on that and any other who would like to
speak today.
Mr. Takeyh. On the first point, I think the Supreme Leader
has given two speeches, most recently July 7th that the
chairman mentioned where he called for 190,000 centrifuges,
potentially, where he has discounted the possibility of an
American military strike explicitly and directly.
So he no longer fears the notion that the United States has
all its options on the table. At least that is what he tells
his audiences and he seems very comfortable with the notion
that his state is no longer going to be subject to American
nuclear military retribution.
Israelis I can't speak to because he hasn't spoken to it.
As far as human rights, as you recall, Congressman, my
colleague, Mark Lagon, and I have come and seen you and seen
Congressman Deutch about establishing a human rights commission
to essentially bring greater legislative focus on this issue.
In previous arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union
the issue of human rights was brought up. That doesn't
necessarily mean that agreement was contingent or linked to
that but nevertheless it was brought up by George Shultz and
others in negotiating with the Soviet Union.
Similarly, I think, could be happening. Human rights
concerns tend to come from the legislative branch. The
executive branch tends to be very hesitant about incorporating
human rights in its diplomacy.
The Human Rights Bureau in the State Department was
essentially conceived during Henry Kissinger's time and there
is nobody less concerned about human rights than Henry
Kissinger, and it was essentially because of legislative
pressure.
So if there is going to be human rights discussions in
nuclear diplomacy and international diplomacy that initiative
has to come from the Hill.
Mr. Modell. Congressman, if I could just say a word on
that. When Rouhani was elected, one of the things that he
said--and this was, of course, in collaboration with the
Supreme Leader--was he had sort of a three-phased approach. One
was the immediate urgency--contending with the immediate
urgency of repairing the economy.
I mean, that first and foremost was on the top of agenda of
everybody. Once he did that it was about shoring up all the
support, shoring up the power of the regime itself, and then if
they got around to it, it was about going and starting to
answer some of the questions about human rights.
Now, of course, we have seen a three- or four-fold increase
in human rights related abuses since Rouhani has taken office.
The other point I would make too, you know, when you look
at the type of international inspection and verification and
monitoring regime that you are going to have to create in the
aftermath of an agreement, I think people need to keep in mind
something that it has taken the Iranians maybe 10 or 15 years--
particularly, the last 10 or 15 years--to build up an extremely
intricate global apparatus for evading sanctions and, you know,
the idea that we can sign an agreement, think that we are going
to be able to figure out all the military dimensions, all--
figure out every way in which they are proliferating, I think
is naive and we better start thinking very soon about how we
are going to--how we are going to actually come up with a new
containment strategy for doing things like that.
And when we talk about the GCC partners and our allies, you
know, I think those are enduring bilateral security
partnerships. I don't think that there is any jointness to be--
you know, to be really taken seriously on the part of the GCC
countries.
But they are shaken by the fact that they are going to be
facing a nuclear Iran. The global multilateral containment
strategy that we need to come up with is critical at this point
in time.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. I see I am out of time.
Chairman Royce. Without objection. We will go to Mr. David
Cicilline.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
the witnesses for your very important testimony. I want to just
begin, Dr. Takeyh, with the statement that you made about, you
know, a better arms control agreement is preferred over a
deficient one, which I think everyone agrees with.
But to focus for a moment on this sunset clause, is it your
assessment that the Iranians think at the conclusion of that
sunset clause that they are likely to be--or before the
conclusion of the sunset clause there is likely to be an
engagement with the United States and the other partners about
an extension to that agreement or is it your assessment they
think once it is over all bets are off and they can robustly
proceed with their nuclear weapons program?
Mr. Takeyh. The notion that once the sunset clause has
expired and Iran is treated as any other member of the NPT and
therefore can expand its nuclear resources and installations
according to its own determination is something that the
Supreme Leader has said. It is something that Iran's chief
negotiator Abbas Araghchi has said as well.
Mr. Cicilline. Does anyone have a different view of that?
Okay. I would like to next turn to the destabilizing impact of
Iran in Iraq and I apologize if you spoke to this a little bit
earlier.
But I would like any of the witnesses' comment what you
think Iran's goals are in Iraq today and whether or not the
Iranian interests are aligned tightly with the Maliki
government and what is the likely impact of Iran's ongoing
engagement in Iraq over the long term.
Mr. Modell. Congressman, to answer the question, everything
that I have seen is that Iran is desperately trying to keep
Maliki in place. They have benefited tremendously by having him
in place over the last decade. They don't want him to go away
and if they do--because if he does go away what comes next.
They are not really sure.
I think that there are certain Iranians--pragmatic-minded
Iranians who look at the way Maliki has failed, you know,
miserably in leading Iraq over the last 10 years and asking
themselves why Maliki didn't do a better job of, you know,
governing over Sunnis and Kurds.
But they are desperately trying to keep him there. They are
desperately trying to keep the Kurds from breaking away but I
think their long-term interest is stability and its continuing
to build the base of support that they have.
But the problem with the base of support that they are
building is that it is mainly comprised of Shi'a militia forces
and those Shi'a militia forces, as we know, are not loyal to
the government in any way whatsoever.
So if you are ever going to hope for some long-term healing
of the sectarian divide in that country in the brutal fighting
that is going on, that is not the way to do it. So they are not
really part of the long-term solution, to be honest.
Mr. Cicilline. Dr. Sachs.
Mr. Sachs. I think this touches on a very severe problem
that Iran has that Ray raised earlier. Iran as the major Shi'a
power would very much like to present itself not as a Shi'a
power simply because the vast majority of Muslims around the
world are Sunni.
And so it would much prefer to present itself as a leading
power in this part of the world rather than a Shi'a one. The
animosity toward Israel is part of that. The best way to curry
favor with people who disagree with you on the Shi'a-Sunni
divide is to adopt the same enemy that many Muslims
unfortunately perceive in Israel.
In Iraq and Syria and Lebanon and elsewhere, Iran is
finding itself, however, on the side of what is becoming more
and more a sectarian divide, something which the adversaries of
Iran--not Israel but Saudi Arabia and others--are seeing very
much as a sectarian divide.
I think this is the common theme now of the Middle East and
really overshadows most of what we are seeing across the
region. It is not necessarily in Iran's interest but it is very
worrisome. I agree with Scott very much, it is very worrisome.
It is becoming more and more, partly through Iran's actions, a
sectarian divide.
Mr. Cicilline. And Dr. Sachs, you mentioned in your
testimony that if Iran develops a nuclear weapon that you
believe that the transfer outside of the state or outside of
Iran is a long shot.
Would you explain kind of what you think argues--from
Iran's perspective why they are likely to do that or not do
that because obviously they are developing a nuclear weapon and
then the transfer to an actor outside of Iran is a further
complication.
Mr. Sachs. I was quoting the views--the common views in
Israel, not necessarily my own. But I do think that by and
large it is a long shot. Of course, it is a long shot with huge
ramifications.
