[Senate Hearing 113-156]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 113-156
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SECURITY
SITUATION IN NORTH AFRICA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 21, 2013
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
TOM UDALL, New Mexico JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TIM KAINE, Virginia RAND PAUL, Kentucky
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Daniel E. O'Brien, Staff Director
Lester E. Munson III, Republican Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS
TIM KAINE, Virginia, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Dory, Amanda, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, African
Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC............ 10
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Robert Menendez............................................ 58
Joscelyn, Thomas, senior fellow, Foundation for Defense of
Democracies, Washington, DC.................................... 36
Prepared statement........................................... 38
Kaine, Hon. Tim, U.S. Senator from Virginia, opening statement... 1
Lawrence, William, visiting professor of political science and
international affairs, George Washington University's Elliott
School of International Affairs, Washington, DC................ 30
Romanowski, Alina, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Middle East
Bureau, U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington,
DC............................................................. 14
Prepared statement........................................... 16
Schmierer, Richard, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State, Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 5
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator
Robert Menendez............................................ 51
Wehrey, Frederic, senior associate in the Middle East Program,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC..... 33
Prepared statement........................................... 35
(iii)
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SECURITY SITUATION IN NORTH AFRICA
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THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 2013
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and
South and Central Asian Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:16 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Tim Kaine
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Kaine and Risch.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TIM KAINE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA
Senator Kaine. Let me call this hearing to order. This is
the Subcommittee on Near Eastern, South and Central Asian
Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
I want to welcome two panels of excellent witnesses before
us today to address political, economic, and security situation
and developments in North Africa. We have two wonderful panels.
I indicated to our first panel for a few seconds that we have
had an interesting day on the floor, and there will be some
more votes later today.
The ranking member, Senator Risch, has invited witnesses to
participate as well, and we will likely be in and out during
the hearing, but I think it is a good idea to go ahead and get
started.
What I will do is give some opening comments, and then I
will turn it to the witnesses and ask them to comment for about
5 minutes each, and then we will get into some Q&A, and then we
will repeat with the second panel the same basic format,
allowing other Senators who are here to ask questions as well.
This is my first hearing as chair of this subcommittee. I
was the chairman of the International Development Subcommittee
until late July, and then with the change in the membership of
the FRC occasioned by the election of Senator Ed Markey, there
was a switching in the committee chairs, and I am very excited
to tackle this important region as is described here in this
building from Marrakesh to Bangladesh.
I am excited to begin my chairmanship with a hearing on
North Africa within that very broad and probably unmanageably
broad scope of real estate in North Africa. We sometimes pay a
little less attention to it than I think we should, and I
wanted to begin here, and especially in a propitious way since
King Mohammed VI of Morocco is visiting the White House this
week, I thought it was a good thing to do and coincident with
his visit.
Three years ago, a young Tunisian unleashed a wave of mass
political protest and change across North Africa and the
broader Middle East, and also across the world. The Arab Spring
has affected each of the countries of North Africa that we will
discuss today. Morocco and Algeria have maintained basic
political continuity during the Arab Spring. We will likely
hear about some significant security status and political
reform status about each of those countries today.
Tunisia and Libya have undergone fundamental and at times
violent political change. Tunisia is participating in a
national dialogue, and Tunisians seem generally committed to a
democratic process, but in each of these countries there is
significant work to do.
There are regional debates among these four countries about
governance, accountability, the transparency of reforms, the
effectiveness of governmental programs, economic liberalization
and the role of religion and military in public life.
While the political and societal debates will go on for a
long time, as they do here, the deterioration of security
conditions recently has raised important questions and has
raised the stakes certainly for local citizens and communities,
and also for the United States and our interests. Violent
extremist groups appear to be exploiting porous borders in the
region and the weaknesses of security forces across North
Africa. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, AQIM, its affiliates
and breakaway factions, and movements referring to themselves
as Ansar al-Sharia are also capitalizing on divisive and entity
issues, as well as popular frustrations with the slow pace of
reforms in these transitional states.
AQIM at this point--we will have testimony about this--does
not appear to pose an imminent threat to the United States
outside of North and West Africa, but we are all concerned
about its capacity to strike at civilian populations, at allied
nations, and at United States and other Western interests, and
also the role of these groups in regional arms trafficking and
ties to other extremist organizations. I know we have witnesses
who are very well prepared to talk about this today.
Since late 2010, U.S. policy has sought to encourage
greater political openness and participation in North Africa
while not undermining other foreign policy priorities,
especially the efforts to combat terrorism. I want to hear
about that balance.
In the budget environment, which is very challenging--I am
on the budget committee as well--we are engaged in a budget
conference which, if it works, would be the first example of a
successful budget conference in a divided Congress since 1986.
But one of the realities about the budget conference that we
all grapple with is resource limitations. So large increases in
U.S. assistance packages are not realistic at the current time.
I want to hear about programs, especially from the USAID
perspective, policies and tools to address challenges in North
Africa that do not come with high dollar figures but rely on
innovation and smart investments, and how we are coordinating
and leveraging those investments together with our
international partners.
A few words about each of the countries in the region.
Morocco remains a staunch counterterrorism and security
partner. We have a free trade agreement with Morocco, and
Virginia ports, just to use my own State as an example, have
strong business partnerships in Morocco. King Mohammad VI's
visit with the President tomorrow is an important one to ratify
and continue to express appreciation for a long-standing
alliance that goes back into the 1770s. Senator Menendez and I
sent a letter to the President this week encouraging the
President to continue to build upon this relationship. I see
opportunities with Morocco potentially as a positive example
for the way the United States engages the rest of the region.
The United States has a strong dialogue with Algeria. We
want to hear about the Algerian agenda. I know our relationship
with Algeria is improving, especially as we face the common
challenges and enemy of the AQIM. I would love to hear about
ways from these witnesses' perspectives about how the Moroccan-
Algerian relationship could be improved. There are economic
opportunities being lost every day as a result of that tension,
and that would, of course, mean addressing the long-disputed
territories in the western Sahara.
Tunisia sought, sadly, to high-profile political
assassinations in 2013, but the citizens still have high hopes
for successful democratic transition. The Islamist Party, Al
Nehadi, is engaging in what appears to be real political and
democratic dialogue, the National Dialogue. We will hear about
that. Secular and Islamist tensions persist, and powerful trade
unions remain an effective regulator of the political process.
I am anxious to hear about the prospects of the success of that
dialogue, and United States programs to foster Tunisia's
democratic process.
Libya is, obviously, a very, very vexing challenge, as this
Nation knows so very well. The lack of security is threatening
prospects for any real political process. We will hear, in our
second panel, from a witness who is an expert on Libya--who is
actually just back from Libya--Fred Wehrey from the Carnegie
Institute, landed just yesterday, where he has been studying
the militias, and we are looking forward to hearing that
testimony.
Libya is different in that it does not need a lot of
financial assistance. It has ample natural resources. But Libya
needs capacity-building and training. Militias need to be
disarmed, which is a huge task, and we are worried about porous
borders and weapons proliferation, arms finding their way to
Egypt, Gaza, and Syria.
I know the United States, along with international
partners, is working on a comprehensive security assistance
program, and we will hear about that.
Of course, we cannot talk about Libya without mentioning
the tragedy at Benghazi on September 11, 2012. Four brave
American public servants were killed. There has been a lot of
attention on that. There has been a lot of effort to affix
blame and also, and more importantly, an effort to learn what
went wrong and what we can do to improve the safety of our
Embassy and security personnel not only in North Africa but
around the world.
I have been happy as a member of the Foreign Relations
Committee to work on efforts with the Department of State to
implement some of the recommendations of the Accountability
Review Board to make sure that we can continue to carry out
vigorous and aggressive diplomacy, but also to take the steps
that we need to keep our embassy personnel safe.
We need to reward those and protect those and support those
who do what Ambassador Chris Stevens and his colleagues were
doing there. They believed in improving the livelihood of
Libyans and promoting U.S. interests, and they felt that those
were consistent, not inconsistent. Ambassador Stevens had so
many close friends in the State Department and in Virginia. Dr.
William Lawrence, who is on our second panel, was a close
friend, and we look forward to hearing from him.
So, this is about our current status in North Africa and
what our policies and orientation should be going forward. We
want to break down barriers in the region. We want to hear
about economic opportunities and the potential for economic
integration, and we also want to talk about other initiatives
such as the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership which
works with 10 countries in west North Africa, including
Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria.
I will reserve opening statements for Senator Risch for
when he arrives and move right to the panel. Let me now
introduce the first panel to you.
Ambassador Richard Schmierer is the Acting Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of Near Eastern
Affairs. He served as Ambassador to Oman and is the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Iraq. He began his diplomatic
career in 1980 and has served all over Europe and the Middle
East.
Ms. Amanda Dory currently serves as the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for African Affairs in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense. Prior to this, she served as the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and received a
Presidential Rank Award for her work on the 2010 Quadrennial
Defense Review. Her nongovernmental experience includes
positions with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
Foreign Policy Magazine, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Project.
And finally on the first panel, Ms. Alina Romanowski
currently serves as the Deputy Assistant Administrator for the
Middle East Bureau of USAID. Since March 2013, she has
fulfilled the duties of Assistant Administrator. She oversees a
large and varied portfolio that provides about $1.5 billion
annually in assistance across the Middle East region. Ms.
Romanowski also served for 14 years at the Defense Department
in senior positions involving the Near East and South Asia.
I would like to ask the witnesses to deliver opening
statements in the order in which I introduced you, and
following that we will begin questions and answers.
So, Mr. Schmierer, to you first.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD SCHMIERER, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF STATE, NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Schmierer. Well, Chairman Kaine, thank you very much
for the invitation to be here today, and it is a particular
honor to appear here with my colleagues, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Defense Amanda Dory, and Deputy Assistant
Administrator Alina Romanowski, with whom I enjoy working on a
regular basis.
We welcome the opportunity to speak to you on the issues
you have just outlined and certainly look forward to answering
any questions that you or your colleagues may have.
I have a fuller statement which I asked to be submitted for
the record.
Senator Kaine. Without objection.
Mr. Schmierer. And with your permission, I would like to
just simply summarize my remarks.
As you have just indicated, North Africa, which is known in
Arabic as the Maghreb, is a region of tremendous potential. It
is the birthplace of the Arab Awakening, and it is currently
undergoing a difficult but critical transformation. Tunisia
pursues efforts to achieve the democratic promise of its 2011
revolution, as Libya continues to undertake its democratic
transition while confronting numerous challenges on the
political, security, and economic fronts. Morocco and Algeria
have undertaken a more gradual reform process. They remain key
regional sources of stability and have assumed increasingly
important roles in our global effort to combat terrorism and
extremism.
We continue to enjoy a very strong bilateral partnership
with Morocco, a relationship that we look forward to
strengthening during the visit of King Mohammed VI this week to
Washington. This is an opportunity to discuss the best means of
promoting security and prosperity in the region.
Under King Mohammed VI, the political system has gradually
liberalized. A new constitution was adopted in 2011, and
Morocco's first Islamist-led government won nationwide
democratic elections. We will continue to support Morocco as it
undertakes these important reforms.
In Algeria, Mr. Chairman, we have also built a strong
relationship characterized by our shared interests to combat
terrorism and facilitate greater regional stability. In
addition, we are focused on developing a more robust economic
partnership and supporting civil society development. We have
encouraged Algeria to continue to expand its regional
leadership role to stabilize neighboring states, which struggle
to address terrorist threats, loose weapons, and porous
borders.
Our continued engagement in Libya is absolutely essential,
Mr. Chairman. It is in our national security interest to ensure
that Libya becomes a stable and democratic partner. Faced with
daily violence, the Libyan Government has been unable to
address the country's overlapping challenges. We stand ready to
support future elections in Libya, as well as constitutional
drafting and national dialogue efforts necessary for security
and governance to take root.
As a part of this effort, we have agreed to train 5,000 to
8,000 members of a general purpose force with Italy and the
United Kingdom to be the core of a new Libyan Army. We are also
in the process of beginning to implement a global security
contingency fund border security program to provide technical
expertise, training and equipment to build Libya's border
security capacity.
Yet, security is only part of the solution. We also welcome
the opportunity with our partners to help the Libyan Government
build its governance capacity.
And finally, Mr. Chairman, we continue to view Tunisia as
one of the region's best hopes for a successful transition to
democracy. The assassination of an opposition politician in
July led to calls for the dissolution of the government. Civil
society mediators have been facilitating negotiations between
the government and the opposition. We are encouraging Tunisian
leaders across the political spectrum to continue efforts to
finalize a constitution that respects the universal rights of
all Tunisians and to set an election date. It also remains a
top priority to help bolster Tunisian security capacity.
This region remains vital to protecting our national
interests as we look to maintain relationships with key allies
and to nudge nascent democracies through difficult transitions,
with the aim of promoting stability and countering extremist
threats.
Chairman Kaine, thank you for the opportunity to testify
before you today. I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schmierer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard Schmierer
Chairman Kaine, Ranking Member Risch, members of the subcommittee,
it is an honor to appear before you to provide background on U.S.
engagement and policy in North Africa. As you know, this is an area of
strategic importance to the Obama administration.
I am also pleased to appear before you today with USAID Deputy
Assistant Administrator Alina Romanowski and Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Defense Amanda Dory. I have had the pleasure of working closely
with both Ms. Romanowski and Ms. Dory for some time to further our
foreign policy objectives in the region and to protect our national
security interests. We welcome the opportunity to speak to you today
and look forward to answering any questions you may have regarding
North Africa and our policy.
Mr. Chairman, as you know, North Africa--known in Arabic as the
Maghreb--is a region of tremendous potential. The birthplace of the
Arab Awakening, it is currently undergoing a difficult but critical
transformation. Tunisia continues efforts to achieve the democratic
promise of its 2011 revolution, even as it faces significant security
and economic challenges. Libya continues to undertake a democratic
transition following a successful revolution, yet confronts numerous
challenges on the political, security, and economic fronts. Libya
struggles with the daily threat of violence posed by a lack of security
and political consensus, yet our continued engagement there is
absolutely essential. Morocco and Algeria have undertaken more gradual
reform processes. They remain key regional sources of stability and
have assumed increasingly important roles in our global effort to
combat terrorism and extremism. At the same time, the strained
relationship between Algeria and Morocco also limits regional
cooperation and development, which is essential if any regional bodies
are to evolve into credible forces for regional stability--in the
Maghreb and the Sahel.
morocco
We continue to enjoy a very strong bilateral relationship with
Morocco, focused on promoting regional stability, supporting democratic
reform efforts, countering violent extremism, and strengthening trade
and cultural ties. Morocco--a major non-NATO ally since 2004--is one of
our closest counterterrorism partners in the region, and an active
member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum. During its current term on
the U.N. Security Council, Morocco is playing an important role in
international efforts to end the Syrian civil war. We also enjoy a
strong economic relationship; a bilateral free trade agreement that
entered into force in 2006 has increased bilateral trade by 244
percent.
We look forward to strengthening this bilateral relationship during
this week's visit of King Mohammed VI to Washington. This is an
opportunity for the United States to reaffirm our close strategic
partnership with Morocco and to discuss the best means of promoting
security and prosperity in the region. In particular, we look forward
to deepening our consultations on regional issues, and will stress our
shared priorities in Mali, Syria, the Maghreb, and the Sahel. We look
forward to continuing our conversations at the next session of the
U.S.-Morocco Strategic Dialogue. Unfortunately, Secretary Kerry had to
postpone the Dialogue in order to attend urgent negotiations in Geneva
in mid-November, but we look forward to rescheduling the Strategic
Dialogue soon.
Under King Mohammed VI, the Moroccan political system has gradually
liberalized; the King founded the Arab world's first truth and
reconciliation commission--to investigate abuses that occurred during
his father's reign--and expanded women's rights. A new constitution was
adopted in 2011, and Morocco's first Islamist-led government won
nationwide democratic elections, but much progress remains to be made
on implementing the guarantees and institutions including increasing
engagement of its citizens, under the new constitution. We have a
robust dialogue with the Moroccan Government on human rights and ways
in which we can support the ongoing process of political reform.
We will continue to support Morocco as it undertakes these
important reform efforts. Our bilateral assistance--roughly $31 million
in FY 2013--focuses on promoting economic, political, and social
reforms; deepening our security partnership by supporting modern
military and law enforcement agencies; promoting export control and
antiterrorism as well as countering violent extremism efforts;
developing a professional criminal justice system; and encouraging
broad-based economic growth that provides expanded opportunities for
women and youth. Our flagship assistance program has been Morocco's
$698 million Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact, which
closed in September and focused on agriculture, fisheries, and
artisans.
With regards to the Western Sahara, we support the United Nations-
led process designed to bring about a peaceful, sustainable, and
mutually acceptable solution to the Western Sahara question. We also
support the work of the U.N. Secretary General's Personal Envoy for the
Western Sahara and urge the parties to work toward a resolution.
algeria
Algeria and the United States have built a strong bilateral
relationship, characterized by our shared interests to combat terrorism
and facilitate greater stability in the region. We are also focused on
developing a more robust trade and economic partnership and supporting
the development of civil society groups. Unfortunately, Secretary Kerry
had to postpone the U.S.-Algeria Strategic Dialogue in order to attend
urgent negotiations in Geneva earlier this month, and we look forward
to rescheduling it soon.
Algeria has made steady and consistent progress on human rights and
political transparency over the past 20 years. We are encouraging the
government to create space for a more vibrant civil society and
inclusive democratic process through supporting small civil society
initiatives, such as funding training for local election monitors. We
also aim to increase educational exchanges with young Algerians,
including promoting English language learning.
The wealth from Algeria's significant hydrocarbon reserves has
empowered the state at the expense of overall economic development,
dampening employment, and the development of human capital. We continue
to encourage Algeria to make market-oriented changes that expand job
opportunities and increase its attractiveness to foreign direct
investment. With that in mind, we are working to strengthen our trade
relationship with Algeria, and are seeking to reactivate the 2001 Trade
and Investment Framework Agreement. General Electric recently signed a
$2.7 billion deal to provide gas turbines to Algeria, an example of the
benefits of our efforts to promote U.S. business in Algeria. This deal
alone will help create 4,000 American jobs.
We have encouraged Algeria to continue to expand its regional
leadership role to help stabilize neighboring states, which struggle to
address terrorist threats, loose weapons, and porous borders. Algeria's
experience fighting an Islamist insurgency during the 1990s resulted in
a well-equipped and battle-hardened military that constitutes the
strongest counterterrorism force in the region. We will continue to
encourage Algeria to use this expertise to train and partner with less
experienced militaries and law enforcement units in the region to help
ensure greater stability in the Sahel and Maghreb. Algeria has
purchased U.S. equipment via Direct Commercial Sales, but has not
overcome its significant reservations about the Foreign Military Sales
program. We also support countering violent extremist efforts seeking
to provide positive alternatives for at risk youth.
libya
Since the 2011 revolution, Libya has faced significant political
and security challenges. Yet our continued engagement there is
absolutely essential. It is in our national security interest to ensure
Libya becomes a stable and democratic partner capable of addressing
regional security challenges and advancing our shared interests. A
successful democratic transition will result in a strategic partner
with significant energy reserves and the ability to exert a positive
and stabilizing influence in a critical region.
Mr. Chairman, let me assure you that, despite its challenges, Libya
is making progress. In the first credible, transparent, and largely
peaceful elections in a generation, Libyans elected a General National
Congress (GNC) in July 2012, and the government continues to take steps
toward establishing a constitution. More recently, the Prime Minister's
staff, and the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) have
taken steps to move a national dialogue process forward to help resolve
political differences. The Libyan Government and GNC have taken steps
to pass a transitional justice law, which will help guide national
justice and reconciliation efforts. The Justice Minister has also taken
to heart recommendations for prison reform. The United States has
signed memoranda of understanding with the Libyan Government to
increase cooperation on education reform, cultural preservation, and
chemical weapons destruction. In addition, 681 candidates for the
constitutional drafting committee registered in October and November
2013. NATO recently agreed to respond positively to Prime Minister
Zeidan's request for support in security sector capacity building.
Yet while the government enjoys democratic legitimacy, it lacks the
ability to project its authority across the country or fulfill many
core government functions. Faced with competing factions and the daily
threat of violence, the Libyan Government and political actors have
been unable to address the country's overlapping challenges. A
political agreement is necessary to advance the National Dialogue and
enable the constitution-drafting process to unfold, empowering the
government to improve governance and establish security in the interim.
The government must also work to demonstrate that Libya's vast natural
resources will be used to benefit the entire Libyan population, and use
those resources to promote economic growth. We stand ready to support
future elections in Libya, as well as constitutional drafting and
national dialogue efforts necessary for security and governance to take
root.
After 42 years of dictatorship, Libya suffers from instability and
poor governance due to weak institutions, wide, porous borders, huge
stockpiles of loose conventional weapons, and the presence of militias,
some of whom have extremist ties. Without capable police and national
security forces that work with communities, security, and justice
sector institutions struggle to fulfill their mandate, and rule of law
is undermined, enabling criminality, illicit trade, and frustration to
grow. The government has struggled to wrest power and influence from
militias, which continue to wield local and regional power; the absence
of political consensus on the way forward hampers these efforts. In a
direct challenge to the weak central government, various actors--
including federalist, militia, and ethnic groups--have blocked
production and exports at many of Libya's onshore facilities.
Our assistance efforts are focused on providing support in order to
build the capacity of Libyan institutions to face these challenges and
to ensure a peaceful transition to democracy. Since Libya is a wealthy
nation, we view our assistance in these areas as seed money intended to
jump-start and unlock Libyan investment in programs that ultimately the
government must own. To improve the government's ability to establish
stability throughout the country, we responded positively to a request
this spring from Prime Minister Zeidan that we help to train a General
Purpose Force (GPF) to be the core of a new Libyan Army. At the U.K.-
hosted G8 summit in June, we pledged to train a 5,000-8,000 member GPF,
prompting the U.K. and Italy to pledge to train 2,000 members each. The
GPF assistance will be paid for by the Libyan Government through a
Foreign Military Sales case which will need to be congressionally
notified.
Border security is also a critical U.S. and international concern
in Libya. Libya's uncontrolled borders permit the flow not only of
destabilizing Qadhafi-era conventional weapons, but also violent
extremists throughout North Africa, the Middle East, and the Sahel. The
flow of these foreign fighters has increased since the fall of Qadhafi
and was highlighted by the January 2013 attack in Amenas, Algeria. We
are in the process of beginning to implement a Global Security
Contingency Fund (GSCF) border security program to provide technical
expertise, training, and limited equipment to build Libya's
interministerial border security capacity to address security along its
southern land border. This program includes training and equipment
programming for Libya's neighbors--Chad, Niger, and Algeria--to improve
border security cooperation with Libya. In addition, we have a GSCF
training and equipment program to build special operations forces
capacity.
