[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-125]
LOGISTICS AND SEALIFT FORCE
REQUIREMENTS AND FORCE
STRUCTURE ASSESSMENT
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
JULY 30, 2014
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
______
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
DUNCAN HUNTER, California JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi RICK LARSEN, Washington
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado Georgia
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii
KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota DEREK KILMER, Washington
PAUL COOK, California SCOTT H. PETERS, California
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
David Sienicki, Professional Staff Member
Phil MacNaughton, Professional Staff Member
Katherine Rember, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2014
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, July 30, 2014, Logistics and Sealift Force
Requirements and Force Structure Assessment.................... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, July 30, 2014......................................... 25
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WEDNESDAY, JULY 30, 2014
LOGISTICS AND SEALIFT FORCE REQUIREMENTS AND FORCE STRUCTURE ASSESSMENT
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces................. 1
McIntyre, Hon. Mike, a Representative from North Carolina,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces. 2
WITNESSES
Brown, VADM William A., USN, Deputy Commander, United States
Transportation Command......................................... 2
DiLisio, F. Scott, Director, Strategic Mobility/Combat Logistics
Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.............. 5
Jaenichen, Paul N., Maritime Administrator, U.S. Department of
Transportation................................................. 3
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Brown, VADM William A........................................ 33
DiLisio, F. Scott............................................ 49
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy........................................ 29
Jaenichen, Paul N............................................ 41
McIntyre, Hon. Mike.......................................... 31
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Hunter................................................... 65
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Forbes................................................... 69
LOGISTICS AND SEALIFT FORCE REQUIREMENTS AND FORCE STRUCTURE ASSESSMENT
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, July 30, 2014.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:02 p.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
PROJECTION FORCES
Mr. Forbes. We want to welcome all of you today to this
hearing, and today the subcommittee convenes to receive
testimony on logistics and sealift requirements.
We are going to forego our opening statements just in the
interest of time, because we are going to have a vote series
called, I think, about 3:00, 3:15, or 3:30, and we want to make
sure we get as much of this hearing in as we can before that.
We have three very distinguished witnesses here today. And
I want to thank all three of you for, one, your service to our
country, but also your willingness to come help us today. I
know, also, you couldn't do what you do without the valuable
work of your staffs that are behind you, and on behalf of Mr.
McIntyre and I, if you could just stand up if you are one of
the staff people here today supporting them, we just want to
tell you how much we appreciate you. So stand up and let us
just thank you for that effort. Well, we appreciate so much all
of your hard work and what you do.
Our witnesses today are the Honorable Paul N. Jaenichen,
Sr., Maritime Administrator, U.S. Department of Transportation,
Maritime Administration; also, Vice Admiral William A. Brown,
Deputy Commander, U.S. Transportation Command; and Mr. F. Scott
DiLisio, Director, Strategic Mobility/Combat Logistics, Office
of Chief of Naval Operations. So we thank you three gentlemen
for being here.
As I mentioned, we are going to put our opening statement
in the record, but I would like to now recognize my partner in
all of this, the ranking member, my good friend from North
Carolina, Mr. McIntyre, for any comments he may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the
Appendix on page 29.]
STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE MCINTYRE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NORTH
CAROLINA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
PROJECTION FORCES
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to all of you
all for coming, and I will echo the chairman's appreciation for
your work and for the staff's work. We also will respect the
fact of the more compressed time schedule we are on and forego
opening remarks, but we will submit them for the record. God
bless you all for your commitment and work.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McIntyre can be found in the
Appendix on page 31.]
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Congressman McIntyre.
And I don't know which order you would like to go. Admiral,
are you going to start us off, or are we going to go in a
different----
Admiral Brown. I can do that, sir.
Mr. Forbes. Okay. Well, we would love to hear your comments
now.
STATEMENT OF VADM WILLIAM A. BROWN, USN, DEPUTY COMMANDER,
UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND
Admiral Brown. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member McIntyre, and distinguished
members of this committee, it is truly an honor for me to be
here today representing the United States Transportation
Command [TRANSCOM]. Our force of men and women, military and
civilian, is dedicated to providing reliable, seamless
logistical support to our warfighters and their families around
the globe. The dedicated professionals at TRANSCOM simply
cannot accomplish this global mission without the capabilities
provided by the United States Strategic Sealift fleet and our
steadfast merchant mariners.
I would also like to recognize and thank my good friends on
my left here, Mr. Jaenichen and Mr. DiLisio. They work with us
every day to try to achieve our goal of supporting our Nation.
Their vision and leadership have enabled TRANSCOM to provide
transportation and distribution support that are second to none
anywhere in the world, and together, we deliver.
TRANSCOM relies on both government-owned vessels and those
accessed via commercial industry. Our government-owned fleet of
60 total assets from the Military Sealift Command and the surge
fleet and the Maritime Administration's Ready Reserve Force are
strategically positioned around the country and important to
our capability. All of these government-owned and commercial
vessels are critical to the Department of Defense's ability to
surge to meet future global requirements.
As the Department of Defense [DOD] postures its forces in
the future, sealift will continue to be a key component in
ensuring strategic agility and dynamic presence for our
Nation's military forces. And although organic assets are
essential to meeting our requirement, we rely on commercial
partners to augment the organic fleet during the initial surge
of combat power and for the vast majority of sealift in
peacetime and in the sustainment phases of the contingency
operations.
Access to these commercial assets is formalized by MARAD's
[United States Maritime Administration] Voluntary Intermodal
Sealift Agreement, the VISA program; and the Maritime Security
Program, MSP program; as well as the Voluntary Tanker
Agreement, the VTA. Through these programs, DOD gains critical
access to U.S. commercial capabilities while ensuring the
availability of a viable U.S.-flag maritime industry and crewed
by U.S. citizens who are merchant mariners in our times of
national emergency.
The Maritime Security Program provides access to a fleet of
60 military useful commercial vessels operating in
international commerce and exercising intermodal networks
throughout the world, and these provide jobs for United States
citizens who are mariners. A significant percentage of our
required sealift capacity needed in response to a national
emergency will come from the 60 vessels operating within the
MSP program.
The maritime defense industrial base provides an
irreplaceable shipbuilding as well as ship operating capability
for the U.S., including the ability to support our forces
around the globe. But this national defense capability is
undergoing stress from several recent enduring factors,
primarily the reduced amount of defense cargo resulting from
our drawdown in Afghanistan and current economic conditions
which make it challenging for U.S.-flag companies to compete
with companies operating at much lower cost under foreign
flags.
Some think that as we transition from Afghanistan our
requirement is reduced; this is, indeed, not the case.
Maintaining a responsive sealift capacity and experienced
mariners to crew our ships in time of need is essential to
meeting the Nation's defense requirements. We are working with
the Maritime Administration in its development of a national
maritime strategy which could grow the U.S.-flag fleet and
ensure that availability and the ability of U.S. Merchant
Marine to meet our national security needs. Despite an
uncertain future and dynamic strategic environment, TRANSCOM
will continue in close collaboration with our partners to
ensure we meet the Nation's needs in peace and in time of
conflict.
Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member McIntyre, and all the
distinguished members of this committee, thank you for your
continued support to TRANSCOM and our total force. I am
grateful for the opportunity to be here before the committee,
and I ask that my written statement be submitted for the record
and I look forward to your questions.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Brown can be found in
the Appendix on page 33.]
Mr. Forbes. Admiral, thank you for your comments. And
without objection, all the written statements will be submitted
as part of the record.
Mr. Jaenichen.
STATEMENT OF PAUL N. JAENICHEN, MARITIME ADMINISTRATOR, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Mr. Jaenichen. Good afternoon, Chairman Forbes, Ranking
Member McIntyre, members of the subcommittee.