So even if the risk of its happening is low, the damage of
it happening would be enormous. The main concern with Iran is
whether it itself would use nuclear weapons and on that many
Israelis and others believe that since it believes Israel has
second strike capabilities, and although its goals seem
unreasonable, its manner of pursuing them has been rational,
and as a rational actor, therefore, you would expect it not to
use these nuclear weapons in mutually assured destruction.
It is a very grim reality, one which I very much hope we do
not get to, but it may be stable. The transfer to other parties
is tied to this as well.
The question is whether they could believe that they could
do this without detection, whether they would believe that
Israel would not think that it is them, whether this kind of
transfer would get them out of the grim mutually assured
destruction logic.
It is certainly possible that they would try to do it. I
think it is unlikely because the chances of avoiding this kind
of mutually assured destruction logic from the Israeli side is
low.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield
back.
Chairman Royce. Thank you. We go now to Mr. Dana
Rohrabacher of California.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. This is
to the panel--how popular are the mullahs in their own country?
Are we talking about 10 percent of the people support them?
Twenty percent? Fifty percent?
What is the real level of support that mullahs have in
their own country?
Mr. Takeyh. I think that is very difficult to estimate.
However, I would suggest in the aftermath of the 2009
election--the fraudulent election of 2009--that was really a
watershed moment when the regime essentially forfeited a
considerable amount of its popular legitimacy.
The Islamic Republic became more Islamic and less republic.
So whatever the popularity it had which, as you mentioned, was
always very marginal, has, in my opinion, diminished
considerably after that particular election.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Could I prod you a little bit more? How
about giving me just a guesstimate?
Mr. Takeyh. Possibly 10 percent of the population. But it
is the 10 percent of the population that it can mobilize and
bring to the street and essentially dominate.
Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. And tacit support another 10
percent or 20 percent?
Mr. Takeyh. It is very difficult to judge that. I think at
this particular point the regime is quite unpopular because of
its performance, because of its ideology and because of the
infamy that has come because of misconduct.
I certainly don't think it can survive a plebiscite or a
fair election.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. What about our next----
Mr. Modell. Congressman, I think that you ask one of the
most difficult questions. We have spent years in the government
trying to figure out exactly the answer to that question and
part of the problem with polling in that country is people are
afraid to speak their minds, particularly when it is not very
delicately done.
So to be honest with you, I don't--I don't know but I can
tell you, though, a reflection of the fact that you don't--I
mean, you may have a significant amount of people there who are
unhappy and don't support the mullahs and the regime but that
hasn't translated into a military movement inside that is
willing to do what the Green Movement did in 2009.
Mr. Sachs. I am no expert on Iranian internal affairs but I
would at least point out that Iran has a very smart way of
going about ruling a country not through democracy, which is to
have something that looks sometimes like democracy.
These hybrid regimes where there are meaningful elections
that have some kind of meaning but are not truly free--the
candidates, of course, are vetted ahead of time--this actually
allows for a lot of steam, a lot of vent to go out. It allows
people to change some of the policies without undermining the
fundamental regime.
So even if the hard core support is very low, we could
still find a system that is stable both because of some fear
and oppression but also because there is a smart design to it,
much smarter than extreme totalitarian dictatorship.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So let me note for the record, Mr.
Chairman, that none of our witnesses were willing to actually
put a number down in terms of what they think the level of
support for the mullahs.
Now, we depend on you guys. You know, this is--you are
supposed to be telling us these things. I would suggest that
the mullahs are very unpopular with about 90 percent of the
people but I don't know that--I was hoping you were going to
give me some guidance on that.
But we do know that among the people of Iran there are not
just Persians. What percentage of the population is Persian?
Mr. Modell. I think it is--the last time I looked I think
it was 68--67 to 68 percent.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So you have about 40 percent or so--30 to
40 percent----
Mr. Modell. Thirty to forty percent that are Azeris and I
know there is Kurds and others.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Kurds, Baloch--people such as that. Is
there--and the popularity among the mullahs among the
minorities I imagine would be even less than among the young
Persians. Is there any reason why--I mean, frankly, when we
talk about Iran I hear all kinds of analysis of the power flow
and the dynamics of the Iranian regime itself.
I rarely hear any specific suggestions of how we get rid of
it and I would suggest, as I have in the past, that we need to
be looking at the opposition. If it is only at 10 percent,
which we don't know--we are not even willing to speculate that
support level--there should be lots of people there including
those people who are non-Persian who we might be able to
mobilize against the regime. But I don't think we have been
doing that, have we?
Mr. Modell. No, we have not. Not at all, to be honest with
you. I would like to make one comment on 2009. So when 2009
came and the aftermath of the Presidential elections, as you
recall, and the Green Movement started and as it grew the
Supreme Leader and the regime completely underestimated it. And
once they did realize the dimension of the problem, the Supreme
Leader said okay, now we have to come together.
And when we are talking about a whole of government
solution, something that is exactly what they did and it
cleared out Evin Prison and they got everybody together and
there is all sort of interagency differences over there
disappeared as they very effectively dismantled that movement.
But the key thing is this: It was in 2009 as it started to
gain momentum that some of the leaders of that movement, and
this is publicly known, were reaching out to the United States
and saying what do we do--where do we go--can you give us any
guidance? And they weren't necessarily looking to overthrow the
regime.
That was never their stated goal. But it was a crack in
the--it was a potential real crack in the foundation that we
could have assisted and we did not do that.
Mr. Rohrabacher. We have been waiting for other people to
make those cracks. We should start helping making them
ourselves. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. We go now to
Brad Schneider of Illinois.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
the panel for sharing your insights and thoughts. Dr. Takeyh,
let me start with you and I think it was you who said, you
know, one of the real concerns about any type of negotiation to
an agreement with Iran is trying to achieve a durable agreement
with an unreliable partner and like you I share the concern of
discussion of a determined--in particular, the idea of a
discussion of a determined number of years. I think it should
be at the very least generations if we can't get the permanent
agreement.
But more broadly, do you think it is possible for a deal
with Iran no matter how well structured it is on the document
to be effectively enforced?
Mr. Takeyh. I think you have to kind of think about the
importance of nuclear capability within Iran's larger regional
policy. At a time when it has an aggressive regional policy it
makes sense to have nuclear capability.
In the Gulf today, there is an imbalance of conventional
power. The Saudis and others have greater conventional strength
simply because they have access to the American military
supplies and Iran does not have an access to international
military supplies and doesn't have an indigenous arms industry.
So the way Iranians have tried to affect that imbalance of
power is by developing unconventional capabilities--missiles
and unconventional weapons, chemical weapons. And so nuclear
weapons fit into that particular equation and so long as Iran
has hegemonic aspiration it will make sense for it to have
nuclear capability.