Libya's European partners also provide significant amounts of
security and justice sector assistance to Libya. We ensure that our
assistance complements their efforts and responds to the security needs
identified by the Libyan Government. Given constraints on Libyan
capacity to accept international assistance, a difficult security
environment, and persistent instability, implementing pledged
assistance is challenging, and often takes more time than expected. If
we continue to help Libya build its capacity, however, these challenges
can lessen.
We have made commitments to support Libya's security sector with
the knowledge that enhanced security is only part of the solution. We
also welcome the opportunity, with our international partners, to help
the Libyan Government build its governance capacity. We support the
Libyan Government and civil society groups in their work to construct
the foundations of a new democratic society in Libya through capacity-
building programs for nascent civil society organizations, political
parties, the GNC, selected local councils, and media institutions, and
work with partners to engage women and youth as active participants in
the democratic transition.
tunisia
Tunisia remains one of the Middle East and North Africa's best
hopes for a successful transition to democracy. Efforts continue to
finalize a new constitution and set a date for democratic elections for
President and Parliament. Tunisia's constituent assembly--tasked with
drafting the constitution--completed a fourth draft in June. This draft
incorporates human rights norms, including equality between women and
men, and respect for rule of law.
As with all transitions, of course, there are also challenges. This
year, there have been two assassinations of opposition politicians: one
in February and one in July.
Following the July assassination, there were widespread, peaceful
demonstrations calling for the dissolution of the government. Civil
society mediators have since been facilitating negotiations between the
government and the opposition, with the goal of implementing a
political transition roadmap. We are encouraging Tunisian leaders
across the political spectrum to continue their efforts to finalize a
constitution that respects the human rights of all Tunisians and to set
a date for credible and transparent elections so the Tunisian people
can determine their country's future.
As we saw with the unfortunate killings of politicians and most
recently the attempted suicide attacks in tourist areas, violent
extremists continue to seek to derail the country's efforts to
transition to democracy peacefully and successfully. Over the past
year, the Tunisian Government has taken a more aggressive stance
against extremism, by raiding weapons caches and undertaking an
operation to root out terrorists in the country's western region. In
late August, the Government of Tunisia designated Ansar al Sharia--
Tunisia (AAS-T) a terrorist organization, and the security forces have
since banned the group's activities and made several high level
arrests.
This approach is not without its challenges. The Tunisian military
and security forces require additional training and equipment to
counter the newly evolving terrorist threat. Improving and deepening
our security cooperation is of top importance in our bilateral
relationship. We have bolstered our assistance to help Tunisia reform
its criminal justice sector to improve its ability to protect Tunisians
and foreigners alike, as well as confront domestic and regional
security challenges. For example, in September 2013, our two countries
signed a letter of agreement to expand programming to reform and
improve the capacity of the police and corrections officials. The other
challenge is ensure that this aggressive, security based approach is
balanced with proven methods to prevent recruitment into violent
extremist organizations. We are working with Tunisia to explore ways to
provide at-risk groups with alternatives and preventing further
marginalization or disconnection of these groups.
We also continue to provide foreign assistance via a number of
mechanisms to support Tunisia's transition from dictatorship to a
prosperous democratic country. On the economic front, we are helping
Tunisia expand economic growth and opportunity to all citizens, and
encouraging it to undertake market-oriented and institutional reforms.
Our focus with existing programs has been to spur job creation and
provide entrepreneurship training as well as to enhance access to
finance for small and medium enterprises. At the same time, we continue
to fund programs that support Tunisia's democratic political processes
and plan to support international and domestic elections observation
missions.
protecting our interests
Chairman Kaine, Ranking Member Risch, and members of the
subcommittee, I want to thank you for the opportunity to testify before
you today. Certainly, we are aware that our budgets are facing
increasing pressure, but this region remains vital to protecting our
national interests, as we look to maintain relationships with key
allies and to nudge nascent democracies through difficult transitions,
with the hope of promoting stability and countering extremist threats
in the Middle East and Africa. With careful, targeted assistance, and
smart diplomatic engagement, we are successfully advancing our key
strategic interests.
Thank you again for your time and attention. I look forward to
answering your questions.
Senator Kaine. Thank you very much.
Ms. Dory.
STATEMENT OF AMANDA DORY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE, AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Dory. Chairman Kaine, I am pleased to appear before
this subcommittee for the first time to provide an update on
the security situation in North Africa and the Department of
Defense's engagement strategy in the region. DOD is committed
to working closely with the State Department to enhance U.S.
Government security assistance to build the capacity of North
African security forces. Our strategic approach recognizes that
developing strong and responsive defense institutions can
support regional stability, allowing partner militaries to
operate under civilian authority while respecting the rule of
law and international human rights.
Each of the four countries under discussion today faces a
differ-
ing array of political, economic, and governance challenges as
a result of the political upheavals that you have already
cited. North African countries will continue to face security
challenges, and addressing those challenges will take time,
particularly in the case of Libya.
Our goals are to focus on long-term institution-building
and regional cooperation in coordination with other countries,
to be supportive of host nation requests, and to maintain a
limited and effective U.S. military footprint in the region.
In Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, DOD maintains close
military-to-military ties with our respective senior military
and civilian counterparts. Our shared security goals include
countering terrorism and enhancing cross-border security. We
regularly engage with counterpart defense institutions in each
of the three governments on a bilateral basis to ensure
alignment of goals and prioritization of security cooperation
activities.
In addition to bilateral engagements, the Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Partnership, TSCTP, is a multiyear regional
program that brings State Department, Department of Defense,
and USAID together to build the capacity and resilience of the
governments and communities in the Sahel and Maghreb to address
the threat of violent extremist organizations.
A few quick remarks on each of the countries.
With Libya, Libya remains a country with a very difficult
democratic transition. Militia violence and consequent
retributive attacks continue within the country. The Libyan
Government is unable to control its borders, contributing to
instability from Mali westward within the Sahel. The Department
of Defense is prioritizing assistance to focus on building
Libyan security institutional capacity and on improving the
government's ability to counter terrorism, and to secure and
destroy its chemical weapons stockpiles.
On the latter point, our chemical weapons abatement program
with Libya is on schedule to eliminate remaining Libyan
chemical weapons by the end of 2013 in accordance with Libya's
international commitments.
And thanks to congressional support, this fiscal year the
United States will work with Libya to develop their capacity to
conduct counterterrorism operations and border security,
particularly along the southern land border.
Additionally, in response to requests from the Prime
Minister, we have offered to provide General Purpose Force
military training, as already mentioned. The training is
intended to help the government build the military it requires
to protect government institutions and maintain order. This
effort builds on the G8 summit announcement that focused on the
expansion of support for Libya's security sector.
In Tunisia, Tunisia's military deserves tremendous credit
for supporting and protecting the population during Tunisia's
democratic transition. The government continues to grapple with
the threat of violent extremism. Our assistance to the security
sector focuses on counterterrorism support, border security
training, and a continuation of long-standing programs such as
the International Military Education and Training Program and
Foreign Military Financing.
Algeria has been a critical security partner in countering
regional violent extremist organizations. In particular, it is
a linchpin in the struggle against Al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb, AQIM, and its affiliates. The January 2013 terrorist
attack against the In Amenas oil facility highlighted the
growing transnational threats in the region. The Algerian
military continues to conduct successful interdiction
operations on its southern border against AQIM and affiliates.
Additionally, Algeria provides training and equipment
assistance to its neighbors, contributing to broader regional
efforts. DOD engages with Algeria across a range of activities,
to include IMAT information-sharing and exercises.
With Morocco, the United States and the Kingdom of Morocco
share a long history of bilateral relations. Morocco has been a
strong partner in the struggle against terrorism. The visit of
the King this week has already been referenced. The Secretary
of Defense and Secretary of State had an excellent meeting with
him yesterday to discuss shared concerns, and our long-standing
security cooperation with the Moroccans continues.
In conclusion, thank you for the chance to discuss today
U.S. military cooperation in the Maghreb as it supports broader
U.S. foreign policy, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Dory follows:]
Prepared Statement of Amanda Dory
Chairman Kaine, Ranking Member Risch, and distinguished members of
the subcommittee, I am pleased to appear before you to update you on
the security situation in North Africa and the Department of Defense's
engagement strategy in the region in coordination with other
interagency partners.
introduction
The Department of Defense is committed to working closely with the
Department of State to enhance U.S. Government security assistance to
build the capacity of North African security forces. Our strategic
approach recognizes that developing strong and responsive defense
institutions can support regional stability, allowing partner
militaries to operate under civilian authority while respecting the
rule of law and international human rights.
The effects of the Arab Awakening in North Africa continue to
reverberate within the region and beyond its borders into the Sahelian
states of sub-Saharan Africa. Libya remains a key source of instability
in North Africa and the Sahel. Thus, the Department of Defense is
working closely with its interagency colleagues and partner nations to
assist the Libyan Government in training its security forces and
strengthening Libyan Government institutions.
In Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, the Department of Defense
maintains close military-to-military ties with respective senior
military and civilian Ministry of Defense counterparts. All three
countries are committed to a security dialogue and partnership with the
United States, and they share our goals of countering terrorism and
enhancing cross-border security. We engage with the three governments
on a bilateral basis every 12-18 months to ensure our shared security
goals are aligned and U.S. Government security assistance is
prioritized accordingly.
The negative effects of terrorism and growing violent extremism
have been experienced by all our partners in North Africa, and have
underscored to them the gravity of the threat and the value of
partnering with the United States and the international community to
address shared security challenges, which extend beyond the Maghreb.
For example, each country is cognizant that its nationals are traveling
to Syria to support violent extremists fighting against the Syrian
Government, and is aware of the danger to North African security if and
when those fighters return.
To address regional instability in North Africa and the Sahel more
broadly, the U.S. Government established, in 2005, the Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). The TSCTP is a multiyear,
regional program to build the capacity and resilience of the
governments and communities in the Sahel and Maghreb to address the
threat of violent extremist organizations. The TSCTP also provides a
means to improve regional and international cooperation and
information-sharing.
country-by-country security environment/dod programs
Libya
Libya remains a country in a difficult democratic transition, and
the path to stability continues to be a challenging one for the weak
government institutions in Tripoli. The recent kidnapping and release
of Prime Minister Zeidan underscore the serious shortcomings in the
Libyan security environment. Militia violence and consequent
retributive attacks continue within the country. The Libyan Government
is unable to control its borders, and weaponry smuggled from Libya is
fueling instability from Mali westward within the Sahel. We and our
Libyan partners are working on joint programs designed to address the
needed skill sets of Libyan security forces to address these challenges
adequately.
The Department of Defense is prioritizing its assistance to focus
on building Libyan security institutional capacity and on improving the
Libyan Government's ability to counter terrorism, counter weapons
proliferation, and secure and destroy its chemical weapons stockpiles.
Thanks to congressional support, the United States is working with
Libya to develop their capacity to conduct counterterrorism operations
via a $8.42M Section 1206 Special Operations Support company and
medical training program; and a $7.75M Global Security Contingency Fund
(GSCF) SOF company build program. DOD will also provide training for
the larger interagency GSCF Under the joint State-DOD GSCF authority,
we are also pursuing a $14.9M program to provide technical expertise,
training, and limited equipment to build Libya's interministerial
(i.e., MOD, MOI, and Customs) border security program ($14.9M) capacity
to address security along its southern land border. This program
includes training and equipping to build a border security company, and
programming for Libya's neighbors--Chad, Niger, and Algeria--to improve
border security cooperation with Libya. We remain hopeful that these
projects will positively impact Libya's security situation.
An additional program that the United States is working with Libya
is a $45 million chemical weapons abatement program at Waddan, Libya
where we have installed a static detonation chamber, and a U.S.
contractor is ramping up operations and is on schedule to eliminate
remaining Libyan chemical weapons by the end of 2013 in accordance with
Libya's international commitments.
In response to a request from Libyan Prime Minister Zeidan, the
United States has offered to provide General Purpose Force military
training for 5,000-8,000 personnel. This training effort is intended to
help the government build the military it requires to protect
government institutions and maintain order. It is one element of the
targeted security programs the United States has provided to Libya
since 2011, building on the February 2013 Paris Ministerial-level
meeting on supporting Libya's security and justice sector needs and
British Prime Minister Cameron's announcement at the G8 summit in June
about expanding international support for Libya's security sector. The
United Kingdom and Italy have also committed to train 2,000 Libyan
General Purpose Forces personnel, each.
We expect the U.S.-led training to begin via FMS in the spring of
2014 at a U.S.-leased/run training facility in Bulgaria and to continue
over a number of years based on cohort size and the pace of training.
The Government of Libya has committed to fund this training program and
provided initial financial deposits. The United States will work
closely with Libya to ensure all candidates for training are properly
vetted to ensure that they meet human rights standards in accordance
with U.S. law.
All U.S. assistance will continue to be coordinated with the U.N.
Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and with European partners who have
also offered substantial security sector assistance to the Government
of Libya.
Tunisia
Tunisia's military deserves tremendous credit for supporting and
protecting the population during Tunisia's democratic transition. More
recently, following a series of terrorist attacks on the Tunisian
military in the Chaambi Forest beginning in April 2013, as well as the
assassination of two opposition political figures, the Tunisian
Government continues to grapple with the threat of violent extremism.
U.S. assistance to the security sector focuses on counterterrorism
support, border security training, and a continuation of our
longstanding Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International
Military Education and Training (IMET) programs.
The United States has provided technical assistance, equipment, and
training to Tunisian Ministries and agencies to make them more
effective in securing land border crossings, maritime borders, ports,
and airport and seaport operations. U.S. assistance has also provided
equipment and relevant training for inspection and/or detection
equipment.
Maintenance and upgrade of existing equipment and the addition of
critically needed procurements through FMF is a U.S. priority to help
address the Ministry of Defense's (MOD's) broadened mission and to
reinforce efforts to counter the growing threat of violent extremism.
The United States is also assisting the Ministry with training through
IMET funding, with an emphasis on enhancing strategic planning
capabilities.
Algeria
Algeria has been a critical security partner in countering regional
violent extremist organizations. Its strategic location in the Maghreb,
and its long history combating domestic terrorism and violent
extremism, make Algeria a linchpin in the struggle against Al Qaeda in
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its affiliates and bringing stability to
the region. The January 2013 terrorist attack against the In Amenas oil
facility highlighted the growing transnational threats in the region.
The Algerian military continues to conduct successful interdiction
operations on its southern border against AQIM affiliates.
Additionally, Algeria provides training and equipment assistance to its
Sahel neighbors, contributing to broader regional efforts to curb
violent extremist groups' transborder movement and activities.
As a result, the Department of Defense continues to expand
engagement with Algeria in cooperation with other U.S. Government
departments and agencies across a range of activities, to include
information sharing and exercises. The Algerian Government is also
interested in acquiring U.S. equipment for counterterrorism purposes.
To address this interest, the Department of Defense is working to
provide Algeria with equipment and training to enhance Government of
Algeria defense capabilities. Algeria has acquired U.S. goods and
services, equipment, and training via direct commercial sales since the
1980s, including a border security system from Northrup Grumman and
eight Lockheed C-130 transport aircraft. U.S. bilateral military
engagement and sustained dialogue is also expanded through the IMET
program, which is enhancing professionalization and modernization of
Algeria's Armed Forces.
Morocco
From the beginning of his reign, King Mohammed VI has recognized
that democratic political and economic reforms are needed. During the
Arab Awakening, he continued to respond to popular demands for change
from within Moroccan society. Nevertheless, the earlier terrorist
bombing in Casablanca in 2003 was a strong signal that Morocco was not
immune from violent extremism and the regional threats to stability in
the Maghreb and Sahel. We anticipate that security cooperation will be
one of many themes during the King's meeting at the White House
tomorrow.
The United States and the Kingdom of Morocco share a long history
of bilateral relations that is enduring and expansive. A major non-NATO
ally, Morocco has been a strong partner in the struggle against
terrorism, and our bilateral military and political cooperation is
growing. Among the first Islamic countries to condemn publicly the
attacks of September 11, 2001, Morocco provided forces in Desert Storm,
Bosnia, and Kosovo. Additionally, Morocco is a strong contributor to
global U.N. peacekeeping operations.
Our security cooperation programs with Morocco enhance Morocco's
military professionalism through the International Military Education
and Training program and help to increase Morocco's effectiveness and
capabilities in the context of multilateral operations through
provision of Foreign Military Financing and Excess Defense Articles.
Additionally, U.S. Africa Command partners with Morocco to execute a
robust program of Military-to-Military activities and joint military
exercises, including AFRICAN LION--a significant joint and combined
exercise on the continent. U.S. security support to Morocco has a
cascade-like effect on the region as Morocco in turn provides
assistance to more than 20 African countries through training and
humanitarian assistance.
conclusion
Each of the four countries under discussion today faces a differing
array of political, economic, and governance challenges as a result of
the political upheavals of the last several years in the region. North
African countries will continue to face security challenges as a
result, and addressing those challenges will take time, particularly in
the case of Libya. Our goals are to focus on long-term institution
building and regional cooperation in coordination with other countries,
to be supportive of host government requests, and to maintain a small
and effective U.S. military footprint in the region.
Thank you for your time and attention today. We appreciate your
interest in, and support of, U.S. military cooperation in the Maghreb
as it supports broader U.S. foreign policy and national security
objectives in the region, and I will be pleased to answer any
questions.
Senator Kaine. Thank you.
Ms. Romanowski.
STATEMENT OF ALINA ROMANOWSKI, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR,
MIDDLE EAST BUREAU, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Romanowski. Chairman Kaine, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss USAID's
ongoing efforts to support U.S interests in North Africa.
As my colleagues have said, North Africa is a region of
many possibilities and great importance, but also one that
faces daunting challenges, especially in this transition
period.
For the past 3 years, USAID has supported Morocco, Tunisia,
and Libya as they write new constitutions, reform institutions,
as they carry out credible and transparent elections, and as
citizens advocate for increased political participation. Our
programs target the development challenges that span North
Africa, including high unemployment and the lack of economic
growth, and work to address factors that push local populations
toward violent extremism.
The Arab Awakening has been a regional phenomenon, but each
country experiences it differently. So we have tailored our
programs to each country's specific needs.
In Libya, USAID has supported the transition by developing
governance institutions and building an emerging civil society.
As Libyans begin to draft a new constitution, USAID is working
to ensure that the Libyan people are engaged in that process.
We are also promoting women's empowerment by supporting
programs that engage women in the political process, like a
series of training programs where some women were provided
internships with the High National Elections Commission, and
these women were, in fact, permanently hired.
USAID is supporting women through economic growth programs
that strengthen women entrepreneurs by providing business
skills training and improving their access to finance through
brokered relationships with financial institutions.
Tunisia remains one of the region's best hopes for a
successful transition to democracy. USAID strongly supports the
Tunisian people as they lay the foundation for economic
prosperity that empowers a new generation, strengthens civil
society, and solidifies the institutions of democracy.
To promote economic growth, we launched the Tunisian-
American Enterprise Fund, a signature United States initiative
that will invest in growing the Tunisian economy. Currently
capitalized at $40 million, the Enterprise Fund is designed to
develop the much-needed private sector in Tunisia, expand
access to credit, and create opportunities for Tunisian small-
and medium-sized businesses.
In 2012, USAID provided the provisional government a $100
million cash transfer that supported its short-term budget
needs. USAID also subsidized the cost of a $485 million loan
guarantee to help address Tunisia's longer term financing
needs.
AID is encouraging job creation in high-impact, growing
sectors of the economy like information communications
technology. Our ICT program recently organized a job fair where
4,500 young Tunisians met with over 200 employers to discuss
job opportunities. Additionally, our work in the ICT sector has
generated over 2,400 new jobs for Tunisians.
USAID is also actively engaged in helping Tunisians build a
peaceful and stable democratic political process. During
Tunisia's historic October 2011 elections, USAID supported the
only nationwide campaign targeting women voters, and also a
get-out-the-vote campaign that focused on youth. For Tunisia's
upcoming elections, USAID will support international and local
monitoring activities.
For over 50 years, USAID and the Government of Morocco have
had a strong bilateral relationship that continues today. This
year, to support the ambitious political and economic reform
goals of the Moroccan Government and respond to the needs of
the Moroccan citizens, USAID has designed a new 5-year country
development strategy. This is a focused plan to work side by
side with the Government of Morocco, civil society, and the
private sector to enhance the employability of Morocco's large
youth demographic, improve the education system, strengthen the
civil society organizations, and improve the credibility and
transparency of political parties.
During this week's visit of Mohammed VI, we will launch
this new strategy, reaffirming our long history of cooperation
in promoting sustainable development in Morocco.
So in conclusion, during this time of transition, it is
essential that AID continue its engagement with the region's
people and their governments to build free, democratic,
prosperous, and secure nations. This engagement is vital to
countering extremist threats, maintaining relationships with
key allies, and advancing key U.S. strategic interests.
Chairman Kaine, thank you very much, and I look forward to
answering your questions today.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Romanowski follows:]
Prepared Statement of Alina L. Romanowski
Chairman Kaine, Ranking Member Risch, and members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to
discuss the political and economic situation in North Africa and
USAID's ongoing efforts to support U.S interests in the region through
our programs and assistance.
Over the last 30 years of my career, I have had the privilege to
serve across four government agencies, focusing on the Middle East. I
know firsthand that it is a region of many possibilities and great
importance, but also one that faces daunting challenges, especially in
this transition period. This is clearly illustrated in North Africa,
where the Arab Awakening began. Tunisia--the country where in 2011 a
single man's frustration and desperation with his economic situation
touched off a chain of events that would topple governments around the
region--continues to make progress along its path toward a successful
transition to democracy. Similarly, in response to its citizens' calls
for change, the Government of Morocco has laid out an important reform
agenda of social and economic change and has taken steps toward a more
inclusive government. In Libya, despite obvious setbacks and ongoing
security challenges, Libyans have repeatedly expressed their deep
desire to transform into a democracy, pushing forward with their
constitutional drafting process and pushing back against unruly
militias. As you can see, each of these countries' path to a more
inclusive, responsive government, and ultimately to stability, varies.
Our continued and flexible engagement to support the efforts of the
region's people and their governments to build free, democratic,
prosperous, and secure nations is absolutely essential. For the past 3
years, USAID has supported these countries in transition as they write
new constitutions and reform institutions, as they carry out credible
and transparent elections, and as citizens advocate for increased
political participation. Our programs also target the major development
challenges that span North Africa, including the lack of economic
growth, high unemployment and large youth demographics. A key component
to the region's economic development and expansion is inclusive growth
and opportunities for women and minorities. USAID programs focus on the
engines of economic growth by supporting small- and medium-sized
enterprises--especially those managed by women--through training,
marketing assistance and building connections with financial
institutions.