I want to thank you for the opportunity to discuss the
United States Merchant Marine that supports our Nation's
government-owned and U.S.-flag commercial fleet sealift
requirements.
While our Nation is continuing to recover from economic
downturn of the past several years, more cargo today is being
moved by merchant ships globally. However, there are challenges
for maintaining the number of commercial U.S.-flag vessels
actively involved in international trade, which affects the
availability of sealift capacity that the Department of Defense
relies upon to move equipment and supplies to support global
projection and sustainment of our Armed Forces.
The U.S.-flag commercial fleet operating international
trade provides a substantial portion of the infrastructure for
the sealift capacity with our commercial maritime companies,
their vessels, and the mariners available in wartime or crisis,
whenever and wherever they are needed.
The number of vessels currently in the U.S.-flag fleet
today has declined by nearly 20 percent as compared to the
running 5-year average between 2008 and 2013. This causes me
great concern about the overall health of our international
trading fleet.
Government-owned sealift force requirements have a direct
and significant nexus to the commercial U.S.-flag maritime
industry that provides the ready pool of proficient and
qualified mariners. Given that the two are linked, DOD and the
Maritime Administration must now assess the impact of a loss of
these vessels on our sealift capacity and the availability to
support national security.
The overall volume of non-bulk dry and dry bulk preference
cargo transported on U.S.-flag vessels has substantially
decreased since 2005. Ships require cargo to be economically
viable. So without ready access to commercial or government-
impelled cargo, the survival of some vessels in the U.S.-flag
fleet operating international trade is in question.
The cause of the falling volume of non-bulk dry and dry
bulk preference cargo do not appear to be transient. Continued
reductions in the number of U.S. Armed Forces and overseas
bases, coupled with the decline in the number of troops
involved in global operations suggest that military cargos will
continue to decrease through 2016 and level off at less than 1
million metric tons per year, or less than half of the volume
that was transported as recently as 2011.
The size of the U.S.-flag international trading fleet has
decreased from the 5-year average of 101 to 83 as of this
afternoon, and it is expected to decrease further in the
future. Adverse impacts on the 58 liner-type vessels in the
Maritime Security Program are already occurring, with one
vessel having left the program and reflagging foreign, and up
to two more expected to leave before the end of this year.
Their primary reason for leaving the program is lack of cargo,
and it appears unlikely that commercial or preference cargo
opportunities will recover significantly anytime in the future.
MARAD is responsible for determining whether adequate
mariners are available to support the operation of sealift
ships required to support our global deployment of our Nation's
Armed Forces. We have determined that the pool of civilian U.S.
merchant mariners available to crew government sealift ships
when activated has declined over the last decade. The current
number of qualified and experienced mariners available may not
be adequate in the very near future without requiring the U.S.
Coast Guard to waive domestic and international requirements
for the mariners to crew government sealift ships when
activated for longer than 6 to 8 months.
This assessment of the status of the civilian merchant
mariner pool included close coordination with the U.S. maritime
labor unions in consultation with other maritime industry
stakeholders. I have shared this assessment with DOD and intend
to work closely with the U.S. Transportation Command, the U.S.
Navy, and commercial maritime industry to address this issue.
The Maritime Administration is currently working on developing
a national maritime strategy with stakeholders aimed at
preserving and growing all aspects of the U.S. Merchant Marine,
including the U.S.-flag fleet trading internationally.
The Maritime Administration is also focused on the future
of the government sealift capacity. The average age of the 46
vessels and the Ready Reserve Force or RRF is 40 years with the
oldest being 47. While commercial ships are typically retired
after 25 to 30 years of operation, the Maritime Administration
intends to maintain the RRF vessels in the fleet for 50 years.
Given the 40-year average age of the Ready Reserve Force,
MARAD is coordinating with the Department of Defense to examine
the need for recapitalization and to assess the full range of
options that will balance DOD's requirements with funding
realities. With regard to the Maritime Security Program which
supports the 60 commercial U.S.-owned, U.S.-flag, U.S.-crewed
vessels that support DOD sustainment sealift requirements and
which transported over 90 percent of the equipment and supplies
used by our troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, I would request
that the committee support full funding at the authorized level
of $186 million, as requested in the President's budget.
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the issues
affecting the ability of the U.S. Merchant Marine to continue
to meet DOD sealift requirements.
I thank the committee for their support, and I look forward
to any questions that you might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jaenichen can be found in
the Appendix on page 41.]
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Jaenichen, thank you so much for your
testimony.
Mr. DiLisio, you are now recognized for any opening remarks
you would like to make.
STATEMENT OF F. SCOTT DILISIO, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC MOBILITY/
COMBAT LOGISTICS DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS
Mr. DiLisio. Thank you, Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member
McIntyre, distinguished----
Mr. Forbes. You might want to pull that microphone a little
bit closer. I don't know if it is turned on or not, but
sometimes you have to get----
Mr. DiLisio. I think I have got it now.
Mr. Forbes. That is good.
Mr. DiLisio. Thanks.
We continue to meet operational requirements while driving
successful, innovative, and nontraditional solutions to global
maritime logistics. You have met my colleagues. I won't
reintroduce them, but I am honored to be here with them both. I
consider them to be my close partners in this regard.
I will be brief in my remarks so we can spare some time
together. The Combat Logistics Force and Strategic Sealift
missions are accomplished by an organic fleet comprised of
about 122 ships. These ships support numerous missions,
including the following: At-sea resupply of our naval
combatants; prepositioning of critical unit equipment,
ammunition, and sustainment for Marine Corps, Army, and Air
Force; humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; towing,
diving, and salvage operations worldwide; rapid intra-theater
movement of cargo and personnel; and afloat staging
capabilities.
This unique segment of the fleet is augmented by the
commercial U.S.-flag fleet, as Mr. Jaenichen spoke to you
about. It provides a scalability capability required by the
combatant commander to execute critical missions around the
globe. The ability to rearm, refuel, and reprovision our forces
at sea, independent of restrictions placed on it by any foreign
country, is critical in the Navy's ability provide presence and
projected warfighting power from the sea where it matters when
it matters.
The Navy's Combat Logistics Force ships are the lifeline of
resupply to the Navy operating forces underway, enabling
carrier strike groups, amphibious ready groups, to operate
forward and remain on station during peacetime and war. The
Combat Logistics Force includes replenishment oilers, T-AOs;
fast combat support ships, T-AOEs; and dry cargo and ammunition
ships, T-AKEs. The T-AOs primarily provide fuel but with the
ability to provide limited quantities of dry cargo. The T-AOEs
and T-AKEs are multi-mission ships capable of multiproduct, a
term of ``one-stop shopping,'' if you will, to customer ships
by simultaneously replenishing ammunition, provisions, and
fuel.
A different portion of that force is the Strategic Sealift
Program, provides the necessary transportation for Marine Corps
and Army combat equipment, fuel, and sustainment. This
capability is provided to the combatant commander through three
methods: afloat prepositioning, surge sealift, and sustainment
shipping. These methods encompass 85 organic ships with each
providing a critical set of capabilities when called for
tasking or activated for service.
The Prepositioned Fleet is strategically located in key
areas on the globe prior to actual need ensuring ready access
for contingencies. Doing so provides flexible, rapid response
of military equipment, combat gear, and supplies essential to
sustaining initial phases of contingencies, including major
combat operations. When Mobile Landing Platform [MLP] ships
join the Large Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off ships as part of
the Maritime Prepositioning Force next year, they will enable a
greater sea-basing capability and increased flexibility across
the operational area.
An MLP is a tremendously versatile ship; it is new and will
act as a floating base for expeditionary operations. Equipped
with ramp systems, the MLP is an intermediary transfer point
for troops, equipment, and sustainment moved ashore by Landing
Craft Air Cushion craft and the Joint High Speed Vessel. The
Joint High Speed Vessel is designed for high-speed intra-
theater transport. Experimentation is revealing more potential
missions to include various types of mission support,
humanitarian assistance, theater security cooperation, and
security force assistance.