As Hassan Rouhani said in his memoirs--he has published
four--he is very self-reflective--the last one he said look,
there is a--he always talks about it as a peaceful nuclear
weapon but he said the problem with our peaceful nuclear weapon
is it got caught before it reached its objectives.
So since then, they have to balance nuclear sophistication
and enlargement with economic contraction and that has been the
struggle. During the Ahmadinejad era, of course, they put
privilege on nuclear enlargement.
Iran, as a matter of revolutionary ideology--the Islamic
Republic as a matter of revolutionary ideology tends to suspect
international norms as unfair and international organizations
as conspiring against it.
That includes the IAEA and the U.N. Security Council, whose
resolutions it has rejected as politically contrived. So it
makes it less reliable of an arms control partner than the
example that is often cited, mainly the Soviet Union.
Mr. Schneider. Let me turn to Dr. Sachs, because in the
context of Iran looking to bolster its capacity--hegemonic
capacity with unconventional you talked about the full spectrum
of Iranian activity. Does the support of Hezbollah--Palestinian
Islamic jihad fit within the context of that trying to extend
their reach?
Mr. Sachs. Well, the problem, of course, with negotiations
around that is what can you do within the context of
negotiations. So the problem, I think, for many Israelis is,
indeed, as we have mentioned before--that these negotiations
don't include all these different aspects--the full spectrum,
as you say.
The problem is, of course, whether or not you can get a
deal in all of that. The question is the capability, even
through sanctions, which were very stringent, can those
sanctions bring about Iranian capitulation on everything or is
there a chance of bringing it about the nuclear issue.
I don't know that we can on the nuclear issue and it
certainly looks like we are not going to have it by July 20th,
although never say never. But the chances of having it on the
full spectrum are even lower.
And so the very difficult dilemma, I think, from a policy
perspective is does one opt for trying to go for something
which one cannot achieve or does one focus very concretely on
the specific issues that maybe one can. The spectrum remains,
though, and this is, I think, a very important point.
Even if there is a deal on the nuclear issue not only will
the nuclear issue still be relevant and important the day
after--in fact, it will be more important to keep a watchful
eye--the other issues that we have been raising here today will
be perhaps even more important with Iran freed from sanctions,
or most of the sanctions at least, and free to do many other
things that it can't do at the moment.
Mr. Schneider. I agree with you and I know last month this
committee passed unanimously the Hezbollah sanctions bill that
would limit or prohibit their access to international banking
and thwart some of that relationship. I am hopeful that that
full House and then the Senate will pass that this month.
Dr. Modell, as you look at what is happening in the region
and the threat of holding Iran to account on the full spectrum
on their nuclear program, and you talked about the inherent
need that we have to understand their potential military
dimension--their weaponization, their delivery systems--an
agreement that just focusses on enrichment how do you see
that--what risks do you see that that leaves open, going
forward?
Mr. Modell. Well, I think the difference--for me, I see
risks no matter what kind of a deal we strike, to be honest
with you, because I think that the time--I think somebody has
mentioned it here--one of the panel has mentioned it here that
time is key.
Three, five, seven years--it doesn't matter because when
that time expires the revolutionary--you know, the conventional
agenda is not going to stop and if you truly believe that they
are after nuclear weapons why can't they suspend that?
They have a long-term vision here--why can't they suspend
that for 3 to 5 years and pick up where they left off? Another
thing I would mention too in the context of these negotiations
it shouldn't be surprising that they are putting limitations--
the Iranians, that is--on the breadth of these negotiations.
They have got their--they very clearly spelled out their
own red lines. They won't even talk about ballistic missiles,
you know, in these--in the context of these negotiations.
Neither will they talk about rapprochement with the West or
even human rights. So I think regardless of the--I mean, I am
hoping for a good--the best deal possible but I think you need
at least 10 to 15 years to build up the trust that is going to
be required and the ability. And it is not just the trust.
It is not just, you know, good behavior over time. It is
for us to build up the mechanisms we need globally to figure
out if they are cheating and we can't rely solely on the IAEA
to do that.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you. I am out of time. I will just say
that against a regime that thinks in millennium and carries
forward a long-term vision, talking about years or decades just
doesn't seem sufficient. And with that, I will yield back.
Chairman Royce. We go to Mr. Steve Chabot of Ohio.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for
holding this important hearing this morning. As the recent
crisis in Iraq began to unfold, the administration initially
welcomed Iranian engagement in an effort to quickly resolve the
issue, although many experts cautioned against such policies
and I would put myself in that latter category.
I think it is--we have to be very wary of any involvement
with Iran. But I would be interested to hear the panel's take
on what is--what is Iran's strategy with respect to Iraq?
What are they trying to accomplish? What should we be
particularly wary of? What dangers are they--either the short
or long term in rubbing elbows with Iran here? Maybe thinking
we are getting something now that we want but long term we have
made a deal with the devil here. Mr. Takeyh.
Mr. Takeyh. I think the objectives of the Iranian
Government at this point and have been since 2003 to
consolidate the power of the Shi'i majority.
They are essentially aware that some degree of Sunni
participation could help and the civil war is not necessarily
in their interest because it will have spillover effects.
In terms of the Maliki government, they probably have their
dissatisfactions with the way Prime Minister Maliki has ruled
but overall their approach is in the middle of a crisis you
don't change horses.
That was the case in Assad as well in the sense that they
didn't want Assad to be dislodged and replaced with another
member of the Alawite family. So you go war with the army you
have, in essence. And long term essentially to remove Iraq from
the Councils of Sunni Arab States, have a weakened Iraq--Shi'i
dominated Iraq--that to some extent relies on Iran for its
objectives and commerce.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. Would any of the other members like
to touch--Mr. Modell.
Mr. Modell. The only thing I would--the only thing I would
add to that is I think there--we shouldn't underestimate how
many Iraqis are against the idea of Iran's influence in that
country growing.
So when we are reading reports here that may sound like we
are sort of dovetailing, you know, in terms of dealing with
ISIS, Iranians are working against that cause. We want to work
against that cause.
But a lot of Iraqis are very wary about the growth of
Iran's role in that country. So I would be cautious about
saying that it is--it certainly is--I think it is more divisive
over time than anything else.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. Dr. Sachs, anything you would like
to add? Okay. Thank you.
At the recent talks over Iran's nuclear program in Vienna,
Secretary Kerry mentioned that the international community
needs tangible reassurance that Iran will not move to quickly
develop nuclear weapons.
How can the administration develop an agreement to
realistically prevent the Iranians from pursuing the weapons
program, which I think, quite frankly, whatever we do they are
bound and determined to accomplish this. But I know the
administration continues to believe that there is some hope
there.
How do you think a long-term nuclear agreement would affect
Iran's interactions with terrorist groups in the region, for
example, and what impact would a long-term nuclear agreement
have on Iran's ability to influence its neighbors in the
region? And whoever would like to take it is welcome to.