As these North African countries experience transition, USAID
programs are on the forefront of undercutting structural factors that
push and pull local populations toward violent extremism. We know that
weak governments and chronic underdevelopment, coupled with
marginalization of groups, create vulnerabilities to recruitment into
violent extremist and terrorist groups. Connecting citizens with their
government and providing economic opportunities is vital. Our
governance programs highlight constituent outreach and civil society
capacity-building to shape the foundations of democratic nations. USAID
economic programs also work to provide educational and vocational
opportunities for youth and other previously marginalized populations.
Our work in Libya to bolster the General National Congress and connect
marginalized communities in the south with Tripoli also helps reduce
the risk of violent extremism. USAID also has programs specifically
targeting those at risk for recruitment into violent extremist groups.
For instance, in Morocco, we are working with at-risk youth to connect
them with vocational education and their local government to better
engage with their communities. Security and development, therefore, are
interlinked--connecting citizens with their government, enabling
government to respond to its citizens, and developing economic
opportunities to help create secure environments.
The political transitions surging through North Africa and the
Middle East have been a regional phenomenon. Yet the reality is that
each country experiences it differently and continues to transition in
its own way reflecting the distinct voices of its citizens. As USAID
supports the efforts of people across North Africa to define their own
futures, we have tailored our policies and programs to each country's
specific needs and experiences.
libya
Our assistance to Libya is an essential component of our continued
engagement in the region. It is in our national security interest to
see a successful democratic transition in Libya and ensure we have a
partner that can address regional security challenges. As such, USAID
assistance in Libya has focused on supporting democratic transition,
developing governance institutions, an emerging civil society and an
engaged citizenry, and promoting women's engagement in Libya's economic
growth. Since June 2011, USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI)
has been working with Libya's civil society and governing authorities
to build an inclusive and accountable democratic government that
reflects the will and needs of the Libyan people. USAID partners with
civil society organizations, local media outlets, and interim governing
authorities to support inclusive transitional political and justice
processes, strengthen local initiatives to mitigate conflict that
destabilizes the transition, and promote the development of effective,
legitimate governance institutions. USAID continues to support fair and
effective electoral, political and governing processes in Libya by
providing technical assistance to the Libyan Government, including the
High National Election Commission, the Judiciary, the General National
Congress and elected local councils to help them fulfill their
responsibilities and communicate more effectively with Libyan citizens.
USAID is also helping to strengthen the ability of civil society to
engage fellow citizens and decisionmakers on key issues, such as
transitional justice, reconciliation and working to promote the
peaceful reintegration of former revolutionaries. As Libya moves toward
the next milestone of drafting a new constitution, USAID is working
with the government and civil society to ensure that the Libyan people
are informed and engaged in the process. To support national
reconciliation, USAID is bringing together local council, religious,
tribal and other community leaders to discuss how they can help their
communities resolve longstanding conflicts.
We are also working with local women's organizations to raise
awareness about important issues to be addressed in the constitution,
and to help Libyan women advocate for their rights during the
constitution drafting process. This year, USAID supported a women's
political leadership program to promote women's participation in the
political process. After a series of training programs and workshops,
the program participants were placed into internships with the High
National Elections Commission (HNEC), the High Judicial Institute,
General National Congress committees, and constituency offices. All
those who interned at the HNEC were then hired as permanent staff.
Last year, USAID launched the War Wounded Project to strengthen the
Government of Libya's ability to provide rehabilitative care to the
tens of thousands of Libyans wounded and disabled in the effort to
topple the Qadhafi regime. USAID provides training to staff in the
Ministries of Health, Social Affairs and Wounded & Missing to build
their leadership and management capacity. USAID's original investment
of $1.5 million to the War Wounded Project has leveraged an additional
$9 million contribution from the Government of Libya to establish
Leadership Development Institutes that will provide ongoing technical,
management, and leadership training to health sector staff.
Additionally, USAID worked with the U.S.-Libya Business Association to
encourage private sector contributions to support treatment of the war-
wounded in Libya. For example, a combined contribution of $1.5 million
from ConocoPhillips and General Electric continued a nursing support
project initially funded by USAID.
To support inclusive economic growth in Libya, USAID's Women's
Economic Empowerment Program is strengthening women entrepreneurs and
women-owned small and medium enterprises by providing business skills
training and networking opportunities, and by improving women's access
to finance through brokered relationships with financial institutions.
USAID is also providing U.S.-based diaspora entrepreneurs with seed
capital and technical assistance through a business plan competition to
help start or expand businesses in Libya.
tunisia
Tunisia remains one of the region's best hopes for a successful
transition to democracy. USAID strongly supports the Tunisian people as
they lay the foundation for a future of economic prosperity that
empowers a new generation, strengthens civil society and solidifies the
foundation of democracy.
The development and growth of a robust and inclusive private-
sector-led economy in Tunisia is central to the success of Tunisia's
long-term political and economic security as well as to U.S. interests
in Tunisia and in the broader region. The Tunisian-American Enterprise
Fund (TAEF), announced by President Obama in May 2011, is a signature
U.S. initiative that will invest in the Tunisian economy to unlock the
benefits of private-sector-led growth. Currently capitalized at $40
million, the TAEF will invest in small and medium enterprises to
promote inclusive economic growth and employment. The TAEF will help
address gaps in financing for entrepreneurs and small businesses that
overwhelmingly drive Tunisia's private sector growth and encourage
Tunisia to undertake market-oriented and institutional reforms.
In 2012, USAID provided a $100 million cash transfer that supported
the short-term budget needs of the provisional government.
Additionally, USAID subsidized the cost of a U.S. guarantee of a $485
million Tunisian sovereign bond to help address Tunisia's longer term
external financing needs.
Encouraging job creation is another key element in USAID's support
for Tunisia's economic growth. As such, USAID has developed programs
that enhance and diversify the education and job skills necessary for a
nation's economic growth. For example, in partnership with the
University of Texas San Antonio, we are in the process of launching 24
university career centers at six college campuses across Tunisia to
help college students and graduates not only look for work but develop
their careers. These entrepreneurs, and the businesses they create, are
the underpinning of a future vibrant economy in North Africa. Many of
our programs encourage students to build skills specific to sectors of
the economy that are growing, like information and communications
technology (ICT).
USAID's programs are creating jobs in high-impact sectors.
Specifically, our work with the ICT sector has generated over 2,400
jobs. In September, our ICT program organized a job fair in Tunis where
4,500 young Tunisians met with over 200 employers to discuss job
opportunities and future careers. Additionally, USAID helped a Silicon
Valley-trained native Tunisian open a small information technology
business in the city of Sousee, then assisted in product marketing and
business plan development and eventually helped him recruit over 75
young graduates to work at his company.
We are also helping Tunisians expand a more diverse and qualified
workforce that is responsive to the country's needs. A USAID-funded
partnership between the University of Colorado and the Advanced
Institute of Technology Studies in Sidi Bouzid is preparing graduates
to contribute to their communities through career training in water
management, energy efficiency, and renewable energy technologies.
USAID is also actively engaged in helping Tunisians build a
peaceful and stable democratic political process and institutions.
Specific efforts by OTI have focused on encouraging broad participation
in the political transition with a particular emphasis on youth and
women's engagement and working with local organizations to identify and
respond to community priorities. USAID-supported democracy and
governance activities have included nationwide voter education
campaigns aimed at getting youth to vote and the only nationwide
campaign targeting women voters in the lead up to Tunisia's historic
October 2011 elections. Our programs continue to help build the
capacity of new democratic institutions and Tunisian civil society
organizations. Moving forward, USAID will support monitoring
activities, by both the international and local communities, of
Tunisia's upcoming elections.
morocco
For over 50 years, USAID and the Government of Morocco have had a
strong bilateral relationship focused on promoting economic growth,
improving educational opportunities and strengthening inclusive
political participation and an active civil society. We also have
worked together to make substantial improvements in the lives of
Moroccan citizens, including significantly improving maternal and child
health, constructing two major dams, transforming thousands of semiarid
acres into productive use, and providing microfinance loans.
Despite impressive economic growth over the past few years, Morocco
still faces many complex challenges, including few employment
opportunities for youth and an overall literacy rate of only 55
percent. As recent political transition sweep the region, Morocco has
experienced a quiet and gradual transformation. The Government of
Morocco responded to the Arab Awakening by reforming the constitution
and laying out an ambitious agenda of political, economic, and social
reforms. Implementing this reform agenda, while maintaining stability
and security throughout the country, is of utmost importance for
Morocco's future development and prosperity.
To help the Government of Morocco achieve its stated reform goals
and respond to the needs of Moroccan citizens, USAID has developed a
new 5-year Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) for
Morocco--a focused plan to work side by side with the Moroccan
Government, civil society and the private sector to support progress
toward key reforms. The new CDCS will focus on workforce development,
increasing citizen participation in governance and improving primary
educational achievement. During this week's visit of King Mohammed VI
to Washington, DC, USAID and the Government of Morocco will celebrate
the launch of USAID's CDCS, reaffirming our long history of cooperation
and collaboration based on a common interest in promoting sustainable
development in Morocco.
To enhance the employability of the country's large youth
demographic, USAID will focus on improving the quality of and access to
career services. We will facilitate partnerships between government
ministries, Moroccan universities and technical institutes, as well as
local NGOs and business associations to develop demand-driven workforce
development services that reach a broad range of youth.
To increase citizen participation in governance, USAID will support
the development of civil society organizations to develop their
constituencies, form effective coalitions and develop policy
recommendations. USAID will also continue to help political parties
improve their credibility by increasing the transparency and
accountability of their internal operations, developing platforms
reflective of citizen needs and enhancing the involvement and
leadership of youth and women in politics. Our efforts will provide
long-term assistance targeting local branches of political parties to
ensure citizen engagement at the grassroots level. By increasing the
capacity of civil society to engage the government on behalf of
citizens and facilitating the development of institutionalized
mechanisms of civic participation in government decisionmaking, Morocco
will be better situated to implement its reform agenda in a peaceful
and sustainable fashion.
USAID's basic education program also plays a crucial role as
Morocco strives to meet the needs of its growing youth population. In
conjunction with Morocco's education reform effort, USAID will promote
higher levels of educational attainment by targeting early grade
reading. Poor reading skills increase children's chances that they will
fall behind in school, setting the stage for future dropout. As such,
these early grade reading programs are designed to improve early
literacy and help curb primary grade dropout rates.
USAID also works to mitigate the drivers of violent extremism as
part of supporting Morocco's peaceful reform agenda. Morocco has
experienced several incidents of violent extremism over the past decade
and, while low, risks of instability are heightened by societal factors
that contribute to political and economic marginalization. In our
countering violent extremism programming, we target areas of Morocco
that suffer from high rates of illiteracy, school dropout, and
unemployment, and are known breeding grounds for transnational
terrorist networks. To reintegrate at-risk youth into mainstream
society, we support nonformal education and vocational training, the
provision of basic social services, career counseling, and job
placement. Capacity-building for public and private social service
providers targeting at-risk youth will increase sustainability and
expand the reach of program activities.
Finally, I would like to conclude with Algeria, where USAID has a
limited presence. While the United States is working to strengthen its
bilateral relationship with Algeria, USAID currently has few programs
there. Consistent with our regional efforts to combat terrorism and
extremism, we are focusing on launching a program in Algeria that aims
to reduce social and economic exclusion of at-risk Algerian youth.
conclusion
USAID views our assistance programs in the North Africa region as
an investment in protecting our national interests and in building
long-term partnerships with the people and the governments of those
countries. USAID programs will continue to provide the seeds for future
innovation and technology, to advance economic prosperity and growth,
and to strengthen regional stability and security. The countries and
peoples in North Africa continue to face significant challenges, but
also significant opportunities. We will continue to support them
through these political and economic transitions. While we recognize
that our budgets are facing increasing pressures, we are aligning our
programs to address the challenges and opportunities facing the region.
We also know that our continued engagement in this region is vital to
maintaining relationships with key allies, promoting stability,
countering extremist threats in the Middle East and North Africa and
advancing our key strategic interests.
Chairman Kaine, Ranking Member Risch and distinguished members of
the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you
today, and I look forward to answering your questions.
Senator Kaine. Great. I thank all of you for your opening
testimony. To have the representatives of our defense,
diplomacy, and development in the region is wonderful. It gives
us a full view. And it is also, I think, particularly fitting,
because AFRICOM, of our geographic commands, probably has the
most integration of both military and the civilian governmental
outreach in the African region. So it is fitting that you would
all be here.
I want to begin with a question. You have each organized
your comments largely around reports on the four countries
individually, talking about the United States bilateral
activities with respect to each.
Ms. Dory, you mentioned efforts to promote regional
cooperation, and I would like each of you to address what is
going on regionally, what do you do regionally that tries to
link any or all of these four countries together, and possibly
beginning with discussions of the current status of the Trans-
Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, which I know encompasses
other nations as well. It is a 10-nation partnership.
But it does seem like there are some regional
opportunities, so let us pick up on the regional cooperation
theme. What is the current status? What can we do more to
promote it?
Mr. Schmierer. Well, Mr. Chairman, let me start with a few
general comments. As I think you indicated in your remarks, and
I think all of us have underscored, the region as a whole is of
great importance and has a lot to offer in terms of security
and U.S. interests.
So one of our challenges has been to ensure, through our
diplomatic and other engagement, that we can work with the
governments of all four countries in ways that support each
other. Clearly, as I was underscoring in my remarks, I think
Morocco and Algeria present certain strengths which can be
helpful to Libya and Tunisia.
So one of the issues--and I think my colleagues can address
this more directly--is to try to use those strengths for
security support throughout the region; likewise in terms of
economic development. Unfortunately, it is a region in which
there is not sufficient economic integration, and that drags
down the economic prospects of the region.
And so one of our efforts--and again, through some of our
other lines of activity--we are seeking to try to break down
those barriers and encourage that kind of joint economic
effort.
But the countries of the region do provide a lot of value.
Morocco comes to mind. Morocco is the center of very moderate
Islam. It is the center which is looked to throughout the
region as a place to try to help moderate some of the
extremists and to try to have that kind of influence broadly
beyond its borders, and we try to work with them to leverage
that both in the Maghreb and in the Sahel, particularly with
Mali.
Senator Kaine. Other comments on the regional cooperation
side, Ms. Romanowski?
Ms. Romanowski. Yes. One of the very specific things we are
doing is also under the G8 umbrella, and it is specifically to
have launched the Deauville Transition Fund where this is
actually a multilateral partnership that is intended to provide
the assistance that bolsters reform efforts across the Middle
East and North Africa, but also spur some economic
collaboration, coordination, and some economic growth.
Through this fund, the United States is helping to marshal
the international resources to advance the economic reforms.
The fund is actually administered by the World Bank and funds
proposals crafted by the governments in partnerships with the
international financial institutions. It primarily provides
technical assistance to support these economic reforms and
opportunities for trade. It tries to build institutions, design
reform, and strengthen government policies.
So that is one very significant fund that is designed to
actually bring the region together. It specifically is limited
to countries in the partnership, which is Jordan, Tunisia,
Egypt, Morocco, Yemen, and Libya.
Senator Kaine. Ms. Dory, could you talk a little bit about
the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, the current
status of efforts and how successful that regional effort has
been?
Ms. Dory. Senator, I would be glad to. I wove it into the
remarks because I thought it was important to emphasize the
regional dynamics that are so critical when you are looking at
transnational threats and transnational flows across borders.
One of the challenges we face as the U.S. Government is in
terms of our implementation. We typically implement on a
bilateral basis through our embassies. But TSCTP, I think, is
important as a regional initiative that has been in place for
close to a decade at this point that really seeks to have
broader regional effects in the way that resources are aligned,
whether they are USAID resources, DOD resources, or State
Department resources. So I think we have had success on the
U.S. Government side, aligning ourselves to consider regional
effects.
The other side of the coin is how do our African partners
present themselves. And when you look across the continent of
Africa, regional institutions are at different stages of
development in each part of the continent, and even the part
that we are focused on today in North Africa, the Arab Maghreb
Union, for example, is the relevant regional entity, and it is
less institutionally developed than some of the other regional
organizations. In West Africa, for example, ECOWAS has a very
strong economic component to it, as well as security component
to it.
So I think we continually look for opportunities to
strengthen existing regional institutions, and then to work in
regional ways when we can. A very concrete example for
Department of Defense would be when we are working with
governments to host military exercises and we seek to involve
participants from multiple other countries beyond the actual
host nation where the exercise would be conducted.
Senator Kaine. Thank you.
A couple of questions about Morocco for Ms. Romanowski, if
I could start with you. You referenced a project that is going
to be announced between the United States and Morocco in
connection with the King's visit. Could you elaborate on that a
little bit?
Ms. Romanowski. Yes. It is actually a 5-year newly revised
strategic country development plan that we do and we try to do
every 5 years where we actually focus on whether we need to
shift our programming, our emphasis, and we work closely with
the Moroccan Government. In this particular 5-year strategy
that we will be announcing actually this afternoon, we are
focusing on continuing to build strong civil society
organizations so that they can participate in the political
process.
We are also focusing on our continued support for
education, improving the education system, because at this
point there are significant issues related to early dropout and
underachievement.
And then we are also in line with shifting a lot of our
focus across the region is to focus on much more job
development and job programs, and how do we actually help the
young people in Morocco but across the region to have the
skills, the job skills, the leadership skills to get jobs that
are relevant to the private sector that is looking for
employment.
Senator Kaine. Thank you.
Mr. Schmierer, if I could ask you to talk a little bit
about--well, first, before I ask the question, the point that
was made about Morocco that I find compelling is, along with
Algeria, its capacity to be an example for the other nations,
Tunisia and Libya. It is so much better to have an example that
is near to home rather than to have to point out an example far
away. Morocco's history of respect for religious minorities,
some of the advances recently in opportunities for women in the
commercial and civic spheres are very strong examples that I
think we should be highlighting.
So a couple of questions, if you would. I know a continuing
challenge, and I referenced it in my opening statement, has
been the status of the western Sahara, and that is a challenge
that is in the U.N. province now. It is a source of tension
between Morocco and Algeria, and I am a little concerned about
it especially because if porous borders are one of our
challenges in the region, disputed territory suggests to me a
potential vulnerability. I am sure it is an actual
vulnerability as well.
It seems that the western Sahara situation has been in kind
of a diplomatic stasis for some time. But could you talk about
its current status and what U.S. policy is with respect to a
resolution?
Mr. Schmierer. I would be happy to, and you are certainly
correct to point out that this is a long-standing source of
tension, and unfortunately tension among countries in the
regional as well, in addition to the issue itself.
Our position is that we fully support the U.N. Secretary
General's efforts, and we are very fortunate to have a very
able diplomat, Ambassador Chris Ross, as his personal envoy to
try to continue to resolve this issue, and he has been out
there numerous times recently to talk to the various parties.
There have been some viable proposals made, and we
certainly want to give those the opportunity to be looked at,
and ultimately we think there should be, and could be, a
peaceful, sustainable, and mutually agreed solution. But the
parties will be the ones that will ultimately have to make that
resolution.
So we continue to put our support behind the U.N. Secretary
General and Ambassador Chris Ross to try to continue to move
that issue forward.
Senator Kaine. Do you have any sense, Mr. Schmierer, of the
timing or what you would foresee? I know it has been an open-
ended issue for now, year after year.
Mr. Schmierer. It is 35 years, I think, is the time.
Senator Kaine. Yes.
Mr. Schmierer. So, yes, it is a long-standing issue. It
would be hard to speculate, but one might hope that the current
dynamics in the region, where there is change underway, and I
think there is new thinking underway, that I think with
Ambassador Ross' engagement and his diplomatic skills and the
support of the international community, one could certainly
hope that we would begin to see some new ways forward that
might actually bring us to a resolution.
Senator Kaine. What is your assessment of the reform
efforts undertaken by King Mohammed since the Arab Awakening
began?
Mr. Schmierer. Well, of course, even when he first came to
office in 1939, he began to make some reforms which I think
were very well received, and certainly we were pleased and
supportive of those reforms. That effort has continued, as I
pointed out. Under their new constitution they have now had
elections, they have an Islamist-led government, and we have
seen a number of changes in the government leadership. So it is
a dynamic governance situation, which I think has been very
well received by the people.
At the same time, I also think that they are seeking more
and more to bring in the kinds of values and principles that we
have long since promoted. I think you referenced the fact that
women and youth and various minorities now really do enjoy an
improved situation and more opportunities.
So we just want to continue it, and I think the King's
visit this week will give us that opportunity to continue to
work with the Moroccans as they themselves seek to move further
down the path that has been kind of opened up through the Arab
Awakening.
Senator Kaine. And the accession to civilian political
power of an Islamist-led government, it has not disturbed the
relationship with the United States that has generally gone in
that continuous way with the past history of good relations we
have had?
Mr. Schmierer. Well, exactly. I think in the Moroccan
context, one sees it a little bit differently than perhaps in
some other contexts. But, no, absolutely. The fact that this
resulted from their constitutional changes from a clearly
understood to be free and fair election and that the government
and the King have continued to work together, to us that has
been a positive example of progressive change.
Senator Kaine. And then, Ms. Dory, one last question about
Morocco. If you could just talk a little bit specifically about
how the Moroccan military has been as a partner in dealing with
the AQIM threat.
Ms. Dory. The Moroccan military, as I mentioned, we have
had a very strong relationship over many years, and
incorporated in the types of training activities that we do in
terms of the exercises that we do, the focus on al-Qaeda and
affiliates is central in the types of conversations and
activities that are underway with the Moroccan military.
We have been very encouraged--even though Morocco is not a
neighbor of Mali--with the events in Mali in the past 2 years,
their concerns and considerations there and the work that they
are doing to support the efforts. The AFISMA force that is in
place, the multinational peace force, Moroccans have provided a
field hospital to that effort, and they are in the process of
providing training that will be religious training for imams
who are based in Mali to help with the dimensions of countering
violent extremism in Mali. So even well beyond their borders,
Morocco has had a long history of participation in peacekeeping
operations, and they continue to be quite engaged in the
region.
The other thing I would flag is Moroccan leadership in
hosting a border security ministerial in the last couple of
weeks that was attended by its neighbors in North Africa, and
again the demonstration of leadership well beyond its borders.
Senator Kaine. Thank you.
Let me ask a question, switching to Algeria for a minute,
sort of make an observation. I may be right; I may be wrong;
and tell me I am wrong, if I am wrong.
Algeria from outside review seems to have some challenges.
So, for example, in youth unemployment and disaffected youth.
And yet, it does also seem from outside review that they have
not been beset with significant civil unrest. Is that correct?
And if so, how do you interpret that? The absence of civil
unrest is a notable thing in the region, and I would kind of
like to get your opinions about that.
Mr. Schmierer. I would be happy to offer at least our
reviews. Algeria, of course, is a country with considerable
resources, and therefore a certain amount of wealth. Of course,
it is the largest country in Africa, but it is a country whose
resources are well matched with its population. So I think the
government has tried to provide opportunities there for their
large youth cohort.
We believe that more can be done in terms of free market
development and those kinds of things. But I think to this
point, the government has been fairly successful in directing
its resources in ways that have supported the people, and as a
result they have maintained a certain level of stability.