Surge ships are the second subset of sealift and is
comprised of 60 ships. These ships move unit equipment to the
theater of operation and facilitate the rapid on-load and off-
load of rolling stock and service-unique special mission
equipment. The sustainment shipping provided by the commercial
U.S.-flag fleet Mr. Jaenichen referred to, is the third
component of Strategic Sealift. These vessels assist in the
sustainment phases of operations as well as the global movement
of government cargo.
These commercial owners participate as a program member of
the overall sealift capability. We are currently working with
fleet commanders to complement Combat Logistics Force and
Strategic Sealift capabilities by examining innovative ways to
improve capability and capacity to perform theater security
cooperation missions that also enhance overall Navy combat
force availability. Deploying adaptive force packaging can
create cost-effective opportunities for our fleet to expand
support missions and sustain global presence.
We will continue to support forward presence and relieve
stress on the rest of the force through traditional and
innovative approaches. We will continue to rely on the Combat
Logistics Force and Strategic Sealift as they contribute to the
Navy's tenets, you have heard from the CNO [Chief of Naval
Operations]: Warfighting first, operate forward, and be ready.
I want to thank you for your continued support of our
force, and thank you again for the opportunity to speak to the
committee.
[The prepared statement of Mr. DiLisio can be found in the
Appendix on page 49.]
Mr. Forbes. Mr. DiLisio, thank you so much for being here
and your service to our country.
I am going to defer my questions until the end to make sure
all our Members can get their questions in.
So at this time, I would like to recognize Mr. McIntyre for
any questions he may have.
Mr. McIntyre. And again, I will follow the chairman's
example, given our compressed time today and proceed with the
Members asking their questions.
Thank you.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. McIntyre.
Then, our first Member for questions will be recognized
will be Mr. Runyan recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Runyan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just a little bit, I know I have dealt with this on other
subcommittees a little bit with TRANSCOM, with airlift and CRAF
[Civil Reserve Air Fleet], which Merchant Marine, I would
think, would be the mirror thing on the seas. I know we have
probably been through these situations before where you have a
downturn and you have to walk away from it.
What have we learned from the past and what are we able to
do to keep that readiness there? Because obviously, we don't
have a need for it. But I dealt with this on the CRAF aspect of
it; as the companies can't keep the civilian fleets around, it
becomes a huge problem and the ramp-up on the back end when
there is another conflict is huge.
And where would that--well, can the Air Force absorb that,
and do you have any idea of what cost that would be to get
that, to get--you know, because it may take you at some point
if you do have to, a year or two to get the civilian sealift
aspect back on?
Mr. Jaenichen, do you have any--I know it is kind of a
vague question, but----
Mr. Jaenichen. Well, first of all, what I will tell you is
the 83 vessels that are currently operating international
trade, 60 of those are in the Maritime Security Program. If
those ships are lost or they decide to not continue in the
program, the cost to the U.S. Government to replace them in
terms of the assets that these civilian companies have
essentially invested, probably over $2 billion in those 60
ships alone. But the piece that is probably more important to
us is the international logistics capability that those
companies have access to that we don't necessarily have access
to as the Department of Defense or as the U.S. Government.
For example, when Pakistan closed their borders to be able
to get our supplies to Afghanistan, it was the MSP program that
actually developed the Northern Distribution Network to be able
to get those supplies to our troops to be able to support the
continued operations in Afghanistan.
So that particular aspect of the infrastructure, that is a
$40 billion, in excess of $40 billion to replace. So to be able
to say that we can ramp up, the ships themselves are important,
but the mariners who man them are probably just as important
because I can't necessarily make a mariner.
It takes 10 years to get a mariner trained and experienced
and licensed to be a master on one of these vessels or a chief
engineer. I can't turn the faucet on and just say, okay, I ramp
up and suddenly they are there. I talked about the fact that we
need cargo to have ships. I need ships to have mariners. The
mariners are probably one of the most important complements of
that, and it is not easy to ramp those up.
Mr. Runyan. I know but also in the same way, to really
train mariners, you are going to have to be moving them around
and you are going to have to have cargo on those ships. So it
is, you know, what is first? The chicken or the egg? I mean, it
is a little bit frustrating. I mean, I really, I think we
understand the need for it, but how do we sustain it? Any
suggestions there?
Mr. Jaenichen. I think the important aspect of sustainment
is to continue the funding of the programs that are currently
in place. The Maritime Security Program which is currently
funded at $186 million a year and is in the request for fiscal
year 2015 at the same funding level, that to replace that
capacity would cost the Department of Defense significantly
more than what we are currently expending. So I think that is
the first piece that we have to do.
The second piece is to take a look at what other cargo
opportunities and to take a look, that is what we are doing
with this national maritime strategy, to evaluate ways to be
able to get cargo on these ships to make sure that they are
economically viable. One of the challenges that we have is for
a number of reasons the cost to operate under U.S. flag, as
Admiral Brown pointed out in his opening remarks, is somewhere
between $5- and $7 million on an annual basis.
The amount that we pay them under the MSP program stipend
barely covers 50 percent of that amount. So in order to make up
that amount, we have to either have government-impelled cargo
through cargo preference or civilian cargo. Absent that, and
now that we have these decreasing cargos, both on the DOD side
and other preference cargos that we have here in the U.S., the
program, when it was developed in 1996, relied on three things:
it relied on the stipend amount; it relied on the cargo
commercially available; and it relied on government-impelled
cargo.
If you change sort of the tenets of the program where you
lower one, you are going to have to figure out how to increase
the other two, and it doesn't look like that the preference
cargo is going to increase any time soon, so we have to look at
those other levers to be able to maintain those ships in the
program that are vitally important.
The mariners, as I talked about, those mariners that are
sailing commercially today are the same mariner pool that mans
our government sealift ships. If I don't have the commercial
ships operating, I don't have access to the mariners, and so I
have now lost that surge capacity that we are currently
maintaining.
Mr. Runyan. Thank you.
Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Gentleman yields back.
Before I recognize Mr. Larsen for his questions, I would
like to ask unanimous consent that non-subcommittee members, if
any, be allowed to participate in today's hearing after all
subcommittee members have had an opportunity to ask questions.
Is there any objection?
Without objection, non-subcommittee members will be
recognized at the appropriate time for 5 minutes.
And now, the chair recognizes Mr. Larsen for 5 minutes.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Jaenichen, thanks for being here. Can you cover in a
little more detail the impact on the employment base on the
mariner availability and mariner training; and are you looking
at that as part of the maritime strategy, not just from a broad
strategic perspective, but are you going to try to describe
that in a little more detail year to year or every 5 years what
it might mean for mariners?
Mr. Jaenichen. Thank you for the question, Mr. Larsen.
There are two things. One, today the licensed mariners that
are sailing internationally, or blue ocean or deep ocean, as we
refer to them, is about 4,100 officers and about 7,600 what we
call unlicensed that operate the ships. Typical crews
themselves, we will continue to take a look at that. The key
piece of this as we take a look at the age demographic, we
coordinate very closely with the maritime unions to make sure
that we are able to man not only our commercial ships but also
our government sealift ships.
We have mariners on our reserve sealift ships today that
are in surge, the Ready Reserve Force. About 460 mariners are
employed to do that. So we have some of the experience and
capacity, but I require in excess of, you know, 1,200
additional mariners if I activate all of those ships. That has
to come from somewhere. So the actual national maritime
strategy will focus on the floor for the number of ships in the
program has to be able to support the Department of Defense
requirements, specifically for the sealift requirements for
TRANSCOM. That is the floor. Our intention is to make sure that
we are well above the floor so that we are not at risk.