Mr. Modell. I would say that they are--I tend to agree with
you. I think regardless of the type of agreement we see, they
have got an agenda to cross that threshold and weaponize and I
think that we are going to, you know, in terms of figuring out
what is it we need to do to figure out how to build a global
apparatus to give ourselves the best chance of determining if
they are cheating or not or if they are going to break out.
Quite frankly, I think we have had the last decade of
realizing--enough time to realize that it is really hard to do
these things.
There is enough evidence--the U.S. Government has collected
enough evidence--and its allies--over the years of
proliferation networks but they haven't been criminalized--
adequately criminalized.
I think that there is a law enforcement aspect to this and
it is not only U.S. but I think there is a global law
enforcement aspect to this that needs to be improved because if
you can--if we enable ourselves to better pursue law
enforcement investigations that are related to nuclear
proliferation it goes hand in hand with figuring out if they
are cheating or not. I think that has been a real deficiency.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. Let me--go ahead, Dr. Sachs.
Mr. Sachs. Well, I think on the central issues that might
allow for a reasonable deal, I don't think a good deal is
possible and I agree that there is little chance that it would
guarantee no development of nuclear weapons.
But certainly the plutonium track, the weaponization
aspects of it and, of course, enrichment, both in terms of
stocks of uranium--the stocks that are already there, but also
technology and technology that might advance.
All these issues are crucial and, of course, are being
raised. Another issue that was raised here today and is more
problematic is the issue of delivery systems of ballistic
missiles accurate enough and capable of doing this, and that is
really important and perhaps one that might be deficient.
And, of course, verification is the main issue--the degree
to how stringent the verification will be of compliance to this
agreement will be crucial. None of this guarantees at all that
Iran won't pursue it anyway. I would just caution, again, that
the lack of a deal certainly does not guarantee that either.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. My time has expired, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Royce. Thank you. We go to Dr. Ami Bera from
California.
Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think, Dr. Takeyh, you
touched on that, at present, Iran doesn't have the military
capabilities with conventional arsenals compared to Saudi
Arabia and others in the region.
So, you know, from my perspective I think how they have
tried to level the playing field and that balance of power is
through this--you know, through the terror networks and so
forth.
And in essence, you can almost draw a line from Iran to
Maliki now to Assad to Hezbollah to Hamas as kind of that
destabilizing force and, you know, if you think about some of
the proxies.
I also--you know, I would be curious on your thought there.
Mr. Takeyh. I think that is right. In 2006 and 2007, the
current head of the Revolutionary Guards, General Jafari,
before that he was kind of a strategic planner and he came up
with something called mosaic defense, namely, that increasingly
the United States will not invade another Middle Eastern
country so the question is how do you adjust your defense
posture in order to advance your objectives given that?
And essentially he came out with the ideals of asymmetrical
defense, reliance on missile technology, proxy forces, and it
was at that time that the role of Hezbollah in particular
changed in Iranian calculations.
Hezbollah was no longer a political party with a military
apparatus that Iranians try to have a greater say in the
Lebanese society, but they essentially became an auxiliary of
the Iranian force and you see that manifestation particularly
in Syria.
So that is essentially the way they think about their
defense and unconventional weapons are essentially part of
that.
Mr. Bera. In your words, Khamenei puts the ideologic
interest ahead of the national interest and I think in your
testimony is it accurate to say he sees the United States as a
country in retreat from the region?
Mr. Takeyh. That is right. That is what he says.
Mr. Bera. So if he is looking at things in that way and if
we look at what has got us to this point, you know, clearly,
the sanctions have been effective in bringing them to the
table.
Clearly, the sanctions have been effective in creating some
unrest and, you know, creating some real issues within the
Iranian economy. Would now--doesn't appear to me now is the
time for us to step back a little bit. Now is the time for us
to actually continue to exert influence.
Mr. Takeyh. I am not disagreeing with that. I think that is
right. I would say that whatever leverage we have mobilized
with sanctions and other measures have obviously been
insufficient to discipline Iran into an agreement should there
be an extension past July 20th.
As I was trying to suggest to Congressman Connolly, I don't
oppose extension of the talks for another 6 months but I do
think the administration has to respond to the question of what
do you think is going to happen in the next 6 months that
didn't happen in the previous ones. I think they should answer
that question.
Mr. Bera. Because if we are negotiating with a regime that
sees us in retreat, from my perspective I don't think that is
the best position to negotiate from, I think.
Mr. Takeyh. I would say at this point our coercive leverage
has not been sufficient to compel an agreement.
Mr. Bera. Okay. So if--yes, I guess a lot of the others, if
you would want to expand on that.
Mr. Modell. I think I would tend to agree with you on this.
The time for retreating on sanctions is wrong. I think that I
have seen a number of Iranian leaders talking about it as a
strategic opening and if after the biggest and the most
effective sanctions regime we have ever put together isn't
compelling them now after 6 months of negotiations with an
economic knife at their throats to actually, you know, really
be forthcoming about the most--the single most complex
problem--in other words, the possible military dimensions of
the program, then the answer is why are we letting up on
sanctions now?
Mr. Bera. I would agree and that is not to be construed
that we don't continue talking. But let us talk and negotiate
from a place of strength.
Iran also has, you know, its own issues. You know,
obviously the challenges that it is facing with the struggling
al-Maliki government with the ISIL in Iraq and the Sunni
uprising with Assad facing his own challenges.
So, you know, they certainly have to--in this negotiation
they certainly have to fight a battle on multiple fronts as
well and, you know, again, from a negotiating perspective I
think my message to the administration and to--I do think we
need to negotiate from a place of strength and that doesn't
mean we don't--we stop talking.
It does mean we negotiate from strength. So thank you. I
will yield back.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Kinzinger, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Kinzinger. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
all for being here today and spending time with us. I just want
to say off the bat the idea of--and I have heard administration
officials talk, Secretary Kerry, and talking about what a
potential final deal with Iran would look like, and in no way
have they ruled out some level of enrichment.
You know, they will argue that well, we will keep it at a
very low level of enrichment so breakout capability takes a
long time and, you know, fine argument to make except the
neighbors don't see it that way.
And what I think is also interesting is as we negotiate in
one-two-three agreements around the world, there is a lot of
areas we have denied our best allies the right to enrich. I
think of South Korea, I think of the United Arab Emirates--
these people that we say we are committed to a nuclear-free
Korean Peninsula or Arab Peninsula and we don't give them that
right.
And so to give the biggest enemy of the United States, I
would argue, the right to do something that we deny to our best
and closest allies will send a tragic message that America
can't be trusted by its allies and it is not to be feared by
its enemies and that is something that I fear.
I also am a veteran of Iraq and as a pilot there and I have
noticed that it seems like every engagement, whether it is a
war, whether it is some low-level engagement in the Middle
East, that we have been involved in has somehow had the
fingerprints of Iran all over it and I think of in Iraq it is
estimated now that about half of the men and women that we lost
in Iraq were a direct or indirect result of Iran itself.