Senator Kaine. On the counterterrorism side, the Algerian
military has had its own experience, sadly, but that has
enabled them to be very battle-hardened and a pretty
significant security partner.
Ms. Dory, you described that relationship a bit in your
opening statement. But if you would talk a little bit about the
capacities of the Algerian military, kind of along the lines of
could they offer assistance to other nations, be they actual or
kind of by example and by technical training, based on the
experiences that they've had?
Ms. Dory. Senator, as you referenced, the Algerians have
had a searing experience internally in dealing with AQIM and
are a very fine counterterrorism force at this point. They have
been working to focus on securing their borders in the past
year and a half or so, with all of the events in Mali, and I
think that is well known.
But what is less known, and we have encouraged them to
speak more about it, is the support that they provide to some
of their neighbors in the Sahel when it comes to training and
equipment assistance. So in addition to being a strong
counterterrorism operating force within their own borders, they
are also sharing that expertise with other partners.
In terms of the relationship with the United States, I
would say we have a growing relationship with the Algerians,
particularly in recent times where we are having additional
dialogues as it pertains to counterterrorism. We are sharing
information. They are very interested, for example, in
improvised explosive devices and some of the tactics,
techniques, and procedures that the United States has developed
in the course of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. This is
something within the Algerian context where AQIM activities,
the kind of continued evolution on their part, there is a
growing IED threat within Algeria that is forming the basis of
some of the collaboration that we have at this point, both in
terms of information-sharing as well as looking at equipment
that we would be able to share with the Algerians.
Senator Kaine. Ms. Romanowski, maybe I am wrong on this.
USAID does not currently have significant programs in Algeria;
correct?
Ms. Romanowski. Chairman, that is correct. USAID has an
extremely limited presence. We have been working to launch a
program that is consistent with our combating terrorism and
extremist programs, but that program we tend to do from Morocco
where we do have a mission and have had one for a long time.
Senator Kaine. Is that status of only limited activity in
Algeria likely to change in terms of USAID planning in the
foreseeable future?
Ms. Romanowski. I do not see anything on the horizon that
would allow us or enable us to change that, but when we have
opportunities, particularly with respect to regional programs,
we will take every opportunity we can.
Senator Kaine. Let me move to Tunisia, and this would be a
question maybe for all of you to weigh in, if you care to,
starting with Mr. Schmierer. Talk about the national dialogue,
kind of the status of the national dialogue currently. Again, a
number of things have gone well in Tunisia, but the two
political assassinations this year obviously have led to
significant unrest, some probably productive civil unrest. This
is not the direction we want to go, but if you could talk about
how that factors into the ongoing national dialogue?
Mr. Schmierer. Well, as you noted, Tunisia is the
birthplace of the Arab Spring and now the ongoing Arab
Awakening. So I think everybody is looking to try to help
Tunisia get through what is turning out to be a difficult
challenge. The two political assassinations of earlier this
year have led to a call for a national dialogue and a
transitional government.
The steps that are needed to be taken, first the parties
need to select an independent figure to be the leader of the
caretaker government, and right now the parties are regrouping
to try to get to that point. Once that has been agreed to, then
once the legislature approves that, then there will be--the
legislature will seat a 9-member electoral monitoring board and
then develop a new electoral law, and then set the date for new
elections, and then adopt a new constitution. So those are the
step-wise procedures that would happen through the national
dialogue effort.
Senator Kaine. One other question. Each of these countries
have their own peculiarities, and one in Tunisia that I find
fascinating is the powerful nature of the trade union
federation, the UGGT. If you could just kind of describe, as
part of the national dialogue, the role that the trade union
federation plays, and is it likely to continue to play that
kind of role going forward or will that likely alter as the
national dialogue goes forward?
Mr. Schmierer. Well, as you pointed out, it is a very
strong
institution in Tunisia, and it has been for some time. So
clearly, all the parties involved will be ensuring that they
work with, and coordinate with, the trade union Congress. It
would be hard to predict. I would anticipate that will continue
because it has been an institution of long standing, but there
are dynamics at play where potentially you could see other
centers of power emerge, because they are still kind of getting
into that new period following the revolution. But I think one
would anticipate a continued strong role by the trade union
conference.
Senator Kaine. And then currently, Ms. Dory, talk a little
bit about the role of the AQIM affiliates and other extremist
groups like Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia, if you could.
Ms. Dory. Tunisia immediately post-revolution has focused
on the political process, as it needed to. But I think there
has been the growing realization within Tunisia, in particular
with Ansar
al-Sharia, they took the step after a period of time of
designating Ansar al-Sharia as a terrorist organization,
recognizing that it was operating outside the boundaries of a
political entity within their political process.
The Tunisian military has faced recent challenges in terms
of attacks against the military in their positioning along the
Algerian border and are in the process of undertaking a quite
kinetic series of engagements against Ansar al-Sharia and other
extremist organizations in their country. So I think that is
something that we continue to need to be vigilant vis-a-vis the
possibility that additional fighters flow into Tunisia or
through Tunisia given the challenges associated with the
borders with Libya and with Mali.
Senator Kaine. Overshadowed by the Benghazi attack was the
fact that the Embassy in Tunis was also attacked within a few
days thereafter, thank goodness not in such a serious way, and
that is one of the reasons it was overshadowed. But have we
done what we need to do, learned the lessons from that attack
as well, and provided additional security as needed to our
diplomatic personnel in Tunisia, Mr. Schmierer?
Mr. Schmierer. I would say very strongly, ``Yes.'' As I am
sure you are aware, our top priority is the security of our
people, of our facilities, and of Americans abroad. And as you
suggest, that was a very unfortunate incident but one which has
caused us to redouble our assessments and our efforts in terms
of security. I know Ambassador Wallace has been very active on
both the physical security and on procedural measures to ensure
that our Embassy in Tunisia is secure and has what it needs to
ensure its security.
Senator Kaine. With respect, one last question on Tunisia
before a few questions about Libya. It does appear that the
United States has a very comprehensive approach to Tunisia from
security assistance, economic assistance, a Millennium
Challenge Corporation Threshold Program, and potential support
for an eventual free trade agreement.
Are we getting good cooperation from other international
partners in trying to devote this comprehensive approach to
increasing stability and then eventually prosperity in Tunisia?
Mr. Schmierer. On the political front, absolutely. We are
in very close contact with allies and with other countries in
the region that also share our goals of stabilizing and helping
Tunisia move forward, and that is true across the region, of
all these transitioning countries. And so that is one really, I
think, great success story, is a common commitment on the part
of us and like-minded nations, whether they are Arab nations,
European nations or others, to support these countries, and
particularly Tunisia, in making a successful transition.
Senator Kaine. Moving to a few questions about Libya before
moving on to the second panel.
Ms. Dory, you testified a little bit about the destruction
of chemical weapons, and I do not want that to be lost for all
the significant challenges that remain. The destruction of
chemical weapons stockpiles is something that is very important
to note and to praise our efforts in that. Did you indicate a
date on which we believe the Libyan stockpile will be
completely eliminated?
Ms. Dory. The current projection is by the end of the year.
Senator Kaine. And can you describe sort of the volume of
the chemical weapons stockpile that we have been dealing with
in trying to do that destruction?
Ms. Dory. I can. We have been working to destroy in the
first instance a series of munitions that included artillery
shells, hundreds of artillery shells, bombs and other munition
cartridges, so a significant stockpile of munitions, and then
there are other materials that will need to be destroyed as
well from production of those munitions.
Senator Kaine. If we could, let us talk about the militias.
I mean, some have called for an international effort, an
international peacekeeping force to try to begin an engagement
surrounding a massive disarmament effort among the militias. Is
that a realistic proposal? Or describe whether that is a good
idea and what we should be doing to advance it if it is a good
idea.
Mr. Schmierer. That is not the approach that we are
supporting. As I mentioned, we, and right now Italy and the
United Kingdom, are all committed to helping stand up this
general purpose force, and obviously our DOD colleagues will be
the essential implementers on that, as the means of helping
Libya establish the internal security which is currently not
there. So we think that is an appropriate and ultimately will
be the successful way to address the internal security issues
in Libya.
Senator Kaine. And, Mr. Schmierer, you indicated that that
training of that general purpose force would be at about--to
the level of about 5,000 people that would be trained?
Mr. Schmierer. Yes. Our commitment coming out of the G8 was
5,000 to 8,000, and since that time the Italians and the
British have also indicated, I believe, a commitment of 2,000
each. So those numbers will then be somewhere between 5,000 and
10,000. The Libyan Government is the sponsor and the funder of
this effort, but obviously with our cooperation we would
certainly be coming to the Congress for their input and their
support for that effort.
Senator Kaine. And is that general purpose force, the size
of it, is that to be sort of a core and it would ultimately be
a much larger force, or how would that advance Libya toward its
ultimate goal of having a significant and appropriately sized
security apparatus?
Mr. Schmierer. I might have to defer to my DOD colleagues
on force levels. It would be between 5,000 and 10,000. We would
very well train the general purpose force for a country of 6
million. So I think ultimately that would really just be a good
first start, as then they would institutionalize and go
forward, a ``train the trainers'' kind of an effort.
Senator Kaine. What is the current status of functioning
local governments in Libya, local elections, local governments,
and is that a positive to the national government or is it seen
at all as sort of a threat or competition?
Mr. Schmierer. Well, it is kind of a combination because at
the local level you do have functioning communities. So you
have local governments which are delivering services and which
are operating in support of the people. Unfortunately, at the
same time you also have security situations, militias and other
instability. So that is not preventing local governments from
doing the basic work that they would be doing, but ultimately
that is not an effective way for them to continue functioning.
So, yes, I think one can say that basically those
governments are functioning, but it is very important to get
the security part fixed so that that can continue in a positive
way.
Senator Kaine. Obviously, our involvement with NATO in
Libya, we have continued to have international partners, for
example, in training the general purpose force that you
indicate. Is the United States satisfied with the degree of
international participation across the range of the activities
that we are currently engaged in in Libya? Are there enough
partners at the table to help us make a difference?
Mr. Schmierer. I can certainly indicate the planning for
the general purpose force, absolutely. And then also as we have
looked at other elements of their capacity-building on the
governance side, we have very strong commitments from a number
of other allies to try to help Libyans stand up that civilian
side, so to speak, of what needs to be developed in the
country. So, yes, I think the international community has done
a very good job both of standing up and of coordinating their
support.
Senator Kaine. Could you talk a little bit about the
governance initiatives and what is currently under way?
Mr. Schmierer. Well, there are a number of planning
processes where the idea would be to try to help--what they are
lacking now is the ability to actually execute the functions of
government. So they have resources, but they really do not even
have good budgetary execution capability. So having the
resources has not allowed them to actually address the kinds of
issues that they face.
So we have not launched anything at this point, but we are
working with the Libyans and with allies and friends to try to
conceptualize and then develop and launch an effort to identify
and help the Libyans stand up the capacities that they need to
use their resources effectively to address the governance
challenges that they face.
Senator Kaine. I want to say that is sufficient questions
for Panel 1. Senator Risch came in and I offered him the chance
to make opening statements, and I said please ask questions,
and he said to me that normally we are hemmed in by 5- or 6-
minute question rounds, and he said he was going to cede me
time to ask as many as I wanted. So it has been good to have
the chance to dialogue with you for about an hour. I appreciate
the testimony and the efforts to address these concerns of the
first panel, and thank you very much for participating.
I would like to ask the second panel now to come on up.
Thank you.
[Pause.]
Senator Kaine. Well, I would like to welcome the second
panel before us. I will do brief introductions of the panel
members and then ask them to testify in the order in which I
introduce them.
Dr. William Lawrence is currently a visiting professor of
political science and international affairs at George
Washington, at the Elliott School of International Affairs
there. From 2011 to 2013, he was director of the North Africa
Project at the International Crisis Group, and prior to that
served in a number of positions in the U.S. State Department,
including service at the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli. Dr. Lawrence
spent 12 years in North Africa, and he served with the late
Ambassador Chris Stevens in the Peace Corps in Morocco.
Frederic Wehrey is a senior associate in the Middle East
Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His
research has focused on political reform and security issues in
the Arab Gulf States and U.S. policy in the Middle East more
broadly. He flew back from Libya just yesterday.
Thank you for accepting our invite when you are so jet-
lagged, where you have been studying and working on the various
Libya militias. Obviously, we look forward to hearing about
your most recent experience.
Thomas Joscelyn, our third witness, is a senior fellow at
the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, and also senior
editor of the Long War Journal, a publication dealing with
counterterrorism and related security issues. Much of his
research focuses on how al-Qaida and its affiliates operate
around the globe. Mr. Joscelyn was the senior counterterrorism
advisor to Mayor Giuliani during his 2008 Presidential campaign
and has testified often before Congress.
If I could begin with Dr. Lawrence and have each of you do
opening statements, we will get into questions. We are
expecting votes to be called sometime between 3:45 and 4:00,
and we will engage in vigorous questioning until we have to run
over to the floor.
But, Dr. Lawrence, welcome, and please begin.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM LAWRENCE, VISITING PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL
SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, GEORGE WASHINGTON
UNIVERSITY'S ELLIOTT SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS,
WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Lawrence. Thank you, Chairman Kaine, and thank you to
all those who helped organize the panel. As you mentioned, I
just spent 2 years in the region witnessing all this from up
close, and although I will only be able to cover so much in 5
minutes, I am happy to answer any questions you have about the
individual countries, and any questions you asked the first
panel insofar as it does not get into the nitty-gritty of U.S.
programs. I would be happy to address any of those questions.
In the North African region and beyond, we are still living
in what historians call a ``world historical moment'' where
change happens fast in profound but cacophonous ways. History
accelerates, and we often miss much of what is going on and get
distracted by things over here and miss what is going on over
there.
Apt comparisons have been made to 1989 in Eastern Europe
and to 1945, but I think the best comparison is to 1848, in
which the authoritarians play themselves, the liberals play
themselves, the street plays itself, and the Marxist spoilers
are replaced by Islamist spoilers. And even though only one
country had a regime change in 1848, about 20 countries in
Europe were profoundly affected, and this began a process of
the decline of monarchies and the growth of democracies in
Europe.
Of the 18 countries that rose up in the winter of 2011, the
North African nations played a much larger role than the
nations to the east. They incubated this change over quite a
long period. They provided much of the political culture, the
slogans, the rap lyrics, the hybridic ideologies, and North
Africa continues to be the place where most of the change is
taking place in the Arab Spring's aftermath.
In a lecture I gave 2 years ago in Boston entitled ``Days
of Rage, Dreams of Trespass,'' you can hear a lot of this
analysis that I am talking about. But suffice it to say that
today the roots of rage and the dreams of trespass have not
subsided in this region, and we cannot rely on the media. The
media is too underfunded and underresourced, and it is not
everywhere.
Just take the example of Bloody Friday last Friday in
Tripoli where we had a massacre of civilians and a civilian
uprising against militias and very poor media coverage, and
this could be a major turning point in the politics of Libya
and the politics of Tripoli. This civilian uprising was much
like the civilian uprising after Chris Stevens' death in
Benghazi, and yet it gets lost in this environment of big
change.
That also raises an important quick point I will make about
Libya, which is that Libya is not one big mess. Libya is a
bunch of little messes that are not very related. So the string
of political assassinations in Benghazi is very different from
the political game involving militias and their GNC allies in
Tripoli, which is different from what is going on in the
borders, which is different from the fighting over smuggling
and trafficking routes in the south, and different from ethnic
conflicts in other communities, and we tend to conflate this
all because there is no military and no police, and we do a
great disservice to ourselves to not understand all the
different dynamics in these different Libyan localities.
Over the last 3 years and across the North African region,
we are talking about major changes every month with national,
regional, and global causes and effects, and we do ourselves a
disservice by focusing on nation/state-level changes and
ignoring the subnational and the transnational.
There are also dozens of ways the information coming from
the region gets distorted as it flows through various filters
coming to Washington. One of the big ones I call the Egypt
Effect. When Egypt is going well, the region is going well; and
when Egypt is doing badly, everyone else is suffering from
whatever malady Egypt has, whereas Tunisia in particular is
very much on its own trajectory and should not be viewed
through that Egyptian lens.
That said, there are regional dimensions to all this, and
what we often miss is what is regional. For example, I would
venture to say that Egypt is not the big problem in North
Africa right now. Syria is the big problem. We have thousands
of fighters streaming to Syria. We have hundreds of deaths
already of North Africans in Syria, and we have blowback
effects already starting, not unlike the young fighters coming
back from Afghanistan that had a direct impact on the 1990s
happening in Algeria.
So we do ourselves a great disservice by not understanding
that by putting the Syria conflict on hold, it does not
constrain itself. It rocks the North African region in very
profound ways. Take, for example, the flows of jihadists and
the flows of weapons, right? We were mostly concerned in 2011
about flows to the west and to the south. Now that is not the
concern. It is the flows back into Libya because Libyan
militias over-sold into the black markets, and the increasing
flows north and east of Libya toward the conflicts that you
mentioned.
It is also not correct to see the change that happened in
North Africa as nonviolent. And it is also incorrect to see
stability as needing to be our number one goal in the region.
Stability for stability's sake, as we have learned, has
destabilizing effects in the region. Democratic transitions are
unstable. Three hundred Tunisians died in their revolution.
Twenty-seven thousand Libyans died in their revolution, and the
vast majority of the deaths were pro-revolution Libyans
fighting and now continuing that fight in Syria, as I mentioned
earlier, because they want change in their countries.
The other martyrs often get overlooked. Bouazizi was the
first of 400 self-immolations across the region, the majority
in Algeria, and the majority of these self-immolators worked in
the informal sector, and the international community and the
national communities have continued the same economic policies
toward the informal sectors, which do not work. So we continue
to exclude from the formal economies, because not enough jobs
are being created, and from the informal economies, and have
this continuing cycle. Even this month, we have had several new
self-immolations because of the despair.
Fifty percent of the people in all of these countries work
in the informal sector. Thirty percent of the economies, on
average, are in the informal sector. And we are not doing a
good job in terms of job creation and making the informal
sector into an engine of growth rather than a problem that
needs to be eradicated.
North African young people made these revolutions, and they
continue to be successful in keeping change happening. But we
also should not see them as those kids over there. In many
ways, it was our investments in vaccinations, our investments
in mother-child health care, our investments in education, our
investments in any number of areas that created the youth bulge
in the first place, which is not created by high fertility. It
is created by mortality dropping twice as quickly as fertility
is dropping in the region, and many of these kids, many of the
revolutionaries studied in American universities. They were our
classmates, they were our students, and as things continue to
unfold, they are wondering why we are not there more.
So in many ways, the chickens of successful developmental
policy, both domestic and international, have come home to
roost, and we have not sufficiently adjusted our assistance
policies to take into account these new realities, where big
investments in health and education and women and youth on the
old models create as many problems, as I mentioned earlier, as
they solve, where the real action right now is the 10 million
jobs that need to be created for this youth bulge that largesse
and good will created in the first place.
I have interviewed over 5,000 young people in the region
over many years, and if I have learned anything from these
interviews, these are very pragmatic young people who have
rejected the old ideologies, nationalist ideologies, socialist
ideologies, Amazerist ideologies, feminist ideologies, Islamist
ideologies, and the vast majority are seeking to build
reconciled political spaces where everyone has a seat at the
metaphorical dinner table.
I remember when youth activists from Abdul Asan, a banned
Islamic group in Morocco, were crushed when their group left
the February 20th movement because they wanted to build a
Morocco where everyone had a seat at that table, where everyone
worked together.
So we have restive populations with higher expectations
because of the Arab Spring, and states, to quote Yahia Zoubir
in his new book on security in the region, which are managers
of violence. To whatever degree these states are to blame for
that violence or are simply victims of that violence varies
from state to state. But there is no question that all four
states need help quelling the increased violence, some of it in
the name of democratization and rights, some in the name of
jobs and keeping price subsidies, and some of the more
nefarious forces that we have been talking about.
But let us not get on the wrong side of democratic change,
as we did in some of the cases in the Arab Spring, and always
ask in our assistance and in our partnerships how does this
policy affect the young people that are trying to emulate our
system with their efforts to make political change? As we
engage with the governments, we do not often think that way.
In security, and I was one of the people who worked on
TSCTP when I was at the State Department, the creation of it,
it was a good idea. It has not been fully implemented in as
holistic a manner as it could have. We need to do a lot more in
human rights, as the head of AFRICOM said and his regret in
terms of what was done in Mali. We also need to do a lot more
on the economic side and the political reform side.
Senator Kaine. If I could ask you to start to summarize,
Dr. Lawrence.
Dr. Lawrence. I am right at the end.
So we need to increase levels of cooperation with all of
these countries.
I am very concerned about our very light footprint in Libya
and the tiny Embassy, and even our light footprint in Tunisia
and Algeria where diplomats, because of what happened in
Benghazi, are very much hunkered down. They do get out with
their escorts, but they are very few in number. We do not have
enough out there, and we need to get more out to the embassies,
in my opinion.
I am optimistic for the long term in the Maghreb even
though my prediction for the medium term is more mixed. The
Maghreb needs our help, our heart and soft power, and our smart
power.
Thank you.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Dr. Lawrence.
Dr. Wehrey.
STATEMENT OF FREDERIC WEHREY, SENIOR ASSOCIATE IN THE MIDDLE
EAST PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Wehrey. Good afternoon, Chairman Kaine. Thank you for
the opportunity to speak about Libya's worsening security
crisis and the next steps for United States policy in building
Libya's Army.
I join you today having flown back last night from a 2-week
trip to Tripoli and Benghazi, where I met with a wide range of
Libyans, including militia leaders, military officers,
parliamentarians, tribal chiefs, and Islamists about options to
improve security.
These voices were nearly unanimous in identifying the
unifying thread of much of Libya's instability in many of these
disparate conflicts to the power and autonomy of the country's
roughly 300 militias, many of which the Libyan Government has
tried to bring under its control by putting them on its
payroll. Now, by all accounts, this has been a disastrous
bargain. It has actually given predatory militias even greater
freedom and even greater latitude.
This past weekend, I witnessed a remarkable turn of events
in Tripoli that suggests public patience with the militias has
reached a tipping point. On Friday, peaceful protesters marched
on a compound belonging to a powerful militia from Misrata,
demanding that they leave. Forty-six of these protesters died
at the hands of militiamen wielding heavy-caliber weapons. The
outrage was immediate. Civil strikes shut down the city, and
protests erupted across Libya.
The message in all of this activism was uniform and clear:
We want the militias dismantled, and we want the legitimate
army and police to take their place.
Now, echoing these popular demands, the United States, as
we have heard, along with Italy and Britain, is considering a
plan to train and equip a new Libyan national army, denoted in
military terms as a general purpose force. In theory, the
concept is sound: bolster the army to protect the elected
officials and institutions and compel the militias to disarm.