I am concerned today about the number of mariners and the
ability to be able to man our vessels, if they were activated,
for much longer than the time that they potentially needed. As
I pointed out in my opening remarks, 6 to 8 months is all we
estimate with release to be able to sustain that. Without that,
those crews would have to go indefinitely on the ships, and
that is just not the way we operate them.
Mr. Larsen. Yeah. So can you explain that 6 to 8 months
timeframe again?
Mr. Jaenichen. That 6 to 8 months is, normally the crews,
when they go on the ship, at some point in time and it really
determines, you know, it is based on the ship manager, it is
based on the ship, it is based on the company, at some point in
the future, they have to have a rotation. We estimate that
there is, you know, about 2.2 times the number of mariners that
is required to be able to man the number of billets on that
vessel, so you have to have a relief crew that is available.
Mr. Larsen. Okay. Great.
And then, Admiral, I think it was you--well, you probably
all discussed recapitalization, but, perhaps it was in your
testimony on recap, can you talk a little bit about what that
cost is and how you are thinking about how we should be
thinking about doing that?
Admiral Brown. Yes, sir. Right now we see there is kind of
a near-term issue in the 2017 to 2026 timeframe that we are
losing about nine vessels, we could lose nine vessels if we
don't extend the life of some of them and then we have a
longer-term problem where more ships would age out. So right
now we are focused on the short-term problem between now and
2026, and we are working with the Navy as well as MARAD to come
up with a hybrid solution that would look at potentially
building new U.S.-built ships for the Navy that we would get
the ships that they replace and put them in the surge force.
The other option would be to extend the service life of
some of the ships that we already have. So we are looking at
those combinations, and we owe basically in the 2017 budget a
plan and I think there will be other requirements to come back
here and discuss our plan in more detail.
Mr. Larsen. On the life extension, is it going from 40 to
45 or just going out to the 50 years?
Admiral Brown. It would go from 50 to 60 years. So what we
have to do is we have to start making those decisions early
because if we are going to take them out of the fleet, we would
stop doing normal investments that would keep them active. So
we would have to, you know, continue to invest in them and then
they would also have to have perhaps some, you know, additional
shipyard work and whatnot to extend them.
Mr. Larsen. Okay. Thanks.
And then just because it is a--not just because, I mean it
is important, as well, but MLP John Glenn was at Naval Station
Everett for about 6 months and left not too long ago. But what
is our MLP plan?
Mr. DiLisio. Right now we have got an MLP assigned to both
MPSRONs [maritime prepositioning ship squadrons], and so what
they basically represent is a feature ship. So they don't carry
cargo, per se, but they allow the opportunity for teaming with
an LMSR [Large, Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off] so that you
could break down that LMSR or its cargo or its vehicles very
quickly. I don't know if you got a chance to see its modified
version when it left, but basically there were three ways for
the LCACs [Landing Craft Air Cushion] to board, plus a landing
spot and a ramp situation so it could interface with the ships
we have just been talking about.
Mr. Larsen. And I am sorry, just quickly, the numbers we
are building?
Mr. DiLisio. Two.
Mr. Larsen. Just the two.
Mr. DiLisio. Two of that variety.
Mr. Larsen. Two of that variety. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. The gentleman yields back the balance of his
time.
The gentleman from California, Mr. Hunter, is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am going to get parochial stuff out of the way first. You
just talked about MLP/AFSB [Afloat Forward Staging Base]. I
think there is a 3- or a 2-year gap at NASSCO [National Steel
and Ship Building Company] where they are in a trough over the
next 2 years, and they are talking about getting lead-time
funding for the second MLP.
Are you familiar with that, Mr. DiLisio? Any thoughts on
that?
Mr. DiLisio. I am familiar with the discussion. I would
probably take that one for the record, in that it was----
Mr. Hunter. Please.
Mr. DiLisio. [continuing]. More appropriate for the
Secretary to answer that one than me.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 65.]
Mr. Hunter. No, I think it is appropriate for you, because
it is a Navy ship. It is not a transportation ship. But
anyway----
Mr. DiLisio. No, I mean the Secretary.
Mr. Hunter. Oh, the Secretary of the Navy. Yeah. Okay. We
will get him in here.
Number two, I want to thank the chairman for doing this. I
think this is one of the most important things we have that we
do here, and we are facing a time in Congress right now where
people don't understand why you have cargo preference. We are
fighting food aid cargo preference. Ex-Im [Export-Import] Bank
goes away; that is cargo preference. These numbers are going to
drop and this is how America goes to war.
When America has to go to war, it uses these ships every
single time. This is how I went to war. In 2004, I actually
loaded a RO/RO [Roll-on/Roll-off] in San Diego. I was the
embarkation officer, some horrible title that the newest guy
gets. That was me. Anyway, drove everything down, got on the
RO/RO, we unloaded it in Kuwait and went up into Iraq in 2004.
So this is important, and I think Mr. Runyan alluded to this,
it doesn't seem like it is sustainable.
You said, Admiral, you don't have a timeframe on the 60-
ship study. Is that right or no?
Admiral Brown. On the 60-ship study, I don't think I----
Mr. Hunter. Am I talking about the right study? The report
on 60-ship requirement U.S. TRANSCOM is doing. I thought Mr.
Larsen just asked and you say you don't have it?
Admiral Brown. Well, the study that I think you are
referring to is one that OMB [Office of Management and Budget]
has asked for that is going to look at the----
Mr. Hunter. Okay. Do we have that one?
Admiral Brown. We are working on that, sir, and we should
have the results of--and that won't just focus on the 60-ship
requirement. It will look at the entire industry and see what--
--
Mr. Hunter. Is that going to play into the strategy that
administrator----
Admiral Brown. That will be going into that, too, sir.
Mr. Hunter. Okay. Let me see. Talking about military useful
RRF [Ready Reserve Force] ships. The Navy had said that they
have some requirement policy changes that would have to go into
effect to stop simply building or maintaining the RRF fleet but
building new RRF ships that are basically dual use.
So to both Admiral and Mr. Jaenichen, what is happening
with that? Are you familiar with that, dual-use RRF ships?
Mr. Jaenichen. I am. In fact, I had a discussion with the
Department of Navy yesterday on that specific issue, and we are
looking at how we might be able to do that. One of the
challenges that we saw in the dual-use component of that is how
you use them in civilian trade and then be able to pull them
back because the civilian sector from a Marine highway or
however we would employ them don't necessarily have the ships
to backfill.
Commercially, if you were a company, typically you will
have four or five ships in a liner-type service. If you pull
one out you might still be able to----
Mr. Hunter. But the RRF is only used in time of actual war,
right?
Mr. Jaenichen. That is correct.
Mr. Hunter. So you would say, hey, stop this route, you are
going to go to war?
Mr. Jaenichen. Correct. And so the question is, does that
make it economically viable going forward? Because once the
shippers don't have cargo----
Mr. Hunter. But they get paid by the government during the
time they were used as RRF, right?
Mr. Jaenichen. Maybe, but then the question is, is do the
shippers come back when the ships are done doing what they are
doing in terms of their activation? That is one of the
challenges that we are looking at from that standpoint.
Admiral Brown. Sir, can I add that you also have to look at
the size of those vessels, would they truly be military useful.
And so if they are too small, we are talking about, you know,
moving BCTs [brigade combat teams] not, you know, platoons
here.
Mr. Hunter. Right. Okay.
Mr. Jaenichen. Mr. Hunter, to the admiral's point, what we
have found in all of our studies is the type of ships that were
available to be able to use in some kind of a Marine Highway
Program are either self-propelled barges or articulated tug and
barges kind of things to be able to move that equipment. Those
are not necessarily the most militarily useful, but they would
be the best in the commercial program if we were looking at it.
Mr. Hunter. The Navy also had, and this ties along in with
this, the Navy did have proposals--I haven't seen those
specific proposals--on how to at least start using dual use.