Whether it was their EFPs, the technology that they exported to
the terrorists in Iraq, or whether it was even in some cases
direct intervention. And we have seen that Iran continues to
destabilize everywhere.
The other question I have, and I will ask you all to
briefly answer this because I have some other questions, when
we withdrew from Iraq--in 2003 we went in, we invaded, Iran
seemed very eager to work with the United States at that point.
When we withdrew after 2011, what message did that send--
pulled all the troops out of Iraq--what message did that send
to Iran? If you could just very briefly answer.
Mr. Takeyh. I think 2003 did come from, you know, an
existential threat. We know that now and particularly with
Rouhani's memoirs. Obviously, the general departure of the
United States from the region and general hesitancy has
emboldened Iran and I would actually go back to Syria before
that and then Iraq became successor and affirmative to Syria.
Mr. Kinzinger. Okay.
Mr. Modell. You know, Congressman, I just second that. I
don't have anything to add other than in 2011 I think they
viewed it as a strategic victory, to be honest with you, and
they view U.S. withdrawal out of Afghanistan the same way.
Mr. Sachs. I think in general there is--the U.S. certainly
has a problem in the Middle East of a perception of its
weakness. It rightly or wrongly is perceived that way. Of
course, the question is what kind of investment is the U.S.
willing to do to avoid that, and it is a real one.
Mr. Kinzinger. I think--it is interesting to me. I have
been studying a little bit recently a lot about the period
between World War I and World War II where the world was war
weary and they saw this rising threat in Europe and they did
not confront it because of purveying war weariness.
Now, after World War I, I think the world had a right to be
war weary. It lost millions of people, economies of scale
destroyed. Today, I hear a lot of, frankly, my colleagues and
talking heads talk about a war weariness in the United States
of America.
And while I understand that some people certainly do
experience war weariness, you know, there was no tax increase
to fight the wars. Our economy was not changed based on the war
in the Middle East, and while we lost too many people it really
pales in comparison to what was lost at the end of World War II
or in World War I and World War II.
At the end of World War II, Harry Truman came in and said--
he didn't look at the American and say you are world weary--we
have to leave Europe.
He looked at the American people and said, I know you are
tired but the Soviet Union is going to be twice the size as it
is today if we leave Europe and really motivated the American
people.
My fear today is that we find ourselves in a situation
where we are so eager to leave a period of conflict and warfare
that we will do anything to get out and we hasten the day when
a bigger war is going to happen, whether it is my generation or
whether it is generations following me.
Lastly, I want to touch on as the situation in Iraq very
tragically unfolds, I hear some people say that this is fine.
You know, let the caliphate figure out that governing is not
easy. They don't see governing like we do.
But they say that is great--let Iran get pulled into a
quagmire in Iraq like we did, and I would argue that Iran
defines quagmire quite differently than us.
We see losing 100 soldiers a month, as tragic as it is, as
a quagmire and Iran does not. What are your all's thoughts on
the idea of letting Iran get drug into a quagmire and how that
would be?
Mr. Takeyh. The same argument was made about Syria.
Somehow, Iranians can manage in these convoluted situations
with less cost and less casualties than we do simply because of
their high reliance on proxies.
Mr. Modell. I would just reiterate what I said before. I
think that the longer time goes on with Iran being involved in
Iraq, particularly militarily, the worse things get because
they are going to rely on building up proxy forces there that
are not necessarily loved by significant amounts of the
population. So I think it is a negative force over time.
Mr. Sachs. Just briefly, I think we should also be very
worried about what happens to these regions whether or not Iran
gets caught in a quagmire. The ramifications for these
countries--Syria, Iraq or others--is huge as well.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, and I yield back.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired. The gentleman
from California, Mr. Sherman, who is the ranking member of the
Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do want to just
mention something for the record. I think it is absurd to think
that the American people would be all gung ho for another war
in the Middle East if only we had a President with a different
personality.
No one thought that President Bush was a retiring violet
but in the last year of his presidency I noticed no popular
groundswell for an American invasion of Iran. I don't sense
that today. I don't think it relates to whether--you know, what
the personality of the President is.
I will say that under this administration we have paid a
significant economic and diplomatic price for strengthening our
sanctions on Iran, whereas in the Bush administration we didn't
pass a single law of significance because the President
prevented it and we didn't enforce any of the laws we had then.
So at least this President is willing to cause us to pay a
diplomatic and economic price to control Iran, if not a price
in the loss of American troops on the ground.
Dr. Sachs, you have got, obviously, the Shi'ite-Sunni
split. Can Iran, al-Qaeda, and this new Islamic state aspire to
be the leaders of extremist Islam? Can Iran aspire to that role
or are they limited to the role of a protector of Shi'ites
worldwide?
Mr. Sachs. They understand that they are very limited and
they are especially limited in the context of this
configuration, so if you look in previous years at the Shi'a-
Sunni divide, it was not necessarily that salient.
The differences in identity were not necessarily expressed.
Other issues, national and other, were much stronger.
But in the context of the Middle East today where the
Sunni-Shi'a divide is so strong, it is hard to see Iran really
taking leadership in the Arab world, and this is something that
is quite different than in the past where they and Hezbollah,
for example, held the mantle of fighting Israel.
Mr. Sherman. I see that Russia seems more positively
disposed to Assad and Tehran. Is this because have a very small
Shi'ite population in their own country and they are near
abroad and so they don't see Iran as an ideological threat but
they do see extremist Sunni groups as an ideological threat?
Mr. Sachs. I don't know, Sir. I doubt it is about a
preference between Shi'a and Sunni. I think it is a very strong
Russian preference for stability at any cost, almost.
And so they would rather not have extremist groups,
certainly, something that they fear in their own periphery and
even in their own federation. But they also have a strong
preference just for stability, and both of these things lead to
support for Assad.
There are other issues as well, but both of these things
lead in the same direction.
Mr. Sherman. Dr. Takeyh, how bad is the economic situation
in Iran now and if you could write one more sanctions law what
would it be, and how dependent is Iran--I will give you a hint
on the second question with my third--on spare parts from
Europe and other American allies? If an elevator breaks down in
a building in Tehran can they fix it without getting a part
flown in from Germany?
Mr. Takeyh. In terms of the economy, according to the IMF
statistics, which they rely on--the Iranian Central Bank so who
knows how reliable they are--IMF suggested Iran's economy is
likely to grow by about 2 percent.
Mr. Sherman. That is better than our growth. And then can
you also talk about the black market value of their currency
because that is something the Iranians can't----
Mr. Takeyh. Right. They had a liquidity crisis but I think
they have managed it. They have taken the hits on that. It is a
country that still relies a great deal on spare parts, as you
suggested, but increasingly they are beginning to have
deficient spare parts from China and other--developing
alternative sources and alternative measures to get their
economy going.