But the plan also carries several risks. Unanswered
questions about the force's mission, its oversight, and its
inclusiveness could further polarize an already-fractured
country. To prevent this from happening, the following five
issues and questions regarding the general purpose force need
to be resolved.
First, its exact role and mission needs to be clarified,
and based on my last visit, it is not clear that the Libyans
have the capacity to determine this at this point. As its name
implies, it is meant to be a conventional infantry force that
is focused on guarding installations and officials, but what
Libya really needs is a more specialized gendarme to tackle
border security, illicit trafficking in narcotics and weapons,
and low-level insurgency.
Second, effective civilian oversight of this force must be
in place. Libya does not need to follow an all-too-common model
in the Arab world where armies' self-entitlement and insularity
have been fatal for democracy. The Libyan revolution was not
launched to replace one colonel with another.
Third, the general purpose force must act and be perceived
as nonpartisan and professional. To prevent it from becoming
the private militia of a particular tribe or region, or the
Pretorian Guard for a political faction, its recruits must draw
from a broad spectrum of Libyan society and must be integrated
into mixed units.
Fourth, the United States and Libyan authorities must
properly vet recruits for aptitude, human rights' violations,
and criminal history. Recent failures bear this out. An effort
last year to train Libyan police officers in Jordan collapsed
when poorly screened recruits mutinied against what they
perceived as poor conditions.
Fifth and perhaps most important, the training effort must
be accompanied by a parallel program to demobilize and
reintegrate the young men in the militias back into society.
These young men must be given economic and social incentives to
leave and enter the workforce, pursue schooling, or join the
regular police and army. Doing so would deprive militia bosses
and cynical politicians of the manpower to obstruct Libya's
democratic transition.
Mr. Chairman, in light of the stunning display of public
activism and government will that I witnessed this weekend, the
United States and Libya's friends have a window of opportunity
to help improve Libya's security. But the United States needs
to proceed cautiously and deliberately. True, establishing an
army is an important first step in restoring security. But the
militia problem cannot be solved solely by the state's
monopolization of force.
The militias draw from a wellspring of deep political and
economic grievances by Libya's long-neglected towns and
regions, and better training and equipment alone will not
confer legitimacy on the new army or compel militias to
surrender their arms. That legitimacy will only be obtained
through broad political reconciliation such as the national
dialogue currently being sponsored by the Prime Minister, a
constitution, and a representative government that is able to
deliver services across the country.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak here today.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Wehrey follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Frederic Wehrey
Chairman Kaine, Ranking Member Risch, committee members, I am
grateful for this opportunity to speak with you about Libya's worsening
security crisis and the next steps for U.S. policy in building Libya's
Army.
I join you today having flown back last night from a 2-week
research trip to Tripoli, western mountains and the troubled eastern
city of Benghazi. It was my sixth visit to the country and my fourth
since the Revolution.
The focus of my recent trip was to assess the prospects for
demobilizing and disarming the country's powerful militias while
building up the regular army and police and reforming its defense
institutions. I held frank and detailed conversations with a variety of
official and nonofficial actors: the Special Forces commander in charge
of securing Benghazi, militant federalists in the east, the heads of
Islamist militias, civil society activists, and parliamentarians.
diagnosing the problem
Much of Libya's worsening crisis stems from the power and autonomy
of the country's roughly 300 militias. Lacking its own police and army,
the transitional government in late 2011 and 2012, cut a deal with
these militias, putting them on the payroll of the Ministries of
Defense and Interior. By all accounts this has been a Faustian bargain
that has given the militias freedom to pursue agendas that are
political, ideological, in some cases, purely criminal.
The militia menace has been especially stark in Tripoli, where
armed groups from outside the city--Misrata and Zintan--have claimed
what they see as the spoils of the revolution, occupying public and
governmental institutions, raiding the army's training camps and
facilities, and pressuring the Parliament to pass legislation. In the
east, militias allied with the country's federalists have shut down oil
production while in the south they guard the porous frontier.
Over the weekend, I witnessed a remarkable turn of events in
Tripoli that suggest public patience with the militias has reached a
tipping point. On Friday protestors marched peacefully on a compound in
Tripoli belonging to a powerful, predatory Misratan militia, demanding
that they leave. Forty-six people, including the elderly, women, and
several adolescents, died in a hail of gunfire by militiamen wielding
heavy caliber weapons. The message was uniform and clear: ``We want the
militias out of Tripoli, and the national army and police to take their
place.''
When I left Tripoli, the Libyan national police and army--long
thought to be nonexistent and missing in action--were out on the
streets of Tripoli in full force,
to thunderous applause from the city's residents. The question before
us now is whether this remarkable episode presages a real dismantlement
of militia power, or whether it is simply a tactical redeployment.
u.s. security assistance: opportunities and challenges
In response to Libyan's deepening crisis and Prime Minister
Zeidan's request for greater outside assistance at this year's G8, the
U.S., Italy, Britain, and Turkey are planning to train and equip a new
Libyan national army, denoted in military terms as a ``general purpose
force.'' In theory, the concept seems sound: bolster a professional
Libyan Army to protect elected officials and institutions, allow the
government to function free from militia pressure, and compel the
militias to disarm.
But the plan also carries the risks. Unanswered questions about the
force's oversight, mission, inclusiveness of different regions, and
composition could potentially polarize and destabilize Libya's already
tenuous landscape. Many Islamists in the east believe the planned army
is hardly a national one but rather a palace guard for the Prime
Minister. Already there are signs that militias are trying to bloody
the nose of the new army before it even gets off the ground.
To avoid potential pitfalls, the following issues and questions
need to be resolved:
First, the exact role of the general purpose force needs to be
determined. As its name implies, it is meant to be a regular infantry,
focused initially on securing government installations and protecting
officials. But what Libya really needs is a more specialized,
gendarmerie-type service to tackle border security, illicit trafficking
in narcotics and weapons, and low-level insurgency.
It does not need another bloated, conventional military force that
sits in its barracks--a far too common occurrence in the Arab world,
where armies' self-entitlement and insularity have proved unhealthy for
democracy. The Libyan revolution was not launched to replace one
colonel for another.
Second, the ``general purpose'' force must be, and must be
perceived as, nonpartisan and professional. To prevent it from becoming
a private militia of a particular tribe, region, or political clique,
recruits must be integrated into mixed units that draw from a broad
swath of Libyan society. The case of a separate and underreported U.S.
effort to train a small Libyan counterterrorism unit inside Libya
earlier this year is instructive. The unit, set up by U.S. special
operations forces, was hardly representative of Libya's regional
makeup: recruitment appeared to be drawn overwhelmingly from westerners
to the exclusion of the long-neglected east.
And at least some of the new enlisted ranks and junior officer
corps must come from the militias. Many senior officers in the Libyan
Army detest that idea, viewing the militiamen as ill-disciplined rabble
or excessively politicized. In many cases, though, these young men
bring the real-world battlefield experience and small unit leadership
that is so desperately needed in the Libyan Army, whose junior and mid-
level officer ranks Qaddafi had hollowed out.
Teaching recruits to function as cohesive fighting units--rather
than focusing solely on imparting individual soldiering skills--is also
essential. The training mission cannot just produce soldiers who are
better marksmen but who return to Libya and melt into the militias, or
who moonlight as militiamen in addition to their day job in the army.
To prevent that worst-case scenario, proper vetting for motivation,
aptitude, past human rights violations, and criminal history is also
vital. Recent failures bear this out: an effort last year to train
Libyan police officers in Jordan collapsed when poorly screened
recruits mutinied against what they perceived as unduly Spartan living
conditions.
Third, and perhaps most important, the training program must be
accompanied by a reinvigorated demobilization, disarmament, and
reintegration program for those in the militias. These young men must
be given economic and social incentives to leave and either enter the
work force, pursue schooling, or join the regular police and army. Many
of the revolutionary fighters I have spoken with over the past 2 years
do not want to remain in the militias. But few real alternatives exist.
Mr. Chairman, to conclude: given the stunning display of popular
and government willpower I witnessed this weekend, the U.S. and Libya's
friends face an important window of opportunity to help improve Libya's
security situation. But the U.S. needs to proceed cautiously and
deliberately. Better training and equipment alone will not
automatically confer legitimacy on the new army, compel militias to
surrender their arms, or entice Libyans to join up.
That legitimacy will only be obtained through broad political
reconciliation, a constitution, and a representative government that is
able to deliver services across the country.
In this respect, U.S. security policy must take a holistic view. It
must go beyond building an army to include sustained assistance to the
Prime Minister's ongoing initiative of National Dialogue that can
establish agreed upon ``rules of the game'' and address and mitigate
the deep seated roots of the political disenchantment that fuels the
militias' persistence. The U.S. must also lend advice and expertise to
the ongoing constitutional process that will ensure proper civilian
control of the military and delineate authorities between federal and
municipal government.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Dr. Wehrey.
Mr. Joscelyn.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS JOSCELYN, SENIOR FELLOW, FOUNDATION FOR
DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Joscelyn. Chairman Kaine, thank you very much for
having me here to talk about the threat environment in North
Africa. Just by way of quick background, I come from this a
little bit different perspective as I am basically a nerd who
studies al-Qaeda very carefully and granularly. So I am going
to talk a little bit about--in the first panel we heard about
what we are doing in North Africa. I want to talk a little bit
about what our enemies are doing.
Senator Kaine. Good, good.
Mr. Joscelyn. And I am going to tailor my comments. I am
going to scratch what I was going to talk about and basically
just talk about some of the issues that you raised in the first
panel.
The first one is, you raised the issue of what we are doing
regionally as opposed to the bilateral agreements with
individual countries. I think that is exactly the right way to
think about it. Our enemies are organized regionally. In fact,
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is the regional emirate of a
global terrorist network. That is how it is set up. It is
basically set up to set up an Islamic state.
This is seen throughout much of its history as a pipedream.
They have had very little success until, really, its takeover
of two-thirds of Mali. However, we have seen AQIM has really
accelerated its operations in a variety of ways. Dr. Lawrence
talked about the network effects to Syria and elsewhere
throughout the Middle East, and that is exactly right.
Basically, this is not just a security problem for North Africa
but it affects things throughout the region and even globally.
In October, in fact, the State Department and then the U.N.
designated a top Egyptian terrorist named Muhammed Jamal al-
Khashef, who was reporting directly to Ayman al-Zawahiri. He
was directly in communication with him. Some of his trainees
actually took part in the Benghazi terrorist attack last year.
Jamal is a good example of how this network effect works,
because he is working with both Al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. He established his
own training camps in the Sinai, eastern Libya, and was even
dispatching fighters to Mali. So that is one of many examples I
can give you about how this sort of works as a network
regionally.
The second thing I want to talk about, obviously al-Qaeda
is just part of the picture. There is a broad spectrum of
issues here which the other witnesses can better speak to than
I can. However, one of the things I would like to talk about is
that we continually underestimate, I think, what al-Qaeda's
clandestine plans are for various regions. We have seen this in
Iraq, we saw this in Yemen, and we have seen this in Syria,
where al-Qaeda's two affiliates have taken over a large portion
of territory.
AQIM now, having taken over Mali, they have been kicked out
by the French, showed that it had the capacity to do more than
just smuggling and contraband and kidnappings for ransom, that
sort of thing.
To that effect, in early October a top alleged al-Qaeda
operative named Abu al-Salibi was captured by U.S. forces in
Tripoli. What's interesting is that most of the press coverage
focused on his historical acts on behalf of al-Qaeda, including
his involvement in the 1998 Embassy bombings, which I think is
well established in the court record.
What I was more interested in is what a report prepared by
the Library of Congress in conjunction with an arm of the
Defense Department concluded about Abu al-Salibi's role, all
the way back in August 2012. They concluded, the authors of
that report, that, in fact, he was the clandestine builder of
al-Qaeda's network in Libya in the wake of the revolution, and
that he had a series of steps that he was following under
guidance from al-Qaeda's senior leadership to build up al-
Qaeda's presence in Libya, including working with various
militias and sort of ingraining al-Qaeda's ideology locally
within Libya.
And that brings me to the third point. There is oftentimes
a distinction that has been made, I think a false one, that al-
Qaeda is sort of this global jihadist threat and it is not
really connected to these local endeavors, it is not really a
local jihadist organization as well. That is fundamentally
wrong. In fact, al-Qaeda, throughout its entire existence, has
spent most of its resources, overwhelmingly so, on local
endeavors, and what we are seeing now in Tunisia or Libya and
elsewhere is really how it is actually moving forward with
those designs.
And you raised the issue of Ansar al-Sharia of Tunisia and
its attack, or you also mentioned the two assassinations
earlier this year, and also the attack on our U.S. Embassy.
Well, the Tunisia Government has blamed Ansar al-Sharia of
Tunisia for all of that. They say that Ansar al-Sharia of
Tunisia was actually responsible for the political
assassinations, and the State Department has recognized that
they were responsible for the attack on our Embassy. They
actually are strong ties between that branch of Ansar
al-Sharia and also the Ansar al-Sharia in Libya.
The reason why I connect the dots on this a little bit is
that Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia--you can see it in my written
testimony, and I can go on with a lot more evidence--I think is
firmly part of the al-Qaeda network inside North Africa, as is
Ansar
al-Sharia in Libya, and there is a lot of data on that that I
have been compiling. These are groups I follow every day
online. These are groups that I have been tracking very
closely.
Why is that important? Well, it shows al-Qaeda's designs
and the al-Qaeda network's designs do have local interests, and
this raises the whole point that you were getting at in terms
of our partnerships with these various countries. Part of the
thing that we have to emphasize here is that our interests are
very much the same as Tunisia's in combating these terrorists
in the al-Qaeda network, as in Libya and elsewhere, where these
local interests that al-Qaeda has, they also can manifest
themselves against us. There is also a threat to us from them,
as we saw with the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Tunis just 3
days after the attack in Benghazi.
And I will just leave it there. Thanks.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Joscelyn follows:]
Prepared Statement of Thomas Joscelyn
Chairman Kaine, Ranking Member Risch, and members of the committee,
thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the security situation
in North Africa. For more than a decade I have been closely tracking
al-Qaeda and associated movements. So, my testimony today will largely
focus on the al-Qaeda network in North and West Africa and how this
network has evolved over time.
The Arab uprisings that began in late 2010 and early 2011 created
new opportunities for millions of oppressed people. Unfortunately, the
overthrow of several dictators also generated new space for al-Qaeda
and like-minded organizations to operate. How the political process
will play out in any of these nations in the coming decades is
extremely difficult, if not impossible, for any prognosticator to say.
But we do know this: The Arab revolutions not been the death knell for
al-Qaeda as some analysts claimed it would be.
Instead, al-Qaeda and other ideologically allied organizations have
taken advantage of the security vacuums caused by the uprisings. In
Mali, for instance, an al-Qaeda branch that was once written off as
nothing more than a ``nuisance'' to the residents of the countries in
which it operated managed to take over a large swath of territory,
thereby forcing the French to intervene.\1\ Al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM) and its allies imposed their harsh sharia law on the
residents of Mali at gunpoint, destroying local Muslim traditions and
practices until the jihadists could be dislodged from power. Even now,
however, the al-Qaeda-led alliance threatens Mali. Many of the jihadist
fighters melted away into neighboring countries, where, free from the
West's superior military might, they have regrouped and lived to fight
another day.\2\
Al-Qaeda did not overthrow the government in Mali, but, as was the
case elsewhere, the international terror network took advantage of the
situation. A coup d'etat by Malian soldiers unseated the elected
government and set in motion a chain of events that AQIM capitalized
on. Armed with weapons formerly kept in Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi's
arsenals, al-Qaeda, other jihadist groups and Tuareg tribesmen quickly
ran roughshod over the Malian military.
The war in Mali is instructive because it shows how events
throughout the region, including inside the countries we were asked to
assess today, are interconnected. Qaddafi's weapons fueled the fight in
Mali, but post-Qaddafi Libya's instability and porous borders have
escalated the violence as well. Fighters who took part in the Libyan
revolution returned to Mali with fresh combat experience. Al-Qaeda and
allied jihadists have established training camps inside Libya and newly
trained fighters have been able to move across Algeria into Mali.
The threat of terrorism inside Algeria has increased during the war
in Mali. In January 2013, an al-Qaeda commander named Mokhtar
Belmokhtar laid siege to the In Amenas gas facility. Belmokhtar's
forces have fought in Mali and operated inside Libya as well. Algerian
authorities claim that some of the Egyptians who took part in the In
Amenas operation also participated in the September 11, 2012, terrorist
attack in Benghazi, Libya. Tunisian authorities have blamed veterans
from Mali with links to AQIM for security problems along the border
with Algeria.\3\
The war in Mali is tied, therefore, to broader regional security
problems that stretch into and throughout all of North Africa. In fact,
the terrorist threats in North Africa are tied to events that occur
even farther away--in Syria, for example. Al Qaeda in Iraq drew many
recruits from North Africa during the height of the Iraq war. With the
Syrian war raging on, al-Qaeda's two affiliates in Syria continue to
draw fighters from North Africa's jihadist pool. These same fighters
can pose threats to their home countries upon their return.
key points
This brief introduction is a way of saying that the terrorist
threat emanating from North and West Africa is a dynamic problem set
with no easy solutions. Still, the last several years have revealed to
us certain key lessons. Any sound strategy for defeating al-Qaeda and
its allies should take the following into account:
AQIM leads a network that operates in several countries.
This network is comprised of not just individuals and brigades
that are formally a part of AQIM, but also entities that are
closely allied with the al-Qaeda branch. If we are to defeat
the AQIM network, then the West and its local allies must
understand AQIM's order of battle--that is, how all of these
groups are operating in conjunction with one another. There are
differences between some of these groups, but at the end of the
day they are in the same trench. I discuss this further below.
The AQIM network includes groups that are frequently
identified as ``local'' jihadist organizations. It is widely
believed that groups such as Ansar al-Dine and the Ansar al-
Sharia chapters are not really a part of the al-Qaeda network
in North and West Africa. But, as I explain, this view is based
on a fundamental misreading of al-Qaeda's objectives.
Western analysts should be careful not to underestimate the
current or future capabilities of al-Qaeda's many branches.
Prior to its takeover of much of Mali, the AQIM threat was
widely viewed as a criminal problem. Kidnappings for ransom,
contraband smuggling, and extortion were and remain key AQIM
operations. But the organization and its allies have now
demonstrated a much more lethal capability. They have proven
capable of taking and holding territory in the absence of
effective central government control. Given that some of the
governments in North Africa have only a tenuous grip on power,
AQIM and its allies may have the opportunity to acquire
additional territory in the future. They will continue to
contest for control of parts of Mali, especially after the
French withdraw their troops.
There is always the potential for AQIM and allied groups to
attempt a mass casualty attack in the West. For obvious
reasons, most analysts downplay AQIM's capabilities and intent
in this regard. Even though its predecessor organization
targeted France as early as 1994, in more recent years the
group has not successfully launched a mass casualty attack in
the West. However, as we've seen with other al-Qaeda branches,
this does not mean that this will continue to be the case in
the future. We've seen time and again how various parts of al-
Qaeda's global network have ended up attempting attacks on the
U.S.\4\ AQIM and allied organizations belong to a network that
is loyal to al-Qaeda's senior leadership and remains deeply
hostile to the West. While most of their assets will be focused
over there, in North and West Africa, there is always the
potential for some of their resources and fighters to be
deployed over here.
In August, al-Qaeda emir Ayman al-Zawahiri appointed Nasir
al-Wuhayshi, the head of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP), to the position of al-Qaeda's general manager. Based on
my reading of captured al-Qaeda documents, the general
manager's position is responsible for overseeing the operations
of
al-Qaeda's many branches.\5\ Wuhayshi has been in contact with
AQIM's top leader, Abdelmalek Droukdel. However, AQIM's emir
ignored some of Wuhayshi's advice in the past.\6\ That may
change now that Wuhayshi is technically Droukdel's superior.
This is important because Wuhayshi has proven to be an
effective manager capable of running insurgency operations at
the same time that his henchmen have plotted attacks against
the U.S.
the al-qaeda network in north africa
In this section, I briefly outline the structure of al-Qaeda's
network in North Africa. The network is comprised of a clandestine
apparatus, al-Qaeda's official branch (joined by its allies), as well
as the Ansar al Sharia chapters.
Clandestine Network
We must always be mindful that al-Qaeda has maintained a
clandestine global network since its inception. Of course, dismantling
this network became the prime objective of American intelligence and
counterterrorism officials after the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks. Today, al-Qaeda continues to maintain a covert network. We
regularly find traces of it. This network operates in conjunction with
groups that are quite open about their allegiance to al-Qaeda.
In August 2012, a report (``Al Qaeda in Libya: A Profile''),
prepared by the federal research division of the Library of Congress
(LOC) in conjunction with the Defense Department's Combating Terrorism
Technical Support Office, outlined the key actors who were secretly
pushing al-Qaeda's agenda forward inside Libya.\7\
Al Qaeda's senior leadership (AQSL) in Pakistan has overseen the
effort, according to the report's authors. AQSL ``issued strategic
guidance to followers in Libya and elsewhere to take advantage of the
Libyan rebellion.'' AQSL ordered its followers to ``gather weapons,''
``establish training camps,'' ``build a network in secret,''
``establish an Islamic state,'' and institute sharia law in Libya.
``AQSL in Pakistan dispatched trusted senior operatives as emissaries
and leaders who could supervise building a network,'' the report notes.
They have been successful in establishing ``a core network in Libya,''
but they still act in secret and refrain from using the
al-Qaeda name.
The chief ``builder'' of al-Qaeda's secret endeavor in Libya was an
alleged al-Qaeda operative known as Abu Anas al-Libi, according to the
report's authors. Al-Libi was captured by U.S. forces in Tripoli in
October. Other al-Qaeda actors are identified in the report and they
presumably continue to operate in Libya.
It is likely that al-Qaeda maintains covert operations inside the
other North African nations as well. In Egypt, a longtime subordinate
to Ayman al-Zawahiri named Muhammad Jamal al-Kashef was designated a
terrorist by both the U.S. State Department and the United Nations in
October.\8\ Egyptian authorities found that Jamal was secretly in
contact with Zawahiri while also working with al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP) and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Jamal
established training camps in the north Sinai and eastern Libya. And
some of his trainees went on to take part in the attack on the U.S.
Mission in Benghazi, Libya on September 11, 2012. Jamal is currently
jailed inside Egypt, but his upstart branch of al-Qaeda, commonly
referred to as the ``Muhammad Jamal Network,'' remains active. Jamal's
network has even established ties to terrorists inside Europe.
Jamal's activities prior to his capture highlight the
interconnectivity of al-Qaeda's global network, including throughout
North Africa and the Middle East, as well as the organization's desire
for secrecy in some key respects. In addition to its official and
unofficial branches, al-Qaeda has also established and maintained
terrorist cells. This has long been part of the organization's
tradecraft.