But have you started using those? Have you started implementing
them? I mean, are you looking at them, or we are not sure yet?
Mr. Jaenichen. No. In fact, what we have talked about is
what kind of legislative proposals, what kind of policy----
Mr. Hunter. There have to be policy changes, right?
Mr. Jaenichen. There would be some policy changes that are
required.
Mr. Hunter. Like what?
Mr. Jaenichen. Well, as we take a look at it, how do you
make the funding stream be able to work that? How do you make a
stipend payment work? For example, some of the investment that
would be required to be able to build those ships has to come
from somewhere, and the question is, is where did it come from
without sacrificing a port of the surge sealift capacity that
is currently there?
Mr. Hunter. You would stop maintaining the RRF fleet and
simply build new ones. You would use the maintenance fund,
right?
Mr. Jaenichen. And then we would start taking risk on the
ships if they were activated during the period of time as we
ramp up, in terms of how--so we have to evaluate how we would
do that. Then, obviously, there is some legislative changes. As
you know, in order to recapitalize the Ready Reserve Force
there is a U.S.-build requirement to be able to support that
recapitalization.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, all. Appreciate it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. I think the gentleman from California raises
some good points that all of you gentlemen, I think, agree
with. And the main thing is that this myth that this is a
faucet that we can turn on and turn off is just not accurate,
because as the ships get reduced, also our industrial base to
repair the ships get reduced.
And, Mr. Jaenichen, as you pointed out, then our workforce
suffers and it takes you about 10 years just to train one
captain to be able to handle one of these ships.
Mr. Courtney, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Actually, your
comment sort of, I think, segue into my question for Mr.
Jaenichen.
Again, your written testimony refers to the fact that MARAD
is working on developing a national maritime strategy with
stakeholders. Again, when we look at the U.S.-build
requirements which you just talked about and the impending, you
know, aging-out of the existing fleet, along with, again, a lot
of the other issues that have come up in the question.
Maybe you can just sort of step back and talk a little bit
about this national maritime strategy, you know, what is
happening with it, how you visualize it unfolding, because I
think at some point I think a lot of us need to get our heads
around that to work with you.
Mr. Jaenichen. Thank you, Mr. Courtney, for the question.
First, in the development of the national maritime
strategy, we have actually had two strategy symposiums. The
first one was done in January. It was specifically focused on
the international trading fleet, which is where I have my most
concerns, because that affects the mariner pool that is used by
both the strategics on the commercial side and also on the
surge sealift side.
The second one we did in May and that was focused on the
inland industry. It was also focused on shipyards, and then we
had some cross-cutting themes of labor and environmental and
those kinds of things. We also focused on that particular one
on port and port infrastructure.
What we have done so far is we have drafted a strategy. We
have created a document that provides a number of options. On
the 14th of August I am going to share that with the Marine
Transportation [System] National Advisory Council [MTSNAC] to
get their recommendations and once we have had an opportunity
to work with them to try to sort of dig into the actual details
of the options that are available, our intent would be that we
would then open it up for public comment later this year after
we have had a chance to do that.
But our first meeting with this national advisory council
that we have, MTSNAC as we refer to them, is going to happen on
the 14th of August.
Mr. Courtney. So, again, to take it to the next step,
public comment occurs. I am sure there is going to be a lot of
comment. I mean, is there going to be a window of time for
that, and then there will be sort of a final-final as far as
some kind of document that will get generated?
Mr. Jaenichen. Yes. And our proposal would be that we would
have some kind of a strategy that has been vetted and we
resolve the public comments by the end of this year. I think we
need to be able to provide the new Congress an opportunity to
work on these particular issues, and there is a number of them
from policy to legislation.
I mean, there is a whole host of possible options. Some of
them are much harder than others to be able to accomplish, but
it is going to have to be done in some way, shape, or form,
because I think we are at that point where we have to do
something about the maritime industry in this country.
Mr. Courtney. And I would assume that, you know, the topic
we are talking about today is going to at least be part of that
overall strategy. Is that a pretty safe assumption?
Mr. Jaenichen. In fact, as I talked about before, the floor
of our strategy in terms of the ships that are required to be
under U.S. flag is really a DOD requirement to be able to make
sure that they have the capacity to be able to support national
security. We would obviously like to be well above that,
because as you get sort of the to the line, you start assuming
more risk and I don't think we want to be in a situation where
we risk not being able to globally project power through our
Armed Forces, and that is one of the reasons why this strategy.
So the sealift strategy that is a component of the national
maritime strategy is something we are closely coordinating with
TRANSCOM and Navy in terms of how you would essentially
structure that to be able to support. You know, obviously, we
have to take a look at what future requirements will be because
that will dictate the size of that U.S.-flag fleet.
Mr. Courtney. So, again, looking forward to the 114th
Congress, we are talking January, February, March, something in
that timeframe in terms of the Seapower Committee having the
opportunity to sink, you know, their teeth into it?
Mr. Jaenichen. That would be my intent.
Mr. Courtney. All right. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Gentleman yields back.
Mr. Johnson is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DiLisio, how did the Department determine the cost of
the procurement of the T-AO(X)?
Mr. DiLisio. Basically, we did a complete study of the
current oiler base, the Kaiser class, to determine what pieces
of the Kaiser class gave us our acceptable requirement set. We
took the Kaiser class, increased some of the freeze chill
[cargo-carrying] portions, increased the lift so we could
handle heavier lift, readdressed speed requirements so we have
an array of different speed requirements that we went and
looked at which would bring you different propulsion sets.
So basically, we are looking at what does a carrier need to
take oil and provisions? What does the rest of the [carrier]
strike group need? So you get a strike group answer, you get an
ARG [Amphibious Ready Group] answer, and then you get basically
a rest-of-the-strike-group answer. So we were looking kind of
at middle of the road. We have a very good class of ships right
now in the Kaiser class, so we didn't have to go too far from
the Kaiser class to get to something that we liked.
Then we want to use the competition in the industry to take
us the rest of the way with some interesting ideas on how to
manage energy, get the O&S [operations and support] cost down
and see if we can get the number of mariners down, as well. So
basically, we are pretty happy with our current oiler. What we
are looking for is something new, something as fast as we could
get it that could do multiproduct and continue the workhorse
development that we currently enjoy.
Mr. Johnson. Does the cost reflect the balance of cost and
capabilities of the T-AO(X)?
Mr. DiLisio. Right now, we have it right around $680 to
$690 million for the one that we have got a draft CDD
[Capability Development Document] for as we sit here right now.
I think we will hold right there with that amount, so I don't
think we need to go any higher than that to meet our current
requirements. So I think I am pretty comfortable in telling you
that we are ready to start as soon as we get through joint
staffing with our CDD, and we are not far from a 2016 start
with the current requirements we have, very comfortable with
them.
Mr. Johnson. If ship capabilities exceed program costs,
will the Department cut back on operational requirements?
Mr. DiLisio. As I am sitting here now, they don't, and I
don't expect that they will because the things that would have
stressed the current oiler were things like a heavier lift
capability so that we could send greater loads of cargo between
ships. I believe we have that covered. We have the ability to
land aircraft that we need to be able to land and refuel on
that deck, which is another new requirement above and beyond
Kaiser class. I think we have that covered. So I am pretty
comfortable right now that is a tradeoff we don't have to make.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you.
Can you explain how the Department, Mr. DiLisio, intends to
conduct competition to build the T-AO(X)?
Mr. DiLisio. Yes, sir. We will put out an RFP [request for
proposal] with the requirements for the oiler in it. There will
be areas where the bidder will be able to associate bill of
material selections and/or arrangements. It is a commercial-
base ship, so there is a couple of very good offerors out there
that know a lot about building these commercial ships. So they
will be able to handle the bill of material as they put their
competitive pricing together, and we will take the best value
between capability and price once we get a chance to see those
bids.