But it is very much still a stagnant economy in the sense
that economic opportunities are having a difficult time keeping
up with demographics.
Mr. Sherman. And if you could write one additional
sanctions law that would cripple or at least hurt the Iranian
economy over the next 5 years what would it be?
Mr. Takeyh. Well, the key would be to essentially limit
their export of oil and that they only have five or six
customers now so that is going to be difficult to do with the
Chinese but perhaps there is more leverage with the North
Koreans and----
Mr. Sherman. Well, the real question here is not whether we
are willing to have tens of thousands of Americans die on the
ground, but whether we are willing to tell the Chinese that
they have to choose between Iran and the United States as a
business partner. The toughest adversary we may have in this is
Wal-Mart.
Mr. Takeyh. Right. I think it will be difficult to get
Iranian exports down but that is where the soft spot is.
Mr. Sherman. Gotcha.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired. The gentleman
from Florida, Mr. DeSantis, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. DeSantis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
gentlemen, for your comments. Dr. Sachs, you had mentioned how
the Israelis view the threat of a nuclear Iran and I think that
you painted a picture that they were a little bit more
accepting than maybe my understanding was going to be.
I mean, historian Bernard Lewis, one of the most
knowledgeable historians of Islamic thinking, said that to
people like Ali Khamenei and Ahmadinejad, the former President,
mutually assured destruction is not a deterrent. It is an
inducement for them because it serves to essentially hasten the
messianic process, the return of the 12th Imam. So what kind of
purchase does that have in Israeli thinking right now as they
look at the threat?
Mr. Sachs. To clarify, I certainly do not mean to suggest
that the Israeli Government views this in the way that I
suggested. The Israeli Government's position is very clear that
only zero enrichment--zero enriched uranium stock--only they
are acceptable.
There are some very senior people from the center of the
Israeli security establishment that view it in a slightly more
nuanced way. They too though, again, don't think very
differently from the Israeli administration. They simply think
that if it was very low enrichment levels, and if the
verification was very stringent, perhaps it would be liveable,
perhaps it would be better than a situation with no agreement
at all.
But, again, the differences are quite small in Israel. The
rifts of opinion is quite small. On the issue of rationality,
there is quite an interesting difference. Some suggest exactly
as you quoted Bernard Lewis saying that the Islamic Republic is
inherently irrational.
The prime minister of Israel has said this as well, and in
that case they cannot be deterred by any of these means. But
there are others, very central, in fact, in the cabinet itself,
who have a slightly different view; who say that even the
Soviet Union had--not messianic in the religious sense but
messianic in the utopian sense--aspirations for the world and
yet they could be deterred.
It is a very grim reality. It is not something we should
hope for. The Cold War was certainly not a picnic but it may be
more stable than the alternative.
Mr. DeSantis. Yes, I would just say Iran's behavior to us
is, clearly, irrational but if you accept some of the premises
that the regime is based on--for example, Rafsanjani was quoted
about a decade ago saying, Look, you know, we could wipe out 5
million Jews with one bomb and yes, we know that they would
respond, and he is just doing this calculation kind of matter
of factly.
And it probably would have killed 15 million Iranians but
you know what? I mean, that is really an acceptable sacrifice.
There are over 1 billion Muslims.
And so I think that some of the calculations that he made
to us would, obviously, be irrational but if you believe in
that apocalyptic view of Shi'ite Islam then it may be something
and that is why I think it is so dangerous to allow Iran to
develop a nuclear weapon. This is not like the Soviet Union,
who was a very hostile regime.
At the end of the day they were atheist. If they got blown
up there was nothing at the light at the end of the tunnel for
them.
Let me ask you or I can--actually, any of the panelists. We
have been talking about on this committee the role of ISIS in
Iraq and what is happening there. I know Iran is involved. Quds
Force is there.
I am trying to get a handle on exactly how involved they
are. Would we see more Iranian involvement if, say, ISIS was
threatening the Shi'ite holy sites?
I know they have talked about they wanted to actually
destroy those. I take it that the Iranian regime would view
that as a vital national interest of their country and that
they may be willing to do even more than they have. What are
the panelists' views on that?
Mr. Modell. I think that they have already--that has
already been in the front of their minds when they are trying
to determine what is their calculus for involvement, figuring
out the extent of their involvement in Iraq.
When they were looking at the--they were looking at the
most important Shi'ite shrines and protecting them, that has
been on their minds for a long time. I also think that you are
going to see--if you start to see the ISIS moving further east
and further south that you are going to continue to see a
buildup of more regular Iranian forces.
Right now, they are relying considerably on proxies and the
integration of those proxies into regular military--Iraqi
military units and----
Mr. DeSantis. You basically have the Shi'ite militia groups
and then you have--there is a Quds Force commander, I think,
and so you have the Quds Force with the kind of Sadrist militia
groups that are the main source of kind of anti-ISIS opposition
at this point?
Mr. Modell. You have several different variations. You
have--you have Shi'a militia groups fighting on their own. You
have Shi'a militia groups that are partially integrated into
Iraqi regular forces.
You have--and what you have, you know, IRGC Quds Forces
officers overseeing those Shi'a militia groups in both roles
and you have Shi'a militia groups integrating into Iraqi
regular military uniforms. You have others where they are
separated out.
You have stuff--you have joint units with the Kurds. I
mean, the Iranians are doing everything they can to build up a
large proxy force but then a lot of--it is a multifaceted
effort.
Mr. DeSantis. Thank you. My time has expired. I would just
say I think that we are running a very, very serious risk of
walking into a bad deal here with the administration and what
they have been doing and, you know, I think Congress really
needs to speak out.
A bad deal will be worse than not having any deal at all,
and I yield back the balance.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired. The gentleman
from Florida, Mr. Deutch, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to the
panelists. I would like to--I would like to take the
conversation a little different direction.
There has been a lot of talk about the nuclear
negotiations, what a deal looks like, how much leverage we have
and what would happen if Iran--if there is no deal or if,
looking ahead if Iran had a nuclear weapon, if they went to
break out at the expiration of term or whatever the deal is, I
would actually like to look at it differently.
What--if you could--if you could talk about what Iran's
goals are with respect to its support for terror, what are its
priorities and with respect to the nuclear deal we spend a lot
of time talking about how dangerous these terrorist groups
supported by Iran would be if Iran had nuclear weapons.
But what could Iran do with the immense amount of resources
that it would possess if it struck a deal and foreign
investment came pouring in, the economy turned around, its
currency rebounded, inflation was--all the other things that
would come from a deal for them, what could they do with that
in their support of terror? Where would they focus and what
would that mean for us?