Official Al-Qaeda Branch and Allies
Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, al-Qaeda's formal
branches have grown significantly. Al-Qaeda's official branch, or
affiliate, in North Africa is AQIM. While AQIM's predecessor
organizations were already closely tied to al-Qaeda, AQIM was
officially recognized by Ayman al-Zawahiri in late 2006. AQIM's main
objectives have been to overthrow North African governments it said
were ruled by apostates and to replace their rule with an Islamic state
based on sharia law. The Arab uprisings removed the ``infidel''
governments, which initially surprised al-Qaeda's ideologues because
they did not expect, nor advocate, nonviolent political change. But, in
al-Qaeda's view, the task remains unfinished because its harsh brand of
sharia law has not been implemented.
Mali was the first instance in which AQIM attempted to govern a
large amount of territory based on its sharia code. In taking over two-
thirds of Mali, AQIM partnered with other organizations that shared its
desire to see sharia implemented. Chief among these is Ansar al-Dine
(AAD), which was added to the U.S. Government's list of global
terrorist organization in March 2013.\9\ The State Department noted
that AAD ``cooperates closely'' with AQIM and ``has received support
from AQIM since its inception in late 2011.'' AAD ``continues to
maintain close ties'' to AQIM and ``has received backing from AQIM in
its fight against Malian and French forces.'' The U.N.'s official
designation page contains additional details concerning the
relationship between AAD and AQIM.\10\
Captured AQIM documents further illuminate the relationship between
AQIM and AAD. In one ``confidential letter'' from Abdelmalek Droukdel
(the emir of AQIM) to his fighters, Droukdel notes that his forces
should be split in two. Part of AQIM's forces would operate under AAD's
command in northern Mali while the other part should focus on
``external activity,'' meaning terrorism elsewhere.\11\
Another AQIM-allied group is the Movement for Unity and Jihad in
West Africa (MUJAO), which was formed by AQIM commanders who wanted to
expand their operations. MUJAO was designated by the U.S. Government as
a terrorist organization in December 2012.\12\ Still another al-Qaeda-
linked group was formed by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a former senior AQIM
who, because of leadership disagreements, formed his own organization
in late 2012. In August, Belmokhtar announced that his group, the al-
Mulathameen Brigade, had merged with MUJAO.\13\
Despite disagreements between the leaders of these various al-
Qaeda-linked groups, they are all openly loyal to al-Qaeda's senior
leadership and they have all continued to work closely together in Mali
and elsewhere. In addition, Boko Haram, which was also recently
designated a terrorist organization, has joined this coalition and is
``linked'' to AQIM.\14\
Ansar Al Sharia in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen
Two prominent chapters of Ansar al-Sharia have risen in North
Africa, one in Libya and the other in neighboring Tunisia. Some have
argued that while these Ansar al-Sharia chapters cooperate with al-
Qaeda they have fundamentally different goals. Ansar al-Sharia is said
to be focused on purely ``local'' matters, while al-Qaeda is only
interested in the global jihad. But this is simply not true. Al-Qaeda's
most senior leaders, including Ayman al-Zawahiri, have repeatedly said
that one of his organization's chief priorities is to implement sharia
law as the foundation for an Islamic state. This is precisely Ansar al-
Sharia's goal. In addition, there are credible reports that the Ansar
al-Sharia chapters in both Libya and Tunisia have provided recruits for
al-Qaeda's affiliates and other jihadist organizations in Syria, the
new epicenter for the global jihad.
The very first Ansar al-Sharia chapter was established in Yemen by
AQAP. The U.S. Government recognizes Ansar Al Sharia Yemen as simply an
``alias'' for AQAP.\15\ Ansar al-Sharia was part of AQAP's expansion
into governance, which involved the implementation of sharia law.
An Ansar al-Sharia chapter in Egypt has hardly concealed its
loyalty to al-Qaeda. Its founder, an extremist who has long been tied
to al-Qaeda's senior leadership, has said that he is ``honored to be an
extension of al-Qaeda.'' \16\ Ansar Al Sharia Egypt was formed by
members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), a terrorist organization
headed by Ayman al-Zawahiri that also merged with al-Qaeda. Mohammed
al-Zawahiri, Ayman's younger brother, starred at Ansar Al Sharia
Egypt's events prior to his re-imprisonment. Ansar Al Sharia Egypt's
social media has consistently praised and advocated on behalf of al-
Qaeda.
In this context, it is hardly surprising to find that the Ansar al-
Sharia chapters in Libya and Tunisia behave much like their
counterparts. In October, Tunisian Prime Minister Ali Larayedh told
Reuters, ``There is a relation between leaders of Ansar al-Sharia
[Tunisia], Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Ansar Al Sharia in
Libya. We are coordinating with our neighbors over that.'' \17\
Tunisian officials have repeatedly alleged that Ansar Al Sharia in
Tunisia is closely tied to AQIM, and even that they have discovered a
handwritten allegiance pact between the emirs of the two organizations.
Ansar Al Sharia Tunisia responded to these allegations by confirming
its ``loyalty'' to al-Qaeda while claiming that it remains
organizationally independent--a claim that is contradicted by other
evidence.\18\
Some of Ansar Al Sharia Tunisia's most senior leaders have known
al-Qaeda ties, and at least two of them previously served as important
al-Qaeda operatives in Europe.\19\ The group's leadership openly
praises al-Qaeda. And the organization's social media is littered with
pro-al-Qaeda messages. AQIM leaders have repeatedly praised and offered
advice to Ansar Al Sharia Tunisia.
Similarly, Ansar Al Sharia Libya's leaders are openly pro-al-Qaeda.
The group has denounced the Libyan Government for allowing American
forces to capture Abu Anas al-Libi, a top al-Qaeda operative. Ansar al-
Sharia has even been running a charity campaign on al-Libi's behalf.
The authors of ``Al Qaeda in Libya: A Profile,'' the Library of
Congress report published in August 2012, concluded that Ansar Al
Sharia Libya ``has increasingly embodied al-Qaeda's presence in
Libya.'' And Sufian Ben Qumu, a former Guantanamo detainee who is now
an Ansar al-Sharia leader based in Derna, Libya, has longstanding ties
to al-Qaeda. A leaked Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO) threat
assessment describes Ben Qumu as an ``associate'' of Osama bin Laden.
JTF-GTMO found that Ben Qumu worked as a driver for a company owned by
bin Laden in the Sudan, fought alongside al-Qaeda and the Taliban in
Afghanistan, and maintained ties to several other well-known al-Qaeda
leaders. Ben Qumu's alias was reportedly found on the laptop of an al-
Qaeda operative responsible for overseeing the finances for the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The information on the laptop
indicated that Ben Qumu was an al-Qaeda ``member receiving family
support.'' \20\
The weight of the evidence makes it far more likely than not that
the Ansar
al-Sharia chapters in Libya and Tunisia are part of al-Qaeda's network
in North Africa. This has important policy ramifications because both
groups have been involved in violence, with Ansar Al Sharia Libya
taking part in the Benghazi terrorist attack and Ansar Al Sharia
Tunisia sacking the U.S. Embassy in Tunis 3 days later. The Tunisian
Government has also blamed Ansar al-Sharia for a failed suicide attack,
the first inside Tunisia in years. While both chapters have been
involved in violence, they have also been working hard to earn new
recruits for their organizations and al-Qaeda's ideology. The Arab
uprisings created a unique opportunity for them to proselytize.
----------------
End Notes
1. ``Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM): A Profile,'' A Report
Prepared by the Federal Research Division, Library of Congress under an
Interagency Agreement with the Combating Terrorism Technical Support
Office's Irregular Warfare Support Program, May 2012. The report's
authors described AQIM and jihadists in general as ``more a nuisance
than an existential threat to the countries in which they operate.''
However, AQIM certainly became an existential threat to many Muslims in
Mali in the months that followed the publication of this report.
2. David Lewis and Laurent Prieur, ``Insight: Revival of Islamists
in Mali Tests French, U.N. Nerve,'' Reuters, November 14, 2013; http://
www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/14/us-mali-islamists-insight-
idUSBRE9AD0QC20131114.
3. See: Agence France Press, ``Jihadists Hunted in Tunisia `Former
Mali Fighters','' May 10, 2013; http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/
news/afp/130510/jihadists-hunted-tunisia-former-mali-fighters.
Lambroschini, Antoine, ``Two Soldiers Killed in Tunisia Hunt for Qaeda-
Linked Group,'' Agence France Presse, June 6, 2013; http://
www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5h_
sUffq2sL8NuZjHiP_GA10-
WOXA?docId=CNG.89440e74fb0ad05503b0e0f59380c91b.01&hl=en.
4. Prior to the attempted Christmas Day 2009 bombing of Flight 253,
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was perceived as mainly a
threat to Western interests inside Yemen, not abroad. A few months
later, in May 2010, a Pakistani Taliban operative attempted to detonate
a car bomb in the middle of Times Square. Earlier this year, a plot
targeting a commuter train traveling from New York City to Toronto was
unraveled by Canadian authorities. The plotters were tied to al-Qaeda's
presence inside Iran. The Boston bombings in April show that young men
who are drawn to the ideology of al-Qaeda-associated groups in Chechnya
and Dagestan can be a threat to the U.S.
5. Thomas Joscelyn and Bill Roggio, ``AQAP's Emir Also Serves as Al
Qaeda's General Manager,'' The Long War Journal, August 6, 2013; http:/
/www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/08/aqap_emir_also_serve.php.
6. Bill Roggio, ``Wuhayshi Imparted Lessons of AQAP Operations in
Yemen to AQIM,'' The Long War Journal, August 12, 2013; http://
www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/08/wuhayshi_imparts_les.php.
7. A copy of the report can be found online here: http://
www.fas.org/irp/world/para/aq-libya-loc.pdf.
8. The State Department's announcement of Jamal's designation can
be found here: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/10/215171.htm. The
U.N.'s designation page can be viewed here: http://www.un.org/News/
Press/docs/2013/sc11154.doc.htm.
9. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/03/206493.htm.
10. http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQE13513E.shtml.
11. Bill Roggio, ``Al Qaeda in Mali Sought To Hide Foreign
Designs,'' The Long War Journal, February 15, 2013; http://
www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/02/al_qaeda_in_mali_
sou.php.
12. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/12/201660.htm.
13. Bill Roggio, ``Al Qaeda Group Led by Belmokhtar, MUJAO Unite To
Form al-Murabitoon,'' Threat Matrix, August 22, 2013; http://
www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2013/08/
al_qaeda_groups_lead_by_belmok.php.
14. For details concerning how these various groups, and Boko
Haram, have operated along-
side one another, see: Jacob Zenn, ``Boko Haram's International
Connections,'' CTC Sentinel, January 14, 2013; http://www.ctc.usma.edu/
posts/boko-harams-international-connections. See also: Bill Roggio,
``US Adds West African Group, 2 Leaders, to Terrorism List,'' The Long
War Journal, December, 7, 2012; http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/
2012/12/us_adds_west_
african.php. The designation for Boko Haram, noting it is ``linked'' to
AQIM, can be found here: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/11/
217509.htm. For more on Boko Haram's ties to the
global al-Qaeda network, see: Thomas Joscelyn, ``A Well-Deserved
Terrorist Designation,'' The
Weekly Standard, November 13, 2013; http://www.weeklystandard.com/
blogs/well-deserved-terrorist-designation_767037.html.
15. Thomas Joscelyn, ``State Department: Ansar al-Sharia An Alias
for AQAP,'' The Long War Journal, October 4, 2012; http://
www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/10/state_department_
ans.php.
16. Thomas Joscelyn, ``Ansar al-Sharia Egypt Founder `Honored To Be
An Extension of al-Qaeda,' '' The Long War Journal, November 27, 2012;
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/11/
ansar_al_sharia_egyp.php.
17. Patrick Markey and Tarek Amara, ``Tunisia Sees Islamist
Militants Exploiting Libya Chaos,'' Reuters, October 20, 2013; http://
articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-10-20/news/sns-rt-us-tunisia-
20131020_1_islamist-militants-ansar-al-sharia-libya. It should be noted
that one year earlier, during interviews on CNN and Fox News in October
2012, Mike Rogers, the Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee,
made similar claims. Rogers said that Ansar al Sharia Tunisia is
``probably'' an al-Qaeda affiliate and that the Ansar al Sharias in
Tunisia and Libya are the ``same organization.''
18. Thomas Joscelyn, ``Ansar al-Sharia Responds to Tunisian
Government,'' The Long War Journal, September 3, 2013; http://
www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/09/ansar_al_
sharia_tuni_6.php.
19. Thomas Joscelyn, ``Al-Qaeda Ally Orchestrated Assault on U.S.
Embassy in Tunisia,'' The Long War Journal, October 2, 2012; http://
www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/10/al_qaeda_ally_orches.php. See
also: Thomas Joscelyn, ``From al-Qaeda in Italy to Ansar al Sharia
Tunisia,'' The Long War Journal, November 21, 2012; http://
www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/11/from_al_qaeda_in_ita.php.
20. The leaked JTF-GTMO threat assessment can be found on The New
York Times Web site: http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/
557-abu-sufian-ibrahim-ahmed-hamuda-bin-qumu/documents/11.
Senator Kaine. Thank you. Boy, that raises a lot of
questions.
Let me just start with the regional point, Mr. Joscelyn.
You addressed that. We can talk about these nations
individually, and I have questions about them individually, but
the first panel suggested that there is at least the regional
partnership through the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism
Partnership. One of you indicated that that has not really been
implemented fully or it has more work to do. And second, the
assertion was made by our State Department witness that there
is some possibility for using the more functioning civil
societies in Algeria and Morocco as sort of models or examples
that can help in Tunisia or Libya.
Talk to me about sort of regional prospects before we get
into some of the country-specific issues that you raised.
Mr. Joscelyn. Well, you know, this is where it gets
difficult because there are different situations in each
country, obviously. I mean, you have a different environment in
each country, and I agree with what the panel was saying
previously about Tunisia being one of the better hopes for
democracy in the region and along those lines.
But I think the fundamental point I have as an al-Qaeda
guy, a guy who studies al-Qaeda, is that they do not think
about things in terms of state to state. I mean, they do and
they do not. They understand that the operating environment in
each state is different, but they have regional designs.
And so they are basically going to try and exploit whatever
vacuums they can to push forward their agenda. And unless we
are having a strong hand--I think Dr. Lawrence is the one who
mentioned the light footprint in Libya and Tunisia, which I
agree with. I think unless we are having a strong hand in terms
of emphasizing that, that this needs to be regional
coordination across these countries, I think that that is
something that is going to be lost in terms of strategy inside
North Africa.
Senator Kaine. Other thoughts on that?
Yes, Dr. Lawrence.
Dr. Lawrence. A couple of thoughts. First of all, in terms
of tactics and strategies, there was a difference for a while
in that for a while Tunisia and Libya got a pass from the worst
terrorists in most ways because the successes of the
revolutions was seen as giving a space for the possibility of
Islamist governments. This has also helped a little bit in
Morocco. To the degree to which the terrorists view the country
as a potential Islamic state as opposed to a Western-backed
secular state, there was a reduction in terrorism as we
normally know it.
And it also led to--and I have a paper on it I am happy to
submit--the rise of the new jihadi Solifism, which is much less
remote terrorists out in the mountains and in the desert and
much more a mainstreaming of jihadi Solifist discourse within
the cities of people who are living among regular and still
espousing that same rhetoric but doing things more like
targeted actions against embassies or against intellectuals,
writers, that sort of thing, rather than classical terrorism.
So we have seen some pretty major changes because of the
Arab Spring. The Algerian Government never got a pass in many
ways. Their government was always seen as the fomenter of all
this, and that is one of the reasons why a lot of the Arab
Spring tumult incubated in Algeria, and I am happy to say more
about that.
In terms of regional cooperation, these countries do not
want to cooperate with each other much. There are a lot of
debates going on about forcing it. We tend to want to see the
region as a region, which is why we want it to be an economic
region too, because it helps us to have big markets and big
regions cooperating. But these guys do not want to cooperate
with each other, in part because of big distrust among the
countries. I mean, look at Algeria's recent announcement that
they are going to be crossing the Tunisian and Libyan border
without permission to go after bad guys, which is a violation
of their long-standing principle of noninterference either of
outsiders in the Algerian state or Algeria and the neighboring
states.
So we are seeing Algeria sort of stepping up and playing
more of a regional role, but not necessarily in a way that
makes us all warm and fuzzy about what is going to be the
outcome of Algeria reaching out regionally that way.
In terms of the whole civil society thing, you asked a
question about whether the civil societies were better
functioning in one country or another, and I would say all the
countries have big destabilizing influences, which is why I
focused on that in my introductory remarks.
Algeria has over 11,000 deployments of riot police per
year. The reason why we did not have a regime change in Algeria
gets back to what the previous panel said about the economic
strength of the Algerian state, but also because of war
weariness, that neither the Algerian security forces nor the
population want to push these local grievances into that kind
of ferocious combat like they saw in the 1990s.
There are other dynamics in Morocco, and others in Tunisia,
and others in Libya, but to think that the quiescence has
anything to do with popular satisfaction with the governments,
we are not seeing that. The number two vote-getter in the
Moroccan election was spoiled ballots. You have similar
statistics in Algeria. You have a deep and increasing suspicion
of all forces in the Tunisian state. And, of course, in Libya
we have this fragmented reality that we are talking about.
In fact, I increasingly think that young people are
wondering what types of new institutions they need to build
from scratch because there is no faith in existing political
parties among the masses of young people, and little faith in
civil society, which has long been controlled by governments in
this part of the world.
Senator Kaine. Thank you.
Dr. Wehrey, do you want to say a word about the regional
efforts? Then I want to come back and ask you a question about
militias.
Dr. Wehrey. Absolutely. Well, with regard to Libya's
cooperation, it is very problematic given the informal security
sector. I mean, the militias are controlling so much of the
country on the borders, and this impacts, for instance,
Algeria's willingness to cooperate on border security. The
Algerians are convinced that the Libyan Government is
penetrated by Islamists, whom they fear, and they are really
loathe to cooperate.
Regarding Libyan and Egyptian relations, there is intense
distrust in Libya regarding Egypt's supposed sponsorship of
Gadhafi loyalists in the country. With the CC government now,
there are sensitivities among many Libyan Islamists about that
government. Libya has had, I think, better cooperation with
some of the countries to the south--for instance, Chad.
But again, when we are talking about regional cooperation,
we are talking about interactions between states, state
institutions, and Libya just does not have those institutions
in place.
Senator Kaine. Let us go to the militia testimony that you
gave earlier. First, just help me understand. When we hear 300
militias, it is a little hard for us to get our head around. I
have not traveled to Libya as you have spent so much time
doing. Are these militias primarily sort of geographical and
town- and community-based? Are they ethnic-based? How would you
describe kind of their formation?
Dr. Wehrey. The majority of them are based on town or
region. They range anywhere from 200 to really no more than
perhaps 2,000 men. Many of them arose during the revolution.
They were the fighting units that overthrew Gadhafi. But others
arose after the revolution, and in some cases they are more
opportunistic gangs. I mean, they have gotten into criminal
enterprise.
So there are ones that have allied themselves for political
reasons with politicians in the Parliament. There are those
that are effectively sort of Neighborhood Watch programs for
towns where there is no municipal police, there is no
government forces providing security.
In the east, for instance, the militias are demanding
federalism. They are demanding a greater share of the oil
revenues. They have shut down oil production. So as we have
heard, in each of Libya's regions, the militias fulfill a
different role.
In the far south among some of these ethnic communities,
the Tebu and the Taureg, the militias do have an ethnic
component there.
Senator Kaine. And do you agree with Dr. Lawrence's earlier
testimony that it is not right to look at Libyan instability as
sort of a single kind of instability but, depending on where it
is in the country, there are all kinds of reasons for
instabilities that you might see?
Dr. Wehrey. Absolutely. I mean, there are many different
microconflicts going on in Libya right now that reflect the
legacy of Gadhafi's rule. He pitted communities against one
another. He played them off, and we are seeing these manifest
themselves.
For instance, in the east, in Benghazi, what is happening
there, these assassinations is a shadowy mix of Islamists and
criminals, vendettas against the old regime. The militia
problem there is really qualitatively different than what is
happening in Tripoli, where you have two power centers, Zintan
and Misrata, that are essentially laying siege to the capital,
demanding the spoils of the revolution. I mean, they are
claiming ministries, they are kicking out the army, and we have
seen over the weekend some of these militias pull back. But
whether that really represents a dismantling of the militias I
think remains to be seen.
Senator Kaine. And just using the Tripoli example that each
of you talked about in your testimony, it was an anti militia
protest. Forty-six individuals who were protesting were killed.
But then I gather even after that there was additional civilian
protest to really continue to amplify the message that we want
the militias out. And has that continued?
Dr. Wehrey. Absolutely. There were civil strikes. I mean,
the city was shut down, shops were closed, there were more
protests, and what you did see was the deployment of the army
into Tripoli. People were wondering, where has the army been
all this time? So you did see the government finally deploy the
army. You had some negotiations where militias have pulled out
of the capital, outside the capital. But does this really
represent diminishment of militia strength I think remains to
be seen.
The army--I mean, this was a show of force, but can the
army really sustain itself? The army does not match the
militias in terms of manpower or firepower.
Senator Kaine. You had a five-point kind of plan that you
walked through, and I think the final point was to try to
basically deemphasize the militias and to get them out of the
militias and to reintegrate militia members back into civilian
life.
Dr. Wehrey. Right.
Senator Kaine. And I gather that you put that fifth because
it might be the hardest thing to do, and you could probably
only do it if you did the other four steps first. Do I read
that right?
Dr. Wehrey. It is the most difficult. I mean, this is an
entrenched economic and social problem. The Libyan Government
has developed a program to try to identify young men in the
militias and to register them, to get them into jobs and
scholarships. But this program has fallen victim to political
in-fighting, to lack of funding, but it is a good first step.
As I understand it, multiple U.S. agencies are supporting this
effort to really get at the roots of this problem and to show
these young men that you fought in the revolution, but now is
the time to move on and build the country and relinquish your
arms.
Senator Kaine. I am going to ask a similar question, Mr.
Joscelyn, to you, and then Dr. Lawrence, but kind of each in
your own sphere. So with respect to your focus on al-Qaeda,
based on your experience, would it be your recommendation that
our policy should be to do new things or to do more of the
things that we are currently doing? Do we need to look at a
different strategy other than the current Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Partnership, or do we just need to make
heavier investments in the activities that we are currently
doing in order to counter the extremist influence?
Mr. Joscelyn. Well, I think my big warning is that I find
these groups do have plans for what they are doing, and my
beginning point is to figure out what that plan is, and then
our plan is to basically dismantle it. That is essentially
where we start.
So when we talk about militias, for example, there is good
evidence that this was part of al-Qaeda's plan for inside
Libya, to coopt or work with certain militias. These militias
are not going to reintegrate into a more national force.