Mr. Johnson. Now, do you anticipate that multiple teams
will be used to build the ship? And also, if you could give me
some idea of your potential bidders?
Mr. DiLisio. I believe we have qualified builders out there
that will--I mean, I would not want to presuppose how they
would go about bidding this, because primarily that is their
own business strategy, so I wouldn't want to get in and try to
predict how they may come at this piece of the business. But
the industrial base is fully capable of building them, so I
expect multiple bidders.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you.
Vice Admiral Brown, does the U.S. have enough commercial
and organic capacity to meet your requirement?
Admiral Brown. Sir, thank you for the question.
We do right now. However, we, in our organic surge fleet as
well as our commercial capacity, but as we discussed a little
bit earlier, we are concerned that we may be coming closer to a
tipping point where our ability to man some of the surge fleet
would be at risk if we lose additional international trade, so
that that is our main concern right now. The other piece is, as
I discussed, is our recapitalization plan that we have to put
in place here in the near term.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Gentleman yields back his time.
And Mr. Garamendi is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Forbes, thank you so much for the
courtesy of allowing me to join your hearing. Mr. Hunter and I
share responsibility on the Coast Guard maritime and therefore
this discussion is very relevant to that as well as to the
Armed Services Committee, so thank you.
A whole series of questions have been asked, many of which
I would have taken up, but the Ready Reserve Fleet and the
recapitalization of it, I think, Admiral Brown, you and Mr.
Jaenichen have talked about a timing and a proposal that you
are going to be putting together to deal with that piece of it.
Could you explain that in a little more detail?
Admiral Brown. Sir, right now our commitment from the Navy
is to put together a plan that would first be introduced in the
fiscal year 2017 budget.
Right now, there is not a requirement in the 2015 or 2016
budget, but we have to work out the details of the eaches of
each ship that would be retiring and have a replacement square
footage for those vessels.
Mr. Garamendi. Okay. So that would include not only the
design of the ship, the cost of the ships, when that money
would be necessary, when the construction would take place.
Does it also include the issue of refurbishing or refitting the
existing ships?
Admiral Brown. Yes, sir. If we decide to execute and extend
its service life of some of the vessels that could be aging
out, we would require investment to extend the life.
Mr. Garamendi. So we are going to be faced with a
significant budget and appropriation issue here as this comes
online; it's not now in the process, it is not in the plans
going forward. Is that correct?
Admiral Brown. Right. It is not currently in the plan, but
we have commitment from all the parties that we need to develop
that plan.
Mr. Garamendi. Okay. Does that include the Army?
Admiral Brown. The Army is a part of that discussion, yes,
sir.
Mr. Garamendi. I would think so, unless they decide to----
Admiral Brown. They are a major customer of sealift, yes,
sir.
Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Jaenichen, could you also address that
same question?
Mr. Jaenichen. Well, one of the things I think that we have
to take a look at is in addition to the recapitalization, we
are going to have to collectively take a look at what the
requirement is.
And your point about the Army, I think, is a critical one
in terms of what we have to lift and how we would have to lift
it to be able to support the Department of Defense's
operational planning and so as we take a look at the ships, the
admiral talked about the eaches. You know, for example, several
of the ships we had, the majority of them that are in the Ready
Reserve Force are Roll-on/Roll-off type vessels. And so some of
the replacement vessels that we may take a look at might be
larger and have more capacity.
In the admiral's written statement, he talks about the fact
that the RRF has about 1.6 million square feet of capacity that
will potentially go out of service and age out at the 50-year
point within the next decade, and we have to think about, you
know, how we do that. So for example, we may have, you know,
two or three ships that age out, but you could replace it with
one and have similar capacity. So we have to think about all of
those things together.
Mr. Garamendi. Since this particular issue bridges two
committees, two very different committees, it would be very
helpful to me, and I suspect to our committee, Mr. Hunter's
committee, to work with you between now and 2017 budget
proposal, so that we can be aware and provide whatever insight
we might have.
This next question goes to Mr. Jaenichen and it has to do
with the incentives that do exist in current law Title XI, the
CCF [Capital Construction Fund] program, the small shipyard
grant program. How does that integrate into what we are
discussing here on this Ready Reserve and the MSP program?
Mr. Jaenichen. The Title XI program is really a commercial
ship loan guarantee program. Currently, we have--as part of
carryover--we have not approved an application since 2011. We
are in the process of approving several. We have about $73
million in carryover, which supports about $750 million or so
of loan applications. So we are actually in good shape in terms
of what we have currently in the queue.
However, right now there are 30 vessels that are currently
on order, under construction, that includes tankers,
articulated tug and barges, large ocean-going supply vessels
and container vessels, and some of these are LNG [liquefied
natural gas] powered, as you know, that are being built down in
NASSCO [National Steel and Shipbuilding Company].
We know that there are more applications that will be
coming, and so we will have to evaluate how Title XI would be
funded going forward to be able to assure that we can support
that.
Mr. Garamendi. Do you personally have constraints--do the
constraints, are they going to limit your opportunities or the
opportunities of shipbuilders?
Mr. Jaenichen. You are talking about constraints in the
funding that we have available?
Mr. Garamendi. The amount of money.
Mr. Jaenichen. We may be at that point here within the next
15 to 18 months depending on the applications and again, the
applications that come in, we have to, you know, validate
through a very rigorous process their financial viability,
financial soundness to be able to get to the point where we can
actually guarantee that loan.
Mr. Garamendi. Yeah. As a guest to this committee, I am 4
seconds over.
Mr. Forbes, thank you for the courtesy.
Mr. Forbes. I thank the gentleman for his questions.
I think all of our Members have asked their questions. As I
mentioned at the beginning, I deferred my questions just to
have a few for you for the record if we could ask them.
The T-AOEs are the Navy's largest and fastest logistics
ships. The Navy has proposed to reduce two of the four ships
that each have over 10 years of service life remaining. Former
strike group commander Rear Admiral Tom Shannon suggested that
the T-AOs and the T-AKEs inability to keep up with carrier
strike groups would be a significant problem.
From a warfighting perspective, from how we operate and
exercise, from one-stop shopping from one ship as opposed to
bringing along two slower ships, I just think keeping the T-
AOEs is a very practical way to go.
Mr. DiLisio, from a warfighting perspective, how does a T-
AOE fit into our ability to project power? Will the reduction
in T-AOEs impair ability to project power? And how will our
ship logistics be changed as a result of the introduction of a
less-capable platform?
Mr. DiLisio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is no surprise to
me that a strike group commander would want an AOE as the
fastest ship because it does make things a little easier. The
time alongside for an AOE replenishment of a carrier is about a
6-hour evolution. That evolution can--I am sorry, a 4-hour
evolution, pardon me. The AO and AKE pair will do the same
evolution in about 6. So the capability is there; it may not be
the preferred capability, but the existing force is actually
matched up pretty well to do those types of replenishments at
sea. The 2-hour loss----
Mr. Forbes. Isn't that once they arrive?
Mr. DiLisio. In most cases, they are already in theater
waiting, because they are forward-hubbed. These are not
necessarily having to keep up with the race across the oceans.
All of the oilers and AKEs are forward-hubbed, so they can be
preplaced, so it is a matter of understanding and being able to
manage the battle space. That is one piece.
The second piece is, we still need to come through an
analysis we are actually in right now with fleet commanders to
make sure that we have got that right. As I am sitting here
today, we have not made that decision. We are still discussing
it. They get a vote in that position. There are only four AOEs
as we sit here right now. They don't enjoy any more protection
of themselves than an oiler or an AKE does in a theater of
battle, and when you get into a more stressful situation, you
need 14 oilers to take care of that situation.