Mr. Takeyh. Historically, Iran's principal strategic arena
of concern has been the Persian Gulf. So, in essence, you will
see them, I think, with additional resources to be much more
involved in Iraq and the Gulf States at the beginning level,
and then there is that sort of organic attachment to Hezbollah
and to a Palestinian rejectionist group--what there would be,
essentially, in that sense.
The regime with additional resources would also have an
opportunity to essentially legitimize itself domestically and
perhaps craft an agreement with its population similar to the
Chinese, namely, that in response to political acquiescence you
get material rewards and vulgar nationalism.
So it might essentially have a new national compact with
the population that could perhaps contribute to the regime's
longevity.
Mr. Deutch. In other words, population says we can--we can
live essentially--economically we can live Western lives. You
do whatever it is you----
Mr. Takeyh. Separate state from society.
Mr. Deutch. Dr. Sachs.
Mr. Sachs. In terms of what I said before, the Iranians do
seem to be investing very heavily in Shi'a populations abroad.
Although they don't want to present themselves as leaders
of the Shi'a, when in fact you look at where they invest their
resources--their considerable resources--it tends to be there,
probably because that is where they can find allies.
So you would expect that Lebanon, Syria--where not only
Shi'a but other non-Sunni groups would have vast support, even
bigger than they do today and that would be very considerable.
In the Persian Gulf itself, one of the biggest concerns of
Saudi Arabia is the fact that Saudi Arabia itself has a very
sizeable Shi'a minority and in fact it is located just in the
strategic area of where the oil is, and so this would be
extremely dangerous, from their perspective.
Of course, Bahrain is Shi'a majority. From the Israeli
perspective, Iranian activity already and even more so if it
had more resources, is very low cost to Iran. Iran can fight
Israel by proxy. It sends Hezbollah to do things. It arms PIJ
and Hamas to do things. But Iran itself does not suffer the
consequences and so it gains two things. First, it fights this
holy war that it imagines, and the second is it gains a
deterrent against Israel for any possible operation.
The debate I described earlier about Hezbollah, whether it
will operate on the behest of Iran, is a very serious one from
Israel thinking that if worst comes to worst and Israel has to
act conventionally would Hezbollah get involved?
Some, at the beginning, thought maybe not and, as I said,
the Syrian civil war just proved that of course they would--
they would do so.
Mr. Deutch. I would just--I would like to narrow it down.
So instead of talking about what Iran would do as the leader of
the Shi'a around the world be specific. Which terrorist groups
that it supports would it like to support more and what would
those groups do with the resources?
Mr. Takeyh. I would say certainly Hezbollah.
Mr. Deutch. Right.
Mr. Takeyh. Hezbollah has already been a very generous
beneficiary of Iran. After 2006 when Hezbollah misadventured
into war the Iranians essentially helped rebuild much of its
infrastructure.
So it would be--that would be different, and also various
Shi'i militia groups that Iran would have to use in order to
manipulate the politics of that country and potentially in
Saudi Arabia.
It is important to recognize, and I know my time is short,
in many Middle Eastern countries their internal populations are
a national security threat. Saudi Arabia views its own citizens
of Shi'i belief as a national security threat because they can
make common cause with an external threat. So there is a lot of
opportunity for mischief.
Mr. Modell. I would agree with everything he said. The only
thing I would add in terms of what specific groups would be--
would be supported in the focus I think it would stay mainly
within the region. But I would also say it is important to look
at the ways in which Iran right now is actually doing some of
that--preparing the ground work for that.
So when you look at Iraq, when you look at Iranian-
supported forces, particularly proxy forces that it is using in
Iraq, you have Bahrainian. You have Yemenis. You have Afghans.
You have a number of others.
They have been cultivating these relationships for a long
time. I think it would be an expansion of those relationships,
particularly when they leave Iraq and they go back home. They
are going back home and they have stronger foundations of power
for the regime.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired. The gentleman
from Florida, Mr. Yoho, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen,
for being here. How does Iran's involvement with Iraq in
dealing with the conflict with the Islamic state, how does that
affect our negotiation with the nuclear deal with Iraq--I mean,
Iran?
Mr. Takeyh. Well, at this particular point I don't think it
has an impact on it in the sense that Supreme Leader said he
doesn't want to negotiate with the United States on this issue
and Secretary Hagel has said the same thing.
I think both parties are trying to keep this segregated
from the larger regional conflict that they have.
Mr. Yoho. Mr. Modell. Okay. Same.
All right. You know, the purpose of this negotiation or our
sanctions up to this point was to prevent Iran from having a
nuclear weapon.
Sitting in this room right here we have had meeting after
meeting after meeting that says Iran is going to get a nuclear
weapon. I mean, 6 to 8 months--we had meetings they said they
are 6 to 8 months from having four to five nuclear weapons.
That was a year ago. So I can only assume with the experts
sitting here they told us the truth so we should assume they
probably have that. Yet the sanctions that we had didn't
prevent that.
So can we realistically think that new sanctions or new
negotiations are going to prevent Iran from having nuclear
weapons, especially if there is a sunset clause? The reports I
have read that said it is going to be 3 to 5 years from now--
when those phase away is what Iran wants.
I mean, are we going to prevent them from ever having a
nuclear weapon?
Mr. Takeyh. Well, I would say in the aftermath of
expirational sunset clause and I think their 5+1 including
United States would like to have the longest sunset clause,
maybe a decade.
After that, Iran has a right as any other NPT member to
have an industrial-sized nuclear program similar to Japan's and
that essentially gives it the ability to manufacture a large
arsenal of nuclear weapons on short notice.
Mr. Yoho. Okay. So if we are going in that direction would
it not be better for us to prepare for that and the rest of the
world to prepare for that instead of wasting all this time
trying to prevent something that they are going to do
regardless if there is an agreement or not?
Because they have shown that they are not trustworthy and
they are going to do this anyway so why don't we prepare for
that and prepare the rest of the world to negotiate conditions
on how another nation acts toward another? And I know we have
treaty after treaty after treaty but yet that day is coming and
I think it would behoove us to focus on that.
Mr. Takeyh. I think that is right. I am not quite sure if
it is inevitable for Iran to get nuclear weapons because I
think there are things that can happen between now and then.
But I do think one of the reasons why we embrace
negotiations and the negotiating process is because we don't
want to ask the questions that you are asking--what if this
issue is not susceptible to diplomatic mediation--and once you
answer that question what does the after look like.
Mr. Yoho. Well, that is just it. It is like--but yet
somebody has got to tell the emperor he doesn't have any
clothes on. I mean, we all see it. We see it coming.
So I think it would behoove us as a nation and this--I want
to bring this up because the subject of this meeting is
``Iran's Destabilizing Role in the Middle East.''
How is our foreign policy viewed? I mean, we have had
Ambassadors in from all kinds of Middle Eastern countries in
the last 2 weeks. They said the view of America is at the
lowest point they have ever seen.
Our credibility is gone. They don't know what we stand for.