Identifying and isolating and trying to contain those militias
should be part of any strategy for anything we are doing inside
Libya. In fact, I warned in April 2011 about some of these
militias in congressional testimony as having already been
coopted by al-Qaeda, and some of them went on to take part,
including Ansar al-Sharia, in the Benghazi terrorist attack.
So to that extent and just to play off something that Dr.
Lawrence said a few minutes ago, too, he was exactly right.
When I said that they do and they do not view it regionally,
they have a whole comprehensive strategy for the region, our
enemies do, but how they operate in any given country can vary,
absolutely. So that is part of how we have to adjust our
tactics, that it corresponds to what they are doing.
For example, in Tunisia, for a long time they would like to
talk about Ansar al-Sharia was basically doing charity events.
I was very concerned about this because these are not overt
acts of terrorism, of course, but yet what they are doing is
they are building up their cadre which can be used for those
types of terrorist acts in the future. Now what we have seen is
that, in fact, they had a clandestine apparatus that was
planning and plotting terrorism all along, including, in fact,
the ransacking of our Embassy.
Senator Kaine. And, Dr. Lawrence, your focus is really on--
I mean, a focus on young people and what we need to do. So I
gather your answer to my question is not that we need to do
more of what we are doing but we kind of need to do different
things and have a different focus that really is looking at the
youth in the region.
Dr. Lawrence. Yes, and the youth are everybody. I mean,
basically because of the youth bulge, we are talking about the
entirety of these populations. The median age in Tunisia, which
has turned the demographic corner, is 30. In Morocco and
Algeria it is 27, and in Libya it is 24. So the latter three
suffer more from that structural youth bulge problem. In
Tunisia, it is more about unemployed university graduates that
is the destabilizing factor demographically.
Four very quick points.
During the revolution in Libya, almost every community
liberated itself, and that is why the militias are community-
based, except Tripoli, which 80 percent liberated itself in 24
hours in August 2011, and then the Zintanis and the Misratans
finished off the job in 9 days with the help of NATO and never
left.
So one of the things that is unique about Tripoli is that
you had foreign militias that never left. So kicking the
Misratans out of Tripoli is progress, but it does not solve any
other problem, except that civilians across Libya, insofar as
they have other problem militias, will see this as an example.
But this was the only problem with militias from somewhere
else.
A second point is that there was some work done by Small
Arms Survey, in cooperation with Crisis Group, and we did a
taxonomy of the militias, and I agree with everything that Fred
said. But just to give you a little data point, about 80
percent of the militias were the revolutionary militias that
now work for the government, and they are getting in trouble
with the government all the time because they are not getting
paid or because there is some political policy they do not
like, so they will storm Parliament or they will hold a
minister hostage. But these are the pro-revolutionary militias.
In our coverage we conflate the pro-revolutionary militias that
are causing a lot of the ruckus with everybody else. It is
different militias.
About 10 percent of the militias are these post-
revolutionary militias that tended to be from the more pro-
Gadhafi areas, like Bani Walid, and they have another set of
issues. And then about 5 percent of the militias are
unaffiliated either way, and they are basically kids with arms
doing something. And then the other 5 percent are terroristic
and criminal gangs, some of which predated the revolution and
which continue to cause all the types of problems that Mr.
Joscelyn is talking about. But you have to think about these
four different types of militias.
The third point is the GPF is a great idea and I subscribe
to everything that Fred said, but the metaphor I use for Libya,
both before and after the revolution because I have worked on
Libya since the early 2000s, is that you do not want to put all
your eggs in the GPF basket. The metaphor is a train station.
It is like we have a GPF train that has not left yet, and then
we think all the passengers should get on the GPF train, and we
do not know if that track is blocked or whether it will make
it.
With Libya, since there is so much dysfunctionality and
lack of capacity in government, you have to have several
different plans, and you do not know which one is going to move
forward at a particular time.
And the last point is to underscore stuff that Fred said.
The militias are not going to give up their weapons in Libya,
even the very pro-government ones, until we have a situation
that is working, we have a constitution, we have further
elections, and we have a system that seems less corrupt in
which the money starts to flow, and that gets to sort of an
economic point, which is that right now oil production is down
to 10 percent of peak capacity because of the problems with the
militias who were not getting paid.
There are certain enlightened people, like the head of the
Tripoli Brigades, who was trying to spin off fighters with
microloans to start businesses and that sort of thing. But
there is almost no capacity in the government to create
economic opportunities for militiamen, and right now one of the
best paid jobs for young persons is to be in a militia, getting
paid eventually by the government, when they pay you.
So a lot of overlapping problems here, and just kicking the
militias out from somewhere is not going to solve them.
Senator Kaine. Let me just follow up on that. I do not
think it was stated so unequivocally in the first panel, but to
some degree they did. There is sort of an assumption that Libya
does not need financial assistance because it has natural
resources. Is that your view as well, or does the diminished
oil production and other sort of economic challenges and
militiamen not getting paid--I mean, is there a need for us
with our partners to contemplate financial assistance?
Dr. Lawrence. On this score, it is the same in Libya before
the revolution--and I worked in a lot of cooperative programs
with Libya--as Libya after the revolution, poor governmental
capacity and a big mistrust of foreigners coming in with a plan
for Libya. So the way in which you do successful cooperation
with Libya is you pilot stuff.
Senator Kaine. Pilot.
Dr. Lawrence. And to pilot things, you have to have
resources. I was often flummoxed when I worked at the State
Department and I talked to Congress and others back when I
worked for the government that they would say OK--and you hear
this in national organizations, too--Libya has money, so we do
not need money. The problem is that in order to get Libya to
take out its checkbook and pay for things--and right now the
bank balance is very low because of the crisis in oil sales--
you need to demonstrate to the Libyans what works and who the
good people are to work with. And to do that, the United
Nations, the European Union, the United States, and other
friends and partners with Libya have to spend a little bit of
money to pilot things. And if things are successful on the
pilot level, then the Libyans will take out their checkbook and
start paying for things.
The same with Algeria, which has $120 billion in the bank
and is not spending it. So you have a very rich country with
very low spending in the areas that it needs to be spending,
and it needs international cooperation to help point the way.
Morocco and Tunisia is a different dynamic.
Senator Kaine. Let me just ask one last question both for
Dr. Joscelyn and Dr. Wehrey, or Mr. Joscelyn and Dr. Wehrey.
Dr. Lawrence in his testimony talked a little bit about the
Syria effect, folks coming back, some backlash from Syria. Mr.
Joscelyn, you just alluded to it briefly in your testimony. But
I would like you to each talk about how you see instability in
Syria or other regional instabilities kind of washing back into
the Maghreb.
Mr. Joscelyn. Well, one of the things that happened with Al
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is that its operations accelerated
during the Iraq war because they were sending off a lot of
recruits to fight in Iraq. Currently during the Syrian war,
basically we have seen that same pattern. Many of those same
facilitation networks are being used to send recruits from
North Africa to Syria to fight, and they can obviously bring
them back to North Africa or they can raise trouble and create
problems in their home countries.
One of the things that I have seen evidence of is, for
example, the Ansar al-Sharia branches in Tunisia and Libya
appear to be sending off recruits to Syria. They actually
promote this sort of thing. I see it in their social media. I
see it in various different indications.
So these are groups that are very actively sending off
recruits to fight in Syria and elsewhere. The reason why that
is important is because it shows you that, again, to the whole
idea that there is a network. There is a network in play of
individuals across this region, and even into the Middle East,
that is capable of sort of orchestrating terrorism, and it is
not just about the insurgency in Syria that these guys are
fighting, but it can also be used in other ways to manifest
itself. It is having effects in Iraq. It could potentially have
effects in Turkey or throughout the region, the Middle East and
elsewhere.
Senator Kaine. Dr. Wehrey.
Dr. Wehrey. Well, I certainly agree. I mean, there is
activity by some of these radical Islamist groups, Ansar al-
Sharia, the Omar Mukhtar Brigade in the east, that send
volunteers. These individuals are participating with al-Qaeda-
affiliated units in Syria. But there is also, I think, a
broader movement in Libya of sending volunteers out of Islamist
nationalism that is not really al-Qaeda. They are fighting with
the Free Syrian Army. I mean, these people did go to
Afghanistan and Iraq, and they see an impulse to help suffering
Muslims in Syria, but they are not al-Qaeda, and I do not think
there is going to be a threat from them coming back.
I do think it is important to distinguish in Libya right
now, when you look at the Islamist spectrum, that the al-Qaeda
affiliates or sympathizers is a very small minority. Many of
these Islamists, they did fight in Afghanistan, they did fight
against United States Forces in Iraq, but they have come back
and they have integrated into the political system. I mean,
they have offices. They are in the Cabinet. They are in
Parliament. I think it is a good thing.
You hear this narrative in Libya by many politicians to try
to tar all Islamists as either Brotherhood or al-Qaeda, and I
think that is very, very dangerous, and we need to distinguish
it.
Senator Kaine. Well, I want to thank you all for your
testimony. It was great to hear the first panel, which was all
State Department, DOD, AID, talking about what we are doing.
Your value is having an expertise and an independence to kind
of not just talk about what we are doing but assess what is
working and what is not. It was helpful to have you today, and
I appreciate it.
And with that, the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:59 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Richard Schmierer to
Questions Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
middle east and north africa transition fund
Question. If funding was appropriated for the Transition Fund, what
programs, activities, and types of engagement would be funded?
Answer. During the 2012 U.S. Presidency of the G8 Deauville
Partnership with Arab Countries in Transition, the United States led an
effort to design and launch a new, grant-based Middle East and North
Africa Transition Fund to support technical assistance and pilot
projects in the areas of economic governance; trade, investment, and
integration; and inclusive development and job creation.
The Fund's mandate is to provide funding for projects that will
allow transition governments participating in the Deauville Partnership
(Tunisia, Libya, Jordan, Morocco, Yemen, and Egypt) to make tangible
progress on policy reforms critical to promoting economic stability and
enabling a shift toward democracy. Projects can support ministries,
local municipalities, central banks, and Parliaments, and many of the
projects proposed are aimed at improving governments' capacity to
support small and medium enterprises, youth employment, and engage with
civil society. Transition countries and multilateral development banks
jointly produce proposals that the Fund's steering committee selects
through a competitive process to create incentives for innovation and
solid program design.
To date, the Fund has approved $101 million for 24 projects in the
partnership countries, and an additional $36 million will be available
for additional project approvals by the end of the year. Other donors
(not including the United States) have pledged $156 million, of which
they have disbursed $117 million to date. By the end of this calendar
year, the United States will have provided $20 million to the MENA
Transition Fund, of which $10 million was provided in May 2013.
Examples of actions to be taken by recipient governments in North
Africa as a result of projects financed by the Fund include:
Tunisia: Establish an Investment Authority to increase
investments in the country, creating much needed jobs and
boosting economic growth.
Morocco: Develop a new governance framework based on public
consultation, transparent budgets, and fiscal decentralization.
smart power
Question. How has the State Department changed the way it does
business since 2011 in order to engage with North African Youth,
including the next generation, including Fulbright and other
scholarship opportunities?
Answer. Prior to and after the Arab Spring, the State Department's
Public Diplomacy programming in North Africa has sought to expand
constructive political, commercial, security, and people-to-people
partnerships, and to apply the themes of pluralism, transparency, and
fairness in ways that recognize the diversity of local circumstances
and audiences across the region. Given increasing levels of
unemployment in the post-Arab Awakening period, especially among those
under the age of 30, U.S. Public Diplomacy programming also encourages
North African youth to seek expanded opportunities through education,
entrepreneurship, and professional development.
We have also used public-private partnerships to promote
entrepreneurship, education, investment, youth employment and regional
economic cooperation throughout the Maghreb. Since 2010, our
partnerships provided an effective framework for regular exchanges of
experience and expertise among U.S. Government representatives,
prominent American business leaders and local entrepreneurs.
Over the past 2 years in Libya, Embassy Tripoli has supported
English Access Microscholarship Programs in Tripoli and Benghazi, and
EducationUSA advisors at six universities. Ambassador Jones signed a
memorandum of understanding on higher education cooperation with the
Libyan Government in the fall of 2013. Social media also greatly
enhances the mission's reach; its 220,000 Facebook fans make Embassy
Tripoli one of the top-five subscribed pages in the country.
Positive trends in the PD environment have continued to support a
level U.S. engagement with the Tunisian people and government that
would have been unimaginable under the previous regime. A key program
in Tunis is the U.S.-funded Thomas Jefferson Scholars program, which
will send about 300 students to the United States over 3 years for a
year of undergraduate or community college study. When combined with
the over 20 active partnership programs between U.S. and Tunisian
universities, Embassy Tunis is making considerable and rapid inroads in
Tunisian higher education. The English Access Microscholarship Program
is now active in eight cities, reaching 1,000 underprivileged
teenagers.
The stable environment and enthusiastic support of the Moroccan
Government have made Morocco an ideal testing ground for new PD
programs, including the English Access Microscholarship and the Youth
Exchange and Study Programs, over the past decade. The TechCamp Caravan
Program, which has already provided intensive technology training to
over 120 Moroccan NGOs, is emblematic of an outreach strategy that
seeks to educate, entertain, engage, and empower audiences in every
corner of Morocco. Another public diplomacy program highlighted the
economic and health impacts of counterfeit pharmaceutical and consumer
products to youths just beginning to form their market preferences. The
program received extensive media coverage over a 2-week period,
culminating in a documentary that aired on Morocco's largest television
network.
Building on a strong commercial relationship and burgeoning
security partnership, Embassy Algiers' Public Diplomacy programming
aims to demonstrate the benefits of a closer relationship to citizens
and government officials throughout Africa's largest country. Diligent
negotiation with the Algerian Government has led to a blossoming
partnership in the media, education, arts, and youth programs. In
addition to a large English Access Microscholarship Program, Embassy
Algiers grants also now provide English training at several government-
run youth centers and career skills training at public universities.
Question. What bilateral and regional tools and pressure is the
administration using to combat the destabilizing effects of extremist
groups such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)?
Answer. Combating violent extremist groups, such as AQIM, is a
priority for the Obama administration. The Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) is the U.S. Government's
multiyear, interagency, and regional program designed to build the
capacity and resilience of the governments and communities in the Sahel
and Maghreb regions of Africa to contain, degrade, and ultimately
defeat the threat posed by al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and other violent
extremist organizations (VEOs) in the Trans-Sahara region. TSCTP also
provides a platform to improve regional and international cooperation
and information-sharing, including between the Sahel and Maghreb
regions, to counter shared threats. TSCTP partner countries include
Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria,
Senegal, and Tunisia.
The TSCTP budget request for FY 2014 is $45 million. These funds
will enable us to build capacity and assist regional counterterrorism
(CT) efforts across a large and diverse geographical area with complex
security situations. Areas of support include: (1) enabling and
enhancing the capacity of North and West African militaries to conduct
counterterrorism operations; (2) integrating the ability of North and
West African militaries, and other supporting allies, to operate
regionally and collaboratively on CT efforts; (3) enhancing individual
nations' border security capacity to monitor, restrain, and interdict
terrorist movements; (4) strengthening the rule of law, including
access to justice, and law enforcement's ability to detect, disrupt,
respond to, investigate, and prosecute terrorist activity; (5)
monitoring and countering the financing of terrorism (such as that
related to kidnapping for ransom); and (6) reducing the limited
sympathy and support among communities for violent extremism.
Additionally the United States supports countries in the region through
bilateral International Military Education and Training (IMET)
Programs, which seek to help professionalize their respective
militaries, and training and equipment funded from Foreign Military
Financing (FMF), which often supports or sustains the capacity of
foreign militaries toward achieving counterterrorism goals.
Other programs aimed to combat AQIM and other VEOs include the
Department of State's Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) Program, which
provides capacity-building programs for law enforcement agencies of
partner nations. All these training programs are designed to
institutionalize and sustain improved antiterrorism prevention and
response. In the Maghreb region, our ATA training and equipment
programs aim to build partner nations' law enforcement capacity,
particularly in the areas of border security and investigations.
With the growing youth population and burgeoning unemployment in
the region, the United States also supports initiatives that deter
youth from participating in terrorist networks, through programs
designed to counter violent extremism (CVE). These programs provide
positive alternatives to communities most at risk of recruitment and
radicalization to violence, through activities like educational
opportunities and job trainings, or others that address specific
drivers of radicalization; and counter terrorist narratives and the
violent extremist worldview by promoting nonviolent interpretations of
Islam.
Question. What soft power methods is the State Department using to
compete with and defeat the ideology and recruitment opportunities
exploited by AQIM and other extremist groups?
Answer. Public Diplomacy (PD) Programs are used in the NEA region
to counter violent extremism (CVE) by promoting alternatives to
violence, providing economic and educational opportunities for
marginalized populations, and countering the specific narratives of
extremist organizations with positive messages. Throughout North
Africa--especially in transition countries--programs are aimed at
encouraging broad participation in national political and transition
processes, particularly among youth and women. Training, skills
development, and education programs enhance economic opportunities for
at-risk youth and expand our access to target communities such as
religious scholars. In addition, programs are designed to build the
capacity of emerging local NGOs. Finally, CVE messaging is accomplished
through film and broadcasting initiatives and an active array of social
media outreach and messaging tools. Online, the interagency Center for
Strategic Counterterrorism Communications' (CSCC) Digital Outreach Team
actively engages audiences in North Africa to counter AQIM propaganda.
CSCC has produced videos to counter-AQIM and they have been seen by
over 57,000 viewers on YouTube alone. Programs aimed at journalism
professionalization and civil society organization (CSO) capacity
development aid in our long-term ability to partner with local media
and CSOs to accomplish CVE goals. English-language training programs
are a critical and widely deployed tool in this area and are gaining in
popularity and effectiveness.
tunisia
Question. The national dialogue, in which all parties have
committed to participate in drafting a new constitution and electoral
law and selecting an interim government to prepare new elections, has
stalled over disagreements concerning the choice of interim Prime
Minister. All parties remain committed to the dialogue, but the 4-6
week timetable for the dialogue is very ambitious.
What is the 2013-14 plan for the Tunisian American
Enterprise Fund, and what sectors will it focus on?
Answer. The Tunisian-American Enterprise Fund (TAEF) was
incorporated on February 4, 2013, and is currently capitalized at $40
million in U.S. foreign assistance funding. The investment has enabled
the TAEF to take the necessary first steps to establish an office in
Washington, DC, and hire a Tunisian Chief Operations Officer who will
set up an office in Tunisia, possibly by the end of 2013. The existing
board members held two board meetings in October 2013 to discuss their
investment strategy and are expected to finalize and share it with us
soon. The TAEF expects to make its first investment in 2014.
The fund will accomplish its objectives by creating and coinvesting
in a small number of special purpose mechanisms and joint ventures,
alongside for-profit companies and multilateral development banks.
TAEF's initial investment focus will be in SME, finance, technology,
agriculture, health, and education sectors. These areas would allow the
TAEF to target U.S. and international partners' interventions in the
Tunisian economy and leverage them for greater economic impact.
Based on prior experience, enterprise funds can take up to 2 years
before making investments. The time allows enterprise funds to build a
greater understanding of the country's investment environment, explore
investment opportunities, and perform due diligence before investing.
Question. What types of U.S. assistance, security and otherwise,
have been most effective since 2011 in addressing Tunisia's security
challenges and promoting economic and political reform, and an active
civil society?
Answer. United States assistance to Tunisia is intended to support
Tunisia's democratic transition. Security assistance is a primary focus
of our ongoing assistance programs, particularly in countering regional
terrorist groups and in reorienting the Ministry of Interior, an
institution that was largely associated with the former dictatorial
regime. Security assistance programs have bolstered the Tunisian
military's ability to obtain and maintain equipment necessary to secure
its borders and locate terrorist suspects. Our Foreign Military
Financing and International Military Education and Training programs
also focus on providing leadership and counterterrorism training to
Ministry of Defense officials.
State Department programs, in partnership with the Tunisian
Ministries of Interior and Justice, have been effective in supporting
leadership development, police reform, antiterrorism training and
nonlethal crowd control techniques in Tunisia.
Supporting Tunisia's economic reform is also a priority for the
United States. USAID programs work to address some of the constraints
and support economic growth. Effective assistance programs that focus
on economic reform include the Information and Communications
Technology (ICT) Competitiveness Project, which generated over 2,400
jobs for Tunisians and assisted Tunisia in reforming its Tax Code.
Other economic programs have focused on developing Tunisia's small and
medium-sized enterprises and creating the market space for this sector
to flourish, including facilitating loans to small enterprises.
Governance and democracy programming remains an assistance
priority. The State Department and USAID contributed significant
technical support to the 2011 Tunisian elections and are preparing to
provide support for Tunisia's upcoming election as well.
Our assistance also provides Tunisian political parties with
training to build relationships with constituents and better articulate
the aspirations of the Tunisian people. These programs have been highly
effective in ensuring that Tunisian youth are taking on political and
civic leadership roles in the ongoing democratic transition as well as
in assisting nascent political parties to develop party platforms and
constituent communication skills.
Question. What is the administration doing to provide business and
investment incentives to support a democratic transition in Tunisia?
Answer. Assistance to help Tunisia expand economic growth and
opportunity to all citizens, including through helping Tunisia to
develop a better investment climate, is a key component of our ongoing
support for Tunisia's democratic transition.
The United States provided $100 million to directly pay debt that
Tunisia owed the International Financial Institutions (IFES) allowing
the Tunisian Government to accelerate economic growth and job creation.
The United States also provided a $30 million loan guarantee that
supported $485 million in new, more affordable, financing for the
Tunisian Government, strengthening Tunisia's capacity to manage its
transition to an economically sound and prosperous democracy.
The United States is focused on providing additional support to
Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). We have provided $40 million to
the Tunisian-American Enterprise Fund, a private, nonprofit corporation
to promote the development of the Tunisian private sector with a
particular focus on SMEs. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation
is also developing a facility of $50 million to provide working capital
to Tunisian franchises, many of which will be small businesses. In
addition to financial support, we are administering a program to
provide technical assistance directly to SMEs. The focus is on
supporting SMEs as exporters and providing diagnostic assessments and
business facilitation services.
We also engage in activities that support entrepreneurship and
innovation within the Tunisian economy. For example, our information
and communications technology (ICT) Competitiveness Project provides
technical assistance, training, and access to finance for firms in ICT
and ICT-enabled sectors (textiles, specialty foods, automotive and
other manufacturing) that have the potential to create jobs.
Additionally, we are supporting projects that assist the Tunisian
Government to boost growth and youth employment in vulnerable, interior
regions by promoting youth-led enterprise creation and development,
including an emphasis on agricultural, ICT, and environmental sectors.