So this is really not just about AOEs, it is about the
total force and whether or not you can bring the amount of
oilers to bear on a most-stressing scenario which is 14; and in
peacetime, it is actually the inverse of what you might think.
In peacetime, the oiler demand is actually higher because we
disperse the force in a greater regard across the globe. So
when you have a wartime scenario you are very focused, which
allows you to keep a smaller number of tankers in the mix.
Peacetime, they are everywhere.
And so right now, even if we were to get rid of the two
AOEs, we would have enough tankers to go perform the missions
we need to with little to no surge we would be right on the
number.
And again, I am not surprise that Admiral Shannon would
want an AOE. It is a very capable vessel, but it also carries a
very capable and impressive O&S cost.
Mr. Forbes. Admiral, you have just heard what Mr. DiLisio
has said, that he wasn't surprised that a strike group
commander would want a particular asset. We often hear that
with our COCOMs [combatant commanders], when we look at their
requirements in this gap that is being developed between what
they are asking and what we are actually giving them. And
oftentimes when we ask that question, we hear a similar
response, so I am not surprised that the COCOMs would want all
this.
What is your feeling in dealing with COCOMs on a regular
basis, and our strike group commanders? Are they asking
unreasonable things, or are they pretty much on the mark? And
then the other part of that is, if sea control will be
increasingly contested in the coming decade, should we
reconsider the need to build a T-AOE(X), or at least replicate
this capability as was planned earlier in the last decade?
Admiral Brown. Sir, thank you for your question.
Working with the COCOMs is something that we do every day
in our planning. As you know, the demand around the world for,
I would call them smaller contingencies, has actually gone up.
So the COCOMs in my experience that have been stationed at
EUCOM [European Command] do not ask for over what they think is
necessary, so it is a natural tension. We are in the process of
looking at different ways of providing forces forward.
So there will be an ongoing discussion with the COCOMs
about forward-deployed assets and what they ask for. But in
general, I think, they are not asking for things that they
personally feel are not required for executing their plan. And
one of the advantages that TRANSCOM has is we are able to pool
our assets and swing from one COCOM to the other rather
quickly. So by assigning the forces in the pool, that is
somewhat of an advantage to be able to swing quickly.
With regard to access, anti-access in future fights and
whatnot, we would in the scenarios that we look at, we would
definitely need, if we were going to take a major combat
operation and go forward to a location with our reserve surge
fleet, we would have to have at least a semi-permissible
environment so we would have to set the conditions to do that
ahead of time. And we have done that in the past, in history,
and we would have to continue to do that in the future. So in
terms of protecting ships as they go across, we, just so you
know, we don't have a lot of attrition built into our modeling.
So that is not something that we really build in there. So we
would have to----
Mr. Forbes. We have heard some testimony before this
subcommittee that perhaps as we look at what the Russians are
doing now, the Chinese are doing, maybe that assumption we have
had over the last decade or two that we were going to have
those permissive environments may at least need to be relooked.
Do you disagree with that testimony, or would you----
Admiral Brown. I concur, I would say they are being
relooked and they are being exercised. And we stay plugged in
with the COCOMs during all those exercises.
Mr. Forbes. Okay. Last year, the Navy placed one of three
maritime prepositioning squadrons, which specifically supported
the European commander, in layup. This reduces the flexibility
of the combatant commander from having Marine Corps equipment
available in Europe in case of a major Marine Corps deployment.
Can you quantify the loss of the European Command maritime
prepositioning squadron on the ability of EUCOM to project
forces in Europe?
Admiral Brown. Sir, those, the ships that were involved
there, they remain in our surge capability. So from a square
footage standpoint, we maintain the same amount of square
footage. So by bringing those forces back to the United States,
it adds somewhere around two weeks or so to our ability to
surge to that requirement should we need to in the future.
Mr. Forbes. Admiral and Mr. DiLisio, during the Cold War,
Combat Logistics Force ships were manned by U.S. Navy sailors
and armed with defensive systems to protect against air and
surface threats. Are there significant cost savings to the
current MSC [Military Sealift Command] model if the blue waters
become contested and the U.S. Navy is going to once again have
to fight for command of the seas, should we be considering
recommissioning a select group of Combat Logistics Force ships
back to the United States Navy?
Mr. DiLisio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You have acknowledged the cost differential. Their cost
would be very large. The current AOE does not enjoy any self-
defense weapons either. What we would need to do is, one,
continue to recapitalize our Kaiser class oilers because they
are about end of service life anyway, and we are going to have
to start capturing data on their performance. There is always a
tradeoff between whether or not the escort can provide that
coverage or whether the ship has to provide own ship coverage,
and I think we have to go look at those trades.
Right now, survivability is being studied, and I believe we
have done some briefing on carrier survivability and the CLF
[Combat Logistics Force] survivability right alongside. Right
now, we enjoy escort-type protection, and so we would have to
come through that conversation that said either that wasn't
good enough or we wanted to do something in addition or
something layered. We don't have any plans currently to do
that.
Mr. Forbes. Okay. I indicated to all three of you before
that at the end we were going to give you any time you needed
to add to the record whatever you think we have not asked or to
clarify anything that you feel was perhaps misrepresented.
So if at this time we could do that, and Mr. DiLisio, why
don't we start with you and we will work back, if that is okay.
Mr. DiLisio. Thank you, sir.
Two things and I will be brief. My comment on the strike
group commander is but one strike group, and there is a
worldwide balance of Combat Logistics Force necessary. So the
balance, and you will find Rear Admiral Shannon as the head of
Military Sealift Command today, is now challenged with his
global force management and supply across the entire world, not
just one strike group. So I wasn't trying to insinuate that he
has asked for something that he should not get, but that asset
may be somewhere else in the world inventory, and there is
usually more than one thing going on at a time. That was one.
Secondly, the entire conversation that we have had about
sealift has been primarily in the surge and sustainment
shipping area. What I would propose, and what my partners and I
have talked through, is getting the services to the table to
talk about how we address prepositioning, how we intend on the
sharp end of the stick to perform and deploy forces, has a lot
to do with how we then surge behind it and how we replenish and
how we do sustainment operations.
So I introduced in my oral statement three different
disciplines that we need to think about in this regard, and not
just buying a one-for-one replacement for square footage on the
surge side of this.
So if investment is tight, we need to make sure across this
entire three-tiered formula that we have got the investment
right and we put it in the right place.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Forbes. And I didn't mean to indicate that you were
belittling the strike group commander's comments. But I did
want to make it clear, because we hear this oftentimes as we
are doing all this dismantling of the military, when they come
and they say, no, this is acceptable risk, et cetera, and when
we say, well, the COCOMs are telling us this or the strike
commanders are telling us this, it is kind of like they get
poo-poo'd like, you know, they just reach for the sky.
That really isn't true because if all the stuff breaks
down, they are the guys we are looking to to make sure that we
are winning these conflicts, and I think we need to pay
attention to what they have to say.
Mr. Jaenichen.
Mr. Jaenichen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I would like to just point out that the U.S.
Merchant Marine, both the vessels and the mariners, are a
national asset. As we take a look at the ability to project
forces globally, it requires a capable U.S. Merchant Marine
both from a standpoint of having vessels that can do it and the
mariners that are able to be there, and so we need to have that
capacity.
We can invest billions in infrastructure, but one of the
critical components is the number of the mariners to man that
infrastructure, that equipment to be able to do that. And we
want them sailing commercial, if it is possible to be able to
do that. We don't want to be able to maintain them in a
reserved capacity and then man them up and spool them, as you
talked about, opening the faucet. It is better to have them
trained and operating all the time than it is to be able to
keep them in reserve status and hope they are ready when the
time comes.
We talked a little about the Maritime Security Program.
That program is under pressure. The House has proposed a $20
million cut to that program of $186 million. That $20 million
cut equates to essentially the loss of about seven ships in
that program and the reason I state seven is because it is a
delta between 18.6 and 21.7, which is the $3.1 million a year,
which is the annual stipend amount.