It is like we have a compass like Jack Sparrow in ``Pirates of
the Caribbean.''
It has got a broken compass and they don't know what our
policies stand for. Our credibility has been lost and you, Dr.
Sachs, you were talking about--you said the other parts of the
world view us as weak.
Explain that. Is that militarily? Is that our foreign
policy or is that the direction or the will to stand up and do
what we view is right?
Mr. Sachs. I think in part it is a pendulum. I think it is
very strong in the Middle East, perhaps stronger than
elsewhere. But I think in the Middle East, in particular, it is
a bit of a pendulum.
After the years of the previous administration, where there
was a very involved U.S. policy with boots on the ground in
massive numbers, we have seems to have swung in the other
direction and the reaction in the Middle East has been severe.
It has been one that America has seemingly lost its
resolve. They have taken the declinist literature seriously,
which is a mistake, I think. And the result, of course, is that
they now view the United States as not as resolved as it was in
the past.
I would just add one point about the possibility of what we
might do with an international coalition. Sustaining the
sanctions, which the Congress has been very important in
installing, this demands also cooperation with the coalition
and to keep this coalition going there is some utility in these
negotiations, even above and beyond the possibility of what a
deal might bring.
Mr. Yoho. Right. But yet to have effective sanctions you
are going to have to tell China what to do and we are not going
to be able to do that, and as far as boots on the ground the
only place I want our military's boots on the ground is in the
United States of America.
And I would like at some point for you guys if you could
submit a reset of our foreign policy of what you think we
should be doing in America as far as dealing with the rest of
the world because what we have done over the last 30 or 40
years it ain't working real well. Thank you.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired and I would
just note for the record this is my 18th year in Congress and I
think that is the first time that I have heard a pirate Jack
Sparrow referred to in the Foreign Affairs Committee.
So we appreciate Mr. Yoho for injecting that, and I think
our final questioner this afternoon will be the gentleman from
Florida, Mr. Vargas, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Vargas. California.
Mr. Chabot. My bad. California.
Mr. Vargas. Mr. Chairman, that is okay but I love
California. Just want to make sure it didn't get confused with
Florida. I love Florida too.
I guess I would say this. I hope it is not inevitable that
Iran would get nuclear weapons because, unfortunately, I think
that they would use them.
I mean, I think it is one of those regimes that would be
willing to do that. I have been very sceptical of this interim
agreement. I think it was a bad deal. I continue to think it is
a bad deal because of naivete on our side.
I am even more sceptical of a long-term agreement if it is
not a permanent agreement and the reason for that is I remember
1970. I am old enough to remember that and the hostage taking.
That was 35 years ago. I mean, certainly, I think the
Iranians will wait us out if it is only 7 or 10 years and they
will have the ability then to break out and have a nuclear
weapon and I think that they would use that in many different
ways.
Even if they didn't use the weapon itself, which I think
they probably would, they would use it at least to destabilize
the area.
And so I look at this very sceptically. I did think that
the sanctions program was working. I think what we did here in
this House was the appropriate thing and that was to ratchet
them down.
And then if were going to get to an agreement I think the
agreement had to be this: Either you do away with your nuclear
program completely--no enrichment, no ability to create a
nuclear weapon--or we continue down this path of sanctions and
you have no economy and you probably lose your regime.
Make them decide that first. Then you can back up and do
the interim agreements. We didn't do that, unfortunately, and
so I think we are in a very difficult situation.
So now what do we do? I mean, we are in this situation now.
I think that it is a very dangerous one. What do we do? I mean,
you are the experts. What should we do?
Mr. Takeyh. I would say in the next--given the fact that
our course of leverage has not been sufficient to compel
Iranian compliance, I think it is time for Congress and the
White House to sort of come together on what they want to see
in terms of another sanctions bill.
The White House would have its preferences and equities and
the Congress would have. But I think it is time for the two
branches of government to come together.
If our leverage has not been sufficient to get Iranian
compliance in the last 6 months, why do we think it is going to
be sufficient to get Iranian agreement in the next 6 months
unless we do something different? So that is what I would
argue.
Mr. Vargas. How about yourself, Mr. Modell?
Mr. Modell. The only thing I would add, I think the only
reason Iran has come to the negotiating table--I mean, this is
a point that has been stressed over and over--is out of
economic necessity and it is because we had a strong position
on the sanctions that this Congress put forth were as strong as
they have ever been.
It is fantastic. I agree with Dr. Takeyh's guidance that
the administration--there has to be better collaboration on
this between this administration and the Congress on figuring
out the way forward.
The last thing I would do is make sure that we shore up
allied support on, you know, from the European Union in
particular on oil sanctions and other things before we lose
them.
Mr. Vargas. Thank you. Dr. Sachs.
Mr. Sachs. Finally, just on this point, I think to maintain
the sanctions, to maintain cooperation from our allies, it is
crucial that if these talks fail, whether this week or in 6
months, that Iran is blamed--that Iran is blamed in the eyes of
others and not the United States.
And this entails from us to be slightly more pragmatic in
the short term but keeping our eye on the long game, and to do
that we need to make sure--we need to understand, I think, that
the key to keeping this pressure on Iran is actually our
alliance with the other P5+1 countries and the EU in
particular. And to do that we will have to be creative about
how we approach this problem.
Mr. Vargas. And I guess I would say this. You know, we
always talk in sort of obfuscating terms. We always say keep
all the options on the table.
Mr. Modell, you kind of broke that taboo today and you
actually talked about using conventional force, and I would
like to talk just a second about that because I think that
there is this huge hesitation even to think about that other
than in this obscure sort of way of saying keep all options on
the table.
But what--really what it looked like if we had to do
something militarily? Let us talk about that for a second
because I think that we should say what it is and that is not
all options on the table but military action.
Mr. Modell. I am not sure what the context was in which I
said--that I said I would advocate the use of----
Mr. Vargas. Not the advocation of it--the possibility of
it. That might need to be what we do.
Mr. Modell. No, actually I think that--listen, as long as
the Supreme Leader thinks that that is possible I think it is
going to compel him to actually take the fact that we are
pushing on this nuclear issue seriously.
If he doesn't believe there is--that that threat even
exists or is credible any longer I think he is going to start
trying to figure out all the--go to fall back on all the
sophisticated ways in which they, you know, relied on denial
and deception and dissimulation for the last 35 years.
I personally agree that we need to go back to what you just
suggested, which was a very strong sanctions position before
anything else.
Mr. Vargas. I agree. My time has expired. I thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much and, again, my apologies
for misidentifying the gentleman's state. I apologize.
Mr. Vargas. No worries, sir.
Mr. Chabot. So I think that concludes the questioners this
afternoon so--this morning, rather. We--actually we are
afternoon, and would like to thank the panel for their
testimony.
All members will have 5 days to extend their remarks or
submit written questions. If there is no further business to
come before the committee we are adjourned.
Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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