In order to create a more conducive environment for investment and
business, we are engaged in building the capacity of institutions and
in working to spur needed economic reforms. The United States is
providing technical assistance to improve legislative and regulatory
frameworks and the overall business environment, as well as supporting
the legal, trade, and investment capacity-building. Additional programs
are providing training to build the capacity of 24 existing small
business centers located throughout the country, including the
interior, in order to improve growth in the SME sector.
Question. Please provide an update on the activities of the Office
of Transition Initiatives (USAID), the Middle East Partnership
Initiative (State) and other political transition assistance we are
carrying out in Tunisia.
Answer. In support of Tunisia's democratic transition, prosperity,
and long-term political stability, U.S. assistance continues to
strengthen civil society and civic participation in the political
process, support a free and fair electoral process, and promote an
inclusive transitional justice process.
USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) continues programs
throughout Tunisia. Specific efforts by OTI have focused on encouraging
broad participation in the political transition with a particular
emphasis on youth and women's engagement and working with local
organizations to identify and respond to community priorities.
To date, OTI has 214 activities completed or currently under
implementation. Illustrative examples of OTI activities include:
conducting a nationwide tolerance campaign through TV, billboards, and
social media; stimulating dialogue between the Constituent Assembly and
youth civil society leaders through a forum focused on the role of
decentralization and the development of local democracy; facilitating
townhall meetings between government officials and communities;
encouraging greater activism among women in the interior region during
Women's Day; providing physical and virtual meeting space for civil
society to conduct business; conducting a live television debate on
emerging political issues; and developing art and music workshops for
at-risk youth.
The Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) is providing
assistance that strengthens political parties and supports elections.
Such assistance includes candidate training, voter and civic education
designed to increase political participation of marginalized groups,
direct assistance to the Tunisian elections management board, and
elections observation support.
For example, at the request of the Tunisian Ministry of Youth, MEPI
programming has trained 48 government officials from all 24
governorates in order to increase the Ministry's capacity to
effectively engage marginalized youth in the political process. MEPI
assistance is closely coordinated with USAID and other donors, such as
MEPI's joint effort with the United Nations Development Program to help
Tunisians develop an electoral law for the next national elections
scheduled to be held in 2014.
morocco
Question. Our relationship with Morocco is strong, and it is the
only country on the African Continent with which we have a Free Trade
Agreement. The unresolved Western Sahara dispute is a barrier to
further economic and security cooperation in the region.
How does the administration plan to develop and deepen the
2012 Strategic Dialogue with Morocco?
Answer. The Strategic Dialogue was launched in 2012 out of a shared
desire to find opportunities to strengthen the partnership between
Morocco and the United States and to seek new avenues for cooperation
in the political, security, economic, educational, and cultural
spheres. The administration plans to hold a second Strategic Dialogue
meeting in early 2014 to build on continuing engagement, to review
ongoing activities and identify new joint initiatives in support of the
reform efforts being undertaken by His Majesty King Mohammed VI, and to
advance our shared priorities of a secure, stable, and prosperous North
Africa and Middle East.
Question. Please provide a brief update on Moroccan civil society
reforms, particularly those contained in the 2011 constitutional
reform.
Answer. Under King Mohammed VI, the Moroccan Government has
undertaken a number of economic, social, and political reforms,
including a revised constitution that is generally considered a step
toward enhanced political rights and transparent governance in Morocco.
Since the ratification of the 2011 constitution, the Moroccan
Government has made measured progress in the development of the organic
laws that the constitution outlines as the foundation for basic rights
and the function of the government itself. Thus far, 4 of the 19
articles of the constitution requiring organic laws have been fully
addressed by the Parliament. In his October 11, 2013, address to open
Parliament's fall session, the King urged the Parliament to pass more
of these organic laws.
The 2011 constitution also gives the judiciary greater
independence. In September 2013 the High Commission for Judicial Reform
and the Ministry of Justice presented their recommendations for
judicial reform to King Mohammed VI. The recommendations included an
overview of all planned reforms, while highlighting and prioritizing
those laws that can be submitted to Parliament before the end of 2013.
These changes include greater independence of the judiciary and
creation of an accompanying High Judicial Council; a statute that
regulates the profession of magistracy; the creation of a
Constitutional Court; and changes to the jurisdiction of military
tribunals.
Morocco has also taken important steps to promote gender equality.
The 2011 constitution called for civic, social, and political equality
for women. The laws implementing these changes are working their way
through Parliament.
With regard to civil society in particular, civil society
organizations are constitutionally empowered to affect political change
in Morocco, and key parts of the government are keen to engage citizens
in policymaking. Morocco's legal framework for civil society is among
the most progressive in the region and given this opportunity, we would
like to see the development of clear mechanisms to enable the Moroccan
Government to receive input from civil society and facilitate inclusion
of civil society in governance processes.
Question. Please describe U.S. policy on the Western Sahara and
updates on U.S. support to the U.N. Process.
Answer. The U.S. Government continues to support the process led by
U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and his Personal Envoy for Western
Sahara, Christopher Ross, to find a peaceful, sustainable, and mutually
agreed solution to the Western Sahara conflict. The U.S. Government,
along with all the other members of the Security Council, unanimously
adopted Resolution 2099 this year, which took note of the Moroccan
autonomy proposal presented to the Secretary General on April 11, 2007,
and welcomed the credible Moroccan efforts to move the process forward
toward a resolution. It also took note of the Frente Polisario proposal
presented on April 10, 2007. The United States has made clear that
Morocco's autonomy plan is serious, realistic, and credible, and that
it represents a potential approach that could satisfy the aspirations
of the people in the Western Sahara to run their own affairs in peace
and dignity.
In November 2012 and March and October of this year, the U.N.
Secretary General's Personal Envoy held broad-based consultations with
the parties to the conflict, Morocco and the Frente Polisario, as well
as with important regional stakeholders Algeria and Mauritania. He also
consulted with the Friends of Western Sahara (France, Spain, Russia,
the United Kingdom, and the United States). Ambassador Ross' work to
bring the two parties together continues to hold promise and inspires
hope for progress toward the resolution of this conflict. The United
States supports Ambassador Ross' approach of bilateral talks with the
parties with the aim to launch shuttle diplomacy to work toward finding
a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution.
Question. How might the U.S. support a more active Moroccan role in
addressing regional security threats? Please describe the state of
security cooperation with Morocco date and plans to strengthen this
partnership.
Answer. Security cooperation with Morocco is excellent. The United
States and Morocco have numerous shared regional priorities throughout
the Middle East, North Africa, and the Sahel.
Morocco and the United States have worked together over the past 2
years on the U.N. Security Council for the advancement of international
peace and security, including in Mali, the Sahel, Syria, Libya, and the
greater Middle East. During their meeting on November 22, 2013,
President Obama and King Mohammed VI committed to continuing close
cooperation in the Global Counterterrorism Forum and to work to
strengthen regional political, economic, and security ties across North
Africa and the Sahel, including through a reinvigorated Arab Maghreb
Union and other regional forums.
Plans to strengthen this partnership include encouraging Morocco to
join the United States in founding the International Institute of
Justice and the Rule of Law in Malta, which the President did during
his meeting with His Majesty the King. This institute will train a new
generation of criminal justice officials across North, West, and East
Africa on how to address counterterrorism and related security
challenges through a rule of law framework.
algeria
Question. The administration has encouraged Algeria to take a
greater role in regional security efforts in the Sahel, including in
Mali since 2012. Algeria's political culture remains dominated by the
same ruling National Liberation Front generation of leaders who took
over at independence in 1962. President Abdelaziz Bouteflika's health
has deteriorated dramatically in 2013, and Presidential elections are
due to take place in spring 2014, possibly pushing for a fourth term
for Bouteflika.
What steps has the administration taken to encourage
greater political and economic openness in Algeria?
Answer. The U.S.-Algeria civilian relationship has rapidly expanded
and continues to grow today. The United States works closely with our
Algerian partners to improve fiscal transparency, and the United States
and Algeria actively discuss Algeria's WTO accession bid and our
bilateral Trade and Investment Framework Agreement through the U.S.-
Algeria Strategic Dialogue. The United States also supports Algerian
civil society through a variety of Middle East Partnership Initiative
Programs, including a training program for newly elected women
parliamentarians and a capacity-building initiative of domestic Civil
Society organizations to observe future elections. Additional projects
focus on Algerian-led advocacy for critical economic reforms and
political leadership capacity building for youth party leaders.
Question. How can we best support Algeria as it takes a larger
regional lead in security and counterterrorism efforts?
Answer. The United States and Algeria are already implementing
agreements regarding information-sharing, increased training and
capacity-building, and political and economic cooperation.
Specifically, the United States is working to increase capacity-
building programs with Algeria through the Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement, Anti-Terrorism Assistance Programs, and
the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership.
Question. What is the outlook for a post-Bouteflika political class
in Algeria? Is an eventual transition of power to a new generation of
leaders likely to have an adverse impact on economic and security
cooperation?
Answer. The United States supports the Algerian people and their
democratic process. We have a productive partnership with President
Bouteflika and the Government of Algeria, but it is for the Algerian
people to decide who leads Algeria. The Algerian Constitution does not
preclude Bouteflika from running for another term. We will continue to
expand U.S.-Algerian cooperation across security and civilian sectors
with President Bouteflika, or any other democratically elected leader.
libya
Question. Libya remains fragmented, and the prevalence of armed
militias prevents the central government from exercising its authority
over the entire country. Rebel militias in Eastern Libya have even
formed their own oil company and control several production and
transportation facilities.
What is the status of Libya's political transition, and
prospects for new elections?
Answer. In elections viewed both domestically and internationally
as credible and largely peaceful, Libyans elected a General National
Congress in July 2012. PM Zeidan's government was approved by the GNC
in October 2012. While the government enjoys democratic legitimacy, it
lacks the ability to project its authority across the country or
fulfill many core government functions. The government has found it
difficult to implement reforms necessary to ensure a successful
transition in part due to scant institutional capacity, day-to-day
security challenges, and political power struggles.
In this context, the Libyan Government is still making halting
progress executing its mandate to usher in full democracy. Preparations
are ongoing for elections for the constitutional drafting assembly that
may be held in January 2014. HNEC announced candidates could self-
nominate in October, and 700 candidates registered by mid-November,
including 74 women. After this body is elected, it will draft a
constitution that will be put before popular referendum and serve as
the basis for electing a permanent government, possible in mid- to
late-2015.
Question. What is the status of plans to use funds from the Global
Security Contingency Fund and other DOD programs to provide security
assistance to the Libyan Government?
Answer. Through GSCF, over the next 3 years we (working with DOD)
intend to assist the Libyan Government in creating an accountable,
interministerial border security capability, including a border
security force that upholds internationally accepted human rights
standards while effectively defending Libya's borders against
terrorism, weapons proliferation, and illicit trafficking. Our
assistance will focus primarily on Libya's southern land border via an
interagency approach. The program will focus on building capacity
through the provision of technical expertise and training, and some
equipping. We expect the Libyans to cover a number of costs.
For GSCF lines of effort under the Department of State, we are in
the process of finalizing curriculums and training locations, in
addition to working with the Libyan Government to identify the MOD,
MOI, and Customs border security-related officials who will receive the
training. We expect the first training under GSCF to take place in
January, 2014.
The Department of Defense is implementing other GSCF programs.
Question. What resources, if any, do you expect will be needed for
such programs over the next several years?
Answer. It is in our national interest to ensure Libya becomes a
stable and democratic partner capable of addressing regional security
challenges and advancing our shared interests. Our security assistance
aims to address some of the most significant challenges to the
democratic transition, including terrorism, porous borders, independent
militias, and weak security and justice institutions. Our largest
initiative, training general purpose forces, will be financed using
Libyan funds; however the Libyan Government, plagued by weak
institutions and limited capacity, faces difficulties spending its
money effectively and focusing on many challenges at once.
While Libya is a wealthy nation, it requires technical assistance
and advice from the United States and other partner nations. We should
continue to provide support that builds the capacity of Libyan
institutions to tackle challenges of greatest interest to the United
States. We view our assistance in these areas as seed money intended
jump-start Libyan Government investment in programs that ultimately the
government must own. Over the next several years we will continue to
evaluate needs in Libya with respect to our priorities, which will help
inform programmatic and funding decisions.
Question. Please provide an update on the effort to train and
develop a small core for a new Libyan Army. Who are we working with on
this effort, and will this force be more of a protective force or will
it have a broader security mandate?
Answer. To improve the government's ability to establish stability
throughout the country, we responded positively to a request this
spring from Zeidan that we train a General Purpose Force (GPF), the
core of a new Libyan Army. We leveraged this bilateral commitment to
encourage Libya's European partners to contribute to this effort. Libya
plans to use their trained forces to provide basic protection for the
Libyan Government and its institutions. At the U.K.-hosted G8 summit in
June, we pledged to train 5,000-8,000 member general purpose forces and
the U.K. and Italy also pledged to train 2,000 members each. Turkey has
more recently pledged to train a similar number. The general purpose
forces are expected to protect the Libyan Government and its
institutions.
We plan to conduct the U.S.-led training in Bulgaria. We are
discussing with the Libyan Government the many details required to
implement this program, and coordinating with the U.K., Italy,
Bulgaria, Turkey and Libya, and the U.N. Other bilateral and
multilateral efforts to assist Libya with defense institution-building
complement GPF training efforts.
The Libyan Government will pay for our contribution to the GPF
effort through a Foreign Military Sales case, and training could begin
as early as spring 2014. This program is currently in the development
phase and we will provide further details when available.
______
Responses of Deputy Assistant Secretary Amanda Dory to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
smart power
Question. What bilateral and regional tools and pressure is the
administration using to combat the destabilizing effects of extremist
groups such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)?
Answer. Combating violent extremist groups, such as AQIM, is a
priority for the administration. The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism
Partnership (TSCTP) is the U.S. Government's multiyear, interagency,
regional program designed to build the capacity and resilience of the
governments and communities in the Sahel and Maghreb regions of Africa
to contain, degrade, and ultimately defeat the threat posed by al-
Qaeda, its affiliates, and other violent extremist organizations (VEOs)
in the Trans-Sahara region. The TSCTP also provides a platform to
improve regional and international cooperation and information-sharing,
including between the Sahel and Maghreb regions, to counter shared
threats. TSCTP partner countries include Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad,
Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia.
The TSCTP budget request for FY 2014 is $45 million. These funds
would enable us to build capacity and assist regional counterterrorism
(CT) efforts across a large and diverse geographical area with complex
security situations. Areas of support include: (1) enabling and
enhancing the capacity of North and West African militaries to conduct
CT operations; (2) integrating the ability of North and West African
militaries, and other supporting partners, to operate regionally and
collaboratively on CT efforts; (3) enhancing individual nations' border
security capacity to monitor, restrain, and interdict terrorist
movements; (4) strengthening the rule of law, including access to
justice, and law enforcement's ability to detect, disrupt, respond to,
investigate, and prosecute terrorist activity; (5) monitoring and
countering the financing of terrorism (such as that related to
kidnapping for ransom); and (6) reducing the limited sympathy and
support among communities for violent extremism. Additionally, the
United States supports countries in the region through bilateral
International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs, which
seek to help professionalize their respective militaries, and training
and equipment funded from Foreign Military Financing (FMF), which often
supports or sustains the capacity of foreign militaries toward
achieving counterterrorism goals.
Other programs aimed to combat AQIM and other VEOs include the
Department of State's Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program, which
provides capacity-building programs for law enforcement agencies of
partner nations. DOD has contributed to this through the 1206 program
which has enhanced the capability of our North African partners to
conduct CT operations.
With the growing youth population and burgeoning unemployment in
the region, the United States also supports initiatives that deter
youth from participating in terrorist networks, through programs
designed to counter violent extremism (CVE). These programs provide
positive alternatives to communities most at risk of recruitment and
radicalization to violence, through providing educational opportunities
and job trainings, and addressing specific drivers of radicalization
narratives and the violent extremist worldview; and by promoting
nonviolent interpretations of Islam.
tunisia
Question. The national dialogue, in which all parties have
committed to participate in drafting a new constitution and electoral
law and selecting an interim government to prepare new elections, has
stalled over disagreements concerning the choice of Interim Prime
Minister. All parties remain committed to the dialogue, but the 4-6
week timetable for the dialogue is very ambitious.
What types of U.S. assistance, security and otherwise, have
been most effective since 2011 in addressing Tunisia' security
challenges and promoting economic and political reform, and an
active civil society?
Answer. U.S. security assistance to Tunisia since 2011 has focused
on supporting the Government of Tunisia's counterterrorism and
counternarcotics efforts within the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism
Partnership (TSCTP) framework, and improving Tunisia's ability to
secure its land and maritime borders. The Tunisian military receives
the most U.S. Foreign Military Financing in Africa (other than Egypt),
and a significant portion of Tunisia's military equipment is U.S.
origin.
morocco
Question. Our relationship with Morocco is strong, and it is the
only country on the African Continent with which we have a Free Trade
Agreement. The unresolved Western Sahara dispute is a barrier to
further economic and security cooperation in the region.
How does the administration plan to develop and deepen the
2012 Strategic Dialogue with Morocco?
Answer. The U.S. Government continues to support the process led by
U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki moon and his Personal Envoy for Western
Sahara, Christopher Ross, to find a peaceful, sustainable, and mutually
agreed solution to the Western Sahara conflict. Ambassador Ross' work
to bring the two parties together continues to hold promise and
inspires hope for progress toward the resolution of this conflict, and
it is these types of important issues that comprise the substance of
the State Department-led Strategic Dialogue with Morocco. The United
States supports Ambassador Ross' approach of bilateral talks with the
parties with the aim to launch shuttle diplomacy to work toward finding
a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution.
Question. How might the U.S. support a more active Moroccan role in
addressing regional security threats? Please describe the state of
security cooperation with Morocco date and plans to strengthen this
partnership.
Answer. Morocco and the United States have strong military ties, as
evidenced by our annual U.S.-Morocco Defense Consultative Committee
meetings, the eighth of which is scheduled for December 12. In
addition, Morocco hosts the annual Exercise African Lion, which is
DOD's largest military exercise in Africa and has expanded to include
regional participants. The United States is very supportive of
Morocco's willingness to expand its regional security cooperation
efforts in Africa. Most recently, Morocco agreed to deploy its military
to the Central African Republic to provide security for N forces in
Bangui. We continue to encourage the Government of Morocco to engage
with countries in the region in pursuit of our common security
objectives.
algeria
Question. The administration has encouraged Algeria to take a
greater role in regional security efforts in the Sahel, including in
Mali since 2012. Algeria's political culture remains dominated by the
same ruling National Liberation Front generation of leaders who took
over at independence in 1962. President Abdelaziz Bouteflika's health
has deteriorated dramatically in 2013, and Presidential elections are
due to take place in spring 2014, possibly pushing for a fourth term
for Bouteflika.
What steps has the administration taken to encourage
greater political and economic openness in Algeria?
How can we best support Algeria as it takes a larger
regional lead in security and counterterrorism efforts?
Answer. The United States seeks to expand its security cooperation
with the Algerian Government to enable it to strengthen its domestic
and regional defense capabilities to counterterrorism and transnational
trafficking in order to deny safe heaven to al-Qaeda and other violent
extremist organizations. To that end, DOD engagements have focused on
supporting Algeria's participation within the Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) framework, expanding military-to-
military engagements in areas such as border security, Counter-
Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED), and air defense, and inviting
Algerian military observers to U.S.-sponsored exercises such as AFRICAN
LION and FLINTLOCK. The U.S. International Military Education and
Training (IMET) program provides a number of positions for the training
of younger Algerian military officers. DOD does not anticipate that a
new generation of military leaders will significantly alter U.S.-
Algeria military-to-military relations.
libya
Question. Libya remains fragmented, and the prevalence of armed
militias prevents the central government from exercising its authority
over the entire country. Rebel militias in Eastern Libya have even
formed their own oil company and control several production and
transportation facilities.
a. What is the status of Libya's political transition, and
prospects for new elections?
Answer. In elections viewed both domestically and internationally
as credible and largely peaceful, Libyans elected a General National
Congress in July 2012. Prime Minister Zeidan's government was approved
by the GNC in October 2012. Although the government enjoys democratic
legitimacy, it lacks the ability to project its authority across the
country or fulfill many core government functions. The government has
found it difficult to implement reforms necessary to ensure a
successful transition in part due to scant institutional capacity, day-
to-day security challenges, and political power struggles.
b. What is the status of plans to use funds from the Global
Security Contingency Fund and other DOD programs to provide
security assistance to the Libyan Government?
Answer. Through Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF), over the
next 3 years DOD (working with DOS) intend to assist the Libyan
Government in creating an accountable, interministerial border security
capability, including a border security force that upholds
internationally accepted human rights standards while contributing to
the defense of Libya's borders against terrorism, weapons
proliferation, and illicit trafficking. Joint DOD/DOS assistance will
focus primarily on Libya's southern land border through an interagency
approach. The program will focus on building capacity through the
provision of technical expertise and training, as well as equipping of
a 150-member border security company. Given the difficult security
situation in Libya, DOD may conduct training in a third country. We
expect the Libyans to cover a number of costs, such as vehicles.
c. What resources, if any, do you expect will be needed for
such programs over the next several years?
Answer. It is in our national interest to ensure Libya becomes a
stable and democratic partner capable of addressing regional security
challenges and advancing our shared interests. Our largest initiative,
training general purpose forces, will be financed using Libyan national
funds via Foreign Military Sales cases; however, the Libyan Government,
plagued by weak institutions and limited capacity, faces difficulties
spending its money effectively and focusing on many challenges at once.
Although Libya is a wealthy nation, we should continue to provide
support that builds the capacity of Libyan institutions to tackle
challenges of greatest interest to the United States and jump-start
Libyan Government investment in programs that benefit both the United
States and Libya. Over the next several years we will continue to
evaluate needs in Libya with respect to our priorities, which will help
inform programmatic and funding decisions.
d. Please provide an update on the effort to train and
develop a small core for a new Libyan Army. Who are we working
with on this effort, and will this force be more of a
protective force or will it have a broader security mandate?
Answer. To improve the Libyan Government's ability to establish
stability throughout the country, we responded positively to Prime
Minister Zeidan's request to train a General Purpose Force (GPF) that
would form the core of a new Libyan Army and provide basic protection
for the Libyan Government and its institutions. Libya's European
partners are also contributing to this effort. At the U.K.-hosted G-8
summit in June, DOD pledged to train 5,000-8,000 GPF personnel while
the U.K. and Italy also pledged to train 2,000 members each. Turkey has
recently signed a bilateral agreement to train approximately 3,000
Libyan personnel. The U.S.-led training is expected to occur at the
Novo Selo Training Area, Bulgaria. DOD is discussing with the Libyan
Government the many details required to implement this program, and are
coordinating closely with the U.K., Italy, Bulgaria, Turkey, Libya, and
the U.N. The GPF's primary function will be the protection of Libya's
political, economic, and security institutions through security
operations to include area security and border security. Training could
begin as early as spring 2014.