That force of 60 ships supports 2,700 mariners. As we have
talked about throughout this testimony, the mariners are the
critical component of this. Those 7 ships, if you lose them,
you lose, you know, 280 sailing mariner jobs. We need them.
The other thing that we talk about in terms of the MSP is
the infrastructure land side logistics that is provided by that
fleet of commercial ships. So we want to make sure that we are
able to maintain them viable in the commercial trade as well as
being able to have preference cargo and support sealift
requirements for sustainment for the Department of Defense.
With the cargos reducing, specifically on the DOD side,
which historically, at least over the last decade or so, has
provided about 87 percent of the revenue for the U.S.-flag
fleet and about 70 percent of what I would call the total
capacity in terms of dry bulk cargo that has been moved on
these ships. With that reducing, we have to evaluate how you
keep those ships viable in the program.
As I talked about in my testimony, the levers that are
available to us are to identify ways to get additional
commercial cargo. They are competing against foreign-flag,
which their cost on a daily average could be as low as $5,000 a
day; for a U.S.-flag it is $18,000 to $20,000 a day. That is a
very difficult delta to make up.
And so the other lever we have is the stipend amount, and
that has to be considered to be able to ensure that we have and
are able to maintain this fleet viable and capable to be able
to serve us from a national security standpoint.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Jaenichen, as I think you have also pointed
out very clearly, there is a domino, a ripple effect with all
of this. As you have fewer ships, you lose actually some of the
repair capabilities in the industrial base to fix other ships,
and then you create a culture that is difficult to get the
workforce that you need to have in to do the job that you need
to have done.
So Congressman Hunter and I were talking before he left
about trying to do something jointly, working with you to make
sure we help fill those gaps.
So thank you for the good work you are doing.
Mr. Jaenichen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate it.
Mr. Forbes. Admiral, we will give you the last word.
Admiral Brown. Sir, first, thank you for your committee
taking the interest in talking to us.
I think one of the concerns that we continue to have is,
that we didn't discuss, is the Budget Control Act potential
there that would have impacts across many, many programs, but
it definitely would impact our surge fleet, as well, and I
don't think Mr. DiLisio could work miracles in that situation.
He has up to this point.
Sir, TRANSCOM has to be ready 24/7 to be able to react to a
small contingency or a large contingency. We are adequately
positioned to do that today, and we appreciate the support that
we get from you in that regard. Our requirement has not
significantly changed because we are coming out of Afghanistan.
We have to maintain the capacity that we have currently.
Mr. Jaenichen mentioned the need to ensure we fully fund
the MSP program and we talked about the recapitalization plan
that we have to come back to the committee with in the near
future.
And lastly, I would like to conclude by thanking the
maritime industry, the mariners that sail every day
commercially and, you know, on our organic fleet in the Navy.
They truly are our heroes, and they allow TRANSCOM to do our
job every day.
So thank you very much, sir.
Mr. Forbes. Admiral, and both of you, gentlemen, thank you
so much for your service to our country. Thanks for sharing
this time with us, and we look forward to working with you in
the future.
And if there is no additional comments or questions, we are
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:09 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
July 30, 2014
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
July 30, 2014
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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
July 30, 2014
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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER
Mr. DiLisio. Mobile Landing Platform (MLP 3) is being built as an
Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB) variant. MLP 3 AFSB is currently
under construction at NASSCO and is expected to deliver in Fiscal Year
(FY) 2015. The second MLP AFSB, MLP 4 AFSB, is planned to be awarded to
NASSCO in 2014. The President's Budget submittal for FY 2015 includes a
third MLP AFSB, MLP 5 AFSB in FY 2017 but did not include advanced
procurement funds for the ship. [See page 11.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
July 30, 2014
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES
Mr. Forbes. If sea control will be increasingly contested in the
coming decade, should we re-consider the need to build a T-AOE(X), as
was planned earlier the last decade?
Admiral Brown. If built, the T-AOE(X) Fleet Oiler would be managed
by the Military Sealift Command, through U.S. Navy operations.
USTRANSCOM would have no operational control of T-AOE(X) assets. The
Navy is in the best position to provide information concerning building
a T-AOE(X).
Mr. Forbes. Today, the U.S. military has a selected set of supply
depots and refineries overseas. Does the Navy's logistic ship
requirement reflect the likelihood that the fleet may need to depend on
a larger number of geographically dispersed refineries and depots
ashore in a conflict?
Admiral Brown. USTRANSCOM does not have operational control or
influence on how the U.S. Navy logistically supports the fleets. The
Navy is in the best position to provide information about the U.S.
Navy's logistic ship requirement.
Mr. Forbes. The advent of longer range threats to carrier strike
groups (like the DF-21D, advanced conventional submarines and long-
range aircraft armed with advanced anti-ship missiles, etc.) suggests
that in the future carrier aircraft may need to conduct high-intensity
operations much farther from their targets than they have in the past.
Has the Navy analyzed the impact of such operations on the demand for
logistic ship support to carrier strike groups, and if so what did it
find?
Admiral Brown. The demand for fleet logistics ships in support of
U.S. Naval Forces underway is an internal U.S. Navy issue. USTRANSCOM
does not conduct analysis on the demand for logistic ship support to
carrier strike groups. U.S. Navy would be in the best position to
answer this question.
Mr. Forbes. Today, the U.S. military has a selected set of supply
depots and refineries overseas. Does the Navy's logistic ship
requirement reflect the likelihood that the fleet may need to depend on
a larger number of geographically dispersed refineries and depots
ashore in a conflict?
Mr. DiLisio. The Navy's logistic ship requirement reflects the
number required to support the Global Force Management Allocation Plan
(GFMAP). GFMAP presence values are based on the SecDef approved
assessment of combatant ship presence required in theaters for national
defense and other priorities. Based on these combatant presence
requirements, Navy Fleet commanders determine the CLF ship presence
needed in each theater to support this force. Fuel refinery and depot
locations are important variables among others that, in the aggregate,
determine the requirement. Working with other DoD entities (e.g.,
Defense Logistics Agency), the Navy constantly reviews options to
ensure appropriate support is in place to meet requirements. As policy
and plans evolve, the numbers (and locations) may change.
Mr. Forbes. On June 23, 2014 the Navy responded to a HASC inquiry
pertaining to the current status of the LMSR Crane Control Upgrade
Program. The Navy response indicated that additional Pier-side and
Afloat testing of the CC3000 crane control system were expected as part
of the next phase of the program. The response stated that the Navy was
currently developing a work package and contract award to support an FY
15 shipboard installation and testing of the CC3000 control system on a
full ship set of four cranes (two twin pedestal cranes). Will this
installation and testing be implemented with FY 14 funding and executed
within CY 2015?
Mr. DiLisio. Efforts to test the CC3000 crane control system have
been put on hold pending identification of funding. Navy will monitor
commercial progress of the technology for future potential application.
Mr. Forbes. We understand that the targeted ship for this
installation and testing is the USNS Sisler. What is the current status
for executing this installation and testing on the USNS Sisler?
Mr. DiLisio. Efforts to test the CC3000 crane control system have
been put on hold pending identification of funding. Ship to be used for
installation and testing has yet to be identified. Navy will monitor
commercial progress of the technology for future potential application.
Mr. Forbes. If the installation and testing are successful, what is
the Navy's plan for installing the CC3000 upgrade across the LMSR
fleet?
Mr. DiLisio. Efforts to test the CC3000 crane control system have
been put on hold pending identification of funding. Navy will monitor
commercial progress of the technology for future potential application.
All current and future efforts will continue to balance the need to
keep existing cranes in service and capable of performing their mission
against components that become obsolete for missions that require
greater control for more complex lifts.
[all]